

**Diplomacy, Terrorism, and Espionage:
Extremist Croatian Separatists and Australian Cold War
Relations with Yugoslavia 1963-1979**

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Abstract

Separatist Croatian terrorist organisations present in Australia were a dominating element of the Australian-Yugoslavian Cold War relationship. These Croatian separatists became part of a unique diplomatic entanglement between the two counties which developed despite the geographic distance between them. This dissertation demonstrates that the entanglement of Croatian separatism into the domestic and international spheres of Australian policy created a heightened awareness of Cold War relations with Yugoslavia, and this enabled Yugoslav authorities to extend sovereignty outside of their borders in an attempt to silence dissenting political opposition on Australian soil. Utilising a range of Australian Government sources this thesis takes an entangled history and a cross-disciplinary approach to make an original contribution to the fields of history and international relations. It highlights the utility of an entangled historical approach by demonstrating that it would be impossible to comparatively investigate Australian-Yugoslavian Cold War diplomacy isolated from the topic of Croatian separatist terrorism. The ongoing global problem of diasporic terrorism means the findings of this dissertation are topical and provide a base for comparative applied historical analysis.

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It may seem odd for an Australian to travel to Hungary to write a dissertation about Croatian separatist terrorists operating in Cold War Australia. Central European University has proven to be an exceptional institution to study this topic at, and has provided me an incredibly solid base from which to write this thesis. The one-year master's program has been stressful, but also thoroughly enjoyable. I must thank my supervisor Professor Constantin Iordachi, and second reader Professor Mate Tokić. Both have provided invaluable insights and guidance for different aspects of this work for which I am grateful. Their willingness to read drafts and provide feedback at short notice has been much appreciated. I would like to especially thank Professor Tokić for the work he has already done on post-War Croatian separatism, especially in the Australian context. Writing this thesis may have not been possible without his existing work and I trust this dissertation contributes to what he already been written.

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Introduction

Destroy the enemy and preserve yourself
In revolution, a goal can be attained only
by military action.¹

The Croatian community in Australia is large, diverse, and the result of a long process of migration dating from the 19th century. No Croatian migrant who arrived in Australia before the Second World War had ever lived in a state called Croatia. They had come from the Habsburg Empire, or possibly the Ottoman Empire, and later from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After the close of the Second World War this community would grow and affirm its Croatian national identity. This community formed what is known as a diaspora. Diaspora's challenge and overcome the notion that a national identity is fixed to certain geography.² National communities may exist in regions far outside of the territory they are historically associated with, and by doing so these group remain closely linked to their idea of homeland.³ The Croatian community in Australia was part of a worldwide network of Croatian émigrés, many of which rejected Tito's Communist Yugoslavia. This diasporic opposition would be formed into political movements for Croatian independence, protected under the idea of free speech which existed in many of the host-nations.

The most extreme elements of this political opposition would see terrorism as a legitimate means to pursuing Croatian independence, and thus would spawn a reign of terror activities in their host countries and in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav authorities utilised a variety of methods in efforts to silence this political dissent – both its violent and non-violent manifestations - including official diplomacy, and more manipulative techniques of their

¹ Quote taken from a Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood document. See "Croatian Extremist Appendix B B14-C7" (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, March 28, 1973), B18.

² Sean Carter, "The Geopolitics of Diaspora," *Area*, no. 1 (2005): 55.

³ Fiona B. Adamson, "The Growing Importance of Diaspora Politics," *Current History* 1 (2016): 291.

intelligence services. What ensured was an entanglement of Yugoslav authorities, Croatian diasporas, and the governments of the host countries.

This dissertation asks the question: how were extreme Croatian separatists entangled into Australian domestic policy and their Cold War relationship with Yugoslavia between 1963-1979, and what were the implications of this entanglement? This research question is purposely framed from an Australian point of view for two reasons. Firstly, because of the unprecedented availability of Australian primary intelligence sources, the likes of which are not as accessible in other countries that hosted a Croatian diaspora during the Cold War. Secondly, covering this topic in adequate detail from the perspectives of all three primary actors involved; Australia, Yugoslavia, and the Croatian diaspora, would far exceed the limitations of a master's thesis. This period has been chosen as it is during this time that almost all Australian based Croatian terrorism was committed, after 1979 it diminished as an issue. This dissertation demonstrates that the entanglement of Croatian separatism into the domestic and international spheres of Australian policy created a heightened awareness of Cold War relations with Yugoslavia, and this enabled Yugoslav authorities to extend sovereignty outside of their borders in an attempt to silence dissenting political opposition on Australian soil. The entangled approach of this research demonstrates that it would be impossible to study Australian-Yugoslavian Cold War relations or Croatian separatism in isolation as they are intimately tied to one another.

This research seeks to offer a unique perspective on the Croatian community in Australia during the height of the Cold War with an entangled history approach, and it fits between the broad historical disciplines of Cold War diplomatic history, migration history, and diasporic studies. It is cross-disciplinary as it addresses topics of international relations; including transnational terrorism, international security, and bilateral diplomacy. An entangled and cross-disciplinary approach means this dissertation will add a new dimension

to the existing field of literature both in Australian history and international relations. The primary methodology employed is that of close sources analysis of Australian Government documents. The unique range of Australian intelligence and government documents regarding this subject are supplemented by secondary literature from a range of well-established fields of research.

The history of Croatian separatist extremism in Australia is a topic of contemporary interest because of renewed journalistic curiosity, and due to the continued prevalence of diasporic political actors worldwide, such as Sikh Khalistan separatists.⁴ Therefore, this thesis aims to offer practical utility through applied history. The findings of this dissertation can be placed in comparison to contemporary issues of diasporic terrorism to advance good policy outcomes. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May drive the point home in their work about using applied history in policy *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* that historical analogies must be heavily scrutinised before their use. A good historical analogy for a contemporary situation can only be found after this examination, and even then, one must be careful about their conclusions as whilst historical events can be similar, they are never exactly the same.⁵ This work aims to provide a base from which the example of Croatian extremist entanglement into Australian-Yugoslavian Cold War relations can be effectively used as applied history.

⁴ For example see “Narendra Modi Draws Line Under Justin Trudeau’s Indian Trip,” *The Australian*, February 23, 2018, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/the-times/justin-trudeau-is-ridiculed-on-india-visit/news-story/371d04f5697001a76db14a4acc16095a>.

⁵ Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, Kobo (New York: The Free Press, 1988), chap. 2.

Literature Review

There is an existing field of literature on pre and post-Second World War Croatian separatist ideologies, and the extremist movements which embodied this. Stephen Clissold's *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism* published in 1979 is the best generic overview of radical Croatian separatists and the ideology behind these movements.⁶ The base has been expanded in more detail by Mate Tokić in articles such as *Landscapes of conflict: unity and disunity in post-Second World War Croatian émigré separatism*.⁷ Tokić has also provided in depth analysis of extremist Croatian separatists in Australia and the relationship to domestic politics, notably in *Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973*.⁸ The topic of Croatian terrorism in Australia, whilst holding the popular imagination of the public, has little other detailed scholarly attention. Of most use from other academic work are the first two volumes of the recently published *Official History of ASIO*, edited by David Horner, which gives a very general account of Australia's domestic intelligence agency – the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIO).⁹ Based on primary ASIO documents made available for the first time to the authors, specific sections of the volumes detail how ASIO perceived the threat of Croatian terrorism and outlines government policies towards this threat. Its weakness comes as an official history, and the work has attracted criticism for glossing over failures of the organisation and not discussing the extent ASIO was supposedly compromised by Soviet intelligence in its early years.¹⁰ Despite these criticisms, this volume offers the first insider's view of ASIO and provides a timeline of Croatian terror activity and the responses to this within Australia.

Outside the abovementioned works, detailed scholarly work on Croatian separatism in the specific Australian context is largely lacking. There has been an important contribution

⁶ Stephen Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*, Conflict Studies, 0069-8792; No. 103. (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979).

by journalists with recent articles providing a contemporary evaluation of Croatian terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s. The most important journalistic work is the short book *Framed* by Hamish McDonald, which investigates inconsistencies of the Croatian 6 terrorist conspiracy of 1979.¹¹ This conspiracy marks the end-point of this thesis. Scholarly work dealing with specific events in the Australian political history are numerous for the period in question. There is much work on Gough Whitlam, his election as Prime Minister, his policies, and the 1975 dismissal.¹² Gaetano Ilardi provides very detailed insight into Whitlam's interaction with ASIO, and the infamous Murphy Raid on ASIO headquarters.¹³ These works are essential for painting an understanding of domestic Australian politics. There is also a reasonable amount of literature on Australian and Yugoslav experiences in the Cold War. The edited volume *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade* is used gain insights into Yugoslav non-alignment, movement away from Stalin, and attitudes in the Cold War.¹⁴ For the Australian experience, David McLean provides an excellent article investigating different historiographical approaches to Australia in the Cold War, and Andrew Cooper's

⁷ Mate Nikola Tokić, "Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in Post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism," *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 16, no. 5 (2009): 739–53, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480903262751>.

⁸ Mate Nikola Tokić, "Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973," in *Control of Violence*, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer et al. (New York, NY: Springer New York, 2011), 395–414, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0383-9_16.

⁹ John Charles Blaxland, *The Protest Years: The Official History of ASIO, 1963-1975*, Kobo, vol. II, III vols., Official History of ASIO (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2016); John Charles Blaxland and Rhys Crawley, *The Secret Cold War: The Official History of ASIO, 1975-1989*, Kobo, vol. III, III vols., The Official History of ASIO (Sydney Melbourne Auckland London: Allen & Unwin, 2016).

¹⁰ For example see Paul Monk, "Soviet Moles in Australia: The Black Holes in ASIO's Official History. (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation)," *Quadrant* 61, no. 5 (2017).

¹¹ Hamish McDonald, *Framed*, Kindle (Fairfax Media, 2012).

¹² See for example Jim Davidson, "Mr Whitlam's Cultural Revolution," *Journal of Australian Studies* 11, no. 20 (May 1987): 83–91, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14443058709386947>; Derek McDougall, "Edward Gough Whitlam, 1916–2014: An Assessment of His Political Significance," *The Round Table* 104, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 31–40, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2015.1005360>; Mike Rann, "Gough Whitlam: A Man Who Changed Australia," *The Round Table* 103, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 599–600, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2014.988029>.

¹³ Gaetano Joe Ilardi, "The Whitlam Government's 1973 Clash With Australian Intelligence," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14, no. 1 (2001): 62–88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600150501335>.

¹⁴ Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boškowska, eds., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade*, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia 96 (London: Routledge, 2014).

volume *Niche Diplomacy* provides more contextual information.¹⁵ Through comparative analysis, these works provide an overview of Australian-Yugoslavian Cold War diplomacy.

Building on this base of secondary source materials, this dissertation will draw upon a large quantity of primary documents from the Australian Government and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America (USA). Most of these documents have been found digitised through the National Archives of Australia's (NAA) online catalogue and the CIA online library. These include intelligence memorandums, letters, and police reports all of which address some aspect of the Croatian diaspora, the extremist element, and relations with Yugoslavia. Furthermore, a selection of ASIO documents tabled before the Australian Senate, which includes terrorist training manuals, letters, and police reports, following the 1973 Murphy Raid on ASIO headquarters expands this corpus. An investigation into the background and the event of this raid will be provided in chapter 2. Given my limitation on reading Serbo-Croat and current restrictions to accessing Yugoslav intelligence service documents, no Yugoslav documents have been used. There is certainly scope for future research into the Yugoslav perspective of this research question, and more importantly for assessing the extent of Yugoslav intelligence service (YIS) operations in Australia.

Framework and Key Terms

This thesis utilised several key terms that require clarification because of the wide range of already existing definitions, which could lead the reader to holding ambiguous understandings. Firstly, is the notion of entanglement. According to Kris Manjapra

¹⁵ David McLean, "Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review," *The International History Review*, no. 2 (2001): 299; Andrew F. Cooper, ed., *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25902-1>.

entanglement in history is ‘the sites in which two or more rationalities, two or more voices, agents or worldviews enter a direct, or even indirect interdependence, whereby the actions of one agent have an effect on the other even without either agent’s choice’.¹⁶ This definition is very applicable to the context of this thesis. The radical element of the Croatian diaspora became the intermediary field through which the states of Yugoslavia and Australia came to interact and define one another. It would become near impossible for either party to view the other without this lens. To understand the motivations and political context of these radical actors which entangled the Australian-Yugoslav relationship, a definition of terrorism is required.

Terrorism is a difficult term to define as one’s political perspective may frame perpetrators of violent acts as either criminals or freedom fighters. Alison Jaggar notes that terrorism is not associated solely with a specific type of conflict or method - it may or may not be committed by soldiers or freedom fighters, and tactics employed can be varied. He also states that forms of political protest, even if breaking the law, is not terrorism if it does not utilise ‘extreme threats and violence against innocent civilians’.¹⁷ Jaggar’s definition of terrorism is as follows:

Terrorism is the use of extreme threats or violence designed to *intimidate or subjugate governments, groups, or individuals*. It is a tactic of coercion intended to promote further ends that in themselves may be good, bad or indifferent. Terrorism may be *practiced by governments or international bodies or forces, sub-state groups or even individuals*. Its threats or violence are aimed directly or immediately at the bodies or belongings of innocent civilians but these are typically terrorists’ secondary targets; *the primary targets of terrorists are the governments, groups or individuals that they wish to intimidate*.¹⁸

¹⁶ Kris Manjapra, “Transnational Approaches to Global History: A View from the Study of German–Indian Entanglement*,” *German History* 32, no. 2 (June 2014): 288.

¹⁷ Alison M. Jaggar, “What Is Terrorism, Why Is It Wrong, and Could It Ever Be Morally Permissible?,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 36, no. 2 (2005): 209–11.

¹⁸ Emphasis added. Jaggar, 209.

This definition will be used in this dissertation. It is appropriate as it is broad in scope and directly applicable to Croatian separatist extremists operating in Australia, and it enables the differentiation between political activism and terrorism.

As will be investigated, much of the Croatian diaspora in Australia believed in Croatian separatism and maintained a political opposition to Communist Yugoslavia. In this dissertation, the term separatist denotes a political view and when used on its own it does not carry the association of terrorism. However, when stated in conjunction with the terms violent, extreme, or radical, I am explicitly referring to the subset of political separatists willing to utilise terrorism in pursuit of their political goals. This terrorist element of the Croatian diaspora was a small element of the entire community and they represent the extreme end of the political spectrum seeking Croatian separatism – the individuals who made up this subset did utilise threats and violence aimed at Yugoslavian targets, both civilian and governmental, and their violence resulted in harm to innocents.

Thesis Structure

This thesis is broken in to three research chapters to construct its argument. The first chapter is titled *Extreme Croatian Separatists: Ideological Origins and Emergence in the Australian Diaspora*. It investigates the history of Croatian separatist ideology, the radical manifestations of this ideology by nationalist groups in the 20th century, and how radical separatists emerged in the post-Second World War Croatian diaspora in Australia. This will be done by drawing together secondary and primary literature, utilising statistical methods, historical migration data, and Australian intelligence reports on the extremists.

Chapter two - *Terror in Australia: Government, Intelligence and Police Reaction to Croatian Extremism* – is focused on Croatian terror activities in Australia from a purely

domestic perspective. It outlines the acts of terror committed by Australian based Croatian extremists, how the Australian Government, intelligence service, and police reacted and changed their policy over time, and how this entanglement generated a heightened concern for Australian authorities regarding their relationship with Yugoslavia. This includes specifically how rhetoric and policy shifted between different Australian Governments.

The third and final chapter is entitled *Entanglements and Sovereignty: Australia, Yugoslavia, and the Croatian Diaspora*. It will cover many of the same events as chapter two, but from the frame of Australian-Yugoslavian diplomatic engagement. This chapter will put the findings of the first two into the Cold War context, and establish the significance of Croatian extremists in Australia for the Australian-Yugoslavian relationship from 1963-1979. It shows that the entanglement of Croatian extremism into both the diplomatic and intelligence aspects of this relationship provided an opportunity for the Yugoslav state to extend an element of their sovereign authority into Australia by using the Croatian diaspora as a metaphysical link between the countries. This was done with manipulative methods to try silence anti-Yugoslav dissent in the Croatian diaspora. This example of Yugoslav authorities using Croatian extremists in Australia to extern their own sovereignty was mirrored in all countries where a significant Croatian diaspora was present during the Cold War.

Chapter 1 - Extreme Croatian Separatists: Ideological Origins and Emergence in the Australian Diaspora

You might think there has been a lot of politics in my life, but you see, I don't see it as politics. It is not about being a socialist, or a communist or a democrat or a liberal. It was only about being allowed to be what I already was: a Croatian.¹⁹

The post-Second World War period is particularly important for the study of the Croatian community in Australia. Not only did this period see many Croatians arrive in Australia, it was from these migrants that the radical separatist Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB) was formed. This chapter will address the question: what was the ideological foundation of Croatian separatism, and how did extreme Croatian separatist organisations emerge in Australia between the years of 1947 and 1974? It will be shown that the ideology of Croatian separatism emerged out of 19th and 20th century politics and became embodied in an extreme violent form by the fascist Ustaše movement before and during the Second World War, and that a small number of post-War migrants who embodied the Ustaše ideology would form the core of the extremist Croatian separatist organisations in Australia. Using statistical methods, it will be shown the individuals who joined extremist separatist organisations in Australia emigrated to Australia almost entirely between the close of the Second World War and 1961. Most of these members were seen by Australian intelligence to be only peripherally involved, however there existed sizable a core leadership group. Acceptance of separatist ideology would be widespread among the Croatian community despite the HRB having only a small number of members.

¹⁹ Josip Grguric quoted in Val Colic-Peisker, *Split Lives: Croatian Australian Stories* (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2004), 73. Josip was a member of the Croatian army during the Second World War and was a refugee post-War, spending the four years after the War in camps. He migrated to Australia and became a prominent member of the Western Australian Croatian diaspora. He is a founding member of the Fremantle Croatian Club and its president from 1952-72.

This chapter begins with a historical investigation into Croatian separatist ideology from the late 19th century, and how the radical implementation of this ideology resulted in the Second World War fascist Ustaše Independent State of Croatia. The second section demonstrates how the ideas of Croatian separatism permeated Croatian diasporas around the world after the close of the War, and how this was led by prominent members of the Ustaše. It will also highlight the political divisions within the extreme element of post-War Croatian separatism. Croatian separatists are placed into the Australian context in the third section. The interaction between ideas of extreme separatism and the wider diaspora, and how the HRB was formed by a small group of radicals is revealed. The chapters final two sections utilise statistical analysis. The first of these seeks to establish from historical migration records the size of Croatian migration to Australia relative to the total number of Yugoslav migrations. The final section uses Australian intelligence documents to determine the size of HRB membership, the years which these members arrived in Australia, place these arrivals in comparison to wider migration patterns, and finally to understand how involved the known members of the HRB's were in extremist activities as seen by Australian intelligence.

Origins of Post-War Croatian Separatism

The violent Croatian separatist organisations which were active in Australia during the 1960s and 1970s were just one embodiment of the anti-Yugoslav ideology of Croatian independence present in diasporas. The origins of Croatian separatist ideas lay in pre-Second World War Yugoslavian politics and could trace an ideology to 19th century nationalist thinkers. Stephen Clissold provides an excellent account of this history in *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*.²⁰ Clissold's work does not deal in detail with the issue of Croatian

²⁰ Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*.

extremism and separatism in Australia however. By drawing from primary and secondary material this section will provide an understanding of violent and non-violent elements of Croatian separatism in global and Australian Cold War contexts. This movement was made up of various elements and actors, many of them were not violent and had supporters from a range of political backgrounds. Simply identifying as Croatian as opposed to Yugoslav after migrating to a new country would place many individuals into this political category. Croatian migrants arriving in countries such as Australia found a far greater degree of free expression and speech than in their former homes. This protected many Croatians in their open support for this political goal for the first time. This freedom of representation and expression would go on to become an element of the entangled Australian-Yugoslavian Cold War relationship explored in chapter three.

The ideology of Croatian separatism had at its core the belief that the Croatian nation deserved independence in a world increasingly made up of independent sovereign nation-states and was born out of 19th century Croatian nationalism. This claim utilised a long nationalist historical memory crafted around the idea of subjugation, beginning with Croatia becoming part of the Hungarian Kingdom in 1102.²¹ Croatian nationalism was developed by Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik, who would establish Croatia's first nationalist political organisation: the Party of Right.²² These individuals called for a unification of perceived historical Croatian territory and the establishment of an independent Croatia inspired by the principles of the French Revolution – they outright rejected ideas of unification between southern Slavic peoples.²³ The Party of Right would continue to exist during the first

²¹ See R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (H. Fertig, 1969), 15–35. for a history of the Croatian relationship to Hungary dating from the Middle Ages.

²² Rory Yeomans, *Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941-1945* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 7; Marcus Tanner, *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1997), 104–5.

²³ “Ivo Goldstein, *Croatia: A History* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 75.

Yugoslavia, its support drawn from ‘petite bourgeois and nationalist intelligentsia’, yet in elections its share of the vote never rose above 2 percent.²⁴ Despite this low support, the political platform of the Party of Right would inspire Croatian nationalists and separatists before, during, and after the Second World War.

During the 20th century Croatian separatism was focused against the southern Slavic union which was Yugoslavia, both the pre-Second World War Kingdom, and the post-War communist state. One alternative manifestation of the separatist ideology of the Party of the Right was the Croatian People’s Peasant Party (HSS) of Stjepan Radić, which was founded at the turn of the century and intimately connected peasant rights to the idea of Croatian national interest.²⁵ Radić had viewed pre-war conceptions of a unified southern Slav state with ‘anathema’ as he insisted on a right of national Croatia to exist within its ‘historic borders’.²⁶ Upon Yugoslavia’s formation after the First World War, the party actively resisted the centralisation of the new state around Serbia and Belgrade, whilst maintaining calls for Croatian autonomy – they were willing to work within Yugoslavia’s political framework towards this.²⁷ In 1928 Radić was shot in parliament and later died of his wounds. This resulted in Croatian political representatives undertaking passive resistance against the Kingdom, and a splinter element fled the country and established themselves as extremist revolutionaries who aimed at creating Croatian independence from Yugoslavia.²⁸ Most prominent of these was Ante Pavelić, who formed the Ustaše²⁹ in 1929 as an extreme fascist

²⁴ Mark Biondich, “Vladko Maček and the Croat Political Right, 1928–1941,” *Contemporary European History* 16, no. 02 (May 2007): 204, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777307003797>.

²⁵ Mark Biondich, *Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2000), 73–74.

²⁶ Biondich, 93.

²⁷ Biondich, 163–65.

²⁸ Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*, 3.

²⁹ Translates roughly to “insurgent”. See Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 269. For the purpose of this dissertation I will maintain the Serbo-Croat spelling of Ustaše (singular) and Ustaša (plural) – pronounced in English as Ustash and Ustasha. Several other spellings exist, such as Ustashi, and these may be seen in quotations from Australian and USA sources within this thesis.

movement willing to use violence to create a racially defined independent Croatia.³⁰ The Ustaše drew its base from supporters of the Party of Right.³¹ This small group of radicals would come to define Croatian separatism for the remainder of the 20th century.

The HSS continued to present an alternative version of Croatian autonomy in Yugoslavia. Following Radić's assassination, Vladko Maček became leader of the party. After an initial moment of political solidarity following the assassination, the HSS and Ustaše would become bitterly opposed in the lead up to the Second World War.³² The HSS did maintain an anti-Yugoslav stance, yet it continued to operate within the sphere of Yugoslavian politics to advance its ideas. Maček was able to make ties and alliances with Serbian politicians, even forming a Serb-Croat opposition before the Second World War – Sabrina Ramet asserts that this refutes historical claims that all interwar Yugoslavian politics was defined by confrontation between Serbs and Croats.³³ Through this political manoeuvring, Maček advanced HSS goals of Croatian autonomy by orchestrating the agreement which saw the Banovina of Croatia formed in 1939 as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia. This agreement was met with distain by Pavelić and the Ustaše, as even though the goal of Croatian autonomy had been advanced, it had been done through cooperation with Yugoslavia, southern Slav political unity still existed, and the new autonomous unity did not include the entirety of Bosnia and Hercegovina.³⁴ Though the Banovina would not last the Axis invasion of the

³⁰ Tanner, *Croatia*, 125; Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*, 3–4. The 1929 establishment of the Ustaše is contested by Clissold, who claims it was actually formed with Italian support two to three years after the assassination of Radić. According to Clissold the group claimed 1929 as their founding year to portray the image that they represented a home-grown movement rather than an externally sponsored paramilitary.

³¹ Biondich, "Vladko Maček and the Croat Political Right, 1928–1941," 204.

³² Biondich, 206–8.

³³ Sabrina P. Ramet, "Vladko Maček and Croatian History: An Introduction," *Contemporary European History* 16, no. 02 (May 2007): 202, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777307003785>.

³⁴ Tanner, *Croatia*, 133.

Second World War, it demonstrated that the Ustaše was not the only embodiment of Croatian national and autonomist ideologies.

The violent manifestation of Croatian separatist ideology came to worldwide attention in the years before the outbreak of the Second World War in the form of the fascist Ustaše. Ante Pavelić built his political support base in Italy and in 1932 he launched an unsuccessful incursion into Yugoslavia from Italian controlled Zadar on the Dalmatian coast.³⁵ He drew further international attention in October of 1934 when the Ustaše, in conjunction with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), orchestrated the assassination of Yugoslav King Alexander during a visit to Marseilles France.³⁶ Mussolini's Italy responded by placing Pavelić and some of the other known Ustaše who were living in their territory into prison. However, the perpetrators escaped further punishment from the international community as, according to Clissold, France and Britain were unwilling to strain their diplomatic relationship with Italy during a time when they were seeking to draw Italy out of the orbit of Hitler's Germany.³⁷ While the leadership was interned they continued their planning for their campaign against Yugoslavia. The outbreak of the Second World War, and the Axis engagement in hostilities against Yugoslavia gave this small group of fascist political terrorists an opening to pursue their program with the support of fascist Germany and Italy. The result would be a tragedy for the region.

Ante Pavelić and the Ustaše would come to power in Croatia and its surrounding territories on the back of the initial Axis success of the Second World War. In April of 1941 Axis forces invaded Yugoslavia and overwhelmed their military forces.³⁸ In the years before the Axis invasion, Hitler had attempted to gain the favour of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

³⁵ Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*, 3–4.

³⁶ Tanner, *Croatia*, 126.

³⁷ Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*, 4.

³⁸ Tanner, *Croatia*, 141.

However, Yugoslavia affirmed a pro-Allied stance in late March of 1941. According to Clissold this caused Hitler to shift his support to the exiled Pavelić and promise him an independent Croatia. In Clissold's words 'with some 200 hurriedly mustered Ustaše, Pavelić was sent in by the Italians and told he could take over Croatia'.³⁹ They soon sought to create 'a carbon copy of Nazi Germany'.⁴⁰ Thus the wartime Independent State of Croatia, backed by Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, was founded by a small group of exiled fascist extremist separatists.

The Ustaše implemented its racist and fascist ideology into this state which aimed at creating a defined homeland for pure ethnic Croats to the exclusion Serbians and all other nationalities (Bosnian Muslims were considered Croatian). The result was horrific genocidal atrocities being perpetrated.⁴¹ According to Nevenko Bartulin the Ustaše sought to redefine the Croatian nation around the idea that Croats as a distinct racial group, in direct contactisation to the pan-Slav vision of Yugoslavia. These racial characteristics were embodied in the concept of the 'new Croatian man' as an archetypal figure derived from pre-War racial thinking.⁴² This image rejected liberal democracy whilst promoting a vision of militancy, and was portrayed as '[t]he only alternative to communism and national suicide' – likewise an image for women being subservient to husbands and confined to the domestic sphere was advanced.⁴³ The Ustaše adopted and martyred historical Croatian national leaders including Stačević and Radić (despite that majority, but not all, of Radić's HSS were in opposition to the Ustaše).⁴⁴ This theme of celebrating nationalist heroes would be maintained

³⁹ Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*, 4.

⁴⁰ Tanner, *Croatia*, 144.

⁴¹ Goldstein, *Croatia: A History*, 135–36.

⁴² Nevenko Bartulin, "The Ideal Nordic – Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia," *Review of Croatian History* 1 (2009): 190–93.

⁴³ Yeomans, *Visions of Annihilation*, 126–29.

⁴⁴ Stipe Kljajić, "Apostles, Saints' Days, and Mass Mobilisation: The Sacralization of Politics in the Ustasha State," in *The Utopia of Terror: Life and Death in Wartime Croatia*, Rochester Studies in East and Central Europe (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015), 156–57.

by post-War Croatian separatists. With the eventual Allied victory of the Second World War, the Independent State of Croatia was abolished. Marshal Tito reformed Yugoslavia along communist ideals. This however did not stop the political idea of Croatian independence. In the post-War years it would develop into a worldwide diaspora-based movement consisting of different actors - some purely political and opposed to the use of violence. Others embraced terrorism and continued the fascist ideology of the Ustaše.

Post-War Separatism

The idea of Croatian separatism permeated the vast Croatian diaspora network which spanned the globe from Argentina to Canada to New Zealand. This diaspora network saw the emergence of separatist organisations willing to go to extreme lengths to achieve their aims. Inspired by the Ustaše, and founded largely by former Ustaše members, these groups are defined by their goal of the destruction of Yugoslavia and the establishment of an independent Croatia through *violent and terrorist means*. The first of these was the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) founded by Pavelić himself after escaping capture by Allied forces after the War. The HOP referred to itself as Ustaše and considered itself a direct continuation of the organisation. Mark Aarons and John Loftus have documented the scale of the escape networks in which Ustaša and other fascists used to escape from Europe after the Allied victory in their engaging and highly provocative work *Ratlines: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets*.⁴⁵ The authors assert that Pavelić and other Ustaše were able to escape due to initially British and later American ambivalence. It is claimed this is a result of a “Hands Off” attitude taken by the western powers. Wanting to utilise their former enemies against their new communist adversaries of the Cold War, despite

⁴⁵ Mark Aarons and John Loftus, *Ratlines: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets* (London: Heinemann, 1991).

the crimes committed, led to an attitude which turned a blind eye to the emigration of these individuals.⁴⁶ In the authors' words 'if the Americans handed over the head of the movement to the enemy, it would be impossible to expect loyalty from the Ustashi rank and file.'⁴⁷ These escaped fascists would see the creation of terrorist organisations in their new host countries which advocated violent methods to achieve Croatian independence.

The first wave of post-Second World War Croatian separatist terrorism was perpetrated by Croatians who had escaped Yugoslavia after the War, but had remained in Europe, and participated in incursions back into their homeland. These groups were organised by Pavelić and known as the Križari (Crusaders). These attempts failed overwhelmingly, and many of these insurgents were captured. Tito ensured these captives were prosecuted in very public show trials.⁴⁸ Following the failure of the Križari the separatist movement shifted their operations to a more long-term focus, based in countries where the leadership had migrated to. From Argentina, Pavelić established the HOP as an overarching unifying force for all Croatian separatists worldwide.⁴⁹ The general strategy of the Croatian separatists led by Pavelić fitted into the larger geopolitical struggle of the Cold War. Seeking to position themselves as allies against communism, the movement believed an independent Croatian state could be achieved in accordance with a western victory over communism if the Cold War turned ever broke into open conflict, which was believed to be inevitable. Thus, the decade following the end of the war saw the abandonment of terrorist methods which had characterised the pre-War Ustaše, though they maintained their radical ideology.⁵⁰ Croatian independence was hardly a primary policy concern of United States or Great Britain however.

⁴⁶ Aarons and Loftus, 84–85.

⁴⁷ Aarons and Loftus, 85.

⁴⁸ Aarons and Loftus, 120–21.

⁴⁹ Tokić, "Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in Post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism," 741.

⁵⁰ Tokić, 743.

All-out war was not to occur in the Cold War, and the separatists were stuck waiting for a conflict which would never happen.⁵¹ A portion of the next generation of diaspora based Croatian separatists would therefore revert to terrorist methods.⁵² This would result in the fracturing of Pavelić's HOP, and the international movement for Croatian separatism became split into competing factions utilising different strategies.

Pavelić's leadership would be challenged by other émigré separatists with slightly different agendas. In their review of Croatian extremism in 1980, the CIA identified four major factions of the extremist diaspora separatist movement. They were recognised as extremist due to their willingness to use violence in pursuit of separatist ideas and Ustaše connections, both in personnel and ideology. These factions were: the HOP founded by Pavelić, the Croatian National Committee (HNO-J) formed in Germany, the Croatian National Resistance (HNO-L) founded in Spain by the Ustaše General Vjekoslav Lubrić (the former head of the Jasenovac concentration camp), and the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB) established 1961 in Australia.⁵³ The HNO-J and the HNO-L would be the first ideological splits from the HOP, the HRB was a later development. The HNO-J was founded in 1950 by Branko Jelić, an Ustaše member who was imprisoned in the United Kingdom for the duration of the Second World War. This group maintained the goal of Croatian independence, however they looked to include individuals of a broader political spectrum and stressed attempts to reject the authoritarianism which had characterised Pavelić's regime.⁵⁴ They also later broke with the HOP's western orientation in the Cold War,

⁵¹ Mate Nikola Tokić, "The End of 'Historical-Ideological Bedazzlement': Cold War Politics and Émigré Croatian Separatist Violence, 1950–1980," *Social Science History* 36, no. 3 (2012): 428–230.

⁵² Tokić, "Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in Post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism," 743.

⁵³ "Yugoslav Emigre Extremists - 29/05/1980" (Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, n.d.), 2–3, CIA Online Library, accessed January 8, 2017.

⁵⁴ Tokić, "Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in Post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism," 741–42.

opening discussions with the Soviets about potentially establishing an independent Croatia in the event of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia.⁵⁵

Vjekoslav Luberić led the HNO-L faction against Pavelić from Spain. This was established sometime around 1955. The CIA described the HNO-L as ‘quasimilitary’ and ‘one of the most active extremist [Croatian separatist] groups’.⁵⁶ It consisted of the conservative element of the extremists who wished to continue pursuing separatism through terrorism rather than relying on Cold War geopolitics, and they believed Pavelić had begun abandoning aspects of the separatist ideology. This was because Pavelić had begun engaging in discussions with the surviving elements of royalist Serbs for the potential partition of Yugoslavia. This could have involved ceding territories in Bosnia and Dalmatia. Luberić’s faction perceived these regions as essential to the historical Croatian nation. The very idea of negotiating the partition of this perceived Croatian territory was considered the ultimate betrayal to the national cause.⁵⁷ The ideological and methodological divisions between the HOP, HNO-J, and the HNO-L demonstrate clearly that the organisations seeking Croatian independence through violent means in the post-War years were not unified, despite their common connection to the Ustaše. Each organisation attracted diaspora support and separately carried out their own programs – in conjunction to other diaspora groups who advocated for separatism without violence.⁵⁸ From this split movement the HRB would emerge in Australia and demonstrate how Croatian extremist separatist violence could impact a western country in the Cold War.

⁵⁵ See Chapter 3.

⁵⁶ “Yugoslav Emigre Extremists - 29/05/1980,” 2, 9–10.

⁵⁷ Tokić, “Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in Post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism,” 742.

⁵⁸ Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism & the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), 24–25, <http://it.ceu.hu/vpn>.

Croatian Separatism in Australia

In Australia there was several different organisations embodying the ideology of Croatian independence. ASIO documents identify eleven different Croatian separatist groups of ‘security interest’ in Australia, ranging from the Croatian National Council which sought impendence along legal lines and within a United Nations framework, through to Pavelić’s HOP. Importantly this document indicates that the HOP had not planned ‘revolutionary activity’ in Australia and would only act to achieve their goals in favourable conditions, that being open conflict between the west and Communism.⁵⁹ All of these groups of interest to the Australian Government did have deep links with the Croatia diaspora.

ASIO’s 1967 position paper on Croatian Extremists in Australia attempts to frame the relationship between the Croatian diaspora and the ideology of separatism. This report, whilst acknowledging the divisions between different separatist actors, states that for several reasons ‘the success of any extremist [separatist] revolutionary venture, however fanatical, and irrespective of the rights and wrongs, *is likely to receive at least the passive approval of a large section of the Croatian community, even the most law abiding; who will correspondingly provide moral and financial support when such seem likely to fail*’.⁶⁰ Some of the justification used by ASIO is questionable, particularly the racially charged suggestion that all people from the Balkans are more subject to ‘extremist views’ and are further ‘swayed by deep-seated beliefs and prejudices’ compared to ‘liberal Western countries’. Despite this reasoning, ASIO’s conclusion that much of the diaspora had sympathies towards a separatist ideology and the ideas was prevalent in the community was probably accurate. Given that much of the diaspora in Australia (and elsewhere in the world) were refugees from Yugoslavia (be it wartime, political, or economic) it would not be surprising to find strong anti-Yugoslav

⁵⁹ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, March 27, 1973), sec. A5.

⁶⁰ Emphasis added. “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A5.

sympathies. Thus, the suggestion that extremist separatist organisations, defined by their use of violence, were tacitly condoned in a widespread way by the diaspora is likely. As will be demonstrated in the following section, despite the apparent wide acceptance of separatist ideology, the membership of these violent separatist organisations in Australia would remain very small.

The most active and potentially dangerous to Australian citizens of all Croatian separatist groups in Australia would prove to be the HRB. This is the organisation primarily responsible for perpetrating acts of terror on Australian soil in the 1960s and 1970s. A Federal Police Report on the HRB asserts that the organisation was formed on the 9th of June 1961 by four individuals; Jure Maric, Gaza Pasti, Josip Oblak, and Ilija Tolic during a meeting in Sydney. These men were members of the HOP, however were ‘critical of the lack of progress being made by the Liberation Movement towards achieving their aims’.⁶¹ They rejected the HOP’s plan to wait for conflict between the west and the Soviets. They instead believed that Croatian independence could be achieved through engaging in violent subversion of the Yugoslav state from their position as émigrés in Australia. HRB terrorism would target primarily symbolic Yugoslav and Serbian targets in Australia, ranging from consulates, to Orthodox Churches and cultural centres. At times Yugoslav Government officials were also targeted by HRB bombings. Mass casualty attacks were avoided, however one attack in Sydney’s George Street in 1972 did injure 16 innocent bystanders. The terror activities of the HRB in Australian and overseas will be analysed in chapter 2, beginning with the 1963 incursion into Yugoslavia.

Despite being only a small element of the whole Croatian diaspora in Australia, the members of the HRB held important and influential positions within this community. It is

⁶¹ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A7.

explicitly stated in the 1967 ASIO report that ‘members of the HRB can be found in every major Croatian organisation in Australia’ and through these organisations they sought to attract new members to the HRB.⁶² ASIO listed several known members of the HRB who subsequently key office holders in more mainstream Croatian organisations. This included the Secretary of the Canberra branch of the Australian Croatian association, a social organisation which sought to ‘assist integration of Croats into the Australian community whilst maintaining the cultural heritage of their background’.⁶³ As already established, sympathy for separatist ideas was widespread among the Croatian diaspora in Australia. The privileged position of HRB members in these community organisations likely meant that they could further affirm separatist ideas throughout the diaspora. Thus, these sympathies could be exploited to generate tacit approval for a culture of violence made in the name of Croatian separatism. HRB membership however would remain relatively low despite the proliferation of separatist thinking in the diaspora – the significance of HRB members in influential community positions came in their ability to reinforce separatist ideology and build general approval for HRB actions, rather than recruiting many members.

Statistical Analysis of post-War Croatian Migration to Australia

Before investigating how HRB membership was related to post-War Croatian migration, it is important to understand the scale of post-War Croatian migration to Australia and how this bolstered the diaspora. Post-War migration records to Australia are well maintained and have been published by the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP). However, all arrivals from the period in question were recorded according to their last country of residence. This means the individuals who would become part of the Croatian community

⁶² “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A5.

⁶³ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A5.

in Australia are recorded as arriving from Yugoslavia. The records give no indication of what number of the 159, 090 Yugoslav migrants who arrived from 1947-74 (out of a total migration to Australia of 3, 471, 816) identified as Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian, Slovene, Albanian, Bosnian, Yugoslav, or something else.⁶⁴ Given the large number of Croats in Australia there has been an assumption that Croats constituted majority of post-War Yugoslav migrants. John Blaxland states in the second volume of *The Official History of ASIO* that of the Yugoslav migrants ‘around half were Croats’. Furthermore, he uses ASIO’s estimate that ‘nearly 50, 000 Yugoslav migrants had moved to Australia between 1945 and 1963’.⁶⁵ This is indicative of contemporary general assumptions regarding post-War Croatian migration. By cross referencing the official arrival records of Yugoslav arrivals from the DIBP with data from the 2006 Australian national census, which recorded the national ancestry of each participant and the year of migrant arrival if the respondent was born overseas, a general approximation of what percentage of Yugoslav migrants in these years considered themselves Croatian can be established.

The 2006 Australian census asked participants to record up to two responses indicating their ancestry. Figure 1 shows the relevant sections of the census.

⁶⁴ “Historical Migration Statistics - September 2016” (Australian Government: Department of Immigration and Border Protection), accessed March 23, 2018, <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/reports-publications/research-statistics/statistics/live-in-australia/historical-migration-statistics>.

⁶⁵ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

18 What is the person's ancestry? • Provide up to two ancestries only. • Examples of 'Other – please specify' are: GREEK, VIETNAMESE, HMONG, DUTCH, KURDISH, MAORI, LEBANESE, AUSTRALIAN SOUTH SEA ISLANDER. • See page 7 of the Census Guide for more information. • Remember to mark boxes like this: ☐	☐ English ☐ Irish ☐ Italian ☐ German ☐ Chinese ☐ Scottish ☐ Australian Other – please specify <table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>																																																																																																					☐ English ☐ Irish ☐ Italian ☐ German ☐ Chinese ☐ Scottish ☐ Australian Other – please specify <table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>																																																																																																				

Figure 1⁶⁶

Data from the 2006 census indicates how many people who considered themselves to have primarily a Croatian ancestry migrated to Australia between 1947-74 and were still living in Australia in 2006.




Figure 2⁶⁷

⁶⁶ “2006 Census Household Form - 08/08/2006” (Australian Bureau of Statistics), accessed March 22, 2018, www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/historicalinformation2006?opendocument.

⁶⁷ IBM Corp, *IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows*, version 25.0 (Armonk, NY: IBM Corp, 2017).

This number is 32,922. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these Croatian arrivals across the years in question, it culminates with a spike in arrivals during 1969-1971. The number of 32,922 taken from the 2006 census data does not indicate the total size of Croatian migration to Australia for the years in question. Between 1974 and the 2006 census, individuals passed away, returned to their homeland, and possibly rejected their ancestry in favour of adopting an Australian identity. To find the approximate number of Yugoslav arrivals between 1947-74 who identified as Croatian, the number of Croatian primary ancestry responses who arrived in these years must be placed in proportion to the other nationalities which formerly constituted Yugoslavia and arrived in these years.

To find what percentage of the total Yugoslav migration between 1947-74 was made up by different nationalities, 2006 census data indicating the year of arrival in Australia was cross referenced with the recorded primary ancestry of each respondent. The data from this is indicated in table 1. Responses which indicated one of the countries in question as a second ancestry have been omitted as they only constitute a small number of the total and do not make a significant difference to the final numbers.

	Croatian	Serbian	Macedonian	Montenegrin	Bosnian	Slovene	Total ⁶⁸
Number of migrants 1947-74 recorded in 2006 census	32,922	19,683	24,347	203	1,440	4,901	83,496
Percentage	39.43%	23.57%	29.16%	0.24%	1.72%	5.87%	100%

Table 1⁶⁹

This data indicates the percentage of Croatian migration for among post-War migrants from Yugoslavia was closer to 40%. This is counter to Blaxland's larger contention of 50%. This

⁶⁸ For the purposes of this investigation, those who identified with an Albanian ancestry have been excluded. With the available data it is impossible to determine if these respondents came from within Yugoslavia, Albania or elsewhere. The total number of respondents who recorded a primary Albanian identity in the 2006 census and migrated between 1947-74 is 1, 210. This inclusion of this number into the investigation would not alter the final conclusions in a significant way.

⁶⁹ Australian Bureau of Statistics, *2006 Census Data*, accessed March 20, 2018, <http://abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/historicaldata2006>.

demonstrates that migrants who saw themselves as Croatian were not close to making up majority of migrants from Yugoslavia. They were undoubtedly the largest single group, however the number of Macedonians at approximately 30%, and Serbians just below 25% were still significant.

Using the above percentages, it can be approximated that around 62, 700 of the 150, 090 Yugoslav migrants who arrived in Australia between 1947 and 1974 considered themselves as Croatian. This figure would call into question Blaxland's assertions that 50, 000 Croatian migrants arrived between 1945-63, especially given the spike in arrivals indicated in figure 2 in 1969-71. Along with these Croatian arrivals there were some 35, 500 Serbians, and 44, 000 Macedonians arriving in this time among other nationalities from the former Yugoslavia. The Croatian proportion of post-War migration to Australia was indeed significant and constituted the single largest national migrant group from the former Yugoslavia, however Croats did not make up a majority nor even half of Yugoslav migrants to Australia.

Statistical Analysis of the HRB in Australia

Documents tabled before the Australian Government following the Australian Federal Police's Murphy Raid on ASIO's headquarters in 1973 provide an insight into the number of individuals suspected by the Australian Government of being involved with the HRB. One folio provides a list from 1967 of 131 individuals known to be associated with the HRB, their associated code names, and their suspected level involvement with the HRB.⁷⁰ Through additional research in the online catalogue of the National Archives of Australia, the year of

⁷⁰ "Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14," sec. A7.

arrival in Australia for most of these individuals has also been found.⁷¹ There are a few individuals whose date of arrival could not be found in the online achieves, and some details on the document are not legible. Thus, several cases are excluded from the following analysis. This data from 1967 relates directly to the most active period of Croatian terrorism in Australia. The decade of the 1960s saw the highest concentration of Croatian terrorism in Australia, and by the mid-1970s it had diminished as an issue. Even by 1968 members of the Australian intelligence community were unsure of the HRB was still functioning.⁷² The following will show how the arrival of the most active members of the HRB in Australia were spread within patterns of Croatian migration to Australia, and the distribution of the level of involvement of known members.

There were more than 200 official members of the HRB in Australia by 1967, the exact number was unknown however.⁷³ Most of these members were believed to have been recruited in the early 1960s - with 21 before 1961, 82 in 1962, and 18 in 1963.⁷⁴ After this date Australian intelligence documents do not indicate further recruitment of individuals to the HRB. This means that the group became less active, or alternatively the Australian intelligence agencies had no idea of HRB activities. The latter option was almost certainly not the case. Whilst Croatian terrorism was prioritised below Communist and other left-wing terrorism by ASIO in the 1960s, it was certainly not completely ignored.⁷⁵ Figure 3 below

⁷¹ See <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRRetrieve/Interface/SearchScreens/BasicSearch.aspx> for the online catalogue used.

⁷² Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

⁷³ "Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14," sec. A7.

⁷⁴ "Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14," sec. A7.

⁷⁵ Further investigation of ASIO's relationship to Croatian separatists will be conducted in chapter 2. See also Tokić, "Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973."

shows the known years of arrival in Australia the distribution of level of involvement for these known members of the HRB in 1967.




Figure 3⁷⁶

These results demonstrate that the individuals who would become members of the HRB in the 1960s arrived in increasing numbers over the decade of the 1950s until 1961. After 1961 the numbers decrease to only a handful. There is only one example of a pre-War migrant being known to join the organisation, which suggests strongly that the radicalised elements of the Croatian diaspora were almost exclusively drawn from post-war migrants. Three of the four founders of the HRB, Maric, Pasti, and, Tolic, arrived between 1954 and 1958 (Oblak's date of arrival is unknown). The sudden drop after 1961 is important to note because it indicates that either arrivals after this date were not interested in becoming involved with the

⁷⁶ IBM Corp, *IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows*.

HRB, or the group stopped recruiting. This suggests that the radical elements of the Croatian diaspora in Australia were intimately tied to a specific wave of post-War migrants – given the proximity to the end of the Second World War it is likely many of these migrants who joined the HRB had connections to the Ustaše, if they were not Ustaše themselves.

All suspected members of the HRB were assigned a number 1 through to 6 to indicate their level of involvement, with a 1 being the most involved and a 6 being the least. Unfortunately, the documents do not explain the criteria used to determine each level. Figure 5 shows the distribution of involvement of the 126 individuals whose data is accessible.




Figure 4⁷⁷

⁷⁷ IBM Corp.

Most of the members were indicated to have a level of involvement denoted as 5. This would suggest that majority of members were not intimately associated with the leadership of the group, however they were more than just peripheral associates (which would more likely be identified with a 6 - of which there were relatively few). The second most numerous group were the most involved group, indicated with a 1. There was 23 of these individuals, and they were most likely part of the inner leadership circle and of most interest to the Australian Government. The group marked as a level 4 involvement is also significant in size; the other three levels have only been used sparingly however. The mean level of involvement is 3.96, indicating that more people were in the outer levels of involvement than the more intimate circles. Whilst all those listed by the Australian Government were members of the HRB, it was really the 23 level 1 members who likely formed the core of the group and were its driving force. These individuals, arriving in Australia between 1949 and 1963, were a very small, but hugely significant proportion of the Croatian diaspora in Australia.

Post-Second World War migration saw approximately 62, 700 Croats arrive in Australia by 1974. A small subset of this number, with an ideology traced from Ante Pavelić's Ustaše, would consider the use of terrorism in Australia as a legitimate means of advocating for an independent Croatian state. It has been demonstrated above that the Croats who would go on to form or become members of the most dangerous extremist Croatian separatist group in Australia, the HRB, would be drawn almost exclusively from post-War migrants arriving before 1961. Although the numbers of Croatian migrants would increase yearly until peaking between 1969-71, this did not result in a larger membership of the HRB. The actions of radical Croatian extremists will define the study of this diaspora during the Cold War. Despite the small size of this extreme element and connection to a very specific period of immigration, their separatist ideology generated sympathy throughout the entire Croatian diaspora. Chapter two will show the acts of terror committed by this organisation and how this became entangled

into Australian domestic politics, raising Australian concerns over their relationship with Yugoslavia.

Chapter 2 - Terror in Australia: Government, Intelligence and Police Reaction to Croatian Extremism

Don't use your phone and don't use mine
Don't speak treason, they're tapping the line
Break in, stake out, tell it in code
Everything is legal, anything goes
The night's getting darker and an ill wind blows
Your life's in a databank at ASIO⁷⁸

Violent Croatian extremism was a persistent menace for the Australian Government over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Despite this ongoing threat to public security, anti-communist attitudes meant that Croatian terrorism maintained a lower priority for Australian intelligence services and the Federal Government than combating Soviet security challenges. The election of Whitlam's Labor government in 1972 coincided with a drastic reduction in Croatian terror activities in Australia and there was a shift in public rhetoric between these governments. This chapter asks the question: what was the significance of the entanglement in the Australian domestic sphere between the government, the radical separatist element of the Croatian diaspora, and the intelligence services, and how did this evolve over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s? It will be demonstrated that the result of this extended period of Croatian extremist activity and interaction with the government would be that Australian relations with Yugoslavia became an issue of heightened importance within domestic politics during the 1960s and 70s, although there was little change in actual policy. There were four stages of this process; the 1963 incursion marking the beginning of Croatian extremist activity in Australia, the initial wave of Croatian terrorism which occurred during a Liberal-Country Federal Government between 1963-1972, the Whitlam election and 1973

⁷⁸ Chorus from the song "ASIO" by released in 1984 by Australian band Redgum. Redgum's music was associated with political activism in Australia during the 1970s and 1980s. See "Redgum," *Encyclopedia of Australian Rock and Pop* (Ian McFarlane, 1999), <https://web.archive.org/web/20030515200023/http://www.whammo.com.au/encyclopedia.asp?articleid=679>. for more information.

Murphy Raid, and finally the activities of radical Croatian separatists from 1972-1979 culminating with the Croatian 6 conspiracy.

The first section will demonstrate how Croatian extremism was introduced into the Australian public and political spheres following the 1963 incursion of Australian based Croatian extremists into Yugoslavia. This event raised the issue of right-wing Croatian terrorism for Australian intelligence and police agencies for the first time and it forced the government of the day to reluctantly address the problem. The following section develops these themes by analysing Croatian terror activities in Australia between 1963-1972 and how the government, ASIO, and police all engaged with this issue. This timeframe corresponds to a Liberal-Country Coalition Federal Government, which maintained a staunch anti-communist rhetoric and was dealing with an increasingly unpopular involvement in the Vietnam War.

The third section will include a historical overview of Gough Whitlam's election in 1972 as leader of the Australian Labor Party, the shift away from the previous government's harsh anti-communism, the infamous Murphy Raid on ASIO's headquarters, and how this raid did little to change ASIO priorities until a Royal Commission investigating Australian intelligence was concluded in 1977. Following this introduction to the Whitlam years the chapter's final section will investigate the government's relationship to radical Croatian separatist movements and domestic intelligence services from 1972-1979. This includes the four years from 1975-1979 where the government was again formed by a Liberal-Country coalition after Whitlam was dismissed as Prime Minister. It will demonstrate a shift in government rhetoric regarding Croatian extremism, and that Croatian extremism was radically reduced in these years. Furthermore, it will show that government and ASIO policy changed little in these years - it was police efforts and the disorganisation of the HRB which resulted in this reduction in extremist activity. The chapter will conclude with the 1979

Croatian 6 conspiracy which marks the end of prominent Croatian extremist activity in Australia. This event raises questions of how the Yugoslav Government was entangled into this issue and used this entanglement to challenge Australian sovereignty. This question will be at the core of the third chapter's investigation.

Terror Emerges 1963

The 1960s saw the first violent acts of terror by radical Croatian separatists planned in Australia and committed both domestically and in Yugoslavia. This string of events was launched with the 1963 incursion of 9 members of the HRB into Yugoslavia which aimed at starting a general uprising against the Yugoslav state in the name of Croatian independence. This group planned the incursion in Australia, and two of its members were Australian citizens. It was a futile effort and the group were soon all arrested after their infiltration into Yugoslavia.⁷⁹ The incursion of Australian based separatists elevated for the first-time concerns over Yugoslav relations within the Australian domestic sphere. This theme would be continued over the next two decades. By September of 1972 there had been 47 incidents of violence recorded that were suspected to have been associated with migrant communities from Yugoslavia according to a document of Dr James Cairns. Dr Cairns was a member of parliament in the opposition Labor party. He was seeking to expose the Liberal-Country government for supposedly covering up the actions of Croatian extremists in Australia. This document recorded violence from the entire Yugoslav community in Australia, not just right wing Croatian separatists, and ranged from the above-mentioned incursion in 1963, to bombing attempts, through to incidents of rocks being thrown at embassies. Whilst the perpetrators of all these acts was not always known, eight are listed as definitely being

⁷⁹ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5; Tokić, "Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973," 395.

perpetrated by Croatians, and additionally 30 others were listed as directed against Yugoslav or national Serbian organisation and persons, inferring these had a connection to Croatian separatists.

The 1963 incursion into Yugoslavia is one of two events listed in Cairns' document which took place outside of Australia. The accompanying caption states 'Croatian extremists, from Australia, entered the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ... illegally for the stated purpose of waging a guerrilla campaign against the regime.'⁸⁰ This act demonstrated the violent lengths the extremist element of the Croatian separatist movement present Australia were willing to pursue. The 1963 incursion only incurred a minimal public response from the government however. Mate Tokić has demonstrated that prior to the 1960s, nationalist Croatian organisations in Australia received little attention from the government despite known Ustaše associations. This was largely because the extreme Croatian separatists in Australia were anti-communist. Given the Cold War context, the government's anti-communist priority resulted in a 'rather accommodating attitude' towards Croatian separatists.⁸¹ This attitude fits into the post-war "Hands Off" view of British and American intelligence investigated in chapter one. According to Tokić, after the 1963 incursion the Liberal government changed little in attitude or policy towards Croatian radicals partly because of the support given to the Liberal Party from the Croatian community in Australia.⁸² Whilst these approaches began to change in the coming years and with the emergence of further Croatian violence on Australian soil, anti-communist attitudes would continue to remain the public focus of the Australian Government.

⁸⁰ "The Honourable Dr James 'Jim' Ford CAIRNS - Incidents with Connotations of Violence within the Yugoslav Community - Croatian Terrorism," 1, National Archives of Australia, accessed June 2, 2018, naa.gov.au.

⁸¹ Tokić, "Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973," 400–401.

⁸² Tokić, 402–3.

There were however privately held concerns within the Liberal-Country government over the implications of Croatian separatist activities in Australia. Sir Garfield Barwick, a prominent member of the Menzies Liberal-Country government, wrote a letter in January 1964 addressing his concern over the implication Croatian terrorism and the 1963 incursion would have for relations with Yugoslavia. Barwick expresses a fear that the actions of Croatian extremists ‘may embarrass our relations with other governments’.⁸³ He responds to Yugoslav claims that Australia was aware of and wittingly tolerated Croatian extremists by stating: ‘I am anxious to prevent any recurrence of behaviour ... on the part of the Yugoslavs [in Australia] ...which adversely affects our external relations’.⁸⁴ Barwick’s concern for international affairs leads him to saying more needed to be done in combating Croatian extremism, which was counter the public rhetoric of his government. The fact Barwick framed his discussions of Croatian extremism around the relationship with Yugoslavia demonstrates the degree Croatian extremists in Australia caused a heightened concern over Australian-Yugoslav relations within the Australian domestic sphere - even if these fears were not public.

Despite the government not having a detectable public change in policy, the 1963 incursion did see a change in attitude towards Croatian extremism within Australia’s intelligence community according to John Blaxland’s second volume of *The Official History of ASIO*. Blaxland states, ‘[i]t was this event [the 1963 incursion], more than any other, that led to ASIO’s investigations into the extremist community in Australia.’⁸⁵ In the years following this event ASIO and the Australian Federal Police began for the first time the monitoring and investigation of a right-wing organisation in the form of radical Croatian

⁸³ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A3.

⁸⁴ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A3.

⁸⁵ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

separatists.⁸⁶ It must be noted that police and AISO efforts were not united. The police looked to prevent crime by making arrests, whilst AISO's focus on intelligence gathering often allowed suspects carry out their conspiracies so maximum information could be gathered.⁸⁷ With increased surveillance of the Croatian diaspora questions were raised over the prevalence of Yugoslav intelligence operations in Australia. Circumstantial grounds for AISO to suspect Yugoslav intelligence operations being carried out in Australia, and infiltrating the Croatian diaspora lead to AISO monitoring Yugoslav diplomatic staff.⁸⁸ Australia's intelligence apparatus became more attuned to the threat of both Croatian terrorists, and the potential infiltration by Yugoslav agents – however these would continue to have a lower priority than AISO's anti-communist efforts.

Croatian Extremism in Australia under the Liberal-Country Government

Terror acts committed by extremist Croatian separatists would be seen in Australia following the 1963 incursion, raising public awareness in Australia of Croatian terrorism and Yugoslav relations. In 1964 Tomislav Lesic, an active member of the Croatian diaspora in Australia and suspected leader of the HRB, became embroiled in a bombing whilst the captured members of the 1963 incursion were awaiting trial in Yugoslavia.⁸⁹ The minute paper *Activities of Extremist Groups in the Yugoslav Migrant Community* prepared in 1970 for the Australian federal Attorney General's Department (AGD) asserts that Lesic had previously threatened staff at the Yugoslav consulate in the Sydney suburb of Double Bay. His aim was to gain a lesser sentence for the captured members of the incursion. On May 7th of 1964 a bomb blast

⁸⁶ Blaxland, vol. II, chap. 5.

⁸⁷ Blaxland, vol. II, chap. 5.

⁸⁸ Blaxland, vol. II, chap. 5.

⁸⁹ Blaxland, vol. II, chap. 5.

in the Sydney suburb of Petersham injured Lesic. Evidence suggests that he was drunk at the time and carrying gelignite explosive, which detonated prematurely, and this led police to the conclusion he was conspiring to set off an explosion at the Yugoslav embassy.⁹⁰ Lesic defended himself with the claim that he had been attacked by ‘pro-Yugoslav elements’. This assertion was dismissed by the police and there no subsequent evidence which could possibly defend this claim.⁹¹ The fact one of the most predominant leaders of a terrorist organisation could blow himself up in the street whilst drunk and far away from his target (Petersham is about 10km away from Double Bay) hints at the disorganisation and lack of direction of the HRB in the early 1960s. Random violent acts by the HRB would continue to be a threat to Australian public safety despite this apparent disorganisation. Violent actions against Yugoslav targets by the HRB, particularly consulates, would raise political awareness of the significance of Yugoslav relations, and Croatian terrorism in domestic Australia.

The Yugoslav consulate in the Sydney suburb of Double Bay remained a focal point for Croatian separatists to outpour aggression. Dr Cairns documents record six notable incidents, either bombings, serious threats, or demonstrations directed specifically towards this consulate from 1963-1972. Another nine similar incidents are indicated to have been directed towards the Yugoslav consulates in Melbourne, Canberra, and Perth.⁹² Not all these actions were anonymous or clandestine terror acts, there were examples of blatant and open aggression. In November of 1968 a Croatian protest of some 500 people took place outside the Double Bay consulate resulting in minor property damage. During this a certain Mirko Bosnjak managed to get on the roof of the consulate and steal the Yugoslav flag, which was subsequently burned by the gathered crowd. The Australian Government appeared to be

⁹⁰ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A10.

⁹¹ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A10.

⁹² “The Honourable Dr James ‘Jim’ Ford CAIRNS - Incidents with Connotations of Violence within the Yugoslav Community - Croatian Terrorism,” 1–6.

particularly interested in Bosnjak as in their words '[i]t is significant in an appreciation of Yugoslav psychology to note that BOSNJAK, although born some twelve months AFTER V.E. day, and although some 12, 000 miles from Yugoslavia which he left at the age of sixteen ... is prepared to literally out himself in danger for "the cause"'.⁹³ Such a large gathering is indicative of the prevalence Croatian separatist ideas had in the Australian diaspora, and it demonstrates the violent and non-violent elements. The distinction between these elements could become blurred at times as the HRB clearly influenced mainstream separatist thinking. Yet it is important to recognise the significant difference between terror acts of the HRB, and political demonstration. The fact that both violent and non-violent Croatian diasporic opposition to Yugoslavia could be seen recurringly at consulates made the Australian relationship with Yugoslavia increasingly visible to the public and further entangled into the sphere of domestic security.

Another attempted incursion into Yugoslavia by Croatian separatists occurred in June of 1972. On this occasion nine of the total nineteen insurgents had been residents of Australia previously. This event would be significant for Australian-Yugoslav relations and the implications of this incursions for this be investigated in the following chapter. Domestically the incursion also had an impact. According to Blaxland, ASIO was taken aback after learning the identities of the nine former Australian residents involved as most had not been previous persons of suspect.⁹⁴ The fallout of this event highlighted a deepened schism between the Attorney-General Ivor Greenwood and ASIO on one side, and the Federal Police on the other. The Federal Police had conducted raids of suspected separatist extremists in the aftermath of the 1972 incursion based on advice provided by the Yugoslav embassy in Canberra. Greenwood and ASIO asserted that this intelligence from the Yugoslav Government was

⁹³ "Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14," sec. A10.

⁹⁴ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

biased and used to spur action by Australian authorities against the Croatian community in Australia, though they could not prove this.⁹⁵ Despite whether these allegations had any validity, Blaxland contends that this view meant public security was compromised in Australia: ‘the troubles were affecting peace and security in Australia. This alone should have prompted the Greenwood to recast the issue in terms of domestic security and not just Cold War Politics’.⁹⁶ Greenwood’s rhetoric emphasises how continued terrorist activities meant the Australian Government was becoming increasingly aware of its relationship with Yugoslavia, and it indicated the disunity between the government, ASIO, and the police regarding how to manage Croatian separatist violence in Australia. The incursion also shows the general lack of intelligence available to the government regarding the most extreme elements of the Croatian diaspora.

In July of 1972, Greenwood made a statement in his capacity as Attorney General responding to assertions from the opposition Labor party that the government had been turning a blind eye to Croatian extremism in Australia. He condemned all politically motivated violence on Australian soil. He states explicitly ‘[i]f there are groups in this country engaged in training for terrorist or subversive activities ... they will not be tolerated.’⁹⁷ He subsequently rejects that there was a large scale organised radical Croatian extremist movement in Australia, instead he casts blame for violent acts onto individuals:

Investigations by the Commonwealth Police so far have *not revealed any credible evidence* that any Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisation exists in Australia. The Government cannot positively reject assertions that *individuals or groups of individuals* may be engaging in terrorist activities directed in some way to achieving Croatian independence.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Blaxland, vol. II, chap. 5.

⁹⁶ Blaxland, vol. II, chap. 5..

⁹⁷ “Statement by the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Senator Ivor J. Greenwood, Q.C. - 20/07/1972” (Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.), 1, Parliament of Australia Library, accessed February 21, 2018.

⁹⁸ Emphasis added. “Statement by the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Senator Ivor J. Greenwood, Q.C. - 20/07/1972,” 3.

In the final part of his statement, recent police investigations into suspected Croatian extremists are asserted to have been made on baseless assumptions – the fact Greenwood calls into question the intelligence used by the police indicates some divisions between the government and its chief law enforcement agency.⁹⁹ As already established, there was a radical Croatian separatist element present in Australia at this time which threatened public security, even if it was they were not highly organised. Despite the real possibility that YIS may have infiltrated Croatian separatist groups, Greenwoods rhetoric here deserves the same criticism as voiced by Blaxland in the above paragraph. Greenwood failed to address a national security issue, and such there was an ongoing threat to public security in Australia.

Continued violence by members of the Croatian community undoubtedly was an interest of both ASIO and the Australian Federal Police from 1963 to 1972, but the two agencies prioritised the issue differently. Croatian separatists were just one element of political violence that were being monitored by ASIO at this time. According to Sean Brawley there was a total of 176 incidents of ‘terrorist activity’ in Australia between just between 1969 to 1972. Only one quarter of these were attributed to known terror groups, the rest were ‘unclaimed’. Whilst the right-wing terror of Croatian separatists and National Socialists was identified, it is asserted that majority of the attacks in fact came from ‘local left-wing political actors’.¹⁰⁰ So how did the government manage the specific aspect of Croatian terrorism at this time in relation to the other threats that were presented? This was especially difficult in the Cold War context where left-wing extremism and communism were perceived as the primary threats, especially by the Liberal Party. As a result, the government maintained, in the words of Tokić, ‘a laissez-faire attitude toward their repeated acts of [Croatian separatist] violence

⁹⁹ “Statement by the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Senator Ivor J. Greenwood, Q.C. - 20/07/1972,” 5–6.

¹⁰⁰ Sean Brawley, “‘Days of Rage’ Downunder: Considering American Influences on ‘Home-Grown’ Terrorism and ASIO’s Response in 1970s Australia,” *Australian Historical Studies* 47, no. 2 (June 2016): 297.

and terrorism’ that would not change until after the election of the Whitlam government in 1972.¹⁰¹ Clamping down on potential communists simply outweighed government and intelligence efforts towards combating Croatian extremism.

Croatian terror and the visibility of anti-Yugoslav dissidents in Australia raised awareness over Australia’s interactions with Yugoslavia in both the public and political spheres. Newspaper headlines such as *Croatian Fascists Conduct Campaign of Terror in Aust*, became increasingly common and highlights this trend in public discourse.¹⁰² Heightened awareness to implications of Croatian terror within government correspondence is seen in a 1970s AGD minute paper which stated: ‘Australian Croats are involved in an international conspiracy directed against the TITO government of Yugoslavia’ and asserted that attacks against Yugoslav targets in Australia would likely continue. The paper conceded that it was difficult to acquire intelligence on groups such as the HRB. It is recommended that the only ‘effective preventive operations’ would be to protect Yugoslav Government officials/officials (consulates, ambassadors, and the embassy) within Australia in addition to maintaining ‘police supervision’ over the HRB.¹⁰³ This shows how the Croatian terrorist security threat to Yugoslav officials in Australia caused the government to dedicate more attention to this issue.

¹⁰¹ Tokić, “Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973,” 396.

¹⁰² M Jurjevec, “Croatian Fascists Conduct Campaign of Terror in Aust,” *Tribune*, November 20, 1963, Trove: National Library of Australia,

[https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/236849241?searchTerm=\(Croatian%20terrorism\)%20date%3A%5B1960%20TO%201972%5D&searchLimits=q-field0||q-type0=all||q-term0=Croatian+terrorism||q-field1=title%3A||q-type1=all||q-term1||q-field2=creator%3A||q-type2=all||q-term2||q-field3=subject%3A||q-type3=all||q-term3||q-year1-date=1960||q-year2-date=1972](https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/236849241?searchTerm=(Croatian%20terrorism)%20date%3A%5B1960%20TO%201972%5D&searchLimits=q-field0||q-type0=all||q-term0=Croatian+terrorism||q-field1=title%3A||q-type1=all||q-term1||q-field2=creator%3A||q-type2=all||q-term2||q-field3=subject%3A||q-type3=all||q-term3||q-year1-date=1960||q-year2-date=1972); see also “Ustasha Is Blamed for Much Violence,” *The Canberra Times*, September 18, 1972, Trove: National Library of Australia, [https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/102004643?searchTerm=\(Croatian%20terrorism\)%20date%3A%5B1960%20TO%201972%5D&searchLimits=q-field0||q-type0=all||q-term0=Croatian+terrorism||q-field1=title%3A||q-type1=all||q-term1||q-field2=creator%3A||q-type2=all||q-term2||q-field3=subject%3A||q-type3=all||q-term3||q-year1-date=1960||q-year2-date=1972](https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/102004643?searchTerm=(Croatian%20terrorism)%20date%3A%5B1960%20TO%201972%5D&searchLimits=q-field0||q-type0=all||q-term0=Croatian+terrorism||q-field1=title%3A||q-type1=all||q-term1||q-field2=creator%3A||q-type2=all||q-term2||q-field3=subject%3A||q-type3=all||q-term3||q-year1-date=1960||q-year2-date=1972).

¹⁰³ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A10.

There was a concentrated number of events connected to separatists Croats in Australia in the lead up to the 1972 federal election. These included bomb attacks on individuals (specifically Marijan Jurjevec, a Yugoslav immigrant who was very critical of Croatian nationalists was targeted along with his wife), an A.N.Z. bank branch displaying a Yugoslav promotion, a travel agency, and most significantly outside of the Yugoslav General Trade and Tourist agency in Sydney's George Street where sixteen bystanders were injured.¹⁰⁴ The Trade and Tourist Agency bombing would occur in September and would be momentous for the Australian public as it the first violent act by Croatian extremists in which Australians with no connection to Yugoslavia were victims of this violence. In conjunction with the 1972 incursion, this bombing would inject the issue of extremism into the upcoming federal election.

The week after the bombing at the Yugoslav General Trade and Tourist Agency the matter of Croatian extremists was debated at a parliamentary level. Gough Whitlam as leader of the opposition Labor party asserted that the George Street Trade and Tourist Agency Bombing demonstrated that there existed the greatest threat to innocent life ever within Australian history because of violent extremists. This was in stark contrast to the rhetoric of Greenwood just two months previously. Furthermore, Whitlam called for the suspension of parliamentary Standing Orders, so a new police and intelligence group could be formed with the specific task of preventing violent acts perpetrated by groups such as the Croatian separatists.¹⁰⁵ Such steps would not be taken, and interestingly after Whitlam won government

¹⁰⁴ "The Honourable Dr James 'Jim' Ford CAIRNS - Incidents with Connotations of Violence within the Yugoslav Community - Croatian Terrorism," 5; Brawley, "Days of Rage' Downunder: Considering American Influences on 'Home-Grown' Terrorism and ASIO's Response in 1970s Australia.," 295.

¹⁰⁵ "Debate on Terrorism: Whitlam Calls for Tighter Security Steps," *The Canberra Times*, September 20, 1972, Trove: National Library of Australia, [https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/102005027?searchTerm=\(Yugoslav%20bombing\)%20date%3A%5B1972%20TO%201973%5D&searchLimits=q-field0||q-type0=all||q-term0=Yugoslav+bombing||q-field1=title%3A||q-type1=all||q-term1||q-field2=creator%3A||q-type2=all||q-term2||q-field3=subject%3A||q-type3=all||q-term3||q-year1-date=1972||q-year2-date=1973#](https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/102005027?searchTerm=(Yugoslav%20bombing)%20date%3A%5B1972%20TO%201973%5D&searchLimits=q-field0||q-type0=all||q-term0=Yugoslav+bombing||q-field1=title%3A||q-type1=all||q-term1||q-field2=creator%3A||q-type2=all||q-term2||q-field3=subject%3A||q-type3=all||q-term3||q-year1-date=1972||q-year2-date=1973#).

a few months later he did not act on this suggestion himself despite making Croatian extremism an issue of the election. This rhetoric utilised by the opposition and Whitlam forced the issue of Croatian terrorism to the forefront of the Australian public consciousness after the 1972 bombing, and thus they could attempt to capitalise on the perceived unwillingness of the Country-Liberal coalition to crack down on Croatian extremist as part of their election campaign – this event also further propelled a heightened concern over Yugoslav relations into Australian domestic politics.

Whitlam's Election and the Murphy Raid

1972 stands as an important marking year of Australian political history. Since 1949 a coalition between the Liberal and Country parties had held power in the Federal Government, and this period saw Sir Robert Menzies becomes Australia's longest serving Prime Minister to date.¹⁰⁶ In 1972 Gough Whitlam achieved an astounding victory over the Liberal-Country coalition as leader of the Labor party. This was achieved on the back of an ambitious platform of social reform and with the use of a well-orchestrated campaign. The catch-phrase of Whitlam's 1972 election victory was 'it's time'. According to interviews with former Australian Labor party political advisors Bruce Hawker and Neil Lawrence, this slogan impeccably appealed to uncertain voters who were seeking change after over two decades of a Liberal-Country government.¹⁰⁷ In 1975 Gough Whitlam would be removed from the Prime Ministership by the Australian Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, in the infamous 1975 constitutional crisis which followed after the Labor party lost control of the Senate and was unable to pass the supply bill.¹⁰⁸ Though Whitlam's government would only survive for three

¹⁰⁶ Gregory Melleuish, "Australian Politics Explainer: Robert Menzies and the Birth of the Liberal-National Coalition," *The Conversation*, October 4, 2017, 2.

¹⁰⁷ Matt Liddy, "It's Time: 9 Reasons Gough Whitlam's Iconic 1972 Political Campaign Worked," *ABC News*, October 22, 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-22/its-time-gough-whitlam-1972-campaign/5831996>.

¹⁰⁸ McDougall, "Edward Gough Whitlam, 1916–2014," 36.

years, the wide-ranging program of social reform and the controversial nature of Whitlam's dismissal as Prime Minister meant this government has become entrenched into the popular political historical memory of Australia. The Whitlam government saw a paradigm shift in rhetoric and a hardening of attitude towards Croatian extremism. After the 1972 election there was a drastic reduction in Croatian terrorism in Australia. It would be incorrect however to attribute this reduction solely to the rhetoric of Whitlam's government – police action and the breakdown of the HRB's organisation were other key contributing factors.

During its short tenure the Whitlam government determinately pursued a policy of social reform with was a focus on education and health. Medibank was introduced as a state sponsored health insurance.¹⁰⁹ Attitudes towards migrants also shifted. Instead of a policy solely focused on integrating migrants into an Australian way life, multiculturalism was adopted; this focused on retaining the culture of new arrivals within Australia.¹¹⁰ Whitlam's attempts to undertake massive social changes requiring high amounts of government expenditure in a very short period attracted negative attention. McDougall explains that economics has often been perceived as the 'Achilles heel' of the Whitlam government'.¹¹¹ The perception of economic mismanagement would eventually be a factor in delegitimising the Whitlam government in public eyes. The liberal social approach which Whitlam led his government was always going to bring a new set of ideas to international diplomacy and national security – his government rejected the fierce anti-communism which had been associated with the previous government.

Whitlam's new set of priorities regarding threats to national security would bring the government into conflict with ASIO. As already established, the previous years had seen ASIO largely focus on combating left-wing threats and only maintain a minimal focus on

¹⁰⁹ McDougall, 33–34.

¹¹⁰ McDougall, 34.

¹¹¹ McDougall, 35.

Croatian extremism. ASIO had sustained close surveillance on trade unions since being formed by Ben Chifley's Labor government in 1949, which is ironic because of the traditional support base unions formed for the Labor party.¹¹² These efforts had been continued under the Liberal-Country coalition prior to Whitlam's election. This surveillance of Labor's political base and other left-wing actors fostered a general mistrust of ASIO within the Labor party.¹¹³ There was an especially strong belief that the previous government and ASIO had not done enough to combat the Croatian extremist threat, and there was continued pressure from the Yugoslav Government to act.

The Whitlam's suspicion of the previous government failing to act appropriately against Croatian terrorist threats from 1963 onwards resulted in the most controversial event in the history of the Australian intelligence community. This was the decision of the government to use the Federal Police Force to raid ASIO's headquarters in 1973. According to Gaetano Ilardi, ASIO's focus on left-wing terrorism and accusations that the organisation had spied on the Labor party had fostered an image within the Labor party that ASIO was 'a Cold War Relic'. Whitlam's overwhelming 1972 election victory gave a perceived mandate to act on these suspicions.¹¹⁴ The trigger for action came in 1973 when Yugoslav Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić was to make an official visit to Australia. There was an obvious security concern over extremist Croatian separatists during this visit. Federal Police and intelligence efforts cooperated in preparing security arrangements and indeed it was found extremist separatists were seeking to use the opportunity of Bijedić's visit to plan an assassination. The events of the Murphy Raid demonstrate a concrete example of how

¹¹² Frank Cain, "ASIO and the Australian Labour Movement: An Historical Perspective," *Labour History*, no. 58 (1990): 6, <https://doi.org/10.2307/27508979>.

¹¹³ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 13; Tokić, "Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973," 406–7.

¹¹⁴ Ilardi, "The Whitlam Government's 1973 Clash With Australian Intelligence," 64–65.

Croatian separatism had caused a heightened concern for relations with Yugoslavia in Australia.

There were continued tensions between police and intelligence agencies in making security preparation for Bijedić's visit. Police arrests could frustrate ASIO's on intelligence gathering and elements of the police saw a perceived lack of action by ASIO as an ambivalence towards extremists. ASIO also began to suspect that the YIS had infiltrated the radical Croatian groups in Australia. In a meeting with representatives from the police, ASIO, and the Attorney-General's Department, ASIO pushed for a security approach 'consistent with the policy of the previous government'.¹¹⁵ The Attorney-General Lionel Murphy believed that ASIO's desire for the continuation of previous policy was part of a conspiracy to protect anti-communist Croatian separatists, and he made the decision to raid ASIO's headquarters without advising Whitlam.¹¹⁶ The fallout would destroy the Whitlam governments credibility regarding intelligence matters.

Murphy believed ASIO was participating in a conspiracy against the government to cover up Croatian extremism in Australia. Ilardi asserts that this assumption was largely based on misunderstandings on behalf of Murphy and the Labor party's general mistrust of ASIO.¹¹⁷ In addition to acting on conspiratorial accusations, Murphy also used the opportunity of the raids to bring ASIO under closer ministerial control, attempting to remove the largely 'free reign' it had previously experienced.¹¹⁸ On the 16th of March 1973, Federal Police Officers entered ASIO's headquarters and with the cooperation of ASIO staff, documents were seized and interviews were undertaken.¹¹⁹ These actions generated a public criticism of the

¹¹⁵ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 13.

¹¹⁶ Greg Sheridan, "ASIO History Recaps the Ghastliness of Gough Whitlam's Gang," *The Australian*, October 22, 2015, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/greg-sheridan/asio-history-recaps-the-ghastliness-of-gough-whitlams-gang/news-story/6052ca0551affe4172bf63fa4c2737bd>.

¹¹⁷ Ilardi, "The Whitlam Government's 1973 Clash With Australian Intelligence," 70–71.

¹¹⁸ Ilardi, 78–79.

¹¹⁹ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 13.

government and a legacy of being ‘incompetent and reckless’ regarding national security would endure for Whitlam’s government.¹²⁰ Once the dust settled after the raid however, no evidence of a cover up came to light and no assassination against Bijedić would be attempted during his visit. The Murphy Raid perhaps more than any other event demonstrates how the entanglement of Croatian extremism into Australian domestic politics had created a heightened concern over Yugoslav relations as the decision to raid Australia’s main intelligence agency was made primarily on back of the fear for Bijedić’s safety during his visit due to security breaches by Croatian terrorists.

The Murphy Raid did spur change of ASIO. A Royal Commission investigating Australia’s intelligence apparatus was instigated, headed by Justice Robert Hope. This “Hope” Royal Commission concluded in 1977 and recommended that ASIO’s mandate needed to be shifted away from Cold War espionage to combating security threats. This report actually suggested that ASIO’s powers should be increased. Furthermore, the Commission sought to make the agency more accountable to the Australian public.¹²¹ According to Warren Reed and Christopher Ward, both former members of the Australian intelligence community, the Hope Commission did spur change in the organisation. It became more effective, and the ‘quasi-military structure’ which it was founded on was replaced to be more in line with the rest of the Australian public service.¹²² Whitlam’s and the Labor party’s general distrust of ASIO was a driving force behind these changes begun implemented. These changes coincided with the reduction of Croatian terrorist activity in Australia after 1972. However, given the Hope Commission was not completed until 1977 it does not sufficiently explain this hiatus in

¹²⁰ Ilardi, “The Whitlam Government’s 1973 Clash With Australian Intelligence,” 83.

¹²¹ Tokić, “Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973,” 411–12.

¹²² Warren Reed and Christopher J. Ward, “Australian Intelligence: Confronting the Past for a Safer Future.,” *National Observer*, no. 77 (2008): 35–36.

Croatian separatist terrorism. It was a combination of this reform, government attitudes, policing efforts, and probable disunity of the HRB which was the cause of this.

Different Rhetoric and the Reduction of Terror 1972-1979

Differences in the attitudes between the Liberal-Country government and the Labor government can be established in the speeches made by Prime Ministers at various stages. Two years after the 1963 incursion, Prime Minister Robert Menzies said the following as part of a statement to the House of Representatives on the 27th of August 1964:

It is difficult for people coming to Australia easily to forget their historical backgrounds. Since the war a number of organisations opposed to the present Government of Yugoslavia has developed throughout the world amongst refugees and migrants from the country. *It is understandable that some Yugoslav migrants of Croatian origin should continue to hope for the establishment of an independent Croatia and within a democracy like Australia they have a right to advocate their views as long as they do so by legitimate means.* I wish to make it perfectly clear that the vast majority of the migrants who have settled in Australia from all parts of Yugoslavia have proved to be law abiding, hard-working citizens – a real asset to this country.¹²³

ASIO and the government knew about the HRB and extremist Croatian separatists at this time, yet the rhetoric here clearly choose to downplay the threat of terrorism on Australian soil. Violent actions are condemned, but Menzies stops short of placing blame on any sections of the Croatian community. As already established, the government and ASIO did focus on communist and left-wing threats at this time, somewhat explaining this rhetoric. Another explanation comes from the strong support the Croatian community generally gave to the Liberal-Country coalition.¹²⁴ Fear of ostracising a strong element of his political support would have evidently influenced how Menzies publicly discussed the issue of violent Croatian extremism.

¹²³ Emphasis added. "Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14," sec. A1.

¹²⁴ Tokić, "Party Politics, National Security, and Émigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973," 400.

Whitlam's rhetoric towards the extreme Croatian separatists can be seen in a speech he made nearly ten years after the above mentioned one by Menzies. In March of 1973 during Yugoslav Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić official visit to Australia Whitlam stated:

The friendship between our two countries has been strengthened by the arrival in Australia in recent years of some 130,000 Yugoslav migrants. They have proved themselves hard-working and popular and have contributed much to the economic, social and cultural development of Australia. *We value their presence.*

It is therefore unfortunate that a minority of these migrants, enjoying the rights we offer for the free expression of views, have sought to aggravate old suspicions and hatreds by importing the methods of terrorism into this country. *My Government is determined to stamp out this terrorism.*

It is a shameful thing that anyone in Australia should ever go in fear. It is an intolerable thing that an honoured guest in this country should be under threat of violence. The threat of political violence has been allowed to go on too long. I have nothing but contempt for those who – often knowingly – have allowed it to go on and to grow.¹²⁵

Here Whitlam makes a concentrated effort to demonstrate to Bijedić that Australia would not tolerate extremist Croatian separatists operating within its borders. He is clearly implicating Croatian separatists though he does not mention them specifically by name. This will become more evident when diplomatic exchanges between Australia and Yugoslavia are analysed in chapter three – these provide explicit examples of the Yugoslav Government directly asking Australian authorities to target Croat separatists. Whitlam's comments are completely opposite to Menzies. He even takes a swipe at the previous government by saying he has 'nothing but contempt' for those he accused with knowingly allowing the separatists to operate. Of course, Whitlam was also attempting to assure Bijedić of his security during his visit, however his rhetoric here is in line with his broader view of national security policy. The aspect most in common with Menzies speech is the emphasis given to the positives of Yugoslav migrants in Australia.

¹²⁵ Emphasis added. Gough Whitlam, "Yugoslav/Australian Relations: Speech, E.G. Whitlam, Canberra, 21 March 1973," March 21, 1973, media/pressrel/HPR1002962, Parliament of Australia Library, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=date-eFirst;page=0;query=YUGOSLAV%2FAUSTRALIAN%20relations;rec=2;resCount=Default>.

After 1972 there was a marked decrease in Croatian terrorist activity. The third volume of the *Official History of ASIO* notes five terror acts from after the election until 1980 which were known to be or likely perpetrated by Croatian extremists.¹²⁶ After 1968 it was widely believed in ASIO that the HRB no longer existed as a unified group and that extremist acts were committed by disjointed individuals or small units and not as part of a larger unified strategy.¹²⁷ Thus this reduction of activity was not solely the result of changing attitudes under Whitlam, but also partially due to a break down in the HRB organisation. The 1970s saw ASIO clearly define its priorities in its intelligence gathering activities. In January of 1976 ASIO's highest concern was given to 'representatives of foreign governments or those acting on behalf of'; this would include primarily the intelligence operatives from communist nations and the activities of communist organisations based in western nations (such as Italy). Following on, the next level of priority was given to groups which threatened Australia and the governmental authority with 'unlawful means'. It is in this group which radical Croatian separatists fell into.¹²⁸ Thus even under Whitlam's government and after the 1973 Murphy Raid, ASIO's primary focus remained on anti-communist efforts.

The Australian police credited the hiatus of Croatian terror activities in Australia following the 1972 incursion and George Street travel agency bombings to their increased attention to these threats. However in 1974 warning signs were recognised that radical elements of the Croatian diaspora were potentially mobilising to undertake new violent acts.¹²⁹ These red flags included; a change in rhetoric in Croatian diaspora newspapers to be more opposed to Yugoslavia and praising the actions of the 1972 insurgents, the formation of the

¹²⁶ Blaxland and Crawley, *The Secret Cold War*, vol. III, chap. 16.

¹²⁷ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 13.

¹²⁸ Blaxland and Crawley, *The Secret Cold War*, vol. III, chap. 2.

¹²⁹ "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1" (Commonwealth of Australia Attorney-General's Department), 14, National Archives of Australia, accessed October 19, 2017, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=12099778&isAv=N>.

Croatian National Council (HNV) in Australia which was to coordinate smaller diaspora groups and the police believed its leadership may have been taken over by extremist elements, and finally it was recognised that the HRB actually still existed and was in contact with an international network of Croatian radicals.¹³⁰ There were only a handful of violent actions undertaken by Croatian separatists in Australia between 1973-1979, and the extremist activity in Australia never replicated the situation of the 1960s. It clear that this decrease in activity did not stop police or intelligence surveillance and this should in part be attributed to preventing attacks in the 1970s. Although radical Croatian terror acts were not as prevalent in the public eye during these latter years, the issue endured in the Australian political sphere because of the continued vigilance of the Australian authorities and the insistence of the Yugoslav Government that Croatian extremism continued to be a threat.

Of the five violent terror acts associated with Croatian extremists that were recorded between 1973-1979, two were bombings directed at Serbian Orthodox Churches, and two were bombings of Yugoslav travel offices in Melbourne.¹³¹ The final of recorded terror act would be the most significant event ever attributed to Croatian extremists in Australia and it would be foiled by police before being carried out in 1979. This was the Croatian 6 conspiracy in which a group of Croatians were arrested and accused with planning to bomb targets in Sydney including a Yugoslav cultural club and the city's water works.¹³² The fallout of this conspiracy, suspicions of YIS involvement, and its implications for the entangled Australian-Yugoslav relationship will be developed in chapter three. After the Croatian 6 case, Croatian extremism disappeared as an issue in the Australian domestic sphere and the heightened concern over Yugoslavian relations which had emerged since the 1963 incursion dissipated.

¹³⁰ "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 14.

¹³¹ Blaxland and Crawley, *The Secret Cold War*, vol. III, chap. 16.

¹³² McDonald, *Framed*, chap. 1.

From 1963 to 1979 the Australian Government, intelligence agencies, and police forces had to adapt to the menace of Croatian terrorism both on Australian soil and overseas. This chapter addressed the question: what was the significance of the entanglement in the Australian domestic sphere between the government, the radical separatist element of the Croatian diaspora, and the intelligence services, and how did this evolve over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s? It has been demonstrated that although policy changed little, the result of this extended period of Croatian extremist activity and interaction with the government was that Australian relations with Yugoslavia became an issue of heightened importance within the domestic sphere of the 1960s and 70s. At the beginning of the 1960s, ASIO and the Liberal-Country government maintained anti-communist efforts over that of combating Croatian extremism. Publicly the Liberal-Country government was largely silent regarding Croatian extremism despite repeated terror acts. ASIO did monitor extremists after the 1963 incursion, however as this was a lower priority compared to other Cold War threats it fell largely to the police to monitor the situation. Where the police did make arrests, this frustrated the elements of ASIO focused on Croatian community, highlighting divisions between the two organisations. What did occur despite the disunity between these organisations was an increased awareness of Australia's relationship with Yugoslavia resulting from the actions of Croatian terrorists in Australia.

1972 saw the second incursion of Australian based extremists into Yugoslavia, the first Croatian terror acts in Australia which would result in non-Yugoslav casualties, and the election of Gough Whitlam. The new government took the mandate of their election and the upcoming visiting of Bijdić to act on divisions between the police and ASIO over Croatian terrorism with the Murphy Raid. The outcome of this raid did not uncover any conspiracy, and ASIO would largely continue to focus on communist actors as it had done previously over the 1960s, until the results of the Hope Commission were implemented in 1977. How

the focus on Bijedić's security during his upcoming visit triggered the raid shows the increased importance Yugoslavia had developed in the mentalities of the Australian Government resulting from Croatian terrorism. Whitlam's government developed harsher public rhetoric towards Croatian extremism, though little changed in policy to mirror this rhetoric. The reduction in extremist activity after 1972 was the mostly result of police action and the disorganisation of Croatian extremists. The Croatian 6 conspiracy marks the end of significant extremist activity in Australia and it leads to the issue of how the radical Croatian separatists were entangled into Australian-Yugoslav Cold War relations, and why this entanglement was significant for both Australia and Yugoslavia. This question will be addressed in the following chapter.

Chapter 3 - Entanglements and Sovereignty: Australia, Yugoslavia, and the Croatian Diaspora

I swear by Almighty God that I will fight against the Communists for freedom and democracy and for the freedom of my homeland Croatia.¹³³

The Croatian community in Australia was part of a global network of Croatian diasporas which would actively promote the political cause for Croatian independence during the Cold War. The unique position of this diaspora as symbolic metaphysical link between Yugoslavia and Australia enabled its entanglement into foreign relations. The chapter asks the question: how significant were radical Croatian extremists as an element of the entangled Australian-Yugoslav relationship during the Cold War, and how did Yugoslavia use this entanglement to engage with dissenting political opposition outside of its borders? It will be demonstrated that the entanglement of radical Croatian extremism became framed as the primary issue of the Australian-Yugoslav Cold War relationship; this in turn enabled Yugoslavia to extend its sovereignty over the Croatian diaspora Australia in pursuit of silencing violent and non-violent anti-Yugoslav dissidents.

I will be utilising the idea of sovereignty devised by Lauren Benton in *A Search for Sovereignty*. Although Benton focuses on early modern century empires, her approach is equally applicable to the Cold War context. Benton asserts that sovereignty is not an all embracing and monopolised concept, but rather a mass of intertwining strands of authority from different state and non-state actors. She elegantly states that '[e]mpires did not cover

¹³³ One version of the HRB Oath according to a self-confessed member of the organisation. "Senate Inquiry into the Rights of Migrant Australians - (Including Yugoslav and Croatian Activities within Australia) - Attorney-General's Department, Australian Security Intelligence Organization and Federal Police Force Papers," 362, National Archives of Australia, accessed April 17, 2018, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=8209209&isAv=N>.

space evenly but composed a fabric that was full of holes, stitched together out of pieces, a tangle of strings'.¹³⁴ Modern states claim to assert absolute sovereignty and authority over their domain, however, this is rarely the case. Like the early modern empires Benton investigates, sovereign authority in modern states is often 'a fabric full of holes' made up of many different actors. Both state and non-state actors can extend lines of sovereignty into a country and undermine nominal central authority. Shain and Barth demonstrate that, '[d]iasporas are among the most prominent actors that link international and domestic spheres of politics'.¹³⁵ Croatian diasporas were the metaphysical intermediary through which Yugoslavia could extend thin lines of sovereignty and authority, represented by diplomatic and intelligence actors, into other countries in pursuit of their own agenda of silencing anti-Yugoslav dissidents. Of all the countries in which this dynamic existed because of the presence of a Croatian diaspora during the Cold War, Australia provides a unique insight due to the activities of the HRB and the availability of key Australian intelligence sources.

This chapter will open with an investigation into Australia and Yugoslavia in the Cold War, partially Yugoslavia's role in the Non-Aligned Movement, how Yugoslavia interacted with worldwide Croatian separatist movements, and Australia's close relationship to the USA. This establishes how the relationship between the geographically distant Yugoslavia and Australia could become of interest to both countries through Croatian separatism. The second section identifies how the 1963 incursion, outlined in chapter two, created the entanglement of Croatian diaspora politics and how Yugoslavia began to use this entanglement to assert their own sovereignty during a time in which Australian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations were growing. Section three demonstrates how full diplomatic relations and bilateral agreements

¹³⁴ Lauren A. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400 - 1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 2.

¹³⁵ Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 57, no. 03 (August 2003): 451, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573015>.

were pursued by the Country-Liberal Coalition with Yugoslavia despite the conflicting rhetoric of both parties regarding Croatian separatists. The following section investigates how the intelligence operations of both countries operated in Australia as state agents advancing their own interests until 1972. Yugoslav authorities sought to manipulate the opinion of the Australian Government and intelligence agencies by constantly emphasising the threat of Croatian extremism and using this threat to advocate for closer cooperation between Australia and Yugoslavia.

The second half of this chapter will focus on the entanglements post 1972. The first aspect investigated is the 1972 incursion and subsequent 1973 Murphy Raid introduced in the previous chapter. Doing so will demonstrate Yugoslav attempts to use the fallout of the incursion to increase their influence in Australia and the strains on Australia's primary relationship with the United States resulting from the Murphy Raid. The next section outlines the priorities of Whitlam's Labor government regarding Yugoslavia. It will be shown that Croatian extremism, whilst being just one of many aspects of this relationship, was for Australia the issue which dominated their perspective of this relationship. For the Australian Government they sought to avoid diplomatic embarrassment, whilst Yugoslav authorities saw the presence of violent extremists to gain greater leverage in diplomatic negotiations. The final sections carries this investigation into the post-Whitlam years until the 1979 Croatian Six conspiracy. This shows an apparent ongoing effort by Yugoslavia to exert their sovereignty on Australian soil by subversive means in pursuit of silencing anti-Yugoslav dissidents in the Croatian diaspora.

Yugoslavia, Australia, and Croatian Separatism in the Cold War

From the earliest rumblings of an ideological post-Second World War conflict, Yugoslavia's international position was to be defined in its relationship with the USSR. Despite the communist credentials of Tito's partisans, interactions with Soviet leadership during the Second World War had been somewhat strained.¹³⁶ Post-War Stalin sought to surround the Soviet Union with friendly countries, this included Yugoslavia. Unlike its neighbours, the newly formed Communist Yugoslavia had been forged out of the Second World War without the direct invasions of the Soviet Red Army. This vestige of independence meant Tito sought to define his own version of communism apart from Stalin. According to Ivo Banac, Stalin's socialist vision was at odds with the 'revolutionary nature' of Yugoslavia.¹³⁷ Increasing tension between Tito and Stalin saw the former creating more open diplomatic relations with Western powers.¹³⁸ In 1948 there was an official split in the communist world. Stalin would no longer accept Tito and his Yugoslavia as a dissenting and divergent voice, though this split would not result in military conflict.¹³⁹ Yugoslavia looked to pursuing a policy independent from both the Soviet Union and the Western powers, whilst occupying a unique position between the two.

Yugoslavia sought to carve out a special position in the Cold War following the Tito-Stalin split. In 1960 Tito made efforts in the UN general assembly towards achieving closer collaboration between nations that were neither Soviet nor close allies of the USA.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Ivo Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*, Acls Humanities E-Book (Cornell University Press, 1988), 4.

¹³⁷ Banac, 23–24.

¹³⁸ Nataša Mišković, "Introduction," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Deli-Bandung-Belgrade*, ed. Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boškovska, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 7.

¹³⁹ Dietmar Rothermund, "The Era of Non-Alignment," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Deli-Bandung-Belgrade*, ed. Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boškovska, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 20.

¹⁴⁰ Lorenz M. Lüthi, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (October 2016): 99, https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00682.

Yugoslavia was also making increasing efforts to strengthen its relationship with developing and neutral countries. This resulted in the 1961 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Belgrade which tied together the Cold War policies of India, Egypt, and Indonesia among others.¹⁴¹ Tito's vision was to promote Yugoslavia to a leadership position in the NAM and to position these countries in the Cold War somewhere between the USA and the Soviets. According to Jovan Čavoški, '[n]on-alignment was the direct expression of Tito's intention to become one of the leading world statesmen, mediator between the blocs and the non-bloc factions, a diplomatic channel between the developed and non-developed countries'.¹⁴² Thus, Tito saw Yugoslavia as playing a unique role between superpowers and as an intermediary with developing nations.

Australia's Cold War interaction with Yugoslavia did somewhat entail these themes of Yugoslavia as a non-aligned intermediary between the West, Soviets, and the third world. However, the relationship was predominantly focused on Yugoslavia's desire to assert sovereignty over the Croatian diaspora, and Australia's commitment to the Western cause, strengthened by deep anti-communist sentiment. Australia's foreign policy in these years was defined by its shift from the traditional ally of Britain to being centred on the USA. In his attempt to unfurl the complex world of Australian Cold War historiography, David McLean asserts that whilst Australia remained strongly sided with the western powers, there was a dedicated push by the post-War Labor government to keep Australia out of any European entanglements.¹⁴³ From this initial post-War Labor government onwards Australia's Cold War policy would be shaped by a continued reliance on the USA and Britain. This policy would be continued by the Sir Robert Menzies subsequent Liberal-Country government after 1949.

¹⁴¹ Jovan Čavoški, "Between Great Powers and Third World Neutralists: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, 1961," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 184.

¹⁴² Čavoški, 187.

¹⁴³ David McLean, "Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review," 305.

Prime Minister Menzies' failed attempt to ban the Australian Communist Party from Australian politics' and Australia's unquestioning commitment to the Korean War highlighted this government's attitude to fighting communism at home and abroad. Australian foreign policy sought to utilise the USA relationship for the defence of Australian and anti-communist interests, and thus a continued obsession with maintaining a positive connection to the USA prevailed in the Australian Government.¹⁴⁴ Brian Hocking makes that point that Australian Cold War diplomacy has traditionally been viewed as through the prism of managing 'special relationships' with great powers, and how such an approach ignores the degree to which independent foreign policy interests were followed. However, it would be impossible to ignore the great degree such relationships moulded Australia in these years.¹⁴⁵ The Cold War also saw the creation of ASIO after the discovery of Soviet spies present in Canberra during the immediate post-War years – again demonstrating the post-war focus on communism.¹⁴⁶ Despite gearing up as a defender against communist aggression, the Liberal-Country government and Yugoslavia did open relations with one another. This was partially due to the sizable Yugoslav diaspora in Australia, but also for geopolitical reasons. Yugoslavia as a leader of the NAM sought greater engagement with the west, and Australia as a supporter of the USA sought to foster positive relationships with a non-Soviet but communist power bordering the Soviet Bloc. This relationship may not have been an obvious one, but with the prevalence of Yugoslav migrants to Australia, increasing actions of extremist separatist Croatians in Australia, and the attempts of Yugoslavia to assert their own sovereignty over the Croatian diaspora in Australia meant it would grow in significance.

¹⁴⁴ David McLean, 307–10, 320.

¹⁴⁵ Brian Hocking, "Finding Your Niche: Australia and the Trials of Middle-Powerdom," in *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Studies in Diplomacy (London: MacMillan Press LTD, 1997), 136.

¹⁴⁶ Monk, "Soviet Moles in Australia: The Black Holes in ASIO's Official History. (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation)," 48–49.

From Argentina to Sweden, wherever a Croatian diaspora had established itself across the post-Second World War world there was non-violent and violent political opposition to Yugoslavia. These protestors gained further protection in Western countries which advocated free political representation and speech, this could blur the lines between non-violent and terrorist actors. In 1979 Stephen Clissold noted '[t]he Yugoslav Government objects that the West treats anti-Tito subversive organisations as if they were political parties; the West suspects the Yugoslav authorities of treating all opposition as if they were subversive'.¹⁴⁷ Yugoslavian authorities sought to find a means of silencing these dissidents and according to Clissold the Yugoslav Government used three different methods to do so. These were inciting diplomatic pressure to act against terrorists (particularly used with Australian, USA, German, and Swedish governments, all of whom had large Croatian diasporas and stressed the protection of political freedoms), the surveillance of Yugoslav émigrés, and utilising the YIS for 'direct action', which included the assassination of key figures in the Croatian nationalist movement.¹⁴⁸ The CIA acknowledged Yugoslavia's use of such manipulative techniques in internal documents. They note that '[Yugoslavia] has emphasised the threat posed by domestic and externally inspired enemies as a means to quiet inter-republic squabbling and as an excuse for curbing the free expression of extreme views'.¹⁴⁹ Through such methods Yugoslav authorities attempted extend thin strands of their sovereign power into foreign states to stamp out political enemies.

Although the Yugoslav state had an interest in suppressing anti-Yugoslav sentiment present in Croatian diasporas around the world, many migrants had been allowed to leave the Yugoslavia in the post-War years, enabling the bolstering of these diasporas. Yugoslav

¹⁴⁷ Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism*, 13.

¹⁴⁸ Clissold, 12–15.

¹⁴⁹ Office of National Estimates, "Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129)" (Central Intelligence Agency, July 27, 1971), 37.

immigration to Australia, of which some 40% considered itself Croatian, peaked in the years between 1969-1971 as shown in chapter one – this correlated with the highest frequency of violent actions undertaken by the Croatian diaspora in Australia. This presents a contradiction. If the Yugoslav state was concerned with politically active Croatian diasporas, why would they allow such large numbers to emigrate in these years? The answer is found in the poor economy of 1960s Yugoslavia. Employment in Yugoslavia stagnated during the 1960s. Between 1964 and 1968 there was an increase of 47% in the number of unemployed people in Yugoslavia – this led to large scale economic migration, primarily to other parts of Europe, which was tolerated by the state.¹⁵⁰ Many of these migrants would subsequently emigrate away from Europe. By 1971 there was an increase in employment within Yugoslavia such economic migration was reduced.¹⁵¹ This economic improvement, as well as the Croatian spring, resulted in the state reigning in the numbers of migrants. However, by this stage anti-communist Croatian diasporas had become firmly established around the world (there were also anti-communist Serbian and Macedonian diasporas resulting from these migrations).

The 1963 Incursion and the Beginning of Entanglements

The entanglement of Croatian separatism into Australian-Yugoslavian relations, and Yugoslav efforts to use this to extend sovereignty into Australia began after the 1963 incursion. Numerous newspaper reports propelled interest of the Croatian community in Australia into public discourse.¹⁵² Discussions in parliament following the incursion involved members of the Liberal-Country coalition focusing on allowing the Croatian diaspora in

¹⁵⁰ Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment: 1948-1974* (London: C. Hurst and Co, 1977), 202–3.

¹⁵¹ Rusinow, 251.

¹⁵² Vice John Batarelo, “A Troubled Relationship: The Croatian Diaspora in Australia Between 1963 and 1973,” *Croatian Studies Review* 10 (2014): 61–62.

Australia free speech to express their political views. Senator John Gorton responded to a question regarding the political views of Croatians in Australia two months after the incursion by stating that ‘Croatians regard Croatia as being a country which should not have been incorporated into Yugoslavia ... I think that the Croatians ... have a *perfect right* to expound those views by legal means’.¹⁵³ Gorton publicly stressed Australia’s commitment to freedom of political representation and inferred that despite the violent actions of some members of the diaspora, the government would protect politically active anti-Yugoslav Croatians in Australia who abided by the law.

The dynamic of politically active Croatian diasporas being viewed as terrorists by Yugoslavia and as a political movement by their host countries, explained by Clissold’s quote in the previous section, came to bear in Australia after the 1963 incursion, as evident in Senator Gorton’s statement above. Chapter two established how the Liberal-Country Australian Government and ASIO perceived the fallout of the 1963 incursion with their deep-seated anti-communist suspicions - official communications from Yugoslavia calling for greater surveillance and actions against Croatian terror organisation were seen to be exaggerated.¹⁵⁴ This was an early case of Yugoslav authorities’ using the actions of Croatian extremists as a tool of leverage against the Australian Government to call for greater suppression of political dissidents outside of their authority. By doing so the politically active Croatian diaspora in Australia was established as a metaphysical link between the two counties – part of the ‘fabric full of holes’ which defines sovereignty in modern states.

By the late 1960s ASIO had acquired quite a bit of information regarding the HRB in Australia and the details surrounding the 1963 incursion. ASIO’s 1967 position paper on the

¹⁵³ Emphasis added. John Gorton, “The Senate Question Croatians Speech - 10/10/1963” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia), Parliament of Australia Library, accessed April 17, 2018, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=3;query=Yugoslav%20Date%3A01%2F01%2F1963%20%3E%3E%2010%2F10%2F1964;rec=7;resCount=Default>.

¹⁵⁴ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

HRB indicates that the nine insurgents had likely overestimated the support they thought that could muster among the local population in Yugoslavia for their coup. Furthermore, ASIO came to assume that Yugoslav authorities may have known of the plot and its origins in Australia before it commenced, possibly from sources within Australia.¹⁵⁵ The fact this information was known the Yugoslav authorities suggests YIS entanglement into the Croatian diaspora, and the vision of using the diaspora as a metaphysical link between Australia and Yugoslavia, had existed before émigré extremism had become a major domestic issue in Australia, and well before ASIO had an awareness of YIS actions in Australia.

This minute paper indicates two primary issues arising from Croatian extremists in Australia. The first of these being security threats in Australia to ‘representatives of the Yugoslav Government and its sympathisers on Australian territory’ – interestingly no mention is made to the threat to Australian citizens, indicating that ASIO must have genuinely believed that the HRB’s actions would not endanger Australian citizens. This belief was shattered after the 1972 General Trade and Tourist Agency bombing, discussed in chapter 2, which injured 16 innocent bystanders. The second of these threats came from extremists organising themselves in Australia for overseas actions like the 1963 incursion, and ‘the consequent embarrassment to the Australian Government in its relations with Yugoslavia’.¹⁵⁶ This indicates a shift in ASIO attitudes from 1963 which had previously seen the threat from Croatian separatism as inflated by Yugoslav rhetoric. This rhetoric became increasingly accepted as both these concerns show at their core an anxiety over relationships with Yugoslavia. This demonstrates Yugoslav success in extending sovereignty over the Croatian diaspora by using rhetoric to influence Australian policy.

¹⁵⁵ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” sec. A5.

¹⁵⁶ “Croatian Extremists Appendix A A1-B14,” pt. A5.

Full Diplomatic Relations

The 1960s witnessed increasing diplomatic engagement and a normalisation of relations between Australia and Yugoslavia. 1966 saw the establishment of a completely reciprocal diplomatic relationship with the opening of a Yugoslav embassy in Canberra and an Australian embassy in Belgrade.¹⁵⁷ This was achieved despite the ongoing violence perpetrated by the HRB, and the opposition to Yugoslavia being voiced by members of the Croatian diaspora in Australia. This suggests that whilst the Australian Government held concerns over Croatian extremists becoming an embarrassing issue with regards to their relationship with Yugoslavia, these extremists did not constitute a roadblock to diplomacy from a Yugoslavian point of view. Further bilateral talks and agreements, as will be demonstrated below, would confirm the willingness of both countries to develop their relationship despite the presence of and rhetoric regarding Croatian separatists in Australia. This diplomacy furthered Yugoslavia's ability to exert sovereignty in Australia to influence the Croatian diaspora, and claims that the Australian Government were turning a blind eye to Croatian terrorists was rhetoric used as part of this process.

The next priority for Australia and Yugoslavia following the formal establishment diplomatic relations was the management of migration to Australia. As established, the number of Yugoslav migrants to Australia was large in these years, and would radically increase until 1971. In conjunction with the poor economic condition in Yugoslavia this spurred the signing of a migration agreement between the two countries on the 12th of February 1970.¹⁵⁸ The agreement had been part of ongoing discussions between the two

¹⁵⁷ "The History of Diplomatic Relations," *Embassy of the Republic of Serbia Canberra - Australia*, accessed April 17, 2018, <http://canberra.mfa.gov.rs/us.php>; Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

¹⁵⁸ Phillip Lynch, "Agreement Signed Between Australia & Yugoslav Government - 12/02/1970" (Department of Immigration), Parliament of Australia Library, accessed April 18, 2018, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FHPR10020499%22>.

governments for some time and delegations finalised negotiations in late 1969.¹⁵⁹ The negotiation of this agreement were perceived by members of the Australian immigration department to be the direct cause for the massive spike in Yugoslav migrants to Australia that began in 1969 and ended in 1971. It is asserted that these discussions had caused potential migrants to fear that the agreement may change the regulations for arriving in Australia and thus strove to arrive before it was ratified.¹⁶⁰ This increase of migrants continued in the months after the agreement was publicly announced, though this would be reduced after an internal cap was placed on migrant numbers.¹⁶¹ Yugoslav migration to Australia would remain relatively small in the next two decades until the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

The successful implementation of this migration agreement demonstrates the willingness for both Yugoslav and Australian Governments to work together. There is nothing to suggest that the contradictory rhetoric from both countries regarding Croatian extremism negatively impacted these negotiations, even though this was a concern for members of the Australian Government. The threat of political extremism is only briefly addressed in Australian Department of Immigration memorandums, and these reports play down this threat. It is stated ‘I have little fear of the political difficulties of an increased migration from Yugoslavia. I believe that with care any such difficulties are so small in number and of such character that they can be handled’.¹⁶² Croatian separatists are not mentioned by name here; however, given the context of Yugoslav migration the ‘political difficulties’ are almost certainly a reference to this threat. Thus, from an Australian view of immigration, Croatian extremists were only a peripheral problem which only warranted a brief mention in broader

¹⁵⁹ “Yugoslav Migration Agreement - Implementation - Part 1,” 5, National Archives of Australia, accessed April 18, 2018, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=1969130&isAv=N>.

¹⁶⁰ “Yugoslav Migration Agreement - Implementation - Part 1,” 108.

¹⁶¹ “Yugoslav Migration Agreement - Implementation - Part 1,” 109–11.

¹⁶² “Yugoslav Migration Agreement - Implementation - Part 1,” 110.

discussions of policymakers. Australian politicians may have been concerned over how the entanglement of Croatian separatist would impact discussions over migration with the Yugoslav Government, yet this appeared not to be a fear of departmental policy makers and it did not hinder discussions with Yugoslavia. The fact Croatian separatism didn't block diplomacy from a Yugoslavian perspective suggests that it was only raised as an issue with Australia when attempting to use the separatists as a metaphysical link to extend sovereignty over the Croatian diaspora into Australia.

Intelligence Operations Under the Country-Liberal Coalition

Yugoslavia sought to extend their sovereignty in Australia to influence the Croatian diaspora during the Liberal-Country government by entangling Croatian extremism with intelligence services. In 1969 a Yugoslav Government letter to the Australian Prime Minister suggested sending a Yugoslav intelligence officer with knowledge of Croatian extremism to work with ASIO. This offer was considered until 1972; however, it was never implemented because of difficulties in finding a suitable officer with English language competency.¹⁶³ This offer would later be reconsidered by Whitlam's government. There was a clear willingness for a degree of engagement and cooperation between intelligence services with the aim of countering Croatian terrorism. One must be sceptical of the Yugoslav motives here; this entanglement would have enabled the greater infiltration of ASIO. Furthermore, it would have extended an element of Yugoslav sovereignty into the already established web of competing sovereign

¹⁶³ "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 170–71.

actors in Australia and therefore provided a privileged position from which to influence Australian intelligence policy regarding the Croatian diaspora.

These issues were acknowledged by the Australian policy makers of the time and were another reason such cooperation never came to fruition. It is explicitly noted that ‘continuous liaison with the Y.I.S. can be exploited for political ends, and so turned to [Australian] Government disadvantage’.¹⁶⁴ CIA documents from 1972 specifically note that the ‘current Yugoslav diplomatic approaches to Western governments’ was driven by a desire to silence separatist movements in diasporas, including non-violent political organisations, and they were increasingly calling on governments to monitor not just Croatian separatists but all Yugoslav diasporic groups. This document also notes the limited success of Yugoslav authorities in pursuing this policy.¹⁶⁵ These recognised attempts to influence western governments and intelligence services demonstrate the Yugoslav desire to extend their sovereign power into these countries through the metaphysical link of Croatian diasporas. Despite the CIA recognising this threat and claiming there was only limited success, the continued entanglement of Croatian separatism into Western diplomacy with Yugoslavia suggests it was more successful than perceived at the time.

The possibility of collaboration between the Yugoslavian and Australian Governments generated increasing anxiety within the Croatian diaspora. There was a belief that YIS operatives were not only observing members of the diaspora, but encouraging or even planning violent acts under the guise of Croatian independence to ostracise the political side of this movement in the eyes of the Australian Government, police, and intelligence services.¹⁶⁶ These concerns of the Croatian community were documented in a *Four Corners*

¹⁶⁴ “Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1,” 173.

¹⁶⁵ Office of National Estimates, “Yugoslavia - The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem” (Central Intelligence Agency, September 27, 1972), 11–12.

¹⁶⁶ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

investigation by the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) which aired in June of 1972. The Croatian diaspora was of increasing interest to the general population of Australia because of recurring acts of political violence, and this program portrayed the Croat community in Australia and their political opposition to Yugoslavia. The ABC program stated ‘[m]any Croatians claim that Yugoslavian communist agents are responsible for the bombings and the bashings, to implicate and discredit Croatians’.¹⁶⁷ Such accusations demonstrate a perception that Yugoslav authorities had some success in extending their sovereignty over the Croatian diaspora in Australia, and could use this as a metaphysical link to the Australian domestic sphere.

Certain members of ASIO came to suspect Yugoslav agents were responsible for some violent actions associated with the Croatian diaspora, although it was not the official view of the organisation.¹⁶⁸ There is some evidence, in conjunction with the suspicions of the Croatian community and individuals within ASIO, to support this claim. Australian intelligence documents from December of 1972 indicate that there were definite concerns within government departments of Yugoslav agents infiltrating the Australian community. It is stated in one example that Croatian separatists in Australia were of interest to Yugoslav authorities and that ‘reports indicate that the Yugoslav Security and Intelligence Services have embarked on a deliberate program of questioning and attempted recruitment of a proportion of those visitors to Yugoslavia from Australia who are of Yugoslav origin’.¹⁶⁹ Further definitive evidence confirming YIS agents orchestrated acts and framed Croatian separatist is difficult to establish. Given the extent of these claims, however, it would be difficult to completely

¹⁶⁷ “ROVER, Srecko,” 1986, 32, National Archives of Australia, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=5036915&isAv=N>.

¹⁶⁸ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

¹⁶⁹ “Yugoslav Intelligence Service, Activities and Interest in Australia Volume 1” (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation), 13, National Archives of Australia, accessed January 21, 2018, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=7949469&isAv=N>.

discredit them as unsubstantiated. However, even if this claim is true, it is impossible to deny that there was a campaign of purposeful violent extremism committed in Australia by Croatian separatists with a fascist and Ustaše ideology, who abused their political freedom and committed violent acts regardless of provocation by the YIS.

One prominent member of the HRB and the Croatian diaspora in Australia who attracted attention regarding YIS activities was Srečko Rover. Rover had been an Ustaše officer in the Second World War and involved in Ante Pavelić's post-War Križari incursions into Yugoslavia discussed in Chapter 1. Aarons and Loftus note from this early stage of Rover's separatist activities the uncertainty of his motives.

Perhaps it is only coincidental, but nearly every Križari operation on which Rover worked was a complete disaster. Pavelić himself came to suspect that Rover may have been a Communist double agent, or at least some sort of provocateur. Among the senior Križari leaders, Rover seems to have been one of the few who repeatedly entered Yugoslavia and avoided detection and arrest by Tito's secret police.¹⁷⁰

This included one incursion in 1948 where Rover was the only individual to avoid capture out of 97 insurgents.¹⁷¹ According to Aarons and Loftus all the Križari operations were well known to the Yugoslav authorities before they were carried out, suggesting the widespread prevalence of spies.¹⁷² After his involvement in these operations, Rover migrated to Australia and established himself as a key figure in the diaspora. Under surveillance in Australia, ASIO had some evidence that suggested Rover was an agent of the YIS, yet they could not confirm this.¹⁷³ Rover was to be a divisive figure within the diaspora. A 1956 letter written by Croatian émigré Slavo Tomijanovic to Pavelić describes how Rover, in conjunction with Vjekoslav Luberic, caused divisions in the Croatian separatist movement, and congratulates Pavelić for

¹⁷⁰ Aarons and Loftus, *Ratlines: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets*, 138.

¹⁷¹ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

¹⁷² Aarons and Loftus, *Ratlines: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets*, 138.

¹⁷³ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

expelling them both from the HOP. Despite these suspicions, Rover maintained much support.¹⁷⁴ He would remain an outspoken radical advocate for Croatian separatism for some time in Australia. Whether or not he was doing so to help Yugoslav authorities has yet to be adequately proven or debunked. The mere fact these accusations existed indicate at the very least the perceived level of entanglement of the YIS into the diaspora and demonstrates how Yugoslav authorities potentially used radical elements as tool of generating a metaphysical link to domestic Australia, and using this to extend their sovereign authority over the Croatian diaspora by playing on Australian fears.

The 1972 Incursion and Murphy Raid

The 1972 incursion into Yugoslavia, introduced in chapter 2, began on the evening of June 19. The group of insurgents totalled nineteen, nine of which were Australian citizens.¹⁷⁵ This even occurred just six months before Whitlam would form government and the inherited diplomatic fallout would be one of the early tests of his foreign policy. Blaxland reports that all the members of the group were killed fighting with Yugoslav police and military (some thirteen Yugoslavs were also killed).¹⁷⁶ This is not completely correct, four of the members were captured alive. They were all sentenced to death by a military tribunal in Yugoslavia, however the youngest member had his sentence changed to 20 years of prison because of his age according to one report made by the South Slav Democratic Union, an anti-Yugoslav organisation which aimed at cooperation between the different national émigré communities of Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁷ The fate of these insurgents would raise the issue of dual nationality between Australia and Yugoslavia. Yugoslav authorities sought to quickly resolve any ambiguities

¹⁷⁴ “Croatian Extremist Appendix B B14-C7,” B18 605.

¹⁷⁵ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, vol. II, chap. 5.

¹⁷⁶ Blaxland, vol. II, chap. 5.

¹⁷⁷ “Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1,” 204–7.

with regards to the prosecution of dual-nationals so they would be able to persecute future offenders from diasporic communities with impunity.

In July 1973, Yugoslav Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić sent Gough Whitlam a letter in the wake of the 1972 incursion specifically addressing the issue of dual citizenship and Australian based insurgents infiltrating into Yugoslavia. Bijedić positively refers to his visit to Australia in 1973 and uses this to argue for ‘the need to promote and diversify our bilateral co-operation in all areas’.¹⁷⁸ From here he moves to the issue of dual nationality and seeks to ‘clarify the *misunderstanding* regarding the treatment of persons possessing dual citizenship’ - specifically regarding the captured members of the 1972 incursion.¹⁷⁹ Concerns over negative treatment of Australian citizens in Yugoslavia had been raised in the Australian parliament and public sphere. In this letter and subsequent negotiations, Bijedić was seeking keep Australian diplomacy out of the persecution of the captured insurgents who were Australian citizens.

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs eventually recommended accepting a Yugoslav proposal which outlined regulations of how the Australian Government could access its dual citizens in Yugoslavia. This proposal excluded the Australian Government from assisting their citizens in Yugoslavia who were accused of crimes against the state. It was accepted as Australia had little leverage to negotiate an alternative arrangement, and they likely feared pushing for different terms would hurt their relationship.¹⁸⁰ Bijedić claimed that the incursion and the citizenship issue was ‘used in Australia for a campaign against Yugoslavia and your Government by *ustashi circles and certain media* with a view of jeopardising the initiated development and strengthening of friendly relations between our

¹⁷⁸ “Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1,” 214.

¹⁷⁹ Emphasis added. “Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1,” 215.

¹⁸⁰ “Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1,” 22.

two countries'.¹⁸¹ Here Bijedić is attempting to demonstrate to Whitlam that Australian-Yugoslavian relations, which were positive and developing, are intimately tied to Croatian extremism and fascism, which was suggested to have support within the Australian community. It is blatantly inferred that if Whitlam wishes to see further bilateral cooperation with Yugoslavia Australia should be taking further efforts to eliminate Croatian extremists in Australia – here the fear of Australian diplomatic embarrassment because of Australian based extremists was fully exploited by Bijedić to influence Australian policy.

As established in chapter two, the 1972 incursion and preparations for Bijedić's visit to Australia in 1973 set the scene for the Murphy Raid on ASIO's headquarters. This raid had dire international consequences for Australia, particularly for its intelligence cooperation with the USA. According to a CIA memorandum from 1972, the lack of western support for an independent Croatian state led Branko Jelić and his organisation, the HNO-J, to break from the anti-communist ideology of the HOP.¹⁸² Jelić opened dialogue with the Soviet Union and sought the establishment of an independent Croatian state in exchange for supporting a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia.¹⁸³ By early 1973 this was causing concern for western intelligence from fear violent Croatian extremists could turn from being staunchly anti-communist to pro-Soviet, and potentially shift the balance of power in the relatively stable Balkans.

USA's intelligence services instructed Whitlam's new government to take further efforts to bring these groups under control.¹⁸⁴ When the 1973 Murphy Raid occurred however, its unpredictable and abrupt nature would shatter all faith of the USA in Whitlam's government to adequately handle intelligence and security measures.¹⁸⁵ There was also

¹⁸¹ Emphasis added. "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 215.

¹⁸² Directorate of Intelligence, "Intelligence Memorandum: Croatian Emigre Activity - 15/09/1972" (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.), 3, CIA Online Library, accessed January 8, 2017.

¹⁸³ Tokić, "Party Politics, National Security, and Emigré Political Violence in Australia, 1949–1973," 407–8.

¹⁸⁴ Tokić, 407–8.

¹⁸⁵ Ilardi, "The Whitlam Government's 1973 Clash With Australian Intelligence," 74.

anxiety over Whitlam's lack of anti-communist rhetoric.¹⁸⁶ The CIA became increasingly concerned actions by Whitlam would expose their operations which were closely integrated with Australia.¹⁸⁷ The Murphy Raid and the reaction of the USA intelligence community demonstrates how the threat of Croatian separatists was perceived and entangled into a broader Cold War context.

Whitlam's Government and Yugoslavia

The interests of Whitlam government in a relationship with Yugoslavia are addressed in a letter sent from the Australian embassy in Belgrade to the Australian Foreign Minister in 1974 as part of preparations for a visit to Yugoslavia by Whitlam. It states that the relationship was seen to have been developing positively since full diplomatic relations were established 'despite the difficulties caused by the *activities of extremists of Yugoslav origin in Australia*, and the doubts which the Yugoslav Government clearly felt about the previous Australian Governments' good faith in wishing to curb these'.¹⁸⁸ It notes the importance of this relationship for Australia because of Yugoslavia's independence from the USSR during the Cold War, its significance to the non-aligned movement, and their close relationship to developing third world countries.¹⁸⁹ Other documents record a view that engaging with non-aligned Yugoslavia would provide 'a different angle of East-West relations' and possibilities to reduce Cold War tensions.¹⁹⁰ The letter notes that fostering a positive Cold War relationship with Yugoslavia would help Australia improve their standing in third world countries, which was an aim of Australian foreign policy of the time.¹⁹¹ Whitlam's visit to

¹⁸⁶ Ilardi, 64.

¹⁸⁷ Ilardi, 82.

¹⁸⁸ Emphasis added. "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 7.

¹⁸⁹ "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 7.

¹⁹⁰ "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 24.

¹⁹¹ "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 8–9.

Yugoslavia was seen as an opportunity to personally explain bilateral interests to Tito, who is described as ‘one of the outstanding political figures of the century ... and the father figure of the non-aligned movement’.¹⁹² This shows the Australian Foreign Affairs Department believed there were many positives to be gained from developing this relationship, and continued attention towards the entangled extremists elements in Australia was needed to foster this.

Briefing documents prepared for Whitlam by the Department of Foreign Affairs to aid in discussions during his visit to Yugoslavia lay out exactly what the Australian priorities for this relationship were and how to undergo bilateral discussions regarding these issues. The first issue listed is that of Croatian Extremism and is given a full page of explanation, indicating the priority this issue had for the relationship. It notes despite assurances from Australia to Yugoslavia that all efforts were being made to counter any continuing threat, the Yugoslav Government had called for further anti-extremist efforts. The document notes that ‘ASIO supports the [Yugoslav] Chancellor’s assertion that there is increased militancy on the part of the Croatian extremists. ... The Attorney General’s Department, however, ... still feels that there is insufficient evidence to warrant legal action against members of the Yugoslav community’.¹⁹³ This document indicates that Australian policy makers under Whitlam were definitely in tune to the threat of Croatian extremists. Yet they took a cynical view of the rhetoric of Yugoslav authorities which ran counter to their own analysis. They believed the further anti-extremist measures called for by Yugoslavia were not necessary. This infers these Yugoslav claims were part of a process to manipulate the Australian government and further extend Yugoslav authority and indirect power over the politically active Croatian diaspora in Australia.

¹⁹² “Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1,” 9.

¹⁹³ “Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1,” 21.

The issues for discussion with Yugoslavia during Whitlam's visit apart Croatian Extremism are listed in the following order; Dual Nationals, Migration Agreement, Consular Agreement, Social Security Agreement, Cultural Agreement, Extradition Agreement, Civil Aviation Agreement, Non-Alignment, East-West Relations, Middle East, Arms Control, Trieste, and Domestic Policies.¹⁹⁴ This list of issues demonstrates what elements the Australian Government perceived as key to this relationship. Bilateral agreements dominated much of the relationship after Croatian extremism because of issues of implementing these even after they had been agreed upon. There were also several issues of international affairs particularly relevant in the Cold War context, specifically non-Alignment and arms control. Trade is not even indicated as a potential bilateral point of discussion, though a separate 1974 Department of Foreign Affairs Country Paper on Yugoslavia asserts that there was a significant trade deficit in favour of Australia by an order of some 61 million Australian dollars.¹⁹⁵ The fact that firm trade links and a plethora of bilateral agreements, which were not perfect but they still were in place, existed between the two countries indicates a general normalisation of Australian-Yugoslavian relations in the 1970s.

Concerns over Yugoslavia attempting to influence intelligence and police thinking in Australia continued during the Whitlam years. This is demonstrated by the information regarding Croatian extremists shared to ASIO by Yugoslav agencies. ASIO cables from 1974 indicate Yugoslav authorities informed ASIO about permanent residents of Australia who travelled to Europe to engage in terror activities. The Yugoslav authorities cite information from the London Metropolitan Police to back up these accusations, however ASIO found that this information was fabricated. It is noted that 'this is the second occasion on which the

¹⁹⁴ "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 21–26.

¹⁹⁵ A trade agreement between the two countries had been signed in July 1970. "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 48.

Yugoslavs have incorrectly used the name of a Police Force in another country in order to gain a degree of credibility for their ... information'.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, the opinion of ASIO according to declassified secret documents was that '[t]he activities of the Y.I.S. in relation to Australia seem to be directed primarily at *neutralisation* of the part of the Yugoslav emigre community considered to be hostile to the Yugoslav government'.¹⁹⁷ Federal Police documents from 1974 note that offers for intelligence collaboration should be viewed sceptically because of supplied information potentially being used for 'clandestine anti-terrorist missions outside Yugoslavia including assassination'.¹⁹⁸ Yugoslav authorities appeared to be willing to use manipulative techniques in an attempt to shift Australian Government opinion, extend their influence in Australia, and to neutralise the politically active anti-Yugoslav Croatian diaspora in Australia. These attempts were evidently suspected and increasingly detected by Australian authorities.

The Croatian 6

Malcolm Fraser became Prime Minister of Australia at the head of a Liberal-Country coalition government after the 1975 constitutional crisis. During the second half of the 1970s the matter of Croatian terrorism largely left the public imagination of Australia – though it remained a political issue. Croatian separatist groups did still exist in Australia and these were monitored by ASIO. Furthermore, ASIO apparently knew of 'monitoring, penetrating, and harassing of

¹⁹⁶ "Yugoslav Intelligence Service, Activities and Interest in Australia Volume 3" (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation), 27–30, National Archives of Australia, accessed April 17, 2018, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=7949471&isAv=N>.

¹⁹⁷ "Yugoslav Intelligence Service, Activities and Interest in Australia Volume 2" (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation), 109, National Archives of Australia, accessed May 22, 2018, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=7949470&isAv=N>.

¹⁹⁸ "Croatian Terrorism: Relations with Yugoslav Government - Part 1," 17.

Croatian groups' by Yugoslav agents – these were continued efforts to exert sovereignty over the diaspora.¹⁹⁹ Yet it was not until the 1979 Croatian 6 conspiracy to bomb Sydney's water works and a Yugoslav cultural club that these violent extremists were largely reintroduced back onto the public stage. All but one of the members of the conspiracy were sentenced to fifteen years of prison in a highly publicised trial. Australian journalist Hamish McDonald has documented the conspiracy and its aftermath in the book *Framed*.²⁰⁰ He claims that the event was the work of the YIS as a means of undermining the politically active anti-Yugoslav Croatian diaspora. This claim supports the assertion that Yugoslav authorities attempted to penetrate the 'fabric full of holes' which made up Australian sovereignty through establishing a metaphysical link with the Croatian diaspora, and using this to pursue an agenda of silencing anti-Yugoslav dissent. McDonald's investigation raises the question of how deeply the YIS penetrated the Croatian diaspora in Australia during the 1960s and 1970s - this question will remain without a certain answer until Yugoslav intelligence archives can be accessed.

Even though Australian intelligence agencies and police had been continuing to monitor extremist Croatian separatists, the Croatian 6 conspiracy appeared to have come out of nowhere. In *Framed* Hamish McDonald quotes John Schindler, who formerly worked for the United States National Security Agency in Balkan operations and is currently a university professor, as saying '[i]t's very clear, the evidence has been available for a long time including from the Balkans more recently, that the so-called Croatian 6 case ... was in fact a provocation by the Yugoslav intelligence services'.²⁰¹ On his personal blog Schindler states that the Croatian 6 case was '[o]ne of UDBA's top successes' and 'offers an ideal study in provocation'.²⁰² The idea of provocation was to undermine and delegitimise the political

¹⁹⁹ Blaxland and Crawley, *The Secret Cold War*, vol. III, chap. 6.

²⁰⁰ McDonald, *Framed*.

²⁰¹ McDonald, chap. 9.

²⁰² The UDBA was one arm of the Yugoslav intelligence services. John Schindler, "Terrorism versus Fake Terrorism," *The XX Committee* (blog), July 21, 2012, <https://20committee.com/2012/07/21/terrorism-versus-fake-terrorism/>.

Croatian separatist movement, especially the non-violent element which the Yugoslav Government had no way of officially countering in Australia. Despite this firm assertion of Schindler, archival sources have yet become available to confirm this, though circumstantial evidence certainly supports him.

A 1991 investigation by journalist Chris Masters found Vico Virkez, the member of the conspiracy who revealed the plot to the Australian authorities and later emigrated back to Yugoslavia after the other 5 members were imprisoned, living in Bosnia. Here Virkez implied that he had connections to the YIS in the 1970s and had been infiltrating Croatian movements in Australia on their behalf. His role in revealing the plot of the Croatian 6 to Australian police was the extension of this work.²⁰³ Virkez clearly had a history of mental instability, having spent time in a psychiatric hospital, so there may be some doubts over his comments regarding an event which occurred over a decade before.²⁰⁴ However many elements of circumstantial evidence support the claims of McDonald and Masters, and this uncertainty was strong enough to see the five imprisoned conspirators released early from their 15 year sentences in 1991.²⁰⁵ The recent work by McDonald and the earlier investigation by Masters has created some level of consensus in Australia that the Croatian 6 conspiracy was not as it appeared, and that by utilising the metaphysical link of the Croatian diaspora Yugoslavia could influence Australian perceptions of anti-Yugoslav dissidents.

This Croatian 6 case best demonstrates how the Yugoslav Government potentially used their intelligence services as provocateurs to create a further entanglement of radical Croatian separatists into their relationship with Australia and by extension sovereign authority could be extended over anti-Yugoslav diasporic communities outside of Yugoslavia's geographical boundaries. It raises a question of if other cases of potential YIS provocation in

²⁰³ McDonald, *Framed*, chap. 7.

²⁰⁴ McDonald, chap. 7.

²⁰⁵ McDonald, chap. 7.

Australia existed – this cannot be answered with the available material. It must be made very clear, as demonstrated in chapters one and two, significant extremist Croatian separatist organisations were active in Australia - notably the HRB. They maintained a direct lineage from the Ustaše, embodied fascist and racist views, and considered themselves Ustaše. They committed terror acts in Australia endangering many people. In no way are these terrorist activities or the motivations behind them exonerated, excused, or ignored by either this chapter's assertion that Yugoslav authorities extended sovereignty into Australia to undermine political opposition, or the claims cases such as the Croatian 6 may have been YIS provocations. Neither could occur without first Croatian extremists operating as terrorists in Australia. What has been shown is that Yugoslav authorities used the metaphysical link of Croatian separatist extremists, who had become firmly established and active in Australia, to extend authority into the 'fabric full of holes' which was sovereignty in Cold War Australia. Moves to discredit violent and non-violent anti-Yugoslav political movements could be made through manipulating both this metaphysical connection, and the insecurities of the Australian Government. The Croatian 6 and the suggestions it was a provocation demonstrates the lengths the YIS *may* have gone to in pursuit of this – until full access to YIS archives are achieved this will remain uncertain. Following this event, violent Croatian extremism largely disappeared from Australia and the Australian-Yugoslavian relationship diminished in importance after Marshall Tito's death one year later.

The radical element of the Croatian diaspora in Australia was entangled into the Australian-Yugoslavian Cold War relationship and acted as a metaphysical link the two countries. This chapter asked the question: how significant were radical Croatian extremists as an element of the entangled Australian-Yugoslav relationship during the Cold War, and how did Yugoslavia use this entanglement to engage with dissenting political opposition outside of its borders? It has been demonstrated that through the framing of radical Croatian

extremism as the most important issue of the Australian-Yugoslav Cold War relationship, Yugoslav authorities could, with varying success, use the metaphysical link of the diaspora to influence Australian policy and extend their sovereignty into Australia in pursuit of silencing anti-Yugoslav dissent. The entanglement and attempts at extending sovereignty began after the 1963 incursion. The Liberal-Country government's desire to generate a good Cold War relationship with non-aligned Yugoslavia led to concerns that actions of radical Croatians could harm this process. Yugoslavia sought to promote their own interests and call for greater control over political dissidents outside of their nominal jurisdiction. This was attempted through diplomatic and intelligence channels, however there was almost constant resistance in Australia to much of the alarmist rhetoric of Yugoslav authorities regarding extremism. Despite the concern over how Croatian extremism in Australia would negatively impact relations with Yugoslavia, bilateral cooperation was achieved on several fronts, notably immigration and with the opening of full diplomatic relations in 1966.

After the election of Gough Whitlam in 1972 there was a shift towards warmer public rhetoric regarding Yugoslavia and a harsher line on Croatian extremists. Bilateral agreements and trade developed, however intelligence actors in both countries postured over the threat of Croatian extremists. This Australian Government was openly concerned about the damage extremists could do to this relationship and Yugoslav authorities sought to make the most of this concern to advance their own interests through diplomatic pressure. On top of this diplomatic pressure, the extensive activities of the YIS in Australia and their suspected involvement in actions such as the Croatian 6 conspiracy suggests Yugoslav authorities went to great lengths to influence Australian perception of the Croatian diaspora. The Croatian 6 conspiracy marked the symbolic peak of suspected YIS involvement, but also the end of any major Croatian terrorist activity in Australia – hence force this entanglement would reduce in importance for both parties. For the period between 1963-1979 Croatian extremists present in

Australia were intimately entangled into the Cold War relationship of Australia and Yugoslavia. This entanglement was significant as it was utilised by Yugoslav authorities to extend their authority into Australia, try stamp out anti-Yugoslav dissidents, and undermine Australian sovereignty. The Australian-Yugoslav Cold War relationship was not defined by official diplomacy, but by the interaction of their various agencies with the issue of Croatian separatism on Australian soil – the Croatian diaspora became the metaphysical space that enabled the entanglement for sovereignty between both countries.

Conclusion: Reflections on Applying History

Croatian terrorism was a global problem amid the Cold War. Those perpetrating these violent actions were but one small element of a much larger diaspora who had emigrated from Yugoslavia to all corners of the world. This dissertation asked the research question: how were extreme Croatian separatists entangled into Australian domestic policy and their Cold War relationship with Yugoslavia between 1963-1979, and what were the implications of this entanglement? It has been asserted that the entanglement of Croatian separatism into the domestic and international spheres of Australian policy created a heightened awareness of Cold War relations with Yugoslavia, and this enabled Yugoslav authorities to extend sovereignty outside of their borders to try silence dissenting political opposition. An entangled history approach demonstrates that it is impossible to study comparative Australian-Yugoslav Cold War relations isolated from Croatian diasporic terrorism because of the symbolic metaphysical link this group formed between the two countries.

Australia is an important example of a country hosting a Cold War Croatian diaspora because of the unique availability of primary intelligence and government documents in the National Archives of Australia. An original contribution to academic discourse is made by using these sources in conjunction with a cross disciplinary approach of history and international relations. I have drawn together diplomatic Cold War history, diasporic studies, and the study of transnational terrorism to demonstrate the importance of each of these sub-fields to one another. This thesis shows the actions of extremist Croatian separatists in Australia had implications for Australian domestic politics, Australian-Yugoslavian relations, the intelligence community, and the wider Croatian diaspora.

This dissertation is important because of its topicality - central themes I have investigated continue to be present in transnational political and terrorist movements in the

world. One such example is that of Sikh Khalistan Punjab separatist movement which finds widespread diasporic support within countries such as Canada, and continues to be an entangled element of Indian-Canadian relations. The continued issue of diasporic extremism indicates the utility of using this research as an analogy of applied history for policy making and analysis. As noted in the introduction, Neustadt and May stress that an essential aspect of applied history is scrutinising analogies before using them to determine their actual relevance.²⁰⁶ No contemporary diasporic terrorist group will exactly mirror the HRB in Australia and its entanglement into relations with Yugoslavia during the Cold War in all its features. However, a comparison under scrutiny should give insight into understanding general themes such as how extremist groups of a diaspora operate in the first world, how they can import a radical ideology, their impact on domestic politics, and the potential entanglement into international diplomacy. I hope that the investigation detailed in this thesis provides such a basis to allow for the example of the entanglement of Croatian extremism into Australian-Yugoslavian relations to be applied as a comparative analysis though effective applied history.

The significance of this study comes from addressing a period of history still in the recent memory of the Croatian community in Australia which has yet to unpacked in detailed academic discourse. This diaspora, like others around the world, still face questions from this time, including details of their relationship with their host government and Yugoslavia, how concerned the authorities were about their political actions, were they monitored by intelligence agencies, and were some violent actions of the HRB provocations of Yugoslav agents? These are complex questions without straightforward answers. This thesis has answered some of these in part, whilst aiming to open a pathway for future research. This thesis reveals opportunities for similar investigations into other countries where Croatian

²⁰⁶ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, chap. 2.

diasporas with an extreme separatist element were present and thus an entanglement with Yugoslavia also existed during the Cold War. There are stories to be told of the entanglement of Croatian extremists with the governments of the USA, Canada, Argentina, Germany, and New Zealand, just to name a few, which would share themes with this research.

Another area of further research from this dissertation is the investigation of the Yugoslavian perspective of the Cold War relationship with Australia. If full access to the YIS archives are made available in the future a complimentary study to this research would be welcomed – though it remains to be seen if this will happen. I have forwarded assertions in this work based on circumstantial evidence which I have signposted as inference and lacking the hard-primary source evidence required to back up, these could be confirmed or debunked by evidence in YIS achieves. As it stands my claims (and claims by journalists and academics) will remain purely conditional and reliant on circumstantial evidence until such further research can be made. I have optimism that my research can serve as a launching pad to help find answers to remaining questions, and to provide a good historical comparison for understanding contemporary diasporic terrorism. Possibilities of applied history and future research aside, I hope above all that the reader found this thesis enjoyable, informative, and has opened a new perspective on historical events.

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