SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE CRISIS OF SOLIDARITY

The Swedish Model and The Refugee Crisis of 2015

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ABSTRACT

During the year of the European Refugee Crisis in 2015 an unprecedented number of 162 877 asylum seekers arrived to Sweden. As a response the Swedish government, led by the Social Democrats, drastically shifted the Swedish asylum- and refugee policy from one of the most generous and open, to one only complying with EU minimum standards. This thesis sets out to explore how the Refugee Crisis of 2015, and the restrictive U-turn in Swedish asylum policies, are debated, negotiated and justified within the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP). The research interest is primarily inspired by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka's (2017) recent elaborations on the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies and focuses on the important role of political actors in promoting inclusive solidarity. The restrictive policy shift has not passed uncontested and a divide has emerged within the party on immigration. By looking into the box and analyzing the internal party debates I hope to contribute with valuable insights in how a central progressive political actor is negotiating the notion of solidarity, as well as, the notion of a possible progressive dilemma. One of the clearest findings in the discourse analysis of the 2017 Social Democratic congress debate show an ongoing crisis of solidarity within the party and a struggle over the understanding of what solidarity entails when it comes to migration policies.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

The analytical starting point for this thesis is the debates over the last decades on the topic of the so called "progressive dilemma" that assumes the existence of a political trade-off between the progressive support for immigration, diversity and multiculturalism on one side, and the progressive support for solidarity manifested through the redistributive welfare state, on the other side. In empirical social sciences a small research industry has emerged testing the effects of ethnic diversity on the redistributive solidarity underpinning the welfare state.

In their recent book on the subject, Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (2017), argue for the need to reframe the debate on diversity and solidarity, by shifting the focus from backlash and exclusion to investigating the political sources that enables the transcending of supposed dilemma and the building of an "inclusive solidarity".[1] To do so they argue that there is a need to ask more specific questions of "how specific dimensions of diversity affect specific types of collective identities, under specific political conditions".[2] I take their call for new perspectives on the subject seriously in this thesis. In their analytical framework of the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies, Banting and Kymlicka identify three political elements that are central in mediating the tensions between diversity and solidarity: conceptions of political community, actions of political actors and the constitution of political institutions and policy regimes. In this thesis I will focus on the role of political actors, more precisely a progressive political party, the Swedish Social Democratic party (SAP).

The idea of a progressive dilemma assumes a dilemma specifically for progressive political actors and the discussion on the dilemma has been going on in left and center-left political circles for soon three decades. For the European Social Democracy two illustrative

[1] Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, *The Strains of Commitment – The Political Source of Solidarity in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 32.
[2] Ibid. 12

examples of this debate can be mentioned: In the British context, David Goodhart (2013), director of the UK center-left think tank Demos with historically close ties to New Labour has become a famous proponent of the stance that immigration is a problem for the British welfare state.[3] In the German context, the Social Democrat Thilo Sarrazin (2010) sparked stark controversy with his assumptions that non-western Muslim immigration has a negative impact for the German society.[4] It is an understatement to argue, that the exceptional events of the European refugee crisis in 2015 – when over one million migrants arrived by land and sea to Europe – have made these issues ever more urgent for political actors to handle all across Europe. The publication *The Politics of Migration and the Future of the European Left* (2017) is one example of recent efforts made to grasp how progressive political parties are responding to these challenges and how the debate evolves in the aftermath of the refugee crisis in 2015.[5]

Interestingly, in the field of migration policy studies it has been quite unusual to put the main focus of attention to the major European party group of Social Democrats and their role, their positions and their impact on immigration policies. In general, focus has been put on analyzing and comparing state policies. When it comes to political actors the main focus has been – not very surprisingly – on the role of European anti-immigration and right-wing populist actors. As some scholars already have pointed out, the absence of Social Democratic parties in the migration policy literature is quite puzzling if one considers the important role these parties have in many European party systems and their frequent holding of government power.[6]

[3] David Goodhart, *The British dream*, (London: Atlantic Books, 2013).
[4] Thilo Sarrazin, *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land auf Spiel setzen*, (München: DVA, 2010).
[5] Michael Bröning and Christoph P. Mohr, *The Politics of Migration and the Future of the European Left* (Bonn: Dietz, 2018)
[6] Jonas Hinnfors, Andrea Spehar and Gregg Bucken-Knapp, "The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy," *Journal of European Public Policy* 19, no. 4 (2012): 585.

During the European refugee crisis in 2015, Sweden crystalized into one main destination for the newcomers and the unprecedented number of 162 877 asylum applications where filed during the year. When it peaked during the fall around 10 000 asylum seekers arrived every week. In the end of November, the Swedish red-green coalition government announced a package of temporary policy changes that shifted the Swedish asylum- and refugee policy from one of the most generous and open, to one that was only complying with EU minimum standards, and with the minimum requirements of international law. As I will show in this thesis, Sweden is one of the European countries that has the best preconditions and maybe even comes closest in realizing the "inclusive solidarity through a multicultural welfare state", which Kymlicka holds up as normatively desirable.[7] This, is especially true when it comes to the constitution of political institutions and policy regimes in Sweden, which has been labeled as a "Swedish exceptionalism" and described as a "unique combination of strongly redistributive social policies and a very liberal asylum policy".[8] This exceptionalism was obviously broken in 2015 with the Swedish U-turn in the refugee- and asylum policy.

However, this policy shift did not pass uncontested and SAP is increasingly divided on the issue of immigration. This has become ever more evident in the ongoing election campaign and during the spring of 2018. Early in May the party leader and Prime Minister Stefan Löfven held a press conference where he announced the party's election policy promises on immigration issues and to a large part it is focused on making the restrictive temporary legislation permanent.[9] The reactions within the party has been harsh, one Member of

[7] Will Kymlicka, "Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism," *Comparative Migration Studies* 3, no. 17 (2015): 1.
[8] Simone Scarpa and Schierup Carl-Ulrik, "Who Undermines the Welfare State? Austerity-Dogmatism and the U-Turn in Swedish Asylum Policy," *Social Inclusion* 6, no. 1 (2018): 200-201.
[9] Karin Eriksson, "Så gick det till när maj blev S krismånad," *Dagens Nyheter*, June 1, 2018, accessed June 1, 2018, https://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/sa-gick-det-till-nar-maj-blev-s-krismanad/

Parliament has chosen to leave her seat in protest to this policy development and several local Social Democratic politicians have done the same.[10] Several influential party-veterans have also openly criticized the party leadership for their election strategy and the tone when it comes to immigration and immigrants.[11] An open divide like this, in the middle of an ongoing election campaign, is very unusual for the Swedish Social Democracy.

I argue in this thesis, that by looking into the box and analyzing the internal party debates on immigration in the aftermath of the refugee crisis 2015 a complex picture arises of the Social Democratic approach to migration policies. This in turn can give valuable insights in how an important progressive center-left actor is negotiating the notions and ideals of solidarity and the assumed challenges of a progressive dilemma. My research questions for this thesis is therefore as follows:

- How is the Refugee Crisis of 2015 – and the Social Democratic responses and policy shifts associated with it – debated, negotiated and justified within the Swedish Social Democratic Party?
- What implications could these internal party debates and discourses have for the broader solidarity-diversity debate and for the role of political actors in promoting inclusive solidarity in Sweden?

The thesis is structured as follows: In chapter 2 an analytical framework is developed based primarily on Banting and Kymlicka's theories on the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies, and with a focus on the important role of political actors in

[10] Gusten Holm, "Fler S-avhopp efter skärpt migrationspolitik," *Expressen*, May 9, 2018, accessed June 1, 2018, https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/fler-s-avhopp-efter-skarpt-migrationspolitik/

[11] Kenan Habul, "Tunga kritiken från S-veteranerna: Har aldrig låtit såhär," Aftonbladet, May 24, 2018, accessed June 1, 2018, https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/samhalle/a/WL1e8g/tunga-kritiken-fran-s-veteranerna-har-aldrig-latit-sa-har

promoting inclusive solidarity. The progressive dilemma is discussed and the Social Democratic relation to the concept of solidarity is thoroughly elaborated upon. In chapter 3 the Swedish case is comprehensively contextualized. It is first done in relation to Banting and Kymlicka's theories, but the primarily focus is later laid on situating the case in a broader socio-political and historical context. Finally, a detailed account is made of the recent context of the 2015 refugee crisis and the policy shifts that sparked the current debates.

In chapter 4 the method of Critical Discourse Analysis and the Discourse-Historical approach is described. The tensions and limitations of this thesis project in relation to the method is discussed. The chapter addresses the research question, data considerations and further contextualizes the data in detail. In chapter 5 the analysis of the SAP 2017 congress debate about new political guidelines for the migration policy is conducted and the findings are continuously presented and discussed. In the final concluding chapter 6, the findings of the analysis are summarized, situated in a broader context and discussed in a dialog with the analytical framework.

2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Instrumental Nationalism and the Progressive Dilemma

Finding a precise definition of *nationalism* is hard, if possible at all. Ernest Gellner represents a modernist approach and defines nationalism broadly as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent".[12] Another modernist, Benedict Anderson, has provided us with the most influential conceptualization of the *nation* as an "imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".[13] All communities larger than "face-to-face" groups are imagined communities according to Anderson, who explains that "members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion".[14]

One central argument in the liberal defense of nationalism is that the sense of solidarity, loyalty and mutual commitment, which can be fostered by a common national identity, is necessary for a democratic society to be able to pursue social justice. David Miller is a political theorist and proponent of liberal nationalism that uses this argumentative logic – sometimes labeled as *instrumental nationalism* – when he argues that in order for the democratic welfare state to function it needs a shared national identity that motivates citizens to pursue common egalitarian goals.[15] A weak version of instrumental nationalism suggests that national identity is not necessary neither sufficient for the welfare state to function, but it

[12] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1.
[13] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1984), 15.
[14] Ibid.
[15] David Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 28. See also, David Miller, *On nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 50-80; David Miller and Sundas Ali, "Testing the national identity argument," *European Political Science Review* 6, no. 2 (2013): 237–259.

most probably creates good conditions for it – while a strong version asserts that it is not a sufficient condition but a necessary one for the welfare state to be sustained.[16]

A parallel debate within academia has been concerned with the effects of immigration and the aspects of belonging when it comes to issues of redistribution. A degree of societal homogeneity is presumed to be important for people's willingness to pay taxes and redistribute benefits to the less well off in a society. Some scholars, comparing the European and US cases, go so far as to assume that the immigrant-driven and increasing ethnic heterogeneity in Europe will pose a problem for the solidarity needed to uphold the redistributive welfare state – pointing to the negative effects of ethnic and racial fragmentation in the US and the historical efforts to build redistributive systems in the US context.[17] The prominent scholar and political scientist Robert D. Putnam has also taken a rather pessimistic approach to the impact of ethnic diversity on general trust in societies, where he assumes a negative correlation. According to him a good case to follow is the development in the Scandinavian societies, which are characterized by high general trust, comprehensive welfare state commitments and relatively high immigration the last decades leading to increased ethnic diversity.[18]

Markus M. L. Crepaz argues that a range of disciplines the last decades have shown interest in, what he calls, "essentialist" and "primordial" concepts and their impact on "one of the most important institutions in the modern polity: the welfare state".[19] Crepaz finds the comparisons between Europe and US problematic because the supposed diversity challenge

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[16] Clara Sandelind, "Constructions of identity, belonging and exclusion in the democratic welfare state," *National Identities* (2016): 2, doi: 10.1080/14608944.2016.1211999

[17] Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: World of Difference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 218-19.

[18] Robert D Putnam, "E pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (2007): 137-174.

[19] Markus M. L. Crepaz, *Trust beyond borders: Immigration, the welfare state and identity in modern societies* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 2, 11. See also Chapter 2.

in Europe is taking place in already mature welfare states, whereas the American experience faced this challenge at the very beginning.[20] He also shows, in his extensive study, how these existing and mature welfare state regimes actually have a trust-generating function, which is central for the further willingness to support redistribution.[21]

There is a similar debate in the political realm, especially among progressive and left-leaning actors that have been increasingly concerned about the so called *progressive dilemma* during the last decades. The dilemma assumes a trade-off between the support for diversity, multiculturalism and immigration on one side, and the support for solidarity manifested through the redistributive welfare state, on the other side.[22] The political philosopher and proponent of liberal nationalism and multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka is rather skeptical to the general assumptions of the progressive dilemma – pointing to the mixed and inconclusive results from comprehensive efforts made to empirically measure this possible trade-off between (redistributive) solidarity and (ethnic) diversity.[23] Still, the notion of a progressive dilemma in politics is widespread and Kymlicka points out two political discourses that feed of the notion; on one side, *welfare chauvinism* that upholds national welfares state solidarity at the expense of diversity and immigrants, hence "solidarity without inclusion"; and on the other side, *neoliberal multiculturalism* which promotes mobility and diversity at the expense of national solidarity, hence "inclusion without solidarity.[24] Kymlicka wants to move beyond these two and argues normatively for the need of a third option which sustains an "inclusive solidarity through a multicultural welfare state".[25]

[20] Ibid. 9
[21] Ibid. 13
[22] Keith G. Banting, "Is there a progressive dilemma in Canada? Immigration, multiculturalism and the welfare state," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 4 (2010): 797-98.
[23] Kymlicka, "Solidarity in diverse…," 1.
[24] Ibid. 7
[25] Ibid. 8

2.2 Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies: The Role of Political Actors

In their most recent book *The Strains of Commitment – The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies* (2017), Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka call upon a shifting perspective in the research and debate on solidarity and diversity, urging for more focus to be put on the possibilities and potentials of inclusive solidarities.[26] Solidarity in their conception is "attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in time of need", and their focus is on solidarity at the macro-level of society, hence the national level.[27] They accept the premises of instrumental nationalism and argue that social justice and the welfare state is dependent on "bounded solidarities" and is rooted in an "ethic of membership".[28] Therefore, feelings of national solidarity are crucial in explaining redistributive policies, hence the welfare state requires a sense of "collective identity" and "social membership".[29]

To go beyond the deadlock of the vast empirical research that has tested the impact of diversity on solidarity, Banting and Kymlicka propose that we need to start asking more specific questions on "how specific dimensions of diversity affect specific types of collective identities, under specific political conditions".[30] They develop a multilayered analytical framework that understands the relationship between solidarity and diversity as complex and heavily context-dependent.[31] Their framework is underpinned by a top-down macro-level perspective focusing on the *political* sources of solidarity, categorized in three political elements: 1) conceptions of political community, 2) political agents and, 3) political institutions and policy regimes.[32] The tensions between diversity and solidarity, they argue, is mediated

[26] Banting and Kymlicka, *The Strains of Commitment*, 32.
[27] Ibid. 3-4
[28] Ibid. 6
[29] Ibid. 7-8
[30] Ibid. 12
[31] Ibid. 14
[32] Ibid. 15

and "conditioned by prevailing political discourses and identities, by the actions of political agents, and by policy regimes such as the welfare state and citizenship and integration policies".[33]

The focus of this thesis is primarily concerned with the second dimension, political actors and their actions. According to Banting and Kymlicka different forms of national identities and "stories of peoplehood" are more or less open to diversity.[34] These are in turn constructed, told and retold, and reinforced by political agents, especially media and political elites play an important role in this process.[35] They distinguish between thick conceptions of political communities, that rely heavily on the existence of cultural ties, and on thin conceptions that are more strictly about political culture and political values.[36] When it comes to instrumental nationalism, Banting and Kymlicka argue, that national identities do not automatically provide a foundation for, and support of, inclusive and redistributive solidarities, but it may do so if the welfare state has been perceived to play a central role in the nation-building project and in important national narratives.[37] This interaction is further dependent on the dimensions of identity that are triggered, here especially political elites have an important role in framing discourses over identity and diversity. In every society there is both thinner and thicker conceptions of the political community, the effects are strongly informed by the aspects of sentiments that are being primed by political agents.[38] According to Banting and Kymlicka, empirical research suggests "that if national identity is to provide a basis for inclusive solidarity in diverse societies, it must be thinned and shaped".[39] They point to the important role of media

[33] Ibid. 2
[34] Ibid. 12
[35] Ibid. 13
[36] Ibid. 15
[37] Ibid. 22
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid. 33

and political parties in "priming and mobilizing opinion around inclusive rather than exclusionary policy frames".[40]

Interestingly, when they elaborate deeper into the mediating role of political agents in the relationship between diversity and solidarity there is a rather pessimistic account of the possibilities for political parties and electoral politics to promote inclusive identities and policies. Banting and Kymlicka argue that "electoral dynamics do not reward the vocal embrace of inclusive solidarity".[41] Outside of the realm of party politics other political actors pointed out as interesting to study are new social movements, business interests and trade unions.[42] The role of Social Democratic parties and Christian Democratic parties as historical champions of the message of solidarity in European politics has become considerably weakened and limited according to Banting and Kymlicka.[43] Still, these political parties as "original carriers of solidarity" remain important actors, but the dynamics of electoral politics in the last decades has led to considerable obstacles, especially for progressive and left-leaning parties.[44]

One important development is the emergence and successes of populist anti-immigration parties that have contributed to the "growing politicization of migration policy" which has moved immigration issues "from low politics to high politics".[45] This development is posing a "structural dilemma" for progressive left parties that often have tended to be for more restrictive on immigration policies (entry-policies), but at the same time have defended immigrant rights and promoted inclusion, diversity and access to goods for those who have arrived and settled.[46] Political anti-immigration actors have also politicized this alleged "coddling of immigrants" which seems to have led progressive actors to increasingly downplay

[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid. 26
[42] Ibid. 24
[43] Ibid. 23-24
[44] Ibid. 24
[45] Ibid. 25
[46] Ibid. 26

diversity issues and rarely promote it vocally, instead they have tried to deflect or depoliticize these issues.[47] These developments in the contested arena of immigration policy has led Banting and Kymlicka to be rather pessimistic about the capacities of progressive political parties to promote inclusive solidarity. To summarize Banting and Kymlicka's framework, they understand inclusive solidarity as built or eroded by political action and most often sustained over time when incorporated into collective identities and narratives, and when it becomes embedded into political institutions and policy regimes.[48] Political actors and their actions are seen as very central in the mediation between solidarity and diversity, at the same time there seems to be few political actors that Banting and Kymlicka at this moment trust in undertaking this important task.[49]

I argue in this thesis that it is a mistake to so easily write off progressive political actors such as Social Democratic parties, as potential champions of inclusive solidarity. At least, I find it interesting to investigate deeper how the *structural dilemma* for progressive parties in regard to the discrepancies between admission and integration policy, as well as the perceived general *progressive dilemma* between immigration and the welfare state, are handled and negotiated within a social democratic party. This could give us a more thorough understanding of what potential capacities these actors may have in the promotion of inclusive solidarity. For this we need to move beyond mere government politics and official policy positions and instead look into the box of the party itself. The Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) is at the moment an interesting case, the radical policy shift of asylum- and refugee policies done by the Social Democratic led government in connection to the 2015 refugee crisis has led to a division on these issues within the party. Within Swedish Social Democracy a recent

[47] Ibid. 26
[48] Ibid. 3
[49] Ibid. 27

struggle has emerged over the social democratic approach to solidarity and diversity, where primarily different understandings of solidarity seem to compete.

2.3 Solidarity and Social Democracy

In comparison to other central concepts, such as freedom, justice and equality, the concept of *solidarity* has been largely overlooked and neglected in the social sciences.[50] The concept is central in the field of sociology but there has been a lack of research on the subject, and in political science and political theory the absence of the concept is striking.[51] One reason for this could be that solidarity as a concept is not well compatible with central theories on modern society.[52] Banting and Kymlicka's elaborations on the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies can be seen as a recent effort to bring some focus to this, in some regards, undertheorized and not well studied concept.

Solidarity as a broad concept is both a scientific term and a political value, and as such the understanding of it has varied considerably over time, and across different scientific fields and political camps.[53] Philosopher Arto Laitinen and sociologist Anne Birgitta Pessi argue that solidarity as a normative concept is usually based on a "we-thinking" and that:

> it can be separated from not only anti-social egocentrism, but also from one-sided "thou-centrism" such as altruism, sympathy, caring, or Christian charity. While these concentrate on the wellbeing of *the other* or *you*, the target of concern in solidarity can be *us together*.[54]

[50] Kymlicka, "Solidarity in diverse…," 8.
[51] Magnus Wennerhag and Johan Lindgren, "Från sammanhållning till solidaritet," *Fronesis*, no. 58-59 (2018): 10.
[52] Kymlicka, "Solidarity in diverse…," 8-9.
[53] Wennerhag and Lindgren, "Från sammanhållning…," 8.
[54] Arto Laitinen and Anne Birgitta Pessi, "Solidarity: Theory and Practice. An Introduction," in *Solidarity: Theory and Practice*, eds. Arto Laitinen and Anne Birgitta Pessi (New York: Lexington Books, 2014): 2.

In a descriptive sense solidarity in contemporary times usually refers to some "kind of connection to other people, to other members of a group, large or small".[55] It can also describe different "microphenomena such as actions, motivations and attitudes as more or less solidary".[56] Following sociological and social psychological approaches, Laitinen and Pessi differentiate solidarity as conceived as a "macro-level" and a "micro-level" phenomenon, the former is about group cohesion and the latter about "behavior, emotions, and attitudes explaining such cohesion".[57] Solidarity on a micro-level is not only a "passive feeling" but also entails "practical dispositions to act".[58] On a macro-level Laitinen and Pessi list four types of solidarities: solidarity within smaller "concrete communities"; a "society-wide" solidarity or "societal solidarity" primarily concerned with the redistribution of goods; a "fighting solidarity" usual among social movements; and solidarity "extended to the whole humanity".[59] The latter, concerned with humanity can be "societal solidarity applied to a global society", or "political solidarity on a global scale", or a matter of moral solidarity that is a "humanitarian universalistic solidarity".[60] Laitinen and Pessi point to the fact that the concept of solidarity has been used and promoted by a wide range of political camps and movements such as: "Marxism, Social Democracy, French Solidarism, Liberalism, Roman Catholicism and neo-Fascism".[61] They describe a crucial ideological difference among political actors as being that:

> The classical Liberal and Catholic approaches stress interpersonal responsibility and solidarity as a private or personal virtue, while Marxists and Social Democrats typically stress structural obstacles, institutional solutions and shared responsibility, so that solidarity can equally be a virtue of institutions.[62]

[55] Ibid. 2
[56] Ibid. 2
[57] Ibid. 3
[58] Ibid. 4
[59] Ibid. 7-10
[60] Ibid. 10
[61] Ibid. 7
[62] Ibid. 7

An expert on the Social democratic and Christian democratic ideological approaches to, and historical genealogies of, the concept of solidarity is the professor of social policy Steinar Stjernø, who has studied this extensively in a European context.[63] Here I will shortly address solidarity as a social democratic basic value and ideological concept drawing on Stjernø's work. Stjernø distinguishes between basic, adjacent and peripheral values and argues that they are "essentially contested concepts", hence:

> Their meanings are not given and they are the object of continuous struggle, interpretation and re-interpretation by contesting participants. Values are identified by terms such as *freedom, justice, equality, solidarity, responsibility, human dignity, subsidiarity, love of ones neighbour, etc*. When a set of basic values is linked together and defined in a stable way, we have a complete political language.[64]

The term solidarity encompasses several ideas that can be analyzed through four different aspects of the concept: "the boundaries of solidarity" (or the "degree of inclusiveness"); "the foundation or sources of solidarity"; "the goal of solidarity"; and "the degree in which collective interest pre-empt individual interests".[65]

Already during the French Revolution some revolutionaries sporadically used the word solidarity instead of the fraternity to "denote a feeling of political community".[66] The first one to elaborate on the concept in a systematic manner was the pre-Marxist communist Pierre Leroux who in the mid 19th century wrote on the subject with the aim to replace the "concept of charity by the concept of solidarity, arguing that the idea of solidarity would be a more able one in the struggle for a justly organised society". Marx himself later-on did not show much interest in the word and concept and did not use it much at all in his writings and speeches.[67]

[63] Steinar Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
[64] Steinar Stjernø, "The idea of solidarity in Europe," *European Journal of Social Law*, no. 3 (2011): 158.
[65] Ibid. 157
[66] Ibid. 156
[67] Ibid. 158

Stjernø shows how labour movements approach to solidarity evolved from the prototypical and classic Marxist class-oriented conception of solidarity to the modern social democratic conception of solidarity and how they diverge from each other. Following the four aspects mentioned above, Marxist class solidarity has a strong collective orientation, the degree of inclusiveness is restricted, only for the working class, but across all nations – others such as farmers, women and poor people in non-industrialised countries where excluded.[68] The source of solidarity was class interest and the goal with it to realize this class interests through revolution and socialism.[69] Interestingly, "solidarity became a domination value" within the labour movement first when the European socialist parties became "deradicalized".[70]

Central to this deradicalization, and revisionism of Marxism, was Eduard Bernstein whom abandoned the restricted conception of class solidarity and argued for seeking parliamentary class alliances to pursue policy reforms.[71] He was central in developing the social democratic idea of solidarity and he introduced equality, solidarity, and freedom as core values in socialist ethics, all three of these concepts where pretty unusual in Marxist theory.[72] Similar ideas of a distinct social democratic ideology emerged among other thinkers across Europe in the very beginning of the 20th century. According to Stjernø, the key factors in the "social democratisation" of the Scandinavian social democratic parties, was when they expanded their idea of solidarity to include also "smallholders, small merchants, and white collar employees, and then to include the whole nation" as well as "shifted their conception of the basis of solidarity from class to ethics and altruism".[73]

[68] Ibid. 158, 161
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid. 160
[71] Ibid. 159
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid. 160

Following the four aspects of the concept it becomes clear how modern social democratic solidarity differs from Marxist. Collective orientation is weaker and the value of individual freedom is accepted, the inclusiveness is "very broad" and can entail the whole nation, women, minorities and third world countries. The objective is social integration, creating a sense of community and sharing risks, while the foundation it rests upon is a complex mixture of interdependence, empathy, compassion, ethics and morality.[74] Stjernø found in his analysis that the "discourse of solidarity" was not properly incorporated into the party programs of most European social democratic parties up until 1968 or later. The student revolts of 1968, the effects of the oil crisis 1973 and the political successes of Margaret Thatcher where all events who led to a "renewed interest" and thinking of the "idea of solidarity".[75] In the 1970s Willy Brandt contributed to "revived discussions about social democratic ideology and values" when it came to issues of solidarity with the Third World.[76]

In the Swedish context one can follow these different emphases on different dimension of solidarity throughout history. In the end of the 19th century solidarity referred primarily to the social cohesion in the national society, in the 1930s the concept became more associated with the emergence of the Swedish welfare state and the active social policies of the time, while in the postwar era and since 1968 the focus shifted towards inequalities and oppression in other countries.[77] Today in Sweden most people initially associate solidarity with "political slogans of international solidarity" that are based on notions that "compassion, direct help, togetherness or cohesion should not be hindered by national borders" – but this aspect became dominant first in the second half of the 19th century.[78] In the last years, nationalist movements and right-wing populist actors have also in Sweden re-emphasized dimensions of

[74] Ibid. 161
[75] Ibid. 160
[76] Ibid.
[77] Wennerhag and Lindgren, "Från sammanhållning…," 9.
[78] Ibid.

national cohesion in an idealizing way.[79] According to Wennerhag and Lindgren, the large refugee immigration to Sweden, especially during the refugee crisis in 2015, has "led to discussions about the boundaries of solidarity", and they describe to camps in these debate:

> Those who first and foremost saw solidarity as an obvious and morally necessary help to those who fled war were opposed to those who were primarily concerned with national solidarity, and said that the welfare system would not cope with a too big refugee immigration. The redistributing welfare state was put against human rights, multiculturalism and compliance of international conventions.[80]

Following the logic of these debates, the progressive dilemma can be re-interpreted as not only entailing conceptions of a possible policy trade-off between a progressive immigration policy and a progressive welfare policy, but also understood as a dilemma encompassing a trade-off between different solidarities. This becomes possible especially in the social democratic ideological conception of solidarity, which as we have noted above, has a broad inclusiveness and not very limited boundaries.

[79] Ibid. 10
[80] Ibid. 13

3 THE SWEDISH CASE CONTEXTUALIZED

3.1 Sweden: A Model for Inclusive Solidarity and a Multicultural Welfare State?

When it comes to Banting and Kymlicka's (2017) comprehensive framework on the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies, Sweden is a particularly interesting case. Sweden may be the European country that comes closest to realizing and representing the "inclusive solidarity" of a "multicultural welfare state", which Banting and Kymlicka hold up as normatively desirable. This is especially true when considering the structure of political institutions and policy regimes in Sweden.

One of the central institutional assets that Sweden has in this regard is the country's comprehensive and universal type of welfare state regime. In Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) well-known classification of welfare state regimes the Swedish welfare state is an prominent case of the universal and so-called "Social Democratic" welfare state regime – which is compared to the "Liberal" and "Conservative" regimes.[81] Empirical evidence have shown that this specific institutional regime seems to promote more inclusive sentiments towards immigrants among the native population,[82] as well as, hamper attitudes connected to "deservingness judgment"[83] and "welfare chauvinism".[84] Three central features of the Scandinavian welfare state can be summarized as: *comprehensiveness* in regard to needs; the *institutionalization* of social rights given to all legal residents aiming at an equal living standard;

[81] Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990)
[82] Steffen Mau and Christoph Burkhardt, "Migration and welfare state solidarity in Western Europe," *Journal of European Social Policy* 19, no. 3 (200): 213-229; See also Banting and Kymlicka, *The Strains of Commitment*, 27-32.
[83] Christian A Larsen, *The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes – How Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support* (New York: Routledge, 2016): 52.
[84] Jeroen Van Der Waal, Willem De Koster and Wim Van Oorschot, "Three Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism? How Welfare Regimes Affect Support for Distributing Welfare to Immigrants in Europe," *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 15, no.2 (2013): 164-181.

and the *universalism* of social rights granted to all legal residents and not only those regarded in need.[85]

Over the last couple of decades Sweden has experienced some remarkable demographical changes, moving from a relatively homogenous society, towards more diversity and heterogeneity. In the first half of the 20th century Sweden was considerably homogenous and maintained its cultural uniformity up until the 1950s with restrictive policies actively "refraining from attracting 'foreign elements'".[86] In the year of 1960 the share of the population that was foreign-born was 4,0 percent, four decades later in 2010 it had increased to 14,7 percent and the last numbers from 2017 show that the total share of the foreign-born population is now at 18,5 percent.[87] If you add to that, everyone who has two foreign-born parents, then 24,1 percent of the Swedish population in 2017 has a so-called "foreign background", that is a bit over 2 400 000 out of a total population of around 10 million people.[88] Sweden is, in this regard, clearly a diverse society.

As mentioned above, the universal and comprehensive character of the Swedish welfare state poses a good institutional precondition for maintaining and/or developing an "inclusive solidarity" in light of the increased heterogeneity in the society. In addition to that, several other central policy regimes in Sweden have during the last decades been characterized by relative openness and inclusiveness. Swedish immigration, integration and multiculturalism policies have been firmly anchored in a strong reliance on the integrative power of the universal welfare state, which has led to comparatively open policies with easy and rapid access to

[85] Andrew Geddes and Peter Scholten, *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2016): 127.
[86] Qingwen Xu, "Globalization, Immigration and the Welfare State: A Cross-National Comparison," *The Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare* 34, no. 2 (2007): 94.
[87] Statistiska Centralbyrån [*Statistics Sweden*], "Befolkningsstatistik i sammandrag 1960–2017", updated 21 March, 2018, www.scb.se (accessed 14 May, 2018)
[88] "Foreign background" (*utländsk bakgrund*) is an official statistical term used by *Statistics Sweden* and it refers to those in the population that are foreign-born and those who have two parents that both are foreign-born.

welfare services and other resources for immigrants.[89] One example is the until 2015 "exceptionally liberal" family reunion policy where reunifying family members could in a relatively short time acquire status of equal rights and access to welfare, while the sponsors were subjected to few if any requirements before bringing their families to Sweden.[90] Compared to other countries Swedish immigration entry policies have been marked by "openness and generosity" when measured in policy design and the number of immigrants coming to the country.[91] Up until the 2015 refugee crisis Sweden stood out by having one of the most generous policies for asylum-seekers and refugees.[92] Sweden has been referred to and described as a "bastion of open asylum politics".[93] When it comes to labor migration, Sweden was "swimming against the tide" when the center-right coalition government in an agreement with the Green party in 2008 introduced the most liberal labor migration policy for third-country nationals in the EU.[94] This policy change put an end to a traditionally restrictive approach to labour immigration that had been in place since the 1970s and contributed to further liberalizing Swedish entry policies in the last decade.[95]

[89] Karin Borevi, "Diversity and Solidarity in Denmark and Sweden," in Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, eds., *Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 379; Karin Borevi, "Sweden: The Flagship of Multiculturalism" in Grete Brochmann et al., *Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945–2010*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 89.
[90] Karin Borevi, "Family Migration Policies and Politics: Understanding the Swedish Exception," *Journal of Family Issues* (2014): 1, doi: 10.1177/0192513X14558297
[91] Andrea Spehar, "Svensk migrationspolitik och EU medlemskap," in *Förhoppningar och farhågor: Sveriges 20 första år i EU*, Centrum för Europaforskning, University of Gothenburg (2014): 146.
[92] Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Aleksandra Ålund, "The end of Swedish exceptionalism? Citizenship, neoliberalism and the politics of exclusion," *Race & Class* 53, no. 1 (2011): 47.
[93] Ted Perlmutter, "Bringing Parties Back In: Comments on `Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic Societies'," *The International Migration Review* 30, no. 1 (1996): 385.
[94] Linda Berg and Andrea Spehar, "Swimming against the tide: why Sweden supports increased labour mobility within and from outside the EU," *Policy Studies* 34, no. 2 (2013): 142.
[95] Hinnfors et al., "The missing factor…," 159.

In regard to naturalization and citizenship policies Sweden has for a long time, and is still today, counted as a country with one of the most liberal and inclusive citizenship legislations in Europe.[96] While the cross-country liberalization trend halted or was reversed in many other Western European countries from the new Millennium and onwards, Sweden has stayed on the path towards ever more liberalization.[97] Sweden also deviates from the so-called "civic turn" traced in many other comparable countries which is characterized by conditioning naturalization and citizenship access on formalized and mandatory tests, mandatory courses and assessment of country and civic knowledge.[98] Sweden has no language requirements for neither entry visas, residence permits or citizenship acquisition and deviates from the more "interventionist countries of Northern Europe" in this regard.[99] Mikael Spång argues, that the notion that a fast naturalization and access to citizenship is an instrument for a successful integration has continued to dominate the Swedish approach, while in many other European countries it has been replaced by the notion that citizenship is rather a reward after completing a successful integration process.[100]

All these inclusive and open policy designs also leave a clear mark in quantitative indexes such as the *Migration Integration Policy Index* (MIPEX) that uses 167 policy indicators across 8 policy areas to rank the success and inclusivity of integration policies across 38 countries – in their last ranking from 2015 Sweden was ranked as number one.[101] But the

[96] Mikael Spång, *Svenskt medborgarskap: Reglering och förändring i ett skandinaviskt perspektiv*, Delegation för Migrationsstudier, 5 (2015): 10.
[97] Ruud Koopmans, Ines Michalowski and Stine Waibel, "Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980-2008," *American Journal of Sociology* 117, no. 4 (2012): 1126.
[98] Sara Wallace Goodman, "Fortifying Citizenship: Policy Strategies for Civic Integration in Western Europe," *World Politics* 64, no. 4 (2012): 665-667.
[99] Claire Extramiana, Reinhilde Pulinx and Piet Van Avermaet, *Linguistic Integration of Adult Migrants: Policy and practice*, Final Report on the 3rd Council of Europe Survey, Language Policy Unit (2014): 27-28.
[100] Spång, "Svenskt medborgarskap…," 2, 10.
[101] The eight policy areas are labour market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination. The 38

MIPEX also indicates that while Sweden is good at putting in place inclusive and equality-promoting legislation, it is not as effective in turning policies and laws into outcomes.[102] Another index where Sweden scores amongst the highest is the *Multicultural Policy Index* (MPI). Sweden is to be found among the countries that have implemented the most comprehensive multicultural policies scoring just under countries such as Australia and Canada in regard to polices that target immigrant minorities.[103]

When it comes to institutional and policy related preconditions Sweden may very well be one of the most promising models of inclusive solidarity and a prototype for the normatively desirable multicultural welfare state discussed by Banting and Kymlicka.

Schierup and Ålund have already earlier on identified this form of a Swedish inclusive solidarity and labelled it an "Swedish exceptionalism".[104] It is characterized by "Sweden's historically unique combination of universalistic social policy and inclusionary multiculturalism".[105] Furthermore, Schierup and Scarpa discuss this Swedish combination of solidarity and diversity in a recent article, explaining that:

> The Swedish model has long been seen as a case in point for the capacity of left political institutions to counteract the expected negative impact of greater ethnic diversity on the welfare state. The Swedish model's unique combination of strongly redistributive social policies and a very liberal asylum policy has epitomised the power of social-democratically inspired politics to hinder the potentially fractionalising effects of large-scale immigration. In effect, the Swedish approach to refugee integration and multiculturalism has been described as state-centred; i.e., entailing a strong reliance on the politically integrative functions of universalistic welfare institutions, encompassing the whole population and transcending ethno-racial divisions.[106]

countries being ranked includes all EU Member States and, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA; See Migration Integration Policy Index, http://www.mipex.eu/ (accessed April 26, 2018)

[102] Geddes and Scholten, *The Politics of Migration*, 128.

[103] Multiculturalism Policy Index 2010, http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities/results (accessed April 26, 2018)

[104] Schierup and Ålund, "The end of Swedish…,".

[105] Scarpa and Schierup, "Who Undermines the Welfare…," 200.

[106] Ibid. 201

This very liberal asylum policy came to an abrupt end during the 2015 refugee crisis, which will be discussed in detail later on in this chapter (see 3.3).

Another "Swedish exceptionalism" worth mentioning, and which came to an end already in 2010, was that Sweden in comparison to other Western democracies – including neighboring countries – for a long time did not have an electorally successful radical right-wing populist party.[107] The lack of such a party tapped well into the narrative of exceptionality in the Swedish management of solidarity and diversity. But this was broken in the elections 2010 when the Sweden Democrats entered the parliament with 5,7 percent of the votes – mobilized mainly on an anti-immigration and anti-establishment agenda.[108] In the last national elections in 2014 the party received 12,9 percent of the votes making them the third biggest party in Sweden.

Sociologist Jens Rydgren who used to focus on explaining the failure of radical right-wing populism in Sweden now tries to explain the electoral successes of the Sweden Democrats – a party with an extreme-right origin and historical ties to the Swedish neo-Nazi and fascist movements.[109] Important factors lifted up as explanations in the Swedish case are: the significant decline in class voting; the convergence of mainstream parties on ideological socio-economic issues; the increased politicization of immigration issues; the growing saliency of socio-cultural issues; the response strategies deployed by mainstream parties; and the fading stigmatization of the party.[110] The Sweden Democrats as a political actor, through their actions

[107] Jens Rydgren, "Radical Right Populism in Sweden: Still a Failure, But for How Long?" *Scandinavian Political Studies* 25, no. 1 (2002): 28.
[108] Anders Hellström, Tom Nilsson and Pauline Stoltz, "Nationalism vs. Nationalism: The Challenge of the Sweden Democrats in the Swedish Public Debate," *Government and Opposition* 47, no. 2 (2012): 186-7.
[109] Jens Rydgren. "Radical Right-wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party System Change and Stability." *SAIS Review* Vol. 30 No. 1 (2010): 67; Mikael Ekman and Daniel Poohl, *Ut ur skuggan – En kritisk granskning av Sverigedemokraterna* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2010), 9-10.
[110] Jens Rydgren and Sara van der Meiden, "The radical right and the end of Swedish exceptionalism," *European Political Science* (2018): 1-17, doi: 10.1057/s41304-018-0159-6

and their mere presence, poses a challenge to the specific Swedish strain of inclusive solidarity discussed above. In this thesis the focus is rather on the role of progressive political actors and in the following part I will elaborate extensively on the political trope of the Swedish Model and sketch out a specifically Swedish form of a progressive dilemma that is connected to it.

3.2 A Swedish Progressive Dilemma: Defending the Swedish Model

3.2.1 Social Democracy, The Swedish Model and Immigration Policies

Labelling the Swedish welfare state regime as Social Democratic fits the Swedish case very well considering the historical and exceptionally dominant role that Swedish Social Democracy and the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) has had in building and developing the Swedish welfare state.[111] SAP is probably the most successful and most dominant party any democracy has ever experienced. While other democratic parties in other countries throughout history could either reach the same number of votes or manage to sit in office as many years, no other party maintained a combination of the two as the SAP did in the 20th century. The party was out of government for just about nine years in three separate periods between 1932 to 2006 and governed in total 44 years without interruption between 1932 and 1976.[112] In the post-WWII era the party was commonly understood as the "natural party of government" and it occupied a "'hegemonic' position in national political and social life".[113]

This exceptionally dominant position has been fading the last three decades and was definitely broken in the last three national elections.[114] Despite a steady decline in electoral

[111] Bo Rothstein, "Social Capital in the Social Democratic Welfare State," *Politics and Society* 29, no. 2 (2001): 207-209 207-241
[112] Nicholas Aylott and Niklas Bolin, "Towards a two-party system? The Swedish parliamentary election of September 2006," *West European Politics* 30, no. 3 (2007): 621.
[113] Christine Agius, "Sweden's 2006 Parliamentary Election and After: Contesting or Consolidating the Swedish Model?" *Parliamentary Affairs* 60, no. 4 (2007): 585.
[114] In the elections 2010 the non-socialist center-right coalition government called the Alliance (*Alliansen*) was re-elected, this was the first time SAP was out of office for two

support and party membership over the last decades, the party is still the biggest in Sweden, gaining 31 percent of the votes in the last national elections in 2014 and having today around 90 000 party members. Historically it has been a classical example of a "catch-all party" with a broad membership base (at most they had over 1,5 million party members in 1983).[115] According to Sheri Berman, SAP stands out as the most classical of social democratic parties and has managed successfully to "preserve a sense of social democratic distinctiveness in Sweden".[116]

The Swedish welfare state has been embedded within a much broader economic and social system associated with the Swedish Social Democracy and most often referred to as *the Swedish Model* (also understood as a "paradigmatic example" of *the Nordic Model*).[117] One can approach the Swedish Model in a narrowly policy-oriented way, like the literature on comparative analysis of welfare states regimes does, and focus on highlighting the distinctiveness and superiority of the system and its specific policies.[118] Following this line, the most common understanding of the Swedish Model in the post-WWII period has been that it is associated "with the rise of the world's largest, non-socialist, public sector, universal welfare state distribution and the Rehn-Meidner model in labour market policy, which secured full employment with high levels of rationalization and productivity output".[119] Typical for the

terms in a row since 1932. In the last elections in 2014 SAP did take back the government power, but as a considerable weaker political force and they formed a weak minority coalition with the Green party.

[115] Ann-Kristin Kölln, "Det sjunkande antalet partimedlemmar och demokratin," *2014 års Demokratiutredning* (2014): 8-10.

[116] Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the making of Europe's Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 198.

[117] Carly Elisabeth Schall, *The Rise and Fall of the Miraculous Welfare Machine – Immigration and Social Democracy in Twentieth-Century Sweden* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 14.

[118] Mikko Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism in the Welfare State After the ‚Golden Age'," *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 42, no. 1 (2007): 11-12.

[119] Jenny Andersson, "Nordic Nostalgia and Nordic Light: the Swedish model as Utopia 1930–2007," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 34, no. 3 (2009): 235.

model was also active labor-market policies, an activist industrial policy and corporatism.[120] Other things making the model exceptional was the combination of universalism and very high generosity, and its high levels of decommodification of society.[121]

As discussed above, in an international comparison Sweden has stood out lately with relatively open and generous immigration entry policies, but this does not mean that Sweden would completely lack restrictive migration policy control measures.[122] Interestingly, in the domestic debates, SAP as a dominant political actor has historically rather been promoting restrictiveness, both when it comes to labour immigration and refugee and asylum immigration. In a study of Swedish immigration policy decisions between 1968-2010, Hinnfors et al. (2012) can show that "SAP is the only mainstream party with a consistent record of supporting strict entry policies".[123] Neither degree of right-wing populist threat/competition, nor degree of public opinion pressure correlate with SAP's stance on immigration policies, which has been "restrictive throughout".[124] In Sweden it is not the non-socialist center-right parties that have been the "driving force behind restrictive policies from 1960s onwards", but Swedish Social Democracy.[125]

Hinnfors et al. first argue that this can seem somewhat "counter-intuitive" given the centrality of notions such as "solidarity, inclusiveness and internationalism" within Social Democracy.[126] Hence, an open, generous and solidaristic immigration policy – at least for refugee and asylum seekers – should fit well with core social democratic ideological principles.[127] But the restrictive position can be explained with another deeply-rooted

[120] Schall, *The Rise and Fall*, 14.
[121] Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism…," 12.
[122] Spehar, "Svensk migrationspolitik…," 151.
[123] Hinnfors et al., "The missing factor…," 586.
[124] Ibid. 597
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid. 585
[127] Ibid. 589

ideological notion: the notion that there are distinct limits to the ability of "'the people's home' to make room for immigrants".[128] Hinnfors et al. show in their study how SAP in the last five decades has continuously perceived immigration to be a possible threat to the Swedish Model.[129] In regard to labour migration it is explained as follows:

> While the party has never advocated exclusively closed borders, the emphasis since the late 1960s has been on promoting policies intended to limit the flow of foreign labour onto the Swedish labour market, and ensuring the privileged position of trade unions in administering work permit applications. Such a stance does not, of course, reflect underlying ethno-nationalist concerns. Rather, the SAP supports restrictive labour migration out of fears that unregulated immigration could undermine the institutional expression of the social democratic project: a heavily regulated labour market and generous welfare state.[130]

I interpret this social democratic skepticism of immigration as closely related to a type of home-crafted and own version of the progressive dilemma connected to a specific defence of the Swedish Model. In the case of SAP, the promotion of restrictive entry policies have been justified with "certain buzzwords" such as "'welfare state protection', preservation of 'union strength', 'public sector financial stability', 'consensus-building' and allusions to 'Swedishness'".[131]

Andrew Geddes and Peter Scholten argue in that national immigration politics are shaped by "broader social, political and economic factors", and not necessary immigration itself.[132] In the Swedish case they emphasis that the "organisation, structure and future of the welfare state" is playing a "key 'internal role'" in shaping the Swedish approach to immigration politics.[133] The comprehensiveness, institutionalization and especially the universalism of the Swedish welfare state forms a kind of "bounded universalism" where access to welfare has

[128] Ibid. 585
[129] Ibid. 599
[130] Ibid. 592
[131] Ibid. 590
[132] Geddes and Scholten, *The Politics of Migration*, 135.
[133] Ibid. 126

usually been combined with restrictive ambitions on the access to state territory.[134] In this regard the SAP approach is a good illustration of a progressive political actor following the so-called "structural dilemma"[135] discussed by Banting and Kymlicka and combining policies of "external exclusion" with "internal inclusion".[136] According to Geddes and Scholten one should understand the fading of the "logic of external closure and internal inclusion" as an indicator of the "weakening of the social democratic welfare state consensus".[137]

3.2.2 The Swedish Model and National Solidarity: The People's Home

Many scholars argue that the Swedish welfare state – conceptualized more broadly as part of *the Swedish Model* or more narrowly as *the People's Home* – is an important and integral part of the Swedish self-image and of Swedish national identity.[138] The welfare state and the Swedish Model evolved within a broader process of nation-state building and identity formation and became an integral part of national institutions and national identity.[139] The Swedish Social Democracy is often used as a classical illustration of a successful "transition from class solidarity to national solidarity", where Per Albin Hansson's famous conceptualization of the People's Home (*Folkhem*) was built on the "idea of the welfare state as an expression of an ethic of nationhood" which proved to be politically much more effective than mobilizing only around class solidarity.[140] SAP do have "international socialist roots", but

[134] Ibid. 127
[135] Banting and Kymlicka, eds., *The Strains of Commitment*, 25-26.
[136] Geddes and Scholten, *The Politics of Migration*, 127
[137] Ibid. 135
[138] Andersson, "Nordic Nostalgia…," 232; Geddes and Scholten, *The Politics of Migration*, 127; Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism…," 17; See also Suvi Keskinen, "From welfare nationalism to welfare chauvinism: Economic rhetoric, the welfare state and changing asylum policies in Finland," *Critical Social Policy* 36, no. 3 (2016): 353; Karin Borevi, Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen and Per Mouritsen, "The civic turn of immigrant integration policies in the Scandinavian welfare states," Comparative Migration Studies 5, no. 9 (2017): 6.
[139] Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism…," 16-17.
[140] Kymlicka, "Solidarity in diverse…," 4-5.

it has also developed some "distinctly national ideological roots", with focus on building the People's Home which included the protection of national industries, as well as cultural values".[141]

The People's Home has primarily been understood as a communitarian approach to society, but the concept and project has always carried a tension between the *demos* and the *ethnos* – and been understood as both a communitarian, and by some as, a civic conception of the national community.[142] In the early 1990's Sweden had its own "particular version of a *historikerstreit*" concerned with the moral and normative roots of the People's Home.[143] A Foucauldian camp addressed the "dark side" of the project highlighting issues of discipline, social engineering and exclusion – another camp argued for the "bright side" and focused on aspects of universalism, emancipation, individual rights and social citizenship.[144] The reality is probably to be found in-between, by acknowledging the "complex legacies" of both perspectives, which many historians have done to be able to move beyond this dichotomy.[145]

This historical discussion overlaps with another rift concerned with the cultural and historical origins of the Swedish Model. Is the model primarily to be understood as a political (social democratic) project of the 20th century or is it rather rooted in an older national culture developed throughout the 18th and 19th centuries?[146] Lars Trägårdh is the historian that has pursued the latter thesis the furthest and his work has been central in contributing to the revitalization of the notion of "Swedishness" in the last decades.[147] Critics have accused Trägårdh to ascribe "too much continuity to Swedish culture" in his efforts to explain the

[141] Hinnfors et al., "The missing factor…," 589.
[142] Borevi, "Sweden: The Flagship of…," 26
[143] Andersson, "Nordic Nostalgia…," 230.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid. 231-32
[147] Lars Trägårdh, "Swedish Model or Swedish Culture," *Critical Review* 4, no. 3 (1990): 569-590; see also Henrik Berggren and Lars Trägårdh, *Är Svensken Människa?* (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2006).

development of the Swedish Model.[148] Still there is, as Carley Elizabeth Schall puts it, "less sweeping claims of the cultural foundations of the welfare state" that are not as controversial.[149] Claims emphasizing the historical experience of a free peasantry or addressing the specifically egalitarian type of Lutheranism that was widespread in the Scandinavian region.[150] Other historical legacies discussed as influential are the early development of strong states connected to the Lutheran Reformation and the wider role of Lutheran Protestantism in the processes of nation-building and state-building in the region, as well as the historical cooperation and cross-class alliance between peasants and workers.[151]

While some scholars think that the role of social democracy and party politics should not be overemphasized, others focus much more on the role of Social Democratic dominance in 20th century Sweden. Carley Elizabeth Schall argues that SAP managed to actively and successfully promote a cultural hegemony that made "Swedishness synonymous with social democratic-values".[152] In this way the Swedish case stands out as "remarkable" because of SAP's "historic role in forging a new cultural idiom and framework for the Swedish nation, one that privileged social-democratic values and institutions".[153] Schall argues that the social democratic hegemony in Sweden was central in the development of Swedish nationhood and became an integral part of national identity.[154] In the end it boils down to a question of what came first, national culture and national values that shaped SAP and the Swedish Model or Social Democratic values that through SAP's dominant position shaped the national culture.

However, what is important here is to grasp that the Swedish welfare state conceptualized as the People's Home has become central to the notion of Swedish identity.

[148] Schall, *The Rise and Fall,* 18.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism…," 15.
[152] Schall, *The Rise and Fall,* 2.
[153] Ibid. 10
[154] Ibid. 12

Jenny Andersson argues that "the historical achievement of the people's home or Swedish model has become a trope in political discourse, a trope that constantly reasserts the norms and values of Swedishness".[155] Furthermore, Andersson develops this argument, by asserting that:

> The importance of this trope, I argue, must be seen in the way that the notion of the People's home seems to occupy a central space in notions of Swedish identity and, in fact, is constantly represented as the fundamental common historical experience and imagined community, a central element in what brings modern Swedes together as a society, quite like British discourse keeps falling back on memories of Empire and French on the values of the République.[156]

An integral part of this self-image is the notion that the Swedish Model and "Scandinavian progressiveness" are "virtually embodying modernity".[157] This can be described as a type of "essentialized modernity" based on the perception that to be Swedish is to be modern, and to be modern is to be Swedish.[158] Some have claimed that this expression of Swedish identity and culture as a "form of universal modernity" has made it especially elusive because it makes it "invisible" and hard to identify, leading to a form is of "culture denying".[159] Karin Borevi, describes this as an paradox in which "an important part of Swedish nation-building during the post-WWII period consisted of consolidating the image of Sweden as a country that had left behind the national".[160] This self-image was also constructed around the notion of Sweden as a "pioneer country" across a diverse set of fields such as design, technology, equality, social planning, developmental aid and gender equality.[161] Mikko Kuisma

[155] Jenny Andersson, "The People's Library and the Electronic Workshop: Comparing Swedish and British Social Democracy," *Politics & Society* 34, no. 3 (2006): 437-38.
[156] Andersson, "Nordic Nostalgia…," 232.
[157] Ibid. 231
[158] Ibid. 232
[159] Borevi, "Sweden: The Flagship of…," 27.
[160] Ibid. 27-28
[161] Ibid. 28

refers to a specific kind of "Nordic nationalism" in which the own societal model is perceived as a "superior way of organizing social, political and economic life".[162]

3.2.3 The Swedish Model and International Solidarity: The Humanitarian Superpower

In the international relations literature a specific Nordic take on issues of internationalism, peace and security has been identified with some central trademarks being neutrality, multilateralism and an active solidaristic internationalism.[163] Mikko Kuisma argues that the Nordic Model and the specific type of welfare state regime that it entails also contributed to carving out a "distinctively Nordic approach to international relations".[164] In the post-war period it became hard to reconcile the promotion of equality at home and at the same time support status quo on the international arena – instead these policies became intertwined following the notion of "equality at home and justice abroad", which Kuisma argues should be understood as "different colour threads that are sewed into the same socio-political fabric".[165] The domestic experiences of democracy and welfare state building where manifested in foreign policy through the "ultimate belief in the good internationalist state" and a type of "Nordic solidaristic internationalism".[166]

As mentioned above the trope of the Swedish Model was often associated with the notion of being a pioneer country and having a superior model for organizing society – this was especially true during the cold war era when the Swedish Model was associated with "the Middle Way" and perceived as a seemingly successful way of achieving "peace, solidarity and prosperity between the two extremes of communism and free market capitalism".[167] Lars

[162] Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism…," 22.
[163] Ibid. 10
[164] Ibid. 13
[165] Ibid.
[166] Ibid. 22
[167] Ibid. 16

Trägårdh argues that Swedish internationalism in the 20th century was "informed by a *superior* moral sensibility, all expressed as a holy mission to spread the Good Message of Swedish Social Democracy to the World".[168] The Swedish solidaristic internationalism of the cold war period also impacted the country's approach to immigration policies. Marie Demker argues that the Swedish foreign policy of international solidarity between 1965-1985 strongly shaped the perceptions of both policymakers and the public in the initial phases of increased refugee and asylum immigration to Sweden – making it a matter of course that Sweden should help and receive people that were being prosecuted.[169] This self-image of prioritizing solidarity in this policy field was challenged already in the second half of the 1980's when economic troubles led to an increased doubt among the public opinion about Sweden's ability to afford that kind of solidarity with refugees and asylum seekers.[170] Even if these doubts and domestic debates are far from new, Sweden, and maybe especially progressives in Sweden, have developed a self-image of the country being a "humanitarian superpower" that manages to both offer rights, security and protection for its residence and "a haven for those fleeing conflict and persecution".[171]

One interesting illustration of how asylum and refugee immigration is conceived in Sweden is the fact that a main central where the operations of the governmental Swedish Migration Agency are navigated from are named after Roul Wallenberg – a Swedish diplomat famous for having saved many Jews from Budapest during the WWII.[172] There is of course

[168] Lars Trägårdh, "Sweden and the EU: Welfare state nationalism and the spectre of 'Europe'," in *European Integration and National Identity: The challenge of the Nordic States*, eds. Lene Hansen and Ole Waever (London: Routledge, 2002), 132.
[169] Marie Demker, *Ingenmansland: Svensk immigrationspolitik i utrikespolitisk belysning*, (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1999), 149.
[170] Ibid. 59
[171] Geddes and Scholten, *The Politics of Migration*, 126-127.
[172] Anders Lindberg, "Migration and the Swedish Left: A very Swedish Political Culture," in The Politics of Migration and the Future of the European Left, eds. Michael Bröning and Christoph P. Mohr (Bonn: Dietz, 2018), 122.

other, less flattening, historical legacies when it comes to Sweden and the WWII, but this gives an anecdotal hint of what perceptions there are on the responsibilities Sweden has in regard to refugees and asylum seekers and this type of immigration to Sweden. Kusima lifts up the thesis that it was easier to combine the ambitions of equality and solidarity on a national level and on an international level when there was a more significant gap between domestic (internal) and international (external) policies and politics.[173] According to him, factors such as globalization, EU-integration and increased immigration has increased the tensions between "welfare state nationalism" and the policies of "solidaristic internationalism".[174]

3.2.4 The Swedish Model and the Relationship to Europe and the EU

The reflex of wanting to export the own "superior" political, economic and social model signified by "Democracy, Prosperity, Modernity and Neutrality" has by Lars Trägårdh been conceptualized as a form of "welfare state nationalism" that he convincingly shows can be traced in Sweden's persistent scepticism to the European Union (EU).[175] Jenny Andersson argues in a similar manner that this scepticism was not only based on perceived threats to the Swedish Model, but also in a broader sense to national identity, giving rise to a form of "welfare nationalism":

> in which European integration and the Others that it brings with it is seen as a threat to the architecture and values of the Model, its collective agreements, wage bargaining system and labour law. This seems to contain more, however, than mere protectionist stances around specific institutional arrangements – it seems to be about the very role of the Model as Swedish self-image and identity.[176]

[173] Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism…," 10.
[174] Ibid. 21
[175] Trägårdh, "Sweden and the EU…," 131.
[176] Andersson, "Nordic Nostalgia…," 241.

In the heyday of Social Democratic hegemony – the first decades after the end of WWII – Europe was within Swedish social democratic circles perceived as hopelessly backwards, as lacking democracy, being corrupt, and suffering from the "'four Ks': *konservatism, kapitalism, katolicism, kolonialism* (Conservatism, Capitalism, Catholicism, Colonialism)" – while Sweden was "cast in the trope of democracy, equality and solidarity".[177] Tough the main official reason why Sweden did not join the ECC (forerunner to the EU) early on was due to the country's strict policy of neutrality.[178] But the Prime Minister Tage Erlander who took the decision in the early 1960s also voiced a concern that a loss of sovereignty could endanger the ongoing project of developing the Swedish welfare state.[179]

The dichotomy between modern Sweden and backward "Europe" re-emerged with full force in the referendum on joining the EU in 1994, where the no-side was composed of the Green party, the Left party, half of social democratic grassroots and a majority of trade union members (SAP was officially on the yes-side, but the party was divided on the issue).[180] In the referendum, Trägårdh describes that the "left-wing supporters of the nation-statist Swedish welfare state could only imagine Europe to the south of Denmark as a backward bastion of neofeudalism, patriarchy, hierarchy, disorder, corruption, and inequality".[181] While the bourgeois pro-EU side, with central actors being the Conservative party, the Liberals and business interest, successfully overthrew the Social Democratic "myth" of a modern and prosperous Swedish Model by pitting "free trade internationalism" against "welfare state

[177] Trägårdh, "Sweden and the EU…," 154-55.
[178] Ibid. 156
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid. 165-167
[181] Lars Trägårdh, "Crisis and the politics of national community: Germany and Sweden, 1933/1994," in *Culture and Crisis*, eds. Nina Witoszek and Lars Trägårdh (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 78.

nationalism" and arguing that "welfare statism" was leading to economic stagnation.[182] The yes-side won with a narrow majority and in 1995 Sweden joined the EU.

The 2004 EU enlargement eastwards sparked another heated debate after the Social Democratic government initially promised solidarity and open borders with the new Eastern countries, but soon changed their mind and appealed to protectionist and "welfare nationalist" arguments fueled by concerns over possible "welfare tourism" and "social dumping".[183] Prime Minister Göran Persson at the time warned for "social tourism" and possible misuse of the Swedish welfare by giving the example that three Swedish child allowances make up a normal wage in some of the new EU member states.[184] The SAP government pushed hard for transitional arrangements to be adopted that would restrict the access to the Swedish labour market for new EU citizens, by referring "to the ideologically sensitive importance of preserving labour union strength and influence".[185] Jenny Andersson argues that this is one of several cases where the EU integration process has sparked a "defence" of the Swedish Model that is understood to be "incompatible with other social models in Europe and with the mentality and work ethic of other European countries".[186] The SAP government lost this battle in the parliament when the non-socialist opposition parties, together with the Left party and the Green party, voted against transitional rules – making Sweden together with UK and Ireland the only countries not imposing any transitional restrictions when EU expanded eastwards in 2004.[187]

EU-membership did not only bring about a new type of immigration, the so-called European Mobile Workers and EU-migrants to Sweden, but it also led to new dynamics in

[182] Trägårdh, "Sweden and the EU…," 160.
[183] Andersson, "Nordic Nostalgia…," 235.
[184] Hinnfors et al., "The missing factor…," 592.
[185] Borevi, "Sweden: The Flagship of…," 78.
[186] Andersson, "Nordic Nostalgia…," 235.
[187] Spehar, "Svensk migrationspolitik…," 154.

migration politics and an additional political arena for migration policies.[188] Sweden has, throughout its whole EU-membership, pushed for and tried to get the EU to take a greater shared responsibility through a common asylum- and refugee policy for the people seeking protection in Europe.[189] This position has been influenced by the fact that Sweden, for long, has received a disproportionally larger share of refugees – a tendency noticeable already during the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990's, a fact when it comes to Iraqi refugees in the 2000's, and also the case most recently in regard to the Syrian crisis.[190] The issue of solidarity in the reception of irregular immigrants has been quite a controversial one for EU-member states.[191] Andrea Spehar points to an interesting discrepancy in the Swedish position on a EU-common supranational asylum and immigration policy – Sweden has traditionally rather been a strong advocate for intergovernmental cooperation – therefore it is "quite puzzling", Spehar argues, that Sweden is one of the most active advocates of a harmonized common asylum policy.[192] So far, the Swedish efforts, campaigns and lobbying attempts for increased "burden-sharing" has not given fruit and rather been "characterized by a high degree of failure".[193]

Sweden may have failed in the attempts to shape a common EU asylum policy, but in a comprehensive review of the impact of EU-membership on Swedish migration policies, Spaher also concludes that the EU has had a very limited impact on Swedish policies:

> Swedish migration policy has retained its distinctive features since the accession to the EU. The core of the migration policy's focus can also today be characterized by openness and generosity measured in policy design and the number of migrants coming to the country.[194]

[188] Ibid. 153, 161
[189] Ibid. 159
[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid. 148
[192] Ibid. 159
[193] Ibid. 161
[194] Ibid. 146-147

This was concluded in 2014, but the events that unfolded only a year after, during the European refugee crisis 2015 may be a reason to reconsider these conclusions ahead. The next and final part of this chapter will address this most recent and crucial context and how it evolved in Sweden.

3.3 The Refugee Crisis of 2015 and the U-turn in Swedish Asylum Policy

During the year of 2015 more than one million migrants and refugees arrived by land and sea to Europe.[195] The EU Member States together registered around 1 250 000 first time asylum seekers that year and the top three citizenships among the applicants where Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi.[196] Some have described it as "the long summer of migration", but the events are more commonly addressed with the Euro-centric label "refugee crisis".[197] EU's failure to provide a comprehensive and coherent response to the crisis has been subjected to debate and criticism.[198] The uneven share of responsibility taken for the reception of the refugees and migrants made two EU member states stand out with their initially generous and welcoming policy: Germany and Sweden – both of which early on crystalized into main destinations for the newcomers.[199] Sweden in the end was one of the countries that proportionally took take the

[195] International Organization for Migration, "Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015," December 12, 2015, accessed May 26, 2018, https://www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom

[196] Eurostat, "Record number of over 1,2 million first time asylum seekers registered in 2015," March 4, 2016, accessed May 26, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6

[197] Scarpa and Schierup, "Who Undermines the Welfare…," 199.

[198] Steven Erlanger and Alison Smale, "Europe's Halting Response to Migrant Crisis Draws Criticism as Toll Mounts," *The New York Times*, August 28, 2015, assessed May 26, 2018, http://nyti.ms/1Jr9RoS; Bernd Riegert, "UNHCR: Europa richtet ein Chaos an, Bernd Riegert," *Deutsche Welle*, September 15, 2015, accessed April 9, 2016, http://www.dw.com/de/unhcr-europa-richtet-ein-chaos-an/a-18715898

[199] "Germany, Sweden can't be left to shoulder refugee burden: UNHCR chief," *The Express Tribune*, August 18, 2015, accessed May 26, 2018,

biggest share of the refugee arrivals and by the end of 2015 Sweden had received the unprecedented number of 162 877 asylum applications in total that year, 35 369 where made by unaccompanied minors, of which a clear majority where boys from Afghanistan.[200]

Table 1 - Number of applications for asylum received per month in 2015 in Sweden[201]											
Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
4 896	4 040	4 117	3 917	5 376	6 619	8 065	11 746	24 307	39 196	36 726	13 872

As Table 1 shows, the number of arrivals increased drastically in the fall of 2015, and in October and November around 10 000 applications a week where registered in Sweden. The reception system was under hard pressure with a mounting backlog in the registration process and a lack of accommodation – both the army and the agency responsible for natural disasters and humanitarian catastrophes were by then involved in the reception process.[202] By the end of the year some 180 000 people where registered in the reception system, 100 000 of them where accommodated at reception centers, 150 000 asylum cases where in queue at the Swedish Migration Board – and the agency anticipated that some 160 000 people needed to be housed in the municipalities during 2016-2017 and the schools needed to prepare for adding a whole new student cohort.[203] In the summer and early fall of 2015 the political and civil society support and defense of the right to asylum culminated, following the news of refugee deaths in

http://tribune.com.pk/story/940245/germany-sweden-cant-be-left-to-shoulder-refugee-burden-unhcr-chief/

[200] Migrationsverket [The Swedish Migration Agency], "Statistics for 2015", last update 22 June 2017, accessed May 27, 2016, http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Facts-and-statistics-/Statistics/2015.html

[201] Ibid.

[202] Patrick Kingsley, Matthew Weaver and Ashifa Kassam, "Sweden calls on army to help manage refugee crises," *The Guardian*, November 10, 2015, accessed May 27, 2016, http://gu.com/p/4e43e/stw

[203] Anders Nilsson och Örjan Nyström, *Flyktingkrisen och den svenska modellen* (Lund: Celanders Förlag, 2016), 49-51.

the Mediterranean and the tragedy of Alan Kurdi.[204] Civil society organization where collecting money and organizing a voluntary chain of logistics to aid, welcome and help with the reception of the arriving asylum seekers.[205] On September the 6th the social democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven held a speech in front of a 15 000-man strong manifestation in central Stockholm under the banner of "Refugees Welcome" and he famously proclaimed that: "My Europe receives people flying from war. My Europe is not building walls".[206]

But already in October, the social democratic Foreign Minister Margot Wallström anticipated in an interview the need for possible changes in Swedish refugee and asylum policy, claiming the situation had reached an unsustainable level and that it could lead to a "'breakdown' of the 'system'".[207] The fear of this so-called "system breakdown" (*systemkollaps*) became a political trope used across the whole political spectrum and constantly repeated in the mass media during the crisis.[208] On November 24, 2015 the Swedish red-green coalition government held a press conference where Prime Minister Löfven and Deputy Prime Minister Åsa Romson from the Green party, announced a package of radical changes of the Swedish migration policy – with emphasis on restricting the refugee and asylum immigration.[209] They announced openly that the aim with the temporary policy changes were to revert the generous and open Swedish asylum policies to a "EU minimum level" and

[204] Sara Karlsson, *Vilse i andrummet: en utvärdering av den tillfälliga asyllagen*, Migrationspolitiska S-föreningen (2018): 6.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Anders Bolling and Clas Svahn, "Löfven: 'Mitt Europa bygger inte murar'," *Dagens Nyheter*, September 6, 2015, accessed May 27, 2018, https://www.dn.se/sthlm/lofven-mitt-europa-bygger-inte-murar/
[207] Scarpa and Schierup, "Who Undermines the Welfare…," 200.
[208] Ibid.
[209] Regeringskansliet [Government Offices of Sweden], "Regeringen föreslår åtgärder för att skapa andrum för svenskt flyktingmottagande," November 24, 2015, accessed May 27, 2018, https://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2015/11/regeringen-foreslar-atgarder-for-att-skapa-andrum-for-svenskt-flyktingmottagande/

presented it as a very hard but necessary decision.[210] Deputy Prime Minister Romson broke into tears during the press conference and commented the policy changes afterwards saying: "It is terrible decisions that the government now feels compelled to make".[211] Her party, the Green party, has promoted the most liberal and refugee-friendly entry policies of all major political parties in Sweden the last decades. Prime Minister Löfven was also not too enthusiastic about the announced policy changes and declared; "It pains me that Sweden is no longer capable of receiving asylum seekers at the high level that we do today. We simply cannot do any more".[212] Löfven also argued that Sweden needed a "breathing space" (*andrum*) which the presented policy changes would provide, according to him.[213]

In the Swedish context, adopting the legislation to a minimum level of international conventions and EU legislation included major changes of the Swedish principle to give permanent residence permits, the new policy almost exclusively granted temporary residence permits that would be re-evaluated regularly. This measurement and other imposed rules heavily restricted the possibility of family reunion for the refugees.[214] At the end of the year another drastic change was announced: the introduction of ID-checks on travels to Sweden, making it possible to reject possible asylum seekers that had no valid identification documents at the border.[215] Already in October a 21-point cross-party migration agreement compromise was struck between six of the eight parties in parliament, the Left party abandoned the negotiations and opposed the agreement because they argued it was too restrictive – while the Sweden Democrats that where never invited to negotiate, opposed it because they thought it to

[210] Rosén, Hans et al., "Sverige anpassar migrationspolitiken till EU:s lägstanivå," *Dagens Nyheter*, November 24, 2015, accessed May 27, 2018, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/sverige-anpassar-migrationspolitiken-till-eus-lagstaniva/
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Lindberg, "Migration and the Swedish Left…," 125; Nilsson och Nyström, *Flyktingkrisen*, 50.
[214] Lindberg, "Migration and the Swedish Left…," 125.
[215] Nilsson och Nyström, *Flyktingkrisen*, 51.

be not restrictive enough.[216] In the end of November the government proposed further restrictions that was broadly accepted by all parties, except the Left party.[217] The new polices would be part of a three-year temporary legislation that was prepared in a relatively short time: a government proposition was put forward in April 2016, the parliament voted in June 2016 and a month later on July 20th the law came into force.[218] ID-checks where practically in place from January 4th 2016 and caused among others complications to the common passport union of the Nordic countries that is dating back to the 1950s and has made document free travel between the counties possible since then.[219]

Disappointed international reactions to the Swedish policy shifts saw it as a humanitarian backlash, for example António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, called the Swedish asylum regime "one of the best in the world" and urged that Europe could not afford losing it.[220] One international commentator proclaimed in an op-ed that the measurements had "killed the dream of European sanctuary"[221] – while a UN official in Stockholm, commented to the Guardian that "the last bastion of humanitarianism has fallen".[222] During and after the Refugee Crisis 2015 a "Migration Movement" emerged in Sweden that was critical to the sharp and temporary asylum policy changes – central actors such as Church of Sweden and "Refugees Welcome" are usually active in such contexts. But a new group also emerged that is especially concerned with the fate of the many unaccompanied minors that

[216] Nilsson och Nyström, *Flyktingkrisen*, 50-51.
[217] Lindberg, "Migration and the Swedish Left…," 125.
[218] Karlsson, "Vilse i andrummet…," 7-8.
[219] Nilsson och Nyström, *Flyktingkrisen*, 51; Lindberg, "Migration and the Swedish Left…," 125.
[220] Thella Johnson, "UNHCR: Europas flyktingpolitik hotar hela unionens asylsystem," *Sveriges Radio*, December 10, 2015, accessed May 27, 2018, http://t.sr.se/1mG1Gyo
[221] Andrew Brown, "When Sweden shut its doors it killed the dream of European sanctuary," *The Guardian*, November 27, 2015, accessed May 27, 2018, http://gu.com/p/4ehk4/stw
[222] David Crouch, "Sweden slams shut its open-door policy towards refugees," *The Guardian*, November 24, 2015, accessed May 27, 2018, http://gu.com/p/4efq7/stw

arrived. It is called #vistårinteut (a hashtag meaning "we can't stand it any longer") and the core of the network is composed of around 10 000 professionals that come in contact with the minors and children through their work (teachers, social workers etc.).[223] They demand amongst other the stopping of deportations to not secure countries such as Afghanistan and they push for an amnesty for minors that have been in Sweden for at least a year.[224] For the Green party the partaking in the coalition government and the compromising with core values and policy positions during this past mandate period has divided the party severely, almost one out of five Members of Parliament have left the work of the Green parliamentary group in protest.[225]

When the restrictive shift in the Swedish asylum and refugee policy evolved during 2015 the critics within the Social Democratic movement mostly complied, the sense of urgency seems to have hampered the internal opposition.[226] But as the new policies became more and more consolidated within the party and the efforts to impose party discipline across parts of the party by the party leadership and party leader seemed to be in vain. The five side-organisations of the party (the Social Democratic youth organization, the Social Democratic students, the Social Democratic women's organization, the Christian Social Democrats and the LGBT-Social Democrats) are all critical to parts of the temporary policies, with an emphasis on opposing the abandonment of permanent residence permits and the severe restrictions on the family reunion policy.[227] As Anders Lindberg notes, both the parties composing the center-right (liberals and conservatives) block and those of the center-left block are divided on the issue of immigration, and the divide is also to be found within many of the parties. He describes the divide within the Swedish progressive left as a "liberal-authoritarian divide" and argues that this is an unusual and confusing development for Swedish Social Democracy because, as he

[223] Lindberg, "Migration and the Swedish Left…," 127.
[224] #vistårinteut, last updated April 22, 2018, http://vistarinteut.org/om-oss/
[225] Lindberg, "Migration and the Swedish Left…," 127.
[226] Ibid. 126
[227] Ibid.

puts it: "There are no liberal or authoritarian fractions within the Social Democratic Party. There are left and right fractions but they are as internally divided as the party itself".[228]

[228] Ibid. 128

4 METHOD AND DATA

4.1 Critical Discourse Studies and the Tension with the Research Interest

Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), formerly known as Critical Discourse Analysis, should be understood as a heterogenous school, paradigm or programme that is characterized by some common principles. It has often been misunderstood as a method (thereof the name-change from *analysis* to *studies*), but CDS is not adherent to one specific methodology, nor to any specific theory, instead it encompasses a wide range of approaches that use different theories, data and methods. In its broadest sense CDS is "at most a shared perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis".[229] One central commonality is the "interests in deconstructing ideologies and power through the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual)".[230] The two pillars of CDS is the common notion of *discourse* and the shared ambition of a *critical* approach.

CDS understands "language as a social practice" and recognizes that the "context of language use" is crucial.[231] Discourses are by the various CDS approaches viewed as "relatively stable uses of language serving the organization and structuring of social life".[232] A discourse is therefore also a form of social practice that is understood as "socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned".[233] Hence, epistemologically CDS most often conforms to social constructivism and conceives discourse as "the result of jointly constructed meanings of the world.[234] When it comes to the differentiation between discourse and text there are some

[229] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, "Critical Discourse Studies: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 3rd ed. (London: SAGE, 2016), 5.
[230] Ibid. 4
[231] Ibid. 5
[232] Ibid. 6
[233] Ibid.
[234] Ibid. 16

different approaches, but the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) – which I will address in more detail further down – understands discourse as "structured forms of knowledge" while text is viewed as "concrete oral utterances or written documents".[235]

The so-called "critical impetus" of CDS is influenced by the critical linguists of the Frankfurter School and the Critical Theory by Max Horkheimer.[236] The latter, as well as CDS, aims at "producing enlightenment and emancipation" and finds it not satisfactory to only describe, understand and explain the social world.[237] The critical ambition also entails some "specific ethical standards" on behalf of the researcher ,that should be as self-aware as possible about their own position, and transparent with it, and with their own interests and values.[238] As a summery, the critique of CDS implies that "social phenomenon could be different – and can be altered" and that "[s]ocieties are changeable, human beings are meaning-makers and the critical subject is not a detached observer".[239]

Because of the "socially consequential" nature of discourses, they bring about important questions concerning issues of power and their possible effects on ideologies.[240] The critical approach of CDS upholds a motivation of "revealing structures of power and unmasking ideologies".[241] Ideology is defined as a "coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs and values" and CDS is primarily interested in the "hidden" and "disguised" ideologies that are often taken for granted in an hegemonian sense.[242] Another central focus of CDS is the interconnection between social power and language, where a common thread is the engagement with questions of how "discourses (re)produce social domination".[243] Power is within CDS generally

[235] Ibid. 6
[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid. 7
[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid. 8
[240] Ibid. 6
[241] Ibid. 8
[242] Ibid. 8-9
[243] Ibid. 9

conceptualized along the Foucauldian tradition and following this discourse is conceptualized as a "manifestation of social action which is determined by social structure and simultaneously reinforces or erodes structure".[244]

Here I need to discuss shortly the implications and tensions that these central parts of CDS has in regard to my thesis. Because CDS is so theoretically and methodologically diverse, Wodak and Meyer argue that the common ground is rather to be found in the nature of the problems of concern and the specifics of the research questions asked.[245] They summarize these specific concerns as follows:

> CDS can be defined as fundamentally interested in analysing hidden, opaque, and visible structures of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDS aim to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse).[246]

My research question in this thesis does not directly emerge out of the critical approach quoted here above, even if I as a researcher sign up on the importance to always incorporate this critical perspective on some level of the analysis. The tension arises from the fact that my research interest and questions here primarily has been informed by Banting and Kymlicka's (2017) call for a shifting perspective when engaging with the impact of diversity on solidarity – moving away from the common focus of backlash and exclusion and putting more attention on possible political sources of inclusion. Wodak and Meyer characterizes CDS repeatedly as fundamentally "problem-oriented" which is somehow at odds with Banting and Kymlicka's call for more of investigation of constructive inclusionary solutions.[247] But when elaborating on the concept of power, Wodak and Meyer also mention – as a contrast to the Foucauldian approach – another more "instrumental, optimistic and emancipatory conception of power-

[244] Ibid. 11
[245] Ibid. 17
[246] Ibid. 12
[247] Ibid. 2, 4, 22

discourse interplay" proposed by Anna Holzscheiter in the field of International Relations.[248] Sense the CDS also has an outspoken ambition to derive results that are of practical relevance and incorporates an advocatory role for the scholars involved – it could be interesting to raise discussions on how it could be possible to also investigate the genealogies, failures and successes of more inclusive and emancipatory discourses within the programme of CDS, if possible at all. In my case I'm self-aware of this tension and transparent about the fact that this study is expanding somewhat beyond the framework of CDS.

Despite the fact that a great variety of methods and theories (on all theoretical levels) are used by the different CDS approaches, the CDS still has some methodological implications, it is "strongly grounded" in theory, and has some theoretical similarities across the approaches. [249] CDS understands the relationship between theory and discourse in a "circular and recursive-abductive" way and according to Wodak and Meyer, all CDS approaches "proceed *abductively*, i.e. oscillate between theory and data analysis in retroductive ways" – even if some tend to have a more inductive emphasis, and others a more deductive one.[250] For example, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) tends to be more inductive and "remain at the 'meso-level' and select problems they are 'curios' about and where they attempt to discover new insights through in-depth case studies".[251] Another crucial similarity is the weight put on the importance of context, where CDS postulates that "all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context".[252] Context is comprehensively elaborated on in the DHA which I will present and discuss shortly here next.

[248] Ibid. 11
[249] Ibid. 13, 16, 21
[250] Ibid. 18
[251] Ibid. 18
[252] Ibid. 19

4.2 The Discourse Historical-Approach and the Limitations of this Thesis Project

The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is one of many approaches within CDS, it is a comprehensive approach that allows "relating the macro- and meso-level contextualization to the micro-level analyses of texts".[253] One of the scholars, central in developing the DHA, Ruth Wodak, summarizes the most important feature being the focus on texts "as they relate to structured knowledge (*discourses*), are realized in specific *genres*, and must be viewed in terms of their *situatedness*".[254] To be able to understand texts fully, several different layers of context need to be deliberated on. The DHA has developed a "four-level model" of context: 1) the broader *socio-political/historical context* in which the discourses are embedded within, 2) the *current context* of a specific situation which considers the dominant discussions related to the situation and its institutional frames and social variables, 3) the *text-internal co-text* of a specific text, and 4) the *intertextual and interdiscursive context* that also considers the relationship and interconnection with other relevant events, texts, discourses and genres.[255] In the case of intertextuality, the concepts of *recontextualization* and *de-contextualization* are central and address how elements are taken out of context and possible put in new contexts.[256] The DHA defines discourse as:

> a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action; socially constituted and socially constitutive; related to a macro-topic; linked to argumentation about validity claims, such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors with different points of view[257]

[253] Ruth Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* (London: SAGE, 2015), 50.
[254] Ibid. 51
[255] Wodak, *The Politics of Fear,* 51; Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The discourse-historical approach (DHA)," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 3rd ed. (London: SAGE, 2016), 30-31.
[256] Reisigl and Wodak, "The discourse-historical…," 28.
[257] Ibid. 27

Discourses has to some extent fluid boundaries and it can be hard to delimit them from other discourses. As a "object of investigation" they dynamic and open for interpretation, and as a "analytical construct" they depend considerable on the analyst's outlook.[258] While texts are seen as more or less parts of a discourses the concept of *genre* is more heavily elaborated on within the DHA and explained as:

> Texts can be assigned to genres. A 'genre' can be characterized as a socially conventionalized type and pattern of communication that fulfils a specific social purpose in a specific social context. In addition, a genre can be seen as a mental schema that refers to specific procedural knowledge about a specific text function and processes of text production, distribution and reception.[259]

In the case of this thesis, the party-internal congress debates and the by congress approved document of political guidelines of the party, are both part of specific genres and as such they follow some social conventional rules and expectations and they have both some particular social purpose.

Another important concept within the DHA is "field of action" which is explained as indicating "a segment of social reality that constitutes a (partial) 'frame' of a discourse" and where "[d]ifferent fields of action are defined by different functions of discursive practices".[260] As an example, as an illustration in the "arena of *political action*" the DHA differentiates between eight separate political functions as eight separate fields of action.[261] The field of political action investigated in this thesis best fits the label "party-internal formation of attitudes, opinions and will" and the data analyzed are among the "political (sub)genres" of

[258] Ibid.
[259] Ibid.
[260] Ibid. 28
[261] The eight fields of political action identified are: Lawmaking procedure; Formation of public attitudes, opinions and will; Party-internal formation of attitudes, opinions and will; Inter-party formation of attitudes, opinions and will; Organization of international/interstate relations; Political advertising; Political executive and administration; and Political control; See Reisigl and Wodak, "The discourse-historical…," 29; Wodak, *The Politics of Fear,* 48.

this field – other examples of political (sub)genres" of this field are party programme, declaration and speech at a party convention.[262] (ibid). Important to notice is that one discourse on a specific topic can start or emerge in one field of action and then move or spread to other fields.[263] But tracing the genealogy, travels and the carrier of a discourse across several fields goes beyond the scope of this thesis that will remain in the above-mentioned field throughout the analysis.

The analysis within the DHA involve two-levels, first an "entry-level analysis" which concentrates on the thematic dimensions of the text, and then an "in-depth analysis" that in a detailed way examines the cohesion and coherence of the text. In the entry-level thematic analysis the goal is to "map out" contents and link them to specific discourses, in this process the central analytical category is *discourse topics* which "'conceptually, summarize the text, and specify its most important information'".[264] The in-depth analysis is enlightened by the research question and incorporate an analysis of the genre, the macro-structure of the text, the discursive strategies and argumentation schemes used and "other means of linguistic realization".[265] The *strategy* in a discursive strategy is conceptualized as "more or less intentional plan of practice (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal".[266] When it comes to in-depth analysis of the argumentation schemes the DHA uses quite sophisticated linguistic tools to critically and systematically examine the arguments that construct a discourse. Its draws heavily upon the concept of *topos – topoi which* can be understood as "strategies of argumentation" used to produce "successful speeches" that dominate and win the debate.[267] They are also important

[262] Reisigl and Wodak, "The discourse-historical…," 29; Wodak, *The Politics of Fear,* 48.
[263] Reisigl and Wodak, "The discourse-historical…," 28; Wodak, *The Politics of Fear,* 47.
[264] Wodak, *The Politics of Fear,* 50-51
[265] Ibid. 51
[266] Reisigl and Wodak, "The discourse-historical…," 32.
[267] Wodak, *The Politics of Fear,* 51.

"warrants which guarantee the transition from argument to conclusion"[268] In this sense they can be understood as argumentative "conclusion rules" that both can be content-abstract and content- and context-specific.[269]

The analysis in this thesis will – due to time and resource limitations, as well as the size of the analyzed text – for the most part stay on an entry-level and focus on abductively to map out the main discourse topics. I will not be able to in detail linguistically scrutinize the text according to the prescriptions put ahead by the DHA, but I will make an effort to trace reoccurring arguments in the discourses used by different actors with different positions on the issue. Another way to put it is that analysis of textual discourse can be divided into a micro-discourse, which is a "detailed study of language use in a specific context" and a meso-discourse, which is going "beyond linguistic analysis in an attempt to find broader general patterns".[270] This thesis will focus on the meso-discourse in regard to this distinction.

Finally, it is important to note that this is part of a general problem with applying the DHA on a more limited research project like this thesis. The DHA developed from, and is preferably applied on, bigger and more comprehensive research projects that have the recourses to fulfill the DHA principles of interdisciplinarity and the so called "multiple triangulation" that combines different perspectives, different theories, data, methods and even different researchers.[271] It also recommends using fieldwork and ethnography when necessary and has a principle of studying several genres and public spaces by focusing of intertextual and interdiscursive relations. All of this will not be able to conduct in this single and limited thesis project. What I will take with me in the analysis is the general principles of the CDS and the

[268] Ibid.
[269] Ibid. 52
[270] Claire Sutherland, "Nation-building through discourse theory," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 2 (2005): 187.
[271] Reisigl and Wodak, "The discourse-historical…," 31.

"special focus of historical embedding" proposed by the DHA.[272] Out of the most common questions investigated by the DHA I will here focus on asking "What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?".[273]

4.3 Data Considerations, Research Question and Further Contextualization

The CDS postulates that data – in the sense of CDS texts and discourses – can never be "theory-neutral", hence the theoretical perspective informs the data-collection and how the data is interpreted.[274] In this thesis it is primarily the analytical framework in chapter two that has directed the interest towards this specific political actor and this specific text, as well as, informed the formulation of the research question. The analysis and interpretations are on the other hand informed by both the analytical framework, the comprehensive contextualization and the principles and concepts of CDS and the DHA. The CDS and the DHA does not postulate a specific way of collecting data but draws primarily upon the principles of Grounded Theory which rejects that the data needs to be fully collected before the analysis begin.[275] Instead it recommends a process of moving back and forth between data collection and analysis, in which for example the "first pilot analyses" informs the collection of further data.[276] The analysis in this thesis is a form of "first pilot analyses", which will generate discussions on the need of further research and further data collection elaborated in the final conclusive chapter.

Informed by the analytical framework and the broader socio-political and historical contextualization of this specific case, I will focus on how the different actors within the party are trying to make sense of the events of the refugee crisis 2015 and their role in

[272] Ibid.
[273] Ibid. 32
[274] Ibid. 14
[275] Ibid. 21
[276] Ibid.

response to them – and how the party is negotiating the ideologically important notion of solidarity across the individual, regional, national, European and international level. The primary research questions employed in the direct analysis of the data is the following:

- How is the Refugee Crisis of 2015 – and the Social Democratic responses and policy shifts associated with it – debated, negotiated and justified within the Swedish Social Democratic Party?

The secondary question draws on the analytical framework and aims at opening up for relevant conclusive comments on the results of the text analyses and the possibilities for further research:

- What implications could these internal party debates and discourses have for the broader solidarity-diversity debate and for the role of political actors in promoting inclusive solidarity in Sweden?

To be able to answer the primary question I have selected to analyse the internal congress debates in 2017 that preceded the adoption of new political guidelines for the migration policy. The text consists of "existing data",[277] and it can be found in the Congress Protocol, a public document which is easy to access from the webpage of the SAP.[278] The debate in itself was about another text, the revised compromise proposal that after the debate was approved in its entirety by the congress. This compromise proposal and today official political guideline have the title "A responsible migration policy characterized by Solidarity" and can be read as a full

[277] Wodak and Meyer, "Critical Discourse Studies…," 22.
[278] Socialdemokraterna, *Kongressprotokoll* [Congress Protocol] (2017): 103-136, https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/globalassets/var-politik/arkiv/kongress-2017/kongressprotokoll_2017.pdf (accessed online May 21, 2018)

text in Appendix I. Before beginning with the analysis some further contextualization and data considerations need to be addressed.

Following the contextualization prescriptions proposed by the DHA and summarized above, we can note that chapter three in this thesis, *The Swedish Case Contextualized*, provides a comprehensive socio-political and historical contextualization. When it comes to the current context of a specific situation the sub-chapter describing the refugee crisis 2015 and the responses to it gives a detailed contextualization of the recent events leading up to the internal debates within the SAP on the issue of the new immigration policy. Here there is also a need to provide some further information on social variables and the institutional frames of this particular context in which the analyzed data and text emerge.

The 39th congress of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) was a five-day event held in the city of Gothenburg between April 8-12 in 2017. The congress is the party's highest decision-making body and according to party custom, the congress before an election year is general and therefore treats all policy areas.[279] The slogan of the congress was "Security in a new area" (*Trygghet i en ny tid*) and some 2 000 motions where treated, being sorted under six broad policy areas and one statues technical area.[280] The six policy areas where labeled and sorted in the following order: "A Jobs and growth for belief in the future"; "B Social cohesion for increased security"; "C Knowledge makes Sweden stronger"; "D Welfare that can be trusted"; "E The world's first fossil-free welfare state"; and "F Cooperation for common security".[281] In the last broad policy area "F Cooperation for common security" the motions where sorted under three sub-topics: "Global development for peace and justice"; "A responsible migration policy"; and "Strong defence with continued military non-alignment".

[279] Socialdemokraterna, "Kongress 2017," last update January 18, 2018, accessed June 1, 2018, https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/var-politik/arkiv/kongresser/kongress-2017/
[280] Ibid.
[281] Ibid.

The motions under the area of "A responsible migration policy" was than sorted under four further sub-topics: "UF59 A humane and sustainable migration policy"; "UF60 EU-common migration policy of the future"; "UF61 Reception"; and "UF62 Order in the asylum process".[282]

Ahead of the congress the upcoming decisions concerning the migration policy was especially addressed in the mass media because several commentators anticipated an upcoming rift between the party executive board and some of the side-organisations, delegations and congress delegates, where many of the latter pushed for a return to a more open and generous asylum and refugee policy.[283] Most of the motions proposed a more open policy by for example rejecting parts of the temporary restrictive legislation, while leadership wanted to continue with the restrictive policy and keep the possibility open to prolong the restrictive legislation.[284] These clusters of motions (UF59-62) under the headline "A responsible migration policy" where all treated on the afternoon negotiations on Sunday 9th of April. The negotiations started with a longer statement by the then Minister of Migration and Asylum Policy and Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson that represent the position of the party executive board. He appealed for an approval of the final revised compromise proposal for new political guidelines in the policy area of migration. This was followed by the debate which had 58 separate debate entries performed by 55 congress delegates and individuals.[285] Here it is important to note that the actual and real negotiations of the congress take place in informal meetings outside of the official schedule of the congress. In these meetings the final proposal

[282] Socialdemokraterna, *F Samarbete för gemensam säkerhet* [F Cooporation for common security] (2017): 25-63, https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/globalassets/var-politik/arkiv/kongress-2017/handlingar/f-samarbete-for-gemensam-sakerhet.pdf (accessed online May 21, 2018)

[283] Claes Lönegård, " Ministern om asylsökande: Tänker inte kompromissa," *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 1, 2017, accessed online May 29, 2018 https://www.svd.se/asylstrid-pa-s-kongressen--migrationsministern-tanker-inte-kompromissa; Mats J. Larsson, "Strid om migration i skuggan av terrordådet," Dagens Nyheter, April 8, 2018, https://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/strid-om-migration-i-skuggan-av-terrordadet/

[284] Ibid.

[285] For a detailed listing of these 58 separate parts of the congress debate see Appendix II.

for new political guidelines is put together, sentence for sentence, word for word, in so called "theme-groups" (*temagrupper*) through negotiations and compromises. The final proposal put forward by the party executive board was therefore already a compromise that had secured a strong favoring majority ahead of the official debate and voting that is documented in the protocol. For example, the headline of the final proposal reveals already one compromise: "A responsible migration policy characterised by solidarity", that is the adding of "characterised by solidarity" to the headline of this policy area.

Despite the fact that the real negotiations happened behind closed doors, the official congress debate still reveals the different positions taken by the delegates and their regional delegations, in contrast to the position of the party executive board and their supporters. There is those who reject the compromise, there is those who accept the compromise with more or less satisfaction or dissatisfaction and are careful to address what aspects of the compromise they find especially important, and there is those who stand close to the party executive board and argue in line with them. I believe the congress debate constitutes a valuable data that will enable me to answer the primary question in this thesis: How the refugee crisis of 2015 and the associated policy shifts are debated, negotiated and justified within the Swedish Social Democratic party. Though, it is important to note, that the findings and interpretations of this specific data will only be valid in respect to this units of analysis and not generalizable to other contexts.

5 ANALYSIS: SAP CONGRESS DEBATE 2017 ON THE MIGRATION POLICY

The congress debate had in total 58 separate debate entries, performed by a total of 55 individuals, which I have sorted according to the different positions represented in the entries. This has resulted in the following five groups: 2 considerably longer statements were made by Minister of Migration and Asylum Policy and Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson that represented the position of the party leadership; 14 debate entries were made by 14 delegates that in general where supporting the party leadership more restrictive position; 30 debate entries were made by 30 delegates that where critical to parts of the more restrictive approach but who with various degrees of satisfaction had accepted the revised compromise proposal for new political guidelines on the migration policy;[286] 7 debate entries made by 6 delegates were critical and rejected the compromise by for example continuing to call for the passing of motions that the party leadership had rejected; and finally 5 debate entries, made by 4 delegates, I have chosen to exclude from the analysis and sort out as irrelevant due to very specific topics that deviate from the general debate concerning the revised compromise proposal.[287] Following the DHA understanding of discourses – as "linked to argumentation about validity claims, such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors with different points of view" –I have chosen to structure the analysis following the different points of views expressed.[288] I will follow the structure as presented here above and listed in more detail in Appendix II.

[286] See Appendix I for the full text of the "Political Guidelines" taken on the Congress of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in Gothenburg 8-12 April 2017. This text also constituted the revised compromise proposal that was debated and later approved in its entirety by the congress delegates.
[287] See Appendix II for a detailed list of which debate entries where sorted under what group, including some comments on the more uncertain cases.
[288] Reisigl and Wodak, "The discourse-historical…," 27.

5.1 The Party Leadership: Setting the Frame for the Debate

Before looking at the longer introduction statement by the Morgan Johansson it is good to acknowledge some text specific context. The party leadership had settled for the revised compromise proposal and called for it to be accepted by the congress. The statements are therefore not very polemic, but can instead be seen as an attempt to balance and acknowledge the different views expressed in the compromise. Still it is interesting to look for what topics and arguments they choose to use and highlight, how events and situations are described, how policy changes and positions are justified and how the compromise is interpreted from their point of view.

Johansson starts by addressing and describing the migration events of the last years in a general manner with the example that Sweden since 2011 has given protection to 143 000 Syrians fleeing from places like Homs and Aleppo. This is described as "Sweden's greatest humanitarian effort in modern times" and the Swedish effort is compared with other EU countries where it is argued that no other EU country has lately taken such a "great responsibility for the global refugee-crisis". He argues that critics think that taking this "great responsibility" is something to "apologize for", but he argues that it is nothing to be "ashamed" of, instead "we should be damn proud about it". The work of taking responsibility continues with the efforts of providing for example accommodation, schools, health care and education. A positive attitude is taken on the prospects of these efforts: "we will make it work", "it will go well" and the people who have come will "become a part of our Sweden".

When Johansson zooms in at the refugee crisis in the fall of 2015 he argues that "two lessons" can be made out of that experience: first that "a small country can do much" by stressing positively that 140 000 people arrived in only 4 months, and that "we made it work". Second lesson is that "a small country cannot do everything", stressing that there is a "limit" and that with 10 000 people arriving a week it "obviously" could not continue. Here the

exceptionality of Sweden is lifted when he argues that Sweden probably has "the world's best reception system" but that "not even we" could work it out. Two justifications are addressed in regard to the policy changes made in the fall of 2015: first that the reception system would have broken down otherwise, and secondly that "we would not have managed the integration", that is providing housing, social workers, teacher etc.

This whole situation led, according to Johansson, to a "very hard ethical dilemma" described by him as: "we want to help as many as possible" but "we cannot do everything". The way out of this ethical dilemma is argued to be increased global and European cooperation, the "solution" needs to be on EU-level and the EU needs to meet this global challenge "with solidarity, together". This is the only dimension of solidarity described by Johansson in his statements. This in turn is yet another justification for the policy changes and the need to keep them, because as is emphasized, it is: "not possible for Sweden to have a much more generous refugee policy than the rest of EU". If this line is not kept there is a "risk" that the situation of 2015 could be repeated, therefore "we cannot promise" to return to the old policy. Instead the solution is to be found in a "common progressive EU-policy" that amongst other defends the right to asylum. According to Johannsson Sweden will work to "force the worst countries to live up to their responsibilities", even with "threats" if needed, and the goal is to develop the whole of EU's refugee policy in a progressive manner and not let the "worst countries" set the rules.

Johansson furthermore feels the need to disclaim some perceptions and claims about the restrictiveness of the new temporary policies stating clearly that "we have not closed the borders", supported by the fact that in 2016 around 29 000 asylum applications where filed. The second disclaimer is that Sweden has not "abolished" the possibility to family reunion, but only "tightened the rules". Finally, Johansson addresses the revised compromise proposal, referring to the "good discussion" with the theme-groups and the delegations, and he lists the

changes made and how the new proposal responds to some of the viewpoints: Firstly, the title of the policy now marks "the important idea of solidarity" which is not specified further of what this entails, only that it is included in the title. (The original proposal for title was "A responsible migration policy" and this was changed after negotiation to "A responsible migration policy characterised by solidarity"). Secondly, an introduction is added that "lifts up the positive effects of immigration for our country". Thirdly, the efforts of civil society and individual volunteers in the crisis 2015 are now highlighted and finally "our approach" to permanent residence permits and family reunion is "clarified". When it comes to the latter Johansson adds that "our opinion has always been that it is important for integration", and that the party will work "very hard" on the EU-level with the issue of permanent residence permits and family reunion.

Johansson concludes that this is "one of the hardest" policy areas "we have to handle" and states that "there are so many conflicting objectives and ethical considerations that one must do that are not easy", he argues that as elected officials: "citizens trust us", "we can make hard decisions" and "we can stand up for those hard decisions", and he appeals to the delegates that "we must live up to that trust" also when it comes to "these issues", that is migration issues.

5.2 The Supporters: Tapping into the Party Leadership Line

The most common reasoning – among the fourteen debate entries supporting party leadership line for a more restrictive migration policy – is about *responsibility.* It is mentioned in eleven of fourteen entries and it is mentioned in total 27 times. It refers to taking responsibility in the sense that "we must take responsibility", "we take responsibility" and "Sweden will continue to take responsibility" and this refers to the need to have a "responsible" refugee- and migration policy. One delegate argues that aspiring for and holding government

power means that SAP needs to take "responsibility" and another one refers to it as "responsibility" for the decisions that are taken. But the most common reference to responsibility is in the argument that more municipalities nationally or/and more EU-countries needs to "share the responsibility". All municipalities "must take responsibility" and the "responsibility must be shared in the EU" are the most common arguments among the supporters of a restrictive policy.

In this argumentation the notion of *solidarity* is commonly infused, following the logic that solidarity is to share responsibility: "For me solidarity is when all help each other and take responsibility". Along this line there are appeals to the need of a "EU-common policy where countries share the responsibility in a solidaristic way" or that we should have a "solidaristic reception in the EU". One delegate uses the concept of "solidaristic responsibility" (*solidariskt ansvar*) that very well illustrates this interlinking of the words, hence: "…it is very important that we take a solidaristic responsibility for the refugee reception in Sweden. But most of all this is an issue that we need to solve on EU-level." Solidarity is commonly addressed, it occurs in eight of fourteen entries and most commonly in connection to discussions on shared responsibility. Ten of the delegates mention EU and/or Europe in total 16 times and almost all references are about the need to share the responsibility on EU-level.

Order and *sustainability* in the refugee reception or/and policy is also addressed several times, where one delegate argues that "refugee reception should be sustainable and then it also becomes solidaristic", while another argues that "only in that way – with order and more even distribution – we can for real defend the right to asylum also in the future, and that is the most important of all". Solidarity is never explicitly referred to as solidarity with the refugees, while one delegate references to the need of combining solidarity and responsibility as it is done in the title of the proposal and argues that "Sweden will continue being a solidaristic country

and a forerunner in migration issues". Yet another one argues that the new policy "maintains Sweden's position in Europe as a forerunner in refugee policies".

The events of the 2015 refugee crisis are mostly not addressed in detail, some describe them in general terms as an "exceptional" or a "very special" situation and development, pointing at numbers of how many refugees arrived. Two entries mention that they are "proud" of how society, volunteers and civil society responded, one of them describing it as a "big humanitarian effort". The policy shift and the temporary legislation is exclusively addressed as *necessary*. The "situation" in the fall of 2015 is described by several as "untenable" or "unsustainable" (*ohållbar*) leading to the necessity of a policy shift. Only two entries express explicitly that this was not desired, one by arguing that it was "unfortunately necessary" and one that "believes" that all social democratic members of parliament "voted for the temporary legislation with a heavy heart" – buts still, it was the "right decision" and it was "important and necessary". One common and repeated argument for the necessity is following the line of the leadership and stressing the importance to avoid the "risk" of getting into a similar situation again, or as one puts it: "All Swedes must trust us Social Democrats that we will not get into the same situation as we did 2015". Following this line, it is repeatedly stated that it is impossible to have a too differing asylum legislation from the rest of the EU, also following the argumentation from the party leadership.

In two entries there are traces of a tendency to describe a possible *progressive dilemma* and trade-off between refugee immigration and the welfare state. The more explicit case is to be found in the following quote, that describes why it was necessary to shift the policy and pass the restrictive temporary legislation:

> But agencies and municipalities witnessed in the end that there was no longer a possibility for Sweden to alone be best in the class – not if we are going to be able to guarantee order in the reception, fast establishment and a strong welfare that is equal for all in our country.

Here the argument is not only that a shift in policy was necessary for the reception system and establishment[289] to work, but it is also extended to the ability to "guarantee" a "strong" and "equal" welfare for all. Hence, the big refugee immigration and the well-being of the welfare state are described as incompatible in this case. A more implicit example of the logic of a progressive dilemma is one delegate that explains what the reception of refugees has meant for her municipality. A positive consequence is a growing population according to her, but it has also meant "big challenges" and she gives several examples of the cons: overcrowded housing, negatively affected school results and that the municipality getting a bad ranking in child poverty and having high unemployment rates. In this case the reception of refugees is linked to increased inequalities by referring to a variety of indicators that has worsened as a result of refugee reception.

There is not much interpretations of the compromise in these entries, but one delegate makes the following interpretation: "the government and parliament took the necessary decisions and it is now good that the congress clarifies that we stand behind it", hence she interprets the new policy as an approval of the policy shift and the temporary legislation. At the same time, she reassures that "we social democrats will never compromise with the right of asylum", describing it as a "moral fundament" and a "human right", and then she makes a turn again saying "but it can not only be one country's task". This is a good illustration of the balance-act that the supporters of the new more restrictive approach are dealing with.

[289] The word "establishment" (*etablering*) has in Sweden the last years been used synonymously with the word "integration" (*integration*). Perhaps it is leaning towards more of a reference to getting an accommodation and a job, and less to aspects of cultural integration. The Social Democratic government that took office in 2014 has preferred using the word "establishment" instead of "integration".

5.3 The Critics that Accepted the Compromise

The Many Forms of Solidarities

One significant difference in these debate entries, compared with the supporters of the more restrictive line of the party leadership, is the way the concept of *solidarity* is addressed. The word "solidarity" (*solidaritet*) or "solidaristic" (*solidarisk*) occur in twenty of the thirty entries and it is in total mentioned 34 times in various ways and contexts. Solidarity is only two times mentioned in the sense of sharing responsibility across EU/Europe and/or at the national level between municipalities, which was almost the exclusive use among the supporters of restrictiveness. The other three times it is mentioned in relation to EU/Europe it refers to the importance of pushing for permanent residence permits and possibilities to family reunion, or to the role of social democracy to promote solidarity on that level, as for example in the statement: "Social democracy is the guarantor for more solidarity in migration policies in Europe and Sweden".

Permanent residence permits and possibilities for family reunion is described by one delegate as not only good for the establishment process, but also "solidaristic" in itself, hence as indirectly referring to solidarity with the refugees affected by the policies. In the cases when the notion of solidarity is explicitly described as to what it refers to, the most common use is solidarity as in solidarity *with* the refugees. Six times in total it is mentioned in this way and representatives from three side-organisations (the Social Democratic youth organization, the Social Democratic students and the Christian Social Democrats) all refer to the reception efforts made during the refugee crisis 2015 as an act of solidarity with refugees and people in need. One delegate refers to the post-crisis situation along this line too, when he states: "We have a solidaristic responsibility for the asylum-seekers, to give them safety in their new time".

Most commonly, around ten times, solidarity is mentioned as simply describing or referring to the new policy that is put forward in the compromise proposal. In these instances,

there is no specification of what this solidarity entails but is rather used as a description of the policy, as a direct reference to the policy or the title of it, and in some cases emphasizing that it is *both*: that is both solidaristic and responsible. In two other cases solidarity is coupled with the notion of generosity, respectively of compassion for humanity (*medmänsklighet*), which indicates that solidarity entails a more open and less restrictive policy approach.

Two interesting cases is two separate debate entries that elaborate on the concept of solidarity in relation to social democratic *values* and *ideology*. One delegate argues that permanent residence permits and possibilities to family reunion is "obvious minimum principles in a humane" social democratic migration policy and welcomes the changes in the policy proposal as a "first step towards a more humane migration policy" and ends this reasoning by referring to values and ideology: "Let us show that Sweden will continue to stand up for freedom, equality and solidarity - values that are untouchable in the social democratic ideology". Another delegate links solidarity and freedom as ideological concepts in an interesting way that interlinks national struggles with the hardships of those fleeing war:

> Freedom and solidarity are words that have led the labor movement forward since the movement began. Freedom from employers' oppression, freedom from economic and social inequality, freedom from war (…) Social Democratic policy is to stand up for people's freedom. That's how solidarity works.

Interesting in this statement is that hardships like employer oppression and economic and social inequalities are coupled with the hardship of fleeing from a war and together linked to the notion of solidarity, which is addressed as a fundamental value for the labor movement.

International Solidarity and the Humanitarian Superpower

In two cases solidarity is mentioned in the context of *international solidarity*. One delegate emphases in her debate entry arguments for the right to family reunion, she states that it is "immensely important that our party has a proper principled position" on among other

family reunion and refers to several international commitments that supports the right to family reunion. After appealing to emotional arguments referring to the destiny of the boy Alan Kurdi and the deaths of other children on Lampedusa, she ends her debate entry by urging the delegates to "never forget" these tragedies and states that: "International solidarity knows no national borders". Hence, international solidarity in this case is conceptualized primarily as the right to family reunion which in turn would lead to less deaths on the Mediterranean Sea. The other delegate referring to international solidarity thinks on the other hand that it was right to change the asylum policies and rejects calls for a reversal of it – but wants to reassure that he still believes in international solidarity and continues to be an internationalist:

> I am a convinced internationalist. I became a Social Democrat because I wanted to fight against racism and for international solidarity. I will always stand up for our values, and that we stand up for our fellow human beings. That's why I'm a Social Democrat, but I mean that the decision we made then was absolutely right. It has created order in the area and it would be a big mistake to return to previous rules. We cannot possibly run the risk of ending up in the position we were in the fall 2015. Not least in my county Västmanland, the reception system was under a completely unsustainable pressure. Ask the social service in Fagersta. Ask the teachers at the Central School in Norberg. It did not work anymore.

This is an interesting quote and reveals an effort to overcome the common perception that there would be a tension between on one side being an internationalist, fighting for the value of international solidarity and standing up for people, and on the other side supporting the new restrictive policies. The delegate tries to reconcile this by stating that he stands for these two positions simultaneously. The narratives surrounding the events of the refugee crisis in 2015 will be discussed in more detail further down.

As discussed in the context part, the notion of international solidarity is in Sweden closely interlinked with the country's self-image of a being a *humanitarian superpower*, this is explicitly invoked in two separate debate entries. One delegate catches on to the rhetoric of "two lessons" mentioned by Morgan Johansson and agrees that one country "cannot do

everything" but argues than that one country "can do damn much" and if "one can do a lot one also should do a lot", because it is an "obligation" according to her. She continues by reassuring: "Sweden is, and will also in the future be, a pioneer country in asylum and migration policy, a humanitarian superpower with both heart and brain". This delegate shows a very optimistic interpretation of the compromise, seeing it as ensuring that Sweden will continue to stand out with open and generous policies and combine both solidarity (heart) and responsibility (brain). Another delegate refers to the concept of a *humanitarian superpower* in a comment on the added clarifications in the compromise proposal that emphasizes that hard efforts will be made to get the rest of the EU on board in regard to the principled position that permanent residence permits and possibilities to family reunion "should be the general rule" and continues: "so that also Europe can become the humanitarian superpower that Social Democrats already have made Sweden".

In both these cases the notion of being a humanitarian superpower is built on an idea that Sweden and Swedish Social Democracy is a forerunner that can teach other actors something valuable. This notion is repeated in other arguments also, for example in the statement that "Social Democracy is at the forefront of human rights everywhere", or when it is described that "Sweden can and will go before" in regard to Social Democrats showing the "path to solidarity and compassion for humanity" by pushing for permanent resident permits and possibilities to family reunion. Invoking these aspects of solidarity, international solidarity and humanitarian obligations is of course one way to argue for less restrictive policies, by invoking common ideological and historical legacies connected to Swedish self-images.

The EU, Europe and The Swedish Model

It is interesting to look a bit closer to the discourses surrounding the EU and Europe which also is a common topic. The EU and/or Europe is explicitly mentioned in twenty

of the thirty debate entries, many of them in unique and single contexts. But let us look at only the topics that appear more than once. One repeated argument that goes in line with what has already been discussed above is that Sweden should be understood as a role model, illustrated by the statements: "more EU-countries should be like us" in reference to the solidarity that Sweden showed during the refugee crisis in 2015 and that "social democracy should take the lead" and "make sure that the rest of Europe will also do it" again refereeing to the efforts made during the crisis.

But, the most common topic and reference to EU and Europe is following the same pattern as the supporters of the more restrictive policy where addressing: that is that the rest of Europe and EU needs to take "greater responsibility" and/or "share responsibility" for the refugee and asylum reception. At least ten times it is mentioned in this context and in three of the cases this shared responsibility is addressed as "more solidaristic" and encompassing a "solidaristic system" on EU-level. On this topic one case stands out as especially interesting where a delegate mentions the Swedish model that should be exported to the EU as a model of solidarity and shared responsibility:

> It is part of the Swedish model that we stand up jointly in solidarity, but in the EU there is still a lot left to be desired in terms of shared responsibility. Our policy must be to transfer the Swedish model to a European level, so that all countries take responsibility.

Here the Swedish model is interpreted as a system where responsibility is shared in a solidaristic manner and includes here again a notion of showing EU how things ought to be done. The second most common topic in regard to EU and Europe in this group of debate entries was about the need to promote the principled position in favor of permanent residence permits and possibilities of family reunion on the EU-level. This is explicitly stated as a policy goal in the new guidelines and at least five delegates choose to emphasize this aspect. One delegate arguing in relation to residence permits and family reunion that it is "important that our party will

continue to work for a common policy based on the same principles even in the EU - that the EU should have the same vision of an open and equal society". Another delegate warns: "It is important that EU harmonization leads to increased, not lowered, levels and standards" in regard to this issue. Finally, it is also interesting to note which topics are not very common, for example only one delegate here refers explicitly to the argument that Sweden cannot have a too differing policy from the rest of the EU, at the same time he distances himself from the consequences of "Fortress Europe":

> We Social Democrats work for the EU to take a joint responsibility. It is difficult for Sweden to almost single-handedly take a responsibility that is whole of Europe's. Having a significantly different asylum policy is even more difficult, while it hurts in the heart when we unfortunately see that Fortress Europe makes it difficult for people on the run. The right to seek asylum is fundamental and more countries should share the responsibility and provide protection.

Making sense of the Refugee Crisis of 2015 and the Policy Shift

In comparison to the supporters of the more restrictive approach the critics of the same who accepted the congress compromise spend much more focus on trying to make sense of what happened in 2015 and how it should be remembered. Firstly, one common topic is expressing pride in the efforts made in 2015, pride over the "sanctuary" given to so many refugees and the solidarity shown towards "people in need". One example summarizes well this topic: "We should remember that Sweden gave and offered an open embrace. That is something I'm really proud of and maybe one of the finest memories I can think of for this country". These "finest memories" refer to the "fantastic" efforts made on streets, squares, train stations and reception-centrals where people who came got help, food, blankets and hugs. Another one talks about people taking "times out of their daily lives to help others". Others also mention pride over the efforts made by the Social Democratic government, the municipalities and government agencies.

While several do acknowledge that the situation in 2015 was challenging and demanding, only in one debate entry it is described as "unsustainable". Instead it is interesting to note that there is another, much more positive narrative brought up by some on how the challenge was successfully "managed". One argues that he situation was "hard", that it was a "test" and that "we actually passed the test" by providing a lot of people with warmness, a roof and food. Another follows the same logic, questioning the wide-spread discourse on a possible "system breakdown" (*systemkollaps*):

> 'A system breakdown,' said our opponents. 'A challenge,' we said. A challenge we actually managed to handle together, with municipalities, the state, NGOs and individuals. A situation where everyone actually got somewhere to live, where nobody went hungry, everyone had clothes and no one froze. It is quite far from a system breakdown.

It is interesting here that the discourse of a "system breakdown" is blamed on the critics and opponents, while it was also early on used by Social Democratic ministers in the fall of 2015. The same person continues to argue that despite the lack of a system breakdown it was still "absolutely necessary" to impose the temporary legislation because it made it possible to "continue handle the situation with dignity and respect for those who were coming".

This brings us to the next contested topic, the narrative surrounding the policy shift. Many do defend the restrictive turn and stand up for that decision, but they do it with a different tone than those who want to consolidate and make it permanent. One argues that it was probably one of the "hardest political decision in our lives" and continues to explain why:

> We removed foundations in our migration policy - the right of those in need of protection to get permanent residence, the right to family reunion as a basic humanitarian principle - and it caused great reactions and has been an open wound in our party.

But the same delegate "defends" firmly the decision and argues that the situation was "very difficult" and that it was "difficult to guarantee a humanitarian refugee reception, which is a

cornerstone of a welfare state". This interpretation of the *welfare state* is interesting because it accentuates the idea of a *progressive dilemma* in a particular way. If the reception system is a fundamental part of the welfare state, then the pressure and stress that the reception system was put under in 2015 also is a pressure and stress affecting the welfare state, hence the threat of a "system breakdown" does not only imply a breakdown of the reception system, but also of fundaments in the welfare system. Another example of the tone of those defending the decision is one delegate arguing that "it was not an easy time and it was not an easy decision we took, nor did we take it with a light heart" but at the same time "we felt the responsibility" and it was "necessary". Important to note is that only two of the thirty delegates describe the policy shift as "necessary" (*nödvändig*) (and both are mentioned here above), and the narratives on "responsibility" when it comes to the making the policy shift is considerably less common than among the supporters of the party leadership line.

Then we also have those who do not approve of the policy shift and that openly say they were critical of the temporary legislation in 2015 and that they still are critical – as one delegate puts it: "the decision with limitations was a decision I thought very badly about, that was painful then, and has been very painful ever since". One describes the restrictive response to the crisis as a "brutal awakening" where suddenly "we" would stand for the "toughest migration policy in the EU" – the "carelessness with the language" and the way the policy shift was communicated is described as causing a "wound" and being "painful". The critical stances are clearly focused on two specific aspect of the policy changes: the abandonment of permanent residence permits and restricted possibilities to family reunion. There is almost no mentioning of other policy changes such as closing the borders or introducing ID-checks. Instead nearly all address these two issues. This is clearly the central part in the compromise.

Interpreting the Congress Compromise: Permanent Residence and Family Reunion

Almost all debate entries in some way express satisfaction over the fact that the permanent residence permits and possibilities to family reunion have been added in the revised compromise proposal. If we look closer at the proposal and what became the new Political Guidelines, the part that is addressed can be found at the end in a list of three priorities that are presented with the headline: "The Swedish model will be developed to encompass a responsible refugee policy. We will give priority to:" and then listing in the following order: "Increased global cooperation"; "Shared responsibility in the EU"; and "Order in Swedish refugee policy".[290] After the priority "Shared responsibility in the EU", one can read:

> Asylum seekers who come to the EU must receive equal treatment, and every country will be involved and share responsibility. Both asylum legislation and refugee reception must be further harmonised. The principle position of the Social Democrats is that permanent residence permits and the opportunity to reunite families increases security and promotes good establishment of refugees. We will work in the EU for improvements of these aspects.[291]

It is interesting to note how the compromise and especially this part is interpreted. Many express that they are not fully "satisfied" but that at least steps are taken in the "right direction" and that the proposal is better now after the compromise. Some argue openly about what further steps they think is right and necessary even if they "accept" this compromise. For example, one argues that it was right to do something drastic in 2015 but that it is "not reasonable to have EU-minimum level" today still. Others who pushed for permanent permits and family reunion have a much more positive and optimistic interpretation of the achievements in the compromise. They express joy and happiness for the changes and argue that: "The new proposal represents a clear statement of the importance of permanent residence and the importance of being able to live and be reunited with your family". Some of the proponents also take the opportunity to

[290] See Appendix I for the full text in English on migration policy in the Political Guidelines.
[291] Ibid.

stress that these two policies are not only good for the establishment but also important of humanitarian reasons and are, as one puts it: “minimum principles” of a “humane migration policy” (but such arguments for permanent permits and family reunion was not incorporated into the compromise proposal).

Positive to Immigration: We Need More People

One last topic worth mentioning in this analysis is the positive discourse on immigration that several of the delegates in this group expressed. The added parts in the revised proposal are welcomed, also because they clarify “the positive effects of immigration”. One argues that immigration is a “great resource that helps to make Sweden the welfare country we are”. One lifts up that there is a clear difference “between us and our political opponents in this political field” and states that immigration “enriches Sweden” and that is “provides the conditions for economic, cultural and demographic development” and adds at the end: “We would be a poorer country without immigration”. Another argues that the immigration to those municipalities that took a “great responsibility” will “contribute to the development of these municipalities”. A repeated argument was in various ways addressing that Sweden “need more people”, for example that “we need more residents here” and that “we need the population growth”. One explains that “more people are needed to manage jobs and welfare”. This last argument is a reversal of the progressive dilemma, where the well-being of the welfare is dependent on that more people come to Sweden.

5.4 The Critics that Rejected the Compromise

A couple of those who were critical but accepted the compromise also took the opportunity to address the hard situation for many of the unaccompanied minors and mark their opposition to the deportations carried out primarily to Afghanistan. When it comes to the seven

debate entries made by six separate delegates, that do not approve of the compromise and continue to call for the passing of motions that are rejected by the party leadership, the main topic is clearly the situation for the *unaccompanied minors* that they find unacceptable. Five of the delegates elaborate extensively and primarily on this topic in five entries and in all these one can find an explicit call for an *amnesty* for this specific group. The security situation in Afghanistan is mentioned and the deportations are perceived as unacceptable. As one puts it: "To send them back to an uncertain situation in Afghanistan can simply not be right". Several addresses the vulnerability of the minors arguing that they are alone, that they have no place to return, no families and relatives and no connections in Afghanistan. The fact that they have been in Sweden long, waiting for decisions, and getting rooted is also brought up. They are referred to as "children", "youngsters", "Afghanis" and "Hazars. One describes them as ambitious, thirsty for knowledge and wanting peace, and another argues that "Sweden needs more young people". Yet another argues that she "cannot be rational" in regard to this issue, instead this is "very emotional" for her, describing the impossibility to ignore "the gaze of children on a memorial where one of their friends have taken their life". All these are used as arguments for an amnesty targeting this specific group. One appeals to responsibility and argues that "we must take responsibility and give these people amnesty" while another argues that: "If we as a country are going to manage this with dignity and solidarity we need an amnesty".

This last example above is one of three delegates in this group that explicitly refer to *solidarity*. Another calling for amnesty argues that "One of our most beautiful words in the Social Democratic ideology is solidarity", saying it may be "worn out" but it is a "fundament" that "obliges" and calls for action. And a third one starts by addressing "basic values":

> I want to start by telling why I became social democrat. This was because the basic values of social democracy were based on freedom, equality and solidarity. I agree with Stefan Löfven that solidarity is an incredibly beautiful word.

She continues with rejecting the policy shifts and temporary legislation from 2015 by referring to "international responsibility":

> Social democracy started as an international movement, a movement in which all small people could gather economic and political power. But today, our party does not want to face this international responsibility.

She appeals to the Social Democratic legacy of *international solidarity* in her opposition to the more restrictive migration policies. She also appeals to *human dignity* by proclaiming: "Let us make human dignity decisive in our decisions and our politics". The same delegate brings in another debate entry up Sweden as a "role model" and argues: "Let us be unique in Sweden and remain a role model for humanitarian and human rights. It must be our foundation".

The one delegate that does not focus on amnesty and unaccompanied minors in his rejection of the compromise instead brings up the case of family reunion. He argues that the development in refugee policy "has been painful for all us Social Democrats":

> In office, we have been responsible for a refugee policy that has gone from being one of the world's most humane to one that is inhumane. We have settled for Europe's minimum level.

He argues that it is time to move away from these minimum-levels and interprets the new revised compromise draft for political guidelines as providing enough room to approve a motion that abolishes the temporary restrictive family reunion policy in Sweden. He appeals to the passing of this motion and argues that he thinks that "all have the right to get their partner and children over here". Another delegate also opposes this policy arguing that preventing family-reunion "results in unsafety and uncertainty" and is also critical to the temporary residence permits arguing that "we want to make it hard for the most vulnerable in our society to really become part of it". She rejects the compromise because she argues that the temporary legislation "must be temporary and not pro-longed". Interestingly, one critic tries to reverse the

"responsibility"-argument and argues instead that "we have a responsibility for the people we took in in 2015, when we opened our doors", repeating that *responsibility* needs to be taken "for those who have been taken in".

6 CONCLUSION: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE CRISIS OF SOLIDARITY

6.1 Main Discourse Topics and Dividing Lines

Social democracy and the crisis of solidarity

In the aftermath of the refugee crisis of 2015, migration has emerged as one of the most central and probably most dividing issues within the Swedish Social Democratic party. One of the clearest findings in the analysis of the 2017 congress debate show an ongoing crisis of solidarity within the party. An internal battle has developed over the understanding of what solidarity entails when it comes to migration policies. The party leadership lifts solidarity only in the context of "burden-sharing" across the EU in regard to refugee reception. The supporters of the new policy line stress primarily solidarity as taking a "responsibility" for order and sustainability in policies, implying more regulations and restrictiveness. The critics of the new restrictive approach address solidarity as first and foremost an act towards asylum seekers and people in need. The modern social democratic conceptualization of solidarity has a high degree of inclusiveness and no strict boundaries as to whom and what groups it can encompass. In the contemporary debate within Swedish social democracy this becomes evident and it seems to give room for conflicting interpretations of solidarity, and even conflicts between different solidarities.

The critics stress solidarity as a core ideological value and invoke historical social democratic legacies of solidaristic internationalism in their effort to promote a less restrictive policy. The progressive dilemma builds on the assumption that there is a trade-off between inclusive and open immigration and diversity policies and the redistributive national welfare policies. But the crisis of solidarity traced in this analysis of the contemporary social democratic debate seem to primarily mirror a much older and historically rooted progressive dilemma within the labour movement: that is the trade-off between international solidarity and national

solidarity. To some extent these two dilemmas end up overlapping in this specific case, I think that is because international solidarity is brought into the equation and here coupled with the idea of an open and inclusive refugee- and asylum policy.

The most difficult issue, the most difficult decision: making sense of the crisis of 2015

All camps in this debate stress that the issue is very difficult, complex and important, if not one of the most difficult political issue at all. The party leadership describes it as very hard "ethical dilemma" with many conflicting objectives. All camps also express, to some extent, pride in the helping and receiving efforts made during the crisis and up until the restrictive turn (even if it is more highlighted by the critics of the policy turn). The dividing lines go along the understandings and interpretations of the events in 2015 and the policy shift that was implemented. The leadership and their supporters stress that the situation became untenable, it was a tremendous pressure and it became unsustainable, painting a dark picture which is reinforced with the discourse of "never again", that is the repeated argument that Sweden can never risk ending up in the same, implicitly bad, situation again. The critics on the other side sketch out a much more positive picture of the fall of 2015, focusing on the helping efforts made by a variety of actors and stress a narrative that argues that it worked out, that it could be and also was managed, questioning the dramatic "system breakdown"-discourse. What is portrayed as negative and dark is the actual policy turn, that is described as painful, hurtful and an open wound.

Still, many of the critics accept that something needed to be done in 2015 but they seem much more skeptical if this something needs to continue also now and in the future. The dividing line on the temporary legislation boils down to the interpretation of what is understood to be a humane policy. The temporary residence permits and possibilities for family reunion, as well as, the situation for the unaccompanied minors and a possible amnesty for this group is

identified as the main policy battles, and the crucial divides when it comes to what is considered as unacceptably inhumane and acceptably humane in regard to refugee- and asylum policies.

Bad Europe, Good Sweden

Discourse topics on the EU and Europe are heavily present across all the camps in this debate. The main concern is the lack of responsibility and solidarity shown by the rest of EU. The EU is the bad guy, the irresponsible actor that is not sharing the burden of this crucial challenge and the punching-bag of all camps in the debate. It is also EU's fault that Sweden cannot have a more open and generous policy, which can be one interpretation of the discourse on the impossibility to have a too diverging policy from the rest of the EU-states. The Swedish type of "welfare nationalism" thoroughly addressed in the context chapter is also traceable in the context of this debate. Sweden is the good guy, Sweden took an exceptional responsibility, Sweden is a forerunner when it comes to asylum- and refugee immigration policies and Sweden is *the* humanitarian superpower are common discourses. This taps into the historical social democratic notion of the superiority of the Swedish model, of the way Sweden handles and organizes both domestic and international matters. The party leadership and their supporters use these notions in their arguments claiming that Sweden will show the EU how things are done and will push for a common progressive policy. The critics use these notions in an effort to appeal to the importance that Sweden keeps its superior position, as more open, more generous and more humanitarian, being a role model – because who wants to be as bad as the rest of Europe and the EU?

The Swedish Model and The Progressive Dilemma?

The party leadership seem to avoid any explicit expressions of a possible progressive dilemma in this internal party-debate. Instead they refer to an "ethical dilemma"

between wanting to help as many as possible and the fact that Sweden cannot to everything. There is in general very few explicit arguments built on the perception that there is a progressive dilemma at stake. Still, the few identified examples do pit the refugee immigration against the possibility to guarantee an equal welfare, or portray immigration as leading to negative consequences for equality, which of course is a main characteristic and outcome of the Swedish model. One delegate also includes a humanitarian refugee reception as a cornerstone of the welfare state, and so makes the pressures on the reception system a matter of not upholding foundations in the welfare system. Indirectly of course, one can question the discourses on the immigration as a "burden" (that needs to be shared) and ask what this burden implies? Burden for what? On the other side, there is a clear discourse present challenging the assumptions of a progressive dilemma: the discourses on the positive effects of immigration, that Sweden needs more people, even needs it to sustain the welfare. Interesting to note is that there are no appeals to the historically restrictive position of the party when it comes to entry policies, by the supporters of the more restrictive line.

6.2 Implications and Further Research

The migration policy changes in Sweden in 2015 is an example of an obvious backlash when it comes to the issues of open and inclusive immigration and diversity policies. It taps well into the unfavorable "electoral dynamics" described by Banting and Kymlicka (2017) as an obstacle for inclusive solidarity, and which leads them to a pessimistic account of the potential of political parties to promote and be champions of inclusivity and diversity. But as this analysis show, this backlash is much more complex, at least when it comes to Swedish Social Democracy. The party is divided on the issue and at the center of this controversy is a crisis concerning the basic value of solidarity is unfolding. The analysis of this party-internal congress debate also show that there are considerable parts of the party that do pursue a more

inclusive conception of solidarity and that still are potentials for progressive political parties to be the bearers of the inclusive solidarity that is normatively preferable according to Banting and Kymlicka.

The analysis also shows that the Swedish Social Democrats, that are familiar with internal left and right (economic) fractions and divides, now increasingly seem to face a more cultural division based on liberal and authoritarian positions, or at least for and against immigration. This is of course not a new phenomenon in politics in general, but certainly a new landscape for the party-internal dynamics within the Swedish Social Democrats, which seems to have been sparked by the 2015 refugee crisis and the party's response to it. This would be an interesting development to follow in further research, how this divide evolves or how and if it is reconciled. It is important to note that these findings and conclusive interpretations are only valid in respect to this unit of analysis and are not generalizable to for example other social democratic parties. Further research could focus on cross-country comparisons of several European Social Democratic parties. How are they as progressive political actors handling the immigration issues? Are there divisions within the parties and how are they manifested? What are the differences and why are some less and some more inclined to promote an inclusive solidarity?

7 APPENDICES

Appendix I

Description: Full text of the "Political Guidelines" taken on the congress of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in Gothenburg 8-12 April 2017. This part is sorted under the broader policy area called "Cooperation for common security" and this is the party's own official English translation of the Political Guidelines. This text also constituted the revised compromise proposal that was debated and later approved in its entirety by the congress delegates.

The English version of the whole document "Political Guidelines" can be found on the webpage of the party on: www.socialdemocraterna.se, or as a PDF directly through this link: https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/globalassets/var-politik/arkiv/kongress-2017/security-in-a-new-era---political-guidelines_2017.pdf

A responsible migration policy characterised by solidarity

Diversity is part of the explanation of Sweden's success. Without immigration, our country would be poorer – economically, socially and culturally.

Refugee policy is based on everyone's moral duty to provide protection for people on the run from war and oppression. The world is plagued by many difficult conflicts and wars. More than65 million people have been forced from their homes. Managing migration issues and refugee flows is one of the greatest challenges of our times. No country, no continent and no organisation can handle this challenge alone. But together we can make a difference. This requires global leadership and shared responsibility.

Social Democratic migration policy is more than its national refugee policy. It begins with an active foreign policy and a progressive development policy which does its utmost to prevent war, contributes to peace and reconstruction when conflicts end, which creates the preconditions for long-term economic development. Immigration policy is a part of a complete policy of solidarity in order to strengthen democratic development, respect for human rights and sustainable development.

The right to seek asylum is a basic human right, but providing protection for refugees can never be solely one individual country's responsibility. It must be shared. Consequently, it may not be possible to choose the country that offers you protection. The cases of those seeking asylum in our country should be examined in a legally secure manner. Anyone who is in need of protection will be allowed to stay. Anyone who is denied asylum has to return. We stand up for regulated immigration because we do not want parallel societies where people are exploited in a grey labour market.

In 2015, more than 160 000 asylum seekers came to Sweden. In the autumn, the situation became untenable. A good reception could no longer be guaranteed, and several basic functions of society were severely strained. This led to the Government pushing through temporary asylum legislation more in line with other countries in the EU. Sweden introduced

both internal border control and ID checks. The number of asylum seekers has since fallen sharply.

Sweden has shouldered great responsibility for the global refugee crisis. Since the war in Syria broke out in 2011, Sweden has given shelter to more than 140 000 Syrians. It is our greatest humanitarian effort ever, and it was possible thanks to the fantastic efforts of the country's municipalities and government agencies, but also thanks to our NGOs and popular movements. We continue to take great responsibility, despite tighter regulations. In 2016, more than 67 000 asylum seekers were granted a residence permit in Sweden.

Refugee reception must be sustainable. There must be sustainable conditions allowing us to receive asylum seekers in a good manner and to give those who are permitted to stay the preconditions to live and work. Sweden must take its share of responsibility for refugees, but this requires a well-functioning, common asylum system in the EU, with more harmonized legislation and implementation. It is not possible for Sweden to apply legislation that is substantially different to other countries in the EU.

Opportunities for labour immigration are vital to Sweden's economic development. This should focus on occupations where there are major shortages and where people with the right qualifications cannot be found on the Swedish labour market. Jobs that require little or no qualifications will primarily be filled by unemployed people who already live in Sweden.

The Swedish Model will be developed to encompass a responsible refugee policy. We will give priority to:

Increased global cooperation. Sweden will be a driving force within the EU and globally to defend the right to asylum and to ensure more countries take responsibility for people fleeing to find a safe haven. It is therefore vital to work to establish more legal routes for people in need of protection. Both increased resettlement and greater humanitarian efforts are necessary. We will work for more, and improved, coordination globally. The root causes that force people to flee should be combatted through long-term development cooperation. Positive effects of migration must be utilised.

Shared responsibility in the EU. Asylum seekers who come to the EU must receive equal treatment, and every country will be involved and share responsibility. Both asylum legislation and refugee reception must be further harmonised. The principle position of the Social Democrats is that permanent residence permits and the opportunity to reunite families increases security and promotes good establishment of refugees. We will work in the EU for improvements of these aspects.

Order in Swedish refugee policy. Ruthless refugee smuggling must be combated. We want to increase the number of quota refugees to Sweden via UNHCR. The case examination by the Migration Agency will be legally secure and effective. Refugee reception will create opportunities for newcomers to quickly get to work or to start studies. Those who are refused must

Appendix II

Description: In the "Congress Protocol" from the Swedish Social Democratic Party's Congress in Gothenburg 8-12 April 2017 the whole debate on the new political guidelines for the social democratic migration policy can be found. It contains in total 58 separate debate entries performed by 55 individuals which I have sorted into five different groups. Here I list transparently what entries I listed in what group and I also comment shortly the more delicate cases.

First group: consists of the two longer statements made by Morgan Johansson, Minister of Migration and Asylum Policy and Minister of Justice at that time, he represented the position of the party leadership.
Second group: consist of 14 debate entries made by 14 delegates that where in general supporting the party leadership position.
Third group: consists of 30 debate entries made by 30 delegates that mostly and in various degrees where critical to the more restrictive policy position but that accepted the revised compromise proposal.
Fourth group: consists of 7 debate entries made by 6 delegates who were critical to the new more restrictive policies and who openly rejected the compromise.
Fifth group consists of 5 debate entries made by 4 delegates that are sorted out as irrelevant to this analysis due to very specific topics that deviate from the general debate concerning the revised compromise proposal for new political guidelines on migration policy.

2nd Group: "The Supporters"	**Comments**
Anna-Belle Strömberg, Västernorrland	
Charlotte Evert, Västernorrland	
Anders Edvinsson, Jämtlands län:	
Johan Söderling, Västerbotten: (?)	No clear position, a more neutral tone
Anneli Hedberg, Södermanland	
Evelina Harr, Norrbotten	
Anders Lundkvist, Norrbotten	
Mathias Tegnér, Stockholms län	
Boel Godner, Stockholms län	
Ulrica Truedsson, Södermanland	
Joakim Sandell, Skåne	
Agnetha Didrikson, Östergötland	No clear position, a more neutral tone
Torbjörn Karlsson, Skåne	No clear position, a more neutral tone
Teresa Carvalho, Östergötland	

3rd Group: "The Critics that Accepted"	**Comments**
Olle Thorell, Västmanland	
Diana Laitinen Karlsson, Jönköpings län	
Daniel Färm, Stockholms län	Accepts the compromise but still appeals to passing the single motion F48.
Bengt Storbacka, Örebro län	
Irma Olofsson, Västerbotten	
Elin Ylvasdotter, S-studenter	
Philip Botström, SSU	
Jörgen Edsvik, Gävleborg	Not very critical, more neutral tone

Jonas Magnusson, Jönköpings län	
Sofie Eriksson, Dalarna	
Ulf Bjereld, Socialdemokrater för tro och solidaritet	
Björn Abelson, Skåne	
Peter Gustavsson, Uppsala län	
Malin Lauber, Kronoberg	
Elina Gustafsson, Blekinge	
Carina Gullberg, Skaraborg	Not very critical, positive to changes in revised proposal
Aylin Fazelian, Bohuslän	
Henrietta Serrate, Kronoberg	
Patrick Gladh, Göteborg	
Anna Franzén, Jönköpings län	
Lawen Redar, Stockholm	
Lisa Dahlpil, Örebro län	
Jonas Gunnarsson, Värmland	
Carina Ohlsson, S-kvinnor	
Sören Juvas, HBT-sossar	
Jytte Guteland, Stockholm	
Robert Roos, Örebro län	Accepts the compromise but still appeals to passing the single motion F48.
Nall Lars Göran Andersson, Bohuslän	
Pia Ingvarsson, Skåne	
Erik Pelling, Uppsala län	Not very critical, more positive tone, positive to immigration

4th Group: "The Critics that Rejected"	
Maria Brauer, Bohuslän	
Janette Olsson, Bohuslän	
Soraya Zarza Lundberg, Bohuslän	First of two debate entries
Erica Parkås, Norra Älvsborg	
Håkan Andersson, Älvsborg södra	
Louise Thunström, Bohuslän	
Soraya Zarza Lundberg, Bohuslän	Second of two debate entries

5th Group: Excluded from Analysis	**Comments**
Rose-Marie Edlund, Halland	First of two debate entries. About translators who served the Swedish Army.
Moez Dharsani, Norra Älvsborg	About private profit actors in providing asylum reception services.
Johan Tolinsson, Halland	About translators who served the Swedish Army.
Rose-Marie Edlund, Halland	Second of two debate entries. About translators who served the Swedish Army.
Stefan Jonsson, Värmland	About schooling opportunities for refugee children.

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