THE PRODUCTIVE POWER OF WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN BRAZIL: A militarizing, gendering and othering National Action Plan

By

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ABSTRACT

Under the symbolic passing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325, women and gender issues began to penetrate into the 'high politics' realm of peace and security. Last year, in support of the Resolution, Brazil conformed to the call for its' internal implementation and launched its National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Through discourse analysis, I shall argue that the Brazilian NAP does not dismantle the militarized notion of peace and security, colluding with the UNSC practices and concepts that are deemed problematic from post-structural and post-colonial frameworks. This collusion becomes understandable when analyze Brazilian recent history, the use of its positionality and its international projection ambitions, thus promoting a militarized, neoliberal and neocolonial understanding of peace and security that aims to (re)produce a delineated political action which universalizes subjectivities rooted on both sex and 'Third World' differences, shaping the discursive power and (re)production of the hegemonic narratives of protection (or victimhood) and empowerment (or agency), as well as shaping the material responses to the agenda.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

I further declare that the following word count for this thesis is accurate:

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INTRODUCTION

During the International Women's Day, in March 2017, Brazil became the 74th and most recent country to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), an agenda that first emerged eighteen years ago after the passing of the symbolic United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325. Initially sparked by the United Nations (UN) effort of 'gender mainstreaming' in 1995 through the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the agenda for women's rights also became a concern in the security area, seeking to guarantee them after the many accounts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) that were disclosed in the 1990s conflicts – in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example, there was a large use of what is now known as rape as a weapon of war. Gathering enough momentum from the allegations, women's rights activists were able to bring the topic to the UNSC, educate the countries' representatives on the issue and to advocate for action of the Member States from the core of the UN's security decision-making agency (Barnes 2011; Independent Commission on Multilateralism 2016; UNSC 2000; Kreft 2016; Dam 2013).

After a long process, enough support and attention were given to the issue and Resolution 1325 was finally (and unanimously) adopted in 2000. Resolution 1325 was a call for action to the development and integration of women's rights and perspectives concerning both peace and conflict processes – that is, on tackling how women could become participative agents involved in peace processes to reconstruct post-conflict societies, and how to consider the impact of conflict in order to protect them in order to achieve gender equality. Thus, the agenda's main pillars developed, alongside gender mainstreaming, focus on the often-called "3 Ps": participation, (conflict) prevention, and protection (Barnes 2011; Independent Commission on Multilateralism 2016; UNSC 2000; Kreft 2016; Dam 2013).

Following 1325, other subsequent Resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, and 2242) were sparingly adopted by the UNSC to implement a gender perspective and to protect and promote the participation of women and girls in conflict and peace (Basu 2017; Kreft 2016). All of these Resolutions focus on applying efforts on all institutional levels – international, national and local. The UNSC President's Statements in 2004/40 and 2005/52 also directly reinforced the national efforts to develop NAPs or national strategies to strengthen the implementation of the Resolutions on WPS. Hence, Member States also became an integral part of these Resolutions on WPS as the ones responsible for implementing the Resolutions and were encouraged to establish and coordinate the NAPs nationally (Barrow 2016; Barnes 2011; Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014). In that sense, NAPs on WPS embody the policies and actions that a government will establish and follow for further implementing gender mainstreaming – and to reach the ultimate goal of gender equality. These involve identifying the priorities, timelines, as well as specific guidelines and mechanisms for implementation, evaluation, monitoring and a budget (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, 10).

In 2005, Denmark became the first country to adopt a NAP, while Brazil became the last one in 2018 (PeaceWomen n.d.). The WPS agenda and the NAPs, however, have produced no shortage of critiques and debates regarding both conceptual and implementation challenges. Current debates of the WPS agenda can be identified around the main topics of: integration of women's security in the traditional notion of peace; effective means and goals of peace; and how women and gender are interpreted (Independent Commission on Multilateralism [ICM] 2016, 5). On the institutional level, the concerns involve the lack of political will and accountability, shortage of focus on men's participation in WPS, and an approach to implementation that is fragmented (ICM 2016, 9), as only 38% of Member States have adopted

them – and only a minority has included a specific budget, a transparent monitoring and evaluation of the NAP or actions to disarm society (PeaceWomen n.d.).

The Brazilian National Action Plan presents similar implementation challenges, as it does not account for a specific budget or for clear mechanisms of accountability (Drumond & Rebelo 2018; PeaceWomen n.d.). However important overcoming these implementation challenges are, my interest on assessing this case here is to analyze the productive power of the document considering the language being used and the political events that concern it, especially those that favor a specific (re)productions of gendered and racialized subjectivities that inform militarized action to promote peace and security. With that purpose, I would like to engage with questions that concern rhetorical, discursive and practices as well as argumentation assumptions (Cohn 2008, 192-194) that need to be addressed when analyzing a productive power of the WPS agenda.

This investigation arises from addressing the possibility of a political transformation from mainstreaming gender in the conflict and security spectrum of the UN, for a "more textured description and analysis of impact, and of what might in the past have been framed in terms of 'cooptation versus empowerment'" (Cohn 2008, 192). This also demands a reflection on what actors were involved in the development of the Brazilian NAP, as well as what and how these actors justified the adoption of the agenda based on their understanding of Women, Peace and Security in a way that accounts for the productive power of the Brazilian NAP in all three of Fairclough's dimensions of analysis – social, discursive and textual (Fairclough 1995; Fairclough 2003).

There is a tension present, from a post-colonial perspective, that delineates this specific case, that is, as the country often explores the category of Global South on its favor to justify an

'authenticity' of its ambitions towards a permanent seat on the UNSC based on allegations of its' institutional democratization. The NAP promotes the image of a regional leadership performed by the Brazilian state in neoliberal projects through the 'Orientalizing' (Said 1977) or 'Othering' of the South, such as in the case of Haiti, while there also needs to be an acknowledgement of the country's experience with both a colonial history and a recent military dictatorship. Therefore, Brazil can be sociologically described as a state that is 'neither traditional nor fully modern' (Tavolaro 2008), permeating in the internal structure in the quest to achieving full modernity whilst exploring its' middle-ground position. This makes the Brazilian case an interesting one for advancing a critical perspective of WPS from both post-structural and post-colonial lenses insofar that it (re)produces hegemonic subjectivities justified based on the sense of 'belonginess' and leadership within the Global South. Therefore, it is also important to contextualize Brazil as a middle power insofar that the country can negotiate its interests without the same material capacity as great powers and therefore had the potential to present independent or innovative answers to WPS (Agius 2018, 70; Beeson 2014, 218). Yet, the Brazilian NAP expressly aligns with hegemonic racialized, gendered and militarized understandings peace and conflict present in the UNSC.

The literature critiques of militarized, gendered and racialized understandings established in the WPS agenda (see Barrow 2016; Basu 2017; Basu & Confortini 2017; Cohn 2008; Dam 2013; Gibbings 2011; Hagen 2016; Kirby & Shepherd 2016; Kreft 2016; Miller; Pournik & Swaine 2014; Pratt 2013; Pratt & Devroe 2011; Shepherd 2008; Shepherd & True 2014; Watson 2015) are very much present in the language used in the Brazilian National Action Plan, and these elements translate and inform the materiality of peace and security practices being displayed and performed by the country towards an international community. From their

perspective, this however presumes a "seemingly neutral and timeless language of social science" (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, 334) as it is established upon an understanding of consensual values and assumptions in the United Nations that in turn obscures the power relations that are in place. By uncritically and constantly justifying the position adopted by the Brazilian NAP on studies conducted by the UN that confirm how women and their 'feminine' traits can benefit and legitimize militarized peace mission, Brazil is also positioning itself in favor of hegemonic discourses of WPS and (re)producing the structural power and violence in place.

Therefore, my main claim will be that my claim is that the Brazilian NAP does not challenge structural hegemonic discursive practices of security as it promotes a binary idea of gender (with a focus on women), promotes a militarized peace and security, and builds on the identity of a Global South humanitarian leadership for other 'Orientalized' countries. These reflect the neoliberal politics and policies that are more concerned with inserting women in problematic spaces in terms of gender and of neocolonialism. That is, the focus of the WPS agenda has been translated to the Security Council as a mean to insert women in the hegemonic structures and discourses of militarized security; a security that has direct implications in the construction of masculinities and femininities, as well as its connections with developed countries against underdeveloped countries and its citizens. These three aspects will be individually unpacked but are not meant to be read as occurring separately. On the contrary, the structural hegemonic discursive practices of security concerning gender, race and militarism are intrinsically interrelated and have productive implications between them. Establishing the literature produced on the WPS agenda, the role of NAPs and their productive power, I will proceed to unpack the three critiques in each respective chapter through a discourse analysis of the NAP and recently political speeches that delineate how the WPS agenda is relevant for

Brazilian foreign policy and, finally, conclude with some reflections on how this can be relevant for the country's immediate political future and the advancement of WPS.

As a starting point for discussion, I will outline some of the current debates around the WPS agenda and NAPs before unpacking the threefold critique of a military peace, gender as a binary division, and the 'Othering' process of a NAP that focuses on the 'overseas'. Finally, I will offer some conclusions and observations that can contribute to the rethinking of commitments and practices on women, peace, and security that are more aware of power and structural inequalities concerning gender, race and militarism, but also that reflect on the specific political moment that Brazil is facing following the impeachment and the elections in 2018 and the ethical opportunities it presents.

1. LITERATURE, THEORY AND METHOD

In this chapter, I will firstly provide some insight into the literature produced on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, especially on the advances and challenges presented from the passing of Resolution 1325 and the National Action Plans that resulted from it, including Brazil's. A wide range of feminist critiques explored many different issues and challenges that arose from the passing of this symbolic Resolution. Of those, I would like to dialogue with the critiques concerned with the productive power that is often (re)produced from the emergence of the WPS agenda and the NAPs. I will proceed to justify why adopting a post-structural and post-colonial analysis that is concerned with the meaning (re)production of both gendered and racialized subjectivities on the case of the Brazilian NAP is important to expose some problematic discursive, normative and argumentative practices. Finally, I will explain how this framework will be adopted in conducting a discourse analysis of the Brazilian NAP and the surrounding events that are key to understanding the country's foreign policy ambitions and the impact WPS has internally, for example how the peace mission in Haiti contributes to establish Brazil's projection of a regional leader identity whilst making invisible violence that occurs against Brazil's favelas' citizens.

The Brazilian case is relevant here for the advancement of a critical perspective of the WPS agenda's (re)production of meaning given that the Brazilian NAP does not challenge structural hegemonic and discursive practices of security concerning gender, race and militarism. It is important to note that Brazil also presents itself as an interesting case, from a theoretical perspective in post-colonialism, because of the country's tense positionality with a long history of colonization and military intervention, and where political speeches often explore their belonging to the Global South to explore and justify their (often also neocolonial)

foreign interests. On the other hand, it is one of the countries that has presented a rapid economic development and participated in numerous international forums on many agendas and thus can be considered a 'middle power', meaning that although Brazil does not have the same material capacity as the great powers, it is still able to defend and negotiate its' interests opposite them (Beeson 2011 as cited in Agius 2018), in the quest to become fully modern (Tavolaro 2008). Hence, both post-structural and post-colonial contributions will be central to this analysis and will provide the basis for unpacking how each element of the critiques (on gender, race and militarism) are present in the Brazilian NAP. The literature, theoretical and methodological tools will be provided next as a layout for unpacking this positionality and the NAP's productive power to, finally, assess the conceptual - and often material – impacts that the NAP on WPS can have on the country's role in strengthening the UN's agenda on Women, Peace and Security.

1.1 Literature review

Eighteen years since the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 (UNSC 2000), often seen as a landmark for the inclusion of women on the United Nations' agenda on peace and security, a considerable amount of critiques has been produced regarding limitations on both conceptual and implementation terms. Starting with its institutionalization genealogy, having already established on the 1995 Beijing Conference the mechanism of 'gender mainstreaming' as a goal towards gender equality, the WPS agenda was finally established within the scope of peace and security in the UNSC in the new millennium. Through the materialization of this Resolution as the result of a long and arduous process in terms of feminist activism and advocacy, it became a normative milestone that was much celebrated for developing women's rights in the UN (Cohn 2008; Barnes 2011; Kirby & Shepherd 2016; Dam

2013; Pratt & Richter-Devroe 2011; Kreft 2017). Therefore, when thinking about WPS in terms of achievements and opportunities it presents, authors have claimed that the adoption of Resolution 1325 represented, at the time, a victory for women's rights movements that pushed for the involvement of women's perspectives in 'high politics', carrying the potential to a more complex understanding of conflict issues, one that would be concerned with protecting women and advancing their rights and participation, developing a normative framework both on women and peacebuilding, and on the issue of conflict-related sexual violence (Barnes 2011; Cohn 2008; Kirby & Shepherd 2016; Hagen 2016; Barrow 2016; Dam 2013; Pratt & Richter-Devroe 2011; Bell & O'Rourke 2010; Kreft 2017; Basu 2017).

After its due celebration, however, many authors pointed to several impediments that still stood in the way of the agenda's effective implementation, as significant gaps between rhetoric and practice remained (True & Shepherd 2014; Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014; ICM 2016). By shining light on structural and power relations, Gibbings' (2011) points to a limited space for what constituted acceptable behavior in the UN, making it clear that exclusionary and unequal practices were a trait present on the agenda from the very beginning of the passing of Resolution 1325. The performativity and language used in this institutional sphere is a normative one that takes a positive outlook of women's knowledge and expertise as agents of peace, and therefore, any discourse that falls outside of those parameters immediately cause some discomfort, illustrating how "agency among gender advocates at the UN… socially and historically contingent" (Gibbings 2011). Security is once again made visible as a political process, one that is arbitrary and subjective, although frequently disguised as rational and not contingent on gender and race.

An initial report pointed to a 'Triple-A' diagnosis of UN's implementation of WPS, those are: apathy, ad-hoc practices and amnesia (Anderlini 2007 as cited in Barnes 2011, 25). The Non-Government Organization (NGO) Working Group on WPS recently pointed out that there are still many operational challenges to be overcome, as for the "agenda to be fully realized, the commitments in past resolutions, and the cumulative recommendations in all peace and security reviews need to be implemented" (NGO WG on WPS, 2016, 5). The 2015 Global Study report reviewing the WPS agenda also found that a gap remains between commitments being proposed in the UN and governments effective financial and political and support, as the adoption of National Action Plans, funding, and accountability mechanisms remains scarce (Coomaraswarmy 2015; PeaceWomen n.d.). As a result, the numbers of women's representation in peace processes, the military, and of conflict-related sexual violence prosecution – the main areas related to Resolution 1325's advancement – is still very small (Coomaraswamy 2015, 5).

The operationalization of the Resolution involved many actors, among them are the Member States, who were encouraged to adopt National Action Plans to strengthen 1325's implementation (Barrow 2016; Barnes 2011). NAPs become the central focus for Member States' operationalization of the WPS agenda, as provided in the Resolutions, and yet present as many implementation problems as in the sphere of the UN. The creation of NAPs presented the potential of a valuable tool for implementation of the WPS agenda by local governments, but what translated into reality was a widely varied content and several shortcomings from different plans (Barnes 2011, 25). Research from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) also showed that, as of this year, only 38% of UN Member States have adopted a NAP and out of these, only 22% include allocated budgets for implementation, 30%

include references to control disarmament and illicit trade, and only about half of them explain the monitoring and evaluating processes of its' implementation (PeaceWomen n.d.).

Therefore, despite "some of the countries' recent history of conflict or involvement in military intervention and arms trade, there is insufficient analysis and consideration of the connection between disarmament, gender equality and violence" (PeaceWomen n.d.). Authors, such as Gibbings (2011), also draw attention to the reformulation, or even absence, of critiques of militarism in the agenda and questioned if the passing of a resolution on women's protection and participation was a mean of maintaining hegemonic military practices in place (Cohn 2008). By reframing the issue to 'women's participation', women come to represent a 'solution' in militarism and issues that are pertinent to women's security (e.g. disarmament) are often not addressed in NAPs (Gibbings 2011; Cohn 2008). Further, Basu and Confortini (2017) correctly identify an under theorization of the gendered aspect of conflict reflecting on a focus on treating the causes and effects of war at the UNSC, which consequently was embedded in 1325 and failed to confront address the "Protection" pillar of the "3 Ps", promoting rather 'gendered forms of militarism and militarization (Basu & Confortini 2017, 43).

States' full realization of the agenda, additionally, has constantly been interpreted and justified through many different theoretical lenses under the inherently political practice of power dynamics veiled under the justification of 'rationalization' (Fierke 2015; Shepherd 2008). What is defined and what is excluded as security, however, is understood here as being a part of a relational dynamic to (re)produce violent – and violently – boundaries of 'stable' identities; security itself is defined in relation to gender norms and identities of combatant, victim, and perpetrators. These ideas shape process of peacebuilding and reconstruction (Enloe 2014; Shepherd 2008; Pankhurst 2008).

The traditional liberal approaches remain present in that the accountability is based on the notion of women's rights as human rights, including the right to participate, by upholding and establishing international and national laws and regulations (Duffield 2010; Hickel 2014). In turn, women's participation would make the military more inclusive – in other words, aware of the implications that women have different biological needs and capacities and that these women may reach higher positions in high politics (Manning 2004, 8). Liberal presumptions have also produced research that directly ties national and international security to women's treatment, as "the loose threads of women's insecurity will unravel peace for all" (Hudson; Caprioli; Ballif-Spanvill; McDermott; Emmett 2008, 45), tying the security of the international and of states to that of women. However, liberal understandings of security and (democratic, stable) peace become very problematic when – it is considered important enough to be – tied to humanitarian aid and development projects that aim for women's empowerment and yet becomes contradictory as from its short-sightedness on structural inequalities, it often aggravates them (Duffield 2010; Hickel 2014; Cohn 2004).

These 'traditional' understandings of security in International Relations disputed their understandings of security studies after the Cold War but were arguably narrow and hierarchical, in that they had an ethnocentric bias (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, 330). Both traditional lenses are still very much present on current understandings of peace, security, and what values are to be pursued and how, although these have correctly been pointed out to being limited and only presenting analysis, especially in security studies, that is based upon a European standpoint. They also diluted the critique of security as gendered to a 'women's issue', making men's role invisible in the development of gender equality and women's empowerment agenda, as in "issues such as sexual and domestic violence against women did reach the agenda as a serious

security concern, men as perpetrators, secondary wit-nesses, and victims are notably absent from the discourse" (Watson 2015, 45).

On more recent perspectives, constructivist authors have presented an opposing perspective for security studies and offered an interpretation of the WPS agenda, for example, as an emerging norm that becomes an accepted practice through social relations (Wendt 1998), beginning to expose the political composition of this agenda. The idea of an accepted practice, however, does not entail lack of responsibility from harmful (re)productions of structural violence in the underlying tension between feminist advancement and cooption in global governance (Reeves 2012), nor does it automatically acknowledge the power relations taking place in it. Nevertheless, other critical perspectives, like post-structuralism and post-colonialism, deepened this understanding and sought to delineate the genealogy of WPS, as well as the productive power that it could develop and maintain in terms of gender and race, moving beyond the idea of a linear progress.

Therefore, these perspectives of the WPS agenda become central to the analysis that is to be conducted here. A few critical issues have been presented and need to be accounted both in the UN established discursive practices, as well as in the case of Brazilian NAP and foreign policy, such as: the WPS agenda being used as an excuse for military interventionism without addressing root causes of conflict (Basu & Confortini 2017; Cohn 2008); the scripting of a 'Other' as violent and inhuman (Pratt 2013), perpetrating Global North and South unequal relations; the absence of markedly queer (Hagen 2016), with disabilities (Ortoleva & Knight 2012) or even male (Watson 2015) subjectivities in the agenda; and finally, the insertion of women through gender-strict roles of victimhood and agency, maintaining an hegemonic notion

of femininity (Butler 2004). All these elements impact policy responses and how WPS is used to establish conflict resolution.

Based on the – occasionally unintentional – aim of 'making war safe for women', gender violence is often portrayed in NAPs as only occurring 'overseas', not accounting for it domestically (Shepherd, 2016) and is considerably important as it exposes the potential for feminist agendas to be coopted and adapted into broader power structures to perpetrate unequal relations. Shepherd's post-structural analysis of countries responsible for the highest amounts of military expenditure and engagement in the Global North is an important first step for assessing the Brazilian NAP, in turn exposing how such NAPs are embedded in the militarization of WPS and rely on the practice of constructing a national identity that opposes that of the states they will intervene.

Similarly, Pratt (2013) still sees WPS as (re)inscribing racial and sexual boundaries through discourses of security that differentiates violence according to gender and race. In that sense, women's insertion – both in terms of protection and representation – suited discourse and practices of the hegemonic security, further making invisible the broader structures that rely on militarized, gendered and racialized insecurities (Cohn 2008; Pratt 2013; Shepherd 2008). By means of rehearsing colonial narratives of saving 'Orientalized' or 'Othered' Third World women, the location of conflict and insecurity is often external, thus obscuring the role of the Global North and of members of the Security Council in the (re)production of conflict and violence, especially when contrasted to dominant security discourses and practices (Pratt 2013).

On the other hand, different post-colonial authors have also contributed a great deal in critically analyzing WPS. By claiming that 'the Global South writes 1325 (too)', Basu (2016) moves away from the standpoint of the Global North as the main source of concepts, institutions

and material, pointing to other actors who adopt and adapt the 'writing', in practice, of WPS. The aim is to draw attention to the 'divergences from the canon', the 'roots and branches' of WPS, by pointing out other locations of contestation, negotiation, implementation, and non-implementation of the agenda – practices that, in turn, result in the 'writing' of 1325 as well (Basu 2016). This is still possible even with the critiques produced here, as it is limited to the analysis of language and the exposure of power dynamics that surround it, and does not entirely excludes the potential for WPS and the NAP to be pivotal for feminist grassroots movements, albeit inserted and aligned with hegemonic discourse.

Nevertheless, from these different perspectives, it is possible to see that expanding the concept of security in the institutional sphere allowed for increasing alternative referential objects, but often did not automatically challenge the 'often-one-dimensional perception of security' that can violently reproduce boundaries of the militarizing, gendering and othering orders (Fierke 2015; Shepherd 2008). This is consistent with the aim here, which is to contribute to the problematization of silences and inequalities the Brazilian NAP (re)produces by not treating the WPS as a complex and intersectional agenda, in a holistic way. As post-structural and postcolonial feminists have now long criticized the use of universalizing concepts, identities become much more nuanced and the focus shifts to the importance of meaning production, as discourse becomes the site of making individuals intelligible and policies can be applied to them.

The Brazilian NAP is filled with examples of how the country's 'savior' identity is being laid out to aid the women who are the 'victims' in conflicts overseas, in an 'othering' manner. But with the Brazilian NAP only being recently approved, few publications have analyzed the document beyond the globally established implementation challenges. Some of the highlighted issues were that there was no transparency as to how much online consultations with civil

society affected or contributed to suggestions and the lack of formal consultations or large sensitization events prevented a greater involvement of Brazilian society to contribute on the NAP (Drumond & Rebelo 2018). In the finished National Action Plan there is an overall lack of specific and transparent mechanisms for commitment and accountability, with an absence of: a specific budget for its implementation; coordination and supervising mechanisms for implementation; indicators for evaluation and monitoring; transparency on the selection of military observers; and finally, a lack of measures for internal training and capacitation on WPS, and for mechanisms to punish sexual exploitation and abuse in the military justice system to conform with UN's zero tolerance policy (Drumond & Rebelo 2018, PeaceWomen n.d.). However, when shifting the focus to a productive power, it is important to establish significative events that have surrounded the development of the WPS agenda and the NAP in Brazil, namely the Haitian mission overseas and the internal violence in the favelas.

The eighteen years of the WPS agenda, thus, have proven that discussions and political will on gender issues are still scarce all over. Having established the literature produced on the development of WPS and Resolution 1325's implementation, and the feminist project I want to position and engage my research with, I will proceed by tracing the main conceptual tools from post-structural and post-colonial standpoints and how they will benefit my interpretation of the Brazilian NAP, hopefully in a way that can inform and benefit the further development of the WPS agenda both domestically and internationally.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

In this thesis, I draw on post-structural and post-colonial frameworks as they highlight underlying and accepted systems of knowledge and action that brings attention to – usually

binary – power relations and silences taking place in discussions of peace and conflict. My analysis benefits from post-structuralism as it allows us to directly challenge the implicit power structures and universalizing experiences that are underlying 'rational' and traditional political practices, enabling the researcher to trace the genealogy of these established notions and its implications in language and in society (Foucault 1981; Butler 2004; Shepherd 2008). Yet, it is important to inform that equal attention is given to both lenses, as gender alone is not enough to assess power relations being (re)produced in the Brazilian NAP, rather involving other axes of power, such as race, when constructing the binary separation between the country and the 'Other', a process that is also known as 'Orientalization' (Said 1977).

The concept of Orientalism is an important one to apply in a post-colonial analysis, as Said (1977) illuminates on how this idea of an 'Othered' unit of knowledge can become understandable from the hegemonic perspective. The issue lies on how this recognition can occur, converting the 'Other' – in his work, the Orient – into imposed Western categories, becoming a disciplined process of conversion as "it is taught, it has its own societies, periodicals, traditions, vocabulary, rhetoric, all in basic ways connected to and supplied by the prevailing cultural and political norms of the West" (Said 1977, 180). Orientalism becomes a form of paranoia from a transgression of the norm and thus produces its own vocabulary to manage this 'Other' in contrast with Western standards, a result of 'imaginative geography boundaries' (Said 1977, 186).

The process of theorizing and politicizing of peace and conflict has not been exempt from 'Othering', as the social and historical constraints have resulted in the exclusion of minorities' accounts and experiences of security and violence as "these experiences are conceived in categories derived from great power politics in the North" by default (Barkawi &

Laffey 2006, 332). Violence, then, can be interpreted as establishing the social relationships that marks subjectivities (Shepherd 2008, 2) and that can, thus, be perpetrated not only in an individual, but in a structural manner, as some subjectivities are benefited to the detriment of others. Structural violence becomes incorporated into a hegemonic establishment that (re)produces unequal power and access (Galtung 1969, 171). As Galtung describes, this is due to "the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is", increasing "the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance" (Galtung 1969, 168).

In order to trace the this structural violence in the Brazilian case, the focus here, thus, becomes on analyzing the language being used and describing the subjectivities through gendering and racializing violence that maintain the naturalized order of these (Shepherd 2008; Butler 2004; Said 1977), that is, the discourse that upholds structural differences that affect both the individual and collective based on gender and race.

While still "acknowledging the intellectual heritage of feminisms that seek to claim rights on behalf of a stable subject and maintain fidelity to a regime of truth that constitutes the universal category of 'women'" (Butler 2004 as cited in Shepherd 2008, 3), the feminist project I envision as a researcher has to be accountable for structural changes and to be aware of unequal power relations that are (re)produced in the discourse which determines the materiality of real - gendered and racialized - lives. This concern is present on my analysis of the Brazilian NAP, as it is part of the larger trend of NAPs that are oblivious to these binary divisions.

It is also important to highlight here that taking gender into consideration should not entail creating a universal model of society (e.g. patriarchy) that can be neatly divided on the opposition between the powerful (masculine) and powerless (feminine), further categorizing

and identifying sexed bodies into the roles of either victims or perpetrators (Mohanty 1988, 339). This understanding can have serious implications for differentiating between those who fit into the universal 'woman' experience, obscuring the 'othering' process that insert women that do not fit this mode into the "Third World Difference". Consisting of "that stable, ahistorical something that apparently oppresses most if not all the women in these countries" (Mohanty 1988, 335). Adopting a stance that regards the 'Third World' experience of Othered women reduces and homogenizes the lives of both women and men into a monolithic, singular pattern that is appropriated and 'colonized' by Western feminists. Hence, a global power balance needs to account for socio-economic, cultural and ideological conditions. In other words, a gendered violence "must be theorized and interpreted within specific societies, both to understand it better, as well as in order to effectively organize to change it", and the notion of sorority "must be forged in concrete, historical and political practice and analysis" (Mohanty 1988, 339) instead of being based on constructed and performative subjectivities that could be universally applied across cultures (Mohanty 1988, 337).

The aim of a feminism concerned with neocolonial practices, therefore, is to decenter 'violence against women' as occurring 'overseas', in turn establishing the exceptionalism of the modern 'West' that fails to acknowledge the complexity of global politics, structural violence, social justice and relational power dynamics, and that they are not embedded in 'non-Western savage actors' (Gentry 2015, 378). The idea of a 'paternalist racism' (Gentry 2015, 369) also resonates with post-colonial authors like Mohanty (1988), who argue that the narrative of a "Third World" is hierarchically colonizing. It implies a structural domination and a monolithic representation of a whole group, one that suppresses their heterogeneity (Mohanty 1988, 333) and that separates the colonial 'native' from the ethics of the West, embodying "the negation of

values" (Fanon 1963, 41) from the binary division. Consequently, it is possible to locate a tendency for the WPS agenda and NAPs to locate the promotion and application of gender equality in opposing parts of the world.

In turn, the gendered and gendering binary of protector and protected is (re)produced by feminizing protection and masculinizing security through a militarized maintenance of the liberal peace project (Enloe 2000; Young 2003). These conceptual limitations further allow for 'gender issues', often diluted as 'women's issues' in the institutional sphere and language, to remain secondary and treated separately from peace and security, as women are often included in 'gendered' areas, but not necessarily mainstreamed, thus further naturalizing gender as a given and not as a socially constructed and performative identity that impacts conflict resolution (Oudraat & Brown 2017; Shepherd 2008). This, however, essentializes discourse and the ideas that underline it, as there is a limited engagement with how conflict and conflict resolution are 'gendered', and the focus remains on inserting women's markedly sexed bodies, or on inserting women as women to achieve a stable peace.

Gender, then, became a synonym for 'women', and many "international documents have gone to absurd lengths to avoid mentioning men and boys" (Watson 2015, 48). In that way, men became the missing gender and a female perspective was accounted for to perform an established femininity and follow strict gender and racialized roles in peace and conflict (Shepherd 2008), and in post-conflict societies, the gender-blindness of peacebuilding strategies seldom create decision-making and economic opportunities for women, reinforcing social and economic inequality instead, thus advancing their vulnerability to violence (True 2018).

The understanding here is that gender and sex categories are developed in situational social instances where one feels compelled to perform gender, and therefore gender can be better

described as something that someone does, not who someone is, in interactional relations (West & Zimmerman 1987, 140; Butler 1999). In that sense, the architecture of WPS needs to be contextualized within and as reproducing heteronormative understandings of 'gender' and of conflict, further obscuring non-conforming experiences and individuals from the monitoring and reporting of the agenda "both theoretical in the way that gender is framed and political in the resulting inclusion or exclusion of individuals as a result of this framing" (Hagen 2016, 314). This is especially relevant to consider in discussions about peace and conflict in a country which has the highest rates of violence, including homicide, against LGBT people[1] but there are no specific accountability mechanisms or legislation on, making it an underreported phenomenon that makes the lives of people that do not conform into marked gender and sexual identities further invisible.

By understanding gender as interactional, we can then tackle the social controlling and structures sustaining it. A post-structural lens, that way, seeks to use gender as an actual tool to reassess how a so-called sexual difference itself is constructed (Scott 2010, 10), thus allowing for thinking about how it can or is being deconstructed (Risman 2009, 84).

Thus, I analyze how Resolution 1325 and the broader WPS agenda were interpreted and implemented in the Brazilian context. Through the constant tension of Brazil's positionality as a middle power (Beeson 2011 as cited in Agius 2018) and as a self-claimed representative of the Global South, but that not necessarily presents a challenge to a Western-centric notion of peace and security. On the contrary, my claim is that the Brazilian NAP does not challenge

[1] There are many reports and statistics of this particular violence in Brazil that is underreported and underrepresented in discussions of gender, peace and conflict: https://catracalivre.com.br/cidadania/brasil-mais-mata-lgbts-1-cada-19-horas/, https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2017/09/25/brasil-tem-recorde-de-lgbts-mortos-em-2017-ainda-doi-diz-parente.htm, https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/assassinatos-de-lgbt-crescem-30-entre-2016-2017-segundo-relatorio-22295785

structural hegemonic discursive practices of security as it promotes the idea of gender as the binary division between men/women, centers the role of military on promoting peace, and positions the country as a humanitarian collaborator for other 'Third World' countries. These three aspects will be further unpacked and explored on the next chapters.

That way, the goal of analyzing the Brazilian NAP is to allow for moving beyond the neutral promise of gender equality, using feminist critical tools to expose the militarized racism and heterosexism of these narratives (Hemmings 2011, 10). Although cognizant of the feminist epistemology, the aim here is not to analyze just the possible outcomes for feminist agency or resistance, but to analyze the structural constraints that shape these particular agencies whilst (re)producing specific categories of femininity and strict gender (as a noun and a verb) roles. Finally, having established that, I would like to move on to the discussion of methodology to contextualize the strategies used to analyze the Brazilian NAP.

1.3 Methodology

To provide for a substantive critique of the subjectivities and power relations that are naturalized in security and are being (re)produced in the Brazilian NAP, attention needs to be given to a productive power of discourse. This was done by a close and symptomatic reading of the Brazilian NAP and applying the method of critical discourse analysis (CDA) to assess the NAP's main direct and indirect implications on what is stated and what is presumed from the silences and topics that are absent on this agenda and on the country's plan. Therefore, the main points I have identified and will outline are: (1) inclusion of women as a gendered and gendering process; (2) the tension between Brazil's role in Global South cooperation and the identity of 'Othered' conflict societies overseas; and finally (3) the militarization of peace and security, as

a process that is also gendered and racialized, resonating with some of the issues authors have already brought up on NAPs and the WPS agenda.

The concern with the critical paradigm of discourse incorporates the definition that accounts for discourse as the practice of language that sets the means and rules for forming the 'realities' and understandings of objects, subjects and themes, producing and delineating the interpretation of these. The fixed meaning (re)produced by discourses enables us 'to make sense of the world' constituting what we come to understand as a social constitution of what is real and naturalized (Shepherd 2008b, 215; Åhäll & Borg 2013). From the 1980s, CDA developed the purpose of exposing structural relations and inequalities of power, including through language interaction; it is therefore, aware of how socially interactional language is and how power is embedded in the process, seeking to illuminate those interactions (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000), to include all spheres of social practice that plays a part in understanding a phenomenon, or to understand how the production of 'truth' and 'reality' takes place (Hodges; Kuper & Reeves 2008, 570).

A close relation with social theory that is concerned with power and ideology can be achieved in this method, and thus the post-structural understandings of productive discourse also allow for the researcher to scrutinize the mechanisms of power, in Butlerian and Foucauldian terms, that inform normative and conceptual tools. Hence, all the normative and material realities are a product of power relations that is also ingrained in language and discursive practices (Foucault 1981; Shepherd 2008; Åhäll & Borg 2013). Identities become much more nuanced and the focus shifts to the importance of meaning production, as discourse becomes the site of making individuals intelligible and policies can be applied to them (Butler 2004). When viewed from the standpoint of a project that seeks to denaturalize these discursive

practices, questioning the nature and politics of a truth, of "what is, in its very general form, the type of division which governs our will to know, then what we see taking shape is perhaps something like a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutionally constraining system" (Foucault 1981). This understanding provides the tools to read the Brazilian National Action Plan beyond the mere use of text and language presented but connecting it to broader and structural settings of a 'natural order' that is embedded in power relations. This relies on three of Fairclough's dimensions of analysis – social, discursive and textual (Fairclough 1995; Fairclough 2003; Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000).

The productive form of power – next to compulsory, institutional, and structural forms – delineated by Barnett & Duvall's (2016) work when assessing the connection between global governance and power presents here the tool for analysis of the NAP and the violence it (re)produces from further separating the potential from the actual that produces inequalities (Galtung 1969). The authors' claim is that although both governance and power are intrinsic to each other, it is still undertheorized and there needs to be an account of the guidance of how global orders are produced and guided, requiring an analysis of the workings of power (Barnett & Duvall 2016, 2), including the productive one. Such an analysis is aware of "the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification, and defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters" (Barnett & Duvall 2016, 3-4).

Productive power can be analyzed by deploying CDA as a transdisciplinary approach that focuses on texts and language as a form of social practice (Fairclough 1989, 20) and aims to reveal the ideological discursive foundations that becomes naturalized. The critiques produced from adopting the CDA method thus focuses on the relation between social structure

and discourse by recognizing them as problematic as it often (re)produces power relations (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000, 449). Through the distinctive linguistic and communicative resources in both large and micro social processes, CDA is further based on unequal access to linguistic and social resources, which are controlled by institutions. Therefore, the link between language and social structure cannot be a given, but rather "sought in the practical interplay between concrete actions and group - or society - level forces and patterns" (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000, 459). This approach, therefore draws on the social theory of thinkers such as Foucault, to examine the ideology and power relations involved in the discourse as it treats the language in connection with the social practices as it is the location where power struggles take place (Fairclough 1989, 15).

Analyzing discourse, therefore, bases "upon the assumption that language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research always has to take account of language" (Fairclough 2003, 2). In this manner, discourse analysis allows for the researcher to "identify, problematize and challenge the ways in which 'realities' become accepted as 'real' in the practices", establishing the "systems of meaning-production rather than simply statements or language, systems that 'fix' meaning, however temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the world" (Shepherd 2008, 20). The emergence of global issues, including WPS, is framed (or not) by actors who are able and have access to promote it in the political space, selecting from a wide range of possible issues that are then brought to the attention, and dismissing others in the process (Carpenter 2006, 204; Fierke 2015; Åhäll & Borg 2013). This suggests a very conscious process of direct engagement with meaning (re)production that needs to be denaturalized, allowing for the researcher to ask questions that "examine how meanings are produced and attached to various

social subjects and objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions that create certain possibilities and exclude others" (Doty 1996, 4 as cited in Shepherd 2008, 21). Therefore, discursively, the practices of (re)presentation and (re)production are the sites where we can locate power (Shepherd 2008, 24) and its reflections on textual representation. Power and discourse become necessary to critically engage with knowledge that had become naturalized and separated from the use of power in practice (Foucault 1972 as cited in Shepherd 2008).

Further "acknowledgement of an intrinsic and layered historicity of each social event" can benefit the assessment of what a text can do in societies, contextualizing "the historical positioning of the events in which the discourse data are set", including the present moment of analysis (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000, 461). Through a close reading of the Brazilian NAP and an account for the country's cultural and historical specificities, the aim of discourse analysis here is to identify the discursive practices from this source of 'meaning' containing power features (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000, 460) that naturalize and stabilize – gendered and racialized – identities made intelligible to establish the WPS agenda. Thus, by "refusing to accept that there is any 'natural fact' that cannot be contested, any essence to the identity of subject or object, allows for multiple interrogations of truth claims that can expose the very political processes that are naturalized through practices of power" (Shepherd 2008, 33).

Finally, it should be noted that post-colonial contributions have also pointed out that, especially Western scholars, have been creating and shaping the narrative that accounts for the narrative of violence against women that pathologizes gender as it places the universal truth of experiencing men's power over powerless women, and consequently shapes the responses to it (Shepherd 2008, 42). Violence against women, additionally, is often expressed to happen as result of a located Orientalist savagery, whilst being deemed exceptional whilst simultaneously

building the identity of the West from their standpoint (Gentry 2015; Said 1977; Barkawi & Laffey 2006, 330). This dynamic reflects the West's own notion of exceptionalism that allows it to build a localized identity as "white, heteronormative, rational, hegemonic male" (Gentry 2015, 375) saviors on the savage-victim-savior triad, deflecting from acknowledging that these everyday violences also happen in the West (Gentry 2015; Olivius 2016; Pratt 2013; Nayak 2006).

Engaging with a feminist research ethic that is aware of structural unequal relations that are often left into place allows for a space where normative concerns and being attentive of power becomes central to the interpretation and knowledge production being made here (Ackerly, Stern & True 2008, 704). Therefore, in this study, I hope to illustrate the ways in which my research on the Brazilian NAP can aid the feminist project that is accountable and concerned with power relations that is (re)produced through discursive practices of the WPS agenda. This concern with power can shine a light on the structural, procedural, and institutional shape of a 'global order' which determines the material conditions of actors and subjects of the WPS agenda. It puts in place the legitimacy of governance, posing an interrogation on "who gets to participate, whose voice matters, and whose vote counts. The focus on power, in short, compels us to engage the analytics, the empirics, and the ethics of global governance" (Barnett & Duvall 2016, 7-8). By reflecting on the literature produced on the WPS agenda and the NAPs, we can begin to critically assess and denaturalize the means and goals of gender equality by shining light on "how the subjects, objects and interpretative dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were enabled and others disabled" (Doty 1993 as cited in Åhäll & Borg 2013, 196-198; Fierke 2015) and thus reshape our feminist political projects, its subjects and goals.

The Brazilian NAP is structured in four areas or pillars that are considered fundamental for establishing a contribution for international peace and security focused of gender (or women and girls) mainstreaming and empowerment, which are: i) Participation; ii) Prevention and Protection; iii) Peace-building and Humanitarian Cooperation; and iv) Strengthening, Awareness and Engagement (NAP 2017, 13). These will now be assessed and unpacked to demonstrate how they (re)produce a violent understanding of international peace and security through the (re)production of gendered and racialized subjectivities.

2. SEXED SECURITY: FEMININITY ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMHOOD AND AGENCY

In this chapter, the (re)productions of gender will be further analyzed in the Brazilian foreign policy discourse, especially under the National Action Plan, to better understand what kinds of subjectivities are being produced under the archetypes of female victim\agent of peace, an initial accomplishment of the feminist movement. Through a symptomatic reading, it is possible to identify the patterns of (re)producing sexed and 'Third World' subjectivities and neoliberal militarized solutions, consequently bringing implications of what is present and what is absent on their discursive acts.

On the NAP, Brazil's involvement with security is justified for being in conformity with constitutional principles of defending peace and reaching pacific resolutions of international disputes in all stages of conflict. In this context, the document states that "women can and should play an active and proactive role for peace in every area" (NAP 2017, 3). By posing Brazil as an actor for gender equality, it justifies, as in the example of the favelas, "coercive policies vis-à-vis state or nonstate actors that actually violate norms of gender equality and women's rights" (Shepherd 2006 as cited in True 2018, 39). This establishes the close relation of maintaining militarized violence as the norm and the violent reproduction of gender (Shepherd 2008) through the logic of masculinist protection present in the WPS agenda, and the externalizing source of conflict that the savior identity must address. In other words, Young states that "at the same time that it legitimates authoritarian power over citizens internally, the logic of masculinist protection justifies aggressive war outside" (Young 2003, 2).

Firstly, I would like to address how gender subjectivities is being violently reproduced, which in turn also has implications concerning race and the 'Othering' process of savage-victim

exterior that will be addressed in the next chapters. Butler points to the fabrication of gender as a narrative instituted and inscribed in bodies, being produced as 'truth' effects of a discourse on a primary and stable identity (Butler 1999, 195). The first two pillars of the Brazilian National Action Plan (participation and prevention and protection) reproduce the masculinist protection logic for women. The activities focus on increasing a qualified presence of markedly female-sexed bodies in activities related to peace and security, including on the level of civil (conflict) society where Brazil plays a role, based on their unique experiences and perspectives regarding conflict. They also aim to protect women and girls' human rights, thus preventing what they name gender-based violence during conflict and post conflict (NAP 2017). Paradoxically, when analyzing the indexed numbers of actual women participating in the Armed Forces and in diplomacy in Brazil, the percentage of female participation is often lower than the global average – which is already low. The concrete numbers of Brazilian women's participation, therefore, in the military and in diplomacy are contradictory to the NAP's ambitions.

The issue, however, when assessing the language and argumentation used on the NAP goes beyond low numbers. Feminists contribution to rethinking peace and security often pointed to the gendered nature of the discursive practices of security, assuming particular 'bodily' conceptions that are constantly related to sexed male and female bodies, but that also have implications in the societal constructions of masculinity and femininity. Thus, "theorizing practices of international security as gendered has allowed feminists to question the naturalness of militarization as based not on necessity but, rather, on socialized gender roles, namely, masculine gender identity" (Wilcox 2012, 596).

This theorizing, however, is insufficient to overcome the dichotomy between culture/nature that consigns femininity to the body and to passivity but can be the starting point

for more nuanced implications of the body and the subject, without reducing them to one another. Through demonstrations of the production of bodies through social and political relations, feminists offer an exclusive perspective on war and violence, "without necessarily reducing these concerns as something that specifically affects women or men as sexed bodies" (Wilcox 2012, 598). Rather, when focusing on violence as reproduction of gender and the international, the focus shifts to the discursive gendered constitution of entities and how violence is performed to (re)produce these discourses (Shepherd 2008, 54).

Even as feminist activists managed to bring gender inequality to the global agenda, theorists have contributed by producing critical tools for assessing gender. Here, it is important to highlight the conceptions of multiple masculinities and hegemonic masculinity, as well as hegemonic femininity (Connell, 1987 as cited in Schippers 2007), which allows for several different social arrangements and implicate them in intersections with other systems of inequality (Schippers 2007), race, for example, will be explored in the next chapter. Furthermore, Schippers describe these masculinities and femininities as "configurations of meaning and not practice, but it is only by identifying how putting these ideals into practice results in unequal power relations and distribution of resources that we can truly know if they constitute hegemonic femininity and hegemonic masculinity" (Schippers 2007, 100).

The Brazilian NAP, nevertheless, fails to produce such a nuanced understanding of gender and violence, aligning instead with what is claimed to be an established 'progressive' understanding in the UN, always backing up their claims on 'scientific evidence' that has been produced by research and reports conducted by the UN (NAP 2017, 12). The general understanding is that when women are inserted and participate in every level of conflict prevention and resolution and peacebuilding and peacekeeping, peace becomes more stable and

sustainable. Therefore, the perception is that sexed female bodies not only need to be protected as victims of a particular kind of violence, but also have to be included as potential peacemakers in an equal position alongside male sexed bodies.

By analyzing the discursive action of hegemonic security and reflecting on the 'gendered' understanding this discourse produced, under the WPS agenda, of victims of sexual violence and the importance of the inclusion of women in the military it is possible to problematize the way 'gender' and 'women' have been understood, at times used interchangeably, in a productive nature of WPS regarding gendered subjects. In that sense, I expect to develop a critical analysis of the WPS integration in the country, as well as possible suggestions for a critical approach to such cooptation without falling into the simplistic notion of a 'doing good or bad question' towards grassroots organizations that conform with this framework. Nor is the intention to diminish women's local agency within the shaping of their agenda and activities on the ground but offering suggestions and new insights on the structural level can shine light on how gender can gradually increase its critical function in tackling structural inequalities.

Consequently, a possible limitation of my research can unpack from focusing only at the structural constraints in the realm of discursive acts, therefore not shining light on local feminist collective and individual agencies, translating this achievement for gender equality from the institutional to the ground. As Hemmings argues, "feminism is both caught and freeing" (year, 2). Acknowledging that feminist expertise goes through both 'cooptation' (of liberal discourse) and 'empowerment' (of feminist discourse) in its mainstreaming (Reeves 2012), it is too early to assess the empowering impact of the NAP in Brazil, but it is possible to analyze its' structural issues and (re)production of gendered/gendering meanings (Shepherd 2008).

In that sense, I shall argue that Brazil's adoption of the NAP proposed on Resolution 1325 presents no challenges to what has been legitimized on the level of the United Nations, thus promoting a militarized and neoliberal understanding of peace and security that aims to (re)produce political action and universalizing subjectivities rooted on sex difference, whereas the next chapter will explore the construction of victimhood in the 'Third World'. These elements, in turn, are very much aligned with hegemonic practices that exclusively establish the subjects of peace and security, rather than being an actual tool for change. This implies that the focus is on women and girls' representation as peacemakers and their protection, leaving the militarized structure, explored previously, in place (Cohn 2008; Shepherd 2008).

2.1 Violent reproduction of gender

From the 1960s, with women's perspectives becoming increasingly more included on the shaping of global issues, especially within the scope of the United Nations (UN) through transnational activism, 'gender' and 'women's issues' have become increasingly political. This, in turn, led to the mainstreaming of gender into shaping of governance, policies, organizations and individual lives to achieve equality, including in the sphere of security. Implementing Resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda, thus, occurs in different levels and involves multiple actors, but the main actor responsible for assuring rights and achieving equality is still the protectionist state, who in turn (re)produces protected and protector identities (Agius 2018, 73; Young 2003). The Brazilian NAP presents no objection to this understanding, rather using the UN's established arguments to justify the intentions of the agenda rather than broaden the discussion to include outside subjectivities – such as men (Watson 2015), women with

disabilities (Ortoleva & Knigt 2012) and queer or non-conforming identities (Hagen 2016) which are absent from the NAP.

Using the framework of a violent reproduction of gender, the focus becomes the "discursively constituted gendered entities and the function that violence performs in (re)producing these discourses" that produce performative individuals (Shepherd 2008, 54). The structures of the nation-state's sovereignty and of patriarchy are intrinsically related in that both are arrangements that is continuously (re)producing itself in a process that embodies gender, values a certain masculinity, and can often resort to violence to reproduce and maintain itself, although this relationship is often obscured as it becomes naturalized (Peterson 1992; True 2018; Shepherd 2008, 6). In that manner, feminist contributions to International Relations and security studies aim to reveal this close relation of the 'gendered state' (Parashar, Tickner & True 2018) by pointing to the gendered dynamics within and between states that produce intelligible subjectivities according to gendered conceptions of, for example, rationality and irrationality, power and powerlessness, manly and dominant and fragile or subordinate (Sjoberg 2012 as cited in True 2018).

The use of these concepts is very present in Brazil's foreign policy discourse surrounding women's rights and the country's position to protect and empower them. In the introduction of the NAP, it is stated that the country's Constitution is principled in the preservation of peace and thus adopting the Women, Peace and Security agenda conforms with this ambition as "women can and should play an active and proactive role for peace in every area (NAP 2017, 3). Furthermore, in the document, there is a specific section named the 'Evolution of the Gender Agenda in the Domestic Sphere', where national accomplishments, such as the creation of a National Women's Rights Council in 1985 and the 2006 Maria da Penha Law for domestic

violence, are presented to establish that Brazil should be taken seriously as an advocate of gender equality (NAP 2017, 7-8).

The most interesting section, however, is the very last one, titled "Images". As the name indicates, pictures of – mostly Brazilian – women are presented as tokens of historical accomplishments in security, either as part of the military or as diplomats (NAP 2017, 51-59). Their tokenistic representation becomes even more evident when contrasted with the preceding section with statistics provided on women's participation. In diplomacy women compose of 22,9% in total (with only 18,6% in the highest position), 7% are in the Armed Forces, and in the police, there are 26,36% in civil and 9,84% in military, already a difference that reflects the close connection with men and the military (NAP 2017, 49-50). The number of Brazilian military and police troops deployed at UN's peace missions also reflect gender disparity in access to 'high politics', with a total of 1,3% – a number that is lower than the 4,19% average of the UN (NAP 2017, 49).

These numbers, however, are not being engaged within the NAP to critically assess Brazil's participation. Instead, the following 'images' section of the document is exaggerated to show women's social inclusion in Brazilian foreign policy. This presentation allows for Brazil to envision itself as a state compliant with the logics of a masculinist protection (Young 2003) that seeks 'to protect external others' through 'gendered concepts of security' (Agius 2018, 71) and of the state (True 2018, 39). Compared to other instances of diplomatic discourse, the tokenistic use of Bertha Lutz, for example, is not an isolated incidence. Her name is often used as a marker of Brazilian progressiveness in assuring women's rights, as she was one of the very few female diplomats present in the drafting of the UN Charter and pushed for the inclusion of

the preamble of equality between men and women, that is, a reminder of Brazil's continuous 'protagonism' in reaching for gender equality (Cleaver 2018; True 2018).[2]

Brazil's role and aim for gender equality is also often placed in purposes that reach beyond equality, with gender analysis being shaped by "neoliberal rationalities of government" (Reeves 2012, 351), thus promoting the cause according to the country's national interest (True 2018, 38). For that purpose, women are often recognized *as women* and thus reproduce gender roles, counting on the idea of difference between genders to succeed in reaching gender equality (Reeves 2012; Olivius 2016), albeit as a secondary goal, at the same time that there is no equal expressed acknowledgment of men as men, nor of their masculinities and its unfolding (Hearn 2012). Thus, women become responsible for their own empowerment, with the help of training provided by 'humanitarian aid' through intervention.

This discursive practice can be illustrated in efforts to fight against corruption, for example, where recently the Lima Commitment published a joint statement for "Democratic Governance in the Face of Corruption" establishing the promotion of "gender equity and equality and empowerment women as a cross-cutting objective of our anti-corruption policies" and to "act so that the follow-up actions emanating from this Lima Commitment promotes the advancement of gender equity and equality and the empowerment of women in the Hemisphere" (Lima Commitment 2018).[3] This strategy relates to Hemmings (2011) exposure of 'the project of modernization' as "profoundly gendered at both an imaginative and material level, since attention to gender inequality (within an especially economic framework) is frequently levelled

[2] http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/outras-autoridadesartigos/18608-pela-defesa-dos-direitos-da-mulher-dentro-e-fora-do-itamaraty-embaixadora-vitoria-cleavermetropoles-08-04-2018

[3] http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/18655-compromiso-de-lima-governabilidadedemocratica-frente-a-corrupcao-declaracao-conjunta

as a prerequisite for financial investment/aid from governments, international corporations, or transnational organizations" (Hemmings 2011, 8).

These incorporations, however, can be exposed for their blindness as Brazil is one of the countries with the highest rates of homo and transphobic violence, and yet the Ministry of Foreign Affairs produces statements claiming that "Brazil has been vocal in promoting and defending these rights in all relevant international forums", and that it understands "that recognizing the human rights of LGBT persons does not imply the creation of new rights, but rather the application of the principle of equality to exercise consecrated human rights and combating all forms of discrimination" (Nota 153 2017).[4] Brazil is also often silent in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers, instead of addressing the 'contradictory effects' that unraveling gendered relations may cause (True 2018, 45).

Nevertheless, the NAP still insists on women perspectives' inclusion without altering "relational aspects of power wherein masculine attributes, ways of governing, and values are ascendant" (True 2018, 39) through posing the questions: "what are the barriers that limit the participation of women in activities related to peace and security?"; "what is missing so that the actions carried out by the international community, including by Brazil, are sufficient to protect the civilian population from gender-based violence?"; "what actions can Brazil take to help overcome the specific challenges faced by women and girls in humanitarian crises and post-conflict situations?"; and "how to overcome the challenges to engage Brazilian society and strategic public bodies in this area?" for elaborating each pillar (NAP 2017, 13).

[4] http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/16296-dia-mundial-de-combate-a-homofobia-e-atransfobia

Brazil uses the concept of gender mainstreaming to recognize women's contribution in peace processes and the different impact they suffer to "prevent inequalities from perpetuating or deepening". For that, women's empowerment is posed as a vital tool for promoting gender equality, women's participation as 'agents of peace', as well as to protect them from gender based violence during conflict. This justification, as shown before, follows the archetypes of masculinist protection and governance. However, only when "gender is an open question about how these meanings are established, what they signify, and in what contexts, then it remains a useful – because critical – category of analysis" (Scott 2010, 13). In the next sections gender will be used to shine light on how women's identities are being (re)produced through the archetypes of victims and agents of peace.

2.2 The (re)production of intelligible gender subjects as victims

The 'prevention and protection' pillars are clumped together in one section of the NAP. The activities of this pillar aim to protect the human rights of all women and girls and to prevent against gender-based violence in every conflict situation in which Brazil operates. In this context, the empowerment of women and girls is seen as contributing to reversing gender inequality and preventing violence (NAP 2017, 25).

The justifications and outcomes are heavily based on UN's feminist knowledge production, which in turn is based on the paradigm of 'liberal peace' (Reeves 2012, 351). Concerning protection, for example, it is pointed out that levels of gender equality and women's access to rights are key indicators of a state's level of peace and that greater investments in gender equality and women's empowerment, including in relation to education and training, are intrinsically connected with stability, development, peace and human rights. These include: (a)

empowerment initiatives for all women and girls; (b) incorporating a gender perspective into all actions and strategies for conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and peacekeeping; (c) the implementation of international normative frameworks for the protection of the human rights of all women and girls, adjusting the national normative framework, when necessary; (d) increasing access to justice; and (e) enhancement of the security sector to better address the specific needs of all women and girls (NAP 2017, 25).

Despite having a definition in the glossary for gender analysis, combatting gender-based violence, gender and mainstreaming, these align with the United Nations definitions and/or continue to use gender and women interchangeably. Gender is defined based on the biology/culture divide, gender analysis is described as systematic evaluation and gathering of gender-specific (in place of sex-specific) data to assess the different impacts on women and men and determine a decrease or increase on gaps and gender inequalities (NAP 2017, 39). Combatting gender-based violence is associated with the Belém do Pará Convention that establishes what is considered as violence against women and, finally, mainstreaming is equated to considering sex-specific perceptions and knowledge to execute political action that does not perpetuate inequalities between men and women (NAP 2017, 40).

Still in the scope of protection, the NAP highlights that the 'Peace Operations Best Practices Inventory' emphasizes that responses aimed at protecting women at risk of sexual violence have their own specificities. Among them, the inclusion of women peacekeepers in patrols and the accompaniment by a woman translator, to facilitate the contact with local women and to dialogue with local women about their needs, concerns and experiences is crucial to ensure the success of protection strategies (NAP 2017, 25). This relies on the notion of using specific 'feminine' abilities that only women can achieve, relying on gendered and gendering

roles to succeed (Reeves 2012; Olivius 2016). Consequently, the expected result established for that pillar is the "expansion and enhancement of Brazil's contribution to address gender-based violence and to the protection of the human rights of all women and girls in pre-conflict and post-conflict situations" (NAP 2017, 25 translated), that is, the savior state Brazil protecting and promoting rights for victims of savage men in Other countries.

Furthermore, it is often stressed that legislation and ending impunity will create a deterrence of sexual violence, which in the case of the Security Council Resolutions did not prove to be true, but just one more tool for fetishizing it. This is often the case when articulating 'humanitarian responses' do not consider a multifront task to tackle a complex issue that transgresses the boundaries of war and peacetime, of the Third World and of men as perpetrators and women as victim. Thinking about long-term expectations, structural reforms and redistribution of power, however, do not usually get as much funding, as it does not necessarily fit neoliberal expected results and outcomes (Reeves 2012, 351).

2.3 The (re)production of intelligible gender subjects as agents of peace

The participation pillar is the first one to be addressed in the NAP. For the purpose of inclusion, "Brazil commits to incorporating a gender perspective and promoting the qualified participation of women in the country's contributions for international peace and security in the medium and long term" (NAP 2017, 12 translated). Although the statistics presented in the document shows that women are still underrepresented in Brazil in comparison to UN's average for peace missions, it is the most discussed topic at length, being present in three of the pillars of the NAP.

The first one, 'Participation', aims to increase and qualify the presence of women in activities related to peace and security, including members of the local civilian conflict societies

in which Brazil operates. Yet again, it departs from the premise that women have different perspectives and experiences of conflicts (NAP 2017, 13). The inclusion of women becomes essential for conflict resolution and the promotion of 'lasting peace' (Reeves 2012) and is justified under a study of the implementation of Resolution 1325, pointing out that the presence of women in peace agreement negotiations increases their chances of lasting longer, as well as presenting transformative potential and increase in the protection network through the inclusion of uniformed women in military and police operations (NAP 2017, 14), relying once again in women's specific 'feminine' traits that becomes the factor responsible for their own empowerment and protection. The presence of uniformed women is expected to help increase the sense of security of the local population and broaden the range of skills of peace operations, basing on and reproducing traditional gender roles (Reeves 2012). The missions' success is also dependent upon women's presence and action, as it is pointed out that: a female police component has been seen to receive fewer complaints related to misconduct, inappropriate use of force or weapons, and authoritarian behavior in interacting with civilians and other low-ranking officers; the presence of women peacekeepers helps ensuring that local institutions incorporate a gender perspective; and their participation contributes to increase the perception of legitimacy of some operations (NAP 2017, 17). For that purpose, the expected result relies on the "increase in the effective participation of Brazilian women in activities related to international peace and security", as well as "the promotion of the effective participation of local women, including in leadership positions, in activities related to peace and security in conflict and post-conflict situations that affect them" (NAP 2017, 18 translated).

The activities of the "Consolidation of Peace and Humanitarian Cooperation" pillar, in turn, aim "to strengthen the gender perspective in Brazil's work in these contexts, considering

the differential impacts of armed conflicts on men and women, in order to achieve a sustainable peace" (NAP 2017, 32 translated). As justification, it is pointed that the UN recognizes that significant participation of women increases effectiveness of humanitarian aid, credibility and quality of peacekeeping operations, pace of economic recovery in post-conflict contexts and the sustainability of peace agreements. Women are expected to perform a positive correlation in improving outcomes in 'feminine' areas, and so the expected results are "strengthening the gender perspective in the development and implementation of peacebuilding and humanitarian cooperation activities undertaken or supported by Brazil" (NAP 2017, 32 translated).

Finally, the activities of the pillar on "Deepening, Awareness and Engagement" aims to increase and diffuse knowledge in Brazilian society about the WPS agenda, sensitizing citizens about its importance, and engaging the relevant actors in the implementation of the NAP, thus broadening cooperation with civil society (NAP 2017, 35). The underlying logic of it relies on the 'fundamental role' played by civil society in that, according to studies, peace agreements have 64% less chances to fail when they are included in the process. For that purpose, the expected result relies on the "expansion of knowledge about women's agenda, peace and security, and engagement in their implementation by public agencies, civil society organizations, women's and women's movements, academia and the general public" (NAP 2017, 35 translated).

All the expected outcomes and logical justifications delineated here can be traced back to the tension between the incorporation of a 'feminist discourse' aiming for 'gender equality' based on a neoliberal framework and discourse which are focused on the main purpose of economic growth (Reeves 2012, 349). This, of course, does not mean there is no space for empowerment and resignifications of traditional values and concepts of security, but there needs

to be an acknowledgment that this process may also create "new marginalities through the normalization of certain gendered and racialized identities and the (re)production of rationales for military intervention in the post-colonial world" (Reeves 2012, 350). As the Brazilian NAP focuses almost exclusively on the external aspect of the WPS agenda, it is important to unpack not only the (re)productions of gendered and gendering subjectivities, but also racialized and racializing ones, which will be closely addressed in the next chapter.

3. NEOCOLONIAL SECURITY: THE (RE)PRODUCTION OF A UNIVERSALIZING EXPERIENCE OF THE 'OTHER' AND THE ROLE OF THE SAVIOR

The inclusion of a woman's perspective to peace and security in the institutionalized sphere of the United Nations and the Security Council not only (re)produced certain orthodoxies of militarism and gendered subjectivities, but also followed the Orientalist pattern of determining security and insecurity (Fierke 2015; Barkawi & Laffey 2006). In this chapter, the aim is to trace the productive power of the 'othering' process of discursive acts and the creation of a 'Third World Woman' experience of sexual violence and victimhood that is often (re)produced in NAPs from middle and great powers that largely contribute to peace missions in terms of economic and military aid, including the Brazilian one.

In the – unexplored – case of Brazil, however, the positionality becomes a central focus point, as there is a tension between having, on the one hand, a strong historical presence of a colonial past and a sense of belonging to the Global South, and on the other hand, being compliant with Western practices and institutions, with an explicit ambition to further integrate and 'represent' local interests as a middle power (Arraes 2005; Agius 2018) in the quest to achieve full modernity (Tavolaro 2008). From capitalizing on this positionality, Brazil is able to present a justification for (re)producing neocolonial practices and interests by relying on a portrayal of 'authenticity' as a Global South insider leader that is able to foster South-South cooperation without critically reflecting on what sort of power relations this claim for authenticity is (re)producing from the internalization of such power structures by Brazil.

In other words, this uncritical positionality as a Global South insider obscures the fact that country's actions are "both reflective of and provide reinforcement for existing relations of

domination" (Grewal 2012, 585) in their claim for South-South cooperation that benefits the country's interest to integrate a dominant order – a permanent seat on the Security Council. In the following sections, therefore, I will provide an analysis of both the NAP and political speeches made to establish and justify Brazilian's interests and neocolonial practices, reflecting on what forms of knowledge and productive power are being (re)produced.

3.1 The (re)production of a Western-centric security normative

Post-colonial theorists have often pointed to the fact that traditional security issues and lenses, as a legacy from realist and liberal theoretical frameworks from the Cold War period, were often focused on a Western-centric standpoint and did not account for different cultures in the hegemonic discursive practice, merely constraining Orientalized 'Others' on the opposite side of insecurity (Fierke 2015, 95; Barkawi & Laffey 2006, 330). Brazil's ambition to chair the Security Council often steered the country's foreign policy for a national projection externally, requiring a recognition of an alleged regional leadership worldwide (Arraes 2003, 16). Despite being a country that has been colonized itself, Brazil can fit into the claim of promoting insecurity in 'function of ongoing exploitation by foreign powers' (Fierke 2015, 102) and often explores this position as an insider to the Global South as leverage of a proclaimed 'authenticity' to promote a supposedly democratic cooperation.

Regarding the development of the WPS agenda to promote this cooperation and aid, Brazil couples it with strengthening its participation in UN's peace missions and commits to the training of the military personnel that will be deployed to the missions and points out that the "government has developed cooperation projects to combat sexual violence in countries recently emerging from conflict, such as Haiti, Guinea-Bissau and the Democratic Republic of Congo"

(NAP 2017, 9), carrying out the separation between Brazil and the 'overseas', that is, the non-Western locations where violence against women occurs.

However, what is obscured in this representational division and in peace operations concerns how gender mainstreaming measures address minorities that are not included in this universalizing 'Third World' woman experience, lacking the intersectionality necessary to address complex issues such as protection from sexual violence and that does not rely solely on women's inclusion and participation. Between 1960 and 2010, global representation of women in national parliaments, for example, increased overall, but women do not consist of a monolithic group, and differences such as race, ethnicity and religion affect the identities and interests of subjects, as well as form intersections of social hierarchies that shape their access to power. It is important to consider, therefore, the extent to which women's political gains have included subjectivities that belong to minority groups, and the same holds true for advances in the inclusion of women in legal advancements driven by gender mainstreaming efforts of peace missions. Response and protection, instead, has become focused on developing 'backwards', traditional, crisis-affected societies (Olivius 2016).

From relying on the discursive definition of neocolonization through the monolithic portrayal of a 'Third World Woman' as the subject, that is, "women are assumed to be sexual-political subjects prior to entry into kinship structures" (Mohanty, 1988), much of what is stressed in the document regards how Brazilian efforts can provide answers and can educate post-conflict societies, reproducing the tendency to think of responses developed by humanitarian aid for the affected population as part of a modernization project (Olivius 2016).

This also helps to (re)produce subjugated knowledges by erasing or 'othering' them as they do not fit into the constructed hegemonic 'consensus' (Foucault 2003, 7). The

recommendations policies in the NAP, however, cannot be compared to a form of consensus, but rather as the result of a complex issue among many actors, which often leads to simplified and diluted responses and results that are able to resonate in the international political sphere, leaving little space for dissenting voices and translations to grassroots and other movements that are intrinsically exclusionary as it does not provide equal access to these institutionalized spaces. Additionally, the bureaucratic language and mechanisms both on the national (through the participation of only one organization as representative of civil society) and international (through the exclusion of many groups in the UN) spheres serve to (re)produce the dominant order that determines the knowledge, procedures and subjectivities that are to be engaged with (Grewal 2012; Gibbings 2011).

When announcing the launching of the NAP, the Brazilian document justifies that is is reaffirming "its commitment to the promotion of international peace and security, as well as to the defense of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls" by aligning with the relevant Security Council resolutions and "with the positions historically defended by Brazil in various regional and multilateral forums, including the creation of the UN itself" (Nota 64 2017). It is possible to unpack here the post-colonial critique that by adopting this position, Brazil is (re)producing foundational assumptions of international law, which, through its implementation, "reproduces the colonial efforts to civilize those who are deemed backward and incorporate them into a culturally specific version of modernity, albeit as lesser beings" instead of actively decolonizing the normative assumptions (Philipose 2008, 113).

To Brazil, in agreement with the UNSC Resolutions, women become vital in this process as they can be included as potential victims of violence but, also as agents for transformation and potential equal partners with men. Through this Plan, Brazil commits itself to measures that

aim, in the short, medium and long term, to incorporate the gender perspective and to promote and provide qualified participation of women in their contribution to international peace and security as their empowerment, as a means and an end, is seen as vital for the promotion of gender equality in the political, economic and social spheres (NAP 2017, 12). Gender equality strategies are presented here from their potential to enhance the legitimacy of norms associated with other spheres of interest of liberal peace, such as the implementation of electoral democracy, market economy, humanitarian intervention and regional economic integration, allowing the tension between cooptation and empowerment of the feminist agenda (Reeves 2012, 349).

Further, by locating violence as occurring 'overseas', this understanding and justification (re)produces the special duality that reinforces binary oppositions that permeates an understanding of peace and security between the inside and outside; the state of conflict and of peace; the backwards and the civilized etc. (Pratt 2013). This division, then, allows the positionality of countries such as Brazil, as 'experts' in WPS providing the qualified participation of women as agents of peace, and the ‘Others’ that become the recipients of this knowledge and are the ones affected by the material and productive power in the narrative of victimhood and protection from the delineated violence (Orford 2002, Pratt 2013; Olivius 2016). The danger in this representational practice ensues that "the WPS agenda will become bound up with neo-colonial practices of 'knowledge transfer' from the minority world to the majority world" (Orford 2002, Pratt 2013, von der Lippe 2012 as cited in Shepherd 2016, 332).

3.2 The (re)production of civilization

The focus on a humanitarian cooperation is presented as "aiming to contribute to the prevention, response, mitigation and socio-economic and environmental recovery of vulnerable and emergency communities", justified according to the institutionalized principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, present in Resolutions 46/182 and 58/114 of the UN General Assembly and in Article 4 of Brazil's Constitution (NAP 2017, 39). Nevertheless, as mentioned before, these principles are often presented as the objective consensus establish within the normative consensus of global governance and therefore not submitted to its decolonization (Philipose 2008). Even the chosen civil society representative, the Igarapé Institute, inserts itself and Brazil as part of regional and foreign security, describing itself as an independent think and of the tank "devoted to evidence-based policy and action on complex security, justice and development challenges in Brazil, Latin America, and Africa" (About Igarapé, n.d.). Hence, what constitutes as (in)security in this agenda is closely tied with a wider regional and 'cooperation-oriented' purpose, reflective of Brazilian foreign policy's interests.

Therefore, the Brazilian adoption and reproduction of the hegemonic concept of security proposed by the United Nations is still embedded in the dynamics of convincing "others of a particular judgement, which may have political consequences" (Fierke 2015, 92). Throughout the whole Plan, the focus is on the international implications that the Brazilian NAP can have on the WPS agenda. The third pillar on peacebuilding and humanitarian cooperation, in particular, claims to aim at contributing to the prevention, response, mitigation and socioeconomic and environmental recovery of vulnerable and emergency communities, strengthening the Brazilian performance regarding a gender perspective that focuses on different experiences of men and women as a binary to reach a sustainable peace (NAP 2017, 39).

It is possible to pinpoint these trends and patterns on recent speeches given out by the Brazilian Ambassador, Antonio Patriota, on the UNSC debate on WPS in 2016. When addressing the issue of conflict-related sexual violence, he claims that "Brazil stresses that the most effective way to avert the use of [it] as a weapon of war would be to intensify political and diplomatic efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts" (Patriota 2016a). That is, sexual violence is once again inscribed in the securitizing division of conflict or non-conflict and inside and outside, where we can locate its occurrence.

The Ambassador then proceeds to provide how Brazilian aid becomes center to efforts on mitigating the issue, stating that:

> our South-South cooperation agenda is closely attuned to the need to offer legal, medical, psychosocial and mental health assistance to the victims of sexual abuse arising from war and instability. In Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we have supported projects to assist victims of sexual and gender-based violence and to uphold criminal accountability for these serious violations. In coordination with UN Women, Brazilian peacekeepers and civilian personnel undergo rigorous pre-deployment training to ensure the highest standards of conduct and discipline. We fully support the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy concerning sexual exploitation and abuse, and to emphasize the need for preventive measures in this regard (Patriota 2016b).

The location of conflict-related sexual violence, and thus protection, becomes reoccurring focused on the 'outside' whereas Brazil can provide the mechanisms for protecting in that it can support women's role as agents of peace, a value also established by the international community when accounting for the aspects of war which mostly affects women and girls. To prove this argument and locate yet again where this violence occurs, Patriota claims that "despite the strong African commitment to fight sexual and gender-based violence, serious

crimes against humanity, involving rape and sexual slavery, continue to occur in some regions of Africa. Brazil strongly condemns these abhorrent violations", whereas Brazil has "long upheld the imperative to pursue accountability for serious crimes and abuses against women and girls, including but not limited to sexual and gender-based violence" (Patriota 2016b). In order to construct and justify Brazilian's capacity to act as an agent for peace and women's rights, Brazil adopts a position of complicity with a (re)production of the narrative that locates violence 'overseas' as result of the 'backwardness' of these cultural locations and values, constructing the identities of both inside and outside as polar opposites, missing the nuances of creating universalizing experiences that obscure violences being (re)produce by this very narrative.

In order to establish this homogenized internal identity that needs to be presented and justified for the 'outside', Brazil adopts a tokenistic mechanism in speeches and in the NAP, where images of women are presented as a 'token' or symbol of the state's progressiveness, in turn essentialized by its function of showcasing the realizations that Brazilian women have made from the mere fact that women were included as women and provided a 'feminine' achievement.

For example, Patriota highlights that a milestone for accountability for conflict-related sexual violence "was the recent International Criminal Court trial, presided by Brazilian judge Sylvia Steiner, leading to a conviction for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Central African Republic. This was the first ICC case to specifically focus on the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and should serve as a powerful deterrent to would-be perpetrators" (Patriota 2016b). Producing the identity of a country that is aligned with the international community's values entails clear rewards for Brazil.

From this established position, Patriota feels legitimized to state that Brazil's:

> South-South cooperation with Africa, a key priority of Brazilian foreign policy, is closely aligned with the Women and Peace and Security agenda. In Guinea-Bissau, we helped enable health institutions to assist women and girls victims of gender-based violence. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we have financed projects to assist victims of sexual and gender-based violence … let me reiterate Brazil`s firm commitment to both the promotion of peace in Africa and the cross-cutting campaign on gender equality and women's empowerment. We will continue to advance these inseparable agendas at all levels in the United Nations (Patriota 2016b).

This positionality becomes central for Brazilian foreign policy as it can proceed to justify its interests by promoting and defending gender equality as an end but also a mean for other (economic and social) purposes. A recent example of this understanding was also present during the Global Leaders' Meeting on Gender Equality, where then President Dilma Rousseff "underscored that women are not only beneficiaries of public policies and initiatives, but also agents of their own future" (Patriota 2015). The burden of responsibility for empowerment – often under the package of a neoliberal development (Hickel 2014) – while the framework in how/what should occur is previously established, in this case by providing humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation to post-conflict countries concerning gender issues (NAP 2017). The reliance on a women's perspective reinforces not only strict delineations of femininity and gender roles but also assumes a homogeneity among women and offers a representation of the country that does not fit with its internal reality (for example, it places on 82nd out of 153 countries of the WPS Index).[5] Nevertheless, Brazil insists on shining light solely on its contributions – co-sponsoring Resolution 1960 on conflict-related sexual violence in 2010 – and achievements – it was under the Brazilian presidency that the Sanctions Committee on the

[5] Country profile available at: https://giwps.georgetown.edu/country/brazil/

Democratic Republic of Congo came to include individuals responsible for serious episodes of sexual violence (NAP 2017, 9).

Women's inclusion in peace mission becomes focused on contributing to increase the perception of legitimacy of the operations, a claim that is backed up using researches that show how the 'feminine' contribution shapes policies outcomes. For example, the NAP cites that translators who were women facilitated the contact with other local women who felt less threatened, allowing the opening of a dialogue about their needs, concerns and experiences which then becomes crucial to ensure the success of protection strategies. That is, reinscribing the responsibility of women's empowerment on an individual level rather than structural, and that is reliant on femininity and the reproduction of gender roles carried out by women. The effectiveness and success of humanitarian aid, then, becomes directly dependent upon the (re)production of gendered and racialized subjectivities as they allow for "increased intelligence gathering and operational situational awareness" and guarantee the credibility and quality of peace operations (NAP 2017, 15-17).

In fact, this pillar, peacebuilding and humanitarian responses, summarizes the three main problems with the NAP, as it focuses on women as homogeneous victims on the overseas or potential peace agents, leaves intact militarized notions of security and aim to establish peace on the outside. Future efforts to combat gender-based violence, however, have to be sensitive to neocolonial forms of representation of victim, perpetrator, and savior representations, and future efforts to mitigate violence cannot maintain invisible particular gendered and racialized notions of where individuals are, what they are doing or what they should be doing in relation to conflict, whilst undermining the security of individuals that fall short from this paradigm (Enloe 2014).

4. MILITARIZED SECURITY: MAINTAINING PEACE AND CONFLICT HEGEMONIES

Finally, as mentioned before, the 'traditional' understandings of security were arguably narrow in that they had an ethnocentric bias and focused in particular issues, hierarchizing them. Introducing the WPS agenda expanded the scope of peace and conflict but did not automatically challenged the often-one-dimensional perception of security that violently reproduces an international system (Fierke 2015; Shepherd 2008). The UN Security Council still holds hegemonic the discourse on peace and conflict that marks gendered and racialized identities to perform military security (Cohn 2008; Pratt 2013).

As mentioned, through the discourse analysis of the NAP, I have observed that the document is very much focused on Brazilian foreign policy's ambitions as it is 'outward looking' and establishes how Brazil can provide for a gender-sensitive training and the integration of women in the country's Armed Forces which consequently will benefit women who are victim of post-conflict societies (NAP 2017). By justifying Brazil's positionality as a middle power from the Global South, especially in the context of the UNSC, Brazil could justify the military activities being used overseas, as it became clear with the mission on Haiti – and domestically, with the military being increasingly used to 'pacify' the favelas over the last decade.

Analysis of NAPs from countries with the most military expenditure and engagement, had already illuminated how the militarization of WPS focused on 'making war safe for women' located 'overseas' (Shepherd 2016), exposing how certain feminist-intended issues and solutions may be translated to a discursive practice that fits the national interest, and thus can be used to perpetrate unequal relations in broader power structures. Here, I would like to analyze

how Brazil adopted and justified the Resolution in its national context, offering the potential for an alternative focus than the Global North as the main source of concepts, material and institutions (Basu 2016), but one I will argue, that does not necessarily presents a challenge to a Western-centric notion of peace and security.

On the contrary, I will show that the Brazilian NAP, does not challenge the country's hegemonic discursive practices of security, thus centering the role of military on promoting peace and positioning the country as a humanitarian collaborator for other 'Third World' conflict societies. Thus, I will argue that the WPS agenda in Brazil does not dismantle the superstructure of unequal power relations and traditional notions of security (Fierke 2015; Barnes 2011; Peterson 1992), particularly those based on a binary division of gender and race, as previously exposed. Consequently, security becomes militarized, minimizing participation from the civil society, whilst maintaining of women's status as victims of sexual violence (in conflict societies) or agents of peace (through the integration of women in the Brazilian Armed Forces and in diplomacy). The result is the subscription to a neoliberal development project that maintains the violent hegemonic, and violent, structure in place, often undermining the Armed Forces and judiciary accountability in the process – something that has often been a source of concern for the democratization movements regarding the state's responsibility toward its citizens. A more holistic view of public policy needs to account and incorporate all these critiques to indeed promote change in traditional security, not make marginalized identities further absent from discourse.

For this purpose, I will first provide some context on WPS and a reflection on security while analyzing the language used in Brazilian specific policies, unpacking the conceptual

make-up used to construct the representation and meaning (Shepherd 2008) of objects and subjects of security, gender and 'Third World'.

4.1 Brazilian peace and security

The UNSC Resolution on WPS is one tool that represents the productive power of meaning and a (re)production of reality, and the Brazilian case is embedded in the hegemonic construction of militarized security. In that sense, I would like to argue here that the Brazilian National Action Plan both justifies and is expressively justified by the established discursive practices in the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, of international peace and security, resonating with the legacy of Brazil's recent military dictatorship and ambition to 'democratize' and be a permanent member of the Security Council.

Enloe describes militarization as a gradual process:

> by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal. Militarization, that is, involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological, and economic transformations (Enloe 2000, 3).

This resonates with Brazil as it still carries the effects of a military coup in the public sphere and has failed to address many of the violent implications the past and the present have displayed in militarized structures – many women were and still are targeted in military gendered strategies, for example (Borges & Silva 2016; Wilding 2010). This implies that the focus of the NAPs often reproduces established violent understandings, based primarily on conceptions of women and girls' representation as peacemakers and on the victims' wartime

protection and in turn leaving the militarized structure in place either for national or international community's defense, and allowing for the (re)production of normative assumptions of civilization from the focus on the 'overseas' by Western countries (Cohn 2008; Shepherd 2008; Shepherd 2016). However, to 'take feminism seriously' (Peterson 1992), the state has to be addressed as a site of gendered power that manipulates identities both for internal unity, constructing and promoting their sovereignty for external legitimacy.

States perform discursive practices that have gendered implications such as the construction of the binary idea of the protector/protected present in the discursive construction of violence against women and gender-based violence. Women's domestic experiences with violence in the favelas, for example, is very present and directly impacted by military interventions but remains absent from mainstream debates of urban violence, or simply inserted as the victimized pole of the binary (Wilding 2010). The focus on gender and the state, thus, shifts from 'women's bodies' and experiences to the gendered structures of institutions, making visible the structural inequalities being (re)produced (Peterson 1992; Shepherd 2008).

By highlighting the importance of accounting for the availability and accessibility patterns of linguistic-communicative resources necessary for critical discourse analysis discussed (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000, 460), it is important to mention the drafting the Brazilian NAP was led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with consultations made in collaboration with a Working Group (WG) composed of the Gender Committee of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice, and the then Ministry of Human Rights. UN Women and the Igarapé Institute, the only civil society organization directly included in the discussions and meetings, also attended the preparation of the document. This is relevant here because "the conditions of production of texts and more specifically the way in which the resources that go

into text are being managed in societies are rarely discussed" (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000, 460).

When addressing the issue of increasing civil society's engagement, it is noted in the NAP that the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched an online portal to receive demands regarding the agenda on WPS" (NAP 2017), although no information is provided on what was the outreach of this consultation, nor on the length of its incorporation into the final document. The effort to reach civil society is mentioned again on the NAP's fourth pillar regarding "Strengthening, Awareness and Engagement", which seeks to "deepen and spread knowledge in Brazilian society on the WPS agenda, raising awareness of its importance; and to engage relevant actors in the implementation of the NAPS, deepening the cooperation with civil society" (NAP 2017, 35 translated).

Also, regarding the drafting of the NAP, it is expressed right away that although Brazil only adopted the NAP last year, in 2017, the country had already been inserted and active within the WPS agenda. Backing up this claim, they state some accomplishments, such as: in its' last mandate at the Security Council, in 2010, Brazil cosponsored Resolution 1960 on CRSV; the Sanctions Committee on the DRC only started to examine those responsible for serious episodes of sexual violence under the Brazilian presidency; and the Brazilian government also developed cooperation projects to tackle sexual violence in post-conflict countries like the DRC, Haiti, and Guinea Bissau (NAP 2017, 9).

There is a great focus on Brazilian agency overseas throughout the entirety of the document. It is only at the justification and contextualization section that the domestic sphere is actually being addressed in the NAP, but it serves to highlight the efforts made for progress concerning Brazilian women's equal participation in all spheres, and on the prevention of

violence and discrimination against women. In this logic, the expansion of gender equality to *international* peace and security would fit the national standard (NAP 2017, 6). In no instance are the remaining 'national' challenges addressed, even though Brazil only scores 0.414 in the Gender Inequality Index, with only 10,8% of female political representation in the parliament (see UNDP's Human Development Reports) and high rates of – underreported – discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity allegations (Human Rights Watch 2016).

Rather, focusing on Brazilian's international agency, the Plan highlights that:

> as a founding member of the United Nations, a champion of multilateralism and the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as a country with the capacity and willingness to assume greater responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, Brazil has the international obligation and national interest to promote implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (NAP 2017, 3, translated).

In that sense, Brazil's adoption of the NAP proposed on Resolution 1325 presents no challenges to what has been legitimized on the level of the United Nations, thus promoting a binary, militarized and neoliberal understanding of peace and security that aims to (re)produce political action that is very much aligned with hegemonic practices instead of being an actual tool for change. Brazil's National Action Plan bases on two main strategic mechanisms for gender equality: the mainstreaming (translated in Portuguese as transversalization) of gender in every action carried out by the country for international peace and security; and (2) empowering women and girls as agents to promote lasting peace. These goals are justified as constituting 'fundamental strategies for an inclusive and sustainable perspective of peace and security' (NAP 2017, 12).

Gender mainstreaming is further explained as seeking to recognize women's role peace processes, but also on how differently they are impacted during conflict and wartime through 'gender-based violence' – the epitome of inequality – and thus women's empowerment represents guaranteeing women's political, economic and social rights, enabling them, in turn, to act as 'agents of peace' (NAP 2017, 12). From this, it is already possible to unpack that the understanding of gender mainstreaming and empowerment is based on certain assumptions, namely: closing the gap between the binary division of differences and inequalities of men and women can be achieved through policies; that women can be productive agents of peace; and that this should be present in every action that promotes security, thus leaving the question of 'what' (in)security is and for 'whom' unanswered.

4.2 Naturalizing military violence

Considering that the end of the Brazilian military rule (1964-1985) was fairly recent and that the country is still struggling with implementing transitional justice mechanisms, it is fair to say that the country has maintained a militaristic approach for the past three decades, being the last country in Latin America to establish a truth commission. Despite the material reparations offered by the Brazilian government, the victims have no access to official information on the reason for the reparation, therefore it would seem counterproductive to think of the state as the one responsible for assuring human rights to its citizens, and abroad, when violations have been perpetrated by the Brazilian government itself (Goes 2013). Furthermore, it has already been noted internationally that a weakening of the Armed Forces is still necessary for a significant demilitarization of the policing systems, as "demilitarization is a necessary condition for civilian oversight, accountability, transparency, serious human rights

improvements, and genuine responsiveness to diverse public constituencies" (Call 2002, 17), including the development of the WPS agenda.

Meger (2016) already pointed to a bias on the kind of violence that typically gains international attention, namely those committed essentially by the powerless, that is, the nonstate actors, reflecting the logic of the Westphalian order, which in Brazil's case is very relevant. Brazil has constantly aspired, mainly through foreign policy, a permanent seat in the Security Council since the end of the Cold War (Arraes 2005). Yet, there is still no recognition or gender perspective that analyzed state terrorism in Brazil, because there is no recognition of political violence committed in general, not to mention those committed based on gender. This impunity still echoes in the country today when investigating the logic of domination linked to sexual exchanges in situations of detention and imprisonment. According to the Report of the National Truth Commission in Brazil in places where torture became a routine practice and mean of exercising power and domination, femininity and masculinity were mobilized to perpetrate violence by the military (Borges & Silva 2016; Young 2003).

The decision to adopt the NAP, nevertheless, is presented as being itself inserted as part of a consistent advancement of a normative framework and public domestic policies in favor of gender equality since Brazil's re-democratization. However, the fact that civil society was barely represented in the drafting of the NAP, in the first place, only symbolizes and reflects the profound distance from the civil society, state security and foreign policy, a legacy of the military dictatorship. Furthermore, the focus of the document on foreign policy perpetrates both the idea that NAPs are used not only to make war safe for women, but on the overseas, while establishing a positive (yet militarized) positionality of Brazil in the 'international community', violently producing the meaning and reproducing an established reality of a cooperative

international space. It is important to highlight the Brazilian peacekeeping experience in Haiti as a case where militarization, gender and race play a vital role.

The Brazilian government argued that participation in the peace operation would contribute to the country's international projection and considered that engagement in Haiti would contribute to the ambition to occupy a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (Silva & de Paula 2017), which led Brazil to initially displace a contingent of 970 military and 230 marines. The first report on disagreements between Haitians and Brazilian troops, however, did not came long after its arrival in 2004, when Brazilian military officers working with Haitian police to seize weapons in the Bel-Air favela, capital of Port-au-Prince, got involved in a shoot-out. The commander of the mission at the time dismissed any incidents justifying the action by the frequency in which the shootings occur and the, then, Brazilian Foreign Minister declared that despite the risks succeeding at the mission was a matter of honor, as it was the highest point of the Brazilian Foreign Policy (Germano 2017). In 2007, a report prepared by the Brazilian Bar Association strongly criticized the mission, characterizing it as military and non-humanitarian, given the lack of construction of schools, hospitals or other urgent socioeconomic actions for the Haitian population, such accusations were dismissed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Souto & Souza 2017). The numerous events and reports of excessive violence from the military is just one of the direct implications the intervention has produced. Haiti has been considered a colonialist lesson on how international response and aid, especially after the earthquake, can be presented in a humanitarian light but entrench neocolonial control over a 'Third World' country (Haiti's Lesson 2010).

However, the Western media still represents military intervention, including the Brazilian role, as essential to Haitian reconstruction (Haiti's Lesson 2010), which justified a

domestic action, in 2007, when about 200 members of the Army, many of whom participated in MINUSTAH, occupied the favela 'Morro da Providência' with the justification of implementing social projects in the area, but according to experts in Strategic Studies, this occupation was identical to the work of the Brazilian military at MINUSTAH (Germano 2017).

While the Ministry of Defense then stated that under Article 15 of the Brazilian Complementary Law 97, which regulates the use of the Armed Forces in maintaining law and order and states that the Forces could only be activated after the exhaustion of the instruments for the maintenance of public order mentioned in the Constitution, what can be seen, in fact, is that recent events have been used to expand the interpretation of the use of the Armed Forces for policing and 'pacifying' both in the national and international spheres. As the army carried out a simulation in a favela in the southern part of the city of Rio de Janeiro, simulating the capture of one of the leaders of a Haitian gang, the Brazilian Army also was used to occupy and pacify its favelas (Germano 2017).

Even when Haiti was no longer a priority, the UN decided that the troops should not withdraw from the country before police were able to enforce urban security, intending to train over a thousand 'men' annually. The Haitian president in 2011, also pointed to the need to enforce security as an internal responsibility, proposing to reorganize the country's Armed Forces, which had been extinguished since 1995 (Souto & Souza 2017), thus seeing the country's return to militarization as something crucial and beneficial for the country's development, and one that could use the Brazilian aid and support.

The use and (re)production of violence, as it can be seen here, is legitimized if it conforms to the boundaries of law, under the 'presumption of warrantability' (Sarat and Kearns as cited in Dexter 2012). However, the expanding limitation and interpretation of what is

legitimate or not in terms of legal violence is being used to reinforce the social institution of warfare, whereas peace can only be achieved when exploring the meaning and functionality of violence in general and not exceptional violence (Dexter, 2012), one that falls outside the boundaries of a UN Mandate or normative and legal prescriptions.

The use of violence has further gendered and gendering implications, where Young (2003) summarizes that "at the same time that it legitimates authoritarian power over citizens internally, the logic of masculinist protection justifies aggressive war outside" (Young 2003, 2) in a manner where feminism can be coopted for perpetrating the image of the non-Western dependent victim and legitimizes the violence of the protector in relation to them. The logic of the masculinist protection "helps account for the rationale leaders give for deepening a security state and its acceptance by those living under their rule. There are two faces to the security state, one facing outward to defend against enemies and the other facing inward to keep those under protection under necessary control" (Young 2003, 16).

The aim here was to provide an analysis of the materialization of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the Resolution 1325 call for member states to adopt a National Action Plan in Brazil. I have argued that the Brazilian Plan does not provide a challenge to a security that seeks to redefine gendered and racialized hegemonic discursive practices of security, but one that aligns to it based on its embeddedness on militarization and an ambition to ratify a regional leadership and a presence in the United Nations Security Council. It is time for feminist security to return and ally with anti-militarism, rejecting not only stereotypes of peaceful women but also opposing militarization and militarized definitions of subject formation surrounding security/citizenship.

CONCLUSION

Posing the 'so what' question induces a reflection that shows that the WPS agenda may act merely as a stepping stone for the Brazilian foreign policy interests, as the impact it can bring may be limited at best, when analyzing the implementation challenges, and problematic when analyzing from the productive power in the discursive acts it (re)produces. Even within the framework that Brazil proposes to establish its NAP, the document and its implied policies itself present a lot of implementation challenges. The weakness of the document also reflects on Brazil's identity and argumentative basis being on numbers that do not correspond to its realities (e.g. the underrepresented number of women in diplomacy and on the Army). From the outset of the document, Brazil also presented great challenges for implementing the NAP, having, symbolically, only one representative of civil society on the Working Group to elaborate the NAP.

However important overcoming those obstacles are, when using the discourse analysis method, we can see that the meaning production of the NAP reproduces a lot of the problematic issues that other (developed) countries have previously been accused of doing, as the WPS agenda is transformed into a mechanism to promote national interests at the cost of gendered and othered individualities and collectives. The neoliberal politics and policies behind the hegemonic security structures are more concerned with inserting women in problematic spaces in terms of gender and of neocolonialism than reforming them. That is, the main focus of the WPS agenda has been translated into the Security Council as a mean to insert women in the hegemonic structures and discourses of security; a security that has direct implications in the construction of masculinities and femininities, as well as its connections with developed countries against underdeveloped countries and its citizens. Of course, it is still important not to

further make women – who participate in the army and/or – that are perpetrators of violence fit the expected gender roles and notions of femininity. Nevertheless, it is one thing to shine light on different patterns of gender and to create a policy that seeks to encourage their entrance in the armed forces, as it bases on the notion that the entrance of women in these militarized (and therefore, masculinized spaces) can be beneficial as women bring in their feminine capacities and abilities, which can benefit both sexes.

A reflection on the rhetorical, normative and discursive practices have also proven to contextualize the Brazilian NAP on the 'outwards' focus trend that pursues and aligns with foreign policy interests (Drumond & Rebelo 2018; Shepherd 2008; True & Shepherd 2014; Barrow 2016) focusing on specific objectives that do not rely on critical assessment of normative and productive (re)productions from a binary division. Such a binary approach, however disregards the continuum between a national and international responsibilities of implementing committing to a gender equality that does not perpetrate racialized and militaristic notions of agency and victimhood based on constructions of inside/outside. Therefore, the Brazilian NAP does not challenge structural hegemonic discursive practices of security as it promotes the idea of gender as the binary division between men/women, centers the role of military on promoting peace, and positions the country as a humanitarian collaborator for other 'Third World' countries. Centering the role of military on promoting peace and positioning the country as a humanitarian collaborator for other 'Third World' conflict societies, the WPS agenda in Brazil does not dismantle the superstructure of unequal power relations, (re)producing the traditional gendered, racialized and militaristic notions of security and maintaining the silences, for example, on the gendered implications of disarmament for women's security or the structural obstacles for a sustainable integration and rights, but the focus is rather on the reframing of

women's social role to integrate them in the defense sector (Drumond & Rebelo 2018; PeaceWomen n.d.).

Building an identity that legitimizes Brazilian action on the 'overseas' but is not reflective of the 'internal' challenges (with only 10,8% of female political representation in the parliament) and of nuanced and intersectional forms of gender inequality (as the high rates of allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, according to Human Rights Watch (2016), and a rise in the rates of domestic violence against black women as opposed to a descent on the rates against white women). understanding of gender mainstreaming and empowerment is still based on certain assumptions, namely: closing the gap between the binary division of differences and inequalities of men and women can be achieved through policies; that women can be productive agents of peace; and that this should be present in every action that promotes security, thus leaving the question of 'what' (in)security is and for 'whom' unanswered, holding Brazil unaccountable for the violence it perpetrates in both discursive and material manners.

Therefore, there is still a limitation of the WPS agenda regarding the focus on the inclusion of women in activities to promote the maintenance of international peace and security, with no regards to the issue that conflicts are connected to unequal power relations that have gendered and racialized implications, resulting in implementation challenges in the form of a lack of connection between the thematic axes of the Brazilian NAP and the details of its activities, with few established goals or monitoring and evaluation indicators and conceptual challenges from the lack of attention to structural, institutional and subjective obstacles for the effective participation of women in initiatives for peace and security, including in conflict and post-conflict situations that Brazil operates (Drummond & Rebelo 2018; PeaceWomen nd).

What becomes established is rather the close relation of maintaining militarized violence as the norm and the violent reproduction of gender through the logic of masculinist protection of the WPS agenda (Young 2003; Shepherd 2008).

All these critiques, of course, do not exclude the possibility of a 'translating back' practice of women's rights movements, that is to use 1325 and the NAP as a tool for change on the grassroots, rewriting a feminist practice of peace. In a practical manner derived from this methodology's limitation, this cannot be controlled, as organizations can interpret and adapt the policies in a different way, but through discourse analysis it becomes a little bit clearer to trace the genealogy of how and why this agenda was formed and what were the values and assumptions behind it. As long as we do not see public policies in a more holistic way, (re)producing certain truths of hegemonic discourses, especially now in Brazil's contemporary panorama, the initial idea behind the women's rights initiatives to establish a WPS agenda will be further forgotten under neoliberal framework that seeks to (re)inscribe identities into strict categories. We should move past these to achieve not a state of affairs that is blind to gender and race and offers militarized solutions for peace and security, but one that is truly moving beyond these categories and can recover WPS' initial ambitions, reflecting back to why the agenda was pushed to be implemented and to how we wish to engage subjects in it.

It is imperative that further rethinking of commitments and practices on women, peace, and security become more aware of power and structural inequalities concerning gender, race and militarism, especially on the specific political moment that Brazil is facing with recent political turmoil and the upcoming elections. The political and economic 'crisis' in the country has often legitimized that human rights and gender issues are minimized and dismissed as secondary thoughts. But it is especially during these times where they become most critical and

present an opportunity to become the focus of national development in a country that is plagued with gendered violence against the LGBT community, black people and that still shows signs of electing a candidate that embodies conservative values with a career in the military, has made explicit comments against human rights and 'gender ideology' and is in favor of neoliberal and militarized solutions that might perpetrate neocolonial practices (DataPoder360 2018). The adoption of the agenda and political challenges, however, can and must become an opportunity for intrinsically connecting WPS and all the conceptual restructuring it can present, becoming a valuable opportunity that aligns with a progressive development of ethics and global security that is aware of nuanced and complex moral questions that reflect structural challenges and inequalities towards a more genuine global sensibility (see Burke; McDonald & Lee-Koo on "Ethics and Global Security", 2016) and a Foucauldian international citizenship.

For that purpose, some of the key areas I would like to highlight as potential contributors to the Brazilian case and the general reshaping of WPS are the issue of 'modernity', the insertion of men in gender issues and the demilitarization of security. For the Foucauldian international citizenship must begin with ending the divide between the initiators of modernity and the passive receptors, rather posing the concept of 'multiple modernities', pushing "us to think beyond the center-periphery dichotomy that have obscured of both 'central' and 'peripheral' societies" (Tavolaro 2008, 127). Secondly, a complete development of WPS must also engage men, as "gender is a relational concept; social changes in the position of women will redefine their relationship with men, and the acceptance of this change will need to involve a shift in male gender norms, otherwise referred to as masculinities" (Watson 2015, 50), without also further excluding non-conforming minorities. And finally, these processes must become detached from militarization as a necessary condition for Brazil's democratization and an

account for peace and security that surpasses the traditional narrowness and one-sidedness of peace and security for all subjectivities.

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