Political Tolerance in Modern Day America

By

Katherine Daniel

Submitted to

Central European University Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

> Thesis Supervisor Levente Littvay

Budapest, Hungary 2016

Abstract

In this thesis I investigate where political intolerance is greater within the American demographic. I first discuss how to define political tolerance and whether it is an essential trait for citizens to have in order for their democracy to thrive. I then review the existing literature on political tolerance and suggest my own hypotheses as to which demographic groups are more likely to exhibit politically tolerant attitudes. The analysis was conducted using multiple multivariate logistic regressions in a fixed-group methodology. This method asked about political tolerance toward Atheists, Racists, Communists, Militarists, Homosexuals, and anti-American Muslim Clergymen. I find that respondents to the 2014 General Social Survey are more likely to be politically tolerant with higher educational attainment. Conversely, greater religiosity, political conservatism, and Democratic Party affiliation all increase the likelihood of intolerance, as does a respondent's age and female gender. Adherents to Western religions are likewise more likely to be politically intolerant, as are members of non-white racial groups. Socioeconomic status, region, and urbanism have little to no effect on impacting respondents' likelihood to express political intolerance.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Levente Littvay, for his help and moral support in getting this thesis to the finish line. I would like to thank my parents for supporting my studies and for their help in getting me to Hungary on a week's notice. I would like to thank my sister Elizabeth and best friend Kelly for offering their unconditional support and, in the case of the former, sending me cat videos to remind me that a greater world exists outside thesis writing. I should thank Garrett for that as well, and also for being my constant companion throughout this entire writing process. Last but not least, I would like to thank all of my brilliant colleagues and professors for making the 2015 school year an incredible, insightful, and unforgettable experience.

Table of Contents

Abstract i
Acknowledgmentsii
List of Tables and Figuresv
1. Introduction
1.1 An Overview of the Present-Day United States1
1.2 Research Question and Thesis Outline
2. State of the Art and Theory
2.1 What is Political Tolerance and Why is it Important?
2.2 Political Tolerance, Then and Now10
2.3 Hypotheses Regarding Political Tolerance in the American Demographic
2.3.1 Education and Socioeconomic Status 15
2.3.2 Urbanism and Race
2.3.3 Religion, Region, and Gender
2.3.4 Age
2.3.5 Political Ideology and Party
2.4 Chapter Summary
3. Methodology
3.1 Different Methods and Their Limitations
3.2 Description of the Data
3.3 Description of the Analysis
3.4 Chapter Summary
4. Results and Discussion
4.1 Results and Interpretation
4.1.1 Atheists
4.1.2 Racists

4.1.3 Communists	. 51
4.1.4 Militarists	. 55
4.1.5 Homosexuals	. 56
4.1.6 Anti-American Muslim Clergymen	. 63
4.2 Discussion	. 66
4.3 Chapter Summary	. 69
5. Conclusion	. 71
Appendix	. 75
References	. 79

List of Tables and Figures

Table 2.1 General Support for Democratic Values in 2014	17
Figure 2.1 Percentage of Respondents with Higher Education by Class	18
Figure 2.2 Percentage of the Urban Population by Decade in the U.S.	21
Table 2.2 Percentage Educational Attainment by Race, 2016	23
Table 2.3 Religion and Religiosity by Region	26
Table 4.1 Results for Political Tolerance toward Atheists: Free Speech	43
Table 4.2 Results for Political Tolerance toward Atheists: Right to Work	44
Table 4.3 Results for Political Tolerance toward Atheists: Free Press	45
Table 4.4 Results for Political Tolerance toward Racists: Free Speech	47
Table 4.5 Results for Political Tolerance toward Racists: Right to Work	49
Table 4.6 Results for Political Tolerance toward Racists: Free Press	50
Table 4.7 Results for Political Tolerance toward Communists: Free Speech	52
Table 4.8 Results for Political Tolerance toward Communists: Right to Work	53
Table 4.9 Results for Political Tolerance toward Communists: Free Press	54
Table 4.10 Results for Political Tolerance toward Militarists: Free Speech	58
Table 4.11 Results for Political Tolerance toward Militarists: Right to Work	59
Table 4.12 Results for Political Tolerance toward Militarists: Free Press	60
Table 4.13 Results for Political Tolerance toward Homosexuals: Free Speech	60
Table 4.14 Results for Political Tolerance toward Homosexuals: Right to Work	61
Table 4.15 Results for Political Tolerance toward Homosexuals: Free Press	62
Table 4.16 Results for Political Tolerance toward Muslims: Free Speech	64
Table 4.17 Results for Political Tolerance toward Muslims: Right to Work	65
Table 4.18 Results for Political Tolerance toward Muslims: Free Press	65
Table 1A. Description of Explanatory Variables and Associated Survey Questions	75
Table 2A. Description of Response Variables and Associated Survey Questions	75
Table 3A. Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables	78

1. Introduction

1.1 An Overview of the Present-Day United States

For the last ten years, the popular democracy index Freedom House has noticed an alarming trend: Countries are more often revoking political rights and civil liberties than they are granting and protecting them (Puddington and Roylance 2016). Not even the United States, a purported bastion of democracy, is immune to this trend; in fact, a number of scholars (i.e. Carothers, Diamond, Fukuyama, Kagan, and Levitsky and Way in 2015) have remarked that democracy is in crisis partly because the American political system has so publicly been plagued with issues in recent years. While the United States continues to receive the highest ratings for its political rights and civil liberties, Freedom House does note in its 2016 country report that the United States' aggregate score for these freedoms is worsening. It cites such issues as a flawed electoral system, a government corrupted by private money, a lack of political transparency, renewed racial tensions, and a poorly functioning criminal justice system as reasons for this decline ("Freedom in the World" 2016).

These issues have not escaped the attention of ordinary Americans. In the last few years, a spate of fatal incidences involving members of the black community and the police has reignited controversy over racial double standards in the criminal justice system. Deadly rampages involving firearms have left many Americans feeling unsafe in their communities, even as some feel that having a weapon is becoming increasingly imperative to combat day-today violence, terrorism, and to revolt against the government if need be. Hostility towards immigrants and refugees has likewise increased out of fear for the financial and physical security of American citizens. Meanwhile, discussions over gender inequality have been revived in the wake of attempts to regulate women's access to healthcare and amid allegations of unequal treatment in the workplace and courtroom.

That is not to say that the United States has not simultaneously made strides in extending equal liberties to marginalized groups. Just last year the Supreme Court mandated that same-sex marriage be legalized nationwide. But even the Court's pro-LGBTQ stance has been met with a sizeable backlash, indicating that a portion of the populace finds it wrong that the same liberties it enjoys have been extended to a traditionally disliked group.

Intolerance is nothing new to the United States, and there are plenty of stereotypes concerning tolerance in certain factions of the demographic. For instance, conservatives have long had a reputation for being intolerant towards those who deviate from their traditional view of the world. Conversely, liberals tend to champion such groups' right to equal liberties and to accord them greater respect within society; however, the issues described above have only served to sharpen the divide between liberals and conservatives, to the point that "ideological silos" have formed between the two groups. The median Democrat is now more liberal than in the past, the median Republican is likewise more conservative, and the two groups are less likely to intermingle in social settings (Doherty 2014). Nor is society only divided politically and ideologically. It is often divided by education level, income, place of residence, race, religion, gender, and age. These kinds of social cleavages can actually act as a stabilizing factor in democracies because they encourage a struggle for power—Lipset (1981) calls this aspect of democracy its "life-blood"—but such struggles pose an inherent threat that group conflicts "may solidify to the point where they threaten to disintegrate the society" (p.71).

With the American public as divided as it is along these lines, citizens have increasingly become intolerant toward views that challenge their own values and beliefs. In doing so, they

may inadvertently act to constrain freedom by raising the cost of voicing contrarian opinions (Gibson 2013, p.413). While stereotypes hold that conservatives tend to be more intolerant, those with more liberal views have also displayed "an illiberal streak that flows from flaws in their well-intentioned ideology" (Friedersdorf 2015, par. 3). Acceptance of and equality for marginalized groups has become the dominant attitude of these liberal-minded individuals, but their quest to ensure that everyone receives equal rights also makes them fast to condemn anyone with a remotely differing view. Indeed, Schafer and Shaw (2009) note that social tolerance toward most out-groups has gone up, but tolerance toward the intolerant, such as racists, has gone down.

The presidential election, a normally polarizing event in itself, has further exacerbated social and political divides. The rise of candidates like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, and the lukewarm acceptance of career politician Hillary Clinton as the Democratic nominee, indicate that there is a strong dissatisfaction with the way the country has been going. What was true in Doherty's 2014 report on polarization in the U.S. is even more pertinent in 2016: Members of both political parties see the other as a "threat to the nation's well-being" (par.3).

Prominent social scientists such as Lipset (1981) have expressed concerns that an ineffective government and a deeply split society can lessen a democracy's legitimacy and destabilize it to the point of dissolution; however, democracy has endured in the United States for almost two and a half centuries, and its freedoms are an integral part of American culture. The cleavages in American society therefore seem to stem more from arguments about how and to whom political rights and civil liberties are meted out, rather than whether the institutions that protect them should exist at all. Therefore, Herbert McClosky (1964) may have been right in saying that:

"Among Americans...the principle danger is not that they will reject democratic ideals in favor of some hostile ideology, but that they will fail to understand the very institutions they believe themselves to be defending and may end up undermining rather than safeguarding them" (p.376-77).

1.2 Research Question and Thesis Outline

In today's polarized political climate, the question remains as to where in the American demographic would individuals be willing to deny rights and liberties to others whose views differ from their own. To my knowledge, a formal investigation of political tolerance has yet to be conducted within the context of the present-day United States. This thesis will seek to address this gap by providing an updated analysis on the levels of political tolerance present in different aspects of the demographic.

This chapter has provided a brief background into why the subject of political tolerance is especially pertinent in today's political climate. With the worrisome thought that Americans may deny some groups their full political rights and civil liberties in order to have their own values made into policy, the extent to which Americans are devoted to democratic norms and principles deserves a more stringent analysis in the present-day period.

To support this analysis, Chapter Two will provide a discussion on what political tolerance is, why it is important, and past research on the subject, before suggesting a number of hypotheses as to which demographic sectors should display more or less political tolerance. In Chapter Three I will discuss the most common methodologies used to analyze political tolerance and their limitations, before laying out my own research design, including a description of the data and how the analysis was conducted. Chapter Four will interpret and discuss the results of

the analysis, and concluding remarks and suggestions for further research will be made in Chapter Five.

2. State of the Art and Theory

2.1 What is Political Tolerance and Why is it Important?

Simply put, political tolerance is the willingness to allow the political participation of groups that one opposes or rejects (Sullivan et al. 1982, p.2). According to Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982), the concept of religious tolerance originated in Europe as a reaction to the continent's countless religious conflicts. Just as religious tolerance was encouraged to promote a more peaceful coexistence among different religions, the concept of political tolerance was born to encourage the acceptance of conflicting political ideas among the people of a shared territory. In the United States, this concept is of special importance owing to the country's religious and ethnic diversity and its liberal democratic tradition that was adopted to protect this diversity.

In theory, liberal democracy permits all groups to engage in the "marketplace of ideas" (Gibson 2011, p.411), even if these ideas are hateful or offensive towards others. In a liberal democracy, policies are implemented based on the majority's preferences and politicians held accountable if they act counter to these preferences. It is also a political system that allows minority groups to voice their opinions, with the hope that their preferences will be made into policy in the future. For this system to function properly, all members of the majority and minority are granted a set of constitutionally-protected political rights and civil liberties (for an in-depth discussion of constitutionalism, see Murphy 1993, Preuss 1994, Elster 1995, and Grimm 2012).

These allow citizens to vote, form political parties, run for office, and express themselves on political issues and personal lifestyle preferences as equals under the law and without undue government interference. These freedoms that are generally associated with liberal democracy are considered to be its principles, or what democracy stands for, while such aspects as inclusion and contestation are its procedural norms, or how democracy works. Citizens are politically tolerant when they support all groups in their right to fully enjoy these freedoms as the procedural norms allow them to do.

However, the concept of political tolerance has a tendency to be ambiguously and biasedly defined. Because no one wants to be considered intolerant, ordinary citizens and political scientists alike tend to describe the concept in ways that make their own actions seem more tolerant. It is also often conflated with a lack of prejudice and a progressive mindset in the members of a polity (Sullivan et al. 1982, p.3). This is misleading because political tolerance "has to do with what one expects of the state, not of oneself" (Gibson 2011, p.417). It is therefore possible to strongly dislike a certain group, for instance African-Americans or Muslims, but still advocate for the protection of their rights.¹ While slightly counterintuitive, such a situation would still demonstrate the health of a democracy because its citizens would still be complying with procedural norms and placing a strong value on democratic principles.

In his analysis of democracy in mid-nineteenth century America, Alexis de Tocqueville $(2004)^2$ suggested that among the necessary conditions for a democracy to succeed, the most important was that its citizens view the principles of liberal democracy as integral aspects of its culture and society. More than a century later, political theorists Griffith, Plamenatz, and Pennock (1956) proposed a similar idea that democracy requires a number of cultural prerequisites to thrive. In their view, democracy was not only "a set of political institutions," but also a set of "manners and morals" and "ways of thinking and feeling" that complement those

¹ Gibson (2011, p.49 fn.2) further remarks that dislike for certain groups, when not discussed in a political context, is more accurately conceptualized as social tolerance and that the two concepts should be kept separate. To minimize confusion, this thesis will utilize "political tolerance" and "tolerance" interchangeably and will indicate when other forms of tolerance are being discussed.

² Originally published in 1835.

institutions (p.115). Essentially, it is necessary for citizens to value democratic principles and to behave in ways that are supportive of them.

Neubauer (1967) later recognized this as a psychological prerequisite for a successful democracy. Because citizens' preferences can vary broadly, he identified two primary conditions for democracy's maintenance: 1) widespread communication among competing groups so that they might combine shared preferences to form a majority, and 2) socialization into the procedural norms of democracy, which he termed "the rules of the game" (p.1002). This latter condition permits minority groups to accept the victory of the majority because they trust that they will have future opportunities to participate in politics and that the majority will not deny them their rights in the meantime (ibid). Socialization into democracy's procedural norms therefore generates mass support for democratic principles by creating a consensus on their inherent importance to a society. Political tolerance is often associated with these discussions on mass support for democracy and its freedoms because it "plays a central role in the civic orientation that most theorists believe is a necessary condition for a thriving democracy" (Sullivan and Transue 1999, p.627).

The study of political tolerance first gained traction in the United States during the 1950s. With the onset of the Cold War, Americans began to fear that communists would undermine the democratic principles on which their way of life was built. The ensuing era of McCarthyism inspired Samuel Stouffer to question whether the "widespread political repression being undertaken in the name of protecting America and its values...was supported by ordinary people" (Gibson 2011, p.409). Stouffer's (1955) research resulted in a seminal study of political tolerance, in which he discovered that an overwhelming number of citizens would be willing to deny communists their political rights and civil liberties.

Shortly after, Prothro and Grigg (1960) conducted an analysis on support for fundamental democratic principles. Centered on two college communities in Michigan and Florida, they discovered that "consensus can be said to exist among the voters on the basic principles of democracy when they are put in abstract terms" (p.284). When asked about specific situations, however, a majority of participants were unwilling to extend political rights and civil liberties to ideologically-unpopular groups or ethnic minorities. McClosky (1964) reported similar results, and also found that "political influentials" were more tolerant than the general electorate.

These initial studies into political tolerance "called into question two fundamental assumptions of democratic theorists" (Sullivan and Transue 1999, p.628). The first was that Americans were being properly socialized to adhere to the rules of the game, where they support democratic principles in more than just their abstract forms. The second was that this national socialization was even strictly necessary, given that democracy in the United States had endured despite pervasive political intolerance (ibid). This is not the first time scholars have questioned these assumptions: Pennock may have emphasized the importance of a "willingness to compromise" and "tolerance" as necessary cultural conditions (Griffith et al. 1956, p.125), but his colleague, Plamenatz, did not find tolerance to be a sufficient condition for a democracy's success. He cited how even de Tocqueville was struck by Americans' intolerance toward others, which the latter found to be "quite compatible with a passion for freedom and the rights of man" (ibid).

Thus, debate surrounds whether or not political tolerance is an indispensable trait for citizens of a democracy to have if it is to be successful; however, while Plamenatz did not consider it a strict condition, he did concede that its lack thereof can still be "fatal to democracy" (ibid, p.127). McClosky (1964) expressed a more optimistic opinion about the ability of the

American democracy to survive despite its notorious lack of political tolerance, but he similarly warned that a nation will continue to run risks "when a large number of its citizens fail to grasp the essential principles on which its constitution is founded" (p.376).

2.2 Political Tolerance, Then and Now

Stouffer's (1955) watershed study confirmed his suspicion that Americans were more than willing to deny disfavored groups—communists, in this instance—their liberties and to exclude them from the political process. These findings were reiterated in the next decade by Prothro and Grigg (1960) and McClosky's (1964) studies of Americans' general support for democratic principles. Subsequent studies reproducing Stouffer's analysis (i.e. Davis 1975; Nunn et al. 1978) suggested that Americans' political tolerance was increasing; however, critics of his "fixed-group" methodology claim that this optimistic conclusion is only applicable to the question of tolerance toward communists and other left-leaning groups. Because concerns over such groups have lessened since the 1950s, it is only natural that political intolerance towards them has likewise decreased.

In 1982, Sullivan and his colleagues decided to test Americans' political tolerance toward a variety of disliked groups. Their "least-liked" methodology first asked Americans to identify the group they disliked the most, then asked whether or not they would accord members of that group their political rights and civil liberties. Their findings suggested that political intolerance remained quite widespread. Furthermore, factions of the demographic that had traditionally been considered more tolerant, such as the wealthy, more-educated, politically engaged, and nonreligious, to name a few, were not immune to expressions of intolerance. It instead appeared that Americans had switched their willingness to deprive democratic freedoms onto different groups, with the "radical and racist right" drawing more ire in response to these groups' growing political influence and popularity in the 1970s and 80s (Sullivan and Hendriks 2009, p.377).

Following Sullivan et al.'s (1982) groundbreaking invention of the least-liked methodology, Gibson continued to investigate the theory of pluralistic intolerance and extended the field into the former Soviet Union and South Africa (see Gibson 1985, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1996a & b, 1997, 1998a & b, 2006, 2011, 2013; Gibson and Bingham 1982; Gibson and Duch 1993; Gibson and Gouws 1999, 2000, 2003). Sullivan and Hendriks (2009) credit Gibson's prolific research for having "broadened and deepened our understanding of political tolerance and how to measure it" (p.378).

Among Gibson's studies are those addressing the purported link between general support for democratic principles and tolerance (Gibson 2002; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Gibson and Howard 2007), and threat and tolerance (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; Gibson 1995). After the first studies into general support were conducted in the 1960s, Lawrence (1976) found that "[1]arge majorities of respondents with tolerant general norms apply them consistently in specific situations" (p.99), a result that was later corroborated by Sullivan et al. (1982). More recent analyses of political tolerance in Post-Soviet states find that general support for democratic principles has a lesser bearing on the tolerance displayed in specific situations. Guérin et al. (2004) and Hinckley (2010) put this down to a lack of socialization into and experience with democracy's principles and norms, while Gibson (2011) suggests that years of being deprived of majority rule in government has made citizens reluctant to put up with unpopular minority views (p.419).

These explanations no doubt draw from earlier psychological studies. Scholars have long remarked on the importance of personality traits and upbringing in determining a person's political tolerance, including influencing his or her capacity to internalize democratic norms and principles. As Sullivan and Hendriks (2009, p.379) nicely summarize, the study of personality and tolerance began in 1950 with Adorno et al.'s identification of the authoritarian personality type. Stouffer (1955) and Rokeach (1960) went on to investigate rigid categorization and dogmatism, respectively, while Sniderman (1975) explored the link between self-esteem and the ability to learn social norms. Costa and McCrae (1985) later developed the NEO-PI test to measure the five main dimensions of personality, three of which—neuroticism, extraversion, and openness to experience—Marcus et al. (1995) determined were particularly useful at predicting levels of political tolerance (Sullivan and Transue 1999, p.634). These studies, according to Sullivan and Hendriks (2009), demonstrate that "certain types of individuals quite clearly find it to be more of a challenge to tolerate those with whom they strongly disagree" (p.379).

As well as influencing a person's ability to learn democratic values, these personality characteristics have also been found to influence a person's perceived level of threat (ibid). Certain dispositional attributes, like neuroticism and authoritarianism, can cause a propensity for paranoia in individuals with these traits. More current studies of the latter-mentioned personality type, such as those by Feldman (2003) and Stenner (2005), have shown that "authoritarianism and perceptions of environmental stress interact in creating intolerance" (Gibson 2011, p.419). By contrast, those lacking in authoritarianism should experience increased political tolerance in the presence of threatening environmental factors.

However, this opposite reaction has been disputed a number of times. Sullivan et al. (1982) suggested that non-authoritarians are similarly intolerant, except that they "do not tolerate groups they view as intolerant" and justify their intolerance as such (p.250). Hetherington, in conjunction with Weiler (2009) and Suhay (2011), takes this argument a step further by claiming

that authoritarians, regardless of a perceived increase in environmental threat, do not become more intolerant than they already are. Instead, those who are not normally authoritarian tend to display greater intolerance and aggression when they believe themselves to be under increased threat. This finding falls more in line with Gibson's (2006, 2013) remarks that threat acts exogenously from other determinants of political tolerance. Whatever the mechanisms behind this link, threat is widely considered to be the "single most important predictor of intolerance" (Gibson 2006, p.22).

Tolerance trends in the 1990s suggested that Americans were becoming more accepting of the expression of unpopular ideas (Wilson 1994). Since the events of 9/11, however, political intolerance appears to have increased along with a heightened perception of threat (Sullivan and Hendriks 2009; Hetherington and Suhay 2011). A more recent study of social tolerance trends found that tolerance for Muslims has decreased dramatically since 2001, along with a slighter reduction in tolerance towards immigrants and racists. All other groups—feminists, homosexuals, militarists, and atheists—have experienced greater social tolerance in the United States, most notably with the mainstream acceptance of the LGBTQ community (Schafer and Shaw 2009). The antipathy towards Muslims is not limited to the United States either; a study conducted in Denmark found pervasive political intolerance toward Muslims, fundamental and "ordinary" alike, because of the perception that Islam is associated with violent acts and a disregard for democratic values (Petersen et al. 2010, p.596).

Based on these trends, Shafer and Shaw (2009) note that "it remains quite possible that Americans have shifted their intolerance toward other least-liked groups" (p.404), rather than having become more tolerant overall. The question now becomes which of these groups are subjects of political intolerance and by whom. When Stouffer conducted his study in the 1950s, he focused mainly on socioeconomic and demographic variables to explain the existence of political intolerance in the population. His findings, drawn from over 6000 survey participants from various walks of life, found that a person's status in his community, size of the community, region of habitation in the U.S., level of education, age, sex, church attendance, and political party affiliation affected political tolerance toward nonconforming attitudes. Since then, psychological variables have been found to have a greater direct influence on a person's level of tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1982; Gibson 2013, p.59). These range from personality characteristics to the capacity to learn social norms, the influence these have on a person's ability to internalize democratic norms and values, to his or her perception of threat. In the absence of character traits that make individuals more predisposed to paranoia, environmental factors can also impact a person's sense of safety, leading them to express less political tolerance towards those groups they perceive to be threatening.

Most of the original variables used in Stouffer's (1955) analysis are no longer considered to be determinants of individuals' political tolerance; however, the demographic variables he identified can still be used to ascertain where political intolerance tends to manifest itself. The next section will suggest a number of hypotheses as to which sectors of the population are more likely to exhibit political intolerance in the present-day United States.

2.3 Hypotheses Regarding Political Tolerance in the American Demographic

Following World War II, the United States underwent a period of rapid economic development that has since been shown to induce "predictable changes in culture and social and political life" (Inglehart and Baker 2000, p.21). These changes include a better-educated

populace and a higher standard of learning, occupation specialization, and greater personal wealth. In turn, these eventually generate a post-material society with increased secularization, self-expression, and a gradual evolution away from traditional gender roles, sexual norms, and acquiescence of authority (ibid).

Although developing countries tend to follow this trajectory, the extent to which these changes occur varies and is dependent upon the institutions that are already embedded in a given society. Americans, for instance, appear to have retained a more traditional set of values and beliefs than equally-as-developed nations going into the twenty-first century, and they continue to be influenced by the United States' largely Protestant heritage (ibid, p.49). Yet, as the first country to enter this post-industrial phase, it is hard to deny that the U.S. *has* undergone this transition, leading to pockets in American society that display great levels of political tolerance and conversely, very little. This section will set out a number of hypotheses regarding the effects of education, class, urbanism, race, religion, region, gender, age, and political ideology and parties in influencing a person's level of political tolerance.

2.3.1 Education and Socioeconomic Status

Among the most studied aspects of political tolerance is the effect of education. In support of Stouffer's claim that education increases political tolerance, Prothro and Grigg (1960) similarly found that a higher level of education does appear to have a positive effect on "correct" democratic attitudes. A few years later, McClosky (1964) argued that the majority of Americans "[1]acked the intellectual equipment necessary to assess complex political events accurately" (p.379), but he acknowledged that he was writing during a period of rapid development in the United States. This led him to predict that improvements to the American education system and

increased educational attainment would help "beget a more articulate population and a more numerous class of political influentials" with a stronger commitment to the liberties that constitute democracy (ibid).

Stouffer's results have been criticized for his focus on left-leaning groups, with Sullivan et al. (1982) positing that education was only positively associated with tolerance because the well-educated were already more disposed to tolerate communism. In contrast, the less-educated were more threatened by it and other nontraditional views, making them more willing to limit these groups' political rights and civil liberties (Sullivan and Hendriks 2009, p.378). Copycat analyses by Davis (1975) and Nunn et al. (1978) have likewise been criticized for reporting that better education had increased citizens' political tolerance when in reality, dislike for communists had decreased.

Still, studies have found that support for abstract democratic norms and principles is higher among the more-educated, regardless of their status in society (Dynes 1967; Lawrence 1976), and that this general support has a strong positive relationship with political tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1982). Coupled with improvements in education, the populace does appear to have become more willing to put up with ideas it opposes (Lawrence 1976; Bobo and Licari 1989; Wilson 1994). The reason for this, as McClosky (1964) predicted and Bobo and Licari (1989) claim, is that "education is associated with more sophisticated styles of reasoning" that allow for greater internalization and comprehension of the rules of the game (p.305-6).

The percentage of the population that has achieved a high school diploma or completed a college degree has steadily increased since the U.S. Census Bureau began collecting data in 1940. As of last year, 88% of adults had achieved a high school diploma or GED and 33% had at least a bachelor's degree (Ryan and Bauman 2016, p.4). Despite this and the assertion that

greater education would lead to greater general support for democratic principles and norms, Americans do not appear to place greater importance on them. As seen in Table 2.1, the percentage of 2014 General Social Survey (GSS)³ respondents placing high importance on the asked-about liberties barely surpasses half, if even that.

Table 2.1 General Support for Democratic Values in 2014

How important is it that	% Very Important	
now important is it that	(N = 1262)	
Government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities?	57.05	
All citizens have an adequate standard of living?	56.58	
People be given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making?	50.63	
Governments respect democratic rights whatever the circumstances?	48.18	
Citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose government actions?	17.59	

Data from the GSS Data Explorer

A number of studies Sullivan has been involved in (i.e. Sullivan et al. 1994; Thalhammer et al. 1994; Wood et al. 1994) discovered that "an education that explicitly ties these abstract principles to their application can make a very great difference in actual levels of tolerance" (Sullivan and Hendriks 2009, p.379). Yet Sullivan and Hendriks (2009) also remark that Americans' political knowledge has not increased in the last half century despite the strides made in educational attainment. While those with more education still tend to display greater political tolerance, "[i]t now simply takes more education to attain past levels of knowledge" that make Americans more supportive of democratic values and consequently more tolerant (p.378-9 fn.3). In spite of this, it still stands that:

³ The General Social Survey and supporting data obtained through the Data Explorer will be cited in-text as "GSS Data Explorer". In the reference list it will appear under Smith, Marsden, Hout, and Kim (2016).

H1: Each subsequent level of education should see a greater likelihood of politically tolerant attitudes.

Closely linked to educational attainment is a person's socioeconomic status in society. We know from Dynes' (1967) study that education is positively associated with political tolerance, even among members of the lower and working classes; however, these classes trail far behind their middle and upper class peers in obtaining higher education, a trend that has persisted since at least the 1970s when the GSS began collecting demographic data. By comparison, the upper class, while relatively small compared to the other social classes, has always had a higher proportion of individuals who have received an associate's degree, bachelor's degree, or continued onto graduate level studies.



Figure 2.1 Percentage of Respondents with Higher Education by Class⁴

⁴ Data from the GSS Data Explorer.

Prothro and Grigg (1960) established that those with better knowledge of general democratic norms and principles tend to have more education and a higher income, putting them in a higher social class. Conversely, the less educated and low income earners they studied members of the lower and working classes—displayed less support for abstract democratic concepts. Figure 2.1 suggests that we could expect similar results today in U.S. residents' support for democratic principles and norms. The only saving grace would have been that overall improvements in the American education system and a steady increase in educational attainment should have had a beneficial impact on instilling democratic values in Americans. As mentioned, however, Americans must undergo more learning today to reach the same level of political knowledge as they held in the past. This greater amount of learning disproportionately belongs to the upper class, where political elites and McClosky's (1964) "more 'articulate' segments of the population" reside (p.362).

These elites have been argued to mitigate the effects of an intolerant population by being themselves more politically tolerant, an idea that Lawrence (1976) disputes. Although they have the better education to make them more knowledgeable about the democratic rules of the game, "tolerance is not unanimous even among the elite" (p.99), and they may occasionally find it in their self-interest to break from democratic rules (ibid, p.100). What is indisputable, however, is that these elites belong to the upper class, where the well-educated disproportionately dwell compared to the rest of the population. If education has been found time and again to positively affect levels of political tolerance, then we should see similar results by social class.

Furthermore, lower income individuals should place greater importance on their existential security rather than on their right or others' right to self-expression (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Along with the effects of a lower level of education, this may help explain why

members of this social bracket are regularly perceived to be intolerant of more liberal views and the groups that espouse them. They may likewise feel threatened by other racial or ethnic groups and immigrants because of fears over how such groups will affect their own ability to procure housing and work (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). This has the effect of breeding greater social and political intolerance among the lower and working classes.

Because educational attainment and class often go hand in hand, and the wealthy tend to acquire greater amounts of education, I hypothesize that:

H2: Each subsequent class in American society should exhibit a greater likelihood of politically tolerant attitudes.

2.3.2 Urbanism and Race

In the late 1930s, Wirth (1938) advanced a theory of urbanism that endorsed it as a source of political tolerance. In his view, the larger number of people inhabiting cities creates a sense of anomie among individuals who are not intimately connected. Because "[1]arge numbers involve...a greater range of individual variation," he inferred that "such variations should give rise to the spatial segregation of individuals according to color, ethnic heritage, economic and social status, tastes and preferences" (p.11). This self-segregation did not mean that residents remained within the spheres with which they identified most. Rather, it meant greater mobility across various groups' territories, which acted to reinforce diversification. The greater contact urban Americans experienced with people dissimilar to themselves should therefore have produced social interactions in which "[n]o single group ha[d] the undivided allegiance of the individual" (ibid, p.16).



Figure 2.2 Percentage of the Urban Population by Decade in the U.S.⁵

Since then, the urban population of the United States has steadily climbed, reaching upwards of 80% in 2015 (World Bank). At the same time, diversity has increased, with the total white population shrinking and its growth rate significantly smaller compared to that of other races (Humes et al. 2011, p.4). Theoretically, these factors should raise levels of social and political tolerance as exposure to other groups and their cultures increases; however, a number of studies suggest that, contrary to Wirth's theory, greater diversity actually exacerbates animosity toward other groups, especially in the context of race and ethnicity.

The reason for this appears to be a heightened perception of threat. In Western Europe, McLaren (2003) discovered that higher levels of immigration increased this sense of threat, even in an environment that has promoted greater acceptance of migrants and other disliked groups in

⁵ Data from "Table1. Urban and Rural Population: 1900 to 1990 [Chart]" and the World Bank.

reparation for the Holocaust. In the U.S., Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) found a relationship, albeit a weak one, between the size of a community and white individuals' social tolerance of blacks. Racist attitudes, they argue, are often not the direct result of distaste for other skin tones, but rather a function of "interracial material competition" and socioeconomic status (p.587). In areas with relatively smaller populations, whites are more opposed to desegregating housing, while in more densely populated areas, they oppose programs that favor the employment of other races (ibid).

Greater diversity therefore does not appear to mitigate commitment to one's own race in any environment, at least when one belongs to the white majority and senses a threat to obtaining and maintaining material resources. This is further aggravated by "psychological responses of out-group aversion that are triggered by low status contexts" (ibid, p.586). Furthermore, where a majority of white individuals inhabit an area with a high minority population, the majority tends to display lower levels of social tolerance for other racial groups (Stein et al. 2000, p.285). Putnam (2007) takes this a step further by arguing that immigration and ethnic diversity lead to greater hostility and distrust, not only toward these minority groups, but in general. And where individuals are already deeply intolerant, they will "avoid intergroup contact and resist positive effects from it" all together (Pettigrew 1998, p.80).

Yet most of these scholars acknowledge that the increased diversity that leads to greater social and political intolerance in the short run, increases tolerance in the long run by reducing the perceived level of threat. This does not occur simply through greater exposure to diverse peoples and their viewpoints, but through deeper ties brought about by the inclusion of such people in diversified social networks (Stein et al. 2000; Cigler and Joslyn 2002; Putnam 2007; Stolle et al. 2008; Harell 2010). Urban settings tend to promote these kinds of networks to a greater extent due to their heterogeneous composition, with "[p]eople in urban areas consistently reporting higher levels of political tolerance than those living in rural areas" (p.726).

If tolerance toward individual members of out-groups increases, attitudes towards these groups may become more favorable overall (Golebiowska 2001). Not only that, but Harell (2010) also concludes that political tolerance toward racist speech decreases with diverse social interaction, even as it increases toward "other types of objectionable speech" (p.724). This greater exposure to, and consequent interaction with, minority racial and ethnic groups and other disliked groups in an urban environment leads me to hypothesize that:

H3: Each subsequent size of a community should exhibit a greater likelihood of politically tolerant attitudes.

Та	able	2.2	Percentage	Educational	Attainment b	v Race	, 2016
						•/	,

	Total	High School	Associate's	Bachelor's	Master's or Higher
White (Non-Hispanic)	140,638	93.3	46.9	36.2	13.5
Black	25,420	87.0	32.4	22.5	8.2
Hispanic	31,020	66.7	22.7	15.5	4.7
Asian	12,331	89.1	60.4	53.9	21.4

Ryan and Bauman 2016, p.2

One would intuitively expect that minority groups, having faced greater discrimination throughout their lives, would be more tolerant towards groups they themselves dislike. This was Sullivan and his colleagues' (1982) hypothesis, based on Erikson and Luttbeg's (1973) findings that blacks were more liberal on domestic issues and in matters involving civil rights (Sullivan et al. 1982, p.129); however, Sullivan et al. (1982) point out that members of the black community tend to achieve lower levels of education, which has been found to negatively impact political tolerance. As seen in Table 2.2, this trend persists, with only Asians outperforming Non-Hispanic whites and those of Hispanic origin receiving even less education than blacks.

However, in the wake of 9/11 and a heightened perception of threat, Davis and Silver (2004) found that "African Americans are much less willing to trade civil liberties for security than whites or Latinos, even with other factors taken into account" (p.28). This suggests that a history of being a target of political intolerance does associate positively with a higher respect for democratic principles and norms, regardless of other demographic variables. If we consider that whites and Asians face relatively little prejudice in American society while African Americans and Hispanics face greater prejudice, it is possible that:

H4: Members of the African American and Hispanic communities should exhibit a greater likelihood of political tolerance than whites or Asians.

2.3.3 Religion, Region, and Gender

Stouffer's findings from the 1950s suggest that a link exists between a person's religion, religiosity, and their attitude toward nonconforming groups. He discovered that Protestants were the least politically tolerant, with only 28% of respondents willing to permit political and civil liberties to communists, followed by Catholics (31%), non-religious respondents (49%), and Jews (71%). By the 1970s, Protestants had become more tolerant, but so had everyone else, with those professing to be non-religious quickly on track to becoming the most tolerant group (Nunn et al., 1978).

However, Sullivan et al.'s (1982) least-liked methodology did not arrive at the same results when it analyzed intolerance toward a variety of disliked groups. They discovered that Jews only appeared more tolerant because they have historically viewed left-leaning groups more favorably, while they strongly dislike groups on the right. Protestants, meanwhile, may only seem more intolerant by Stouffer's analysis because their religious views are well-suited to capitalism, as Weber (1930) has argued. It therefore appears that a person's religion does not necessarily make him or her more tolerant in general so much as less tolerant toward specific groups.

But while specific faiths have little effect, the impact of religiosity on political tolerance was found to be much more obvious: Stouffer (1955), Nunn et al. (1978), and Sullivan et al. (1982) all find clear evidence that the amount of time spent practicing one's faith has a negative effect on tolerance. By Nunn and his colleagues' reasoning, religiosity has this effect because,

"[T] hose who participate actively in their churches and who find themselves with limited resources to comprehend and affect the larger world, closely link God and political authority and are also likely to see political nonconformity as the work of the devil" (p.140).

Nunn et al. were actually attempting to explain "traditional Christians" for their seemingly more intolerant attitudes, but recall that their study was strictly measuring tolerance toward communists and that more general studies do not find one religion to be especially more tolerant than another. Of course, it is possible that Protestants really are more intolerant—not because of something inherent in Protestantism, but because it has traditionally been the "in" religion of the United States and it appears to have the most religious adherents out of other faiths (see Table 2.3).

Although Nunn's statement only accounts for Protestants, it stands to reason that highly active participants of other faiths may also be unable to comprehend the world in non-religious ways that could affect their tolerance toward others. Thus, I hypothesize that those who do consider themselves to be highly religious would be less willing to permit freedoms to out-groups, but that this is not dependent on adherence to specific faiths.

H5: Americans who are highly religious should exhibit a lower likelihood of political tolerance, regardless of their specific faith.

Lipka and Wormald's (2016) report on the religiosity of each state in the U.S. suggests a correlation: the South is the most religious region of the country and it has been found to be the least tolerant (also see Stouffer 1955; Prothro and Grigg, 1960). If religiosity does in fact produce a lower level of political tolerance, the statistics in Table 2.3 indicate that the Northeast should be the most tolerant with the lowest number of highly religious people, followed by the West, Midwest, and lastly the South.

	Protestant	Catholic	Other (including	Unaffiliated	Religion	Pray	Attend religious
	(Evangelical		Judaism)		very	daily	services weekly
	and Mainline)				important		
West	33%	23%	7%	28%	47%	51%	32%
Northeast	28%	30%	10%	25%	45%	48%	30%
Midwest	45%	21%	4%	22%	51%	53%	35%
South	48%	15%	4%	19%	62%	63%	41%

Table 2.3 Religion and Religiosity by Region

"Religious Landscape Study" 2014

This is in contrast to Stouffer and Nunn et al.'s findings, in which they claim that the West is the most politically tolerant region. It is possible that the West used to be the least religious region, as well as generally being known for its more open-minded culture, which could have contributed to their conclusion. The West was also not as urbanized as the Northeast when these studies were undertaken, suggesting that residence in an urban setting was not a factor in determining overall political tolerance by region; since then, however, the West has come to surpass the Northeast in this regard, followed by the Midwest and South, respectively ("Growth in Urban Population" 2012). Despite the greater religious diversity and lower religiosity of the Northeast, the West's level of urbanization coupled with its historically greater tolerance has the potential to maintain past findings. Therefore,

H6: Residents living in the West should continue to exhibit a greater likelihood of political tolerance compared to other regions in the United States.

Along with its potential influence on political tolerance by region, religiosity also plays a role in the tolerance exhibited by both sexes.⁶ According to Stouffer's (1955) research, women were found to be less tolerant than men. At the time of his study, women were considerably less likely than men to obtain higher education, which likely limited their political knowledge and exposure to other ways of thinking. This trend continued into the 1990s, when the gap in education began to close (Ryan and Bauman 2016, p.8). Nunn et al. (1978) acknowledge that throughout American history, men have enjoyed a more privileged position than the opposite sex. They theorize that this has allowed them to acquire a more diverse set of experiences and

⁶ It is generally acknowledged that sex and gender are two separate concepts, with the former referring more to anatomy and the latter more to psychology. For the purpose of this thesis, I will use these two terms interchangeably to mean a person's sex.

expectations that led to their increased political tolerance (p.119). Sullivan et al. (1982) dispute this explanation. Their analysis does not find a significant effect between a person's sex and their political tolerance, but they do agree with Stouffer's reasoning that women's higher attendance of religious services most likely contributed to his findings.

This gender gap in religiosity persists to this day. In comments made by religious sociologist David Voas to the Pew Research Center (Murphy 2016), he admits that the causes of this gap remain uncertain, but surmises that they could have a biological or sociological basis based on previous research (see Voas et al. 2013). A biological explanation would suggest that "physiological or hormonal differences could influence personality, which may in turn be linked to 'spirituality' or religious thinking" (Murphy 2016, par.4). Another explanation, although inconsistent, is that women still tend to work outside the home to a lesser extent than men, leaving them more time to engage in religious practices; however, Voas questions the causality of this, stating that it is possible that "women who already are less religious go out to work and those who are more traditional stay at home" (ibid, par.11). He also suggests support for Nunn et al.'s (1978) explanation that working outside the home promotes diverse interactions that increase political tolerance.

Whatever the causes for this gap, the modern American woman is more likely than men are to say that religion is very important (60% to 47%), and she is more likely to pray on a daily basis (64% to 46%) and to attend weekly religious services (40% to 32%) ("The Gender Gap" 2016). At the same time, men and women have achieved almost equal levels of education, with women even surpassing men in higher learning. Perhaps this may lead to more modern results in which men and women do not display vastly different levels of political tolerance, but with the persisting gender gap in religiosity, Stouffer's findings from the 1950s may still hold true today: *H7:* Women should exhibit lower levels of political tolerance than men.

2.3.4 Age

The assumption that the young are more open-minded than the old has been around for so long that even Stouffer (1955) suggested that aging has an effect on levels of political tolerance. While poll data at the time suggested that older generations were more conservative and younger generations more liberal, the reasons for this have not been attributed to age so much as to the effects of an increasingly well-educated population (Lawrence 1976, p.100) and to "rising levels of existential security," which Inglehart and Baker (2000) claim is "the key factor underlying intergenerational value change" (p.42). This latter claim has a caveat, however: economic collapse will reverse the more liberal values that economic development otherwise promotes (ibid, p.41).

The "Millennial" generation, those aged 18 to 34, have spent a significant amount of their adult lives struggling with the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. A report conducted by the Council of Economic Advisors remarks that while the economy has been in recovery, Millennials' own recovery will lag behind that of other generations because they have "less experience and more tenuous connections to employers" at a time when competition for jobs is elevated ("15 Economic Facts" 2014, p.24). This is likely to have a lasting impact on their earnings potential and careers (ibid).

This relatively young generation should display the most political tolerance compared to older cohorts. Its members are the most educated in the history of the United States, the least religious, and are more likely to reside in urban areas (GSS Data Explorer); however, many of

them finished their degrees with a debilitating amount of student loan debt, which has already been shown to affect the ability of Millennials to become homeowners and to start families ("15 Economic Facts" 2014, p.34). This could affect the amount of existential security this younger generation of Americans has been able to achieve, which could negatively impact the political tolerance they display towards others. It is therefore entirely possible that:

H8: Those who are younger may not necessarily exhibit greater political tolerance, although they are still likely to be more politically tolerant than members of elder generations.

2.3.5 Political Ideology and Party

Conceptions of democracy vary from country to country, but in the United States, it is viewed as a liberal political system that emphasizes freedom of expression and broad political participation (Sullivan and Transue 1999, p.636). This understanding of democracy should promote political tolerance because it encourages greater political inclusion of out-groups and the incorporation of their values and beliefs into governance. Citing Lipset and Raab (1970), Sullivan et al. (1982) note that this has caused tolerance and liberalism to become practically interchangeable, as liberal theory implies that political tolerance of all groups is an intrinsic aspect of democracy (p.176).

However, certain factions of the population are more prone to accepting and embracing this understanding of democracy. According to Schlenker, Chambers, and Le (2011), "[1]iberalism and conservatism are complex, multifaceted ideologies...that are associated with numerous personality, value, and attitudinal differences" (p.143). When it comes to politics, the former is considered to be more progressive and given over to protecting individual rights, while
the latter has a more traditional set of beliefs and values and a greater interest in protecting the broader community and the existing social order (Davis and Silver 2004, p.37). That is to say, liberals are more tolerant than conservatives. This carries over even in times when threat is perceived to be higher, trust in government is lower, and other demographic factors are taken into account (ibid). Liberals have a reputation for wavering in their commitment to their ideology's values, suggesting that they are not immune to expressions of intolerance. Yet despite this, they continue to display greater political tolerance even under duress and towards speech that they do not personally agree with (Lindner and Nosek 2009, p.88).

In recent years, the divide between liberals and conservatives has sharpened into a social cleavage (Doherty 2014), with individuals who adhere to one ideology averse to interacting with those who adhere to the other. Political parties have also become more divided along ideological lines. In 1955, Stouffer found that Republicans were actually the more tolerant political party, but in today's United States, Republicans tend to be more conservative and Democrats more liberal. This suggests that Democrats should display greater political tolerance due to their more liberal mindset.

Moreover, other factors that normally contribute to tolerance, such as youthfulness, urbanism, a high level of education, lower religiosity, and residing in the West, are positively associated with liberalism and, to a lesser extent, Democratic Party affiliation. The converse of these variables are true for increased conservativism and support for the Republican Party. While 40% of Americans still profess to having mixed ideological views, higher than either liberals or conservatives, they still remain highly polarized on specific issues and are therefore not necessarily more moderate (Doherty 2014).

With prior research indicating that liberals are more politically tolerant overall, and with liberals most often identifying with the Democratic Party, I hypothesize that:

H9: Democrats and liberals should exhibit a greater likelihood of having politically tolerant attitudes than Republicans and conservatives.

2.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has provided a brief overview of how political tolerance came to be and why it is a debatably essential aspect that citizens should have if their democracy is to be successful. I then discussed prior research conducted into the subject, including the psychological factors that have been found to be the strongest causes of political tolerance, before I suggested several hypotheses as to where political tolerance can be said to be greater within the American demographic.

In the next chapter, I will provide a brief description of the different methods that have been used in the past to measure political tolerance, as well as their limitations. I will then address the limitations of my own analysis, which will utilize GSS data in a fixed-group methodology, before providing a description of the data and how it will be employed in a quantitative analysis.

3. Methodology

3.1 Different Methods and Their Limitations

The study of political tolerance has commanded interest for more than half a century, but scholars have yet to reach a consensus on the best way to measure it. As previously mentioned, three main methods exist for measuring the political tolerance of a given polity: 1) Stouffer's (1955) fixed-group method; 2) Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus' (1982) least-liked method; and 3) the more general study of support for abstract democratic principles and norms versus support for their application in specific instances. Gibson (2013) suspects that most scholars would agree, at least intuitively, that these different methods achieve comparable results and are therefore interchangeable (p.47); however, results of various political tolerance studies have revealed that "different measures seem to be measuring somewhat different constructs" (ibid, p.45).

This is most obvious in the third option. Measuring the gap between support for the abstract and actual application of democratic principles and norms undoubtedly yields a measure of political tolerance, but it also operationalizes it differently. By contrast, the fixed-group and least-liked methods do not operationalize political intolerance as slippage, but rather as dislike toward certain groups and the deliberate targeting of these groups' rights, which studies of general support do not explicitly address. This fundamental difference in these three methods has led Gibson (2013) to remark that researchers should not consider every method and their results similar enough to be interchangeably used (p.45-6).

As a pioneer of the least-liked method, Sullivan stands by it as the best means of measuring political tolerance. His method introduces an "objection precondition," as Gibson

(2013, p.54) terms it, by allowing individuals to select their own least-liked group. Researchers can then be sure that the participants in their studies actively dislike the group when they are asked whether or not they would deny its members their political rights and civil liberties. While this method has its drawbacks—participants are free to choose even the most trivial or outlandish groups—Sullivan and Transue (1999) claim that "[the objection precondition] alone would provide a significant test of [individuals'] political tolerance" (p.630-31).

The reason for this is simple: a true measure of political tolerance cannot be taken when individuals have a neutral opinion or even a favorable view of the groups they are asked about. Without controlling for this as the least-liked method does, an analysis will generate measurement error (Gibson 2013, p.54). This is a large limitation of using a fixed-group methodology to measure political tolerance. Another limitation is that asking about one's willingness to extend rights and liberties to preselected groups provides some participants with more opportunities to appear intolerant because they dislike more of the groups in question (Gibson 1992, p.574).

As well as these limitations, the use of preselected groups can produce spurious results in longitudinal studies that measure the change in individuals' *overall* level of political tolerance. This is the case because disliked groups can lose their salience over time and other groups can take their place. Such studies (i.e. Davis 1975; Nunn et al. 1978) that have generalized changes in overall tolerance while measuring tolerance toward only one group have been heavily criticized as a result. Thus, scholars like Gibson (2013) and Schafer and Shaw (2009) now state that "[they] are cautious...about how boldly assertions of long-term changes in Americans' levels of tolerance might be made" (p.405). Fixed-groups measures should still perform as well as can be expected with cross-sectional studies, however, and would fit well with longitudinal

studies measuring changes in tolerance toward a specific group, without generalizing those results to changes in overall political tolerance.

Data for the fixed-group method is most readily available from the General Social Survey (GSS), which has gathered information on Americans and their views toward a variety of social topics since the early 1970s ("About the GSS" 2016). Although Gibson's attitude toward the GSS fluctuates, in the past he has found it to be a useful source of data for studies of political tolerance. He reasoned that most Americans would consider the survey's preselected groups as candidates for their own least-liked group, mitigating some of the measurement error introduced by a fixed-group methodology, and that this would produce valid measures of political intolerance if not tolerance per se (1992, p.574).

Surveys also have their own limitations. Their often closed-style questionnaires, as in the case of the GSS, leave much open to interpretation by respondents without providing room for further clarification or insight into respondents' thought processes. Petersen et al. (2011) also acknowledge that respondents may try to appear more consistent in their tolerance or intolerance by saying that they would or would not grant political rights and civil liberties across the board (p.587). There is also the issue that respondents may not be entirely truthful as they attempt to appear more tolerant than they really are, since individuals generally do not wish to be considered intolerant.

Conclusions derived through the use of one method are not necessarily any less accurate than those derived from another. Scholars should simply be aware that, depending on the specific aspect of political tolerance up for analysis, employing one method over another may be more appropriate. Be that as it may, studies are often dependent on the data that is available to them, and as Shafer and Shaw (2009) note, this is "mainly of the Stouffer type: tolerance measures employing queries about preselected groups, such as those from the General Social Survey" (p.405).

As the survey with the most current data on Americans' political tolerance, this thesis will utilize GSS data from 2014 to analyze in which demographic sectors political tolerance can be said to be greater. The above-mentioned limitations toward using a fixed-group methodology and data obtained via survey will therefore apply to this analysis. I can neither know nor control for the honesty of responses and how questions were interpreted by respondents, nor does the GSS provide the necessary information to control for pre-existing social tolerance, indifference toward, or membership in the asked-about groups; however, this analysis will at least bypass the issues associated with measuring changes in overall tolerance in a fixed-group setting by only focusing on levels of tolerance in the present-day United States. These limitations notwithstanding, this analysis should still address the research question of which demographic sectors display more political tolerance by indicating where intolerance is more prevalent.

3.2 Description of the Data

In order to conduct this analysis, I utilized the most recent data available for the study of political tolerance, which is accessible through the GSS for the year 2014. The data involves a number of indicators that represent the demographic variables under scrutiny for their levels of tolerance and which ask about the protection of liberties for several groups in American society. These groups are: Atheists, Racists, Communists, Militarists, Homosexuals, and anti-American Muslim clergymen. All except the last have been present in items asking about political tolerance for decades, while the addition of Muslims to the survey was more recently made in 2008.

For each group, respondents were asked three questions pertaining to whether or not democratic liberties should be extended to these groups. These questions are meant to measure the willingness of Americans to 1) permit members of these groups to publicly speak about their values or beliefs without persecution and precluding violence; 2) permit members of these groups to find work and to perform their jobs without discrimination, especially as pertains to university professors, who perhaps have a better venue through which to impress their beliefs and values on others; and 3) permit members of these groups to publicly disseminate publications and other sources of media that espouse their values and beliefs without censorship. Respondents were able to choose between a binary answer set, either saying that they would allow a certain action by these groups (coded as 0), or would not (coded as 1) (see the Appendix for specific code names and their associated questions). These measures of political tolerance act as the response variables.

The explanatory variables are as follows:

- 1) *Age:* Respondents' age was analyzed as a continuous variable, with the youngest respondents 18 years of age, the eldest 89 years of age, and the mean age at 48.56.
- 2) Class: Respondents were asked to self-identify the class that they feel they belong in. This variable represents respondents' socioeconomic status and was analyzed as a categorical variable on a four-point scale. Each point was assigned to represent a certain class, with the lower class assigned to 1, the working class to 2, the middle class to 3, and the upper class to 4.
- 3) *Education:* This variable represents the highest level of education obtained by the respondent. It was measured as a categorical variable on a five-point scale, where respondents who have attained less than a high school diploma were ranked as 1;

those who completed high school but have not pursued higher education were ranked as 2; those who obtained a certificate or associate's degree from a junior college were ranked as 3; and those who completed a bachelor's degree or went on to graduate level studies were ranked as 4 and 5, respectively.

- Gender: This variable represents a respondent's sex, with a code of 1 assigned to males and 2 assigned to females.
- 5) *Ideology:* For this variable, respondents were asked to describe their political views as either liberal, moderate, or conservative. They were then asked to describe the strength of their commitment to these views, with the result a seven-point scale where 1 is extremely liberal; 2 is liberal; 3 is slightly liberal; 4 is moderate; 5 is slightly conservative; 6 is conservative; and 7 is extremely conservative.
- 6) *Party:* For this variable, respondents were asked to describe the political party that they normally think of themselves as belonging to and how strongly they consider themselves to be affiliated with their political party of choice. This variable is measured on an eight-point scale, where 1 represents respondents who strongly think of themselves as Democrats; 2 represents respondents who consider themselves to be Democrats but are not strongly committed to the party; 3 are respondents who consider themselves to be independent of any political party but lean towards the Democratic Party in elections; 4 are staunch independents; 5 are respondents who are similarly independent but lean towards the Republican Party; 6 are respondents who are weakly committed to the Republican Party; 7 are respondents strongly committed to the Republican Party; and 8 are respondents who belong to another party all together.

- 7) *Race:* Respondents were asked to identify the race or ethnicity they belong to, with the GSS survey allowing them to select up to three races or ethnicities that they consider themselves to be. This analysis utilizes respondents' first mention of their race or ethnicity. Due to ambiguity between the two terms and a large selection of Asian ethnicities, I recoded this variable so that 1 represents whites, who made up a majority of survey respondents; 2 represents Asians; 3 represents Hispanics; and 4 represents blacks and African Americans.
- 8) *Region:* This variable is based off of where interviews of survey respondents took place and has been collapsed into a four-point scale. The Northeast encompasses the regions of New England and the Middle Atlantic and has been assigned a value of 1; the Midwest encompasses the East and West North Central regions of the United States and has been assigned a value of 2; the South encompasses the South Atlantic and East and West South Central regions and has been assigned a value of 3; and the West encompasses the Mountain and Pacific regions and has been assigned a value of 4.
- 9) *Religion:* This variable asks about respondents' religious preference. Just under half of the respondents said they were Protestant and were assigned a value of 1; the second largest group, Catholics, were assigned to 2; Jews were assigned to 3; and unaffiliated respondents assigned to 4. Due to the small number of respondents identifying as Muslim, this group was removed after being found to have no impact on the analysis.
- 10) *Religiosity:* This variable asks about the commitment respondents have towards practicing their religion and is measured by respondents' attendance of religious

services. It is measured on a nine-point scale, where 1 represents respondents who never attend religious services; 2 represents those who attend less than once a year; 3 represents those who attend once a year; 4 are respondents who attend services several times a year; 5 represents respondents who attend services once a month; 6 represents respondents who attend two to three times a month; 7 are respondents who attend services nearly every week; 8 are respondents who attend services every week, and 9 represents those who attend services more than once a week.

11) *Urbanism:* This variable is based off of the gross population of the area where interviews of survey respondents took place. It was analyzed as a continuous variable with a minimum population of zero inhabitants and a maximum population of over 8 million inhabitants. This variable was logarithmically transformed to account for a large right skew and high kurtosis resulting from most respondents inhabiting much less densely populated areas.

The variance inflation factor (VIF) for the explanatory variables were all close to or under 1.5, indicating that multicollinearity is not present. The original sample had responses from 2538 respondents, with slight variations across the sample sizes of individual explanatory variables. The number of respondents per each response variables ranged from 1535 to 1696.

3.3 Description of the Analysis

The analysis was conducted by employing multiple multivariate logistic regressions to determine where political tolerance is greater in the American demographic. This statistical method finds the odds that an explanatory variable has an effect on a binary response variable, meaning that any relationship the explanatory variable has with the response will fall into one of two categories—in this case, politically tolerant or not politically tolerant. A logistic regression is appropriate to this analysis because the response variables measuring political tolerance were coded to be dichotomous.

The logistic regression outputs the log odds that one unit increase of the explanatory variable will have on the response variable. To facilitate the interpretation of the findings, I then calculated the odds ratio of the effect the explanatory variables have on the response variables. Confidence intervals provided for these odds ratios help to better understand how confident we can be that the effect is true for the entire population, rather than only for those respondents included in the sample.

3.4 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have discussed the methods most often utilized for the study of political tolerance and their limitations, especially in respect to the fixed-group methodology that I employ using General Social Survey data from 2014. Section 3.2 goes into detail about the explanatory and response variables, including a brief description of the variable and its unit of measure. The final section of this chapter discusses the analysis, which was conducted using multiple multivariate logistic regressions to determine which demographic groups in the U.S. are more likely to be tolerant or intolerant politically. The next chapter will interpret the findings of this analysis and discuss their implications for political tolerance in the United States.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Results and Interpretation

Political tolerance in the United States was operationalized as the tolerance Americans were willing to accord to disliked groups in American society. These groups, as preselected by the GSS, are Atheists, Racists, Communists, Militarists, Homosexuals, and anti-American Muslim Clergymen. Respondents were asked to choose whether or not they would allow these groups their freedom of speech, right to work without discrimination when they could impart their views onto others, and freedom to express themselves via published materials accessible to the public. The results and their interpretations will be presented in the following sections by each group.

4.1.1 Atheists

Towards atheists and their right to free speech, respondents' class, education, gender, political party, race, region, religiosity, and urbanism had a significant effect on respondents' political tolerance toward free speech by this group (see Table 4.1). As wealth increases, subsequently allowing respondents to subjectively place themselves in a higher social class, the likelihood for political intolerance decreases by 23%, with the real effects indicated by the confidence intervals within 1% up to 50%, suggesting that the effects of class on political tolerance may not be substantive. Education has a far greater effect, with each level of educational attainment seeing a decrease in the likelihood of political tolerance by 74% and confidence intervals indicating a substantive likelihood of 50% to double the population seeing these effects.

Men also appear to be more likely to be tolerant in relation to women by almost five times, with confidence intervals between nearly four to six times suggesting a substantive effect in the overall population. Concerning political party, those more strongly identifying with democrats see a reduction in their likelihood of intolerance by 14% per strength of affiliation, but with confidence intervals showing this likelihood between 5% and 23%, this effect may not be substantive.

With race, those identifying as Asian and black do not show significant difference in tolerance likelihood compared to white people, but Hispanics are more likely to be intolerant by 73%, although the confidence we can say this is between 4% to almost 3 times, suggesting that this should not be generalized to the Hispanic population. The Northeast, Midwest, and South all prove to be more likely to be tolerant than the West, with the Northeast more likely to be tolerant by 4.4 times, the Midwest by 5.5 times, and the South by only 2.6 times compared to respondents from the West. Compared to Protestants, Catholics are more likely to be tolerant by 3.2 times, those with no religious affiliation by nearly eight times, and those identifying as Jewish by 2.7 times. With each subsequent level of greater church attendance, respondents are more likely to be intolerant by 15%, with generalizable effects between 9% and 21%, while living in areas with greater populations decreases respondents' likelihood of being intolerant by 22%.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%	
Age	0.004	1.005	0.997	1.012	
Class	-0.209*	0.811	0.667	.987	
Education	555***	0.574	0.495	.665	
Gender: Male	-1.580***	0.206	0.168	.255	
Ideology	-0.030	0.970	0.873	1.078	
Party	-0.131***	0.877	0.809	0.951	
Race: Asian	-0.123	0.885	0.466	1.680	

Race: Hispanic	0.550*	1.733	1.037	2.898
Race: Black	-0.218	0.804	0.610	1.060
Region: Northeast	-1.484***	0.227	0.163	0.316
Region: Midwest	-1.696***	0.183	0.163	0.316
Region: South	-0.972***	0.378	0.308	0.464
Religion: Catholic	-1.157***	0.314	0.214	0.410
Religion: Jewish	-0.999*	0.368	0.137	0.993
Religion: None	-2.073***	0.126	0.086	0.183
Religiosity	0.140***	1.151	1.090	1.214
Urbanism	-0.197***	.821	.702	.960

Table 4.2 Results for Political Tolerance toward Atheists: Right to Work

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.014***	1.014	1.007	1.022
Class	-0.268***	0.765	0.643	0.909
Education	-0.445***	0.641	0.570	0.721
Gender: Male	-0.817***	0.441	0.370	0.527
Ideology	0.010	1.010	0.920	1.108
Party	-0.054	0.947	0.883	1.016
Race: Asian	-0.758*	0.469	0.232	0.945
Race: Hispanic	-0.173	0.841	0.510	1.386
Race: Black	-0.431***	0.650	0.490	0.862
Region: Northeast	-0.811***	0.444	0.336	0.589
Region: Midwest	0.891***	0.410	0.319	0.528
Region: South	-0.445***	0.641	0.530	0.774
Religion: Catholic	-1.157***	0.314	0.214	0.410
Religion: Jewish	-0.999*	0.368	0.137	0.993
Religion: None	-2.073***	0.126	0.086	0.183
Religiosity	0.104***	1.110	1.059	1.163
Urbanism	-0.370***	0.691	0.646	0.739

Towards atheists and their right to work (see Table 4.2), age becomes significant, with each additional year making respondents 1.4% more likely to be politically intolerant, with real effects between less than 1% and up to 2.2%. On its own, this may not appear substantive, but over time the cumulative effects would place an older respondent at a much higher likelihood of intolerance than a younger respondent. Class again is highly significant, with each additional income level seeing respondents' likelihood of political intolerance decreasing by 31% and this likelihood in the overall population between 10% and 56% according to the confidence intervals. Education and gender are significant as well, with each level of education producing a likelihood of decreased intolerance by 56% and men about 2.3 times more likely to be tolerant than women.

Asian respondents are slightly more than twice as likely to be politically tolerant than white respondents, while black respondents were 1.5 times more likely. Hispanic respondents are also more likely to be tolerant, but failed to reach a significant difference compared to white respondents. Within different regions of the U.S., respondents in the Northeast were roughly 2.3 times more likely to be politically tolerant than respondents in the West and respondents in the Midwest 2.4 times more likely, while those in the South were 56% more likely to be tolerant. When it comes to religion, Catholics were about 3.2 times more likely to be tolerant than Protestants, Jewish respondents 2.7 times, and those with no religious affiliation 8 times more likely. Each subsequent level of religiosity sees respondents becoming 11% more likely to be intolerant toward atheists' right to work, while the increasing size of respondents' area of habitation saw a 45% decrease in likelihood of intolerance.

Towards atheists and their right to publish and disseminate information freely (see Table 4.3), each subsequent income group sees a decrease in the likelihood of being politically

intolerant by 41%, with the confidence intervals suggesting that this may or may not be substantive between 16% and 70% in the overall population. Education remains substantively significant with each subsequent level of education leading to a likelihood of decreased intolerance by 84%. Men are four times more likely than women to be politically tolerant.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.000	1.00	0.992	1.007
Class	-0.342***	0.711	0.586	0.862
Education	-0.609***	0.544	0.469	0.632
Gender: Male	-1.399***	0.247	0.201	0.302
Ideology	0.023	1.024	0.922	1.136
Party	-0.045	0.956	0.884	1.034
Race: Asian	-0.693*	0.500	0.252	0.993
Race: Hispanic	-0.435	0.647	0.392	1.068
Race: Black	-0.739***	0.478	0.356	0.641
Region: Northeast	-1.691***	0.184	0.129	0.263
Region: Midwest	-1.393***	0.248	0.187	0.330
Region: South	-0.850***	0.427	0.350	0.522
Religion: Catholic	-1.157***	0.314	0.214	0.410
Religion: Jewish	-0.999*	0.368	0.137	0.993
Religion: None	-2.073***	0.126	0.086	0.183
Religiosity	0.156***	1.169	1.108	1.232
Urbanism	-0.060	0.942	0.810	1.096

Table 4.3 Results for Political Tolerance toward Atheists: Free Press

Significance Codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05

Asian and black respondents continue to be more likely to have a decreased likelihood of intolerance by double that of white respondents, while Hispanic respondents are not significantly different. Respondents in the Northeast are 5.4 times more likely to have a decrease in intolerance than respondents in the West, those in the Midwest roughly 4 times, and those in the

South 2.3 times. Catholics are 3.2 times more likely to be tolerant, Jews 2.7 times, and those with no religion 7.9 times more likely to be tolerant compared to Protestant respondents, while each subsequent level of religious attendance leads to a greater likelihood of political intolerance by nearly 17%.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	-0.002	0.998	0.991	1.004
Class	0.064	1.066	0.907	1.254
Education	-0.348***	0.706	0.635	0.785
Gender: Male	-0.691***	0.501	0.422	0.595
Ideology	0.003	1.003	0.919	1.095
Party	-0.087**	0.917	0.858	0.980
Race: Asian	-0.123	0.668	0.466	1.680
Race: Hispanic	0.550*	1.733	1.037	2.898
Race: Black	-0.218	0.804	0.610	1.060
Region: Northeast	-0.464***	0.629	0.483	0.819
Region: Midwest	-0.561***	0.571	0.461	0.723
Region: South	-0.287***	0.751	0.624	0.904
Religion: Catholic	-0.279***	0.757	0.602	0.952
Religion: Jewish	-0.310	0.733	0.301	1.785
Religion: None	-0.794***	0.452	0.351	0.583
Religiosity	0.090**	1.094	1.047	1.143
Urbanism	-0.021	0.979	0.864	1.109

Table 4.4 Results for Political Tolerance toward Racists: Free Speech

Significance Codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05

4.1.2 Racists

Education continues to have a significant effect on political tolerance toward racists in the United States. The likelihood of allowing free speech, free press, and the right to work increases by 41.6%, 21.7%, and 44.7% respectively with each higher level of educational

attainment (see Tables 4.4 - 4.6). The confidence intervals for education's effect on the response variables indicate that each additional level of education should be substantive throughout the entire American population.

As seen in Table 4.4, stronger affiliation with the Democratic Party sees a decreased likelihood to support the free speech of racists by 9%. The effect of political party on tolerance for racist speech is relatively weak, however, with confidence that 97.5% of the population experiences this effect falling between 2% and 16.6%. Gender also has a significant effect on tolerance, with men more likely to have a decreased likelihood of political intolerance by two times compared to women in allowing racists free speech. Higher attendance of religious services likewise has a significant effect on speech tolerance. Each additional unit of measure sees an increased likelihood of intolerance of 9.8%, with the likelihood of this effect as pertains to the whole population falling between 4.7% and 14.3%.

Race, region, and religion also have an effect, with Hispanic respondents more likely to be intolerant of racist speech compared to white respondents by 73.3%; however, with the confidence intervals suggesting that this pertains to the overall population from 3.7% to nearly three times, I would be cautious in generalizing this likelihood. Asian and black respondents showed a decreased likelihood of being intolerant, but failed to be significantly different in relation to tolerance of white respondents. The Northeast, Midwest, and South are all significantly more tolerant than the West by 2.1 times, 2.2 times, and 1.6 times, respectively, while Catholics and unaffiliated respondents were less likely to be intolerant by 1.3 times and 2.2 times with confidence intervals suggesting substantive results.

In Table 4.5, other than the effects of educational attainment, only race finds significant differences in levels of political tolerance, with Hispanic and black respondents more likely to be

intolerant of racists and their right to work by 86.2% and 31.6%, respectively, compared to white respondents. With wide-ranging confidence intervals, however, this may not be substantive.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.003	1.003	0.996	1.009
Class	0.114	1.121	0.958	1.311
Education	-0.196***	0.822	0.746	0.907
Gender: Male	0.000	1.000	0.850	1.176
Ideology	0.008	1.008	0.927	1.096
Party	-0.054	0.947	0.889	1.010
Race: Asian	0.205	1.227	0.645	2.336
Race: Hispanic	0.622**	1.862	1.111	3.120
Race: Black	0.274*	1.316	0.996	1.738
Region: Northeast	0.114	1.121	0.864	1.453
Region: Midwest	0.041	1.042	0.830	1.307
Region: South	0.139	1.149	0.955	1.382
Religion: Catholic	0.168	1.183	0.943	1.485
Religion: Jewish	0.470	1.600	0.648	3.949
Religion: None	0.000	1.000	0.789	1.267
Religiosity	0.021	1.021	0.979	1.065
Urbanism	0.039	1.040	0.923	1.172

Table 4.5 Results for Political Tolerance toward Racists: Right to Work

Significance Codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05

In Table 4.6 reporting the results of tolerance for racists and their right to free press, race fails to be significant in this regard, but we do see that an increase in age generates a decreased likelihood of intolerance by less than .6 of a percentage point, but this does gain significant perhaps owing to the fact that over time this can accumulate into a large difference. Gender is also significant, with men roughly two times more likely than women to have decreased intolerance. As democratic party affiliation strengthens, respondents likewise have decreased intolerance by 8.3%, while increased religiosity increases the likelihood of intolerance by 6.6%.

Regions and religious affiliation are also significant, with those in the Northeast, Midwest, and South showing decreased intolerance toward racists' right to publish compared to respondents in the West by 2.04 times, 2.06 times, and 1.44 times respectively. In relation to Protestants, Catholics are 1.56% less likely to be intolerant, and the unaffiliated 2.8 times and Jews 3.16 times less likely to be intolerant; however, the latter religious group has a wide confidence interval, suggesting that results are not generalizable to the overall population.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	-0.006*	0.994	0.994	1.000
Class	0.055	1.057	0.896	1.247
Education	-0.370***	0.691	0.620	0.771
Gender: Male	-0.703***	0.495	0.416	0.589
Ideology	-0.032	0.968	0.906	1.059
Party	-0.080**	0.923	0.862	0.988
Race: Asian	-0.167	0.846	0.442	1.620
Race: Hispanic	0.416	1.515	0.916	2.505
Race: Black	-0.030	0.970	0.737	1.277
Region: Northeast	-0.723***	0.485	0.368	0.639
Region: Midwest	-0.713***	0.490	0.384	0.626
Region: South	-0.362***	0.696	0.578	0.839
Religion: Catholic	-0.448***	0.639	0.506	0.806
Religion: Jewish	-1.153*	0.316	0.111	0.902
Religion: None	-1.036***	0.355	0.271	0.464
Religiosity	0.109***	1.116	1.066	1.167
Urbanism	0.096	1.101	0.969	1.251

Table 4.6 Results for Political Tolerance toward Racists: Free Pres

Significance Codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05

4.1.3 Communists

Educational attainment remains a substantively significant predictor of political tolerance or lack thereof, with the likelihood of political intolerance toward communists' rights to free speech and free press decreasing by 80% and by two times respectively; however, greater educational attainment in the case of intolerance toward communists' right to work sees an increase in this likelihood by 70%. This result represents the only instance in this analysis where greater education actually increases the likelihood of intolerance.

Regarding free speech, men exhibit a greater likelihood of decreased intolerance by nearly three times compared to women. Greater religiosity continues to have a significant effect by increasing the likelihood of intolerance by 11.2% per unit increase in religious service attendance, while Catholic respondents, Jewish respondents, and respondents with no religious affiliation are more likely to exhibit lower intolerance by 1.9 times, 2.7 times, and 4.4 times, respectively, compared to Protestant respondents. Region continues to have a substantive effect, with Midwestern respondents 2.5 times as likely to exhibit lower intolerance than Western respondents and Midwestern and Southern respondents nearly 3 times and 1.73 times as likely. Asians are roughly 2 times as likely as white respondents to exhibit lower intolerance, although the effect of this is questionably substantive, while black respondents are 59% more likely to exhibit lower intolerance. Hispanics are 5% more likely than whites to be intolerant, but this fails to be a significant difference. Lastly, strength of affiliation with the democratic party decreases the likelihood of intolerance by 9%.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.006	1.006	0.998	1.013
Class	-0.128	0.880	0.736	1.051
Education	-0.589***	0.555	0.488	0.631
Gender: Male	-1.078***	0.340	0.282	0.411
Ideology	0.039	1.039	0.944	1.144
Party	-0.087**	0.917	0.852	0.986
Race: Asian	-0.724*	0.485	0.245	0.960
Race: Hispanic	0.053	1.054	0.630	1.763
Race: Black	-0.464***	0.629	0.472	0.837
Region: Northeast	-0.900***	0.407	0.306	0.541
Region: Midwest	-1.092***	0.336	0.257	0.438
Region: South	-0.548***	0.578	0.477	0.701
Religion: Catholic	-0.674***	0.510	0.400	0.640
Religion: Jewish	-0.999*	0.368	0.137	0.993
Religion: None	-1.473***	0.229	0.169	0.311
Religiosity	0.106***	1.112	1.060	1.167
Urbanism	-0.132*	0.876	0.762	1.007

Table 4.7 Results for Political Tolerance toward Communists: Free Speech

Concerning communists' right to work (see Table 4.8), as respondents' age increases, they exhibit a decrease in intolerance by 1% each year. As income increases, each subsequent level of wealth sees an increased likelihood of intolerance by 22.8%. Men are also more likely than women to be intolerant by 2.3 times. Asian respondents show a decrease in the likelihood of intolerance by 2.1 times, as do black respondents by 59%. Respondents from the Northeast, Midwest, and South are more likely to be intolerant by 2.27 times, 2.25 times, and 1.65 times, respectively, while those living in areas with more inhabitants are 19% more likely to be intolerant as population increases. Catholics, Jews, and the unaffiliated are all likewise more

intolerant than Protestants by 1.73 times, 2.57 times, and 3.7 times, while religiosity decreases the likelihood of intolerance by 6% per increase in religious attendance.

Towards communists' right to free press (see Table 4.9), the results revert back to what we would more commonly expect to see, with greater wealth leading to a likelihood of lower intolerance by 22.7%. Political party affiliation has a significant effect, with stronger affiliation with the Democratic Party decreasing the likelihood of intolerant attitudes by 8.2%. Asian and black respondents likewise show a reduction in this likelihood by 2.27 times and 1.5 times compared to white respondents, respectively, as do respondents from the Northeast, Midwest, and South, again respectively by 3.5 times, 3.15 times, and 1.94 times compared to respondents from the West. In relation to Protestants, Catholics are 2.56 times less likely to be intolerant, Jews 3.16 times, and the affiliated 6.41 times less likely. Greater religious attendance produces a likelihood of greater intolerance by 14.3%, while areas with greater population see a decrease in likelihood of intolerance by 16%.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	-0.010**	0.990	0.983	0.997
Class	0.205**	1.228	1.030	1.463
Education	0.531***	1.701	1.506	1.921
Gender: Male	0.827***	2.286	1.913	2.733
Ideology	-0.065	0.937	0.852	1.030
Party	0.017	1.017	0.947	1.093
Race: Asian	-0.167*	0.485	0.245	0.960
Race: Hispanic	0.154	1.054	0.630	1.763
Race: Black	-0.561***	0.629	0.472	0.837
Region: Northeast	0.818***	2.267	1.707	3.010
Region: Midwest	0.813***	2.254	1.752	2.901

Table 4.8 Results for Political Tolerance toward Communists: Right to Work

Region: South	0.503***	1.654	1.362	2.009
Religion: Catholic	0.547***	1.728	1.357	2.200
Religion: Jewish	0.944*	2.571	0.947	6.979
Religion: None	1.309***	3.703	2.761	4.966
Religiosity	-0.057**	0.944	0.983	0.997
Urbanism	0.174**	1.191	1.039	1.364

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.006	1.006	.999	1.013
Class	-0.205*	0.815	0.677	0.980
Education	-0.694***	0.500	0.433	0.576
Gender: Male	0.035	1.036	0.791	1.356
Ideology	0.045	1.047	0.947	1.157
Party	-0.079*	0.924	0.857	0.997
Race: Asian	-0.818**	0.441	0.220	0.884
Race: Hispanic	-0.437	0.646	0.385	1.082
Race: Black	-0.409***	0.665	0.500	0.884
Region: Northeast	-1.251***	0.286	0.210	0.391
Region: Midwest	-1.148***	0.317	0.243	0.415
Region: South	-0.663***	0.516	0.424	0.627
Religion: Catholic	-0.942***	0.390	0.302	0.503
Religion: Jewish	-1.153*	0.316	0.111	0.902
Religion: None	-1.856***	0.156	0.110	0.221
Religiosity	0.134***	1.143	1.087	1.202
Urbanism	-0.148*	0.862	0.745	0.998

Table 4.9 Results for Political Tolerance toward Communists: Free Press

Significance Codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05

4.1.4 Militarists

When it comes to militarists and tolerance toward their rights to free speech and free press, age class, education, gender, race, region, religion, and religiosity all have a significant effect (see Tables 4.10 and 4.12). Per yearly increase in age, respondents were approximately 1% more likely to be intolerant. Each level of higher educational attainment creates a likelihood of less intolerance by 65.8% towards militarists and their right to free speech and 59.5% towards their right to free press. In both scenarios, men are less likely to be intolerant than women by 2.7 times, while stronger Democratic Party affiliation reduces the likelihood of intolerance by 10-11%.

Compared to white respondents, only black respondents showed any significant difference in the likelihood of intolerance, with the latter decreasing in likelihood by 58.7% towards free speech. Concerning free press, this decrease drops to 29.4%, while Asian respondents also showed a decrease in the likelihood of intolerance by 88.3%. With wide confidence intervals, however, these effects may not be generalizable to the entire population. In the Northeast, respondents were less likely to be intolerant compared to respondents in the West by 2.6 times concerning free speech and 3 times concerning press. In the Midwest, respondents are similarly three times less likely to be intolerant in both scenarios, while respondents in the South are less likely to be intolerant by 70-80% compared to Western respondents. Catholics are less likely to be intolerant than Protestants when it comes to free speech and free press, with the former seeing a reduction by two times and the latter slightly more at 2.2 times. The unaffiliated are less likely to be intolerant toward militarists' right to free speech by 4.2 times and toward their right to free press by 5.7 times. Jewish respondents were less likely to be intolerant toward speech by 2.3 times, but failed to significantly differ from Protestants in regard to press. Lastly,

religiosity remains significant, with those attending religious services more often 10% more likely to be intolerant of militarists' speech and 15.4% more intolerant of their press.

As for militarists' right to work, age produces a nearly 2% increase in the likelihood of intolerance by year, while each higher level of income sees a decrease in the likelihood of intolerance by 29.5%. Each level of educational attainment similarly sees a decrease by 45.3%. Men prove to be less likely to be intolerant by 60%, while respondents in the Northeast, Midwest, and South are respectively 52%, 54%, and 23% less likely to be intolerant compared to Western respondents. With greater religious attendance comes a greater likelihood of intolerance by 4.6%, while Catholics and the unaffiliated are less likely to be intolerant than Protestants by 25.5% and 2.5 times, respectively.

4.1.5 Homosexuals

Towards homosexuals, all demographic variables achieve significance except for ideology, party, and to a lesser extent, age concerning free speech. A yearly increase in age increases the likelihood of intolerance by 1.3% towards the right to work, and 1.0% towards the right to free press. Confidence intervals at 97.5% indicate that, despite variations in the strength of this effect throughout the entire population, age should aggregately have a substantive effect on political tolerance toward homosexuals. Class also has a significant effect, with respondents 59% less likely to be intolerant toward this group's right to free speech with each subsequent level of income, and 70% and 66% less likely to be intolerant towards at 97.5% indicating a substantive effect.

The effects of education are especially prominent towards this historically disliked group. Each additional level of education obtained by respondents reduces the likelihood of political intolerance by 2.28 times towards free speech, 2.16 times towards the right to work, and by nearly double towards free press. The confidence intervals show that this likelihood of decreased intolerance can dip slightly lower than 35%, as in the case of tolerance for homosexuals' right to free press, but conversely, it can also reach as high as 2.9 times decreased intolerance.

Gender is also a significant predictor, with male respondents less likely to be intolerant compared to female respondents by 8.1 times towards right to free speech, 7.2 times towards right to free press, and 4.4 times towards right to work. Confidence intervals indicate that at 3.6 times, the right to work achieves the lowest difference between men and women, while the right to free speech goes as high as 10.5 times, suggesting an all around substantive effect. Greater religiosity sees an increased likelihood of political intolerance by 12% toward homosexuals' right to free speech, 11.5% toward their right to work, and 16.2% toward their right to free press, while living in an area with a greater number of inhabitants lessens the likelihood of intolerance towards rights to free speech, work, and free press by 37.4%, 32.5%, and 43.9%.

Racial, regional, and religious demographics all see a likelihood of decreased political intolerance. Concerning the right to free speech, Asian respondents were 8.6 times less likely to be intolerant, Hispanic respondents 3.9 times less likely to be intolerant, and black respondents 5.3 times less likely to be intolerant compared to white respondents. Respondents in the Northeast, Midwest, and South were respectively 9.5 times, 9.3 times, and 5.8 times less likely to be intolerant than respondents in the West, while Catholic, Jewish, and unaffiliated respondents were 10.2 times, 25 times, and 15.4 times less likely to be intolerant than Protestant respondents.

such these numbers should not necessarily be considered generalizable to each demographic group's overall populations.

Concerning homosexuals' right to work, Asians exhibit a lower likelihood of being politically intolerant by 22.7 times (although with confidence intervals ranging from 4.4 to 111 times, this should be taken with a grain of salt), while Hispanic and black respondents were 4.9 and 4.8 times less likely to be intolerant compared to white respondents. Respondents from the Northeast, Midwest, and South were respectively 10.5 times, 9 times, and 4.8 times less likely to be intolerant in the West. Respectively, respondents affiliated with Catholicism, Judaism, and no affiliation were roughly 10 times, 12 times, and 18 times less likely to be intolerant compared to Protestants, but confidence intervals for Jewish and unaffiliated respondents suggest that these effects could be small to quite large.

Concerning homosexuals' right to free press, Asian respondents exhibit a lower likelihood of being politically intolerant by 5 times, Hispanic respondents by 2.9 times, and black respondents by 2.6 times compared to white respondents. Those residing in the Northeast, Midwest, and South are respectively less likely to be intolerant than those in the West by 6.8 times, 4.8 times, and 2.7 times. Catholic respondents were 5.3 times less likely to be intolerant than Protestants, while Jewish respondents were 12 times less likely (with confidence intervals at 97.5% putting this effect between 2.3 and 62.5 times) and unaffiliated respondents 9.3 times less likely.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.011***	1.011	1.004	1.018
Class	-0.352***	0.704	0.589	0.840
Education	-0.467***	0.627	0.554	0.709

Table 4.10 Results for Political Tolerance toward Militarists: Free Speech

Gender: Male	-1.007***	0.365	0.304	0.439
Ideology	0.030	1.030	0.937	1.133
Party	-0.103**	0.902	0.839	0.970
Race: Asian	-0.123	0.885	0.466	1.680
Race: Hispanic	0.147	1.158	0.705	1.902
Race: Black	-0.463***	0.630	0.474	0.836
Region: Northeast	-0.949***	0.387	0.290	0.516
Region: Midwest	-1.130***	0.323	0.248	0.421
Region: South	-0.572***	0.564	0.466	0.683
Religion: Catholic	-0.712***	0.490	0.385	0.625
Religion: Jewish	-0.811***	0.444	0.171	1.152
Religion: None	-1.428***	0.240	0.178	0.323
Religiosity	0.093***	1.098	1.047	1.152
Urbanism	-0.032	0.969	0.845	1.111

Table 4.11 Results for Political Tolerance toward Militarists: Right to Work

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.018***	1.018	1.011	1.025
Class	-0.259***	0.772	0.654	0.911
Education	-0.374***	0.688	0.618	0.766
Gender: Male	-0.472***	0.624	0.527	0.738
Ideology	0.000	1.000	0.915	1.093
Party	-0.041	0.959	0.897	1.026
Race: Asian	0.041	1.042	0.549	1.977
Race: Hispanic	0.074	1.077	0.654	1.773
Race: Black	-0.159	0.853	0.647	1.125
Region: Northeast	-0.425***	0.654	0.501	0.853
Region: Midwest	-0.434***	0.648	0.512	0.820
Region: South	-0.204*	0.815	0.677	0.982
Religion: Catholic	-0.227*	0.797	0.633	1.004
Religion: Jewish	-0.470	0.625	0.253	1.543

Religion: None	-0.903***	0.406	0.312	0.527
Religiosity	0.045*	1.046	1.001	1.094
Urbanism	-0.037	0.963	0.849	1.093

Table 4.12 Results for Political Toleran	ce toward Militarists: Free Press
--	-----------------------------------

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.012***	1.012	1.005	1.019
Class	-0.325***	0.722	0.603	0.865
Education	-0.506***	0.603	0.531	0.684
Gender: Male	-0.004***	0.366	0.305	0.440
Ideology	-0.006	0.994	0.902	1.095
Party	-0.099**	0.906	0.842	0.976
Race: Asian	-0.633*	0.531	0.271	1.041
Race: Hispanic	-0.384	0.681	0.407	1.138
Race: Black	-0.257*	0.773	0.586	1.020
Region: Northeast	-1.090***	0.336	0.250	0.452
Region: Midwest	-1.116***	0.328	0.251	0.427
Region: South	-0.533***	0.587	0.485	0.711
Religion: Catholic	-0.780***	0.458	0.358	0.586
Religion: Jewish	-0.811	0.444	0.171	1.152
Religion: None	-1.731***	0.177	0.127	0.246
Religiosity	0.143***	1.154	1.099	1.212
Urbanism	-0.098	0.907	0.788	1.044

Significance Codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05

 Table 4.13 Results for Political Tolerance toward Homosexuals: Free Speech

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.001	1.001	0.991	1.011
Class	-0.463***	0.630	0.490	0.810

Education	-0.824***	0.438	0.346	0.556
Gender: Male	-2.091***	0.124	0.095	0.160
Ideology	0.077	1.080	0.943	1.238
Party	-0.090	0.914	0.823	1.014
Race: Asian	-2.152***	0.116	0.040	0.335
Race: Hispanic	-1.371***	0.254	0.138	0.466
Race: Black	-1.678***	0.187	0.128	0.272
Region: Northeast	-2.249***	0.105	0.068	0.163
Region: Midwest	-2.223***	0.108	0.074	0.159
Region: South	-1.755***	0.173	0.133	0.224
Religion: Catholic	-2.325***	0.098	0.066	0.145
Religion: Jewish	-3.219**	0.040	0.004	0.393
Religion: None	-2.738***	0.065	0.040	0.106
Religiosity	0.113***	1.120	1.046	1.199
Urbanism	-0.364***	0.695	0.565	0.854

Table 4.14 Results for Political Tolerance toward Homosexuals: Right to Work

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.013**	1.013	1.004	1.023
Class	-0.529***	0.589	0.461	0.753
Education	-0.770***	0.463	0.371	0.577
Gender: Male	-1.972***	0.139	0.109	0.178
Ideology	-0.108	0.898	0.787	1.025
Party	0.003	1.003	0.909	1.108
Race: Asian	-3.114***	0.044	0.009	0.225
Race: Hispanic	-1.595***	0.203	0.105	0.391
Race: Black	-1.565***	0.209	0.145	0.301
Region: Northeast	-2.355***	0.095	0.060	0.150
Region: Midwest	-2.197***	0.111	0.076	0.162
Region: South	-1.576***	0.207	0.162	0.264
Religion: Catholic	-2.283***	0.102	0.069	0.151

Religion: Jewish	-2.485***	0.083	0.016	0.434
Religion: None	-2.890***	0.056	0.033	0.094
Religiosity	0.109***	1.115	1.044	1.190
Urbanism	281***	0.755	0.620	0.920

 Table 4.15 Results for Political Tolerance toward Homosexuals: Free Press

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.010**	1.010	1.002	1.019
Class	-0.506***	0.603	0.489	0.743
Education	-0.638***	0.529	0.448	0.624
Gender: Male	-1.479***	0.228	0.185	0.281
Ideology	0.046	1.047	0.937	1.170
Party	-0.052	0.949	0.873	1.032
Race: Asian	-1.634***	0.195	0.082	0.464
Race: Hispanic	-1.083***	0.339	0.192	0.596
Race: Black	-0.940***	0.391	0.288	0.530
Region: Northeast	-1.909***	0.148	0.101	0.218
Region: Midwest	-1.560***	0.210	0.155	0.284
Region: South	-0.979***	0.376	0.306	0.461
Religion: Catholic	-1.663***	0.190	0.139	0.259
Religion: Jewish	-2.485***	0.083	0.016	0.434
Religion: None	-2.232***	0.107	0.072	0.160
Religiosity	0.150***	1.162	1.099	1.228
Urbanism	-0.318***	0.728	0.616	0.860

Significance Codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05

4.1.6 Anti-American Muslim Clergymen

Unlike political intolerance toward other disliked groups, neither age, class, nor urbanism have any significant effect on the political tolerance felt toward Muslims who profess a negative view of the United States. Education continues to have a strong effect, however, with the likelihood of political intolerance decreasing by 56% toward free speech, 51.7% toward the right to work, and 63.4% toward free press with each additional level of educational attainment. And unlike political intolerance toward other disliked groups in American society, women do not prove to be significantly more likely to be intolerant—men are actually more likely to be intolerant by 63.5% when it comes to anti-American Muslim clergymen's right to work in the United States. Ideology and political party also have an effect, with respondents professing more conservative values more likely to be politically intolerant by 20.5% toward the right to free speech, 17.5% toward the right to work, and 14% toward the right to publish. Conversely, respondents with a stronger affiliation with the Democratic Party are respectively 13.5%, 7.3%, and 8% less likely to be intolerant.

Asian respondents do not prove to be significantly different than white respondents in their intolerance toward anti-American Muslim clergymen, while Hispanic and black respondents are more likely to be intolerant than white respondents. Respondents in the Northeast, Midwest, and South are also more likely than respondents in the West to be intolerant when it comes to this group's right to work (by 78.7%, 80.4%, and 2.6 times, respectively). Towards the right to free speech, these three regions are again more likely than the West to be intolerant, but only the South proves significantly more likely 72.4%, while the Northeast and Midwest are less likely to be intolerant toward the right to free press but the South again more likely by 47.9%.

Catholics are more likely than Protestants to be intolerant by 69% toward the right to free speech, 2.6 times toward the right to work, and 31% toward the right to free press. Jewish respondents have a smaller effect, only achieving a significant difference from Protestants by being 3.2 times less likely to be intolerant. Toward the right to free speech and free press, unaffiliated respondents are 55% and 71% less likely to be intolerant, while they are more likely to be intolerant concerning the right to work 24%. Greater religious attendance remains significant in increasing the likelihood of intolerance by 12% toward the right to free speech, 9% toward the right to work, and 13% toward the right to freely publish without censorship.

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.003	1.003	0.997	1.010
Class	0.030	1.030	0.873	1.215
Education	-0.445***	0.641	0.577	0.712
Gender: Male	-0.018	0.982	0.835	1.155
Ideology	0.187***	1.205	1.100	1.320
Party	-0.127***	0.881	0.822	0.944
Race: Asian	0.457	1.579	0.818	3.046
Race: Hispanic	1.214***	3.368	1.875	6.050
Race: Black	0.654***	1.923	1.439	2.569
Region: Northeast	0.179	1.196	0.923	1.548
Region: Midwest	0.052	1.053	0.839	1.322
Region: South	0.545***	1.724	1.426	2.084
Religion: Catholic	0.525***	1.690	1.336	2.137
Religion: Jewish	-0.575	0.563	0.221	1.431
Religion: None	-0.394***	0.674	0.530	0.858
Religiosity	0.112***	1.118	1.069	1.170
Urbanism	-0.025	0.976	0.860	1.107

 Table 4.16 Results for Political Tolerance toward Muslims: Free Speech

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.005	1.005	1.042	1.144
Class	0.122	1.130	0.951	1.342
Education	-0.416***	0.659	0.593	0.734
Gender: Male	0.492***	1.635	1.383	1.934
Ideology	0.162***	1.175	1.070	1.291
Party	-0.070***	0.932	0.868	1.001
Race: Asian	0.544	1.722	0.886	3.346
Race: Hispanic	1.684***	5.385	2.736	10.596
Race: Black	1.084***	2.955	2.153	4.057
Region: Northeast	0.581***	1.787	1.365	2.339
Region: Midwest	0.590***	1.804	1.422	2.289
Region: South	0.967***	2.630	2.143	3.229
Religion: Catholic	0.958***	2.607	2.021	3.364
Religion: Jewish	0.080	1.083	0.442	2.657
Religion: None	0.213***	1.237	0.975	1.570
Religiosity	0.088***	1.092	1.042	1.144
Urbanism	0.075	1.078	0.945	1.229

Table 4.17 Results for Political Tolerance toward Muslims: Right to Work

Table 4.18 Results for Political Tolerance toward Muslims: Free Press

	Estimates	Odds Ratio	CI 2.5%	CI 97.5%
Age	0.004	1.004	0.997	1.010
Class	-0.044	0.957	0.812	1.128
Education	-0.491***	0.612	0.550	0.681
Gender: Male	-0.118	0.888	0.755	1.045
Ideology	0.122***	1.140	1.042	1.247
Party	-0.077**	0.926	0.865	0.991
Race: Asian	0.123	1.130	0.595	2.147
Race: Hispanic	0.824***	2.280	1.332	3.903
Race: Black	0.626***	1.871	1.403	2.495

Region: Northeast	-0.007	0.993	0.757	1.286
Region: Midwest	-0.041	0.960	0.764	1.205
Region: South	0.391***	1.479	1.227	1.784
Religion: Catholic	0.273**	1.314	1.045	1.651
Religion: Jewish	-1.153*	0.316	0.111	0.902
Religion: None	-0.538***	0.584	0.457	0.747
Religiosity	0.122***	1.130	1.080	1.182
Urbanism	0.022	1.023	0.901	1.161

4.2 Discussion

In Chapter 2, I hypothesized that political tolerance would be more prevalent in certain areas of the American demographic than in others. Concerning education, I hypothesized that each subsequent level of educational attainment would produce greater levels of political tolerance. The results of the analysis show that, in keeping with past findings and my hypothesis, a higher level of education does indeed have a strong and consistent effect on decreasing political intolerance toward every single group preselected by the 2014 General Social Survey, except in the case of Communists and their right to work, where greater educational attainment led to an increased likelihood of intolerance.

Socioeconomic status of respondents also had a significant effect towards a number of groups and their rights. Class often acted as expected by exhibiting a lesser likelihood of political tolerance as respondents' self-described socioeconomic status increased, with the notable exceptions that socioeconomic status did not produce significant differences toward intolerance of racists or anti-American Muslim clergymen, and a higher status increased the likelihood of intolerance toward communists and their right to work. Urbanism had a varied effect, although in
the cases where it did prove significant, such as toward atheists, communists, and the LGBTQ community, more densely populated areas did tend to see decreased likelihoods of intolerance as predicted; however, one exception is in communists and their right to work, which increased the likelihood of intolerance as population density increased.

Race proved to have a significant effect on political tolerance toward a number of groups and their specific rights, but the results are quite varied depending on the specific target group and the rights in question. For instance, Hispanic and black respondents were unsurprisingly more likely to be intolerant of racists than white respondents, though perhaps more surprisingly this same result applied to anti-American Muslim clergymen, while Asian and black respondents were less likely to be intolerant toward communists and all racial categories were less likely to be intolerant than white respondents toward members of the LGBTQ community. The effects of race on political tolerance has not been well-documented within the existing literature, and may be an interesting avenue for further research.

Gender proved to have a substantively significant effect on levels of political tolerance toward most of the disliked groups present in the 2014 GSS data. As hypothesized, men have a decreased likelihood of being politically intolerant compared to women. The only exceptions to this in this analysis are toward anti-American Muslim clergymen's rights to free speech and press and racists' right to work, which failed to find any significant difference in likelihoods, as well as the finding that men were more likely to be intolerant toward anti-American Muslim clergymen's right to work.

Respondents' region of habitation in the U.S. had a similarly substantive effect. Contrary to my prediction, the results show that the Northeast, Midwest, and South are all less likely to be politically intolerant than the West. The exceptions to this are racists and their right to work, which failed to find any significant differences among the regions, and toward communists and anti-American Muslim clergymen's right to work, where all three regions were found to be more likely to be intolerant than the West. In two cases the South did prove to be the most intolerant region in regard to anti-American Muslim clergymen's rights to free speech and free press. It is surprisingly to discover that not only is the West not the most politically tolerant region, but that traditionally intolerant areas like the South and to a lesser extent, the Midwest, are more tolerant. One possible explanation for this finding is that regions, being large geographic areas, are populated by a variety of people with different beliefs and values that may aggregately make them more or less tolerant. There is also the possibility that respondents within each region may not be entirely truthful on groups they do not feel strongly about, but differences shine through more clearly toward especially contentious groups, such as Southern respondents toward anti-American Muslim clergymen.

Religiosity, as hypothesized, was also a consistent predictor of political intolerance. Where respondents more frequently attended religious services, they were more likely to be politically intolerant. The only instance where this was not the case was political intolerance toward racists and their right to work, where religiosity failed to be a significantly different predictor of likelihood. Contrary to my prediction, eligious preference also had an effect, with Catholic, Jewish, and unaffiliated respondents all showing a decreased likelihood of intolerance compared to Protestant respondents. This effect was markedly strong with unaffiliated respondents, while in some cases Jewish respondents failed to be significantly different from Protestants' likelihood of intolerance, such as in militarists' rights to work and free press and anti-American Muslim clergymen's rights to work and free speech. In this latter group's case, Catholics exhibited a greater likelihood of being politically intolerant compared to Protestants.

Measured by year, respondents' age increases the likelihood of intolerance toward atheists' right to work, militarists, and members of the LGBTQ community, while it decreases the likelihood of intolerance toward atheists' right to free speech, racists' right to free press, and communists' right to work. Toward all other disliked groups, age fails to generate significant differences in the likelihood of political intolerance, and therefore only selectively affirms my hypothesis that the elderly are more likely to be intolerant.

Finally, while political party affiliation and ideology have a significant effect on levels of political tolerance, it is less prevalent than what I would expect, and they do not go hand in hand as often as previous research by Doherty (2014) suggests. Stronger affiliation with the Democratic Party decreased the likelihood of intolerance toward atheists, racists, communists, militarists, and anti-American Muslim clergymen, but was not significantly different from respondents with a stronger affiliation to the Republican Party on rights for the LGBTQ community. Liberal versus conservative values fail to be significantly different in all groups except for anti-American Muslim clergymen, where stronger conservative values increased the likelihood of political intolerance.

4.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter has analyzed the results of the analysis by interpreting the likelihood that certain groups in the American demographic display more or less political tolerance toward disliked groups in American society. It then turns to a discussion of the hypotheses, with the findings that hypotheses regarding the effects of education, class, gender, and religiosity were accurate in most instances, as were hypotheses regarding age, political party affiliation, ideology, race, and urbanism to a less consistent extent. Hypotheses regarding region and religious preference were incorrect. This thesis will now turn to its final section of concluding remarks and further opportunities for research.

5. Conclusion

When the United States was first conceived, it was with a rather limited notion of which groups it would and would not include under its banner of liberty and equality for all. The exceedingly prevalent political intolerance that existed during the country's early years is taught to every American school child, as are the societal transformations that took place as groups like African Americans and women fought to ensure their own political rights and civil liberties. These lessons form the basis of the idea that the U.S. is a country where everyone has equal opportunity to participate in governance and to follow their beliefs and values without fear of persecution. The reality is, however, that political intolerance continues to pervade the American public, with many Americans willing to deny certain disliked groups their rights and liberties.

The current political climate is one of polarization, with many Americans increasingly unhappy with the way the country has been going. Renewed fears of internal attacks by police, external attacks by terrorists, an economy that many perceive to still be lagging, persisting gender inequality, and increasingly mainstream acceptance of traditionally-marginalized groups have only served to divide American society further. Inspired by these events, this thesis sought to provide an analysis on where political intolerance is more likely to be present within certain factions of the American demographic.

Following introductory remarks, the second chapter reported previous scholars' findings towards whether political tolerance is a necessary trait for citizens of a democracy to have if it is to be successful—not very, as it turns out. The chapter continues with a literature review of past findings toward political tolerance and its main causes, which have mainly been found to be psychological following the first foray into political tolerance by Samuel Stouffer in 1955. It finishes by suggesting a number of hypotheses as to where political intolerance is more likely to be present in the American demographic. Chapter Three discusses the most common methods used for analyzing political tolerance, with a focus on the fixed-group method and its limitations, before describing the data and analysis.

Chapter Four reports the results of the multiple multivariate logistic regressions that were employed to analyze the likelihood of greater political intolerance toward atheists, racists, communists, militarists, homosexuals, and anti-American Muslim clergymen. The findings suggest that my hypotheses concerning education, religiosity, gender, and class were correct: those with higher educational attainment are more likely to exhibit greater political tolerance, and more so than in any other demographic variable. Conversely, greater devotion to religion proved to be a strong predictor of political intolerance, while women also displayed markedly higher intolerance than men and respondents in a higher socioeconomic bracket were less likely to be intolerant.

To a lesser extent, my hypotheses regarding age and political party affiliation and ideology were also accurate. More youthful respondents were considerably less intolerant than older ones, with each additional birthday adding considerably to the likelihood of intolerance. This is in contrast to my hypothesis that the young might not be more politically tolerant owing to frustration with their financial situations, while my hypothesis that older respondents would continue to be more intolerant was inconsistent. As hypothesized, conservatives were found to be more intolerant, but only toward anti-American Muslim clergymen, while Democratic respondents were less likely to be intolerant where there were significant differences. Town size and religious preference proved to be inconsistently significant but the former tended to confirm my hypothesis while the latter, although not entirely incorrect in the idea that non-Western

religions would be more tolerant, does not support my hypothesis that different religious preferences would have no effect at all. Lastly, tolerance by non-white respondents also varied widely depending on the disliked group and right being considered.

These results deserve greater analysis, and perhaps with a narrower focus on each variable, before definitive conclusions should be drawn as to where political intolerance tends to manifest itself in the American demographic. Concentrating on fewer variables per study would simplify the coding process and analysis, potentially leading to more easily-interpretable and accurate results. Preliminary results for interactions among the explanatory variables indicate that education, socioeconomic status, age, party affiliation, ideology, and religiosity may all interact to varying degrees to produce greater intolerance, as could urbanism and race. To better understand where intolerance is more likely to be present in the United States, testing the interaction of demographic groups would be a worthwhile analysis.

Political intolerance has been and is likely to always be present in large portions of the American populace. While deep divisions over values and beliefs have the potential to destabilize society, they also reinforce democratic institutions. Even when some groups see their rights and liberties denied, other groups have shown that they will fight to ensure that marginalized groups are not excluded from their full rights and liberties. Recent strides and renewed attention toward these democratic principles have put the U.S. on track to be more inclusive than ever before. Despite pervasive intolerance within the country, there is hope that the United States and its citizens will continue to push for greater political tolerance toward all groups going into the future.

CEU eTD Collection

Appendix

Expl. Var. Name	GSS Codename	Survey Question		
Age	Age	Respondent's age		
Religiosity	Attend	"How often do you attend religious services?"		
		People often describe themselves as either being lower		
Class	Class	class, working class, middle class, or upper class. Which		
		group do you think of yourself as belonging to?		
Education	Degree	Respondent's degree		
Doutes	Partyid	"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a		
Faity		Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?"		
		"We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and		
Ideology	Polviews	conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point		
		scaleWhere would you place yourself on this scale?"		
Race	Racecen1	"What is your race? Indicate one or more races that you		
		consider yourself to be [First mention]"		
Region	Region	Region of interview		
Religion	Relig	"What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant,		
		Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?"		
Gender	Sex	Respondent's sex		
Urbanism	Size	Size of place of interview		

Table 1A. Description of Explanatory Variables and Associated Survey Questions

Table 2A. Description of Response Variables and Associated Survey Questions

Response Var. Name	GSS Codename	Survey Question	
Atheists	Spkath	"There are always some people whose ideas are considered	
		bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody	
		who is against all churches and religion If such a person	
		wanted to make a speech in your (city/town/community)	

		against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak			
		or not?"			
	Colath	"Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or			
		university, or not?"			
	Libath	"If some people in your community suggested that a			
		book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken			
		out of your public library, would you favor removing this			
		book, or not?"			
Racists	Spkrac	"Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are			
		genetically inferior If such a person wanted to make a			
		speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior,			
		should he be allowed to speak or not?"			
	Colrac	"Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or			
		university, or not?"			
	Librac	"If some people in your community suggested that a			
		book he wrote which said Blacks are inferior should be			
		taken out of your public library, would you favor removing			
		this book, or not?"			
Communists	Spkcom	"Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man			
		who admits he is a CommunistSuppose this admitted			
		Communist wanted to make a speech in your community.			
		Should he be allowed to speak, or not?"			
	Colcom	"Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired,			
		or not?"			
	Libcom	"Suppose he wrote a book which is in your public			
		library. Somebody in your community suggests that the			
		book should be removed from the library. Would you favor			
		removing it, or not?"			
Militarists	Spkmil	"Consider a person who advocates doing away with			
		elections and letting the military run the country If such a			
		person wanted to make a speech in your community, should			

76

		he be allowed to speak, or not?"			
	Colmil	"Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college o			
		university, or not?"			
	Libmil	 "Suppose he wrote a book advocating doing away with elections and letting the military run the country.Somebody in your community suggests that the book be			
		removed from the public library. Would you favor			
		removing it, or not?"			
Homosexuals	Spkhomo	"And what about a man who admits that he is a			
		homosexual?Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to			
		make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to			
		speak, or not?"			
	Colhomo	"Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or			
		university, or not?"			
	Libhomo	"If some people in your community suggested that a			
		book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken			
		out of your public library, would you favor removing this			
		book, or not?"			
Anti-American	Spkmslm	"Now consider a Muslim clergyman who preaches hatred of			
Muslim		the United States If such a person wanted to make a			
Clergymen		speech in your community preaching hatred of the United			
		States, should he be allowed to speak, or not?"			
	Colmslm	"Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or			
		university, or not?"			
	Libmslm	"If some people in your community suggested that a			
		book he wrote which preaches hatred of the United States			
		should be taken out of your public library, would you favor			
		removing this book, or not?"			

Expl.		St.						St.	
Var.	Mean	Dev.	Median	Min.	Max.	Skew	Kurtosis	Error	Ν
Age	49	17.412	49	18	89	.236	827	.346	2529
Class	2.38	.686	2.00	1	4	179	.049	.014	2519
Education	1.65	1.235	1.00	0	4	.632	822	.025	2538
Gender	1.55	.498	2.00	1	2	203	-1.960	.010	2538
Ideology	4.09	1.434	4.00	1	7	068	350	.029	2449
Party	2.77	2.016	3.00	0	7	.267	994	.040	2512
Race	1.59	1.131	1.00	1	4	1.482	.362	.023	2457
Region	2.67	1.020	3.00	1	4	275	-1.033	.020	2538
Religion	2.22	1.586	2.00	1	5	1.012	672	.033	2302
Religiosity	3.32	2.825	3.00	0	8	.264	-1.394	.056	2525
Urbanism	1.59	.895	1.48	.00	3.91	.495	196	.018	2533

Table 3A. Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables

References

About the GSS. (2016). Retrieved September 21, 2016, from http://gss.norc.org/About-The-GSS

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, N. (1950). *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York, NY: Harper.
- Bobo, L., & Licari, F. C. (1989). Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 53, 285-308.
- Carothers, T. (2015). Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose. *Journal of Democracy*, 26(1), 59-73. doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0010
- Cigler, A., & Joslyn, M. R. (2002). The Extensiveness of Group Membership and Social Capital: The Impact on Political Tolerance Attitudes. *Political Research Quarterly*, 55(1), 7-25. Retrieved September 9, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088064
- Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1985). *The NEO personality inventory: Manual, form S and form R*. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.
- Davis, D. W., & Silver, B. D. (2004). Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(1), 28-46. Retrieved September 14, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1519895
- Davis, J. (1975). Communism, Conformity, Cohorts, and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-73. *American Journal of Sociology*, 81, 491-513.
- De Tocqueville, A. (2004). Principle Causes Which Tend to Maintain the Democratic Republic in the United States. In H. Reeve (Trans.), *Democracy in America* (Vol. 1, Bantam Classics, pp. 334-383). New York, NY: Bantam Dell.
- Diamond, L. (2015). Facing Up to the Democratic Recession. *Journal of Democracy*, 26(1), 141-155. doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0009
- Doherty, C. (2014). 7 things to know about polarization in America. Retrieved September 18, 2016, from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-america/
- Dynes, W. (1967). Education and Tolerance: An Analysis of Intervening Factors. *Social Forces*, 46(1), 22-34. Retrieved May 26, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2575317
- Elster, J. (1995). Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process. *Duke Law Journal*, 45(2), 364-396. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1372906
- Erikson, R. S., & Luttbeg, N. R. (1973). American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
- Feldman, S. (2003). Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, 24(1), 41-74. Retrieved September 16, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792510
- Freedom in the World: United States. (2016). Retrieved September 23, 2016, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/united-states
- Friedersdorf, C. (2015, November 9). The New Intolerance of Student Activism. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved November 9, 2015, from http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/the-new-intolerance-of-studentactivism-at-yale/414810/
- Fukuyama, F. (2015). Why Is Democracy Performing So Poorly? *Journal of Democracy*, 26(1), 11-20. doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0017

- Gibson, J. L. (1985). Pluralistic Intolerance in America: A Reconsideration. *American Politics Quarterly*, 14, 267-293.
- Gibson, J. L. (1989). The Structure of Attitudinal Tolerance in the United States. *British Journal* of Political Science, 19(4), 562-570.
- Gibson, J. L. (1992). Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be "Least-Liked"? American Journal of Political Science, 36(2), 560-577. Retrieved August 15, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111491
- Gibson, J. L. (1995). The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies. In V. Tismaneanu (Ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (pp. 53-111). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp.
- Gibson, J. L. (1996a). A Mile Wide but an Inch Deep? The Structure of Democratic Commitments in the Former USSR. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(2), 396-420.
- Gibson, J. L. (1996b). Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections between Attitudes toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine. *The Journal of Politics*, *58*(4), 954-984.
- Gibson, J. L. (1997). The Struggle between Order and Liberty in Contemporary Russian Political Culture. *The Australian Journal of Political Science*, *32*(2), 271-290.
- Gibson, J. L. (1998a). A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate. *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 819-850.
- Gibson, J. L. (1998b). Putting Up with Fellow Russians: An Analysis of Political Tolerance in the Fledgling Russian Democracy. *Political Research Quarterly*, *51*(1), 37-68.
- Gibson, J. L. (2002). Becoming Tolerant? Short-Term Changes in Russian Political Culture. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32(2), 309-333.
- Gibson, J. L. (2006). Enigmas of Intolerance: Fifty Years after Stouffer's Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties. *Perspectives on Politics*, 40(1), 21-34. Retrieved May 22, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688624
- Gibson, J. L. (2011). Political Intolerance in the Context of Democratic Theory. In R. E. Goodin (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science* (pp. 409-424). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0021
- Gibson, J. L. (2013). Measuring Political Intolerance and General Support for Pro-Civil Liberties Policies: Notes, Evidence, and Cautions. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 77(S1), 45-68. Retrieved July 27, 2016.
- Gibson, J. L., & Bingham, R. D. (1982). On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance. *The American Political Science Review*, 76(3), 603-620. Retrieved September 16, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963734
- Gibson, J. L., & Duch, R. M. (1993). Political Intolerance in the USSR: The Distribution and Etiology of Mass Opinion. *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(3), 286-329.
- Gibson, J. L., & Gouws, A. (1999). Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Attributions of Blame and the Struggle over Apartheid. *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3), 501-517. Retrieved September 16, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585571
- Gibson, J. L., & Gouws, A. (2000). Social Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages within the South African Mass Public. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2), 278-292.
- Gibson, J. L., & Gouws, A. (2003). Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic Persuasion. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Gibson, J. L., Duch, R. M., & Tedin, K. L. (1992). Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union. *The Journal of Politics*, 54(2), 329-371. Retrieved September 16, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2132030
- Gibson, J. M., & Howard, M. M. (2007). Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of Jews: The Dog that Didn't Bark? *British Journal of Political Science*, *37*(2), 193-224.
- Golebiowska, E. A. (2001). Individual-Targeted Tolerance and Timing of Group Membership Disclosure. *The Journal of Politics*, 63(4), 1017-1040. Retrieved September 14, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2691805
- Griffith, E. S., Plamenatz, J., & Pennock, J. R. (1956). Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium. *The American Political Science Review*, 50(1), 101-137. Retrieved May 24, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951601
- Grimm, D. (2012). Types of Constitutions. In M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajo (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law* (pp. 98-131). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, Census Bureau Reports. (2012). Retrieved September 9, 2016, from https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html
- Guérin, D., Petry, F., & Crête, J. (2004). Tolerance, protest, and democratic transition: Survey evidence from 13 post-communist countries. *European Journal of Political Research, 43*, 371-395. Retrieved August 15, 2016.
- Harell, A. (2010). Political Tolerance, Racist Speech, and the Influence of Social Networks. *Social Science Quarterly*, *91*(3), 724-740. Retrieved June 5, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/42956427
- Hetherington, M. J., & Suhay, E. (2011). Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans' Support for the War on Terror. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3), 546-560. Retrieved August 15, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23024936
- Hetherington, M. J., & Weiler, J. D. (2009). Authoritarianism and Polarization in American *Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Hinckley, R. A. (2010). Personality and Political Tolerance: The Limits of Democratic Learning in Postcommunist Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(2), 188-207. doi:10.1177/0010414009349327
- Humes, K. R., Jones, N. A., & Ramirez, R. R. (2011). Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010 (U.S.A., U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration). Retrieved September 13, 2016, from https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values. *American Sociological Review*, 65(1), 19-51. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657288
- Kagan, R. (2015). The Weight of Geopolitics. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 21-31. doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0001
- Lawrence, D. G. (1976). Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment. *The American Political Science Review*, 70(1), 80-100. Retrieved May 26, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960325
- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2015). The Myth of the Democratic Recession. *Journal of Democracy*, 26(1), 45-58. doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0007

- Lindner, N. M., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Alienable Speech: Ideological Variations in the Application of Free-Speech Principles. *Political Psychology*, 30(1), 67-92. Retrieved September 14, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447185
- Lipka, M., & Wormald, B. (2016). How religious is your state? Retrieved June 8, 2016, from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/29/how-religious-is-your-state/?state=alabama
- Lipset, S. M. (1981). *The Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Expanded ed.). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, S. M., & Raab, E. (1970). The Politics of Unreason. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Marcus, G. E., Sullivan, J. L., Theiss-Morse, E., & Wood, S. L. (1995). With Malice toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- McClosky, H. (1964). Consensus and Ideology in American Politics. The American Political Science Review, 58(2), 361-382. Retrieved May 22, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952868
- McLaren, L. M. (2003). Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants. *Social Forces*, 81(3), 909-936. Retrieved September 10, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598180
- Murphy, C. (2016). Q&A: Why are women generally more religious than men? Retrieved June 11, 2016, from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/23/qa-why-are-women-generally-more-religious-than-men/
- Murphy, W. (1993). Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy. In D. Greenberg, S. Katz,
 & S. C. Wheatley (Eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World: The American Council of Learned Societies Comparative Constitutionalism Papers (pp. 3-25). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Neubauer, D. E. (1967). Some Conditions of Democracy. *The American Political Science Review*, 61(4), 1002-1009. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953402
- Nunn, C. Z., Crockett, H. J., & Williams, J. A. (1978). *Tolerance for Nonconformity*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Oliver, J. E., & Mendelberg, T. (2000). Reconsidering the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(3), 574-589. Retrieved September 9, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669265
- Petersen, M., Slothuus, R., Stubager, R., & Togeby, L. (2011). Freedom for All? The Strength and Limit of Political Tolerance. *British Journal of Political Science*, 41(3), 581-597. doi:10.1017/S0007123410000451
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup Contact Theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49(1), 65-85.
- Preuss, U. K. (1994). Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution. In M. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy* (pp. 143-164). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Prothro, J. W., & Grigg, C. M. (1960). Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement. *The Journal of Politics*, 22(2), 276-294. Retrieved May 24, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2127359

Puddington, A., & Roylance, T. (2016). *Freedom in the World 2016* (Rep.). Retrieved April 30, 2016, from Freedom House website: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf

- Putnam, R. D. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, *30*(2), 137-174. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x
- Religious Landscape Study. (2014). Retrieved June 11, 2016, from http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/
- Rokeach, M. (1960). The Open and Closed Mind. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Ryan, C. L., & Bauman, K. (2016). Educational Attainment in the United States: 2015 (U.S.A., Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration). Retrieved June 10, 2016, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p20-

578.pdf

- Schafer, C. E., & Shaw, G. M. (2009). The Polls—Trends: Tolerance in the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 73(2, Summer), 404-431. doi:10.1093/poq/nfp022
- Schlenker, B. R., Chambers, J. R., & Le, B. M. (2011). Conservatives are happier than liberals, but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 46, 127-146. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2011.12.009
- Smith, T. W., Marsden, P. V., Hout, M., & Kim, J. (2016). GSS2014.sav. Retrieved September 23, 2016, from gssdataexplorer.norc.org
- Sniderman, P. M. (1975). *Personality and Democratic Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Stein, R. M., Post, S. S., & Rinden, A. L. (2000). Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 53(2), 285-303. Retrieved September 9, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/449282
- Stenner, K. (2005). The Authoritarian Dynamic. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Stolle, D., Soroka, S., & Johnston, R. (2008). When Does Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions. *Political Studies*, 56(1), 57-75. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00717.x
- Stouffer, S. (1955). Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties. New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Sullivan, J. L., & Hendriks, H. (2009). Public Support for Civil Liberties Pre- and Post-9/11. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 5, 375-391. doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131525
- Sullivan, J. L., & Transue, J. E. (1999). The Psychological Underpinnings of Democracy: A Selective Review of Research on Political Tolerance, Interpersonal Trust, and Social Capital. Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1), 625-650. Retrieved May 21, 2016.
- Sullivan, J. L., Avery, P. G., Thalhammer, K., Wood, S., & Bird, K. (1994). Education and Political Tolerance in the United States: The Mediating Role of Cognitive Sophistication, Personality, and Democratic Norms. *Review of Education, Pedagogy & Cultural Studies,* 16(3/4), 315-324.
- Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1982). *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- *Table 1. Urban and Rural Population: 1900 to 1990* [Chart]. (1995). Retrieved September 9, 2016, from https://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/urpop0090.txt

- Thalhammer, K., Wood, S., Bird, K., Avery, P. G., & Sullivan, J. L. (1994). Adolescents and Political Tolerance: Lip-Synching to the Tune of Democracy. *Review of Education*, *Pedagogy & Cultural Studies*, 16(3/4), 325-347.
- The Gender Gap in Religion Around the World. (2016). Retrieved June 11, 2016, from http://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/22/the-gender-gap-in-religion-around-the-world/
- U.S.A., The Council of Economic Advisors, The White House. (2014). *15 Economic Facts about Millennials*. Retrieved June 12, 2016, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/millennials_report.pdf
- Voas, D., McAndrew, S., & Storm, I. (2013). Modernization and the gender gap in religiosity: Evidence from cross-national European surveys. *Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie & Sozialpsychologie*, 65(1), 259-283. doi:10.1007/s11577-013-0226-5
- Weber, M. (1930). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Wilson, T. C. (1994). Trends in Tolerance toward Rightist and Leftist Groups, 1976-1988: Effects of Attitude Change and Cohort Succession. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 58(4), 539-556. Retrieved August 15, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2749607
- Wirth, L. (1938). Urbanism as a Way of Life. *American Journal of Sociology*, 44(1), 1-24. Retrieved May 24, 2016, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2768119
- Wood, S., Thalhammer, K., Sullivan, J. L., Bird, K., Avery, P. G., & Klein, K. (1994). Tolerance for Diversity of Beliefs: Learning about Tolerance and Liking It, Too. *Review of Education, Pedagogy & Cultural Studies, 16*(3/4), 349-372.
- World Bank (1960-2015). Urban population (% of total): United States. Retrieved September 9, 2016, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=US