"I Just Want to Start a Life"[1]:

Theory and Comparative Analysis of Refugee Experiences

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[1] Quote from a refugee in Malmö (MM1).

Abstract

In this paper, I examine three discussions in the political theory literature, each of which builds on the former: who is a refugee, what are the obligations of states to refugees, and what is owed to refugees after admission. Although the literature has given substantial attention to the former two, there is a lack of nuanced discussion on the latter. Furthermore, the field has mostly sought to answer these normative questions from a purely theoretical perspective. Since the question of what is owed to refugees after admission relies on the question of what enables newcomers to best join existing societies, empirical field research can be helpful. Accordingly, employing original field research interviewing refugees in Budapest and Malmö, I conduct a comparative analysis of their experiences in terms of why they chose to stay, what they think of life there, and what their future plans are. I find that interpersonal embeddedness in the life of the city, personal connections to locals, and activities that furnish meaning and purpose are critical after resettlement. Putting this in conversation with the theoretical normative literature on what is owed after admission, I identify several problematic areas. By critiquing the prevailing theories, and highlighting Goodin's neglected theory in the field that argues that the boundaries around people are what matter morally, I provide a pathway forward. From this perspective, I argue that what is owed to refugees is best conceptualized in terms of certain duties of the state and other obligations of the local community.

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Introduction

In June 2016, I began working in the Bicske refugee camp, about thirty-five miles west of Budapest, Hungary. My daily work consisted of classroom teaching for children aged seven to twelve, which meant anything from art projects to spatial learning games to outdoors activities. New families entered the camp each week, and yet many left shortly thereafter. It was therefore difficult to develop bonds with the children, both for us and for them, because of the limited time we spent together and the likelihood that they would disappear any day. When one young boy had been around for a full month, then, we grew unusually close—something my colleague had warned against. One day, he broke down crying as we walked to the football field with the class, and as we sat together, he told me in his limited English about specific abuses perpetrated by the police in Bulgaria. I did not know what to say, but I sat with him for a long time while my colleague presided over the daily outdoors activity. Later, when I asked my colleague what to do in that situation, they told me there was nothing to do.[2] However, they also told me that just being there, sitting there with him, providing a shoulder to cry on, would be more important to the kid than I could imagine.

The importance of 'just being there' to the young boy is likely somewhat lost—at least in any visceral way—for those who grew up with those they could lean on as they processed the events of their lives. In fleeing conflict, as families are torn about, one of the critical difficulties becomes the lack of interpersonal connections through which grief and trauma can be processed.

[2] Nothing to do in terms of what I could say to the boy to magically resolve the pain. There was a procedure in place for reporting crimes that had occurred while they travelled to Hungary; although it is also worth noting that there was no 'real' legal recourse for addressing these crimes, i.e. nothing seemed to come from the reports on these crimes, as they seemed only to add an additional number to wider statistics on crimes that occurred during migration through the Balkan route.

However, this is also a phenomenon that can be neither grasped nor analyzed solely through a theoretical lens. I have found that this methodological flaw is present in certain pockets of political theory—of presenting normative arguments without taking into adequate consideration the realities of the world—and seems particularly problematic in the political theory on refugee and migration issues.

The political theory literature on refugees—who they are, what obligates states to admit them, and what states owe to them after admission—is born out of many convictions and theoretical constructions that are divorced from reality. Many political theorists have sought to build—from first principles and foundational theories—an expansive framework for how to address the largest refugee crisis in history.[3] With over 65 million displaced persons around the world,[4] global conversations have increasingly looked past the mere moral proclamations that we ought to admit these needy people to more thorny topics, like *who* should count as a refugee and *which states* should admit them. Beyond these issues lies a further and perhaps more timely issue, which is that of the *just* integration of refugees: what is owed to refugees *after* admission? As theorists and policy makers alike have debated and probed these questions and issues, they have mostly done so without an investigation into the actual experiences of refugees. Once again, a crucial mistake is being made by presuming to know best what others need. Without pertinent

[3] Joseph Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013; Matthew J. Gibney, "Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees," *The American Political Science Review* 93, no. 1 (Mar. 1999): 169-181; Charles B. Keely, "How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows," *The International Migration Review* 30, no. 4 (Winter, 1996): 1055; David Miller, *Strangers in our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016; A.G. Noorani, "Duty to Asylum Seekers," *Economic and Political Weekly* 26 (Feb. 1991): 402; Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, New York City: Basic Books, 1984.

[4] Based on the UNHCR's most recent global report on trends of force displacement, which was in 2015. The number has likely risen over the past 3 years, however without the data to confirm or deny this hypothesis, the most recent statistic is employed here.

conversations with the relevant people, our knowledge of these situations is accordingly constrained; the theories that we create are then no longer adequately tethered to reality. They can therefore be entirely coherent on their own, without providing the slightest insight into how to better care for refugees and ensure that they can rebuild their lives after displacement.

This paper holds as a starting point the position that theories ought to enable us to better understand our world, analyze it, scrutinize it, and ultimately re-shape it to allow us to live better and happier lives. Theories of refugee admission and integration, then, ought to allow us to better understand these constitutive processes and to offer solutions for how to improve them. Insofar as the prevailing theories in modern political theory are out of touch with the experiences of refugees, they fail in their most basic objective.[5] This paper seeks a better theory of refugee admission and integration through a comparative analysis of interviews with refugees in Budapest, Hungary, and Malmö, Sweden. Due to certain limitations, this research serves as a pilot; however, it nevertheless highlights *some* aspects of refugee admission and integration that are working well and some that are not for the relevant people. Furthermore, these interviews can be constructive for tying theories of refugee admission and integration to the real-world, expanding a conversation of what economic assistance refugees might need to the wider socio-cultural elements that constrain and shape the experiences of refugees in new countries. Lastly, by using these interviews to build a theory of admission and integration, we can demonstrate how to use empirical field research to inform political theory; a tool that is underemployed in the literature and would be of great use as political

[5] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration,* 196; Gibney, "Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees," 169-181; Keely, "How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows," 1055; Miller, *Strangers in our Midst,* 27-8; Noorani, "Duty to Asylum Seekers," 402; Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* 49.

theory aims to tackle the modern issues arising from twenty-first century developments in immigration, transnationalism, and refugee and asylum claims.

This paper is divided into four chapters. The first looks at the conceptual links between harm and protection that underlie the theoretical questions of who should qualify as a refugee and which states are obligated to admit them. Although there is merit to criticisms of the existing legal doctrine, and they can be used to bolster and expand the refugee protections, I will ultimately argue for a wide-reading of the international legal definition of the refugee. With a definition for the refugee at-hand, I will then survey the literature on state duties to refugees and problematize the various solutions offered by different groups of thinkers. By categorizing the literature as either proposing individual circumstantial state duties to refugees or collective universal state duties to refugees,[6] we can not only grasp why states are obligated to admit refugees in particular situations, but also why the vast majority of refugees are nevertheless left without a state offering them asylum.[7]

Chapter II probes the question of what we owe to refugees after they have been admitted by a state. This chapter is divided in two, corresponding to the theoretical split in thinking through what is owed to a refugee after admission and what sorts of integration ought to be provided. This first section examines the types of integration that theorists argue ought to be provided in order for newcomers to join a state successfully. The second section explores what it means to join a

[6] The original terminology for the classification of these types of duties derives from my undergraduate thesis in political science (Haverford College, 2017).

[7] Although this explicitly calls attention to the way in which the literature's theoretical limitations leave the vast majority of refugees without a state offering them asylum, it is of course poignant to note that this is reflected in the real world. Although circumstances and factors vary, and many more reasons would need to be articulated which lie beyond the scope of the theoretical literature, it is not a coincidence that in the real world the vast majority of refugees are likewise left without a state offering them asylum.

community or nation-state through an analysis of contemporary political theories of membership, distributive justice, and national identity, and the ways that political theorists tie these theories together to account for the modern phenomenon of nation-states and their citizens. Once again, by working through the theoretical knots in the literature, we can get a better sense of what it really means to be a member in the community, specifically in a world divided into nation-states.

The third chapter defends the relevance and methodology of the interviews conducted in Budapest and Malmö to address the theoretical questions surrounding what is owed to refugees after admission. Although both Hungary and Sweden are European Union member states, and are accordingly legally bound by the same European Commission directives on refugee admission and resettlement, they nevertheless have the most different public perceptions of refugees and the most different integration schemes. With a better understanding of why Hungary and Sweden (and Budapest and Malmö) were chosen, I explain the methodology of interviewee selection and interview format, while disclaiming the representativeness of the sample.

Chapter IV presents the research findings in Budapest and Malmö, and then seeks to construct a better theory for the integration of refugees, taking into account the social needs of refugees that are often overlooked, as well as the role of local communities and the duties they have to refugees. The chapter is divided into three sections: refugee experiences in Budapest, refugee experiences in Malmö, and the theoretical lessons that can be learned from these experiences. In the commonalities of refugee experiences in Budapest, a picture emerges of an integration scheme that (inadvertently) produces significant social attachments to particular people and a wider interpersonal embeddedness for refugees, while ensuring the need to work and study in order to make a life for oneself. Conversely, in the common spaces of refugee experiences in Malmö, a very different picture emerges; this is one of refugees who are lonely and feeling useless

to society, while remaining grateful for all the assistance provided by the Swedish state and desiring to be able to contribute to the community. From these differences, a better theory for refugee integration can be built.

First, we must recognize the centrality of comprehensive integration schemes to securing a new life after refugee admission; in this way, we can recognize that a socio-economic integration scheme is the first step, rather than a civic integration.[8] However, this ought to be only the groundwork for a wider integration scheme. Enabling the newcomer to make a meaningful life for herself requires ensuring socio-cultural ties are possible, an interpersonal embeddedness into the life of the community, and the pathway to belonging in the community. This is best conceptualized by dividing the duties into those of the state and those of the local community, of which only the former is specified and discussed in the literature.

By producing theoretical innovations to the existing discourses on integration and what is owed to refugees after admission from empirical research, I hope that this paper can illuminate a neglected practice in the field of political theory. It is all too often presumed that we are able to tweak our theoretical understandings of the world through reading, discussion, and critical thought alone. While these are valuable and necessary tools, I believe that a methodological mistake is being made when we choose not to step out into the world and ask the relevant people about their experiences. Through interviews with social workers, intercultural mediators, and refugees in Budapest and Malmö, I am equipped to critique the literature and its theories, and highlight and expand alternative theoretical pathways. As a growing number of political theorists choose to deploy these sorts of tools for theorizing, this paper can hopefully also contribute to these on-going discussions about the best ways to conduct political theory research in the 21st century.

[8] Miller, *Strangers in our Midst*, 132-33.

Chapter I

Conceptual Links between Harm and Protection:
Defining "Refugees" and Who Ought to Admit Them

Introduction

In order to discuss what is owed to refugees after admission, it is first necessary to understand which people are designated by the word "refugee" and why so many people think that states are obligated to admit refugees. It is only with a definition for who counts as a refugee that we can consider the succeeding question of what links states to refugees. Furthermore, it is by understanding what links states to refugees in terms of admission that we can analyze the subsequent question of what is owed to refugees *after* admission.

Although the empirical findings presented in this paper are most apparently relevant for this latter theoretical conversation, it is only possible to engage meaningfully in a conversation about justice after admission once we establish the conceptual grounds on which we will theorize. Accordingly, we must first address the question of who ought to be designated by the word "refugee," and then analyze what sorts of duties states have to them.

Who is a Refugee?

The word "refugee" was first widely used during the inter-war period to identify individuals and groups forced to leave their country due to political exclusion and suppression.[9] In the wake of the second World War, however, the word was given legal and political import, which forever changed the way that those called "refugees" were perceived and treated.[10]

[9] Katy Long, "When refugees stopped being migrants: Movement, labour and humanitarian protection," in *Migration Studies* 1, no. 1 (2013): 6.
[10] Ibid, 7.

Following World War II, the global community of states formed the United Nations (UN), and through that new deliberative body, they produced a convention to specify the conditions under which a person was entitled to asylum in any state in the world. The sort of person entitled to asylum under these conditions was designated a refugee and the agency responsible for these persons was entitled the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This convention is grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries. The 1951 convention limited the right to asylum to those fleeing their country due to events within Europe that occurred prior to 1 January 1951. This was radically expanded by the 1967 protocol, which provided a formal definition for who ought to be considered a refugee, while stipulating the minimum standards for the treatment of refugees: "access to the courts, to primary education, to work, and the provision of documentation, including a refugee travel document in passport form."[11] The definition itself, which is often referred to as the UNHCR definition, is that a person is a refugee if:

> owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, [he] is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. […] a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of one of the countries of which he is a national.[12]

[11] UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, "Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees," *UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency*, Accessed 2 November 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html.
[12] Ibid, 14.

The distinction between the terms 'refugee' and 'migrant' nevertheless remained unclear even after the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol.[13] In the wake of the Second World War, with millions of people displaced across Europe and in need of assistance with repatriation, the International Refugee Organization repatriated 73,000 displaced persons and helped over a million resettle. During this process, the distinction between refugee and migrant was overlooked due to the pressing concern to stabilize the region. The focus remained on an "amorphous mixed surplus population," which grouped together refugees and migrants—in other words, those persons who needed *resettlement*.[14] It was, in fact, Cold War politics that helped distinguish refugees from migrants as it became politically useful for the West to present Eastern European refugees as not merely impoverished, but also victims of communism.[15] Concurrently, the UNHCR lobbied for conceptualizing refugee resettlement within the terms of humanitarian assistance, rather than economic value.[16] As the definitions solidified in legal precedent, the emphasis on persecution "as the qualifying criteria for refugee status" was legitimated.[17]

Closely associated with the UNHCR at its founding, Elfan Rees was involved in the original writing of the UN definition for the refugee in the 1951 convention and reflects on his concerns in a 1960 article for an American Political and Social Science journal. He acknowledges that there are many reasons why people can be forced from their homes, from their states, and would therefore need protection in a new state; however, he defends the 1951 definition's limitation to victims of political events because he argues that there needs to be a strict link

[13] Long, "When refugees stopped being migrants," 13.
[14] Ibid, 18.
[15] Ibid, 20.
[16] Ibid, 20.
[17] Ibid, 21.

between the harm suffered and the protection offered.[18] Ultimately, he spends much of the article lamenting his concerns that when the free-world has an opportunity to act, the world will see that all the talk was empty hypocrisy.[19] These two thoughts have since rippled through the literature on how to define a refugee, although Rees is rarely credited with sparking these conversations. Although his latter point is less relevant here, the former is of critical importance. How strict does the link between harm suffered and protection offered need to be, and how ought we classify each? In his celebrated 1985 article, Shacknove critiques the UNHCR definition on these grounds and offers an alternative conception of the refugee.

Shacknove first argues that the conception of the refugee is not really a definition—although it has been spun into various definitions in various jurisdictions through legal instruments—but rather it crafts and perpetuates an implicit four-part argument:

> *a)* a bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance between the citizen and the state constitutes the normal basis of society;
> *b)* in the case of the refugee, this bond has been severed;
> *c)* persecution and alienage are always the physical manifestations of this severed bond; and
> *d)* these manifestations are the necessary and sufficient conditions for determining refugeehood[20]

According to Shacknove, this theoretical structure undergirds the existing definition for the refugee by asserting a moral and an empirical claim. Morally it posits the minimal normal relations between citizen and state—of duties and rights, that which the citizen owes to the state and can expect to receive from the state—and when these relations are compromised, then the refugee is produced through a dangerous situation.[21] Empirically, it asserts that the real world consequences of the severed bond are always persecution and alienage.[22] The Organization of African Unity

[18] Elfan Rees, "The Refugee Problem: Joint Responsibility," in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 329 (May, 1960): 17.
[19] Ibid, 19.
[20] Andrew E. Shacknove, "Who is a Refugee?," in *Ethics* 95, no. 2 (1985): 275.
[21] Ibid, 275.
[22] Ibid, 275.

(OAU) poses a challenge to this notion that persecution is essential for being a refugee, as the OAU definition expands the grounds for the UNHCR definition:

> The term 'refugee' shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part of the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of nationality.[23]

However, this difference is less representative of a philosophical dispute rather than reflective of differing historical contexts. The UNHCR definition was a response to the events of World War II through which people were persecuted by European totalitarian regimes, i.e. refugees were the victims of organized predatory states. On the other hand, the OAU definition emerged out of a content of grappling with the post-colonial situation in Africa, where poorly drawn border lines spurred new forms of conflict; in this way, the OAU definition recognized that this normative bond of state and citizen can be severed in many ways, not only by persecution.[24] Through this differentiation, Shacknove is able to argue for the salience of properly denoting the arena for refugeehood—in much the same way that Rees does. The demarcating lines of who counts as a refugee can be seen as relaying to sovereign states their priority for whom to provide political and financial supports, and those situations in which asylum is the necessary remedy for the relevant harm. Accordingly, these issues are magnified by too narrowly or too widely demarcating the bounds of refugeehood. Shacknove therefore sets out to argue that—contrary to the implicit argument within existing definitions for who is a refugee—neither persecution nor alienage sufficiently captures what is essential about being a refugee. While he accepts the first two components of the implicit argument, he rejects the latter two as being non-exhaustive. For

[23] UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, "OAU Convention: Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa," *UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency*, Accessed 22 February 2018. http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc1a682/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html.
[24] Shacknove, "Who is a Refugee?," 276.

persecution, this manifests in the fact that there are other examples of the absence of physical security—for example, civil war, terrorism, kidnapping, and others—regardless of whether the state is the perpetrator.[25] In so doing, claims based on natural disasters—which are usually dismissed as the basis for UNHCR refugee claims—would be acceptable to Shacknove because he rejects the notion that it is only the grounds of harm by persecution that one is entitled to asylum. So, while persecution is a sufficient condition, it is not necessary.

Alienage too, he argues, is sufficient, but not necessary. Rather, there is a more fundamental aspect to the positionality of the refugee. At its core, Shacknove's argument is one in which citizens are entitled to physical security, vital subsistence, and liberty of political participation and physical movement, and therefore refugees are those whose home state has failed to provide these.[26] However, merely lacking one of these basics needs does not justify the refugee claim on its own. It is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Therefore there must be a further criterion. Shacknove argues that this is the relation of the person suffering the harm to the international community: namely, a refugee must be accessible to the international community such that the international community can ameliorate these conditions.[27] In this way, Shacknove is not only able to argue that persecution is sufficient but not necessary, but also he is able to argue that alienage is sufficient, but not necessary. In turn, he deconstructs the essential link between harm and protection posited by the UNHCR definition. He also situates the argument such that it is possible to stipulate that one no longer need limit refugeehood to those outside the original country's borders. Rather, the group can merely be defined as those whose government fails to

[25] Ibid, 280.
[26] Ibid, 281.
[27] Ibid, 281.

protect their basic needs, who have no remaining recourse to protect them from the relevant harm, and are situated such that international assistance is feasible.

There are many problems with Shacknove's argument. The most basic one requires a better understanding of what is meant by the link between harm and protection. The fundamental premise is that to call a group of people X means that they have suffered Y harm and therefore need Z protection in order to ameliorate their condition. In this formulation, one needs causal and contained links between X, Y, and Z. Shacknove—by attempting to expand the definition for anyone who *can* be helped—dilutes the definition to the extent that these links are no longer causal and contained. For example, there are many people around the world who do not have adequate access to food, who have no recourse for adequate food from their own government, and who are situated such that they accessible to international assistance; however, this does not mean that the most effective remedy is asylum. In many cases, these people do not want to relocate, and if they were provided adequate food by the international community within their existing state, then their harm would be considered redressed. In this way, we can see how the specific form of protection—asylum—is not the most effective answer to every harm specified by Shacknove. Nevertheless, Shacknove's article not only constitutes the most extensive theoretical argument for a broader refugee definition, but also has been explicitly endorsed by numerous giants in the field.[28] In order to move beyond it, then, we must thoroughly understand why it is a faulty definition and consequentially ascertain a better one.

[28] Matthew J. Gibney, "Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees," in The American Political Science Review 93, no. 1 (Mar. 1999): 173; Joseph H. Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; Peter Singer and Renata Singer, "The Ethics of Refugee Policy," *Open Borders? Closed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues*, Ed. Mark Gibney, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988): 111-130.

Lister argues that there are two fundamental problems with Shacknove's definition. One is the aforementioned fact that the UNHCR definition selects a group of people whose basic needs are not being met, and then specifies a specific form of assistance that would remedy that problem—namely, asylum and not forcing them to return to an unsafe country (i.e. the duty of *non-refoulement*). Shacknove fails to conceptually tie asylum to the forms of harm that he discusses, and thereby produces a definition that is not only conceptually weak, but also politically intractable. There is a second problem, however, that Lister illuminates and thereby contributes to our understanding of what a proper definition entails. Lister points out that Shacknove argues that we can and should define a refugee separately from arguing what we owe to the refugee, and this is a distinction that many scholars have upheld. However, if we do not explicitly identify what it is that we can and ought to be doing for a refugee, then there is no reason to distinguish between *any* type of person in desperate need—including those in war zones, extreme poverty, the aftermath of environmental disasters, etc. In those situations, then, we just look at relative levels of welfare. However, by being unable to link the type of harm to the form of assistance, it lacks any practical guidance, and therefore cannot serve as a guiding moral principle, especially for making massively important political and legal decisions.[29] Building on Lister's point, we can recognize an even more fundamental methodological issue. Shacknove fails to distinguish the basic principles from the obligations that arise from those principles within a specific context or situation. Of course we ought to do all we can to help those who cannot meet their basic needs—which roughly conforms to Rawl's duty of assistance[30], or Pogge's cosmopolitan notion of global justice[31]—however, these

[29] Matthew Lister, "Who are Refugees?" *Law and Philosophy* 32 (2013): 662.
[30] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
[31] Thomas W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," *Ethics* 103, no. 1 (Oct., 1992): 48-75.

principles of justice are then used to create a wide variety of duties. For Shacknove, the principles are considered one and the same with the duties derived from them, which presents deep analytical issues. We must keep our principles separate from our duties, and we must develop a definition for the refugee with a causal and contained link between harm and protection.

Lister argues that we ought to instead adopt a wide-reading of the UNHCR definition. He argues that there are three reasons why we ought to do so. The first is the requirement of a *well-founded* fear of persecution, which the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted to mean even a ten percent chance and Canadian law prescribes as a *real* chance of persecution.[32] This challenges Shacknove's concern—as well as many others[33]—that proving persecution is too high of a standard. This is not to say that there are not a variety of concerns regarding the effective implementation of such a policy, but rather that the theoretical argument does not hold the ground that many suppose considering its legal application. The second is that a wide reading of the UNCHR definition, in fact, better deals with many of Shacknove's problems than his own definition can—including suffering from natural disasters.[34] After all, if groups are made to suffer more severely than others, then this is persecution that could ground a refugee claim; furthermore, to consider the example of a massive natural disaster causing migration, the question is not—as Shacknove supposes—whether assistance is owed to the group, but rather which *form* of assistance. The third is the necessity of grounding a refugee claim on one of the five protected

[32] Lister, "Who are Refugees?," 670.
[33] Charles B. Keely, "How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows," *The International Migration Review* 30, no. 4 (Winter, 1996): 1055; Matthew J. Gibney, "Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees," *The American Political Science Review* 93, no. 1 (Mar. 1999): 169-181; A.G. Noorani, "Duty to Asylum Seekers," *Economic and Political Weekly* 26 (Feb. 1991): 402.
[34] Lister, "Who are Refugees?," 670.

grounds, implementing a *wide-reading* of these grounds.[35] As Lister notes, the requirement for a protected grounds ensures that the need is serious and not the result of a personal dispute of no relevance to the international community; however, these grounds can be widely interpreted. For example, sexual orientation can fall within *membership of a particular social group* without needing to specify sexual orientation as a grounds for claiming asylum as a refugee.

We can see, then, that a wide reading of the UNHCR definition satisfies many of Shacknove's and others' concerns. Importantly, it also allows us to argue for a definition that currently holds tremendous legal and political weight in the international arena, and will better position us for engaging with the existing socio-political debates about the questions of what we owe to refugees. In order to move towards these questions, however, we need a better grasp of the political theory debates surrounding what states owe to refugees.

But *Which* States Ought to Admit *Which* Refugees?

With a precise definition for the refugee at hand, we can turn to the question of state duties to refugees. At first, it might seem that such a question should be easily tackled, after all the very notion of the refugee seems to be inextricably tied to the duty of states to admit them. However, the issue is, in fact, quite thorny. Even if we accept the duty of *non-refoulement*—which specifies that a state ought not to return the refugee to place where she will be unsafe—we have gained no greater clarity on which states ought to admit which refugees. In a world divided into nation-states with controlled borders, the question of which states ought to admit *who* is not so simple—after all, refusing admission is not synonymous with sending a person back to persecution, harm, or death. Matthew Gibney identifies two prevailing arguments to address these vital questions.

[35] Ibid, 670.

Gibney divides the literature into two groups[36]: the global liberal and the utilitarian political theories (which includes Carens[37] for the former and Singer[38] for the latter), and the communitarian and conservative political theories (which includes Walzer[39] for the former and Miller[40] for the latter). In short, Gibney boils down the first camp, which he refers to as the impartialist view, to a single question: "why should something as arbitrary as where one is born determine where one should be allowed to live?"[41] Global liberals and utilitarians assert that restrictions to migration are barriers to establishing a more equal and more just world, and merely serves to preserve the privileges of those living in the richest states. The second camp, which he refers to as the partialist view, places greater emphasis on the centrality of distinctive cultural life to our lives, which produces an imperative to curtail entrance into the community in order to preserve these distinctive cultures.

Walzer presented the first cogent argument in his foundational 1983 book *Spheres of Justice* after discussing different theoretical models for what constitutes a national community—which we will return to in the following chapter. He begins with the premise that refugees are *needy outsiders* whose needs can only be met by being taken in by an existing state, and

[36] Gibney, "Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees," 172.
[37] Joseph Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013; Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," in *The Review of Politics* 49, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 251-273.
[38] Singer and Singer, "The Ethics of Refugee Policy," 111-130.
[39] Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, New York City: Basic Books, 1984.
[40] David Miller, *Strangers in our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016; Miller, "National responsibility and global justice," in *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 11, no. 4 (2008): 383-399; Miller, "Why Immigration Controls Are Not Coercive: A Reply to Arash Abizadeh," *Political Theory* 38, no. 1 (Feb. 2010): 111-120.
[41] Gibney, "Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees," 172.

accordingly their need is for membership itself.[42] Of course, with millions of refugees around the world, the notion that any specific state is obligated to admit all of them, simply on the grounds of needing admission, is nonsensible to Walzer. After all, if so many refugees are admitted that the amount of liberty enjoyed by members within the state decreases, then an injustice is being done to the current members.[43] The question therefore becomes under which circumstances is a state individually obligated to admit specific refugees. Walzer argues that there are two sets of circumstances that can obligate a specific state to admit specific refugees.

The first is when the state is directly responsible for turning a group of people into refugees.[44] This is a highly appealing proposition. After all, if a state is responsible for turning a group of people into refugees, then that state has produced an injustice in the world and therefore ought to remedy the harm it has created. Walzer offers the example of Vietnamese refugees seeking asylum in the Unites States, who he claims had been "effectively Americanized […] in a moral sense" even before they arrived on American territory.[45] However, the application of this rule to specific circumstances fails to produce the desirable results. After all, the question of what counts as *directly responsible* is left for interpretation, and the latitude there is unacceptably wide. The United States undeniably further destabilized Afghanistan, as hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled the ruthlessness of the Taliban. However, is the United States directly responsible for producing those refugees? Well, not exactly. It was the actions of the Taliban and their persecution of Afghanis that drove so many to flee the country. In this way, we are unable to tie Afghani

[42] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 48.
[43] Ibid, 49.
[44] Ibid, 49.
[45] Ibid, 49.

refugees to the United States *directly*[46], even though it seems to present a clear case of an outside state intervening in a foreign conflict and that intervention producing refugees. The ambivalence present in Walzer's formulation here means that is fails to be dispositive in determining which states ought to admit which refugees. His second proposed set of circumstances runs into the same problem.

Walzer argues that in addition to the *directly responsible* form of obligation, there is also a duty produced by the *like us* criteria: we are bound to admit those who are "persecuted or oppressed because they are like us."[47] Broadly, Walzer specifies two ways in which a people could be like us. The first is ideological affinity and the second is ethnicity, which he asserts can generate moral bonds across political lines.[48] His theoretical example here is: "when we claim to embody certain principles in our communal life and encourage men and women elsewhere to defend those principles."[49] Once again, Walzer stipulates a situation in which states are obligated to admit refugees that is intuitively appealing. However, this intuitive appeal is quickly diluted by the fact that we are also, once again, left without a clue of what it *really* means to be *like us*. What constitutes these principles and this communal life, and furthermore what ought to be considered encouragement given abroad? Should national traditions, legal systems, or language be the requisite grounds, or are we discussing something more theoretical, like liberty, democracy, or

[46] This assertion relies on the presumption that direct responsibility entails *either* total liability—that is full responsibility, without the involvement of additional parties—*or* certainty that had the state not done X, then the relevant people would not have been turned into refugees. As Walzer fails to demarcate the bounds of direct responsibility, we cannot be sure what is intended here; however, there are strong grounds for presuming that one of these must constitute direct responsibility. After all, were the state's actions irrelevant to the fact that those people became refugees, then what grounds Walzer's claim that that state *must* admit those refugees?
[47] Ibid, 49.
[48] Ibid, 49.
[49] Ibid, 49.

justice? The uncertainty here is far too great, and we are once again unable to generate duties of states to admit refugees on these grounds. Walzer does an excellent job of asserting two ways in which we think a state *should* admit refugees, and the intuitive appeal is undeniable. However, applying these two rules to the real world is untenable. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, were we to apply them, we would likely find many groups of refugees without any state that is obligated to admit them. It is this latter concern that provoked the impartialist response, prominently argued by Joseph Carens.

In his 2013 book, *The Ethics of Immigration*, Carens argues that the global community of states is obligated to admit refugees unconditionally. In this way, he presents a structurally contrasting argument from Walzer by asserting *universal*[50] and *collective*[51] state duties to refugees, whereas we can call Walzer's argument one that proposes *circumstantial*[52] and *individual*[53] state duties to refugees. Carens' argument is three-fold, the first two of which reflect prior concerns in the literature, while the third provides a novel contribution. First, he acknowledges that causal connections can ground a state duty to admit refugees[54]—which is essentially a revised version of Walzer's *direct responsibility* argument. Carens opens up the grounds here, though, by arguing that states have obligations to admit refugees when the actions of the state "have contributed in some way to the fact that the refugees are no longer safe in their home country."[55] In this way, he radically expands the group of states that are responsible for admitting refugees based on their

[50] Duties that apply in all circumstances, regardless of the conditions that produced the refugee—of course, the relevant person must indeed be a refugee.
[51] Duties that all the states have together to admit refugees.
[52] Duties that are circumstantially grounded, that is the state's duty to the refugee depends on the specific circumstances that produced the refugeehood.
[53] Duties that a specific state has because of something about the state itself, rather than all states in virtue of being states.
[54] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 195.
[55] Ibid, 195.

actions abroad. Second, he argues that a duty to admit can derive from *humanitarian concern*, which simply means that the refugee urgently needs a safe place to live and the state can provide it.[56] Here Carens reflects the utilitarian perspective that Singer and Singer propounded back in 1988, when they argued that the nations of the developed world could more fully satisfy their moral obligations to refugees.[57] In short, Singer and Singer argued that there is no reason that the nations of the developed world could not, at least, double their refugee intake without causing domestic harm, and therefore they should gradually increase refugee acceptance, while monitoring the effects of the increase.[58]

Carens' innovative contribution to the literature is presented in his third reason for why states can be obligated to admit refugees. He argues that the normative presuppositions of the modern state system, in fact, generate the duty to admit refugees because the world is divided into states, which have the right as legitimate and sovereign states to control and limit entry into their territories.[59] The legitimacy and sovereignty of these states, however, derives from the collective system of states itself. In this way, Carens argues that since this global state system assigns people to existing states, these existing states "collectively have a responsibility to help those for whom this assignment is disastrous."[60] The duty—importantly a *collective* one—then is an obligation that arises to correct for the failures of the inevitable failures of the social, political, and legal institutions that collectively legitimize each other. In his words, "states have a duty to admit

[56] Ibid, 195.
[57] Singer, "The Ethics of Refugee Policy," 128.
[58] Ibid, 128.
[59] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 196.
[60] Ibid, 196.

refugees that derives from their own claim to exercise power legitimately in a world divided into states."[61]

This innovative argumentative structure advances the literature in several important ways. For one, it provides a way of thinking about refugees that ensures that all refugees have a state that is obligated to admit them—and it does so by acknowledging that there are numerous reasons why states are obligated, incorporating both Walzer and Singer's approaches. It also advances the literature by articulating a new type of duty—namely a universal, collective one. Unfortunately, this duty is less helpful than it might seem at first. As Miller is quick to point out in his new 2016 book, *Strangers in our Midst*, Carens is correct that the global community of states has a *collective* duty to admit refugees—and we can even call it *universal*, so long as the definition of the refugee is sufficiently narrowly tailored—however, this does not mean that any *individual* state must admit refugees.[62] While Carens' innovative argument may be theoretically compelling, Miller argues that it is functionally useless insofar as it fails to ever compel any individual state to admit specific refugees applying for asylum. Furthermore, insofar as this collective duty remains the bedrock of the obligation to admit refugees, it becomes unclear why any specific state should have a "special responsibility" to admit the specific refugee knocking on its doors.[63]

Miller responds to these concerns by returning to a Walzerian style of circumstantial, individual duties, while focusing on what precisely links the refugee to the state. While Miller would likely accept Walzer's criteria of *direct responsibility*, and to a lesser extent Carens' notion of being responsible if a states *contributes in some way*, he nevertheless chooses to focus primarily on the proximity of the refugee to the state. He likens the situation to if he were walking down the

[61] Ibid, 196.
[62] Miller, *Strangers in our Midst*, 83.
[63] Ibid, 83.

street and someone collapses next to him.[64] Theoretically, anyone *could* be responsible, but he would have special responsibilities due to his physical proximity and capacity to help. So too it goes for states. When the refugee knocks on a particular state's doors, then that state has a special responsibility to admit that person because the person is making themselves vulnerable to the state. However, importantly, this does not produce an absolute duty, according to Miller. There is no situation in which a state can be said to absolutely need to admit a refugee—although he does recognize the duty *of non-refoulement*, i.e. not sending back persons to places where they will be harmed. Ultimately, Miller thinks states ought to help those closest to them, and do their best to help as may as they can, while recognizing practical and political constraints: "not everyone can be rescued, just as in the other cases where human rights are at stake such as conflicts that require humanitarian intervention—we may have to acknowledge a gap between the rights of the vulnerable and the obligations of those who might protect them."[65] He argues for a sort of circumstantial individual duty, but consequentially one that is far less compelling than either Walzer's, Singer's or Carens'.

We can now recognize that there are two general approaches to considering how and why states are obligated to admit refugees. Gibney would call these approaches the partialist and impartialist views; however, I advocate for the specificity in distinguishing the circumstantial individual duties from the universal collective duties. Although universal collective duties are theoretically compelling, they are practically intractable insofar as they fail to obligate any individual state to admit refugees. This means that any individual state can simply evade their duty by asking, "why us?" Although circumstantial individual duties *do* bind specific states to specific

[64] Ibid, 84.
[65] Ibid, 93.

groups of refugees, they unfortunately leave the vast majority of the 22+ million refugees without a specific state that ought to admit them. Of course, if they manage to make the perilous voyage to a state's borders and successfully knock of their gates, then that state has a special responsibility to admit them. With this framework, we can turn to the question of what a state owes to those admitted persons on its territory who have been recognized as refugees.[66]

[66] There is a gap here, which will be discussed briefly at the end of the second chapter; however, it is worth noting that this timeline omits the stage during which an asylum seeker waits for their decision on whether they have been granted refugee status. There are certainly duties that a state has to the asylum seeker during this period, and there are additional obligations that may fall on other parties, however this is not the focus of the theoretical literature discussed in this paper, nor of the empirical study or the consequent theoretical developments.

Chapter II

Pathways to Membership and Belonging:
Clarifying and Probing What We Owe to Refugees *after* Admission

Introduction

With a definition for the refugee at hand—one that articulates a causal and contained link between harm and protection—and a framework for conceptualizing the duties that states have to refugees, we can turn to the pressing question of what we owe to refugees after they have been admitted. Although both the questions of who should be admitted and which states should admit them are pressing, they in fact form the groundwork for a more encompassing conversation. This too is a conversation of justice, but it instead concerns what is owed to refugees after they have been admitted.

There are several overlapping issues that are all too often conflated in discussions of what is owed to refugees after admission. The two most prominent are whether integration services should be provided by the government or the 'third' sector—i.e. non-profit and non-governmental organizations—and of what these integration services should consist. In order to join a new country successfully, many scholars have defended the necessity of language training, housing and stipend provision, and skills and jobs training.[67] The goal of such an integration program would then be the eventual independence and self-sufficiency of the refugee, which is said to be critical to leading a meaningful life. However, the relevant question materializes if this is not only necessary but also sufficient. After all, membership is not tied—at least not necessarily—to these sorts of things. In

[67] Alastair Ager and Alison Strang, "Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework," in *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, No. 2 (2008): 166-186; Elizabeth Mestheneos and Elizabeth Ioannidi, "Obstances to Refugee Integration in the European Union Member States," *in Journal of Refugee Studies* 15, no. 3 (2002): 313.

other words, simply speaking the local language, having a place to stay, and a job that pays does not necessarily entail that one is a member of the relevant country or nation. This more elusive question of membership spurs additional conversations surrounding *distributive justice*—how to justly share, divide, and exchange resources within a community, including social goods—and *national identity*, whose very definition and conception seeds the ground for vigorous debate. In turning to these, we must keep in mind what we seek to better understand: what is owed to refugees after they are admitted by a state.

Joining a State: Miller's Three Types of Integration

The political theory literature on immigration has mostly eschewed the question of how immigrants and refugees ought to be integrated and what they are accordingly owed after admission, even within the tradition of examining membership in the community. The prevailing thought has been that political theory ought to focus on who counts as a member of the community, and what the constitutive processes of membership are, rather than on how states can enable newcomers to *become* members.[68] Although this was mostly reflected in the communitarian thinkers of the 1980s, it can even be found in cosmopolitan thought in the 1990s[69].

It is perhaps most telling that even Carens ascribes to this guiding belief, as he defends in his 2013 seminal work in political theory the importance of ensuring citizenship for all denizens without discussing any integration services.[70] Carens reflects this presumption in the field, then,

[68] Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, (New York City: Basic Books, 1984): 31-2.
[69] Thomas W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," *Ethics* 103, no. 1 (1992): 66-71; Robert E. Goodin, "What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?," *Ethics* 98, no. 4 (1988): 685; Andrew E. Shacknove, "American Duties to Refugees: Their Scopes and Limits," *Open Borders? Closed Socities?: The Ethical and Political Issues*, Ed. Mark Gibney, (Westport: Greenword, 1988): 136.
[70] Joseph Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 52-59.

by ascribing the moral duty to both the admission of others and the granting of full political rights through citizenship to those who intend to make a life in a country; however, a conversation of the ethics of integration itself is left aside. Even with respect to refugees, to whom Carens argues we have the greatest ethical obligations when it comes to immigration, he has little to say about what should happen after they are admitted: "If a democratic state admits refugees, it must provide the refugees with most of the rights that others living in the society enjoy. Over time, it must accept them as members."[71] These lines are the closest that Carens comes to addressing the issue at hand, and yet fails to truly address it at all. The first line presents an already existing international legal principle as morally binding as well; a statement that few are likely to disagree with, especially insofar as the rights left out of "most of the rights" are up to interpretation.[72] The second line is more controversial. However, without either specifying what he means by members or over what *length* of time, very little content is actually being put forward. Only in 2016—in the wake of the largest refugee crisis since the legal term was created—has the political theory literature been presented with a framework for what states owe to refugees after admission.

Miller argues that we ought to distinguish between three types of integration, and only then can we engage in a fruitful discussion about what is owed to immigrants and refugees respectively.[73] He proposes distinguishing social integration, civic integration, and cultural integration:

> Social integration describes a pattern of behavior. The people who lived in a particular place are socially integrated to the extent that they regularly interact with one another across a range of social contexts […Civic integration means] people coming to share a set of principles and norms that guide their social and political life. For example, they not only share a commitment to democracy as an abstract principle, but also share an understanding of what 'behaving like a democrat' means […] People are culturally integrated when they share a common culture, which might mean having

[71] Ibid, 204.
[72] Ibid, 204.
[73] David Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016): 132.

> the same values and experiences or, on the other hand, having a common cultural identity. Thus we might say that cultural integration occurs when people enjoy the same TV programs or films, read the same books or newspapers, or listen to the same music; or alternatively when they identify with the same religion, with the same city, or with the same nation.[74]

This long-winded quote displays both what he considers each type of integration to be, as well as what sort of thing integration is at-large—namely, a way of categorizing the extent to which a group of people becomes more similar to the larger community that they are joining. Each of the three types, then, explains the extent to which that group of people has become more similar to the community through a specific dimension of society. Social integration describes the extent to which people who live in common spaces spend time together and interact communally in a variety of activities. Civic integration describes the extent to which those people are in agreement about the wider philosophy behind their laws and codes of behavior, and the ways in which their society is structured in terms of where value is placed. Lastly, cultural integration is notably more ambiguous, as Miller attempts to squeeze several phenomena under a single umbrella. It therefore describes the extent to which people share values, experiences, and various sorts of media and information, and also religious, geographical, and national identities. In this way, Miller also presents a wider structural argument about what he sees as the three fundamental aspects of society in relation to immigrant populations: the social, the civic, and the cultural.

There are some important clarifications that need to be made. First, when Miller discusses civic integration, one should *not* confuse his definition with one that prescribes that people are civically integrated when they share the same goals in politics and life. Rather, the shared set of principles and norms prescribes *the way in which* people pursue these goals in politics and life, and the various constraints that might apply.[75] Even if two people have radically different goals,

[74] Ibid, 132-133.
[75] Ibid, 133.

civic integration would prescribe the ways in which it is acceptable to pursue those goals, and the ways it is not. The second clarification is that Miller does not argue that all three types of integration ought to be employed in all circumstances; rather, he views these as the three metrics by which to view the extent to which people are integrated into a communal life.[76] Different sorts of people, then, depending on their relation to this communal life and society at-large ought to have different levels of integration. Through these clarifications, it seems that he is making a descriptive argument rather than a prescriptive one. It is a descriptive argument that, though there could be alternatives presented, is the most comprehensive in the political theory literature and serves as a decent model. The prescriptive model that he offers following this descriptive one is both more problematic and will get us further to a conversation about what is owed to refugees after admission.

Miller argues that communities of immigrants have moral obligations to integrate into society. These stem from the fact that no community is totally separate from another when they exist within the same state, and "people in poorly integrated societies are less likely to understand, to communicate with, and to trust one another."[77] Accordingly, insofar as we have moral obligations to ensure our societies are as least conflict-prone as possible, we also have moral obligations to ensure some basic level of integration.[78] This link between integration and conflict is tenuous at best and problematic at worst, but we can grant it to Miller for now, as it is necessary for the advancement of his argument. Now, the question at hand becomes what types of integration are necessary to reduce conflict between groups of immigrants and the natives/citizens in the area. Miller asserts that social integration is necessary as it allows for increasing contact between groups

[76] Ibid, 133.
[77] Ibid, 134.
[78] Ibid, 134-5.

and a breakdown of the social walls that exist within society. Civic integration, too, is necessary; however, an immediate critique arises that targets the element of civic integration that seeks to change the mindset of immigrants. Miller acknowledges that this might be a necessary component of civic integration, but responds with a three-part argument: (1) it is necessary to give immigrants the linguistic, social, and political skills they need to participate in society, which might include changing their mind-set; (2) immigrants might bring with them practices that the society has a legitimate interest in outlawing, e.g. coerced marriages or punishing homosexuality; and (3) insofar as it is legitimate for liberal societies to include promotion of liberal and democratic principles in school curriculum, it should be acceptable for immigrants too.[79] In these ways, Miller argues that social and civic integration are morally obligated for immigrants, and should accordingly be facilitated by the government. Although this issue will be discussed at length in the following chapters, it is noteworthy that Miller discusses the importance of *state-facilitated* social and civic integration, and thereby places the obligation at the level of the state. In this way, the moral obligations for integration fall solely to the state; the local community is therefore only discussed in relation to the potentiality that immigrants could be disruptive.

Immigrants also have a moral obligation to culturally integrate—to an extent—because it allows them to identify with the new society more fully, which is important if they plan to stay long-term.[80] However, Miller does *not* think that the government can be involved with this integration, as the onus must lie with the immigrants; to force cultural integration would not only be likely unsuccessful but also would be infringing on liberal principles that allow one to personally identify in whichever fashion one chooses.[81] Furthermore, Miller rightly worries about

[79] Ibid, 136-8.
[80] Ibid, 144.
[81] Ibid, 147-8.

government-sponsored cultural integration that might target religious beliefs and practices, which would constitute a gross violation of the freedom of religion enjoyed by denizens of liberal democracies.[82] It is therefore a responsibility that lies in the hands of the immigrants themselves. The government should ensure social and civic integration, while leaving the extent of cultural integration to the immigrants.

There are many issues that arise with Miller's prescriptive theory of integration. For one, Miller omits the entire arena of economic integration, which has been discussed by other theorists, albeit briefly.[83] We can perhaps infer that Miller does not discuss economic integration as he considers it to be an element of the free economy, which would translate to a view of this sort: immigrants will be better off themselves if they are more integrated into the local economy, however there is no moral dimension to this and there is accordingly no role for the government to play, nor a space to assert a moral obligation on the immigrant's behalf. We will be better poised to consider the fallaciousness of this view, and the omission of economic integration from his theory, after a discussion of refugee experiences in Budapest and Malmö—and so we will return to this point then.

Secondly, it is possible for an immigrant to speak the local language, be economically integrated into the local economy, have children enrolled in the local schools, and not present some sort of divisive threat to society. Miller however implies that in order to *not* present a divisive threat, immigrants must be socially integrated, which extends far beyond linguistic and economic integration. The extent to which he asserts that integration is morally obligated, then, does not

[82] Ibid, 149.
[83] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 55; Shacknove, "American Duties to Refugees: Their Scopes and Limits," 136; Peter Singer and Renata Singer, "The Ethics of Refugee Policy," *Open Borders? Closed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues*, Ed. Mark Gibney, (Westport: Greenwood, 1988): 124.

follow from his concern of divisive threats to society. The role that social integration plays and the corresponding moral obligation that would be derived is unclear, and once again, a better picture can be drawn after comparatively considering the experiences of refugees in Budapest and Malmö.

Miller's prescription of cultural integration, which follows from the imperative of ensuring an identification with the new society, is likewise untethered. It is not clear why identifying with the new society is an imperative for the newcomer, and furthermore, to place the onus on the newcomer without creating a corresponding right to claim from the government creates a lop-sided responsibility. Although this might be acceptable to some in conversations of immigrants, it becomes substantially less so when we switch to discussing refugees specifically. Miller does not provide a different framework for the integration of refugees. However, since he defends the moral obligation of states to admit refugees in limited circumstances, one would presume that after admission, they can simply be considered immigrants and the various moral obligations of integration discussed here would apply.

On the whole, Miller provides a useful (although incomplete) descriptive account of different types of integration and how they contribute in various ways to the newcomer becoming a member of society. However, he fails to adequately defend his prescriptive argument for why immigrants ought to integrate. Part of this failure is due to the lack of specificity with which he treats the issue of *successful* integration. What makes integration successful for Miller? Well, it is not clear he has much in mind beyond mitigating the risks posed to the local community. Part of the issue, then, is the uncertainty around what Miller means by membership in society, while normatively it might be problematic that he seems to define the success of integration in terms of the local community rather than those who are being integrating. It is only with a better

understanding of what it means to be a member in society that we can better understand Miller's prescriptive arguments for integration.

Joining a Nation: Membership, Distributive Justice, and National Identity

In his foundational and widely cited book (with an accurately succinct title), Benedict Anderson propounded the notion of nations as socially constructed communities, whose construction is built from the ways in which people perceive themselves as a part of an imagined (national) community.[84] In conjunction with Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*[85], published in the same year, a field of scholarly inquiry into the formation and reproduction of nations emerged. Concurrently, a group of political theorists and philosophers began to probe the question of what it means to be a *member* in a state. Building from Rogers Brubaker's idea[86] that civic and ethnic nationalism could not be meaningfully distinguished, there was a rejection of the notion that what it constitutively meant to be a member of a nation like Hungary or a member of a nation like the United States was over-stated in the weak form and erroneous in the strong form; their nationalisms were fundamentally the same. This field of nationalism studies had a significant impact on the political theory literature. Regardless of what forms the perhaps fictitious notion of the nation-state, political theorists homed in on an argument that states were recognized as real and legitimate entities, and membership in those (imagined) communities carried significance.

A wide lens reveals two general approaches to membership. The first is that membership needs to be selective, restrictive, that this approach conforms to distributive justice, and that we

[84] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*,(London: Verso, 1983): 6-7.
[85] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.
[86] Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction Between "Civic and Ethnic Nationalism," in *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*, (Zurich: Rüegger. 1999): 63-67.

ought to have special responsibilities to our compatriots[87]; the other is that membership as a way of restricting the possibility to belong to a community is a wrongheaded extension of distributive justice, and that accordingly we do not have special responsibilities to our compatriots.[88] This division is situated rather typically within the modern split of political theory, between the communitarian and conservative theorists and the cosmopolitans. We can begin with the former and then move briefly to the latter before opening up some space in between them, which we will return to in the last section of the fourth chapter.

Just one year after Anderson and Gellner published their foundational books for the field of nationalism studies, Walzer published his seminal work in political theory, which posited three ways of thinking about membership in a community, all built on his theory of distributive justice. Walzer believed that the *just* community was defined by how it committed itself to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods.[89] In order to understand how distributive justice operates on the level of the community, he thought it was necessary to understand how membership operates in the nation. After all, there is a reciprocal relationship between the process for deciding who belongs to the community and what justice means in the context of the social bonds within the community. In order to explain the complex process of determining membership in the community,

[87] Miller, *Strangers in Our* Midst, 23-28; Miller, "National responsibility and global justice," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 11, no. 4 (2008): 383-399; Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 30-42; Christopher Wellman, Phillip Cole, "In Defense of the Right to Exclude," *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude*, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011): 13-55.
[88] Goodin, "What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen," 686; David Owen, "Refugees, Fairness, and Taking up the Slack: On Justice and the International Refugee Regime," Academia Working Paper; Serena Parekh, "Beyond the ethics of admission: Stateless people, refugee camps and moral obligations," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 40, no. 7 (2014): 651-6; Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," 53-55; Shacknove, "American Duties to Refugees: Their Scopes and Limits," 142-5.
[89] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 31.

Walzer employed an analogy to the distinction between the admissions processes of neighborhoods, clubs, and families.

The admissions policies of neighborhoods are such that strangers can either be welcomed or not welcomed—but they cannot be either admitted or excluded—and this distinction is relevant because it highlights how families *choose* to move into a neighborhood.[90] Families are *not* chosen by the neighborhood and then through this selection eligible to move into the neighborhood. Rather, the selection apparatus of the neighborhood consists of families choosing to join, and then the neighborhood can either be welcoming towards the new family or not. Clubs, on the other hand, have a mutual relationship with respect to admissions decisions. Both the person must choose to join the club, and the club must choose to admit the person.[91] Lastly, families neither choose their members, nor do family members have the option to choose their family. In this way, the family represents how a person is born into the community or otherwise inherits their membership, and must live with the consequences.[92]

States are a combination of all three of forms of association, largely depending on how the person enters the state. How the person enters, then, not only shapes the relationship between the person and the state, but also could shape the relationship between the person and their compatriots. Accordingly, Walzer argues that admission and exclusion are necessary—at least in a limited manner—for "communal independence."[93] (Here one can likewise think of Wellman's more expansive theory on the right to exclude.[94]) In this way, Walzer conceptualizes the community as a cohesive and singular unit:

[90] Ibid, 35-6.
[91] Ibid, 36-8.
[92] Ibid, 40-2.
[93] Ibid, 61.
[94] Wellman, "In Defense of the Right to Exclude," 13-55.

> …*communities of character*, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life. […] these rights are to be exercised only by the community as a whole and only with regards to foreigners, not by some members with regard to others. No community can be half-metric, half-citizen and claim that its admissions policies are acts of self-determination or that its politics is democratic.[95]

Walzer establishes two key aspects of the community here—which is his theoretically foundational notion for the nation itself. The first is that every member of the community is an equal member, which reflects his commitment to liberal democratic traditions. The second is that within the community (or nation), members have greater responsibilities and commitments to each other than they do others in the world, which was later coined "compatriot partiality."[96]

It is from these two aspects of the community that Walzer is able to derive his theory of distributive justice, which grounds his *ethics of the community* (or, equally valid, ethics of the nation). This theory of distributive justice is built from his account of membership rights. The theory, then, "must vindicate at one and the same time the (limited) right of closure, without which there could be no communities at all, and the political inclusiveness of the existing communities."[97] It is in this way that he ties distributive justice itself not only to the equality of members within the nation, but also to their capacity to exclude. Not anyone can become a member of the community, and simply moving into the territory does not grant one membership in the community. It is furthermore derived from his theory of distributive justice and the ethics of the community that the nation must be able to exclude others, both through limiting its immigration policies, as well as exercising various forms of welcoming towards newcomers.

[95] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 62-3.
[96] Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*, 23.
[97] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 64.

The pressing question that remains is what it really means *to be a member* in a community. It is telling that Walzer primarily answers this question by delineating the ways in which one can become a member in a community, as well as the instances and reasons why a community can exclude others. In turning to the question of the membership itself, Walzer distinguishes between citizenship and nationality, explaining that immigrants and refugees can over time gain citizenship, without gaining nationality; he employs the example of an Algerian immigrant to France who becomes a French citizen without becoming a Frenchman.[98] However, he sees an injustice here in creating a society with such stringent internal divisions. Walzer concludes that naturalization must have the same standards as immigration: "The members must be prepared to accept, as their own equals in a world of shared obligations, the men and women they admit; the immigrants must be prepared to share the obligations."[99] So, for Walzer, to become a member in the community is revealed to be becoming an equal in the world of obligations. However, this sets a very low bar for what is owed to refugees after admission, insofar as the community owes them admission, and then simply the possibility to become a member. Miller offers a more encompassing theory employing his notion of compatriot partiality, which specifies not just the right but the obligation to treat one's fellow citizens more favorably than outsiders.

Miller contrasts his theory of compatriot partiality with a cosmopolitan theory of justice, which argues that all people should be treated equally and that membership in the community does not afford one different rights or obligations[100]. The problem with cosmopolitanism, according to Miller, is that it not only rules out partiality towards compatriots, but also towards families, friends,

[98] Ibid, 52.
[99] Ibid, 52.
[100] Pogge, "Cosmpolitanism and Sovereignty," 53-5.

and colleagues.[101] "If recognizing the equal worth of human beings excludes showing any sort of preference for those close to us, then our everyday behavior would need to change radically."[102] At first glance, this seems a highly favorable theoretical advance, at least in its implications for what is owed to refugees. After all, if no special preference can be shown to others, then the grounds for granting special protection for refugees are uprooted. However, Miller takes this further by arguing not only that interpersonal closeness provides grounds for special treatment but also cultural similarity. Here, Miller expands Wellman's defense of the communal right to exclude[103] by arguing that partiality based on association is integral to worthwhile human life, and that the proper extension of this association is that of the nation-state:

> "First [the nation] enables people to coexist on terms of justice. By putting in place a set of rules to govern ownership, employment, taxation, access to education and health care, and so forth, they are able to ensure that the benefits and burdens of economic cooperation are fairly distributed among them. Second, they are able to exercise some degree of control over the future direction over their association: […] In short they can achieve, within practical limits, both distributive justice and collective freedom. These values are sufficient to create associative obligations."[104]

Now, before turning to critique, let's follow Miller's argument for a moment. He argues that the link between community, distributive justice, and collective freedom ensures not only the validity of compatriot partiality, but furthermore associative obligations.[105] These are then linked to national identity because—regardless of whether national identity is fictitious—it creates a form of solidarity and belonging that extends beyond the economic and political relationships that are forged in the creation of a state.[106] So, even if the national identity, tied up in its national story, is pure myth, it nevertheless has value, consequences, and deepens the association because the

[101] Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*, 23.
[102] Ibid, 23.
[103] Wellman, "In Defense of the Right to Exclude," 24-6.
[104] Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*, 27.
[105] Ibid, 27.
[106] Ibid, 28.

political community *conceives of itself* as extended back in time, sometimes back to antiquity.[107] This national identity, then, becomes highly important because it produces the collective feeling[108] that people share a national identity; if a person is asked, then they can produce an *explanation* for why they belong together and why they belong together *here* in a specific place, with jurisdiction over a specific territory.[109] In this way, Miller ties membership in the community to national identity itself, and further argues for the morality of the nation insofar as the concept of nationhood forges a stronger community. To be a member is to share in this national identity, to conceive of oneself as a member of the political community, extended back in time, and to be able to explain why a particular people belong in a particular place. Importantly, to be a member also carries moral significance, not only in terms of one's associative obligations to others in the community, but also in terms of one's belonging; however, there is a caveat here. Miller notes that horrific actions have been taken under the banner of national identity, and so he distances himself from the moral significance there by arguing that national identity *itself* ought not to be valorized; rather, it should be recognized as a phenomenon that has consequences.[110] These consequences are themselves to be analyzed. To belong, then, is to be morally relevant in the terms of *compatriot partiality*, which completes the circle of his reasoning.

[107] Ibid, 28.
[108] In discussing this collective feeling, Miller makes a highly dubious claim. Miller asserts that the strength of the nation correlates to the strength of egalitarianism and communitarianism. He provides the example—acknowledging that there is no evidence to support this—of states like those in Scandinavia that (allegedly) have citizens who are readier to promote egalitarian forms of social justice, while also having the strongest national identity. The egalitarian forms of social justice materialized in Scandinavian states are then attributable to their strong national identity. This ungrounded claim reflects Miller's tendency to fold personal suspicions into his theory that ultimately provide easy targets for criticism.
[109] Ibid, 28-9.
[110] Ibid, 29-30.

However, there is a theoretical knot in Miller's theory. He is presenting two competing ideas. One is that we ought to allow for compatriot partiality because of the meaningfulness and moral relevance of national identity and collectivity. But, he also asserts that we do not need to valorize national identity through his appeal to a realist conception of the national collective. He cannot have it both ways, but importantly, this reveals the central tension in thinking about membership and what is owed to other members of the community. We want to say that we can exhibit compatriot partiality because nations do matter and national identity does influence our lives; but we also need to acknowledge that national identity is constructed, and not necessarily good, and so we cannot hinge compatriot partiality on national identity without valorizing the national collective. Miller seems to run into an issue that Walzer repeatedly struggles with: balancing our intuitive perceptions of the world and what we think we owe to others, with the logical consequences of questioning the institutions that structure our world.

There is an alternative. In Goodin's 1988 article investigating the pervasive trend in the literature to justify the valorization of compatriot partiality, he argues that we have misplaced what is morally relevant. By putting aside the contemporary importance of nationalism, and focusing instead of the strict consequences of membership in the community, he argues:

> "But it is the boundaries around people, not the boundaries around territories, that really matter morally. Territorial boundaries are merely useful devices for 'matching' one person to one protector. Citizenship is merely a device for fixing special responsibility in some agent for discharging our general duties vis-à-vis each particular person. […] If all has gone well with the assignment of responsibilities, then respecting special responsibilities and the priority of compatriots to which they give rise would be the best way of discharging those general duties. But the assignment of responsibility will never work perfectly, […and i]n the present world system, it is often—perhaps ordinarily—wrong to give priority to the claims of our compatriots."[111]

In short, what Goodin argues here is that a utopian world can be imagined in which the assignment of responsibilities is so perfectly distributed that adopting an ethics of compatriot partiality ensures

[111] Goodin, "What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?," 686.

that everyone's needs are met. In this counterfactual situation, compatriot partiality would just be one way of assigning responsibility, and an assuredly morally valid one. However, this is not the case, and it is accordingly wrong to give priority to the claims of one's compatriots because others' needs might be both more pressing and also unmet. It is through this theoretical framework that the exceptional situation of the refugee can be fully realized, both in terms of who counts as a refugee—namely one whose harm is remedied by asylum in a causal and contained fashion—and why states are obligated to admit them in any of the formulations of duties reviewed in the previous chapter.

If we take Goodin's theoretical analysis seriously, then this means that the boundaries around people are what matter morally. So, without rejecting the duties of the state to admit refugees, we can conceptualize the moral obligations to refugees and membership in terms of local communities alongside those on the level of the state. Of course, this reinforces the pressing question at hand, which concerns the nature of these moral obligations. In terms of membership, what is owed to refugees? Goodin provides a pathway for arguing that more is owed than simply admission, but the content of these obligations remains unclear. This revelatory notion opens the door to considering what is owed to refugees *beyond* what the state either can or should provide. By contextualizing the obligations and duties of states, alongside those of local communities, all with an eye towards what refugees need to rebuild after resettlement, a more encompassing theory of what is owed to refugees can be drawn. By studying the experiences of refugees in Budapest and Malmö, we can elucidate some of what is owed to refugees after admission.

Bridging the Theory with the Real World

With this theoretical analysis at hand, we can turn to the empirical findings of this study. However, before we consider the methodological approach and the findings, it is necessary to grasp how all of this theory is intricately intertwined, as well as how the questions it poses can only be approached through an empirical study. First, let us turn to the question of the theoretical links between the first chapter and this one.

In the first chapter, two central questions were posed: *how do we define* "*refugee*," and *why are states obligated to admit refugees*. This first question is foundational to the literature on refugee and migration issues, primarily because so many theorists have questioned whether a meaningful distinction can even be drawn between refugees and migrants.[112] Furthermore, ever since the international legal instrument was created through UN doctrine, theorists have questioned whether refugeehood ought to be so closely tied to either asylum or persecution.[113] It was therefore necessary to establish, before anything else was considered, what definition of the refugee would be employed and why. Accordingly, the specific definition that was employed—a wide reading of the UNHCR definition with a causal and contained link between harm and protection—formed the ground on which everything else was built. In turning to the question of why states are obligated to admit refugees, it was argued that the link between harm and asylum necessitated the duties of states to refugees. Admittedly, there was a gap between what the theory would allow, and the number of refugees that need a state to admit them—i.e. a theoretical construction obligating individual states to the collective group of tens of millions of refugees was not found. However,

[112] Katy Long, "When refugees stopped being migrants: Movement, labour and humanitarian protection," in *Migration Studies* 1, no. 1 (2013): 21; Philip Marfleet, *Refugees in a Global Era*, (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006): 13; Prem Kumar Rajaram, "Europe's 'Hungarian solution,'" in *Radical Philosophy* 197 (May/June 2016): 3.
[113] Andrew E. Shacknove, "Who is a Refugee?," in *Ethics* 95, no. 2 (1985): 275-81.

in both theoretical arguments discussed—the case of universal collective duties and of circumstantial individual duties—the obligations were only binding insofar as refugees were those in need of asylum in order to remedy their harm, or to ensure that no future harm was incurred. In this way, the theoretical arguments for why states are obligated to admit refugees were only made possible by employing the specific definition for refugees previously defended. If there were other forms of assistance that were possible to remedy the harm of the refugee,[114] then neither the argument for universal collective duties nor that for circumstantial individual states would be valid.

With a definition for the refugee and the types of duties that states can have to them at-hand, it was then possible to move into more contemporary conversations of membership and integration. However, before turning to these conversations, it is important to note that there is a gap in aligning the theory with the real-world process for refugees (as previously mentioned in footnote 67). There can be significant waiting periods for asylum seekers before receiving refugee status. During this period, there are moral obligations of the state and local communities to these people. In Hungary, asylum seekers are detained and held in a facility comparable to a jail; this is surely a vast abrogation of their duties to help those who need asylum to rebuild after resettlement. In notable contrast to the discussions in this paper, an investigation into the duties to asylum seekers whose claims are being processed would likely *not* rely or employ any differentiation between those who are refugees and those who are not. However, the content of these duties is not the subject of this paper, nor of the relevant theoretical discussions on which this paper builds.

Turning to the theoretical discussions in this chapter, it is important to note that though the chapter focused on wider theories in which the terms refugees and immigrants could have been

[114] Here the most obvious referent is Shacknove, although we could also look to Gibney or Pogge for more expansive definitions of the refugee than simply those who need asylum to remedy the harm.

used interchangeably, it was only because of the strict definition for the refugee that had been earlier attained, as well as the particular conceptualization of state duties to refugees, that the terms could be kept distinct. Without these prior discussions, this chapter would have fallen prey to common missteps by other theorists, such as positing that since both migrants and refugees need to be able to lead meaningful lives after resettlement, there can be no distinction in the types of integration that they are owed by the state.[115] This mistake would be particularly disastrous in the context of the following chapters, as Goodin's alternative[116] is taken seriously in the context of refugee experiences in Budapest and Malmö. Of course, if refugees and migrants cannot be meaningfully distinguished—or if states do not have duties to admit and integrate refugees above those they have to assisting migrants with legal status to enter—then there is likewise no reason for local communities to have duties to refugees that extend beyond those they have to migrants with legal status. In this way, considering Walzer's analogy for the three types of communities, we could see membership *for refugees* in the community as merely that of a neighborhood, where it is the neighborhood's *choice* whether to be welcoming.[117] To argue that local communities owe anything to refugees above what the national community owes would be nonsensical. This would therefore be destructive to Goodin's alternative and its extensions that will follow the analysis of the research findings. It is only through the right sort of definition for the refugee, and an understanding of why states are obligated to admit them, that we can move to these conversations of what is owed after admission.

At last we can turn to what all of this means for the empirical study that will comprise the second half of this paper. The pressing questions that emerge from this theoretical analysis are:

[115] Marfleet, *Refugees in a Global Era*, 13.
[116] Goodin, "What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?," 686.
[117] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 35-6.

what are the constitutive components of a successful integration and transition after receiving refugee status, and what does this mean for what is owed to refugees after admission? In what ways can local communities assist or impede the refugee's ability to rebuild a meaningful life after admission? What role ought the national state (and, perhaps, the national community) play in this integration process? What gaps exist between what refugees need after admission, what states can and/or ought to provide, and what local communities can and/or ought to provide? What sort of membership ought the refugee to have after admission in terms of the national community, and in terms of the local community?

An immediate question that arises from these is that of how to define a "successful" integration. Although there are competing ideas of what it means to successfully integrate,[118] and there is of course no singular experience of "the refugee," those best poised to speak to the varied experiences of what makes integration successful are refugees themselves. It therefore becomes clear that the questions that emerge are a combination of normative and descriptive, and that the normative questions are built on the empirical. We cannot answer what is owed to refugees after admission without an adequate understanding of the constitutive components of successful integration processes. We cannot address the role of local communities without understanding how they are perceived by refugees, and what refugees want from those communities—and all of this must be situated within an understanding of the role played by the formal integration process. Although this study surely cannot answer these questions definitively, it can serve as a pilot for how empirical study can inform political theory, and furthermore illuminate several promising areas that begin to address these questions.

[118] Here the reader can think of Miller or Walzer's ideas of what it means to be a member in the community and how to become a member, as well as Miller's descriptive theory of integration and what he purposefully leaves out of it.

Chapter III

Methodology and Research Design:
Country Selection, Interviewee Selection, and Interview Format

Introduction

Before delving into the research and relevant findings, it is necessary to first establish the salience of the particular methods employed. We need to explore why these conversations with refugees took place in Hungary and Sweden specifically, as well as how interviewees were selected, how interviews were conducted, and why these methods were the right ones for the questions at hand. Taken together, all of these provide a more accurate and encompassing picture for why this particular research acutely homes in on the processes discussed in the preceding chapters.

Scholars have disagreed about who should be entitled to refugee protections, which states should be obligated to admit refugees and why, and what states owe to refugees after admission. Although the research here cannot definitively settle all three of these debates—both because aspects of all three are prescriptive rather than descriptive, and because of the highly limited scope of this research—by understanding the relevance of refugee experiences in Hungary and Sweden, we can situate the importance of the research findings within the literature. In so doing, we will be positioned to then build a better theory of what is owed to refugees after admission.

Why Hungary and Sweden?

In designing this research project, one of the most immediate and salient questions was that of country selection. My extensive connections and work experience in Hungary—together with my current residence here—made it an appealing option for study; however, this alone was insufficient to select it with scientific integrity. Although I needed two countries where I could meet with an

array of refugees with different life experiences, as well as having access to translators, the mere accessibility of a country did not guarantee that it would be fruitful for research and comparison. Accordingly, the accessibility of a country conferred my capacity to conduct research there, rather than the necessity to do so. Ultimately, Hungary and Sweden were selected because they are ideally suited for comparison.

Both countries are European Union member states and are therefore legally bound by the same European Commission directives on refugee admission and resettlement. Most notably both are bound by Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, which specifies the "common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection," namely refugee status, but also including subsidiary protection.[119] The Directive has since been included in national legislation for both Hungary and Sweden. However, despite the commonalities in how refugees ought to be treated according to the law, the Hungarian and Swedish populations are diametrically dissimilar from each other—in fact, more so than any other two European Union member states. Correspondingly, what is provided to refugees *after* admission is more dissimilar between Hungary and Sweden than between any other two European Union member states. First, let us consider the public perception of refugees in Hungary and Sweden.

One of the most important and widely cited studies—and the most recently published for this particular series—is the Pew Research Center's Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Pew found that Hungary rates the highest of any EU member state for being higher than the EU median on the three metrics that were employed to assess how burdened an EU state feels by refugees. The first metric was "Refugees are a burden because they take our jobs and social benefits," to

[119] Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, *Official Journal of the European Union*, Accessed 17 Apr. 2018. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0032&from=en

which 82% of Hungarians agreed, but only 50% for the EU median.[120] The second metric was "Refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in our country," to which 76% of Hungarians agreed, but only 59% for the EU median.[121] Lastly, Pew found that to the assertion, "Large number of refugees leaving Iraq/Syria are a major threat," 69% of Hungarians agreed, but only 49% for the EU median.[122] Accordingly, there is strong evidence to support the claim that Hungary has a negative public perception of refugees and that this perception is not only fairly widespread, but notably more so than in any other EU member state. Of course, this means more so than in Sweden as well.

While Hungary felt most burdened by refugees of any EU member state by these metrics, Sweden felt least burdened by refugees—at least within economic terms. While 82% of Hungarians found refugees a burden because they took jobs and social benefits, only 32% of Swedes assented to this claim.[123] In fact, even the public perception of whether Muslim refugees *want* to adopt Hungarian or Swedish customs differs notably between the two countries. Only 16% of Hungarians assent to the claim that Muslim refugees in Hungary want to adopt Hungarian customs and the way of life, but 43% of Swedes assent to the corresponding claim about their country—the highest percentage of any EU member state.[124]

[120] Dorothy Manevich, "Hungarians share Europe's embrace of democratic principles but are less tolerant of refugees, minorities," *Pew Research Fact Tank*, 30 Sept. 2016, Accessed 14 Jan. 2018. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/30/hungarians-share-europes-embrace-of-democratic-principles-but-are-less-tolerant-of-refugees-minorities/
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Richard Wike, "Negative views of minorities, refugees commonalities in EU," *Pew Research Fact Tank*, 11 July 2016, Accessed 14 Jan. 2018. http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/
[124] Ibid.

Interestingly, when it comes to crime however, the two countries are highly similar. 46% of Swedes think refugees are more to blame for crime than other groups, while 43% of Hungarians assent to this statement.[125] In many demographical aspects, the two countries are similar as well. Hungary has a population of roughly 9.8 million[126], while Sweden has a population of roughly 9.9 million.[127] At the same time, the Hungarian GDP is 124 billion USD,[128] while the Swedish GDP is 511 billion USD.[129] With nearly identical populations, we can perhaps make some sense of Hungary's negative economic attitude towards refugees, considering that the national GDP is just over a fifth of that of Sweden's. Furthermore, we can perhaps make some sense of their radically different integration schemes for refugees (which denotes what is provided to a refugee after they receive status from the state).

In Hungary, after a refugee[130] receives their status, they have 30 days of residence in an open camp[131] and then are required to leave. At this point, the refugee is not eligible for any services from the government. Accordingly all integration support—including Hungarian language school, housing assistance, jobs and skills training, etc.—is provided by the NGO and

[125] Ibid.
[126] Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, "Hungary," *Central Intelligence Agency*, 12 Dec. 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hu.html
[127] Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, "Sweden," *Central Intelligence Agency*, 12 Dec. 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/Publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sw.html
[128] Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, "Hungary," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hu.html
[129] Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, "Sweden," https://www.cia.gov/library/Publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sw.html
[130] This procedure is different for unaccompanied minors as Hungary is bound by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, Sweden's procedure is also different for unaccompanied minors. For a variety of reasons (including ethical considerations), this study did not interview and research unaccompanied minors, and so questions of what they are given and what they are owed is not a part of this study. This does not mean that such research is considered unimportant. It is essential; however, it lies outside the scope of this particular project.
[131] By May 2018, the only remaining open camp in Hungary is the Vámosszabadi refugee camp.

non-profit sectors. In this way, the Hungarian government provides the least amount of integration support to admitted refugees of any EU member state. At the same time, the Swedish government provides the most extensive integration support to admitted refugees of any EU member state. After receiving status, refugees must enroll in a language school run by the government. So long as they are enrolled in the school, the government provides housing and a monthly stipend, which varies depending on the living costs of the city, the number of dependents, etc. Refugees are required to advance through four levels of language training, which they refer to as 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D', after which they have access to the local school system and can advance through to the University system, all of which is free. During this time, refugees also have access to social workers, which is also a free service. For most refugees, this process takes between one and a half and two and a half years, which means that refugees have housing and a monthly stipend for a couple years after receiving status. They can only begin searching for work after this integration process is complete.

In examining refugee experiences in relation to the question of what is owed to admitted refugees, there are no two countries better suited for comparison than Hungary and Sweden. Their integration schemes are the most different of any two countries in the EU; their public perception of refugees and the corresponding burden on the economy are the most different of any two countries in the EU. At the same time, they are not only bound by the same EU directives on refugee admission, but also they are demographically similar. For these reasons, Hungary and Sweden were chosen.

The cities of Budapest and Malmö were correspondingly chosen for simpler reasons: the availability of connections to refugees and the size of the refugee populations. The choice of Budapest was perhaps the simplest as there is no other city in Hungary with a substantial refugee

population, and there was neither the time nor resources to conduct interviews in numerous cities in Hungary. In Sweden, the two options were Stockholm and Malmö, and there was once again neither the time nor resources to visit both cities. With a wider network in Malmö than Stockholm, the decision was a pragmatic one. It was possible to conduct a wide array of interviews in Malmö, including with intercultural mediators who had previously worked in Budapest, while the same opportunities were not available in Stockholm. Accordingly, with a better understanding of why these conversations were held in Budapest, Hungary, and Malmö, Sweden, we can now turn to the methodology of the interviews.

Interviewee Selection and Interview Format

Interviewee selection differed slightly in Budapest, Hungary, and in Malmö, Sweden, corresponding to my differing networks within the refugee communities in each city; however, I aimed to interview a combination of social workers, intercultural mediators, and refugees. The bulk of interviews in each city was intended to be with refugees, while the interviews with social workers and intercultural mediators were intended to flesh out the picture of refugee experiences in the country. The interviews with social workers and intercultural mediators proved more important in Hungary, as they were needed to garner insight into the many refugees that arrive in Hungary and choose to leave. Such a phenomenon was not noted in any conversations or interviews in Sweden. In any case, the interviewee selection differed slightly between the countries, while the interview format did not.

In Hungary, the social workers and intercultural mediators were selected from two prominent Hungarian NGOs, while the refugees were identified both through Hungarian NGOs as well as referred through a network of refugees that I have accessed through my professional work with Menedék, as well as other NGOs working on refugee issues in Hungary. Social workers and

intercultural mediators were chosen based on their seniority, i.e. more work experience and a greater diversity of work situations, as well as personal familiarity and comfort; prior trust was essential to ensuring access to stories about their clients, since the typical presumption is that client stories are confidential and cannot be shared with researchers. Refugees needed to have received status at least 18 months prior to the interview, and were selected to ensure a variety of countries of origin, ages, genders, and durations of time lived in Hungary. Importantly, I wanted a sample of refugees that arrived prior to and that arrived after the summer of 2015, which is generally considered the beginning of the 'European migrant crisis.' These interviews were conducted during February and March, 2018, across the Budapest metropolitan area.

In Sweden, intercultural mediators were selected through my network in Hungary, while refugees were both identified by the intercultural mediators as well as through a wider network of refugees accessed through personal connections, academic connections affiliated with Central European University, and professional connections in Hungary. As with the refugees in Hungary, the refugees in Sweden also needed to have received status at least 18 months prior to the interview, and were selected with an eye towards a variety of countries of origin, ages, genders, and durations of time lived in Sweden, as well arriving before and after the summer of 2015. These interviews were conducted over a ten-day period in April, 2018, at several locations located across the Malmö metropolitan area. The tables detailing the relevant information for the interviewees are divided into those of refugees in Budapest (Table 1), those of refugees in Malmö (Table 2), and those of the professionals (Table 3):

Table 1: Refugees in Budapest

Refugees in Budapest	Country of Origin	Year of Departure	Age Range	Marital Status/ Family	Education/ Profession	Translation (Y/N)
Male 1 (BM1)	Afghanistan	2015	21-25	Girlfriend, no family	BA Student	N
Male 2 (BM2)	Afghanistan	1998	30-35	Girlfriend, parents and siblings	Translator	N
Male 3 (BM3)	Somalia	2015	18-21	N/A, no family	Works in restaurant	N
Male 4 (BM4)	Afghanistan	N/A	21-25	N/A, no family	Works in restaurant	Y[132]
Female 1 (BF1)	Syria/Palestine[133]	2014[134]	21-25	N/A, no family	Medical student	N
Female 2 (BF2)[135]	Iran	N/A	N/A	N/A, no family	BA student	N
They 1 (BT1)	Afghanistan	2015	18-21	N/A, no family	BA student (aspiring dental student)	N

Table 2: Refugees in Malmö

Refugees in Malmö	Country of Origin	Year of Departure	Age Range	Marital Status/ Family With Them	Education/ Profession	Translation[136] (Y/N)
Male 1 (MM1)	Syria	2014	30-35	Married, wife and 2 kids	N/A, business owner back in Syria	N
Male 2 (MM2)	Syria	2016	25-30	Single, no family	Doctor	N
Female 1 (MF1)	Yemen	2015	55-60	Single, no family	N/A	Y
Female 2 (MF2)	Iraq	2014	21-25	Single, parents and siblings	Primary school teacher	Y
Female 3 (MF3)	Iran	N/A	25-35	Single, parents and siblings	N/A	Y

[132] Translation by BM2.
[133] Originally from Palestine, spent a few years in Syria before fleeing to Hungary.
[134] Departure date from Syria.
[135] Conducted over the phone; only interview not conducted in person.
[136] All translation in Malmö by IM1.

Table 3: Professionals

Professionals	Country	Years in Job
Social Worker (SW1)	Hungary	4
Social Worker (SW2)	Hungary	16
Intercultural Mediator (IM1)	Sweden	2 (+3 years prior in Hungary)

The interviews were semi-structured and either conducted in English or with the assistance of a translator. Flexible question frameworks were employed to ensure an adaptable conversation with the interviewee. The interview format avoided any leading questions, focusing instead on open-ended questions, thereby aiming to have the respondent give longer and more detailed answers. Elaboration was then encouraged through specific follow-up questions. For the social workers and intercultural mediators, interview topics focused on what brought the person to the field of social work or intercultural mediation with refugees and migrants, the most significant challenges they faced in their job, the aspects of their job they most enjoyed, convictions and conflicts about Hungarians or Swedes and their treatment of refugees, why they think refugees choose to stay or not to stay in Hungary or Sweden, and what motivates these choices. The perception of the 'crisis' was also probed by asking how their job has changed since 2015, in relation to each of the aforementioned questions. Follow up questions typically encouraged telling stories about clients, as well as inquiring about trends in the experiences of their clients.

The interviews with refugees were purposefully less structured than those with social workers and intercultural mediators. There were three topics that I discussed with the refugees, and proceeded in chronological order: (1) how they arrived in Hungary or Sweden, and why they settled in Hungary or Sweden, and so on, (2) what do they think of their lives in Hungary or Sweden, what do they think of Hungarians or Swedes, do they tend to spend time with Hungarians or Swedes, or with other migrants, refugees, and so on, and (3) what are their future plans, do they

plan to remain in Hungary or Sweden, where do they see themselves in five years, and so on. I did not ask these questions as a comprehensive list, but rather they depict the succession of topics that were typically discussed, with some of each of the three covered in every refugee interview.

It is important to note that these interviewee samples are too small to be representative of refugees in either Hungary or Sweden, in either Budapest or Malmö, or of refugees at-large around the world. Furthermore, although diversity of experiences was sought in selecting interviewees, the size of the research sample entails that no conclusions can be drawn based on differences in country of origin, age, gender, or duration of time lived in the host country. However, this was recognized and acknowledged from the beginning of this research project, as the objective was never to draw definitive conclusions about what is the case for refugees in Hungary or Sweden. Rather, the aim was to get a better sense of differences or similarities in the trends of the experiences of refugees in two countries with radically different integration schemes. By doing so, we can better understand the obligations of states to refugees after admission and build a more comprehensive theory of just integration for refugees.

Chapter IV

Re-Building One's Life in a New Country:
Thinking about What is Owed from Refugee Experiences

Introduction

Over a three-month period, I conducted interviews with fifteen people across the Budapest metropolitan area and the Malmö metropolitan area, nine in the former and six in the latter. Of the fifteen, twelve were with refugees, while the other three were with social workers and intercultural mediators who helped shed light on the wider experiences of refugees in their country and the integration processes there. These twelve refugees fled seven different countries—Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—and their ages at the time of departure ranged from sixteen to fifty-four, while the years at the time of departure ranged from 1998 to 2016, with the majority fleeing between 2014 and 2016.

Although their experiences might not be representative of any corresponding identity groups, they nevertheless illuminate some of the successes and shortcomings of two very different integration schemes. By exploring the commonalities in refugee experiences in Budapest, Hungary, a picture emerges of an integration scheme that (inadvertently) produces significant social attachments to particular people and a wider interpersonal embeddedness for refugees, while ensuring the need to work and study in order to make a life *for oneself*. Conversely, in the common spaces of refugee experiences in Malmö, Sweden, a very different picture emerges. This is one of refugees who are lonely and occasionally deeply unhappily, while remaining immensely grateful for all the assistance provided by the Swedish state, but this is tethered to a life without meaningful work or interpersonal embeddedness in society. Through these experiences, a better theory for refugee integration can be built, which begins with recognizing both the centrality of

comprehensive integration schemes as well as the salience of interpersonal embeddedness and work that furnishes meaning and purpose.

First, we will analyze the experiences of refugees in Budapest through the three areas that were targeted: why they chose to stay in Budapest, what they think of their life in Budapest, and what their future plans are. Next, we will analyze the experiences of refugees in Malmö through these same three subjects. Lastly, we will reconcile these findings with the theoretical literature discussed in the preceding chapters. By expanding on Goodin's alternative pathway to what is owed after admission, a better understanding of what justice looks like for refugees can be achieved.

Refugee Experiences in Budapest

In each of the nine interviews I conducted in Budapest—regardless of whether the interviewee was a social worker, intercultural mediator, or a refugee—it became clear that interpersonal embeddedness, social membership, and belonging were central to establishing lives after receiving asylum in Hungary. By moving through the three topics that were discussed—why Hungary, what they think of their lives in Hungary, and what is next for them—a better picture of these commonalities can be drawn.

Why Refugees Chose to Stay in Hungary

In response to the question of why they chose to stay in Hungary, refugees overwhelmingly explained their decisions to stay in terms of personal connections to specific people and a wider interpersonal embeddedness within life in Budapest. Before delving into the interviews with the refugees, however, it is important to note that these conversations could *only* discuss why they chose to stay. In this way, their responses necessarily omit the experiences of the majority of

asylum seekers that enter Hungary—as most choose to leave and apply for asylum elsewhere in Europe. Before turning to the interviews conducted with refugees who chose to stay, then, we ought to consider briefly possible reasons for why so many choose to leave. Through interviews with social workers in Hungary, we can garner some insight into *why refugees leave Hungary*.

The social worker in the camp for unaccompanied minors (SW1) cited several unsurprising reasons why asylum-seeking minors choose to leave: the perception of "better opportunities in western Europe," needing to "pay back the money […] when you have a smuggler knocking on your family door," and the families' "expectation of you in Germany" when they were the ones paying for your trip. There were two reasons, however, that stood out for their relevance in uncovering deeper socio-cultural and socio-psychological drives influencing these decisions. The first was the increase in social capital for the refugee's family back home by choosing to move further west:

> We've been talking with one kid about these kinds of motivations and about asking them, like, why someone is moving. Like, why the family is asking you to move, or pushing you to move, and one guy told me, […] 'well, if I make it to Germany, my Mom can talk with the neighbors, you know the ladies, and say my son is in Germany, so it will give a better position for my brother to marry the girl who he wants because this is a prestige for the family that someone made it; someone made it to Western Europe.' So, even if it costs 7 or 8 thousand euros for the family, even if they had to sell their properties for that, […] at least there is someone in the family that made it.

This particular unaccompanied minor proceeded to leave Hungary, although the social worker noted that he does not know whether he made it to Germany. Nevertheless, it seems that the driving force was a social pressure back home related to status and legitimation within the community in Afghanistan. In this way, we can see the reason for leaving as tied to socio-cultural drivers and personal connections. Another story the social worker told furthers this narrative that a driving force behind decisions to leave is socio-cultural influences related to interpersonal relations:

> We have a uniform, and on the back is written 'SOS – Children's Villages Refugee Program.' So, we wear the uniform and when we go into public places we wear the uniform as well. And so it happened that we took the children with us to the cinema, and we were maybe 8 of us and we were

> walking in the mall, reaching the cinema, and a lot of people around us, and there was one group of teenagers, like 7 guys, coming with me like together, and then there was one guy who was like far away, like far away, like at least 20 metres, so I ask him, like [name redacted], 'what's going on? What don't you join us?' And he said, 'well I would like but maybe next time can you change your t-shirt because it's written refugee team.' So he doesn't even want to include himself because he knows what the Hungarian people think about it, about the refugees.

This story highlights the teenager's aversion to a perceived societal antipathy towards refugees. The teenager is of course neither a Hungarian citizen nor has he been in the country for a long period of time; yet the perception of him by "the Hungarian people" is nevertheless of significant importance. If the social worker is right, then it is important enough to be a driving force behind his departure from the country. Although the influences related to better opportunities in western Europe cannot be dismissed, it also cannot be dismissed that reasons to leave Hungary are tied to both the domestic social pressure of perceiving Hungarians as not wanting refugees in their country, as well as the transnational social pressure from their families back in the country of origin. Without interviews with refugees who chose to leave Hungary, nothing definitive can be asserted about their reasoning for choosing to leave, but the evidence at-hand suggests that social and cultural pressures from Hungarian society were influencing factors. Interestingly, for those who chose to stay, these social and cultural influences from Hungarians were also notable.

In nearly every interview with a refugee in Budapest, social and cultural influences were cited. This was also reflected by stories that the social workers told. A telling example of the centrality of social influences in deciding to stay was provided by a social worker (SW2) who works with refugees in Budapest to assist their integration into life in the city. She met an Iraqi man first in the Vámosszabadi refugee camp, and then helped him after he was released and searching for employment in Budapest. After securing housing and employment in the food services industry, he contemplated leaving Hungary. Yet, in the basic conception of refugee integration, his needs were met: refugee status with its corresponding rights, housing, and

employment. Ultimately, he decided to remain in Budapest after the social worker connected him to a boxing and body building gym nearby his flat. Although the gym had many Hungarians, the man was able to join the gym. It was his immersion into a community where he felt he belonged and could share his passion with others that mattered, not his national identity (nor theirs). According to the social worker, the Iraqi man committed to remaining in Hungary *only after* finding his place in a boxing and body building community. Reflecting on this idea, the social worker pondered the relative importance of these sorts of bonds:

> And at first he was just volunteering there, and like immediately he started to work there, and then he had his own things, and I haven't even seen him ever since. So it could be these small things that if something in their life goes one way in a direction, like also having a partner can also be like this, so it's more important than reaching another country or trying something else.

This story reflects not only the role played by small things in determining whether a refugee chooses to stay, but also the fact that for this particular refugee, it was neither his basic needs being met nor the possibility for greater opportunities in western Europe that motivated his decision. It was the feeling of belonging and membership in a community that furnished meaning in his life that compelled him to stay.

The interviews with refugees themselves revealed similar stories. The cohering pattern was of refugees providing an answer that targeted a specific decision-making process around staying; in this way, they considered it a choice they made. Furthermore, that choice was motivated by interpersonal connections that tied them to life in Budapest. One interviewee from Somalia (BM3) told of his journey fleeing war, his initial arrival in Hungary, his departure and arrival in Sweden, his flight to Nicaragua and subsequent journey to Chicago, United States, and then his detainment and ultimate deportation back to Hungary. Why did he choose to stay in Hungary?

> Whenever you grow up, you get more sense, more experience than before. And when I came back here, I tried to support myself. The first time I come to Hungary, I did not have nobody. Now I work for a chef, in a restaurant. I have trying to learn the Hungarian language, and I get a flat from

> an organization. And I share it with three others and they are [my] friends. I [am] studying for my driver's license.

He stayed in Budapest this time because he feels like he is leading a meaningful and busy life. He has friends, a job, goals, and he feels like he is moving forward. This combination of friends, an interpersonal embeddedness in life in Budapest, and a job were at the core of the responses provided by refugees.

An Afghani (BT1) who had been tortured by the Taliban felt immense gratitude to the Hungarian family with whom they were living, while discussing their enjoyment of University studies. A Palestinian woman (BF1) who had been living in Syria when the civil war erupted answered the question of why she chose to stay in Hungary by telling me about how amazing her Hungarian flat-mates are, and how she has a life here because she has Hungarian friends. An Afghani man (BM2) who spoke with visible anger regarding the Hungarian government's anti-refugee billboard campaign, explained his decision to stay in relation to his Hungarian girlfriend. In each of these interviews, the refugee highlighted an explicit decision-making process around whether to stay in Hungary. Furthermore, in each, their decision to stay was explained in relation to the people and communities in Budapest that brought happiness into their lives, and the educational and occupational pursuits that furnished meaning.

In a reflective moment, the social worker for unaccompanied minors (SW1) pondered how refugees in Hungary conceptualize their *decision* to stay. Speaking in the name of a generalized refugee, this social worker projected a homogenized experience that was experienced by so many who chose to stay:

> I learned Hungarian. I learned English. I finished primary education. So if I want, I can take the driving lessons now. Now I move to higher education, I mean high school. And, I have Hungarian girlfriend, and I joined the football team. I travel to Norway, I travel to Austria, I travel to France. And maybe next week I'll travel to Mexico playing football. And I live here and next month I'll get 18 and then from there I will move to another place […] So, and they say, 'the others are stupid.'

> But, you know, you have to picture yourself as the winner, the hero, the one who has made the right decision.

Perhaps, then, the responses to the "why Hungary" question are colored by this psychological necessity to justify one's decision. However, what is more relevant than the need to justify is *how* people justify. In the justifications, a cohering story is told of decisions to stay being driven by an interpersonal embeddedness within life in Budapest. Refugees, then, choose to stay in Budapest because they have personal connections that bring them happiness, and educational and occupational opportunities that provide meaningful engagement.

Life in Budapest

When asked about how refugees found life in Budapest, the answers see-sawed between similar responses to the prior question, further illuminating the feelings of interpersonal embeddedness, and expressions of outrage at the Hungarian government. In this way, the answers here moved between discussing specific people that made their lives better, and reflections on the society at large. In between answers about people and the government, an overall satisfaction with life was expressed in relation to educational and occupational opportunities.

While the Afghani (BT1) who had been tortured by the Taliban felt immense gratitude for the "refuge and safety provide[d] by the Hungarian state" and the Hungarian family that welcomed them into their home as a minor, a fellow Afghani (BM2) spoke with disgust about the Hungarian state's "hatred campaign against migrants and refugees." These were extremes though, and most interviewees reflected a greater variance and nuance in their perceptions: some Hungarians are generous and warm, some are very mean or rude, but most are indifferent. Notably, every single refugee had something to say about "Hungarians" and had certain opinions about what Hungarians are like.

As interviewees reflected on the role that Hungarians and others played in their lives in Budapest, they tended to focus more on specific ways in which certain people made their lives better. One male interviewee (BM1) talked about how his Hungarian girlfriend made his life better in Budapest and how grateful he felt for her role in his life. Even here, there was some frustration with life in Budapest and prejudice by Hungarians. He noted how they had just begun apartment hunting, and due to prejudice founded on his darker skin, he was unable to visit apartments without her. Still, his remark on prejudice was tethered to his appreciation for how his Hungarian girlfriend ameliorates his life. Another interviewee, the young Palestinian refugee from Syria (BF1), talked about how her Hungarian flat-mates became her best friends in Budapest. She was proud of her fluency in Hungarian, and cited her friendships with Hungarians as the best reason for this successful language acquisition. In these ways, my questions about daily life in Budapest and the corresponding perceptions of Hungarians did not provoke any examples of how Hungarians act as a people because, unsurprisingly, the interviewees spoke about people *as people*. This meant that comments about Hungarians as a people tended to be general, nonspecific, and even once acknowledged as "but maybe that's not true."

The interview with the social worker in Budapest (SW2) provided further insight into this phenomenon. She thought that most people, even those who work for the state, "do not fall into the trap of propaganda." In thinking through the ways in which government-sponsored propaganda and hate towards migrants and refugees fail to penetrate daily life in Budapest, she provided the following example:

> I've actually been asking about this, and I was trying to make a joke with a long-term former client of mine. We were going to somewhere, checking a house together, and she was from Palestine, she's Palestinian, but she's from Lebanon, and I was trying to make a joke with her, and we passed by several "Stop Soros" campaigns signs, and it says that Soros wants to bring here millions of people from Africa and from the Middle East. And, I was trying to make a joke with her, like, what do you think of that the others are coming, hey? [Laughs] And then she didn't really catch it, because I think she doesn't really pay attention that it's against her, that it's against refugees. And

> she's been here long time and she speaks Hungarian. So she could understand it. And, I don't know, And I constantly, because she also wears a hijab, and yeah I somehow experienced that I'm afraid more when we travel together that someone will tell her off or do something or look at her bad, and she's more confident, like she doesn't care about it at all and is not worried about it.

Here the social worker not only reflects the ambivalence of a long-term Budapest resident and refugee towards the billboard campaigns and propaganda, but also that towards the possibility of discrimination. This ambivalence towards both propaganda and the potential for prejudiced behavior rippled throughout my conversations with refugees in Budapest. In reflecting on their lives in Budapest, refugees highlighted how specific people made their lives better, and how educational and occupational pursuits brought meaning. Once again, then, interviews were marked by interpersonal embeddedness in life in Budapest. It was this that refugees chose to focus on, rather than billboard campaigns and hateful propaganda sponsored by the government. Perhaps it is those that choose to stay that are best able to look past this.

Looking to the Future

Responses to questions related to future plans demonstrated greater variance than those to any of the previous questions. Some planned to stay; others pondered possibilities elsewhere in the European Union. However, taken together, these responses underlined the importance of educational and occupational opportunities to imagining oneself living a meaningful life in a new place.

The Afghani (BT1) who spoke profusely about their gratitude to the Hungarian state and the welcoming embrace of a specific Hungarian family was also working their way through dental school, planning to be a dentist in Budapest. Although they initially chose to stay because of the Hungarian family, and spoke warmly of the family in discussing their life in Budapest, it was the educational opportunities in the present that furnished exciting occupational possibilities in the future that ensured a continued life here. This trend was reflected in the interview with the young

Palestinian woman (BF1) as well. Her decision to stay and her enjoyment of life in Budapest were marked by her Hungarian flat-mates; however, she planned to stay because she was enrolled in medical school and looked forward to a career in Budapest as a doctor.

At the same time, the Afghani (BM2) who spoke about the Hungarian state's "hatred campaign" was uncertain about his future and acknowledged that after receiving Hungarian citizenship, he would consider moving elsewhere within the EU. Importantly, all three of these refugees had social ties in Budapest, whether to a Hungarian family, Hungarian flat-mates, or a Hungarian girlfriend. What seems to have driven the differences then, in addition to perceptions of the Hungarian state, is educational and occupational opportunities, and possibilities for further professional advancement. The Afghani (BM2) worked as a translator for an NGO in Budapest, while the government has increasingly restricted the activities of NGOs. Similarly, the Somalian (BM3), who had finally found a place in Budapest with a community of people he cared about and was satisfied with his current life, was open to leaving after receiving citizenship. This was explained in terms of his occupational opportunities. He worked in a restaurant and was barely able to make ends meet, and therefore thought he could make more money in western Europe.

The responses to questions about future plans, then, had a different focus from those about decisions to stay and current feelings about life in Budapest. While the prior two areas focused on what brought feelings of belonging, which mostly consisted of personal connections and interpersonal embeddedness, the latter area homed in the possibilities for occupational and professional advancement. Once again, it is important to note that these are the stories of those who chose to stay, and they seemingly universally cite community engagement and personal bonds as reasons for staying. However, as much as it can inform us about the integration experiences of the refugees who chose to stay, an overstatement that would be easy to make would involve an

assessment of the integration scheme in Hungary. With so many choosing to leave, and likely precisely because of the lack of institutional support here, in conjunction with the unwelcoming Hungarian social pressures, we cannot derive from the experiences of those who chose to stay any conclusions about the scheme at large.

With this reservation noted, we can nevertheless recognize that these refugee experiences in Budapest reveal a deep interconnection between choices to stay and the interpersonal embeddedness in socio-cultural life in Budapest. These are then linked to one's satisfaction with one's current life; however in thinking about the future, these conversations shift towards those surrounding educational and occupational opportunities. At each level, the experiences of refugees in Budapest differed notably from the refugee experiences in Malmö.

Refugee Experiences in Malmö

In each of the six interviews I conducted in Malmö—whether with refugees or an intercultural mediator—common ground was found in the loneliness and unhappiness of the refugees, the rejection of the idea that they "chose" to stay in Sweden, and a gratitude to both Swedes as a people and the Swedish state. In each of these—which prominently presented themselves in the first two sections of the interviews: why Sweden and what do they think of Swedes and their life in Malmö—a sharp distinction is found in relation to the interviews conducted in Budapest. With a more thorough understanding of the experiences of refugees in Malmö, we can turn to the differences between these experiences and those of refugees in Budapest, and ultimately what this means for just integration schemes for refugees.

Why Refugees Chose to Stay in Sweden

The interviews—which were conducted in the same fashion as those in Budapest in order to ensure methodological coherence—began with the conversation of why they chose Sweden, how they got to Malmö, and what their path has been like, with an emphasis on the psychological rather than strictly geographical description. In every single response, all five refugees noted that they did *not* choose Sweden. Rather, they emphasized how a series of events forced them from their country and their path led to Sweden, often arriving by plane in Stockholm, and then being relocated by the government numerous times before finally settling in Malmö.

A middle-aged Yemeni (MF1) woman fled Yemen after both her husband and son were killed; the smugglers chose the final destination for her. The translator noted to me that she took offense at the very idea that she *chose* Sweden. An Iraqi woman (MF2) came to Sweden because "this [is] the place refugees come" when they are able to leave their country. A Syrian doctor (MM1) who was imprisoned and tortured by the Assad regime and was able to flee only after bribing a guard explained his reluctance to move at every step. He first entered Turkey and tried to make a life there, but was unable to because of the legal obstacles to working or owning a home. After getting on a boat to leave Turkey, which sank and three fellow passengers died (who he said he tried to save but was unable to), he found himself in Greece. Once again, however, he was in a place where he was not allowed to work or obtain a residence status that would allow him to create a life for himself. Smugglers there arranged for his travel to Sweden:

> This smuggler was like, where do you want to go? And I said, like, just get me out of here, but yeah, I don't know, like, can I choose? And they said, well yes, but no, not really. It doesn't work like that. And everything is, like, illegal. So, just get me out of here. I don't know how it is. So he just brought me, like, a Greek ID. And with that they also bought me a plane ticket to Sweden. […] But, I was somehow lucky. And not all the people were lucky.

The Syrian doctor here brings out two aspects of his experience that were shared in common with the experiences of the other refugees interviewed in Malmö: (1) there was no decision to choose

to come to Sweden, but rather it was the place that they could go and live safely, and so they paid smugglers to bring them there; and (2) they are lucky because they made it there; they are now safe, and in contrast saw many people throughout their journey who were not so lucky.

Life in Malmö

As the conversations moved from why Sweden to their experiences in Malmö, and what they thought of their lives, the tone accordingly shifted. Interestingly, although the 'why Hungary' portion of interviews was the longest for those in Budapest, the 'life in Malmö' section was the longest for those in Malmö. The responses likewise differed radically from those in Budapest. Refugees expressed frustration with the long integration process, the slowness of the language schooling system, the inability to work during this process, the alienation from the Malmö society and Swedes living there, and the according lack of social or occupational ties to the city. At the same time, refugees expressed a deep desire to contribute and give back to the country that had given them so much, which further revealed the appreciation that refugees felt towards everything they had been given.

The Yemeni woman (MF1) who took offense at my prior question opened up about her emotional disposition and life in Malmö. She was lonely, had no friends, stuck in Swedish language classes all day long, living in housing provided by the Swedish government, and longed not only for friends, but to forge friendships with Swedes. But, as she asked rhetorically, as translated, "what way do I make friends with Swedes here? […] We live in different part of the city, spend all day in class and are not allowed to work." A Syrian man (MM2), who was a business owner in Aleppo before the war, lamented his inability to work and the slowness of the language school process. Although the government provides housing and a stipend, he noted, "I spend all day learning a language I do not practice, […] no job, while my children are in schools here and

make a life." The Iraqi woman (MF2) expressed similar concerns for the growing distance between herself and her children, twice using a word that the translator said was "depression." The Syrian doctor (MM1), who just minutes before spoke of his luck, discussed his frustration with the fact that he was not yet allowed to work. In a thoughtful moment, he reflected on the causes of his own unhappiness and loneliness, even after living in Sweden for two and a half years:

> For me, it's still pretty difficult. Because I have no friends, at some point. I have only one guy, who is like a friend of my elder brother, from Syria, and that's the one that helped me to find an apartment here, and that's like it. And he's working, so he's quite busy. We don't meet quite often. Yeah, like being unemployed up until now, it's like, it's rough, not rough economically, it's rough mentally actually, like you feels like, this feeling that you are worth nothing, useless, to the society because you don't work, because you don't give back to society, to be like effective person, you know, being helpful. […] And everything just goes in an easy way. It's not like Germany. It's like no one needs to be stressed, just go in an easy way, like don't overwork or whatever, and things like go slowly, so it's like for someone who wants to make a start again, it feels somehow like it stops him or it hinders him in a way. Everything is working here, but like for the people who are living here, for the Swedes, and they already have their lifestyles, their routines, their jobs, their schools, whatever, and they know how to do, and they are relaxed with this. And if you think about this from the perspective of a Swedish worker, then it's like really good. You don't have to worry or get stressed or kiss ass, it's all quite clear and they don't go with any shady ways, or make things faster, like we're cool here, we have our system, and it works for us. So, it works. But for me as a newcomer, it's like, everything takes so much time, and so no job, no friends, and everything takes so many years. I just want to start a life.

This long passage reflects many of the trends that ran throughout the interviews with refugees in Malmö. The intercultural mediator (IM1) noted that she knew a refugee who was still in the Swedish language school after seven years. So long as the refugees are enrolled and attending the language school, they receive healthcare, housing, and a living stipend; however, they are also unable to work. Without exception, the refugees spoke about this facet of the integration scheme with frustration—noting the ways in which it contributed to their feelings of loneliness and unhappiness, and how they wished to be productive members of Swedish society.

If anything marked this section of the interviews, then it was alienation from Swedish life in Malmö and the immense frustration and sadness that brought. We can accordingly see then how a consequence of the Swedish integration scheme—which requires extensive language schooling

before a refugee is allowed to work—is social isolation deriving from the difficulty of forging friendships with Swedes in Malmö in the absence of a job that situates them within the productive life of the city. While they are theoretically provided the most comprehensive integration program imaginable—housing, living stipend, healthcare, and full-time language training until fluency—the duration of time that it takes to complete this process makes it more difficult for refugees to feel like they have moved on. Time and time again, the desire to "start a life" was affirmed, always situated opposite from the feeling that everything moves too slowly in the integration program in Malmö.

Importantly, the gratitude that was universally expressed towards the Swedish government and to Swedes generally cannot be understated. Although frustrations about unemployment and the inability to "start a life" abounded, each refugee noted how grateful they were to the Swedish government. The Yemeni woman (MF1) said that all she wanted was to make Swedish friends in Malmö and that this was more important to her than employment. This desire to develop relationships with Swedes was emphasized by the universal feeling that although some Swedes in Malmö likely harbor hatred or resentment towards refugees, it was never expressed. Even here, though, frustrations surrounding current predicaments leaked, as the gratitude to the Swedish government often provoked more discussion of feelings of uselessness. As the Syrian father (MM2) noted:

> And it takes time. It all takes time. But hopefully, at some point in the future, I can be part of the society, you know? […] But, basically, I have no other choice. Because if you come and ask for asylum here, and you get status, refugee status, and you're considered here that your life will not be safe if you go back to your country. So, yeah, and this way, they sort of take away your passport, and I'm not allowed to travel back to my home country. Like at all. And so I applied and I get a travel document, and it's written clearly, like in three different languages, that I can apply for a visa in any country, but not Syria, except Syria, so basically I have no other choice now. So that's sad because I still have my family there, my brothers, and it's called home for a reason. But I have to somehow adapt to the situation, and I am, like, I feel thankful to Sweden for being here, for help, but I still can't work, and I want to be helpful, like productive to society. And I want to work, and also for my daughters, but they still, I can't.

Even as the conversations moved towards the refugees' perception of Swedes in Malmö and their feelings towards Sweden as a country, frustrations around the inability to work dominated the conversation. Even though the desire to make Swedish friends were repeatedly brought up, it was always balanced by the difficulty to do so without having a job. The city is *de facto* segregated such that refugees live in the southern section, while the language schools are always nearby to the government provided housing. As the Syrian doctor (MM1) noted, until one finishes the language school, one is not allowed to rent one's own accommodation, even if one has money, nor is one allowed to buy a car. This housing segregation, coupled with the daily routine of attending language classes with non-Swedes, ensures a complementary social segregation.

Looking to the Future

As the conversations with refugees shifted to discussions of future plans, it was notable that every single refugee planned to stay in Malmö. There were no discussions of moving elsewhere in the European Union, or back to their country of origin. The thought of the future sparked hope and excitement. This commonality is perhaps best explained by the fact that refugees had sunk years into the language schools and integration process, and were excitedly anticipating the day that they could begin the next phase of their life in Malmö.

Every single refugee had the same future plan: finish the language school, get the additional schooling and/or accreditation necessary, and join the work force *in Malmö*. Even the fifty-six-year-old Yemeni woman (MF1) expressed excitement about the idea of finally working a job alongside Swedes, and earning money for herself. The Syrian doctor (MM1) could not wait to gain the appropriate accreditation for his medical degree and begin working at a local hospital. The Iraqi woman (MF2) looked forward to finishing the language school, earning a degree in

education, and teaching at an elementary school in Malmö. The eager anticipation of finishing the language school and acquiring employment accordingly had two components: (1) working alongside Swedes in Malmö, which would foster friendships and attachments to locals; and (2) making one's life for oneself, earning money for oneself, being able to choose one's own flat, and generally feeling a normalcy and routine in one's life, all the while finally giving back to the society that helped them in their moments of greatest need.

There is an important note worth making here about the limited diversity of refugee experiences of those who were interviewed. All of the refugees who were interviewed did not yet have full-time employment in Malmö. Although both the Syrian doctor (MM1) and the Iraqi woman (MF2) discussed examples of friends and family members who had full-time employment and were correspondingly more immersed in Swedish life, no interviews were conducted with refugees in that position.[137] The notion, then, that socio-cultural immersion and interpersonal embeddedness in Malmö would follow from gainful employment is better situated within the expectations of refugees rather than the realities of refugees in the Malmö workplace.

With these commonalities of refugee experiences in Malmö at-hand, we can now turn back to the lingering question of what is owed to refugees after admission. By comparing the refugee experiences in Budapest to those in Malmö, with due consideration for the differences in their respective integration schemes, we can get a better sense of what refugees might need in order to transition into a new society. From recognizing both what refugees might need, as well as what

[137] This was a product of the limits of the available refugee population, as well as my connections to the refugee community in Malmö. For one, the majority of the refugee community arrived in 2015 or later, which means that most are still in the language schools. Secondly, my connections to refugees in Malmö furnished greater opportunities for interviewing those in the schools both because it was through the schools that refugee communities formed, and these networks were most accessible to me.

sorts of opportunities furnish meaning and purpose in rebuilding one's life, we can better situate what it means to transition from newcomer to member and accordingly what states owe to refugees after admission within the wider political theory literature.

Implications for the Literature: Balancing Comprehensive Integration with Social Needs and Fulfillment

My research findings in Budapest and Malmö were frankly surprising. It had seemed clear to me beforehand that refugees in Budapest would lament the lack of governmental support and infrastructure for refugees, and that refugees in Malmö would heap praise on the extensive government integration program. Neither was borne out in the field.

Refugees in Budapest focused far more on the ways in which particular people made their lives worthwhile, while acknowledging that the government could do more to assist with their lives after admission. Refugees in Malmö were lonely and feeling frustrated with the slowness of the integration process, while expressing eager anticipation of their eventual employment. As has been noted several times, the limited scope of this research serves as a pilot rather than a conclusive investigation. Yet, the findings here nevertheless highlight several interesting points of contrast between the refugee experiences in Budapest and Malmö. These points of contrast, coupled with the differences in the integration schemes, enable us to begin to stake out the ground for what is owed to refugees after admission.

Although refugees in Budapest provided a variety of reasons for why they chose to stay in Hungary, not a single person rejected the idea that there was a *choice* in staying. Conversely, every single refugee in Malmö rejected the comparable notion. In this way, we can properly situate the reasons for staying within the wider experiences of refugees in Budapest. It was precisely because of their interpersonal embeddedness in life in Budapest, precisely because of specific people, that

they chose to stay—all in a way that cannot be asserted about any of the aspects of life in Malmö that were discussed. At the same time, the coalescing of answers about future plans for refugees in Malmö was notably distinct from those in Budapest. Refugees in Malmö all looked with eager anticipation to the future, to the moment that they would be able to finish their language schooling, their education, and join the workforce. Even for those refugees in Budapest who had jobs, like the Somalian working in a restaurant, they were uncertain if they would remain there. In this way, it is possible to read a universal confidence in the possibility for professional and occupational advancement in the responses by refugees in Malmö that is not possible for the responses provided by refugees in Budapest. Lastly, although there were traces of the desire to contribute and give back to Hungary, the sentiments were substantially stronger among refugees in Malmö, who greatly desired to give back to and contribute in numerous ways to Sweden.[138]

Turning back to the theoretical conversations about what is owed to refugees after admission, these findings have several notable consequences. The first relates to Miller's descriptive account of the three types of integration. Miller argues that integration is a way of categorizing the extent to which a group of people becomes more similar to the larger community that they are joining, and then argues that the three types of integration are social, civic, and

[138] It was worth noting here, before these empirical findings are considered in relation to the theoretical literature and discussions, that these findings are highly relevant to the fields of psychology and social psychology. It might seem, then, to be an erroneous omission of this paper to not discuss the psychological ramifications of these findings, particularly situated within the social psychology literature on forced migration and refugee studies. However, it must be noted that this omission is intentional. It is simply beyond the scope of this paper and beyond my own expertise to analyze the psychological dimensions of this study outside the bounds of political theory. This does not deny in any capacity the relevance of these findings to psychological investigation, nor its potential fruitfulness. For those interested, a promising lead might be to analyze the findings—specifically the unexpected finding of the resilience of refugees in Budapest compared to the frustrations of those in Malmö—in relation to the psychological phenomenon known as "learned helplessness theory," which ties depression and the feeling that one is not in control to specified external stimuli.

cultural.[139] However, the clear omission here is economic integration, and—as we can now recognize—this means more than simply being a productive part of the economy. As the refugee experiences in Malmö illuminate, work furnishes not only capital to be spent, but also meaning, purpose, and a sense of contributing to the society in which one lives. All of these are necessary for a group of people to join as seamlessly as possible into a larger community, and they fail to be encapsulated by the social, civic, and cultural spheres alone. Perhaps, this element of integration is best categorized as socio-economic, and it is wholly left out from Miller's types of integration. In order for there to be a successful integration—which in light of these findings might itself be better characterized as *that which enables the newcomers to join the society and lead meaningful, productive lives alongside the prior members*—the tools must be provided for one to engage productively with life in the city, to forge friendships with locals, to make a life for oneself, and to feel that one is giving back in some way. By focusing too narrowly on how to minimize conflict in society, rather than ensure a transition successful for newcomers *in terms of the newcomers' experiences*, Miller misses these critical aspects of integration. The holes in his descriptive theory bleed into his prescriptive theory.

Miller argues that the only types of integration that are both morally obligated and that the government should facilitate are social and civic integration, where social integration merely means increasing contact between groups, and civic integration means giving them the linguistic and political skills needed to participate in society.[140] Yet, these fail on their own to enable newcomers to lead meaningful and productive lives. Now, if the conversation merely involved those who chose to migrate, then perhaps Miller's prescriptive theory would be defensible.

[139] David Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016): 132-3.
[140] Ibid, 134-5.

However, refugees have a causal and contained link between their harm and the protection offered by the state in the form of asylum, and furthermore states have duties to admit these refugees. It therefore follows that what is owed to refugees after admission is likely to be constitutively different from what it owes to a regular immigrant, as the claim to admission is itself constitutively different. This is clearly recognized by programs like those run by the Swedish government to provide housing, healthcare, and a stipend, all while refugees attend Swedish language schools; programs that are not offered to regular immigrants. Theoretically, then, the difference in what is owed after admission is derived from the differences in what is owed in respect to admission; if the country has an obligation to admit the refugee, then they likewise have an obligation to ensure that they are able to re-settle and join the society. This obligation has two components: (1) merely providing admission fails to fully remedy the harm that the state is obligated to remedy, insofar as it only prevents the perpetrator from *furthering* harm, rather than acknowledging that harm has been incurred and establishing a meaningful life is necessary to as *fully* remedy that harm as possible; and (2) taking a page from Miller's playbook: failing to successfully integrate newcomers can cause problems for current members, and so it is the duty of the state to ensure that accepting refugees does not produce unfair burdens for current members. For these reasons, states not only have obligations to admit refugees, but also they have obligations to refugees after admission. While this has been recognized throughout the literature,[141] we are now poised to more fully substantiate the content of these duties. First and foremost, integration schemes for language

[141] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 55; Shacknove, "American Duties to Refugees: Their Scopes and Limits," 136; Peter Singer and Renata Singer, "The Ethics of Refugee Policy," *Open Borders? Closed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues*, Ed. Mark Gibney, (Westport: Greenwood, 1988): 124.

acquisition, skills and jobs training, cultural understanding, providing initial housing, healthcare, and a stipend are all necessary building blocks. They are necessary, however insufficient.

Although it might be clear that assisting refugees to lead meaningful and productive lives is a component of the obligation to refugees after admission, the difficulty arises of clarifying on whom this duty falls. Miller, Walzer, and Wellman were all shown to argue that these duties fall to the collective, as it is collective freedom that substantiates not only the validity of compatriot partiality—on which the nation is founded—but also associative obligations. However, in the second chapter, I also argued that there is a theoretical knot in this theory, insofar as the two constitutive ideas are incompatible.[142] Looking for an alternative, I presented Goodin's idea that the boundaries around people, rather than those around administrative territories (states), are what matter morally. It is this idea that can at last be brought to fruition in consideration of the question of where these obligations fall.

With Goodin's theoretical argument at-hand, and the implications of the comparative analysis of the refugee experiences laid out, I argue that local communities have obligations to refugees that work in tandem with those of the state. While the duty to admit refugees is that of the state's—which has been fully recognized in the literature[143]—the obligations of what is owed after admission are split between the state and the local community. The formal integration scheme for language schools, jobs and skills training, health care provision, housing, and stipend provision ought to be provided by the state; however, ensuring that refugees are able to become members in

[142] This discussion occurs on pages 39-41. In short, these theorists argue that we ought to allow for compatriot partiality because of the moral relevance of national identity and collectivity, while also asserting that we ought not valorize national identity. But, we cannot have it both ways—and so there is a dilemma created by the issue of needing to acknowledge that national identity is both constructed and sometimes problematic, while nevertheless insisting that we exhibit compatriot partiality because nations matter and national identity influences our lives.
[143] This argument is presented in the second part of the first chapter (p. 17-25).

the community falls to the local community and produces a corresponding obligation. In this way, Walzer was right to assert that a society with tiers of membership is an unjust one, but he wrongly places the onus at the level of the state and is wrong to argue that becoming a member in the community is *only* being an equal in the world of obligations.[144] Becoming a member has social and economic components, as well as being an equal in the world of rights that can be claimed from the community. The question that immediately materializes, then, is that of the contents of these obligations of the local community. What *do* local communities owe to refugees, and how ought these obligations be conceptualized and implemented?

The simple answer is that there is no one-size-fits-all to specifying what local communities owe to refugees. The content and actualization of these obligations will surely depend on the local community—the size of the community, its local economy, socio-cultural topography and communal life, political organization, and many other factors. However, the local community—as a constitutive part of the state itself—shares the moral obligation, which stems from the duty to admit refugees itself, that the harm can only be fully remedied by ensuring the capacity to rebuild after resettlement. These obligations can be fulfilled by local governments providing additional services beyond those of the state, or by NGOs offering services to facilitate social integration, or by other community organizations (e.g. religious organizations, sports leagues, libraries, etc.) offering activities and services that enable refugees to develop (social, personal, cultural, and economic) ties to the local community. In this way, Miller is right to suggest that the state ought not obligate newcomers to culturally integrate; however, he is wrong to think that refugees are not owed support and methods through which cultural fluency can be gained. Refugees are owed

[144] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 52.

support through which socio-cultural integration is possible. Moreover, this support ought to be provided by local communities.

Although the actualization of these obligations will vary from place to place, an example from the other side of the Atlantic is found in the town of Rutland, which is located in the U.S. state of Vermont. Although the U.S. funds the resettlement in terms of formal integration procedures—processing the asylum claim, language training, jobs and skills training, housing, health care, etc.[145]—the local community organization, Rutland Welcomes, has held donation drives to help the refugee settle, and make them feel at home, while pairing refugees with locals in the town who welcome them to the community.[146] They arrange community events that enable locals to learn more about the refugees' backgrounds, and for the refugees to get a better sense of life in Rutland. In a small town like Rutland, they are able to hold movie nights where refugees and locals alike watch movies together, and discuss them afterwards—and this can surely be viewed as a way of fulfilling some of their obligations to refugees as the local community. However, the form of these types of events, as well as whether they are created through NGOs, local governments, or grassroots-citizens organizations, will all depend on various factors related to the local community.

It is, therefore, in this way that the obligation of local communities to refugees can be asserted. Importantly, there is balance that must be struck. The objective of demarcating the territory of these duties must be weighed against the concern of specifying so narrowly their content that the theory is inapplicable to a variety of contexts.

[145] U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, "VRRP About Us," *U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants*, Accessed 24 May 2018. http://refugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/VRRP-About-Us.jpg
[146] Rutland Welcomes, "About Us," *Rutland Welcomes,* Accessed 24 May 2018. https://www.rutlandwelcomes.org/about-us.html

Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined and staked out ground in three debates of the political theory literature on refugee and migration issues—who is a refugee, which states are obligated to admit refugees and why, and what is owed to refugees after admission. Each of these debates builds on the former, and this was displayed in the theoretical analysis in the first and second chapters. By defining the refugee through a causal and contained link between harm and protection, between (a well-founded fear of) persecution and asylum, states could be obligated to admit refugees precisely because refugees are those in need of asylum—and asylum alone is needed in order to remedy the harm. By tying states to that harm in various ways then, either through universal collective duties or circumstantial individual duties, the states were obligated to remedy that harm, which always meant asylum *only because of* the definition defended in the earlier part of the chapter. This definition of the refugee and this understanding of why states are obligated to admit refugees was then employed in exploring the obligations of states to refugees after admission.

The knots in the political theory literature on integration are exacerbated by their lack of grounding in empirical research. Original field work was therefore conducted in order to get a better idea of what a "successful" integration means, and in what terms refugees would define their ability to establish a life after resettlement. Through interviews with social workers, an intercultural mediator, and refugees in Budapest and Malmö—two cities in EU member states with the most different integration schemes—a comparative analysis of refugee experiences was made possible, whose findings could then be brought into conversation with the political theory literature. In so doing, I argued that theorists have been wrong to assert only obligations of the state to refugees after admission. There are also obligations of the local community that seek to ensure the sort of socio-cultural and socio-economic integration that enables refugees to lead

meaningful and fulfilling lives after resettlement. It is this capacity to rebuild after resettlement, to engage with the local community, to find fulfilling and purposeful ways to spend one's time that defines the successful integration of refugees. Rejecting the existing definitions in the literature, then, integration itself was defined as *that which enables the newcomers to join the society and lead meaningful, productive lives alongside the prior members*. Integration was therefore defined in terms of the refugees, situated alongside prior members, rather than defined in relation to the potential danger their presence could pose to prior members (or maximizing their economic utility to the prior members).

Beginning this research from a political theory perspective inherently limited my focus, and with hindsight, I have discovered numerous areas for additional research. Staying within the realm of political theory for a moment, it became clear that the timeline for the political theory literature has a gap: there is a lack of normative literature on what is owed to asylum seekers while their claims are being processed. Here, too, the literature would likely benefit from empirical research. Moving away from political theory, however, opens up several promising pathways for considering the wider findings of the original field research presented in this paper.

For one, the psychological ramifications of this study are immediately relevant. The overwhelming positivity of refugees in Budapest was a marked surprise from my own expectations; at the same time, the notable negativity and frustrations of refugees in Malmö was equally surprising. The ways in which support systems can suspend daily productive life, and the sorts of productivity that people need to feel fulfilled, were highlighted by this study—though mostly overlooked in this paper due to the lack of relevance to the political theory literature itself. With a different focus, these findings could be highly relevant, specifically to conversations in psychology and social psychology.

A second implication of this study—and one that extends beyond academic discourses—is to conversations of public policy and law. The surprising nature of these findings indicate that there might be distressing aspects of even the most carefully constructed integration schemes. More extensive field research is surely needed, and methodological refinements are needed as well, including a wider scope of countries, more interviewees, a demographically representative sample, etc. However, a study of this sort seems to be a likely fruitful extension of the findings presented in this paper.

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