Xenophobia and the German Economy: 1991 – Present

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Abstract

The phenomenon of xenophobia in Germany was not studied in earnest until shortly after the Cold War's conclusion. As of today, quite a bit of literature can be found regarding xenophobic behaviors in Germany, especially in the former East Germany. Of course, xenophobia persists in Germany to this day, in spite of the fact that, since after the Second World War, the country has taken extraordinary measures to ensure that the lessons of the Holocaust and World War II are learned and remembered. However, there is very little literature that discusses xenophobia's economic implications for the country, because such effects are still being played out. For certain people who live outside of the country of Germany, though, xenophobia in Germany discourages consumption of German products. Additionally, xenophobia is counterproductive because many of the types of lower-skilled positions over which some native Germans are afraid of foreigners taking are disappearing anyway because of technological innovation and globalization. In fact, it is precisely the intensified xenophobia as a reaction against increased in-migration that makes immigration negative, as opposed to implications regarding labor. In any case, the reality of exogenous factors from which Germany cannot decouple itself obviously does not stop anti-immigrant German politicians from deliberately misconstruing employment numbers to further their agenda. Regardless, though, what makes Germany unique is not that xenophobia exists there. This is something that exists in most, if not all, countries worldwide. Rather, what distinguishes the country is that xenophobia persists in spite of the German government's expansive and extensive efforts to discourage the institution, in addition to many Germans' willingness to accept and internalize these measures. These efforts create the false impression to certain outsiders that Germany is, in fact, a cosmopolitan country without xenophobia at all.

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1.) Xenophobia & Overview

What makes xenophobia researchable, interesting, and measurable are its palpability and relevance. The seemingly chronic retrenchment of xenophobic sentiments has had a profound impact on the German political landscape. While Germany, a country that has learned the most from the horrors of the Holocaust and World War II, has been relatively successful at quelling xenophobia, the fact that right-wing populism and xenophobia exist even here are evidenced by violence in East Germany shortly after reunification and, most recently, the entry of the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) into the Bundestag. Therefore, in spite of some of the most inclusive immigration laws in Europe, not to mention the German government's 2015 decision to implement an open border policy in order to accommodate Syrian refugees, it is inaccurate to think that xenophobia is a non-issue in Germany. Not only is it important to understand just how xenophobia fits into the German landscape, it is also important to understand what kind of economic effects that xenophobia has on the European Union's most powerful economy. Obviously, Germany is not alone in containing xenophobic elements. What distinguishes Germany, though, are the significant measures to discourage retrenchment of anything that even remotely symbolizes Nazism, which co-exist alongside continued xenophobia, and, at times, supersede democratic institutions (i.e., freedom of speech). Many individuals in the German government and the German public have internalized this tendency to keep xenophobia at bay. However, there is a segment of Germany's population to which this trend does not apply. Specifically, these are native Germans who would rather not have immigrants penetrate their country's borders. This paradigm is attributable to economic anxieties, as well as anxieties related to the identity of what Germany and Germans should be.

Beginning in the early 1960s, low-skilled laborers journeyed to what was, at the time, West Germany. Initially, these workers came from Turkey through recruitment contracts. Later, West Germany signed agreements with the former Yugoslavia, as well as Morocco and Tunisia. Because of the recession at the time, this "Gastarbeiter" program ended in 1973. In the 1980s, another slew of immigrants arrived in Germany, this time as refugees or asylum seekers, from Turkey, the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, and North Africa.[1] Not only does Germany have a storied and "intense" history of migration, but it also has a "high share of foreigners and foreign workers."[2] Though not consistently, then, Germany has taken on the role of immigration country multiple times in the past.[3] In spite of the promise that the destruction of the "Iron Curtain" seemed to hold, though, xenophobia was certainly apparent in the early days of the reunified republic.[4] After a decrease in xenophobic attacks between 1994 and 1997, xenophobic activity had experienced an uptick in the context of prevalent joblessness, especially in the *neue Bundesländer* (new German states) in eastern Germany.

Because the economic effects of xenophobia in Germany are not yet fully discernible, they are not measurable. Even though one can reasonably speculate and hypothesize about how xenophobia could impact Germany's economy years before such an impact can be perceived, vis-à-vis use of economic theorems, this is not sufficient; it is necessary to go beyond economic theories by examining perceptions, specifically as they relate to attitudes of non-Germans to Germans themselves in the

[1] Günther Jikeli, "European Muslims: Between Integration and Discrimination," in *European Muslim Antisemitism: Why Young Urban Males Say They Don't Like Jews*, (Indiana University Press, 2015): 9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt16gzdvm.5.pdf.

[2] Christoph M. Schmidt and Klaus F. Zimmermann, "Migration Pressure in Germany: Past and Future," in *Migration and economic development*, ed. Klaus F. Zimmermann (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992), 204.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Meredith W. Watts, "Political Xenophobia in the Transition from Socialism: Threat, Racism and Ideology Among East German Youth," *Political Psychology* 17, no. 1 (1996): 97, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3791945.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:be8ef1734943bfc14ce42d4aacbdddf3.

context of consumption of the country's products. For people who can afford to do so, and who are of a certain mind, consumption decisions are partially made based on ethics, specifically regarding responsible consumption of products that are more beneficial for the planet, laborers, etc. Additionally, this type of logic can be expanded to encompass other causes, such as opposition towards xenophobia: if such a movement were to take hold, like similar movements, it would be a means of political action through the market, responding to xenophobia vis-à-vis consumption decisions as a reaction to perceptions of xenophobic behaviors and phenomena in Germany. This is explored by dissemination of a survey, and interviews with people about their perceptions of xenophobia in Germany, as well as xenophobia in Eastern Europe, for better contextualization. The survey results indicate that a portion of the population would be discouraged from purchasing German products upon hearing reports of xenophobic attacks in Germany. While it is difficult to completely generalize the survey results to the entire world's population, the fact that certain respondents said that they would be discouraged "a lot" from purchasing German products is indicative of a larger group of people in the world who, in practice, would probably halt, or at least decrease, consumption of German products. Additionally, many of the positions (i.e., "unskilled" jobs) of which native Germans have anxieties of losing to foreigners will decrease more and more in the future, due to technological innovation and globalization. In turn, this trend will further exacerbate xenophobia in Germany, simultaneously jeopardizing German export potential. Actually, studies have shown that the economic effects of migration on Germany are neutral regarding GDP, but not when it comes to those who benefit and those who are disadvantaged from the economic changes that in-migration of out-group individuals (i.e., non-Germans) precipitates. Indirectly, then, in-migration of non-Germans negatively

affects the German economy, but as far as perceptions of the German public by foreigners is concerned, not because of the lingering fears of displacement and replacement of native labor. This is a connection that macroeconomic analyses omit, thereby distorting these studies. Consequently, there is a need for further studies that are based on larger representative surveys to model and test for this causal link. Even so, there are not very many analyses of how xenophobia impacts the German economy because of the fact that xenophobia in the country was not studied in earnest until after the Cold War. As already mentioned, then, xenophobia's economic effects in the country are not currently discernible.

2.) Literature Review & Methodology

Xenophobia's "literal definition from the Greek is the fear (*phobos*) of the strange or foreign (*xenos*). Its common use has come to signify the expression of mistrust, fear, and/or hatred of foreigners linked to an identification of the nation as the representative of culture."[5] Xenophobia is a phenomenon that occurs in many countries, and both overt racism and implicit forms of prejudice are based upon xenophobia. Because of this characteristic, as well as xenophobia's ability to transcend national boundaries, there is a large body of research that scrutinizes the topic.[6] In this specific context, xenophobia is defined as fear and/or hatred of non-Germans, citizens who are not ethnically German, and even recently returned ethnic Germans who had been living elsewhere. Interestingly enough, there simply is not a lot of literature that explores the relationship between xenophobia and economics, especially as it relates to the country of Germany.

People did not begin to study xenophobia in earnest until after the Cold War. Consequently, there is very little literature that directly addresses how xenophobia in Germany affects the German economy. Yes, the German government has addressed xenophobia's potential economic effects in a yearly report regarding the state of German unification, by noting that xenophobia is a risk to attraction of foreign

[5] Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy, "Xenophobia and the European Union," *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 4 (2000): 425, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/422387.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:8cf87b36a67f833d7c89b285d5ad5385.

[6] Mikael Hjerm, "National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four Western Countries," *Acta Sociologica* 41, no. 4 (1998): 335 – 347, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4201098.pdf.

businesses.[7] Additionally, the presence of xenophobia arguably decreases a country's exports and overall GDP. This is precisely what German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich had expressed concerns over in a 2012 interview with the daily *Der Tagesspiegel*.[8] However, most of the texts that discuss the relationship between xenophobia and the economy in Germany do so in a speculative manner. More literature exists that discusses the opposite: people's economic circumstances and the overall German economy's status on the prevalence of xenophobic behavior. One such finding is the "permanent latent potential of culturally and ethnically oriented xenophobia which is easily mobilized in periods of economic crisis."[9] In any case, xenophobia's economic effects on the country's economy are still being played out, and it could be years before xenophobia's economic effects will be known for sure. This is not the case for the reverse, which is more apparent because of the more direct link. Of course, Germany is not exempt from economic axioms that incorporate xenophobia, because of how economically powerful the country is. As Naci Mocan and Christian Raschke posit in "Economic well-being and anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and racist attitudes in Germany," xenophobia affects economies because xenophobia oftentimes has implications for those discriminated against in the markets of credit, housing, labor, etc.[10] Mocan and Raschke utilize data in Germany from 1996 –

[7] Caroline Copley, "German Government Fears Xenophobia Will Do Economic Harm," *HuffPost*, last modified September 21, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/german-government-fears-xenophobia-will-do-economic-harm_us_57e280e5e4b0e28b2b513287.

[8] "German minister says xenophobia threatens exports," *BBC Monitoring Europe*, October 1, 2012.

[9] Ralph Rotte, "Immigration Control in United Germany: Toward a Broader Scope of National Policies," *The International Migration Review* 34, no. 2 (2000): 362, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2675906.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:86522bad9cd86ae54b63763a717f6e23.

[10] Naci Mocan and Christian Raschke, "Economic Well-Being and Anti-Semitic, Xenophobic, and Racist Attitudes in Germany," *National Bureau of Economic Research* (Cambridge: NBER Working Paper Series, 2014), Abstract, http://www.nber.org/papers/w20059.pdf.

2010.[11] The scholars find that the relationship between economic well-being and xenophobic sentiments is inversely proportional: the higher the economic security of people, the less enmity they have towards targets of xenophobia (i.e., foreigners). Here, then, a starting point is provided.

Between 1991 and 1997, violence against foreigners was at the highest level it had been since the Second World War, and, in 1992, the highest number of acts against foreigners had transpired since the end of the Cold War, with 2,544 such instances occurring. "According to the Federal Criminal Office, a total of 2,426, 6,336 and 6,721 crimes against foreigners were committed in 1991, 1992 and 1993, respectively, including racist propaganda and threats."[12] More recently, in 2015, over 1,000 instances of arson on refugees' homes had been registered; attacks had increased on asylum and refugee shelters following Germany's decision to implement the open border policy.[13] Overall, xenophobia has recently increased, especially in eastern Germany.[14] One aspect of incidents in several German cities that was striking was the tacit support that the perpetrators of the anti-immigrant violence received.[15] Even after an attack in Rostock and the negativity of the incident's reception, nearly 70 percent of Germans believed that those who sought asylum were abusing the system, while nearly 80 percent supported immediate deportation of asylum seekers from states lacking a means of persecution for those wanting asylum. Additionally, 36 percent of individuals in the group of 1992 surveys expressed outright worry about migrants.[16] Attacks had predominated in the former East Germany, which experienced

[11] Ibid.
[12] Ralph Rotte, "Immigration Control in United Germany: Toward a Broader Scope of National Policies," 363.
[13] "Federal report laments rising xenophobia in Germany," *DW*, last accessed May 9, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/federal-report-laments-rising-xenophobia-in-germany/a-19565604.
[14] Caroline Copley, "German Government Fears Xenophobia Will Do Economic Harm."
[15] Barbara Marshall, *Europe in Change: The new Germany and migration in Europe*, 72.
[16] Ibid., 80.

a dramatic decline in labor when employees in the *neue Bundesländer* (new German states) migrated to the former Federal Republic of Germany. Subsequently, the new German government attempted to fill these positions with non-native labor, but this was not successful.[17] In Germany itself, because of occupational restructuring and technological innovations, "it is conceivable that the skill requirements of various types of jobs were upgraded between 1984 and 2000."[18] This factor can precipitate "potentially serious measurement errors in studies that analyse change over time in the structure of employment and lead to erroneous conclusions on the mechanisms of change."[19] Between 1984 and 2000, "the proportion of low-skilled jobs dropped by 12 percentage points from 32 per cent in 1984 to 20 per cent in 2000 while the proportion of jobs demanding a university degree during the same period increased by 7 percentage points from 14 per cent to 21 per cent.[20] To attract foreign laborers with higher skills, the German government under Gerhard Schröder adopted a more inclusive immigration policy in the early 2000s, specifically targeted at foreign professionals in Information Technology (IT). However, this effort failed, and was abandoned in 2005, because the government "wasted a lot of valuable time debating whether they should allow high skilled immigrants to come in, and how to force them to leave after their contracts expire. Germany did not realize that at the same time, other countries were competing against them to attract high skilled immigrants from the global market."[21] Therefore, the failure of foreign laborers to fill positions in the

[17] PressTV, "Xenophobia could threaten peace in Germany," Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, September 21, 2016. Web. May 21, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YG1a6FO7jlg.
[18] Matthias Pollmann-Schult, "Crowding-out of Unskilled Workers in the Business Cycle: Evidence from West Germany," *European Sociological Review* 21, no. 5 (2005): 471, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3559640.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:200c01138e35d17a0c7e8dcbd511b73a .
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 473.
[21] Amelie F. Constant and Bienvenue N. Tien, "Germany's Immigration Policy and Labor Shortages," *IZA Research Report* no. 41 (2011): 7 – 8,

former East coincided with greater demand for more skilled and knowledgeable employees.

The increased focus that joblessness underwent in German economic and home affairs resulted in a fear of increased competition in social transfers and the labor market.[22] Perceptions of migrants were exacerbated with the importation in the 1990s of foreign, low-wage laborers to building industry positions, creating competition between these laborers and Germany's own highly paid employees.[23] As far as in-migration of non-Germans to the country was concerned, the discrepancy between immigrants and Germans in low-skilled positions had been striking. In 1997, in the "low-wage, service industry," employment of immigrants had amounted to 100,000. The corresponding figure for Germans was 2,000. Ostensibly, such figures indicate a trend of migrant labor replacing German labor. These circumstances resulted in the perception of migrants as burdensome and unproductive. Questionnaires from fall 1991 illustrated that a sizeable percentage of the native German population had an unfavorable opinion of foreigners, including the "foreigners" who were ethnic Germans and had been living abroad beforehand.[24] 1997 saw a 27 percent increase in right-wing extremist offenses, in spite of a decrease of the same figure by nearly 6 percent the following year. The same year that this slight decrease in violence occurred, such actions increased in Berlin from 52 percent to a whopping 82 percent. Across the country, anti-Semitic crimes increased by 15 percent between 1996 and 1997. A lot of the increase in xenophobic activities in 1998

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http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/iza_report_41.pdf.

[22] Ibid., 362. (Melanie Swan).

[23] Uwe Hunger, "Temporary transnational labour migration in an integrating Europe and the challenge to the German welfare state," in *Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the borders of the welfare state*, ed. Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes (London: Routledge, 2000), 189-190.

[24] Barbara Marshall, *Europe in Change: The new Germany and migration in Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 80.

consisted of propaganda-related acts, rather than outright violence. However, an increase in the reporting of such things as *Hakenkreuzschmierereien* (swastika scrawlings) is emblematic of increased xenophobia, regardless, and therefore signifies a departure of the image of Germany that many people have today as a country that has entrenched cosmopolitan ideals.[25] A survey from 2009 discovered that Germany was the "most positively assessed country cross-nationally with a score of 61 percent."[26] In the same year, though, almost as high of a percentage of German respondents whom the German Marshall Fund surveyed thought that the greatest obstacle to immigrants' integration was the refusal of the immigrants to integrate in the first place. This figure stood in stark contrast to the less than 30 percent of German respondents who thought that the greatest challenge was societal discrimination.[27]

Something else that influenced the negative perception of foreigners was that, in the public sphere, a close connection was established between immigration and organized transnational crime, which never completely went away.[28] Certainly, before Chancellor Merkel declared that Germany was an immigration country in 2005, right-leaning politicians and audiences alike were partial towards explanations that essentially viewed migrants as more prone to criminal acts. Political press releases and public discourses would "mix easily fundamental problems of organized crime, internal security and immigration […]."[29] Officially, statistics were indicative of a "certain criminal potential connected to migration."[30] Between 1991 and 1996, the

[25] Barbara Marshall, *Europe in Change: The new Germany and migration in Europe*, 72 – 73.
[26] Eric Langenbacher, "Conclusion: The Germans Must Have Done Something Right," *German Politics & Society* 28, no. 2 (2010): 185, doi: 10.3167/gps.2010.280212, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250200792_Conclusion_The_Germans_Must_Have_Done_Something_Right.
[27] Ibid., 186.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid., 362 – 363.
[30] Ibid., 363.

proportion of non-native suspects in organized crime had increased from 50.6 percent to 62.2 percent.[31] It is likely, though, that this was not due to merely a greater crime rate among immigrants themselves; another component of this was how law enforcement came to perceive immigrants, and as a greater number of foreigners entered the country, there were more people for police officers to be suspicious of. Anyway, the anti-migrant behavior underscores the fact that anxieties relating to identity were just as much a part (if not more than) of xenophobia as economic anxieties. Yet the former component was an integral aspect of xenophobic behavior. Many native Germans have had concerns over job replacement vis-à-vis non-Germans "taking their jobs away." To be fair, in the past, influxes of migrant laborers have appeared to negatively affect German labor, specifically jobs with lower skill requirements. [32] In fact, there has been strong evidence that, as far as these types of occupations are concerned, immigration has negatively affected the number of native Germans employed.[33] From 1991 – 1996, there was an increase of Germans and migrants alike in white-collar and self-employed jobs, but a decrease in the numbers for each group in skilled and un-skilled blue-collar jobs. As far as blue-collar jobs were concerned, though, there was a large decrease in the number of Germans employed, while, concerning foreign laborers, gains were actually achieved, albeit at smaller levels than in the case of white-collar jobs.[34] All of this, though, is part and parcel of the larger trends of globalization and technological innovation, resulting in

[31] Ibid.
[32] Melanie Swan, "Chapter 2: Is Technological Unemployment Real? An Assessment and a Plea for Abundance Economics," in *Surviving the Machine Age: Intelligent Technology and the Transformation of Human Work*, ed. Kevin LaGrandeur and James J. Hughes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 21, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-51165-%208_2.pdf.
[33] Barbara Marshall, *Europe in Change: The new Germany and migration in Europe*, 47, 49.
[34] Ibid., 49.

the elimination of low-skilled positions.[35] Because Germany is an advanced enough country, it cannot decouple itself from this trend. While technological innovations certainly have been, and can be, a net job creator, job displacement transpires in the short-term. Indeed, between 2015 and 2020, the World Economic Forum has projected that job losses will total 5.1 million.[36] Since the 2008 crisis, worldwide there have been improvements in economic productivity and health, yet not a similar decrease in joblessness. One study has evidenced jobless growth by over 5.7% from May 2007 – October 2009, "simultaneous with increases in automation […]."[37] In spite of potential long-term gains, then,

> Some of the potential costs of technological unemployment result from its disproportionate impact on society. One example of this is the bifurcation of the labor force: highly skilled workers in certain industries are better poised to succeed, while others are being displaced into lower-paying service industry jobs or into a state of permanent unemployment. Also, blue-collar employment is being impacted more than white-collar employment, and women more than men […].[38]

In spite of the ostensible displacement of native German laborers by foreign employees, at least among blue-collar jobs, it still remains that, historically, the greatest contribution from migration for a country's economy comes from unskilled migrant laborers. Indeed, initially, the general consensus was that migration was a boon to Germany's economy. By the end of 1992, estimates were that non-Germans contributed 7.8 billion Deutsch Marks to the German economy, excluding an additional yearly revenue of 28 billion Deutsch Marks. According to the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftforschung (RWI) (Essen University), Germany's gross national product (GNP) increased six percent more than it would have if there were no migrants, and, between 1988 and 1992, GDP increased by 3.5 percent

[35] Melanie Swan, "Chapter 2: Is Technological Unemployment Real? An Assessment and a Plea for Abundance Economics," 47.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 22.
[38] Ibid.

annually; without immigrants, this figure would have been around just 2 percent. Furthermore, employers' earnings gained an additional 10 percent because of migrant labor, and the corresponding figure for employees increased by half of that. Overall, public budgets experienced a nearly 14 billion Deutsch Mark improvement. In spite of the ostensible positivity of all of these figures, though, the reality here is not even so straightforward. This is because calculations made around the turn of the century, contextualized within a sluggish economy, were suggestive of the redistributive effect that migration can have, dependent on the policy approach taken towards immigration. The studies in question concluded that migration as it stood had neither a positive nor negative impact on the German economy. The impact, then, was neutral. Generally, migration is positive regarding labor mobility for a market economy that fully functions, to say nothing of the fact that ease of movement is integral to the Single European Act. However, particularly during times of high unemployment, there has been anxiety over the threat to native labor.[39] The presence of these unskilled migrant laborers, though, also pressured skilled employees to adjust. Certain experts believed that this pressure imposed a *Verdrängungseffekt* ("pushing-out" effect) for Germany's labor market. Additionally, the shrinking of the world vis-à-vis greater interconnectedness led organizations to reduce the number of lower-skilled labor, thereby increasing demand for individual positions that fit this mold.

To be sure, whether or not immigrant labor is a force that displaces or complements German labor certainly depends on how migrant labor affects German labor in semi-skilled or unskilled jobs. Historically, there has not been very much reliable information regarding the actual numbers in this specific area; estimates have

[39] Barbara Marshall, *Europe in Change: The new Germany and migration in Europe*, 44.

been as low as 1.6 million employed in these positions to as high as 5.6 million employed. So, while immigration of unskilled, manual laborers exacerbated German unemployment, experts contended that immigration of individuals who would fill white-collar positions would decrease unemployment vis-à-vis moderation of the issue of joblessness without reliance upon trade unions' wage flexibility.[40] Simultaneously, though, in spite of migration's positive effects (i.e., improvement of GDP, improvement of GNP, etc.), certain calculations seemingly indicated that migration increased Germany's unemployed by 580,000 people more compared to how many people would have been unemployed without immigrants (500,000), so there was higher joblessness in areas with immigrants. In 1996, joblessness among non-Germans was nearly twice as high as it was among Germans.[41] Labor statistics do not exist in a vacuum, though. Germany in particular is an old country (as far as the population is concerned), so, compared to countries whose populations are younger and more able-bodied, there is increased difficulty in filling positions with native labor. In fact, in late 1995, the percentage of individuals who were ages 50 – 65 was over three times larger than those who were between the ages of 40 and 49, as well as those who were between 25 and 39; for the former group, non-employment was around 35 percent.[42] Germany has distinguished itself by its small employment rate of old people, especially older men, largely resulting from policy initiatives beginning in the late 1970s, the purpose of which was to compensate for the social cost of industrial restructuring and industrial employment decline.[43] Additionally, Germany

[40] Ibid., 49.
[41] Ibid., 44.
[42] Fabian Lange, "Not Working? The West German Labor Market, 1964 – 2001," *Cuadernos de Economía* 40, no. 121 (2003): 495 – 504, https://scielo.conicyt.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0717-68212003012100016&script=sci_arttext.
[43] Giuliano Bonoli, "Chapter 2: Adapting Employment Policies to Postindustrial Labour Market Risks," in *The Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Policy Responses and Collective Action*, ed. Marco Giugni (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2009), 43.

has established a means of allowing for temporary controlled migration of laborers whose presence in Germany has "filled gaps" in Germany's labor market that existed in spite of increasing joblessness among Germans.[44] This underscores the fact that what is perhaps most important in employment numbers is whether or not a phenomenon is a net job creator or job destroyer, as opposed to whether or not something destroys or creates jobs in general.[45] Whether or not some force is a net job creator or destroyer, though, is oftentimes overlooked in political rhetoric because, in politics, the most effective rhetoric is that which is the most simplistic.

The trope of immigrants as job stealers is quite a bit more effective than an image of immigrants of people who displace or replace native laborers only in certain situations. The "immigrants as job stealers" trope is specifically good for politicians of a niche variety, and it exacerbates xenophobia by providing examples of supposed negative effects of immigrants, which these politicians and their supporters evidence with deliberately misconstrued employment statistics. Actually, the number of non-Germans employed in unskilled labor declined between 1991 and 1996, from more than 50 percent to lower than 40 percent, although these percentages were much higher compared to the percentages of Germans employed in unskilled manufacturing jobs in 1991 and 1996 (16 percent and 12 percent, respectively). Arguably, then, figures such as those regarding Germans and non-Germans in manufacturing positions allowed room for a counter-narrative against the one in support of the notion that immigrants benefit the economy, exogenous economic factors notwithstanding (i.e., a broader increase of manufacturing jobs beginning in the early 1990s). In addition, even though the effect of migration on wage levels and employment has oftentimes been shown to be statistically significant, migrants have not always changed the

[44] Barbara Marshall, *Europe in Change: The new Germany and migration in Europe*, 49.
[45] Y. Michael Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul, "Introduction," in *Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos*, ed. Y. Michael Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 3.

native population's economic situation to a significant extent.[46] This is not to say, though, that there are not potential negative effects of xenophobia from other countries, specifically regarding consumption of German products, and this is what would make migration's effect on the German economy negative: exacerbated xenophobia resulting in discouraged foreign consumers of German products.

In spite of the word's common usage, the meaning of "consumption" is not clear. The best definition of the word is the "*acquisition*, use and disposal of goods and services, which, by substituting 'purchase' with 'acquisition', includes all these different ways in which goods can be acquired."[47] Ethical consumption entails a broad group of actions,

> From non-consumption, as in the case of boycotts and the voluntary simplicity movement (general downshifting of consumption) to consumption following particular ethical principles, such as the purchase of fair trade, green, and free-range goods and 'buycotts'. More broadly, it involves not only particular purchasing (or nonpurchasing) decisions, but also particular ways of using goods – such as handling them with care so that they lost longer, for green motives – and ways of disposing of them, such as recycling and selective waste collection […].[48]

On an international level, ethical consumption lies at the intersection of trade and politics, both of which have long shared a link with the other. More recently, the connection has become more conspicuous on the individual and social levels.[49] The type of ethical consumption that is most popular is the increasing preference for items that people perceive to be made in environmentally and socially good ways.[50] While it does seem that purchasing habits in response to xenophobia have been hardly studied, there are tried and true norms of consumption that can be applied to such a context,

[46] Ibid., 45, 47.
[47] Léna Pellandini-Simányi, *Consumption Norms and Everyday Ethics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 20.
[48] Ibid., 142.
[49] James G. Carrier, "Ethical Consumption," *Anthropology Today* 23, no. 4 (2007): 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4620369.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6f0ccb9d75b9abb12cad52be24650dc5.
[50] James G. Carrier, "Introduction," in *Ethical Consumption: Social Value and Economic Practice*, ed. James G. Carrier and Peter G. Luetchford (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 2.

and there have been recent discussions regarding citizenship and consumption. There are two separate, yet linked, levels at which people articulate norms of consumption: "first, in public discourse, including the intellectual moralizing about consumption, the political debate about the regulation of consumption, and views promoted by social movements addressing consumption; and second, at an everyday private level."[51] In spite of the potential for research regarding how xenophobia can discourage importation and subsequent consumption of products from where xenophobia takes place, though, "none of the existing literature provides a focused discussion of everyday consumption norms. As a result, the two levels of consumption norms are hardly connected; and even when they are, it is limited to identifying values in everyday life that conforms to the agendas of intellectual and political movements."[52] Likewise, "consumption norms per se have rarely been the core focus of research or theorizing."[53]

Dietary restrictions are considered the most common taboos of consumption. Oftentimes, these taboos stem from religion. However, not all consumption norms are couched within a religious, or even legal, framework. "Social movements, various organizations, intellectuals and even the state express abundant criticism or encouragement of certain consumption practices on normative grounds, without codifying these in an explicit form."[54] For instance, efforts like the one to end Apartheid in South Africa underscore that similar movements to discourage xenophobia in countries such as Germany could be conceivable. However, the German government officially eschews and discourages xenophobic actions and words to an abnormal extent, although it may inadvertently precipitate or allow

[51] Léna Pellandini-Simányi, *Consumption Norms and Everyday Ethics*, 1.
[52] Ibid., 1 – 2.
[53] Ibid., 2.
[54] Ibid., 3.

xenophobia to transpire. As xenophobia in Germany becomes more and more prevalent, one of the reasons that it would be possible for efforts akin to such movements as the boycott movement of South African goods in the 1980s to emerge is that consumption has the capacity to attract such a high degree of moralizing. This is because "consumption norms mediate particular normative visions of how to live and who to be. What makes consumption norms a suitable terrain to mediate these questions is the fact that consumption is involved in most human practices; and as such, in the practical realization of nearly all the endeavors that people pursue."[55] Ethical ideals are not the only thing that affects consumers' habits, though; consumers make consumption decisions as a response to the direct circumstances under which they operate.

Motives for xenophobic behavior and legislation are not just economic in nature, even though an inextricable link exists between xenophobia as an expression of identity politics and xenophobia as a manifestation of economic and financial anxieties. For instance, a large proportion of refugees does not mean that anti-migrant violence will transpire. Except for Berlin, the states of the former East Germany have the lowest ratio of non-native residents compared to western Germany, evidencing that violence against immigrants is not always due to a sizeable proportion of refugees wherever the xenophobic activity occurs.[56] "Perceived cultural threat is behind anti-immigration attitudes […] and that sharp influxes of foreigners into the local area can trigger demands for closure […]."[57] Yet, as far as legislation is concerned, actions taken do not have to be xenophobic to be not so permissive of immigrants entering the

[55] Ibid., 6.
[56] "Federal report laments rising xenophobia in Germany," *DW*.
[57] Jennifer Fitzgerald, "Social Engagement and Immigration Attitudes: Panel Survey Evidence from Germany," *The International Migration Review* 46, no. 4 (2012): 941 – 942, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41804869.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A8466efe41a3961e50d2f179ad1ae9a65.

country. In 2015, following an exuberant, optimistic atmosphere upon the government's announcement and subsequent implementation of an open door policy for immigrants, the country had encountered "daily reports of clashes in asylum seeker homes" and "bureaucrats overwhelmed by a backlog of registration claims."[58] In 2018, two cities in Germany, Cottbus and Freiburg, halted entry of immigrants because of the strain on infrastructure and space, and, in the case of the latter, anyway, the mayor explicitly stated, "We are not xenophobic." Given that such measures came following the tensions that so many people in one space created, there is good reason to take this statement at face value.[59] At the end of the day, the difficulty exists in retrofitting a country's policies and overall carrying capacity to a higher population that is not anticipated.

In order to find out how exactly xenophobia in Germany affects the economy, what must first be achieved is establishment of the extent to which migrants contribute to the German economy and constitute German society. From here, a more educated guess can be made about how xenophobia, if taken to its logical conclusion, reverses the economic changes that in-migration of out-group individuals precipitates. Countries with which Germany has economic relations affect Germany's economy as well, which thereby makes perceptions of xenophobia in Germany, and the consequences of such perceptions, researchable. In spite of the fact that little literature exists on how exactly xenophobia affects the German economy, then, one can still research the subject quite a bit. Even after all is said and done, though, further studies with larger populations will be necessary, for not only are there few analyses that

[58] Kate Connolly, "Refugee crisis: Germany creaks under strain of open door policy," *The Guardian*, last modified October 8, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/08/refugee-crisis-germany-creaks-under-strain-of-open-door-policy.

[59] RT, "'We're not xenophobic, we have no space': 2 German cities ban new refugees amid violence," Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, February 3, 2018. Web. May 19, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNrGHmgZMNQ&t=1s.

discuss the effects that xenophobia has on the German economy in more than just a speculative way, but such studies are also prone to omitted variable bias, thereby undercutting the research in question.

After the introductory and background sections, what is then discussed are the results and implications of a survey that was distributed, vis-à-vis Facebook, to Central European University students and connections outside of the university. The survey had a total of 194 respondents. The survey asks the following questions: (1) "How much do you believe that xenophobia (fear/hatred of foreigners) exists in Germany?"; (2) "If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?"; and the demographic questions regarding respondents' ages, genders, and nationalities. For the first question, the answer options were: "Not at all (0)"; "A little (1)"; "Some (2)"; and "A lot (3)". For the second question, the answer choices were: "Not at all (0)"; "A little (1)"; "Some (2)"; "A lot (3)"; and "Don't know/Not applicable (4)". It should be noted that, for averages that contained answers in which respondents chose the "Don't know/Not applicable" option, these answers were deliberately excluded because of the arbitrariness of the numbering; the "Don't know/Not applicable" option coded as the number 4 does not follow the pattern of the four options that precede this fifth option. Therefore, the legitimacy of the averages would be undercut if these answers were included. The answer choice exists due to anticipation of such a sentiment on the part of the respondents; a very small fraction of individuals who filled out the survey (14 out of 194) picked the second question's fifth answer choice. Upon accepting answers from respondents, the next step was to average coded values for both of the questions.

The first set of averages for the answers for each question was for the entire population of 194 respondents. The second set of respondents was a non-randomized set of 20 individuals whom I could verify were members of the CEU community. Of the first 20 respondents, though, there were two who gave the answer of "Don't know/Not applicable" to the second question. Therefore, I had gone a bit further down the list to choose two individuals who did not answer like this. The survey was disseminated exclusively through the use of Facebook, and, initially, was publicized on a group page strictly for CEU students, on the 20th of April. On April 21st, I had shared it on my personal Facebook timeline. Because of Facebook's algorithm, though, only a fraction of one's "Friends List" can automatically see someone's news feed (i.e., see what friends post without having to deliberately go to someone's page). Therefore, I had individually chatted mostly CEU students, as well as friends of mine I had met through the Erasmus students I had lived with last semester, so I could get a large population of respondents. More importantly, though, because the survey was initially restricted to the CEU community and only later opened it up to non-CEU students as well, I was able to compare the time stamp on the survey's spreadsheet with the times of when I shared the survey on the strictly CEU page, as well as to the time that I had shared it on my personal Facebook profiles. Coupled with looking at the days that I had chatted people to take the survey, I could make sure that the 20 CEU individuals whose coded answers I had averaged were actually from CEU. Additionally, there are not very many people with whom I am connected on Facebook who, for example, are from the Balkans, except for CEU students, so this was another method that was used to verify respondents. This was how I had determined the 19th and 20th individuals whose answers I had averaged were CEU students.

After averaging the coded responses for the entire population and the 20 CEU students, I next subtracted the entire population's average of the answers to the second question from the average of the first question, and then I averaged coded responses of sub-groups within the population. The first set of sub-groups consisted of all respondents who identified as men and women. For each sub-group, answers to the first and second questions were averaged, and, just as the case with the entire population, the average of the responses to the second question were subtracted from the average to the first question, for both men and women. Then, the responses of the countries and country groups were averaged. Normally, each country or country group had, at a minimum, 10 – 15 respondents, with the exception of the respondents from Russia and the former Soviet Union countries whose responses to the second question were averaged. There were ten respondents in this group, but two of the respondents answered "Don't know/Not applicable" to the second question. This was also the case for western European countries. Initially, I had added the country of Lithuania to Russia/former Soviet Union countries, in order to meet the minimum "threshold." However, this would have been arbitrary because I would have excluded Latvia, which was also a former Soviet Union country, and I did not think it was necessary to add countries that were also considered as northern European, a separate category all by itself. Besides Russia and the former Soviet Union countries, and the northern European countries (including Belgium and the Netherlands), the countries/country groups were as follows: the United States; North America; Hungary; Southeast Asia/Australia; Balkans; Central Eastern Europe (CEE); western Europe; and the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region/Turkey.

After this portion of my work, I had asked a German employee of a German company (whose branch is in Budapest) questions regarding the labor force in

Germany. The employee, Rainer Grundl, clarified that he was not an official representative of the company, so it was agreed that the name of the company for which he worked would not be disclosed. The questions he was asked were: (1) "From what you know, how has immigration of foreigners to Germany impacted [sic] [your company] in the country?"; (2) "In general, how has immigration of foreigners to Germany impacted German businesses and the labor market"; (3) "How do you think xenophobia affects (or can affect) Germany's economy"; (4) "How exactly do you think immigration affects the German economy as a whole?"; and (5) "Did the Syrian Crisis affect [sic] [your company] in any way?". After this, ten students, and one administrator affiliated with the CEU community, were interviewed. The questions that I had asked of these individuals had varied slightly based on which countries or country groups they had come from. For respondents from the Balkans: (1) "Would you say that people from Eastern Europe tend to be more hostile towards migrants compared to other Europeans, or is this just a stereotype?"; (2) "What kinds of stories have you heard about how Germans view foreigners?"; (3) "From the survey, one of the questions was, 'If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?'. Would reports of anti-immigrant activity (i.e., attacks) in Germany affect how likely you would buy German products? Why or why not?"; and (4) "Do you think that if your skin was not white and you weren't European, you would be treated differently in Germany?". The students from Russia/former Soviet Union were asked more or less the same questions, but, in the fourth question, the European part was excluded because of its questionable applicability. Likewise, students from the MENA/Turkey region were asked the same questions, but the fourth question was excluded completely, which was the identical case for students from Southeast

Asia/Australia. Hungarians were asked the following: (1) “Compared to Hungarians, would you say that Germans are more open to migrants? If so, to what extent?”; (2) “What kinds of stories have you heard about how Germans view foreigners”; (3) “Does the Holocaust/Nazism/World War II have any impact on how you view Germany?”; and (4) “From the survey, one of the questions was, ‘If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?’. Would reports of anti-immigrant activity (i.e., attacks) in Germany affect how likely you would buy German products? Why or why not?”. Lastly, interviewees from North America were asked the same questions as those from the Balkans, for example, except the last question was changed to, “Do you think that if your skin was not white and you didn’t come from where you came from, you would be treated differently in Germany?”. To be clear, the North American student who was interviewed identifies as white.

3.) Survey Results, Interviews, & Interpretations

In the survey, the second question that respondents were asked was, "If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?" Certainly, this was an appropriate question to ask. In 2005, exports constituted a third of Germany's GDP. Currently, Germany is the third biggest exporter globally, and exports make up nearly half of the country's economic output.[60] Because of the increasing rate of globalization, it is probable that other countries will rely even more on German imports, thereby necessitating an increase in the German economy's exports, especially as low-skilled jobs dwindle. Just as far as the survey itself is concerned, the answers are quite fascinating, but reasons for potential errors need to be addressed. More specifically, constructive criticism was received from multiple sources about the questions themselves. One individual said that a shortcoming of the survey was how few questions were asked. Someone else said that she found the questions "extremely misleading." Upon further reflection, I can see how the second question, "If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?" could certainly be misinterpreted. However, contextualized in relation to the first question, "How much do you believe that xenophobia (fear/hatred of foreigners) exists in Germany?", the potential shortcomings of the second question are treated as a non-issue, in spite of the fact that the first question has the capacity to be misinterpreted as well. In any case, the survey is not perfect, but perfection is not necessary in this context. The purpose of the survey was just to get a sense of how people feel towards xenophobia in Germany, and further research can rectify the survey's shortcomings.

[60] "Germany Exports," *Trading Economics*, accessed May 8, 2018, https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/exports.

Among the entire population surveyed, a plurality of respondents said that reports of xenophobia by Germans in Germany would make no difference at all in whether or not they would purchase German products. However, a large percentage of respondents answered that reports of xenophobia in Germany would discourage consumption of German products to at least a small extent. Assuming that the respondents who answered that their purchasing of German goods would be affected follow through in their consumption habits, this would effectively sanction the German government for behaviors of its citizens that the government officially condemns. This economic retribution could come from a place of the respondents believing that the German government has not done enough to curb xenophobia, but, concerning the diversity of the population surveyed, it would be difficult to make accurate assumptions of how respondents came to the answers they did. What potentially provides greater context are comparisons between the averages of the first and second questions, as well as comparing the answers to the first and second questions of individual respondents.

Before detailing the results and interpretations of the survey, it must be noted that when the subject of xenophobia comes up for people, the typical thought process entails the "xenophobia in relation to what?" paradigm. What this means, then, is that if, for example, someone from Hungary goes to Germany and perceives the more "cosmopolitan" environment that Germany has (in the big cities, anyway), that, relative to Hungary, xenophobia in Germany does not exist. This, though, is a logical fallacy. Xenophobia anywhere is still xenophobia, even if fewer people are guilty of xenophobic sentiments and behaviors in relation to somewhere else, and/or even if xenophobia is less publicized. To be sure, in the case of Hungary, one must keep in mind xenophobia's prevalence. Polling has shown that as much as 80 percent of the

Hungarian public is xenophobic. It must also be noted, though, that xenophobia's manifestations are not just words and actions. In an informal discussion with a visiting professor at CEU, it was discussed that, before World War II, there was a campaign to boycott shops owned and operated by practitioners of Judaism. In the same way today, if people in Germany are particularly xenophobic, they probably do avoid consumption of non-German items, especially different types of ethnic cuisine (i.e., Turkish food). In instances such as these, though, whether or not the local population buys German or ethnic food, it is likely that their money goes to the German economy either way. Additionally, in today's globalized world, personnel employed at an establishment are not necessarily reflective of who is ultimately in charge. In the same vein, it is impossible, or at least impractical, for people to boycott every foreign good. Lastly, up to a certain point, people can simultaneously be very xenophobic and still purchase foreign products, as long as the quality of the goods is good enough.

Entire Population – First Question

Table 1

"How much do you believe that xenophobia (fear/hatred of foreigners) exists in Germany?"	
Not at all (0)	14 (7.2%)
A little (1)	57 (29.2%)
Some (2)	89 (45.6%)
A lot (3)	35 (17.9%)

It was not quite expected that people would respond to this question with a "Not at all" response, however how few. It is thinkable that the respondents who answered "Not at all" largely had the pro-immigration attitudes of the German government in

mind and assumed that such attitudes completely filtered down to the German populace, comparing it to their own countries that were less "cosmopolitan," Hungary being a prime example of this. Ostensibly, it looks as if the percentages would manufacture a modified normal distribution.

Entire Population – Second Question

Table 2

"If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?"	
Not at all (0)	94 (48.2%)
A little (1)	36 (18.5%)
Some (2)	38 (19.5%)
A lot (3)	13 (6.7%)
Don't know/Not applicable (4)	14 (7.2%)

As the graph shows, for a plurality of respondents, reports of xenophobia in Germany would not affect the likelihood that they would purchase German products, and, for almost as many respondents, the likelihood that they would purchase German products would decrease between a little to a lot. The number of respondents who answered "A lot" is surprising, though, oftentimes, surveys are not perfect at replicating actual circumstances. It is conceivable, then, that certain people who answered that they would be discouraged from purchasing German products may have just had a knee-jerk reaction. After all, at the grocery store, people may not even think about such issues as xenophobia, but they obviously thought about xenophobia in Germany in the survey because they were asked questions about the phenomenon.

First Question – Entire Population vs. Non-Randomized Sample

Table 3

"How much do you believe that xenophobia (fear/hatred of foreigners) exists in Germany?"	
Average score (whole population) – 1.74	Average score (sample of 20 non-randomized CEU students) – 1.80
"If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?"	
Average score (whole population) – 0.84	Average score (sample of 20 non-randomized CEU students) – 0.35

For this question, the average of the answers of the entire population of respondents within and without the CEU community was slightly lower than the average of the group of non-randomized CEU students. However, to the question, "If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?", the average of the answers of the same group of 20 CEU students was less than half of the average of the entire population's answers.

First Question – Population vs. Country Groups

Table 4

"How much do you believe that xenophobia (fear/hatred of foreigners) exists in Germany?"

Entire Population (194)	1.74
United States (72)	1.76
North America (77)	1.78
Hungary (14)	1.43
Southeast Asia/Australia (11)	1.36

Balkans (13)	1.85
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) (21)	1.52
Northern Europe (23)	1.55
Western Europe (10)	1.90
MENA/Turkey (13)	1.85
Russia/former Soviet Union countries (10)	1.40

The averages of respondents from the United States and North America, the Balkans, Western Europe, and Middle East North Africa (MENA)/Turkey were all higher than the average of the respondents from the entire population, and the averages of respondents from Hungary, Southeast Asia/Australia, Central Eastern Europe (CEE), Northern Europe, and Russia/former Soviet Union countries were all lower. Obviously, not everyone perceives xenophobia in the same way, and this is not just because of culture, although culture is certainly a factor. If one applies the "xenophobia in relation to what?" paradigm, the relatively low average of Hungarians is not surprising. This is complicated, though, by the even lower average of the respondents from Southeast Asia/Australia.

Second Question – Population vs. Country Groups

Table 5

"If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?"	
Entire Population (180)	0.84
U.S. (65)	1.20
North America (72)	1.09

Hungary (14)	0.21
Southeast Asia/Australia (11)	1.18
Balkans (13)	0.69
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) (20)	0.20
Northern Europe (23)	0.02
Western Europe (8)	0.30
MENA/Turkey (11)	0.73
Russia/former Soviet Union countries (8)	0.13

The averages of respondents from the U.S. and North America, and Southeast Asia/Australia, were higher than the average of all the respondents, while the averages of respondents from Hungary, the Balkans, Central Eastern Europe (CEE), Northern Europe, Western Europe, MENA/Turkey, and Russia/former Soviet Union countries were all lower. One of the things that makes this chart interesting is that the group of respondents with the lowest average was the group of respondents from Northern Europe. Maybe part of this is the fact that the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden are all major trading partners of Germany, so, for many respondents from these countries, the fact that German imports played such a role in their countries' economies could have affected how they responded in the survey. The caveat here, of course, is that, in 2017, the U.S. was the biggest importer of German goods.[61] Then again, though, the U.S. is a major importer across-the-board, so it may not have made much of a difference for American respondents, in addition to the fact that, because

[61] Daniel Workman, "Germany's Top Trading Partners," *World's Top Exports*, last updated May 7, 2018, http://www.worldstopexports.com/germanys-top-import-partners/.

the U.S. is so geographically big, German products do not really make a big impact in a lot of towns.

First Question – All Men vs. All Women

Table 6

"How much do you believe that xenophobia (fear/hatred of foreigners) exists in Germany?"	
Males in the whole group (86)	1.74
Females in the whole group (103)	1.71

Between men and women of the entire population of respondents, the difference of the averages is negligible, even though there were almost 20 more female respondents than male respondents. The respondents who identified as neither male nor female (i.e., "Gender Queer," "Prefer not to say," "Boeing AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter," etc.) were not included.

Second Question – All Men vs. All Women

Table 7

"If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?"	
Males in the whole group (82)	0.51
Females in the whole group (93)	1.16

The average response of women in the group was more than twice the average of men in the population. One of the reasons that the average for women's responses was so much higher than the male average could have had something to do with the perception that if someone is a woman and a foreigner compared to being male and a foreigner, the former person is more subject to xenophobic attacks.

Average of the Differences – Country Groups

Table 8

Average of the Differences ["How much do you believe that xenophobia (fear/hatred of foreigners) exists in Germany?" (Average 1) – "If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?" (Average 2)]	
Entire Population	0.90
U.S.	0.60
North America	0.57
Hungary	1.21
Southeast Asia/Australia	0.18
Central Eastern Europe (CEE)	1.30
Northern Europe	1.09
Western Europe	1.50
MENA/Turkey	1.09
Russia/former Soviet Union countries	1.38
Males of the whole group	1.22
Females of the whole group	0.56

The average of the differences for respondents from the U.S. and North America, and Southeast Asia/Australia, were lower than the average of the differences for the entire population. For respondents from Hungary, Central Eastern Europe (CEE), Northern Europe, Western Europe, MENA/Turkey, and Russia/former Soviet Union countries, averages of the differences were higher. Additionally, the average of the difference for men in the whole group was higher than the entire population, but, for women, it was lower. Regarding respondents' individual answers, there was only one Hungarian

who said that reports of xenophobia in Germany would affect the likelihood of consumption of German products. Yet, most of the other Hungarian respondents said that xenophobia existed at least a little in Germany. In fact, two Hungarian respondents answered that xenophobia exists in Germany to a greater extent than the Hungarian who said that reports of xenophobia from Germans in Germany would affect the likelihood to which this person would buy products from Germany. Interestingly enough, there were also respondents (from the population at large) who believed that, while xenophobia does not exist in Germany, reports of xenophobia would affect consumption of German products. Cases of this happening, though, were far less common than respondents simultaneously saying that xenophobia exists in Germany and reports of xenophobia would not affect their decision to purchase German goods. In fact, the case of the former transpiring was an outlier in the survey. Therefore, what one can say about these findings is that knowledge of the existence of xenophobia in Germany was a bigger factor in affecting consumption of German products than a hypothetical scenario in which respondents learn of xenophobia in Germany and are subsequently surprised.

Concerning, again, the coded averages of respondents' questionnaire answers, all except one of the countries/country groups had a higher average of answers to the question, "How much do you believe that xenophobia (fear/hatred of foreigners) exists in Germany?" than to the question, "If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?". The only group for which this was not the case was that of people from Australia. This was because there were two respondents in this group who said that, in spite of the fact that they did not believe that xenophobia existed in Germany, their decisions to purchase German products would be significantly affected by

reports of xenophobia from the native population in Germany. Then, there are, of course, the pragmatic beliefs of the respondents (as well as the individuals whom the respondents represent) interact with and affect ethical beliefs, and differ as well, depending on the individual and which country or group of countries that individuals are from. Of course, though, "social relations alone do not define consumption norms, but they act only in conjunction with traditions and cultural ideals in the context where they developed."[62] For instance, in a comparison between the similarly egalitarian country of Sweden and Gandhi's ideal of society, the emphases were on "national autonomy to be achieved through self-sufficiency, local tradition and spirituality, which informed the consumption norm favoring traditional, locally produced clothes"; and "social order as based on care and responsibility for one another, with individuals, families and homes being the basic building blocks of this social order […]," respectively.[63] Explanations such as this evidence the fact that consumption norms' content can be derived from "specific aims of the community as a whole: maximizing its material well-being, maintaining the stability of its shared cultural categories of or of its social order."[64] Furthermore, the "evaluation of particular consumption practices not only depends on *who* engages in them but also on the context of consumption."[65] Likewise, Europeans and North Americans view society and economy differently.[66]

Something else that may have affected respondents' answers was whether the societies they came from were more collective or more individualistic. This is because consumption norms arguably "conform to the requirements of different types of social

[62] Léna Pellandini-Simányi, *Consumption Norms and Everyday Ethics*, 59.
[63] Ibid., 59 – 60.
[64] Ibid., 60.
[65] Ibid., 31.
[66] James G. Carrier, "Introduction," 3.

environments."[67] Respondents who came from a less individualistic society could have certainly been influenced by consumption norms in their particular society as they related to what was most beneficial to their society. This can potentially explain why many respondents from less individualistic societies responded that, even if xenophobia does exist in Germany, and even if these respondents do hear reports of xenophobia from Germany, they did not like the idea of no longer purchasing German goods because importation of German goods benefits the economies of their countries. There is also the correct assumption that the German government would not encourage these instances of xenophobia, even if most all of these respondents attend CEU and are at least comfortable with "open society values." Regarding Hungarian respondents' answers, such factors are compounded by the higher likelihood that respondents did not come to CEU necessarily for the open society values that the university espouses, but more for the reputation the university has as the best institution of higher learning in Hungary. Likewise, even though the U.S. is considered the biggest importer of German goods, the entrenched individualism in the country could help explain why the average of respondents' answers to the second question was the highest of respondents from all countries and country groups surveyed. This individualism, though, is also a reason why the majority of U.S. Americans probably would not want to be restricted from buying German products because of xenophobia.

Another factor that could have impacted Hungarian respondents' answers could have been the dominant attitude in Hungary regarding immigrants. According to a very recent article from *The Economist*, people from 25 European countries were surveyed about how comfortable they were in interacting with immigrants. Of the

[67] Léna Pellandini-Simányi, *Consumption Norms and Everyday Ethics*, 59.

respondents from the 25 countries surveyed, Hungary ranked next to the least comfortable country, right ahead of Bulgaria. More specifically, in the survey, fewer than 20 percent of respondents said that they felt comfortable in their social interactions with immigrants, but more than 65 percent of Hungarian respondents said that they felt uncomfortable, with another approximately 10 percent saying that they simply did not know. This is certainly not to say, of course, that any of the Hungarians who were surveyed and interviewed were xenophobic. Rather, the point is that, in a country where a sizeable majority of individuals are not comfortable with migrants, respondents could arguably be less altruistic of immigrants to other countries, especially in the context of Hungary's current political circumstances. The intervening factor here, of course, is that the forces in Hungary that discourage sympathy for immigrants are also the same forces that encourage consumption of Hungarian products. This is curious because, in most studies, the link with ethical consumption is that of leftist politics. However, in Hungary, conservative groups have encouraged people to be attentive regarding individual consumer choice's social implications.

> Nationalistic consumer mobilization has strong historical roots in Hungary […], and initiatives such as the 'Club for Hungarian Products' and 'Domestic Product – Domestic Jobs' appeared in post-socialist Hungary as early as the middle of the 1990s. The movement got a strong boost in 2002 with the establishment of 'civic circles' […] and a call by a former right-wing prime minister to buy only things with a product code that starts with 599, supposedly a marker of Hungarian origin.[68]

Another point of the article is that there is a certain correlation between the percentage of immigrants in a country and how accepting a country's native population is of immigrants. Indeed, as of 2017, the percentage of non-natives in Bulgaria and Hungary were 2 percent and 5 percent, respectively. Even in Germany, the

[68] Tamás Dombos, "Beyond the 'Official' Disclosure of Ethical Consumption in Hungary," in *Ethical Consumption: Social Value and Economic Practice*, ed. James G. Carrier and Peter G. Luetchford (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 133 – 134.

"cosmopolitan" immigration country that it is, with its less restrictive border controls, was just below the EU average in the survey.[69] Of course, this may underscore the fact that the correlation of the percentage of immigrants in countries and comfort with such individuals only goes so far, but it also underscores the more important point that there is still room for xenophobic narratives within Germany. The former point, though, is disputable. In the article, Sweden had a percentage of 18 percent of individuals who were foreign-born.[70] However, according to *World Population Review*, of EU member states, Germany has the highest percentage of immigrants in its population…at 12 percent.[71] If accurate, this would confirm the correlation of the percentage of non-native individuals in a country and the percentage of a country's native inhabitants accepting and including these individuals. Yet, the fact that the *World Population Review* said that Germany had the highest percentage of those not born in the country compared to Sweden is curious. While the *World Population Review* article was last updated in early 2018, and the percentages from the article in *The Economist* were from last year, such a major change in a short time, even if not around the same time, is dubious.

In order to better contextualize the research and fortify the arguments here, interviews are an integral component. Because of the lack of resources to do actual fieldwork in Germany, one set of interviews is from a YouTube™ video. In the clip, a British man named Graham Phillips went to Munich in August of 2016 and interviewed the Germans there, asking them about Angela Merkel, immigration, and terrorism. This recording was recent enough to be used, and Munich (a more

[69] "Europeans remain welcoming to immigrants," *The Economist*, last modified April 19, 2018, 2012): 133 – 134.
https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2018/04/daily-chart-12?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/europeansremainwelcomingtoimmigrantsdailychart.
[70] Ibid.
[71] "Germany Population 2018," *World Population R*eview, last updated January 23, 2018, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/germany-population/.

cosmopolitan city in a conservative part of Germany) was a good place to have the interviews, as evidenced by the diversity of responses that Phillips received. Many interviewees had spoken disapprovingly of Germany's Chancellor, or simply refused to answer the question regarding their thoughts on Merkel. On their own, "responses" such as these are hard to interpret, but, judging by body language and context (i.e., the blame that Merkel received for the problems attributed to the vast influx of refugees at the height of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in 2015), those who refused to answer most likely had negative views of her. More importantly, though, the interviews were informative because, for one, their responses did not conform to stereotypes. For instance, the majority of interviewees' answers were not necessarily pro-immigrant. However, multiple respondents also said that the problems that Germany is facing are also problems that the world has, thereby (perhaps) indicating a degree of cosmopolitanism, or at least worldliness, that one would not necessarily assume. This worldliness went only so far, of course, and while it would not necessarily be accurate to say that a lot of interviewees' responses were xenophobic, none of the interviewees said anything along the lines of excessive immigration to Germany as a negative because of the effects immigration has on the immigrants themselves. Certainly, there were responses that actually were xenophobic. One individual said, in response to the interviewer's question, "Why all the problems, and terrorism in Germany?": "It's a very difficult question for many people, but everything is obvious, why the problem is…".[72] In context, the individual who gave this reply seemed to imply that immigrants were the problem. Additionally, when Phillips asked, "What do you think of the situation with immigration in Germany?", one interviewee answered that

[72]Graham Phillips, "Street Interviews with Germans on Merkel, Immigration, and more," Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, August 10, 2016. Web. May 19, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gS5c_OVZmtk.

immigration was not "in the interests of the people."[73] The rest of the responses were certainly less strident. When Phillips said to a young (and white) German woman, "The world nowadays looks at Germany, and asks 'why are there so many problems, terrorism…?'", the woman responded, "Because we've become too kind in Germany. We want to atone for all the sins of the past. But in the end, that doesn't work."[74] To a point, anyway, this woman's point is understandable, though if she intentionally sought to not come off as xenophobic, she may have qualified this statement with something along the lines of the problem that she is talking about being one of population, not migrants' origins. However, the viewer only knows what this individual said by what was filmed and the English subtitles in the video. Furthermore, the video underscores how misleading stereotypes in this context can be: the way they answered the question regarding how they felt about Merkel did not mean that they would answer similarly regarding the issues in Germany and immigration. For example, one of the interviewees, when asked about her thoughts of Merkel, said, "Oh, ok…..that she's done a very good job running the country in a time of crisis."[75] However, the woman's response to the question regarding Germany's problems, namely terrorism, was, "Because so many cultures have come to live here." Out of context, this response certainly sounds like an expression of opposition against not only immigration in Germany, but multiculturalism in Germany as well. However, because of how this woman answered the question regarding Merkel, this is not necessarily the case. More specifically, it seems as if the interviewee could have matter-of-factly said that, in an environment in which many types of people co-exist, conflicts are inevitable, but it did not seem as if the interviewee was saying that multiculturalism and immigration were bad in and of themselves. The last individual

[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.

whom Phillips interviewed gave perhaps the most measured responses. When Phillips asked the interviewee about his feelings regarding Merkel, he responded that she was mediocre. The respondent continued by saying, "She's run the country in peace and is not too extreme, but there's too many matters she doesn't have her own opinion on."[76] Additionally, the interviewee said, in response to the interviewer's question about Germany's many problems, "The world is getting smaller, problems which affect one country affect the whole world. It's globalization."[77] Indeed, globalization has contributed to employment issues in Germany because of the demand for higher skills in the labor market.

The first interview that I conducted was with Rainer Grundl, a German employee of a German company, based in Budapest. When I asked Grundl about how, from what he knows, immigration of foreigners to Germany has impacted the company that he works for in Germany, his response was "not so much" because of the presumably neutralizing (and positive) effect that his company has in its education and assistance efforts for migrants. For the specific branch for which Grundl works, he said that it has a "low scale" of 150 immigrants, but all of the company's branches are involved in such aid efforts, "more or less." To the second question, "In general, how has immigration of foreigners impacted German businesses […] and the labor market?", Grundl believed that there was " not so much" of an effect here as well, because of the fact that the German market is big enough to accommodate these migrants, "or would be if they had sufficient […] education," Grundl qualified. In response to the third question, "How do you think xenophobia affects (or can affect) Germany's economy?", Grundl said, "…It's a usual old story, also populists in Germany are using, are playing with the fear against foreigners […]. They are really

[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.

raising it up." Judging by this response, then, Grundl questioned the anti-migrant rhetoric that xenophobic and populist forces in Germany use, and delegitimized what they portray the effects of migration to be. To the fourth question, "How exactly do you think migration affects the German economy as a whole?", Grundl said that the effects are neutral, due to the forces of migrants who are less educated and acquiring social benefits and the more educated migrants who "find a job and are paying" cancelling each other out. Grundl does, though, end this response by saying that he hopes the effects will be neutral. To the last question, regarding the Syrian Refugee Crisis's effect on his employer, Grundl said that the impact would be on a "very, very low scale" for the company worldwide.

After interviewing Grundl, the next step was to interview members of the CEU community. The questions that interviewees were asked varied slightly, perhaps (to a certain extent) due to differentiation of country of origin. The first question some individuals were asked was, "Would you say that people from Eastern Europe tend to be more hostile towards migrants compared to other Europeans, or is this just a stereotype?". The first person who was asked this was a friend from Canada, who had answered, "I don't know, I haven't noticed any difference, between even where I'm from and hostility towards migrants. I don't think they're any better or worse than anyone else." Others, though, perceived a bit more of a difference. To this question, the Indonesian interviewee responded, "It's not a stereotype. Uh…I think that they are probably more hostile because of the way they are treated in western countries like the UK, where they end up becoming migrants. And despite their level of education, which probably or probably not is high, so it could be high, it could not be high, they end up working in the supermarkets as check-out girls or boys, in very lowly paid jobs. So, and, uh, a country like the UK would be far more humane towards migrants

in general. Full stop." Another interviewee, Tamer Khraisha, from Palestine, attributed the difference to something else. "I lived in Italy for 8 years," Khraisha replied, "and I could say that there is like a fraction of people, not as much as you can find here […]. But I would say […] there is much more propaganda that is functioning better here, so I can say yes, they are more hostile." Perhaps one of the most unique answers I had heard was from a Russian interviewee. "Well, I think we just have, you know," she began, "different migrants from different areas. And I don't really think they are more hostile to migrants, because we see this now, this trend of rising populism and hostility and policy of the government connected to that in our parts. […] For example in Russia we have a lot of migrants from Central Asia […]. You also have to distinguish between nation states […]. The image of migrant is different in different cultures." I had also asked someone this question who actually is from Eastern Europe, Luka Mihajlovic from Serbia, and he had this to say: "I think, the first thing is, I think people from Eastern Europe, at least from the Balkans […] think of themselves as very welcoming in general. When it comes to migrants, you hear a lot in the media by […] officials that they are welcoming towards migrants and the reality on the ground. […] I think in the end, I think, because of levels of democracy in the western countries, I think […] in the end, yes, […]. But I think there is no clear-cut answer to this […]." Objectively, generalizing an entire region of the world is not easy and, upon hearing this question, many CEU students would possibly keep such pitfalls of generalizing in mind. For instance, Ifra Asad, from Pakistan, answered, "I have to say that I can't generalize for all of Eastern Europe, and I can't generalize for all of the rest of the European countries, and I have to say I'm in an insulated bubble at CEU […]." Asad continued, though, by saying, "but from what I've seen of the government, I would say yes […]. But that's what my perception is

based off of. […]. I've lived in London, […] and they were much more pro-migrant and much more […] left-leaning values." Whether or not CEU students share so much as Asad, though, is a different story. For instance, one individual from Turkey simply responded, "I'll say yes." Yet, another individual, from Montenegro, replied, "Basically, I would say it is a stereotype. There is some truth in it […]. If you were to conduct […] empirical research, you would find people in Eastern Europe in general negative attitudes as compared to Western Europe […]. But […] that's a consequence of the political process during the Cold War […] when people weren't exposed to foreigners […] as people in the West were. Since it's not even been 30 years since the regime change […] the results would be necessarily related to the end of the Cold War and to the fact that this historical experience is still alive in the minds of people who are living in Eastern Europe […]. It's more because of the specific historical circumstances that made this problem in a way." One of the last people I interviewed, Raed AlKhayrat, from Syria, just responded, "A stereotype."

A similar question, which was specifically directed at those from Hungary, was, "Compared to Hungarians, would you say that Germans are more open to migrants? If so, to what extent?". The first Hungarian who was asked this question, Anna Kaposvári, is also half German (in addition to not having been a student for years), but, in her current capacity, Kaposvári is affiliated with the Department of Economics and Business at CEU. Kaposvári responded, "I think so. Um, in Germany we have the whole Holocaust story, and based on that, everything which is about racism or not including others…is a very painful story, and everybody's afraid of coming out with ideas which are not fair or politically correct. […] In Germany, we have a huge Turkish minority and, um, yeah, I think we learned to live with other cultures together and after that most of the Turkish people living in Germany are

Muslims, uh, everybody's thinking in a similar way about refugees…". The second Hungarian whom I had interviewed, Bence Jenőfi (a CEU student who is 100% Hungarian), answered quite differently though. Jenőfi replied, "Um, to be honest, for that I really have to know [...] I think I have to live in Germany to feel the difference. I'm not so sure. I think maybe the German society is much more diverse in that sense, so I can imagine that there are German people who are even less tolerant than Hungarians, and people who are more tolerant [...] I would refrain from generalizing." The last Hungarian whom I had interviewed, Dorka Takácsy, responded, "Definitely, like 100%. [...]. I would say that they are much more constructive. I mean, I think they are kind of able to see different sides of the question at the same time, which we are pretty much unable to do. [...]."

The purpose of inquiring about interviewees' perceptions of Eastern Europeans versus other Europeans is for contextualization of the survey results. Of course, though, a more relevant question is, "What kinds of stories have you heard about how Germans view foreigners?". Not only did the interviewee from Indonesia have a negative view concerning xenophobia among Eastern Europeans, but she also had a negative perception of xenophobia among Germans themselves. She answered, "Pretty badly. They're racist, uh, they have a very severe attitude towards people of my color. […]. I have personally received being at the other end of that attitude during my visit to Germany. This is for, in terms of Germans in the big cities like Berlin and Munich. This is not the case for a small place like Pappenheim, where Germans are more 'smiley' towards you. I have had friends of my color in Germany who are extremely educated, being verbally discriminated against because of the way they look, by Germans." Likewise, Asad replied, "So I have a sister who lives in a

'suburb of a suburb' of Frankfurt. Where it's entirely white people. And my sister married into a Pakistani-German family […]. My nephew was badly bullied, he was harassed by his classmates […]. From what I've heard it was pretty scarring, and it breaks my heart […] my nieces say I wish I could be beautiful […] but instead I'm dark and brown […]. The school administration is generally very supportive of my sister […] but I think the incidents don't happen in a vacuum, these kids are learning these things somewhere […]. Because they're 2 – 3 hours away [from Frankfurt], they're more likely to experience this kind of discrimination." The interviewee from Turkey responded, "I can kind of answer this from the perspective of Turkish migrants living there. Well since there is a big integration problem in Germany, the perception against 'foreigners,' which are basically Turks, are not that good. They're kind of considered as a problem […] because they have problems of integration because they can't get used to 'Western' type of life. So I would say Germans have a […] problem living with immigrants, with foreigners […]." AlKhayrat replied, "It depends. Because like…I heard in eastern part of Germany, they really hate foreigners. In western, western Germans just follow the laws. They follow laws […] they are very nice with foreigners. I believe in that. It's my opinion. Because laws force them just to do that. Although there is a lot of nice people as well. Because in every nation you can find people who are nice…".

Kaposvári had a different take on the matter. Her answer was, "I've always worked for big international companies, most of my life, for German international companies. And I have to work based on my job with other cultures together all my life, which I think had me a lot not to have the same opinion that the average German or average Hungarian has, but of course, in Germany, we have a lot of jokes, mostly jokes, because nobody is ready to talk about something up front and directly that is

not politically correct […]. We have a lot of jokes […].” Bence Jenőfi’s corresponding answer was the following: “In general, I think they’re welcoming. It really depends on which part of Germany, I would say. Also, at what stage. I mean, like, what I’m pretty sure of is at first they’re welcoming you to enter the society, but obviously, they encourage you to learn German, for sure. It’s not like you can get away with English that easy. But to be honest it’s really hard to answer without having a German identity.” The Serbian had a similar response: “Um, […]. Well, I have a few friends from Germany, first of all. Two good friends. One lives in Freiburg […] one in Hamburg. From what I heard, the initial policy of the German state has tried to place migrants in rural areas, in villages. I think the idea was that they might more easily integrate. Also you might avoid the problem of ghettoes, in cities. But the reality is most of the migrants want to go to cities […]. You can see that [migrants] are separated in cities […]. There are so many Muslims, let’s say. Most of them are Muslims. Where I’ve been I haven’t seen that. A lot of people from Balkans integrated from the War, and they integrated pretty well. The only stories that I’ve heard […] is positive, but […] it’s not really a topic I know a lot about.” Furthermore, the Montenegrin said: “Well, that’s a big question. It sounds like quite a general one. If you think of stereotypes with Germans, you connect them with Nazis […]. My first answer would be that I tend to think of the capital, Berlin, and they are, as far as I know, Germans are not hostile towards immigrants. They’re very […] it’s hard to say multicultural country, but Berlin is definitely a city which has a number of communities from all parts of the world. So, uh, I wouldn’t imagine that the Germans are necessarily […] that they would have extraordinarily hostile stances towards, or negative stances towards immigrants. On the other hand, there is still a significant […]

radical right group of people who […] are definitely very negative towards immigrants […]. Depending on what you want to find, you can find anything, you can find pros, and cons […]. As for Khraisha: "Like on the side of the government, we have seen Syrian refugees, how she [Merkel] welcomed them, how she treated them very well, despite the fact that there has been attacks against immigrants. We have seen a very humanitarian position on the side of the government. The people are also very welcoming […]. Of course it has limits, if you just bring me millions of refugees, at some point, every nation would oppose this. But Germans are famous […] very welcoming, much more tolerant. The Canadian's response was…maybe slightly less complex. He said: "Only the two extremes. That they're either extremely welcoming, or anti-migrant fascists. Nothing in the middle, really […]." Takácsy had a somewhat similar response, though more nuanced. "I have relatives there," she began, "so I've heard also their stories. I've heard a lot how they are integrating through education, and through trainings […]. The refugees. Which I've heard they [Germans] have contradictory feelings for. They think it's a little unfair that they [refugees] get […] a lot more help. But also they are positive about it. Like, 'yes, we should help those people.'" For the interviewee from Russia, though, the accession of the AfD to the Bundestag did color her response. The Russian said, "Well, um, I heard some stories that Germany used to be an example of tolerance […] but the last election of the rising party […] threat narrative is increasing its popularity. […] I've been on this abandoned airport where they tried to settle migrants […]. Even German policy is not so ideal as it's supposed to be […] I know what this party did […] was the first party to appeal to the Russian diaspora in Germany and appeal to the feeling of otherness in Russians […] to increase their popularity

among Russian diaspora, who are very conservative, I think. […] German case used to be ideal […]. In practice, it still needs to work on […]."

As stated before, many of the survey respondents answered that, to a certain extent, the likelihood that they would purchase German products would decrease upon hearing news of xenophobic attacks in Germany. While interesting, it is not as telling as the reason why they would be discouraged, other than an understandable knee-jerk reaction. This is why respondents were asked, "From the survey, one of the questions was, 'If you hear reports of xenophobic activity from Germans in Germany, how much would this make you less likely to buy German products?' Would reports of anti-immigrant activity (i.e., attacks) in Germany affect how likely you would buy German products? Why or why not?". To this question, all respondents basically said that such reports would not affect their decision to purchase German products. The interviewee from Turkey said, "That wouldn't change my opinion about German products. I would buy it anyway." However, what the Turkish respondent said about migrants having trouble integrating is useful because, if the trend continues, he could very well be more discouraged from buying German products in the future, even if he is not in the present. Even the person from Indonesia replied, "It would not. I would still buy them. Because they [German products] are first class." This was interesting, given this person's reaction against xenophobia in Germany and Eastern Europe alike. However, it is important to be mindful of the difference between what transpires in Germany and what the German government itself may or may not promote. Khraisha expressed this just sentiment when he said, to this question, "So, uh, I think no, because for me, any kind of xenophobic acts, they come from people who are not usually productive. I would say they are the

most ignorant and the most stupid […]. So I would separate that. […].” Similarly, Takácsy said, “I think absolutely not. Since basically anti-migrant activities and German production itself have very little connection,” and the interviewee from Montenegro said, “No, it wouldn’t. I don’t form my consumer choices on such a basis. Why or why not? To be honest, I normally as a consumer don’t have time to think about all the implications of the products that I own […].” The Montenegrin added, “On the other hand, I think there’s lots of false moralizing behind these decisions […]. For instance, in the case of Germany, I might not buy German products, but I might buy U.S. products […]. ‘Trump won, I’m not going to buy U.S. products, whatever.’ There are still a number of reasons I shouldn’t buy the American one. So, long story short, that wouldn’t affect […].” AlKhayrat just said, “No. definitely not.”

Something important that colored Jenőfi’s response was the small fraction of people who commit xenophobic acts out of Germany’s total population. Specifically, Jenőfi answered, “Um, absolutely not. It would have zero impact on it, actually. I do not decide on what products I buy based on what I hear from the news […]. Germany has a population of 70 million or so […]. Sometimes I prefer Hungarian products over German […] because I prefer local ingredients. It’s not based on whether I prefer Germany or not, it’s just a preference of locality, and it has nothing to do with the people in the country.” Likewise, Mihajlovic answered, “First of all, I would always try to buy local anyways. But I don’t think this would play a big part in my decision. I don’t think so. I don’t think if I went to buy a product, […] anti-immigration laws as a factor […].” To the same question, Kaposvári replied, “I never decide to buy a product based on the origin. I buy products based on price-value ratio. I’m an economist. For me to sell bullsh** is

not so easy, I'm too much down-to-earth for that." Certainly, then, this underscores the fact that not changing one's consumption of goods from a country where xenophobia exists does not mean that people approve of xenophobia (ignoring the fact that xenophobia occurs in many more countries besides Germany). Additionally, there are those who would not change their consumption habits because of a lack of utilization of ethical consumption. Asad replied, "No, it wouldn't. It wouldn't affect it. Because […] first of all, I'm not that conscious of a consumer. There are lots of products I buy that are made not very ethically. And I also don't think it's fair that if the average German is behaving racist towards his countrymen, that I take it out on a German business […]. I don't think there's a direct link between German products and German racism." The Canadian answered, "No, I'm not a conscious consumer." Even the Russian interviewee, who began her response with, "I mean, now when you ask such a question, I would like to say that I want to emphasize myself as kind of conscious person, and I want to say, 'yes of course it would influence my patterns,'" continued with, "but in practice, it would not influence much. I would like to present myself as a conscious person, and say I would like to change it, but in practice, I will not sacrifice some kind of comfort to buy a high quality thing." However, to the question, "Do you think that if your skin was not white and you didn't come from where you came from, you would be treated differently in Germany?", without hesitating, the Canadian just said, "Yes." When I had inquired this of the Russian, she responded, "Yes, I would think so. I've been in Germany and, I mean, when they hear my accent, I can feel some kind of, sometimes, intolerance, or, I see the perception of people in headscarf, to be treated differently […]. I've been in Germany several times, and I stayed in

predominantly big cities, like Berlin and Leipzig […] I cannot evaluate the whole situation […], but the cases exist, especially in the small cities." Likewise, Mihajlovic responded, "Probably, yeah. I think so. Differently, for sure. What that means, whether this different is really, really bad, I don't know. But I would say differently, for sure. I think that's a reality all over the countries." This was an interesting point that Luka brought up. It was assumed in the questioning that people knew what was meant by "different treatment," but maybe this is not something that should necessarily be taken for granted. Lastly, to the question, "Do you think that if your skin was not white and you weren't European, you would be treated differently in Germany?", the Montenegrin replied, "No. Actually, I wouldn't say that […]. There is definitely a difference. Lots of people from my country, from the former Yugoslavia, came to Germany to work as *Gastarbeiters*, and they did face these kinds of issues. It was not based on racism, but there was some kind of reluctancy on the German side to engage […]. There could be a possibility […]. But again, Germany's a really big country, it's hard to generalize. Would it be possible? Yes, of course. […]. Would I be personally worried about that? I don't think so. Unless I lived in the countryside."

One of the things that makes Germany such an interesting case to study is how the country's Nazi past shaped Germany to this day. To the question, "Does the Holocaust/Nazism/World War II have any impact on how you view Germany," Jenőfi responded, "Um, not really. I mean, obviously, that's something you cannot forget, but I certainly can make a distinction between Germany back then and Germany now. So obviously, just because somebody is German does not mean someone is a Nazi […]. And it's important to point out that Hungary collaborated with Germany in that period. […]. Xenophobia has always been an issue in

Hungary and every society as well […]. I would definitely not say that Nazism has any impact on how I view Germany today." To the same question, Kaposvári replied, "I think everybody has bad feelings about it, even if I had nothing to do with it, and based on that everybody feels that we have to be more cautious not to make the same mistake again, or not to let the politicians do the same mistake again." To this question, Takácsy replied, "I think, personally not. […]. As for today's Germany, I would say not."

Even if all of the interviewees were from the CEU community, none of their sets of responses was identical. First, respondents' answers regarding xenophobia in Germany were more or less benign or positive, except for the respondents who had negative experiences because of their (or their family members') skin colors. Of course, this is not to say that all non-white CEU interviewees would necessarily respond that they had similar negative experiences in Germany or with Germans, if applicable. However, the fact that the white and ethnically European respondents answered more positively compared to the non-white respondents is telling. What is particularly interesting is the Indonesian's response specifically regarding xenophobia in the big cities compared to the small towns. As opposed to the conventional wisdom that the phenomenon of xenophobia is much more prevalent and intense in the small German towns, especially in the former East Germany, the Indonesian had the opposite experience of encountering more xenophobia in the big cities.

Even though none of the interviewees said that they would be deterred from purchasing products in Germany based on reports of xenophobia in Germany, many respondents in the survey responded that xenophobia in Germany would discourage them from doing so. This is most likely because,

compared to the number of respondents in the survey, the number of interviewees was quite small. Additionally, though, no one from the U.S. was interviewed, and U.S. respondents had the highest average among country groups regarding the answer to the survey's second question. Of course, this is not to say that any of the interviewees thought that xenophobia was irrelevant, let alone a positive thing. For one, multiple interviewees admitted that they were not conscious consumers. More importantly, though, regarding consumption decisions in reaction to xenophobia, consumer movements to oppose xenophobia have not really taken off, thereby making inattention to xenophobia when buying products that much more understandable. Movements have transpired to make people more mindful of free vs. fair trade and environmental impact, so whether or not xenophobia is present in a country where products come from is not necessarily something that occupies consumers' minds. There is the quality of German goods to take into consideration as well. German products are known for their quality, as underscored by the Indonesian interviewee's response to the question of whether or not her consumption of German products would be affected by reports of xenophobia in Germany. Currently, anyway, a bigger consideration for consumers, as far as German products, and all products across-the-board, is most likely price of goods.

4.) Conclusion

In a vacuum, the fact that xenophobia in Germany exists does not distinguish the country. In many countries across the continent of Europe, as well as in many other countries, xenophobia is alive and well. This is one of the reasons why it would not make sense to begin a campaign against product consumption that would target only Germany. The government of Germany makes some effort to denounce xenophobia, even though the German government may inadvertently cause or allow xenophobic sentiments through social and economic policies, such as persistent lower wages in the former East Germany. What is distinctive about Germany is that, in spite of the measures that the German government has taken to discourage empowerment of nationalism and xenophobia, not to mention the fact that much of the German public takes similar caution to be mindful of the past, xenophobia still persists. Although xenophobia in Germany is not new, and there is certainly a lot of literature available on the subject, xenophobia's economic effects are largely understudied. The reason for this is that xenophobia in the country had not been studied in earnest until after the Cold War, so the phenomenon's economic effects are still being played out. Additionally, the already existing analyses that do relate to xenophobia's economic effects, even tangentially, may be guilty of omitted variable bias. Further research, though, can establish whether or not there is a causal link between xenophobia and Germany's economy (and how much of one there is).

As the survey indicates, there are certainly people who think that xenophobia is not present in Germany. Consequently, an obstacle is created in not only studying something that not everyone agrees is persistent or prevalent, but also in studying this phenomenon's (xenophobia's) effects on an additional thing (i.e., the German economy). Regardless, though, because most of the research regarding xenophobia in

Germany is relatively recent, excluding, of course, the Nazi era and the Second World War, it is perhaps too early to tell how exactly xenophobia affects Germany's economy. However, to an extent, and in certain cases, one can make relatively accurate projections of how xenophobia in a country such as Germany can alter the country's economy. For instance, take the responses in the survey itself. Many respondents said that reports of xenophobia in Germany would decrease the likelihood that they would purchase products from the country. Many of the respondents who said that they would be discouraged from doing so were from the U.S., and in 2017, the U.S. happened to be the highest importer of German goods. Therefore, it is not hard to see that, if xenophobia in Germany increases enough (and, of course, becomes sufficiently publicized), then consumption of German products by the same types of people who said that xenophobia would discourage such consumption could significantly decrease. Larger studies, though, need to test better for representativeness.

Needless to say, respondents' answers have implications because respondents are also consumers. What is an unfortunate by-product of a social phenomenon that many studies consider to be neutral, then, is exacerbation of sentiments that ultimately have negative results for the German economy. This does not mean, though, that such results are inevitable. If in-migration of foreigners to Germany is, in many respects, not detrimental to Germany's economy, then German policymakers could make more of an effort to mitigate the very thing that indirectly makes migration into Germany a negative phenomenon (i.e., xenophobia). If German laborers who are employed in the types of jobs that are the most threatened because of technological innovation and globalization are also the most guilty of harboring xenophobic attitudes, then

Germany's government could implement policies that not only support non-Germans, but these German laborers (who have less of an income) as well.

Under certain circumstances, Germans are correct to have economic anxieties in the face of large influxes of individuals who were not previously accounted for in the population. Yet, in the cities of Freiburg and Cottbus, while the decisions by the city governments to stop the influx of refugees most likely did not result from anti-migrant sentiments in and of themselves, the decisions vindicated elements in the cities that were xenophobic. Additionally, the tensions that transpired did not take place simply because of the overconcentration of people, but between refugees and native Germans. In Cottbus, the residents had planned anti-migrant demonstrations, which seamlessly feed into and give way to legitimate xenophobic sentiments.[78] Therefore, anti-migrant forces can use the example of an inordinate influx of out-group individuals to a city or cities in Germany, resulting in displacement or replacement of native labor, to support the argument that the existence of immigration to any extent damages a country's economy and image. This latter issue that people take with immigrants and multiculturalism is where the problem lies. As underscored by the xenophobia in the states that constitute the former East Germany, with the exception of the eastern portion of Berlin, there was a lower ratio of migrants to natives compared to the states in western Germany. It is certainly probable that less exposure to foreigners accounts a lot for the actions and words against the non-native population in the small towns in the former East Germany. This, though, would corroborate the assertion that economic anxiety directed at non-Germans is misplaced. Something else that created enmity towards non-Germans in the former East Germany was that, after the Berlin Wall's destruction, many Germans living in the former East

[78] RT, "'We're not xenophobic, we have no space': 2 German cities ban new refugees amid violence."

Germany migrated to the former West Germany. The government of the newly unified country tried to compensate for this by recruiting non-native laborers to fill these newly vacated positions. Unfortunately for these foreign laborers, though, their recruitment coincided with a higher demand of labor skills, resulting in failure to fill these positions with foreign labor, thereby contributing to the notion among certain Germans that foreigners are not productive members of their society. While the concern of too many people using space and services is understandable, xenophobia oftentimes becomes exacerbated regardless. It is a large leap to start from legitimate concerns over the German labor force's carrying capacity to an outright embrace of xenophobic narratives. This is oftentimes the line of thought that many Germans have embraced, as evidenced by the AfD's entry into the Bundestag.

Regarding the extent to which the German government's decision in 2015 to open its borders to the Syrian refugees was criticized and panned, it is not likely that Merkel would do this again, in no small part due to the fact that it has become such a political liability. Therefore, as of now, such a decision can be treated as an aberration in German immigration policy. In normal circumstances, migrants to Germany seem to have, at worst, a benign impact overall on the German economy. If immigrants do find employment in Germany, they contribute to the economy regardless. If they do not find employment, then there is no threat of native labor being displaced or replaced, though, oftentimes, more people in Germany means more money that the federal government must spend on welfare. However, as the survey suggests, the economic effects of xenophobia in Germany may prove to be worse than benign, especially if it becomes more and more prevalent and outsiders become more concerned about its growth in relation to how Germany has ostensibly internalized the lessons of the past.

Because of the much higher influx of immigrants and refugees since 2015, perhaps a bigger issue is the carrying capacity of a finite amount of space. Certainly, as the halting of immigration in Cottbus and Freiburg underscores, this concern is genuine and legitimate. However, what can happen with this concern is spillover to other matters in the minds of many Germans: an uncharacteristically large influx of migrants puts pressure on Germany's carrying capacity, which lends itself to the interpretation that this must also be bad for Germany's economy, especially when coupled with cherry-picked employment data. Going out in public amongst larger and larger crowds may be off-putting for some Germans, yet, at the end of the day, people still need to go out and consume, so the economic effect of large numbers of migrants entering Germany may be exaggerated in this context. What certainly has stronger implications for Germany's economy, though, is migration's negative effect of exacerbated xenophobia. Likewise, the very fear that migrant labor would displace or replace native labor implies a more general aversion towards people from other countries "stealing labor." Therefore, what exacerbates the population issue on a fundamental level, for some Germans, at least, is aversion to the "Other."

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