

# **INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL ACCESS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The thesis aims at addressing the following puzzle: some international organisations (IOs) provide more institutional access for transnational actors (TNAs) into their policy processes than others. What does explain this variation? I argue that the international authority of IOs plays an important role in shaping the level of access provision. IOs with high and low international authority levels provide less access than IOs with medium levels of authority. High authority IOs have no functional needs in involving TNAs because their high authority allows them to achieve their mandate goals on their own. Low authority IOs are neither mandated with tasks that may require additional input by TNAs nor delegated with enough authority to even initiate the access provision. In contrast, IOs with medium levels of authority experience an institutional shortage of authority for achieving the goals of their mandates. For this reason, they see a strong functional benefit in involving TNAs as a way to overcome their authority limitations. Medium authority provides them with enough institutional abilities to provide access, but at the same time limits their autonomy from member-states to fulfil their mandate goals without any involvement from third parties. The statistical results of the study provide support for the argument. They illustrate that there is non-linear inverse U-shaped relationship between the level of authority and the level of access: medium authority IOs provide the highest access, while low and high authority IOs provide less access.

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my Mom and Dad for their infinite love that makes me feel alive and happy every single day.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

African Union	AU
Andean Community	CAN
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	APEC
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	ASEAN
Arab Maghreb Union	AMU
Bank for International Settlements	BIS
Caribbean Community	CARICOM
Central African Economic and Monetary Union	CEMAC
Commonwealth of Nations	COMW
Council of Europe	CoE
European Free Trade Association	EFTA
Intergovernmental Authority on Development	IGAD
International Criminal Court	ICC
International Monetary Fund	IMF
International Organisations	IOs
International Whaling Commission	IWC
Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	OAPEC
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	OECD
Organization for Islamic Cooperation	OIC
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	OSCE
Organization of American States	OAS
Non-governmental Organizations	NGOs
Nordic Council	NC
North American Free Trade Association	NAFTA
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization	NAFO
Pacific Islands Forum	PIF
Shanghai Cooperation Organization	SCO
Transnational Actors	TNAs
United Nations	UN
World Bank	WB
World Trade Organization	WTO



## INTRODUCTION

With the end of the World War II, international organisations (IOs) became the main arenas for institutionalizing international cooperation and engaging in global policy-making.<sup>1</sup> With intensifying globalization and interdependence, international relations went through one more transformation: there was a dramatic increase in the levels of involvement of all kinds of transnational actors (TNAs) in global governance processes.<sup>2</sup> Since international organisations are the main access channels to global management of the world, the process of how international organisations accommodate increasing in number and importance role of transnational actors becomes an important area for research.

Yet, not so much has been produced on this topic by scholars of international relations. The most of studies on IO-TNA relations focuses on comparative or single case studies. They provide rich details, but produce little generalizable knowledge that can be applied to the wider scope of IOs. Not the least important reason for this was the absence of reliable large-N data on the measurement of access provision for transnational actors in international organisations.

As such, an important puzzle remains: why do some international organisations provide more access into their policy processes to transnational actors, while other international organisations provide less access? This thesis aims to investigate this puzzle. I argue that the international authority of international organisations is an important factor in explaining this variation. Conventional logic may seem to suggest that the higher the authority of IOs, the higher the access level provided for TNAs. IOs as servants of the international community may seem as interested in further transnationalization of the governance of global issues. My argument goes against this logic and reveals the political side of IO-TNA relations. Assuming that IOs

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<sup>1</sup> Tana Johnson, "Cooperation, Co-optation, Competition, Conflict: International Bureaucracies and Non-Governmental Organizations in an Interdependent World," *Review of International Political Economy* 23 (2016): 738.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

are self-directed actors with own interests, I argue that there is non-linear relationship between the international authority of IOs and their levels of access provision. International organisations with the highest level of authority have the highest ability to provide access, but they are not interested in doing so from bureaucratic politics rationale. International organisations with the lowest level of authority neither have the ability nor interest in providing access. International organisations with the medium level of authority, having limited ability but strong functional and political interest in the involvement of TNAs provide the highest level of access among the three kinds of IOs.

I test my argument on the original panel dataset of 29 international organisations including data on the levels of authority and access from 1950 till 2010. Statistical results provide the support for the argument illustrating inverse U-shaped relationship between authority and access, where IOs with high and low authority provide low access, while IOs with medium authority provide high access.

The study makes several contributions to the literature. The study helps us to explain how IOs, experiencing institutionalized shortages of authority necessary for achieving collective goals, utilize the access provision for TNAs in order to extend their operational capacity and independence from member-states. No previous works studied the relationship between authority and access and tested the causal link through large-N study. The concept of international authority is also a useful tool in understanding the whole spectrum of different institutional forms that international organisations take because international authority can be found, in expansive, limited or marginal form, in an every organisation. As such, it is legitimate to claim that the findings of this study have a potential for generalizability. At the very least, it opens up a whole spectrum of areas where the effects of international authority can be statistically studied.

The thesis proceeds as follows: in the chapter I, I provide an overview of major theoretical approaches in international relations scholarship to the study of international organisations. In the chapter II, I lay foundations of my theoretical argument. In the chapter III, I describe my dataset, provide descriptive statistics and specify my statistical model. In chapters IV, I present the results and discuss their implications. After that, I provide final thought on this study.

## CHAPTER I. LITERATURE REVIEW

### 1.1. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

For the purpose of conceptual clarity, we have to differentiate between concepts of “international organization,” “international organisations” and “international institutions.” International *organization* is a process representing “a secular trend toward the systematic development of an enterprising quest for political means of making the world safe for human habitation.”<sup>3</sup> If we remove a clear normative aspect of the definition, in an essence, international organization is a process of institutionalization of inter-states relations.<sup>4</sup>

International *organisations* are a result of this process, existing in the form of intergovernmental bureaucracies.<sup>5</sup> They have legally formalized existence, physical headquarters and most importantly, their key stakeholders are states, which differentiates intergovernmental organizations from every other entity operating on the international level (multinational corporations, international forums, non-governmental organizations).<sup>6</sup>

International institutions and international organisations are separate concepts as well. While international organisations are formalized intergovernmental bureaucracies, international institution is a broader concept referring to rules and norms, both formal and informal, regulating behavior of and relations between states.<sup>7</sup> In other words, all international organisations can be considered as formal international institutions, but not all international institutions are international organisations.

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<sup>3</sup> Inis L. Claude, "International organization: the process and the Institutions," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 8 (1968): 34.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, "International Organization and Global Governance: What Matters and Why," in *International Organization and Global Governance*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (New York: Routledge, 2014): 7.

<sup>5</sup> Weiss and Wilkinson, "International Organization," 8; Margaret P. Karns, Karen A. Mingst and Kendal W. Stiles, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, inc: 2015): 25.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Weiss and Wilkinson, "International Organization," 9.

From the emergence of the field, international relations scholars have been trying to find out why do states create and act through international organisations and why do they prefer this form of formalized institutionalization to other non-formal non-bureaucratic forms of international organization.<sup>8</sup> As it will be shown below, different school of thoughts within international relations literature provide different interpretations of these questions, but for the general overview of the field, it is important to outline global historical development that created the need for the creation of international organisations.

The conventional argument goes that the increasing levels of globalization, interdependence and transnationalization with the end of the Cold War as well dramatic technological innovations created the situation where states could no longer solve global problems on only the national level.<sup>9</sup> Neither did they have necessary capacity and expertise to deal with them on their own.<sup>10</sup> New global developments expanded the scope of international cooperation to include trade, finance, environment, energy, communications and human rights to already institutionalized cooperation in the field of international security and peace. They also increased the number of actors involved in the process of international organization such as private actors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), networks and epistemic communities.<sup>11</sup> The complexity of new international and transnational relations created the need in global arenas for the management of global issues that would involve a variety of relevant actors. International organisations came to become main arenas for the process of global governance that still takes at its core inter-state cooperation, but significantly expands and consumes “the totality of ways” through which “the world is governed.”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1998): 5.

<sup>9</sup> Karns, Mingst and Stiles, *International Organizations*, 26.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke, “The Correlates of War 2 international governmental organizations data version 2.0.,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21 (2004): 102; Weiss and Wilkinson, “International Organization,” 10.

<sup>12</sup> Weiss and Wilkinson, 15.

There is no clear agreement between different schools on why do states decided to organize international cooperation primarily through, as they remain to be a key international policy arenas, international organisations. The following part of this section is dedicated to surveying the variety of theoretical answers to this question.

## **1.2. STATE-LEVEL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION**

International relations (IR) scholarship has been mostly focusing on the question of why do IOs exist and surprisingly ignoring their abilities to act as actors on their own. This is due mostly to the fact that the two most dominant schools of thought within IR, realism and liberalism, and their later transformations neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, are theories of states' interests, behavior and interactions that provide no conceptual toolkit for analyzing the interests of IOs in separation from the interests of states.<sup>13</sup> For realists, IOs are instruments in the hands of states, which are created only when states are interested in their creation.<sup>14</sup> For them, IOs are not able to promote international cooperation as this would require IOs to change the behavior of states – something that neither states have interests in doing nor IOs have authority to enforce.<sup>15</sup> States are concerned about relative gains from possible international cooperation fearing that if one state gets more than the other, then the second state may use its relative advantage against the first state.<sup>16</sup> As such, states would never create IOs

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<sup>13</sup> Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53 (1999): 670.

<sup>14</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf:1967): 123.

<sup>15</sup> Karns, Mingst and Stiles, 27.

<sup>16</sup> John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 13 (1995): 30; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," *International Security* 24 (1999): 54; Charles L Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19 (1994): 55.

that may significantly constrain the pursuit of their survival interests and they are hesitant to empower IOs with enforcement tools.<sup>17</sup>

In contrast, neoliberal institutionalists have more positive perception of the possibility of international cooperation and the utility of international organisations in its facilitation.<sup>18</sup> As states know that they will interact with each other on a continuous basis in the future, they are actually incentivized to institutionalize their relations through international institutions, including IOs.<sup>19</sup> It helps states to solve commitment problems through monitoring and information provision mechanisms, extend the shadow of the future and ensure reciprocity if the commitments are broken.<sup>20</sup> Neoliberal institutionalist do not deny that states care about relative gains from cooperation, but they make an argument that states care about long term gains because their interactions are not limited to only one instance. In contrast to realists, for institutionalists, IOs – while still being tools of states' interests – are important as they help states to institutionalize their cooperation in the long term.<sup>21</sup> The further development of neoliberal institutionalist ideas led to the emergence of new sub-fields such as *functionalism*, *international regimes* and *rational design*. Functionalism implies that IOs are created because there is a functional need in them to solve specific problems.<sup>22</sup> The theory of international regimes implies that international regimes help states to formalize sets of international informal

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<sup>17</sup> Jason Charrette and Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realism," in *International Organization and Global Governance*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (New York: Routledge, 2014): 96.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston, Pearson: 1977); Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," *The American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 729.

<sup>19</sup> Lisa L. Martin, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," *International Organization* 46 (1992): 770; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20 (1995): 45; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38 (1985): 230.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Karns, Mingst and Stiles, 34; David P. Forsythe, "Neoliberal Institutionalism," in *International Organization and Global Governance*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (New York: Routledge, 2014): 119; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation," 231.

<sup>22</sup> David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1946); Abbott and Snidal, "Why States Act," 8;

rules, values and codes of conduct and IOs play an important role in their proliferation.<sup>23</sup> Lastly, advocates of rational design project<sup>24</sup> argue that the design of IOs are affected by the type of cooperation problems they were created to solve.

Constructivism, being one the prominent advocates of non-rationalist approach to IR, presents an alternative interpretation of IOs, putting much more power and influence onto them. The core idea is that international relations as they appear at the given moment of time are socially constructed by rules, norms, beliefs, knowledge and perceptions that shape the interaction between states.<sup>25</sup> In such context, IOs are both socially constructed products of state interactions as well as the shapers of these interactions.<sup>26</sup> For constructivists, IOs are self-directed actors with own interests and autonomy to pursue them. International organisations are international bureaucracies having rational-legal authority within their policy domain as codified in their legal mandates.<sup>27</sup> This authority is socially constructed, that is, it is a result of interaction between states and their conferral to the bureaucracy of the right to make credible claims.<sup>28</sup> The key source of such authority is the perception that international bureaucracies are not politicized, but rather neutral and impersonal, that is, they do not play politics, but focus on technical tasks. However, exactly this perception provides IOs with the authorized ability to shape international cooperation according to their ideas and beliefs and re-define the interests of states in accordance with, in the most of cases, values of liberal international order.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 98; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1984): 154.

<sup>24</sup> Barbara, Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55 (2001): 765.

<sup>25</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (1992): 392; Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996): 101; Abbott and Snidal, "Why States Act," 12.

<sup>26</sup> Finnemore, *National Interests*, 102.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004): 20.

<sup>28</sup> Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, 21;

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*



One of ways IOs do so is through acting as norm entrepreneurs and engaging into the socialization of states with international norms and values.<sup>30</sup> As such, in the constructivist interpretation of IOs, international organisations are not empty shells and forums for the projection of interests of their member-states, but rather they can act as actors on their own and have separate and sometimes conflicting with those of members agenda.

### 1.3. RATIONAL CHOICE AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT LITERATURE

Within the rationalist literature, Principal-Agent (PA) framework has been applied by IR scholars in order to analyze the sources of IOs' autonomy. At its core, PA framework is based on *delegation* that is "a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former."<sup>31</sup> This contractual relationship between the principal and the agent does not mean, however, that the agent always follows what the principal says. Then, the concept of *discretion* comes into the play, which entails the degree of operational freedom granted to the agent.<sup>32</sup> It results from the contract between the principal and the agent that provides information about the goals of the delegation, but does not specify actions the agent should take to achieve them.<sup>33</sup> Discretion provides the agent with authorized *autonomy* to act independently within certain range established by the principal.<sup>34</sup> Independent action outside of these limits is undesired by the principle and considered as *agency slack*.<sup>35</sup>

In the context of international organisations, there are three challenges for states to actually effectively control their agents. Firstly, in order to design effective delegation contract,

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<sup>30</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," *International Organization* 59 (2005): 802.

<sup>31</sup> Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, And Michael J. Tierney, "Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory," in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, ed. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, And Michael J. Tierney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 7.

<sup>32</sup> Hawkins et al, "Delegation Under Anarchy," 8;

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

member-states should first resolve their collective actions problems.<sup>36</sup> Secondly, IOs may contract with different principals from the same member-state, especially when the executive and the legislature in one state delegate one IO with different tasks.<sup>37</sup> Thirdly, IOs may actually end up being the latest in the delegation chain from citizens to parties, the parliament, the executive, the state, the collective of states, which complicates the cohesiveness of goals IOs should achieve.<sup>38</sup> All of these complications are enough for IOs to gain and expand their discretion and autonomy from members in the face of ever rising need for global governance.<sup>39</sup> The difference between delegation in domestic and international settings is that international anarchy provides much more opportunities for autonomy for IOs, even if it may result in agency slack.<sup>40</sup>

Similar to neoliberal institutionalists, PA scholars believe that there is functional utility logic behind delegation of authority from members to IOs. Two features of IOs – *centralization* and *independence* – incentivizes states to delegate.<sup>41</sup> Centralization of collective activities through organizational structure and bureaucratic support decreases the cost of transacting among states, increases the efficiency of inter-state cooperation and provides IOs with ability to change the interests of their members.<sup>42</sup> Centralization helps the international bureaucracies to create hierarchical structure for better production of joint policies between states and IO's bodies and to better pool resources, assets and risks.<sup>43</sup> It ensures the division of labor, thereby

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<sup>36</sup> Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," *International Organization* 57 (2003): 245.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Henning Tamm and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Choice and Principal-Agent Theory," in *International Organization and Global Governance*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (New York: Routledge, 2014): 136.

<sup>40</sup> Tamm and Snidal, "Rational Choice," 135.

<sup>41</sup> Abbott and Snidal, "Why States Act," 10.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*; Martin, "Interests, Power," 772; Hawkins et al, "Delegation Under Anarchy," 12;

<sup>43</sup> Abbot and Snidal, 10.

allowing states to delegate tasks that they themselves are not able or too busy to take care of, to specialized IOs with expertise, knowledge, resources and will to perform.<sup>44</sup>

Independence, authorized by members, allows IOs to present themselves as neutral actor in solving inter-state disputes and legitimizing collective actions.<sup>45</sup> Neutrality helps states to solve coordination problems such as lack of information, the monitoring of behavior and similar functions that can be performed by IOs.<sup>46</sup> It allows states that greatly benefit from some international policy at the moment, to delegate more independence to IOs in order to ensure that the policy will not be changed in the future under pressure from less benefiting states.<sup>47</sup>

Even in PA literature there is a strong bias toward the interests of principals.<sup>48</sup> PA framework still solely focuses on the control mechanisms employed by principals to explain the behavior of agents. Much less attention has been given to the strategies of IOs to overcome the constraints on actions established by members.<sup>49</sup> Partially, this can be explained by the methodological issue related to the focus on the agent side: the feedback from principals are important for agents, thus, agents can adjust their behavior accordingly in order to avoid punishment for agency slack, which makes it questionable whether we are able to observe self-interested behavior of agents in the presence of principals' controls.<sup>50</sup>

Other PA scholars started to focus on how IOs deal with the control of their principals in order to advance own goals.<sup>51</sup> Firstly, IOs as agents can participate in the creation of their

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<sup>44</sup> Hawkins et al, "Delegation Under Anarchy," 10;

<sup>45</sup> Abbott and Snidal, 15; Judith, Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics," *International Organization* 54 (2000): 389; Hawkins et al, 19;

<sup>46</sup> Hawkins et al, 19;

<sup>47</sup> Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in Inter-national Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999): 76; Hawkins et al, 20.

<sup>48</sup> Darren G. Hawkins And Wade Jacoby, "How Agents Matter," in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, ed. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, And Michael J. Tierney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 202.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 203.

<sup>50</sup> Tamm and Snidal, "Rational Choice," 134;

<sup>51</sup> Hawkins and Jacoby, "How Agents Matter," 202.

mandates before the delegation through the “principal-friendly interpretations” of the proposed mandates in an attempt to secure for themselves more discretion.<sup>52</sup> Secondly, after the delegation, IOs may freely engage in the reinterpretation of their mandates in order to advocate for more autonomy.<sup>53</sup> Through the strategy of buffering, IOs may try to incentivize principals to put less efforts into controlling them via increasing the cost of monitoring.<sup>54</sup> Lastly, member-states may allow IOs to engage with third parties, if such engagement is seen as beneficial for the interests of members; in turn, organisations, if they consider that there is potential to utilize the participation of third parties for own interests, may re-direct their behavior to focus more on serving these third parties, rather than member-states.<sup>55</sup>

The involvement of third parties plays an important role in the emergence of an alternative to PA framework mode of governance called *orchestration*. Basing its framework on PA relations, governance through orchestration expands the principal-agent relations between members and IOs to account for the role of NGOs and other transnational actors (TNAs) in providing IOs with more ways to secure and advance autonomy.<sup>56</sup> For example, if one member-state is resistant to comply with international environmental standards, while an IO does not have enough autonomy to enforce these standards on it, the IO may indirectly involve environmental NGO in order blame and shame the non-compliant state into the adherence to environmental norms. In contrast to delegation, which assumes formal contractual relations between the two contracting parties, orchestration implies the voluntary cooperation

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 203.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 204.

<sup>56</sup> Kenneth W. Abbot, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl, “Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries,” in *International Organizations as Orchestrators*, ed. Kenneth W. Abbot, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 10; Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl, “Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration,” *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (2016): 720;

between IOs and NGOs in achieving common governance goals.<sup>57</sup> Thus, orchestration may seem as exposing the important limitations of PA framework – when there is alignment of interests and goals, even voluntary non-contractual cooperation may bring essential benefits without the need in monitoring.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, orchestration also complements PA framework in illustrating much complex governance chain, including delegation from members to IOs, and IOs’ orchestration of NGOs in order to affect members. In other words, starting from members’ delegation, going through IOs’ orchestration through NGOs, governance chain loops back to indirectly change the behavior of members who initiated the chain: Members – IOs – NGOs – Members.<sup>59</sup>

Others criticize PA framework by arguing that in the reality, IOs have much more autonomy, while states have much limited monitoring capabilities.<sup>60</sup> In this argument, domestic voters within states are ultimate principals of IOs, which makes the delegation chain much extended than in classical PA relations – from voters, through parliament to government, from government to international supervisory bodies to international bureaucracies, with a significant role of interest and lobby groups playing at each level of delegation.<sup>61</sup> On one hand, it means that IOs may have four different contracts with each of principals-on-their-own bodies: voters, parliament, government, international supervisors, which complicates both the monitoring of IOs and IOs’ abilities to comply with the interests of each principal, especially if interests diverge.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, it also means that the distance between ultimate principal – voter, and the ultimate agent – IO, is wide enough to liberalize IOs into considerable autonomy and consequently, agency slack.<sup>63</sup> Voters are too distanced from international policy-

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<sup>57</sup> Abbott et al, “Orchestration,” 12; Abbott et al, “Two Logics,” 719;

<sup>58</sup> Tamm and Snidal, “Rational Choice,” 135;

<sup>59</sup> Ibid; Abbott et al, “Two Logics,” 720;

<sup>60</sup> Tamm and Snidal, 136;

<sup>61</sup> Roland Vaubel, “Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations,” *Review of International Organizations* 1 (2006): 126.

<sup>62</sup> Vaubel, “Principal-Agent Problems”, 127.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

making in IOs due to this extensive chain of delegation. Neither parliaments nor governments or international bodies are able to minimize the distance as there is lack of information and purposeful self-interested behavior, including mispresenting and covering of information, at each level of this delegation chain.<sup>64</sup>

There is also a criticism from constructivists. From PA perspective, IOs engage into self-interested behavior and thus able to shape the behavior of states because of either the weakness of control mechanisms or their purposeful manipulation of delegation arrangements in the pursuit of more autonomy.<sup>65</sup> Constructivists deny such conception of IOs altogether. For them, IOs are actors on their own not because they manipulate their ways into getting more autonomy, but because, as it was previously discussed, they have authority on their own, which allow them to act autonomously.<sup>66</sup> They deny the negative concept of agency slack, but rather argue that IOs' deviations from their original goals may be not the result of their self-interested opportunistic behavior, but rather a product of internal bureaucratic culture that may lead to dysfunctional behavior.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, IOs autonomy may not necessarily result in self-interested behavior of pursuing better funding, more resources and bureaucracy expansion, as although these things are indeed important for international bureaucracies, they do not dominate the main discourse of decision-making.<sup>68</sup>

#### **1.4. TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS**

The recently evolved transnational dimension of IOs present another area for the debate on the role of IOs as self-directed actors. There is increasing number of studies indicating the emergence and evolution of transnational orientation of IOs, to the level that can be comparable

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 126.

<sup>65</sup> Hawkins and Jacoby, 207.

<sup>66</sup> Barnett and Finnemore, "The Politics, Power," 670.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 671; Tamm and Snidal, 137.

<sup>68</sup> Barnett and Finnemore, "The Politics, Power," 671.

to organisations' original intergovernmental focus.<sup>69</sup> With the overall rise of TNAs as important players in global governance, IOs strived to accommodate the demands and utilize the benefits that come from the interaction with these actors.<sup>70</sup> The increased level of the influence of these actors can be illustrated through the fact, that IOs, even the most prominent and powerful as the United Nations, found it challenging to balance between the sovereign interests of their members and participation demands coming from TNAs, to the extent, that such balancing resulted in decision-making paralysis.<sup>71</sup> It is this area, which promises to bring the most useful insights about self-directed behavior of IOs in managing intergovernmental and transnational demands. IR literature, in line with realist, institutionalist and constructivist division, offers different interpretations of the ways IOs behave in such context.

Following neoliberal institutionalist logic, states rationally design IOs in order to solve cooperation problems. In extending this argument to transnational dimension of IOs, the provision of access for TNAs is rational design choice of states, based on the functional utility of these actors in helping IOs and states to solve cooperation problems.<sup>72</sup> In other words, states will allow IOs to provide more participation opportunities for TNAs if such participation promises functional benefits.<sup>73</sup> The benefits of TNAs participation for states lie in their complementing to IOs role in solving cooperation challenges: information provision and

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<sup>69</sup> Bruce Cronin, "The Two Faces of the United Nations: The Tension Between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism," *Global Governance* 8 (2002): 55; Peter Willetts, "From 'Consultative Arrangements' to 'Partnership': The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN," *Global Governance* 6 (2000): 199; Chadwick Alger, "The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People's Millennium Assembly," *Global Governance* 8 (2002): 109.

<sup>70</sup> Pevehouse et al, "The Correlates of War," 103; Alger, "The Emerging Roles," 110;

<sup>71</sup> Cronin, "The Two Faces," 56.

<sup>72</sup> Jonas Tallberg, "Transnational Access to International Institutions: Three Approaches," in *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations and Implications*, ed. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg (London: Palgrave MacMillan 2010): 48; Miles Kahler, "Defining Accountability Up: The Global Economic Multilaterals," in *Global Governance and Public Accountability*, ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (London: Blackwell, 2005): 145.

<sup>73</sup> Kal Raustiala, "States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 730; Robert O'Brien, Anna Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams, *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 37; Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 55.

efficiency in policy implementation.<sup>74</sup> TNAs can serve as useful partners in providing and analyzing information, especially those that specialize on information collection and have a necessary policy expertise, while the plurality of these actors provide an alternative source of checking the reliability of such information.<sup>75</sup> TNAs may act as important observers not only of other states' behavior and adherence to their international commitments, but even of IOs themselves.<sup>76</sup> TNAs are useful in keeping up with emerging global issues that should be addressed on the international level.<sup>77</sup> They also may act as an extended hand in policy areas where neither states nor IOs have sufficient capacity and will to operate.<sup>78</sup> For example in the areas of humanitarian and foreign aid, neither states nor IOs have the comparable to NGOs level of flexibility to operate on the local level.<sup>79</sup>

From the realist perspective, TNAs, similar to IOs, are utilized by states in order to advance national goals.<sup>80</sup> Concerned with relative gains, states will allow TNAs participation only if such participation will be beneficial in shifting power balance in their own favor.<sup>81</sup> The global emergence of TNAs is explained by the dominance of the US' power in international relations and its interests in the continuation of its power projection through like-minded IOs and TNAs.<sup>82</sup> In comparison to institutionalists, realists do not deny the functional benefits of

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<sup>74</sup> Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 55;

<sup>75</sup> Ibid; Raustiala, "States, NGOs," 731;

<sup>76</sup> Kal Raustiala, "Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC," *Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review* 26 (2004): 389; Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (1984): 165; Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 54.

<sup>77</sup> Jens Steffek, "Explaining cooperation between IGOs and NGOs – push factors, pull factors, and the policy cycle," *Review of International Studies* 39 (2013): 995.

<sup>78</sup> Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 55;

<sup>79</sup> Steffek, "Explaining Cooperation," 999; Kim D. Reimann, "A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms, and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006): 45; Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 60;

<sup>80</sup> Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 62.

<sup>81</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978): 110.

<sup>82</sup> Robert Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment* (New York: Basic Books, 1975): 96; Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 62.



TNAs, but they emphasize the power distribution as main explanatory variable in allowing them to participate in international policy-making.<sup>83</sup> As such, TNAs that were provided with access to IOs are primarily oriented to serve the interests of the current major power and only those TNA that align with the major power's interests are to be provided with such access.<sup>84</sup>

In a traditional opposition to rationalists, constructivists emphasize the emergence of a new norm of global democracy and the need of both states and IOs to comply with it in order to legitimize their actions, especially in the consideration of increasing discourse on democratic deficit in global governance.<sup>85</sup> This discourse on the huge distance between international decision-making in IOs and voters' interests leads to the mainstreaming of the idea of democratic deficit in international bodies, which in turn endangers the legitimacy both of international policies and of states and IOs in making them.<sup>86</sup> In this argument, TNAs are seen as the representatives of emerging global civil society and their participation in international organisations are perceived by these organisations as a way out of this problem.<sup>87</sup> Interestingly, in an almost complete alignment with realist logic, another constructivist suggests that the rise of global democracy norm is related to the dominance of democratic powers in IOs.<sup>88</sup> Major powers tend to diffuse norms that emerged in domestic settings on the international arena to create the community of like-minded states and actors. Since democratic powers dominated much of IOs in the past decades, the prominence of global democracy norm is associated with

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<sup>83</sup> Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 62.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid;

<sup>85</sup> Checkel, "International Institutions," 805; Jan Art Scholte, "Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance," *Government and Opposition* 39 (2004): 213; Jens Steffek, Claudia Kissling, and Patrizia Nanz, *Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance: A cure for the Democratic Deficit?* (London: Macmillan, 2008): 45; Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 62;

<sup>86</sup> Vaubel, "Principal-Agent Problems", 128;

<sup>87</sup> Checkel, "International Institutions," 810; Steffek et al, *Civil Society*, 55; Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 65;

<sup>88</sup> Alexandru Grigorescu, "Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2007): 626.

their efforts to bring more accountability and transparency that dominate their national discourses to the international level.

### **1.5. CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE**

Surprisingly, the scholars working within PA framework have been silent on the implications of the involvement of TNAs on the principal-agent problems. One strand applied PA framework on states-NGOs relations, illustrating the presence of similar problems of agency slack as in states-IOs relations.<sup>89</sup> Others, as it was previously discussed, illustrated that principals may allow third parties such as TNAs to access their agents, in order to make use of functional benefits of such access for extra monitoring.<sup>90</sup>

Paradoxically, they portray TNAs-IOs relations as always initiated by TNAs, or at least, portraying that TNAs are the most interested actors in engaging with IOs, while totally neglecting the initiating role of IOs. In such model, IOs act only as gate-keepers, deciding whether there is beneficial potential in access provision for TNAs or not. It is TNAs that through constant lobbying and advocacy, find their way into IOs. In this logic, IOs are not allowed to initiate the access provision, but only agree or disagree to utilize it. Orchestration model provides much more complete picture in that sense. In the orchestration model, IOs actually allowed to initiate and mobilize TNAs in order to overcome constraints established by members.<sup>91</sup>

The problem for understanding the implications of rational-legal authority of IOs, however, is that the orchestration model considers only informal access provision, meaning not codified and institutionalized in the mandates of IOs, but rather arranged in informal ad-hoc manner. It is not clear how would IOs behave in initiating access provision for TNAs in formal contractual settings of authority delegation from members to international bureaucracies.

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<sup>89</sup> Alexander Cooley and James Ron, "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action," *International Security* 27 (2002): 22.

<sup>90</sup> Hawkins and Jacoby, "How Agents Matter," 203.

<sup>91</sup> Abbott et al, "Orchestration," 15;

Having formal rational-legal authority delegated from member-states, how would international organisations behave in their attempts to utilize transnational actors for their goals of securing more discretion and autonomy in achieving their mandate goals?

This study aims to contribute to this strand of literature through extending the principal-agent framework to analyze the implications of the involvement of transnational actors on the members-IO relations in formal contractual settings. The study synthesizes both rationalist and constructivist approaches, in taking at the core the idea of IOs being self-directed actors with own authority, but also with a full realization that such authority has rational-legal characters and primarily stems from the contractual relationship between members and organisations. Although member-states remain to be principal actors with vested interests in IOs, I still leave the room for IOs to behave in self-interested manner. Finally, in agreement with constructivists, I also assume that what can be considered agency slack, in the actuality is the purposeful behavior of international organisations to secure for themselves more freedom and flexibility in order to better achieve their mandate goals, which are, ultimately, aimed at promoting collective goods against the self-interested tendencies of states.

## CHAPTER II. THEORY

In this thesis, I study how the international authority of IOs affect their levels of access provision for TNAs. I argue that IOs with the medium level of authority provide more access for TNAs than IOs with high and low levels of authority. This chapter proceeds as follows. Before theoretically illustrating the causal link, I de-construct the concept of international authority and illustrate its empirical existence in the design of international organisations. Following this, I overview three kinds of authority and finally, illustrate how they affect the level of access provision.

### 2.1. CONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY

Authority in domestic setting implies the ability of the one who governs to make collective binding decisions on the behalf of people who invested such powers in her.<sup>92</sup> Conceptually, authority is a “social contract in which governor provides a political order of value to community in exchange for compliance by the governed with the rules necessary to produce that order.”<sup>93</sup> At the international level, due to the anarchic structure of the international system, it has been more challenging to identify what international authority exactly constitute.

International relations scholars have made several attempts to provide a cohesive conceptual framework for understanding international authority. The concepts of *supranationalism* and *intergovernmentalism* have been introduced as a continuum representing the variation in the levels of international authority. Supranationalism represents the highest possible level of international authority, where IOs acquire significant autonomy from their

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<sup>92</sup> Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations,” *Review of International Organization* 10 (2015): 308.

<sup>93</sup> David A Lake, “Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global Governance,” *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2010): 587.

member-states and able to exert independent influence on international relations.<sup>94</sup> In contrast, intergovernmentalism implies the lowest level of international authority, where IOs serve only as forums facilitating inter-state negotiations with minimal role in the actual international policy-making.<sup>95</sup> Within this continuum, there are concepts of *autonomy* and *independence*, conceptualizing the ability of IOs to take decisions without states' oversight.<sup>96</sup> In the Rational Design project, authority of IOs is conceptualized through the concepts of *centralization* and *control*, where the former indicates the level of concentration of international task in the hands of non-state body, while the latter stands for how much individual control members have in collective decision-making among each other.<sup>97</sup> *Institutionalization* refers to the ability of IOs to institutionalize international cooperation by incentivizing states to alter their preferences,<sup>98</sup> while *legalization* means the institutionalized solidification of cooperation through legal means.<sup>99</sup>

These concepts have one core fundamental idea at their core: ability of international organisations to exert independent authority on member-states in pursuit of collective goals. As a more encompassing definition, in this study I define international authority as institutionalized power of IOs to make collective binding decisions on the behalf of, but autonomously from, their member-states.<sup>100</sup>

International authority has legal-rational character.<sup>101</sup> It is "institutionalized, i.e. codified in recognized rules; circumscribed, i.e. specifying who has authority over whom for

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<sup>94</sup> Claude, "International Organization," 35; Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication," *Yale Law Journal* 107 (1997): 275.

<sup>95</sup> Ernst B Haas, "International Integration: Regional Integration," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 7 ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968): 522–8;

<sup>96</sup> Abbott and Snidal, "Why States Act," 10; Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for The World*, 24;

<sup>97</sup> Koremenos et al, "The Rational Design," 772;

<sup>98</sup> Paul Ingram, Jeffrey Robinson, and Marc L. Busch, "The Intergovernmental Network of World Trade: IGO Connectedness, Governance, and Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 111(2005): 850.

<sup>99</sup> Goldstein "Introduction," 387.

<sup>100</sup> Hooghe and Marks, "Delegation and Pooling," 309;

<sup>101</sup> Hawkins et al, "Delegation Under Anarchy," 7; Barnett and Finnemore, "The Politics," 707.

what; impersonal, i.e. designating roles, not persons; territorial, i.e. exercised in territorially defined jurisdictions.”<sup>102</sup> Legalization of authority through codified rules and procedures and its rationalization through the application of socially accepted knowledge on the process of international rule creation provide the main basis for legitimizing international authority.<sup>103</sup> It excludes informal arrangements and power relations but clearly defines the hierarchy of institutionalized relations as collectively agreed. It creates an apolitical image of IOs. States want to see them as technocratic bureaucracies, free from power games and political controversies. Generally, states do not want to obey other states, but rather they agree to comply with “legally established impersonal order.”<sup>104</sup> Thus, IOs’ image of neutral, impersonal, apolitical, rationality and expertise-driven motivate states to delegate authority to IOs to make collective decisions that are binding on them.<sup>105</sup>

## 2.2. CONCRETIZING INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY

International authority cannot be understood as a single cohesive concept because of the complexity of international environment it is exercised in and the complexity of international authorities, that is, international organisations, it is exercised by. In contrast to one-dimensional conceptualizations of international authority presented above, I adopt two-dimensional definition based on the works of Hooghe and Marks.<sup>106</sup> International authority of international organisations consists of two parts: delegation and pooling. These two constitutive parts reflect both the supranational, in the case of delegation, and

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<sup>102</sup> Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka and Svet Derderyan, *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 14.

<sup>103</sup> Barnett and Finnermore, 707 – 708.

<sup>104</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Günther Roth and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968): 215 – 216.

<sup>105</sup> Hooghe and Marks, “Delegation and Pooling,” 310; Hooghe et al, *Measuring International Authority*, 18;

<sup>106</sup> Hooghe and Marks, 311; Hooghe et al, 18;

intergovernmental, in the case of pooling, dimensions of international authority. This conceptualization provides us more complex and comprehensive picture of authority of IOs.

Delegation is a *grant* of authority to the international secretariat of an international organisation to take institutionally independent of state control roles in the overall decision-making of the organisation.<sup>107</sup> Institutional independence of the secretariat stems from the fact that member-states' governments do not select or held privately accountable the officials working in the secretariat.<sup>108</sup> Delegation indicates what is the independent role of the secretariat in the decision-making of the overall international organisation, such as “executive functions, executive monopoly, policy initiation, monopoly of policy initiative, budget drafting, financial non-compliance, member state accession, suspension of a member state, and constitutional revision.”<sup>109</sup>

Pooling is a *transfer* of authority from individual member-states to the body of an international organisation which consists of nationally selected representatives of member-states, where member-states cede their national veto to some form of majoritarian collective decision-making.<sup>110</sup> Such bodies inside an international organisation can take the form of national assemblies or boards of executives, where national representatives are directly selected by their national governments and held directly responsibly to them.<sup>111</sup> In essence, pooling indicates whether member-state bodies inside IOs employ some form of majoritarian voting, whether collective decisions taken by them require national ratifications and whether these decisions have binding or voluntary character.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid; Ibid, 24.

<sup>108</sup> Hooghe et al, 24.

<sup>109</sup> Hooghe and Marks, 311.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid; Hooghe et al, 24.

<sup>111</sup> Hooghe and Marks, 324 – 325.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, 311.

## 2.3. TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY

As such, on the idealized conceptual continuum, we can differentiate between the three level of international authority: high, medium and low.

### 2.3.1 *High International Authority*

IOs with the highest level of authority are those that have highest levels of both pooling and delegation. States are willing to delegate authority to the secretariats if an newly designed IO includes a high number of participating states and covers a broad range of policy issues.<sup>113</sup> When IOs have a broad policy mandates, the number of policy issue for headlining international agenda as well as the number of possible bargaining combinations, including issue-linkages, among members increase dramatically.<sup>114</sup> When the number of members in such IOs are also high, it doubles the complexity of international policy-making as the larger number of states holding a veto power and bargaining over a wide array of policy issues creates a strong foundation for decisional deadlock.<sup>115</sup> This complexity is also coupled with general uncertainty under the conditions of anarchy about the environment, preferences of other states, the endurance of their international commitments and etc.<sup>116</sup> As such, there are strong functional benefits of delegating authority to international secretariats of IOs. As these IOs cover a wide area of global issues, their delegation contracts also will provide them with more discretion, as rational states, aware of the fact that they cannot predict every future event, will leave some major decisions to IOs.<sup>117</sup>

It is quite different situation with pooling, that is, the transfer of authority from member-states to collective member-states bodies within IOs. In IOs with large memberships, members will transfer their authority to collective state bodies to avoid veto deadlock, but they do not do

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<sup>113</sup> Hooghe and Marks, 312; Koremenos et al, 788.

<sup>114</sup> Hooghe and Marks, 312.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Koremenos et al 2001, 787 – 789.

<sup>117</sup> Hawkins et al 2006, 204.



so in IOs that cover a broad array of policy areas.<sup>118</sup> IOs with a broad policy scope, acting as a soft form of international government, may touch upon issue areas that are of highest domestic interests over which members cannot compromise.<sup>119</sup> In such IOs, there is too high chance of member-states being outvoted on important domestic issues, and as such, states will want to keep their veto powers. As such, IOs with the highest level of authority are those that have a high number of member-states, but they cover limited policy areas. These IOs have both high levels of delegation and pooling.

### 2.3.2 *Low International Authority*

IOs with the lowest level of authority have the lowest pooling and delegation levels. The lowest level of delegation can be observed in IOs that have small memberships and limited policy scope.<sup>120</sup> Under such conditions, member-states are not incentivized to delegate much, if any, authority to the secretariat, as there is no urgent functional need in centralization of tasks.<sup>121</sup> There is no need in pooling authority neither.<sup>122</sup> For one, small number of participating states allows members to avoid deadlock and even come to decisions based on informal arrangements; for another, limited policy scope ensures that decision-making in IOs will not touch upon sensitive domestic issues. In essence, small circle of participating states communicating over concrete policy area essentially transforms such IOs into intergovernmental forum and tasks the secretariat only with organizational, negotiation-facilitating functions.

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<sup>118</sup> Hooghe and Marks, 313.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid; Koremenos et al 2001, 787.

<sup>121</sup> Hooghe and Marks, 313.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

### 2.3.3 *Medium International Authority*

In the reality, of course, IOs neither have total independence from member-states nor they are fully obsolete organizational shells. Most of IOs operate within the above-mentioned extremes, mixing relatively high levels of delegation with relatively low levels of pooling. What differentiates these IOs from low and high authority IOs is extensive scope of issues, which by default makes members unwilling to give up their veto powers. At the same time, extensive scope justifies high levels of delegation. As such, these IOs mix low pooling with high delegation levels. As it is the case with high authority IOs, member-states in medium authority IOs may experience a strong functional need to delegate to international secretariats due to both extensive number of states involved and range of issues covered, but they will be hesitant to transfer their veto powers to collective decision-making body. Alternatively, IOs may have a small number of members, but cover quite extensive number of issues, which again, creates a need for delegation, but pushes states to keep their veto powers.

## 2.4. **INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND TRANSNATIONAL ACCESS**

I define institutional access provision by IOs as institutionalized and legalized mechanisms that allow transnational actors to take part at different stages of policy making.<sup>123</sup> As it is the case with the definition of international authority, the definition of institutional access also focuses on its legal-rational character as codified in formal rules and procedures in the mandates of international organisations. Importantly, access does not imply the actual participation of TNAs in IOs; participation means the actual historically documented involvement of TNAs in IOs' policy processes, while institutional access, importantly, means only the presence of opportunity for such engagement.

To conceptually map out the link between international authority and institutional access, I suggest looking at the IOs authority as one single continuum ranging from the extreme

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<sup>123</sup> Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrio and Christer Jonsson, "Explaining Transnational Design of International Organizations," *International Organization* 68 (2014): 724.

high level to the extreme low level. Along this continuum, I differentiate between the levels of access by looking at IOs' *opportunity* and *willingness* for access provision. *Opportunity* is the mandated ability of IOs to provide access for TNAs, while *willingness* is the IOs' perception of utility of TNAs' involvement for the advancement of the goals of its mandate. Considering the difference in access provision between IOs with the highest and lowest level of authority, we have to remember that these are idealized cases theorized in order to provide useful threshold points for measuring the real-life levels of authority and access. I argue that IOs with high authority have opportunity for access provision, but they are not willing to do so. IOs with low authority neither have opportunity nor willingness for access provision. Lastly, IOs with medium authority, have higher level of opportunity than low authority IOs and very high level of willingness compared to high authority IOs (Table 1).

IO Authority	Pooling	Delegation	Opportunity	Willingness
<b>High</b>	Highest level	Highest level	High	Low
<b>Low</b>	Lowest level	Lowest level	Low	Low
<b>Medium</b>	Low level	High level	High	High

*Table 1. International Authority Levels and Opportunity and Willingness of IOs for Access Provision*

#### 2.4.1 High Authority IOs and Access Provision

In an idealized IO with the highest levels of delegation and pooling, member-states may exercise extremely minimized control over the secretariat, while the IO itself enjoys significant budget and final decision-making autonomy from member-states. These IOs can be characterized in three aspects: firstly, they have extensive regulatory competence in the specific policy area they are operating in, possibly to the level of being international rule creating body; secondly, they have all the necessary, including financial and technical-scientific, resources for implementation of their international policies; and lastly, considering two above factors, they

are considered to be the main international rule-making authorities in their policy domain, as such, they enjoy taken-for-granted legitimacy.<sup>124</sup> With such authority, IOs may effectively govern international issues on their own. It is not to say that these IOs are closed to TNAs or do not have enough institutional capabilities to provide access. In fact, high authority IOs are the ones who have the highest opportunity for access provision, and the majority of transnational actors are more than willing to work with these IOs due to legitimacy and reputation that they will gain.<sup>125</sup> However, the point is that these IOs do not see much sense in utilizing existing access provision mechanisms for their mandate goals.

However, member-states of these IOs still may want to involve transnational actors for two reasons: either when there is functional need in additional expertise by these TNAs, or states may want to institute additional controlling mechanism over international bureaucracies.<sup>126</sup> I argue against these. Firstly, in high authority IOs, member-states may want to involve transnational actors in order to establish additional monitoring system, illustrated through the concept of “fire alarms” in PA literature,<sup>127</sup> over too independent international secretariats, but they but they will be cautious to provide too much access for TNAs as these actors themselves may become influencers on the operations of IOs if they to be granted equal rights as states.<sup>128</sup> Having considered the fact that high authority IOs operate within specific policy domains over which member-states are willing to retain national control, members may be afraid that involvement of TNAs may bring up harmful criticism or advocacy for policies that will not serve their domestic interests.

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<sup>124</sup> Abbott et al, “Orchestration,” 21; Philipp Genschel and Bernhard Zangl, “State Transformations in OECD Countries,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 339;

<sup>125</sup> Abbott et al, “Orchestration,” 21.

<sup>126</sup> Tallberg et al, “Explaining Transnational Design,” 743; Hawkins and Jacoby, “How Agents Matter,” 208.

<sup>127</sup> Hawkins et al, “Delegation Under Anarchy,” 12.

<sup>128</sup> Hawkins and Jacoby, 208.

Secondly, neither there is a demand for additional functional input by TNAs in such IOs: the secretariat of high authority IO has formalized power to directly implement policy in national jurisdictions of its member-states and enough financial resources to set up own local implementation units, research departments or in-house forums for additional technical input. Having all of these, it will not be rational for these IOs to enter into additional contractual relations with third parties to outsource functions that they themselves legally mandated, politically legitimized and financially capable of performing on their own.<sup>129</sup>

#### 2.4.2 *Low Authority IOs and Access Provision*

In a stark contrast, IOs with the lowest levels of delegation and pooling neither enjoy policy and budget independence, neither they are tasked with any extensive mandate that would require such independence. As such, these IOs do not enjoy neither regulatory competence, operational capacity or taken-for-granted legitimacy.<sup>130</sup>

These IOs are essentially vivid examples of pure intergovernmentalism, with secretariats playing only administrative and supportive roles in negotiations of states. Their mandates do not require any additional input by TNAs. Although their policy scope may be quite extensive, member-states themselves, exactly for the reason of extensive policy scope, may want to negotiate and co-operate with TNAs without the intermediary function of IOs, because of domestic sensitivity to issues that they cannot compromise over. Nor TNAs will be willing working with them, as these IOs neither can provide TNAs with additional resources and rewards for their job, nor do these TNAs will receive international reputation or legitimacy for working with such low authority IOs.<sup>131</sup> These IOs neither have enough opportunity nor are they mandated with extensive tasks to be willing to engage with TNAs.

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<sup>129</sup> Abbott et al, "Orchestration," 14.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

### 2.4.3 *Medium Authority IOs and Access Provision*

Having established these two extreme threshold points, we now turn to the authority area where the most of current international organisations operate within – that is, area of medium international authority. Medium authority IOs may have a variety of combinations of regulatory competence, operational capacity and legitimacy and the involvement of TNAs helps them to complement their deficiencies.<sup>132</sup> For example, they may have legitimacy and competence, but may lack capacity to enforce local implementation. Or, they may lack competence and legitimacy to create international standards, but have capacity to provide access for TNAs, so TNAs can to advocate for international rule creation in the needed field. I argue that exactly this capability gap pushes them to pursue states to establish and formalize institutional channels for access provision for TNAs, as, the argument goes, it is essential for their mandate fulfillment, and thereby, for the achievement of collective goals.

Medium authority IOs are those that may have relatively higher level of delegation, as they usually handle an extensive scope of issues, but lower level of pooling, with member-states willing to keep things under their national veto. As such, medium authority IOs are faced with functional dilemma: on one hand, they have an extensive list of issues that they should solve, but their hands are tied by member-states' control mechanisms, which means that every decision taken by the secretariats should gain approval of members. This makes international policy-making and implementation both time and policy inefficient, as by the time the secretariat gets the permission to act, the issue may evolve in unexpected way and old policy may no longer be relevant. In such IOs, states are also hesitant to delegate secretariats with powers to hierarchically govern states through the creation of international laws, to apply these laws on members and create enforcement mechanisms.<sup>133</sup> Neither these IOs have powers to

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<sup>132</sup> Abbott et al, "Orchestration," 21.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, 11.

directly access private actors operating within national borders and protected by national jurisdictions in order to ensure the compliance with international policies.<sup>134</sup>

The access provision for transnational actors helps IOs to overcome these limitations. Firstly, even the soft involvement of TNAs may help an IO to indirectly *manage* states into compliance with international norms and policies through public naming and shaming that may re-shape interests and behavior of member-states in alignment with the IO's mandate goals.<sup>135</sup> Secondly, TNAs also helps an IO to *bypass* states in accessing private actors operating under the umbrella of national sovereign jurisdictions, without dealing with states as intermediaries.<sup>136</sup> In both cases, the important thing is that the IO providing access to TNAs neither conflicts with its member-states' interests, thus making sure that members are still the main players in the organisation, nor the IO intervenes into domestic sovereign affairs of members, thus protecting itself from such criticism.<sup>137</sup> For example, if this IO employs a TNA from same country as the target member-states, technically, there is no foreign intervention into domestic affairs, but rather local civil society advocacy and participation.

Medium authority IOs may not push for hard and direct access for TNAs, but even more medium level of access may be considered enough in order to utilize TNAs' help. Such IOs may use the existing access mechanism and expand them over time by illustrating that they are essential for the fulfillment of their mandate. The main difference between high and medium authority IOs is that both have opportunity to expand institutional access over time, but only medium authority IOs go for it. While high authority IOs may have enough authority to delegate some functions to TNAs in the real time, medium authority IOs may start with

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<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid, 12.

informal access, involving orchestration,<sup>138</sup> and later institutionalize this access if it can be proven successful for members.

As such, from the theoretical discussion above, I propose following hypothesis for empirical testing:

**H1:** All things being equal, international organisations with the medium level of international authority provide the higher level of access to transnational actors than international organisations with the high and low levels of authority.

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<sup>138</sup> Abbott et al, “Orchestration,” 3; Abbott et al, “Two Logics,” 722;



## CHAPTER III. DATA AND METHOD

### 3.1. DATA SETUP

In order to test the hypothesis, I compile a panel dataset containing information on the levels of authority and access provision among 29 international organisations in the period from 1950 to 2010. As such, the unit of analysis is an international organisation in a year. To qualify as such, an international body should fulfill following criteria:

*“it should have at least 3 member-states;  
it should have distinct physical location or website;  
it should have a formal structure (i.e., a legislative body, executive, and bureaucracy);  
at least thirty permanent staff;  
it should have a written constitution or convention;  
it should have and a decision body that meets at least once a year.”*<sup>139</sup>

IOs in the dataset range from global (UN, WTO, the World Bank, ICC, OECD, IMF, IGAD) to regional organizations (AMU, APEC, ASEAN, AU, CAN, CEMAC, OIC) covering a variety of different policy issues ranging from energy (OAPEC), free market and trade (ASEAN, CARICOM, CEMAC, EFTA, NAFTA), security (AU, NATO, OSCE, UN) to environment (IWC, NAFO) among others. Although it does not cover all existing IOs in the international system, the sample of 29 IOs present in the dataset cover an extensive period of time from 1950 to 2010 with more than 1000 observations.

#### 3.1.1 Independent Variables

I operationalize the international authority of IOs through two variables, *Delegation* and *Pooling*, that come from Measuring International Authority dataset by Hooghe et al.<sup>140</sup> Both variables range from 0 to 1, 0 being the lowest level of delegation to IO and the lowest level of pooling in an IO, and 1 being the highest level of both.

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<sup>139</sup> Hooghe et al, *Measuring International Authority*, 105.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

In Measuring International Authority dataset,<sup>141</sup> *Delegation* is operationalized as “an annual measure of the allocation of authoritative competences to non-state bodies in IO’s decision-making process.” It consists of political delegation and judicial delegation.<sup>142</sup> Political delegation is measured across the bureaucratic bodies within an IO that are composed of non-state actors and that have institutionalized ability to “exercise or co-exercise authority” over agenda-setting and/or final decision-making across six following decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and policy-making in up to five different issue areas.<sup>143</sup> Judicial delegation is a “conditional grant of authority to courts, arbitrators, or tribunals.”<sup>144</sup> It measures the level of independence of judicial body, the level of bindingness of its legal decisions and whether there is a remedy for non-compliance. Scores for political and judicial delegation are then distributed across three decision areas each with own score: agenda-setting (1), final decision-making (2) and dispute settlement (3). The average of these three scores constitutes delegation score for each of six decision areas. Final *Delegation* index for an international organisation is an average of these delegation scores for six decision areas.

*Pooling* measures “the extent to which member states share authority through collective decision making.”<sup>145</sup> Pooling is measured by looking at voting rules across the bodies of an IO that involves members’ decision-making in the two processes: agenda-setting (1) and final decision-making (2) in six decision areas mentioned above.<sup>146</sup> Simultaneously, a state-dominated IO body receives the scores for bindingness and ratification of decisions in each of six decision areas. Voting score for agenda-setting and final decision-making in each of six decision areas is averaged and multiplied by scores for bindingness and ratification for each

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid, 108.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 113.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

decision area, which produces overall agenda-setting score and final decision-making score for each decision area. Two scores are averaged for each decision area in order to produce pooling score for each decision area. Finally, pooling scores for each decision area are averaged to produce the overall *Pooling* score for an international organisation.

### 3.1.2 *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable, the level of access provided by IOs to TNAs is operationalized through *TNA Access* index created by Sommerer and Tallberg.<sup>147</sup> *TNA Access* is composite of four indicators: the depth of access, the range of access, the permanence of access and the level of codification of access.<sup>148</sup>

The *depth* of access is the level of TNAs involvement into IOs' activities and it ranges from 0 to 4, 4 being the highest level.<sup>149</sup> IOs that receive the score of 4 for the depth provide TNAs with the same level of treatment in the terms of rights and opportunities as for member-states. IOs with the score of 3 provide a direct access into its decision-making, but do not grant them equal rights as member-states. The score of 2 indicates that IOs do not provide direct access into decision-making, but they actively involve TNAs through alternative specially designated forums and activities, that may happen at the same time as the decision-making process in the main bodies. IOs with the score of 1 provide only passive access, usually allowing TNAs to participate as silent observers or information receivers. Lastly, the score of 0 indicates the total absence of access.

The *range* is the level of exclusiveness of access to some particular type of TNAs and it scores between 0 and 4, with 4 indicating the broadest and limitless definition for the type of

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<sup>147</sup> Thomas Sommerer and Jonas Tallberg, "Transnational Access to International Organizations 1950 – 2010: A New Data Set," *International Studies Perspectives* 18 (2017): 249.

<sup>148</sup> Sommerer and Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 254.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

TNAs allowed into the decision-making.<sup>150</sup> IOs with the score of 3 have only weak and shallow rules for TNAs' involvement, while IOs with the score of 2 have more demanding criteria, such as the alignment of TNAs' activities with the mandate goals of IOs and demonstrated ability to make contribution to the issue at the hand. The score of 1 indicates the presence of even more restrictive rules, where TNAs may be required to have specific skills, expertise or geographic coverage; alternatively, rules may explicitly name TNAs which should be provided access. Finally, 0 indicates the absence of access for all TNAs.

The overall *TNA Access* index is the combination of depth and range multiplied by two additional institutional indicators – permanence, which is the level of sustainability of access over time, and codification, which is the level to which access is codified in formal rules.<sup>151</sup> *TNA Access* ranges from 0 to 12, 0 indicating the total absence of access, while 12 indicating the ideal type of access into all decision-making activities for all kinds of TNAs on permanent and legally codified basis.

### 3.2. SPECIFYING THE REGRESSION MODEL

In the dataset, 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of pooling score is 0.49 with the highest score being 0.53, while 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of delegation is 0.32 with the highest score of 0.46. As high IO authority means the highest levels of delegation and pooling, in the dataset, throughout the period from 1950 to 2010, there are two IOs fulfilling this condition: Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2010, BIS got 0.33 for delegation and 0.52 for pooling, with pooling score being the highest among all IOs in the dataset (Table 2). In the same year, WTO got very balanced scores for both variables with 0.44 for delegation and 0.49 for pooling. Despite being one of the most authoritative IOs in the dataset, WTO scored less

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

than Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) in 2010, which got the highest score of 0.46 for delegation.

Low IO authority is captured through the lowest 25<sup>th</sup> percentile: 0.11 and lower for pooling and 0.06 and lower for delegation. There is only one IO that consistently fulfils this condition throughout all the years in the dataset – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which in 2010 got the lowest score for delegation of 0.01. In different years, following IOs were considered to have lowest authority: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which got the lowest score for pooling in 2010; Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN); Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD); Nordic Council (NC) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, in 2010, only APEC was considered to be an IO with the lowest level of authority.

As such, it is not suprising that IOs with the highest levels of access provision are those located within these two extremes. International Criminal Court (ICC) consistently has been scoring the highest on access provision since 2006, while Organization for American States (OAS) has been taking the first spot till 2006, and since then was the second one. ICC scores for delegation and pooling are both in the medium range and the same can be said of OAS and Council of Europe (CoE) that follow right after it.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION	DELEGATION	POOLING	ACCESS
<i>International Criminal Court</i>	0.34	0.37	<b>1.21</b>
Organization of American States	0.24	0.4	1.17
Council of Europe	0.4	0.48	0.90
Andean Community	0.39	0.26	0.83
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	0.18	0.19	0.80
African Union	0.3	0.5	0.78
United Nations	0.2	0.49	0.75
European Free Trade Association	0.21	0.15	0.63
Pacific Islands Forum	0.27	0.31	0.62
Nordic Council	0.08	0.09	0.58
World Bank	0.17	0.39	0.57
Organization for Islamic Cooperation	0.05	0.34	0.53
Commonwealth of Nations	0.25	0.31	0.51
International Whaling Commission	0.05	0.33	0.51
Caribbean Community	0.31	0.33	0.50
World Trade Organization	0.44	0.49	0.49
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	0.14	0.11	0.48
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization	0.14	0.32	0.44
Intergovernmental Authority on Development	0.05	0.19	0.38
North American Free Trade Association	0.21	0.07	0.37
<i>Central African Economic and Monetary Union</i>	<b>0.46</b>	0.28	0.35
International Monetary Fund	0.30	0.30	0.31
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	0.25	0.13	0.28
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	0.01	0.04	0.27
Shanghai Cooperation Organization	0.08	0.20	0.18
Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	0.19	0.22	0.17
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	0.13	0.07	0.15
<i>Bank for International Settlements</i>	0.33	<b>0.52</b>	0.04

Arab Maghreb Union 0.19 0.02 0.02

*Note: Sorted by the highest level of TNA access to lowest. Highest scores are highlighted.*

**Table 2.** 29 International organisations and their levels of delegation, pooling and TNA access in 2010.

As it was stated in the theoretical argument, there is a non-linear relationship between the measures of authority and access. For this reason, I created a square term variables for *Delegation* and *Pooling* in each year in the dataset and label them as *Delegation\_SQ* and *Pooling\_SQ*. As I hypothesize non-linear relationships between delegation, pooling and access, the expectation is that *Delegation\_SQ* and *Pooling\_SQ* should have negative associations with the level of *TNA Access*.

	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
TNA ACCESS	1211	0.26	0.26	0	1.21
POOLING	1211	0.25	0.16	0	0.53
DELEGATION	1211	0.17	0.10	0	0.46
AFFINITY OF MEMBERS	1117	-0.71	0.17	-0.98	0.09
DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS	1164	3.56	5.08	-8.75	10
DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER	1211	0.33	0.47	0	1
DECISION	1211	0.39	0.19	0	1
SECURITY	1211	0.07	0.22	0	1
TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY	1211	0.61	0.45	0	2
LOCAL ACTIVITIES	1211	0.20	0.21	0	1
NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES	1211	0.14	0.26	0	1

**Table 3.** Summary Statistics of All Variables.

I also include 8 additional variables in order to control for biased estimates. Summary statistics are available in the Table 3. The data for these variables is taken from TRANSACCESS dataset.<sup>152</sup> Firstly, it is argued that the heterogeneity of preferences of member-states may have an effect on the level of IOs' access provision for TNAs. However, there is no clear agreement between scholars on this: while some argue that goal divergence

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, 760.

among members leads to the limited authority of an IO, as a result of which the IO will seek TNAs' involvement to complement its limited capabilities,<sup>153</sup> others argue that if members have similar interests, they are more like to design more institutional access mechanisms for TNAs.<sup>154</sup> Variable *Affinity of Members* is based on the voting patterns of member-states of IOs in the United Nations General Assembly and measures yearly average policy interests convergence among all possible combinations of member-states of each international organisation in the dataset.<sup>155</sup>

Secondly, overlapping logic applies to the argument of democratic memberships: IOs that are dominated by like-minded democracies tend to provide more access for TNAs as an extension of domestic democratic principles such as transparency and accountability to the global level.<sup>156</sup> Variable *Democratic Members* captures the average score of the level of democracy among the member-states of each IO as aggregated based on Polity IV scores.

Thirdly, in following constructivist argument that democratic major power in the membership of an IO diffuses its norms and values on the IO and its members, for example through promoting more access opportunities for TNAs,<sup>157</sup> I add *Democratic Major Power* dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if there is a democratic major power in an IO in a year without any other power of non-democratic character, and 0 if not.<sup>158</sup>

Fourthly, I include two dummy variables in order to test whether the sovereignty concerns of member-states affect the level of access provision. The argument is that members may fear that the involvement of TNAs may touch upon their sovereign domestic affairs in undesired or unexpected ways, as such they would like to avoid their involvement in two cases: if an IO's secretariat has major legally binding decision and rule-making capabilities and if an

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<sup>153</sup> Abbott et al, "Orchestration," 27;

<sup>154</sup> Raustiala, "States, NGOs," 731; Hawkins and Jacoby, "How Agents Matter," 204.

<sup>155</sup> Sommerrer and Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 760.

<sup>156</sup> Grigorescu, "Transparency," 626.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Sommerrer and Tallberg, "Transnational Access," 760.



IO operates in the field of international security.<sup>159</sup> Dummies *Decision* and *Security* take the values of 1 if an IO has major decision-making functions and engages in international security issues, and 0 if otherwise.

Finally, in order to account for the argument about the functional need for TNAs involvement, I also include three more control variables that specify the kind of tasks that IOs perform: *Technical Complexity*, *Local Activities* and *Non-Compliance Incentives*. IOs are interested in providing access for TNAs if their mandate tasks are “technically complex, require local implementation and present significant noncompliance incentives, and where the relevant information – policy expertise, implementation knowledge, and compliance information – is held by societal actors.”<sup>160</sup> The measure of technical complexity of an IO’s mandate ranges from 0 to 1, while the measures of the need for local implementation and of the level of possible non-compliance incentives range from 0 to 2.

Since this study uses panel data with the authority and access levels of IOs varying over time, I employ two-way fixed effect model to account for within organization variations. The model includes squared delegation (*Delegation\_SQ<sub>it</sub>*) and pooling (*Pooling\_SQ<sub>it</sub>*) terms to account for non-linear causal relationship, organization ( $u_i$ ) and time ( $v_t$ ) fixed effects in addition to control variables ( $\sum \gamma X_{it}$ ) and error term ( $\epsilon_{it}$ ). The overall base model looks as following:

$$TNA\ Access_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Delegation_{it} + \beta_2 Pooling_{it} + \beta_3 Pooling\_SQ_{it} + \beta_4 Delegation\_SQ_{it} + \sum \gamma X_{it} + u_i + v_t + \epsilon_{it}$$


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<sup>159</sup> Ibid, 756.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, 754.

## CHAPTER IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Before jumping into the empirical results, it is worth to take a minute to look at anecdotal evidence coming from the dataset. Figure 1 illustrates the correlation between the degree of access provision with the level of pooling in 29 IOs in 2010, while in the Figure 2, pooling is substituted with delegation.



**Figure 1.** Association between the level of pooling and the level of TNA Access in 2010.

As it can be seen from the both figures, there is non-linear relationship between two independent variables and the level of access. IOs with pooling levels approximately between 0.15 and 0.25 have reached the highest levels of access provision in 2010, while IOs with pooling levels higher than 0.25 and lower than 0.15 had lesser levels of access. Similarly, IOs with delegation levels approximately between 0.12 and 0.17 provider more access than IOs with delegation levels higher than 0.17 and lower than 0.12.




Figure 2. Association between the level of delegation and the level of TNA Access in 2010.

#### 4.1. MAIN MODELS

Results presented in the Table 4 support these trends. I start with a simple OLS regression in the model 1 including all independent and control variables. In accordance with expectations, there is statistically significant negative relationship between *Pooling\_SQ* and *TNA Access*. Specifically, the rate of change in *TNA Access* in an IO depends on the IO's level of pooling. Since sign for *Pooling* is positive, and sign for *Pooling\_SQ* is negative, results indicate that the effect of pooling is positive until the level of pooling reaches 0.422 threshold, after which its effect becomes negative. IOs with the level of pooling of 0.422 provide the highest level of access. As such, there is inverted U-shaped relationship between *TNA Access* and *Pooling\_SQ*.

Although having a negative sign, *Delegation\_SQ* has no statistically significant effect on the level of access provision. In the terms of magnitude, the effect of pooling is strongest among all statistically significant variables included in the model. *Decision* comes the second: IOs with the international decision-making powers on average provide less access than IOs with less powers. In an essence, it provides indirect support for the authority hypothesis as well: the more authoritative the IO is, the more decision-making powers it has.

In order to specifically account for organizational characteristics of IOs and their variation over time, I employ fixed effects OLS regression controlling for years and IOs in the models 2 and 3. The model 2 includes only main independent variables in the absence of control variables. Picture remains the same, *Pooling\_SQ* is negative and significant, although its magnitude almost doubles. *Delegation\_SQ* remains insignificant.

The model 3 is a base model with all control variables included. Even in the presence of control variables, *Pooling\_SQ* keeps its significance and increases the magnitude of its effect. In the base model, the threshold level of pooling is 0.403: IOs that have the level of pooling equal to 0.403 provide the highest access level to TNAs; IOs with pooling levels below and higher than this, provide less access. Interestingly, *Delegation\_SQ* becomes significant at 95% level of confidence, having a positive effect on the level of access. *Decision* and *Security* still provide indirect support for the argument about authoritative IOs – their effects on *TNA Access* remain negative and statistically significant, scoring the third after *Pooling\_SQ* and *Delegation\_SQ* in the terms of the magnitudes of their effects. With 1110 observations, the two-way fixed effects OLS explains 70% of within-IOs variation over the whole period in the dataset.

	OLS	Fixed Effects OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3: Base model)
POOLING	1.20*** (0.14)	2.15*** (0.22)	2.21*** (0.22)
POOLING_SQ	-1.42*** (0.24)	-2.02*** (0.39)	-2.74*** (0.40)
DELEGATION	0.10 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.33 (0.20)
DELEGATION_SQ	-0.00 (0.40)	0.09 (0.41)	1.09** (0.47)
AFFINITY OF MEMBERS	-0.27*** (0.03)	—	-0.07 (0.04)
DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS	0.02*** (0.00)	—	0.00*** (0.00)
DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER	0.08*** (0.01)	—	0.02 (0.02)
DECISION	-0.5*** (0.03)	—	-0.86*** (0.07)
SECURITY	-0.27*** (0.02)	—	-0.73*** (0.10)
TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY	-0.00 (0.01)	—	-0.31*** (0.03)
LOCAL ACTIVITIES	0.11*** (0.02)	—	0.01 (0.03)
NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES	0.25*** (0.02)	—	0.14*** (0.04)
<i>Intercept</i>	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.08)
R <sup>2</sup> : Within		0.64	0.71
Between		0.12	0.45
Overall	0.57	0.23	0.40
# of observations	1110	1211	1110
<i>Note: *** <math>p &lt; 0.01</math>; ** <math>p &lt; 0.05</math>; Standard Errors are in brackets. Models (2) and (3) include organisation-fixed effect and year dummies.</i>			

**Table 4.** Regression results for simple OLS and fixed effect OLS models.

## 4.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECK

I run three additional models in order to check for the robustness of results. Firstly, I run fixed effects OLS models while clustering for standards errors on IOs in order to check for heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Results are reported in the Table 5. As in previous models, *Pooling\_SQ* remains negative and significant, although its magnitude reaches the highest level among all estimated models: IOs with the level of pooling of 0.38 provide the highest level of access; IOs with pooling levels lower and higher than this threshold provide less access. *Delegation\_SQ* also does not illustrate any changes in comparison to previous models. Out of 8 control variables, only two has statistical significance: *Decision*, which keeps its negative effect on the level of access, and surprisingly, *Affinity of Members* that did not show significance in the base model (4). One-point increase in *Affinity of Members* is associated with 0.22-point drop in *TNA Access*.

Following Tallberg and his co-authors that used the same *TNA Access* variable in their study,<sup>161</sup> I also run Tobit regression for the model 5. The choice is motivated by the type of data-points distribution for dependent variable *TNA Access*: it is left-censored at zero, thereby indicating a higher density of data-points that score zero in comparison to data-points scoring higher than zero. In an essence, whether *TNA Access* is equal to zero or not indicates whether an IO provides access to TNAs or not, and all values higher than zero indicate the degree of access provision.<sup>162</sup> Tobit model presents a better suit to account for this left-censored bias in the data, which allows to get the most of information from “theoretically relevant zero entries.”<sup>163</sup> Results do not differ a lot from fixed effects OLS model. *Pooling\_SQ* still has the strongest effect and it is still negative. The effect of pooling on access stays positive till it reaches the threshold level of 0.395, after which its effect becomes negative. *Decision*, *Security*

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<sup>161</sup> Tallberg et al, “Explaining the Transnational Design,” 761.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

and few of other control variables illustrate the same statistically significant but limited effects on *TNA Access*. Among all models, Tobit model provides the strongest support for my hypothesis. This is due to the fact that surprisingly, *Delegation\_SQ* acquires negative sign which is significant at 95% confidence level: IOs with the delegation level of 0.286 provide the highest level of access to TNAs, while IOs with delegation levels lower and higher than this provide less access. The magnitude of its effect also turns out to be the strongest after the effect of pooling.

Lastly, building from the logic that values in *TNA Access* variable that take value of higher than zero indicate the general openness of IOs, I construct a dummy *Open* dependent variable, which takes value of 1 if *TNA Access* is higher than zero, and takes value of 0 if otherwise. I run logit regression in order to test the implications of the substituted dependent variable. Looking at general direction of coefficients, we can observe that as in two previous models, both *Pooling\_SQ* and *Delegation\_SQ* have negative sign, indicating that on average, IOs with higher levels of pooling and delegation are likely to provide less access for TNAs than IOs with less pooling and delegation levels. Control variables keep their previous signs.

	Fixed Effects Clustered S.E.	Tobit	Logit
	(4)	(5)	(6)
POOLING	2.54*** (0.95)	1.93*** (0.20)	22.85*** (2.77)
POOLING_SQ	-3.26*** (1.42)	-2.44*** (0.34)	-31.17*** (4.39)
DELEGATION	0.15 (0.67)	0.66*** (0.24)	8.82*** (3.03)
DELEGATION_SQ	0.71 (1.59)	-1.15** (0.54)	-22.87*** (7.19)
AFFINITY OF MEMBERS	-0.22*** (0.09)	-0.37*** (0.04)	-4.65*** (0.70)
DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS	0.01 (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.31*** (0.02)
DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER	0.02 (0.07)	0.10*** (0.01)	1.40*** (0.28)
DECISION	-0.92*** (0.30)	-0.77*** (0.05)	-9.07*** (0.82)
SECURITY	-0.71 (0.48)	-0.35*** (0.04)	-4.72*** (0.48)
TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY	-0.29 (0.15)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.29)
LOCAL ACTIVITIES	-0.04 (0.14)	0.16*** (0.03)	-1.35 (0.49)
NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES	0.19 (0.19)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.77 (0.48)
<i>Intercept</i>	0.20 (0.27)	-0.31 (0.06)	-2.69*** (0.86)
R <sup>2</sup> within	0.65		
between	0.48		
overall	0.40		
# of observations	1211	1110	1110
*** $p < 0.01$ ; ** $p < 0.05$			

**Table 5.** *Alternative models for Robustness check.*



### 4.3. DISCUSSION

Overall, the presented estimates lend support for the main hypothesis of this study. On average, IOs with the highest and lowest levels of authority provide less institutional access to TNAs than IOs with the medium level of authority. If we conceptualize international authority in the terms of pooling only, then we have a strong support for the argument. *Pooling\_SQ* is consistently negative and significant in all 6 models and its effect has the highest magnitude among all variables. Anecdotal evidence from descriptive statistics of the data provide additional support for this (Table 6). None of IOs that got the highest scores for delegation and pooling throughout all the years in the dataset, except CoE, receive high scores for access provision. IOs that scored high on access provision in 2010 (Table 2), come close to top 3 IOs in terms of both pooling and delegation scores, but are mostly located within the high and low range. In contrast, IOs that score highest and lowest on these variables, score relatively low on access provision, especially BIS, CEMAC and OIC.

Levels	Delegation	Pooling	Access
Top 3 IOs	CEMAC, WTO, CoE	UN, BIS, AU	ICC, OAS, CoE
Bottom 3 IOs	SCO, OSCE, APEC	ASEAN, NC, OIC	BIS, AU, WB

*Table 6. Top 3 IOs with highest and lowest scores for delegation, pooling and access.*

However, since the concept of international authority also includes delegation, results are not consistent. *Delegation\_SQ* fails to yield significant results in first 4 models, but acquires negative effect and significance once I run tobit and logit models. There is an interesting implication that we can derive from this empirical observation. Despite all of discourse on increasing supranational dimension of international organisations, it may be the case that their intergovernmental character still plays a determining role in shaping their authority and relations with TNAs. Member-states are key stakeholders in IOs and they still have a final say over the degree of independence IOs are going to be granted. As such, we may hypothesize, that IOs that pool the decision-making powers to the collective member-state body to the

highest level, enjoy the highest level of authority, which in turn disincentives them to engage with TNAs. This possible implication needs further research.

Estimates for *Decision* and *Security* variables also provide support for this interpretation of international authority. *Decision* is consistently negative and significant across all 5 models<sup>164</sup> and the magnitude of its effect is the strongest after *Pooling\_SQ* and *Delegation\_SQ*.<sup>165</sup> *Security* is negative in all models as well, but significant only in 4 of them. These findings provide indirect support for “high pooling – less access” argument because IOs that have significant decision-making powers and involve in international security issues are likely to pool the decision-making votes of member-states to some collective member-state body. The obvious example is the United Nations, where Security Council enjoys significant powers on deciding on the issues of international security. Not surprisingly, the United Nations also score the highest on pooling among all IOs in the dataset over the whole period with 0.53-point in 1950.

Another interesting finding relates to the heterogeneity of members’ policy preferences. *Affinity of Members* is negative and consistently significant in all models except the model 3, which indicates that IOs where the preferences of members converge provide less access to TNAs than IOs with divergent members’ preferences. This goes against the argument that the homogeneity of preferences leads to more access as well as the argument that the heterogeneity of preferences leads to more access. In contrast, the potential rational for this observation may be as following: if members of an IO share the same preferences, they either may agree to delegate extensive authority to the IO, thereby disincentivizing it to provide access, or they may agree to not delegate much at all, since they can perfectly agree with each other without

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<sup>164</sup> It is not included in the model 2.

<sup>165</sup> In models where *Delegation\_SQ* is statistically significant.

the need in extensively institutionalized and authorized non-state body. This opens one more area for further research.

## CONCLUSION

The thesis aims to investigate why do some international organisations provide more access to transnational actors than other international organisations. It makes a claim that the level of international authority international organisations plays one of determining roles in their levels of access provision. It argues that international organisations with the highest level of international authority are able to provide access, but they do not see functional benefit in doing so. International organisations with the lowest authority neither able nor willing to provide access. International organisations with the medium level of authority have higher opportunity and willingness to provide access as they want to use it to overcome authority limitations for the fulfilment of their mandate goals.

The statistical results provide support for the argument. They indicate that there is inverse U-shaped relationship between the international authority, which is operationalized through variables of pooling and delegation, and the level of access provision. Evidence on the effect of pooling is strongest: IOs with high and low pooling levels on average provide less access than IOs with medium pooling levels.

The findings provide support for the general idea of IOs being self-directed actors. IOs engage in access provision only when they experience authority shortage, but still enjoy higher than the low levels of it – just enough to be able to set up institutional mechanisms for access provision. The study contributes to our understanding of how international authority of IOs, granted by member-states, shape the ways they handle the performance of their mandates. It also helps to conceptualize the relations between members and IOs in formal rational-legal settings and the role of TNAs in this process. The further research should test the hypothesis on the larger dataset that will cover more IOs over longer period of time. The case studies providing empirical linkage of authority to access provision, not included in this study because

of space limitations and the need in different methodological toolkit, also should help to further test the generalizability of the results.

Finally, it is important to set up the boundaries of this research. Firstly, the study was not aimed at creating a grand theory that can explain the full spectrum of IO-TNA relations as well as the whole process of their interactions. Instead, this is a study of a certain sample of international organisations over a certain period of time with a specific understanding of international authority and institutional access. Secondly, this study does not explain the variation in access provision by IOs from the perspective of TNAs. The study does not answer the questions of how TNAs select among different IOs, why do they choose some IOs over others and how and why do they lobby and advocate their ways into policy processes. Rather, the focus is solely from the perspective of IOs. Lastly, the study relies on formal definitions and rules, as codified in the founding treaties, agreements and other legal documents of IOs for conceptualizing and measuring both the authority and institutional access. Indeed, I define international authority as institutionalized power of IOs to make independent collective decisions binding on their-member-states. I define access as institutionalized mechanisms within IOs that provide opportunities for TNAs to participate in their policy processes. As such, the study excludes informalism, networking and political lobbying from its definition of main variables. Without any doubt, in the real world, much of TNAs engagement with IOs does not always take place through formally institutionalized channels, but rather involve a significant level of informalism. However, they are not captured in the legal treaties, which make them impossible to measure quantitatively. For methodological purpose, this study focused only on institutionalized and codified concepts.

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