

**Unraveling the Black Mountain:
Authoritarian Submission and Party Preference in
Montenegro**

By

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Abstract

Why some post-communist countries regularly experience democratic overturn of power while others not? Concentrating on the psychological factors that could prevent democratic competitiveness in post-communist area, this thesis investigates the relationship between one particular dimension of authoritarian personality – *authoritarian submission*, and party preferences in Montenegro - the country that never changed the incumbent government since the breakdown of communism. I adopt a novel approach to tap into the multi-dimensional examination of authoritarianism, concentrating on three dimensions (*authoritarian submission*, *conventionalism*, *authoritarian aggression*) separately. I argue that authoritarian submission, as a psychological construct that stands for obedient relation to political authority and upbringing patterns, has a potential to explain domination of Democratic Party of Socialists – DPS. I test my assumptions using survey research. More precisely, I use two surveys – Montenegrin National Elections Study (2016) – MNES, and a self-designed student survey (2018). Notwithstanding the Montenegrin/Serb ethnic cleavage that remains significant, findings from both analyses confirm that submissive tendencies are relevant for voting this party, thus emphasizing the relevance of psychological factors for the democratic potential of post-communist countries.

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Introduction

The breakdown of communism across Europe provoked numerous scholarly debates that were primarily interested in the process of *transition* to functioning democracies (Bielasiak, 2002; Innes, 2002; Rose and Munro, 2003; Birch, 2003; Tavits, 2005; Powell and Tucker, 2014; Whitefield, 1993; Kitschelt, 1995; Evans and Whitefield, 2002)¹. For many of the Southeast European countries, the transition brought multipartism and competitive elections. Such political experience moved the academic focus further to the concept of *representation* in newly formed democracies (Alonso et al, 2011; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2007), where it is vital to observe one of democracies central characteristics – “*government replaceability*” (Komar and Zivkovic, 2016:785). Namely, some of post-communist countries, even under political pluralism, have run single party government for decades and do not experience the basics of representative democracy – competitiveness² (Sartori, 2005) and regular overturn of power.

Now, the tempting question is - why today, even decades after the collapse of communism, some post-communist countries still struggle to achieve competitiveness? What differentiates these countries from those that succeeded in competitive democratic organization? I analyze these questions with a deviant case study (Lijphart, 1971:692; Gerring, 2008:656) - the only post-communist country in Southeast Europe that did not experience any democratic overturn of power since the collapse of communism (Morrison, 2008; Vukovic, 2015) - Montenegro.

¹ Note that these authors investigated transitional processes through institutionalization of the elections, electoral systems (Bielasiak, 2002, to Powell and Tucker, 2014) and inherited party cleavages, dominantly based on social, economic, and political factors (Whitefield, 1993, to Evans and Whitefield, 2002).

² It is important to note that competitiveness, in Sartori's (2005) terms, and as used in this thesis, does not mean the same as competition (p.218) i.e. the existence of formal conditions that allow the fair electoral battle. Namely, competitiveness poses competition as a pre-condition, namely it “(...)presupposes *competition* (as a structure) and is something to be measured in outcome, on the basis of its *effectiveness*” (Sartori, 1976:218; emphasis added).

With 27 years of uninterrupted domination of Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), this country presents a vivid example of Sartori's (2005) "*pre-dominant party system*" (ibid, p. 172; emphasis added), or a political scenario where "the same party manages to win, over time, an absolute majority of seats" (ibid, p. 173) on at least three consecutive elections (ibid, p. 175). I argue that the lack of competitiveness in Montenegrin politics is shaped by habits inherited from the communist regime, but primarily from turbulent post-communist transitions, where the cult of leadership emerged, and citizens were susceptible to the authoritarian nature of political system. I further argue that these circumstances present a fruitful ground for strengthening exactly authoritarian personality, and its dimension – authoritarian submission (Adorno et al, 1950; Altemeyer, 1996).

I claim that this dimension of authoritarianism presents a potent explanatory factor why the overturn of power never happened in this country. This research, therefore, sets the following four goals:

First, in my thesis, I aim to present why authoritarian submission is highly relevant for the democratic potential of post-communist societies that were under strong leadership for a long time. Namely, this particular dimension of authoritarian personality, directly measures how individuals relate to political authority that is established within a certain society, and is usually emanated in a *strong leader*. I argue that the propensity for democratic success does not depend solely on political transition - without social transition – the transition in consciousness, democracy is harder to achieve. This argument is built from the literature that investigates transitional societies through the interplay between the nature of the previous regime and citizen mentality i.e. consciousness among citizenry (see: McFarland et al, 1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Thus, this thesis presents practical application of the general assumption that individuals from former communist, Southeast European area, still value obedience as a proper behavior to political authority.

Further, the deviant case study approach I am implementing, means that findings from this research can provide better understanding of the outcomes of the transitional experiences and its effects on contemporary political development of post-communist societies. If the authoritarian submission model works here, on a deviant case, it can be expanded on other common cases that experienced communist past and post-communist transition.

Second, my goal is to demonstrate why exactly the Montenegrin example is well suited for the analysis of authoritarian submission. I argue that Montenegro, being a deviant case of post-communist transition, has certain specificities that make it especially intriguing in terms of authoritarian submission, as derived from communist and post-communist legacy (Ekman and Linde, 2005; Wittenberg, 2013). Namely, not only that this country did not experience any democratic overturn of power since the end of communist era, but also, Montenegro is the only Southeast European country that did not change the major structure of the leadership since then (Morrison, 2009). That is how DPS and its leader – Milo Djukanovic, persistently remained in the center of the regime. Moreover, Montenegro is especially suited to study authoritarian mindsets – the country was listed among the 25% of the most authoritarian countries covered by European Values Study in 2008 (Komar, 2013:173), *exactly* on the dimension of the authoritarian submission.

Further, with its pre-dominant party system, the Montenegrin political scene, lacks “*ex-ante uncertainty*” (Przeworski, 2000:16) or a possibility that the electoral outcome will be *unknown* in advance. There are many scholarly attempts trying to explain how this ‘ex-ante uncertainty’ is actually created – more precisely, how transitional societies are transformed into competitive and representative democracies. One very prominent explanation, is the institutionalist approach, that analyzes the “institutional performance” (Mishler and Rose, 2001:1) of newly formed democracies.

However, I claim that the institutionalist approach does not answer the puzzle of Montenegro – this country experienced positive institutional changes (Darmanovic, 2007; cited in: Komar and Zivkovic, 2016:785), where the “liberal economy [was] introduced, the EU accession process has started, freedom of speech is practiced, and the majority of the press is freed of state control” (Darmanovic, 2007; cited in: Komar and Zivkovic, 2016:785). Still, this institutionally functional democracy did not experience any democratic overturn of power despite the institutional changes. This specificity of Montenegrin politics opens the space for approaches from another side of the spectrum – *political psychology*, where I argue for the relevance of authoritarian submission, in relation to party preferences in this country.

Besides the psychological approach, I also test the alternative explanations, derived from cleavage-based theory, which identifies “varying salience of socio-cultural conflicts in post-communist countries and the relations among ethnic groups” (Kitschelt, 1995:447). These alternative explanations have particular relevance for those post-communist countries that experienced identity-based turmoil, such as Montenegro. Namely, Montenegro, unlike many of post-communist countries that polarized their parties on left-right continuum, divided its political scene along the ethnic cleavage. As I present in Chapter 3, the ethnic divisions that mark contemporary Montenegrin parties, emerged from the turbulent relation with Serbia, and the question of Montenegrin independence that was formally resolved in 2006, when the country officially became independent. This long-term tension about Montenegrin independence made the Montenegrin/Serb division grow into an enduring cleavage of Montenegrin politics. Parties divide themselves clearly on this dimension, and persistently remain centered around ethnicity.

I consider ethnic cleavage to be a powerful alternative explanation. Being Montenegrin or Serb becomes a strong precondition for vote choice, even experimentally proven (see: Stankov, 2016).

This is the reason why I take into account the significance of ethnic cleavage, and control for ethnic factors in my analysis. I test the effects of authoritarian submission on both ethnic groups, this way I can make a valid inference about the real presence and effects of my explanatory variable.

When it comes to the *third* goal of this thesis, I argue for refined concept of authoritarianism i.e. for application of the three-dimensional approach to this personality structure, as opposed to uni-dimensional perspective (see: Passini, 2017). Namely, I primarily introduce authoritarian submission through the theory of *authoritarian personality* as presented by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950). Based on Adorno et al. study (1950), authoritarianism³ is defined as a set of enduring personal characteristics that make an individual be rigid and conventional in his/her beliefs and values [conventionalism]; submissive to people with superior status [authoritarian submission]; and aggressive-oppressive to inferior individuals [authoritarian aggression] (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; Čupić, 2009). While Adorno et al. presented authoritarianism through numerous dimensions, I follow Altemeyer's (1996) classification that nicely reduced all of these into three dimensions, according to aforementioned definition: *conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression*.

I present authoritarianism as a three-dimensional concept, and I claim that treating authoritarianism as uni-dimensional syndrome masks the separate influence that each authoritarianism dimension may have. Namely, when using uni-dimensional approach, and measuring the overall influence of authoritarianism on party preferences, it remains unclear what particular dimensions are influencing the response variable, how, and to which extent.

³In order to avoid ambiguity, it is important to note that authoritarian personality and authoritarianism are treated as synonyms in Adorno et al. analysis; both present set of personal tendencies, characteristics and dynamics, see: Adorno et al, (1950:228).

My research does not suffer from this obstacle since I distinguish between authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism, and measure the impact of each of them, both separately, and jointly. This way I would have a better understanding of how fondness for authoritarianism might work out exactly.

Fourth, this thesis aims to present a contribution to voting behavior research in Montenegro, and especially to the study of political psychology and leadership that is under-developed in this case. Namely, even though the Montenegrin case calls for in-depth research, studies investigating voting behavior together with authoritarian submission are in the stage of development. As expected, there are detailed analyses of the traditional ethnic cleavage (Bieber, 2003; Pavlovic, 2003; Dzankic, 2012, 2013, 2014; Jenne and Bieber, 2014; Vukovic, 2014; Vukovic, 2015; Stankov, 2016), however, research on the psychology of Montenegrin citizens⁴ (Komar, 2013; Batricevic, 2015; Todosijevic, Pavlovic, Komar, 2016), is still rare, especially in terms of authoritarian submission.

To the best of my knowledge, there were no previous attempts to analyze the influence of this dimension on vote choice, among Montenegrin citizens⁵. I test the influence of the authoritarian submission on voting preferences with survey research method, and I ask whether this dimension mostly holds for the Democratic Party of Socialists – DPS, or it is relevant for other Montenegrin parties. Afterwards, I compare the impact of authoritarian submission with explanatory power of other dimensions of authoritarianism. Therefore, my aim is to create a more refined model applicable for further testing and with the ability to capture all the relevant measures of the case.

Further, I consider important to note to the reader that this is an exploratory study and I do not intend to prove that authoritarian submission *causes* preference for certain parties.

⁴ Psychology relevant for political behavior, respectively.

⁵ With the exception of the aforementioned Komar's (2013) analysis and already cited Todosijevic, Pavlovic, and Komar research (2016). In the last case authors were primarily interested in correlation between education, ideological orientation (authoritarianism) and party preference. Neither of these researches did examine specifically authoritarian submission and its relation to vote choice.

Rather, my goal is to see whether there is any other salient feature of the Montenegrin electorate, beside the well-known ethnic cleavage, that can provide an understanding of the Montenegrin political situation. We know that Montenegrin voters divide themselves on their ethnicity sharply, but we do not know whether they meet on some other dimension.

Finally, the structure of this thesis is as follows. In order to capture what authoritarian submission is, I consider necessary to provide explanation of authoritarianism. Chapter 1 is dedicated to its dimensions, and the formation of authoritarian personality. In this chapter, I explain how the interest for this psychological structure is developed, through viewpoints of its founders, already cited – Adorno et al (1950). In later parts of the chapter, I further present Altemeyer's (1996) approach to underline the theoretical support for the three-dimensional authoritarianism perspective, applied in this thesis.

In Chapter 2, I provide detailed elaboration of the main explanatory factor of this thesis - authoritarian submission. Based on the literature, I argue that this dimension of authoritarian personality dominantly relates to general perception of authority, and it is, therefore, easily applicable to political behavior and the study of follower-leader relationship. I further demonstrate how this authoritarianism dimension, even though driven by upbringing patterns, dominantly depends on the character of the individual's surrounding. The formation of authoritarian submission, presented in this chapter, provides the theoretical evidence on how this dimension actually applies to the post-communist area.

The Chapter 3 consists of the specific details of the selected case, where I justify my focus on Montenegro, in relation to authoritarian submission. I provide detailed overview of the history and specificities of the Montenegrin political scene, such as one-party dominance, ethnic cleavage, and the lack of clear ideological polarization of Montenegrin parties.

Chapters 4 and 5 consist of two analyses where I present my survey research results, as empirical investigation of this topic. In order to test the influence of authoritarian submission on party preferences, I examine the Montenegrin wave of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) i.e. Montenegrin National Election Study (MNES) – 2016, done on a nationally representative sample (Chapter 4). For the second survey, I designed a questionnaire distributed to a sample of Montenegrin students (Chapter 5). As I further elaborate in Chapter 5, the student survey serves as a supplement to the MNES research, enabling me to test a more extensive authoritarianism scale, on a specific sample – the young and educated.

Chapter 1 – An overview of authoritarianism

This chapter presents theoretical examination of the authoritarian personality, and its three dimensions – conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission. I explain how this personality structure is viewed by authors who introduced the authoritarianism syndrome - Adorno et. al (1950). I argue that Adorno et al. concept of authoritarianism, as consisted from nine dimensions, suffers from conceptual clarity, and clear methodological application. Then I introduce Altemeyer`s (1996) three-dimensional perspective, and explain why authoritarianism should be analyzed as a three-dimensional concept, not through uni-dimensional approach. Following Passini (2017), I conclude by arguing that the uni-dimensional perspective is not able to identify those individuals that could prevent democratic progress of certain society – those who do not show aggressive tendencies, but they express obedient relation to authority. Such argument presents an introduction to the importance of authoritarian submission, which is elaborated in further chapters of this thesis.

2.1 The two viewpoints on authoritarian personality

The authoritarian personality structure - APS - (Adorno et al. 1950), presents one of the most valued contributions to the study of political psychology. The Authors` primary aim was to investigate the core of authoritarianism and connect it with political realm.

Initially, authoritarianism was examined only in relation to antisemitism. As summarized by Todosijevic (2008) - Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford used qualitative-interviewing methods in order to demystify beliefs, values, and traits of anti-Semitic respondents. Publishing their “*Anti-democratic personality*” article, they moved the focus from antisemitism (Todosijevic, 2008:125) to authoritarian personality. They posed two particular questions that determined the direction of their analysis:


- 1) How authoritarianism affects individual's tendency towards prejudice?
- 2) Does authoritarianism make an individual be susceptible to “anti-democratic propaganda” (Adorno et al, 1950:223)?

In order to answer these questions, firstly, they had to operationalize authoritarian personality. Adorno and colleagues constructed the F (fascism) scale, with 39 items intending to measure authoritarianism (ibid, p.255). Their methodological goal was to grasp various dimensions of the authoritarian personality, and to form a “(...) single syndrome [or] (...) enduring structure in the person (...)” (ibid, p.228) that would explain his/her attachment to anti-democratic tendencies.

As we notice from the Figure 1, Adorno et al (1950) model of the authoritarianism (p.228) was operationalized through a set of psychological dimensions they identified:

- 1) *conventionalism* – a tendency to accept “middle-class values” (ibid, p.228);
- 2) *authoritarian submission* – conformist behavior towards authority, unquestionable obedience;
- 3) *authoritarian aggression* – tendency to be violent and punishable to people who are distanced from conventional values;
- 4) *anti-intraception* – unwillingness to accept anything subjective, “imaginative” (Todosijevic, 1998:2);
- 5) *superstition and stereotypy* – the faith in mystical forces that are able to pre-determinate individual's life; tendency towards narrowed, rigid thinking;
- 6) *power and “toughness”* – obsession with sources of authority, domination, submission, leader-follower relations; increased illusion of individual's strength and ability;
- 7) *destructiveness and cynicism* – intentional hostile behavior; sarcasm and underestimation of the human;
- 8) *projectivity* – the tendency to believe that the reality is not secure; the expression of inner emotional impetus;
- 9) *Sexual deviations* – preoccupation with sexual drives, affinity to sadism (Adorno et al, 1950:228).

Figure 1: Dimensions of the authoritarian personality, based on Adorno et. al (1950:228)



Even though these parcels of authoritarianism strengthened the understanding of the concept, the authors' operationalization of authoritarianism was subject of various critiques. Critiques cast the doubt on the construct validity of the scale, questioning its potential to reveal authoritarian tendencies - whether *the scale actually is an indicator of the authoritarianism?*

Initially, the Adorno et al. scale was criticized for being incoherent (Smith, 1997:160), biased towards rightist politics (Shils, 1954; Christie and Jahoda, 1954; Stone, 1980), and conservatism (Farris, 1956; Gul and Ray, 1989).

Equally relevant critiques, revealed that the scale "(...) measured acceptance of beliefs characteristic for patriarchal environment, not the degree and existence of some stable personality traits" (Rot and Havelka, 1973; cited in: Todosijevic, 1998:4). Different, but important evaluation of APS operationalization, indicated that the scale was unable to control for "acquiescent response bias" (Ray, 1983:81), i.e. respondents' tendency to "yes-answering", even on questions they are not certain about (see: Brown, 1965; Ray, 1984a; Titus and Hollander, 1957).

Despite these criticisms, the Adorno et al. concept of the authoritarianism remained one of the most potent attempts to explain human behavior. Moreover, wide application of the scale made original APS ideas survive waves of critiques. However, numerous evaluations resulted in adjusted and alternative versions of the F-scale, that present immense contribution to the field.⁶ I follow one of the most prominent critiques that came from, already cited, founder of the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale – Bob Altemeyer (1996)⁷. Altemeyer taps into what I believe is the most problematic vulnerability of the Adorno et al. concept. Namely, even though systematic in nature, the number of dimensions Adorno et al. presented, risks to make the scale difficult for application on substantive research questions.

Altemeyer (1996), as already mentioned, reduced Adorno et al. nine dimensions to three – conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. Conventionalism reflects “(...) a strong acceptance (...) and commitment to the traditional social norms in one’s society” (Altemeyer, 1996:11), authoritarian submission presents obedient relation to authority, while authoritarian aggression means intentional hostile behavior to “(...) unconventional people (including ‘social deviants’) and conventional victims of aggression (such as certain minority groups)” (Altemeyer, 1996:10).

I have mentioned in the introductory part that I believe authoritarian personality is rigid and conventional in his/her beliefs, submissive to superiors, and aggressive-oppressive to inferiors. Even though this definition consists of original Adorno et al. ideas, it is primarily consistent with Altemeyer’s classification and contains both psychological and behavioral implications of authoritarian personality.

⁶ Beside Altemeyer’s concept there are another interesting contributions – Rokeach’s dogmatism (1956) and Social-dominance orientation scale – see: Pratto et al, 1994.

⁷ Note that for Altemeyer ‘right-wing’ does not imply rightist ideologies, rather he defines right “in one of its earliest meanings, (...) as an adjective meant lawful, proper, correct, doing what the authorities said” (Altemeyer, 2006:9).

Namely, individual's inner values and beliefs make him adopt these worldviews that are consistent with his/her personality structure, which further results in individual's behavior to persons superior/inferior to him/her. Furthermore, each part of this definition: a) rigidity and conventionality; b) conformist attitude to superiors; c) aggression-oppression, I extract as clusters of APS dimensions that both Adorno et al. and Altemeyer elaborated. Figure 2 presents how we can clearly conclude which dimensions of the APS are associated with which dimension of the definition (a, b, c) and what they actually encompass for the different authors:

Figure 2. Clusters from the definition of APS and APS dimensions associated with them (based on Adorno et al -1950, and Altemeyer's classification-1996)

Rigid and conventional values and beliefs	Conformist attitude to superiors	Hostile attitude to inferiors
Anti-intraception	Authoritarian submission	Authoritarian aggression
Conventionalism	Power and "toughness"	Destructiveness and cynicism
Superstition and stereotypy	(Adorno et al)	Power and "toughness"
Projectivity	Authoritarian submission	(Adorno et al)
Sexual deviations	(Altemeyer)	Authoritarian aggression
(Adorno et al)		(Altemeyer)
Conventionalism		
(Altemeyer)		

Altemeyer provides a better understanding of authoritarianism, but this does not mean that his concept is flawless. On the contrary, as with every significant research contribution, his operationalization of authoritarianism was also subject of scrutiny.

Critiques, again, were more of a methodological nature. Even though Altemeyer significantly reduced the original number of dimensions to three, his RWA scale is criticized as measuring all of them through a unidimensional approach – they all fall under the umbrella of authoritarianism (see: Stone and Smith, 1993, Passini, 2017). There is a grounded risk that analyzing conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission, all-together, erases their differences (Funke, 2005). Moreover, their distinctiveness becomes masked by “(...) the global authoritarianism score” (Passini, 2008:57).

For an example, while conventionalism and authoritarian aggression are more likely to be applied on left-right ideological identification, e.g. conservatism (Ray, 1985), authoritarian submission measures relation to authority without ideological constraints. This actually means that individuals who are obedient and submissive to authority are not necessarily conservative or rightist in their worldviews. This is exactly why I focus on authoritarian submission. This dimension is able to recognize those voters that are not aggressive, however, they are equally destructive for democracy (Passini, 2017:83), and such voters could not be identified with the analysis of joint effects of the authoritarianism dimensions. Therefore, I acknowledge the multi-dimensionality of authoritarianism and recognize the applicability of one particular dimension – authoritarian submission, and I compare the impact of this dimension with others – conventionalism and authoritarian aggression in my case study.

Even though this thesis argues for the influence of authoritarian submission, I test its effects with other two dimensions in order to see how they behave comparatively. I claim that this approach produces more information on what are actual effects of particular dimensions of authoritarianism and provides more possibility for valid generalization of findings.

In summary, this chapter argued for the relevance of the three-dimensional approach, through presentation of the two most prominent authoritarianism conceptualizations – Altemeyer's (1996) and Adorno et. al (1950). I still stick to Altemeyer's theoretical concept of authoritarianism and especially his elaboration on authoritarian submission. The point where I use refined version of his concept, is the methodological one, which is presented in later stages of this thesis.

Before introducing the empirical framework, I present detailed examination of the central dimension of this thesis - authoritarian submission, and show how it actually applies to political behavior. The following chapter is dedicated to this.

Chapter 2 – The puzzling connection: Authoritarian submission and political orientation

In the previous chapter, I have explained what authoritarianism is, and which dimensions comprise authoritarian personality. Now I turn to investigating how one dimension of authoritarianism – authoritarian submission – presents relevant concept for political behavior analysis. In order to do so, I elaborate authoritarian submission in a detailed fashion. Authoritarian submission means submissive, obedient attitude towards political authority, and its application on political behavior is more than intuitive. Individuals scoring high on authoritarian submission value obedience as virtue their children should adopt, and exercise obedience as their own behavior to authorities. Further, such submissive relation to authorities primarily originates in the family (where parents presented obedience as value as well) but it is dependent on the type of individual's surrounding i.e. "conducive environment" (Padilla, Hogan, Kaiser, 2007:185). After I expose what authoritarian submission is, I formulate a general hypothesis that is specified and tested in later parts of my thesis.

2.1 Superior you, inferior me - Authoritarian submission

Obedience to authority underlines many discussions that aim to reveal how people actually relate to those with (political) power. Authoritarian submission is, as said before, a dimension of authoritarianism that discovers how individuals comprehend authority. It is defined as "a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives" (Altemeyer, 1996:7).

Furthermore, authoritarian submission presents “(...) a general willingness to comply with instructions [of the authority]⁸ without further inducement” (Altemeyer, 1996:9), where the “officials know what is best and that critics do not know what they are talking about” (Altemeyer, 1996:9). In this context, authoritarian submission means individuals’ tendency to obey their authorities to a great extent (Sullivan et al, 1981).

Authoritarian submission was empirically tested previously in Milgram’s study (1965) of obedience, and disobedience to authority. Milgram’s analysis revealed that:

A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority (Milgram, 1965:75).

Thus, such individuals actually value the legitimacy of authority, they trust the established authorities, “(...) even if abuse of this trust occasionally occurs” (Miller, Collins and Brief, 1995:8). Hence, authoritarians are preoccupied with their role of compliant followers (Haslam et al, 2016:2), and are infatuated with the authority they obey. Authoritarians are indeed convinced that strong authority presents the best political solution - the only one truly capable of bringing decisions about political future (Altemeyer, 1996).

What does this urge for uncritical obedience further tell us about authoritarian submission? Individuals falling into this category do not easily accept change, moreover, they are *resistant* to it (Jost et al, 2003; Jost, 2015). Authoritarian minds are used to thinking in narrow categories, where requiring them to let go of their attachment to authority, and their perception of political reality itself, would be a demanding and slow process (see: Bridges and Mitchell 2002:2). Strong authority is what remains central to these individuals (see: Eckstein, 1988).

⁸ The original text consists the term ‘their’. ‘Of the authority’ is added for the sake of clarification.


A different, but equally important component of authoritarian submission, examines the upbringing process. This is a part where authoritarian submission is assumed to originate. Even though Altemeyer's definition of authoritarian submission does not contain this aspect, both his right-wing authoritarianism, and the Adorno et al. F scale, do. Altemeyer himself theoretically notes that authoritarians believe that obedience and respect for authority "(...) are important virtues that children should be taught and that if children stray from these principles, parents have a duty to get them back in line" (Altemeyer, 1996:9). This actually means that authoritarian submission includes obedience as action (political authority) and obedience as value (upbringing). But let me now examine the origins of submissive relation to authority.

Parents are the first authoritative figures that children face in their life. How parents transmit their authority to the child, affects the child's general perception about *preferable values and beliefs; dominance and subordination*, in later stages of his/her life. More precisely, individuals, who experience authoritarian behavior from their parents, are more prone to authoritarian personal characteristics that further shape their "(...) social and personal behavior both toward those with power and those without it" (Frenkel-Brunswik, in Adorno et al, 1950:350). This approach is consistent with the basis of psychodynamic personality theory that argues about the upbringing process as the crucial step in development of particular personality structure (Guntrip, 1995). To simplify it, individuals with authoritarian parents will value authority as such, will be submissive to their parents, and political figures, later. Furthermore, they are more likely to transmit the authoritarian values they learnt to their children, and that is how they create a vicious circle. Individuals that were subjected to obedience and authority in the upbringing process are more likely to develop the same behavioral pattern in the political world. According to Lakoff's theory, "disciplinarian parenting values (...) envision (...) governmental authority figures as fulfilling the role (...) to encourage proper behavior and maintain order" (Barker and Tinnick III, 2006:251).

However, this is not the whole story. One could have authoritarian parents, without being submissive to authorities later; or the opposite, one could experience non-authoritarian parents, and become obedient. There is one important factor in between – a “*conductive environment*” (Padilla, Hogan, Kaiser, 2007:185). Namely, in order to develop a submissive relation to political authority, external factors matter to a great extent (Altemeyer, 2006).

If an individual is socialized in a conducive environment i.e. the surrounding where there is a tradition of centralized leadership, structural instability of the system, dominance of traditional cleavages, homogeneity of society enhanced with “(...) controlling information and tilting the content of educational programs in one or another direction”⁹ (Padilla, Hogan, Kaiser, 2007:21), he/she is more likely to develop submissive and dependent relation to those in power. I do not argue that this process is one-directional and that there are no exceptions but that it is of a vital importance to discuss the relevance of different stages, in order to have a better understanding of authoritarian submission:

Figure 3. Development of the authoritarian submission¹⁰



To get to a submissive relation to those in power, some stages have to be encountered, previously.

In this context, Altemeyer (2006) further notes:

⁹ The text-book characteristic of authoritarian political systems, and rote-learning model see: Simpson, 1972.

¹⁰ This model is combined from both Altemeyer's and Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser theory.

It's naturally easier for children from authoritarian homes to remain authoritarian, and it's easier for kids with unauthoritarian parents to become decidedly unauthoritarian. But ultimately the experiences do most of the shaping. (Altemeyer, 2006:61)

In summary, submissive relation to those in power (a defining element of the dimension of authoritarian submission), is more likely to be developed when we go through authoritarian upbringing, but primarily when we experience a *conducive environment*. In the context of this thesis, the connection between authoritarian submission and party preferences can be found in those places where strong leadership is identifiable. Given the aforementioned-grounded theoretical and empirical evidence on the connection between submission and preference for certain types of leadership, I formulate a general hypothesis for this thesis:

H: The more submissive societies will show more preference for strong leadership i.e. more chances for no change of the incumbent government.

Chapter 3 - Authoritarian submission and party preference in Montenegro

In the introductory part of this thesis, I have listed particular specificities of my case study. Now, I systematically expose the suitability of Montenegrin case for the investigation of the authoritarian submission. We could see in the previous section that submissive relation to those in power is built from authoritarian upbringing and further strengthened by conducive environments. Now I expose how each of these stages is present in Montenegrin case and further explain why this country is an interesting case for such analysis. At the end of this chapter, I formulate detailed hypotheses that present practical application of the already exposed general hypothesis.

I argue that Montenegro is relevant case for the analysis on authoritarian submission due to two reasons.

Firstly, comparative data shows that Montenegro is a valid example for those Southeast European post-communist societies that were rooted in communist regime, submissive relation to those in power, and authoritarian perception of the upbringing process, as an important element of authoritarian submission. Namely, an extensive UNICEF study conducted in 2013 revealed that 40% of the Montenegrin citizens think of the traditional and rigid model of upbringing as the best option of raising a child.¹¹ Moreover, UNICEF reported that 63% of children from Montenegro personally experienced some sort of violent discipline, where physical punishment occurred to 45% of them.¹²

¹¹ Moreover, 63% of Montenegrin citizens believed that upbringing process in Montenegro is mild and it should be sharpened, see: <https://www.slideshare.net/unicefcecis/kap-istrazivanje-najvaznijinalazi>, accessed on 5th of September, 2017.

¹² This indicates the “percentage of children aged 2 to 14 years who experienced any violent discipline (psychological aggression and/or physical punishment) in the past month”, for UNICEF study see: http://files.unicef.org/publications/files/Hidden_in_plain_sight_statistical_analysis_EN_3_Sept_2014.pdf, p.2, accessed on: 6th of September, 2017.

When we put this evidence on physical punishment in perspective, it is visible that Montenegro stays in the middle compared to other Southeast European countries, for which data was available for – (Albania – 61%, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – 52%, Bosnia and Herzegovina – 40%, Serbia 37%).¹³

Interestingly enough, the other UNICEF study, conducted in 2016, revealed that, the percentage of Montenegrin citizens who consider physical punishment had a negative effect on their upbringing, is decreasing (25% in 2016, 31% in 2013)¹⁴. The study further revealed that the respondents who answered ‘yes’ on the question - whether the “(...) physical penalty during childhood in your personal experience had a positive impact on your upbringing”¹⁵ remained unchanged (47% in 2016, 47% in 2013). Moreover, they report that these individuals have dominantly applied the same pattern of upbringing in their families. These findings actually indicate that the traditional, punishing, models of upbringing strengthen in this country, while they might weaken in other countries.

As Table 1. shows, Montenegrin respondents, on average, score highly (3.09) on the measure of the authoritarian perception of the upbringing process – *“Today’s society is immoral partly due to the fact that both teachers and parents forgot that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing”*, compared to respondents from Serbia (2.87):

¹³ See: http://files.unicef.org/publications/files/Hidden_in_plain_sight_statistical_analysis_EN_3_Sept_2014.pdf, p.2, accessed on: 14th of October, 2017.

¹⁴ See: https://www.unicef.org/montenegro/media_15873.html, Violence against children in Montenegro - KAP Survey - Key findings (2016), accessed on: 14th of October, 2017.

¹⁵ See: https://www.unicef.org/montenegro/media_15873.html, accessed on: 14th of October, 2017.

Table 1. *Descriptive statistics: Authoritarian perception of upbringing process – Serbia and Montenegro*

Variable	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Authoritarian perception of upbringing - MNE	1134	3.09	1.47	3	1	5	-0.14	-1.34

Source: Montenegrin wave of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data (CSES- Module 5, 2016).

Variable	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Authoritarian perception of upbringing - SERB	1548	2.87	1.51	3	1	5	0.07	-1.46

Source: Serbia Public Opinion Study (Data and documentation-2012). Bojan Todosijevic, Institute of social sciences, Belgrade, 2013.

The comparison in authoritarian tendencies between these two countries is based on the availability of the data, and the most-similar cases principle (see: Gerring, 2008). Namely, both countries, as I explain in further parts of this chapter, share political and cultural legacy, which makes them meaningful for comparison.

The item presented in Table 1. originates in the authoritarian submission dimension of the RWA-scale (Altemeyer, 1996) and is measured on a five-point scale in both surveys, and reverse-coded so that the higher values imply higher authoritarian affiliation. To put it in other words, 23.01% of Montenegrin respondents completely agree with the justification of physical punishment, compared to 20.15% of Serbian respondents. Further, 22.48% of respondents from Montenegro, completely disagree with such authoritarian perception of upbringing, compared to 28.81% of Serbian respondents. What is notable here is that this difference is not substantively high. Moreover, Serbian respondents score higher, in general measures of authoritarian submission, compared to Montenegrin respondents:

Table 2. *Descriptive statistics: Authoritarian submission index – Serbia and Montenegro*

	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Authoritarian submission index - MNE	1109	3.59	1.08	3.67	1	5	-0.52	-0.46
<i>Source: Montenegrin wave of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data (CSES- Module 5, 2016).</i>								
	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Authoritarian submission index - SERB	1540	3.9	0.81	4	1	5	-0.7	0.48

The mean values presented in the Table 2. include the average score that both Montenegrin and Serbian respondents have on three measures of authoritarian submission. More precisely, on the authoritarian submission additive index, created out of three available submission items: *1) Today's society is immoral partly due to the fact that both teachers and parents forgot that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing; 2) Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn; 3) The state of immorality in our society is partly a consequence of the fact that both teachers and parents have forgotten that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing.*

Thus, the empirical evidence presented here, does not indicate that Montenegro is dramatically distinct compared to its neighboring countries, in terms of authoritarian submission. Rather, the results imply that these countries share more or less similar submissive patterns that support the argumentation about the outcomes of their common legacy.

The presence of the upbringing element of authoritarian submission, makes it worth investigating Montenegro. Namely, the upbringing patterns of today, have its origins in the *patriarchal* and *authoritarian* frame of the traditional Montenegrin family (Vujacic, 1973:109) which emphasized the role of father as the main authority figure, and a subordinate position of women (Denich, 1974).

It further requested the “(...) unconditional child`s discipline”¹⁶ (Vasovic, 2007; cited in: Komar, 2013:170) which consisted the “(...) traditional Montenegrin model of upbringing” (Komar, 2013:170).

Even though this concept is under-researched to a great extent in Montenegrin society, it is obvious that substantive proportion of Montenegrin citizens still values submissive, and punishing behavior, as a proper way of raising a child. Secondly, what makes Montenegro critically different from its neighboring countries, and adequate for the analysis, is the unusual domination of one party, centralized leadership, traditional cleavages, and the lack of ideological distinctiveness among Montenegrin political actors.

Taken all-together, these conditions make authoritarian submission more likely to be developed, and strong authority visible, as suitable political solution. These specificities are related to the second, and more substantive element of the story – conducive environment and subordinate relation to authority. As I have argued, the concept of authoritarian submission is not developed for a day. It is not only a product of authoritarian consciousness among citizenry (obedience as value), but also the decades of *conducive environment* that has the following characteristics: the dominant role of one political party and strong and charismatic leadership.

First, and foremost, one party – Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) which dominates the Montenegrin political scene for 27 years¹⁷ - did *not* face *any* electoral overturn in period of its governance:

Table 3. An overview of the electoral results of DPS

Election year	1990	1992	1996	1998	2001	2002	2006	2009	2012	2016
Vote %	56.2	42.7	49.9	48.9	42	48	48.6	51.9	45.6	41.41

Source: Vukovic (2014:208-219) and State Electoral Commission, results available at: <http://dik.co.me/kategorija-dokumenta/rezultati/>

¹⁶ Original translation by author: “(...) zahtijevanje od djeteta bezuslovne discipline” (Vasovic, 2007; cited in: Komar, 2013:170); “(...)tradicionalnog modela kućnog vaspitanja u Crnoj Gori” (Komar, 2013:170).

¹⁷ Since the breakdown of communism, see further.

“The great authoritarian party”- DPS (Darmanovic, 2010:15) emerged in 1991, in the middle of the separation of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as direct successor of the Montenegrin League of Communists.

That was the beginning of the first extensive transitional period of Montenegrin post-communist history (1990-1997), classified as “competitive authoritarianism” (Darmanovic, 2010:15), or the regime where:

(...) formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which fraud, civil liberties violations, and abuse of state and media resources so skew the playing field that the regime cannot be labeled democratic. Such regimes are competitive, in that democratic institutions are not a façade: opposition forces can use legal channels to seriously contest for (and occasionally win) power; but they are authoritarian in that opposition forces are handicapped by a highly uneven—and even dangerous—playing field (Levitsky and Way, 2010:4).

Therefore, DPS was in the center of competitive authoritarianism in the very first years of its electoral domination. Furthermore, “the unlimited political authority of [this party], accompanied by ineffective opposition activity (...), was undoubtedly the main characteristic of the first phase of Montenegrin transition” (Vukovic, 2010:63).

Second, and especially relevant for authoritarian submission, the split in DPS has crystallized the political leadership of this party that remained continuously associated with its actual president – Milo Djukanovic. While nurturing a cult of strong and charismatic leadership, Djukanovic kept dominating the Montenegrin political scene.¹⁸ None of the other Montenegrin politicians managed to survive all waves of changes in Montenegrin politics, and to develop such cult of leadership, at the same time.

This constructs the second specificity of the Montenegrin political landscape – namely, Montenegro “(...) holds the unenviable record of being the only state in Southeast Europe (...) with an uninterrupted ex-communist government (...) in power (...)” (Morrison, 2008:230).

¹⁸ He was elected as a prime minister for seven times and once as a president of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He was elected as the youngest prime-minister in Europe, being 29 years old. See: Morrison, 2009.

This is a text-book example of the tendency within post-communist societies to have high ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (Luthans et al, 1998:191) i.e. to be resistant to change (recall that this is an important implication of authoritarian submission)¹⁹ and to seek for a strong leader that will provide them with the sense of clarity and direction in stressful transitional periods (see: Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser, 2007). As nicely summarized by McAllister (2007):

The autocratic nature of the old communist regimes has been a legacy that many have found difficult to leave behind, and political instability and economic stress have combined to influence many voters to seek a ‘strong leader’ to overcome their problems (McAllister, 2007:577, cited in: Komar, 2013:174).

Djukanovic, therefore, continued the tradition of strong leadership in the post-communist period, where his governance evoked many critiques that consider his omnipresence in Montenegrin politics as “(...) detrimental to the democratic development of the state” (Morrison, 2009:25). Moreover, as Morrison argues, it is “inherently unhealthy for one individual (...) to dominate a country’s domestic politics” (Morrison, 2009:54) for more than two decades.

In the line with this argument, let me recall that the domination of strong authority is central to the concept of the authoritarian submission. In the case of Montenegro, *strong, legitimate, and established authority*,²⁰ concentrated in the *leader*, is exactly what marks Montenegrin political reality. Furthermore, the strong attachment to the leader is indeed appearing as characteristic of Montenegrin society. I have mentioned Komar’s analysis (2013) which revealed that, on the dimension of the authoritarian submission, Montenegro has a score of .62, that placed this country among the 25% of the most authoritarian countries covered by European Values Study (Komar, 2013:171-173)²¹ in 2008.

¹⁹ See p. 17.

²⁰ See p. 16.

²¹ Authoritarian submission was operationalized through these items: 1) Children should learn obedience; 2) The best political system is the one in which there is a powerful leader which does not have to deal with parliament and elections; 3) The best political system is when there is a military power in the country; translation by author; Djecu bi trebalo učiti poslušnosti; Najbolji politički sistem je onaj u kome postoji moćni vođa koji ne mora da se bavi parlamentom i izborima; Najbolji politički sistem je kada postoji vojna vlast u državi. (Komar, 2013:171).

The third characteristic of Montenegrin case is visible through the sensitive ethnic question and lack of ideological party polarization. I argue that permanent focus on traditional cleavages and the absence of left-right identification (atypical for post-communist countries) made strong authority more visible, which tends to make voters focus on leaders, rather than on parties' program guidelines. Simultaneously, I have warned that the ethnic cleavage is a powerful alternative explanation here.

The ethnic question and the sensitivity of Montenegrin nationhood, dates back to 1918, when with the decision brought on *Podgorica Assembly*, on the insistence from Serbian side, Montenegro was violently²² incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Pavlovic, 1999:157). In the time frame from 1918 until 2006, Montenegro was under communism for forty-seven years, initially as a part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.²³ The breakdown of communism led Montenegro directly into the unity with Serbia in 1992²⁴, where the two countries were the only former Yugoslav republics staying together until 21st of May, 2006 (Bieber, 2003:11). Then Montenegro officially has become an independent country with 55,5% of citizens stating yes for separation from Serbia (Darmanovic, 2007).

In the 2006 referenda, when Montenegro become independent, ethnic polarization further escalated - Montenegrin parties created two blocks - pro-independent and pro-unionist (Dzankic, 2015). At that moment, parties from pro-union stream explicitly expressed their association with Serbia, and neglected the existence of sovereign Montenegrin state, Montenegrin language, and Montenegrin Orthodox Church (Dzankic, 2013).

²² The process violated numerous core legal provisions of the state: "Contrary to the legal guidelines outlined in the Montenegrin Constitution of 1905, and with complete disregard of the People's Assembly of Montenegro, the delegates for the Podgorica Assembly were handpicked by the organizers from among those who supported the idea of the unification. According to the available documents and state records, a considerable amount of money was used to bribe and payoff the potential candidates" (Pavlovic, 199:160-161).

²³ Previously named as Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, then Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, see: Lampe, 2000.

²⁴ Initially as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2003), than as a State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006), see: Lampe, 2000.

These long-term unresolved questions with Montenegrin independence logically faded its politics for the first post-communist transitional period in Montenegro (1990-1997)²⁵. 1997 was a year that declared not only the end of the first transition period, but the separation in DPS, as well. This event will become the central point in structuration of the Montenegrin political scene of today.

Namely, the split in DPS during 1997s (Bieber 2003:11) determined the national perspective of this party, necessarily associated with Montenegrin independence and identity, while the competing branch - Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (Socijalistička narodna partija Crne Gore, SNP) emphasized Serbian ancestry of Montenegrin citizens, and unification with Serbia (Dzankic, 2014:3).

That is how the ethnic cleavage remained the characteristic of contemporary Montenegrin party politics, where declaring yourself as Montenegrin or Serb determines individual's party preferences. That is the reason why in this thesis, the ethnic specificity of Montenegrin case is treated as a grounded alternative explanation, where I examine the effects of authoritarian submission while controlling for both ethnic sides.

Finally, the fourth characteristic that facilitates the attachment to the leader, is the ideological character of Montenegrin political scene. Compared with many studies that investigate authoritarian personality exactly in terms of preference for left-right parties (Shils, 1954; Barker, 1963; Stone, 1980; Feldman, 2003; Van Hiel et al, 2006; Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; De Regt et al, 2011), this strategy does not work for Montenegrin political scene. Namely, contrary to many of post-communist countries²⁶, Montenegro does not have a clear party-polarization on left-right continuum.

²⁵ See p.26.

²⁶ For an example: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, and further. See: Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2010.

Furthermore, left-right identification is not a potent explanatory factor in terms of voting behavior, among Montenegrin citizens (Komar, 2013).

When it comes to the empirical evidence, results from CSES study show that Montenegrin citizens usually place parties around the center position (with modest tendency to left):

***Table 4.** Descriptive statistics: Citizens' placement of Montenegrin parties on left-right dimension*

Party	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
DPS	584	4.46	3.79	4	0	10	0.28	-1.44
Democratic Front	572	5.14	3.57	5	0	10	-0.03	-1.39
DEMOS	563	4.37	3.18	4	0	10	0.28	-0.98
Socialist People's Party	564	4.62	3.47	4	0	10	0.28	-1.26
Civic Movement URA (United Reformed Action)	572	3.85	3	3	0	10	0.54	-0.66
Democratic Montenegro	576	4.07	2.93	4	0	10	0.42	-0.65
Social-democratic Party	579	4.28	3.26	4	0	10	0.38	-1.04
Bosniak Party	551	5	3.63	5	0	10	0.01	-1.42
Socio-democrats	575	4.15	3.25	4	0	10	0.34	-1.06

This finding implies that voters do not recognize Montenegrin parties as clearly distinct in their ideological positioning. That ideological continuum is not a salient issue for Montenegrin voters, demonstrates the Table 5, where almost half of the Montenegrin respondents - 48,02%, did not hear for the left-right or did not know to position himself/herself on this self-identification scale:

***Table 5.** Citizens' self-identification on left-right dimension*

	Left	Center	Right	Do not know	Did not hear	Total
N	192	113	276	245	292	1118
%	17,17	10,10	24,86	21,91%	26,11%	100%

As it can be seen from the Table 5, the remainder is divided between leftist (17,17%), centrist (10,10%) and rightist ideological positioning (24,86%).

Even though these proportions do not reveal any substantively dominant ideological tendency among Montenegrin electorate, it is important to check whether supporters of Montenegrin parties actually significantly differ in terms of their ideological orientation. Table 6. exposes the results from Welch`s One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), which revealed that supporters of distinct Montenegrin parties are not significantly different in their ideological positioning:

Table 6. Welch`s One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for left-right identification

	Sum of Squares	DF	F test	p value
Left-right self-identification	18.24	5	0.32	0.901
Residuals	4940.19	433		

The F test statistic with this high p-value indicates that I failed to identify the difference in ideological positioning among different party supporters. These results are in the line with the expectations about ideological homogeneity of Montenegrin political scene. Firstly, parties themselves are not easily identifiable along this dimension, then, voters are not aware of the exact meaning of the left-right cleavages, and logically, voters are incapable of using this ideological heuristic in deciding whom to support.

These circumstances further facilitate focusing on authoritarian submission, instead of other two dimensions (conventionalism, authoritarian aggression), that are more applicable on ideological constraints. Moreover, the lack of ideological cleavages opens the space for strong leadership, which is more likely to become central to voters when parties are getting closer to the center position, with many overlapping program offers, and rarely something newer than traditional cleavages (Caprara et. al, 2006:2), as ethnicity is, in the case of Montenegro.

Now going back to the communist and post-communist legacy, I have argued in the introduction that democratic potential of certain society, relies to a substantive extent on the interplay between previous regime i.e. transitional periods, and consciousness.

In the line with this argument, while commenting on political transition and authoritarian political culture of former Yugoslavian countries, to which Montenegro belonged, Siber (1992) concludes:

Bearing in mind that communist systems have initially established themselves in the countries without the traditions of civil society, (...) in the conditions of predominantly traditional, and agrarian society, it is certain that the authoritarian character of these communities was a grateful basis for the authoritarian system, and that the authoritarian system, as such, strengthened the authoritarian consciousness. Since the collapse of the communist regime is not followed with the disappearance of authoritarian consciousness, it is exactly authoritarian worldview that remains a limiting factor for the establishment of democratic order (Siber 1992:106).

So, how the transitional processes were developed will greatly affect how the political future and social transition will look like. In this context, Welsh (1994) argues that “the mode in which new regimes are created has important implications for the stability of newly emerging polyarchies” (Welsh, 1994:379). In the case of Montenegro, this is indeed true. I have argued here that Montenegrin society reflects authoritarian upbringing to a certain extent, but conducive environment much more. That conducive environment contains set of characteristics that dominantly emerged from turbulent post-communist transition. These are: domination of one party, centralized leadership, traditional cleavages, and the lack of ideological distinctiveness among parties. Taken all-together they allow me to raise authoritarian submission as relevant concept in Montenegrin case.

Finally, as I have argued in the introductory part, this thesis aims to investigate not so easily-accessible dimensions that could present relevant characteristics of voting behavior among Montenegrin electorate. Given the previously presented evidence on the relevance between authoritarian submission and Montenegrin pre-dominant party system, I hypothesize the following:

H1: Authoritarian submission will have a positive effect on voting for Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), compared to voting for other parties.

H2: Authoritarian submission will present the best predictor of vote choice (voting DPS versus voting other parties), compared to other dimensions of authoritarianism that will show no effect on response variable.

H3: DPS supporters will show the strongest submissive tendencies, unlike other party supporters.

Chapter 4 – The first empirical evidence – MNES analysis

In previous chapter, I have argued for the relevance of authoritarian submission in voting behavior among Montenegrin citizens. In order to investigate the aforementioned research puzzles, I firstly analyze the data from the newest wave of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems – Module 5 (2016) i.e. Montenegrin National Election Study (MNES).

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section provides the description of CSES i.e. MNES research, and relevant variables, while the second section contains the analysis conducted with its data. The discussion of the results is the concluding part of this chapter.

4.1 The initial research – the Montenegrin wave of CSES

The comparative study of electoral systems is a cross-national, collaborative research program, on elections, covering more than 30 countries worldwide. Until now, the data was collected in six waves i.e. modules, from 1996 till 2016. The study design and questionnaires are standardized, moreover, they are “(...) developed by an international committee of leading scholars of electoral politics, political science, and survey research.”²⁷ Survey design is implemented and adjusted to specificities of particular country.

Finally, the research is conducted by country's most prominent scientists. The CSES data was gathered during the second half of 2016, through face-to-face interview method, more precisely, with CAPI technique (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing)²⁸. The data was collected on a nationally representative sample – 1213 respondents, with the $\pm 2.81\%$ margin of error for 50% of reported percentage.²⁹

²⁷ See: <http://www.cses.org/>, accessed on: 7th of October, 2017.

²⁸ More precisely, interviewers were using tablets in order to conduct the research. Further, tablets had geo-locators that enabled the control for interviewers' motion, see: <http://mnes.defacto.me/faq/>, accessed on: 7th of October, 2017.

²⁹ For further information see: <http://mnes.defacto.me/faq/>, accessed on: 7th of October, 2017.

4.1.1 Demographic characteristics of the sample

The sample distribution of gender is roughly uniform (women/man – 51.07%, 48.93%). In terms of the settlement, respondents from the central part of the country are slightly dominant (40.26%), then those from the north (37.87%), and finally from the south (21.86%). Given education, the sample is dominated with middle-educated respondents i.e. those with high school education (48.43%). College educated individuals consist 27.89% of the sample, while 23.68% finished elementary school, or less. There is a good distribution of age in the sample – 35.90% of the respondents are middle aged – (35-54), 31.01% are in the category of young (18-34), while 33.08% of respondents consist the category of old (55+).³⁰ Finally, the ethnic composition of the sample did not show wide discrepancies compared to census data - Montenegrins consist 56.23%(45%) of the sample, Serbs 22.64%(28%), Bosniaks 8.65%(9%), Albanians 4.32%(5%), and respondents of other nationalities the remaining 8.16% (9%).

The percentages presented here indicate that the demographic structure of the specific sample does not show notable deviations from the structure in general population. This is very important, given that severely biased ethnic, age or educational distribution can distort the results of this analysis. Why the demographics are particularly important, I further explain in the section that exposes central control variables of this thesis.

4.1.2 Measurements

I operationalize *Authoritarian submission*, as the major explanatory variable, from the set of seven survey items that measure authoritarianism. Items were selected from Adorno et al. F-scale and Altemeyer's RWA scale. On each of these items respondents were indicating a level of agreement on five point Likert scale:

³⁰ See: <http://mnes.defacto.me/vizuelizacija/>, accessed on: 7th of October, 2017.

Table 7. Authoritarianism scale – MNES research

1.	Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.
2.	The most important virtues children should learn are obedience and respect to authority.
3.	Young people sometimes have rebellious ideas, but as they grow, they should overcome them, and calm down.
4.	The state of immorality in our society is partly a consequence of the fact that both teachers and parents have forgotten that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing.
5.	It would be better for everyone if the government would censor the press, films and other media, so that the trash is kept away from the youth.
6.	People can be divided into two groups: the strong and the weak.
7.	Most of our social problems would be solved if we would somehow get rid of immoral and degenerate individuals.

Vote choice is operationalized through post-election vote question i.e. *for whom did u vote on last elections* survey item.

4.1.2.1 Control variables

I include a set of relevant control variables in order to properly measure the effect of my explanatory variable. Two major reasons justify my choices below. Firstly, I want to see how authoritarian submission behaves when particular controls are included. Secondly, I argue that some of the variables listed here should be controlled in terms of their effect on vote choice.

For an example, ethnicity is presupposed to have an influence on voting preferences, and if I do not control for ethnic distribution in the sample, I could deliver misleading conclusions of the actual effects of authoritarian submission.³¹

I present now the demographic set of variables which are included as controls – age, education, and ethnicity. *Age* can serve as an important factor explaining individual's propensity to authoritarian tendencies. Of course, the number of ages, as such, does not tell us a lot.

³¹ See p. 35. And "Demographic structure of the sample" section.

It has to be put in the context of development of authoritarian submission. Namely, individuals that were growing in certain political surroundings (authoritarian) are less likely to let go values and beliefs they employed there (McAllister, 2007). That is the reason why I consider important to control for age, given the potential higher likelihood of possessing authoritarian attitudes, among older respondents.

When it comes to *education*, there is a grounded assumption that higher level of education has a potential to modify and weaken authoritarian tendencies. For an example, Nie et al. (1996) claim that the education has a positive effect on individual's level of political tolerance, and therefore, presents a necessary precondition for "democratic enlightenment" (Nie et al, 1996:37), contrary to what authoritarian submission actually presents. Another reason that gives the weight to education is related directly to the Montenegrin case. Namely, the last analysis conducted by Todosijevic, Pavlovic, and Komar (2016) on the correlation between education, ideology (authoritarianism) and party preferences, revealed that when it comes to Montenegro, "there is no statistically significant difference among voters of different parties" (Todosijevic, Pavlovic, and Komar, 2016:12) in terms of education, contrary to the Serbian case. I treat this finding as intriguing, rather than as a reason not to control for education. Especially given the significant theoretical relevance of this variable in connection with authoritarian tendencies. This analysis will, therefore, check for the effects of education on vote choice, but also introduce how education relates to submission.

Another important demographic variable is *ethnicity*. As it was previously explained, this is a well-grounded cleavage on Montenegrin political scene. Given the Montenegrin-Serb polarization in Montenegrin parties, this is the variable that must be controlled for, in order to properly analyze the effect of authoritarian submission.

I include two more variables as controls. The first among them is *political interest* as a measure of *political sophistication*.³² It is theoretically argued that more sophisticated individuals are less prone to rely on attachments to the leader (Bittner, 2011), in this case, submissive tendencies, as the factor affecting their vote choice.

The second one is *satisfaction with the economy*. This variable is important due to two reasons. Firstly, from theoretical viewpoint, individuals being dissatisfied with the current economic conditions in the state, report higher levels of authoritarianism (McFarland, Ageyev, and Hinton, 1995; cited in: Feldman and Stenner, 1997:743). Furthermore, individuals frustrated with the situation in the economy, will strive for a stronger role of the authority, “(...) even if prevailing economic wisdom indicated that this was unwise” (Stevens et al, 2006:615). Secondly, it is worth seeing how authoritarian submission behaves under variable measuring satisfaction with the economy, since Montenegrin economic situation had certain fluctuations³³ but support to major party, as we could see, does not show notable decline.

³² Usually political sophistication is operationalized through political interest and political knowledge battery.

However CSES questionnaire did not consist the questions of political knowledge. They are present in my analysis.

³³ For an example the biggest rate of poverty was measured in 2006(11,3%), 2012 (11,3%), than in 2011 (9,3%) and 2013(8,6%). There is no consistency in the process, there were rapid declines and increases. See: <http://www.monstat.org/cg/page.php?id=73&pageid=73>, accessed on 15th of October, 2017.

4.2. Analysis and results – MNES research

Before I perform hypotheses testing and regression analysis, I have conducted an exploratory factor analysis, in order to reveal the multidimensionality of the authoritarianism scale, and which items actually discover authoritarian submission. I applied principal axis factoring method followed by oblimin rotation. Compared to varimax, oblimin rotation enables the correlation among factors (O'Rourke and Hatcher, 2013:47), which I consider to be a proper statistical solution - all of the scale items belong to a unique phenomenon – authoritarianism.

I have checked for both three-factor and two-factor solutions. Three-factor analysis extracted authoritarian submission as the first factor. As it is visible from Table 8, this factor has positive loadings on three items measuring authoritarian submission (0.70, 0.90, 0.36). The second factor the analysis extracted I named *conventional aggression* given that the items this factor recognized (0.63, 0.36, 0.89) originate in both conventionalism, and authoritarian aggression dimensions, of the F-scale and RWA scale.³⁴ However, the third factor shows ambiguous picture. Namely, even though the third factor has a positive loading (0.32) on item “*Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government*”, I have decided not to keep this factor in the analysis due to several reasons.

Firstly, this factor loads *only* on one item, which is below conventional expectations of having at least three items grouped within particular factor (ibid, p.53). Secondly, the item in this factor, unlike other items, does not belong to neither the standardized F-scale, nor RWA scale, and its potential to measure authoritarian tendencies is questionable.

³⁴ As I will argue later, the difference between conventionalism and authoritarian aggression is not captured here due to the limited number of items that were actually used to operationalize these two dimensions in CSES research (see p.36).

Thirdly, this factor's contribution to cumulative variance is modest (0.03) and below conventional value of 10% (0.10) (ibid, p.64), especially in comparison with other two factors which together explain 41% of cumulative variance:

Table 8. Three factor solution – authoritarianism scale

Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.	-0.21	-0.14	0.32
The most important virtues children should learn are obedience and respect to authority.	0.70	0.13	0.06
Young people sometimes have rebellious ideas, but as they grow, they should overcome them, and calm down.	0.90	-0.05	-0.04
The state of immorality in our society is partly a consequence of the fact that both teachers and parents have forgotten that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing.	0.36	0.10	0.19
It would be better for everyone if the government would censor the press, films and other media, so that the trash is kept away from the youth.	0.13	0.63	0.12
People can be divided into two groups: the strong and the weak.	0.11	0.36	0.25
Most of our social problems would be solved if we would somehow get rid of immoral and degenerate individuals.	-0.03	0.89	-0.05
Cumulative variance	0.21	0.41	0.44
Correlations	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Factor 1	1.00	0.66	0.28
Factor 2	0.66	1.00	0.35
Factor 3	0.28	0.35	1.00

Given the ambiguous nature of the third factor, I have decided to continue the analysis without it, and to keep the two-factor solution as more appropriate. Namely, Table 9. shows that the two-factor solution again recognized the same structure of authoritarian submission (0.66,0.91,0.31), and conventional aggression items (0.77, 0.50, 0.81). These two factors together explain 43% of variance:

Table 9. Two-factor solution – authoritarianism scale

Items	Factor 1	Factor 2
The most important virtues children should learn are obedience and respect to authority.	0.20	0.66
Young people sometimes have rebellious ideas, but as they grow, they should overcome them, and calm down.	-0.06	0.91
The state of immorality in our society is partly a consequence of the fact that both teachers and parents have forgotten that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing.	0.23	0.31
It would be better for everyone if the government would censor the press, films and other media, so that the trash is kept away from the youth.	0.77	0.03
People can be divided into two groups: the strong and the weak.	0.50	0.06
Most of our social problems would be solved if we would somehow get rid of immoral and degenerate individuals.	0.81	-0.02
Cumulative variance	0.23	0.43
Correlations	Factor 1	Factor 2
Factor 1	1.00	0.69
Factor 2	0.69	1.00

Further, two-factor analysis has shown that conventional aggression does correlate with authoritarian submission— $r=0.69$. Even though the existence of *some* correlation is expected (given that all items fall under one concept – authoritarianism), I believe that the high result is dominantly produced by limited construct validity of the scale used in CSES research. Namely, it is important to note that only two items for conventionalism and one for authoritarian aggression are not able to grasp the whole concept of these two dimensions. Furthermore, the two conventionalism items presented here, do not entirely catch individual's "strong commitment to the traditional norms" (Altemeyer, 1996:11) that are usually based on his/her religious beliefs (ibid, p.11).

The same refers to authoritarian aggression – only one item is not enough to cover a range of aggressive attitudes that an individual has for those perceived as "social deviants" (ibid, p. 10) or "conventional victims of aggression such as certain minority groups" (ibid, p. 11).

This limitation, however, is corrected in my survey research, where greater attention is dedicated to the selection of the scale items that are able to provide wider picture of authoritarianism dimensions (see later sections).

Regardless of its imperfections in construct validity, this authoritarianism scale has shown good reliability estimates. Namely, Cronbach's Alpha for the whole authoritarianism scale is 0.76. Additionally, I have previously warned that the first item in the scale *"Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government"* is questionable from the point of its ability to actually tap into any dimension of authoritarianism. Statistical analysis supports my argument – Cronbach's Alpha, for the whole authoritarianism scale, increases by 0.06 (0.82) when this item is dropped. This measure of 0.82 is more than satisfying and actually means that the scale is internally consistent - its items indeed belong to the concept of authoritarianism.

Due to the multidimensional character of the scale, it is of a great importance to report the value of Cronbach's Alpha for both authoritarian submission, and conventional aggression measures, that I use in further analyses. The reliability estimate for measures representing authoritarian submission is satisfying - 0.74.³⁵ Further, Cronbach's Alpha for conventional aggression is the same – 0.74.

4.2.1. The gist of the story: submissiveness and party preferences

H1: Authoritarian submission will have a positive effect on voting for Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), compared to voting for other parties.

H2: Authoritarian submission will present the best predictor of vote choice (voting DPS versus voting other parties), compared to other dimensions of authoritarianism that will show no effect on response variable.

In order to test my hypotheses, I have performed logistic regression, which I consider the method with the least disadvantages, due to several reasons.

³⁵ Even though this is a short scale I consider relevant to check for the internal consistency of measures I am using. Values of Cronbach's Alpha are in the range from 0 to 1, where the number closer to 1 indicates higher internal reliability. Values >.70 are considered acceptable. It is also important to note that even though Cronbach's Alpha assesses internal consistency of the scale it does *not* mean that the scale is unidimensional, that is the reason why factor analysis must be performed (see: Gliem and Gliem, 2003:87).

Firstly, out of authoritarian submission and conventional aggression items, I have created two separate additive indices followed by the items the factor analysis extracted. Additionally, my major explanatory variables (authoritarian submission and conventional aggression) are of a continuous nature, and my response variable is dichotomous, which is necessary pre-condition for performing logistic regression. Secondly, logistic regression allows me to see how each variable in the model individually affects the response, so that I can properly quantify the strengths of these effects. Thirdly, unlike linear regression model, logistic regression does not assume normally distributed data³⁶; does not require assumptions of linearity between explanatory and response variable; and, finally, it does not require homoscedasticity (uniform variance for all possible values of the explanatory variable) (Menard, 2002:5). However, an important assumption that logistic regression must satisfy is that of no significant multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in the model (more precisely, explanatory and controls) which in the case of my analysis does not exist.³⁷

Finally, the hypothesized relationship among variables indicates that one-unit increase in authoritarian submission (on a five-point scale) affects the probability of voting DPS, or as indicated in the formula:

$$\ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AuthS + \beta_2 ConAgg + \beta_3 MNE + \beta_4 SERB + \beta_5 Age + \beta_6 Edu + \beta_7 Gender + \beta_8 PolInter \\ + \beta_9 Eco$$

³⁶ See the descriptive statistics for all variables in the model, in Appendix 1.

³⁷ I have checked for this assumption with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) that shows how much variance in each variable is affected by its collinearity with remaining predictor variables. The result closer to 1 indicates marginal multicollinearity, while VIF bigger than 10 shows the existence of high multicollinearity (Mela and Kopalle, 2002). The analysis does not indicate any significant collinearity: Authoritarian submission-1.67; Conventional aggression-1.61; MNE ethnicity-1.45; SERB ethnicity-1.23; Age-1.26; Education-1.45; Gender-1.05; Political interest-1.05; Satisfaction with the economy-1.05.

Namely, the log odds ratio - $\ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)$ of the binary outcome (1-vote DPS, 0-vote other parties) is presented here as a function of several relevant explanatory variables (from β_1AuthS to β_9Eco , where β presents a coefficient for each explanatory variable). β_0 presents an intercept of the logistic regression i.e. it determines the outcome when all the predictor variables equal to 0 (see: Gravetter and Wallnau, 2008:450).

Besides testing the separate effects of authoritarian submission (AS) and conventional aggression (CA) on vote choice (Model 1), I have checked for the joint effects between AS and CA, namely the overall effect of the authoritarianism on vote choice (Model 2).

The results of Model 1 clearly show that I can reject the hypothesis of no effect between authoritarian submission and vote choice. Namely, authoritarian submission indeed has a *positive* effect on individual's likelihood to vote DPS, compared to other parties. As presented in the Table 10, with one-unit increase in authoritarian submission (on a five-point scale), individual's likelihood for voting DPS, compared to other parties, increases by 41 % ($\beta=0.349$). Furthermore, these results provide the support for my second hypothesis - conventional aggression does not present statistically significant predictor of vote choice:

Table 10. Logistic regression analysis results³⁸

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	vote choice	
	Model (1)	Model (2)
Authoritarianism		0.259*** (0.096)
Authoritarian submission	0.349*** (0.108)	
Conventional aggression	-0.075 (0.101)	
Ethnicity – MNE	0.439* (0.258)	0.385 (0.255)
Ethnicity – SERB	-1.394*** (0.340)	-1.389*** (0.338)
Ethnicity – BOSN	0.144 (0.338)	0.070 (0.335)
Age	0.013** (0.006)	0.014** (0.006)
Education	-0.071 (0.062)	-0.068 (0.061)
Gender	0.558*** (0.183)	0.555** (0.182)
Interest in politics	0.645*** (0.196)	0.640*** (0.195)
Satisfaction with the economy 1	2.344*** (0.263)	2.317*** (0.261)
Satisfaction with the economy 2	0.763*** (0.257)	0.727*** (0.254)
Employment	-0.121 (0.213)	-0.122 (0.212)
Constant	-3.546*** (0.662)	-3.469*** (0.659)
Observations	771	771
Log Likelihood	-390.64	-393.28
Akaike Inf. Crit.	807.29	810.57

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses

³⁸ Each model was validated with Hosmer-Lemeshow test of model fit and with classification table, which presents the percentage of correctly classified cases by the model. Model 1: $X^2(8) = 8.6309$, p-value = 0.37, correctly classified cases: 75.6%. Model 2: $X^2(8) = 7.9444$, df = 8, p-value = 0.43, correctly classified cases: 75.6%.

Thus, the results from Model 1, are in accordance with my expectations that authoritarian submission will show a positive predictive power in terms of voting for DPS, compared to voting for other parties, but prior to all, that multi-dimensionality of authoritarianism scale must be revealed in order to properly interpret its effects. Namely, if a researcher would not acknowledge the existence of different dimensions under the concept of authoritarianism he/she would be mistakenly led by the overall result, without actually discovering which parts of authoritarianism scale are relevant for that result.

More precisely, when I created a single authoritarianism measure out of authoritarian submission, and conventional aggression items, and included it in the logistic regression equation (Model 2, with all other parameters kept the same), I still received statistically significant result – one-unit increase in authoritarianism (on five-point scale) increases individual's odds for voting DPS, compared to voting for other parties, by 29% ($\beta=0.259$, $p<0.01$). Even though this result is by 12% lower than the contribution of the authoritarian submission itself, it could be interpreted as the existence of the overall effect of authoritarianism, but as shown, we can argue for the substantive effect of authoritarian submission *only*.

Further, the Table 10 (Model 1) reveals statistically significant contribution of several control variables to vote choice. In order to capture Montenegrin/Serb polarization, I have included two dummy ethnicity variables in the model. As expected, ethnic belonging presents an important factor – Montenegrins are by 55% ($\beta=0.439$) more likely to vote DPS than voters of other ethnicities. Intuitively, respondents who declare themselves as Serbians are by 76% ($\beta=-1.394$) less likely to vote DPS, compared to voters that belong to other ethnic groups. As expected, these results indeed reflect the ethnic polarization in Montenegrin society.

Namely, individuals who declare themselves as Montenegrins have a stable likelihood of voting DPS, while those that identify themselves as Serbians, show significantly smaller likelihood of doing so. Thus, these results are an empirical confirmation of the ethnic standing of this incumbent party. Namely, as noted before³⁹, DPS is clearly associated with Montenegrin ethnic belonging, and Montenegrin independence of 2006. Voters indeed dominantly recognize this party as representing pro-Montenegrin politics.

When it comes to the remaining control variables, the analysis shows that females are by 74% ($\beta=0.558$) more likely to vote DPS, than males. The interpretation of the effects of gender, on vote choice, remains very inconclusive. While there is growing interest for the influence of gender on voting, there is enough skepticism to argue that this relationship is straightforward (Campbell, 2017:160). Also, in relation to submissive tendencies, it would be very pretentious to assume that gender, as such, predetermines the level of submission. And, indeed, females are not more submissive, than males, in this research (Polyserial correlation between gender and authoritarian submission $r=0.05$).

The only available explanation that might be intuitive for such result, relates to DPS gender-related politics. Namely, this incumbent party has the highest percentage of female representation in the Parliament – 27.77%⁴⁰ and coordinates Parliament's Board for Gender Equality⁴¹. The gender-inclusive politics of DPS might have a potential to mobilize those voters that are unable to identify gender standing of other parties. Again, this interpretation should be cautiously taken, and additionally tested in further research, where demographic indicators are central.

³⁹ See page 29.

⁴⁰ See: <http://www.skupstina.me/index.php/me/skupstina/poslanice-i-poslanici/lista-poslanika-i-poslanica/itemlist/category/54-sigurnim-korakom-dps-milo-dukanovic>, accessed on: 20th of April, 2018.

⁴¹ See: <http://www.skupstina.me/index.php/me/odbor-za-rodnu-ravnopravnost>, accessed on: 20th of April, 2018.

Further, even though the age variable shows a statistical significance, its effect is not substantively big - with every additional life decade, individual's likelihood for voting DPS, compared to voting for other parties, increases by 1% ($\beta=0.013$).

Finally, those who are interested in politics are by 90% ($\beta=0.645$) more likely to vote DPS, compared to those who are not interested. The interpretation of this result necessarily relates to motivation that voters have and DPS "image of invincibility" (Komar and Zivkovic, 2016:785). Namely, voters tend to be on winner's side (Anderson and LoTempio, 2002). Furthermore, DPS, with its uninterrupted dominance, created an atmosphere where its supporters are permanently motivated to vote. Komar and Zivkovic (2016) found that the 'image of invincibility' increases the likelihood for voting DPS by 19 times (p.800). The political interest variable in this research, therefore, additionally confirms that constant dominance of DPS brings constant voting motivation to its voters.

Interestingly enough, satisfaction with the economy – i.e. individual's perception that the Montenegrin economic situation is getting better in the last ten months, presents enviably good predictor – respondents with such perceptions are by 10.42 ($\beta=2.344$) times more likely to vote DPS, compared to individuals that perceive economic situation as worse. Further, individuals who think that the economic situation remained unchanged are by 2.14 ($\beta=0.763$) times more likely to vote DPS, compared to those who think that the economic situation is worsened.

Such result becomes meaningful due to two reasons. Firstly, *subjective* indicators are in question – Table 10. includes one 'objective' indicator such as employment. It is visible that this variable does not have any influence on vote choice. Namely, this analysis shows the clear discrepancy between these two indicators. More precisely, employed individuals may still not be satisfied with the overall economic situation in Montenegro and vice versa. Given that economic issues do not lose their importance, it is expected that their substantive effect is constant, especially when subjective indicators are in question.

Secondly, this high result refers *only* to those who think that everything is turning out well, and those who think that nothing dramatically has changed. When compared with the opposite – those who agree that Montenegrin economy has worsened, large difference is observed. Why? Optimist and neutral voters, intuitively, associate economic improvements with the incumbent government that has the largest share in economic issues, and the greatest access to resources. This is especially the case if voters personally experienced some sort of economic benefits, which was enough for them to perceive the overall situation as better and/or unchanged.

The results presented here show that individual's vote for DPS can be interpreted as a function of submissive tendencies, positive perceptions about economic situation in Montenegro, and ethnic cleavage. Additional control indicators have shown that the electoral body of DPS is dominated by females and those who are more interested in politics. On the other hand, submissive tendencies are still meaningfully increasing individual's odds of choosing DPS over other parties, even under the most potent controls. The finding that the relationship between authoritarian submission and vote choice sustained under controls, especially ethnic, proves that the importance of this dimension in voting for DPS is substantive, not marginal.

4.2.2. Who stands out? Voters and differences in authoritarian submission

In the previous section, I have established the substantive effect of authoritarian submission on vote choice, under the relevant controls of the case, and the potent ethnicity predictors. In order to make my results more robust, and the overall conclusions of this study more reliable, I have performed additional analyses that are directly related to the remaining hypothesis:

H3: DPS supporters will show the strongest submissive tendencies, unlike other party supporters.

Namely, I am interested in seeing whether there is any statistically significant mean difference, in terms of authoritarian submission, among voters of different Montenegrin parties. In order to test my hypotheses, I have performed Welch's One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with Games-Howell post-hoc test. The results show that I confirm the difference in authoritarian submission among various party supporters:

Table 11. Welch's One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for authoritarian submission

	Sum of Squares	DF	F test	p value
Authoritarian submission	25.54	5	4.68	0.001***
Residuals	732.59	671		

However, these results do not tell us exactly whose voters actually differ on this dimension (H3). This is the role of the post-hoc test I performed, which extracted four pairs of party supporters whose level of authoritarian submission is different on a statistically significant level:

Table 12. Multiple comparisons – Mean difference in authoritarian submission among party supporters

	Mean Difference	Lower CI	Upper CI	p value
DPS – SDP	0.57	0.05	1.08	0.023**
Democrats – DPS	-0.60	-1.06	-0.14	0.004***
Bosniak Party – SDP	0.63	0.08	1.18	0.015*
Bosniak Party – Democrats	0.67	0.17	1.17	0.003***

Results from the Table 12. reveal that voters of Democratic Party of Socialists *and* those that support minority Bosniak Party show the strongest tendencies towards authoritarian submission. Namely, voters of DPS tend to be more submissive, than voters from Social Democrat Party (SDP), by 0.57 points. Further, voters of Democrats are by 0.60 points less submissive than those that support DPS. When it comes to Bosniak Party, its supporters are by 0.63 points more submissive than SDP voters. The same holds for Democrats (0.67 points difference in favor of Bosniak Party supporters).

Thus, results from the post-hoc test indicate that the Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Namely, DPS voters are indeed recognized as submissive, however, this is also the case with Bosniak Party supporters. Even though the mean values on authoritarian submission items (measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates the highest level of submissiveness), do not differ substantively between voters of DPS (3.7) and those of BP (3.8), such finding has an importance. Namely, given that the post-hoc test recognized voters of Bosniak Party (BP) as significantly different in terms of authoritarian submission, it is important to test whether these submissive tendencies affect their vote choice, as it was the case with DPS supporters.

In order to discover the impact of authoritarian submission on voting for BP, I have performed three analyses. Model 1 tests the effects of AS on *voting BP versus voting other parties*; Model 2 tests the same effects with *voting BP versus voting DPS* as a response variable; while the Model 3 identifies the impact of AS on *voting BP versus voting other minority parties*. These three models were selected in order to compare voters of Bosniak Party to remaining population of voters (Model 1), as it was the case in the analysis with DPS. Second model serves us as a comparison of the electoral decisions of the voting body in two parties where submission matters the most.

The third model serves as an addition to the analysis, where BP voters are compared to their similar counterparts – voters of other minority parties such as Croatian Civic Initiative (Hrvatska građanska inicijativa) and three coalitions that represent interests of Albanian minority.⁴²

Given that Bosniak Party is representative of those who are Bosniaks i.e. constitutionally recognized ethnic minority in Montenegro, it is important to include Bosniak ethnicity as a control, in order to properly investigate the effects of AS. Besides Bosniak ethnicity, as it is visible from the Table 13, the three models contain the same set of explanatory and control variables, like those in the previous analysis:⁴³

⁴² Albanians resolutely (Albanci odlučno, FORCA-DUA-AA), Albanian coalition “With one goal” (Albanska koalicija „Sa jednim ciljem”), and the List of Albanian Democratic Association (Lista demokratskog saveza Albanaca)

⁴³ See p. 41.

Table 13: Logistic regression analysis results for Bosniak Party supporters

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	vote choice		
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Authoritarian submission	0.144 (0.325)	-0.094 (0.114)	0.086 (0.354)
Conventional aggression	0.191 (0.293)	0.071 (0.277)	-0.026 (0.348)
Ethnicity – MNE	-2.895*** (0.911)	-3.394*** (0.941)	-2.084** (0.942)
Ethnicity – SERB	-3.918** (1.570)	-2.259 (1.514)	-2.496* (1.501)
Ethnicity – Bosniak	3.263*** (0.613)	2.104*** (0.528)	3.722*** (0.725)
Age	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.020 (0.016)	0.001 (0.020)
Education	0.205 (0.183)	0.294* (0.171)	0.163 (0.200)
Gender	-0.629 (0.513)	-1.465*** (0.483)	-0.875 (0.590)
Interest in politics	0.679 (0.518)	-0.116 (0.506)	0.900 (0.595)
Satisfaction with the economy 1	0.106 (0.713)	-1.297* (0.664)	-0.324 (0.806)
Satisfaction with the economy 2	-0.122 (0.612)	-0.322 (0.592)	-0.149 (0.696)
Employment	-0.050 (0.647)	-0.306 (0.662)	-0.050 (0.710)
Constant	-4.387** (1.958)	-0.106 (1.917)	-3.083 (2.124)
Observations	509	359	229
Log Likelihood	-53.64	-61.71	-41.33
Akaike Inf. Crit.	133.29	149.42	108.66

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 13. clearly shows that authoritarian submission does not have an effect on voting for BP in neither of the three models. Results further show that ethnicity is the most important factor that determines the vote for Bosniak Party.

Namely, Montenegrin and Serbian ethnicity present negative predictors in voting for BS, while Bosniak ethnic belonging increases the likelihood of voting BP for more than eight times (Model 2), and even more than twenty times (Models 1 and 3), compared to any other ethnic belonging. This finding is not surprising given that the existence of Bosniak Party is based on representation of that ethnic group. If we go back to the Table 8, we will see that Bosniak ethnicity does not have an effect on voting DPS, compared to voting other parties, unlike Montenegrin and Serbian ethnicity. This result additionally confirms that Bosniaks dominantly vote BP, and they are able to identify this political party as mainly representative of those who belong to Bosniak ethnic group. Significant contribution of other control variables (gender, education, satisfaction with the economy) is found only in the Model (2), when BP voters are compared with those that support DPS. The analysis reveals that females are by 77% ($\beta=-1.465$) less likely to vote BP, over DPS, than males. Further, every additional educational degree increases the likelihood of voting BP over DPS by 34% ($\beta=0.294$), and finally, positive economic perceptions have the negative effect on voting BP versus DPS - they decrease the likelihood of voting BP over DPS by 73% ($\beta=-1.297$). These differences in control variables are consistent with previous findings, where DPS electorate is found to be dominated by females, and those that have positive perceptions about economic situation in Montenegro.

On the other hand, the general conclusion, derived from these three models, implies that the vote for BP, in each scenario, is dominantly driven by ethnicity. Other predictors matter only to the extent when the scope of comparison is narrowed i.e. limited to the pre-dominant party. More importantly, these results imply that authoritarian submission does not have any relevance for voting BP, even though the electorate of this party is dominated by submissive tendencies. When compared with DPS story, these findings indicate one conclusion. Namely, in the case of BP, unlike with the DPS, ethnicity is the *only* factor that matters.

This does not mean that submission is not there, but it is not relevant as a function of vote choice. As said before, Bosniak Party is representing small ethnic group of Bosniak people, where ethnic voting presents the crucial factor, superior to all others.

On the other hand, DPS voters, even though indisputably Montenegrins, have shown that there is something more that determines their vote, besides their ethnicity. I doubt that ethnic polarization will fade in the near future of Montenegrin politics, however, the first findings from this thesis imply that authoritarian submission can help understanding the puzzle of this actor's pre-domination in Montenegrin political scene.

4.2.3. Summary

The results from the analysis obtained with MNES data provide the evidence that authoritarian submission is a valid explanatory factor in voting for the most influential Montenegrin party – Democratic Party of Socialists, *compared to voting for other parties*. Further, additional analyses revealed that voters of Montenegrin parties significantly differ in terms of authoritarian submission. Those who support DPS and minority Bosniak Party stand out in terms of this dimension. However, unlike in the case of DPS, in voting for Bosniak Party, authoritarian submission is not even on a level of statistical significance. Namely, vote for Bosniak Party is dominantly influenced by ethnic factors.

Even though the analysis revealed significant contribution of certain control variables (such as subjective economic perceptions and ethnicity) authoritarian submission kept increasing individual's odds for voting DPS by 41%, when confronted with the most influential factors of the case. Additionally, the analysis supported my expectations that other dimensions of authoritarianism (in this case conventional aggression) will not present potent factors in explanation of individual's tendency to vote for the major party. Moreover, I will further scrutinize this finding in the following chapter, where three dimensions of authoritarianism will be operationalized in detailed fashion. Namely, Chapter 5 contains the analysis from the second survey research – done on a student sample, where authoritarian submission is operationalized with greater attention to construct validity, and certain design techniques that CSES questionnaire prevented me to use.

Chapter 5 - The original survey research – student sample

The data for the second survey was collected from 19th until 23rd of February 2018, on Faculty of Political Science and Faculty of Law, University of Montenegro. A total of 228 students participated, the demographic structure of the sample is as follows: students' age varies from 18 to 29. Females are overrepresented – 71.87%; while men are consisting 28.12% of the sample. Such gender distribution stems from the general demographic structure of Faculty of Law and Faculty of Political Science, where females are usually in majority.⁴⁴ When it comes to the ethnic composition of the sample – Montenegrins comprise 68.75%, Serbs 17.85%, Muslims 6.69%, Bosniaks 3.12%, Albanians 2.23, and the remaining 1.33% are students of other nationalities. This ethnic structure shows that Montenegrins are overrepresented, while Serbs are underreported, compared to census data.⁴⁵ Given that ethnicity is a central control variable in my analysis, the uneven distribution can bias the results I get. This is the reason why I have constructed political identity variable (Stankov, 2016) out of ethnicity, religion and language (p.36) which increased the sample size of Serbs from 40 to 87 i.e. 38.83%, compared to previous 17.85%. The political identity variable means that Montenegrin/Serb division, as previously explained⁴⁶, is an expression of ethnicity, but of religious belonging (Montenegrin/Serb Orthodox church) and language (Montenegrin/Serb) also. This redistribution of the ethnic structure, even though imperfect, decreases the potential ethnic-driven bias.

It is important to note, at the very beginning, that I am aware of the limitation that always follows research with the student sample - namely, this analysis is limited in its external validity i.e. generalizability of the results of the research. This limitation stems from the very nature of the student sample as non-representative of general population.

⁴⁴ Such inference was also established in previous analyses done on a student sample from Faculty of Political Science, see: Stankov (2016) and Batricevic (2015).

⁴⁵ See page 35.

⁴⁶ See page 28.

It is also important to emphasize that this thesis aimed at compensating for this limitation with the inclusion of the analysis with the nationally representative sample. In addition, the analysis with the student sample is necessary in order to test the authoritarianism scale that covers all the three authoritarianism dimensions, which was not the case in the first survey. This research, as it will be discussed in further sections, tests the results derived from MNES research, with more acceptable construct validity.

5.1. Measurements

Authoritarianism is measured with 18 survey items, dominantly selected from Adorno et al. F-scale, Altemeyer's RWA scale, the authoritarianism scale used by Todosijevic and Enyedi (2002:257), and several newly formulated items. Respondents were indicating a level of agreement/disagreement with each item, on five-point Likert scale. The internal reliability of the scale is acceptable, with Cronbach's Alpha being 0.78.

Table 14. The authoritarianism scale – second survey research

1. Some of the best people in our country are those who criticize religion and ignore the traditional way the people should behave. C ^{47*}
2. Minorities should adjust to the customs and traditions in our country, at all costs. AG
3. Young people sometimes have rebellious thoughts, but as they grow up, they should condemn these and adapt. AS
4. People should pay less attention to old religious beliefs and develop personal moral standards. C*
5. Today's society is immoral partly due to the fact that both teachers and parents forgot that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing. AS
6. Sex crimes, such as rape, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly punished or worse. AG
7. Young people should stick to old customs. C
8. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. AS
9. Anyone who has contact with drugs should be arrested. AG

⁴⁷ C- conventionalism, AS – authoritarian submission, AG – authoritarian aggression; * is for reverse-coded items.

10. Alcoholics should be expelled from the society. AG

11. Women should follow traditions. C

12. What this country needs the most is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in. AS

13. Our leaders know what is best for us. AS

14. We should not doubt the decisions made by state authorities. AS

15. Life imprisonment is justified for permanent criminals. AG

16. Atheists are undoubtedly as good as those who are religious. C*

17. There is nothing wrong about the same-sex marriages. C*

18. Homosexuals are not better than criminals and should be severely punished. AG

The response variable – voting preferences is measured with propensity to vote question i.e. the respondents were asked: “if there were elections held next week, how likely is that you would vote for the following parties”. The response categories varied from “very likely” to “very unlikely”.

The survey contains vote choice question also i.e. “for whom did you vote in the Montenegrin parliamentary elections (2016)”. However, I was prevented from including this question in the analysis due to the high non-response rate. I believe that there are two reasons that explain this situation. The first one is intuitive and well-known in the literature – vote choice questions are sensitive (see: Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). Respondents, especially in small samples, do not have a sense of anonymity, and tend to avoid answering such questions. Namely, there was 25.68% of those who did not want to answer for whom did they vote in last elections. The second reason is related to the nature of the sample. Namely, respondents are students, where more than half of them are at their first year of undergraduate studies (59.64%). It may be that these respondents did not even vote in last elections –26.60% reported non-voting, while there was 5.04% of those who are not registered for voting. This may be an additional explanation why the response rate was somewhat higher for the propensity to vote question, which did not require the actual i.e. given vote.

As with the previous (MNES) survey, *satisfaction with the economy*, is included as control. Respondents were asked to express their level of satisfaction with the economic situation in Montenegro (from very satisfied to very dissatisfied).

Additional control, which I use as a proxy for political sophistication, relates to *political knowledge*⁴⁸.

Respondents were asked seven multiple-choice questions about Montenegrin politics, and politics in general, such as: “*How many seats are in the Parliament of Montenegro?*” or “*To the best of your knowledge, who is currently Secretary-General of the United Nations?*”. The final control relates to *ethnicity* – two dummy variables are included to represent Montenegrin and Serb ethnic belonging.

5.2. Analysis and results

I firstly conduct confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), with maximum likelihood estimation, of the authoritarianism scale, in order to isolate its three dimensions. Authoritarian submission, aggression, and conventionalism consist three factors. The selection of the items in these factors is based on two criteria. The first one is previously discussed theoretical conceptualization of each of these dimensions.⁴⁹ The second criteria for item-selection is the usage of these items that are classified as indicators for submission/aggression/conventionalism, in the original F-scale and/or RWA scale. After several attempts, I constructed the three-factor model, which reduced the total authoritarianism scale of 18 items to 12 items. As it is visible from the Table 15, these items load on specified factors:

⁴⁸ The whole political knowledge battery is available in Appendix 2.

⁴⁹ See page 28-32.

Table 15. CFA - three-factor solution – authoritarianism scale

Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Minorities should adjust to the customs and traditions in our country, at all costs.	0.81		
Anyone who has contact with drugs should be arrested.	0.75		
Alcoholics should be expelled from the society.	0.82		
Life imprisonment is justified for permanent criminals.	0.63		
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.		0.51	
What this country needs the most is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in.		0.74	
Our leaders know what is best for us.		0.87	
We should not doubt the decisions made by state authorities.		0.42	
Some of the best people in our country are those who criticize religion and ignore the traditional way the people should behave.*			0.79
People should pay less attention to old religious beliefs and develop personal moral standards.*			0.64
Young people should stick to old customs.			0.75
Women should follow traditions.			0.41
<i>TLI=0.84</i> <i>CFI=0.88</i> <i>RMSEA=0.06</i>			
<i>Note:</i> All factor loadings are significant at $p<.05$; *reverse coded items			

The evaluation of the model fit, in CFA, is very important, given that it demonstrates to what extent theoretical assumptions, posed by the researcher, deviate from methodological rules. In this thesis, I report several measures of model fit that the literature recognizes as necessary (see: Hu and Bentler (1998), cited in: Passini, 2008:55).

The three-factor model fit is not excellent, but it is in the acceptable range – Tucker-Lewis Index – TLI (0.84), Comparative Fit Index – CFI (0.88), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.06 for 90% CI (0.03-0.08). Further, the three-factor model showed significantly better fit than the one-factor model: $X^2(3)=82.52, p<.001$.⁵⁰

The first factor has positive loadings (0.81, 0.75, 0.82, 0.63) on items which represent punitive attitudes towards those who are social deviants, and exclusionary view on minorities (Altemeyer, 1996). Therefore, this factor is named *authoritarian aggression*.

The second factor, loads on items (0.51, 0.74, 0.87, 0.42) that are dominantly related to the concept of political authority, but also upbringing– this factor presents *authoritarian submission*.

Finally, the third factor contains loadings (0.79, 0.64, 0.75, 0.41) on items which refer to religion, tradition and morality i.e. to pre-established social norms of 'acceptable' behavior – this factor is named *conventionalism*.

Given that the authoritarianism scale is reduced from 18 to 12 items, I report the internal consistency of the 12-item scale. Cronbach's Alpha for the reduced scale is 0.72, which is indeed lower compared to the full scale (0.78), but still in the acceptable range $>.70$. More importantly, even though this factor analysis reduced the original authoritarianism scale, it still presents more satisfactory solution compared to the scale used in the previous research, which contained limited number of authoritarianism items.⁵¹ Namely, the previous scale was not able to catch the three-dimensional solution for authoritarianism, with its six items. The 12-item scale, used in the student analysis, is, therefore, capable of capturing the three dimensions (four items per each), and provides more valid solution for the central variable in this research.

⁵⁰ It is important to note that I have tested the same 12-item scale with exploratory factor analysis, where parallel analysis and eigenvalues of the extracted factors confirmed the fit of the three-factor model, see Appendix 3.

⁵¹ See page 36.

What is more, the confirmatory factor analysis presented here, supports the argumentation that authoritarianism is not uni-dimensional concept, and that, indeed, can be observed as a function of three correlated latent dimensions (Passini, 2017:73). In the second research, therefore, previous results can be additionally checked, with more acceptable construct validity. Namely, this analysis enables me to look at the actual impact of the three dimensions – it will show whether the lack of effect of other dimensions of authoritarianism (such as conventional aggression), in the previous research, was due to the limited construct validity of the previous scale.

Prior to performing any analysis with voting preferences, I was interested in investigating whether there will be any substantive difference between student and nationally representative sample, in their submissive tendencies. Table 16. includes only these items that were present in both surveys:

Table 16. Submissive tendencies – nationally representative versus student sample

Items	National sample		Student sample	
	Agree ⁵²	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
1. The most important virtues children should learn are obedience and respect to authority.	63.48	18.90	56.25	32.58
2. Young people sometimes have rebellious ideas, but as they grow, they should overcome them, and calm down.	68.32	14. 18	43.51	42.59
3. The state of immorality in our society is partly a consequence of the fact that both teachers and parents have forgotten that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing.	43.65	35.53	23.63	64.09

**Note:* The results are expressed in percentages

These results show that students are, in general, less submissive, compared to the nationally representative sample. The highest discrepancy is notable for the third item – corporate punishment, were 64.09% of students disagree with this attitude, compared to 35.53% of disagreement for those in the national sample. The smallest difference, however, is visible for the first item, related to *obedience as value*⁵³, where 56.25% of students support such upbringing, compared to 63.48% of agreement in general population.

⁵² Both 'agree' and 'disagree' categories presented here are cumulative percentages of 'completely agree/disagree' and 'somewhat agree/disagree'. The remaining percentages not presented in this table refer to category of neutral.

⁵³ See page 19.

When it comes to the second item, and rebellious ideas of the youth, students are quite divided – there is 43.51% of those who agree with silencing of rebellious attitudes, and almost the same percentage of disagreement – 42.59%. The nationally representative sample, on the other hand, shows clear picture with 68.32% of agreement with this attitude.

The differences between student, and national sample, reflect the argumentation that age and education are relevant for authoritarian i.e. submissive tendencies. As argued before, those who are more educated and young i.e. did not experience education in authoritarian surroundings⁵⁴ are expected to be less submissive. Namely, Montenegrin contemporary education goes through demanding, but purposeful process of structural changes, which should result in higher quality of education, and increased international experience.

Students, in my research, therefore, do not support submissive attitudes to the same extent, as respondents in the nationally representative sample. Further, when it comes to the follower-leader relationship, students do not show a clear submissive tendency. The Table 17. contains the items that belong to the concept of authoritarian submission, with a particular emphasis on leadership:

Table 17. Submissive tendencies – student sample

Items	Agree	Disagree
1. What this country needs the most is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in.	67.44	19.53
2. Our leaders know what is best for us.	14.28	71.42
3. We should not doubt the decisions made by state authorities.	11.21	77.57

**Note:* The results are expressed in percentages

⁵⁴ See page 37.

Almost 68% of students support strong leadership as a ‘cure’ for political situation, prior to laws and agencies.

However, when it comes to the items that represent ‘blind’ obedience, students who disagree with such line of thinking are obviously in majority. Table 16. and 17. indeed demonstrate that students do not support ‘rigid’ forms of authoritarian submission, they are more critical towards physical punishment and unquestionable obedience. Nevertheless, they are supportive towards ‘soft’ forms of authoritarian submission, i.e. *obedience as a value* in upbringing, and strong leadership as a political priority.

While it is encouraging that students, as supposed to be educationally and politically sophisticated, show skepticism towards unquestionable obedience, this does not mean that submissive tendencies are absent, or marginal. They are indeed present to a certain extent and the following section demonstrates how submission actually relates to party preferences in the sample of Montenegrin students.

5.3.3. Is the youth different? Authoritarian submission and voting – student sample

Due to the fact that vote choice question, used as a response variable in previous analysis, has low response rate, logistic regression would not present a suitable method for data analysis. Moreover, the mean comparisons in authoritarian submission, among various party supporters are not possible for the same reason. This limitation should be addressed in further analyses, which should apply the three-dimensional authoritarianism scale on a nationally representative sample. This way it would be possible to capture fully differences in authoritarian submission, among various party supporters. Nevertheless, the analysis with the student sample, serves as an additional test for the conclusions derived in the previous research, with an *extreme sample*, i.e. the sample that is, in overall, more sophisticated and younger than general population. Namely, this sample is specific by its age and education in new circumstances i.e. democratizing political surrounding.

Given that propensity to vote is used as a continuous response variable, I chose linear regression as a method for data analysis. As in the previous research, I created three separate additive indices out of authoritarian submission, aggression, and conventionalism, with the items from confirmatory factor analysis. The response variable asked respondents to indicate their propensity to vote certain party, on a scale from 1 to 4: 1 being ‘very likely’, 2 – ‘somewhat likely’, 3 – ‘somewhat unlikely’, and 4 – ‘very unlikely’.

Prior to performing linear regression, I have checked the assumptions that this method must satisfy.⁵⁵ The linear regression models, as presented in the Table 18⁵⁶, do not contain the satisfaction with the economy variable. Namely, the normality of the data was assessed with Shapiro-Wilk test (See: Shapiro and Wilk, 1965).

⁵⁵ Such as: constant variance, uncorrelated errors, linearity, multivariate normality, see: Montgomery et al. 2012:17.

⁵⁶ See page 71.

Given that the inclusion of the 'satisfaction with the economy' variable distorted the normal distribution of the sample ($W=0.97$, $p<0.05$), I have decided to continue the analysis without this control. Namely, the overall distribution of the sample was severely skewed with the inclusion of this variable ($Skew=6.15$, $p<0.01$).

One reason behind this methodological obstacle might be very modest variation in satisfaction with the economy, among students. Namely, the perception about economic situation in Montenegro is, as expected, somewhat different in the nationally representative sample, compared to the student sample. MNES data shows that there is 27.57% of respondents who think that the economic situation is getting better in Montenegro, in past ten months, and 30.51% of those who agree with the opposite – that the economic situation is worsened. The highest percentage reflects the neutral attitude i.e. that everything in the economy remained unchanged – 41.91%. On the other hand, in the student research, only 7.69% of respondents reported to be very or somewhat satisfied with the economy in Montenegro. 20.81% remained neutral, while 71.49% expressed their dissatisfaction.

Again, these differences could be very sample-specific i.e. parent-driven and/or self-driven. Namely, students are mainly unemployed or partially employed population, which is still economically dependent on their parents. Students whose family members personally experienced economic disturbance might be more dissatisfied, with the economy, compared to those who did not. Secondly, students themselves might already experience anxiety for their future employment.

Namely, the UNDP report from 2017, on the employment and Montenegrin youth,⁵⁷ acknowledges that the “unemployment rate of the youth is on a high level (35-40%)”⁵⁸ with “almost 10000 unemployed young people in Montenegro”.⁵⁹ These results, in overall, confirm that the student sample, by its very specific structure, might reflect different attitudes on certain issues compared to general population.

Going back to the relationship between authoritarian submission and party preferences, the linear regression models, with propensity to vote DPS as a response variable⁶⁰, are presented in the following table:

⁵⁷ See: <http://www.un.org.me/Library/Youth-Empowerment/Nezaposlenoh%20mladih%20u%20Crnoj%20Gori%20-%20Politike%20za%20pove%20C4%87anje%20zaposlenosti%20mladih%20-%20UNDP%20-%202017.pdf>, accessed on: 20th of April, 2018.

⁵⁸ <http://www.un.org.me/Library/Youth-Empowerment/Nezaposlenoh%20mladih%20u%20Crnoj%20Gori%20-%20Politike%20za%20pove%20C4%87anje%20zaposlenosti%20mladih%20-%20UNDP%20-%202017.pdf>, p. 9.

Original translation: “Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih je na visokom nivou (35-40%)”

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 9, original translation: “Gotovo 10.000 mladih u Crnoj Gori je nezaposleno.”

⁶⁰ Due to the small sample size, I was prevented from running linear models on other Montenegrin parties, where the overall model fit was not satisfying (F-statistics with high p-value).

Table 18: Linear regression analysis results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	propensity to vote DPS			
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Authoritarianism				0.534*** (0.172)
Authoritarian aggression			0.066 (0.120)	
Conventionalism		0.186 (0.146)		
Authoritarian submission	0.621*** (0.106)			
Ethnicity – MNE	0.441** (0.212)	0.473* (0.251)	0.115 (0.246)	0.325 (0.242)
Ethnicity – SERB	-0.779*** (0.198)	-1.072*** (0.244)	-1.223*** (0.235)	-1.154*** (0.229)
Gender	0.088 (0.195)	0.057 (0.236)	0.039 (0.230)	-0.019 (0.231)
Political knowledge	-0.311 (0.453)	0.069 (0.587)	-0.353 (0.556)	-0.145 (0.549)
Constant	0.511 (0.739)	1.371 (1.022)	2.553*** (0.841)	0.810 (0.955)
Observations	97	88	89	75
F-statistic (p-value)	14.23(0.001)	6.24(0.001)	5.80(0.001)	8.70(0.001)
Adj. R ²	0.40	0.23	0.21	0.34

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*
Standard errors in parentheses

The overall inference from MNES and the student research is that DPS voters indeed do not cherish neither aggressive nor conventional beliefs, but they are showing a dosage of submissive tendencies. Namely, with one unit increase in authoritarian submission (on a five-point scale) individual's propensity to vote DPS increases by 0.62, as it is visible from Model 1. This model shows good general fit with the F-statistic being statistically significant, and with decent R² value. Namely, the model explains 40% of variance in the response variable with all of these predictors included. More intuitively, 40% of change in propensity to vote DPS can be attributed to the influence of the explanatory variables in the model.

We can further see that the effects of ethnicity are present (Model 1), as in the previous research.⁶¹ Namely, Montenegrin ethnicity increases the propensity for voting DPS by 0.44, compared to other ethnic groups. Moreover, Serbs are by ~ 0.78 less likely to vote this party, compared to voters of other ethnic belonging. The effects of ethnicity are constant in all four models – Serbian ethnicity shows the strongest negative influence on propensity to vote DPS. These results are an additional confirmation that DPS supporters still associate this party with its pro-Montenegrin politics, and experience it as a protégé of Montenegrin independence.

Further, as noted before, the analysis shows that other dimensions of authoritarianism (aggression and conventionalism) do not have an effect on the propensity to vote DPS. Even though these results should be cautiously interpreted, due to the small sample size, this analysis helps clarifying the results from the previous (MNES) research. Namely, in the analysis with the nationally representative sample, conventional aggression did not have an effect on vote choice. One grounded concern was that such result might be the product of limited construct validity of the previous authoritarianism scale. Now, in the second research, both conventionalism and aggression are better-captured and I get an additional confirmation that these dimensions still do not show any effect on response variable.

Again, this conclusion could not be derived if authoritarianism would be treated as uni-dimensional syndrome. Namely, Model 4 shows that with one unit increase in authoritarianism (on five-point scale), individual's propensity to vote DPS increases by 0.53. Without revealing the underlying structure of authoritarianism, one could mistakenly argue the contribution of this personality structure as a whole, while submission is the only dimension that works in this case.

⁶¹ See page 46.

Conclusion

In my thesis, I investigated the relationship between authoritarian submission and party preferences in Montenegro. Following Altemeyer's (1996) approach, I introduced authoritarian submission as one out of three dimensions of authoritarianism (together with conventionalism and authoritarian aggression) that investigates the relation of individuals to authority and upbringing patterns. I argued that authoritarian submission, unlike conventionalism and authoritarian aggression, would have a potential to demystify voting patterns – more specifically the uninterrupted domination of Democratic Party of Socialists – DPS, a party associated with Montenegrin independence and pro-Western orientation, and characterized by strong, constant leadership for the past almost three decades.

I tested my assumptions with analyzing two surveys – one nationally representative sample (MNES 2016), and a student sample. Both analyses showed that authoritarian submission explains voting for DPS *together* with the most influential alternative explanation – ethnicity. Both student and MNES analyses revealed that ethnic cleavages have a constant and substantive contribution to voting preferences in Montenegro – supporters of DPS still recognize this party as an emanation of Montenegrin orientation and autonomy. Ethnicity functioned as a pre-selector for choosing ethnic parties (such as Bosniaks voting for the Bosniak Party) notwithstanding authoritarian submission (voters of Bosniak Party were recognized as the most submissive in the sample), but authoritarian submission had a substantive effect for choosing among other parties. Nevertheless, the student sample proves that educated youth is generally less submissive and are less supportive of 'unquestionable' respect to political authority.

Nonetheless, those students who generally scored high in authoritarian submission, were ready to vote DPS. Even though characterized by several limitations⁶², the analysis with the student sample indicates that submissive tendencies do matter as a function of voting preferences, even for the most unlikely sample – young, educated, more sophisticated voters. This is especially important for practical implications - democratic outcomes are harder to achieve in societies that are developing some sort of dependent relationship to a leader, moreover, to a *particular* leader. The lack of individual's interest to scrutinize decisions that authorities make, prevents development of democracy. Secondly, submissive relation to authority together with the enduring ethnic mark can develop into a persisting cleavage that could further restrict democratic overturn of Montenegrin government. This is the reason why more attention should be paid to unraveling and analyzing the not so palpable dimensions that are relevant for democratic performance – as Passini (2017) argues, those who are submissive but not aggressive, are “not (...) less dangerous for democracy” (ibid, p.83).

When it comes to the methodological implications, this thesis showed that analyzing authoritarianism as a uni-dimensional concept is highly misleading. The whole concept of authoritarianism is based on a relationship to the *other*. Without separating the three underlying dimensions, one would fail to map these individuals that are susceptible to political authority, but not hostile to others and/or conventional in their beliefs (Passini, 2017:74). Submission is less visible than aggression, but not less important. Passini (2017:83) further nicely recognized that the focus is always on those who are louder, however, ignoring or overlooking those who are silent is equally destructive. The essence of democracy is in individual engagement and active involvement in (re-)questioning the existing power-relations.

⁶² See pages 58. and 68.

The second methodological implication stems from the nature of the deviant case study design (Lijphart 1971, Gerring, 2008). Namely, the obvious limitation that always follows case studies is their inability to generalize to other cases. However, the deviant case study approach, as noted in the introduction, allows for theoretical generalizations, novel assumptions tested on deviant cases can allow generalization to other, ‘more common’ cases. This research demonstrated that psychological factors such as authoritarian submission could have relevance for other postcommunist societies that experienced turbulent political past.

This does not mean that institutionalist approaches to regime change should be disregarded, on the contrary, they should be complemented with psychological perspectives. Namely, the prospects of attitudinal democratization⁶³ of post-communist societies do not depend solely on structural and institutional conditions. As Schmitter and Karl (1991) argue, the democratic political organization begins with a two-fold relation between citizens and representatives, where it is central that the “rulers know they will be held to account” (Schmitter, 2015:36). In the context of authoritarian submission, it is necessary that a citizen is not in the dependent relationship with the rulers, but rather in an interactive association to have a functioning accountability. This thesis pointed out at the psychological mechanisms that could help envisioning the democratic potential of post-communist societies. Attitudinal democratization must be recognized as one of the core conditions for building vibrant democracies in the former communist area. If democratic changes fail to penetrate into individual mindsets, the speed, character, and the future of democratic progress remains very questionable.

⁶³ This expression is derived from Linz and Stepan (1996) analysis on democratic transition in post-communist societies, p. 4.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables in MNES research

Variables	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Age	1206	45.28	16.58	46	18	88	0.23	-0.95
Education	1212	4.53	1.8	4	1	9	0.31	-0.8
Nationality MNE	1179	0.56	0.5	1	0	1	-0.25	-1.94
Nationality SERB	1179	0.23	0.42	0	0	1	1.31	-0.3
Satisfaction with the economy	1193	1.11	0.84	1	0	2	-0.22	-1.56
Employment	1213	0.39	0.49	0	0	1	0.45	-1.8
Gender	1212	0.44	0.5	0	0	1	0.26	-1.94
Interest in politics	1205	0.61	0.49	1	0	1	-0.47	-1.78
Authoritarian submission index	1109	3.59	1.08	3.67	1	5	-0.52	-0.46
Conventional aggression index	1075	3.54	1.09	3.67	1	5	-0.7	-0.09


Appendix 2

Political knowledge battery from the student research

- 1. Does Montenegro belong to Council of Europe?**
 - a) Yes
 - b) No
- 2. How many seats are in the Parliament of Montenegro?**
 - a) 81
 - b) 83
 - c) 85
- 3. To the best of your knowledge, who is currently serving as the Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms in Montenegro?**
 - a) Sefko Crnovrsanin
 - b) Sucko Bakovic
 - c) Mehmed Zenka
- 4. When Montenegro applied for membership in the European Union?**
 - a) In 2006.
 - b) In 2007.
 - c) In 2008.
 - d) In 2009.
- 5. How many times the same person can be elected as a president of Montenegro?**
 - a) Two times
 - b) Three times
- 6. How many members does NATO have?**
 - a) 28
 - b) 29
 - c) 30
 - d) 33
- 7. To the best of your knowledge, who is currently Secretary-General of the United Nations?**
 - a) António Guterres
 - b) Ban Ki-Moon
 - c) Kofi Annan

Appendix 3

Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis - student sample



Appendix 4
The introduction to the student survey

SURVEY RESEARCH

Dear respondent,

Thank you for your participation in this research. This survey is a part of master's research project at the Central European University (CEU, Budapest, Hungary), which investigates attitudes of the student population in Montenegro.

It should take approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete the survey. You will be asked about various questions that are divided into three parts - the first part refers to demographic issues; the second part includes questions about your views on socio-political issues, while the final part of the survey contains questions of political knowledge.

All answers you provide are completely anonymous; they cannot be transmitted to any third party, nor they will be used for any purpose that is not indicated by this questionnaire. Therefore, it is important to us that you answer on all questions honestly, and in accordance with your best knowledge.

Please fill out this questionnaire by rounding out only one letter/number next to the desired answer, for each question, or provide a written response when there is a blank line provided.

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