ANALYZING MOBILIZATION AND OUTCOMES OF PEOPLE POWER MOVEMENTS IN NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICAL AND DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES IN ASIAN PEOPLE POWER MOVEMENTS (1970s-1990s)

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I do not regret having crossed the boundaries of conventional political science, [as] there is need for adventurers to explore the unfamiliar and try out the untested.

– Francisco Nemenzo, *Misadventures in Political Science* (2016, 66)

ABSTRACT

People power movements are protest movements that seek to challenge authoritarian regimes through methods of nonviolent action such as protest demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience. The inordinate risks associated with mobilizing in non-democratic regimes such as the regime's propensity to use force to repress dissent should decrease the likelihood of collective action, but people power movements have emerged and even been regarded as crucial to the democratization of some autocracies. Analyzing opportunity structures accessible to the movement provides a compelling framework in explaining how people power movements in non-democratic regimes mobilize and achieve successful outcomes. This thesis focuses on the interplay of two types of opportunity structures, namely the political opportunity structures (POS) and the discursive opportunity structures (DOS), to account for movement mobilization and achievement of outcomes. Through a comparative study of Myanmar's People's Democracy Movement (1988) and China's Tiananmen Democracy Movement (1989), this thesis explores how the variation in the degree of strength of POS and DOS of these movements contributes to mobilization and attainment of successful outcomes. In the case of Myanmar, it is shown that the strong presence of POS has not been fully maximized due to the movement's failure to deeply engage the citizens in sustained collective action through the effective use of discursive opportunities. In the case of China, the strong presence of DOS has not been completely maximized due to its failure to recast the overall political context, undermine state legitimacy, and create possible opening of political opportunities. Both cases demonstrate that there may be a mismatch between existing and perceived opportunities, that the state can supplement its repressive apparatuses with persuasive repertoires to impede mobilization, and that failure to maximize both POS and DOS is a constraint in achieving movement resilience and undermining regime power and legitimacy.

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Let me begin by confessing that I do not want to be a renowned political scientist, nor do I want to call myself *political scientist*. In one of the parallel universes I have devised, I am nothing but an average laidback guy who is able to save all the people in my country from deliberate disregard to constitutional principles, lack of knowledge on how Philippine politics should work, and fanatical submission to a borderline psychotic tyrant. So forgive me if I need to keep reminding myself why I chose Political Science as my college degree. I could have gone for Biochemistry or Molecular Biology. In another parallel universe, I would have been a badass physical scientist, much to Dr. Sheldon Cooper's chagrin. In any case, the thought of shifting to another degree program kept lingering in my mind. The pile of readings was a breath of fresh air, but speaking and expressing your thoughts in front of the class was not. My introversion was killing me, and so was the depressing vibe of Philippine politics.

But I chose to stay, and I do not know why. I just remember walking inside the Philippine General Hospital during my first year in college. The hospital is located within our university's campus in Manila. It is a public hospital, so its services cost way lesser than private hospitals. As I went inside the emergency room, I saw a host of bedridden people clustered in utter disarray. The electric fans, some of which do not work, could only do so much to pacify the searing heat. Amid the overwhelming noise and stench, I saw children sleeping soundly as their mothers fan them to remedy the poor ventilation. In another parallel universe, I am my country's Secretary of Health who makes sure that the state budget on healthcare goes to where it should go. During that time, that was all I could do, create parallel universes, and to say that I feel powerless is an understatement. My naiveté as a political science major made me want to cure the maladies of Philippine society. You may call me naïve (and sure, I was), but this same naiveté made me ditch my transfer forms and enroll in political science classes the following year.

This master's thesis is a concrete proof that I have stayed. While finishing my thesis was not a stroll in the park, the invaluable assistance of mentors, colleagues, and friends made my thesis-writing period a worthwhile learning experience. Without these people, not only would my thesis not come into fruition, but I would be infinitely lost in the labyrinthine jungle that is the graduate school.

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Finally, to you, beloved reader, please know that there is more to a political science major's life than being pissed off by dimwitted politicians. As can be gathered from this work, freedom and justice are not always served on a silver platter, but people, notwithstanding bleak prospects of loss, are ever capable of fighting for these. With warm regards from Manila, I sincerely thank you for taking the time to read my work.

John Raymond Jison
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABFSU   All Burma Federation of Students' Union

BBC   British Broadcasting Corporation

BSAUPC   Beijing Students' Autonomous Union Preparatory Committee

BSSP   Burma State Socialist Party

BWAU   Beijing Workers' Autonomous Union

CCP   Chinese Communist Party

CSDD   College Students Dialogue Delegation (China)

DOS   Discursive Opportunity Structures

GNAD   Global Nonviolent Action Database

GSC   General Strike Committee (Myanmar)

ICT   Information and Communication Technology

NPC   National People's Congress (China)

POS   Political Opportunity Structures

POSND   Political Opportunity Structures in Non-Democracies

PRC   People's Republic of China

RIT   Rangoon Institute of Technology

SHSD   Student Hunger Strikers' Delegation (China)

SLORC   State Law and Order Restoration Committee (Myanmar)

VOA   Voice of America

INTRODUCTION

Despite inherent restrictions on freedom to organize and the state's extensive capacities to repress dissent, authoritarian regimes have been challenged by popular mobilization (Deutsch 1954; Teorell 2010; Welzel and Deutsch 2011). Anti-regime movements that have fought against the communist rule in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and throughout Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union during the late 1980s (Oberschall 1996; Tarrow 1998; Schock 2005), or the authoritarian regimes in the Third World that have been overthrown by popular protests and unarmed rebellions (Zunes 1994; Schock 2005), are just a few examples.

Some popular mobilizations, as in the cases of South Africa (1983-1986) and the Philippines (1986), gave rise to a more widespread and organized form of popular challenges to government authority: people power movements (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994). People power movement is defined as a collective "challenge to the policies or structures of authoritarian regimes that primarily incorporate methods of nonviolent action, such as protest demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, and interventions" (Schock 1999, 355). People power movements are protest movements, which suggests that they use protest as a primary repertoire of action "to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations" (Taylor and van Dyke 2004, 268).

The opportunity structure frameworks lay a compelling groundwork for explaining the emergence of people power movements and their achievement of intended outcomes. In social movement research, opportunity structures are defined as a configuration of factors that are conducive to movement mobilization and success in achieving outcomes (Tarrow 1996, 1998). In particular, it refers to a cluster of causes that can motivate people to engage in collective

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action. This thesis chooses to focus on two opportunity structures, namely political opportunities and discursive opportunities. The former refers to the structural and institutional dimensions that could be relevant in movement mobilization, while the latter refers to the aspects of public discourse that individuals use to diffuse claims and narratives to instigate mobilization. Political opportunities become meaningless when their public visibility is limited or when people fail to act upon these opportunities because the claims of the movement do not resonate with them. In such case, discursive opportunities play a crucial role in ensuring that the movement becomes visible and people respond to its articulated demands. These two opportunity frameworks complement each other as they show the enmeshing of both structure and agency. Analyzing how they interact with each other provides an encompassing explanation of how people power movements mobilize in non-democratic settings.

Research question and theoretical framework

The thesis explores the following question*:* How do political opportunities and discursive opportunities interplay in determining the success or failure of people power movement mobilization and outcomes? Successful mobilization is hereby defined as "sustained collective action targeted against the government by at least tens of thousands of participants drawn from many segments of society" (Schock 1999, 357), while successful outcome is defined as the regime's transition from autocracy to democracy.

Looking into configurations of political opportunities and discursive opportunities is a nascent attempt to explain how protest movements in autocratic regimes are able to carry out mobilization against the incumbent regime and the realization of intended outcomes. Whereas political opportunity theory remains to be a prominent framework in social movement research, discursive opportunity theory is a novel approach that can address the shortcomings of the

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former, more particularly its overemphasis on structural and institutional factors (Osa and Schock 2007). Unlike the political opportunity theory, discursive opportunity theory is able to account for the diffusion of the movement's claims and narratives, which is consequential to the participation of mobilization targets.

Based on the existing literature on political opportunity theory (Tarrow 1998; Schock 1999; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Kriesi 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Hooghe 2005) and discursive opportunity theory (Benford and Snow 2000; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Bröer and Duyvendak 2009; Koopmans and Muis 2009; Molaei 2015), a strong presence of political opportunities and discursive opportunities accessible to the movement should account for successful mobilization and outcome. However, this is unclear in cases when there is variation on the strength (or the lack thereof) of the configuration of both opportunity structures. Through a comparative analysis of people power movements, the thesis explores what happens when people power movements have strong political opportunities but weak discursive opportunities, and *vice versa*. Focusing on this variation contributes to the better understanding of the dynamics of political and discursive opportunities in movement mobilization and attainment of outcomes.

Significance of the study

This thesis contributes to the empirical literature on people power movements and addresses some theoretical lacunae in opportunity structures research as follows:

The study of opportunity structures in non-democracies

Much of the literature on opportunity structures vis-à-vis social movements are concerned with collective action in liberal democratic contexts (e.g. Dalton and Keuchler 1990; Koopmans and

Statham 1999; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Hooghe 2005). Osa and Schock (2007) argue that political opportunities, for instance, equally matter in non-democracies as much as they do in democracies (see also Jenkins and Schock 1992; Boudreau 1996). Although a survey of recent publications in the field of social movements shows that political opportunity and discursive opportunity theories is now being applied in non-democracies (e.g. Kurzman 1996; Oberschall 1996; Schock 1999, 2005; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Wright 2008; Hayoz 2012), there are still insufficient studies that have been written on the subject. It can be surmised that using both theories would matter in non-democratic contexts. Since authoritarian regimes are predisposed to suppress any form of resistance, political and discursive opportunities become all the more important for emergent movements and more likely to precipitate mobilization.

The incorporation of discursive opportunities in movement mobilization and outcomes

Political opportunities as a framework has, time and again, been used to explain social movement-related phenomena, such as movement emergence (see McAdam 1982; Costain 1992; Schock 1999) and mobilization outcomes (see Amenta and Zylan 1991; Kriesi et al 1995; Schock 1999), among others. However, some scholars have criticized political opportunity theory for privileging structure over agency and its lack of predictive power (Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Osa and Schock 2007). The discursive opportunities framework, aside from the widely used political opportunities framework, provides a novel approach for understanding mobilization mechanisms and outcomes of protest movements. The analysis of the role of discourse in analyzing mobilization is a recent development in social movement literature (Koopmans and Olzak 2004), and understanding how it influences movement activities in non-democratic contexts is a way of incorporating the concept of agency, aside from structure, in explaining this phenomenon.

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The study of success and failure of democratic transitions with focus on protest movements

Studies that analyze democratization through a movement-oriented approach remain lacking in extant literature. Gleaning over existing democratization studies shows that the emphasis is on: (1) whether it stems from institutional requisites (structure) or negotiations among political elites (agency) (Schock 2005; Ajagbe 2016); and (2) whether it is initiated from *above* or *below* (O'Donnell et al 1986; Bermeo 1997; Giugni et al 1998; Collier 2000; Wood 2000; Teorell 2010). Moreover, research on social movements and democratization typically focuses on "mobilization within a fatally weakened or degenerating authoritarian regime" (Osa and Schock 2007, 125). While some studies recognize protest movements and popular uprisings as main drivers of democratization (e.g. Teorell 2010), this thesis contributes to the democratization literature by shedding light on the antecedent preconditions of democratic transition, or the factors that influence the success or failure of oppositional mobilization to materialize regime change in non-democratic settings (Osa and Schock 2007).

The use of Asian cases and experience on democratization

This thesis focuses on Asian cases to analyze the diverse experience of the region in protest mobilization and democratization. The selection of cases from this region de-provincializes the study on protest movements vis-à-vis non-democratic regimes. The inclusion of cases from Asia enriches comparative understanding and advances theorizing on people power movements, which is mostly dominated by studies from the West (Smith and Pagnucco 1992; Zuo and Benford 1995; Katsiaficas 2013). The exploration of Asian cases contributes to a better understanding of people power movements by finding out if theories applied in mobilization of movements emerging from Western countries would provide good, if not similar, explanations in Asian non-democracies.

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Structure of the thesis

The thesis is organized into four main chapters. Chapter 1 situates the topic in the broader literature and surveys what has been written so far on people power movements vis-à-vis political opportunities and discursive opportunities. The chapter focuses on the dimensions of political opportunities and discursive opportunities and how they have been used as frameworks to analyze mobilization and outcomes of protest movement. It is emphasized that, while political opportunities is a prominent framework for analyzing movement mobilization and outcomes, it is unable to address some important aspects necessary in accounting for the movements' mobilization and attainment of outcomes in non-democratic contexts such as individual actions, cultural environments, framing of claims and demands, and discursive processes.

Chapter 2 discusses the thesis' methodological elements and the process of conducting the analysis. It starts by expounding the study's main theoretical argument that guides the research design, i.e. people power movements with strong political and discursive opportunities are more likely to be successful cases. The elements of research design such as identifying people power movements as possible cases, operationalizing the dimensions of political and discursive opportunities, collecting and analyzing data, coding of the cases, determining the strength/weakness of both opportunity structures in all cases, and the selection of cases for analysis are explained accordingly.

Chapter 3 analyzes the dimensions of political opportunity and discursive opportunity structures that are strong or weak in select cases. The study employs thematic analysis of multiple sources and evidence to examine people power movements through the four dimensions of political opportunities (elite divisions, influential allies, social networks, and

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state repression) and three dimensions of discursive opportunities (visibility, resonance, and legitimacy).

Chapter 4 explores the interplay of these opportunity structures and how these structures could account for the success or failure of movement mobilization and outcomes. It also offers a cross-case analysis of both cases and identifies salient themes that emanated from the thematic analysis with regard to the interplay of these structures.

The thesis concludes by summarizing its main points and arguments, discussing the relevance of the research in theoretical and empirical terms, acknowledging research limitations, and recommending further avenues of research.

CHAPTER 1:

Theorizing people power movement mobilization and outcomes: Perspectives from the opportunity frameworks

Protest movements are social movements that primarily employ protests and public demonstrations to articulate demands and challenge regime legitimacy (Taylor and van Dyke 2004; Ozen and Ozen 2010). They emerge and mobilize due to various factors that are collectively known in social movement research as *opportunities*. Opportunities facilitate not only the emergence of the movement but also their subsequent development. They also determine the likelihood of a movement's success in achieving its goals and objectives.

Social movement scholars have emphasized the role of discursive opportunities (e.g. Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Cinalli and Giugni 2011, 2016; Chan 2017), emotional opportunities (Guenther 2009), international opportunities (Khagram et al 2002), mediation opportunities (Cammaerts 2012), organizational opportunities (Kurzman 1998), political opportunities (e.g. McAdam 1982, 1996; Kitschelt 1986; Meyer 2004), and transnational opportunities (della Porta and Tarrow 2007), among others, to explain why social movements emerge and how they mobilize in order to attain certain outcomes. As Jasper (2012) comments, the need for more precise causal processes in analyzing the emergence and mobilization of social movements as well as the open-ended nature of strategic interaction are some of the reasons why the literature on social movement opportunity structures keeps expanding.

In the social movement literature, there has been considerable attention given to political opportunities, the prominence of which arguably dates back from Charles Tilly's (1978) foundational work, which he would later expand along with his colleagues Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow (2001). In essence, political opportunities are the "dimensions of the political

environment that provide incentives for people to engage in collective action" (Osa and Schock 2007, 124). However, while immensely valuable for social movement research, political opportunities have sometimes been shown not sufficient to explain social movement mobilization and outcomes. Recent studies (McAdam et al 2001; Ferree 2003; Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Bröer and Duyvendak 2009; Koopmans and Muis 2009; Amenta and Halfmann 2012) suggest that political opportunities lose their utility if their public visibility is limited, if not none at all; or if the claims that movements make strike people as immaterial, resulting in the people's failure to act upon these opportunities. Hence, even with the presence of a host of favorable political opportunities, social movements can still be susceptible to mobilization issues or failure of attaining movement objectives.

For this reason, the framework of discursive opportunities, building on the groundbreaking work of Koopmans and Olzak (2004), becomes relevant. Discursive opportunities bridge the gap between the agents of the movement and the structures that constrain their actions by suggesting that "opportunities and threats are not objective categories…but also involve members of the polity and subjects as well as other challengers" (McAdam et al 2001, 45). Discursive opportunity theory presents a more novel and encompassing approach in explaining movement mobilization and outcomes while taking into account the agency of actors that the heavily-structural political opportunities framework glosses over (Benford and Snow 2000).

This chapter conceptualizes political opportunities and discursive opportunities, specifies their core dimensions, and demonstrates their analytic utility as frameworks in the comparative analysis of people power movement mobilization and outcomes in non-democracies. It does this by evidencing the need to employ both political and discursive opportunity frameworks instead of using just one. The political opportunity theory overemphasizes structural and

institutional factors while the discursive opportunity theory is largely dependent on individual actions to explain movement mobilization. These two theories complement each other by accounting for both structure and agency to formulate a holistic explanation of how movements mobilize and achieve successful outcomes.

1.1. Explaining people power movements through opportunity structures

Protest movements such as people power movements are perceived as highly unlikely to emerge in autocratic regimes, since non-democratic regimes are characterized by relatively closed polity, persecution of regime challengers, and controlled media (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Schock 1999, 2005; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003). Moreover, the propensity of the regime to utilize its capacities for repression and violence increases the risk and decreases the likelihood of protest mobilization and participation (Brockett 1995; Zuo and Benford 1995).

However, recent studies (Geddes et al 2014; Nam 2016) show that mass uprisings, especially those that demand regime change, pose a challenge to the survival of authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, in terms of promoting regime change, there is consensus among scholars that non-violent protests are more effective in toppling incumbent governments and furthering democratization as compared to violent protests (Zunes 1994; Teorell 2010; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013). People power movements, employing methods of nonviolent action (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Schock 2005), have prompted democratic regime transitions especially in the Third World. Sustained protests in non-democracies can depose autocrats and overthrow the authoritarian regime itself, which implies that sentiments of discontent to the ruling order can emanate from repressive environments (Teorell 2010).

People power movements regard a favorable political environment as a primary consideration for mobilization and realization of successful outcomes. The dynamic nature of societies suggests that the timing of movement activity and the motivation for individual participation can be explained by analyzing opportunities and how these opportunities influence movement activities (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1996). As such, it is imperative to look into opportunity structures to explain the mobilization and outcomes of peoples in non-democracies. The study chooses to focus primarily on political opportunities and discursive opportunities as they complement each other by scrutinizing both the structural dimensions (political opportunities) and agential dimensions (discursive opportunities) of movement mobilization processes and outcomes. Moreover, discursive opportunities incorporate other structures such as emotions (Flam and King 2005; Guenther 2009) and framing processes (Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000) in examining mobilization and outcomes. The succeeding sections of this chapter elaborate on both opportunity frameworks.

1.2. Political opportunity structures in people power movements

Political opportunities comprise the exogenous factors that can improve prospects for mobilization and influence of the movement in mainstream institutional politics (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Edwards 2014). They are viewed as a cluster of power relationships within a society, in which the balance of power exists among various actors (Tarrow 1998; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Political opportunity structures ensure the capacity of the social movements "to mobilize depending on opportunities and constraints offered by the political-institutional setting in which collective action takes place" (Koopmans and Olzak 2004, 201). As new contenders for power emerge or old contenders lose their influence, the likelihood of collective action increases (Smith and Pagnucco 1992).

Political opportunities play a critical role in explaining movement mobilization and outcomes (Zuo and Benford 1995; Schock 1999; Kriesi 2004; Osa and Schock 2007). In non-democracies, as Osa and Schock (2007, 142) maintain, political opportunities can serve as a plausible theoretical framework for analyzing how movements are mobilized, since "the sources of political opportunity are fewer and narrower in scope," making the comparative analysis of mobilization in authoritarian regimes much feasible. Also, movement mobilization in non-democratic regimes can be explained by changes in political opportunities "because of the relatively higher barriers and risks associated with any form of dissent and the limits imposed on political access and independent activism" (Nesossi 2015, 963).

1.2.1. Specifying the core dimensions of political opportunities

Whereas scholars have identified various dimensions of political opportunity structures, any "highly consensual" list (Jasper 2012) of the core dimensions of political opportunities includes the following: (1) the openness of the polity to new actors (2) relative stability of existing political alignments; (3) presence of influential allies; and (4) declining state repression (see Smith and Pagnucco 1992; McAdam et al 1996; Tarrow 1996, 1998; Edwards 2014). This list, however, is contextualized from the experience of liberal democracies and may not be necessarily relevant to non-democracies. For example, regime openness as a political opportunity applies pertinently to democratic contexts since there are mechanisms through which activists can access and influence power-wielding institutions (e.g. elections) (Schock 1999). In non-democratic contexts, political openness is less likely "since it would undermine the power and legitimacy of the regime and the mechanisms of rule" (Osa and Schock 2007, 128). However, recent studies on political opportunities and non-democracies (Schock 1999; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Osa and Schock 2007) show that some of the dimensions

listed above are equally relevant in analyzing mobilization in non-democratic regimes: (1) elite divisions; (2) influential allies; (3) social networks; and (4) state repression.

Firstly, **elite divisions** can be advantageous to protest movements when the breaking up of elite alliances signals the emergence of new coalitions, in which case movements can "induce elites to seek support from outside the polity" (Tarrow 1996, 55). In non-democratic regimes, the lack of mechanisms for electoral contest is a potential source of instability and contention (Tarrow 1996). As such, elite divisions are "more sporadic and spasmodic and have far more reaching consequences for political change in non-democracies" (Osa and Schock 2007, 130). For instance, the post-World War II peasant movements that seized the southern Italian *latifundia* were organized because of a constellation of factors, including the demise of Mussolini's fascist regime and constantly shifting partisan alignments among the elite (Tarrow 1967).

Secondly, the presence of **influential allies** is another crucial factor for movement mobilization inasmuch as it encourages collective action. Allies can act as "guarantors against repression" and "acceptable negotiators on [the movements'] behalf" (Tarrow 1998, 79), as shown by the case of liberation movements in the former Soviet Union which found support from some members of the Communist Party elite (Fish 1995). Gamson (1990) claims that the presence of influential allies and movement success are correlational. In non-democratic regimes such as Poland during the 1980s (Osa 1995) and the Philippines during the height of Marcos' authoritarian rule (Wurfel 1988; Thompson 1995), the Catholic church provided assistance to protest movements by protecting activists, encouraging protest participation, and helping the movements achieve their desired objectives.

Thirdly, **social networks** and links are critical in facilitating collective mobilization especially in non-democracies. Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003) find out that the role of social networks in non-democracies goes beyond merely providing mobilizing structures, as they can generate opportunities on their own while increasing rates of mobilization. In 1970s Romania, Deletant (in Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003) writes that during the height of Nicolae Caeușescu's power, Romanian coalminers were able to organize a massive strike against the regime's repressive labor policies due to highly complex social networks that transcend occupational, social, and residential affiliations (see also Vasi 2004). Informal and grassroots networks, as in the case of Chile (Noonan 1995), are able to assume mobilizational functions for the movement such as resource generation and formation of broad-based coalitions.

Lastly, **state repression** is a critical dimension especially in authoritarian regimes where social movements are inherently subject to coercion (Tarrow 1998; Osa and Schock 2007). In democracies, the decline in the repressive capacities of the state is a political opportunity that could enable greater mobilization as it decreases the odds of the movement being crushed (Olson 1965; Lichbach 1987; Boudreau 2002). Although repressive apparatuses allow the state to quell opposition and dissent, Sharp (1973) clarifies that regime violence can incite further mobilization and protest participation in non-democratic contexts. This is exemplified by the Burmese pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988 (Burma Watcher 1989; Schock 1999) and popular uprisings in the Eastern Europe and Soviet Union during the late 1980s to early 1990s (Oberschall 1996; Smithey and Kurtz 1999). In this regard, increasing rates of repression catalyze rather than stifle movement mobilization (Brockett 1995; Goldstone and Tilly 2001).

1.2.2. Political opportunities and people power movements: A comparative perspective

The emergence of protest movements as well as their mobilization and outcomes in non-democratic regimes have been studied through the perspective of political opportunities (Oberschall 1996; Schock 1999; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003).

In his analysis of framing, mobilization, and opportunity in relation to the Eastern European revolts of 1989, Oberschall (1996) underscores the importance of domestic and international political opportunities as well as state legitimacy in analyzing mobilization and framing processes of the protest movements. He argues that the short-term and international aspects of political opportunity, such as the triumph of democratic opposition in other Eastern European states, spelled success for popular opposition. Just like Oberschall (1996), Schock's (1999) comparative study of people power movements in the Philippines and Burma suggests that political opportunities are relevant in explaining mobilization and outcomes of popular uprisings in non-democratic contexts, although he posits that configurations of opportunities must be further examined "since dimensions of opportunity may not have consistent or additive effects on social movement mobilization and outcomes" (Schock 1999, 371).

One common feature that can be gleaned from these analyses is its emphasis on formal institutions, particularly state institutions. Due to the dynamic nature of social movements, the emphasis on formal institutions leaves the analysis of both authors on protest mobilization much to be desired. To look into institutional factors alone in explaining how movements mobilize and achieve outcomes in non-democratic settings is to ignore important aspects that are relevant for such analysis. The concept of discursive opportunities addresses this weakness.

1.3. Discursive opportunities in people power movements

Political opportunities as a framework demonstrates great explanatory power as it probes into the external factors that facilitate the emergence and outcomes of social movements (della Porta and Diani 2006; Edwards 2014). Despite its analytic utility, some scholars have emphasized that, while highlighting politico-structural considerations, the theory seems to ignore some aspects that are germane to the analysis of movement mobilization (della Porta and Diani 2006; Opp 2009; Molaei 2015). For instance, political opportunities have yet to recognize that "cultural and strategic processes define and create the factors usually presented as structural" (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 27). To fill this theoretical void, a plethora of empirical studies that adopts the political process model have incorporated additional explanatory factors such as culture (Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Kurzman 2004; Polletta 2008), emotions (Flam and King 2005), framing processes (Snow et al 1986; Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; Benford and Snow 2000), and identity (Tilly 2005), among others.

The discursive opportunity theory is a nascent attempt to address the weaknesses of political opportunity theory. Koopmans and Olzak (2004, 202) define discursive opportunities as "the aspects of public discourse that determine a message's chances of diffusion in the public sphere." The public sphere acts as an arena where protest movements can make their objectives known to potential participants and persuade them of the salience of the issues and causes on which they work (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; McCarthy et al 1996; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Bröer and Duyvendak 2009). Knowing what drives people to engage in protest activities shows that movement participants respond to the political opportunities accessible to them (Ferree 2003; Bröer and Duyvendak 2009).

Discursive opportunities is a broad approach, able to explain the diffusion process of movement discourse even in non-democracies and to synthesize social movement framing theory and the political process theory (Ferree 2002; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon et al 2007). It also sheds light on how movements in non-democracies are able to overcome restraints to diffuse movement messages and propagate discourse (Zuo and Benford 1995). Whereas the political opportunity theory views social movements as mere "carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements," the discursive opportunity theory, with its focus on discursive processes, considers social movements as "signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists and bystanders for observers" (Benford and Snow 2000, 613). The role of discursive opportunities in movement mobilization has been largely overlooked for some time but is now gaining traction among social movement scholars (see Ferree 2002; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon et al 2007; Bröer and Duyvendak 2009; Molaei 2015).

It must be emphasized that discursive opportunities, albeit interrelated, are distinct from political opportunities (Ferree 2002; Koopmans 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006). Through discursive opportunities, people become aware of structurally-given political opportunities which arise on the basis of information and public visibility (Koopmans and Muis 2009). The discursive opportunity theory deviates from the unidimensional emphasis on the political realm and instead acknowledges the role of meaning-making among protest actors (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). Without the availability of discursive opportunities, structural factors such as political space remain meaningless (Koopmans and Muis 2009).

1.3.1. Specifying the core dimensions of discursive opportunities

The concept of discursive opportunities was first introduced by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (in McCammon et al 2007, 731) as mechanisms "to identify ideas in the larger political culture that are believed to be 'sensible,' 'realistic,' and 'legitimate' and that facilitate the reception of certain movement frames." In this process, three (3) elements are of great significance: visibility, resonance, and legitimacy.

Visibility refers to the extent to which people become aware of the movement and its activities (Walgrave and Massens 2000; Koopmans and Olzak 2004). As Koopmans and Muis (2009, 648) affirm, visibility for protest movements is important, as "regime weaknesses and openings that do not become publicly visible may be considered 'non-opportunities,' which for all practical purposes might as well not exist at all." A message must be visible if the movement's objective is to influence the public discourse (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). In their study of 1996 White March mobilization in Brussels, Belgium, Walgrave and Massens (2000) conclude that mass media is an influential factor in protest mobilization visibility. The effectiveness of mass media for influencing mobilization outcomes among protest movements is premised on the notions that the public is not a passive recipient of news and engaging with media imagery remains to be an active process, as the study of Gamson et al (1992) finds out.

In addition to mass media, the internet and social media have created new avenues for visibility by allowing social movements to communicate their messages easier, circumventing media gatekeepers in the process, and providing movement actors an unmediated access to the general public (Molaei 2015; Owen 2016; Neumayer and Rossi 2018). For instance, during the closing years of Suharto's dictatorship in Indonesia, online chat groups and e-mail news groups have been used by members of the anti-Suharto movement to disseminate messages and information,

both locally and internationally (Hill and Sen 2000). Social media networks have also been found crucial in the visibility of Indonesian anti-corruption and advocacy movements (Molaei 2015).

Resonance, according to Koopmans and Olzak (2004, 205), refers to the act of "provoking reactions from other actors in the public sphere." It enhances the reproduction of a message in order to elicit reactions from mobilization targets and other movement actors. Benford and Snow (2000, 619) explain that resonance is relevant "to the issue of the effectiveness or mobilizing potency of proffered framings, thereby attending to the question of why some framings seem to be effective or 'resonate' while others do not." Resonance comes in two forms: consonance and dissonance (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). Consonance occurs when individuals accept or support the movement's message and demands, which implies that the movement has become relevant to a certain segment of population. Dissonance, on the other hand, is when individuals reject the claims articulated by the movement or when individuals fail to reproduce the message of the movement.

In the same vein, Snow and Benford (1988) claim that a high degree of resonance is achieved when two factors are met concerning the movement's claims and narratives: empirical credibility and experiential commensurability. The former ensures that the claims of the movement have material and factual basis, while the latter ensures that these claims are congruous with the personal and day-to-day experiences of mobilization targets.

Legitimacy refers to the degree of support that actors in the public sphere accord to the message of the claim-makers (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). Recruitment of membership is drawn from various sectors and social bases, which renders the movement more legitimate. In essence, high

resonance go hand-in-hand with high legitimacy, but it could also go the other way around, as Koopmans and Olzak (2004, 205) explain: "highly legitimate messages may have no resonance at all because they are uncontroversial, while highly illegitimate messages may have strong resonance." In Zuo and Benford's (1995) study, high resonance of the claims articulated by the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement in China resulted in extensive mobilization of citizens coming from various sectors of society. The Tiananmen movement also succeeded in mobilizing not only the citizens of Beijing but also the people from neighboring cities and provinces (Tong 1998).

1.3.2. Discursive opportunities and people power movements: A comparative perspective

In the comparative scholarship on people power movements, two elements present insightful angles in looking at discursive opportunities vis-à-vis mobilization in non-democratic settings: (1) mass media and the new information and communication technology (ICT) networks, and (2) culture.

Discursive opportunities include mass media and ICT networks acting as established avenues for information dissemination and opinion formation (della Porta and Diani 2006; Heeks and Seo-Zindy 2013). Zunes (1994, 423) highlights the role of mass media in protest movements, stating that "nonviolent uprisings which do not get much media coverage in subsidising metropoles will be unable to stop a continued flow of support for the regimes they oppose." Mass media provides a primary site of context where protest actors get their message across a broader audience to encourage political mobilization (Gamson 2004). Access to communication networks is an equally indispensable resource for movements and an indicator of potential mobilization success (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Eyerman 1994). ICT networks have indeed proven to be an essential tool to empower citizens in non-democratic

regimes as in the cases of the Philippines (Castells et al 2006) and Ukraine (Goldstein 2007). The creation of public sphere made possible by the presence of mass media structures is a key factor for the preponderance of discursive opportunities, as "in the public sphere, movement activists communicate messages to fellow activists and potential adherents, and thereby gain crucial information about the actions and reactions of authorities, political opponents, allies, and sympathizers" (Koopmans and Olzak 2004, 199). The presence of mediatic space provides a channel for discourse, which could be employed by the movements to broaden support and participation (della Porta and Diani 2006).

There is also a growing consensus among scholars that culture is linked with the availability of discursive opportunities among protest movements, since social movements operate within a larger societal context (Zald, 1996). In general, social movements "draw on the cultural stock for images of what is an injustice, for what is a violation of what ought to be" (Zald 1996, 266). Cultural environments, as Williams and Kubal (1999) argue, can determine if the demands and goals articulated by the movement acquire resonance among the citizens. For instance, Kurzman (2004) finds out that culture determines how activists perceive their external reality, including the cluster of opportunities for mobilization that are readily available to them. Movement frames emerge out of these cultural environments; thus, movement mobilization and outcomes have an inevitable component that recognizes symbolic and institutionalized cultural assumptions (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Zald 1996; Werner and Cornelissen 2014).

This literature review shows that studies concerned with explaining social movements' mobilization and outcomes have employed both political opportunities and discursive opportunities as frameworks of analysis. In contrast, comparative studies on people power movements have mostly relied on political opportunities framework to explain mobilization process and outcomes. It is only recently that comparative research on people power

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movements have started employing discursive opportunities framework to explain how movements mobilize and achieve desired outcomes. This thesis employs the frameworks provided by both political opportunities and discursive opportunities as frameworks as they strongly complement each other by striking a good balance between structure and agency. While the political opportunities framework emphasizes the institutional and structural factors that can influence mobilization, the discursive opportunities framework underscores the individual and agential factors that recognize movement participants as agents capable of perceiving and interpreting social realities.

CHAPTER 2:

Analyzing people power movement mobilization and outcomes through comparative case study

Having explained the relevance of looking at political opportunity structures (POS) and discursive opportunity structures (DOS) in people power movements, this chapter will outline the processes involved in the analysis of the interplay between these two opportunity structures in shaping movement mobilization and outcomes. First, the thesis argues that when configurations of both POS and DOS are strong for the people power to access, this will more likely result in successful mobilization and outcomes. Conversely, where both POS and DOS are weak, people power movements will more likely experience failure from mobilization and outcomes. However in cases where either POS or DOS are weak, this thesis does not have a precise hypothesis. In that regard, it seeks to explore the mechanisms underlying people power movements that exhibit mixed cases, i.e. strong POS but weak DOS, and weak POS but strong DOS.

In conducting the analysis, this thesis has determined which people power movements have these specific POS and DOS configurations. In this process, all people power movements that can be included as possible cases have been identified. Next, the dimensions of the POS and DOS have been specified and operationalized in preparation for the analysis of case evidence. Subsequently, data sources and case study evidence have been collected and analyzed. After doing these preliminary steps, the coding of all POS and DOS dimensions in all of the people power movements has been conducted. With the presence or absence of the dimensions now ascertained, the strength or weakness of the configurations of POS and DOS for each movement has been evaluated and established. After this evaluation, the two cases for comparative study have been selected based on the most-different systems design. Finally, a

separate chapter has been allotted to present the results obtained from this process. Each step will be discussed in detail in the succeeding sections.

2.1. Establishing the study's theoretical argument

Since the configuration of political and discursive opportunities can be labeled as strong or weak, the interplay of both opportunity structures, therefore, suggests four combinations: (1) both strong configuration of political and discursive opportunities; (2) strong political opportunities but weak discursive opportunities; (3) weak political opportunities but strong discursive opportunities; and (4) both weak configuration of political and discursive opportunities.

As evidenced in the previous chapter, political opportunities and discursive opportunities are distinct and interrelated structures, but both may exist at a given point in time (Ferree 2002; Koopmans 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006). Building on the current studies on the POS theory (Tarrow 1998; Schock 1999; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Kriesi 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Hooghe 2005) and the DOS theory (Benford and Snow 2000; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Bröer and Duyvendak 2009; Koopmans and Muis 2009; Molaei 2015), a strong configuration of either political opportunities or discursive opportunities should be able to account for successful mobilization and attainment of outcomes of people power movements.

However, with regard to the mixed cases (i.e. cases that have demonstrated interplay combinations (2) and (3), as specified above), this thesis does not have a clear hypothesis. These mixed cases command scrutiny and shall be the focus of this study, as exploring what happens in these cases can serve as a vantage point towards contributing to the debate in the

literature with regard to the role the POS and DOS play in movement mobilization and outcomes. Table 1 illustrates the study's framework.

Table 1: *Interplay of political opportunities and discursive opportunities and its effect on movement outcomes*

<table>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="3" align="center">**Discursive opportunities**</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">**Political opportunities**</td><td>Degree of strength</td><td>**Strong**</td><td>**Weak**</td></tr>
<tr><td>**Strong**</td><td>More likely successful</td><td>**X**</td></tr>
<tr><td>**Weak**</td><td>**X**</td><td>More likely unsuccessful</td></tr>
</table>

The succeeding sections discuss the procedures involved in analyzing the cases, namely: (1) identifying people power movements as possible cases; (2) specifying the POS and DOS dimensions and defining their respective indicators; (3) collecting and analyzing data sources and evidence; (4) coding the dimensions for both POS and DOS; (5) evaluating the strength or weakness of both POS and DOS configurations; and (6) selecting the cases.

2.2. Identifying people power movements as possible cases

In identifying people power movements that can be included in this study, a thorough survey of literature on people power and protest movements (Huntington 1991; Zunes 1994; Goodwin 2001; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Schock 2005; Slater 2010; Katsiaficas 2013) has been conducted. In order to limit the number of choices and cases, the study has to consider three conditions:

Firstly, the movement should emanate from the region of focus, i.e. Asia. The first criterion is an attempt to address the lack of Asian cases in protest movement literature. Katsiaficas (2013)

laments on the Western bias of social movement theory, particularly the political process framework, rendering the Asian protest movements largely invisible in empirical literature. Whereas Western revolutions such as the 1989 revolts in Eastern Europe against Soviet regimes (Oberschall 1996) matter in their own right, the accomplishments of Asian popular uprisings, especially the ones that unfolded from 1980s to the early 1990s, command equal attention. These people power movements have a "huge political impact" and are noteworthy for their character and resilience (Katsiaficas 2013, 2).

Secondly, the movement should emerge in a non-democratic context. Osa and Schock (2007), in particular, note that the political opportunity framework is shaped and influenced by the form of the state; i.e. whether a state is a democracy or a non-democracy; therefore, political opportunities vis-à-vis collective action would actually matter in non-democratic contexts as much as they do in democracies. Because dissent, in essence, is more or less tolerated in democratic regimes, "any mobilization in non-democracies outside of tightly regulated channels is construed as illegal and regime threatening and therefore subject to repression" (Osa and Schock 2007, 127). Focusing on people power movements in non-democratic regimes addresses this gap.

Lastly, the movement should occur from the 1970s to 1990s. The selection of this particular time frame is built on the influential work of Samuel Huntington (1991), who argues that the democratization process across the world emerged through waves. Transpiring from the 1970s to 1990s, the third wave of democratization is characterized by the surge of democratic transitions in Asia and the rest of the Third World (Huntington 1991). The existing studies on democratization underscore the proximate conditions for or the main drivers of democratic transition (Osa and Schock 2007). This study contributes to the literature by focusing instead

on the antecedent preconditions of democratization (Osa and Schock 2007), or the host of conditions that make the availability of opportunities for mobilization possible in non-democratic contexts.

This process has yielded thirteen cases of people power movements that satisfied all these conditions. Table 2 identifies these people power movements and their places of origin.

Table 2: *People power movements in Asia* (1977-1998)

Country/Nation	Movement/Campaign
Iran	Iranian Revolution (1977-1979)
Pakistan	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (1983)
Philippines	People Power Revolution (1986)
South Korea	June Democracy Movement (1987)
Palestine	First Intifada (1987-1988)
Tibet	Tibetan Uprising (1987-1989)
Myanmar/Burma	8888 People's Democracy Movement (1988)
China	Tiananmen Democracy Movement (1989)
Mongolia	Mongolian Democratic Revolution (1989-1990)
Bangladesh	Bangladeshi Mass Uprising (1990)
Nepal	Nepali *Jana Andolan* (People's Movement) (1990)
Thailand	Campaign for Popular Democracy (1991-1992)
Indonesia	Anti-Suharto Demonstrations (1998)

2.3. Specifying the dimensions and defining their respective indicators

In specifying the dimensions of political opportunities and discursive opportunities, this study has been guided by the empirical and theoretical literature as mentioned and reviewed in Chapter 1. To wit, the four dimensions of political opportunities are the following: elite divisions or unstable political alignments, influential allies, social networks, and state

repression; and the three dimensions of discursive opportunities are the following: visibility, resonance, and legitimacy of the movements' claims and narratives.

To identify and operationalize the indicator/s for all the dimensions, the study has used multiple references to ensure the construct validity of their operationalization (Yin 2009). Table 3 summarizes the measures for the dimensions of both political opportunities and discursive opportunities.

Table 3: *Operationalization of the dimensions*

Dimension	Operationalization	Bases
Political opportunities		
Elite divisions	Competing factions within the ruling elite; symbolic opposition within the ruling elite or presence of powerless moderates does not count	Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003); Vasi (2004); Osa and Schock (2007)
Influential allies	At least two (2) religious organizations, foreign governments, international organizations, transnational social movements, or prominent individuals that were recorded to have been pivotal for movement mobilization	Schock (1999); Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003); Osa and Schock (2007);
Social networks	Presence of inter-organizational networks and interconnected groups that were implicated in mobilization	Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003); Osa and Schock (2007)
Repression	Reports of/data on increasing rates of repression throughout the duration of the movement	Sharp (1973); Brockett (1993, 1995); Tarrow (1998); Goldstone and Tilly (2001)
Discursive opportunities		
Visibility	Access to media (alternative/underground/ independent) and information flows (print, media, broadcast, and/or personal networks)	Walgrave and Massens (2000); Koopmans and Olzak (2004); Koopmans and Muis (2009)

Resonance	Expression of claims (written or oral) or performative actions (e.g. hunger strike, lightning protest) that contain empirical credibility and experiential commensurability, as defined by Snow and Benford (1988)	Snow and Benford (1988); Zuo and Benford (1995); Benford and Snow (2000); Koopmans and Olzak (2004)
Legitimacy	Participation of actors from a broader social base; diffusion of participation beyond the city/region of the movement's origin	Koopmans and Olzak (2004)

2.4. Collecting and analyzing data sources and evidence

This thesis has used multiple data sources as case study evidence to ensure data triangulation and holistic analysis (Patton 2002; Gerring 2007; Yin 2009). In the case of secondary references, there has been an effort to include sources that were written by local authors to provide representation of *authentic voices* in the data. These sources are as follows:

1) Primary sources, which include personal accounts and interviews of those who have participated or have been involved in the movement (e.g. Han 1990; Li 1990; Yu 1990; Kreager 1991; Cunningham 2009);

2) Secondary sources, which primarily comprise case studies and area literature (e.g. Maung 1990, 1992; Calhoun 1994; Schock 1999, 2005; Zhao 2001; Hlaing 2007; Steinberg 2010);

3) Newspaper articles, clippings, and entries taken from the LexisNexis Academic database (e.g. Baker 1988a, 1988b; Costello 1988; Richburg 1988; Dobbs 1989; Neilan 1989; Schidlovsky 1989);

4) Archival records such as government memoranda and minutes of party meetings and congressional sessions (e.g. Liang et al 2001; Nathan 2001; SLORC 2009);

5) Data from the Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD), which provides essential information about the mobilization and outcomes of nonviolent movements and campaigns; and

6) Data from the Political Opportunity Structures in Non-Democracies (POSND) database by Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003).

Thematic analysis of pertinent documents has been used for data analysis. To extract patterned meanings and overarching themes across the datasets, data sources and references have first been read and re-read for familiarization of their content. In generating codes and labels for the data as well as developing themes, the deductive method (Crabtree and Miller 1999; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006) has been employed since the study already has *a priori* template codes to focus on, i.e. the four dimensions of political opportunities and three dimensions of discursive opportunities, as specified earlier. Data have been collated for each code and examined altogether to identify broader themes relevant to the codes. Generated themes and data extracts have been woven together and situated in the existing literature to form an analytic narrative. The discussion of the themes can be found in Chapter 4.

2.5. Coding the dimensions for both POS and DOS

After the dimensions have been operationalized and data sources gathered, the next step is to determine the presence of all dimensions for both opportunity structures. The study has referred to a wide variety of sources and references as enumerated above. Adopting what Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003) did in their study, the case has been coded 1 in a particular dimension if consensual evidence are found supporting the presence of that dimension; the case has been coded 0 if determined otherwise.

2.6. Evaluating the strength or weakness of POS and DOS configurations

Upon assessing the presence or absence of each dimension for both opportunity structures, whether a particular movement has a strong or weak configuration of political and discursive opportunities has been determined. People power movements are considered to have a strong presence of political opportunities if they, upon comprehensive review of pertinent references, have satisfied at least three (3) out of the four dimensions. On the other hand, they are deemed to have a strong presence of discursive opportunities if two (2) out of the three dimensions have been satisfied. It must be noted that these dimensions are treated as independent of each other; that is to say, the presence of a particular dimension does not preclude the presence or the absence of the other dimension/s. Table 4 shows the results of the analysis (see the Appendix for the coding of dimensions in each case).

2.7. Selecting the cases

After the strength or weakness of both opportunity structures was ascertained, the two (2) cases for comparative analysis have been chosen. Table 4 shows the strength of POS and DOS for all the cases as well as their outcome and rating in the Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD).[1] As can be observed in Table 4, people power movements with POS and DOS that exhibit strong configuration (i.e. Iran, Philippines, South Korea, Mongolia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand, and Indonesia) are also the same movements that have achieved successful outcomes. There is one case (i.e. Tibet) where both POS and DOS exhibit weak configuration. Both observations lend support and consistency with the theoretical and empirical literature on the POS and DOS theories.

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[1] Successful outcome is defined as regime transition towards democracy. Cases with GNAD ratings of 7 and above are determined as successful in terms of achievement of primary outcomes. (S) stands for success, (F) for failure.

However, people power movements that have manifested a strong POS or DOS but not both (i.e. Pakistan, Palestine, Myanmar, and China) are the same movements that have not attained successful outcomes. This thesis finds the need for an in-depth analysis of the factors and mechanisms that contributed to the failure of these movements, despite the strong of presence of POS or DOS. In particular, there is a need to explore two mixed cases. One case should demonstrate a strong presence of political opportunity structures but weak discursive opportunity structures, and the other should exhibit a weak presence of political opportunity structures but strong presence of political opportunity structures.

Table 4: *Strength of political opportunities and discursive opportunities in Asian people power movement*s[2]

Country/Nation	Movement/Campaign	POS	DOS	GNAD rating
Iran	Iranian Revolution (1977-1979)	+	+	9 (S)
Pakistan	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (1983)	+	-	3.5 (F)
Philippines	People Power Revolution (1986)	+	+	10 (S)
South Korea	June Democracy Movement (1987)	+	+	9 (S)
Palestine	First Intifada (1987-1988)	-	+	3 (F)
Tibet	Tibetan Uprising (1987-1989)	-	-	n/a (F)
Myanmar/Burma	**8888 People's Democracy Movement (1988)**	**+**	**-**	**6 (F)**
China	**Tiananmen Democracy Movement (1989)**	**-**	**+**	**4 (F)**
Mongolia	Mongolian Democratic Revolution (1989-1990)	+	+	10 (S)
Bangladesh	Bangladeshi Mass Uprising (1990)	+	+	10 (S)
Nepal	Nepali *Jana Andolan* (People's Movement) (1990)	+	+	9 (S)
Thailand	Campaign for Popular Democracy (1991-1992)	+	+	8 (S)
Indonesia	Anti-Suharto Demonstrations (1998)	+	+	10 (S)

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[2] POS means political opportunity structures while DOS stands for discursive opportunity structures. The (+) indicates strong presence of the opportunity structures; the (-) indicates otherwise. The highlighted rows represent the chosen cases for comparative study.

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The 1988 People's Democracy Movement in Myanmar and the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy Movement in China fit into these requirements, respectively. Aside from the variation requirement, this pair of cases has been chosen because there is a panoply of case studies, researches, and sources pertaining to both movements. Archival records and other data sources are also accessible for the researcher.

Based on Gerring's (2007) techniques for choosing cases, the selection of cases meets the requirements of the most-different systems design. The Burmese and Chinese democracy movements demonstrate variance in the key dimensions, i.e. strength of configurations of POS and DOS, but show similarity in terms of outcome, i.e. failure of regime transition. Also, both cases remain similar in other factors that might explain movement outcomes.

A comparison of the social, political, and economic contexts in which the people power movements in Myanmar and China emerged and developed shows notable similarities. Firstly, both Myanmar and China were ruled by a dominant single party (the Burma State Socialist Party in Myanmar and the Chinese Communist Party in China) that possesses overreaching influence over the political and social affairs of their respective countries. Secondly, both countries experienced economic crisis in the late 1980s, the time when the Burmese and Tiananmen democracy movements were organized. In China, the adverse effects of the economic reforms introduced by CCP's new cadre of leaders led by Deng Xiaoping started to settle in as it was not able to sustain its intended goal of boosting economic prosperity for the country (Katsiaficas 2013). By 1989, inflation soared in an explicable rate, the cost of living became exorbitant, and political corruption became rampant (Dittmer 1990; Meisner 1999). Myanmar also suffered from drastic economic decline when the government concentrated economic policies in the hands of the state (Taylor 1991; Schock 1999). Thirdly, both countries

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were relatively autonomous from the international system. In the 1980s, China was not yet well-integrated in the international system while Myanmar strictly implemented its policy of isolation and autarkic economic policy (Schock 2005). Finally, both regimes had a high propensity for repression especially in quelling dissent, as evidenced by how the Burmese and Chinese governments used coercion and violence to permanently disperse the movement (Schock 1999, 2005).

The next chapter reports the results of the analysis from the processes described in this chapter and examines the political and discursive opportunity structures present in Burmese and Chinese people power movements.

CHAPTER 3:

Examining people power movement mobilization and outcomes:
The cases of Myanmar (1988) and China (1989)

The emergence of the 8888 People's Democracy Movement in Myanmar (formerly Burma) traces its origins from the events of March 1962, particularly the rise of General Ne Win into military dictatorship (Yitri 1989; Maung 1990; Taylor 1991; Schock 1999). Claiming that the state was veering away from its socialist foundations, Ne Win led a coup that overthrew U Nu's democratic government (Maung 1990; Schock 1999). Over the course of his regime, the role of the *tatmadaw*[3] in politics increased, and protests and demonstrations, albeit minimal and intermittent, started to gain traction. By 1988, anti-regime protests became ubiquitous. In March of that year, students from the Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) protested against the killing of fellow university students by the *Lon Htein*.[4] Months later, students organized a more widespread protest which was violently dispersed by the police and the army, causing the deaths and arrests of many dissidents (Burma Watcher 1989).

In response to the growing discontent, the Burma State Socialist Party (BSSP) held a congressional session in July where Ne Win announced that he would step down as the president and chair of the BSSP (Schock 2005). He also proposed a referendum to gauge the public sentiment on the adoption of a multiparty system, which was subsequently rejected by the congress. The rejection of the proposal, along with the appointment of Sein Lwin, the notorious leader of the *Lon Htein*, as the new president and chair of the BSSP intensified anti-regime mobilizations (Maung 1990). A pro-democracy demonstration was organized on 8 August 1988 (8/8/88), which, similarly to the previous demonstrations, was violently

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[3] The *tatmadaw* is the Burmese term for Myanmar's armed forces (Steinberg 2001; Taylor 2009).
[4] The *Lon Htein* is the special riot police force tasked to intimidate and quell the protests (Schock 1999).

suppressed by the state troops (Schock 2005). Demonstrations escalated in the following weeks to call for the end of one-party rule and establishment of democracy. As the country verged into lawlessness, a group of generals led by former party leader Ne Win and general Saw Maung orchestrated a *sui coup*[5] to form the State Law and Order Restoration Committee (SLORC), underpinned by the *raison d'être* of addressing the social chaos that engulfed the country (Guyot 1989). The SLORC, now in full power, declared martial law and brutally suppressed all opposition, culminating in the movement's collapse.

In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the laggard pace of political reform and the death of Hu Yaobang, former general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who was the most supportive of political reform in the party elite, are viewed as consequential to the emergence of the Tiananmen Democracy Movement in 1989 (Smith and Pagnucco 1992; Zhao 2001). Adversely affected by the country's deepening economic crisis, university students and public intellectuals staged protests calling for the end of corruption, greater freedom for the press, and increase in education funding (McCormick et al 1992; Smith and Pagnucco 1992). Despite the publication of the ominous *People's Daily* editorial on 26 April 1989 where the government implicitly issued threats to use force against the protesters if the demonstrations continued (Nathan 2001), a series of anti-regime protests was held at Tiananmen Square, the symbolic center of Chinese communist politics. The protesters thought that "economic reform without substantial political reform was contradictory and democratization was the solution to China's problems" (Schock 2005, 99). During Hu's state funeral, some students from Beijing-based universities attempted to hold a dialogue with Premier Li Peng; the dialogue did not push through much to the students' frustration.

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[5] *Sui coup*, as defined by Guyot (1989), is when the government ruled by the military is taken by over by the military.

After Mikhail Gorbachev's state visit to China during the Sino-Soviet summit, the government declared martial law on 20 May and military troops were ordered to enter Beijing, but protesters along with Beijing residents blocked them from entering the Square. The government, seeking to put an end to the mounting dissent, decisively went for a military crackdown (Liang et al 2001). On the evening of 3 June, military troops advanced to the Square; on the dawn of 4 June, the soldiers opened fire and before the morning broke, the Square had been cleared. An estimated 1,000 people were killed and some dissidents were arrested (Schock 2005).

Economic crisis may have influenced the growing discontent among Burmese and Chinese citizens, but the emergence of discontent in the public does not presuppose the formation of protest movements. Following Kuran (1991), protest movements must be able to alter the widely held conceptions regarding the incumbent regime and trigger a revolutionary bandwagon against that regime. The capacity of the state to use violence and the lack of international pressure against Burmese and Chinese governments should have hampered popular mobilization in the first place, but both Burmese and Chinese people power movements precipitated and mobilized more citizens in their respective countries. Looking into political opportunity structures during the inception and development of both movements is a vantage point for an encompassing explanation of their mobilization and achievement of outcomes, but how the claims of the movements became visible, resonated, and found support among the citizens commands equal attention (Snow and Benford 1988).

3.1. Political opportunity structures: A comparison between Myanmar and China

Despite the internal cohesion of military elite, the configuration of political opportunities that were available for the participants of the Burmese democracy movement remained strong due

to the presence of influential allies, social networks, and increasing rates of repression that facilitated movement mobilization. On the contrary, the lack of influential allies and the absence of political elite division within the CCP rendered the configuration of political opportunities for the Tiananmen movement weak, despite the presence of social networks and increasing rates of repression that triggered mobilization. Comparing the two cases shows that both movements failed to maximize these opportunities and overcome constraints that go with capitalizing on the opportunities, leading to their eventual demise.

3.1.1. Elite divisions

The military's internal cohesion in Myanmar prior to and during the mobilization of the 1988 democracy movement is one of the factors attributed to the relative stability of Ne Win's regime (Guyot 1989; Schock 1999, 2005; Thompson 1999; Boudreau 2004; Slater 2010; Pedersen 2011; Jones 2014). Since the 1962 coup, Ne Win used the *tatmadaw* to solidify his power and influence. The successful purges of those who were critical of Ne Win's leadership and those who attempted to subvert his rule could account for the lack of defections within the military and party structures (Guyot 1989; Schock 1999; Slater 2010). There were no reports of withdrawal of support from the military, save for a small group of rank-and-file personnel who were stationed in the peripheral services (Guyot 1989); in any case, military personnel in the lowest levels of hierarchy had not changed sides and no significant cracks in the military structure were observed (Guyot 1989; Thompson 1999). Boasting itself as the state's central institution (Taylor 1991) and as possessing a nationalist purpose of protecting the state at all costs (Slater 2009), the military remained steadfast in carrying out its duties with loyalty.

In the case of the Tiananmen movement, the existing tensions between the party elite, as perceived by the students, became manifest when the CCP leadership was split between two

factions: the *reformers*, represented by Zhao Ziyang and his allies, and the *hardliners*, represented by Li Peng and other critics of the reforms (Liu 1992; Smith and Pagnucco 1992; Zhao 2001). This was ostensibly perceived by the students as an indication of factionalism within the party structure. After all, the editorial that was published in the *People's Daily* on 26 April gave some semblance of lack of consensus among the party's upper echelons. However, gleaning over memoranda and minutes of party proceedings (in Liang et al 2001) shows that, whereas there had been differences of views on the efficiency of proposed political reforms and strategies in response to student protests, the disagreements were not entrenched enough to result in party defection, as party members remained fully committed to the party. As Schock (2005, 115) writes, "there were no elite divisions with regard to the supreme political role of the CCP." Elite factionalism during the heyday of the movement, as Nathan (1990) and Zhao (2001) point out, would have generated a pernicious course of events, such as the purge of reformers within the CCP, reversal of Deng's economic program, or an evident power struggle that would undermine party stability. All of these, however, did not materialize throughout the duration of the movement in 1989.

3.1.2. Influential allies

An analysis of reports and literature on the development of the Burmese democracy movement (Baker 1988b; Kelly 1988a, 1988b; Reuters 1988a; Vines 1988; Burma Watcher 1989; Guyot 1989; Thompson 1999; Noble 2009a; Steinberg 2010) shows that there were three personalities who rose into the challenge of leading the opposition of Ne Win's military rule: first, retired brigadier general Aung Gyi, who was imprisoned during the time of Ne Win and a vocal critic of the military regime; second, retired major general Tin Oo, who remained to have a considerable influence in the military; and third, Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Burma's venerated independence leader, General Aung San. The most influential among the three, Suu

Kyi became a leading voice of the movement and a staunch advocate of multiparty democracy and nonviolent opposition (Kreager 1991). Aside from these individuals, the *sangha*[6] became involved with the movement from its inception to its eventual development. While Schock (1999, 2005) questioned the influence of the *sangha* as an ally due to the state's overreaching control and willingness to use violence against them, other scholars (Guyot 1989; Maung 1992; Hlaing 2007; Steinberg 2001, 2010) regard them as pivotal for mobilization. As a sector of civil society, the *sangha* remained a "potential point of resistance" (Guyot 1989, 112) and exuded tremendous moral authority, which made them politically important in terms of undermining the legitimacy of the military dictatorship (Hlaing 2007). It is noteworthy that these allies embody what Slater (2009, 209) calls communal elites, the ones who possess the "society's nationalist and religious authorities" that can enable mobilization against an authoritarian regime. Given some measure of political autonomy, they can "provide democratic oppositionists with significant mobilizational thrust" and "can tilt the scale towards the opposition during times of regime crisis" (Slater 2009, 210). The symbolic power of these personalities and institutions give them the moral ascendancy to call for social justice, thereby inducing mobilization.

Contrary to the case of Myanmar, the Tiananmen movement lacked personalities or institutions that would serve as a potent force for mobilizing people. If there were ever any, these allies were not influential enough as they were plagued by personal or organizational problems of their own. Although dismissed by the CCP for his lenient handling of student mobilizations during his term as general secretary, Hu Yaobang was regarded as an esteemed figure by the intellectuals and the masses, and would have been a viable ally for the movement (Zhao 2001). From the party ranks, Zhao Ziyang was the only party member who was reported to have been

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[6] *Sangha* is the collective term for the Buddhist monkhood (Lintner 1990).

sympathetic to the movement's cause, although there is consensus that he did it to save his own political career (Dittmer 1990; Tianjian 1990; Zhao 2001; Schock 2005). Regardless, the minutes from the meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) (Liang et al 2001; Nathan 2001) recorded that there was a discussion on the need for democratization, which shows that, at least for some time, Zhao Ziyang and the rest of the reformers had brought the possibility of political reform in the party agenda. Even so, Zhao and the rest of the reformers did not play a monumental part in influencing mobilization in Tiananmen (Zhao 2001).

3.1.3. Social networks

Both people power movements in Myanmar and China were supported by networks and organizations. The Burmese democracy movement was able to find support from organizations such as the All Burma Federation of Students' Unions (ABFSU), comprising various student organizations. Its predecessor, the Rangoon University Students' Union, was founded by General Aung San and led massive demonstrations against British colonial rule in the 1930s (Sam 2007). Having been demolished after Ne Win's coup, the federation was revived and headed by Min Ko Naing with the concurrence of other prominent student leaders (Schock 2005; Sam 2007). Also, the General Strike Committee (GSC), comprising various sectors of society such as urban workers and professionals, had been organized to serve as an umbrella organization for the mobilization of the working class (Schock 2005).

Social networks mostly composed of student organizations were also established during the Tiananmen movement. The first student movement organization assembled was the Autonomous Student Union Preparatory Committee at Beijing University on 19 April 1989 attended by around 1,000 students (Zhao 2001). The Beijing Students' Autonomous Union Preparatory Committee (BSAUPC), considered as the first Beijing-wide student organization,

was formed a day after Hu's funeral, with students from 21 universities participating in the meeting (Meisner 1999; Zhao 2001). With the creation of the BSAUPC, "Beijing students thus achieved a great mobilization and established several formal – albeit self-appointed – social movement organizations" (Zhao 2001, 155). As the activities of the movement diversified, intercollegiate organizations such as College Students Dialogue Delegation (CSDD) and the Student Hunger Strikers' Delegation (SHSD) were created (Schock 2005). The Beijing Workers' Autonomous Union (BWAU) was established on 18 May to include the working class in the movement (Walder and Gong 1993). While these organizations remained at the forefront of protest mobilization, they were beset by organizational problems such as competition among leaders (Saich 1990), weak membership due to lack of grassroots membership (Zhao 2001), and lack of organizational infrastructure required for effective coordination (Schock 2005). Nonetheless, these social networks played a vital part in building coalition formations throughout the movement's existence.

3.1.4. Repression

The crescendo of repression by the state apparatus against the Burmese democracy movement has been well-documented in the area literature (Guyot 1989; Lintner 1990; Maung 1990; Taylor 1991, 2009; Schock 1999, 2005; Steinberg 2001; Roberts 2009) and news reports (Baker 1988a, 1988b; Costello 1988; Cumming-Bruce 1988; Kelly 1988a; Reuters 1988b; Richburg 1988). Guyot (1989) reports that throughout the movement, the regime employed various forms of coercion against the dissenters. While "resistance to military rule in Burma was consistently met with violent repression" (Schock 2005, 93), the number of demonstrators who were reported to have marched and assembled in Rangoon increased (Thompson 1999). The deployment of the *Lon Htein* was primarily aimed to crush the movement (Burma Watcher 1989; Schock 2005). Several news reports (Baker 1988a; Costello 1988; Mydans 1988b;

Richburg 1988; Whitecross 1988) document beatings to students by the police and open fire to unarmed protesters. Further, incidence of brutality against the *sangha* was made evident by the military's attacks to all 133 monasteries as well as the beatings and indiscriminate shootings in the city of Mandalay, considered as the bedrock of *sangha* activism (Schock 1999; Maung 1992; Matthews 1993). During the 8 August mobilization, estimates of deaths ranged from 500-1,000 in Rangoon and 3,000 in the entire country (Guyot 1989).

The increasing intensity of repression was also observed in Tiananmen. During the early days of the movement, rates of repression were low and the regime's tolerance on protest activities remained relatively high (Zhao 2001). However, as the movement gathered momentum in Beijing and neighboring cities, the movement was met with intimidation and violence as army troops advanced into the areas where protesters assembled. The party leadership decided to quash the opposition through force, right after Gorbachev's visit during the Sino-Soviet Summit and the failure of Zhao Ziyang's policy of limited concessions (Dittmer 1990; Zhao 2001). News reports (Gittings 1989; Kristof 1989c; Schidlovsky 1989; Southerland 1989b) recorded that, by 4 June, army units began to swarm over the Tiananmen Square. Staccatos of gunfire were first heard at 4:45 in the morning, and shooting would continue two days after. Casualties were estimated at around 300 and around 7,000 were reported to have been injured, according to government reports, although some estimates registered higher numbers (Katsiaficas 2013).

In summary, the strong presence of political opportunities for the Burmese movement is characterized by the presence of influential allies, effective social networks, and escalating level of state repression that induced mobilization among the citizens, despite the cohesion within the military elite. In contrast, the weak presence of political opportunities for the

Tiananmen movement is ascribed to the absence of elite divisions and influential allies, despite the formation of social networks and increasing rate of state repression that provoked popular mobilization. The next section discusses how discursive opportunity structures influenced the Burmese and Tiananmen movements' strategies to mobilize and attain objectives.

3.2. Discursive opportunity structures: A comparison between Myanmar and China

Despite the weak presence of political opportunities, ample evidence is found to support that discursive opportunities available for the participants of the Tiananmen movement have engendered favorable results as regards mobilization. The movement has successfully made their claims visible to the greater public, and resonance of the message claims was achieved through a variety of means. Legitimacy was achieved as proven by the increase in movement membership and diffusion of the movement in Beijing and beyond in a relatively short amount of time. This is the exact opposite of what happened in Burma, where the weak presence of discursive opportunity structures is characterized by low resonance of the movement claims and low legitimacy as determined by failure to garner support from broader social bases, despite achieving high visibility of its movement claims and demands.

3.2.1. Visibility of the movement's claims and narratives

The visibility of the various messages and claims of the Tiananmen movement was made possible by the use of alternative sources of media, as major broadcast and print media outlets were heavily subject of state control. It must be noted though that after the CCP published the infamous April 26 *People's Daily* editorial that criticized the student movements, government's control of mass media weakened, particularly during the period from 28 April to 13 May 1989 (Schock 2005). Before the declaration of martial law that reinstituted censorship in the country, journalists were able to publish positive accounts of the movement (Zhao 2001).

While the foreign media such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Voice of America (VOA) had provided intensive coverage of the movement (Dittmer 1990; Mark 1991; Zuo and Benford 1995), they did not assume a significant role in providing movement visibility as "Western journalists' general lack of a deep cultural knowledge of China led their coverage to center more on iconic symbols and slogans, stars of the movement, unconfirmed rumors, and human interest stories than on the movement's internal dynamics" (Zhao 2001, 305). The alternative media sources and informal channels were regarded as more effective tools of communication. Students who became actively involved in the movement made use of *dazibao* (large character posters) posted in bulletin boards, building walls, and other conspicuous areas around the campuses to disseminate information (Meisner 1999; Cunningham 2009). Residents in the university dorms around Beijing distributed mimeographed leaflets among their fellow students (Han 1990; Yu 1990). Some participants became aware of the movement through personal networks and by word of mouth (Zuo and Benford 1995).

Protesters also engaged in performative actions to attract public attention and reach broader audience, such as the collective singing of *Internationale* while assembling in the Tiananmen Square and other mass demonstrations (Li 1990). The most effective of these actions are, arguably, the hunger strikes that were initiated by the students from 13-19 May. The hunger strikes galvanized the movement's commitment to use nonviolent action in voicing their claims and signified that the movement was serious in attaining its goals and objectives (Zhao 2001). Aside from the hunger strikes, reports and relevant literature (Dobbs 1989; Gittings 1989; Kristof 1989b; Calhoun 1994; Tong 1998; Meisner 1999; Zhao 2001) identify the following as high visibility events that contributed to movement visibility: (1) televised dialogues between the movement participants and party leaders; (2) Gorbachev's Beijing visit during the Sino-Soviet summit in 1989; (3) Zhao Ziyang's visit to the Tiananmen Square to meet with the

student protesters; (4) the declaration of martial law on 20 May which also coincided with the confrontation between the Beijing security force and city residents; and (5) the plea of student leader Wuer Kaixi to leave Tiananmen Square on 22 May. The success of the movement to articulate their demands and express their claims without gaining the ire of the regime, at least in the initial days of its inception, became a crucial factor for protest mobilization visibility (Zuo and Benford 1995).

In the case of the democracy movement in Myanmar, there was a presence of alternative media and underground press during the heyday of the movement (Schock 1999; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003). After the 1962 coup, Ne Win's military regime took control of all publishing and communication networks and banned all non-state publications (Schock 1999; Taylor 2009). However, from June to September 1988, around 40 newspapers that published critical pieces against the regime were in circulation in Rangoon (Lintner 1990). There was also a brief episode where workers sieged state-sponsored newspapers and pushed for mobilization of the opposition (Guyot 1989). Student accounts noted that weeks before the movement began, most of the residents in the rural areas were not at all aware of the nationwide protests (Hlaing 2007). The role of the foreign press such as the BBC and VOA during this time was crucial in broadly disseminating the activities of the movement (Thompson 1999; Hlaing 2007; Noble 2009a). BBC correspondent Christopher Gunness conducted a radio interview with some students of Rangoon University, where they described their country's bleak situation and outlined their demands (Thompson 1999; Hlaing 2007). According to an account by one of the movement's student leaders:

> The most important thing was the role of the BBC. The students could not spread the news about 8888 events to the whole country but BBC did the splendid job for us. When it was broadcast by BBC the whole 40 million people know and prepare for it (in Thompson 1999, 35).

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3.2.2. Resonance of the movement's claims and narratives

The claims articulated by the Tiananmen movement achieved high consonance with a broader audience as they did not only emphasize the grievances of the students but also the issues of the masses. By analyzing movement manifestos, statements, slogans, and speeches (Han 1990; Yu 1990; Zuo and Benford 1995), it is found that the movement constructed their claims from two broader themes: (1) critique of injustice caused by the market reforms; and (2) commitment to three cultural traditions, namely Confucianism, communism, and nationalism. By using these themes, the movement has achieved two important objectives. First, by framing their claims with critiques of injustice, it won the support of mobilization targets by elevating the discourse to a higher degree and making the people know that the movement was not a mere product of youth hysteria. Second, by framing their claims within the three politico-cultural traditions, it earned understanding among large publics, which spared them from being cracked down by state authorities.

The following passage from a manifesto entitled *A Letter to Citizens of Beijing* written by the Beijing Aeronautics Institute Students' Federation, contains significant themes such as upholding the public interest and pledging loyalty for the motherland:

> Our actions is by no means an action of blind impulse; we have a feasible program, clear and definite objectives, and a well-disciplined and powerful organization. We will not accept the control or manipulation of any person, nor will we stoop to compromise. We have no selfish motives or hidden ambitions. Our actions these last few days sprang from our patriotic hearts, from our pure and loyal love for our great motherland. We do not desire to 'plunge the world into chaos' [as has been alleged], nor are we a 'small handful' of bad people with ulterior motives. All we want is do our best to push forward the process of reform and democratization, to try to obtain for the people the most practical benefits possible (in Han 1990, 76).

That the movement's message successfully resonated with the public is also due to how the movement participants were able to rebut and undermine the state's counterframing of the

movement. The Chinese government gave various negative appendages to impugn the movement's collective character,[7] such as "antirevolutionary turmoil," "plotted conspiracy," and "a violation of the constitution" (Liu 1992; Zuo and Benford 1995; Liang et al 2001; Zhao 2001). To neutralize these counterframes, the students employed frames that call out injustice and, at the same time, amplify Chinese cultural traditions (Zuo and Benford 1995). For example, the hunger strikers' slogans, **"I STARVE FOR CHINA; I CRY FOR CHINA"** and **"MAMA, I AM HUNGRY, BUT I CANNOT EAT"** (in Zuo and Benford 1995, 147) express their willingness to sacrifice in pursuit of noble principles (*si jian*), a Confucian virtue that is highly valued in traditional Chinese society.

The Burmese democracy movement is a different case. Even though they made their claims known to a wider population, the lack of potent framing of their claims was the reason why these claims failed to resonate with the general public. When 8 August came, widespread mobilization was reported, mostly coming from the ranks of students. While most students knew that they were protesting against the regime, as to what they were actually protesting for remained ambiguous at the time (Lintner 1990; Thompson 1999). Further, unlike the Tiananmen movement, its Burmese counterpart failed to address the barrage of counterframes coming from the state. The government, for example, used themes of xenophobia and distaste for foreigners to argue that international forces would do whatever it takes to destabilize the incumbent regime (SLORC 1989; Thompson 1999). As a consequence, the people's "perceptions of the government may have changed, but the way they acted toward the government reverted to its previous state" (Thompson 1999, 37).

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[7] These negative labels were used in the *People's Daily* editorial published on 26 April 1989.

3.2.3. Legitimacy of the movement's claims and narratives

The degree of support for the Tiananmen movement from the general public was well-documented in the news reports and the literature (Dobbs 1989; Dodd and Byrnes 1989; Fathers 1989; Kristof 1989a; Neilan 1989; Southerland 1989a; Tong 1998; Meisner 1999; Atshan and Tedla 2010). Whereas it is true that the movement was born in Beijing, it gathered greater momentum as more rallies were organized in cities and regions beyond the capital. In his detailed spatial analysis of city participation in the movement, Tong (1998) finds out that 132 out of 434 cities in China reported protest demonstrations. While it only comprised 30.4% of the total Chinese cities, it remained to be the largest mass mobilization in China to date (Tong 1998; Zhao 2001; Katsiaficas 2013).

During the first week of the movement's inception, the aggregate mobilization was around 400,000 coming from demonstrations staged in 12 cities. However, from the 14th May to 23rd May, the movement reached its most sustained peak as aggregate mobilization in all cities was reported to have reached around six million (Tong 1998). A majority of the defiant cities (90%) had at most two days of demonstrations. Beijing, meanwhile, had demonstrations everyday throughout the emergence of the movement, i.e. 52 days.[8] The public support was not just mere attendance as they became actively involved in the activities of the movement. Reports (Dobbs 1989; Dodd and Byrnes 1989; Neilan 1989; Southerland 1989c) document that some citizens blocked major roads to obstruct the advancement of the army towards the square. Some also donated food, clothing, and money for the participants (Liu 1990; Zhao 2001).

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[8] The movement, according to Tong (1998), began on 15 April 1989, the day when the media announced the death of Hu Yaobang. It ended on 9 June 1989, when Deng Xiaoping reviewed the military troops, which signaled the end of operations in Beijing.

Although the Burmese democracy movement witnessed widespread participation from the middle class mostly composed of students, professionals, and the urban workers, the movement failed to mobilize other sectors such as the ethnic minorities (Reuters 1988c; Mydans 1988a; Thompson 1999) and the peasantry (Guyot 1989). This resulted in low legitimacy. Although the workers and the poor had joined the demonstrations, they were not able to sustain participation (Thompson 1999). Also, there had been underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in the movement, considering that around 200 different ethnic groups during that time could be found all over the country (Smith 1991; Thompson 1999). As Thompson (1999, 41) states, "the revolt was led for the most part by ethnic Burmans (and by the ethnic minorities who were lucky enough to be attending universities) and was never able to build a large-scale base throughout the country." Student activists who fled to the mountains and went underground were not able to invite the minorities to join them in their struggle. For another, the movement was a "purely urban phenomenon" (Guyot 1989, 125) as it remained mostly centralized in the city of Rangoon. The rebellion, as Guyot (1989) observed, failed to reach the villages, which could have been used as an opportunity to mobilize the peasants.

In summary, the strong presence of discursive opportunities for the Tiananmen movement is due to how the participants made use of various communication avenues to achieve movement visibility. They were also successful in framing their claims that resonated with the citizens, resulting in broad support from various sectors and neighboring cities. On the contrary, the weak presence of discursive opportunities for the Burmese movement is due to how they failed to achieve resonance in their claims and garner widespread support from other sectors of society, despite being able to articulate their demands and make them visible to the public.

The next chapter attempts to synthesize the discussion on these dimensions, with the goal of formulating a coherent account of how the interplay of political and discursive opportunities in the Burmese and Tiananmen movements played a role in shaping the outcomes of both movements.

CHAPTER 4:

Exploring the interplay of political opportunities and discursive opportunities in the cases of Myanmar (1988) and China (1989)

As discussed in the previous chapter, the democracy movements in Myanmar and China can be characterized by either strong or weak political and discursive opportunity structures. In the Burmese democracy movement, strong POS but weak DOS are accessible and evident; conversely, the Tiananmen democracy movement had weak POS but strong DOS. In both movements, mobilization processes became susceptible to issues and the regime transition did not materialize. This chapter analyzes the interplay of POS and DOS in these movements, situates the analysis in the existing literature, and explores common themes between the two cases.

4.1. Strong POS and weak DOS: The case of Myanmar's People's Democracy Movement (1988)

The presence of political opportunities, building on the prolific scholarship on POS theory (e.g. Tarrow 1998; Schock 1999; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Kriesi 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Hooghe 2005), should be favorable to the movement as it improves prospects for greater mobilization and attainment of goals. The strong configuration of political opportunities is evident in the Burmese democracy movement due to the presence of influential allies, social networks, and increasing intensity of repression, although elite cohesion is evident in the regime. These opportunities should allow the movement leaders and participants to undermine the incumbent regime's political-institutional structure, and pave the path for transitioning towards democracy (Schock 2005). In the Burmese case, all of these did not come into fruition.

While political opportunities maintained a strong presence, discursive opportunities proved otherwise. That the Burmese democracy movement was able to make their claims visible and known to the public through alternative communication channels is true, but mere awareness to the articulated demands is not enough to induce broader action. The movement has to achieve resonance with regard to its claims, in which it failed, further resulting in the lack of support from large social bases such as the ethnic minorities and the peasantry. Whereas the visibility of the movement through the articulation of claims and narratives facilitated mobilization in the incipient days of the movement, active participation was not sustained and dwindled accordingly. The movement's goals and objectives remained ambiguous and shifting to participants (Lintner 1990; Thompson 1999), which brought apparent contradictions as to how participants should understand the problematic condition they were in; hence, the loss of credibility. More so, the movement was not able to combat the counterframes that the state employed to delegitimize the movement, which made the movement appear distant and immaterial to the citizens; hence, the loss of experiential commensurability.

In the Burmese case, political opportunities for collective action are indeed present but not maximized due to the movement's failure to avail of discursive opportunities as means to engage the actors in sustained collective action. As such, the weak presence of discursive opportunities became fatal for the movement. The movement's lack of resilience in the verge of breakdown (Schock 2005) is a product of low resonance and legitimacy, manifested through the movement's failure to negotiate a "shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change" (Benford and Snow 2000, 615) and, notably, to "demobilize antagonists" (Snow and Benford 1988, 198). Borrowing Thompson (1999, 46), the Burmese protesters "never reached the state where they were willing to throw down their lives." The shared interpretation of reality as problematic provides depth, meaning, and

inspiration to ameliorative collective action and reinforces legitimation of the activities and campaigns of the movement. This construction of interpretive reality is crucial in weathering mobilizational restraints such as repression and fostering sustained collective action, as in the case of the 1986 People Power Revolution in the Philippines which resulted in the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos and restoration of democratic rule in the country (Schock 1999, 2005; Gatmaytan 2006).

4.2. Weak POS and strong DOS: The case of China's Tiananmen Democracy Movement (1989)

The presence of discursive opportunities, building on the work of the existing studies on the subject (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Bröer and Duyvendak 2009; Koopmans and Muis 2009; Molaei 2015), should be advantageous to any protest movement as it allows diffusion of movement claims and messages in the public sphere, thereby generating considerable support from third party actors for attaining outcomes. The strong configuration of discursive opportunities in the Tiananmen movement is characterized by how the movement successfully made their claims visible to the public, achieved resonance of the claims through the use of injustice frames and cultural narrations, and gained legitimacy through the diffusion of support from other sectors of society in various Chinese regions and cities. In essence, the presence of discursive opportunities should allow the movement to draw active and sustained participation from the broader, multisectoral constituency and gain leverage through the support of potential adherents to induce pressure against the state to democratize (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Schock 2005). The Tiananmen movement failed to do so.

Even though discursive opportunities are strong in the Tiananmen movement, the strength of political opportunities leaves much to be desired. Despite intra-party tensions caused by divergence on political reforms and response to the demands of student protests, elite divisions

did not manifest within the CCP. Initially, the movement thought that internal conflict within the party was brewing due to the emergence of two factions (i.e. reformers and hardliners), but the party elites, regardless of which faction they identify with, remained committed to CCP's preeminence in Chinese politics. There is also an apparent dearth of influential allies who are crucial for enabling mobilization and influencing outcomes. The lack of allies that come from outside the state control contributes to why power discrepancies between the state and the dissenters remained high. Social networks should have allayed this weakness, but there is consensus that networks, most of which were organized by students, encountered serious organizational problems throughout their run (Saich 1990; Zhao 2001; Schock 2005). Although the state in the beginning was reluctant to use coercion against the movement, the state's repressive capacities increased as the movement gathered greater momentum.

Discursive opportunities are, beyond doubt, present for the movement participants to access. However, they were not fully exploited due to the movement's failure to overcome constraints and recast the political context to allow opening of political opportunities. (Schock 2005). As in the case of Myanmar's weak DOS, weak political opportunities became fatal for the Tiananmen movement. The absence of elite divisions and influential allies coming from the party made negotiations to political concessions a futile task. The social networks, while pivotal for student mobilization, became uncoordinated and problematic in the long run. Also, the movement was not able to adapt into the escalating intensity of repression as the movement "depended almost entirely on methods of concentration in which a large number of people were concentrated in a public place, such as the occupation of Tiananmen Square" (Osa and Schock 2007, 136). When political opportunities remain closed for the movements to access, discursive opportunities could only do so much to achieve movement outcomes.

4.3. People power movements in Myanmar and China: Salient themes

The cases of Myanmar and China shed new light on how political and discursive opportunities can shape and influence the outcomes of the movement. How the movements make sense of opportunity structures, how the state uses persuasive repertoires to eliminate regime challenges aside from repression, and how the movements employ strategies to achieve resilience and undermine state power, are able to signify the interplay of political and discursive opportunities from the experience of Myanmar and China.

4.3.1. Perceived opportunities and actual opportunities

The two cases demonstrate that there is a difference between the actual opportunities and how movements perceive these opportunities. For example, in the Tiananmen democracy movement, student protesters believed that there was a division within the CCP structure, causing them to be bold in their approach in challenging state power. What appeared to be a division was actually just a divergence on how the government must respond to the students' demands. The CCP elites remained cohesive in membership and in agreement on the supremacy of the CCP in Chinese politics. This faulty perception, through the effective use of discourse and communication, diffused to the potential adherents and a result, motivated mobilization. As Zhao (2001, 320-321) puts it: "Rumors about governmental divisions gave people hope to continue fighting … Had people known that most of the information around them was unfounded rumor and that the top state elites had consolidated even before martial law had begun, they would have thought that any efforts at resistance were risky and futile."

In the Burmese movement, there was a perception that the military would defect and, instead, fight along with the people in support of ousting the incumbent regime. The military, however, did not change sides, not did it show any sign of state defection. From the words of Lintner (in

Thompson 1999, 45-46): "the public counted on the fact that the average soldier was just an ordinary village boy. Surely, the troops would eventually realize that there was no point in defending a government that had lost all popular support." The movement also perceived divisions within the regime regarding the possibility of democratic reforms (Lintner 1990; Osa and Schock 2007). In both cases, the strategies adopted to advance movement's goals were founded on misperceptions rather than an objective assessment of the real conditions (Schock 2005).

The mismatch between perceived opportunities and actual opportunities carries three implications. First, this lends support to Kurzman's (1996) claim that perceived opportunities, as opposed to objective or actual opportunities, have the potential to affect mobilization processes and outcome. In the cases of Myanmar and China, perceived opportunities influenced how movements devised strategies and tactics in mobilizing people and attaining their goals. Second, in addition to identifying whether opportunities that the movements can access are present or absent, it is equally important to look into how the movements' perception of these opportunities influence their strategies and repertoires of collective action. Third, movements are not passive recipients of information but are capable of processing this information to act upon opportunities that may surface at a given time. They base their decisions and actions on the information that is readily available or accessible to them. Considering that they operate in a non-democratic context, this information asymmetry is all the more reinforced by restrictions on information flows.

4.3.2. Persuasive repertoires of the state

Further, the two cases show that the state uses propaganda and misinformation to supplement repression as a tool for eliminating potential regime challenges. The state's persuasive

repertoires, in essence, intend to delegitimize the movement and discourage the expansion of mobilization (Osa and Schock 2007). Osa (2003), for instance, discusses the state's use of racial stereotypes and anti-Semitic tropes against Polish protesters in 1968. In the Tiananmen movement, the CCP labeled the movement as counterrevolutionary and its formation as unconstitutional to create the impression that the protests were merely a product of the youth's impetuousness and to legitimate the use of repressive force against them. In the Burmese democracy movement, the military regime used xenophobic frames to assert that the movement was a mere machination of international forces to destabilize the regime and bring turmoil to the country (Thompson 1999).

The analysis of these cases suggests that through the effective use of discursive opportunities, the movement can fight against state propaganda. This is exemplified by the Tiananmen movement with its use of a diverse array of communication channels, ranging from written and printed materials (e.g. leaflets, character posters) to performative actions (e.g. hunger strikes). The movement was also able to use their cultural environment to frame their claims and narratives in a way that resonated with the potential adherents, a phenomenon that lends support to the conclusions of notable studies (e.g. Zald 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Williams and Kubal 1999) linking culture and resonance of claims. This is an aspect which the Burmese movement failed to maximize. The movement was not successful in using a variety of communication channels to clarify their goals and demands and address the state's pejorative counterframes and anti-democracy propaganda.

4.3.3. Resilience and state power

Finally, the two cases demonstrate that non-democratic regimes are not unassailable; therefore, state power can be undermined. As Deutsch (1954) states, non-democratic regimes are not

invincible as they too can develop "cracks in the monolith." It is rather intuitive to expect that any overt challenge to non-democratic regimes will be met with repression as the regime needs to protects its interests and to appear stable amidst resistance. The movement has to acquire resilience by surviving repression, if not mitigating its negative consequences. Opportunities must be used to recast the political context and transform political transitions for the movement's outcome, i.e. regime transition, to be attained successfully (Schock 2005).

In this light, both movements failed to weather repression and undermine state power due to its failure to maximize the opportunities available to them. In the Tiananmen movement, the movement failed to discern the cohesion of party elites, reinforcing a false assumption that the elites are divided. Also, while it is true that mobilization diffused beyond Beijing, the movement was still headquartered and much concentrated in the capital, making it easier for the regime to exercise targeted repression to suppress dissent (Osa and Schock 2007). The effective use of multiple spaces and places for resistance could have been used by the movement to evade targeted repression by the state. In the cases of Nepal and Thailand (Schock 2005), for example, lightning protests, aside from public demonstrations, were organized wherein protesters would assemble in one place and disperse as soon as authorities come to stop them, only to reappear in another place. In the cases of the Philippines and Thailand, liberated areas and communes, i.e. areas that were rendered by the movement as outside of the military's control, were crucial in making the movements resilient. While there were social networks and student federations, the Tiananmen movement failed to use this opportunity with effectiveness due to the networks' inability to coordinate activities in the long run.

The concentration of the movement's activities has become a problem in the Burmese movement. The movement also failed to mobilize the peasants, which could have been crucial

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for the movement since the regime depends heavily on the farmers (Guyot 1989). The state's dependence relations is a way to undermine state power, as "in any society, the state directly depends on segments of its own populace to rule" (Schock 205, 53). Since the economy of Myanmar in the 1980s is predominantly agricultural (Taylor 2009), the movement could have used the support of the farmers to withdraw cooperation with the state; thereby creating a possible leverage for concessions. Non-cooperation of groups and entities to which states rely on for survival and legitimacy can be used as a resource to exert leverage over the regime (Schock 2005).

Both cases also show that due to Myanmar's policy of isolationism and China's relative state autonomy in the international system (in the 1980s, at the very least), political and discursive opportunities were not maximized to undermine state power. As opportunities operate at various levels from the domestic to the international (McAdam 1982), it follows that "the more integrated a state is into the international system of states and the more integrated its populace is into transnational networks, the more likely it will be that foreign states and transnational social movements will be in a position to provide support for a challenge or effectively pressure the state for change" (Schock 2005, 154). For instance, the support of third-party actors such as transnational networks and foreign states could have provided leverage for the movements to tip the balance in their favor; in particular, through applying international pressure and implementing economic sanctions against the state to concede to the movements' demands and force the regime to reconsider its course.

This analysis shows that in the Burmese case, the strong presence of political opportunities has not been completely maximized as the movement failed to deeply engage the citizens in prolonged collective action through the effective use of discursive opportunities. In the Chinese

case, the strong presence of discursive opportunities has also not been fully maximized due to the movement's failure to pressure the state and recast the overall political context to create opening of political opportunities. The experience of Burmese and Tiananmen movements further shows that there can be a mismatch between actual and perceived opportunities; that the state can use persuasive repertoires aside from repression to discourage mobilization; and that the movement's failure to maximize political and discursive opportunities constrained their ability to achieve resilience and weaken state power.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has analyzed the emergence of mobilization and outcomes of people power movements in non-democratic regimes. By looking into the interplay of political and discursive opportunity structures accessible to the movement, this thesis has sought to unravel the mechanisms through which people power movements mobilize and achieve outcomes in non-democratic contexts.

The first chapter has surveyed and evaluated the existing literature on political and discursive opportunities vis-à-vis people power movements. The POS theory remains a predominantly employed framework in explaining movement mobilization and outcomes, but most of these studies have been applied to democratic contexts. It has been argued that POS theory is all the more applicable in non-democracies as it is in democracies. However, the POS theory has been criticized primarily due to privileging structure over agency. To address such limitation, this thesis has employed a relatively novel approach, the discursive opportunities theory, building on the work of Koopmans and Olzak (2004). The DOS theory, through its emphasis on meaning-making processes and diffusion of movement messages, takes into account the agency of movement actors. By analyzing how movements availed of, maximized, and responded to both opportunity structures, this study has attempted to provide a more nuanced and encompassing explanation of movement mobilization and outcomes.

The second chapter has discussed the methodology of the thesis. Specifically, the thesis has used a comparative case study to analyze the interplay of POS and DOS in people power movements. To select the two cases for comparison, the study has undergone a thorough process of determining the strength and weakness of the configuration of both opportunity

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structures in Asian people power movements. This process found out that people power movements which exhibited either strong POS or DOS but not both are the same movements that resulted in failed outcomes. This thesis has further explored these cases to understand how both political and discursive opportunities contributed to such outcome, thereby presenting an avenue to contribute to the literature regarding the dynamics of POS and DOS in movement mobilization and achieving outcomes. In consonance with the most-different systems design, this thesis has chosen the cases of Myanmar (1988) and China (1989) for comparative analysis, since both cases have demonstrated a variation in the strength of their respective POS and DOS configurations, but similarity in other aspects such as adoption of one-party system, laggard economic growth, relative autonomy from the international system, and high propensity of the regime to use violence in quelling dissent.

The third chapter has examined the Burmese and Chinese (Tiananmen) movements in-depth by exploring how both movements responded to the political opportunities and discursive opportunities in their respective regimes. In terms of political opportunities, both movements were under a non-democratic regime with strong elite cohesion and high propensity to use repression. The Burmese movement has influential allies and effective social networks; the Tiananmen movement, however, has been found wanting in both aspects. In terms of discursive opportunities, the Tiananmen movement has successfully used and maximized all their discursive opportunities by making their claims visible, framing them in ways that resonate with the greater Chinese citizenry, and eliciting public support that transcended social status and region. The Burmese movement, on the contrary, has managed to make their claims visible for a time but failed to make them resonate with the people and, consequently, garner broader support.

The fourth chapter has discussed the results of the findings from the previous chapter and further explored the interplay of both opportunity structures for the two cases to account for the failure of both movements. In the Burmese case, the strong presence of political opportunities has not been fully maximized due to the movement's failure to deeply engage the citizens in prolonged and sustained collective action through the effective use of discursive opportunities. In the Chinese case, the strong presence of discursive opportunities has also not been effectively maximized due to the movement's inability to pressure the state and undermine state legitimacy, thereby preventing them from recasting the overall political context and possible opening of political opportunities. The experience of both movements has further demonstrated that actual opportunities may differ from how movement participants perceive them and, concomitantly, how they respond to these opportunities; that the state can use persuasive repertoires aside from or along with its repressive apparatuses to thwart resistance and discourage mobilization; and that the movement's failure to maximize both political and discursive opportunities is a constraint in achieving resilience and undermining state power and legitimacy.

Relevance and contribution

In theoretical terms, the thesis provides a novel contribution to the literature by showing that probing into the interplay of multiple opportunity structures such as POS and DOS, as compared to the prevailing practice of focusing on a single set of opportunity structures (Osa and Schock 2007), accounts for a more credible and holistic analysis of movement mobilization. In this study, the POS and DOS as frameworks complement each other. The DOS framework has incorporated agential dimensions in the analysis of protest mobilization, which addressed the theoretical weaknesses of the POS framework. Likewise, the POS framework has addressed the DOS framework's emphasis on agency by including structural and

institutional dimensions in the analysis. This implies that the analytic utility of political opportunity theory, mainly criticized for its overemphasis on structural factors and reductive explanation of movement mobilization, should not be completely discredited as some scholars argue (e.g. McAdam et al 2001; Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Amenta and Halfmann 2012), because it could be the case that political opportunities interact with other opportunity structures in shaping movement mobilization outcomes.

In empirical terms, this thesis is able to show that the political and discursive opportunity frameworks can account for the antecedent preconditions of democratization. Indeed, people power movements organized in autocracies are viewed as a potential precondition for democratization, but how these movements mobilize and eventually contribute to successful or unsuccessful regime transition can be explored using opportunity frameworks. To look solely into the economic deprivation of the citizens or the state's repressive capacities cannot substantively encapsulate how movements mobilize in non-democratic settings. It behooves any research on this subject to employ a more encompassing framework to account for all the possible factors and provide a compelling explanation. The POS and DOS as multifaceted frameworks have done this by taking into account the role of state institutions (elite divisions, state repression), social institutions (social networks, influential allies) and individual actions (visibility, resonance, legitimacy).

Limitations

The limitations of this study stem from its inability to use key informant or elite interviews as potential data sources due to logistical constraints. The interviews on those who had participated in the movement could have provided grounded perspectives on the subject and verified secondary sources. To address this shortcoming, this thesis made use of personal

written accounts in the form of books or journals written by former participants of the movement or compiled by their former colleagues.

In terms of analysis, the study was not able to account for the dynamism of opportunity dimensions in determining the strength or weakness of POS and DOS configurations. Dynamism here means that opportunity structures could fluctuate rather than remain constant throughout the entire period of mobilization. For instance, state repression could intensify at one point, weaken eventually, and intensify again when the movement gains broader support. Applying this consideration in the thesis would require more hours of analyzing each dimension. In the interest of time, the study relied on the consensus of pertinent literature and data sources in determining the presence or absence of dimensions for both political and discursive opportunities.

Further avenues of research

That movement participants perceive opportunities based on their subjective assessment signifies that they are active agents that are able to interpret and understand social realities. As such, it would be interesting to explore whether opportunities solely emerge prior to mobilization (mobilization preconditions) or after the mobilization (mobilization consequences). Are they mere products of structural and objective conditions? Are they shaped by individual or collective actions? Exploring this enriches understanding of the nature of opportunity structures. If indeed they are shaped by the agent's activities, for example, it implies that individuals can create opportunities and change them in their favor.

This study has treated POS and DOS as aggregate wholes in analyzing how they interact to influence movement outcomes. Future studies could focus on the interaction of specific parts

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or dimensions of these opportunity structures. For example, how are mobilization and movement outcomes influenced by the interplay of elite divisions and state repression (political opportunities), and resonance of movement claims (discursive opportunity)? Focusing on the interaction of particular dimensions contributes to a better understanding of how configurations work. In terms of analyzing data, would it matter if political opportunities, for instance, be treated as a single cluster, or should it be disaggregated to see how specific dimensions interact with discursive opportunities in shaping mobilization and outcomes?

In terms of scope, the interplay of opportunity structures in people power movements in other regions such as Europe and Latin America could be examined to see if the same theoretical argument would apply and same results would be obtained. Further research on the subject could strengthen the generalizability of the framework and render opportunity frameworks as potent tools in explaining movement mobilization and outcomes in non-democratic regimes.

Strength/weakness of political opportunities and discursive opportunities in the Asian cases

Dimension	POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES					DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES				SOURCES/REFERENCES
	(1) Elite division	(2) Influential allies	(3) Social networks	(4) State repression		(1) Visibility	(2) Resonance	(3) Legitimacy		
Definition	Competing factions within the ruling elite	Organizations/ external allies/ social elites that have been pivotal for mobilization	Inter-organizational networks/ groups that were implicated in mobilization	Increasing rates of repression throughout the movement's duration		Access to media and information flows	Expression of claims that contain empirical credibility and experiential commensurability	Participation of actors from broader social and geographical bases		SOURCES/REFERENCES
Iran	1	1	1	1	**4 (Strong)**	0	1	1	**2 (Strong)**	Parsa 1989; Kurzman 1996; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Dolan 2009
Pakistan	0	1	1	1	**3 (Strong)**	0	1	0	**1 (Weak)**	Bin Sayeed 1984; Duncan 1989; Corby 2011
Philippines	1	1	1	1	**4 (Strong)**	1	1	1	**3 (Strong)**	Zunes 1994; Thompson 1995; Schock 1999, 2005; Rivera 2002; Slater 2010; Alicea 2011
South Korea	1	1	1	1	**4 (Strong)**	1	1	1	**3 (Strong)**	Shorrock 1988; Yun 1997; Kim 2000; Lakey 2009
Palestine	0	0	0	1	**1 (Weak)**	0	1	1	**2 (Strong)**	Zunes 1994; King 2007; Tedla 2010

Tibet	0	1	0	1	**2** **(Weak)**	0	1	0	**1** **(Weak)**	van Walt van Praag 1987; Donnet 1994; Carlson 2004; Katsiaficas 2013
Burma/ Myanmar	0	1	1	1	**3** **(Strong**	1	0	0	**1** **(Weak)**	Guyot 1989; Thompson 1999; Schock 1999, 2005; Steinberg 2001; Noble 2009a; Taylor 2009
China	0	0	1	1	**2** **(Weak)**	1	1	1	**3** **(Strong)**	Smith and Pagnucco 1992; Zuo and Benford 1995; Zhao 2001; Schock 2005; Wright 2008; Atshan and Tedla 2010
Mongolia	0	1	1	1	**3** **(Strong)**	1	1	1	**3** **(Strong)**	Sanders 1991; Fish 1998; Goldberg and Rennebohm 2009, 2011
Bangladesh	1	1	1	1	**4** **(Strong)**	1	1	1	**3** **(Strong)**	Khan and Husain 1996; Lewis 2011; Kim 2012
Nepal	1	1	1	0	**3** **(Strong)**	1	1	1	**3** **(Strong)**	Ganguly and Shoup 2005; Schock 2005; Pahari 2010; Capron 2012
Thailand	1	1	1	0	**3** **(Strong)**	1	1	1	**3** **(Strong)**	Hewison 1997; Callahan 1998; Schock 2005; Slater 2010; Wallin 2012
Indonesia	1	1	1	0	**3** **(Strong)**	1	1	1	**3** **(Strong)**	Aspinall 2005; Noble 2009b; Slater 2010; Hamayotsu 2013; Mietzner 2017

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