

TRANSFORMING HUNGARIAN KIN-MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA

by

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Abstract

The thesis explores the impact of the Hungarian government on the Transylvanian civil and political actors. The paper investigates four organizations: the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (EMNT), the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania (EMNP), the Eurotrans Foundation and the Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania (RMDSZ).

The research examines the shift in the Transylvanian politics from being the members of the Romanian political community towards the extended Hungarian political community. The thesis argues that the autonomous claim-making of the civil and political organizations in Transylvania gradually decreases by the influence of the Hungarian government.

Relying on previous literature and the experiences of ethnographic observation the thesis builds up a framework which helps in deeper understanding of this mechanism. Analysis of the discursive shift in the politics of Transylvanian actors supports the argumentation.

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1. Introduction

Hungary as a kin-state entitled the Hungarian minorities abroad to apply for dual citizenship in 2010 with the amendment of the Act on Nationality and included the dual citizens into the political community via the extension of voting rights in 2013. My research focuses on the consequences of this extension by investigating the Transylvanian political and civil actors. This region is relevant as the largest Hungarian minority lives here (approximately 1.2 million people). The number of dual citizenship applications is the highest in this region.¹ Romania gives further prospects for research as it recognizes the ethnic external citizenship in its politics and offers great possibility for comparison with its large number of Romanians in neighboring countries.

With the strong influence of the Hungarian government, new institutions were created to implement the naturalization process and, relying on this set-up, a new political party in Romania, the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania (EMNP) was born. The system of institutions, the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (EMNT) and the People's Party have been working heavily interconnected since then. In 2015 the Hungarian Government extended its intervention in the Transylvanian political arena as it signed an agreement with another civic organization, the Eurotrans Foundation² which is connected to the leading

¹ According to Zsolt Semjén Deputy Prime Minister the number of the new citizens reached one million in November 2017 Zsolt Semjén, "Megvan az egymilliomodik magyar állampolgár," Semjén Zsolt honlapja (blog), November 9, 2017, <http://www.semjenzsolt.hu/2017/11/megvan-az-egymilliomodik-magyar-allampolgar/>. The registration numbers for the 2018 elections show that the highest number of applications is coming from Transylvania. All together 381,939 registrations were received from which 187,439 arrived from Romania and the second highest number 62,570 from Serbia. For a continuously updating database: "Külhoni magyar állampolgárok választási regisztrációja," Nemzeti Választási Iroda, 2018, <http://www.valasztas.hu/kulhoni-magyar-allampolgarok-valasztasi-regisztracioja>.

² Eurotrans Alapítvány in Hungarian

political party, RMDSZ. As a result, this civic organization takes its part in the dual citizenship implementation as well.

The paper argues that the expansion of Hungarian politics towards Transylvania resulted in the fact that the political and civil actors' autonomous claim-making gradually decreases. The thesis investigates those instances when the participation in the Hungarian political community collides with their interest in the Romanian or Transylvanian politics. With the amendment of the Act on Nationality and with its influence on the implementation of dual citizenship in Transylvania, the Hungarian government intervenes into the claim-making processes.³ The thesis intends to analyze the impact of this intervention via investigating the organizations listed. The institutions of the Transylvanian kin-minority are scrutinized to explore the extent of the influence of the Hungarian domestic politics in the Transylvanian scene. The Hungarian parliamentary elections were held on the 8th of April 2018. This gives an opportunity to scrutinize the activities of the organizations strongly involved in the Hungarian elections. Hungarians from Transylvania voted in high numbers and these organizations take their part in the related campaigning activity. The thesis builds up a framework to better understand and analyze the Transylvanian scene.

The thesis describes the shift in the political scene in Transylvania and investigates the specific nature of the intersection of civil and political life. Interviews have been conducted before among the employees of EMNT and EMNP, which support that the interviewees are agents of Hungary, rather than representatives of the Hungarian kin-minority.⁴ The organizations could rather be identified as extended tentacles of the Hungarian government. Building on this prerequisite the thesis further investigates the everyday activities of the

³ Szaboles Pogonyi, "Europeanization of Kin-Citizenship and the Dynamics of Kin-Minority Claim-Making: The Case of Hungary," *Problems of Post-Communism* 64, no. 5 (September 3, 2017): 242–56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2017.1329630>.

⁴ Kriszta Kovács, Zsolt Körtvélyesi, and Alíz Nagy, "Margins of Nationality. External Ethnic Citizenship and Non-Discrimination," *Perspectives on Federalism* 7, no. 1 (2015): 85–116.

organizations, to show the consequences of this phenomenon. Preceding the last elections, the institutions concerned took part in an extensive registration campaign and in ballot collecting. These organizations have direct links to the external voting base. The ballots coming from Transylvania in 2014 resulted in more than one mandate, ensuring the two thirds majority of the Hungarian government. For the 2018 elections these numbers doubled. A new thread of activities related to the registration campaign and election give space for further research.

The extension of citizenship is part of a process, in which Hungary changes its nation concept from the political to the ethno-cultural one.⁵ This results in the fact that the kin-minorities in the neighboring countries belong to the political community of Hungary. Still the Hungarian kin-minority is much embedded in the Romanian society. The thesis argues that the intervention of the Hungarian government instead of ensuring the well-being of the members of the kin-minority by the influence on the organizations, rather leads to undermining their autonomy.

The Hungarian government's impact on the Transylvanian kin-minority is investigated relying on ethnographic observations, conducted before the 2018 elections among the system of institutions. The relation of the Hungarian government and the political parties is explored by the analysis of legislations, and agreements and the consequences of those to the Transylvanian scene. The discourses of the organizations are investigated to see whether the impact of the Hungarian government is apparent on those. The secondary reading of previous statistical data gathered by other scholars supplements my research.

⁵ Zsolt Körtvélyesi, "Az „egységes magyar nemzet” és az állampolgárság,” *Fundamentum*, no. 2 (2011), <http://www.fundamentum.hu/sites/default/files/11-2-03.pdf>.

1.1 Structure of Thesis

The thesis provides an overview of previous literature, which findings it intends to underline with empirical data. Further it analyzes previous data gathered by other scholars mainly focusing on the political participation and electoral behavior of the kin-minority in Transylvania. It gives an overview of changes in the Transylvanian political arena and supports these with findings of ethnographic observation. During the registration campaign and election in 2018, I have spent several weeks in Transylvania observing the activity of the organizations. The ethnographic inquiry was conducted in Cluj-Napoca, as this is the center of the organizations. I focused on civil actors as they are the ones who carried out campaigning and ballot collecting activity. I intended to conduct interviews among the employers of the organizations as well; however, Eurotrans Foundation and RMDSZ officers declined my request for an interview. I managed to talk to the person responsible for the communication at one of the organizations. The interview guideline is based on the ethnographic observations and with its help I aimed for a more elaborate understanding of the communication strategy of the organizations. More insight on this helped me in designing the discourse analysis.

To reveal the consequences of the Hungarian government's intervention on Transylvanian actors I analyzed speeches from the Hungarian Prime Minister and statements of the organizations' leaders in connection to the Hungarian legislations. I explored the extent to which their discourses are influenced by the Hungarian government, and by the dual involvement, namely the involvement in Romanian and in Hungarian political community. Further I wanted to investigate if these discursive panels transmitted from the Hungarian political discourse are kept in the same way within the Transylvanian politics, as they are referred to in the Hungarian one or they are transformed in line with the issues which the Transylvanian audience is most concerned about.

The thesis provides a more comprehensive understanding about the impact of the kin-state's presence in Transylvania and more generally, it draws the sketch of a mechanism, which can be possibly useful in investigating the impact of extraterritorial citizenship policies in the region.

2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

There are distinct still interacting theoretical levels in the research. First, I introduce the theoretical framework which helps in understanding the role of the Transylvanian kin-minority and its relation to Hungary. Second, I focus on claim-making processes of the Transylvanian kin-minority, so that finally I could add my own findings of the research conducted about the impact of the kin-state.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This thesis relies on the Brubakerian traditions of triadic nexus whereas he describes the reorganization of political space corresponding to the democratic transitions in Central Eastern Europe.⁶ Accordingly the nationalization of this political space resulted in a ‘relational nexus’.⁷ Brubaker refers to the actors of these interactions as: the national minorities, the nationalizing state and the external national homeland. In this framework the external national homelands develop relation towards the national minority; still Brubaker states that this ‘ethnocultural affinity’ is not a legal connection. In the Hungarian case, this ethnocultural based affinity is formalized in citizenship since 2010. The relations between the three actors are used in the thesis as follows: kin-state (Hungary), kin-minority (Hungarian in Transylvania) and home state (Romania). The Brubakerian concept can be criticized as it considers kin-state and kin-minority as unified actors. In the thesis I distinguish between actors of the kin-state and kin-minority, I do not consider them unified and I do not state that the actors are representing the same unified community of people. In the analyses I

⁶ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁷ Brubaker, 4.

differentiate between the political and civil actors based on their claimed role within the community which they want to represent.

Further to this Brubaker's concept about the politics of belonging can be used. Brubaker differentiates among the external and internal dimensions of belonging.⁸ This concept underlies also the formal and informal aspects of belonging. In the Hungarian case the citizens outside the country's border can be seen as subjects to the external type of belonging, whereas the national minority consider themselves belonging to the nation which they are territorially not part. Brubaker's distinction between the sense of belonging to the nation, or to the nation state helps in contextualizing the thesis. In the Hungarian case one can observe a process which starts with including the kin-minority into the nation concept then by the extension of citizenship and voting rights they are included into the political community. Accordingly, I argue that the Hungarian government does extend some functions of the nation state beyond borders. The paper investigates to what extent the Transylvanian actors play a role in this process.

In his paper Brubaker investigates different types of membership in the modern nation-state. He makes a distinction in the understanding of nation-state as an analytical and as a normative ideal type. Accordingly, the analytical one stands for the nation-state as "a model *of* political, social, and cultural organization; as a normative ideal type, it is a model *for* political, social, and cultural organization."⁹ The analytical type is used as category of analysis, whereas the normative one as category of practice. In terms of this thesis Hungary as a nation-state appears for pure practical reasons as a category of analysis. In this case practical consideration means that the measures for extension of nation are not normatively assessed.

⁸ Rogers Brubaker, "Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 41, no. 1 (2010): 61–78.

⁹ Brubaker, 62.

The nation-state and its extension is not evaluated in terms of their constitutive role in the social world.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the paper investigates exactly the fluidity of these categories set up by Brubaker. He scrutinizes the nation-state from the perspective of migration and membership, whereas he states that “[t]he nation-state, in short, is conceptualized in both social-scientific analysis and political practice as an internally homogeneous, externally bounded political, legal, social, cultural, and (sometimes) economic space.”¹¹ I argue that the extension of the Hungarian polity beyond border and the intervention of the Hungarian politics into the everyday practices of Transylvanian actors mean that this external boundedness of the political, legal space has become porous. In accordance to Brubaker I state that the “increasing importance of nation-state as a locus of belonging, as development of increasingly direct, intrusive, and centralized forms of rule” is clearly apparent in the latter analysis on the impact of the Hungarian government in Transylvania. I argue for the understanding the fluidity of these types of belonging. I argue that the distinct nature of belonging in the case of the Hungarian kin-minority is changed not by the citizens’ own willingness to change it, for example by migration, but by the external impact of the Hungarian government on their everyday life. In what follows I investigate this external intrusion into the ways of belonging and I state that it has crucial consequences on the claim-making strategies of the kin-minority actors.

Another element of the thesis relies on Brubaker’s theory about ethnicity without groups.¹² The author argues that in making of a group, external actors play a role. Adapting this to the thesis it becomes clear that the Hungarian government intervenes into the Transylvanian scene. According to Brubaker the ‘protagonists’ of the ethnic based conflicts

¹⁰ Brubaker, 62.

¹¹ Brubaker, 63.

¹² Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006).

are usually organizations, in the case of the paper I conceptualize the situation based on this theory. The concept can be useful as it focuses on the crystallization of ethnic events. The thesis relies on this concept to the extent that it identifies some points of crystallization in connection to the organization's work. The organizations analyzed in the paper claim to stand for the Hungarian community in Transylvania. The Hungarian government claims to stand up for the same community. Brubaker's concept helps in avoiding groupism and rather concentrating on the actors. The paper analyzes those moments, where 'heightened groupness' crystallize.

The analysis of the political community is another key element of this thesis. Relying on Bauböck's thesis about stakeholder citizenship I investigate the legitimacy of dual participation, namely participating in the Romanian political community and participating in the Hungarian political community at the same time. Bauböck analyzed the change in the concept of citizenship in those cases, where demos cannot be identified any more as community of people within borders.¹³ Scrutinizing voting rights, he creates the concept of stakeholder citizenship. He states that those are entitled for political participation, whose well-being is dependent on the future of the given state. These people should belong to the political community of the country.¹⁴

The paper discusses the concept of political community, mainly relying on this concept. Bauböck's thesis about stakeholder citizenship and transnational membership can be useful in those cases whereas the people are participants of two (or more) political communities. He states that those are entitled for political participation, whose well-being is dependent on the future of the given state. Interpreting his thesis for the Hungarian kin-minority the dual citizens' well-being should be ensured by Romania. This thesis relies on his

¹³ Rainer Bauböck, "Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting," *Fordham Law Review* 75, no. 5 (January 1, 2007): 2393.

¹⁴ Bauböck, 2393.

work to the extent that it uses the stakeholder principle to justify their belonging to the Hungarian political community, still emphasize their belonging to their home state. The paradox gives us the possibility to understand the importance of the Hungarian domestic politics' impact on the Transylvanian kin-minority.

2.2 Literature Review

Before discussing the claim-making strategies of the Transylvanian kin-minority, it is worth to make an overview of the most influential literature dealing with the politics of ethnicity. Rabushka and Shepsle discuss the concept of ethnic outbidding extensively in 1972. They investigate the role of ethnic groups in plural societies and based on their findings (which are constructed by the overview of a great list of countries) they conclude that democratic stability cannot be ensured in ethnically heterogeneous societies.¹⁵

The same phenomenon is analyzed in depth by Horowitz.¹⁶ Both books offer some possible solutions for the stability of a democratic regime. Rabushka and Shepsle consider the denial of independent decision-making and restriction of authority based on their case studies as a structure in which ethnic conflict could be prevented. They also discuss the possibility of limiting political competition and restricting the scope of government, or as a final answer creating a homogenous society. However, they emphasize that any of these solutions could lead to even more problematic set ups.¹⁷

¹⁵ Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*, 1 edition (Colombus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 2008).

¹⁶ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, First Edition (University of California Press, 1985).

¹⁷ Rabushka and Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies*, 213–16.

Horowitz argues that ethnic conflicts can be resolved once interethnic relations within the society could be rearranged.¹⁸ He identifies five mechanisms which could lead to reduction of conflicts: dispersion of power; focusing on intra-ethnic conflict, instead of interethnic conflict; encouraging policies for interethnic cooperation; encouraging policies for alignment; or by “reducing disparities between groups.”¹⁹ He argues that success of ethnic parties can be understood along these lines and that it is dependent on the level of ethnic conflict. By identifying the role of parties within the society, he demonstrates via several examples that an ethnic party is “identified with the cause of the ethnic group it represents.”²⁰ The thesis relies on these literatures in conceptualizing the position of ethnic parties, and ethnic actors analyzed.

Institutional framework is emphasized by Chandra. She argues that ethnic parties can succeed in those set-ups, where the institutional framework can influence the electorate party relations. The analysis of ethnic parties in India helps understanding ethnic party politics in a ‘patronage-democracy.’²¹ Chandra formulates herself against the theories by Rabushka and Schepsle and by Horowitz. Referring to both concepts she claims, that “these theoretical families assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the success of ethnic parties is a natural by-product of the process by which ethnic identities become politically salient.”²² Still the

¹⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

¹⁹ Horowitz, 598–99.

²⁰ Horowitz, 296.

²¹ Chandra defines patronage-democracy as follows: „a democracy in which the state monopolizes access to jobs and services, and in which elected officials have discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state. The key aspect of a patronage-democracy is not simply the size of the state but the power of elected officials to distribute the vast resources controlled by the state to voters on an individualized basis, by exercising their discretion in the implementation of state policy.” Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6.

²² Chandra, 10.

starting point of her research states that there are political parties which “fail to attract the support of their target ethnic categories.”²³

She differentiates among the terms which have been used as related analytical categories; she calls for making a distinction among “disparate types of ethnically motivated activit[ies].”²⁴ Among these activities she lists voting, riots, protests. Using the rational choice explanations Chandra argues that by the nature of a patronage-democracy the “voters and politicians [...] favour co-ethnics in the delivery of benefits and votes.”²⁵ This nature basically means that there are information constraints within the set-up of patronage democracy. She argues that such elements as “institutional legacies and ethnic networks, may reinforce the politics of ethnic favouritism once it emerges.”²⁶ Accordingly these are variables which could only matter in cases the information constraint is present. Relying on Down’s work²⁷ Chandra states that the main information constraint is ideology, being the most important indicator of voting behavior. However, she provides broader list of shortcuts, from which explicitly she names ethnic cues, which basically means that voters tend to cast their ballots for people with same ethnicity.²⁸ The thesis plays on this argument of information constraint and provides an overview with the help of the Hungarian case study about the relationship of the Hungarian electorate, the ethnic parties of Transylvania and the kin-state, Hungary.

The literature since the 1980’s widely discusses ethnic parties relying often on the kin-minorities relation toward their home-state or on their relations to each other and their electorate. Some examples are Fearon’s and Kitschelt’s works. Fearon states that there are

²³ Chandra, 10.

²⁴ Chandra, 12.

²⁵ Chandra, 13.

²⁶ Chandra, 100.

²⁷ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957).

²⁸ Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*, 37.

two types of political goods which the parties could use in strengthening their voting base: policy goods and political pork, meaning those types of material benefits which could be allocated from public funds to the voter's needs.²⁹ According to Kiss's and Székely's article the shift in RMDSZ's politics happened along these lines. They also rely on the typologies set up by Kitschelt, whereas the author differentiates among charismatic, clientelistic and programmatic linkages between parties and electorate.³⁰ These typologies help in understanding the position of the Transylvanian actors in the Romanian political community and their relations with their electorate. This thesis relies on this literature and provide an overview in the shift of these nexuses.

Horowitz's work also addresses the nature of the parallel society, which is later discussed in this thesis. Kiss's and Székely's article is used concerning RMDSZ' role within the Transylvanian scene, where the authors reflect on the contradiction between Brubaker et al.'s thesis about the Transylvanian kin-minority³¹ and Horowitz's argument. As they note: "Brubaker et al. (2006, 265–301) reject the metaphor of a parallel society when they interpret the Hungarian world in the Transylvanian city of Cluj/Kolozsvár, because in their opinion, such a concept would conceal the pronounced asymmetry between minority and majority segments of society."³² Still this thesis discusses the phenomenon of a parallel society, as this is relevant in terms of the restructuring of the Transylvanian scene, where the analyzed organizations transform.

²⁹ Fearon James D., "Why Ethnic Politics and 'Pork' Tend to Go Together." Working Paper." (CA: Stanford University., 1999).

³⁰ Herbert Kitschelt, "Divergent Paths of Postcommunist Democracies," MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, vol. Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore: MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 299–326.

³¹ Rogers Brubaker et al., eds., *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

³² Tamás Kiss and István Gergő Székely, "Shifting Linkages in Ethnic Mobilization: The Case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania," *Nationalities Papers* 44, no. 4 (2016): 607. footnote 23.

About the kin-state's impact on the ethnic party dynamics wide range of literature is available, explicitly addressing the Transylvanian kin-minorities. Most discussed elements of these strategies are the questions raised by democratic transitions, the Status Law and the European integration.

Iordachi deals with changes after the democratic transitions discussing also kin-state policies. He argues that wide range of policies introduced in the region aimed to reconstruct national 'imagined communities'.³³ In his argumentation Iordachi refers to Tilly's citizenship concept. It is a status which is viewed as "transactions, contested claims between agents of states and members of socially constructed categories."³⁴ Dual citizenship in this sense is viewed as a mutual relationship between citizens and states. The extension of citizenship was not a unique phenomenon in the region, Romania already in 1991 extended its citizenry beyond borders, mainly targeting the newly created citizenry of the Republic Moldova. The main aim was to create a political community which later can support the political unification of the two states.

Extraterritorial citizenship and its impact on domestic politics was investigated by Agarin and Karolewski extensively in 2015 focusing on the post-soviet space.³⁵ The analytical framework set up by the editors of the book helps understanding the impact of non-resident citizenship not only on the kin-state but on the political dynamics of the country of residence.³⁶ The editors focus on the individuals and investigate their position within the

³³ Constantin Iordachi, "Dual Citizenship and Policies toward Kin-Minorities in East-Central Europe: A Comparison between Hungary, Romania, and the Republic of Moldova," in *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*, 2004, http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no4_ses/chapter08.pdf.

³⁴ Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," *International Review of Social History* 40, no. S3 (December 1995): 6, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859000113586>; Iordachi, "Dual Citizenship and Policies toward Kin-Minorities in East-Central Europe: A Comparison between Hungary, Romania, and the Republic of Moldova," 243.

³⁵ Timofey Agarin and Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski, eds., *Extraterritorial Citizenship in Postcommunist Europe* (London ; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015).

³⁶ Agarin and Karolewski, 3.

framework of state and society. The states declare that the individuals are their core constituents, however, the authors' assumption is that the 'expense of liberty' is some kind of institutional stewardship over citizenries.³⁷ The scholars base their theories on the understanding of societal processes and they emphasize the role of the institutions. The book addresses long-term and short-term effects of citizenship extension and enables the elaborate investigation of kin-minority institutions. As the authors argue the ethnic composition of the state is very relevant concerning policies towards citizens, my research can support this argumentation with the analysis of the kin-minority organizations in Transylvania.

The European integration impacted the policies toward kin-minorities and in Hungary this process indirectly reinforced the first legal connection to the Hungarians of neighboring countries, the Status Law. Waterbury investigates extensively already at the beginning of 2000, why states become more interested in their kin-minorities, "why do states become more 'ethnic activists'?"³⁸ In her paper she discusses the Hungarian case study, as the paper was written some years after Status Law was accepted, she discusses the consequences of this new relations. In this paper Waterbury demonstrates the ways how domestic politics use "transnational ethnic affiliations" as part of their internal political strategies.³⁹

She also describes this as a process of externalization, whereas the "deeper integration into European institutions" interconnected with the extension of citizenship and voting rights "offers additional arenas through which minority political actors can make claims and gain allies, but is of limited use as a mobilizational resource."⁴⁰ She argues that the new externalized political arena changes the claim-making procedures of the minorities and results

³⁷ Agarin and Karolewski, 4.

³⁸ Myra A. Waterbury, "Ideology, Organization, Opposition: How Domestic Political Strategy Shapes Hungary's Ethnic Activism," *Regio : Minorities, Politics, Society* 6, no. 1 (2006): 66.

³⁹ Waterbury, 66.

⁴⁰ Myra A. Waterbury, "National Minorities in an Era of Externalization," *Problems of Post-Communism* 64, no. 5 (September 3, 2017): 228, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1251825>.

in the fact that they drift away from political institutions of the country of residency and they rely more on the kin-state.

The impact of the European integration on the Hungarian policies towards the kin-minorities is more extensively investigated by Csergő and Goldgeier.⁴¹ They discuss the effects of European integration on the nationalist strategies (among other examples) of Hungary. To specify the consequences of this process they apply the term transsovereign nationalism, which is widely quoted since their paper was published. Transsovereign nationalism is the strategy used by countries which have policies for their kins beyond border, without the intentions to change these borders. The Hungarian nation strategy is an exemplary case. The key actors of the Hungarian transsovereign nationalism are institutions, which reach out to the kin-minorities. As they state: " [t]his national project is thus related to substate nationalism, but comes from a different angle: it is coordinated/led by a national center that is at the same time the political center of a state."⁴² They already name the consequences of Hungary unilaterally trying to 'virtualize' the country's borders. The problem of the unilateral virtualization refers to the relation with the neighboring countries rather than the situation of the kin-minorities in it. My thesis deals with this latter problem.

Csergő and Goldgeier discuss in more depth the issues of kin-state activism in a paper published in 2013, where they contrast Hungarian nation building strategies with the Romanian one and they conclude that "[i]n sharp contrast to Hungary, in Romania the fate of external kin populations did not become a major battleground for party building and electoral policy."⁴³ My thesis also discusses this phenomenon, however, I focus on different aspect of this battleground. While Csergő and Goldgeier, and also Waterbury discuss how the

⁴¹ Zsuzsa Csergő and James M. Goldgeier, "Nationalist Strategies and European Integration," *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 1 (2004): 21–37.

⁴² Csergő and Goldgeier, 27.

⁴³ Zsuzsa Csergő and James M. Goldgeier, "Kin-State Activism in Hungary, Romania, and Russia: The Politics of Ethnic Demography," *Divided Nations and European Integration*, 2013, 114.

Hungarian elites competed for their domestic support via the policies introduced among their kins, I analyze what is the impact of those domestic politics on the actors of the Transylvanian kin-minorities, and how strategies of the Hungarian government transform the dynamics in the Transylvanian political arena.

Transylvanian scholars discuss consequences of democratic transition and the kin-state's approach toward the minorities. Salat already in the early 2000's discusses the Hungarian policies very critically. He coins the expression 'respirator-mechanism' to voice the concerns related to the Hungarian aid policy. He argues that nevertheless the Hungarian actors claim to support the well-being of members of the kin-minority within their homeland, they missed to support the improvement of the majority-minority relations in Romania, without which no well-being can be reached. Salat says that Hungarian policies result in the fact that kin-minority actors are not capable for claim-making towards their home country any more, they are not able to benefit from the European Union's support as well, as they depend only on kin-state institutions.⁴⁴

The current changes in Hungary's nation building strategies, including the extension of citizenship and voting rights is investigated more extensively by Pogonyi.⁴⁵ He explores the dynamics of kin-minority claim-making since the extension of citizenship beyond borders. He states that the Hungarian kin-minority focuses on the support coming from Hungary, rather than on the claim-making as minority within their home state. The thesis uses exactly this statement to show that the Hungarian kin-minority organizations are agents of Hungary, rather than representatives of the kin-minority. Pogonyi relying on his empirical data gathered suggests that dual citizens of the Hungarian kin-minority associate symbolic and pragmatic

⁴⁴ "NERdély 2.: Hogyan alakította át az erdélyi politikát a Fidesz?" Erdély (blog), accessed May 30, 2018, <https://erdely.atlatszo.hu/2018/04/06/nerdely-2-hogyan-alakitotta-at-az-erdelyi-politikat-a-fidesz/>.

⁴⁵ Szabolcs Pogonyi, *Extra-Territorial Ethnic Politics, Discourses and Identities in Hungary* (Springer, 2017).

values to their citizenship and the stronger the pragmatic value is the stronger the symbolic becomes.⁴⁶ The thesis relies on Pogonyi's findings to support that dual citizenship does not mean full inclusion to the Hungarian political community, despite of claims made by the Hungarian government. What is more, the argumentation can be extended and argued that the extension nevertheless transformed the claim-making as minority in the home-state, still did not provide full inclusion into the Hungarian political community.

Pogonyi indicates also that in the future the Hungarian strategy "in terms of minority agency" will lead to counterproductive functioning. "Rather than encouraging minority mobilization to secure minority rights in the country of residence, kin-citizenship projects actually compromise the claims-making potential of transborder political actors. Through the analysis of Hungarian minority mobilization strategies in the neighboring states, I argued that contrary to the aims of nationalist governments that introduce it as part of symbolic nation-building projects, kin-citizenship may weaken transborder minorities' claims-making potential in their countries of residence."⁴⁷ This thesis investigates whether this counterproductive functioning is visible in the working of the four organizations.

My thesis investigates the politics of the Transylvanian actors focusing on the level of the institutions and the findings are empirically confirmed. The focus on the institutional framework of the kin-minorities has been neglected so far. The thesis attracts attention for the relevance of civil and political actors within a scene where different interactions result in the restructuring of the claim-making strategies.

⁴⁶ Pogonyi, 176–77.

⁴⁷ Pogonyi, "Europeanization of Kin-Citizenship and the Dynamics of Kin-Minority Claim-Making," 252.

3. Research Design and Methodology

The thesis investigates the impact of the Hungarian government's intervention on civil and political actors of the Hungarian kin-minority in Transylvania. First, I analyze the connected legislations, their implementation and their impact on the belonging of the members of the Hungarian kin-minority to the Romanian and to the Hungarian political community. Second, relying on ethnographic fieldwork in Transylvania preceding the 2018 elections I introduce the implementation of legislations and the everyday functioning of the institutions. Without having the ethnographic experience, the research could miss the first-hand experiences of everyday practices and interactions of these organizations. Furthermore, I analyze the statements by the leaders of Transylvanian actors to see if the discursive panels of the Hungarian politics are transmitted to Transylvania. I expected that the discourse analyzes confirms my presuppositions based on the ethnographic field work.

In developing my research design, I built on my previous experiences with the organizations analyzed. Since 2011 I spent several months in Transylvania conducting field work. First, I started to investigate the implementation of Nationality Act in Transylvania and realized the leading role of the National Council and EMNP in this process. I conducted several interviews to assess the role of these organizations in citizenship application. Relying on these experiences I decided to do ethnographic observation preceding the 2018 elections to see the extent of the intervention of the Hungarian government and the impact of the Hungarian politics on the Transylvanian actors. I decided to conduct the research in Cluj, as this is the center of organizations, their national offices are located in the city and their main projects are coordinated from there.

The organizations are in the focus of this paper as they are the ones who execute the initiations of the Hungarian government, they are in direct contact with the already naturalized Hungarian dual citizens and they are the first point of contact for those who want

to naturalize. I have chosen EMNT and EMNP as since 2010 they have an agreement with the Hungarian government for the implementation of the Nationality Act, and I investigate Eurotrans Foundation and RMDSZ as after the 2014 elections they also allied with Fidesz and preceding the 2018 elections started to establish their own network for the same purpose. Further organizations could have been investigated as well, smaller civil or political parties (like Blessing, Population [Áldás, Néesség] Association or the Hungarian Civic Party [MPP] are also supported by the Hungarian government) but the four organizations chosen are the most influential, either by their previous role in the Transylvanian civil and political life, or by the direct consequences of the citizenship extension.

I started the ethnographic inquiry before the elections of 2018, as the weeks of registration and election itself are very relevant in the context of my research. Preceding the Hungarian election, the four organizations started the registration and electoral campaign. During this period the organizations carry out those kinds of activities which can indicate the level of involvement into the Hungarian politics. Further to the importance of the elections, the first week I spent in Cluj was the one before the 15th of March national holiday, so I could also see how they carry out everyday practices as members of the extended Hungarian nation. I expected that the parallel activity of the civil organizations: on the one hand registration campaign and on the other hand the celebration of a Hungarian national holiday shows the dual involvement of these organizations both as being the members of the Hungarian kin-minority and the Hungarian political community.

I spent one week during this campaign in Cluj, so that I could see the activities carried out by the organizations. As analyzed below the Democracy Centers and the Eurotrans Foundation's offices offered help for dual citizens to register them to the Hungarian electoral registry of postal voters. I conducted the ethnographic inquiry mainly in the courtyard of the Hungarian consulate where the Democracy Center and several offices of the Hungarian

consulates are located. Further to observations I was prepared to conduct interviews among the employers of EMNT/EMNP and Eurotrans Foundation/RMDSZ. I knew that it was a busy period for the employees, so I was not surprised that except for one person no one had the time to do the interview. That one person I could talk to is responsible for the communication strategy of the organizations, so I used the interview rather to supplement my ethnographic fieldwork and prepare for the discourse analysis. During these weeks I approached Eurotrans Foundation's leading figures and RMDSZ officers several times without success. I asked for interviews also after the elections, but they explicitly rejected my inquiry.

Based on the experiences of the ethnography I argue that the intervention of the Hungarian government into the Transylvanian scene impacts the everyday life of the organizations concerned, so that it alters their activity from being representative of the Hungarian kin-minority, rather for being agents of the Hungarian government. To verify this statement, I analyzed the discourses of the organizations. During the time I have spent in Cluj I experienced that the people coming into the offices of the organizations refer to the same rhetorical devices used by the Hungarian politicians. Further to this I have checked statements of the Transylvanian politicians in connection to the elections and I realized that they also use very similar rhetorical devices to the Hungarian Prime Minister. I conducted the interview with the person responsible for communication to have some insight into the communication strategies of the organizations.

Accordingly, I investigated whether the discursive panels used in the Hungarian politics are transmitted into the agenda of these organizations. I focused on the last two elections as I expected that since 2014 the gradual intervention of the Hungarian government into the everyday activities of these organizations would be more visible via speeches and public statements of organizations' leaders.

Before going into details of the discourse analysis I introduce the process of the extension of the Hungarian citizenry beyond borders. I also describe the organizations in depth and overview their recent activities connected to the Hungarian political community.

4. Systematic Inclusion of the Hungarian Kin-Minority

The following chapters investigate the systemic inclusion of transborder kin-minorities into the Hungarian political community. I make an account of most important steps taken by the Hungarian government to include transborder Hungarians into the political community of Hungary. I follow chronological order and explore characteristics of the extension of the Hungarian politics into Transylvania. First, I provide the overview of relevant legislations then I analyze the impact of those on the civil and political actors of the Transylvanian kin-minority. I check further measures in connection to the 2014 and 2018 elections of the Hungarian government. The two elections are chosen as the measures introduced by the government in time of elections are the salient forms of the interventions. Relying on previous literature I show that this systematic intervention of the Hungarian government results in the fact that the Transylvanian actors have no other chance than executing Hungarian politics. I do not argue intentionality, nevertheless the intervention of the Hungarian government results in the fact that the Transylvanian actors have no further capacity to focus on their claim-making as a Romanian minority

4.1 Extension of Citizenship

Since 2010 the Hungarian government extended the citizenry of Hungary. After the Fidesz government won two thirds majority in the elections, as a first step they adopted the Amendment of the Act on Nationality. To be able to see the significance I offer a short historical overview of nation politics before.

The discussions about the faith of transborder Hungarians is in the focus of the Hungarian political parties since the democratic transition. Following World War I. Hungary

lost two thirds of its territory and population in Trianon Peace Treaty,⁴⁸ and the people in the Carpathian basin become ‘accidental diaspora’.⁴⁹ During the socialist period there was no room for discussing the situation of Hungarian kin-minorities in neighboring countries, or the Hungarian diaspora in the world, those who fled from Hungary mainly after the World Wars or after the 1956 Revolution. Only after the democratic transition of the country in the 1990’s could the political debate about their faith start. Politicians put the case of transborder Hungarians on their agenda mainly according to their political ideology.⁵⁰ The debate became more vivid in the 90’s when Hungary started its European integration process preceding all the neighbors that had significant Hungarian minority populations. The transition to Europe raised concerns about being even more disconnected from the kin-minorities.⁵¹

The so-called Status Law was created as a result. The Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries created the first legal connection towards Hungarians living in neighboring countries (with the exception of Austria, where the Hungarians was supposed to live in good conditions, which does not require any further action from the Hungarian

⁴⁸ Károly Kocsis and Eszter Kocsisné Hodosi, *Ethnic Geography of the Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin* (Simon Publications, 1998); Nándor Bárdi, Csilla Fedinec, and László Szarka, eds., *Minority Hungarian Communities in the Twentieth Century* (East European Monographs, 2011).

⁴⁹ Rogers Brubaker, “Accidental Diasporas and External" Homelands" in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present. IHS Political Science Series 71, October 2000.,” 2000.

⁵⁰ More precisely formulated by András L. Pap Hungary followed a „hypocritical model” of multiculturalism back this time also in its domestic politics, in which the most important element was to show an example for the neighboring countries to support policies towards national minorities. Fifth chapter in András L. Pap, *Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy* (New York, London: Routledge, 2017), <https://www.routledge.com/Democratic-Decline-in-Hungary-Law-and-Society-in-an-Illiberal-Democracy/Pap/p/book/9781138052123>.

⁵¹ Balázs Vizi, “Minority Rights in International Relations,” in *Minority Hungarian Communities in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Csilla Fedinec, László Szarka, and Nándor Bárdi (East European Monographs, 2011), 438–39; Myra A. Waterbury, *Between State and Nation. Diaspora Politics and Kin-State Nationalism in Hungary* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 10.

state⁵²). This Act can be derived from the responsibility clause of the previous Hungarian Constitution. It aimed “to promote and preserve” transborder Hungarians’ “well-being and awareness of national identity within their home country” and to “ensure undisturbed cultural, economic and family relations.”⁵³ These kinds of legislations are not rare in the region; several countries regulate their relations to their ethnic minorities in neighboring countries with status laws.⁵⁴ In accordance with the Law, the so-called “Certificate of Hungarian Nationality” has been created; providing certain benefits in Hungary. The certificate can be obtained on the recommendations of several religious and civil organizations (and now also can be obtained via citizenship).⁵⁵ The Venice Commission has pointed out some concerns of extraterritoriality as the organizations involved in the process are located in neighboring countries.⁵⁶ The Act was created with explicit aim to avoid extension of citizenship beyond borders as it was not supported at this stage by any of the Hungarian political parties.⁵⁷

As the European integration process would result in the disconnection of the kin-minorities abroad some non-political organization expressed further concerns and started to collect signatures for a referendum for citizenship extension. The World Federation of Hungarians, which is an organization without strong internal embeddedness collected the sufficient number of signatures and the referendum was held on the 5th of December 2004. At

⁵² Iván Halász and Balázs Majtényi, “Constitutional Regulation in Europe on the Status of Minorities Living Abroad,” *Minorities Research*, no. 4 (2002): 135–44.

⁵³ Chapter II Article 4 in Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries 2001.

⁵⁴ For a list of “national responsibility clauses” and status laws see Mária M. Kovács, Zsolt Körtvélyesi, and Szabolcs Pogonyi, “The Politics of External Kin-State Citizenship in East Central Europe,” EUDO Citizenship Observatory (Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2010), <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/ECEcomporeport.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Article 19 (3) in Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries 2001

⁵⁶ “The Protection of National Minorities by Their Kin-State” (Athen: Venice Commission, European Commission for Democracy Through Law, June 7, 2002), <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-STD%282002%29032-bil>.

⁵⁷ Kinga Gál, “The Hungarian Legislation on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries”, in *The Protection of National Minorities by Their Kin-State*, Venice Commission, Science and Technique of Democracy (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Strasbourg., 2002).

the first stage none of the political parties supported the initiation, but later Fidesz (who was the governing party when the Status Law was created) started backing the referendum.⁵⁸ The parties in opposition claimed the enormous costs which dual citizenship would mean to Hungary. The referendum was invalid, as not enough people participated on the election.⁵⁹ This moment is referred to as the ‘black day’ of the contemporary Hungarian history further the current extension of citizenship is referred to make this decision right.⁶⁰ Applying Brubaker’s concept about the crystallization of ethnicity, this date could be perceived as an example. This date is often invoked, and the organizations introduced later did chose to reorganize themselves and restructure their connections with the kin-state exactly on this day.

The change, which is most relevant in the context of this thesis, occurred only in 2010, when the Fidesz government won two thirds majority in the Hungarian Parliament and as their very first and symbolic step adopted the Amendment of the Act on Nationality.⁶¹ The residency requirement was removed, and the simplified naturalization procedure was introduced. Before the ones with Hungarian origin have had already the possibility to naturalize on preferential terms, but some years of residency was required (i.e. depending on marital status). Analyzed together with the later accepted Testimony on National Cohesion⁶² and the new Hungarian constitution called Fundamental Law, these steps could be understood as the extension of the nation concept beyond borders.⁶³ As explained by others the previously

⁵⁸ “Kettős Állampolgárság - Adatok, Állásfoglalások, Elemzések,” accessed April 9, 2018, http://kisebbssegkutato.tk.mta.hu/kettosallampolgarsag/allasfoglalasok/allasfogl_28.html.

⁵⁹ Mária M. Kovács, “The Politics of Dual Citizenship in Hungary,” *Citizenship Studies* 10, no. 4 (September 1, 2006): 431–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020600858088>.

⁶⁰ Zsolt Semjén, “Dr. Semjén Zsolt miniszterelnök-helyettes a törvény kapcsán elmondott beszéde,” 2010, http://allampolgarsag.gov.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=142:semjen&catid=43:torveny&Itemid=72.

⁶¹ “Amendment of Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship,” A magyar állampolgársági törvény módosításának háttere, 2010, <http://allampolgarsag.gov.hu/images/angol.pdf>.

⁶² “ACT XLV on Testimony on National Cohesion,” (2010).

⁶³ Zsolt Körtvélyesi, “Állampolgárság és felelősségi klauzula,” *Pázmány Law Working Papers*, no. 30 (2011), <http://plwp.eu/evfolyamok/2011/108-2011-30>.

used political nation concept, which refers to the ones belonging to the Hungarian nation, as the ones who live within the territory of Hungary, the ethno-cultural nation concept is rather applicable.⁶⁴ This means that those belong to the Hungarian nation, who share the common traditions and speak the Hungarian language. Living on the territory is no further requirement. At this stage the extension of voting rights was explicitly excluded from the regulation, mainly because the government wanted to bear the support of all the political parties. This was successful as the legislation was accepted with overwhelming majority.

The thesis analyzes four actors of the Transylvanian scene which are impacted by these regulations. The Hungarian National Council of Transylvania is a civil organization, which is a central actor in the Transylvanian scene since 2003. The organization focused mainly on cultural issues and supported the autonomy struggles of the Transylvanian community, as a whole. According to the yearbook of 2008 which was published for the fifth jubilee of the organization the primary target of the organization is to reach the highest level of autonomy for the Transylvanian Hungarians. EMNT claimed to stand for the role of mediator between the people and the political parties.⁶⁵ At this stage they still claim to work without the influence of any political parties, in this sense their previous functioning is closer to the classical understanding of a civil organization. The major change occurred in 2010, with the introduction of the above described measures.

In 2010 the organization signed an agreement with the Hungarian government to support the implementation of the Nationality Act beyond borders. EMNT declared that their most important goal is to support the struggles of the Hungarian national community of Transylvania, to stand for their rights and interest. They furthermore claim to support the civil

⁶⁴ Körtvélyesi, “Az „egységes magyar nemzet” és az állampolgárság.”

⁶⁵ “Ötéves Az Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács. Jubileumi Kötet - PDF,” 2008, <http://docplayer.hu/859819-Oteves-az-erdelyi-magyar-nemzeti-tanacs-jubileumi-kotet.html>.

society, democracy, rule of law and political plurality, and the economic, social, cultural and infrastructural development of different regions.⁶⁶

The Democracy Centers were established in 2011 after the agreement among the National Council and the Hungarian Ministry of Justice and the Hungarian government.⁶⁷ According to the agreement EMNT takes its part in implementation of dual citizenship introduced by the Hungarian government. At the same time the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania was established.

The People's Party was created with the explicit aim to support the autonomy of the Hungarian kin-minority in Transylvania. As they state in their founding decree they want to counteract the politics of the last 20 years in Transylvania, which other actors were not able to reach self-determination for the Transylvanian community.⁶⁸ The organization was established with the support of the Hungarian government. Others claim that EMNP (and the other smaller ethnic party MPP) is supported by Fidesz to "reconfigure the Transylvanian Hungarian political field."⁶⁹ The great influence of the government is clear since then, EMNP supports Fidesz' political agenda and campaigning activity quite extensively.⁷⁰ In 2012, when the Democracy Centers started their work I conducted interviews among the employees and

⁶⁶ "Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács - Az EMNT Céljai," accessed May 19, 2018, <http://emnt.org/archivum/az-emnt-celjai.html>.

⁶⁷ Magyar Külügyi Évkönyv 176, 2010, http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/e/0b/60000/kulpolitikai-evkonyv_2010.pdf#!DocumentBrowse.

⁶⁸ Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács Országos Küldöttgyűlése, "Autonómiát, politikai érdekképviselőket, nemzeti közösséget Határozat az Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt létrehozásáról" (Székelyudvarhely, 4, 2010), http://emnt.org/archivum/admin/data/file/20130318/emnp_hatarozat_emnt.pdf.

⁶⁹ Tamás Kiss, "Increasing Marginality, Ethnic Parallelism and Asymmetric Accommodation. Social and Political Processes Concerning the Hungarian Community of Transylvania," *Minority Studies*, no. 18 (2015): 66. See more about Fidesz' domestic political motivations and its impact on the diaspora politics before these regulations in Waterbury, "Ideology, Organization, Opposition: How Domestic Political Strategy Shapes Hungary's Ethnic Activism."

⁷⁰ "Toró: az erdélyi magyarok is részesei a Fidesz-KDNP választási győzelmének," 2014, <http://www.neppart.eu/toro-az-erdelyi-magyarok-is-reszesei-a-fidesz-kdnp-valasztasi-gyozelmenek.html>.

employers of the organizations, which have demonstrated that the organizations are heavily interconnected. This means that the financial support coming from the Hungarian government flows also into the budget of EMNP.⁷¹ They share their offices and human resources since that time. The support coming from the Hungarian government this way towards a Romanian political party contradicts the Romanian law. However, since then the government's support is continuous.

4.2 Extension of Voting Rights

Before the 2014 elections the government changed the electoral system enormously. They reduced the number of the members of the parliament to 199 mandates. The elections are held in one round, instead of the previous two-round system. The citizens of Hungary can vote on the individual candidates from their own constituencies, namely 106 Members of Parliament are elected on this basis. The remaining 93 candidates are elected from party and minority lists. The Hungarian citizens without permanent residency in the country may only cast their votes for the party lists. Despite the fact, that the extension of voting rights toward transborder Hungarians was explicitly rejected by the government at the time of the amendment of citizenship law, the Act on the Elections of the Members of the Parliament was changed in 2013. According to the legislation a cardinal act may regulate further the electoral rights, which can “be subject of residence in Hungary.”⁷²

The participation of citizens without residency in the country on the Hungarian national elections is bound to registration, which is available 15 days before the day of election. Till the end of March some 450 thousand registrations were received, from which

⁷¹ Aliz Nagy, “Kettős állampolgárság hatása Erdélyben,” in *Kulcskérdések a társadalomkutatásban 2014-2015. Konferenciakötet* (Budapest: Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Társadalomtudományi Kar, 2016).

⁷² Article XXIII (4) “Fundamental Law” (2011).

some 370 thousand were registered into the postal voters' electoral register.⁷³ Their ballots are not counted separately, so it is not known who represents them in the Hungarian Parliament.

Nevertheless, voting rights for citizens beyond border is an extension of rights they still only have 'half vote'.⁷⁴ The differentiation is not only in the number of the votes, but also in the method of voting. However, till the 2013 amendment of the electoral system the Hungarian citizens who have residency in the country, but are abroad at the time of the elections could have casted their votes via post as well, but ten days before the 2014 elections, contradicting to the rules the government changed this (by accepting the Act LXXXIX of 2013). They can only cast their votes on foreign representation. This may be a burden not only in time but in travelling costs as well. The difficulty of their situation is also visible, from the numbers of registrations received for the 2018 election. Only 50 000 expats registered to cast their vote from one of the embassies or consulates.⁷⁵ The exact number of expats are not known, but there are estimations from 300 000 to 500 000 people.⁷⁶ The Hungarians without residency in the country can send their ballots via post for two weeks before the elections.

This seems to be a reasonable time due to difficulties of postal voting. Nevertheless, expats can only cast their vote in one dedicated location, which can result in hours of standing in line. Just in London, where the biggest number of expats lives, more than 9700 people registered.⁷⁷ The differentiation in the method of voting was brought in front of the

⁷³ "Külhoni magyar állampolgárok választási regisztrációja."

⁷⁴ András Jakab, "A külföldön élő magyar állampolgárok választójoga egyenlőségének kérdése a választási törvény koncepciójában," *Pázmány Law Working Papers*, no. 38 (2011), <http://plwp.eu/evfolyamok/2011/100-2011-38>.

⁷⁵ "Külképviseleti Szavazás - Nemzeti Választási Iroda," 2018, <http://www.valasztas.hu/kulkepviseleti-szavazas1>.

⁷⁶ Kim Lane Scheppele, "Hungary, An Election in Question, Part 4 - The New York Times," 2014, <https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part-4/>.

⁷⁷ "Külképviseleti Szavazás - Nemzeti Választási Iroda," 2018, http://www.valasztas.hu/kulkepviseleti-szavazas1?p_p_id=kuvik_WAR_nvinvrportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1#_kuvik_WAR_nvinvrportlet_tableTop.

Constitutional Court of Hungary, which turned down the request.⁷⁸ The European Court of Human Rights dealt with the issue, and ruled that the regulation belongs to the wide margin of appreciation of the state.⁷⁹ From this differentiation it becomes evident, that the incorporation into the Hungarian political community is not absolute, the transborder Hungarians form a distinct category, for whom different rules apply. Nevertheless, the thesis investigates the impact of this extension, it does not aim for normative assessment of the phenomenon.

Preceding the 2014 elections the Democracy Centers extended their work for registration and ballot collecting. They collected approximately 66 thousand ballots in Transylvania.⁸⁰ The ballots coming via post resulted in more than one mandate, which helped Fidesz to reach the two thirds majority in the parliament. Before the 2018 elections using their previous contact list the National Council went on with the registration and ballot collecting procedure. They managed again to collect some 67 thousand ballots; this is almost the half of the voting packages received from Transylvania. The ballots coming from the region were worth of more than two mandates, however, due to the complicated electoral math, in this election they did not result directly in any further seats for Fidesz.

The party managed to reach two thirds majority without the support of the Transylvanian ballots. Nevertheless, counting those together with the winner compensation ballots, they meant more than seven seats for the governing party in the parliament.⁸¹ The winner compensation is also a phenomenon introduced by the change of the electoral system in 2013. Compensation in general means that votes of non-mandate receiving candidates in the single member constituencies are added to their party list, so that a more proportionate

⁷⁸ 3048/2014. (III. 13.), No. 3048 (Constitutional Court 2014).

⁷⁹ *Vámos and other v. Hungary*, No. 48148/14 (European Court of Human Rights March 19, 2015).

⁸⁰ “Toró: az erdélyi magyarok is részesei a Fidesz-KDNP választási győzelmének.”

⁸¹ Róbert László, “Nem hozott a külhon mandátumot a Fidesznek, a „győzteskompenzációval” együtt viszont 7-et is,” 2018, <http://www.valasztasirendszer.hu/?p=1943608>.

representation could be established also counting the casted ballots, which would not result any further mandate in the given individual constituency. The new regulation enables also the mandate winning candidate to obtain the ballots received above the sufficient number for one mandate. These additional ballots are added to the mandate winner's national party list.⁸² Counting these winner compensation votes and ballots received from Transylvania together means that Fidesz received another seven mandates.

Not only has the National Council put extra effort in supporting the ballots coming from transborder Hungarians, the consulates are open for extraordinary hours as well (6 a.m. till 10 p.m. every weekday, including some weekends and even national holidays). I spent one week during the registration period in Transylvania and another couple of days preceding the Hungarian elections. I observed the activity of the National Council and the consulates. I spent my time in the office of the Council, which shares its courtyard with the consulate.

During the registration period (till 24th of March, 15 days before the elections) paid volunteers offered their help in registration. Based on the catalogue of dual citizens, whom naturalization the National Council helped, they contacted the citizens, asked whether they want to participate on the elections and offered their help in registration via phone. Using the website of the National Electoral Office anyone can register basically anyone for the elections, knowing only the details from the residence card which every citizen received automatically. The volunteers also asked for the family members contact, so that they can reach out to more and more people. They also asked citizens not to cast their ballots via post, because one cannot trust the Romanian postal services. They offered to help in filling out the identification form in the voting packages and help to transfer ballots to the Hungarian Consulate.

⁸² For a more in-depth analysis of this phenomenon see: Kim Lane Scheppele, "Hungary, An Election in Question, Part 3," *Paul Krugman Blog* (blog), 28, 2014, <https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part-3/>.

I experienced that the people, usually elderly come in to the office after every single piece of letter which they receive, usually from Viktor Orbán himself. They ask the employees what to do with the letter. Quite often those letters were never opened, because they already experienced that officers can help efficiently filling out forms, so they automatically come to EMNT office, rather than reading the letters and following the sometimes too complicated instructions. In time of the election the officers help in filling out the forms and there is a polling station located in the EMNT office, where they can cast their ballots. These ballots are delivered to the neighboring consulate and are brought by the consulate to Hungary. People quite often take pictures in front of the polling station, as this is a unique experience for them to cast the ballot.

The Hungarian government expanded its influence in Transylvania with signing an agreement with Eurotrans Foundations, which is affiliated with the most influential Hungarian political party in Romania, RMDSZ. Previously the EMNP was created to be the counterpart of RMDSZ, and this is one of the reasons why it was supported by the Hungarian government. Eurotrans Foundation was founded in 2004, mainly with the aim to support the collaboration among different regions and countries focusing on the participation of developing regions in European projects.⁸³ According to their official website the simplified naturalization procedure fits this objective. Few previous data are available about the Foundation, as their website was restructured once the agreement with the Hungarian government was signed. Before the agreement they mainly coordinated the projects supported by the so-called Szülőföld Alap (Motherland Fund), a fund sponsored by Hungary to help in

⁸³ “Eurotrans Alapítvány | » Bemutakozás,” accessed May 23, 2018, <http://eurotransalapitvany.ro/rolunk/>.

preserving the Hungarian identity among the transborder Hungarians.⁸⁴ The Foundation was coordinated previously by RMDSZ leaders.⁸⁵

Since the democratic transition in the region RMDSZ played an important role in the political matters of the Hungarian kin-minority in Transylvania. Kiss and Székely, investigated extensively the shifting linkages of the Hungarian electorate and RMDSZ.⁸⁶ In their analysis they used the typologies concerning ethnic parties and mobilization but supplemented those with the so-called ethnic voter habitus, which is characteristic for the Hungarians in the region. RMDSZ appeared on the political landscape of Romania not merely as an ethnic political party, but it was described as a social movement as well.

RMDSZ managed to play on the historical roots of the Transylvanian Hungarians for which the most relevant term was the Minority Society. As explained by Kiss and Székely relying on Sulyok⁸⁷ “[t]he Minority Society, in the sense of a parallel society or “Hungarian world” is more than a description of social reality; it is also a political program, a desirable state of affairs, which, according to its supporters, should be pursued by the Hungarian elite.”⁸⁸ Accordingly this parallel society cannot be established merely by political agenda, but the community itself should be actively organized. RMDSZ in the 1990’s set up an agenda relying on this strategy. The party turned away from this by experiencing the pressure from the majority politics.⁸⁹ At this stage RMDSZ’ leader Béla Markó stated that the situation

⁸⁴ “LXV. Szülőföld Alap - Fejezeti Indokolása,” 2011. This fund has been already converted into Bethlen Gábor Alapkezelő Zrt. “BGA Zrt.,” accessed May 23, 2018, <http://www.szulofold.hu/>.

⁸⁵ “Titokzatos RMDSZ-alapítvány segít a honosításban,” <http://foter.ro/>, accessed May 23, 2018, http://foter.ro/cikk/20150218_titokzatos_rmdsz_alapitvany_segit_a_honositasban.

⁸⁶ Kiss and Székely, “Shifting Linkages in Ethnic Mobilization: The Case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania.”

⁸⁷ Sulyok István, “A kisebbségi kérdés szociológiai oldala,” *Erdélyi Múzeum*, no. 1931. Új folyam 2. (36.) 4-6. sz. (1931): 170–81.

⁸⁸ Kiss and Székely, “Shifting Linkages in Ethnic Mobilization: The Case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania,” 597.

⁸⁹ Tibor Toró, “A romániai magyar nyilvánosság alakulásának diskurzusa politikai filozófiai megközelítésben” (Babes-Bolyai University, 2013).

of the Hungarian kin-minority in Transylvania can be resolved only within the framework of Romanian politics. Since then the tension between RMDSZ and Hungarian politics is apparent.

Right after the regime change in Transylvania the Hungarian politicians have been rejected by the majority parties as those aimed for a homogenous political community. The change occurred in 1996 as RMDSZ joined the government. The international environment at this time played a key role, as due to the Yugoslav secessions the case of the Hungarians in Romania was perceived as a security issue and could have prevented Romania's European integration once the situation is not solved in accordance to international norms. RMDSZ changed its politics accordingly; they turned away from the previous strategy of supporting the autonomy ambitions, but relied on majority politics. However, the question of autonomy was relaunched in 2004, no influential steps have been taken by the party.⁹⁰

RMDSZ politics focused rather on the allocation of funds, what they primarily wanted to ensure by relying on the majority politics. This changed enormously with interventions of the Hungarian government. Previously the funds coming from Romanian resources could any time transcend the ones coming from Hungary, since the analyzed agreement with the Hungarian government the situation has changed. After the agreement with the Hungarian government RMDSZ started to actively support Fidesz. This is not a unique phenomenon as all of the leading politicians from the neighboring countries supported the re-election of Viktor Orbán,⁹¹ claiming that the Fidesz-KDNP alliance would strengthen their well-being in their own country. Already in 2016, the RMDSZ leader Hunor Kelemen in connection to

⁹⁰ Zsuzsa Csörgő, "Kosovo and the Framing of Non-Secessionist Self-Government Claims in Romania," *Europe-Asia Studies* 65 (July 1, 2013): 889–911, <https://doi.org/10.2307/23438647>.

⁹¹ "A Fidesz-kormányzás folytatását szeretnék a határon túli magyar politikusok | 24.Hu," accessed April 4, 2018, <https://24.hu/kozelet/2017/07/21/a-fidesz-kormanyzas-folytatatas-szeretnek-a-hatarontuli-magyar-politikusok/>.

Romanian elections expressed his gratitude to Fidesz as he phrases the Fidesz-KDNP alliance helped them during the Romanian elections.⁹²

The agreement with RMDSZ related foundation seems to be part of a process in which Fidesz wants to improve its connections towards transborder Hungarians in Transylvania. The Eurotrans Foundation provides similar help to that of EMNT. A network was established, which since July 2017 supports naturalization, registration and ballot collecting. The offices have been set up with the financial help of the government.⁹³ In time of the 2018 election I witnessed that in the courtyard of the Hungarian consulate a new office started to work. The office belongs to an association called Áldás, népesség, which is strongly allied with MPP (Hungarian Civic Party) and RMDSZ. The people working in this office offered their help in filling out the identification form for voting packages. The Áldás, népesség office was located right across the consulates office and one employee of the consulate stand hour long in front of the entrance and told people to go and ask for help at the 'RMDSZ office' instead of the EMNT office (located in the same courtyard two doors further).⁹⁴ It was clear that there is a competition between the organizations in the ballot collecting. Volunteers stood in front of the RMDSZ office and guided people, who approached EMNT office rather in that direction.

The Hungarian government's policies towards the Transylvania actors results in competition. This is not a unique phenomenon, however in this case what becomes clear that the competition is based on an element which has further implications for claim-making strategies of the Hungarian kin-minority organizations. The competition is based on the capacity of these organizations to recruit citizens for Hungary and voters for Fidesz. Both

⁹² "RMDSZ.ro - Kelemen Hunor szövetségi elnök: megbizonyosodtunk, erős magyar közösség él Erdélyben," 2016, <http://www.rmdsz.ro/sajtoszoba/hir/kelemen-hunor-szovetsegi-elnok-megbizonyosodtunk-eros-magyar-kozosseg-el-erdelyben>.


⁹³ Interview conducted with the president of the Foundation in Transindex online platform: "250 millió forintból honosít idén az Eurotrans Alapítvány," <http://www.transindex.ro>, accessed May 23, 2018, <http://itthon.transindex.ro/?cikk=25554>.

⁹⁴ Field Notes from the 5th of April 2018, Cluj

network of organizations (I understand here together EMNT/EMNP and Eurotrans Foundation/RMDSZ) are allied with the Hungarian government; they are in strategic partnership which means that they explicitly support Fidesz in retaining its power in the Hungarian parliament. This also impacts the Transylvanian voting behavior.

Several authors discuss the impact of kin-state politics on the ethnic minorities abroad, but none of these literature deals with these everyday practices of interconnected network of organizations and impact of kin-state's politics on those. This type of intervention into the everyday functioning of organizations impacts claim-making strategies enormously and pulls out easily the roots of these organizations from the Romanian sphere. Both EMNT and Eurotrans Foundation were created with the explicit aim to support members of the Hungarian kin-minority with funds allocation; projects follow up and further different tools for claim-making. Nevertheless, their connection to political parties disables this type of activity in the current establishment. Not only the agreement with Fidesz but the influence of their own parties has impact on their everyday practices. In what follows I introduce the consequence of this phenomena not only on the civil organizations but also on the political parties.

The table below shows the introduced legislations and most important events connected to the organizations.⁹⁵



1. Table Timeline of legislations and events

Considering the classical theories related to ethnic parties, one can see that consequences of these strategies are conceptualized differently. The classic thesis of ethnic outbidding⁹⁶ or about the classification of ethnic parties relied always on their relation toward their home-state⁹⁷ or it was analyzed based on their relations to each other and their electorate. In the above analyzed situation, the relation of the parties to each other is less relevant, their partner-organizations are in scope, via which they approach the citizens and relying on those organizations they can exercise different type of power than before. The civil organizations lose their autonomous functioning, become dependent on the Hungarian politics. The political parties on the other hand become even more dependent on their civil actors. As those organizations are the ones who execute the Hungarian government's initiations, the parties,

⁹⁵ Eurotrans Foundation was founded in 2004, no exact date is available, and the registration campaign started in Mid-July 2017, again no exact date available. I added the dates to provide more structured overview on the visualization.

⁹⁶ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

⁹⁷ Kitschelt, "Divergent Paths of Postcommunist Democracies."

who are in strategic partnership with Fidesz needs to rely more in their everyday politics on the civil actors. The political competition is transmitted to the level of civil organizations. Their everyday activities become tool for campaigning not only for the Hungarian government and for Hungarian elections, but for the political parties. The politicians need to come into the office of EMNT and Eurotrans Foundation to cast their ballots for the Hungarian elections, they are photographed there,⁹⁸ there photos are posted online and via the functioning of these offices of the civil organizations they can campaign not only for Fidesz, but for their own voting base.

In this sense explicitly, the presumption made by Pogonyi⁹⁹ and others¹⁰⁰ are confirmed. These political and civil organizations need to focus in setting up their claim-making strategies on Hungary and not on the state of affairs in their country of residence. Pogonyi argues that “in terms of minority agency” the Hungarian nation strategy leads to counterproductive functioning. Instead of supporting the transborder actors to concentrate on their claim-making procedures, the actors become agents of the Hungarian political community.

Pogonyi also argues based on his empirical research that the members of the Hungarian kin-minority associate values towards their citizenship rights, the stronger pragmatic relevance of citizenship they see the stronger symbolic values they connect. This can impact the functioning of the analyzed organizations. The dual citizens in Transylvania rely on those institutions which support their pragmatic needs and expect them to coordinate their matters accordingly. Because of these the political parties needs to take their part in citizenship and electoral management, so that they could attract the Hungarian dual citizens.

⁹⁸ Field Notes from the 4th of April 2018, Cluj. Most probably those photos are still available via the official facebook account of the politicians.

⁹⁹ Pogonyi, “Europeanization of Kin-Citizenship and the Dynamics of Kin-Minority Claim-Making.”

¹⁰⁰ Salat Levente, “A könnyített honosítás látható és várható következményeiről. Válaszok a Magyar Kisebbség kérdéseire,” *Magyar Kisebbség*, no. 69-70. 18. (2013.): 226–40.

The political campaign cannot be based any more only on the previous strategy of ethnic Hungarian parties, those Hungarian political parties in Romania need to rely on their participation in the Hungarian political community.

This phenomenon is also confirmed by the research conducted by the scholars of the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities. Already in 2013 it was illustrated that the members of the Hungarian kin-minority trust the Hungarian political actors of the kin-state, they perceive those as the ones who understand and help in their issues.¹⁰¹ The survey scrutinized the voting behavior of ethnic minority voters. It was confirmed that the members of the Transylvanian kin-minority who already applied, or planned to apply for the Hungarian citizenship are easier to mobilize, and they tend to vote for the smaller parties (EMNP, MPP).¹⁰² The survey was conducted before the agreement with RMDSZ, back that time only EMNP was in strong connection to the Hungarian government. This shows that the attention of the dual citizens is worth to attract. Further the research confirmed that the members of the Hungarian kin-minority consider their political parties relation to the Hungarian government crucial.

I argue that this phenomenon is the result of the external impact of the Hungarian government, transforms the Transylvanian political scene, not only because the organizations needs to reform their claim-making strategies, but by the influence of the government relations among the organizations changed. Instead of focusing on the majoritarian politics in Romania their everyday practices are more and more connected to the Hungarian political community.

¹⁰¹ Tamás Kiss, “Nemzetdiskurzusok hálójában. Az állampolgárság-politika, mint a magyar nemzetre vonatkozó klasszifikációs küzdelem epizódja és eszköze,” *Magyar Kisebbség*, no. 3 (2013).

¹⁰² Tamás Kiss, István Gergő Székely, and Gergő Barna, “Factors Affecting Turnout among Ethnic Minority Voters,” *Intersections* 3, no. 4 (December 28, 2017): 111, <https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v3i4.392>.

4.3 Extension of the Tentacles

The intervention of the Hungarian government not only impacts the actors analyzed above, but via the alliances and agreements it impacts those elements of the everyday life which are somehow connected to these actors. By the influence which Fidesz exercises in the organizations, the Hungarian government can reach out to more and more components of the Transylvanian everyday life. This results in the fact that the institutional framework of the Hungarian kin-minority in Transylvania is rather dependent on the Hungarian government. The relations realized towards Transylvanian organizations are becoming clientelistic. The most apparent examples of the last years for this phenomenon are the cases of media and clerical life in Transylvania.

After the agreement with Eurotrans the government started to support RMDSZ friendly media. Previously Hungarian authorities supported the Hungarian language media already, however only with minimal funding for RMDSZ related websites. The organization “Without Borders for the Hungarian Press Foundation” previously supported with large amounts a small online platform connected to Fidesz.¹⁰³ This support was extended however, step by step to RMDSZ friendly platforms as well.¹⁰⁴ The importance of this phenomenon is confirmed again by another survey conducted about the media consumption of the Transylvanian youth.¹⁰⁵ The research from 2013 states, that online websites are the most important source of news. Previously the government supported only those platforms which

¹⁰³ “Így „építik” a sajtót magyar pénzből Erdélyben – ujszo.com | EuroCom - Romániai Sajtófigyelő,” 2018, <https://eurocom.wordpress.com/2018/02/15/igy-epitik-a-sajtot-magyar-penzbol-erdelyben-ujszo-com/>.

¹⁰⁴ The portal Átlátszó Erdély (Transparent Transylvania) makes an account of all the online platform supported by the Hungarian government: “Magához édesgette a Fidesz az erdélyi magyar online sajtót,” Erdély, 2017, <https://erdely.atlatszo.hu/2017/06/05/magahoz-edesgette-a-fidesz-az-erdelyi-magyar-online-sajtot/>.

¹⁰⁵ Barna Gergő and Kiss Tamás, *Erdélyi Magyar Fiatalok 2013 - Hungarian Youth in Transylvania - Research Report* (Cluj-Napoca: ISPMN, 2013).

were said to be on the right side of the political spectrum. Since 2016 this strategy changed, and the most influential portal szekelyhon.ro also receives support from the government.¹⁰⁶

Further important factor in the external voting is the relationship towards churches. Among the Transylvanian kin-minority religious organizations play a determinative role in the ethnic community life. RMDSZ has a strong connection with religious organizations, which support their political aims as well. Dating back till the 2001 Status Law, the religious organizations played determinative role in the application of that system. This relationship seems to be used during the Hungarian elections as well. Both RMDSZ and other organizations ask voters not to trust the Romanian post offices, rather they go and collect the ballots in different villages, and they ask the voters to come to the regional offices to cast their ballots. In the countryside they can also rely on clerical and educational institutions, nursery and primary schools, as they did it previously during the naturalization processes.¹⁰⁷ Fidesz extended its tentacles over these organizations as well. In March 2018 the government announced to support the Transylvanian clerical life and civil society with 560 million forints.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ “Magához édesgette a Fidesz az erdélyi magyar online sajtót.”

¹⁰⁷ “Eurotrans Alapítvány | » Kiszállások,” 2018, <http://eurotransalapitvany.ro/category/kiszallasok/?osszes=igen>.

¹⁰⁸ “Csíki RMDSZ - A közösség alapja az egyház és a civil élet,” 2018, <http://csikirmdsz.ro/hu/nd/11338/a-kozosseg-alapja-az-egyhaz-es-a-civil-elet>.

5. Discursive Shift

Relying on ethnographic experiences I analyze discourses of the Hungarian government and of the organizations (EMNT, EMNP and Eurotrans Foundation, RMDSZ). I assume that discursive panels used in the rhetoric of the Hungarian government infiltrate also into the discourse of the Transylvanian actors. The shift in the discursive panels can verify that there is a transformation in the work of the Transylvanian organizations, from being representatives of the kin-minority to becoming agents of the Hungarian government. This can be shown by investigating the discursive panels and by checking whether those refer to the members of the kin-minority as members of the Romanian political community, the Transylvanian political community or the extended Hungarian political community beyond borders. The interview conducted with the person responsible for the communication strategies of the organization confirmed that the changing nature of this discourse is not a direct product of the Hungarian government's influence, the wording of the articles written by members of the organizations is the product of their own strategy. Based on the interviewee's perception no influence of the Hungarian government is realized in those statements, which I below analyze. This verifies that the discursive panels are the result of an organic development within the organizations.

I organize this chapter along three main lines to support my argument. First, I introduce the methodology, sampling and coding criteria. Second, I list different concepts of political community as used by the Transylvanian actors. Finally, I discuss the discursive shift in the communication of the Transylvanian actors.

Building my assumptions, I relied on experiences of ethnographic observations. During the weeks I spent in Cluj I realized that communicative strategies used by the organizations are very similar to that of the Hungarian government. The most important activity of the organizations preceding the elections was registration, then ballot collecting.

As stated by several actors dual citizens need to be informed first and foremost about the processes of registration and postal voting, because as a Romanian citizen they do not need to register for elections, neither can they cast the ballots via post. This information was advertised on websites specifically created for these occasions. The one used by the Eurotrans Foundation corresponds in its style to the Hungarian informational campaign¹⁰⁹ and the one which was developed by EMNT recalls the style of the so-called ‘Government-window’, which is a centralized, online forum for Hungarian citizens for their everyday administrative issues.¹¹⁰

I argue that measures introduced by the government reduced the capacity of the organizations (EMNT, EMNP, Eurotrans Foundation and RMDSZ) to stand for the kin-minority as members of the Romanian political community, or as members of the Transylvanian political community, which could have been the realization of the concept of Minority Society promoted by RMDSZ long. Not only are these organizations deprived of their capacity, but the political space in which they have to operate is converted enormously by the presence of the Hungarian government.

The restructuring of the political space has consequences for the relation of Transylvanian actors and the population. I assume that the extension of the Hungarian political community impacts the sense of belonging of the members of the Hungarian kin-minority, which must impact the Transylvanian organizations. The change in the perception of the people as members of the Hungarian political community will influence their relation towards their civil and political organizations. I overviewed how the people are invoked and checked if this has been impacted by the changes in politics.

¹⁰⁹ “Választások 2018. - Regisztráció,” 2018, <http://regisztracio.ro>; “Nemzeti Konzultáció 2018,” accessed May 20, 2018, <https://nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu/>.

¹¹⁰ The website of EMNT: valasztas.info is not available any more. “Kormányablak,” Kormányablak, accessed May 20, 2018, <http://kormanyablak.hu/hu>; “Magyarországi választások: új honlap segíti a regisztrációt,” accessed May 20, 2018, <https://kronika.ro/erdelyi-hirek/magyarorszag-valasztasok-honlap-segiti-a-regisztraciott>.

First, in lack of any political program of the Hungarian government I collected speeches from Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. I decided to rely on Orbán's political speeches since those serve as pragmatic milestones of the government's program. I narrowed down the sample to speeches before and after the last two elections. The first speech I analyzed was from July 2013. The Prime Minister visits the Bálványos Summer School every year and holds a speech which defines the next year of his politics. Based on this I started with the speech from the summer 2013 and to the 2014 elections I selected every speech which somehow refers to the nation strategy of the government, or even more explicitly to Hungarian kin-minorities. In 2014 the last speech I analyzed was the one which he held once he has taken the oath for Prime Minister. The same structure I followed from summer 2017 to 2018 elections. Besides the purpose to reduce the amount of the data available I choose these speeches as they were held during the electoral campaign, so the audience they target are the population which the Prime Minister believes to participate on election, the entire Hungarian electorate.

I followed the same structure concerning the four organizations analyzed. I kept the timeframe, starting from the summer 2013 to 2014 election and again from 2017 to 2018 election. I have chosen the statements from the organizations which are connected somehow to the Hungarian elections and to the Hungarian politics more generally. Mainly these statements deal with citizenship application, registration campaign and beyond these technicalities with Hungarian national remembrances, like 15th of March events or with events connected directly to the Hungarian government, like the Peace March organized in Budapest, in favor of the ruling party.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ The rally, Békement is organized by a civil organization supported by the Fidesz government. People from the neighboring countries organize themselves and come with buses together to support the Prime Minister. See for further information about this year Peace March: "Tens of Thousands Join Rally for Hungary's Orban before April Vote," *Reuters*, March 15, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-election-rallies/tens-of->

I collected 20 speeches from Viktor Orbán, all together 53 568 words. From EMNT I coded the same amount of statements, 20 articles, worth of 9 606 words, and from EMNP 19 articles, worth of 5 646 words.

The same selection of articles I intended to use at Eurotrans Foundation and RMDSZ, but the two organizations are so interconnected in their communication, that it was impossible to differentiate between the articles published by the Foundation or the party. Though, the website of the Foundation collects articles in connection to the registration and election, but those are linked to the RMDSZ' website, or to any other online news platforms. Thus, at the end I collected and coded articles only from RMDSZ website. I went through all of the pages and selected articles which relate somehow to Hungarian national elections and to the agreement with the Hungarian government. So, in the case of the RMDSZ' articles the sample could not be narrowed by the same criteria as in the case of EMNT and EMNP. As RMDSZ and the Hungarian government's agreement only dates back to the time before the 2018 elections I used in the sample also those statements which refer to the negotiations about the agreement (later these statements will be referred to as the ones from 2016, the rapprochement started in 2015 and was finalized with Eurotrans Foundation starting the registration campaign in summer 2017). All together 20 articles have been used here as well, which takes up 8 905 words.

The difference between the lengths of the articles is apparent. Majority of speeches by Viktor Orbán are pragmatic milestones of the government's politics, he lays out grounds of next year's politics, and provides an elaborate structure for all speeches. In case of EMNT it is also characteristic, that articles address both information about the Hungarian government,

thousands-march-to-back-hungarys-nationalist-pm-before-vote-idUSKCN1GR1U6. The organizations analyzed in this paper organized their own buses as well: "Békemenet Budapesten – EMNT," accessed May 21, 2018, <http://emnt.org/2018/03/05/bekemenet-budapest/>; "Nem cáfol az RMDSZ: buszoztatnak a Békemenetre," Hír TV, March 9, 2018, <https://hirtv.hu/ahirtvhirei/nem-cafol-az-rmdsz-buszoztatnak-a-bekemenetre-2452559>.

and technicalities of citizenship. What is more, quite often these articles are introducing or quoting some Transylvanian politicians (often László Tőkés President of EMNT and European Parliament member, elected from an integrated Hungarian national list), who express their opinion about Hungarian politics. The EMNP and RMDSZ articles are much shorter, they contain more direct messages. Often these articles serve as campaigning devices, they express the support of Transylvanian politicians towards Fidesz, and sometimes they incorporate a couple of sentences of very technical information about registration and election.

In coding the articles, I differentiated between two types of codes (definition and prototypic quotation in 2. Table). One is referring to the words and phrases used by the Transylvanian actors. I applied the code ‘Wording by Viktor Orbán’ in those instances once the Transylvanian actors’ statements recall the exact same words of Viktor Orbán. I only applied the code once it was relevant, so when Viktor Orbán was quoted, or what he said was referred to I did not apply the code. Further to this I used more evaluative codes for the content of phrases itself. I used codes ‘Transformed meaning of statements by Transylvanian actors’ once the meaning of words or phrases mentioned in statements are altered in accordance to the understanding of the audience targeted, not in the way it was used originally by Viktor Orbán, from whom the words or the topic discussed are taken over.

The second type of codes I applied is based on the audience, whom the text targeted. Accordingly, I made a distinction between the ‘Transylvanian political community’; the ‘Romanian political community’; the ‘extended Hungarian political community’ and the ‘Hungarian political community within borders’. Those codes apply in those instances once the people are addressed as members of the given political community, and in those cases once they are referred to as members of that community.

During coding I also applied two more codes, which are not shown on the below table. The code 'Hungarian political community within the borders' occurred only in one speech by Viktor Orbán, when he was referring to the economic situation of the country before 2014, and the code 'Against Hungarian rhetoric' occurred four times in texts by RMDSZ in 2013 before the agreement with Fidesz.

Code	Definition of codes	Prototypic quotation
Extended Hungarian political community	Coded when reference for the political community which includes the transborder Hungarians	Original text: "Azok, akik a nemzet megosztásán ügyködtek, csúfos vereséget szenvedtek. //Európai képviselőnk szívbeli elismerését fejezte ki Orbán Viktor elnöknek, a nemzet minisztere elnökének" - Translation: Those who hustled for dividing the nation are defeated badly. // Our European Parliamentary Representative expressed his acknowledgement from his heart to Viktor Orbán, to the Minister President of the nation .
Romanian political community	Coded when reference for the political community of Romania, to which the Hungarian kin-minority belongs	Original texts: "ha bármilyen mértékben figyelembe venné a romániai magyarság jogos érdekeit" Translation: If only one could consider interests of Hungarians of Romania .
Transylvanian political community	Coded when reference for the political community of the Hungarian kin-minority in Transylvania	Original text: "A lényeg az, hogy azt az illúziót keltse az itteni magyarokban , mintha nekik módjukban állna...." Translation: The only thing what matters, is to create a delusion in the Hungarians here , as they could..."
Wording by Viktor Orbán	Used once the wording appears as in Viktor Orbán's speeches	Original text: "szélsőségesen liberális politikusok igent mondanának a több ezer, kultúrájukban tőlünk idegen migráns befogadására" Translation: Radically liberal politicians agreed in accepting more thousand, culturally foreign migrants .
Transformed meaning of statements by Transylvanian actors	Coded when same references used, but meaning transformed according to the Transylvanian understanding	Original text: "hiszen miként a magyar történelem során oly sokszor, a magyar összefogás által ismét sikerült megvédenünk Magyarországot, s vele együtt évezredek kultúránkat." Translation: via the joint Hungarian unification we managed to defend Hungary again, and along the thousand years of Hungarian culture.

2. Table Prototypes of codes

First, I went through all the texts and applied the codes for the political community. In the speeches of Viktor Orbán the concept of the extended political community is used most frequently, when referring to 'Hungarians' or 'nation'. I coded all the words, phrases, sentences, which refer to any kind of political community. In total I coded 393 occurrences of the different codes.

As a second step I relied on previous literature about the rhetorical devices used by Viktor Orbán. I used academic literature to avoid arbitrary coding of those discursive panels. Szilágyi and Bozóki investigated the discursive continuity of the Prime Minister's rhetoric and speech situations.¹¹² They refer to some thematically reoccurring words since his speeches from 1990's, like 'citizen' and 'Hungarian citizen', which in this thesis cannot be investigated thoroughly as the organizations deal with citizenship application, and the quantified results alter the findings. Citizenship for these organizations often appears in the context of technicalities connected to their everyday work. However, nevertheless RMDSZ also takes its part in registration and ballot collecting; they have rarely mentioned this term. From the 178 occurrences of the word 'citizen' only 17 times it was mentioned by RMDSZ or Eurotrans Foundation. This fits into the analyzed patterns of the nexus of RMDSZ towards the Hungarian government.

More important for this thesis is their analysis of Viktor Orbán's contemporary usage of words. Szilágyi and Bozóki refer to the words revolution and oligarchs. Besides their paper I relied also on the research conducted by Kopper et al.,¹¹³ who investigate the enemy images of Viktor Orbán also analyzing his speeches. Following their categorization, I searched for the words 'left', 'civil', 'liberal', and 'migrant' and as suggested by Szilágyi and Bozóki also for the words 'revolution' and 'oligarchs'. Further I added the word migrant, which is not discussed by the scholars, but I expected this to be relevant. Based on the way Transylvanian actors used the word I coded these instances as 'Wording by Viktor Orbán'. All together 42 items have been found in the articles, from which in 5 instances the word has been used in a

¹¹² András Bozóki and Anna Szilágyi, "Playing It Again in Post-Communism: The Revolutionary Rhetoric of Viktor Orbán in Hungary: Advances in the History of Rhetoric: Vol 18, No Sup1," *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 18, no. Rhetorics of "1989" and After: Rhetorical Archaeologies of Political (2015): 153–66.

¹¹³ Ákos Kopper et al., "Creating Suspicion and Vigilance. Using Enemy Images to Hinder Mobilization," *Intersections. EEJSP* 3, no. 3 (2018): 108–25.

transformed context, so that it could fit the Transylvanian audience better. Overall code performance is listed in 3. Table.

Code	Grounded
Extended Hungarian political community	282
Romanian political community	7
Transylvanian political community	103
Hungarian political community within borders	1
Wording by Viktor Orbán	42
Transformed meaning of statements by Transylvanian actors	20
Against Hungarian rhetoric	4

3. Table Overall code performance

I analyzed not only the occurrence of the given words, but also evaluated their meanings within the given context. All together I found 20 items within the texts of the Transylvanian actors in which those statements occurred which are very similar to that by Viktor Orbán, but their meaning is aligned to the context of the Transylvanian community. See for example the below case:

EMNP statement: In name of our volunteers and employees we gladly express our pleasure for the results, as it happened frequently during the Hungarian history via the joint Hungarian unification we managed to defend Hungary again, and along the thousand years of Hungarian culture was defend as well.¹¹⁴

EMNT statement: László Tőkés evaluated the results of the election as victory over hatred - on his speech at the result-waiting ceremony. Those who hustled for dividing the nation are defeated badly. On the contrary, those who set the goal of the fight for the self-defense of Hungarians won a sweeping victory – discussed our Transylvanian representative, emphasizing that the campaign against the transborder Hungarians could not be acted upon, moreover the transborder forces assisted significantly in the decisive victory of the national forces, the victory of Fidesz-KDNP party alliance¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ „Önkénteseink és munkatársaink nevében ezúton is örömünket fejezzük ki az elért eredményekért, hiszen miként a magyar történelem során oly sokszor, a magyar összefogás által ismét sikerült megvédenünk Magyarországot, s vele együtt évezredes kultúránkat.” – EMNP “Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt - Gratulálunk a FIDESZ—KDNP Pártszövetségnek!” accessed May 31, 2018, <http://www.neppart.eu/gratulalunk-a-fidesz-kdnp-partzsovetsegnek.html>.

¹¹⁵ „Az eredményvárón elhangzott beszédében Tőkés László a szeretetnek a gyűlölet fölött aratott győzelmeként értékelte a választási eredményeket. Azok, akik a nemzet megosztásán

Viktor Orbán's speech before the election: Lastly, I ask everyone to consider what is important in our life. Our family, children, human dignity, freedom, culture, faith and our home. This we must defend now! Things are simplified for the end of our campaign, we can choose between two futures. One is offered by Soros's candidates, the other is represented by the Fidesz and KDNP candidates. We consider Hungary comes first, for them George Soros, and the power and money offered by him. Because for money and power they will do everything.¹¹⁶

In the EMNT and EMNP excerpts it is clear that the defense of the homeland means not exactly the same, what Viktor Orbán is referring to. In the context of those the defense of homeland and of nation mean the saving of the unified Hungarian nation and the common culture, while in defending the homeland the Prime Minister refers to the members of the opposition, whom he claims to be agents of George Soros. In this case the nuances are very relevant, the wording seems to be the same, and even the subjects what the statements are about are seemingly the same, nevertheless within the given article, and within the given context the point of reference is different.

Kopper et al. scrutinize Orbán's framing mechanism relying on Benford and Snow.¹¹⁷ They diagnose that Orbán uses all the "three core framing tasks: the construction of

ügyködtek, csúfos vereséget szenvedtek. Ezzel szemben viszont azok, akik a magyarság önvédelmi harcának ügyét tűzték zászlajukra, elsőprő sikert arattak – mutatott rá erdélyi képviselőnk, külön is kiemelve, hogy a külhoni magyarok ellen irányuló kampánypropagandának nem volt foganatja, sőt a külhoni magyarok jelentős mértékben járultak hozzá a nemzeti erők, a Fidesz-KDNP-pártszövetség sorsdöntő győzelméhez.” – EMNT “A szeretetnek a gyűlölet fölött aratott győzelme,” *EMNT* (blog), accessed May 31, 2018, <http://emnt.org/2018/04/09/9053/>.

¹¹⁶ „Végül arra kérek mindenkit, gondoljuk át, mi az, ami igazán fontos dolog az életünkben. A családuink, a gyermekeink, az emberi méltóságunk, a szabadságunk, a kultúránk, a hitünk és a hazánk. Mindezt most kell megvédenünk! A dolgok a kampány végére leegyszerűsödtek, két jövő közül választhatunk. Az egyiket Soros jelöltjei kínálják, a másikat a Fidesz és a kereszténydemokraták jelöltjei képviselik. Nekünk Magyarország az első, nekik Soros György és az általa kínált hatalom az első. Mert pénzért és hatalomért mindenre képesek.” – Viktor Orbán “Orbán Viktor beszéde a Fidesz kampányzáró eseményén,” Kormányzat, accessed May 31, 2018, <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/orban-viktor-beszede-a-fidesz-kampanyzaro-esemenyen>.

¹¹⁷ Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–39.

diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames.”¹¹⁸ They state that “Orbán is diagnostic when he identifies the problems of the past,” he is prognostic when he talks about the „dangers and challenges the Hungarian nation faces” and he uses the motivational frames with „his visionary and prophetic avowals that call on supporters to be vigilant and suspicious.”¹¹⁹ These kinds of devices occur also in the fragments coded. Lack of these mechanisms in the communicative strategies of the Transylvanian actors leads to the transformation of the meanings of the coded statements.

The codes applied for the political community confirm that there is a gradual shift into the direction of the extended Hungarian political community. The noticeable lack of referring to the Hungarian kin-minority as members of the Romanian political community demonstrates that the members of the Hungarian kin-minority are not perceived as people belonging to the Romanian politics. Being part of the Romanian political community appears only one time in the articles from EMNT/EMNP and six more times in the texts by RMDSZ. In the speeches by Viktor Orbán there is no reference to the kin-minority as being member of the Romanian political community.

It might be the by-effect of the selection of my sample. I focused on those types of articles which inform about the Hungarian elections, nation politics or any other relevant events connected to Hungary itself. The people targeted in these articles are dual citizens of Hungary, or the pure aim of the articles is to promote the Hungarian citizenship. This might result in the fact that they are not referred to as members of the Romanian political community. There were only 7 occasions, out of the 393 codes applied for political community when they were addressed as Romanian electors. Nevertheless, the fact that basically throughout two years (from 2013 July to 2014 elections and from 2017 July to 2018

¹¹⁸ Kopper et al., “Creating Suspicion and Vigilance. Using Enemy Images to Hinder Mobilization,” 113.

¹¹⁹ Kopper et al., 113.


elections) there were several articles and statements published which never addresses the people whom they want to attract as members of the political community of their country of residence can lead to the conclusion that belonging to the Romanian political community is not a relevant element of everyday communications.

What is more, the gradual shift from being member of the Transylvanian political community to membership in the extended Hungarian political community is apparent. I coded 103 instances when the reference to the Transylvanian political community occurred throughout all texts, and only three times it was mentioned by the Prime Minister, and even in those cases he was referring to the Transylvanian population which he incorporated into the extended Hungarian political community. RMDSZ clearly uses the concept of the Transylvanian political community more often, than the other organizations. In case of RMDSZ it needs to be noted again, that in choosing the articles related to the party, I also added some articles from 2016, when the discussion between Fidesz and RMDSZ are perked up. This will be more visible on the analysis about the frequency of the codes. All together RMDSZ refers to its supporters as members of the Transylvanian political community 46 times within the 20 articles. EMNT uses the concept 35 times and EMNP only 19 times.

Due to the huge amount of data I decided to define seven specific nodes within the analyzed timeframe, around which I collected the occurrences of codes. This enables better visualization and reflects also the most important events of the years analyzed. The seven specific nodes are: summer of 2013, pre-election period of 2014 Hungarian election (including the articles since 2013 December, when the registration campaign is most intense), then the articles from 2014, exactly those which corresponds to the elections. The same structure I followed in connection to the 2017/18 timeframe. I also included one slot for 2016, which is only relevant in case of RMDSZ (as already described before, this was included into the sample, as this is when Fidesz and RMDSZ started to come closer).

I analyzed the frequency of the codes to see the tendency in the usage of the concept. The frequency of the code occurrences displays how often the actors invoke the members of the Transylvanian kin-minority as members of the Transylvanian political community. I assumed that the less frequent the code 'Transylvanian political community' could be applied, the more the members of the extended Hungarian political community are invoked. Thus, I conferred the code occurrences 'Transylvanian political community' and 'extended Hungarian political community'.

The organizations invoke the membership in the Transylvanian political community in different ways. It is apparent that addressing members of the political community is not only in line with their own political agenda, but also, they are influenced by the Hungarian politics. Figure 1. shows how often did the reference for the Transylvanian political community occurred in the chosen articles.




1. Figure Frequency of the code 'Transylvanian political community'

As time passes the concept of the Transylvanian political community is less referred to by RMD SZ and EMNT. However, EMNP uses this concept more frequently, which fits into the pattern of the nexus of Fidesz and EMNP and also fits into the dynamic of the political competition among actors. During the period, when only EMNP and EMNT were

allied with Fidesz, they rarely used the concept. But after the agreement between RMDSZ and Fidesz, they gradually started to refer to their supporters as members of the Transylvanian political community.

In the case of RMDSZ and EMNT it is clear, that the summer period, when they delivered speeches at the Summer School and in connection to registration campaign the population is referred to as members of the Transylvanian political community, whose duty is to participate on the Hungarian election. However, within the speeches delivered in time of the elections and right after they are less referred to as members of that community.

Every organization uses the extended Hungarian political community concept more frequently than the Transylvanian political community as time passes. The visualization (on the 2. figure) shows no linear development, which is the result of the different elements in the sample. Fewer articles have been published in the exact days of the elections, then during the months of campaign, which means that both the code ‘Transylvanian political community’ and ‘extended Hungarian political community’ could be applied in smaller quantity.



2. Figure Frequency of the codes ‘Transylvanian political community’ and ‘extended Hungarian political community’¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Tr. PC stands for Transylvanian political community, and EXT. PC stand for the extended Hungarian political community

Figure 2. demonstrates the contrast, and shows that at time of the 2018 election the people are addressed by organizations as members of the extended Hungarian political community, rather than members of the Transylvanian one. In the 2013/14 statements it is not that clearly separated, the code occurrences are lower, and closer to each other.

The political dynamics are demonstrated by the discursive panels. The competition between the organizations is clearly visible on the dataset. Once Eurotrans Foundation in summer 2017 starts the naturalization, and registration campaign EMNT and EMNP statements reinforce their position towards the Hungarian government by addressing their audience as members of the extended Hungarian political community, they do not mention their belonging to the Transylvanian political community once. In the pre-election period RMDSZ starts to use the extended Hungarian political community more frequently as well.

Discussing the changing nature of the political dynamics, it is worth going back to Kiss and Székely who provide a detailed overview on literature of ethnic parties.¹²¹ They start by referring to Horowitz discusses the strategies which could lead to the radicalization of ethnic parties. They briefly refer to Fearon's¹²² and Chandra's¹²³ works and their relevance about the "increasing emphasis on the interconnection of ethnic politics and clientelism."¹²⁴ About the shift in RMDSZ' politics Kiss and Székely also rely heavily on Fearon's concept about ethnic parties. Accordingly Kiss and Székely argues that the shift in RMDSZ' politics happened along the lines of allocation policy goods and political pork.

I argue that no further shifts in this type of politics could occur, as by the nature of the Hungarian intervention into Transylvanian politics, RMDSZ gradually loses its status as an

¹²¹ Kiss and Székely, "Shifting Linkages in Ethnic Mobilization: The Case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania," 592–94.

¹²² Fearon, "Why Ethnic Politics and 'Pork' Tend to Go Together." Working Paper."

¹²³ Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*.

¹²⁴ Kiss and Székely, "Shifting Linkages in Ethnic Mobilization: The Case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania," 592.

ethnic party, and in its claim-making cannot fully rely on these strategies any more. I state based on the findings of the discourse analysis that instead of relying on the Romanian political community in its politics, they must commit to the Hungarian government, which converts the political scene enormously. With the emphasis on the concept of the extended Hungarian political community, the Hungarian parties in Transylvania have to divide their political strategy so that they could compete also within the Hungarian political community for the support of the Hungarian population. The allocation of resources, which they focused on relying on the majoritarian politics of the country of residence is less important, in time of the Hungarian elections. Their politics cannot be conceptualized any more within the framework of the theories listed above, as they are not only the members of the Romanian political community any more. These organizations compete within the Hungarian political community for the trust of their supporters. Their relation towards the kin-state is more important, than their capacity for resource allocation within the Romanian polity.

Competing among the organizations occurs along the lines assigned by the Hungarian government, better to express by Viktor Orbán. The fact that the organizations have taken over the wording by the Prime Minister, and they started to refer for their voters in Transylvania as members of the Hungarian political community means that they accepted their position within the political space of Hungary, rather than in Romania. This communication strategy is connected in the research to the Hungarian elections, but it is not a particular phenomenon without any further general implications for the Transylvanian political space. The fact that already from the 2014 to 2018 elections the organizations have used the concept of the extended Hungarian political community more frequently shows that this is an important mean for competing for the support of the voters in Transylvania, and for the support of the Hungarian government at the same time. Kiss et al. confirmed by their research that the Hungarian dual citizens tend to be more active in their political participation

and they are more willing to cast their ballots for the smaller parties.¹²⁵ This results in the fact, that the political competition between RMDSZ and EMNP should happen along the lines of citizenship policies. This lead to the phenomenon that the political parties' and their connected civil organizations' everyday activities are connected to citizenship applications and registrations for the Hungarian elections so that they could contest for the support of the dual citizen population. The recruitment of a Transylvanian voting base for Fidesz has become the primary purpose of the organizations' activities which results in the fact that in their everyday communications they have no further space to use any other language, than the governmental one. As the organizations are highly dependent on the Hungarian government in their everyday discourse they have to use the same rhetorical devices, thus no parallel Transylvanian political community can be upheld. In case of the Romanian elections it is still highly probable that being member of the Romanian political community is still relevant, but the thesis could not cover that element of the Transylvanian politics in this analysis.

¹²⁵ Kiss, Székely, and Barna, "Factors Affecting Turnout among Ethnic Minority Voters."

6. Conclusion

The thesis argues that the influence of the Hungarian government on the Transylvanian civil and political actors results in the fact that their autonomous claim-making decreases. The research provides an overview of the elements of this influence from 2010 to 2018 elections. The thesis focuses on the institutional framework of the Transylvanian actors, and scrutinizes the Hungarian government's impact on four organizations. Actors analyzed are the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (EMNT), the connected Romanian political party, the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania (EMNP), Eurotrans Foundation and its allied political party, the Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania (RMDSZ) as they are the ones who execute the Hungarian government's policies in the region. Since 2010 EMNT and since 2015 Eurotrans Foundation has an agreement with the Hungarian government to support the implementation of citizenship policies and they offer help in registration and ballot collecting in time of the Hungarian election. EMNP and RMDSZ are in strategic partnership with the Hungarian government.

The theoretical framework is based on Brubaker's concept about belonging, whereby transborder Hungarians are viewed as external members of the polity. However, the thesis argues that the extension of nation state beyond borders changed this status quo and members of the Hungarian kin-minority can be conceptualized by the internal dimension of belonging rather than by the external type. I argue for an understanding of the interactions between civil and political actors and those whom they are supposed to represent within the Brubakerian framework. The members of the Transylvanian kin-minority are mobilized by these actors for participation on the Hungarian elections, which they do in significant numbers. This results in the fact, that they are addressed by their own representatives as members of the Hungarian political community. The interaction between citizens and actors are determined by the Hungarian government's influence. Without the actors the government could not mobilize the

Transylvanian dual citizens, and without the rhetoric of the Hungarian government these dual citizens cannot be invoked any more. This resulted in the fact that the claim-making strategies of the organizations changed enormously. Nevertheless, this population is not incorporated fully into the Hungarian society, still they sense of belonging has become more internal, than external.

Further theoretical considerations are based on Brubaker's concept about the external factors which impact functioning of the organizations, which represent the kin-minority. Brubaker's argument in *Ethnicity without groups* relies on the concept, that external actors do play a role in group making. This has been demonstrated by my analysis, which showed that kin-minority organizations are heavily defined by the Hungarian government and the way they represent members of the kin-minority is realized in interplays with the Hungarian government. The institutional framework of the Hungarian kin-minority is transformed so that it serves the interest of the kin-state, rather than those of the kin-minority.

The concept of the political community is applied in the thesis relying on Bauböck's conceptualization about stakeholdership and dual membership in different polities. Bauböck argues that dual citizenship is legitimate in those cases once democratic institutions of the country of residence cannot ensure the equal participation of national minorities. The Hungarian government does not claim explicitly that this is the situation in Romania. Furthermore, Bauböck argues that in democratic states the national minority's well-being should be realized via their autonomous claim-making, mainly in establishing autonomous status for the national minorities. The Hungarian government claims to support the autonomy of Transylvanian kin-minority, which can only be realized within the home-state. On the contrary, the extension of citizenship and voting rights and the consequences of the Hungarian government's intervention created a political space in which the Transylvanian actors lose

some of their autonomy, so they have no more capacity for claim-making within the Romanian political community.

The thesis built on literature about kin-state engagement, whereby Csergő and Goldgeier, and also Waterbury discuss that Hungary's unilateral actions toward the kin-minority in Transylvania could lead to interstate tensions, and to the destabilization of the kin-minorities position within the Romanian political community. Further I relied on the argument by Pogonyi, whereas he explores that the extension of citizenship and voting rights despite of the theories of ethnic conflict does not result radicalization of the political parties. He also indicates that the intervention of the Hungarian government impacts the claim-making strategies of the Hungarian kin-minority organizations.

Ethnic parties and their potential for competing for supporters were previously investigated along the lines of ethnic conflicts. Rabushka and Shepsle and also Horowitz argue that ethnic outbidding leads to radicalization of the parties. Chandra however, positions her argument against these authors, as she argues that “institutional legacies and ethnic networks” can lead to the success of ethnic parties. She argues that within those types of societies this is possible where there is information constraint resulting in the fact that the minority population tends to cast their ballots based on ethnic cues. I used in addition Fearon's and Kitschelt's typologies to analyze the role of the ethnic parties in Transylvania, mainly relying on Kiss and Székely's overview about the shift in RMDSZ' politics I conceptualized my own research. Relying on these literatures I built my assumptions, which I verify with the analysis of legislations and the scrutinization of the discursive panels of the organizations.

The thesis analyzes legislations with which the Hungarian government first changed its nation concept, from political to the ethno-cultural one, so that it incorporates the transborder Hungarians. Than as part of its nation building process in 2013 with the change of

the electoral system, it includes the dual citizens into the political community of Hungary. Since 2010 the expansion of the Hungarian government is systematic, which the thesis explores via introducing the actors involved and investigating their everyday practices which are significantly transformed by the government's interventions.

With the introduction of the Hungarian government's systematic extension in Transylvania I listed the legislations which realized this expansion and I demonstrated how the Hungarian government's steps are part of a process in which the Hungarian political community is extended beyond borders. Via the introduction of the political parties and civil organizations I demonstrated the mechanism in which the Transylvanian kin-minority organizations lose some of their autonomy to be able to compete for the support of the members of the kin-minority within this newly established extended Hungarian political community. The impact of this intervention of the Hungarian government on to the Transylvanian actors and their position towards their electorate has been investigated by conducting discourse analysis

The major contribution of the thesis is the analysis of the discursive panels of the organizations, which provides empirical data about these changes. The discourse analysis showed that there is a gradual shift in the politics of the Transylvanian actors towards the Hungarian politics. The wording by the Hungarian Prime Minister is used by all of the organizations, in given cases those are altered in accordance to the Transylvanian perception of key events. As an example, I analyzed Viktor Orbán's speech before the 2018 elections more in depth to show, while the Prime Minister requests his supporters to defend the nation in his speech he refers to the opposition and to George Soros. While in the case of the Transylvanian actors' statements defending the nation refers on the Hungarian unified nation, rather than on the opposition.

The analysis demonstrated how the political dynamics are represented in the communication strategies of the organizations. The usage of the concept ‘Transylvanian political community’ and the ‘extended Hungarian political community’ illustrates that once Eurotrans Foundation starts its registration campaign EMNT and EMNP starts to refer to the members of the kin-minority exclusively as members of the extended Hungarian political community. Once Fidesz-RMDSZ rapprochement begins RMDSZ uses the same concept more and more frequently.

It is clearly visible that the relation toward the Hungarian government influences the way how the organizations address their audience. The population, whom they hope to mobilize for political participation are addressed either as members of the Transylvanian political community, or as members of the extended Hungarian political community. The closer the Hungarian election is more often are the members of the kin-minority invoked as members of the extended Hungarian political community.

I argue based on these empirical findings that the organizations focus from being the representative of the Hungarian kin-minority within the political community of the state of residence shifted towards being the agent of the Hungarian government in Romania. This results in the fact that in their everyday communication they have to rely on the same communicative strategies, as used by the Hungarian government.

The thesis has some limitations. The sample for the analysis was chosen concentrating on the Hungarian politics. Once the articles also discussing the Romanian elections could have been analyzed a broader understanding of the phenomenon could have been provided. The thesis can only confirm that the politics toward the Hungarian dual citizens is influenced by the Hungarian government, but without a more comprehensive analysis no general statement about the ethnic parties in Romanian can be developed. Nevertheless, based on the findings one could hypothesize that the Hungarian parties of Romania at least should bear

with two sets of rhetorical devices. One is discussed above, which refers to the population as members of the Hungarian political community and the other one most probably is connected to the elections in Romania, local or national ones, once they are addressed as members of the Romanian, or the Transylvanian political community.

The thesis could not introduce the long-term consequences of the phenomenon analyzed, however, the changes demonstrated in the politics could lead to significant modification of the Transylvanian kin-minority. The extension of citizenship leads to stratification of the Hungarian kin-minority in Transylvania, which was shown already by other scholars.¹²⁶ But the shift toward the Hungarian politics could lead to further differentiation among the population. The changes could impact the relations of Hungary and Romania as well, or the relation of the Hungarian political parties towards their home-state.

With introducing the impact of the Hungarian government's intervention on to the Transylvanian actors the thesis opened some prospects for future research. The Transylvanian case study shows a phenomenon which is a consequence of the Hungarian nation building strategy in which Hungary expanded its political community beyond border with the extension of citizenship and voting rights. The case study demonstrates that kin-state engagement and ethnic mobilization could not only take place along the lines of the ethnic parties' and the kin-state's political spectrum, or along resource allocation, it can transform the civil and political organizations of the kin-minority resulting in the gradual loss of autonomous claim-making.

¹²⁶ Myra A. Waterbury, "Making Citizens Beyond the Borders: Nonresident Ethnic Citizenship in Post-Communist Europe," *Problems of Post-Communism* 61, no. 4 (2014): 36–49; Waterbury, *Between State and Nation. Diaspora Politics and Kin-State Nationalism in Hungary*.

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