PARTY PATRONAGE AND THE PATTERNS OF POLITICIZATION UNDER UNM AND GD GOVERNANCE IN GEORGIA

THE CASE STUDY FROM 2004 TO 2014

By

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Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned Tinatin Samkharadze declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I hereby certify that this thesis has not previously been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification and the contribution of the other authors to this work has been explicitly indicated below in bibliographical reference.

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ABSTRACT

The biggest ambiguous issue around the bureaucracy still is reflected in affiliation politics and administration. The newly elected government, in order to extend its survival and advance control in the area of policy implementation, made an appointment regarding the political criteria. Patronage sometimes is grounded so profoundly that even legislation is insufficient to provide an effective restraint against patterns of politicization.

The idea of the thesis, therefore, is to observe the modes of appointments occurred in Georgia over time and study to what extent do ruling parties influence on personnel turnover? And how it is manifested in Georgia? By comparing two different administration the United National Movement and the Georgian Dream Coalition research finds that recently there is a shift from the partisan mode to an open and bounded mode of appointments and further hypothesized that manifestation of politicization is extremely high under the unified government and while administration fails to meet coherent opposition.

Beyond that study pays significant attention to the organizational implications of politicization exhibited through the disappearance of administrative talent and institutional knowledge.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSB	-	Civil Service Bureau
CSC	-	The Civil Service Council
EU	-	European Union
GD	-	Georgian Dream Collation
HR	-	Human Resources
MoJ	-	Civil Registry of the Ministry of Justice
MoLHSA	-	Ministry of Labour Health and Social Affairs
NSC	-	National Security Council
NPM	-	New Public Management
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
PM	-	Member of Parliament
TI	-	Transparency International
UNM	-	United National Movement

1. INTRODUCTION

Georgia is a democratic state with clearly model of the Parliamentary republic where the government is accountable to parliament and political parties play a prominent role throughout state-building process. Formation of statehood, as well as public sector and bureaucracy in Georgia occurred identically hard and contradictory full of obstacles and mistakes. Despite the numerous changes adopted to the legislation and initiated reforms none of the political parties manage to establish stable, free and depoliticized bureaucracy in Georgia so far. Several factors, especially country's historical developments determined these conditions: high unemployment, oppressive socioeconomic conditions, and low level of political culture (Alapishvili, 2015).

In 2012 after the parliamentary elections in Georgia power from the United National Movement shifted to the Georgian Dream Coalition. It was democratic transfer since Georgia gained its Independence. The outgoing government was replaced by the incoming one, who was in opposition until the regime changed. Hence, two different government has different ideological approach. It was therefore supposed that the newly elected government has some sort of mistrust towards the state apparatus previously worked with the outgoing government (Meyer-Sahling, 2004: 92). Therefore, it is well-known and acknowledged that change of regime means replacing the number of administrative figures in the government. The success of politicization means the appointment of civil servants on political grounds, who will define their actions in more political terms. If political leaders decide to influence and impose their power over bureaucracy they will certainly succeed. Since politicians feel a real power over public servants, they are likely refused to use power and by doing this, politicization not only will strengthen but also it will advance (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 289).

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However, sometimes according to Meyer-Sahling and Veen "Changes in the number of state employees might be the result from factors unrelated to political appointment practices"(Meyer-Sahling and Veen, 2012: 3). For example, in the process of EU accession, the administration may be responsible to perform new functions that require the change of the staff. This is mostly happening in developing countries where international organizations are pushing countries to take some kind of political decisions. County could not avoid implementing changes in public sector whether it is considered by the EU Directive. Other problematic issue is the World Bank Indicator about Government's effectiveness, which requires employment of qualified professionals within the public sector.

Furthermore, it is an assumption that every newly elected government is puzzled by challenges concerning to policymaking ambiguity (Meyer-Sahling, 2004: 80). In this regard, public officials who are the predecessor from the previous government are the important source of information to the incoming government. They have knowledge and experience of existing policies. Experience, which was adopted throughout serving to outgoing government. Whether the incoming government desires to cooperate with them it can benefit not only the government itself but also the whole process of policy making as they can expend prospect of advancing well-designed policies (Meyer-Sahling, 2004: 77).

However, political leadership usually try to influence bureaucracy and tend to politicize them. This tendency especially is visible during the last decades. Public servants are obliged to pay attention to government and its politics (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 1). Peters and Pierre (2004: 2) identifies politicization at the most basic level as "the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service." Politicization is more about controlling policy and its implementation rather than award party members or create a personal network. As a general rule, the longer the party survives, the manifestation of politicization gains intensive form. Civil

servants might be dismissed and appointment might be based on partisan, political and loyalist grounds. Sometimes ministers do not favour the environment they have to work, especially, after changing the government they found that inherited officials whose careers are connected with the previous regime are very dissatisfied and it is hard to trust to them so a new government view them with the scepticism. Hence, they think that the best way to control the bureaucracy is to appoint trusted loyalists to positions and control or influence policy and its implementation. They need bureaucracy who are individually faithful, if not surely partisans. Therefore, through politicization, government forms a new area of decision making and at the same time, gains political control over appointments in order to change their attitude and behaviour within the administration (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 258). More precisely, policicization occurs when newly elected government replaces higher or top rank civil servants and reqruits officials with strong ties with politics, as well as governmental posts or parliament. Consequently, political and bureaucratic career is distinguishable from each other and the change of regime causes significant changes in state machinery (Meyer-Sahling, 2008: 6).

The abovementioned approach has nothing similar to the Weberian ideal-type of bureaucracy. In which, bureaucracy is associated with efficiency and effectiveness when the tasks between the government and administration are divided. Policy of public administration is decided by the government but executed by officials. Selection of officials is guaranteed by specified rules based on their achievements (Lane, 1993). And, the government intends to stabilize the public sector through recruitment of the best possible staff with further career advancement (Kvashilava, 2016: 11) that will undermine incompetence of political appointments and nepotism (Peters, 2010: 83). Civil service system, therefore, must be divided into two parts: political part and executive part. This means that person holding a political position shouldn't directly engage in work done by his/her subordinate unit (Ministry). He/she must have special advisory team and work on determination/development of the policy of the

system subject to him. And the ministry must be managed (person responsible for implementing the developed strategy) by the Head of Administration, appointed for a specific term as a result of the competitive process. This will result in not having to change the executive part with changing the person of political position, executive part will become steadier, oriented on fulfilling the objectives and efficient.

According to Lewis "for democratic government and its elected officials to be responsive to citizens, the government apparatus must be effective. To be affective the modern administrative state needs a corps of professional, continuing personnel who are competent at what they do. Building a competent bureaucracy is usually accomplished through the enactment of civil service reforms that protect government agencies from the political selection, promotion, and activity of government workers" (Lewis, 2008: 5).

Since Georgia gained its independence it has undergone various civil service reforms. The process started with the adoption of the first Civil Service Code in 1997. And, afterwards hundreds of changes have been made in legislation. Legislative amendments were unsustainable; obviously it reduced government's possibility to recruit outsiders based on political criteria but generally it was insufficient to prevent bureaucracy from patronage practices. The reform was characterized by failures or delays and politicization of bureaucracy was continuing over time.

Existing circumstances therefore stipulated adoption of the new Civil Service Code since the new government came into power. The new law introduced qualitatively new approaches in practice and aimed to establish integrated public service in Georgia based on career advancement, merit, political neutrality and impartiality. More stable and neutral state machinary, with high professional level and qualified bureaucracy which creates guarantees for civil servants and at the same time imposes barriers for ministers and other political leaders

during dismissal and appointment process of civil servants. Establishment of the Politically Neutral Professional Public Service is a huge step towards the de-politicization of public sector in Georgia. Newly adopted law created a solid legal base for the establishment of a modern, western standard system of public service in Georgia. The Public administration should be politically neutral and should restrict political involvement by public servants. Thus, the greatest achievement of the new law is a strict separation between the politics and administration in public service. A solid line between the government and the public service plays an important role for country's further development. In this regard, the law existed during the previous government contained huge threats of politicization because there was no separation between political and executive parts in the system. A political officials directly controlled the structural units, including administrative part. Accordingly, in the system directly controlled by the political official, there is a high probability that the system will experience political influence. Therefore, adoption of civil service law that creates real guarantees for public servants is the instigator for professionalization, de-politicization, and stabilization of the state machinery (Meyer-Sahling, 2004: 72). And, establishment of depoliticized, professional bureaucracy is a key success for country's advance and development. Useful state machinery paves the way to a consolidated democracy and creates legal bureaucratic rules (Meyer-Sahling, 2004: 71).

To go back to the research question and examine to what extent do ruling parties influence on personnel turnover? And how it is manifested in Georgia? the methods offered by Meyer-Sahling (2008) is used. The comparison case study finds that the tendency of politicization during the UNM administration was explicitly partisan at all level of government. In respect of Georgian Dream Collation research approves that politically motivated changes is divided between bounded mode and the open mode of appointments and at the same time some practices of non-politicazation is manifested, too.

Turnover within the bureaucracy was also demonstrated more by UNM administration. They restructured and totally cleaned up the public sector shortly after came into power. Partisan allegiance and faithfulness delivered a significant role in the formation of staff. The government has full control over its bureaucracy. They reached not only the top rank officials but also middle and low-rank bureaucracy. In contrary, GD targeted only the high-rank civil servants as ruling party has a serious shortage of qualified staff; deficiency to attain alternative staff with special qualification to supply the governmental positions. However, position like cabinet member is clearly political appointment and it witnessed constant pressure of party politics during both administration. Changing of government, therefore, means dismissal of the whole cabinet and its high-level advisers. But, here it is one interesting point, high-level advisors still might be replaced whether the new minister is from the same party. The opinion is that the ministers suspect alliance from the state apparatus (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 17). In 2014 when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia has left the post, whose political career before was affiliated with the ruling coalition, all her 4 deputy ministers resigned together with her.

Furthermore, effects of politicization is slightly higher while government holds overwhelming majority and opposition is ineffective. As a rule, critical opposition creates liable administration. Failure of coherent opposition encourages politicization practices. UNM lacked constraints from its fragmented opposition that supported intensity of politicization. Beyond that, taking an example from Lewis (2008) politicization is more proposed during the consolidated power. Sharply separated authority between the president and the parliament contributed to get less politicization environment, today, opposed from UNM who used supermajority to hire and remove whomever the government decided, but here is another problematic area that later will be examined.

2. THEORY AND THE LITERATURE REVIEW: THE CONCEPTS OF THE MODES OF APPOINTMENT, CONSTRAINTS AND ITS ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The following chapter presents overview of factual and academic evolution of patronage modes and politicization practices in governance. It provides reader with in-depth understanding about the motivations behind politically motivated changes and its broad implications manifested regarding deficiency in administrative talent and institutional knowledge.

Patterns of politicization and patronage system is treated differently in the scholarly studies. The most authors argue that politicization intends to influence over public administration to change the policy along with the desire to award partisan allies and party supporters. While others argue that it is only the mechanism to award the party supporters and trusted loyalists.

Peters and Pierre (2004: 2) examine the politicization of public sector in industrially exceptional countries and claim that the politicization is "the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service." The clear measurement of the growing level of politicization is considered the turnover in public sector after the changing regime. They are judging the real impact of any changes within the government on the effectiveness of bureaucracy and political appointments are found as a negative thing which supports losing the trust of ruling institutions as well as the authority of the administrative system (Ibid, 11).

Meyer-Sahling (2004) differentiates three distinct outlines that could occur after governmental regime changes and their influence on public sector reform. Including, policy making uncertainty due to the lack of information which is created after new government holds an office. And, another problem refers to the fact that the newly elected government lacks the

level of political trust and usually try to replace officials with the trusted loyalists having no links with previous government. The author concludes that turnover is significantly high while the new government is formed by the party that has been in opposition for a long time before elected (Meyer-Sahling, 2004: 95).

Taking the example of Meyer-Sahling (2006), adopting and implementing the Civil Service Law does not undoubtedly serve to completely de-politicized bureaucracy. But author believes that it reduces the government's discretion to influence policies. In this perspective, Meyer-Sahling (2006) discusses four reforms of public service implemented in Hungary when institutional settings for de-politicization was advanced. Similarly, Kopecký and Mair (2011: 22) argue that "mere presence of laws and regulations establishes breaks on the ability of parties to make political appointments in the public sector," civil Service Law encourages creation of a strong bureaucracy. It istablishes clear boundaries and sets of rules that safeguard public sector from political pressure (Meyer-Sahling, 2006: 700).

Within the framework established by Meyer-Sahling (2008), politicization of public sector leads to the risk of recruitment of non-professional bureaucracy, as well as to the high-level personnel turnover and appointing outsiders to higher positions. Due to the various literature patterns of politicization is observed as recruitment of partisan allies in order to gain control over state apparatus. But at the same time, it does not necessarily mean that hiring process is based on political and partisan criteria. That is way Meyer-Sahling (2008: 1) theorized various modes of politicization "that differ with respect to the political control over the making and breaking of bureaucratic careers." The author argues that the professional pathway of new appointees is different. Officials may be appointed not only from political settings (partisan appointment) but also from non-political settings (open appointment) or from the government itself (bounded appointment) (Ibid, 8).

Later this assumption offered by Meyer-Sahling (2008) was strengthened with empirical study conducted by Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012). The authors claim that appointment on political ground plays a crucial part in developing a political agenda. Political recruitment is a decisive step in expending politically suspected shifts. According to the Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012: 2) party patronage consistently is identified as "distribution of divisible goods to party supporters," this contains appointment partisan allies to an office. Especially, newly formed parties have this kind of initiative to advance its partisan capabilities. But at the same time, it is highlighted that parties recruit outsiders from its personal network to control government processes and the role of political appointments therefore are to formulate and implement policies rather than simply establishing party organizations. Politicians, first of all, are interested in advancing political control over policy planning and implementation processes. In other words, Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012: 11) make contribution to the arguments theorized by O'Dwyer and Grzymala-Busse upon patronage practice "political leaders provide jobs in the civil service for the sake of rewarding loyal party supporters and to ensure the organisational survival of their parties." Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) consider this assumption incomplete and assume that for party patronage not only appointment of trusted loyalists is necessary to gain organizational endurance but also desire to control policy and its implementation. Similarly, Kopecky (2011) in his empirical study argues that politicization tends to influence on state institutions along with the desire to award partisan allies and party supporters.

The early theory of Wilson (1887) Study of Administration differentiates politico-administrative relationships and argue that the administration is the most outstanding part of the state, which definitely should be outward of the power of politics (Wilson, 1887: 197). In other words, separating it from the political influence of the administration will reduce the patronage risk, where the personal network and faithfulness run government actions. Reducing

risk of patronage and meritocratic appointments would advance public service effectiveness and its performance.

He further distinguishes change of regime with the change of government and assumes that change of government reduces dismissal of employees as fewer changes occurred by that time. In spite of change of regime while newly elected government has a reasonable reason to mistrust the insiders and put their reliability under the question as their career is associated with the previous regime.

Similarly, Kopecky (2008) offers "principal–agent" theory in which government tries to avoid cooperation with the inherited ministerial staff who are affiliated with the previous government, having in mind that they can use strategically gained experience against newly elected government. The ruling party therefore mistrust and replaced them with trusted loyalists.

Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981) in famous study "Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies" sharply distinguish politics from administration as well. They explain that both bureaucrats and parliamentary politicians represent important actors in the political processes. The main resemblance is that bureaucrats along with the politicians are involved in the process of policy development but at a different level. Politicians are more concerned about how the relevant plan affects the crucial constituencies, while the bureaucracy outlines the technical and administrative side of the policy implementation. The authors attach the great importance to the role of bureaucracy in expending contemporary social policy. Indeed, bureaucracy is the main driving force to determine the right course of the governmental activities.

With regard to Page and Wright (1999: 180), since studying bureaucracy and its importance in the political context across the different countries, de-politicization means

"breaking down the barriers between political and nonpartisan tasks in government." Taking British example, the authors claim that civil service in the United Kingdom is universal. It is permanent, anonymous and non-political. It does not depend on patronage. Being permanent and unified therefore encourages separation between politics and administration. Public service is the most respected area in the United Kingdom. Recruitment is based on open competition with lifetime service. The authors also studied generally the roots of politicization and assume that it is a natural phenomenon since the newly elected government avoid supplying offices to its party opponents. And, politicization seems to be dangerous within the most bureaucratic states but Austria, Belgium, and Italy are distinguished with its endemic nature; where personal networks may appear essential condition for appointment even for the lower career professionals (Ibid, 8). Regarding the Bureaucracy authors highlight its neutrality, high standard of government service and ethics. Officials are responsible for being neutral performers and serve to incoming governments in the same way as they do before. This assumption is not valid only for the process of policy implementation but also implies during the process of giving an advice to the incoming government, too (Ibid, 271).

At the same time, low staff mobility within the public sector contains some problematic nature in deficiency of fresh and different ideas, especially from the private sector. There is an increasing danger that bureaucracy will be isolated from the nation and its decisions will be inefficient and outdated.

Haughton (2008: 493) finds an interesting measuring of patronage through a speedy extension in the size of the government. He further assumes that politicization occurs in the leading structures of state apparatus and the existence of civil service legislation plays a crucial role in this regard. But at the same time legislation lack to offer efficient constraints on patronage appointments.

In the similar vein, the research in the area of the public administration is concentrated on political influence and management performance. Mainly Lewis (2008), which gives some arguments on politically motivated changes taking an example of the US presidential appointments, argues that changes of president and the political parties cause a high risk of politicization. And, politicization itself is defined as "the increase in the number and penetration of political appointees. Recruiting appointees only on the basis of party loyalty, involving civil servants in political fights, and making appointment and promotion decisions in the civil service on the basis of political attitude" (Lewis, 2008: 209). In other words, politicization is desire of the government to gain political influence over the state machinery and satisfy patronage demand. It is the one way to advance control on public administration through growing ministerial officials, restructuring or reorganizing different agencies, replacing bureaucracy in order to show the government that public sector making policies with regard to their preferences.

Lewis (2008) identifies several factors why the executives care to influence over state apparatus. First and foremost is that the government is concerned about the policy impact. They worry about policy outcome as they want to pursue a specific policy or they just care about how different constituencies recognize their actions. Beyond this, government aspires the competent state agencies in order to get the desired outcome. The government prefers to avoid mistakes in policymaking process since mistakes can drive worse policy results for them. In addition, sometimes governmental outline upon policy differs from the agencies prospects as they are the successor of the outgoing government. Therefore, to deliver agency preferences with the governmental vision recruiting new administrative staff members is the best solution. Therefore, no matter if government and its agencies have same vision or disagree the level of politicization is significantly reduced (Lewis, 2008: 59).

The study also examines patronage influence on organizational performance. Firstly, it leads to the rapid turnover in management. Secondly, politicization changes organizational environment and behaviour of the newly requited staff along with the existing public officials. Thirdly, in such case, public sector experience weakens management that decreases motivation to elaborate policy expertise and undermines therefore public administration as the newly appointed staff lack the understanding of the system and are in a hardship to support its effective functioning. According to Lewis (2008: 205) "the combination of these factors mean that there is a trade-off with politicization – presidents get more control but at the expense of performance."

With regard to Kopecky, Mair, & Spirova (2012), who made thorough empirical research of different European countries on the scope of patronage practices revealed that patronage is a governmental asset and powerful approach through which political parties seek to guarantee their bureaucratic endurance and triumph in the political system. Sometimes, politicians and political parties grant their supporters and recruit them as they are predominantly engaged in strengthening control over political processes. In other words, politicization is discussed as party's endeavor to accomplish its actual goal that is clearly political, focused on policy result and related to the organizational management.

Kopecky (2008) understands patronage as recruitment officials regarding political criteria for the sake of extending party durability and advance pressure in the area of policy implementation process; party patronage is rooted so deeply that even legislation is ineffective to establish efficient constraints against patterns of politicization. Kopecky (2008: 26) also makes reference to party polarization process and assumes that failure of coherent opposition encourages politicization practices.

Based on aforementioned literature, this thesis is the first academic contribution where the modes of appointment and the patterns of politicization and its managerial implications are discussed in light. Up to now, in Georgia did not existed the measurement criteria of politicization that contributed intensity of patronage practices as its manifestation was not clearly visible. Therefore, thesis makes significant contribution in analysing politicization processes in different perspectives and outlining its measurement methods.

Through showing deficiency accompanied by the patronage practices and its damaging effects over public administration thesis tries to reduce governmental incentives to further politicize the bureaucracy.

3. METHODOLOGY: THE CASE STUDY DESIGN

Within the scope of the study, the qualitative research methodology was used, which establishes the in-depth analysis of the data obtained through comprehensive research. Therefore, the present section contains information about the research design techniques, data collection method, as well as the format of interviews and the sampling frame.

3.1 Qualitative Research Design Method

An Empirical analysis of this research is based on comparative case study of two different governments. The period of two ruling party's administration – the United National Movement (UNM) and the Georgian Dream Coalition (GD) is researched. More precisely, the methods and tools that they used in terms of politicization practices and differences between patronage appointments from 2004 to 2014. The analysis is based only the data attained throughout 2004-2014 years and touches upon the change of regime/transition and not to the second term of the government. The study includes two years period of the new government ruling, as dismissal of bureaucracy due to political or other discriminatory reasons, as well as largest risk of unlawful hiring coincides with first couple of month after changing of regime.

The study reveals that the patterns of politicization are apparent during both administrations. However, the difference is between the techniques of politically motivated changes and it intensity. The comparative case study finds that the tendency of politicization was explicitly partisan, during UNM administration, at all level of government. In respect of Georgian Dream Collation research accepts that politically motivated changes are divided between bounded mode and the open mode of appointments and at the same time some practices of non-politicazation is apparent as well (Mayer-Sahling, 2008).

3.2 Research Methods and Interpretation

3.2.1 Data Collection

Interviews appeared a very strong tool for obtaining the data in a present case. As open-ended questions give more explicit data the questions were semi-structured with some open-ended items. The semi-structured questions (how many questions?) helped to get more information about respondent's attitudes, feelings, and experiences. The interview echoed the research question stated in the preliminary section.

In this present study interviews were also appended with the secondary data, including legislative study, annual reports of Public Service Bureau (PSB), the data obtained from Transparency International upon "Staffing Changes in the Civil Service" conducted after 2012 Parliamentary Elections and information obtained through the media monitoring. In addition, newspaper articles, the literature on patronage practices, the interviews distributed by media as well as other publicly attainable information and biographical data of politicians accessed on official webpages. The study of professional and employment pathway is significantly important as it brings an important understanding into patronage practices.

3.2.2 The Target Groups of the Research

As a part of the research 13 interviews were conducted (see Appendix) upon the patterns of politicization and patronage practices. Experts were selected by different categories who were actively involved in the process of public service reform, including representative of NGO sector, international organization, and academic cycle as well as former and current public servants and Members of Parliament (PM). Sample covers different categories in order to get balanced data from the distinct perspectives.

Interviewees were challenged about the scope and depth of politicization within the ministries and the different agencies. The incentives of patronage practices, its desire to control the policy processes or just to award partisan allies. The differences between current practices and the developments in the past. To what extent two governments are involved in personnel turnover and when, at what level was party influence bigger.

3.3 Limitations

The character of the qualitative research is representative and its generalization therefore to the whole public administration is difficult. Sometimes, respondent's individualism can pose obstacle for the reliability and the validity of the research. As they may forget the event occurred in the past or they have restricted understanding of facts that creates bias and the research becomes problematic.

The existing comparative study was full of difficulties. The serious problems arose during receiving the necessary information, as interviewees avoid answering the questions that was sensitive for them. In addition, in some singular cases, agreed respondents cancelled to give an interview as they avoid critic of government regarding the politically motivated changes. However, to ensure the validity of the research and avoid bias more than one respondent was interviewed within the same agency or ministerial bureaucracy. In addition, research analysis has been associated with huge challenges in terms of attaining sources and data since 2004.

4. PATTERNS OF POLITICIZATION

Peters argues that "public bureaucracies are among the oldest political institutions" and the fundamental in government decision-making (Peters, 2010: 15). Public administration is always analyzed in politicized aspect rather than in managerial form as it is a significant component of government. But the idea of this thesis is to argue that significant difference exist among administration and the government. Efficient and effective administration matters a lot as officials are a primary source in a service delivery (Ibid, 43).

In fact, the relations between politics and administration is very sharp and easy. Politicians are responsible for decision-making and formulation of policy, while bureacracy merely administer this policy and makes its enforcement(Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981: 3). The earliest theory about the difference between politics and administration is well theorized in a popular study of Woodrow Wilson (1887: 210):

"Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices… Politics is thus the special province of the statesman, administration of the technical official."

Politicians often lack the necessary expertize, the data and time for answering thousands of policy problems that the modern state faces today. Ministers may come with bright ideas how to advance the policy but to transfer it into the real goals and encourage its implementation or create policy mechanisms for unexpected events is generally decided by bureaucracy. According to Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981: 6) therefore "skilled and experienced bureaucrats have gained a predominant influence over the evolution of the agenda for decision. As a result…bureaucratic politics rather than party politics has become the dominant theater of decision in the modern state."

Both bureaucracy and politicians are engaged to create a policy. However, bureaucracy brings experiences and awareness; politicians passion, and preferences. Public officials focus on the technical effectiveness of the policy, and politicians on the relevant constituencies (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981: 3). Politicians explore publicity while the bureaucracy is responsible for effectiveness of state apparatus and implementation of routine decisions.

Implicitly, all governments have some positions at which appointments are clearly a political issue. Politicization mostly happens while the process of decision-making within the administration is too fragmented. Ministers appoint officials on political grounds in order to implement some alliance of political purposes; to build compliance within the state machinery. By doing this, they also exercise some control over civil servants and their decisions. Dismissing officials and appointing others to job creates an appropriate shortage of institutional knowledge in those settings (Peters, 2010: 85).

Harassing administration takes place especially within the parliamentary governments. The legislatures execute authority over the administration through the concept of ministerial accountability. The ministers are responsible for the actions of their officials. They should explain whether bureaucracy executed ministerial rules or simply used legitimate discretion. As Peters argues (2010: 280) "ministerial responsibility has increasingly become a convenient myth. Ministers are increasingly reluctant to have their political futures jeopardized by the mistakes of lower-echelon civil servants. They therefore must answer parliamentary questions about problems that are identified but have become more than willing to deflect public attention onto the civil servants thought to be culpable. The traditional principle that civil servants would remain anonymous while the minister would take public responsibility for errors has become honored more in the breach than in the observance." Usually, executives are criticized rather than praised for everything that happens within their governing units, consequently, they desire

to control what truly happens within the ministry (Ibid, 290). And, as they are responsible for the results, ministers hire officials with whom they experience same political affiliation. According to Peters and Pierre (2004: 286), "to some extent ministers and other political officials have always been judged by the performance of their organizations but as that measurement becomes more overt then the need to control becomes more pressing."

In parliamentary regime, embarrassment in the legislative branch for ministers often indicate the end of holding an office. The concept of ministerial responsibility has different meaning in presidential regimes. In these kind of settings, ministers are not responsible on the misleading made by their public servants. However, the government has an absolute authority to hire and replace officials. Extensive power over personal staff; those who judged politically unpredictable were easily dismissed or reappointed. In this type of governance, the President has unlimited ability to hire and remove whomever he decided. Without any approval from the parliament (Peters, 2010: 290).

Powers of the executive in dealing with the bureaucracy vary across political systems. The major variations appear in the ability to appoint and remove officials, the ability to transfer personal staffs from one agency to another and strength to restructure the government.

4.1 The Period of the United National Movement Administration

The power of executive branch during the presidential regime is clearly demonstrated in UNM administration. The new government was led by the former president Mikheil Saakashvili who set the strong importance of changing country's state machinery (Rinnert, 2011: 23). The president and his cabinet determined to handle with dominating corruption within the public administration as they perceived inefficient officials and corruption as a foremost obstacle for country's advancement and development.

Comprehensive reform of public administration started by reducing the federal ministries from 18 to 13 and abolishing 18 state departments (Rinnert, 2011). This strategy afforded unique possibility for staff removal and recruitment of trusted loyalists into new agencies or ministries. The government merged ministries and cut dimension of the bureaucracy. The President fully backed the fundamental reform of Civil Registry of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), including the removal of its whole 2200 officials on one single day. Bennet (2015: 2) argues that "Saakashvili filled his Cabinet with recent college graduates who had supported peaceful demonstrations against former President Eduard Shevardnadze's regime. ministries began to cut back the size of government."

After coming to power the new political party dedicated its effort to clean out the public sector and to made widespread political appointments, especially on a managerial level. The government has full control and political influence to attain its aims. They completely released, cleaned up the bureaucracy through the different types of reorganization and structural changes. They intended to renew the public sector to meet the preferences of the government (Bennet, 2015: 5). By 2007 the bureaucracy had been decreased up to 50 percent. Generally, this process happened at the ministerial level. In order to avoid judgment from international organizations, the government pushed public officials to write the letter of resignation to reduce possibilities for judicial appeal. It was the easiest way to resign someone, otherwise, public administration is a major arbitrator of allegations against the government. Citizens are holding the right to challenge the administrative act that consider an improper (Peters, 2010: 293). Interviewee 7, during the conversation, indicated that flee of public officials was resulted through changing political leadership in public service. Flee of the civil servants therefore influenced non-existence of the institutional memory at the public administration. The government spent a lot of funds on the professional training of the civil servant and then bureaucracy was easily dismissed. The change of the civil servants with political motivation was connected to many

things, control of political processes as well as having a goal to change the policy of the state institution. But mostly political mistrust and desire to award supporters was the main motivations of politicians. UNM didn't want to work with civil servants who were employed by the previous government; this tendency currently is not very strong but still exists.

However, interviewee 3 acknowledged that the main objective of the reform was to establish a small, flexible government that would rapidly and adequately respond to problems and to decrease possibilities of concluding corrupted agreements at the maximum extent. To this end, state institutions have been restructured, which lead to simplifying decision making process and reduction of relevant timelines. As a result, process of responding and solving issues became more effective. According to the statistics agency, level of unemployment has not been reduced, in spite of the fact that number of civil servants has decreased by 50% during this period. This means that number of jobs decreased at the public sector due to reforms was created in the private one, i.e. number of individuals employed in the private sector was increased. Reforms established significant grounds for motivation of the civil servants (number of individuals keen on being employed at the public sector increased). Possibilities of transfer of employees from private to public sector were also amplified (better salary possibilities made the system more attractive to the qualified candidates). At the same time, number of corrupted agreements has significantly decreased (better salaries are one of the measures contributing to the reduction of this number).

In contrary, interviewee 2, approved that government dismissed thousands of public officials from state apparatus; actually, they cleaned up the whole staff so it was obvious that bureaucracy filled out with partisan allies as the government coming through revolutionary way desire to appoint officials from its personal network.

Therefore, political patronage was extremely advanced by that time as the political force that came into office during the political crisis, seeks for supporters and partisan allies,

especially when public institutions are not strong. This is what happened in 2004. The professional level of the existing public officials was below of average and the necessity for new professionals was obvious. Consequently, UNM found new candidates among their supporters to delegate its discretion.

The interviewee 2 also mentioned that in 2004 when state bodies were staffed, of course the process was politicized, many UNM supporters were recruited as a result of patronage. But it must be highlighted that good professionals were selected and qualified bureaucracy was established, so in some sense it was to increase professionalism by political appointments. But, over the years, it has turned into a form that not a professionalism but allegiance towards the party became essential, then this got so widespread that included private companies which were also depended on the political spectrum. All of this turned into a very clear form of patronage.

Beyond this, regime was characterized with the high rate of turnover during their ruling period, too. Since 2004 Ministers were changed almost every 12 months from the same political party so any changes happened throughout that period was attributed to personal trust rather than politicization (Staronová and Adamicová, 2016: 92). Several studies also emphasized that the problematic was situation while ministers and their deputies were replaced, half of the ministerial staff were replaced, too. Welton claims (2006: 14) that "turnover of other leaders was significantly higher in the MoLHSA, for instance with more than 20 changes of Deputy Ministers after 2003" occurred. Many officials recalled stories of uncertainty periods connected to changes of ministers or the heads of different agencies and the stress and incompetence this provided. Interviewee 12, who worked in Civil Service Bureau, recalled during the interview that there have been several facts when public servants had been dismissed since the new Agency Head took an office. Some due to the lack of qualification, some because the new head preferred working with his own team members. For example, in 2009 new Head of the Bureau cleared the institution completely (about only three out of 10 employees continued working

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there, one of them was also fired later on by the same Head of the Unit, and another resigned himself) and started working with his own team. Whom he brought from his previous workplace. Interviewee also mentioned one interesting factor for the research that the work of the new Head of the Bureau was directly connected to the political settings, as he was in the list of the UNM during the 2012 parliamentary elections.

Hence, in order to limit ministerial power over the appointments and dismissal, some members of the parliament initiated establishment of traditional Weberian model of bureaucracy, the idea installed constraints for the Ministers so that the ministers did not have the power to replace the existing public servants with the new staff when they arrived in a Ministry. The supporters of Weberian model of bureaucracy intended to differentiate in the legislation the terms the public official and the political appointee that did not exist before. Their argument was based on the fact that the regular removal of state machinery resulted in a deficiency of administrative talent and professional skills. The institutional knowledge that qualified public officials owned only a few politicians and outsiders were expected to match (Welton, 2006: 19).

In contrary, NPM supporters backed the contractualist approach which is based on short term contracts. Where ministers are able to exercise significant choice over the bureaucracy and changing staff is absolutely possible with the ministerial appointments. They can simply dismiss officials and hire others to an office. Contractualist approach supporters believed that government should maintain full authority over the bureaucracy, especially, in such dramatically changing environment, flexibility was more important rather than maintenance of skills within the public sector. Explaining their argument with the fact that since Georgia resolves its territorial conflicts the existence of Ministry of Conflict Resolution will not be necessary. Further, they argued that limited political power will reduce reform path and produce uncertainty, mainly, in the area of policy implementation process. They considered

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that the best way to achieve the desired result was necessary to consolidate all power with the minister; whether the ministers bear the responsibility for results and outcomes of their stuff so they should hold discretion to hire the best suitable personnel (Welton, 2006).

The advocates of NPM were always in the dominant position as they hold leading posts in the executive branch of the government. However, a final victory they gained in 2007 when the Parliament rejected the Civil Service Code initiated by the supporters of the Weberian model of Bureaucracy. Since then, the Civil Service Bureau also became a great supporter of NPM and began to focus more on meritocracy and effectiveness instead of institutional memory or stability of the public sector. Appointment and dismissal were completely under the privilege of the heads of the agencies who, in most cases, disregarded administrative talent and institutional knowledge. According to Kvashilava (2016: 25) "career growth was of secondary importance as the government believed in the "revolving door" strategy whereby the staff would constantly flow in and out of the civil service."

Interviewee 3 declared that the public service legislation was the type of quasi-careeristic, considering hiring a person according to the set terms and conditions of the competition, but it did not prevent the persons appointed for the political position and leading position to act as they desired. "The risk of politicizing the civil servants is much higher in a career system, due to the fact that in the career system public servant becomes dependent on public service and there is a high probability that he will be tied to the routine work, the benefits of public service and simply become not competitive in the labor market. Accordingly, there is a high probability/possibility of their politicization." (Interview with the former Head of the Civil Service Bureau)

Furthermore, the legislative changes that was made, by that time, reduced official's positions. Moreover, under the new law - The Civil Service Council (CSC) was established responsible upon advancement of public sector reform strategy. It was the advisory board of

the President which also created high risk of politicization of bureaucracy. The Secretary of the Council which directly was appointed by the President, at the same time, represented the Head of the Civil Service Bureau (CSB). This decision clearly illustrates how important was for the government control the bureaucracy. Yet, interviewee 3 acknowledged that the Civil Service Council was absolutely inefficient and inflexible. During its existence they hold formal meetings only several times. Inefficiency of the body is also supported by the fact that members of the council were appointed not due to their official positions but were selected personally and when having new person appointed to the position, the composition of the council should have been approved again.

Overall, the government changed the legislation to evade legal accusations in the name of reorganization of the public sector (Bennet, 2015: 8). It was one important power that they hold. Through this step, authorities shaped structure of administration, using restructuring for own purposes and gaining possibility to work with trusted loyalists to control them some time in the future. In most cases, reorganization was related with the idea to create the New Public Management. As bureaucracy missed the administrative qualification important for a modern public sector. Actually, it did not advance the effectiveness of performing the policy but turned its direction and agency behaviour (Peters, 2010).

4.2 The Period of the Georgian Dream Coalition Governance

Since October 1, 2012 Parliamentary elections when the new political party came in charge the process of bureaucracy reforms and change has started again. The reform concerned the HR policy of civil service. In several months after the parliamentary election 5149 public servants were dismissed. Among them 2330 (around 45% of the total number of dismissed persons) persons have resigned by submitting letters of resignation. Considering the high level

of unemployment, it's highly doubtful that so many people voluntarily resigned from work (Transparency International, 2013).

Regarding the recruitment process of new employees, due to the obtained data from Transparency International (2013), 6557 public servants were appointed/ hired at central and local government bodies. Among them only 257 (4%) were selected through competitive hiring process. Appointment of new employees without a competition is clearly a negative tendency that occurred in nearly every public institution with minor exclusions. Another issue that arose was frequent unlawful appointment to the position. Very often people were directly appointed to the vacant positions without the competitive process, even when the law directly foresaw competition for the specific position.

As long as the ministers and their deputies have the less survival opportunity, within the short period of time, as expected Georgia Dream Coalition replaced the whole cabinet with their partisan allies, who has some political background and were associated with the ruling coalition. But at the same time, it is worth mentioning that together with the ministers, higher civil servants have replaced, too. According to Meyer-Sahling (2008: 5) "after a change of regime, new governments have good reason to question the reliability of inherited senior officials because their careers inevitably are associated with the former regime… in order to address problems of political responsiveness, new governments can choose to break the careers of inherited senior officials."

However, a legitimate question arises who will fill out their posts. Interviewee 5, argued that when the newly elected government took its office, inherited officials were not dismissed. The changes more or less touched to the managerial staff lower rank civil servants were likely to be replaced. Only the top rank civil servants left an office due to their own desire as they appeared trusted loyalists to the previous government and abstain to cooperate with incoming

government. They were replaced by the outsiders from non-political settings or professionals from internal organizational settings. The government support mid-career officials into top ranks. It was beneficial for them as by doing this, they avoid instability and incompetence within the state administration.

In the similar vein, the Interviewee 2, during the conversation, argued that apparently the managerial staff were replaced in public sector but the process was not as acute as it was during the UNM administration. This mostly is due to the fact that their professional knowledge, experience and qualification was lower than of the previous government and to maintain the path of ongoing reforms they had to keep the people (mainly middle and lower level managers). At the same time, interviewee acknowledged that anything is progressing currently its due to this institutional memory.

Similarly, interviewee 8 claimed that sometimes it is difficult to replace public servants with qualified people. When Georgian Dream came in to power they left inherited officials just because that there was real shortage of the qualified officials within their personal network. Therefore, everyone in public administration assumes that administrative system full of party patronage and personal network is less efficient than qualification connected with the meritocracy (Peters and Pierre, 2004)

Besides that, the new government also returned back officials whose career were related to public sector. Majority of the returned officials were employed and dismissed by outgoing government for different reasons, including political reasons as well. Interviewee 13, whose name is associated with different reforms in the area of education acknowledged that once Minister of Education unexpectedly issued an order and dismissed her from an office just because that her son was one of the participant of demonstration organized by the opposition party. In parallel, her brother expressed support for these events from TV station. Interviewee

admitted that this fact was clear manifestation of politically motivated dismissal, happened during UNM administration, which has no analogy.

Sometimes government used their power not to terminate the contract of senior officials but as Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012: 15) argues they are "replacing officials three and four levels down the hierarchy. " Interviewee 9, in this study, recalled quite identical fact. She held the position of senior advisor and right afterwards the new government took its office they offered her to move as the secretary of the Deputy Head of Administration. She refused to get this job as it was missed with the duties she performed before. Her refusal was followed by making radical decision from the administration. One day she discovered that her computer was replaced to new office. Finally, she resigned by her own decision.

The method of dismissing the officials and hiring others is often used on newly appointed senior officials as well and turnover in this respect is too high within GD administration alike UNM. As each new minister are selecting officials with their own preferences. Requirement and dismissal are accomplished on political grounds in order to easily implement received directives. Page and Wright (1999: 3) argue that frequency in appointment of ministers also means political instability within the state machinery and supports weaken the role of bureaucracy.

In this regard, interviewee 10 referred to a very challenging situation existing in the Ministry of Defense while each new minister took an office. She recalled that during her term within the ministry two out of three appointed ministers were members of the political party. Ministers used to directly appoint members of the political party and their close surroundings, besides these new employees were selected as a result of nepotism and cronyism, despite of the qualification requirements. Appointment of the new Minister meant change of the policy

of the governmental body towards specific directions, that didn't change the procedural goal overall but weaken/strengthen/change term goals of the strategic direction.

At the same time, interviewee claimed that appointment of the Minister, as a political figure automatically meant dismissal of the staff members hired/appointed by the previous minister so that the new Minister could replace them with the trusted loyalists. These facts had systemic and "traditional" character. The main changes usually concern high officials but, so called "whistleblower"and officials, that Minister doesn't like are and always will be the candidates for dismissal and the method of reorganization is usually used as a procedure for their replacement. The Unit, in which interviewee worked in, dealt with political and military course of the country, consequently when the member of the political party is appointed as a Minister, a political official, influencing political proceedings is inevitable so it directly changes the course of the unit as well. The change of the defense strategy of the country endangers its sustainability and systemic development.

Another interviewee 11 from the Ministry of Defense was also extremely upset because of the existed unlawful environment within the ministry and unequal treatment towards public officials that used to take place when the new Minister hold an office. Minister and newly appointed deputies didn't have enough qualification and knowledge in the field of defense and security. People were appointed on the managerial positions with violation of law having no managerial experience. Interviewee acknowledged that the Head of the Department was known for nepotism and employing people affiliated with the Republican Party (Republican Party was member of the ruling coalition that later separated from them). The unit couldn't ensure HR management due to being overstaffed, as staff list was tailed to specific people, in this case to ensure interest of the political party. The resources of the Ministry were spent on the PR of the Republican friends of the Head of the Unit and on persons under their patronage. And, while Minister affiliated with Republican Party hold the office, no open, public, transparent and

Western oriented competition took place. According to the interviewee, employees worked in the unit on the incompatible positions.

Similarly, interviewee 2, argued that whether the appointment has political character during outgoing government this tendency currently changed, and nepotism and favoritism became more frequent. At the same time, she highlighted difference between political appointment and nepotism "usually political appointment benefits more, as during nepotism, professionalism suffers the most as family member or the relative won't become professional just because they work in governmental institutions."

Analogous to the previous regime the structural change is also revealed in case of GD. According to Peters and Pierre (2004: 269) „politicization may take the form of influencing the appointments and the behavior of civil service personnel as well as the form of structural change." One of such kind of structural change that Georgina Dream is going to do is abolishing the State Security Council by new constitution. As long as, the authority between the president and the government is sharply separated during current administration parliament tries to target agencies which are under the presidential power. Interviewee (6) mentioned that despite of the fact that the council was announced void by the new Constitution and there is no alternative of the National Security Council yet, and even state safety and crisis management council existing under the government was also annulled, Constitution established non-functioning defense council, that only operates during wartime by arranging negotiations, analogue of which doesn't exist anywhere else and is irrelevant to existing challenges. It can be said that the Security Council is left without legal inheritance. Consequently, there is no discussion about the fate of 30 public officials who are working in the Security Council. The decision about annulment of the council was mostly result of the political agenda and not the rational view regarding the Security Council. As there has not been a comprehensive discussion of how the

architect of national security should adjust to the new constitution this gives rise to the doubt that this circumstances is a part of political decision.

Apart from that measuring patronage practices and patterns of politicization is also possible through visible growth of bureaucracy; Lewis (2008) directly linked patronage to increase in recruitment. Taking this example therefore it can be hypothesized that Georgian Dream tends to politicize more than UNM as according to Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFA) the number of public servants was increased almost with 15 000 employees since 2012. This data indicates on durable and consistent increase of bureaucracy in public administration. In spite of UNM administration where government steadily tried to reduce the scope and the size of government. However, Extension or decrease in the intensity of public sector may not undoubtedly be an outcome of politicization. Turnover or growth of bureaucracy may occur from reorganization or through different reforms of public administration (Haughton, 2008: 496). For instance, it can be considered regarding the EU Directive or Association Agreement that for successful implementation of EU Action Plan establishment of an additional division within the agency is strongly required. But, at the same time this assumption also indicates the fact that the party recruited a new staff but not an expense of inherited employees.

Despite the fact that politicization is a complex issue the newly elected government made significant step forward in terms of de-politicization and adopted the new law on Civil service. According to Kvashilava (2016: 25) decision to depoliticize the public sector was made since electoral campaign in 2012. And, from the very first day government begun to execute its decision "this accomplishment was in large predetermined by the political will of the new government to do away with the politicization of the civil service as was the practice throughout the previous governments. The main idea of this process was to ensure more independence of the civil servants from changing political fortunes. In the past, it was

customary for the new government to seriously overhaul the staff employed by the public institutions by preplacing the existing cadre with new government loyalists." The new Law on Civil Service created environment today that appointment is more likely happen on the ground of professional expertise rather than political adherence and loyalty.

In this respect, interviewee 1 argued that the new Civil Service law offers lots of important news in terms of dismissing public sector from political influence. In particular, it presents public service system from the new point of view and clearly draws a line between Government and Public sector. Bureaucracy should be conceptually separated from the Government and its influence in order to ensure the independence of the Public service from the exercise of legislative, judicial and political content. According to this logic, the activities of the Members of Parliament in the legislative branch mainly refer to the governmental service, while the activities and functions of the parliamentary office are related directly to the public service. Execution of judicial functions in Judiciary refer to the governmental service, while the functioning of judicial machinery - to public service. Moreover, the activity of the minister and deputies in the executive authority refer to the governmental service, while the activities of the ministerial bureacracy - to the public service. Consequently, this new law on public service draws a clear line between the political parties and simple professional activities, which is an essential requirement for having a neutral and impartial public service.

Similarly, interviewee 7 argued that the new Law on Civil Service foresees number of guarantees for establishing politically neutral public service, that didn't exist under the previous law. The newly adopted law foresees establishment of professional public service and professional public official. The admission has become more difficult by establishing open and close competition possibilities, and with the change of the government the direct appointment of the person to the position of public official due to his/her political affiliation won't be possible. At the same time, possibility of having employee employed by an administrative

agreement, that separated persons selected by their political views (advisors, assistant) from public officials and left the opportunity to the political figure to appoint persons with similar political ideology on these positions. Interestingly, interviewee 4 acknowledged that the risks for politicization always might arise, even in the countries with long term culture of democracy, though there are some conditions that minimize these risks. First of all, the legal guarantees existing for the civil servants. The implemented reform of public service directly responded to ensure this protection.

The new law on Public Service guarantees that a person won't be dismissed from the public institutions directly without notice. When the public officials' appraisal system is enforced the dismissal due to the political reasons will be reduced and more sustainable environment will be established in the governmental bodies. However, Interviewee 8 mentioned that the current law is sufficiently strict regarding the isolation of the system as it seizes the opportunity for mid-career professionals to be appointed on the same level within the public sector and bring experience, knowledge, and expertise that she or he have acquired. But on the other hand, it provides stability for bureaucracy distinctive from the previous government when the turnover was pretty much high.

4.3 Manifested Modes of Politicization during UNM and GD Administration

As it was already pointed out in the empirical part of this study, since Georgian Dream Coalition came into power it was shift from partisan mode of appointment to a bounded and an open mode and at the same time some practices of non-politicazation was also apparent. The new government either hired career civil servants within the administration or selected outsiders from non-governmental organizations and other non-political settings. It is interesting

to look to the Heads of Presidential Administration and see the difference between the modes of appointments existing throughout this two administration.

The finding is that the last two Heads of Administration are clearly non-political appointees. Mr. Davit Pataraia former Head of Presidential Administration served as a lawyer and delivered the lectures at Tbilisi State University prior came into office. As for Mr. Giorgi Abashishvili who currently holds this position can be said that his career is related to academic activities as well. He served as a Deputy Dean at Ilia State University. Prior to that he worked as an Executive Director of non-governmental organization "Economic Policy Institute" and delivered the lectures in various universities.

In this regard, the situation was different during UNM administration where appointments had clearly political character. As Kopecký and Mair argue partisans are public officials with a political background "whose last job belonged to the political executive… In addition, partisan recruits cover State Secretaries who, according to their curriculum vitae or statements of the appointing Ministers made in personal interviews, could be identified as party activists" (Kopecký and Mair, 2011: 18). Taking this example, the last Head of the Presidential Administration Mr. Andro Barnovi is a clasical example of partisan politisization. He served as the Deputy Defense Minister of Georgia prior joined the Presidential Administration, and afterwards he was a member and Political Council of the UNM. But, at the same time it is worth mentioning that he played very active role in reforming process of Georgian civil and public sector. Mr. Davit Tyeshelashvili, the former Head of Presidential Administration also had a political background. Since 2006, he served in the different ministries on ministerial positions. Prior to this, throughout 1995-2006 years, he was a Member of Parliament also selected from the UNM.

4.4 Chapter Conclusion and Analysis

Hence, the two case studies demonstrated that politicization influence performance in different perspectives. It regularly affects the officials who are chosen to manage public administration and it creates hidden impacts on the spirit, tenure, and encouragement of career managers. Partisan allies usually lack experience of working in public sector as well as policy area expertize and management abilities than their fellows serving in agency so they are less likely to bring broader vision, new perspectives, and management skills to a given agency. Still, whether partisan allies and careerists hold the same educational background and knowledge, the temporary character of political appointments damages an administration's overall achievement. It undermines policy implementation process as well as monitoring rules and drops essential programs without fulfillment. Political appointees are granted with the highest paying jobs and they are most influential in office. When the most profitable positions are no longer achievable for inherited officials they likely leave an agency. According to Lewis "The politicized management structure generated consistent vacancies, low morale, and difficulties in conceptualizing and implementing reforms" (Lewis, 2008: 170).

An unprecedented number of dismissal and establishment of partisan allies and party loyalists across the state apparatus resulted reduction of institutional knowledge and organizational effficiency in Georgia. Ministers were replaced or transferred too often. Some ministers maintain their offices just a few months and many of them hardly had the chance to acquire responsibilities of their job before taking the new posts. New ministers, appointed within the same political party, brought the deputy ministers who have implemented their own policy and changed ministries' internal operation. Ministries were unable to keep sequance in policy directives and its execution. Not surprisingly, in case of limited turnover, agencies attained huge progress in implementing long-run goals (Bennet, 2015: 11). Therefore, all

governments should agree that having a permanent state machinery is important as replacement of civil servants will not depend on political changes happen and officials will stay as professionals (Welton, 2006: 24).

5. CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to determine governmental influence on personnel turnover and how it was manifested during the different regime. The case study found that UNM ruling period was characterized with the partisan mode of politicization. They hire only trusted loyalists and political allies on all level of government. The mode of appointment with respect of GD Collation is separated among bounded mode and the open mode of politicization and in parallel, the cases of non-politicization is also revealed.

Moreover, the case study found that ministries are the most politicized institutions in Georgia, regardless of its policy field. The appointment of ministers therefore is fulfilled clearly on political grounds and they are constantly changing since selection of the new government. This rule applies to the deputy ministers, too. They are dismissed not only during the regime transition but also with cabinet modification as well. Hereby, it should be underlined the fact that patronage practices within the ministry often is related to individual connections rather than political alliance. In other words, sometimes it is family member or trusted friend who is appointed on a position in a ministerial bureaucracy. Furthermore, the case study demonstrated that patronage and politicization practices are aggregated in the top-ranks of state bureaucracy, today, while the former government reached the steadfast pressure of party politics not only over higher or senior public servants but also over middle and low-rank professionals as well.

Usually, the full influence of party patronage and politicization do not appear until remarkable failure comes to light. The performance of the United National Movement is closer to politicization than the actions implemented by the Georgian Dream Coalition. However, UNM's work that gave relatively less harm to bureaucracy was the availability of skilled and trained public servants in executive and legislative branches. The effects of politicization are reduced while the government choose qualified professionals and appoint them to an office.

This was what happened during the UNM period of governance. They cut thousands of appointees, restructured or reorganized a number of ministries and state departments but selected qualified people and by all means established the outline and the proficiency level of state machinery (Lewis, 2008: 170). Under the ruling of Georgian Dream Collation, the patterns of politicization have significantly reduced but appointees essentially selected to run the government by open politicization generally lack the experience of serving in public sector as well as the management experience that creates challenges throughout country's governing process.

Taking an example from Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012: 10) it can be hypothesized that UNM controlled the personnel policy rather than GD Coalition as "critical opposition and the responsible government…create incentives for governing parties to refrain from politicising the state apparatus due to monitoring by their political competitors." Therefore, the emergence of stable and coherent opposition endorses de-politicization of government as it would actively observe and in case of necessity blame the ruling party. Georgian Dream Coalition during the parliamentary election 2012, won 85 seats of 150 unlike the United National Movement who were represented by 135 parliamentarians after changing the regime. This data indicates that UNM has owerwhelming majority despite from the Georgian Dream Coalation. Under these circumstances, GD has critical and coherent opposition that establishes constraints for ruling party and support for less politicization practices within the state machinery. In contrary, UNM lacked the meaningful opposition that strengthened manifestation of politicization by that period.

Similarly, Lewis (2008: 74) theorized that politicization is more predictable during the "periods of unified government." This argument supports the fact that effects of patronage appointment was clearly visible during UNM administration as they controled all branches of government. Having overwhelming majority gave the chance to the UNM administration to

control both the Parliament and the Institute of President and gaining influence over the whole state apparatus. The situation has dramatically changed since parliamentary election 2012, the president and the parliament represent the two opposite political powers. The authority between the president and the government is sharply separated. However, here another problematic issue occurs upon policy disagreement between two institutions that performs an important aspect in politicization choice. The parliament tries to target agencies which are under the presidential power.

Looking and comparing the patterns of politicization of ruling parties show that both the UNM and GD politicize the public administration. Indeed, difference between the scope and depth as well as methods and tactics of manifestation of politicization remains, but it does not deny its existence. Comparative analysis of two administration also reveals that government often politicize only single ministries or agencies and it leads therefore to the conclusion that politicization is not only a partisan phenomenon, it is not just a tool used by one government. In contrast, patronage appointment is an effective governmental strategy to control bureaucracy.

As a part of the study it should be underlined the limitations that the research had - measuring politicization occurred very difficult. It was hard to find that dismissal or appointment in concrete governmental settings was clear manifestation of politicization or just desire to recruit qualified staff. Also, it was hard to determine its scope and depth and real impact on bureaucracy. It was complicated, as long as, many interviewees avoid making critical statements towards both outgoing and incoming government. In singular cases, respondents refused to give an interview in a last moment. In addition, attaining archive sources of outgoing government was restricted. Research was related with huge challenges especially to obtain data since 2004 and in terms of theory, too. It was believed that attainment of important materials would happened from the leaders served to outgoing and incoming government or who

personally witnessed patronage practices. However, they either refused to give an interview or responded with pointless, common and vapid answers.

In spite of this facts, the study theorized that since taking an office, the newly elected government constantly tries to change policies in public administration. When they discover that bureaucracy tries to maintain the current situation – status quo, the government put its effort to influence entire bureaucracy through politicizing public sector. While outsiders are appointed instead of professional staff or recruited superior positions, naturally, it brings instability in state apparatus, also reduces implementation of meaningful policies and hinders entire public sector. Politicization injures government's ability to supply valuable services and goods to their own population (Lewis, 2008: 211).

In addition, existing research reveals facts that political parties use the patronage practices not only to reward partisan allies but also to gain full control on political processes as well as rule institutions that play an important role in policy formulation and implementation practices. The dominant power of the United National Movement was demonstrated in the fact that the most top-rank officials tried to politicize bureaucracy in order to fulfil party commitments. In spite of the current government where ministers or other senior officials often use this authority for their personal interests rather than aid party or the government.

Overall, politicized bureaucracy cannot be sustainable because it lacks effectiveness. Such governance is in a disadvantage to develop administrative talent, institutional knowledge, necessary professionalism and expertise. It undermines long-term outlining and produce difficulties during the policy implementation process. Hence, as Georgia aspires for European integration, establishment of de-politicized and professional bureaucracy should be the main priority of the political agenda in order to achieve successful EU accession.

List of Interviewees		
Name	**Agency**	**Date and sort of interview**
Interviewee 1	Public Service Bureau The Head of Department of Civil Service Reform and Development	12.06.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 2	Professor, Ilia State University Concentration: Public Administration	26.05.2018/Semi-structured interview *(by Skype)*
Interviewee 3	The Former Head of the Public Service Bureau	5.06.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 4	Member of Parliament; Georgian Dream Coalition	11.06.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 5	The Former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration	08.06.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 6	The Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council	04.06.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 7	Parliamentary Secretary at Georgian Lawyers Association (NGO)	30.05.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 8	Good Governance Initiative	25.05.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 9	The Former Public Servant	02.05.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 10	The Former Public Servant; the Ministry of Defense	01.06.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 11	The Former Public Servant; the Ministry of Defense	30.05.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 12	The Former Public Servant; Civil Service Bureau	30.05.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*
Interviewee 13	The Ministry of Education	23.05.2018/Semi-structured interview *(written answers by Email)*

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