DEALING WITH THE HYBRID WAR

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ABSTRACT

Russia's and China's hybrid practices in Ukraine and the South China Sea raise significant questions about how to prevent the hybrid war. Although international security experts and practitioners show their strong interest in how to deal with the hybrid war, no scholars conduct comparative case analysis incorporating with both European and Asian perspectives. The MA thesis aims at detecting some factors which contribute to deterring the hybrid war. To this aim, it selects four cases in Europe and Asia: 1) Ukraine; 2) the South China Sea; 3) the Baltic States; and 4) the East China Sea. Cross-regional comparison shown in this thesis reveals that while deterrent capabilities based on hard power contribute to preventing the hybrid war, economic interdependence between hybrid war initiators and their targeted countries is not necessarily effective for deterring such a warfare, rather, utilized as the part of the nonmilitary measures for the hybrid warfare.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Association Agenda

ADIZ: Air Defense Identification Zone

ARBD: Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

A2/AD: Anti-Access/Area Denial

CCDCOE: Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CCTV: China Central Television

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies

DCFTA: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement

DDOS: Distributed Denial-of-Service

EDCA: Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement

EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone

EaP: Eastern Partnership

ENP: European Neighborhood Partnership

EU: European Union

GSDF: Ground Self-Defense Force

Hybrid CoE: European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats

ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

JASDF: Japan Air Self-Defense Force

JSDF: Japan Self-Defense Force

MOD: Japan Ministry of Defense

MOFA: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MSC: Munich Security Conference

MSDF: Maritime Self-Defense Force

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPA: Japan National Police Agency

NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NRF: NATO Response Force

NSC: National Security Council

NSS: National Security Strategy

OUN: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

PCA: Permanent Court of Arbitration

PLA: People's Liberation Army

PRC: People's Republic of China

RAP: Readiness Action Plan

StratCom: Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence

TTX: Tabletop Exercise

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

US: United States

VJTF: Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1-1. Background

Does the hybrid war exercised by state actors change theory and practice of

international security? The answer to this question is of great importance to both scholars

and policy practitioners because the hybrid war can become an effective means of

changing liberal international order, generally understood to include the commitment to

freedom and human rights, international institutions and international law, and an open

economic order. In 2014, by organizing the "little green men" under the "Gerasimov

doctrine", Russia has annexed the Crimea Peninsula in violation of commitments to the

Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994, and has intervened directly in the conflict in

Ukraine. China also has expanded its military and economic power at the expense of the

sovereignty of others by taking steps to turn its contested claims over islands in the South

China Sea (Chatham House, 2015:2). Through use of non-military and paramilitary forces

such as its coast guard, fisheries enforcement vessels, oil exploration ships, oi-drilling

platforms, Chinese-registered commercial ships and fishing boats, China has been

exerting influence (Patman, 2017), constructed its dual-use outposts in the Spratly and

Paracel Islands, and ended up with completing the dredging and landfilling operations to

create its seven new islands in the Spratly Islands by early 2016 (*Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, 2017). The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the Philippines, and Vietnam are threatened by the hybrid tactics conducted by powerful state actors in the Eurasian Continent: Russia and China.

The hybrid practices in Ukraine and the South China Sea raised significant questions about how to prevent the hybrid war, whose implications reach liberal powers' capitals located at borderline in the Eurasia Continent. The Baltic States, neighboring countries of Russia and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), started to theorize the hybrid war because they are concerned about the growing array of hybrid warfare capabilities in Russia's arsenal, and have increasingly become a testing ground (Standish, 2017). NATO and the European Union (EU) agreed on establishing the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in Helsinki. Since 2017, Hybrid CoE has initiated its mission for serving as a hub of experts from the EU and NATO countries, and enhancing their civil-military capabilities, resilience, and preparedness to counter hybrid threats.

Russian hybrid tactics looks like the inspiration for a new Chinese operation in East China Sea. Beijing claims the Japan's Senkaku Islands (or the Diaoyu Islands called in Chinese) as an inseparable part of Chinese territory in the same way they have claimed

Tibet, Taiwan, and all part of the South China Sea. In 2016, China has sent between 200 and 300 fishing boats into Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) along with 28 Chinese Coast Guard ships (Gelernter, 2016). Very recently, a Chinese frigate and a submarine entered the contiguous zone just outside territorial waters around the Senkakus (*NHK World,* January 11, 2018). Under these circumstances, Japan Ministry of Defense (MOD) formulated "gray zone" situation. "Gray zone" is understood as a broad range of situations, "neither pure peacetime nor contingencies", involving the following circumstances: 1) conflicting assertions between states over national interests; 2) not relying only on diplomatic negotiation; but also 3) showing frequent physical attempts to challenge the status quo by using armed organizations or other means (MOD, 2017:43). Officials, journalists, and pundits in Tokyo claim, "yesterday's Crimea is today's Senkakus" (*South China Morning Post*, September 17, 2012; Nakanishi, 2014).

It is truism that the hybrid war changes theory and practice of international security. NATO, the EU, and Japan has situated the issue in a broader context of the crisis of the liberal international order (MSC, 2018).

1-2. Research Design

Considering the evolving international security affairs, one can see the four cases

in terms of the hybrid war by state actors: 1) Crimea; 2) the Baltic States; 3) the South China Sea; and 4) the East China Sea. One also can categorize the cases into the two. In Crimea and the South China Sea, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the Philippines, and Vietnam have been truncated, while the Baltic States and Japan are concerned about a scenario that the Baltic region and the disputed waters around the Senkakus would become next theaters of the hybrid war conducted by powerful neighboring countries.

Why have Russia and China in the former two cases succeeded in conducting hybrid operations for the sake of achieving their political objectives while have they not engaged in actual hybrid operations in the latter two cases? What kind of factors do make things different across the categories?

Traditionally, the topic of how to prevent inter-state war has been studied by many scholars in the field of international relations. As realist school, Hans Morgenthau considers that war is averted if states enjoy balance of power at international level (Morgenthau, 1964). The Kantian liberalism puts much emphasis on economic interdependence among states as a source of preventing inter-state war (Kant, 1848). Based on the conventional wisdom from international relations theory, the MA thesis sets the following two hypotheses to answer the above-mentioned questions.

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H1: The hybrid war can be deterred if targeted countries of such a warfare have enough deterrent capabilities.

H2: The hybrid war is unlikely to happen if hybrid warfare initiators and their targeted countries enjoy economic interdependence.

To test the two hypotheses based on the various sources written in English, Japanese, and Chinese, the MA thesis selects the four cases of Ukraine, the Baltic States, the South and East China Seas. In this regard, it employs intra-regional and cross-regional comparisons, expecting not only to refine causal claims by adding contextual conditions, but also to show descriptive information on general prevalence across regions (Basedau & Köllner 2007: 110-114).

The MA thesis has several strengths and limitations. Although international security experts and practitioners show their strong interest in how to deal with the hybrid war, no scholars have conducted comparative case analysis incorporating with both European and Asian perspectives. The MA thesis is a first-ever comprehensive study displaying several factors which lead to the hybrid military operations by state actors in some cases. Moreover, while the European perspective, focusing on Ukraine and the

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Baltic region, has been shown in English publications, due to the language barriers, the cases of the South and East China Seas have not been conveyed to a wider audience. To fill the gap, the MA thesis contributes to both scholarly works and policy circles by providing a guideline of how to deter the hybrid war.

It does not mean there is no limitation in this study. Some international relation theorists argue that deterrence strategy depends on cognitive system and perception of political leaders (Lebow, 1987; Jervis, 1982-1983; Jervis 1988). According to the basic assumption of deterrence, X (defender) deters Y (challenger) by convincing Y that the expected value of a certain action is outweighed by the expected punishment. This frame, however, would not function when Y acts based on misperception. According to Jervis (1982-1983), there are three cognitive barriers which lead to the Y's misperception: 1) "people overestimate their cognitive abilities" (20); 2) "people often believe that the policy they favor is better than the alternatives" (22); and 3) people tend to "assimilate new information to their preexisting beliefs" (24). While economic interdependence shown in H2 can be measured by statistical data of inter-state trade, it is hard to quantify perception of political leaders with respect to deterrence. For this reason, this study, disregarding ideational factor, primarily focuses on material factors such as military capabilities, economic power, and social resilience of states.

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1-3. Literature Reviews

While there is no comprehensive scholarly works which incorporate with the cases of the South and East China Seas, there is a plenty of literatures which show the development of Crimea in 2014 as a striking case of the hybrid war. Some scholars outline the detail of the "Gerasimov doctrine" of Russian hybrid tactics. As a part of policy recommendation, others attempt to tackle the issues of how to deter such a hybrid war.

After the annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis, the Russian intention and its hybrid tactics through the event have received much attentions. Karagiannis (2014) and Bukkovoll (2016) explain that Moscow directly intervened in Crimea and Ukraine for a purely defensive reason: *to prevent further NATO eastward enlargement*. To accomplish this goal, Moscow employs the hybrid war, which has a significant impact on the international order. On the warfare itself, many security specialists in the Western countries show an origin of the concept by introducing the "Gerasimov doctrine", and describe how the hybrid military operation was conducted during the annexation process in Crimea (Erol & Oğuz, 2015; Renz, 2016; Renz & Smith, 2016).

Some security experts draw security implications for NATO countries and beyond (Barber, 2015; Radin, 2017; Takacs, 2017). Legal experts also deal with the

question of whether the hybrid war can be considered violations of the prohibition of the

use and threat of force, which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (UN).

Bílková (2015) concludes that the Russian operation over Crimea is regard as "violations

of the prohibition of the use of force as well as to acts of aggression and, when assessed

in combination, an armed attack" (27). Even further, Nader (2017) claims that to counter

the hybrid war with accumulated situations of threat of force, each county can exercise

the self-defense measures as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force entitled

by the UN charter (18).

Like experts in the Western countries, Chinese military shows their interests in

research on the hybrid war. *China Military* (*Zhongguo Junwan*, in Chinese), an official

website of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), introduces the "Gerasimov

doctrine" displayed by Russian in Crimea. Interestingly, unlike in the West, *China*

Military regards the hybrid war as the past Western attempts to interfere in the domestic

affairs in other countries. A series of the "Colored Revolutions" in the 2000s, according

to them, was the hybrid warfare collaborated with the Western hard and soft power (Li,

2016). Very recently, one of the thinktanks in China published their academic work on

this topic. This publication says much about the Western hybrid strategy towards the

"Colored Revolution" in the 2000s, little about Ukraine in 2014 (Knowfar Institute for

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Strategic & Defense Studies, 2018). Therefore, we can say that there is a conflicting view over the concept of the hybrid war between the West and China.

Looking back to scholarly works in the NATO countries, Takacs (2017) introduces the state-of-the-art discussion about "deterrence by resilience" as a promising strategy instead of conventional deterrence strategy. In theory, there are two categories of deterrence. One is "deterrence by denial" which means that results from the capacity to deny territorial gains to the enemy. The other is "deterrence by punishment" based on the threat of retaliation which would make enemy reconsider his attack (1-2). In many cases, capability for "deterrence by punishment" is guaranteed by external powerful states through alliance coordination in the form of "extended deterrence". This classification, however, is based on assumptions of possible conventional war, not the hybrid one, therefore, deterring hybrid elements of warfare requires a much different approach than that of deterring a conventional attack. By saying so, Takacs (2017) invents "deterrence by resilience", defining that it is not primarily relied on increasing military capabilities, but on increasing resilience of "cyber networks, diversification of energy supplies, and strategic communications that can rapidly correct false information spread by an opponent" (4).

In summary, there are some academic gaps in the field of the hybrid war. First,

there is no common view over the new warfare between the Western countries and China, even worse, among experts within the West. Second, while some mention about a possibility of "deterrence by resilience", focusing on soft power, to counter the hybrid threat, traditional deterrence strategy (deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment) should be revisited. How can existing hard power play a vital role in dealing with the hybrid war? And third, no scholars refer Chinese behaviors in the South and East China Seas as the hybrid operations. The MA thesis fills these gaps. Last but not least, the accumulation of scholarly works about the hybrid war itself can contribute to strengthening capacities for "deterrence by resilience", which is an ultimate goal of the MA thesis.

1-4. Overview of the Next Chapters

This thesis is structured in seven chapters including introduction and conclusion parts. Chapter 2, Theorizing the Hybrid War, shows theory and practice of the hybrid war. It serves to establish the concept of the hybrid war which differentiates from conventional inter-state war and other "asymmetrical warfare". From Chapter 3 to Chapter 6, this thesis deals with the four case studies of Ukraine, the South China Sea, the Baltic Region, and East China Seas. In these chapters, by referring to national security strategy, economic

power, and social resilience of each state, details of the evolving hybrid tactics by Russia

and China are introduced. In conclusion, summary, comparative analysis of this study,

and policy recommendations are covered in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIZING THE HYBRID WAR

2-1. Is the Hybrid War the "New Wars"?

After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the term "hybrid war" or "hybrid warfare" receives much attention, particularly among security experts in the Western countries. The term itself, however, has no consistent definition and is used by analysts and officials in different ways. Before going into details, it is necessary to define the concept of the term.

"Hybridity" of warfare itself has been pointed out by ancient Chinese thinkers to modern European strategists. Sun Tzu, in his monumental book, *The Art of War*, argues, "all warfare is based on deception" (兵者詭道也). He also claims, "the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting" (不戰而屈人之兵善之善者也) (Sun Tzu, 1988: Chap.2). Another great figure in this field, Carl von Clausewitz, considers war a political, social, and military phenomenon which involve the entire population of a nation at war, and stresses the complex nature of war which encompasses both the socio-political and the operational and stresses the primacy of state policy (Clausewitz, 1989: Chap.1).

Looking back in history, it is truism that "warfare" itself contains the nature of

"hybridity". During the First World War, many governments were urged to pay attention not only to the "front line" where regular forces engage in military operations, but also to how to physically defend critical infrastructures in the "home front". They were also overly concerned about lowering of nationals' morale due to psychological warfare such as propaganda conducted by enemy. There are other examples after the Second World War. In the Cold War period, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union engaged in an "asymmetrical warfare" against non-state, irregular actors in the Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Viet Cong and Mujāhidīn). In the 2000s, the US and Israel asymmetrically fought against Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah who threatened technologically-superior countries by using hybrid tactics understood as "diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities" (Batyuk, 2017:465; Velijovski et.al., 2017:293).

In the late 2000s, reflecting the fact that the US faced difficulty in winning the "asymmetrical warfare" against technologically-inferior non-state actors, the term "hybrid war" has been cited in the US military. Frank G. Hoffman, a former US Marine officer, explains, "hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder" (Hoffman,

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2007:14; Renz, 2016:285).

Until the 2000s, non-state actor such as armed guerrillas and terrorist groups has been considered the main actor of the hybrid warfare. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, however, had a strong impact on theory and practice of international security in the sense that the hybrid tactics can be exercised by militarily and economically powerful state actors. Reflecting new reality, European Commission (2016) defines the hybrid war as "the mixture of coercive countless and subversive activities, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, and technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare". In a narrow sense, the Rand Corporation describes it as "covert or deniable activities, supported by conventional or nuclear forces, to influence the domestic politics of target countries" (Radin, 2017:5).

While Brussels' formulation allows the concept to apply to various state and non-state actors, the description of the US thinktank, reflecting the actual behavior over the Crimean Peninsula, directly refers to Russia. Still, both sentences are meaningful for following points. For one thing, the former explains "hybridity" literally understood as combinations of different methods by various actors. For another, the latter implies

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difficulty in dealing with the hybrid war conducted by militarily and economically powerful state actors. It is more dangerous when initiated by strong state actors. In case that stronger states initiate the hybrid war to other countries in a coordinated manner, it is hard to respond effectively and properly compared to the conventional war instigated by relatively weak (non-)state actors. Such stronger state actors may use conventional forces to shield, support, or defend irregular forces, and even nuclear forces may function as deterrent factor for military response from target states or their friendship countries (Radin, 2017:5; Velijovski et.al. 2017:293).

The hybrid war conducted by strong state actors in a coordinated manner with other non-state actors is fundamentally different from military operation against armed guerrillas or "war on terrors". Therefore, the MA thesis regards the hybrid warfare as "new wars", focusing on the following Kaldor's argument: *the distinction between state and non-state, public and private, external and internal, economic and political, and even war and peace are breaking down'* (Kaldor, 2013:2).

2-2. What is the "Gerasimov doctrine"?

As an inventor of the hybrid war as actual tactics employed by strong states, it is necessary to refer to the "Gerasimov doctrine". In early 2013, in the Russian newspaper

Voenno-Promyshlenni Kurier, the Russian Chief of the Staff, namely Army General

Valery Gerasimov writes the following sentences;

> The very "rules of war" have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness […] The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population (Radin, 2017:9; Veljovski et.al., 2017:297).

As Veljovski et.al. (2017) argues that in fact, this doctrine reflects the old Soviet

unconventional doctrine and the actual developments in international politics. During the

Cold War, Russians revoked deception and information management labeled as "reflexive

control", which was known in the West as psychological operations. The recent Russian

version, however, goes beyond it. Veljovski et.al. (2017) describes;

> They project a set of information with the intention to deliberately guide the opponent into making the desired moves that will be either bad for him, or even if the moves are correct, to be too late and thus useless. The flow of a large quantity of uncertain or fake information tends to disrupt the decision-making process of the opponent in a way that he either cannot distinguish what is true or false or he takes too much time to take a timely decision (296).

Moreover, the action of the unmarked soldiers was taken place in the Middle East. The

Soviets initiated operations whose aim was to seize key infrastructure in Afghanistan in

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1979, conducted by Soviet troops in Afghan uniforms (Veljovski et.al. 2017:296).

The "Gerasimov doctrine" relies on some lessons drawing from current international affairs. First, according to Gerasimov, the lessons of the "Arab Spring" are that if the "rules of war" have changed, the consequences have not changed. The results of the "colored revolutions" are that a "thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an area of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war". Thus, he concludes that Russian armed forces need to be able both to fight that "fierce armed conflict" and also shut out potential "foreign intervention", technically speaking, the latter strategy is based on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These armed forces, from conventional to strategic nuclear forces, are expected to serve to protection of national interests. Gerasimov also suggests that Russian armed forces have to acquire capability of readiness in order to response effectively new environment of international security where there has been a tendency towards blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared (Erol & Oğuz, 2015:267; Monaghan, 2016:70-71).

In theory, the "Gerasimov doctrine" is easily exercised in an environment similar to Ukraine: *ethnic and religious diversity*; *social and economic challenges*; *identity crisis*;

ambiguous policies; and *a lack of a clear vision for the political end state* (Veljovski et.al., 2017:297). Based on this tricky doctrine, Russia achieved its political objective (annexation of Crimea) without provoking an overwhelming military response from NATO (Barber, 2015:15). This is what Russian President Vladimir Putin alluding to, when he declared in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea: '*I cannot recall a single case in history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and with no human casualties*' (Bílková, 2015:33).

2-3. What Happens during the Hybrid Operations?

Although being understood not simply a collection of different elements, Russia's hybrid warfare model in Crimea boasted at least five attributes: economic pressure; information operations; conventional military posturing; unconventional destabilization; and political activities. According to Captain of Australian Army, Nicholas Barber, first, energy dependence on Russian state-owned giants aimed to limit Ukraine's strategic response, as well as compel NATO to exhaust diplomatic options. Second, Barber (2015) says that Russia's information operations are "designed to affect the attitude and behavior of a target audience" for the sake of establishing plausible deniability. Messages were delivered "through state-owned media agencies, such as

Russia Today, which then cleverly facilitated redistribution of the narrative through social media networks". Russia also used cyberattack "to isolate Crimea and disrupt Kiev's immediate response to the situation". For example, "unknown forces served telecommunication lines between Ukraine and Crimea, while Russia blocked Internet sites and social media accounts linked to Ukrainian opposition groups" (13), displays Barber (2015).

Third, conventional military forces played vital roles as well. Referring to snap combat readiness drills of military in the western and central Russian military districts in late February 2014, Barber (2015) argues, "the exercises provided Russia with concealment for any additional military movements to the Crimea Peninsula, as well as communicating a significant diplomatic message to Kiev that the Russian military was ready to any Ukrainian actions" (13). Fourth, the presence of the "little green men", should not be ignored in recalling the Russian hybrid war over Crimea. These well-trained and well-equipped groups led local pro-Russian militias to seize government facilities, supported by regular Russian military forces.

Lastly, Barber (2015) stresses, "establishing a political alternative was the decisive point". In the case of Crimea, "the process commenced with the expedited issue of Russian passports to ethnic Russians in order to establish the pretext that Russia was

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defending the rights of its citizens abroad" (13).

In essence, these elements displayed by the Russian operations are overlapping China's non-kinetic "Three Warfare (三戦論)" consisting of public opinion (世論戦), psychological (心理戦), and legal warfare (法律戦) formulated by the US (Navarro, 2016) and "History War (歴史戦)" with China coined by the Japanese conservative intellectuals (The Sankei Shimbun, 2015). Speaking of "legal warfare", Russia had some legal justifications for the use of force in Crimea. In case that Russia was not attacked by Ukraine in the first place, Russia could not invoke the right to use force following the principle of self-defense or humanitarian intervention. Yet, Russia has repeatedly referred to the right to protect its citizens present in the territory of Ukraine, whose lives were allegedly threatened by the new Ukrainian authorities.

Ever since the adoption of the UN Charter, however, international lawyers have argued whether the use of force to protect nationals abroad is, or is not, lawful, and whether the it falls under self-defense or stands as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force. To provide nationals abroad with human security, Russia justified its military involvement as humanitarian intervention. As Bílková (2015) draws, in fact, no massive and large-scale violations of human rights took place in the Peninsula in spring 2014 (48-49). In addition, humanitarian intervention, defined as "a military intervention with the

goal of protecting the lives and welfare of foreign civilians", is still legally controversial (47-49). By claiming the needs for self-defense or humanitarian intervention, Russia engaged in "legal warfare" over the use of force with the Western countries.

As a part of "public opinion warfare" and "psychological warfare", Russia mobilized latent historic grievances. In theory, ethnic groups value symbols justify chauvinism or hostility towards another group. As Lanoszka (2016) formulates, "when members of an ethnic group fear that their rights and welfare are threatened, the symbols by which they orientate their world-view can shape their response. Those groups with a history of having experienced victimization, domination and other collective trauma might react more forcefully than others" (183).

Ukraine and its neighboring countries share sensitive historical problems. In the past, Lithuanian nationalism developed in response to perception of Polish cultural dominance. Looking back to the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations during the interwar period, ethnic Ukrainians living in eastern Poland saw Polish as discriminatory and repressive. They share an experience that a campaign led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) to bring about the ethnic cleansing of the region of Volhynia, followed by the killing of about 100,000 Poles. Poles committed their own atrocities against Ukrainian populations during a campaign of forced resettlement called

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Operation Vistula. The history of Lithuanian-Polish relations features similar controversies surrounding Polish massacres of Lithuanians and Lithuanian cooperation with Nazi Germany (Lanoszka, 2016:183-184).

As Lanoszka (2016) points out, "these traumatic experiences provide a repository of historical grievances and emotionally charged symbols that the Kremlin can use to divide and conquer target societies and to prevent strong ties of alliance from developing between them". In this regard, Russia denounced the Euro-Maidan movement and the post-Yanukovych regime in early 2014 as being steeped in the historical influence of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN. Elsewhere in the region, Facebook groups have appeared demanding the deployment of "little green men" to support greater independence for Russian- and Polish- speaking populations living in Lithuania (Lanoszka, 2016: 184). For Moscow, there is a legitimacy to behave as security guarantor in the region because Russian "liberated" Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania from Nazi Germany. The ultimate objective, through the "history war", is to drive a wedge between Ukraine and the West, and prevent the NATO countries from taking collective actions.

2-4. Concept Stretch from Russia to China

The Russia hybrid tactics in European front can be stretched to the cases of the

South and East China Seas. As discussed in detail in the following chapters, in the early 2010s, Beijing drew the so-called "nine-dash line", which runs as far as 2,000km from the Chinese mainland to within a few hundred kilometers of the Philippines and Vietnam, and began to claim that China has its "historical maritime rights" in the waters within the "nine-dash line" (Zhen, 2016). Since then, through the various media sources, such as CCTV, the predominant state television broadcaster in the People's Republic of China (PRC), Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency of PRC, and *People's Daily*, an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propagates discourse using the phrase "Our South China Sea (我国南海)". According to one scholar, as of 2015, there is vast amount of article which refer to the following phrases "Our South China Sea" (282 articles), "Legal Status of the South China Sea (南海法律地位)" (72 articles), "Sovereignty of the South China Sea (南海主権)" (59 articles) (Bai, 2015:22-23).

Even though Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) issued an award in July 2016, concluding, "China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf"; "China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines"; and "China has unlawfully prevented Philippine

fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal" (PCA, 2016), through the use of non-military and paramilitary forces such as its coast guard, fisheries enforcement vessels, oil exploration ships, oi-drilling platforms, Chinese-registered commercial ships and fishing boats, China has been exerting influence (Patman, 2017), constructed its dual-use outposts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and ended up with completing the dredging and landfilling operations to create its seven new islands in the Spratly Islands by early 2016 (*Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, 2017). China has engaged in information operations. In May 2014, following an international incident surrounding a Chinese oil rig in Vietnam-claimed waters that escalated into deadly anti-China protests throughout the country, Chinese hackers gained access to sensitive information about Vietnam's diplomatic and military strategy by sneaking an intelligence agency network. In October the same year, similar attacks were observed (Piiparinen, 2016). In July 2016, the Chinese hacker group carried out several cyberattacks on Vietnam's two biggest airports and the official website of the national flag-carrier Vietnam Airlines. The hackers took control of the speaker system at Noi Bai airport for a few minutes, during which the speakers broadcast a male voice distorting Vietnam's claims over the South China Sea in English (*Viet Nam News*, July 29, 2016).

Japan also face the "gray zone" situation over the Senkakus Islands (尖閣諸島). Like in the case of the South China Sea, the number of propaganda, reflecting CCP's claim that Diaoyu Dao (釣魚島) and its affiliated Islands are an inseparable part of the Chinese territory, has increased. After announcement of the State Council of PRC on September 25, 2012, a lot of essays about the "Diaoyu Dao's Truth (釣魚島真相)" were published in journals and *People's Daily*. Two years later, National Marine Data and Information Service, one of the subordinate agencies of the State Oceanic Administration of PRC, created a website to centralize data and information about the islands dispute with Japan, by introducing various historical materials which show the "Diaoyu Dao's Truth". It becomes the academic trend in China to display historical cartographic records which are expected to support the Beijing's claim (Fei & Lai, 2016).[1] In parallel, Beijing often sends a various naval vessel, from fishing boats, coast guard vessels, to frigates, to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Under these circumstances, Japan gets worried about a possible scenario that Beijing-sponsored "little blue fishermen" would launch landing operations over uninhabited Senkakus Islands.

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[1] Considering international tribunals which have set a standard that claims to historic title must be supported by evidence of the exercise of territorial sovereignty an approach by focusing on historic titles and ancient maps, is severely limited (Loja, 2017). Followed by this academic trend in China, some scholars in the Western countries also analyze the Senkakus dispute from the perspective of international law (Harry, 2013; Scoville, 2013).

All in all, the evolving situation of Crimea, the Baltic, the South and East China

Seas can be understood as the cases of the hybrid war. In the next chapters, detailed case

studies are introduced.

CHAPTER 3. THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA

3-1. Ukrainian Neutral Security Policy

At the Cold War's demise, the two Soviet Republics, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic under Leonid Kravchuk and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic under Boris Yeltsin, forming alliance against Soviet President Gorbachev, separated from the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine and Russia became independent states. Since then, Ukraine has proclaimed a non-block status, whose basis is founded in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine passed on July 1, 1990. It declares that the country has an "intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles". The Ukrainian Constitution, which bases itself on the Declaration of Independence in 1991, contains these basic principles of non-coalition and future neutrality (Potapkina, 2010).

Fulfilling the intention of being a permanently non-aligned state, Ukraine did not join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) collective security arrangement signed in Tashkent in May 1992. Nor did Ukraine's early leaders aspire to NATO membership, like their Visegrád and Baltic neighbors, and Ukrainian public opinion was consistently unfavorable towards NATO until 2014. From 1992 to 1994, Ukraine, facing a growing threat of border revisionism from Russia, pushed hard to have their security guaranteed by the West and Russia.

Ukraine also had a nuclear problem inherited from the Soviets. Ukraine had already moved all of its tactical nuclear weapons to Russia between January and May 1992. However, none of Ukraine's 1,656 strategic nuclear weapons have been transferred to Russia (Mearscheimer, 1993:52)[2].

This nuclear reality contradicts Ukrainian intention since they defined themselves as being non-nuclear weapons state. Ukraine wanted security assurances provided by the West and Russia in exchange for surrendering the nuclear weapons. In exchange for Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons state, the US, the United Kingdom (UK) and Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 and pledged that the three great powers guarantee Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity referring to the UN Charter and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki Final Act. The Budapest Memorandum seems to provide Ukraine with the model of "Finlandization". As Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger argue, the formulation is expected to "both placate Russia by keeping Ukraine out of Western alliances and suit Ukraine by leaving it otherwise free to life as an independent state" (Bodjeryn, 2015). By neither alliance coordination with external powers nor nuclear weapons[3],

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[2] That force, which is aimed at the US but could be programmed to strike Russia, includes 130 SS-19s (6 warhead each), 46 SS-24s (10 warhead each), and 30 Bear-H and Blackjack bombers (together carrying 416 bombs), making a total of 1,656 nuclear weapons (Mearscheimer, 1993:52).

[3] In fact, the Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994 pledges that the US, the UK, and Russia "reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity

but only by its conventional forces, Ukrainian neutral security policy has been upheld. Ukrainian neutral security policy did not prevent Russia from exercising hybrid warfare in the Crimea Peninsula.

3-2. Dependence on Russian or Integration in the West

On one hand, Ukraine has enjoyed its political status of neutrality. On the other hand, economic interdependence between Kiev and Moscow has been exceptionally high. While Russia was heavily dependent on Ukraine's gas pipelines to transport hydrocarbons to customers in the West, as a smaller, energy-poor Ukraine's dependence was far greater on Russia with regard to trade and energy than vice versa (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016:680). Taking advantage of Ukraine's energy dependence, Russia has put pressures on Ukrainian domestic politics in several times. It is necessary for Ukraine to search for economic diversification by discovering the "European choice".

After the Orange Revolution in 2004, Ukrainian economic interest inclined towards the West. At the same time, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and Ukraine, along with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova, became a part of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Although the ENP would not offer EU membership to the EaP

and political independence of Ukraine", but it does not mention extended security guarantee along with nuclear and conventional forces provided by those parties in case that Ukrainian sovereignty is in danger.

countries, the partnership would nevertheless offer collaboration, thus safeguarding democracy and security in the region (Babayan 2015:438-439; Nilsson & Silander 2016:44-45). Particularly, EU-Ukraine Association Agenda (AA) negotiations started in 2007, which replaced the original ENP Ukraine Action Plan, strongly focuses on improving democracy at Ukrainian institutions. Moreover, throughout the AA negotiation process, it was with the offer of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) that the EU incentivized the prescribed democratic reform for Ukraine (Smith, 2015:530-531). In 2014, however, Viktor Yanukovych, facing Russian pressure, decided to postpone the signing the AA, abandon the "European choice", and offer *de facto* a major concession to the Kremlin. This decision, failing to create economic diversification, led to the crisis in 2014 (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016:678), followed by internal divisions between the Euromaidan protesters living in the Western part of Ukraine and pro-Russia separatists in the East. To make matters worse, the Crimean issue spurs on the psychological division of the country.

3-3. The Crimean Issue

Between Moscow and Kiev, there has been a conflicting view over the territory of Crimea. More than any other location in Crimea, the port city of Sevastopol has come to encapsulate and embody some of the inmost mental shrines of Russia. The port of Sevastopol was founded by Prince Grigory Potemkin in 1793 when Crimea was annexed by the Russia

empire. Psychologically, the battle over Sevastopol during the Crimean War (1853-1856) has become a symbol of the heroism of the Russian people, which saved Russia from foreign invasion. The Sevastopol Myth was revived during the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany (Charron, 2016:231-232).

Legally, until 1917, Crimea remained part of the tsarist empire. After the establishment of the Soviet Union, the peninsula joined the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. On February 19, 1954, the Crimean oblast was transferred to the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, and Crimea was upgraded to an autonomous republic within Ukraine on February 12, 1991. In May 1992, the Crimean parliament once experienced to vote for independence from Ukraine. That was hardly surprising given that a majority of the local population was ethnic Russian (Karagiannis, 2014:407). Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's Sevastopol Myth remains there. Russia continues to lease the port of Sevastopol from Ukraine and base its Black Sea Fleet. Under the 1997 Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet in the Territory of Ukraine, Russia had the authority to locate its military units on its bases in Crimea (Bílková, 2015:31-32). Russia's ongoing military presence played both a formal and symbolic role in sustaining Russian national discourse about Crimea (Charron, 2016:232). The Black Sea Fleet also contributes to Russian A2/AD strategies during the hybrid operations for seizing Crimea (Karagiannis, 2014:409).

Furthermore, ethnic Russians living in the two administrative regions, Ukraine's

Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, were particularly susceptible to the narrative of an "ethno-nationalist" and "fascist" movement hostile to Russian minorities, and the violent climax of the Euromaidan that toppled Yanukovych's regime caused a panic in the Peninsula (Charron, 2016:228). Ethnic diversity in Crimea served as a foundation for people welcoming "little green men" dispatched from Russia.

CHAPTER 4. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

4-1. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea

As one security expert in Tokyo points out, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, along with the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, is one of the severe security problems in the region (Iida, 2007:143). China, the Philippines, and Vietnam are main concerning parties over the issue which has been involved in several armed conflicts in history. In 1974, China defeated Vietnamese forces and extended its control to the entire Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands in Chinese). In 1988, China defeated Vietnamese again in the Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands in Chinese). In 1992, Beijing passed domestic Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which is enacted for China to exercise its sovereignty over its territorial sea and the control over its contiguous zone, and to safeguard its national security and its maritime rights and interests. Article 2 of the Law claims that Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands (Senkakus in Japanese), and all part of the South China Sea including the Xisha and Nansha Islands belong to the territory of the PRC (*Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone*, 1992).

In 1995, China occupied the Philippine-clamed Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. Until the early 1990s, Chinese position over the South China Sea had been assertive. In the late 1990s, however, China changed its attitude from unilateral to multilateral spirit. In 2002, China

and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed to a non-binding code of conduct in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, pledging concerning parties promote "a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea" (ASEAN, 2002). In the 2010s, However, China has displays its assertiveness again by occupying the Spratly and Paracel Islands by force and started to construct dual-use outposts in cooperation with various non-state actors.

4-2. The Philippines and Vietnam: Swinging between the US and China

During the Cold War, the Philippines signed the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the US for the sake of establishing collective self-defense obligations. US bases remained operational until 1992. A rise of anti-US sentiment driven by its colonial legacy, led the Philippines Senate to narrowly vote down a treaty to renew the lease for US facilities. After that, US troops withdrew from the Philippines. In the 1990s, China expanded its control to the power vacuum in the region after US withdrawal.

Facing security threat from China, the Philippines came back to forging security cooperation with the US and signed the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement. In 2014, Washington and Manila signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), a ten-year deal that allows a strengthened US military presence in the Philippines, with increased rotation of US military personnel and assistance devoted to humanitarian and maritime operations (Albert,

2016). To counter assertiveness of China in the region, while seeking stronger bilateral relationships with the US, the Philippines engages in "legal warfare" against China. On January 22, 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceeding against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The PCA in The Hague served as Registry in this arbitration. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in July 2016, PCA issued an award, ruling that Beijing's claims of historic rights in the South China Sea are without legal basis. In response, as shown in Chapter 2, through the various media sources, China engaged in "history war" by claiming, "history teaches us that the South China Sea is ours". The birth of the Duterte administration in Manila leads to departure from Manila's existing policy direction. With anti-US and pro-China sentiments, President Duterte mentions possible US troops withdrawal from the Philippines and building stronger economic ties with China. The Duterte administration does not eager to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea even though territorial integrity of the country has been challenged by China.

Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam has seen the US as a longstanding adversary since the 1960s. However, Vietnamese security policy has gradually transformed due to maritime security development driven by the assertive China. On May 1, 2014, Vietnam detected the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) oil rig and three Chinese oil and gas service ships heading south from China's Hainan Province. The HYSY 981 moved into Vietnamese-claimed waters. Vietnamese Coast Guard and Fisheries Resources Surveillance forces were immediately

dispatched to intercept HYSY 981. In response, 40 Chinese vessels, including China Coast

Guard, civilian fishing, and probably Chinese navy ships, deployed to protect their own oil rigs.

Soon after, Hanoi reported the presence of 60 Chinese vessels as well as dozens of aircraft

overhead by May 7. Vietnamese had 29 armed naval and law enforcement ships deployed (*Asia*

Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2017). During the standoff, massive cyberattacks from

China hit Vietnam by showing distorted Vietnam's claims over the South China Sea. The

China-Vietnam oil rig standoff, which ended in the summer of 2014, made Vietnam consider

the possible security cooperation with the US (Shoji, 2017:24). Until now, there is no defense

treaty between the two. Still, Vietnam attempts to forge stronger security ties with the US. Like

the Philippines, Vietnam also seeks economic cooperation with China for improving their

domestic economic conditions.

4-3. Beijing's Diplomatic Leverage and "Salami Slice" Strategy

From the Beijing's viewpoint, to support its claim over territorial disputes, it is

required to hinder ASEAN countries from acting in a coordinated way which would have

adverse effect on Chinese policy. For instance, on April 29, 2017, ASEAN Summit displayed

no official customary joint statement and it was unclear whether there was agreement over

including references to China's militarization and island-building in the hotly disputed

waterway (*Reuters*, April 29, 2017). During the Summit meeting, Japan and the US criticized

Chinese unilateral action in the South China Sea, in response, China harshly claimed that China will defend its core maritime interest and sovereignty against intervention by the extra-regional power, namely the US. Beijing, through its hard power as diplomatic leverage, put pressure on ASEAN countries not to act collectively in favor of the Philippines and Vietnam (*Nikkei*, November 16, 2017).

In comparison, unlike Russian case in Crimea, Chinese hybrid tactics is based on time-consuming "salami-slice" strategy-"using small, incremental actions, none of which by itself is *casus belli"*. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reports that the major dual-use infrastructure in the South China Sea is wrapping up, and Beijing can now deploy A2/AD military assets, including combat aircraft and mobile missile launchers, to the Spratly Islands at any time (*Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, 2017). In this way, through use of non-military and paramilitary, and regular forces, China nearly achieves its political objective (conquering the South China Sea). China is about to complete this mission by hindering ASEAN countries with non-kinetic tools from forming alliance against China, and Chinese A2/AD assets blocks overwhelming military response from the US.

CHAPTER 5. THE BALTIC REGION

5-1. Harbinger of Hybrid War

After the end of the Second World War, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, belonged to the Soviet Union. In 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed, the Baltic States displayed Westward security and economic policy, and eventually became the member states of NATO and EU in 2004. While Lithuania has a cultural bond rooted in history with Poland, Estonia and Latvia inherit Russian Soviets past. For that reason, the majority of Russian speakers, who came during the Soviet era, are concentrated mainly in the major cities or Russian-dominated regions in the countries. Within Estonia, 87 percent of ethnic Russians live in Harju and Ida-Viru, and in Latvia, 70 percent in Riga or Latgale regions. Russia has sought to maintain a connection to and influence among the Russia speakers in the Baltics. In fact, Russia has used proxies, propaganda, cyberattacks, and possible other means to foment pro-Russian protest and instability in the Baltics (Radin, 2017:16-19).

In considering cyberattacks towards the Baltic States, we can trace back to the Estonian cyberattacks in 2007. The incident was also related to identity politics. In April 2007, the Estonian government announced plans to move a statue commemorating the victory over Nazi Germany in Tallinn. This decision triggered rioting among Russian-speaking minorities. In addition to rioting and violence from April 27 to May 18, distributed denial-of-service

(DDOS) cyberattacks targeting Estonia's critical infrastructure shut down the websites of all government ministries, major banks, and several political parties. While technical experts in European Commission and NATO were unable to find credible evidence, Estonian officials quickly accused Russia of conducting the attacks (Herzog, 2011:50-51). DDOS attacks in the case of Estonia, along with website defacement, were also exercised during the Ukrainian crisis in 2014.[4] Reflecting these realities, security services in Estonia and Latvia publicly report their concerns about Russia's use of its propaganda as a means of undermining Estonia and Latvia's sovereignty and security, including by promoting alternative views of the Soviet Union's occupation of the Baltics and by convincing the population that the Baltic governments are "fascist" (Radin, 2017:18).

Furthermore, the Baltic States are facing growing security threat coming from massive Russian conventional forces. In September 2017, Russia's biggest war games were held in Belarus, the Baltic Sea, western Russia and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Codenamed Zapad (*West* in English), the drills were expected to simulate a conflict with the US-led alliance intended to show Russia's ability to mass large numbers of troops at very short notice in the event of a conflict. This is why some 100,000 troops and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles were

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[4] While attribution in cyberspace remains a complicated task, it is suspected that following pro-Russian hacker groups would be participating cyber operations. "CyberNerkut": the hacker group supports separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine. "APT28": the group is believed to have ties to the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) (CSS Cyber Defense Hotspot Analysis, 2017:8).

involved in the drills. Experts from NATO have raised concerns that Russia might use the drills as a "Trojan horse" to make incursions into Poland and Russian-speaking regions in the Baltics (*Reuters*, 2017). It could be said that the Baltic States are facing hybrid threat from cyber and information operations to combat readiness drills of military forces near the borders.

5-2. Strengthening Deterrence Capabilities

To avoid being the "next Ukraine", the Baltic States have been investing their efforts in strengthening deterrence capabilities in collaboration with NATO. Lithuania has reintroduced conscription and amended its legislation to allow the use of force during peacetime to shorten reaction times in case of an attack. Latvia has amended a national security law which gives the commanders of the particular units rights and obligations to act without prior political agreement to react as quick as possible (Takacs, 2017:5-6). Estonia has conducted study on cyber security at Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). Latvia has hosted NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom) and engaged in a series of researches which deals with how to tackle propaganda and to strengthen "deterrence by resilience" capabilities by introducing better understanding of strategic communication.

The Baltic States have advocated the need for strengthening NATO's Eastern Flank and in NATO has significantly improved its deterrent posture on the Flank. Since the

annexation of Crimea in 2014, there have been two large NATO Summits, both of which have introduced significant changes regarding NATO's deterrent posture. The Wales Summit in 2014 resulted in a Readiness Action Plan (RAP). It comprises both adaptation measures, which are changes to NATO's military posture and capabilities, and assurance measures, namely an immediate increase in the military presence on the Eastern Flank. As part of the RAP measures, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has been upgraded by creating the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The NRF consists of about 40,000 personnel, 5,000 of which will be part of the VJTF and will deploy within 2-3 days. During the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO has pledged to increase its forward presence on the Eastern Flank by deploying one battalion in each of the Baltic States and Poland starting in 2017 (Takacs, 2017:5-6). In this way, to counter hybrid threats from Russia, the Baltic States have improved conventional deterrence capabilities based on hard power.

CHAPTER 6. THE EAST CHINA SEA

6-1. Japan's Evolving Security Policy

Since 1945 until 1952, Japan, as a defeated country of the Second World War, had been occupied by the US. At that time, the Cold War structure spread from Europe to the East Asia. In 1949, PRC was founded by the CCP in Beijing and in 1950, the North Korea invaded the South. Due to the "loss of China" and the Korean War (1950-1953), Japan was incorporated into US-led Western camp. In 1952, Japan regained its sovereignty with the Treaty of San Francisco and became the US ally under the security treaty. From historical perspective, Japan went through two experiences in East Asia: The Second World War and the Cold War. After the end of the Second World War, Japan embraced pacifism. Stick to the principle of "Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy", the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) has minimum self-defense capability. This means that JSDF is not possessing offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, and attack aircraft carriers (MOD, 2017:212). With the beginning of the Cold War, using Japan as a forward deployment base, the US attempted to contain the expansion of communism across the region.

Since the end of the Cold War, particularly since 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has evolved Japan's security arrangement domestically and bilaterally. In 2013, Abe established a

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National Security Council (NSC) within the Cabinet Office and the first-ever National Security

Strategy (NSS) was made public. In 2014, a National Security Secretariat was created with

expectation that it supports the NSC. In April 2015, Japan and the US adopted the new

"Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation", pledging "in an increasingly interconnected

world, Japan and the US will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a

foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and

beyond". Fulfilling the promises made in the new Guidelines, on September 19, 2015, Japan's

Diet passed the new security legislation which allowed Japan to exercise the right of collective

self-defense. At the same time, Japan formulated the "gray zone" situation in which rights and

obligations of Japan-US Security Treaty can cover (MOD, 2017:19). The security threat,

coming from China, over the uninhabited Senkakus Islands in the East China Sea has been the

main driver for the evolving security policy of Japan.

6-2. The Senkakus Disputes

Between Tokyo and Beijing, there has been a conflicting fact about the Senkakus

Islands. With the principle enshrined in its own domestic Law of the People's Republic of China

on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1992, Chinese attitude has been assertive

over the dispute ever since 2010s when Xi Jinping became the Chinese President. After Xi

launched the "Chinese Dream" as a new slogan for the PRC, many pundits point out that China

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seems to restore its role in the contemporary East Asia to its historical height during the era of the Chinese dynasty (Zheng, 2015). Japanese practitioners and citizens are concerned over a possible Chinese invasion over the Senkakus as part of Chinese "irredentism". This mood has been strengthened by a series of actual Chinese behavior in the South and East China Seas.

Since March 2011, Chinese helicopters and other aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration on several occasions have flown close to Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers which were engaged in monitoring and surveillance activities in the East China Sea. In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed its fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer navigating in the East China Sea. In May and June 2014, fighters of PLA flew abnormally close to aircraft of the MSDF and of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) which were flying over the Sea. On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government declared "the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)", which covers the Senkaku Islands as if they were a part of China's territory. Officials in Beijing announced that the PLA would take "defensive emergency measures" if aircraft does not follow the instructed procedures (MOD, 2017:189).

In parallel, China provokes "history war" against Japan. At the 2012 UN assembly, China submitted a copy of the government's baseline announcement on the "Diaoyu Dao's Truth" and accused Japan of 'stealing' the islands in 1895, referring to Japanese military aggression in China from 1937 to 1945. As explained in Chapter 2, a lot of essays about the

"Diaoyu Dao's Truth" were published in many domestic publications. In the international

media, Chinese scholars and diplomats condemned Japan as having a false claim over China's

'stolen' territory (Nakano, 2016:177) [5]. Furthermore, Chinese hacker groups exercised

cyberattacks targeting the websites of government ministries of Japan. The Japan National

Police Agency (NPA) reports that in September 2012, about 300 organizations in Japan have

been targeted of cyberattacks and at least eight websites, including courts and national

university hospitals, receive website defacement which are programmed to claim "Diaoyu

Islands is ours" with Chinese national flag (NPA, 2012).

6-3. Strengthening Deterrence Capabilities

To counter hybrid threats over the Senkakus disputes, Japan has paid much attention

to strengthening deterrence capabilities. As a part of national security measurements, Japan

revisits the strategic importance of southwest Japan in which the Senkakus are located, and

creates a new concept of "dynamic joint defense force", placing emphasis on the following

measures: 1) to ensure security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and 2) to response

to attacks on remote islands. Each measurement to be reached, Japan plans 1) to acquire patrol

helicopters (SH-60K), new airborne early-warning aircraft (E-2D), and part of the Global

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[5] The following references show the legal and historical aspects of the Senkakus Islands dispute: Harry (2013), Scoville (2013), Hook (2014), O'Shea (2015), Manyin (2016), and Loja (2017).

Hawk system, and 2) to procure fighter aircraft (F-35A), the Osprey (V-22), and amphibious vehicles (AAV7). Now, operating existing P-3C, E-2C and E-767, JSDF engages in warning and surveillance activities surrounding Japan in peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. In January 2016, JASDF newly established the 9th Air Wing with two fighter squadrons at Naha Air Base in Okinawa. In March, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) newly formed the coast observation unit on Yonaguni close to the Senkakus. The GSDF has deployed an area security unit in charge of the initial responses within the remote islands area, as well as establishing an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARBD). MSDF has acquired SH-60K and other equipment. To improve the joint operation capabilities of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF as well as to strengthen amphibious operational capabilities, JSDF has engaged in joint training exercises overseas such as "Dawn Blitz 15" and "Iron Fist" held in the US, and "Exercise Talisman Sabre" in Australia (MOD, 2017). Recently, it is reported that the government of Japan starts to consider whether Japan acquire Tomahawk missiles, expected to prevent landing operations over remote islands conducted by adversary (*Yomiuri Online*, November 29, 2017).

It is also crucial for Japan to receive extended deterrence assurance from the US. In April 2014, US President Obama reiterated that the US-Japan Security Treaty covers the islands (Manyin, 2016:7-8). In the meeting with Prime Minister Abe, Secretary of Defense James Mattis reaffirmed the US security commitment (*Reuters*, February 3, 2017). In order for both

countries to deepen understanding of how to defend the Senkakus in various scenarios, a group

of experienced retired US and Japanese defense, intelligence, and security officials conduct a

Tabletop Exercise (TTX) (Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2017). Beyond security ties with

the US, Japan also seeks cooperation with partners in Europe. Recently, Japan fosters cyber

dialogues with UK, Germany, and Estonia to cultivate better understanding of cyber security

(MOFA, April 26, 2018). In January 2018, Japan joins CCDCOE in Estonia (CCDCOE,

January 12, 2018). Like the Baltic States, to counter hybrid threats from China, Japan has

strengthened deterrence capabilities based on both hard and soft power.

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

7-1. Summary

Does the hybrid war change theory and practice of international security? Answering this fundamental question with 'yes', the MA thesis has dealt with how to prevent the hybrid war. To this aim, it has chosen four cases in Europe and Asia in order to detect some factors which contribute to deterring the hybrid war. Cross-regional comparison, shown from Chapter 3 to Chapter 6, is expected to display generalized pictures. Before going in details, in Chapter 2, the MA thesis regards the hybrid war as a warfare conducted by strong state actors, namely Russia and China, in a coordinated manner with other non-state actors. By doing so, while recognizing it as "new wars", we can differentiate the hybrid war as such from military operation against armed guerrillas or "war on terrors".

Chapter 3 displays Ukrainian country profiles which unintentionally led to Russian hybrid war over the Crimea Peninsula in 2014. Ukrainian security policy has been based on its neutrality. Ukraine does not have defense pacts with other stronger parties and possess nuclear forces. The Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994 had guaranteed Ukrainian neutrality until 2014. One can observe that there has been economic interdependence between Kiev and Moscow. As a matter of fact, however, Ukraine economy has heavily depended on Russian energy supplies. Ukrainian attempts to create economic diversification did not come true when

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Yanukovych decided to postpone the FTA deal with the EU. Furthermore, ethnic diversity in the country, particularly in Crimea, unintentionally has contributed to the success of Russian hybrid operation in 2014. There also has been a conflicting view over the territory of Crimea. In Moscow's eyes, Crimea is not only a strategic lynchpin where the Black Sea Fleet has deployed, but also a symbol of Russia's Sevastopol Myth.

Chapter 4 deals with the case of the South China Sea. Through use of non-military and paramilitary forces including its coast guard, fisheries enforcement vessels, oil exploration ships, China has constructed its dual-use outposts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. China, the Philippines and Vietnam have been main concerning parties over territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which has been involved in several armed conflicts since the 1970s. After several victories in maritime theaters, China has gradually expanded its control in the South China Sea. It is hard to say that security and economic policy of the Philippines and Vietnam, who have been facing security threat coming from mainland China, have been stable. Until now, there is no bilateral defense pacts between Manila and Washington or Hanoi and Washington which counter Chinese assertiveness. Even though facing threat, Manila and Hanoi are interested in strengthening cooperation with economically powerful China. Beijing, thorough its military and economic power as diplomatic leverage, put pressure on ASEAN countries not to act collectively in favor of the Philippines and Vietnam. Without defense arrangements which enable the US to display its permanent military presence, the US has not

played a vital role in the dispute.

Chapter 5 discusses the case of the Baltic States who have been concerned about Russian hybrid war next to Ukraine. Like Ukraine, there is a lot of people whose nationality is Russia. The most Russian speakers, who came during the Soviet era, are concentrated mainly in the major cities or Russian-dominated regions in the countries. Russia has used proxies and propaganda to foment pro-Russian protest and instability in the Baltics. The Estonian cyberattacks in 2007 is a remarkable example. The Baltic States also faces growing security threat from Russia. Zapad 2017 held in Belarus, the Baltic Sea, western Russia and Kaliningrad, was once considered a "Trojan horse" to exercise hybrid operations in Poland and Russian-speaking regions in the Baltics. Unlike Ukraine, taking advantage of their memberships of NATO, the Baltics States has strengthened deterrence capabilities in collaboration with other member states. They also attempt to deepen their understanding of the hybrid war by establishing some NATO-accredited Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE in Tallinn, StratCom in Riga, and Hybrid CoE in Helsinki). At this moment, there is no Russian-coordinated hybrid operations whose aim is to truncate part of the sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Baltic States.

Chapter 6 introduces the case of the East China Sea. Recently, Japan faces growing security threat over the Senkakus Islands. Since 2011, through fisheries boats, paramilitary naval vessels, and military assets, China has displayed its assertive claim in the East China Sea.

Under these circumstances, Japan has been concerned about a possible scenario that Beijing-sponsored "little blue fishermen" would launch landing operations over uninhabited Senkakus Islands. To avoid the Crimean-style hybrid war, like the Baltic States, Japan has improved deterrence capabilities. JSDF creates a concept of "dynamic joint defense force" to ensure security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan and to response to attacks on remote islands. In this regard, Japan decides to acquire military assets such as patrol and early-warning aircrafts, amphibious vehicles, and Tomahawks, which are expected to counter the hybrid operation effectively and even to deter the hybrid aspiration in advance. The Japanese military posture has shifted towards southwest of the country by establishing new fighter squadrons, coast observation unit, and ARBD. In taking these measurements, Japan also fosters much stronger bilateral ties with the allied partner, the US, as well as seeks cooperation with partners in Europe. So far, Beijing-sponsored "little blue fishermen" do not make their appearance in the Senkakus Islands.

Based on the above, the next section evaluates the following two hypotheses.

H1: The hybrid war can be deterred if targeted countries of such a warfare have enough deterrent capabilities.

H2: The hybrid war is unlikely to happen if hybrid warfare initiators and their targeted countries enjoy economic interdependence.

7-2. Comparative Analysis

In Crimea and the South China Sea, Russian and Chinese hybrid operations became successful. While hybrid threat coming from Russia and China in the Baltic region and the East China Sea, actual hybrid operations in both regions do not occur. What kind of factors do make things different across these cases?

First, security treaties, which enables concerning parties to exercise the right of collective self-defense, play a crucial role in deterring both conventional and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is a neutral country who does not have any defense pacts with the Western and post Soviets countries. Even though it is questionable that they also exercise neutral security policy, the Philippines and Vietnam are in the same situation. The Baltic and Japanese securities are guaranteed by North Atlantic Treaty and Japan-US Security Treaty. Under these arrangements, these countries address enhancing deterrence capabilities focusing on both hard and soft power. The Baltic States, along with Poland, host multinational battalion battle groups, to respond quickly and effectively to both conventional and hybrid operations exercised by Moscow. Japan establishes a new brigade for amphibious operations, expecting to conduct remote islands recapture operation. To train the unit, Japan engages in joint exercises with the US and other maritime democracies such as Australia. Furthermore, Japan is on the road to acquiring Tomahawks, designed to prevent landing operations over remote islands in the East China Sea. Before these efforts of the Eastern Flank of NATO and the Western Pacific of US military,

Russian and Chinese hybrid operations have not happened yet. We therefore conclude that existing hard power plays a vital role in deterring not only conventional but also hybrid warfare.

Second, it is required to revisit that economic interdependence between hybrid warfare initiators and their targeted countries also contributes to deterring such a warfare. Ukraine has heavily depended on Russian energy supplies. Manila and Hanoi regard stronger economic cooperation with Beijing as essential for boosting their national economic growth. In the past, liberal international relations theorists Keohane and Nye formulated the terms "sensitivity" and "vulnerability". Sensitivity, according to them, involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework, in concrete terms, how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects. Vulnerability is explained as the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face (Keohane & Nye, 2000). In more distilled terms, "sensitivity is used to describe the pressures faced by various State actors as the result of others' actions, while vulnerability is how open their options are to change the processes and framework of their own structure to suit their needs" (*The Meridian*, November 16, 2014). In this sense, in terms of economic ties with Moscow and Beijing, sensitivity and vulnerability of Ukraine, the Philippines, and Vietnam are high. Taking advantage of interdependence, Russia and China can put pressure on their neighbors by showing their economic power. Based on this story, we can say that economic interdependence is not effective to deter the hybrid war, rather, easily utilized as the part of the nonmilitary

measures for the hybrid warfare.

Putting aside a point whether actual hybrid operations occur or not, we can observe some similarities across the four cases. First, we cannot ignore geopolitical and military facts that Russia and China effectively deploy their military capabilities. They possess nuclear forces and A2/AD capabilities in the South China, the Black, and the Baltic Seas (*Iskander*-M mobile ballistic missile in Kaliningrad) which serve as the major factor prevents overwhelming military response from the other concerning parties (Murphy, Hoffman & Schaub, Jr. 2016:8). Second, Russia and China often display their "legitimacy" by raising "history war". According to their historical narratives, Russian define themselves as a "security guarantor" in the region since they "liberate" many cities of Europe against Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Chinese, describing themselves as a "victor" of the "War of Resistance against Japan" or the "World Anti-Fascist War",[6] attempt to gain international support for their territorial claims in the region. Cyber and information warfare raising from Moscow and Beijing contribute to propagating these narratives with the expectation that they would succeed in driving a wedge among the Western countries.

Considering these facts, it is difficult to conclude that the two cases of Japan and the Baltic States are the fully-successful deterrence stories, since the both regions have ongoing

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[6] We can say that the narrative of the "World Anti-Fascist War" is newly-created after the nomination of Xi Jinping as a Chinese President. For more information, see the following references. Shi (2010), Xu (2015), Liu & Lei (2015) and Kawashima (2017).

hybrid threats. We can evaluate that the two cases are successful deterrence stories in the sense that thanks to security treaties of the Western countries, Moscow and Beijing do not accomplish their political objectives by conducting their hybrid operations: *supporting pro-Russian separatists in the part of the Baltic and coordinating "little blue fishermen" to land the Senkakus and claiming its maritime sovereignty*. At the same time, we can also regard that the two regions are facing ongoing hybrid threats. The Baltics have received Russian-backed information operations with the spread of the alternative fact about their legitimized governments and DDOS attacks against public and private sectors (*Reuters*, May 11, 2017). They are also supposed to be pressured by Russian-held massive military drills of Zapad down the road. Furthermore, according to a report published by NATO-accredited StratCom, a relatively small but significant proportion of active pro-Russian ideological users who have created virtual Russian world in every network in each of the Baltics (Teperik et.al., 2018:4-5). Looking to the East China Sea, it is reported that Chinese unilaterally starts their oil rig project in the disputed waters close to the Senkakus (*Sankei News*, August 1, 2017). The same situation in the South China Sea is about to occur. From Beijing's perspective, PLA can defend maritime sovereignty and interests by force, legitimized by Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and conducting its operation in the ADIZ.

All in all, the hybrid war, involving in from nuclear and conventional forces to historical narratives, is about to change theory and practice of international security. To uphold

liberal international order under threat of such a warfare, what kind of thoughts would be required for us down the road?

7-3. Policy Recommendations

The MA thesis makes the following proposals:

1. To improve deterrence capabilities based on hard power:

    a. Country should concentrate on enhancing early-warning and surveillance capabilities to detect disturbing behaviors of non-state actors dispatched from an opponent.

    b. Country should concentrate on improving military capabilities for "deterrence by denial", focusing on the terms "Rapid Deployment" and "Readiness" to respond effectively hybrid military operations from an opponent.

    c. Procurement of Tomahawk missiles and enhancing defense cooperation with other parties who have strong power projection capabilities may contribute to enhancing "deterrence by denial" capabilities. A2/AD strategy is one of the effective measurements for an opponent.

    d. Country should reconsider effectiveness of defense pacts in terms of "deterrence by punishment".

2. To improve deterrence capabilities based on soft power:

    a. Country should seek economic diversification strategy to redress country's economic

vulnerability. Bilateral, intra-regional, and cross-regional FTA arrangements must be positively reconsidered driven by strategic motivation. Free trade principles are also essential for upholding liberal international order.

b. Country should create resilient society that can respond effectively cyberattacks and other information warfare including spread of disinformation and website defacement which displays "AlternaFacts".

3. The MA thesis draws the following recommendations for Brussels and Tokyo:

a: To address "history war", practitioners, scholars, and students in NATO and Japan should hold academic seminar on regular basis, focusing on different historical recognition between the Western countries and Russia/China.

b: To deepen better understanding of strategic communication and cyber security, Japan should strengthen ties with NATO. It is reasonable for Japan to join academic activities of NATO-accredited CCDCOE, StratCom, and Hybrid CoE.

c: To improve maritime military doctrines and capabilities, NATO should seek security cooperation with Japan who is on the road to dealing with conventional and hybrid military threats in maritime theaters.

d: While seeking security cooperation, NATO and Japan should concentrate on diplomatic efforts towards Moscow and Beijing to explain that it is guided by defensive sprit without any aggressive intentions.

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