

SHOULD WE STAY OR SHOULD WE LEAVE?
POLICIES TARGETING THE OUTMIGRATION OF THE YOUTH IN
POLAND AND HUNGARY

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Abstract

The free movement of persons within the European Union, established by the Maastricht treaty in 1992, has given new opportunities for people looking for improved career and personal advancement outside their country of citizenship. Since the accession of Central East European countries in 2004, a sharp increase in East-West migration flows has taken place. The newly accessed member states have experienced the negative economic and societal consequences of the large-scale emigration of their well-educated youth. Considering that labour migration is mainly driven by differences in economic development and higher wages, source country governments have only a small room to move in mitigating migration decisions. Using Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theory as a conceptual framework through the example of Poland and Hungary, this thesis seeks to contribute to existing literature by illustrating the ways in which source country governments can mitigate migration decisions. The thesis finds that government policy effort and rhetoric may have an influence on migration decisions by shaping the perceived future opportunities and socioeconomic standing of the youth. Efforts to mitigate outmigration decisions are essential for the reason that due to substantial economic differences between Eastern and Western European member states, the phenomenon of outmigration of the youth is likely to persist.

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List of Abbreviations

EU – European Union

EU-8 - Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia

KSH – Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical Office)

LMP – Lehet más a politika (Politics Can Be Different)

MTA – Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (Hungarian Academic of Sciences)

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

UK – United Kingdom

VAT – value-added tax

Introduction

The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 putting into law the free movement of capital, services, and persons, marked a pivotal turning point in European Union integration.¹ The free movement of persons has changed the lives of many European citizens by giving them the opportunity to work and settle without restraint in the member state providing the best opportunities for their career and personal advancement.

Intra-EU labour mobility became an increased concern for Western European member states around the accession of East European post-communist states, referred to as the EU-8. Political leaders expected massive East-West flows of migrants due to substantial economic inequalities between the West and the East of the European Union, and narratives of Eastern European migrants taking Western European jobs and making use of welfare systems flooded the media and appeared in politicians' speeches.² As a result, the borders of most Western European member states remained closed until 2011, apart from the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden.³ Although to a lesser extent than previously expected, large East-West migration flows have been significant since the 2004 enlargement, making East-West intra-EU migration a relevant phenomenon.⁴

Newly accessed member states have begun to feel the effects of outmigration exacerbated by the fact that current emigrants tend to be younger and more educated than their

¹ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

² Giacomo De Giorgi and Michele Pellizzari, 'Welfare Migration in Europe', *Labour Economics* 16, no. 4 (2009): 353–63.

³ Agnieszka Fihel and Marta Anacka, 'Return Migration to Poland in the Post-Accession Period', in *EU Labour Migration in Troubled Times: Skills Mismatch, Return, and Policy Responses*, ed. Bela Galgoczi, Janine Leschke, and Andrew Watt (Burlington, Ashgate, 2012), 143–67.

⁴ Elena Fries-Tersch et al., '2017 Annual Report on Intra-EU Labour Mobility' (European Commission, January 2018).

respective national averages.⁵ The loss of a large segment of their young population carries a set of profound consequences, such as losing much of the working-age population decreasing productivity, loss in welfare contributions, exacerbating the effects of declining fertility rates and rapid population aging.⁶ Faced by the negative consequences of outmigration, Central East European governments have sought to find ways in which the negative effects of outmigration could be mitigated.

The topic of outmigration is a highly relevant contemporary problem in need of further understanding. Existing research has attempted to discover and analyse the wide range of factors influencing migration decisions but have been inconsistent in their findings. The majority of research projects have focused on the effect of immigration on destination countries, and largely neglected the effect of outmigration on source countries.⁷ As argued by many academics, the best policy to retain and reattract emigrants is solid economic policy, as the main motivation to emigrate is provided by higher wages and living conditions in Western European countries.⁸ However, as emigration is costly and is also influenced by individual preferences, governments may have the ability to at least partially influence decisions to migrate or to return.⁹ Literature on source country government responses has analysed the type of policies needed to foster the successful retainment, reattraction, and reintegration of emigrants, but has not contextualised the rhetoric, and objective of such policies with regards

⁵ Martin Kahanec and Brian Fabo, 'Migration Strategies of Crisis-Stricken Youth in an Enlarged European Union', *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research* 19, no. 3 (August 2013): 365–80

⁶ Kahanec and Fabo; John Gibson and David McKenzie, 'The Economic Consequences of "Brain Drain" of the Best and Brightest: Microeconomic Evidence from Five Countries', *The Economic Journal* 122, no. 560 (May 2012): 339–75,

⁷ George J. Borjas, 'Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market?', *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2001, no. 1 (2001): 69–133, Zimmermann, Klaus F and Thomas K Bauer, 'Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and Its Labour Market Impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe', 1999.

⁸ Lucia Kureková, 'From Job Search to Skill Search: Political Economy of Labour Migration in Central and Eastern Europe' (PhD dissertation, Central European University, 2011).

⁹ Paweł Kazemarczyk and Magdalena Lesińska, 'Return Migration, State Policy and Integration of Returnees - the Case of Poland', in *Welcome Home? Challenges and Chances of Return Migration*, ed. Vanya Ivanova and Isabell Zwanja-Roessler (Transatlantic Forum on Migration and Integration, 2012), 29–35.

to influence on migration decisions.¹⁰ This thesis seeks to contribute to existing research by contextualising and interpreting governments' policy efforts and rhetoric surrounding the phenomenon of outmigration through the conceptual framework of Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theory.¹¹ It is hypothesised that when young people perceive that they are valued in their home country and that their problems are taken seriously, they might change their decision to migrate or be more likely to return. Therefore, sending country governments may have an influence on migration decisions of the youth not only through their policies but their rhetoric as well.

The thesis follows a qualitative research methodology relying on secondary sources such as existing literature and data. In the case of Poland, the period between 2004 and today will be looked at, as large-scale outmigration trends started to rise and be acknowledged as early as 2004.¹² In the case of Hungary, the period between 2010 and today will be considered due to the delayed experience of large-scale outmigration.¹³ It is necessary to note that available outmigration data are often incomplete. Data collection problems stem from the fact that each country uses different definitions of different types of migration patterns and the number of emigrants is usually underestimated due to the lack of compulsory deregistration in the source country.¹⁴

The research of this thesis adopted a comparative case study approach, focusing on the experience of two Central East European countries. Poland and Hungary have been chosen for the case study because they show similarities in their demographic and political setting but are vastly different in their rhetoric concerning outmigration and the objectives of their targeted

¹⁰ Kazcmarczyk and Lesińska; Gábor Lados and Gábor Hegedűs, 'Returning Home: An Evaluation of Hungarian Return Migration', *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 65, no. 4 (17 January 2017): 321–30,

¹¹ Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

¹² Kazcmarczyk and Lesińska, 'Return Migration, State Policy and Integration of Returnees - the Case of Poland'.

¹³ Ágnes Hárs, 'Elvándorlás És Bevándorlás Magyarországon a Rendszerváltás Után Nemzetközi Összehasonlításban', in *Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2015*, ed. Zsuzsa Blaskó and Fazekas (MTA, 2016).

¹⁴ Hárs; Jakub Bijak et al., 'Population and Labour Force Projections for 27 European Countries', *European Journal of Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie* 23, no. 1 (March 2007): 1–31

initiatives and of their wider social and labour market policies. While Poland has had a long history as an emigration country, and therefore is advantaged in terms of experience in dealing with large outmigration flows, Hungary has only experienced significant levels of outmigration since 2010.¹⁵ Whereas Poland has responded to such migration dynamics quickly and seemingly appropriately, Hungary is yet to address the phenomenon meaningfully and comprehensively. While the political leadership of Poland has framed outmigration as an important issue to tackle, the phenomenon has been mostly disregarded in Hungary. Even though both countries have witnessed low fertility rates and a rapidly aging population, Poland has set out to ease the problem by immigration, family policy, and outmigration policies, while Hungary has only aimed to tackle the problem by generous pro-natalist family policy.¹⁶ Politically, the youth in both countries are disillusioned with the established political parties and both countries have experienced a turn to illiberalism, even though such illiberalism commenced in Hungary in 2010, while in Poland has only taken its turn in 2015.¹⁷

In Hungary and Poland, education levels and the potential to migrate are related.¹⁸ A large portion of emigrants in both countries are young and well-educated, and tend to be underemployed abroad, exacerbating the likelihood of brain waste.¹⁹ Apart from the well-educated, data shows that a significant segment of emigrants have vocational training.²⁰

¹⁵ Kazmarczyk and Lesińska, 'Return Migration, State Policy and Integration of Returnees - the Case of Poland'; Hárs, 'Elvándorlás És Bevándorlás Magyarországon a Rendszerváltás Után Nemzetközi Összehasonlításban'.

¹⁶ Magdalena Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession', *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 2, no. 1 (June 2013): 77–90; Zoltán Kovács et al., 'Transnational Strategy for Re-Attracting and Re-Integrating Migrants' (Leibniz-Institut für Länderkun, 2014).

¹⁷ Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti, 'The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe?', *Politics and Governance* 5, no. 4 (29 December 2017): 166

¹⁸ Hubert Krieger, 'Migration Trends in an Enlarged Europe' (Eurofund Report, 2012); Agnieszka Fihel and Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska, 'Labour Market Behaviours of Back-and-Forth Migrants From Poland', *International Migration* 52, no. 1 (February 2014): 22–35,

¹⁹ Hárs, 'Elvándorlás És Bevándorlás Magyarországon a Rendszerváltás Után Nemzetközi Összehasonlításban'; Fihel and Grabowska-Lusinska, 'Labour Market Behaviours of Back-and-Forth Migrants From Poland'.

²⁰ Hárs, 'Elvándorlás És Bevándorlás Magyarországon a Rendszerváltás Után Nemzetközi Összehasonlításban'; Agnieszka Fihel, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, and Marek Okólski, 'Labour Mobility in the Enlarged European Union International Migration from the EU8 Countries', CMR Working Papers, 2006.

Medical professionals take up a significant segment of emigrants, including doctors and nurses, especially those younger and less experienced who wish to advance their career elsewhere.²¹

Advantages of comparative case studies include in-depth knowledge on and detailed description of policies enacted since the significant rise of outmigration. Such an approach might provide an interpretive insight into the largely underdeveloped policy issue of outmigration. However, as the main argument of this thesis is effectively an experiment of ideas illustrated by two similar yet different cases, it is difficult if not impossible to test and generalise its findings. Measurement of the direct effects of policies is outside the scope of the thesis due to lack of data. This thesis does not attempt to create a theory or to reformulate an existing theory. Rather, it seeks to illuminate the influence of governments by using existing theories. Most importantly, the thesis does not argue that there exists a direct causal relationship between government action and migration patterns, rather, it illustrates that decisions to migrate may be mitigated by government action and rhetoric.

To link the policies and rhetoric related to outmigration to the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty framework, the structure of the thesis will be the following. In the first chapter, the conceptual theoretical framework and a review of the existing literature will be outlined. The second chapter written on Poland and the third chapter dedicated to Hungary are similar in structure. Firstly, the trends and consequences of outmigration will be summarised in both chapters. Secondly, the ways in which political and social actors have framed the phenomenon of outmigration will be described to stress the importance of rhetoric. Thirdly, a brief description and analysis of existing outmigration policies will be provided. Fourthly, the main labour market and social policy reforms which may directly or indirectly affect the socioeconomic

²¹ Júlia Varga, '2003–2011 Az Orvosmigráció Ütemének Változásai 2003–2011', in *Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2015*, ed. Zsuzsa Blaskó and Károly Fazekas (MTA, 2016); Bozena Leven, 'Reforms and Emigration: Poland's Medical Sector', *The Polish Review* 52, no. 3 (2007): 369–77.

standing of the youth will be examined. Lastly, the influence of governmental policy efforts and rhetoric will be evaluated through the lens of the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theory. The thesis will conclude that the way in which policy efforts are formulated and the phenomenon of outmigration is framed by the political leadership influence migration decisions by shaping young people's perception of their future opportunities and their economic and societal value in their home country.

Chapter I: Theory and Background

Theoretical Framework: Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty

Albert Hirschman applies the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty framework to companies producing marketed products and organisations, such as political parties and associations.²² According to the theory, when faced with deterioration of the quality of the product or service provided, customers or members have two options to alert the leadership. The first option is exit, which is a relatively costless action in terms of effort referring to the action of replacing the existing product or service with a close substitute. However, if too few people exit, the leadership will not get the message and if too many exit, the leadership will not have the necessary customer base to continue its activities.²³

Voice is another option which refers to the action of articulating discontent instead of switching to the competition. From the perspective of voice, a mixture of alert and inert customers or members are needed, because as in the case of exit, it can be overused. If too many people use their voice, the leadership might not have the time to respond, while if too few, the leadership may never notice quality decline. Voice becomes the substitute for exit if customers believe that speaking up will deliver positive results, therefore they delay exit. The uncertainty and high cost of the voice option is usually weighed against the certainty and smaller cost of the exit option. Moreover, for the successful use of voice, collective action is needed, while for the successful use of exit, individual decisions are sufficient. Voice serves as a complement to exit when such exit seems unavailable, as in the case of family, church, and state. Without the possibility of exit, the voice option gains importance. The difficulty of

²² Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

²³ Hirschman

combining exit with voice lies in the fact that usually it is exactly those customers who are most likely to use their voice that are first to exit, especially when an alternative option of higher quality becomes available. According to Hirschman, a combination of voice and exit is needed for optimal result.²⁴

The existence of loyalty complicates the exit-voice dynamic. Loyalty to a company or organisation may hold exit at bay by fostering the use of voice and increasing the cost of exit. The more loyal the customers or members, the most likely they will prefer the voice option to the exit option. However, without loyalty, exit becomes a relatively costless action. Those loyal can threaten to exit to bargain for increased voice, but when voice reaches its limit, exit ensues. In the case of nations, families, and other close-knit communities to which there is no cost of entry, complete exit is impossible, because one can never fully exit such communities. Furthermore, upon their exit and without their contribution, conditions at home tend to deteriorate.²⁵

The theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty has been used to account for emigration patterns by Hirschman himself and by other scholars and academics.²⁶ Hirschman has added to the theory the existence of ‘political safety valves’ with relation to emigration, namely that a certain extent of emigration is preferred by politicians to reduce the likelihood of voicing discontent.²⁷ However, once emigration becomes a large-scale phenomenon, such a safety valve gets overridden by the negative consequences of emigration.²⁸ The most important

²⁴ Hirschman.

²⁵ Hirschman

²⁶ Bert Hoffman, ‘Bringing Hirschman Back in: Conceptualizing Transnational Migration as a Reconfiguration of “Exit”, “Voice”, and “Loyalty” (GIGA Working Papers No 91, 2008); Daniel R Pfister, ‘Exit, Voice and Mobility’, *BSIS Journal of International Studies* 3 (2006); Albert O. Hirschman, ‘Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History’, *World Politics* 45, no. 2 (1993): 173–202; Johnathon W Moses, ‘Exit, Vote and Sovereignty: Migration, States and Globalization’, *Review of International Political Economy* 12, no. 1 (2005): 5377.

²⁷ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

²⁸ Hirschman.

finding of the existing literature is the changing dynamics of exit, voice, and loyalty with relation to politics and emigration. Originally, Hirschman believed that exit, voice, and loyalty were mutually exclusive, while when applied to the field of politics and emigration, scholars have noted that due to the existence of free mobility, exit, voice, and loyalty can work together dynamically to mitigate emigration decisions.²⁹

This thesis uses the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty logic to illustrate the importance of policy responses and the message sent by governments to those wishing to emigrate and to those already emigrated. With the accession of Poland and Hungary to the European Union in 2004, the exit option ceased to be unthinkable and impossible because of the emergence of free movement. However, exit has not become completely costless, as emigration is influenced by not only structural but individual preferences as well. One cannot fully exit their country of nationality, therefore, to a certain extent they are influenced by the economic and political situation in their home country. However, such cost of exit may be significantly decreased if the voice option never fully materialises, if it is felt by many that it is not heard or responded to or if it is non-existent.

This thesis focuses on the emigration of the well-educated youth not only because they constitute a large segment of emigrants in both Poland and Hungary, but also because the well-educated youth tend to be the most quality-conscious and hence the most likely to use their voice to express discontent.³⁰ Therefore, the exit of those willing to voice their discontent likely hampers the situation of those staying behind. Loyalty in this sense refers to the existence of feelings of commitment toward one's country which may increase the likelihood of voice over exit. This thesis finds that the existence of a comprehensive outmigration policy together with

²⁹ Hoffman, 'Bringing Hirschman Back in: Conceptualizing Transnational Migration as a Reconfiguration of "Exit", "Voice", and "Loyalty"; Pfister, 'Exit, Voice and Mobility'; Moses, 'Exit, Vote and Sovereignty: Migration, States and Globalization'.

³⁰ Ruben Atoyan et al., 'Migration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe', IMF Staff Discussion Notes, 2016.

policies that are aimed at improving the situation of the youth are most successful in enhancing loyalty if supported by the large-scale acknowledgement and treatment of the phenomenon as important in need of a response by the political leadership. Briefly, the well-educated youth have experienced a lowered cost of exit, but it is not negligible as costs remain for leaving friends and family behind. As a result, exit does not necessarily become the primary option. Exit becomes less costly and the successful use of voice less likely if the loyalty of the youth to their home country decreases. Therefore, by directly or indirectly affecting feelings of loyalty through rhetoric and policy, political leaders can have an influence on migration and return decisions.

Literature and Background

International Labour Migration

The knowledge of international labour migration theories is necessary in the formulation of policies targeting outmigration, because they provide policy-makers with the necessary information about the main drivers of the outmigration phenomenon. International labour migration theories have been dominated by neoclassical economics, according to which the main driver of labour migration is real or expected wage differentials between sending and receiving countries.³¹ The human capital theory of migration argues that individual choice

³¹ Dan Corry, 'Economics and European Union Migration Policy' (Institute for Public Policy Research, 1996); John R. Harris and Michael P. Todaro, 'Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis', *American Economic Review* 60, no. 1 (March 1970): 126–42; Douglas S Massey et al., 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review* 19, no. 3 (1993): 431–66.

assessing cost-benefit factors of migration plays a crucial part in migration decisions.³² Neoclassical economists have also found that the likelihood of migration decreases with age and increases with education level, and that international migrants are relatively more skilled than non-migrants.³³ Neoclassical theories have been criticised for being reductive, homogenising, and disregarding the importance of individual agency, politics, and migration policies.³⁴

Due to the noticed complexity of migration patterns and motivations, multiple new theories have emerged which emphasise that wage differentials are not necessarily the most important motivation for migration. Some have analysed the importance of political and economic power imbalances across the globe, some have drawn attention to the importance of migrant networks and previous migration experiences, and migration as a self-sustaining process.³⁵ Recently, scholars and researchers have drawn attention to the fact that existing theories cannot fully account for highly complex migration patterns, as they do not explain non-migration and have a host-country bias.³⁶ Thus, multidisciplinary approaches have been

³² Larry A Sjaastad, 'The Costs and Returns of Human Migration', *Journal of Political Economy* 70, no. 5 (1962): 80–93; George Borjas and Stephen Trejo, 'Immigrant Participation in the Welfare System' (Cambridge, MA: NBER, 1990)

³³ Zimmermann, Klaus F and Bauer, 'Report No. 3'.

³⁴ Massey et al., 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal'.

³⁵ Oded Stark and David E Bloom, 'The New Economics of Labor Migration', *The American Economic Review* 75, no. 2 (1985): 173–78; Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 4th ed., Rev. & updated (New York: Guilford Press, 2009); Massey et al., 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal'; Christian Dustmann, Francesca Fabbri, and Ian Preston, 'The Impact of Immigration on the British Labour Market', *The Economic Journal* 115, no. 507 (2005): 324–41, Thomas Faist, 'Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 2 (2000): 189–222, Hein De Haas, 'Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective', *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (March 2010): 227–64, Alejandro Portes, 'Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism', *Global Networks* 1, no. 3 (July 2001): 181–94.

³⁶ Kureková, 'From Job Search to Skill Search: Political Economy of Labour Migration in Central and Eastern Europe'; Faist, 'Transnationalization in International Migration'.

incorporated, mainly in the field of political economy, dynamically combining structure and agency.³⁷

The relatively low number of East Central European migrants and the complexity of migration patterns after the 2004 EU enlargement represented new challenges for international labour migration theories. Nevertheless, wage differentials have remained the most important but altogether insufficient means to analyse East-West migration.³⁸ New forms of migration emerged, in terms of duration and geographical location, including patterns of temporary, circular, seasonal, retirement and onward migration and permanent settlement of both low- and high-skilled Central East European migrants in Western and Northern Europe.³⁹ Austerity policies implemented in response to the 2008 economic crisis have created new patterns of intra-EU mobility, especially concerning young people seeking to improve their meagre opportunities by moving abroad and low-skilled labour migrants trying to escape the prolonged effects of the crisis.⁴⁰ Despite the prediction of large-scale return migration as a result of worsening conditions in destination countries, East-West migration patterns have decreased only slightly and have not ceased to be a relevant phenomenon in need of addressing.⁴¹

³⁷ Gary P. Freeman and Alan K. Kessler, 'Political Economy and Migration Policy', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 4 (May 2008): 655–78, Tomas Hammar, ed., *International Migration, Immobility, and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives* (Oxford ; New York: Berg, 1997).

³⁸ Kureková, 'From Job Search to Skill Search: Political Economy of Labour Migration in Central and Eastern Europe'.

³⁹ Stephen Drinkwater, John Eade, and Michal Garapich, 'Poles Apart? EU Enlargement and the Labour Market Outcomes of Immigrants in the United Kingdom', *International Migration* 47, no. 1 (March 2009): 161–90, Birgit Glorius, Izabela Grabowska-Lusińska, and Aimee Kuvik, eds., *Mobility in Transition: Migration Patterns after EU Enlargement* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013); Torben Krings et al., 'Polish Migration to Ireland: "Free Movers" in the New European Mobility Space', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39, no. 1 (January 2013): 87–103,

⁴⁰ Galgoczi, Leschke, and Watt, *EU Labour Migration in Troubled Times*; Mathias Czaika and Carlos Vargas-Silva, eds., *Migration and Economic Growth*, The International Library of Studies on Migration 13 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).

⁴¹ Fries-Tersch et al., '2017 Annual Report on Intra-EU Labour Mobility'.

Effects of Migration in Home Countries

Traditionally, literature written on international labour migration and intra-EU labour mobility has studied the effect of migration in host countries.⁴² Recently, research has also focused on the effects of outmigration on source countries. Positive influences are few, and mainly highlight the beneficial role of return migrants in economic and socio-political development, as well as remittances.⁴³ On the negative side, the loss of the well-educated youth has the gravest consequences in terms of both economic and non-economic development.⁴⁴ However, many become underemployed and experience limited upward mobility in their destination country.⁴⁵ It is important to note, moreover, that young people do not only migrate in search for better wages and job opportunities as described above, rather a sense of personal and political security and reward for their efforts by better opportunities.⁴⁶

The negative consequences of the large-scale emigration of the well-educated youth include the loss of highly educated workers from the labour force also described as brain drain, reduced productivity, loss of important state revenue, acceleration of the effects of ageing societies, destructive impact on family life, local communities, and health status of non-migrants, and the lack of human capital improvement upon return.⁴⁷ Brain waste occurs when

⁴² Jon Kvist, 'Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction among EU Member States in Social Policy', *Journal of European Social Policy* 14, no. 3 (August 2004): 301–18

⁴³ Hein De Haas, 'International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts', *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 8 (November 2005): 1269–84, Massey et al., 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal'.

⁴⁴ Kvist, 'Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom?'

⁴⁵ Sarah Voitchovsky, 'Occupational Downgrading and Wages of New Member States Immigrants to Ireland', *International Migration Review* 48, no. 2 (June 2014): 500–537

⁴⁶ Nicoleta Maria Ienciu and Ionel-Alin Ienciu, 'Brain Drain in Central and Eastern Europe: New Insights on the Role of Public Policy', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 15, no. 3 (3 July 2015): 281–99

⁴⁷ Vladimir Balaz, Allan M. Williams, and Daniel Kollar, 'Temporary versus Permanent Youth Brain Drain: Economic Implications', *International Migration* 42, no. 4 (October 2004): 3–34, Zimmermann, Klaus F and Bauer, 'Report No. 3' Frédéric Docquier, Çağlar Ozden, and Giovanni Peri, 'The Labour Market Effects of Immigration and Emigration in OECD Countries', *The Economic Journal* 124, no. 579 (September 2014): 1106–45, Gibson and McKenzie, 'The Economic Consequences of "Brain Drain" of the Best and Brightest'; Agnieszka Fihel, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, and Marek Okólski, 'Labour Mobility in the Enlarged European Union International Migration from the EU8 Countries', CMR Working Papers, 2006

high-skilled emigrants take up jobs below their skills in sending countries or do not find employment upon return to their home countries.⁴⁸ The role of remittances is undecided in the literature, as some consider them as a source of economic growth while some view them as unimportant or even detrimental by causing regional inequalities.⁴⁹

Moreover, emigration of the well-educated has been linked to weaker governance because they are more likely to fight corruption, call for voice, accountability, rule of law, and transparency to exert change in their societies and to improve existing institutions.⁵⁰ Case studies on sending countries have found that pull factors, such as dissatisfaction with working conditions and better opportunities elsewhere are labour market related, while push factors, such as living standards and social welfare policies, are related to a broader range of factors.⁵¹ This suggests that further research on policies and politics of the source country will ameliorate the understanding of migration patterns. Most arguments point towards the belief that the positive effects of outmigration can only be sourced if the political, economic, and social circumstances in the source country are exploited in a useful manner.⁵² By that notion, it can be argued that governments should pay attention to improve those areas which may encourage potential migrants to stay and should formulate targeted policies to encourage return migration, as will be explored in the following case studies.

⁴⁸ Kahanec and Fabo, 'Migration Strategies of Crisis-Stricken Youth in an Enlarged European Union'.

⁴⁹ Hein De Haas, 'International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts', *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 8 (November 2005): 1269–84

⁵⁰ Atoyan et al., 'Migration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe'.

⁵¹ Fihel and Anacka, 'Return Migration to Poland in the Post-Accession Period'.

⁵² Lajos Boros and Gábor Hegedűs, 'European National Policies Aimed at Stimulating Return Migration', in *Return Migration and Regional Development in Europe*, ed. Robert Nadler et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), Kazmarczyk and Lesińska, 'Return Migration, State Policy and Integration of Returnees - the Case of Poland'.

Managing Migration

While the role of host countries in managing inflows is evident, less attention has been devoted to policies managing outmigration flows in source countries.⁵³ On one hand, targeted outmigration policies are considered to have only a limited success because return usually occurs when economic opportunities at home converge with those in destination countries, therefore the most effective policy is general economic development.⁵⁴ On the other hand, as the decision to emigrate is the result of a mix of motives including economic, social, political, and personal perspectives, governments should try to uncover and address such motivations to mitigate outmigration.⁵⁵ There is abundant evidence of successful outmigration policies in China, India and Taiwan.⁵⁶

Even though there are many types of migration, from a policy-making viewpoint, circular and return migration are to be promoted.⁵⁷ Circular migration is the ‘repetition of legal migration by the same person between two or more countries’, which is largely seen as having a positive effect on the home society as those returning even temporarily may use their newly-acquired skills.⁵⁸ Return migration happens when emigrants decide to resettle either temporarily or permanently in their home countries.⁵⁹ Short-term migration, such as seasonal work, refers to the phenomenon in which migrants maintain ties with the country of origin, therefore is less of a policy concern.⁶⁰

⁵³ Kureková, ‘From Job Search to Skill Search: Political Economy of Labour Migration in Central and Eastern Europe’.

⁵⁴ Balaz, Williams, and Kollar, ‘Temporary versus Permanent Youth Brain Drain’.

⁵⁵ Balaz, Williams, and Kollar.

⁵⁶ ‘Case Evidence on Brain Drain’ (UNDP Capacity Development Resource, 2007).

⁵⁷ European Migration Network, ‘Temporary and Circular Migration: Empirical Evidence, Current Policy Practice and Future Options in EU Member States’, 2011.

⁵⁸ European Migration Network.p14

⁵⁹ *International Migration Outlook: Annual Report 2008* (Paris: OECD, 2008),

⁶⁰ European Migration Network, ‘Temporary and Circular Migration: Empirical Evidence, Current Policy Practice and Future Options in EU Member States’.

Scholars have formulated different typologies of outmigration policies. According to Quaked, there exist four main types of policies to reduce the negative consequences of outmigration: education, retention, diaspora involvement, and promotion of circular and return migration.⁶¹ According to Lowell and Findlay, there are six policy responses to outmigration, outlined as return, restriction of mobility, recruitment of international migrants, reparation for loss of human capital, resourcing expatriates, and retention.⁶² According to Lados and Hegedűs, policies affecting outmigration can be classified according to their objectives, namely reattraction, reintegration, reemployment, networking with diasporas abroad, and immigration from other countries.⁶³ Restriction is unfeasible due to EU legislation, reparation is largely theoretical, while immigration and repatriation are of limited success.⁶⁴ Return policies rely on network-building, lobbying, and promoting local culture abroad and collecting information. Although most East Central European source countries have neglected return policies, they have gained increased attention recently.⁶⁵ From the perspective of governments, policies which aim to permanently resettle emigrants are the most useful. It is important to note, however, that return is also influenced by the destination country therefore the perceived success or failure of such policies should be established with caution.⁶⁶

The crucial issue is whether migrants are able to successfully integrate into their home country's labour market and society upon return.⁶⁷ In Central East Europe, returnees are more

⁶¹ Said Quaked, 'Transatlantic Roundtable on High-Skilled Migration and Sending Countries Issues', *International Migration* 40, no. 4 (2002): 153–66.

⁶² B Lindsay Lowell and Allan M Findlay, 'Migration of Highly Skilled Persons from Developing Countries: Impact and Policy Responses' (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2002).

⁶³ Lados and Hegedűs, 'Returning Home'.

⁶⁴ Lajos Boros and Gábor Hegedűs, 'European National Policies Aimed at Stimulating Return Migration', in *Return Migration and Regional Development in Europe*, ed. Robert Nadler et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016)

⁶⁵ European Migration Network, 'Temporary and Circular Migration: Empirical Evidence, Current Policy Practice and Future Options in EU Member States'.

⁶⁶ Kazcmarczyk and Lesińska, 'Return Migration, State Policy and Integration of Returnees - the Case of Poland'.

⁶⁷ Reiner Martin and Dragos Radu, 'Return Migration: The Experience of Eastern Europe ¹: *Return Migration: The Experience of Eastern Europe*', *International Migration* 50, no. 6 (December 2012): 109–28

likely to become unemployed or inactive upon return and consequently tend to re-migrate again.⁶⁸ According to Iglicka, it is most difficult to reintegrate those young highly educated migrants who are threatened by brain waste and hence are in danger of being on the constant move between their home country and Western European countries.⁶⁹ According to White, double return migration refers to the phenomenon of unsuccessful reintegration which is often followed by permanent re-migration.⁷⁰ The above phenomena therefore, leaves governments some room to move in terms of ensuring that return migrants are successfully integrated.

Castles argues that migration strategies should incorporate action not closely related to migration itself, such as sustainable development and wider social and economic goals.⁷¹ Therefore, there are two broad kinds of migration policies: those directly targeting migration and those focusing on the larger context, such as education and regional development.⁷² Most research on the effect of immigrants on welfare states has focused on the perceived negative effect of immigration on host countries.⁷³ Less attention has been paid to the role of home countries' welfare states in managing outmigration, even though they may influence outmigration trends.

As argued by Kureková, welfare systems can be institutional determinants of migration by shaping opportunities and risks through labour market policies, access and generosity of

⁶⁸ Anzelika Zaiceva and Klaus F. Zimmermann, 'Returning Home at Times of Trouble? Return Migration of EU Enlargement Migrants During the Crisis', in *Labor Migration, EU Enlargement, and the Great Recession*, ed. Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann (Berlin: Springer, 2016), 397–41; Martin and Radu, 'Return Migration'.

⁶⁹ Krystyna Iglicka, 'Waiting For' Irregular Migration'', in *Circular Migration between Europe and Its Neighbourhood: Choice or Necessity?*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou, First edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁷⁰ Anne White, 'Polish Return and Double Return Migration', *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, no. 1 (2 January 2014): 25–49,

⁷¹ Stephen Castles, 'International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Global Trends and Issues', *International Social Science Journal* 52, no. 165 (September 2000): 269–81

⁷² Boros and Hegedűs, 'European National Policies Aimed at Stimulating Return Migration'.

⁷³ Kureková, 'From Job Search to Skill Search: Political Economy of Labour Migration in Central and Eastern Europe'.

health care, housing, and family support benefits.⁷⁴ Moreover, as people's welfare tend to partially depend on welfare states, the quality of the welfare state depends on human capital which is in turn shaped by policies targeting education, health care, labour market and even political circumstances.⁷⁵ It is important to note, however, that a country's welfare system and labour market policy is a highly polarised political issue, depending on the preference of labour unions and lobbyists and affecting voter behaviour, meaning that such policies are difficult to change.⁷⁶

Central East European societies have relied greatly on their social welfare systems since the transformation period and have since expected their governments to provide social assistance.⁷⁷ Even though social policies may have an important mitigating role in managing outmigration and return migration trends, many Central European countries have not yet formulated comprehensive migration policies connecting different policy fields.⁷⁸

In sum, governments should employ both specifically targeted migration policies and other welfare-related policies which could improve the situation of potential emigrants or return migrants at home, as will be explored in the cases of Poland and Hungary in the subsequent two chapters.

⁷⁴ Kureková.

⁷⁵ Ienciu and Ienciu, 'Brain Drain in Central and Eastern Europe'.

⁷⁶ Paul Pierson, ed., *The New Politics of the Welfare State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁷⁷ Tomasz Inglot and American Council of Learned Societies, *Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919-2004* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁷⁸ Judit Kálmán, 'A Hazatérést Ösztönző Közpolitikák Európában', in *Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2015*, ed. Zsuzsa Blaskó and Károly Fazekas (MTA, 2016).

Chapter II. Exit Without Voice: Poland

Trends, Characteristics, and Consequences of Outmigration

Even though Poland had long been considered an emigration country, its accession to the European Union in 2004 significantly increased the level of outmigration.⁷⁹ The number of emigrants was highest in 2007, estimated at about 2.3 million people and around 6.6 per cent of the country's total population.⁸⁰ The main destination countries for Polish emigrants are the United Kingdom and Ireland, which opened their borders immediately after accession, and more recently, Germany.⁸¹ As expected, the 2008 economic crisis has contributed to the phenomenon of return migration, approximately 580 000 people returned between 2004 and 2008.⁸² The return of such a high number of migrants might be the result of the country's relative advantage to Western European countries as Poland remained relatively unharmed by the crisis, or individual factors such as adequate savings and family ties.⁸³ Even though outmigration has slightly slowed down since 2007 and return migration has been on the rise simultaneously, outflows outweigh inflows considerably.⁸⁴

It is important to highlight the fact that as with outmigration, return migration affects each region differently due to different push and pull factors and socioeconomic dynamics.⁸⁵ Emigration has significantly affected Poland's human capital quality to varying degrees among

⁷⁹ Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'.

⁸⁰ Lesińska.p84

⁸¹ *OECD Territorial Reviews: Poland 2008* (Ministry of Regional Development, Poland, 2009)

⁸² Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'. P84

⁸³ Torben Krings, 'A Race to the Bottom? Trade Unions, EU Enlargement and the Free Movement of Labour', *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 15, no. 1 (March 2009): 49–69,

⁸⁴ Marta Anacka and Agnieszka Fihel, 'Selectivity of the Recent Return Migration to Poland', accessed 26 April 2018, http://test.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/economic_ANACKA_FIHEL.pdf.

⁸⁵ Fihel and Anacka, 'Return Migration to Poland in the Post-Accession Period'.

different regions.⁸⁶ Together with large-scale depopulation of certain regions, governments have been concerned about the contribution of outmigration to the process of population ageing and declining fertility rates.⁸⁷ The phenomenon of brain drain has also been apparent, the negative effects of which have not been balanced by remittances.⁸⁸

Since the beginning of the accession, Polish governments have tried to address mounting economic and socioeconomic problems exacerbated by outmigration, especially depopulation, labour market shortages, skill mismatch, and demographic problems of aging and declining fertility.⁸⁹ From this viewpoint, the youth are especially important since they are heavily relied on for their productivity, social insurance contributions and potential to have children. The three governments since 2004 have sought to encourage labour migration from Eastern European countries, have initiated pro-natalist family policies to drive up fertility rates, and have launched comprehensive initiatives to assist potential return migrants to resettle in Poland.⁹⁰ Even though the permanent immigration of non-Poles into Polish territory has not been supported, temporary labour immigration from other Eastern European countries has been encouraged through work permits.⁹¹ Moreover, the Polish government has launched a programme targeting native Polish people to resettle in their homeland by issuing repatriation cards.⁹²

Together with immigration and pro-family policies, Polish politicians and policy-makers have widely acknowledged the negative effects of outmigration and formulated a

⁸⁶ Anacka and Fihel, 'Selectivity of the Recent Return Migration to Poland'.

⁸⁷ Agnieszka Fihel and Marta Anacka, 'Demographic Impact of Recent Outmigration from Poland' (Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, 2014).

⁸⁸ Marek Kupiszewski, 'Migration in Poland in the Period of Transition – The Adjustment to the Labour Market Change', in *Discussion Paper No. 266, Project on Intergenerational Equity. Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi*, 2005.

⁸⁹ Fihel and Grabowska-Lusinska, 'Labour Market Behaviours of Back-and-Forth Migrants From Poland'.

⁹⁰ Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'.

⁹¹ Karolina Grot, 'An Overview of the Migration Policies and Trends – Poland', accessed 18 April 2018, https://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/6334c0c7298d6b396d213ccd19be5999/kgrot_poland_summary.pdf.

⁹² Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'.

comprehensive set of policies to assist the return of Polish emigrants. It is important to note, however, that due to an oversupply of university graduates, the outflow and reintegration of the highly educated has not become a specific policy objective.⁹³ At the same time, young highly qualified manual workers have been needed in the country's economy.⁹⁴ Therefore, governments have only engaged in successfully integrating those already wishing to return instead of actively reattracting them and have not differentiated between different migrant profiles in their government policy. Such differentiation is only apparent in regional and local return policies.⁹⁵ It is also important to note that despite multiple changes of government since 2004, outmigration policies have shown policy continuity, shedding light on the fact that regardless of political orientation, the Polish leadership views the successful reintegration of emigrants into the Polish economy and society a crucial issue to tackle.

Framing of Outmigration

Evidence for the perceived importance of outmigration is provided by the fact that research projects have been commissioned by the government on the profile of migrants and their impact on the economy and society in both Poland and destination countries ever since the consequences of outmigration became apparent in 2006.⁹⁶ Outmigration and return migration have occupied a prominent role in both media and public discourse, which needed immediate response in both rhetoric and action. Furthermore, the potential negative effects of the emigration of so many young people have widely been regarded as a crucial loss for Poland,

⁹³ 'Welcome Home? Challenges and Chances of Return Migration', The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 18 January 2013, <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/welcome-home-challenges-and-chances-return-migration>.

⁹⁴ Michal Polakowski, 'Youth Unemployment in Poland' (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Study, 2012).

⁹⁵ 'Welcome Home?'

⁹⁶ Fihel and Grabowska-Lusinska, 'Labour Market Behaviours of Back-and-Forth Migrants From Poland'.

both in economic and demographic terms.⁹⁷ The media have gone as far as to create a picture of the country as a hollow land depopulated by migration.⁹⁸

Political focus on outmigration might partly be attributed to the fact that after 2004, emigrants became an important target group as a potential voter base. Emigrants have been at the centre of political parties' campaigns since 2004. Both the conservative Law and Justice Party and the liberal Civic Platform stated that they would provide support to those willing to return.⁹⁹ Despite political polarisation and the opposition's agenda to frame emigration as the consequence of the governing party's inability to tackle the economic hardship of the youth and on occasion as a deliberate agenda to send them away, the phenomenon of outmigration has generally been framed as having economic rather than political roots.¹⁰⁰

Such framing is apparent in low-quality Polish press in which outmigration has been framed as a necessity due to Poland's relatively poor economic situation.¹⁰¹ With respect to public opinion, non-migrants often resent emigrants and returnees considering them disloyal or weak. The right has on occasion gone as far as to frame emigrants as betraying Poland.¹⁰² Despite its aggressive anti-immigration rhetoric in response to the 2015 refugee crisis, the current Polish government has frequently expressed that the return of Polish citizens is welcome, separating the issues of Polish outmigration and non-Polish immigration.¹⁰³ Interestingly, regardless of political polarisation surrounding the issue of emigration and occasional portrayal of migrants as either unimportant or as traitors, Poland has exhibited

⁹⁷ White, 'Polish Return and Double Return Migration'.

⁹⁸ Krzysztof Cibor, 'The Hollow Land? On the Politicisation of Emigration from Poland', 2007, https://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/6334c0c7298d6b396d213ccd19be5999/KCibor_TheHollowLand.pdf.

⁹⁹ Cibor.

¹⁰⁰ Cibor.

¹⁰¹ Andrew A Clement, 'News from the East: Perceptions of the Free Movement of Persons in the Polish Popular Press', *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 31, no. 4 (2017): 799–817.

¹⁰² Cibor, 'The Hollow Land? On the Politicisation of Emigration from Poland'.

¹⁰³ Barbara Tasch, "'Come back to Poland': Polish Deputy Prime Minister Wants Emigrants to Return', *Business Insider*, accessed 17 May 2018, <http://uk.businessinsider.com/polish-deputy-prime-minister-calls-on-emigrants-to-return-home-2016-3>.

steady policy continuity towards out- and return migration since the formulation of the first government initiative in 2006.

Targeted Outmigration Policies

Polish governments have responded to the outmigration phenomenon quickly and seemingly efficiently. Efforts have been aimed at easing access to services ensuring successful return and integration, targeting all returnees without significant differentiation between the highly educated and those with vocational education.¹⁰⁴ The Polish leadership has prioritised the return of those residing in the UK and Ireland because they are younger and better educated than those in other Western European countries.¹⁰⁵ The Polish government has not neglected the Polish diaspora with relation to outmigration policy, acknowledging both its political influence and network effect.¹⁰⁶

Table 1 - Targeted Outmigration Policies in Poland¹⁰⁷

Name	Year	Type	Run by	Target Group	Details
Closer to Work, Closer to Poland	2006	Emigration assistance	Various Ministries	Those wishing to emigrate	Focus turned to return migration
Return Programme	2007	Return (reintegration, reemployment)	Various Ministries	Return migrants	Never implemented
Inter-ministry Working Group on Return Migration	2007	Return (reintegration, reemployment)	Various Ministries	Return migrants	Research projects, Tax Abolition Act

¹⁰⁴ 'Welcome Home?'

¹⁰⁵ White, 'Polish Return and Double Return Migration'.

¹⁰⁶ Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'.

¹⁰⁷ Lesińska; 'Welcome Home?'

Have you got a PŁan to return?	2008 - today	Return (reintegration, reemployment)	Various Ministries	Return migrants	Comprehensive
Opolskie – Here I Stay	2009	Retention, Return (reintegration, reemployment)	Opolskie Regional Government	University graduates, unemployed	Relatively successful
Become Your Own Boss, Stay in Poland	2010 - today	Retention, Return (reintegration, reemployment)	Mazovia Regional Government	Unemployed (mainly women)	Relatively successful
The 12 Cities to Go Back But Where to?	2009	Return (reintegration, reemployment)	Municipalities and London-based NGO	Return migrants	Cancelled due to lack of funding
Barka Foundation	2007 - today	Reattraction, return (reintegration, reemployment)	NGO	Homeless emigrants in London	Mixed evidence

The Polish government was quick to react to post-accession outmigration trends as early as 2006. During the early stage of outmigration, instead of attempting to halt outmigration flows, it sought to provide assistance to those wishing to emigrate. The *Closer to Work, Closer to Poland* eased access to Polish consulates and provided information on employment opportunities in destination countries with the purpose of protecting Polish citizens from the experience of unsuccessful emigration.¹⁰⁸

Return migration became the focus of policy-makers in 2007 before the change of government, when the negative effects of outmigration on the Polish economy became perceptible, requiring immediate response on part of the state.¹⁰⁹ The *Return Programme* was an ambitious initiative to create opportunities for those who had left the country for economic reasons. It offered a tax relief for newly established businesses, planned to reduce the social insurance contribution of returnees, to establish an information service, and to improve the image of Poland abroad. Due to the change of government, however, the programme was never

¹⁰⁸ Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'.

¹⁰⁹ 'Welcome Home?'

fully implemented.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, the existence and policy focus of the programme serves as immediate evidence of the issue of outmigration as a central focus of the Polish government.

Despite the change of government in 2007, outmigration policy showed significant continuity. An independent body was created to deal with the problem which issued a document in which it stated that the government did not wish to attract migrants to Poland, rather, it wished to ease the return of those already planning to come back.¹¹¹ The *Inter-ministry Working Group on Return Migration* established online information and counselling services, introduced the Tax Abolition Act to avoid double taxation of returnees, implemented investment allowances, promised to recognise foreign diplomas, provided access to the educational system, and trained civil servants to deal with the administrative problems of return migrants.¹¹² A comprehensive and still ongoing government campaign called *Have You Got a PPlan to Return* was launched in the same year. The programme is most known for its manual called *Powrotnik*, which provides returnees with useful information about the labour market and reintegration. The programme's website has been incorporated into the Green Line Service, which serves as a consultation and information platform for all those searching for a job.¹¹³

Apart from the overarching government programme and numerous governmental initiatives, other programmes have been implemented at the regional and local levels. As most Polish emigrants return to their home regions, regional initiatives are essential in ensuring the successful integration of return migrants and in avoiding remigration.¹¹⁴ Regions severely affected by the negative effects of outmigration have launched their own programmes in line with their specific needs. For example, the Opolskie region with its *Opolskie - Here I Stay*

¹¹⁰ 'Welcome Home?'

¹¹¹ Kazemarczyk and Lesińska, 'Return Migration, State Policy and Integration of Returnees - the Case of Poland'.

¹¹² Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'.

¹¹³ Lesińska.

¹¹⁴ Nicola Daniele Coniglio and Jan Brzozowski, 'Migration and Development at Home: Bitter or Sweet Return? Evidence from Poland', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 25, no. 1 (January 2018): 85–105

programme has targeted university graduates and the unemployed.¹¹⁵ A programme targeting mainly older, female returnees called *Become Your Own Boss, Stay in Poland* was initiated in Mazovia in 2010 to promote self-employment and the establishment of businesses.¹¹⁶ A programme launched and stopped in 2009 due to financial reasons called *The 12 Cities to Go Back But Where to?* was initiated by a London-based Polish NGO in cooperation with the municipalities of large Polish cities to help UK returnees settle in Poland.¹¹⁷ NGOs have also been active in assisting returns, the most prominent example of which is the *Barka Foundation* which has more or less successfully trying to reattract and integrate homeless Poles living in the UK.¹¹⁸

Even though the effects and success of these policies are yet to be extensively assessed, Polish governments' and regional municipalities' responded to both outmigration and return migration within three years of the EU accession. While such programmes may not particularly provide incentives to return, they seek to remove the most striking barriers to return. Therefore, the large-scale return phenomenon in Poland cannot be attributed to the country's efforts to tackle the effects of outmigration.

¹¹⁵ 'Welcome Home?'

¹¹⁶ 'Welcome Home?'

¹¹⁷ 'Welcome Home?'

¹¹⁸ Izabela Czerniejewska and Elżbieta M. Goździak, "Aiding Defeated Migrants": Institutional Strategies to Assist Polish Returned Migrants', *International Migration* 52, no. 1 (February 2014): 87–99

Labour Market and Social Policy

Accompanying targeted outmigration policies, a variety of labour market and social policies have been implemented in Poland. Even though labour market and social policies cannot be directly connected to outmigration policies, they might improve the career opportunities and the socioeconomic situation of the youth.

Table 2 – Recent Changes in Labour Market and Social Policy in Poland¹¹⁹

Policy Field	Year	Action	Objective	Details
Labour Market	2014	Act on Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions Amendment	Increasing the mobility and labour market opportunities of the youth	Training and work experience, establishment of businesses
Housing	2007-2012	Family's Own Home	Mortgage interest subsidy for people with children	Only supports those with children, discontinued due to lack of funding
	2014	Housing for the Young	Independent living for young people	Preferential treatment to those with children, rental housing problem left unsolved
		VAT refunds for construction materials reduced	Only young people building their first home eligible	Preferential treatment to the youth, rental housing problem left unsolved

¹¹⁹ European Trade Union Institute, 'Labour Market Reforms in Poland', accessed 6 May 2018, <https://www.etui.org/ReformsWatch/Poland/Labour-market-reforms-in-Poland-background-summary>; 'Youth Entrepreneurship Support in Poland' (OECD Working Paper, 2015); Marissa Plouin and Daniela Glocker, 'Overview of Housing Policy Interventions in Poland', OECD Regional Development Working Papers, 20 October 2016, Changes in the Education System in Poland' (ESPN, 2017).

Family Policy	2016	Family 500+	Family benefits increased	Might exacerbate low female unemployment
Education	2007	Education reform	New curriculum as an extension of the 1999 reforms	PISA scores improving, inequalities decreased
	2017		Complete reorganisation of school system and curriculum	Increased inequality in educational outcomes, worsening situation of teachers

According to White, the labour market is the most important field affecting integration because returnees lack the information on and access to local labour markets.¹²⁰ Polish governments have addressed labour market problems primarily by providing advice and support to returnees. Nonetheless, they have not in each case been successful due to their failure to distinguish between the needs of returnees and non-migrants looking for a job.¹²¹

Job insecurity and detrimental working conditions are also wide-spread phenomena along with skill mismatch and high unemployment, especially among recent graduates.¹²² Such an unstable environment inarguably affects potential outmigration and the possibility of successful reintegration upon return.¹²³ Returnees face the danger of becoming inactive upon return due to the lack of suitable jobs, which might be balanced by the possibility of launching a small business as a form of self-employment.¹²⁴ At the same time, young returnees and those entering the labour market are rarely eligible for unemployment benefits, as they are required to have worked for at least 12 months 18 months prior to registration.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ White, 'Polish Return and Double Return Migration'.

¹²¹ White.

¹²² Polakowski, 'Youth Unemployment in Poland'; C. Glass and E. Fodor, 'From Public to Private Maternalism? Gender and Welfare in Poland and Hungary after 1989', *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 14, no. 3 (1 September 2007): 323–50,

¹²³ White, 'Polish Return and Double Return Migration'.

¹²⁴ White.

¹²⁵ Polakowski, 'Youth Unemployment in Poland'.

Recent policies enacted by the government have preferred active labour market policies encouraging employment to passive policies, such as unemployment benefits to mitigate the effects of unemployment.¹²⁶ In 2014, the government amended the *Act on Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions*, in which a separate category of the unemployed was created for the young below the age of 30.¹²⁷ The act has implemented training, traineeship, employment, and settlement vouchers to help young people find employment and to increase their mobility.¹²⁸ Furthermore, labour market institutions are now required to cooperate with universities to support graduates entering the labour market.¹²⁹ The government has also made a variety of loans and grants available for the youth to establish their own businesses.¹³⁰ In essence, the government has treated the labour market opportunities of the young as a central policy issue.

Labour market mismatches and high youth unemployment can be partly attributed to the housing situation in Poland. The housing market has been dominated by home ownership, which has not been able to adjust to demographic change.¹³¹ The lack of affordable housing for low- and medium- income households has been exacerbated by government policies which have reduced incentives to develop the rental housing sector.¹³² Most returnees who do not own property return to the house of their parents.¹³³ Less than 20 per cent of young people between the ages of 25 and 34 are eligible for housing allowances or any kind of support, unless they have children.¹³⁴ This phenomenon is part of the pro-natalist family policy of the current

¹²⁶ Michal Dahlke, 'Efficiency of Active Labour Market Policies in Poland', 2016.

¹²⁷ European Trade Union Institute, 'Labour Market Reforms in Poland'.

¹²⁸ European Trade Union Institute.

¹²⁹ 'Youth Entrepreneurship Support in Poland'.

¹³⁰ 'Youth Entrepreneurship Support in Poland'.

¹³¹ Marissa Plouin and Daniela Glocker, 'Overview of Housing Policy Interventions in Poland', OECD Regional Development Working Papers, 20 October 2016,

¹³² Plouin and Glocker.

¹³³ White, 'Polish Return and Double Return Migration'.

¹³⁴ Plouin and Glocker, 'Overview of Housing Policy Interventions in Poland'. P26

government which aims to increase low fertility rates by encouraging young people to have children.

The ongoing programme called *Housing for the Young* was introduced in 2014 and has aimed to help young first-time buyers under the age of 35 to purchase a home.¹³⁵ The *Family's Own Home* programme ran between 2007 and 2012 and was the predecessor of the Housing for the Young programme, which offered a temporary mortgage interest subsidy for married people and single parents.¹³⁶ Furthermore, VAT refunds of construction materials have been part of the government's policy to assist construction.¹³⁷ Overall, families with children are preferred to single households, mirroring the government's pro-family objective.¹³⁸ However, young people without children are not excluded from benefits altogether.

Family policy has gone hand in hand with other policies aimed to mitigate the effect of demographic change. Despite the traditional allocation of the responsibility of caring for children to families, Polish governments have sought to ease families' difficulties in reconciling work and childcare since the 2000s.¹³⁹ Reforms have not solved the problem of low labour market participation of mothers, and the new childcare benefit called Family 500+ might further exacerbate the problem.¹⁴⁰ Despite the increasing generosity of family benefits in Poland, most policies fail to address the reasons for which young people decide not to have children. Existing policies do not solve the problem of permanent job insecurity and fear of unemployment, and the increased cost of education.¹⁴¹ In contrast to Hungary, however, the

¹³⁵ Plouin and Glocker.

¹³⁶ Plouin and Glocker.

¹³⁷ Plouin and Glocker.

¹³⁸ Plouin and Glocker.

¹³⁹ Tomas Frejka and Stuart Gietel-Basten, 'Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990', 30 June 2016

¹⁴⁰ 'Country Report Poland 2017' (European Commission Staff Working Document, 2017).

¹⁴¹ Frejka and Gietel-Basten, 'Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990'.

youth have not only been valued for their reproductive capabilities, but for their labour market productivity and societal worth as well.

Education policies have an indirect effect on managing outmigration flows by improving labour market productivity and skill formation, and by the successful integration of returnees.¹⁴² The post-transition education boom has exacerbated the problem of lack of jobs for university graduates in the labour market, as seen by high unemployment rates among recent graduates.¹⁴³ The 2007 education reform prioritised the improvement of critical thinking skills over knowledge acquisition and has improved the labour market situation of graduates by enhancing teaching quality and labour market relevance.¹⁴⁴ However, the current government's comprehensive restructuring of the educational system may significantly worsen the equality of educational outputs and alienate students.¹⁴⁵

Exit Without Voice

The theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty can be applied to the pattern of the exit option chosen by Polish citizens before and after the 2004 accession.¹⁴⁶ Considering that the country had had a long-standing experience of emigration before the accession, the cost of exit had already been low because of previous migration experience, especially compared to the scarcity of opportunities at home. After 2004, with the emergence of free mobility of persons, the cost of exit further decreased as substitutes became legally available. Faced with a sharp increase in the number of emigrants, the government was quickly alerted of the decline of the quality of

¹⁴² Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'.

¹⁴³ Polakowski, 'Youth Unemployment in Poland'.

¹⁴⁴ 'Changes in the Education System in Poland'.

¹⁴⁵ 'Changes in the Education System in Poland'.

¹⁴⁶ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

services and opportunities it provided for its citizens. The emigration of such a large number of young Polish citizens, moreover, could not function as a safety valve.¹⁴⁷

Considering that wider structural problems cannot be solved overnight, the government was quick to respond by framing the phenomenon as important and by initiating a series of comprehensive policies to assist the return of those willing. Polish governments have quickly acknowledged the fact that aging, fertility decline, depopulation and labour shortages in certain regions have been exacerbated by outmigration. They have responded immediately to both the outflow of Polish citizens and the inflow of returnees by initiating a set of policies to improve the socioeconomic situation of the young, while at the same time encouraging labour migration and pro-family policy to tackle such pressing problems. However, it is necessary to stress that none of the three governments in office since 2004 have formulated policies actively attempting to encourage people to return.

Interestingly, the voice option has been mostly underused in Poland. As in many other Eastern European countries, the participation of the youth in politics both in terms of representation and political protest has been low.¹⁴⁸ The youth have tended to mobilise around specific issues. Even though not as a direct consequence, the youth have voted for anti-establishment parties in the 2015 election, including the current government.¹⁴⁹ Such voting behaviour might signal large-scale disillusionment with existing policies and with the performance of previous governments. Such distrust has long-term and deep-reaching consequences as it can mean that people do not see the state as an actor defending their

¹⁴⁷ Hirschman.

¹⁴⁸ Béla Greskovits, *The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998); Fiona Mary Robertson, 'A Study of Youth Political Participation in Poland and Romania' (UCL, 2009).

¹⁴⁹ Polskie Radio, 'Polish Youth Votes for Conservatives', accessed 20 May 2018, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/226333,Polish-youth-votes-for-conservatives>.

interests.¹⁵⁰ Unless the current government is successful in establishing trust and credibility, policies aimed to improve the socioeconomic standing of the youth may be of limited success. Lately, large-scale protests with high youth participation have taken place in response to the government's attack on courts and to the 2017 restructuring of the educational system.¹⁵¹ Taking into consideration the country's recent turn to illiberalism and the increased but still not substantial use of the voice option, the current government should be careful in its response to the claims articulated by the youth in order to avoid alienating them further.¹⁵² In the absence of the adequate articulation of demands, which is collective action of high cost compared to the relatively costless individual decision of exit, the exit option has been largely preferred to the voice option as illustrated by outmigration trends.

According to the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theory, loyalty has an influence on keeping exit at bay.¹⁵³ The three governments since 2004 have arguably made substantial efforts to foster such loyalty both by targeted outmigration initiatives, and by formulating policies in wider policy fields to improve the labour market opportunities and socioeconomic situation of the youth. Such policies, however, have only been partly successful, due to the failure to address the most crucial challenges faced by the youth. Moreover, the effect of these policies might only be indirect and marginal on the decision of youth to either migrate or to return and can only be assessed in the long term. Most importantly, Poland's targeted migration policies have aimed to successfully integrate returnees to avoid re-migration. Labour market and social policies have been initiated to improve the situation of the young, especially those with children, without the explicit objective to mitigate migration trends, but potentially curbing

¹⁵⁰ White, 'Polish Return and Double Return Migration'.

¹⁵¹ Matthew Day, 'Youth Protests Sweep Poland as Government Pushes through Controversial Court Bill', *The Telegraph*, 22 July 2017, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/22/youth-protests-sweep-poland-government-pushes-controversial/>; Deutsche Welle, 'Poland Education Reform to Slash Thousands of Teachers' Jobs', accessed 20 May 2018, <http://www.dw.com/en/poland-education-reform-to-slash-thousands-of-teachers-jobs/a-40333721>.

¹⁵² Bustikova and Guasti, 'The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe?'

¹⁵³ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

outmigration. Returnees seem to decide on their own without incentives, therefore it seems logical that the government only seeks to successfully reintegrate those already wishing to return.

Despite the limited success of policy outcomes, the government's message has become increasingly important in mitigating migration decisions. The political leadership has frequently and consistently expressed their belief that outmigration is an important phenomenon in need of an appropriate response and that the return migration of Polish citizens is a highly beneficial opportunity for Poland. Even though in rhetoric politicians have sought to frame the issue as political, both public discourse and enacted policies have treated the phenomenon as mainly economic, lessening the effect of political blame games. In this manner, the youth are encouraged to feel that they are valued for their labour market performance and output and for their social worth as well. Significant levels of return migration, however, cannot be solely contributed to the governments' efforts, as many other external, internal, and individual factors might have contributed to the phenomenon.¹⁵⁴ As illustrated by statistics, most returnees are not highly educated and young, rather, middle aged and poorly educated.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the prioritisation of policies benefiting young and return migrants has a rhetorical effect that may dampen further outmigration.

In sum, returns have not been the achievement of government policies, while it is not yet known whether returnees are successful in reintegrating into the Polish economy and society. Nevertheless, the existence of such stable policy continuity, frequent efforts to improve the living conditions of the youth, and the steady salience of the phenomenon as crucial for the Polish economy and society implies that efforts on the part of the government do not actively

¹⁵⁴ Lesińska, 'The Dilemmas of Policy Towards Return Migration: The Case of Poland After the EU Accession'.

¹⁵⁵ Fihel and Anacka, 'Demographic Impact of Recent Outmigration from Poland'

discourage the youth from return. The current government should be wise enough not to change this attitude towards the youth to encourage feelings of loyalty.

Chapter III. Exit Without Loyalty: Hungary

Trends, Characteristics and Consequences of Outmigration

Before the country's accession to the European Union in 2004, Hungary had witnessed negligible outmigration and since has remained below regional averages. Outmigration grew a little between 2004 and 2010 and started to rise significantly after 2010.¹⁵⁶ The exact reason for this trend is difficult to pin down, as only in 2011 did Germany and Austria, two out of the three most important destination countries in terms of the number of immigrants, the third being the UK, fully liberalised, which coincided with the landslide victory of the current governing party, Fidesz, in 2010.¹⁵⁷ The low level of outmigration before 2010 has been attributed to the insignificant pull factors caused by the accession and the sudden increase after 2010 to the influential push factors caused by the tough economic conditions exacerbated by austerity measures implemented by the government in response to the 2008 crisis.¹⁵⁸

According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), in 2013 there were 350 thousand people living abroad between the ages of 18-49.¹⁵⁹ Many academics, research centres and politicians have criticised KSH for its conservative estimation and instead put the number of emigrants at 600.000 persons.¹⁶⁰ According to the latest research published by KSH in 2018, outmigration has slowed down since its peak in 2015 and is now close to 2013 levels, which might be due to Brexit and the improving labour market situation in Hungary.¹⁶¹ Outmigration

¹⁵⁶ Hárs, 'Elvándorlás És Bevándorlás Magyarországon a Rendszerváltás Után Nemzetközi Összehasonlításban'.

¹⁵⁷ Hárs in *Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2016*

¹⁵⁸ Hárs in *Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2016*

¹⁵⁹ 'Népmozgalom 2014', Statisztikai Tükör (Budapest: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2015), <https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/nepmozg/nepmoz14.pdf>.

¹⁶⁰ Tamás Bakó and Judit Lakatos, 'A Magyarországi Munkapiac 2016-Ban', in *Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2016*, ed. Károly Fazekas and Köllő (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 2017).

¹⁶¹ 'Népmozgalom 2014'; Bakó and Lakatos, 'A Magyarországi Munkapiac 2016-Ban'.

potential is higher than average when opportunities and constraints strengthen one another, more precisely when young people with considerable human capital become dissatisfied or discriminated.¹⁶² 67 per cent of students in secondary or higher education plan to leave the country, out of which 69 in the hope for a better future as they expect the existing permanent instability to remain unchanged.¹⁶³ This suggests a potential for drastic increases in outmigration in the near future.

Hungary's demographic characteristics are worse than those of Western European countries. An aging population combined with very low fertility rates may result in a precarious situation in terms of welfare sustainability and budget deficit.¹⁶⁴ Welfare benefits, including health care, pensions, and family benefits are often supplemented by tax revenue because contributions are no longer sufficient to finance them.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, emigrants might use their home country's welfare benefits even from abroad.¹⁶⁶ In 2016, the number of young people in the labour market decreased partly due to outmigration, while there is also evidence of labour shortage in a few economic sectors, which has been attributed to labour outmigration in public discourse.¹⁶⁷

As in the case of Poland, the Hungarian government has had the same options at its disposal to tackle the demographic problem: immigration, pro-natalist policy and return policy. Seeing that Hungarian governments have had a strict anti-immigration and secularisation

¹⁶² Endre Sik and Bianka Szeitl, 'Migrációs Szándékok a Mai Magyarországon', in *Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2015*, ed. Zsuzsa Blaskó and Fazekas (MTA, 2016).

¹⁶³ Levente Székely and Andrea Szabó, 'Hungarian Youth Survey 2016' (Új Nemzedék Központ, 2016); 'Migrációs Potenciál Magyarországon – 2015. Október', accessed 18 May 2018, http://old.tarki.hu/hu/news/2016/kitekint/20160111_migracio.html.

¹⁶⁴ Szilvia Závecz, 'Analysis of the Hungarian Family Support System in Perspective of the Current Demographic Trends' (International Research Institute, 2014).

¹⁶⁵ Gabriella Lantos, 'Erzsike néni utazzon 30 kilométert vagy Tóth doktor 1300-at?: A finanszírozható és működőképes egészségügyi rendszer', in *Hegymenet: társadalmi és politikai kihívások Magyarországon*, ed. András Jakab and László Urbán (Budapest: Osiris, 2017).

¹⁶⁶ Kureková, 'From Job Search to Skill Search: Political Economy of Labour Migration in Central and Eastern Europe'.

¹⁶⁷ Hárs, 'Elvándorlás És Bevándorlás Magyarországon a Rendszerváltás Után Nemzetközi Összehasonlításban'.

rhetoric since 2015, immigration is generally not supported. The exception concerns ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, whose repatriation has been supported as part of the country's diaspora policy.¹⁶⁸ Because of the lack of significant immigration to the country since 2000, immigrants cannot make up for the loss of active workers in the labour market.¹⁶⁹ The government's main policy focus regarding demographic and economic issues has been on pro-natalist family policy, broadly neglecting targeted outmigration policies.

The positive effects of outmigration have not yet been apparent in Hungary. Outmigration has not eased labour market mismatch problems in Hungary and the impact of return migrants' skills and experience has not yet materialised. On the contrary, most return migrants face difficulties in finding a suitable job and in reintegrating into the country. While outmigration might have lowered the country's unemployment rate, it has not been accompanied by a higher activity rate.¹⁷⁰ There is no consensus on the impact of remittances sent to Hungary. Nevertheless, existing limited evidence shows that remittances are used for building homes, buying cars, paying debts, schooling, and for additional family subsistence.¹⁷¹

Framing of Outmigration

Before the sudden rise of outmigration, the phenomenon of outmigration was clearly a low salience issue in politics, the media, and public discourse. After the sudden rise of outmigration and the landslide victory of the right-wing Fidesz party in 2010, the phenomenon

¹⁶⁸ Kriszta Kovács, Zsolt Körtvélyesi, and Alíz Nagy, 'Margins of Nationality. External Ethnic Citizenship and Non-Discrimination', *Perspective on Federalism* 7, no. 1 (2015).

¹⁶⁹ Katalin Bodnár and Lajos Tamás Szabó, 'A Kivándorlás Hatása a Hazai Munkaerőpiacra' (Hungarian Central Bank, 2014).

¹⁷⁰ Bodnár and Szabó.

¹⁷¹ Fruzsina Albert and Ágnes Hárs, 'Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary', Executive Summary (GVG, EC, 2012)

gained relevance particularly emphasised by the political opposition and left-leaning media outlets, which framed the phenomenon as motivated by both economic and political reasons. In contrast, right, far right, and state media, which has served as a mouthpiece of the government, largely disregarded and understated the existence of the phenomenon, apart from the news site of the right opposition party, Jobbik.

The issue was clearly downplayed by the Fidesz government. In 2013, prime minister Viktor Orbán stated that by 2018, Hungary would become a country to which all emigrated youth would return.¹⁷² In the same year, he condescendingly said that it was natural for the youth to have fun in other countries because later they would have to learn to behave more responsibly.¹⁷³ In 2015, Viktor Orbán expressed the belief that that the topic outmigration was used by the left for winning political games.¹⁷⁴ The opposition, both left and right, have expressed their take on outmigration frequently. In 2014, an LMP politician argued that the country was ‘threatened by the picture of a country without grandchildren’.¹⁷⁵ Large-scale concern with outmigration started to rise dramatically with the 2015 migration crisis, when Hungary experienced a large inflow of refugees.¹⁷⁶ While the government aggressively generated widespread public paranoia and fear of refugees by consistently referring to them as terrorists, the left took the opportunity to draw attention to outmigration by describing it as the real problem instead of immigration.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² Index.hu, ‘Itt dolgozik a félmillió kitűnő magyar’, 30 January 2013, http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/01/30/itt_dolgoznak_matolcsy_kituno_magyarjai/.

¹⁷³ Index.hu, ‘Orbán fiatakként külföldre menne’, 17 April 2013, http://index.hu/belfold/2013/04/17/orban_fiatakkent_kulfoldre_menne/.

¹⁷⁴ Index.hu 2015 ‘Orbán szerint nincs kivándorlás’, 18 January 2015, http://index.hu/belfold/2015/01/18/orban_szerint_nincs_kivandorlas/ accessed 21 April 2018,

¹⁷⁵ Index.hu, ‘Egy unokák nélküli ország rémképe fenyeget’, 15 September 2014, https://index.hu/belfold/2014/09/15/parlament_pp/egy_unokak_nelkuli_orzag_remkepe_fenyeget./.

¹⁷⁶ ‘Ten Things You Need to Know About Hungary’s Refugees’, Open Society Foundations, accessed 18 May 2018, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/what-you-need-know-about-refugee-crisis-hungary>.

¹⁷⁷ 444.hu, ‘A Kivándorlásról Indított Netes Konzultációt Az LMP’, accessed 21 April 2018, <https://444.hu/2015/07/04/a-kivandorlasrol-inditott-netes-konzultaciott-az-lmp>.

The issue of outmigration was at the centre of the opposition parties' 2018 election campaigns. A prominent LMP politician argued that the government did not concern itself with the youth.¹⁷⁸ The president of Jobbik said that the youth were fleeing Viktor Orbán's politics.¹⁷⁹ Despite dramatic statements made by opposition parties blaming the government for outmigration, only the two parties with well-educated youth in their voter base formulated a comprehensive set of policies targeting outmigration.¹⁸⁰ Jobbik, a party which started out as a far-right youth movement, blamed the government for the lack of quality jobs, problems in public education, the impossibility of acquiring a home, corruption, and the general suffocating atmosphere of hopelessness causing outmigration.¹⁸¹

The governing Fidesz party, however, secured yet another landslide victory in April, 2018, and responding to the ensuing outmigration hysteria, described the opposition as the enemy of the state and explicitly expressed the belief that those disillusioned with the government's actions and ideology were welcome to leave. Since then, the opposition media have been flooded with stories and posts written by young to-be-emigrants, and the phrase 'Well, we will have to live here then', borrowed from a 1982 Hungarian film titled *Time Stands Still* has been used to frame the possibility of future emigration from the country, referring to the perceived similarity between the hopelessness of the communist regime and the current political situation in Hungary.¹⁸² There has also been a trend of dealing with outmigration in

¹⁷⁸ Index.hu, 'Szél: Elkezdtek már hitelből is lopni, felélik a jövőt', 22 March 2018, https://index.hu/belfold/2018/valasztas/2018/03/22/valasztasi_kampany_percrol_percre_marcius_22/szel_elkezdtek_mar_hitelbol_is_lopni_felelik_a_jovot/.

¹⁷⁹ Index.hu 'Vona: Nem az a kérdés, hogy bevándorlóországgá válunk-e, hanem hogy kivándorlóország leszünk-e', 14 March 2018, https://index.hu/belfold/2018/valasztas/2018/03/14/valasztasi_kampany_percrol_percre/vona_nem_az_a_kerdes_hogy_bevandorloorszagga_valunk-e_hanem_hogy_kivandorloorszag_leszunk-e/.

¹⁸⁰ Republikon Intézet, 'Erősödő Szocialisták, Mérhető Momentum', 2018, <http://republikon.hu/elemzesek,-kutasok/170330-kvk.aspx>.

¹⁸¹ 'Jobbik Election Programme', Text, Jobbik.hu, 28 February 2018, <https://www.jobbik.hu/magyar-szivvel-jozan-essel-tiszta-kezzel>.

¹⁸² 444.hu, 'Miért Lett Az Ellenzéki Fájdalom Jelmondata a „Jó, Hát Akkor Itt Fogunk Élni”?', 12 April 2018, <https://444.hu/2018/04/12/miert-lett-az-ellenzeki-fajdalom-jelmondata-a-jo-hat-akkor-itt-fogunk-elni>.

the arts and pop culture, which demonstrates that it was considered to be socially relevant despite the lack of emphasis by the Fidesz government.¹⁸³

The rhetoric through which the phenomenon of outmigration is communicated is significant, because it shapes the way in which the phenomenon is viewed and valued, therefore it establishes the boundaries of conceivable responses. The fact that the government has framed outmigration as unimportant may explain the lack of a comprehensive policy response to outmigration.

Targeted Outmigration Policies

Following the literature on policy response typologies, existing Hungarian initiatives can be classified as reattraction and return policies, including reintegration and reemployment.¹⁸⁴ While the Polish leadership responded to outmigration within three years of its existence, the Hungarian leadership has not meaningfully addressed it within eight years of rising outmigration levels, which signals uninterest. As some of the programmes have been organised by private or academic organisations, Hungary is yet to formulate a clear-cut and comprehensive set of policies for retaining its educated youth and to reattract those already living abroad.

¹⁸³ 'Illaberek', accessed 22 April 2018, <http://katonajozsefszinhas.hu/eloadasok/archivum/41398>; 'Külhon', *Capa Központ* (blog), accessed 22 April 2018, <https://capacenter.hu/kiallitasok/kulhon-magyarok-new-yorkban>.

¹⁸⁴ Lados and Hegedűs, 'Returning Home'; Zoltán Kovács et al., 'Returning People to the Homeland: Tools and Methods Supporting Remigrants in a European Context' (Leipzig: Institute for Regional Geography, 2012).

Table 3 - Targeted Outmigration Policies in Hungary¹⁸⁵

Name	Year	Type	Run by	Target Group	Details
Project Retour	2003-2005	Return (reemployment, integration)	Grass-roots organisation	Highly educated youth	Unsuccessful due to lack of resources
Momentum	2009-	Return (reemployment, retention)	Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA)	Researchers and academics	Successful, but only affect a few
Come Home Foundation	2010-	Reattraction, Return (reemployment)	Supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities since 2013	All emigrated youth	Insignificant results
Medical Scholarships	2011-	Retention, Reattraction	Private Foundations and Government	Young medical doctors	Only a few eligible
Future of the New Generation	2011-	Retention	Ministry of Human Capacities	Non-migrant youth	No evidence
Come Home, Youth	2015-2016	Reattraction, Return (reintegration, reemployment)	Sponsored by the Ministry for National Economy	Targeted young highly educated professionals to re-establish their lives at home	Unsuccessful (105 people came home)
Launch Your Business at Home, Youth	2016-	Reattraction, Return (reintegration, reemployment)	Sponsored by the Ministry for National Economy	Young people residing in Budapest and agglomeration	Ongoing

The need for a comprehensive policy response is evidenced by the existence of grassroots and private programmes to retain, reattract and foster the return of Hungarian citizens. The first return initiative was a grass-roots programme running between 2003 and 2005 called *Project Retour*, which sought to help highly educated returnees with job-seeking

¹⁸⁵ Lados and Hegedűs, 'Returning Home'; Boros and Hegedűs, 'European National Policies Aimed at Stimulating Return Migration'; 'Vállalkozz Itthon Fiatal - OFA Nonprofit Kft.', accessed 23 April 2018, <http://ofa.hu/vallalkozz-itthon-fiatal>.

and integration.¹⁸⁶ *Momentum* is an ongoing programme launched by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2009 to reattract young researchers and to retain those still in Hungary.¹⁸⁷ Even though the programme has provided many young researchers with an incentive to return or to stay, only a few of the most educated are eligible. *Medical scholarships* have been available since 2011 to retain or reattract young health care professionals by increasing their income and widening their opportunities.¹⁸⁸ These scholarships, however, are few and are only accessible by the most educated.

The *Come Home Foundation* was established in 2010 as a non-governmental programme which became supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities in 2013 to reattract young people.¹⁸⁹ The foundation provides counselling services, information about the Hungarian labour market, and know-how on establishing small businesses.¹⁹⁰ The foundation's website has been inactive for years, and the programme has been considered unsuccessful.¹⁹¹ The *Future of the New Generation* programme became the official government accepted framework programme for the youth in 2011 together with the National Youth Strategy, which has been run by a non-governmental organisation supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities. The aim of the programme is to involve the youth in decision-making, therefore it can be considered a return initiative.¹⁹² There is no evidence of the programme's retaining capacities and success.

¹⁸⁶ Albert and Hárs, 'Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary'.

¹⁸⁷ Lados and Hegedűs, 'Returning Home'.

¹⁸⁸ Lados and Hegedűs.

¹⁸⁹ Kovács et al., 'Transnational Strategy for Re-Attracting and Re-Integrating Migrants'.

¹⁹⁰ 'Gyere Haza Karrier Pont | Gyerehaza.org', accessed 23 April 2018, <http://www.gyerehaza.org/node/14786>.

¹⁹¹ Lados and Hegedűs, 'Returning Home'.

¹⁹² 'Új Nemzedék Központ', accessed 23 April 2018, <http://www.ujnemzedek.com/hu/uj-nemzedek-jovojeert-program>.

The programme titled *Come home, youth* was run by a non-profit organisation sponsored by The Ministry for National Economy between 2015 and 2016. The objective of the programme was to foster remigration through reattraction, reemployment and integration. The programme targeted highly educated young professionals living in London that were needed the most in the Hungarian economy.¹⁹³ The programme only managed to reattract 105 young emigrants and was discontinued in 2016.¹⁹⁴ Unshaken by the failure of the Come Home Youth programme, a new initiative titled *Launch a business at home, youth* was implemented by the Ministry of National Economy in 2016, which has aimed to help young returnees become entrepreneurs. The programme only targets people between the ages of 18 and 30 living in Budapest and its agglomeration.¹⁹⁵ Left-leaning newspapers reported that a private entrepreneur managing training courses close to the Fidesz leadership has been the main beneficiary of the first round of the initiative, and that in many cases grants have not been transferred to participants on time.¹⁹⁶

Overall, private and government initiatives have only focused on a narrow segment of outmigrants and have disregarded the pressing problems faced by the Hungarian youth, such as overqualification for available jobs and ineligibility for unemployment benefits. These limited programmes combined with government rhetoric de-emphasising the concern about outmigration have hardly encouraged emigrants to return.

¹⁹³ Lados and Hegedűs, 'Returning Home'.

¹⁹⁴ HVG.hu, 'Vége, Megbukott a Gyere Haza, Fiatal! Program', accessed 18 May 2018, http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20160613_nem_folytatjak_a_Gyere_Haza_Fiatal_programot_varga_mihaly.

¹⁹⁵ 'Vállalkozz Itthon Fiatal - OFA Nonprofit Kft.'

¹⁹⁶ Index.hu, 'Jól megszívatta az állam a hazacsábított fiatalokat', 13 May 2017, http://index.hu/gazdasag/2017/05/13/jol_megszivatta_az_allam_a_hazacsabitott_fiatlokat/.

Labour Market and Social Policy

As described in the theory chapter, a country's labour market and welfare policies play an important part in managing risks and opportunities, which might influence migration decisions. As argued by Szalai, the Hungarian society is heavily dependent on its welfare state, therefore, labour market and social policies might mitigate migration decisions.¹⁹⁷

Table 4 - Recent Changes in Labour Market and Social Policy in Hungary¹⁹⁸

Policy Field	Year	Action	Objective	Details
Labour Market	2011	Unemployment Benefits reduced	Incentive to find employment	Fewer young people eligible
	2012	First Job Guarantee	Work experience for the youth	Little improvement of labour market opportunities
	2016	Youth Guarantee	Training and employment assistance	
Housing	2012	Housing Allowance	Increasing youth mobility	Does not differentiate among different profiles and needs

¹⁹⁷ Júlia Szalai, *Nincs két ország...? társadalmi küzdelmek az állami (túl)elosztásért a rendszerváltás utáni Magyarországon* (Budapest: Osiris K, 2007).

¹⁹⁸ Ágota Scharle and Dorottya Szikra, 'Recent Changes Moving Hungary Away from the European Social Model', in *The European Social Model in Crisis. Is Europe Losing It's Soul?*, ed. Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015); 'Hungary: Working Conditions of Young Entrants to the Labour Market | Eurofound', accessed 15 May 2018, <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-contributions/hungary/hungary-working-conditions-of-young-entrants-to-the-labour-market>; 'Munkahely & Elhelyezkedés', 11 March 2015, <http://www.ifjuszaggaranciaprogram.hu/ifjuszaggarancia-munkahely-elhelyezkedes>; Adrienne Csizmady and József Hegedüs, 'Hungarian Mortgage Rescue Programs 2009-2016', SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Network, 2016); 'Gyermekgondozási díj (gyed)', 11 January 2017, http://www.neak.gov.hu/felso_menu/lakossagnak/ellatas_magyarorszagon/penzbeli_ellatasok/gyermekvallalas_tamogatasa/gyermekgondozasi_dij/gyermekgondozasi_dij.html; Tomasz Inglot, Dorottya Szikra, and Christina Rat, 'Continuity and Change in Family Policies of the New European Democracies: A Comparison of Poland, Hungary, and Romania', NCEEER Working Paper (National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2011).

	2015	Family Home Establishing Allowance	Independent living for those planning to have at least three children	Only improving the housing needs of high-income households
Family Policy	2013	Barriers to female employment removed	Increasing fertility rate and women's employment	Increased flexibility and improved reconciliation of work and care
		Flat-rate benefit for those in education introduced	Increasing fertility rate	Mothers still in education covered who have not paid contributions
Education	2011	New Higher Education Law	Retention of those whose tuition fee was covered by the state	Fewer students Easier choice to study abroad
	2010-2015	Centralisation Reduced Funding	Central control of education	Lowered quality, inflexibility

The 2011 new higher education law is the only reform which directly influences outmigration by restricting the mobility of students.¹⁹⁹ The law requires recent graduates on government scholarships to work for 20 years in the country after graduation or to pay back the cost of their tuition.²⁰⁰ Moreover, access to and funding for certain degree programmes have been reduced, serving narrow labour market objectives by restricting the career choice of university graduates.²⁰¹ The law has reduced the motivation to study and has increased the willingness to study abroad.²⁰² Recent government reforms in education have resulted in the large-scale alienation of the youth. Instead of serving their interest, they have categorically worsened the freedom of choice and career opportunities of the youth.

¹⁹⁹ Lados and Hegedűs, 'Returning Home'.

²⁰⁰ Lados and Hegedűs.

²⁰¹ István Polónyi, 'Oktatáspolitikai kísérletek és kudarcok: Nemzetközi színvonalú oktatási rendszer létrehozása', in *Hegymenet: társadalmi és politikai kihívások Magyarországon*, ed. András Jakab and László Urbán (Budapest: Osiris, 2017).

²⁰² Boros and Hegedűs, 'European National Policies Aimed at Stimulating Return Migration'.

The quality of life and future opportunities of the youth are mainly shaped by labour market policies. According to Szalai, only a small segment of the working-age population has a secure institutional background which results in a sense of insecurity.²⁰³ The government has built a welfare regime in which the majority of welfare benefits are strongly related to previous earnings, which disadvantages young people entering the labour market.²⁰⁴ Hungary suffers from high youth unemployment, which stood at 21 per cent in 2015.²⁰⁵ Moreover, there is a lack of support for the establishment of small and medium-scale businesses.²⁰⁶ In 2011, the government cut both the duration and the amount of unemployment benefits and raised the required length of prior contributions, which resulted in the increased difficulty for recent graduates to enter the labour market.²⁰⁷ Since 2010, a variety of reforms were initiated to improve the labour market opportunities of the young. The *First Job Guarantee Programme* was launched in 2012 to help career starters gain work experience, but was discontinued in 2013.²⁰⁸ In 2016, the government launched the *Youth Guarantee Programme*, which has aimed to provide training and employment opportunities for the youth.²⁰⁹ Even though it has delivered positive results, it has failed to differentiate among non-migrants and return migrants and has only affected young people in certain regions.²¹⁰

Housing policy affects labour market opportunities through mobility.²¹¹ Like Poland, Hungary has a very high rate of privately owned property.²¹² There is also enormously high rents and a lack of sufficient rental housing.²¹³ Most returnees choose Budapest as their

²⁰³ Szalai, *Nincs két ország...?*

²⁰⁴ Scharle and Szikra, 'Recent Changes Moving Hungary Away from the European Social Model'.

²⁰⁵ Polónyi, 'Oktáspolitikai kísérletek és kudarcok: Nemzetközi színvonalú oktatási rendszer létrehozása'. p.386

²⁰⁶ Scharle in Hegyemenet

²⁰⁷ Scharle and Szikra, 'Recent Changes Moving Hungary Away from the European Social Model'.

²⁰⁸ 'Hungary'.

²⁰⁹ 'Munkahely & Elhelyezkedés'.

²¹⁰ 'Munkahely & Elhelyezkedés'.

²¹¹ Magda Nico, 'Housing and Residential Autonomy' (Council of Europe Policy Sheet, 2013).

²¹² József Hegedüs, Martin Lux, and Nóra Teller, eds., *Social Housing in Transition Countries* (Routledge, 2013).

²¹³ Albert and Hárs, 'Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary'.

destination due to grave regional inequalities and a lack of career opportunities outside the capital city.²¹⁴ The *Housing Allowance* programme was launched in 2012 to facilitate the mobility of those career starters unable to find a job at home. It is important to note, however, that the programme has not taken into account the quality of jobs, working conditions, and does not support people obtaining a job in their hometown.²¹⁵ In 2015, the *Family Home Establishing Allowance* was introduced to help young couples planning to have three or more children establish their own home.²¹⁶ The allowance has a clear pro-natalist objective, since the Hungarian government had long recognised the importance of the lack of housing as a delaying factor in the decision to have children.²¹⁷

The only field in which substantial effort has been made to improve the socioeconomic situation of the youth is family policy, which the government believes is the only field capable of solving the country's demographic problems.²¹⁸ Like Poland, Hungary has followed a pro-natalist objective and has displayed low female employment rates.²¹⁹ However, despite such rhetoric, the government has reformed existing policies in 2013 to encourage the successful reconciliation of family and work by improving the employment prospects of women.²²⁰ To increase the fertility rate of those starting their career, a flat-rate non-contribution based childcare benefit for young women in education was introduced in the same year.²²¹ However, women's labour market participation has only been marginally affected as the current system

²¹⁴ Áron Kincses, 'Nemzetközi Migrációs Körkép Magyarországról a 2011-Es Népszámlálási Adatok Alapján', *Területi Statisztika* 54, no. 6 (2014): 590–805.

²¹⁵ Csizmady and Hegedüs, 'Hungarian Mortgage Rescue Programs 2009-2016'.

²¹⁶ Tibor László Buskó, 'A Lakáspolitikai Területi Hatásai Magyarországon Az Ezredfordulót Követően', *Pro Publico Bono: Magyar Közigazgatás* 0, no. 1 (2016): 109–19.

²¹⁷ Maria Iacovu and Alexandra Skew, 'Household Structure in the EU' (ISER Working Paper Series, 2010)

²¹⁸ Kapitány, Balázs and Spéder, Zsolt, 'Hitek, tévhitek és tények a népességszűkülés megállításáról: Demográfiai kihívások és kezelési lehetőségeik', in *Hegymenet: társadalmi és politikai kihívások Magyarországon*, ed. András Jakab and László Urbán (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2017).

²¹⁹ Inglot, Szikra, and Rat, 'Continuity and Change in Family Policies of the New European Democracies: A Comparison of Poland, Hungary, and Romania'.

²²⁰ Kapitány, Balázs and Spéder, Zsolt, 'Hitek, tévhitek és tények a népességszűkülés megállításáról: Demográfiai kihívások és kezelési lehetőségeik'.

²²¹ 'Gyermekgondozási díj (gyed)'.

is not flexible enough to enhance such participation.²²² The existing system of family benefits and allowances mainly benefits high-income households, leaving the young largely unaffected.²²³ Moreover, current policies do not address other factors mitigating the motivation to have children, such as career advancement opportunities, quality of life, and personal values such as future prospects.²²⁴ The pro-natalist government rhetoric sends the message that only those willing to have children are valued in society, which may result in the alienation of a segment of the young population.

Exit Without Loyalty

Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theory can be applied to the phenomenon of outmigration of the Hungarian youth.²²⁵ As illustrated by low outmigration flows before 2010, despite the availability of the exit option due to free movement since 2004, the exit option was only rarely used. Such underuse of the exit option can be explained by three different factors. Firstly, two out of the three most important destination countries for Hungarian emigrants, namely Germany and Austria, only opened their borders in 2011, resulting in the decrease of the cost of exit at a later stage. Secondly, austerity programmes implemented in response to the 2008 economic crisis might have had a significant influence on outmigration trends, making available substitutes more appealing. Thirdly, loyalty might have kept exit at bay until 2010. Despite a significant rise of the number of emigrants, large-scale exit did not alert the government of the declining quality of citizenship. In contrast to Poland, instead of

²²² Kapitány, Balázs and Spéder, Zsolt, 'Hitek, tévhitek és tények a népességcskkenés megállításáról: Demográfiai kihívások és kezelési lehetőségeik'.

²²³ Inglot, Szikra, and Rat, 'Continuity and Change in Family Policies of the New European Democracies: A Comparison of Poland, Hungary, and Romania'.

²²⁴ Kapitány, Balázs and Spéder, Zsolt, 'Hitek, tévhitek és tények a népességcskkenés megállításáról: Demográfiai kihívások és kezelési lehetőségeik'.

²²⁵ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

acknowledging and addressing the phenomenon, the government has not comprehensively and meaningfully addressed the phenomenon either in its rhetoric or by action. This can partly be explained by the Hirschmanian idea of a safety valve, according to which governments might welcome the emigration of those willing to use their voice to avoid the rise of political tensions.²²⁶

Traditionally, the Hungarian youth are no exception to the pattern of low youth participation in politics across Central Eastern Europe.²²⁷ However, such participation has arguably been on the rise, signalling the increased importance of the use of voice. The first mass youth movement was the predecessor of the far-right party, Jobbik, which began to mobilise a high number of young people in 2006 as a response to the large-scale disillusionment and disappointment of the youth.²²⁸ A new party called Momentum was formed in 2016 which has aimed to produce a new generation of political leadership. The youth have also been quite articulate by organising protest movements. Mass protests broke out in response to the education reforms of 2011, the youth have frequently taken to the street in response to the centralisation of the curricula since 2011 and protested the attempt to shut down the Central European University in 2017. The youth are highly represented in anti-government protests, the most recent case of which is the ongoing protest movement in response to the 2018 electoral victory of Fidesz. In terms of voting behaviour, Fidesz was voted for by the older generations while the majority of the youth between the ages of 18-29 voted for Jobbik.²²⁹ Such protests

²²⁶ Hirschman.

²²⁷ Greskovits, *The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared*.

²²⁸ Lili Török, 'The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared' (Central European University, 2013).

²²⁹ 444.hu, 'A Fiatalok Között a Leggyengébb a Fidesz', 10 April 2018, <https://444.hu/2018/04/10/a-fiatalok-kozott-a-leggyengebb-a-fidesz>.

and movements, however, have not only been ignored by the governing party, but have been met with sentiments expressing condescension and hostility.

Therefore, the voice option has slowly lost its power due to the lack of response on the part of the government. The prime minister claimed that students protesting changes in the educational system were not aware of what they are protesting.²³⁰ After the 2018 elections, the youth have on occasion threatened with the use of exit to increase the power of voice. Recently, those opposing the ideology and actions of the government have been dubbed as imbeciles and traitors by government officials. Therefore, it is not surprising that the youth feel that their voice is ignored and unwelcome on the part of the political leadership. Without the option of voice, the incentive for exit has increased.

As argued by Hirschman, loyalty has the capacity to increase the use of voice and to decrease the propensity for exit.²³¹ Since 2010, however, the three Fidesz governments have not only failed to encourage loyalty, they have actively discouraged it both in rhetoric and by action. The government's rhetoric has at first ignored the large-scale outmigration of its young population, then refuted the number of outmigrants, and in 2018, expressed the belief that only those supporting the government's actions should stay in the country.²³² Despite the above rhetoric, the government has attempted to formulate half-hearted responses to the outmigration phenomenon, many of which are similar to the return migration policies implemented in Poland, but dissimilar in terms of objective and rhetoric.

Policies targeting outmigration have aimed to reattract and successfully integrate educated individuals by using a wide range of means from counselling to help with job search. For lack of funding, comprehensive research background, and only a narrow outreach, these

²³⁰ Index.hu, 'Orbán fiataként külföldre menne'.

²³¹ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

²³² 444.hu, 'Csak a Fenyégetés Maradt', 15 March 2018, <https://444.hu/2018/03/15/csak-a-fenyegetes-maradt>.

programmes have not been considered a meaningful response and have only yielded weak results. With respect to wider labour market and social policies, the government has largely disregarded the needs of the youth. The policies capable of at least partly improving the socioeconomic standing and future opportunities of the youth are strongly connected to pronatalist objectives, expressing that the youth are only valued for their reproductive capabilities. Changes in the education system resulted in the angering and alienating of the youth. In general, therefore, Hungarian youth, both living home and abroad, have received the message that they are not a policy concern for the government, or in more extreme cases, that they are considered non-existent. Such a non-response might be due to the fact that welfare systems are dependent on political participation with short-term political goals overriding long-term economic goals, therefore can be used for social and political exclusion.²³³ Young professionals, partly due to their lack of political power, are often left out of social benefits and decision-making.²³⁴

The political opposition has leveraged the high-scale politicisation of the outmigration phenomenon to widen their voter base. Such heightened emotions might have been exacerbated by the fact that the negative consequences of outmigration started to become apparent during the three Fidesz governments. Therefore, politically, it has been easy to blame the governing party for the outmigration phenomenon, focusing on the political rather than the economic motivation for migration. Furthermore, the narrative of outmigration of the youth as a consequence of politics is exacerbated by the fact that historically, Hungary has experienced huge outmigration flows as a result of political turbulence, such as the mass emigration wave after the 1956 revolution.

²³³ Scharle and Szikra, 'Recent Changes Moving Hungary Away from the European Social Model'.

²³⁴ Martin Hällsten, Christofer Edling, and Jens Rydgren, 'Social Capital, Friendship Networks, and Youth Unemployment', *Social Science Research* 61 (January 2017): 234–50, Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, 'East-Central Europe's Quandary', *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 4 (2009): 50–63,

Arguably the most important motivation for intra-EU migration has been employment related.²³⁵ This thesis does not challenge the fact that East-West intra-EU mobility is largely motivated by wage differentials and the hope of a better life, but wage differentials cannot fully explain the sudden shift in Hungary. Rather, it argues that hopelessness, despair, and the expectation of the future as unfavourable might play a significant role in the migration decision of the youth. Such ideas are supported by Hungarian researcher Ágnes Hárs, who in an interview argued that even though better wages were an important push factor, since 2010, the pull factors which had kept outmigration levels low disappeared, therefore there existed a group which left the country for political reasons.²³⁶ Thus, those who have been contemplating migration driven by economic advantages but have been undecided because of personal reasons might be pushed over the edge by perceiving a lack of hope for a better future. By reducing loyalty and ignoring voice, the Hungarian government has failed to keep exit at bay and to encourage return.

²³⁵ Amelie Constant and Klaus F. Zimmermann, eds., *International Handbook on the Economics of Migration* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013).

²³⁶ Magyar Nemzet, 'Exodussá Válhat Az Elvándorlás', accessed 21 April 2018, <https://mno.hu/belfold/exodussza-valhat-az-elvandorlas-2455430>.

Conclusion

This thesis has contributed to the existing literature on outmigration by illustrating the ways in which government policy effort and rhetoric influence the migration decision of youth. It has found that government rhetoric combined with targeted outmigration initiatives and wider social policies shape the perceptions of the youth regarding their future opportunities and socioeconomic situation.

Following the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty logic, governments may influence migration decisions by encouraging loyalty, which may increase the cost of exit and reduce the cost of voice. By framing the outmigration phenomenon as an important issue and by sending the message that the youth are valued, the Polish government has actively attempted to encourage loyalty. In contrast, by framing the phenomenon as unimportant, by sending the message that the youth are only valued for their reproductive ability, and by being unresponsive to the use of voice, the Hungarian government has actively discouraged loyalty. Even though both Poland and Hungary have initiated policies targeting outmigration, the Polish policies are more targeted, and the political leadership has strengthened the possible success of such programmes through rhetoric, whereas the Hungarian government has undermined their efficiency by framing the phenomenon of outmigration as unimportant.

With respect to wider social and labour market policies, Polish governments have attempted to improve the labour market opportunities and the socioeconomic situation of the youth in many policy areas. Even though some of these policies have been of pro-natalist nature with the objective of increasing fertility rates, childless young people have also benefited, creating the impression that young people are valued for their economic and societal contributions as well. In contrast, policy reforms in Hungary have displayed the sole objective of increasing fertility rates, disseminating the message that the youth are only valued in society

for their reproductive ability. In sum, while Hungarian governments have largely discouraged loyalty by ignoring voice and alienating their young population, Polish governments have sought to encourage loyalty in rhetoric and by improving the socioeconomic situation of the youth.

Even though Poland has made significant efforts to foster loyalty, the recent turn to illiberalism might affect policy effort and rhetoric, as illustrated by the 2017 education reform. Hungary serves an example of the road not to be followed. As large wage differentials between Eastern and Western member states remain, the phenomenon of outmigration of the youth will likely persist. The long-term policy objective of mitigating the outmigration of the youth should not be overridden by short-term political goals. To successfully mitigate the negative effects of outmigration, Central East European governments should actively attempt to retain and reattract their well-educated youth in rhetoric and by initiating improved policies supported by more extensive research on the motivations underlying migration decisions.

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