

The Unwanted Intellectual Elite: What Is Other Serbia?

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Abstract

Twenty-five years after the emergence of the Other Serbia, this intellectual circle still remains an unexplored topic. It is often used as a mean for political disqualification, due to the fact that their ideas were never analyzed with structural and historical determinants taken into consideration. In order to do this, and provide an answer to the broad question, what Other Serbia is, this research used interpretivist approach with special emphasis on close-reading and historical method. The historical and structural determinants were subsumed into four ‘critical junctures’, Belgrade’s student rebellion in 1968, the 1974 Constitution, the 1986 Memorandum and the war as a direct trigger for the emergence of this intellectual circle. The main ideas identified are the anti-war platform (normative and analytical part), the struggle against collectivism and the struggle for modernization. They chose particular ideas, radically different in every sense from those embraced by the dominant nationalist intellectuals. This happened due to the public isolation they were subjected to, the context of war, and the fact that they represented intellectual counter-elite that sought to delegitimize the dominant intellectual elite, their position, as well as the factual foundation they were building it upon.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

*“A da nas narod razume, to se nikada nece dogoditi.”
“And if people only understood, but that will never happen.”¹*

What is Other Serbia? Is it an intellectual movement or is it just a group of people loosely connected by a set of ideas? What were these ideas that connected different people later known as the Other Serbia? Although the labels ‘Other Serbia’ and ‘Other Serbian’ are still frequently used in the public discourse, these and related questions remain largely unaddressed. This is the core justification for the choice of the topic of this thesis.

Before raising questions, some background information should be provided. Other Serbia came into existence in 1992 when the book “The Other Serbia” was published by the Belgrade Circle². This book collected up to eighty speeches held by prominent intellectuals on ten different occasions in the spring of 1992.³ Even though these speeches, later turned into book-sections, address a plethora of different issues, several overarching themes can be identified. Most of the contributions take a firm stance against the war and prevailing atmosphere of nationalism in the sphere of politics, media or culture. Milosevic and his regime are always present and usually depicted as personifications of everything Other Serbia is against. Yet, nationalism was not the only component of the ruling regime they were opposing. Nationalism and regime-controlled media were also in focus. Furthermore, even though the volume did not reveal distinctive and unified ideology, collectivism is identifiable as one of its prominent targets. In positive terms, they advocated human rights, democratic principles,

¹ Velimir Abramovic, “Ucinimo to odmah” [Do it now], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 71.

² Belgrade Circle represents a group of Belgrade intellectuals gathered against nationalism and Milosevic’s politics.

³ Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic, eds., *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]* (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992).

independence of civil society and modernization. These and related premises will be discussed in detail in this thesis. Before that, the importance of this topic has to be elaborated.

The brief analysis of the current situation can show us the place Other Serbia has within the contemporary public discourse.⁴ The aim of the thesis is not to exaggerate the weight of this phenomenon in Serbia today, but only to briefly state how Other Serbia is still alive in political debates. It is important to account that almost 20 years have passed since the Yugoslav civil war in the 1990s and the Milosevic regime, which are the two main topics representatives of the Other Serbia are focusing on. However, even after such a long time, the two topics, along with the label of Other Serbian are still used for various political qualifications in the public discourse. This shows that the consequences of certain phenomena were not fully analyzed and understood.⁵ This topic was never scrutinized in a serious manner, thus remaining at the level of everyday politics and everyday political debates fought in the newspapers or internet portals of debatable quality.⁶ The topic bears importance from yet another perspective. In other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, constructing the Self and the Other in correspondence with the topics of democratization, human rights or the West, is not a rare phenomenon.⁷ Therefore, a proper understanding of Other Serbia might enable to connect it with the research done on some other dissident movements across this region.

⁴ Vesna Pesic, “‘Svakodnevno me nervira. On ne zna sta je Druga Srbija’: Vesna Pesic Odgovorila Svetislavu Basari” [‘He annoys me every day. He Does Not Know What Other Serbia Is’: Vesna Pesic Responded to Svetislav Basara], *Nedeljnik*, accessed April 9, 2018,

<https://www.nedeljnik.rs/nedeljnik/portalnews/svakodnevno-me-nervira-on-ne-zna-sta-je-druga-srbija-vesna-pesic-odgovorila-svetislavu-basari>; Mehmed Slezovic, “Druga Srbija i Sandzacki krug” [Other Serbia and Sandzak circle], *Danas*, accessed April 9, 2018, <https://www.danas.rs/nedelja/druga-srbija-i-sandzacki-krug/>

⁵ Mijat Lakicevic, “Sta prva srbija hoce od Druge Srbije” [What does the First Serbia want from the Other Serbia], *Pescanik*, accessed April 29, 2016, <https://pescanik.net/sta-prva-srbija-hoce-od-druge-srbije/>.

⁶ “Sta je Druga Srbija?” [What is Other Serbia], *IN4S*, accessed April 7, 2017, <https://www.in4s.net/sta-je-druga-srbija/>; “Evo kako Druga Srbija vodi rat protiv Pravoslavlja!” [Here is how Other Serbia wages a war against the Orthodox Christianity!], *Vidovdan Magazin*, accessed November 3, 2017, <http://www.vidovdan.org/info/evo-kako-druga-srbija-vodi-rat-protiv-pravoslavlja/>.

⁷ Ana Russel-Omaljev, *Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in “First” and “Other” Serbia. Social Construction of the Self and the Other* (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2016), 10.

This research focuses on the following broad question: What is Other Serbia? This further requires addressing several more specific issues. If Other Serbia is a loosely connected group of intellectuals, as stated before, can it be said that they still espouse a relatively coherent system of ideas, including modernization, pacifism, cosmopolitanism, etc.? In that case, if Other Serbia is based on the struggle against collectivism as one of the basic values that communism and nationalism share, why did their struggle emerge only in the 1990s? If Other Serbia stands behind this system of ideas, to what extent is their system reactive to the intellectual tendencies within the society during the collapse of Yugoslavia? These questions already imply several categorizations: Other Serbia as a force for modernity, Other Serbia as an anti-war platform, and Other Serbia as an option struggling against collectivism and traditionalism. These and related implications will be thoroughly explored later on, but for now they serve the purpose of explaining the focus and scope of the research.

Researchers, despite their limited number, focused more on the discourses embraced, either by the protagonists of Other Serbia or by their political opponents.⁸ This approach could be particularly useful in order to introduce the topic and explain the chasms between Other Serbia and their opponents. It can also be useful to learn about the perceptions different actors involved in this topic have about themselves and about others. However, a research limited only to discourse may not be able to catch the nuances and resolve the above stated issues. In order to do that, the analysis focusing on the structural factors and historical determinants is also necessary. By concentrating on these aspects, it becomes possible to follow to a certain extent, the social changes which arguably offer a contextualization to the matters of our interest. Furthermore, the historical paths several most important protagonists of Other Serbia pursued can discover many less obvious reasons for embracing particular ideas instead of some

⁸ Ana Russel-Omaljev, *Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in "First" and "Other" Serbia. Social Construction of the Self and the Other* (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2016).

others. It can also help discovering why certain actors became closer to Other Serbia instead to some other intellectual option. This will hopefully bring us closer to answering the question of why Other Serbia emerged and what it is.

The research is exploratory rather than the hypotheses-testing one. Yet, even though hypotheses cannot be formally introduced and explicated, it is still possible to make certain broad expectations regarding the answers it might deliver. It may be that for the emergence of Other Serbia, certain structural features, distinctive for the 1990s, were as crucial as the influence of certain other groups of intellectuals (i.e. Siminovci⁹). Also, the influence of particular individuals, mostly intellectuals without a commonly assumed clear political role might have had even greater influence. Furthermore, the Communist treatment of some of the most prominent actors of Other Serbia during the 1970s and 1980s, compared to the treatment of other intellectuals and dissidents, can be of detrimental importance. Also, special emphasis should be put on the relationship between Other Serbia and other, especially nationalist, intellectuals. It could be that these two groups radicalized each other to the point where there was no return.

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the methodology of the research. Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis of Other Serbia focusing on the particular ideas they embrace. Chapter 4 is the key part of the research. It provides the historical background with the special emphasis on the events which can be categorized as the ‘critical junctures’ for the core questions of the research. Finally, Chapter 5 will synthesize the results from Chapters 3 and 4 and try to provide answers to the issues set in this introductory chapter.

⁹ Siminovci is a group of nationalistically oriented Serbian intellectuals.

Chapter 2: Methodology and Theoretical Approaches

This dissertation offers an exploratory research. Studying intellectuals, their behavior, actions and thoughts, while following structural factors and the interplay between them, can hardly fit into the positivist hypothesis-testing research design. Therefore, interpretivist research design strategy will be deployed. It focuses on the: “meaning-making practices of actors in their contexts, and the specific situated meanings with which they engage.”¹⁰ This will arguably suit more the broad objectives of this research and make it possible to successfully answer the questions raised without enforcing strict limitations on the topic.

2.1 Methodology – Interpretivist approach

Once again, as explained in the introduction, the issues we are engaging with present what we could call the misfit between experience and expectations which is why abductive logic will be brought into play.¹¹ The abductive logic, very often found in interpretivist research, is not often used but “[...] the typical situation for abduction is when we become interested in a class of phenomena for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we do not know for certain, that what we see is not random.”¹² Blaikie for example, defines abduction as a process through which it becomes possible for an author to generate hypotheses and use creativity when there are no theories to be applied on the data.¹³ Interpretivist research is often connected with what is in philosophy known as the hermeneutic circle.¹⁴ For this research, it will be of huge importance to properly examine not only the parts of the problem (i.e. certain protagonists) but to understand the relationship between the whole

¹⁰ Barbara Simpson, “Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes,” *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal* 9, no. 2 (June 2014): 169.

¹¹ Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes*, Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods (New York: Routledge, 2012), 28.

¹² Jorg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology,” *International Organization* 63, no. 4 (October 2009): 714.

¹³ Norman Blaikie, *Approaches to Social Enquiry* (Cambridge: Polity, 1993).

¹⁴ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 30.

and the parts and only through that interdependence resolve the puzzles introduced. The hermeneutic circle can be defined as, “this movement back and forth between the parts and the whole in the process of understanding...”¹⁵ The more we go “back and forth”, the deeper insight we shall gain into the problematics of this research and this is an additional reason why interpretivist research design is used. The “back and forth” strategy will be particularly helpful since in the making of the argument, this research will constantly have to move back and forth through history, but also through different levels of Other Serbia phenomenon or in other words, different levels of its wholeness.

The reality tends to be very diffused and to spread over many different areas and even have many different faces. A positivist research often tends to reveal only one of them and proclaim it as the ultimate truth. The complexity of this topic does not allow that. In the end, we may face multiple “truths” which is why “the expectation, then, that all research designs should contain “falsifiable hypotheses” reveals a misunderstanding of the character and purposes of interpretative research.”¹⁶ These “multiple truths” do not attempt to mask the relativist stance which includes the premise “everything goes” but rather try to point out in what way could competing explanations exist, all valid to a similar extent or in other words, none of them more valid than the other.¹⁷ This topic is further complicated with multiple historical and structural complexities which is why it cannot be narrowed down to a single determinant figuring as an only viable and valid explanation.

Another reason this research addresses the structural factors is the conviction that when studying intellectuals, one has to understand the spirit of the time to make our interpretations

¹⁵ Sebastian K. Boell and Dubravka Cecez-Kecmanovic, “Literature Reviews and the Hermeneutic Circle,” *Australian Academic & Research Libraries* 41, no. 2 (June 2010): 132.

¹⁶ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 82.

¹⁷ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 4.

and judgments accurate. “Even Ranke, a more empirical mind, [...] was convinced that each period of history was reflection of an individual idea and this idea molded its various aspects. Politics, religion, literature, and the philosophy all were expression of the same *Zeitgeist*”¹⁸ Although Greene’s evaluation of Ranke is rather strong and deterministic, it reveals an important aspect for this research - that knowing and understanding particular phenomenon only becomes possible “if one is aware of the possibilities that existed.”¹⁹ In other words, one has to understand the conditions which influenced certain behavior and moreover, to know the possibilities facing the individuals in order to fairly assess their decisions, judgements or choices.

2.2 Methodology – Close Reading and Historical Method

Particular methods this research will be using are close reading and historical method, both complementary with the interpretivist approach. Firstly, close reading will be employed when tackling ideas emphasized by Other Serbia. To do that, great attention has to be paid to the “Other Serbia” 1992 volume through which this intellectual circle announced its emergence. The close reading aims at: “reading text closely as text and not to move at once into the general context of human experience and history.”²⁰ Later on, research will deploy historical method in order to connect all of the dots which means to contextualize the knowledge acquired through the use of the close reading method. Nederman explains Skinner’s methodological scheme and principle underlying historical method by stating how: “an adequate historical account of any text of political theory may be given just by recovering author’s intention (or intended meaning) in writing. In turn, Skinner says that we locate a

¹⁸ Felix Gilbert, “Intellectual History: Its Aims and Methods,” *Daedalus*, no. 1 (1971): 86.

¹⁹ Felix Gilbert, 90.

²⁰ Frank Lentricchia and A. DuBois, *Close Reading: The Reader* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press., c2003), 2.

theorist's intention ... by setting his text within the context of the prevailing ideological conventions and debates of his time.”²¹

2.3 Theoretical Approach

A very important remark is that Other Serbia does not represent a unified intellectual movement where stances of particular individuals can be automatically attributed to all other members. For example, some of them have a rather firm position, while others potentially have a different, softer approach. A representative for the first category is Srdjan Karanovic whose contribution to the “Other Serbia” volume exuded discontent with even the most benign practices characteristic for the Serbian society.²² On the other hand, Zagorka Golubovic represents a softer approach. For example, she advises that it is needed “to teach people once again to evaluate others based on their human values and not imaginary national stereotypes.”²³ The thesis will try to catch these nuances and describe the range of opinions and to make clear dissociations when needed. Furthermore, “it is important to note that certain writers, politicians and public intellectuals have identified themselves in different discourses at different times...”²⁴ This means that the research will strive to explain “the jumps” certain intellectuals make if important for the overall argument of the thesis. Moreover, certain intellectuals have an exceptionally prominent role within Other Serbia, which is why they will be favored and their writings and thoughts will be analyzed in more detail.

²¹ Cary J. Nederman, “Quentin Skinner’s State: Historical Method and Traditions of Discourse,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique*, no. 2 (1985): 341.

²² Srdjan Karanovic, “Kad bi...” [If only...], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 143–45.

²³ Zagorka Golubovic, “Kako prevazici ‘truli zadah propadanja’ i stvoriti uslove za demokratski preporod Srbije?” [How to overcome the ‘bad smell of decay’ and create conditions for Serbia’s democratic rebirth], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 54.

²⁴ Ana Russel-Omaljev, *Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in “First” and “Other” Serbia. Social Construction of the Self and the Other* (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2016), 24.

Yet, regardless of how broad interpretative research should be, it still needs to have a properly defined limits because “before one can explain an intellectual development, one must be able to define it by indicating the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem*.”²⁵ Here we introduce methodological-theoretical limits of our study of intellectuals. The next chapter will attend to the historical limitations.

Various definitions and different authors vary in scope and terms when discussing what an intellectual is. These variations can make a great difference for the research because they determine which actors will be encompassed by the research. Antonio Gramsci famously argued: “All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals.”²⁶ This broad and functionalistic determination which implicitly sets up the foundations for examining intelligentsia is “referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals...”²⁷ Yet, this may not be enough for the purposes of this research even though it represents a good starting point in sense that it narrows down the category of people which can and should be considered intellectuals. However, it still does not clarify whether there are particular features or certain knowledge an intellectual has to obtain in order to differentiate her from others. Michels goes further and says: “Intellectuals are persons possessing knowledge, or in a narrower sense those whose judgment, based on reflection and knowledge, derives less directly and exclusively from sensory perception than in the case of non-intellectuals. Although morale or aesthetic development is often associated with intellectualism, these qualities stem from other roots and are not indispensable components.”²⁸ He introduces precise features and particular knowledge

²⁵ John C. Greene, “Objectives and Methods in Intellectual History,” *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 44, no. 1 (June 1957): 64.

²⁶ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), 9.

²⁷ Gramsci, 9.

²⁸ Robert Michels, “Intellectuals,” *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 8 (1932): 118.

or type of knowledge we needed in order to narrow down the category of people this research will focus on. Michels disqualifies category of morality when discussing intellectuals unlike other authors like Karabel, who considers moral capital indispensable for one to be an intellectual²⁹ or Jovanovic who calls those with no cultural and moral education only “semi-intellectuals”.³⁰ Furthermore, Shills emphasizes revolutionary character intellectuals’ nature must embrace in order for one to be called an intellectual.³¹ Shills relates the revolutionary character to the constant opposition to the authorities, intellectuals should embrace.³² Yet, the category of morality and the revolutionary character could be a stretch too far in regard to the needs of this research. Namely, the moral could be a category to include in the definition which can have an impact on the selection of the protagonists this research will examine. However, it would arguably bring too much discretion and subjectivity into the research regardless of the interpretivist research design. Revolutionary character would bring identical difficulties. Different questions like what is moral or what is revolutionary, or how far should one go when insisting on these categories, would come to the surface sooner or later. These aspects would only bring additional complexity, ambiguity, and vagueness without contributing to the quality of the selection of protagonists; therefore, they will be omitted.

To conclude, this research will follow interpretivist research design and employ abductive logic. It will try to catch the nuances extracted from the interplay between the whole and the parts and therefore follow the individuals, groups, and events while bearing in mind structural factors and all that through the contextual analysis. Furthermore, intellectuals, the

²⁹ Jerome Karabel, “Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics,” *Theory and Society* 25, no. 2 (1996): 205–233.

³⁰ Slobodan Jovanovic, *Kulturni obrazac - Jedan prilog za proucavanje srpskog nacionalnog karaktera* [Cultural pattern – Contribution for studying Serbian national character] (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 2011).

³¹ Edward Albert Shils, *Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

³² Edward Albert Shils, *Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 18.

main protagonists of this research will be seen through the lenses of Gramscian, functionalist definition with Michels' additional premises of distinctive knowledge or distinctive type of knowledge involved.

Chapter 3: Historical Path and Critical Junctures

In contextualizing the historical period from 1968 to 1992, relevant for the research, it is necessary to address shortly the period prior to 1968, in order to properly understand what happened afterwards. The structural features emerging before 1968 can be considered as the causes for what happened in the 1968 student rebellion in Yugoslavia.

3.1 Structural Features and Turmoil Preceding 1968

Nebojsa Popov sums up the political conditions which reflected on the cultural, economic and living conditions in Yugoslavia through the theory of inconsistencies.³³ With this theory, Popov aims to explain the contradictions of the unique form of the political-societal organizational setup in Yugoslavia called workers' self-management. For example, workers' self-management and the omnipotence of the Yugoslav Communist Party coexisted in the contradiction to each other: "With its key role in the industrialization, the state became stronger by letting its roots to go deep down in the new society's structure. By introducing self-management, opposite flow of changes was indicated..."³⁴ The means of production became social ownership: "they are owned by all of society, while the workers who work with them perform direct management, maintenance, and utilization of them."³⁵ The worker's self-management should also have extended its influence to social decisions after required abandonment of centralistic planning but it is arguable whether that happened.³⁶ Furthermore, growing obstacles for employment and rising inequalities also corresponded with the inconsistencies theory since these structural, economic phenomena are exactly the vice-versa

³³ Nebojsa Popov, *Drustveni sukobi/Izazov sociologiji* [Social Conflicts/Sociological Challenge] (Belgrade: Centar za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju, 1990).

³⁴ Popov, *Drustveni sukobi/Izazov sociologiji* [Social conflicts/Sociological challenge], 91.

³⁵ Kiro Gligorov, "The Social and Economic Basis of Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia," *Eastern European Economics* 20, no. 2 (1981): 6.

³⁶ Drago Gorupic, "Trends in the Development of Workers' Self-Management in Yugoslavia," *Eastern European Economics* 8, no. 2 (1969): 107.

of what Yugoslav workers' self-management was supposed to be, or what the regime proclaimed it to be: the system of comprehensive social, political and legal equality.³⁷

This unique setup had as a consequence the rearrangements in the field of foreign policy. The breakup of the relationships with the USSR in 1948 caused a need for an alternative geopolitical positioning, ultimately found in the closer relationships with Western, capitalist countries. Simply, this alternative to USSR's kind of socialism had to be justified externally.³⁸

Yet, 1968 cannot only be seen as the product of inconsistencies within the Yugoslav society. It was also the continuation of major crises that were constantly coming one after other. In 1965, a set of economic measures was adopted which was "the most radical transformation of the economic system in the country since the self-management in 1950 was introduced."³⁹ As a result, "The prices and living expenses rose, economic standard declined, and unemployment became more and more present society's problem."⁴⁰ Furthermore, as Bugarcic⁴¹ claims: "Sixty-eight in Belgrade cannot be seen isolated from what was happening two years before."⁴² Bugarcic is referring here to the 1966 Briuni plenum⁴³ where Aleksandar Rankovic⁴⁴ was removed from politics and cast far away from the public life. Afterwards, only four days before the student rebellion was about to happen, Dobrica Cosic was removed from the Yugoslav Communist Party, after being accused for stirring up the nationalistic tendencies and for opening the so-called "Kosovo question". At that point, everyone, including Dragoslav

³⁷ Popov, 159.

³⁸ Zarko Puhovski, *Socijalistička kritika zbilje [Socialist critique of reality]* (Zagreb: RS SOH i skolska pitanja, 1990).

³⁹ Hrvoje Klasic, *Jugoslavija i svijet - 1968 [Yugoslavia and the world - 1968]* (Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2012), 23.

⁴⁰ Klasic, 29.

⁴¹ High-ranking official of the Yugoslavian Communist Party, Chief of Police in June 1968.

⁴² Ivan Miladinovic, *1968 - Poslednji veliki san [1968 – The last great dream]* (Belgrade: Filip Visnjic, 2008), 119.

⁴³ Briuni Plenum is a name for the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia held on the Briunian Islands

⁴⁴ Top-ranking official and one of the three most important persons within the Yugoslavian Communist Party.

Draza Markovic wondered whether there is any Cosic's involvement in the happenings surrounding June of 1968: "There is no evidence but I am convinced there are immediate links between Gedza's⁴⁵ presentation at the plenum and this action."⁴⁶ These two speculations of Bugarcic and Draza Markovic regarding Rankovic and Cosic's expulsion from the Party should show us how paranoid Communist Party was. Although, these two events had nothing to do with the 1968 rebellion, due to the fact that the state was living in the series of crises, they tried to connect even the events without any connection whatsoever since they could not find a sustainable and long-term solution for the structural inconsistencies.

3.2 First 'Critical Juncture' – 1968 Student Demonstrations in Belgrade

Therefore, the period before 1968 was a period of huge turmoil and changes in the power constellation. After all of this, spontaneous student rebellion in June 1968 came. Later on, it shaped the lives of many actors, particularly interesting for this research and launched them into the orbit of broader public recognition. In other words, 1968 helped many of them to become publicly recognized intellectuals as we will see below. The Belgrade 1968 is important for multiple reasons and constitutes the first 'critical juncture'. However, before engaging those reasons, a brief introduction to what happened in 1968 is to follow.

When discussing the general causes of the 1968, Croatian historian, Hrvoje Klasic, sums them to the economic crisis which came as a consequence of a slow transition to a more market-driven economy and to the relaxation of the "police's firm hand". Nebojsa Popov, on the other hand, relies once again on the "inconsistencies" of the political-societal development, vividly depicted in the statements of Veljko Vlahovic, high-ranked Communist official: "Our state is actually the only state which negates the state and such a state has to trigger certain

⁴⁵ Dobrica Cosic's code name in the World War II

⁴⁶ Nick Miller, *The Nonconformists – Culture, Politics, and Nationalism in a Serbian Intellectual Circle, 1944-1991* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), 185.

respect.”⁴⁷ Therefore, the combination of economic trends and societal-political determinants is what in the end gave birth to the Belgrade student rebellion in 1968. However, one should bear in mind that the 1968 once again demonstrates the logic of Yugoslav dynamism which comes down to facing crisis after a crisis. To avoid unnecessary extensiveness, the direct trigger of the student rebellion shall not be analyzed.

The student movement in Belgrade had a few demands expressed in the document called “Resolution”. The most important requests were those regarding “democratization of all socio-political organizations, especially of the Communist Party” and the “free formation of the public opinion and freedom of assembly and demonstration.”⁴⁸ Even though this rebellion was carried out by the students, the biggest part regarding intellectual support was provided by eight professors from the Faculty of Philosophy: Mihailo Markovic, Svetozar Stojanovic, Ljubomir Tadic, Dragoljub Micunovic, Zagorka Pesic-Golubovic, Miladin Zivotic, Trivo Indjic and Nebojsa Popov, who were later put on the so-called blacklist.⁴⁹ The clash between them and the Communist Party lasted until 1975 when they were “kicked out from the University by the decision of the Serbian National Assembly.”⁵⁰

Why are these people important? Firstly, because they were the first to become publicly recognized dissidents, after certain isolated cases of individuals such as Milovan Djilas, for example. Secondly, they resisted the Communist Party for 7 years and showed that it is more than possible to resist the authoritarian nature of the Yugoslav Communist regime. Thirdly, they were recognized as the leaders of the rebellion which showed that pluralism of thought

⁴⁷ Nebojsa Popov, *Drustveni sukobi/Izazov sociologiji* [Social conflicts/Sociological challenge] (Belgrade: Centar za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju, 1990), 145.

⁴⁸ Popov, *Drustveni sukobi/Izazov sociologiji* [Social conflicts/Sociological challenge], 18.

⁴⁹ Srdjan Cvetkovic, “Crna lista profesora” [Professors’ black list], *Vecernje Novosti*, accessed January 21, 2018, http://www.novosti.rs/dodatni_sadržaj/clanci.119.html:364097-Crna-lista-profesora.

⁵⁰ Nebojsa Popov, “Ideoloska cenzura pamcenja” [Ideological censorship of memory], in *Sezdeset osma - Licne istorije* [Sixty-eight - Personal histories], ed. Djordje Malavrazic (Belgrade: RDU RTS - Radio Beograd 2 and JP Sluzbeni Glasnik, 2008), 88.

not only exists in Yugoslavia but has a potential for the political engagement. For the first time, if we exclude isolated cases of rare strikes, the dissatisfaction exploded on a large scale. Fourthly, these eight professors who attacked the regime from the unique position of progressive Marxism, ended up on a completely different ideological and especially political positions in the late 1980s and 1990s. As an example, we can take Mihailo Markovic and Nebojsa Popov. Markovic was a huge supporter of Milosevic and one of the most prominent members of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia, while Popov stood against the regime as one of intellectual and even organizational leaders of Other Serbia and political organizations surrounding its ideas like the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative.

The first aim of this short section was to elaborate the structural features characterizing Yugoslav society and its political life prior to 1968. Secondly, it tried to show why 1968 is taken as the first 'critical juncture'. It is the first point in Yugoslavia's historical timeline when intellectual engagement of various actors became large scale and publicly expressed. Thirdly, at this point, some of the future protagonists of Other Serbia became publicly identified as dissidents. Their ideas, which belonged to the progressive left, echoed throughout the intellectual community. Fourthly, in the 1990s, when Other Serbia emerged, some of them became sworn political enemies. What happened in-between and what separated them? To answer to this question, we need to identify and analyze the next 'critical juncture', where some new actors, also important for the phenomenon of Other Serbia, will be introduced.

3.3 Second 'Critical Juncture' – The 1974 Constitution and Events Surrounding It

A new Constitution was enacted in 1974. The Constitution was based on the constitutional amendments from 1967-1971 which radically decentralized Yugoslavia. 'The battle' regarding Yugoslavia's decentralization was led by Croatian national-liberals whose intention was to "establish a Croatian state within federal Yugoslavia" and Serbs who "opposed

the reforms for nationalistic reasons.”⁵¹ It could be said that the Croatian leadership won in this competition. The “clear tendency to weaken the federation in favor of the republics” expressed in these amendments, “in addition to the quasi-independence of the autonomous provinces, was again an argument in favor of the further deterioration of the position of the Serbs...”⁵² Many different actors opposed these amendments, albeit from different perspectives. Mihajlo Djuric⁵³ in his presentation “Premeditated Intrigues” attacked the amendments, accusing both amendments and their creator, Edvard Kardelj, for fomenting nationalistic tendencies across Yugoslavia, but also warning the Serbs that they would experience a subordinate position within the Yugoslav federation as the consequence of the amendments.⁵⁴ Djuric was sentenced and incarcerated on the charges that “he was a “greater Serbian nationalist”.”⁵⁵ His two other supporters, Vojislav Kostunica⁵⁶ and Kosta Cavoski, were also thrown out from Belgrade Law School.⁵⁷ Kostunica and Cavoski were part of the democratic opposition, but still preserved nationalistic sentiment which especially came to surface in the 2000s in relation to their attitudes towards the wars of 1990s, the issue of Kosovo and Metohija and the European Union. Clearly, they never were a part of Other Serbia. Moreover, Kostunica, interestingly, was not a communist either and during the 1970s was one of the rare people prone to liberal school of

⁵¹ Vesna Pesic, “The War for Ethnic States,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 24.

⁵² Vojin Dimitrijevic, “The 1974 Constitution as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia, or as a Sign of Decaying Totalitarianism,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 402.

⁵³ Mihajlo Djuric was a professor at the University of Belgrade's Law School and a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

⁵⁴ Mihailo Djuric, “Smisljene smutnje” [Premeditated intrigues], *Nova Srpska Politicka Misao*, accessed April 12, 2018, <http://www.nspm.rs/dokumenti/smisljene-smutnje-%E2%80%93-tekst-izlaganja-povodom-rasprave-o-ustavnim-amandmanima-iz-1971.-godine.html?alphabet=l>.

⁵⁵ Raymond H. Anderson, “Yugoslavia Bans Serbian Journal,” *The New York Times*, accessed February 26, 2018, sec. Archives, <https://www.nytimes.com/1972/09/17/archives/yugoslavia-bans-serbian-journal-quarterly-criticized-jailing-of.html>.

⁵⁶ Vojislav Kostunica is a former Serbian politician who won the presidential elections against Milosevic in 2000 and was also the Prime Minister on two occasions during the 2000s.

⁵⁷ Bora Kuzmanovic, “Secanja i naknadna zapazanja o 68” [Memories and additional observations about 68], in *Sezdeset osma - Licne istorije [Sixty-eight - Personal histories]*, ed. Djordje Malavrazic (Belgrade: RDU RTS - Radio Beograd 2 and JP Sluzbeni Glasnik, 2008), 104.

thought.⁵⁸ Therefore, Djuric, Kostunica, and Cavoski can be considered anti-communists and anti-authoritarian from the very beginning and in the 1990s they took the position of the nationalists opposed to Milosevic's regime.

Controversies over constitutional amendments led to the identification of yet another group, the so-called "Serbian Liberals". The term "Liberals" was coined by the Communist party, and it is somewhat confusing since it applied to high ranking officials of the Communist Party. This faction of the Party was liberal only compared to other factions, arguably composed of elder, hardcore members. Yet, certain goals they were trying to achieve within the system could have been considered truly "liberal" when put into the context: "(1) Market-oriented economy (2) Modern Serbia (3) Liberation from the "ballast" of the Serbian Yugoslavism and self-assimilation (4) support for the "technocrats" (5) cooperation rather than confrontation with other Republics."⁵⁹ They were not, at least not before October 1972, anywhere close to dissidence. They followed the dominant Communist party's rhetoric against other dissidents or "enemies of the regime" such as Milovan Djilas or Aleksandar Rankovic. In her speech delivered to the students of the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Latinka Perovic said: "You, on your own, threw out pro-Djilas elements. Yet, my dear comrades, there are attempts to activate forces convicted on the Briuni plenum. Your active political program will have the best effect only if you isolate various pro-Djilas and pro-Rankovic elements."⁶⁰ Interestingly, as we will see in the following chapters, in the 1990s Perovic and Djilas became very close, united against the ruling regime. None of this is meant to label Perovic as someone prone to changing sides, but to show the complexity of the situation and importance of the context, and

⁵⁸ Svetozar Stojanovic, "Levoemancipatorski pokret 1968" [Leftist emancipatory movement of 1968], in *Sezdeset osma - Licne istorije [Sixty-eight - Personal histories]*, ed. Djordje Malavrazic (Belgrade: RDU RTS - Radio Beograd 2 and JP Sluzbeni Glasnik, 2008), 48.

⁵⁹ Dzon R. Lempi, *Jugoslavija kao istorija - Bila dvaput jedna zemlja [Yugoslavia as history - Twice there was a country]* (Belgrade: Dan Graf, 2004), 274.

⁶⁰ Miladinovic, *1968 - Poslednji veliki san [1968 - The last great dream]*, 76.

to demonstrate how most of our protagonists switched sides, ideas and ideologies during the decades preceding 1990s and the emergence of Other Serbia.

Finally, in October 1972, “Serbian Liberals” were removed from the Communist Party and it is from that point onwards that they can become recognized as dissidents even though they mostly vanished from the public sphere.

After the removal of Serbian Liberals in 1972, the final remaining obstacle was removed and the ground for the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. There was no one left within the political elite to oppose intentions built into the new constitution, although “the Serbian leaders were dissatisfied with Tito's inclination to make concessions to the demands of the two Serbian provinces - Kosovo and Vojvodina. Serbian politicians believed Tito was too soft on Kosovo and Vojvodina, and ready to accept political compromises with them even when this was clearly against the main principles of the new Constitution.”⁶¹ Yet, although the opponents were forcibly removed, the attitudes of significant part of intellectual elites towards the Constitution remained highly, if covertly, critical. This will transpire immediately after Tito's death. I will return to this juncture later on. Vesna Pesic concludes that: “The more the institutional organization of Yugoslavia gave independence and sovereignty to the republics and regions to the detriment of the central government (culminating in the 1974 Constitution), the more a Serbian national corpus [...] experienced those changes to its own detriment and to the benefit of other nationalities.”⁶² Therefore, the 1974 Constitution and the period preceding it hastened the awakening of the nationalistic sentiments personalized in certain dissident intellectual groups or individuals.

⁶¹ Dejan Jovic, “The Breakdown of Elite Ideological Consensus: The Prelude to the Disintegration of Yugoslavia (1974-1990).” (London School of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom), 1999), 94, accessed February 13, 2018, <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1545/>.

⁶² Vesna Pesic, “The War for Ethnic States,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 14.

Before proceeding to the next ‘critical juncture’, we should briefly summarize how critical junctures we came up with so far influenced the intellectuals we are focusing on and what are the implications for the analysis of the future Other Serbia. The 1968 student rebellion in Belgrade is “...the first (and up until now the only one) significant movement which had clear political implications and is not based on utility...”⁶³ What this means is that manifestations of discontent before 1968, as some occasional strikes, did not have a political background or were not grounded in ideological or ideational, but were rather struggles for particular utility-based aims.

The early 1970s with special emphasis on 1974 is the most important ‘critical juncture’ for this research since it was when the Communist Party settled accounts with almost all intellectuals and all different groups within them, including Serbian Liberals, Marxist opposition, and dissidents marked as nationalists. ‘Liberals’ i.e. the political leaders expelled from the Party in 1972, largely withdrew from public life. Marxists (eight professors and people close to them, see above) remained largely faithful to their radical socialist ideas. Their activity and core ideas can be followed through their engagement in the Praxis group of Yugoslav Marxist intellectuals. Only when Milosevic came to power, the cracks appeared within this group, with some of its most prominent members joining the nationalist camp (Mihajlo Markovic, Svetozar Stojanovic, Ljubomir Tadic). Finally, the nationalist intellectuals throughout the period between 1968 and 1987 (the year of Milosevic’s coming to power) nurtured their ideas centered on the claims of Serbian victimhood, suffering an unequal status of Serbia in the federation. One of the rare points of communication among the two latter groups was the occasional gatherings to demand respect for certain human rights (e.g. Drustvo za borbu protiv smrtne kazne – Association for Struggle against Death Penalty, 1981). Whether

⁶³ Zarko Puhovski, *Socijalistička kritika zbilje [Socialist critique of reality]* (Zagreb: RS SOH i skolska pitanja, 1990), 136.

the Communist Party settled accounts with all of them on a similar basis or some of them had privileges is yet to be seen, but before that we should mention two other ‘critical junctures’ important for the analysis.

3.4 Third ‘Critical Juncture’ – 1986 Memorandum

In 1986, Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences’ (SANU) was leaked to the media.⁶⁴ Among its co-authors were Dobrica Cosic, already famous for the nationalistic tone in his critics of Yugoslavia and Tito, but also prominent Marxists Ljubomir Tadic and Mihajlo Markovic. This document is important for various reasons. It represented a platform for the rise of nationalism in all spheres of public life including politics: “The drafting of the Memorandum marked a turning point in the post-war intellectual history of Serbia. That was the moment when the Yugoslavs clearly noticed the nationalist inclination of Serbian intellectuals.”⁶⁵ What does the Memorandum say or do? Most importantly, it embraces and additionally induces strong nationalistic sentiments: “The Memorandum was an amalgamation of constitutive discourses offering a series of trans-historical narratives explaining Serb suffering...”, “...the Memorandum fixed Serbian subjectivity as a string of victimization.”⁶⁶ Most importantly, the sufferings of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija was exploited and usually exaggerated in order to evoke collective feelings of the Serbian people: “The expulsion of the Serbian people from Kosovo bears dramatic testimony to their historical defeat. In the spring of 1981, an open and total war was declared on the Serbian people...”, “The physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija...”⁶⁷ Yet, it is

⁶⁴ Kosta Mihailovic and Vasilije Krestic, *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts - Answers to Criticism*, ed. Miroslav Pantic (Belgrade: SANU, 1995).

⁶⁵ Rei Shigeno, “Nationalism and Serbian Intellectuals,” *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* 5, no. 1 (2004): 140.

⁶⁶ Christina Morus, “The SANU Memorandum: Intellectual Authority and the Constitution of an Exclusive Serbian ‘People,’” *Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies* 4, no. 2 (2007): 145–46.

⁶⁷ Nicholas J. Miller, “Searching for a Serbian Havel,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 44, no. 4 (1997): 4.

not only Memorandum that served the abovementioned purposes, because ever since 1968 the question of the status of Kosovo and Metohija already “served to overheat the atmosphere.”⁶⁸

Memorandum is important for two reasons. Firstly, nationalistic rhetoric was for the first time used openly and deliberately in order to “raise the temperature” among the people: “It was not Milosevic who made it possible for the Memorandum to appear: he was produced by the atmosphere created through Memorandum.”⁶⁹ Secondly, it was for the first time that the already well-known nationalist dissidents (i.e. Dobrica Cosic) made a coalition with some of Marxist dissidents (Ljubomir Tadic and Mihajlo Markovic).

Soon after that, on the 8th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1987, Slobodan Milosevic finally took over. One might ask, how such an important event as this one, was not incorporated to the list of the ‘critical junctures’. Again, there are two reasons. Firstly, Other Serbia did not yet exist, it did not emerge with this event and most importantly Other Serbia’s intellectuals did not publicly act on a mass-scale at that point. In other words, unlike in the 1968 and events surrounding early 1970s they were not protagonists. Secondly, the nationalistic intellectual elite (the majority of whom supported Milosevic), was already formed and actively participated in the public life.

3.5 Fourth ‘Critical Juncture’ – The Outbreak of War and Other Serbia’s Emergence

In the first multi-party elections held in 1990, Croatia and Serbia chose, or more precisely confirmed already selected leaders - Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. In the months to come, in 1991, “The Wars of Yugoslav Succession”

⁶⁸ Marina Blagojevic, “The Migration of Serbs from Kosovo during the 1970s and 1980s: Trauma and/or Catharsis,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 234.

⁶⁹ Latinka Perovic, *Dominantna i nezeljena elita: Beleske o intelektualnoj i politickoj eliti u Srbiji (XX - XXI vek)* [*Dominant and unwanted elite: Notes about intellectual and political elite in Serbia (XX – XXI century)*] (Belgrade: Dan Graf i Javna medijska ustanova “Radio-Televizija Vojvodine,” 2016), 46.

began in Slovenia and Croatia.⁷⁰ In 1992, the war spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The outbreak of the war cemented already existing deep schism between nationalist and anti-nationalist intellectuals. While nationalists enthusiastically supported the wars and the regime, their opponents started to unite around the opposition to the regime, war, nationalism, and rhetoric surrounding it. The war which was tearing Yugoslavia apart became a symbol of all the things this intellectual circle was opposed to. Finally, in 1992 the Belgrade Circle published a book called “The Other Serbia”, announced their emergence, and expressed their thoughts and opinions publicly.⁷¹ The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the trigger. Yet, one should not think that there were no other and earlier attempts of the intellectuals to join politics and penetrate the wall of the nationalism in the public sphere by promulgating different ideas. In relation to this, Nebojsa Popov was certainly one of the intellectuals who did his best, as one of the founders of the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative. There were others like Vesna Pesic, Bogdan Bogdanovic, and Dragoljub Micunovic. Some of them (e.g. Micunovic) formed or belonged to the political parties (Democratic Party) which nurtured certain premises of nationalism. This should not be surprising if we take into consideration the aspirations to take over the power - the political calculus was that no party stood a chance in the fight for power unless it embraced a degree of the dominant nationalist rhetoric.

To conclude this historical introduction to the topic, we should repeat that there are four ‘critical junctures’ of importance for the phenomenon of Other Serbia. First was Belgrade’s student rebellion in 1968 that gave birth to the Marxist opposition. Some of its protagonists would become close to the Other Serbia in the 1990s, while others would stand on the ground of the “moderate” nationalist opposition to the Milosevic’s regime. The second juncture is

⁷⁰ Lempi, *Jugoslavija kao istorija - Bila dvaput jedna zemlja [Yugoslavia as history – Twice there was a country]*, 324.

⁷¹ Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic, eds., *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]* (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992).

1974, the year of the adoption of the Constitution which arguably started decomposing Yugoslavia, together with constitutional amendments which came few years before it. During this period, Serbian Liberals, a progressive faction within Communist Party were excommunicated. Some of them, as Latinka Perovic will become a significant part of Other Serbia in the 1990s. Also, the Constitution and the events surrounding it made it possible for the dissidents leaning towards nationalism to entrench. Thirdly, in 1986, the SANU Memorandum was leaked to the press and signaled that nationalism took over parts of the intellectual elite and that this side has the right to speak on behalf of the entire intellectual elite and, sometimes, people in general. This created an atmosphere in which it became possible for Milosevic to rise. Finally, we come to the fourth ‘juncture’, the Yugoslav war due to which an intellectual circle emerged and named itself - Other Serbia.

The next chapter will analyze core values, ideas and claims of Other Serbia.

Chapter 4: The Core Ideas and Values of Other Serbia

This Chapter explores the core ideas and values of Other Serbia. In the introduction, we argued that Other Serbia was an anti-war and anti-regime platform. Yet, the story of Other Serbia is more complex. In particular, the struggle against collectivism and traditionalism, as the values which are claimed to dominate the Serbian society, requires attention. The identification and analysis of the main values and ideas of Other Serbia will be followed by the exploration of their interplay with the structural factors analyzed in Chapter 3. This kind of comprehensive approach will hopefully provide us with an answer to the question of what Other Serbia is, without simplifying and narrowing the phenomenon to its particular aspects.

4.1 The Anti-War Platform

The Other Serbia represented an anti-war platform. Recall that the fourth ‘critical juncture’ was the beginning of the wars. It certainly gave impetus and was a tipping point for different intellectuals to set aside their ideological differences and unite around a single cause – stopping the war. The outbreak of wars across Yugoslavia signaled to the part of the intellectual elite that society came to a point of no return and that a more homogeneous and radical opposition is needed in order to put things back on the right track again: “The Other Serbia will develop and survive only if it is constructed as a democratic state. There are huge obstacles on that path today: prior to everything else, war and a possibility of tearing Serbia into pieces if the war relocates onto its territory... We must, therefore, remove those obstacles in order to free the path for Serbia’s development into a modern and democratic society. And that means, we must, prior to everything else, *stop the war!*”⁷² Almost all of the Other Serbia volume protagonists, and there were 80 of them, mention the horrors of war and point out to it

⁷² Zagorka Golubovic, “Kako prevazici ‘truli zadrž propadanja’ i stvoriti uslove za demokratski preporod Srbije?” [How to overcome the ‘bad smell of decay’ and create conditions for Serbia’s democratic rebirth], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 55.

as to the first thing to be resolved. Only after that can there be thinking about the future: “We ask from you, for once let us live, and not die, Serbia!”⁷³ Since the war was ongoing at the time these essays were created, understandably, most of them were written with a high dose of emotionality and excessive sentimentality for the country disappearing in front of their eyes. These intellectuals could not allow themselves to be speechless spectators of the catastrophe threatening to swallow everything and everyone. The horridness of war inspired some intellectuals, as Bogdanovic, to make some rather harsh comparisons and strong statements:

We shall – particularly we, the Serbian side – be remembered as the destroyers of the cities, new Huns. The abomination of a Western man is understandable. For several hundreds of years now, he cannot even etymologically differentiate terms “city” and “civilization”. The meaningless destruction of the cities, he cannot, he does not know how to understand differently than as a manifestation of the violent opposition to the highest values of the civilization itself.⁷⁴

An interesting point in this excerpt is the admiration author shows for a distant Western man, apparently several hundred years away from a Serb in civilizational sense. Bogdanovic, born in 1922, the witness of World War II and famous for various architectural achievements in the field of memorials, must have been familiar with the bestial desolation of various European cities, the Western Europe’s 20th century was full of. This may help us question Bogdanovic’s implicit thesis of the civilizational backwardness of the Serbs when compared to the “Western man.”

Furthermore, Koca Popovic, whom Latinka Perovic classifies as a part of the so-called “unwanted elite”⁷⁵, claims, when criticizing the events surrounding 1990s, that: “It is a sad fact

⁷³ Milorad Belancic, “Da li Je Balkan nasa sudbina?” [Is balkan our destiny?], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 151.

⁷⁴ Bogdan Bogdanovic, “Ritualno ubijanje gradova” [Ritual killings of the cities], *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Mimica, Aljosa and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 34.

⁷⁵ Latinka Perovic, *Dominantna i nezeljena elita: Beleske o intelektualnoj i politickoj eliti u Srbiji (XX-XXI vek)* [Dominant and unwanted elite: Notes about intellectual and political elite in Serbia (XX – XXI century)] (Belgrade: Dan Graf i Javna medijska ustanova “Radio-Televizija Vojvodine,” 2016).

that in terms of culture and civilizational values the Serbs have stayed at the level they were at hundred years ago.”⁷⁶ Again, within the rhetoric of the anti-war platform, we come across the argumentation about Serbian evolutionary and civilizational backwardness. These two examples are radical and the intention is not to infer that the rest of the work within the Other Serbia circle is done in the same manner. However, when analyzing the Other Serbia as an anti-war platform, one must bear in mind that the premises as these are not rare either.

The Other Serbia’s anti-war platform primarily stands on the normative grounds. What this means is that they took a normative stance of condemning the violence and crimes regardless of the side committing them. Since the Other Serbia is mostly composed of people of Serbian nationality, they had a moral obligation to raise their voice especially against the innocent people killed in their own name. Yet, this circle of intellectuals aimed to stop the war as well and to do that their anti-war platform did analytically engage the complexity of war by tracking down the causes and elaborating on them. While doing that, they still focused solely on Serbian nationalism and occasionally narrowed down the causes of the Yugoslav wars to certain inherent dispositions of a particular side in the conflict. Appealing to only one of the sides in the war which also at times includes some rather harsh premises about that side can be a debatable strategy. The analytical component of the anti-war platform had to tackle all the different structural, historical and other aspects of the complexity of this war in order to fully understand its causes. Only following this logic and showing understanding for all of its different aspects could have contributed to the conflict resolution. It could be called naïve to expect from one side to accept the full blame for the war, especially if it is packed together with the mentioned negative premises. Moreover, often it is not an easy task to completely differentiate between the analytical and normative component of the anti-war platform as they

⁷⁶ Dusan Ckrebic, “Tajna Koce Popovica” [Koca Popovic’s secret], Vreme, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1055287>.

tend to overlap and use similar if not the same arguments. All of this makes its analytical part simplistic and casts a negative light on the whole aim of contributing to the conflict resolution. Therefore, the normative ground of the anti-war platform should be, even if it is not always easy, completely dissociated from its analytical part which arguably does not make an in-depth analysis and simplifies the intricacy of the war. However, there are many intellectuals who should be dissociated from this conclusion, for example Nebojsa Popov with his contribution, “Letter to Jovan.”⁷⁷

The previous part elaborated on the Other Serbia’s anti-war platform. In the following part, other ideas will be analyzed.

4.2 The Struggle Against Collectivism

The struggle against collectivism is another most common feature among the intellectuals of the Other Serbia circle: “Undifferentiated society only could have accepted statements related to its totality. The risk to appear from the very same positions defended by the ruling ideology was “overcome” by ideologically introducing a new form of collectivity – the national one.”⁷⁸ This thesis of collectivism as a permanent feature of the Serbian society’s political and historical trajectory appears very often. The words of Latinka Perovic can serve as a vivid example of the abovementioned: “It is necessary not just to point out the essence of symbiosis of state socialism and nationalism but also to create an alternative. Even if you do not label it formally as “Other” Serbia, that alternative will inevitably exist.”⁷⁹ Although collectivism is rarely, if ever elaborated in this volume, it is not hard to understand that

⁷⁷ Nebojsa Popov, “Pismo Jovanu” [The letter to Jovan], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992).

⁷⁸ Mladen Lazic, “Od klasnog i nacionalnog monologa ka dijalogu” [From class and national monologue to a dialogue], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 8.

⁷⁹ Latinka Perovic, “Patrijarhalan odgovor na izazov modernizacije” [Patriarchal response to modernization’s challenges], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 6.

collectivism is usually implicitly defined as something radically different from individualism and something which stops an individual and a citizen to express himself or herself as such under the pressure of the collective (class or nation): “The tribal code still bears down the civic thought...”⁸⁰ Yet, occasionally, authors again use rather harsh evaluations based on the evolutive backwardness of the Serbian society and Serbian people characterizing them as a “pre-political community.”⁸¹

Although examples, as this one, appear very rarely, if at all, they can still serve the purpose of explaining what exact stance Other Serbia has in relation to the struggle against collectivism. Most of the authors, arguably correctly, found in collectivism the link between the Milosevic’s regime nationalism and ex-communist regime’s socialism. These two ideologies share, rely on, and encourage collectivism. However, there are problems with this argument on top of which Other Serbia builds its position. They tend to pull through an argument that collectivism became such a deeply entrenched part of the Serbia’s political culture that it eventually became a part of its nature as well: “To what extent was their [Serbian people’s] value system, their social and political ideals, influenced by the mentality of agrarian society...”⁸² Although this can arguably be an answer to the question why Serbia became a fertile ground for collectivist ideologies, it is still not an answer without alternative which would allow such a confident conclusion of Serbia being “a pre-modern or maybe even a feudal

⁸⁰ Jelena Santic, “Paralelni svetovi” [Parallel worlds], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 103.

⁸¹ Dusan Janjic, “Kuda ide Srbija?” [Where is Serbia going to?], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 172.

⁸² Latinka Perovic, *Izmedju anarhije i autokratije. Srpsko drustvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI) [Between the anarchy and autocracy. Serbian society on the centuries' crossing (XIX-XXI)]*, ed. Latinka Perovic, Sonja Biserko, and Seska Stanojlovic (Belgrade: Helsinski odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006), 71.

society.”⁸³ It could be, after all, that totalitarian and authoritarian systems rather produce and then exploit the atmosphere where collectivism is a dominant value than vice versa.⁸⁴

4.3 The Modernization

The next dominant idea within the Other Serbia is the idea of modernization. As with collectivism being in-built in the Serbian political culture, the Other Serbia points out to the anti-modernization forces as to an obstacle for Serbia’s development and progress. Very often, modernization is defined by stating what it is not and what is radically in opposition with it: “Yet, Greater Serbian nationalism is not only by its nature undemocratic. It is also retrograde, conservative and archaic. As being like that, it answers the question of the Serbian society’s development perspective: nationalism or modernization. It is above everything grounded in intention to avert the possibility of modernity on this soil.”⁸⁵ For Golubovic, modernization is a key for the establishing a different Serbia. Yet, she disassociates herself from the claim that the modern society is “a priori in opposition to the Serbian tradition”, and gives an example of local autonomies both grounded in the Serbian tradition and modernity in general.⁸⁶ There are others insisting on the ideas of “Protestantism and Reformation” as irreplaceable within the idea of modernity but again hard to find within the Serbian tradition.⁸⁷ Oftentimes, modernization is linked with urbanization or cosmopolitanism, and these are explicated as

⁸³ Miroslav Milovic, “Mesto Filozofije Je u Opoziciji” [Philosophy's place is in the opposition], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 108.

⁸⁴ Laslo Vogel, “Sanse liberalne katarze” [Chances of liberal catharsis], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 40.

⁸⁵ Slobodan Inic, “Tako smo duboko pali” [We fell so deep], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 80.

⁸⁶ Golubovic, “Kako prevazici ‘truli zadah propadanja’ i stvoriti uslove za demokratski preporod Srbije?” [How to overcome the 'bad smell of decay' and create conditions for Serbia’s democratic rebirth], 54.

⁸⁷ Miroslav Milovic, “Mesto filozofije je u opoziciji” [Philosophy's place is in the opposition], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 108.

goals alternative Serbia should strive for. Latinka Perovic is the main proponent of the idea of modernization.

She widely discusses obstacles on the modernization path of the Serbian society. Very often, she follows the line of several, above discussed authors and relies on the argumentation centered around the mentioned in-built obstacles for modernization in the Serbian mentality: “Patriarchal mentality outlasts patriarchal institutions and turns up as an important agent in blocking transition.”⁸⁸ However, very important for her stance is the omnipresent “popular ideology”⁸⁹ practiced by almost all ruling parties in the past two centuries in Serbian politics.⁹⁰ This claim, however, still does not allow one to completely grasp the meaning of the mentioned “popular” ideology, that Perovic blamed for blocking modernization. Mira Bogdanovic elaborates on it: “In both Yugoslavian cases, it was a ‘modernization without modernity’, as sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf would say, in which both key factors of the Western civilization were suspended, political participation and personal economic initiative, therefore, both citizen and the entrepreneur.”⁹¹ Furthermore, she quotes Radovan Marjanovic:

The dominant feature of the majority of our citizens, including wanna-be politicians and intellectuals, is a tribal mind. It cannot be reduced to the residuals of patriarchalism and backwardness, as the consequences of the long-term Asiatic domination. One of the main sources of its survival is a rather long-term ideologization, since ‘the first rule of ideology’ is the Manichaeian view of the world. The important feature of the tribal mind is the Manichaeian, black and

⁸⁸ Latinka Perovic, “Politicka elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske drzave” [Political elite and modernization in the first decade of the Serbian state’s independence], in *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX Veka* [Serbia in modernization processes of XX century], ed. Latinka Perovic, Marija Obradovic, and Dubravka Stojanovic (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1994), 236.

⁸⁹ In Serbian, Perovic uses the term “narodnjacka ideologija”. Narodnjacka is somewhat close to the populist, yet it contains a certain amount of pejorative connotation which is why it is rather hard to translate. Here and in the following part, “popular” will be used to translate ‘narodnjacki’.

⁹⁰ Perovic, “Politicka elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske drzave” [Political elite and modernization in the first decade of the Serbian state’s independence], 235.

⁹¹ Mira Bogdanovic, “Modernizacijski procesi u Srbiji u XX Veku” [Modernization processes in Serbia in XX Century], in *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX Veka* [Serbia in modernization processes of XX century], ed. Latinka Perovic, Marija Obradovic, and Dubravka Stojanovic (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1994), 36.

white and in-dichotomies thinking; world split on ‘ours’ and theirs’, ‘holy’ and ‘secular’, therefore on ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’.⁹²

Perovic elaborates along the lines of the two-centuries-long struggle between two radically opposed ideas regarding the Serbian society’s path into future. The first is the ‘liberal’ idea, striving for modernization, and the second is the one relying on ‘popular’ ideology which ultimately blocks every attempt of modernization. Obviously, Perovic divides the intellectual elite in Serbia into two different blocks, the dominant and the unwanted elite. It is not hard to guess, which of the two is the ‘liberal’ one and moreover, to which the Serbian Liberals (whose member she was) belong to:

Serbian Liberalism in the 1970s should not be a taboo. It should be critically assessed...in the context of the only two political programs Serbia ever had in its modern history. The program of the in-depth development, inner modernization, or in other words Europeanization, openness to other South Slavic and Balkan people, and – the program of ethnic state making, which meant territorial expansion and wars... These two programs came out as incompatible. In order to take over, one had to be deprived of the alternative one.⁹³

To conclude, the Other Serbia represents a radical anti-war platform and struggle against collectivism as the dominant feature of the Serbian mentality and culture. Furthermore, it is comprised of advocates for modernization. The anti-war platform is noticeably marked with simplifications of a rather complex war. Furthermore, it demands the war to end before everything else and frequently insists that certain innate Serbian features are the main culprits for the outbreak of the war. One of those features is collectivism Other Serbia struggles against and which it considers responsible for both communism and nationalism, the two collectivist ideologies that were successfully implemented in Serbia. This is strongly connected with their analysis of why modernization policies were never carried out properly in the Serbian society.

⁹² Radovan Marjanovic, “Industrija Smrti u Rukama Plemenske Svesti” [Death industry in the hands of a tribal consciousness], *Socioloski Pregled* XXVI, no. 1–4 (1992): 43.

⁹³ Latinka Perovic, *Dominantna i nezeljena elita: Beleske o intelektualnoj i politickoj eliti u Srbiji (XX - XXI vek)* [Dominant and unwanted elite: Notes about intellectual and political elite in Serbia (XX – XXI century)] (Belgrade: Dan Graf i Javna medijska ustanova “Radio-Televizija Vojvodine,” 2016), 144–45.

For one of the leading intellectuals of Other Serbia, Latinka Perovic, modernization is the key concept, through which she comes up with the intellectual division in Serbia on the “dominant” and the “unwanted” elite. The Other Serbia is only a historical sequel of those unwanted.

Chapter 5: Analysis

It is time to combine the chapter examining structural and historical determinants which marked the lifespan of Yugoslavia with the chapter solely focusing on tracing the most important ideas behind this intellectual circle. This will ultimately lead to the comprehensive understanding of the reasons why Other Serbia chose certain ideas, of the ways in which they were expressed, and it will finally give an answer to what Other Serbia actually is. As important for this research, we extracted four ‘critical junctures’ – the Belgrade student rebellion in 1968, the adoption of the 1974 Constitution and events surrounding it, the 1986 SANU Memorandum and 1992 as the year when Other Serbia emerged. Anti-war platform (analytical and normative part), struggle against collectivism and struggle for modernization were identified as the main ideological aspects of Other Serbia.

Not rarely, the Other Serbia phenomenon is seen exclusively through the lenses of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s: “Milosevic left behind two Serbias. [...] One Serbia, partisan, Yugoslav, with the legacy of modernization, internationalism and unresolved crimes. The other, victimized, mostly nationalist and monarchist...”⁹⁴ This can only be a part of the answer to the “what is Other Serbia” question. This chapter shall argue that the causes for the emergence of Other Serbia and the causes for the choices of their ideas go much deeper in the past. The events of the 1990s including the war, as well as Milosevic’s rise and rule can only be one out of many causes or only a direct trigger which will be discussed later on. For now, we should start with 1974.

⁹⁴ Ana Russel-Omaljev, *Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in “First” and “Other” Serbia. Social Construction of the Self and the Other* (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2016), 222.

5.1 A Strange Alliance

In the early 1970s ruling bureaucracy started producing new ideology – nationalism, strengthening repression towards all aspirations oriented on creating civic society based on the rule of law. [...] Systematic suppression of the aspirations towards democratization by strengthening nationalistic intolerance, hatred, and resentment which finally led us to the bloody dead-end street through the civil war, is an act of all of the so far ruling political oligarchies and by them favored nationalistic intelligentsia.⁹⁵

Demirovic categorizes these Communist regime's "uncontrolled experiments with nationalism", under the phenomenon of Kosovization; every time the regime had to face the need to change or evolve, it exploited the intra-national relationships and different republics' nationalisms.⁹⁶ Therefore, the overall perception of Other Serbia is that nationalism was brought up and nurtured by the Communist Party in the 1970s. Some of them like Knjazez-Adamovic etiquette the 1974 Constitution as the first thing to blame.⁹⁷ Why do they have such a perception of the events surrounding early 1970s which culminated with the Constitution of 1974?

It is a fact that the Constitution, alongside the amendments, strengthened the prerogatives of the republics.⁹⁸ The Constitution also had the famous Article 3 where "the republics were referred to as states, based on the 'sovereignty of the people' and '...communities of the working people and citizens, and of nations and nationalities having equal rights'."⁹⁹ Therefore, the right to self-determination and secession came into forefront.

⁹⁵ Miladin Zivotic, "Proizvodjaci nacionalnih mrznji" [Manufacturers of national hatred], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 26.

⁹⁶ Hamdija Demirovic, "Imas kompjutere, vrati pistolj" [You have the computers, give back the pistol], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 48.

⁹⁷ Svetlana Knjazez-Adamovic, "Odgovornost prosvecenog apsolutizma" [Responsibility of the enlightened absolutism], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 149.

⁹⁸ Dzon R. Lempi, *Jugoslavija kao istorija - Bila dvaput jedna zemlja [Yugoslavia as history – Twice there was a country]* (Belgrade: Dan Graf, 2004), 276.

⁹⁹ Vojin Dimitrijevic, "The 1974 Constitution as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia, or as a Sign of Decaying Totalitarianism," in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 406.

However, the Constitution does not only reserve these rights for the republics (or states) but it remains unclear “whether it applied also to ‘nationalities’ (minorities)”, which is ultimately very important for Kosovo and Metohija. While being a province within Serbia at that time, it already heralded Albanian irredentism.¹⁰⁰ Finally, the Constitution in 1974 dismantled the federation which became a “representative of agreement between the republics and the provinces, without its own, authentic power to pass resolutions and implement them.”¹⁰¹ The purges of Croatian party leadership and especially Serbian Liberals which preceded these institutional changes allowed both Serbian and Croatian nationalisms to enter the Yugoslavian society through the back door.¹⁰² “...in Belgrade, particularly after the fall of the so-called ‘liberal’ leadership of the Communist Party of Serbia in 1972, a strange alliance was gradually established between the Party and the so-called ‘loyal nationalists’.”¹⁰³

Therefore, the connections Other Serbia noticed between the policies and institutional changes Communist Party was promulgating in the 1970s and the rise of nationalism across Yugoslavia is real. Other Serbia’s premises directly and strongly rely on the theory already developed by Puhovski. He blames the 1974 Constitution for introducing the model of collective rights (based on nation and nationalities) which became the foundation for all of the rights an individual can have. Moreover, he claims: “In such a situation, gradual development of the interrepublic (and provincial) cryptoparty pluralism, leads an individual to a place where the limitations of his political engagement, in a best-case scenario, are given by his nation (i.e. the federal unit) ...”¹⁰⁴ Puhovski follows the thesis that the Yugoslav society was in a constant

¹⁰⁰ Dimitrijevic, 407.

¹⁰¹ Vesna Pesic, “The War for Ethnic States,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 27.

¹⁰² Pesic, 25.

¹⁰³ Nenad Dimitrijevic, “Words and Death: Serbian Nationalist Intellectuals,” in *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe*, ed. Andras Bozoki (Budapest: CEU Press, c1999), 127.

¹⁰⁴ Zarko Puhovski, *Socijalistička kritika zbilje [Socialist critique of reality]* (Zagreb: RS SOH i skolska pitanja, 1990), 151.

series of crises and, therefore, suggests that when ultimately it became impossible for the ruling regime to overcome it: "...started accentuating collective subjects of the basic rights. In the first place, ethnicity as the source of rights and after the 1971 Amendments and 1974 Constitution, also as the grounds on which entire federation rests on."¹⁰⁵

Why is this theory and their beliefs regarding it particularly important? Primarily because it evidently shows how isolated from the public sphere they were or, at least, how isolated they felt. It becomes obvious that in the 1970s nationalistically oriented intellectuals took over the sphere of dissidence and occupied the field of opposition to the ruling communist regime. In other words, they managed to position themselves as the only option through which it was possible to oppose ruling regime's political and social decisions. In the years preceding the promulgation of the Constitution, intellectuals were grouped around three different options. The first emerged after the student rebellion in 1968 as the left-oriented or progressive-Marxist opposition. After the Constitution was adopted, they ceased being a relevant actor, as a group. Only some individuals, Ljubomir Tadic and Mihajlo Markovic for example, who approached nationalistic option remained significant for a wider public. The second group was gathered around the Serbian Liberals, out of which most important individual for this research is Latinka Perovic. Yet, after 1972 they simply vanished from the public sphere and re-appeared, as Latinka Perovic, only in the early 1990s. The third group, the nationalists, were primarily gathered around Dobrica Cosic and they are the only ones that remained publicly (or semi-publicly) active throughout this period, from 1974 to the early 1990s. The nationalism and intellectuals representing this option remained the only major dissident group in the years following 1974 at least when observed from the perspective of the Other Serbia intellectuals.

¹⁰⁵

Puhovski, 164.

5.2 Nationalistic Intellectuals

The reputation Dobrica Cosic enjoys within the Other Serbia intellectual circle can serve as an indication. Cosic was a writer and Serbian politician who was expelled from the Communist Party only several days before the 1968 student rebellion, famous for opposing the Communist regime and defending nationalistic ideas centered around the struggle to equalize Serbia's rights with those of other Yugoslav republics. Even before 1968, Cosic made some rather astounding statements for, at that time, a member of the Communist Party when "...he asserted that for the maintenance of Serbian disunity, "an entire ideology has been created. Austro-Hungarian and Comintern conceptions of the Balkans and Yugoslavia contributed to this ideology." The ideology itself was Titoism. Cosic appended a warning: "one day," the nature of the ideology would "be understood with all of its consequences".¹⁰⁶ Most importantly for this topic, he was an informal leader of the intellectual group named "Siminovci" after a meeting place in the street Simina 9a.¹⁰⁷ Within this intellectual circle, recognizable for its Anti-Titoist stances, Dobrica Cosic always had a special place and represented a figure others used to gather around and "served as the lightning rod."¹⁰⁸ The importance of Dobrica Cosic, who is even known as the "Father of the Nation" is unquestionable.¹⁰⁹ However, the "weight" Other Serbia assigns him with is far more interesting.

Cirkovic claims that even basic rights of an individual have been taken away by the nationalistic intellectuals: "Becoming nation's avant-garde, ruling bureaucracy with its nationalistic intelligence created unimaginable variations of tyranny. Construction of the

¹⁰⁶ Nick Miller, *The Nonconformists: Culture, Politics, and Nationalism in a Serbian Intellectual Circle, 1944-1991* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), 178.

¹⁰⁷ Miller, 7.

¹⁰⁸ Miller, 26.

¹⁰⁹ Zorica Vulic, "Ko je ovaj covek?: Dobrica Cosic" [Who is this man?: Dobrica Cosic], Glas Javnosti, accessed May 5, 2018, <http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/2000/05/11/srpski/P00051027.shtm>.

national identity and development of the feeling of affiliation to your own nation as a personal right have been taken away and imposed on us as a test of the political convenience.”¹¹⁰ Dobrica Cosic comes up as “paradigmatic writer of this collective form of existence” and more importantly isolation which was imposed on the Other Serbia intellectuals.¹¹¹ Very often Cosic and some others are portrayed as personalities who “pushed us in the corner of history”¹¹² and blamed for creating specific sentiment of victimhood in the entire Serbian nation.¹¹³ However, even when Cosic is not mentioned personally, it should be assumed that he is implicitly present whenever the Other Serbia intellectuals talk about SANU, whose member he was, or when they talk about the writing of the Memorandum, in which he indirectly participated: “...it was not written by Dobrica Cosic, although he has long been credited with authorship by non-Serbian commentators and he had promoted such a project. Unquestionably, his ideas did find their way into the document.”¹¹⁴

Latinka Perovic and Dobrica Cosic are often portrayed in Serbia as antipodes. Perovic’s book “Dominantna i Nezeljena Elita” is a highly valuable source for the examination of Other Serbia’s perception regarding Cosic’s character and opus. Perovic compares Cosic’s impact with Nikola Pasic’s¹¹⁵ importance in the late 19th and early 20th century.¹¹⁶ In the mentioned book, Dobrica Cosic stands as the sole representative of the Dominant Serbian Elite in contrast

¹¹⁰ Miladin Zivotic, “Proizvodjaci nacionalnih mrznji” [Manufacturers of national hatred], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 27.

¹¹¹ Slobodan Blagojevic, “Epika i vreme” [Epic and time], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 31.

¹¹² Jelena Santic, “Paralelni svetovi” [Parallel worlds], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 103.

¹¹³ Dusan Makavejev, “Smrtoljublje” [The love of death], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 111.

¹¹⁴ Miller, *The Nonconformists: Culture, Politics, and Nationalism in a Serbian Intellectual Circle, 1944-1991*, 269.

¹¹⁵ Nikola Pasic was one of the, if not the most important political figure in 19th and first half of the 20th century Serbia

¹¹⁶ Tamara Nikcevic, “Latinka Perovic – Intervju (2)” [Latinka Perovic – Interview (2)], Pescanik, March 23, 2018, <https://pescanik.net/latinka-perovic-intervju-2-2/>.

to twelve other representatives of the Unwanted Elite.¹¹⁷ As stated, the importance of the Dobrica Cosic's role is unquestionable, however, it is dubious whether his power and influence could be stretched enough to create a picture where: "In opposition to twelve apostles of modernity, reason, development, and West, lonely stands Dobrica Cosic, collective embodiment of the tradition, collectivism, egalitarianism, and the East", and a personification of the entire Dominant Elite of 19th and 20th century.¹¹⁸ The perception that safety of Cosic and people close to him had, was guaranteed by the regime is rather present in Perovic's writings as when she talks about Siminovci and claims how OZNA¹¹⁹ recruited many of them.¹²⁰

It is not only Dobrica Cosic who has a specific place within the Other Serbia's discourse. There are also other intellectuals, particularly those who switched sides in the 1970s and 1980s and went from a position of progressive Marxism to the nationalistic side. The usual suspects are Ljuba Tadic, Mihajlo Markovic and Svetozar Stojanovic.¹²¹ They (nationalist intellectuals) are often accused for creating an atmosphere of intolerance, nationalism and chauvinism.¹²² Mihajlo Markovic was even among the founders of Milosevic's political party.¹²³ One of the reasons why there might be a special negative sentiment reserved within Other Serbia for these few people is probably because they were previously members of the

¹¹⁷ Latinka Perovic, *Dominantna i nezeljena elita: Beleske o intelektualnoj i politickoj eliti u Srbiji (XX-XXI vek)* [Dominant and unwanted elite: Notes about intellectual and political elite in Serbia (XX – XXI century)] (Belgrade: Dan Graf i Javna medijska ustanova "Radio-Televizija Vojvodine," 2016).

¹¹⁸ Mira Bogdanovic, *Elitisticki pasijans: Povijesni revizionizam Latinke Perovic* [Elitist solitaire: Latinka Perovic's historical revisionism] (Zemun: Mostart d.o.o., 2016), 21.

¹¹⁹ OZNA is abbreviation for "Odeljenje za Zastitu Naroda" and it was a security agency of Yugoslavia.

¹²⁰ Perovic, *Dominantna i Nezeljena Elita: Beleske o Intelektualnoj i Politickoj Eliti u Srbiji (XX- XXI Vek)* [Dominant and unwanted elite: Notes about intellectual and political elite in Serbia (XX – XXI century)], 35.

¹²¹ Vladan A. Vasiljevic, "Intelektualna provincija Srbije" [Serbian intellectual province], in *Druga Srbija* [Other Serbia], ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 45.

¹²² Miladin Zivotic, "Proizvodjaci nacionalnih mrznji" [Manufacturers of national hatred], in *Druga Srbija* [Other Serbia], ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 27–28.

¹²³ "U Beogradu kremiran akademik Mihajlo Markovic" [Academician Mihajlo Markovic cremated in Belgrade], Glas Javnosti, accessed May 20, 2018, <http://www.glas-javnosti.rs/node/78468/print>.

Praxis group and were closely related to leftist ideas. Therefore, their “ideological jump” was arguably a big one. Yet, the phenomenon of Ljuba Tadic is particularly interesting since he was in opposition to the politics of Slobodan Milosevic almost from the very beginning, as he is one of the founders of the Democratic Party which was the biggest opposition to Milosevic’s Socialist Party during the 1990s. It seems that Other Serbia is not interested in that since he is usually depicted with a negative connotation. One of the paradoxical moments is that Latinka Perovic classifies Zoran Djindjic, member of Democratic Party and later its president, in the category of the Unwanted Elite¹²⁴ even though his political career is marked with nationalistic stances in the early 1990s.¹²⁵ The implicit forgiveness was, therefore, given to Zoran Djindjic but not to Ljuba Tadic.

5.3 The Institutional Isolation

The two key institutions through which intellectuals in Serbia could have actualized themselves and act publicly were The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) and The Association of Writers of Serbia (AWS). The members of SANU:

created the impression that there existed absolute agreement between the new national politics and the intellectual elite which had been summoned to decide the fate of the people. In this respect, there was no significant difference between the two sides of the politically active membership of the SANU: the division simply consisted in being ‘for’ or ‘against’ Milosevic. There was no dispute on questions of the alleged dangers that the existing Yugoslavia represented for the Serbian people, nor on the concept of Serbian ‘national interest’ which would be built in Yugoslavia ruins, nor on the Academy’s position regarding the war.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Perovic, *Dominantna i Nezeljena Elita: Beleske o Intelektualnoj i Politickoj Eliti u Srbiji (XX- XXI Vek)* [Dominant and unwanted elite: Notes about intellectual and political elite in Serbia (XX – XXI century)].

¹²⁵ Dusan Maljkovic, “Mit o vladavini Zorana Djindjica” [Myth about Zoran Djindjic’s rule], Novi plamen, accessed May 20, 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/glavna/mit-o-vladavini-zorana-dindjica/>.

¹²⁶ Olivera Milosavljevic, “The Abuse of the Authority of Science,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 289.

In the beginning of the 1980s AWS became an oasis of dissidence “and took threatened writers all over Yugoslavia under their protection...”¹²⁷ Yet, it did not take long before the AWS became occupied by the group of people politically oriented in the same way as those that led SANU. It therefore became a place where Other Serbia’s intellectuals had no access. In other words, only like-minded people prone to particular ideas such as the victimization of Serbs could become members and so did their “dissidence shrank to its most elementary form – opposition to the regime – but the regime was already dead.”¹²⁸

This is not the only example of the public blockade and isolation Other Serbia’s intellectuals faced. Some very vivid examples of this are various newspapers such as *Politika* or *Vecernje Novosti*. In *Politika*, famous column ‘Among Us’ together with “Echoes and Reactions” became a platform for public appearance of only those who were “suitable”: “The non-nationalistic opposition, tragically fettered and practically marginalized as it was, and the dwindling number of resistant helpless journalistic professionals, received this ‘catastrophically successful’ innovation on the pages of *Politika* as a humiliation.”¹²⁹

After pointing to the Other Serbia’s perception of its public isolation, and providing contextual and factual background for this perception, it is time to see whether and how this influenced their stances on certain key issues and to see whether isolation had an impact on their proclaimed ideas which were analyzed in the previous chapter.

5.4 Radical Opposition and the Counter-Elite

Other Serbia is mostly reactive to the already existing, dominant discourse in the public arena. In the end, they did emerge only after the war had already started. While the nationalistic

¹²⁷ Drinka Gojkovic, “The Birth of Nationalism from the Spirit of Democracy,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 328.

¹²⁸ Gojkovic, 346.

¹²⁹ Aleksandar Nenadovic, “Politika in the Storm of Nationalism,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 541.

opposition (whether or not in the coalition with the Communist regime itself) worked on building its image of the only “true” dissidence and occupied institutional options for intellectual gatherings, Other Serbia’s intellectuals did not manage to do the same thing, at least not on a large-scale.

The argument is that Other Serbia built its stance to a significant degree in opposition to the nationalistic intellectual elite. The nationalist intellectuals focused widely on the structural and historical determinants when developing their main idea that Serbs were a victim of the Yugoslav project. They exploited the facts by exaggerating them and presenting them in a way to evoke nationalistic sentiments in a wider population, as for example, when presenting the crimes over Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija during the existence of Yugoslavia as genocidal.¹³⁰ On the other hand, Other Serbia often neglects exactly those determinants within the analytical part of its anti-war platform. Very rarely, if ever, will Other Serbia’s intellectuals mention or pay attention to the genocide Serbs were subjected to in the Second World War when analyzing Serbian nationalism, in order to understand it, while nationalist intellectuals never stopped exploiting it. If we dive in the nationalist discourse we will find terms as annihilation, assimilation, genocide very often in order to present Serbs as the “innocent victims” which would eventually result “in widespread call for revenge.”¹³¹ Other Serbia took a radically opposing position to that of the nationalists and completely neglected those facts nationalists were distorting and exploiting in order to build the pacifist-cosmopolitan position. Interestingly, Branko Petranovic, to whom Latinka Perovic dedicated the volume “Serbia in Modernization Processes of 20. Century”, said:

For us, cosmopolitan casualness of certain colleagues of ours who think that the national question is exhausted in Serbian history is unacceptable... With that kind of understanding, national question as the reality of life and

¹³⁰ Kosta Mihailovic and Vasilije Krestic, *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts - Answers to Criticism*, ed. Miroslav Pantic (Belgrade: SANU, 1995), 119.

¹³¹ Russel-Omaljev, 93.

history, opened by the breakdown of the wider Yugoslavian community is ignored while it should not be ignored. Why would Serbian people reject resolution of its national question while all other Yugoslavians do that in a state form placing it as a primary and imperative task. For us, dissenting with the extreme nationalistic conception on one side and pacifist-cosmopolitan which does not understand the drama of the Serbian people within the ruins of Yugoslavia... begins with understanding Serbian national question (historically, ethnically, internationally, legally, democratically) and with understanding a way (methodologically) in which it should be resolved.¹³²

Very often it seems as if the normative part of the anti-war platform preceded its analytical part. In other words, the Other Serbia, arguably, chose only those facts and built arguments on top of them in the analytical part so that they can be compatible with the normative part's position. The normative part strongly condemned the war, crimes and their victims, focusing exclusively on those committed on behalf of the Serbian people. But, the analytical part followed these lines as well, and only discussed Serbian nationalism without taking into account all of the reasons for its revival in the 1970s and 1980s. All of the things nationalists were exploiting, World War Two genocide, position of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija and nationalisms coming from other Republics, primarily Croatia and Slovenia, Other Serbia never took into account. Moreover, when they disqualify the nationalists' arguments of Serbian victimhood, they rarely make a distinction between the facts and the exaggerations and tend to disqualify their claims in total.¹³³ Therefore, the analytical part of the anti-war platform focused more on the spirit of collectivism, omni-present anti-modernization forces, and particular individuals, while completely disregarding the foundation for the arguments nationalists were using. Due to this selectivity of facts in their approach and bigger focus on the normative issues and moral condemnations they "seldom offered proposal

¹³² Branko Petranovic, "Modernizacija u uslovima nacionalno nestabilnog drustva (Jugoslovensko i srpsko iskustvo)" [Modernization in the conditions of a nationally unstable society (Yugoslav and Serbian experience)], in *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX Veka [Serbia in modernization processes of XX century]*, ed. Latinka Perovic, Marija Obradovic, and Dubravka Stojanovic (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1994), 18.

¹³³ Dusan Makavejev, "Smrtoljublje" [The love of death], in *Druga Srbija [Other Serbia]*, ed. Aljosa Mimica and Ivan Colovic (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, Plato, i Borba, 1992), 111.

for an alternative resolution of conflict.”¹³⁴ As stated in the beginning of the paragraph, Other Serbia’s position is usually reactive to what “official” intellectuals were offering in sense that they publicly engaged only after the nationalists already “won the battle.” Still, it is interesting that it is rather hard to catch even the slightest common denominator in the arguments nationalists and the Other Serbia use. Whether or not someone accepts the arguments of any of the sides, he/she would probably agree that both have certain factual foundation, even though it would be hard to find any compromise regarding the extent of what is factual and what is imagination. However, they use completely different factual foundations to build their arguments. Since Other Serbia only came as a response to the “damage done” by the nationalist intellectuals, they were the ones to build their position afterwards. In doing this, they never accepted any of the ideas nationalist intellectuals embraced, almost never agreed with anything coming from this circle of intellectuals, and what is most surprising, they never even used nor accepted the factual foundation on which nationalists build their narrative, as if it never happened or as if it was completely irrelevant. This amount of disagreement, non-recognition of bare facts different sides use, and such a radical opposition can point to a conclusion that these different sides were radicalizing each other’s narratives: “the symbiosis of their relationship is clear: they are helping create and construct each other’s political identity and justify each other’s political concept.”¹³⁵ However, although it is true that the Other Serbia’s narrative is more dependent on the narrative of the nationalist intellectuals than it is vice versa, simply due to the time-frame already explained, it would be a simplification to only claim how they merely radicalized each other. The socio-political, cultural context, on-going war, and the

¹³⁴ Bojana Susak, “An Alternative to War,” in *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 504.

¹³⁵ Russel-Omaljev, *Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in “First” and “Other” Serbia. Social Construction of the Self and the Other*, 91.

mentioned public isolation of the Other Serbia's intellectuals also contributed, to a large extent, to this radicalization.

After including the concept of isolation the Other Serbia was subjected to and concept of radical opposition to whatever claims nationalists had, including their factual foundation, we can fit Other Serbia into the theoretical framework of the Counter-Elite: "In Vilfredo Pareto's terms, they were simply counter-elites, bidding for their turn in the circulation of elites."¹³⁶ In the end, Robert Nisbet said: "no revolutionary community or revolutionary philosophy is without a sense of being or espousing an elite."¹³⁷ The main two arguments in favor of putting the Other Serbia in the category of Counter-Elites are to follow. Firstly, the Other Serbia intellectuals were completely without an access to any institutions which could have allowed them to perform their role of an intellectual publicly. Secondly, this possibly radicalized their stances in the sense that they took over the narrative excessively different than the one nationalist intellectual held in order to completely delegitimize their appearance and even disqualify their basic premises and their factual foundation. To do that, the analytical part of their anti-war platform took a radically different explanation together with different historical and structural determinants when analyzing Serbian nationalism, Yugoslav civil-war, and the context of then current conditions of war. In their analysis, very often, they omit the Yugoslav context and rather focus on the Serbian political culture and structural aspects of the Serbian history dating from the period of even before World War One, which radically differs from the factual basis on top of which nationalists build their stances regarding exploitation and victimization of the Serbian people. Moreover, they emphasize, sometimes overemphasize, the role particular individuals from the nationalist intelligentsia circle had on political arena and the rise of the certain political figures.

¹³⁶ Martin E. Marty, "Knowledge Elites and Counter-Elites," *Daedalus* 103, no. 4 (1974): 104.
¹³⁷ Marty, 105.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis intended to show what Other Serbia stands for and provide evidence for the claims made in the introductory part. Regarding the main question - what Other Serbia represents – the finding of the research is that Other Serbia represented an intellectual counter-elite, opposed to the dominant intellectual elite that embraced political and cultural nationalism. The main ideas that Other Serbia embraced are singled out and categorized into three different groups. The first one is the anti-war platform consisting of normative and analytical parts. The normative part is mainly concerned with condemning and stopping the war and war crimes, focusing on those committed on the behalf of Serbian people. The analytical one bears more importance for this research and traces Serbian nationalism as the most important cause of the Yugoslav civil war. The second idea is the struggle against collectivism as a part of the Serbian political culture. In their narratives, collectivism is often portrayed as an inherent characteristic of the Serbs, due to which Serbia represents a fertile ground for collectivist ideologies, such as communism and nationalism. The third idea is the struggle for modernization; a battle against anti-modernization forces often personified in particular political or intellectual figures. The modernization usually stands together with the notions of urbanization, cosmopolitanism, and Europeanization.

However, the primary objective of this thesis was not only to identify and explain specific ideas which Other Serbia embraced. Its purpose was to present a wider perception of this intellectual circle, providing a broader picture of this phenomenon. To do that, structural and historical determinants were singled out and grouped into four ‘critical junctures.’ The first one was the 1968 student rebellion in Belgrade when most of the protagonists relevant for this research became publicly recognized intellectuals. This was the moment when the first dissidents emerged, including those on the position of Progressive Marxism and those with nationalistic stances. The second ‘critical juncture’ was the 1974 Constitution and the few years

before its promulgation. During those years, the nationalists started consolidating their position. On the other hand, the Serbian Liberals, a faction within the Communist Party, fell from grace. The third juncture, the 1986 draft Memorandum of the SANU, cemented nationalistic atmosphere in the Serbian society and arguably, helped Milosevic's political rise. This document embedded the central ideas of the nationalist intellectuals. Finally, the fourth 'critical juncture' triggered Other Serbia's emergence – the war.

Sublimation of the extracted ideas and the 'junctures' contributed to the construction of the argument about the nature of Other Serbia. This thesis investigated why they chose a particular set of ideas rather than some others and why they emerged in that particular period. Furthermore, this argument tried to infer that the war, or the last 'juncture', although directly triggering the emergence of Other Serbia, overshadowed deeper causes hidden in the structural determinants. This is not to claim that the war is insignificant, quite the opposite.

First of all, in the late 1970s, nationalist intellectuals managed to establish and proclaim themselves as the only viable dissidents of the Communist regime. The Other Serbia, later on, argued that they secretly coalesced with the regime's etiquettes, as 'loyal opposition'. However, there are numerous indicators which show that Other Serbia intellectuals were publicly isolated during the 1970s and especially during the 1980s. Most of the institutions through which they could have publicly acted and performed their intellectual role had their doors closed for them since they were occupied by nationalistically oriented intellectuals. This public isolation and the context of the on-going war radicalized some of their stances and influenced the choice of their ideas and argumentation in a peculiar way. Even the slightest common denominator cannot be found between the ideas that Other Serbia and nationalists embraced. Be that as it may, the fact that Other Serbia rejects the most basic factual foundation on which nationalists built their arguments is still surprising. This can be ascribed to the influence of the isolation, imposed on them by the nationalists during which they could not perform their role of an

intellectual. In other words, to breach this isolation and self-actualize themselves as intellectuals, but also under the influence of the dramatic context of war, they radicalized their stances, in order to completely delegitimize arguments and position which nationalists (responsible for the isolation) took. Finally, this qualifies Other Serbia for the classification under the theoretical framework of the counter-elite. This can arguably make clearer the puzzle stated in the introduction. It is evident that Other Serbia does embrace a coherent system of ideas. They emerged so late, only in the 1990s because they were publicly isolated and because there was the need for a dramatic context to flash their emergence. The concept of the counter-elite under which Other Serbia was categorized, their arguably reactive position, and radical opposition to the dominant elite sought to resolve the last riddle from the introduction.

The main limitation of this research is that it does not focus on several aspects due to the space restraint. The context of the war and its influence on the Other Serbia's work plays an important role which can be investigated further. The thesis does not analyze in detail the accuracy of claims made either by Other Serbia or the nationalistic intellectuals but tries to elaborate on their appearance; offer an understanding of their background, and their mindset at that time. Furthermore, some important Other Serbia's protagonists and their ideas were not analyzed in detail. This research could serve as a suggestion for the future work on this topic. Yet, this research could be helpful for the future work since it contributed to a clarification of the ideas Other Serbia embraced. The paper provided a certain explanation for Other Serbia's emergence. It sets the good ground for the study of intellectual elites, taking into consideration that there is a gap within a theoretical framework – the paper could play an important role as an individual research regarding the behavior of counter-elites.

The perceived perennial division into two Serbias among the intellectuals has thus far been a story about the two elites, this thesis, arguably confirms; the dominant one, which presents itself as the sole legitimate representative of the nation's interests and the other,

unwanted, isolated and ostracized. As the quotation from the beginning of the dissertation, “And if people only understood, but that will never happen.” is there for a reason. It poetically sublimates one of the points of this research. The Other Serbia embraced the role of the unwanted elite, the system imposed on them and fought against the dominant elite using radical pacifist position and different factual choice within the struggle against collectivism and anti-modernization forces.

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