Pro-democracy in the sheets but less in the streets: social movement protest alliances of Ukrainian Maidan 2013-2014

By

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Abstract

Why did the middle-class protesters of Ukrainian Maidan 2013-2014 resort to coalitions with far-right and oligarchic parties? The modernization theory assumptions would suggest that to be an unlikely scenario which is especially puzzling considering that the previous research. Namely, it indicates that Maidan protesters had pro-democratic preferences and a degree of support for universalist values that is unprecedented compared to the average in Ukrainian or even European populations. Using social movement organization framework, I investigate the question of the protest coalition formation. Based on the interviews with Maidan social movement organization participants I study the protest coalition in Kiev and the most different regional cases. Despite the socio-demographic parameters and progressive values of the protesters the research finds evidence that the coalitions were dependent on immediate ideological demands than on strategic vision of the future, patronage of oligarchic parties, far-right support and less on prior ties. The research also finds that the calculation of political opportunities and threat of the protesters played an ambiguous role in the coalition making and further research on radicalization is needed. The research results lead to a conclusion that pro-democratic capacities of the post-Maidan Ukrainian civil society are yet to be built and suggests some policy recommendations.

Keywords: protest, alliance, Ukraine, revolution, Maidan, civil society, far-right, democratization

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1. Introduction

Why did the middle-class protesters of Ukrainian Maidan 2013-2014 resort to coalition with far-right and oligarchic parties[1]? This question is especially puzzling considering that the protesters demonstrated middle-class inclusive ideological agenda (Onuch 2014; Zelinska 2015). Indeed, the Maidan was pronounced in its middle-class component at the early stages mobilizing educated people, businessmen and student youth expressing the magnitude of universalist values that is unprecedented compared to the average in Ukrainian or even European populations (Shestakovskii 2015). Yet, oligarchic parties and far-right joined the protests along with pro-democratic protesters as early as between 21st November 2013 and 30th of November both in the capital and regions and created a visible alliance starting the 1st of December 2013.

The fact of heterogeneous coalitions might seem straightforward considering cross-class coalitions, or cross-movement coalitions remain among the robust findings predicting the emergence of the revolutionary situations (Goldstone 2011). The literature on protest coalition formation puts forward a variety of factors, from negative demands or political opportunity and threat to common ideology, goals, identity, friendly ties and a need for resources. In this way, movements potentially have numerous ways of developing tolerance towards different actors.

The Arab Spring corroborates the assumption that anti-government protests can tolerate a range of alliances, like those of Islamists and secular liberals. Still one cannot trace a simple pattern

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[1] The oligarchic parties Batkivschyna ('Fatherhood'),Udar('Punch') and the far-right Svoboda ('Freedom')

with respect to the alliances in place. In Tunisia, the main anti-government coalition of secular liberals and Islamists was forming years before the overthrow indicating the presence of what Linz and Stepan (2013) call political society. The Egyptian coalition, on the contrary, had a different pivotal moment of its formation – it lacked pre-existing contacts between the two groups and surfaced rather during the protest.

Yet, it does not literally mean that any coalition goes. The literature on social movements and revolutions has developed researched non-alliances as well. The very same factors can alternatively have a negative impact on coalition making. Differences in ideology, competition for resources, misperception of opportunity or threat, a rise of within movement distrust in response to brokerage can impede a coalition. Even accomplished coalitions risk to break down, for instance, by tuning an opportunity cost for participation excluding radical flank (Gupta 2002).

The departure of Maidan is puzzling. Why the protest initially bearing pro-democratic values turned out to produce an alliance incorporating right-wing nationalist and oligarchic parties? Having the modernization theory assumptions in place (Lipset 1959) one would expect that the democratic protesters would be the vanguard that would help to avoid the pitfalls of democratization such as exacerbation of the ethnic split (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2015) or inclusion of oligarchic parties, that systematically limit attempts of other players to enter parliamentary politics (Umland et. al. 2014).

In other words, one would expect constraints to the coalition of the far-right, NGOs pro-democratic and oligarchic parties. First, distancing from far-right based on the difference between universalist and exclusive ideologies of the groups. Second, removal of the far-right

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as their commitment to confrontations and violence would cause more severe government repressions. Third, one would expect that the protesters bear a high cost accommodating the far right as the presence of exclusive ethnic agenda in the protest signals other ethnic groups that representation of their interest is under the threat, thus limiting the bystanders' support or mobilizing counter-movement, as the literature on the post-Soviet regime change suggests (Beissinger 2002; Kudelia 2017, 217).

Moreover, the literature on color revolutions hints (D'Anieri 2006, 345) far-right would not be particularly a match for oligarchic parties either, as their interest has been in balancing the cost of government change, preserving the perception of their legitimacy nationwide. Thus, one would expect that the oppositional parties would make a substantial effort to emphasize bargaining and negotiation with the government and cut off the far-right scenario of violent revolution.

Next, one would expect limited cooperation among civic NGO protestors, pro-democratic parties and oligarchic parties as the first two would potentially be limited in their decision making by the existing oligarchic party structures. The pre-Maidan affairs of Ukrainian parties and social movements were somewhere in between the two mentioned scenarios of Arab Spring. NGO representatives and top rank party officials barely stated any joint strategic political agreements. Yet, all of them mobilized and during large anti-government campaigns as it happened during 'Revolution on Granite' 1990, 'Ukraine without Kuchma' 2000 and later Orange Revolution of 2004. That experience, however, paved a love and hate relationship of cooperation, conflict, and disappointment every time the parties limited a transfer of protesters into conventional politics.

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Both the oligarchic political parties and far-right were initially not particularly welcomed on Maidan. In fact, the civic protesters in the capital first set their tents separately considering the instances the parties let down the protest causes in the past while the oligarchic parties were hesitant to join the protest themselves. Yet, very shortly after the beginning of protest, all the actors found themselves coordinating actions with each other. At first, the extra-planetary far-right commitment to violence received some critique from the parties and civil sector protesters. Nevertheless, as the protest went on the perception of the far right departed from the critique of their radical actions towards little to no efforts of isolation or acceptance. Next, oligarchic parties took over a substantial part of the decision making producing hierarchies toppling decisions of other protesters.

The existing literature attributes the coalition to the protest policing style which created the situation of a 'moral shock' of individuals (Gomza and Koval 2015) and common threat to the protesters (Way 2014). Yet these explanations tend to clarify the individual micro-level of participation but are deficient to explain why cooperation between far-right, NGOs, pro-democratic (Democratic Alliance) and oligarchic parties started well before the violent repressions in the capital: as early as from 21st of November both in regions and the capital. The deficiency of focus on the dynamics within the coalition of different ideological and political SMOs and attribution of the coalition formation to a negative identity created by the interaction between protesters and government let alone does not fully explain the changes from the 21st of November 2013 to the February 23rd of February 2014. For example, this would not explain why in some cases NGOs initially encouraged the oligarchic parties to continue to participate after Yanukovych declined the EU-association agreement but before the repressions of 30th of November 2013. Or why parties and civic sector shared crowdsourcing and material supply of the protest infrastructure during the protest, or coordination of protest

committees that emerged during capturing and holding of the administrative buildings in the capital and the regions, which further brought an opportunity to take policy decisions or encourage defection of law-enforcement, local officials, and elites.

To contribute to the explanation, I argue that it is essential to consider meso-level of coalition building of social movement organizations (SMOs). By doing so I deal with puzzling for the theories of modernization question. To put it more directly, why the individual demographic characteristics of the protesters and pro-democratic preferences do not translate into pro-democratic alliances. The use of SMO approach indicates that organized collective actors take a systematic role in the development of the protest as they possess a capacity for a sustained participation (compared to individuals) and a formal structure allowing to collectively coordinate within-group decisions that have effects for the behavior of other SMOs and individual actors. The approach allows to fill in the gap in understanding the links leading to an alliance between the right-wing, oligarchic parties, pro-democratic parties and NGOs respectfully to that role in the protest. As the result, by analyzing the case of Maidan the research contributes to the growing literature on the coalition building in anti-government political protests in non-democratic regimes. Moreover, the research has a policy implication. The SMO approach allows developing further democracy promotion policy recommendation which can potentially be effectively implemented to already existing organizations.

The structure of my thesis goes as follows. In the second chapter, I introduce arguments for applicability of SMO approach. I continue with an overview of the literature on the SMO coalition formation factors which further serve as a foundation for hypotheses formulation. In the third chapter, I introduce data collection and case selection procedures. In the fourth

chapter, using evidence from interviews I investigate the hypotheses about the protest coalition formation introduced in the second chapter.

I investigate the case of the coalition in Kiev and regional most distinct cases using the evidence from the interview data. As the result, the research provides limited confirmation of the positive effect of ideological proximity as a coalition forming factor. Besides that, it finds a positive effect of resources in all cases whereas prior ties of organizations provide the impetus for coalitions in only some cases. In addition to that, the research investigates the effect of the protester`s opportunity/threat calculus concluding that it had no single effect on coalition making across the cases. By using the research results I conclude that Ukrainian civil society of Maidan period has yet to grow pro-democratic capacity. My research discusses policy recommendations in the conclusion.

2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, I introduce SMO approach to the case of Ukrainian Maidan 2013-2014. To formulate the hypotheses about coalition formation of far right, oligarchic and pro-democratic parties, and NGOs I address the existing literature on the SMO coalition formation. The section two point one provides the working definition of coalition and argument for applicability of the SMO approach to the collective actors of Ukrainian Maidan – oligarchic and pro-democratic political parties, far-right and NGOs.

The next sections deal with theories suggesting causal factors of coalition making. Those are critically evaluated regarding the strength and weaknesses of approaches in the given context. The section two point two reviews the literature on ideology against the literature on Ukrainian party system and far-right. I conclude that while the approach provides robust insights into coalition making the application is challenging due to ideological specifics of Post-Soviet oligarchic parties. I anticipate that the factor of ideological proximity would be less important for the explanation of coalition between oligarchic parties and other SMOs than the factors introduced in the following sections. Next section deals with political opportunity and threat perception. The section two point four introduces the hypothesis about importance of prior social ties. Lastly, the section two point five examines the literature on protest recourses.

2.1 Protest coalition: the argument for 'SMOs coalition' framework

In this section, I discuss the concept of social movement organization and its derivative – the concept of social movement partyism (Almeida 2010) allowing for application of the common framework. Finally, I introduce working definition of the coalition concept.

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It may not seem straightforward how come the notion of social movement organization is commonly applicable to institutionalized political parties along with NGOs and extra-parliamentary far-right groups. Armstrong and Bartley (2007) provide a more concrete ground for the comparison using the framework defining SMOs as "formal organizations that take the collective pursuit of social change as a primary goal." Yet, considering the contentious politics scholarly work one might point out that political parties do not seem to match the profile of protest actors or of those who engage in unconventional politics to direct or pursue a social change. I argue that this is an oversimplification.

First, the distinction of SMOs by the participation primarily in contentious politics largely excludes the Latin American and post-Soviet experiences where political parties engage in protests along with conventional activities such as participation in the elections or policy-making (this is not to mention contemporary developments in Western democracies). To give an example, Almeida (2010) explores how political parties in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Uruguay join efforts with social movements in the wake of political threats of deepening of neoliberalism and pursuit of opportunities for democratization.

Second, in the post-Soviet/Communist region, the SMOs soon to become political parties were actively participating in the pro-Independence campaigns. The example is Ukrainian Narodnyi Rukh that had representation in local councils of the Western and Central Ukraine in 1990. During the pro-Independence campaign 'Revolution on Granite' of 1990, the movement encouraged supporters to strike and demonstrate. In the next decade, during the anti-authoritarian 2001 'Ukraine without Kuchma' campaign the parliamentary parties Ukrainian Socialist Party, Narodnyi Rukh along with student youth NGOs and far-right UNA-UNSO took protesters to the street and managed negotiations with the president to get some concessions.

During the post-electoral 2004 'Orange revolution' the parties along with NGOs were largely responsible for both mobilization and negotiations.

Hence, Ukrainian political parties demonstrate features of what is social movement partyism defined by Almeida (2010, 174) as "(1) an electoral opposition political party taking up social movement cause as its own by coalescing with a movement […] (2) use of social movement-type strategies (e.g., disruptive actions and street demonstrations) to mobilize party members and other groups to achieve social movement goals.".

Despite the point above it is not up-front who takes whose cause in Ukrainian case. It is worth mentioning that the boundaries between civil society and the parties are still a point of post-Soviet contentious and party politics scholarly puzzling (Onuch 2014). In other words, the question of an extent of civil society's autonomy from the parties and the government in the decision making and agenda setting, is still a debatable point.

Next, I make a point why coalition matter for the research. Besides the findings on alliances' importance in forging revolutionary outcome (Goldstone 2011) another point of significance is functional role of SMO coalitions in mobilizing and sustaining of protests. While the researchers emphasize that contemporary revolutions rely on the 'logic of numbers' (Della Porta and Diani 2006) signaling popular dissatisfaction with governments, nonetheless, coalitions of SMOs matter for the cause of mobilizing bystanders, taking responsibility for negotiations with government on the behalf of the protesters, sustaining protest infrastructure of popular mobilization, developing and modifying of collective frames, providing material support – all those tasks do not overwhelm an individual capacity of joining protest action but matter to provide a cohesive collective action support. Moreover, the SMOs, by representing a

collective, bear a capacity for more systematic participation and representation of the interests than individual protesters.

Yet, it does not exclude the possibility that the coalition itself is a point of conflict among SMOs due to competition for representing the protest, mobilizing supporters or bystanders. Moreover, the SMO approach has an important evidence that the composition of SMO coalitions impacts both protest policing and bystanders' reaction (Gupta 2002). Hence, coalitions matter for within the movement collective decision making, interaction among protesters, government, bystanders and potentially counter-movement.

Lastly, I provide the working definition of the coalition. The existing literature provides a variety of suggestions specifying the depth of alliance. Yet, accounting for the heterogeneity of the coalition actors as the baseline for hypotheses testing I propose using the minimalist definitions:

"temporary, means oriented alliances among individuals or groups which differ in goals... [with] *little value consensus...* [and] *tacit neutrality on matters which go beyond the immediate prerogatives*" (Gamson 1961, 374)

"coalition affairs, featuring sometimes loosely negotiated alliances among groups and individuals with different agendas... often comprised of multiple formal coalitions" (Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005, 329).

I step in into the analysis using the two definitions combined to emphasize the following points. Meyer and Corrigall-Brown's (2005) allows acknowledging that the alliances among SMO actors imply diverse frequency of co-participation and changing composition over the period of protests. Gamson's (1961) definition in its turn, allows setting the timeframe of analysis concentrating much more on the protest period and putting less emphasis on the background of organizations and their parameters (except for exploration of preexisting ties). Lastly, both definitions allow accounting for cross-organizational brokers or elite participants by specifying

the individual component. In other words, individual participants of organizations and their agency in coalition making do not completely dissolve due to the choice of the SMOs as units of analysis.

The two definitions allow drawing conceptual borders of what is and what is not a coalition. To be considered a coalition the cross-SMO relations should satisfy two criteria. First, a coalition includes shared recognition of the presence of SMOs as a protest supporter. Second, any degree of cross-organizational coordination aimed at the protest cause. The minimalist example would be a knowledge about the presence of an SMO as an ally and negotiations about an intention of a joint action. A counter-example would be the presence of an organization within a protest but without a recognition of it as an ally by any other SMO, or presence of an organization within a protest as an ally but without any evidence on any joint coordinated activities.

2.2 Common interests, identity, and ideology

In this section, I introduce the literature on positive and negative effects of ideology on coalition building. Second, I discuss implications of the factor against the literature on the ideology of Post-Soviet oligarchic political parties and Ukrainian far-right.

The existing research on social movement coalition formation suggests that correspondence in identities, interests, and ideology of organizations provides a robust insight into coalition formation. McCammon and Van Dyke (2010) in their qualitative comparative analysis based on the study of twenty-four cases of coalition formation conclude that the alignment of ideologies, interests, and identities has been a positive factor in nineteen cases and 2 times out of 21 analyzed cases had no effect.

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How to approach a definition of ideology? The scholarly works suggest that this is a debate in itself, especially dealing with other social movements studies developments on the cultural and ideational factors, such as framing (Beck 2013; Zald 2000; Oliver and Johnston 2000). First, the literature allows drawing on the degree of correspondence among the notions of culture, ideology and framing. Generally, the suggestion is that culture plays a role of a toolbox both for ideology and framing development.

The distinction between framing and ideology is more debatable. While scholars put forward the idea that frames develop from the ideology of organization and less often vice versa the latter is still an option (Beck 2013). But the more important distinction is a temporal one. It suggests that ideology is more stable over time while frames being more process driven. As Oliver and Johnston (2000) and Beck (2013) put it, organizations more often modify frames to engage in activities which match to its ideology than compromise its own ideology. Which brings back to the notion of ideology emphasizing its function of being a dispatcher of interests and identities enabling a coherent action of organizations.

The way I approach the definition is done in correspondence to the research question situated in the realm of collective action, particularly – coalition making. In other words, this eventually relates the definition to the section of scholarly work that treats ideology as a dispatcher of interests and identities serving as an action and strategy foundation (Zald 2000; Beck 2013). This indicates that organizations that recognize proximity in ideology form a coalition and vice versa.

Hence, the research is much more interested in ideology than in frames as the approach suggests that SMOs who share closeness in ideology would be interested in creating mutually beneficial frames or amplifying each other's frames to meet their own goals or at least not to hinder spread of each other's frames (Oliver and Johnston 2000).

The previous research suggests that in the most extreme cases the ideological closeness of organization predefines any coalition building. In the absence of any common disposition even other factors cannot make up for that (McCammon and Van Dyke 2010). This viewpoint represents a notion that emphasizes the stability of the organizational interest, identities, and ideology.

The point of ideological stability is crucial in theorizing the behavior of SMOs. It is especially puzzling in the post-Soviet countries, like in Ukraine, where new and old ideologies and identities had to reconfigure themselves with respect to the emerging political environment. This might reveal the weakness of the ideological approach in the case.

What ideologies could possibly allow for the coalition in Maidan case? The first noticeable discussion is on Ukrainian nationalism and liberalism that are believed to be the main drives of Ukrainian nationwide protests throughout the independence (Onuch 2017). The thing is that they were not exactly separately developed. One can trace that during the year 1990`s 'Revolution on Granite' the participants, such as national-liberal party Narodnyi Rukh, (People's movement) or student and civil rights organizations provided both national and civil rights agendas. That further persisted in 'Ukraine without Kuchma' of the year 2001 and 'Orange Revolution' of 2004 campaigns when pro-democratic and oligarchic parties, NGOs

and far-right stood together not for the last time. I expect that this relation between nationalism and liberalism enables coalitions of pro-democratic liberal parties, NGOs and far-right. [2]

Nevertheless, such a generalization would be problematic for Ukrainian oligarchic parties. The existing research, while not being conclusive, suggest that leading Ukrainian oligarchic political parties are flexible in their ideological preferences and are able to switch from centrist views to provision of some emphasis on national or civic identity, language or geopolitical issues within one year, as it happened between 2006 and early elections of 2007 (Melnykovska et. al. 2011). This leaves Svoboda to be if not an only pre-Maidan parliamentary ideologically committed political party along with Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). I expect this fact to be perceived by other actors considering previous experiences of SMOs. Also, the previous research problematizes tangible ideological boundaries between the parliamentary far-right Svoboda and extra-parliamentary far-right. The latter are perceiving Svoboda to be not radical enough or 'sold-out' (Shekhovtsov and Umland 2014). Hence, I anticipate the ideological proximity to be less important factor enabling a coalition of oligarchic and far-right parties with other SMOs than factors discussed in the next sections.

H1. If SMOs demonstrate ideological proximity, then coalition is built.

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[2] Of course, one should acknowledge that the radicalism of nationalism provided by the far-right and national liberals or NGOs might be varying. At most the discussion on the far-right would trace the transformation of the ideology and interests of marginal groups of Ukrainian far-right to foundation of an electoral political party. This what Shekhovtsov and Umland (2014, 59) narrate as Social-National Party changed its name to Svoboda. The party manifesto smoothens the rough edges of xenophobia and chauvinism with socio-economic block appealing to the left-leaning socio-economic topics. Yet, it is not representative of the overall far right currents of Ukraine with many of them, like Trident, C14 or White Hammer staying constantly far-right without divergence or serious attempt of flattening civic representation of their cause. Yet the literature review did not reveal a systematic data on ideology of Ukrainian NGOs.

2.3 Political threat and opportunity

In this section, I deal with theoretical assumptions about positive and negative effects of political threat and opportunity dealing with the dynamic-relational approach to political threat and opportunity.

The systematic review of the literature of McCammon and Van Dyke (2010, 302) reveals that in eight out of twenty-four cases examined political opportunity facilitated coalition, in two it had no effect, in one it was negative, in the rest the concept was not used. The variable had the positive effect in fifteen out of twenty-four cases and negative in one instance. In the rest, the relationship was not investigated.

Simple definition by Tarrow (1996, 54) explicates political opportunities as "consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements". This definition also allows acknowledging the sequential relationship between opportunities and threats (Almeida 2003). In other words, the SMOs engage in the protest with a proportion of opportunities and threats involved, changing as protest the develops due to interaction with government (e. g. facilitation or state repressions), counter-movement, or within coalitions. This brings the research definition close to the dynamic-relational approach (McAdam et. al. 2001).

Specifically, expected effects are related to the tuning of the scope of political opportunity and threats for the protest coalition. The organizations are likely to coalesce if by doing so they anticipate expansion of already existing opportunities for SMOs even if there is no ultimate share of a long-term strategic goal (or common opportunity perception). The participating

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SMOs join the coalition if they perceive that by doing so they can expand access to the government institutions and protest support without increasing political threat related to interaction with government and counter-movement. This hypothesis holds if they coalesce anticipating no increase in political threat produced by the reaction of the government and/or counter-movement.

The literature suggests the calculation of risk of loss of bystanders' and increased government repression was important for the anti-government protest coalition in Ukraine in the past. D'Anieri (2006) and Wilson (2009) suggest that ethnic split and risk of evoking a counter movement has been accounted by the oppositional forces in the previous anti-government campaign 'Orange revolution' of 2004.

Finally, in addition to the political opportunity threat for the coalition, one must account for political opportunity threat for each organization separately. In other words, to differentiate between political opportunities within the organization and the protest coalition. This allows drawing a distinction between preexisting political opportunities of SMOs and coalition political opportunity. What could potentially be included in threat/opportunity calculus in case of Maidan for each organization?

First, one would notice a discussion on institutional access in non-democratic regimes (Fisun 2012; D'Anieri 2006). The desire for an increase of political opportunities can be tied to the argument that the government political institutions in hybrid and non-democratic regimes systematically restrain access of oppositional political parties, civil society NGOs. Hence, the increase of political opportunities is potentially tied to a better institutional access. Second, when it comes to increased political threat one would suppose calculating the threat of closure

of already achieved political opportunities for an organization. This point is further emphasized in the literature on electoral revolutions, political threat induced protests in non-democratic regimes (Almeida 2003).

To account for the hypothesized effect described above I use political opportunity/threat perception approach (Giugni 2009, 364; Meyer 2004, 136). This allows to specifically survey the SMOs with respect to risks and benefits for participation they perceived producing a coalition making.

H2. SMOs build a coalition if they perceive that it allows expanding their political opportunities compared to previously existing ones without an increase in political threat related to the inclusion of SMO into the coalition.

2.4 Prior ties

McCammon and Van Dyke's (2010, 302) meta-analysis concludes that in thirteen out of twenty-four cases the ties had a positive effect on coalition building, and in one case the ties had no effect. The rest cases out of twenty-four under review did not use the concept.

 Why do the prior ties matter? Mostly the literature suggests that the social ties work for collation building when everything else separately fails. The social ties of individuals from different organizations, no matter formal or informal, can potentially provide a ground for negotiation leading to mutual recognition and participation in a protest. For example, Almeida (2010) in his analysis of social movement partyism illustrates a similar point with cases of double partisanship – members of parties were also members of NGOs. As the result, the link between NGOs and parties got easier as the so-called double agents gained more trust, mediated

negotiations, knew some insider information that allowed for providing a better mutual understanding among organizations. Alternatively, a negative impact of social ties suggested in the literature is disruption of within-SMO trust and membership because of the cross-SMO negotiations.

Which ties can potentially count in the researched case? The previous local activism and experiences of large-scale nationwide protest campaigns can provide the most systematic ties. The local activism is convenient as does not necessarily require a prominent ideological partisanship. The local activism is can be based on resolving more grounded issues such as illegal area development, public utilities than ideological or political ones. Thus, it enables a variety of options for parties, far right or NGOs. Moreover, local activism provides a productive environment for more frequent interactions potentially resulting in social connections, informal ties such as friendships. Second, the expectation is that ties developed in the national campaigns would provide an opportunity for coalescing for more experienced protesters who already have some partisanship and activist experience from previous anti-government protests. Also, there are some expectations related to the negative effect of prior ties. The organizations might avoid coalitions with organizations which had proven to have a bad reputation (e.g. involvement in corruption) or to be ineffective in the past.

H4. It SMOs had prior ties before Maidan then the coalition among them is built.

2.5 Resources

McCammon and Van Dyke`s (2010, 303) meta-analysis highlights that in seventeen out of twenty-four studies there is an investigation on the resource-induced coalitions. One study found no effect, two studies – negative and fourteen positive.

The baseline logic of positive effect behind the resource argument is the following. Provided that by joining resources, organizations can increase political opportunities, then they can resort to resource pooling, appropriation or accepting patronage eventually forming a coalition. In other words, if organizations consider a resource to be important for the protest cause then they develop coalitions with those who possess it.

However, availability of resources itself does not necessarily lead to an effective coalition as a competition for resources might promote a conflict between SMOs, thus resource-based coalition can break down. In other words, a negative effect is also an option, be it resource scarce or rich environments.

The resource mobilization framework got the most systematic development of the resource typology, nonetheless, it is still feasible to use it if to account that different SMOs have resources of distinct type and capacity. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) provide the following typology 1) human resources: skills, labor, knowhow directions to organize the protest 2) socio-organizational: various types of mobilization networks, non-protest created institutions available for use 3) material resources: material assets relevant for the protest 4) moral: solidarity, support 5) cultural: common sense knowledge, beliefs, values. What is more important in the definition for investigation of coalition building – resources are not a static attribute of an actor but are rather dependent on the actor's action. Basic resource attainment mechanisms include: 1) self-generation 2) appropriation/co-optation 3) patronage 4) aggregation (Ibid 2004). Hence, the typology allows accounting for the resources and strategies SMOs applied to attain the resources within the coalition. In case of coalition making options 2-4 would be of the most interest as those imply some cross-organizational interaction.

Which resource could potentially lead to coalitions in the case of Maidan? One should consider the development of Maidan as nationwide long-lasting protests withstanding high-intensity coercion. First, the protest would require moral and cultural resources to cover the protest in media in a way to maximize its support among bystanders and international audience. The latter is specifically important considering discussions on Western linkage and its the role in causing elites' deflection and government change (Levitsky and Way 2005). Next, the protest infrastructure would require an enormous amount of material resources starting from the protest stage, tent camps ending with the continuous food supply. Then it would require resources allowing to withstand high-intensity coercion, in other words, human resources of those whom Tilly (2003) calls specialists on violence. Alternatively, for a more peaceful option, the SMOs would require socio-organizational resources of local deputies and party members allowing to facilitate protesters' demands or cause deflection of local governments and law-enforcement.

H4. If organizations, consider that another SMO possess resources to be important for the success of the protest (expanding political opportunities/withstanding threats) then coalition is developed

3. Methodology

The research implements positivist methodology. The assumption is that the collected data and the applied methods of analysis allow studying factual relationships shaping the coalition. For investigation of the research question respective to the hypothesized relations I use case study of the coalitions in Kiev and the regions. For the latter, I use the most distinct case design. The study of the regional cases allows accounting for estimated variance in explanatory variables which may reveal a difference in the effect. Namely, resources, political threats, and opportunities, as well as prior ties. As the main data source for the analysis, I draw on the interviews. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in line with positivist strategy and, as suggested by Silverman (2016), were targeted to obtain factual data about SMOs' participation, the members' perceptions and beliefs about the facts, standards of action and conscious reasons for action.

3.1 The timeframe and universe of cases

The Ukrainian Maidan of 2013-2014 is a crucial case for understanding protest alliances in anti-government protests in non-democratic regimes. This includes Arab Spring protests, Ukrainian Orange Revolution 2004 etc. Moreover, it represents the atypical case in the universe of cases of modernization and 'negotiated revolution' theories.

The research mainly deals with the investigation of coalitions within the timeframe from 21st of November 2013 to 23 of February 2013. The timeframe allows studying the coalition at the time of its appearance and accommodation of NGOs, far-right, oligarchic and pro-liberal democracy parties. The closing period is chosen due to the fact of decomposing of the coalition after the accomplishment of the immediate task of overthrowing of Yanukovych. Thus, to

research the question on coalition building with respect to identified actors the given timeframe delivers a pivotal moment of its existence.

Next to provide a complex picture of coalition formation the research picks up study of both regional and capital coalitions. The distinction between regional coalitions and the one in the capital is important as research anticipates a varying scope of political opportunities and threats as well as the distribution of resources by region and organization. For instance, parties have a variance in the distribution of socio-organizational resources, such as seats in local councils, with respect to the voting patterns in the region. Next, the resource allocation is also regionally dependent, concentrating on capital only one might ignore the uneven distribution of resources or deal with the bias of studying only non-proprietary resources which were more visible in the capital. Yet, it would mean ignoring the fact that Maidan was a multi-regional protest involving the uneven distribution of resources, ties and opportunities/threats.

Additionally, the choice is justified by the reference to the fact that the protest was dependent on multi-regional actions and involved regionally dispersed SMOs. The choice helps to minimize the selection bias, assuming that some SMOs got filtered out of the coalition in the capital or were more committed to a regional cause.

3.2 Interview methodology

The research uses a subsample of semi-structured interviews from positivist perspective implying that respondents present facts about studied phenomena. The original dataset is

composed of the interviews taken between November 2016 and May 2017 as a part of a group project studying Maidan and Anti-Maidan in comparative perspective[3].

The research takes theoretically driven subsample from the interviews that used opportunistic sampling with elements of snowball sampling as it was problematic to identify and access the population after the event precisely. After initial interviews, the informants were asked to recruit additional contacts[4] considering the following categories: non-SMO protesters (those who did not have any previous activism experience), law-enforcement, counter-movement, elite participants of political parties, and far-right. The procedure resulted in the total sample of 102 respondent from the capital and the regions. While the sample does not exactly represent the population of the protesters, the snowball strategy gives a grasp on within organizational and cross-organizational connections of the protesters, including the SMOs. The sampling cut off point was chosen based on saturation criteria for the respondent category but was also limited by the availability of the informants in the given timeframe.

The research uses a theoretically driven subsample of 62 interviews with organization members participating in Maidan protests in November 2013 – February 2014. This results in the choice of the interviews with members of the following SMO categories:

- Pro-Maidan oligarchic parties – Ukrainian political parties funded by regional financial and industrial lobbies supporting Maidan in various forms. This includes MPs affiliated

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[3] The data and research documentation would be available in the forthcoming years through the archive of Research Center for East European Studies at Bremen University.

[4] Including the ones from another region

to parties, local council members, regular rank and file party members. This includes the parties: Batkivschyna party (BUT), Udar.

- Pro-Maidan far-right:
  - Parliamentary far-right. Members of Svoboda parliamentary party. Including affiliated Student Svoboda youth organization, C14 and Sokil.
  - Members of extra-parliamentary far-right organizations such as Trident, White Hammer, UNSO, Patriot of Ukraine as well as created during Maidan Right sector organization.
- Pro-democratic parties – non-oligarchic political parties expressing commitment to liberal-democratic ideology. For the suggested timeframe the research identifies only one SMO in the category – Democratic Alliance party, including affiliated Youth of Democratic Alliance.
- Non-governmental organizations. Non-radical, non-profit organizations, of varied purpose and ideology.
- Movement organizations emerging during the protest focused on protest cause and support of the protest infrastructure such as self-defense units Samooborona. Avtomaidan and protest committees.

Table 1 demonstrates the breakdown of respondents per SMO category and region[5]. The research fulfills the saturation criteria for the categories of NGOs, movement organizations, extra-parliamentary and parliamentary far right. For the oligarchic parties, this was more problematic due to low availability of the respondents. Lastly, the pro-democratic party

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[5] A more detailed breakdown per city and region is in the appendix A table A

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members were largely unavailable for the interviews both in Kiev and in the regions, hence

their answers provide less reliable information.

Table 1. Number of informants per SMO category and region in the subsample

SMO	Central	Eastern	Kyiv	Southern	Western	Donbass	Total
Pro-democratic party				2	1		3
Extra parliamentary far-right	1	3	1	1	5	1	12
NGO		2	5	2	7	2	18
Movement organization		2	3	3	5		13
Oligarchic party		1		2	3		6
Parliamentary far-right		3	1		6	1	11
Other (Non-SMO individuals, Anti-Maidan, law-enforcement)	2	21	3	3	10		39
Grand Total	**3**	**32**	**13**	**13**	**37**	**4**	**102**

Yet, another possible source of biases and factual errors is the relative time distance between

the events and the interview period. This brings a risk of interviewing a person who no longer

represents facts about SMOs due to change of membership, loss of connection to the

organization, retrospective narration. To minimize the biases the research utilizes the

procedures of a semi-structured questionnaire asking to clarify the specific protest dates and

periods and whether the information relates to an individual or organization. Additionally, to

keep the membership in mind the interviews registered a socio-demographic profile of the

informants, including SMO membership. The biases related to sensitive questions were

minimized by providing anonymization, citation and archiving consent options. For that matter,

the research provides the respondent's name and direct citation only with the consent. First, the

respondents were instructed about the research purpose, then provided the consent form

specifying recording, citation, anonymity, and archiving options. Then the respondents were

provided with a short socio-economic survey, after that the interviews started according to the

main questionnaire.

The research questionnaire has a broader purpose investigating not only coalitions but also mobilization and radicalization of the protesters. The questionnaire blocks I use can be presented as follows.[6] First block investigates conscious reasons, the motivation for mobilization, facts about participation networks, previous social and political ties. Second block deals with cross-organizational dynamics asking about existing decision-making mechanisms and conflicts among the protest participants, the perception of SMOs` goals, ways of sustaining the protest infrastructure, attitudes towards parties, NGOs and far-right. Next block deals with questions related to political opportunity and threat asking about repressions, negotiations with the government. Fifth block is about interaction with counter-movement Anti-Maidan. Lastly, the questionnaire asks about the aftermath of the Maidan and its accomplishments, further activism. The average duration of the interview in the subsample is 99 minutes.

Next, the interviews were transcribed, the text fragments were coded using deductive-inductive approach, I set categories based on research concepts, then interview findings dictated the subcategories.

3.3 Case selection

I selected to study cases of the SMO protest coalition in Kiev and the regions. The selection of regional cases allows accounting for variation in the independent variables. The regional differences in political opportunity/threat, prior ties and resources would allow investigating

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[6] The research questionnaire has a broader purpose investigating not only coalitions but also mobilization and radicalization of the protesters. Other questionnaire blocks deal with the investigation of repressions and backlash mobilization asking about factual details, the perception of coercion episodes, emotional reaction to the episodes, reasons for continuing participation.

whether the relation in place depends on the same variables which have the same effect among the regions.

While it is problematic to measure the exact distribution of independent variables per region one can estimate the most different cases of the regional coalition making. For that I suggest using the following criteria. First is the per cent of votes for oligarchic and far-right oppositional parties in the closest to Maidan parliamentary elections of 2012[7]. This allows estimating most different cases with respect to opportunities/threats, resources, ties available for the SMOs. One can assume that the voters' support, subsequent access to administrative positions would allow to produce differences or similarities within the regional coalitions. In the same way, the votes for pro-government oligarchic Party of Regions would allow to estimate the political threat, to check whether the Maidan SMOs account for that in their calculus.

The second criterion is the per cent of Ukrainian and Russian native speakers. This allows to estimate ethnic and geopolitical preferences in the regions. This also allows to roughly estimate the presence of local pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian nationalist movements, including the far-right. For that I use the data of all-national Ukrainian census of 2001[8]

The case selection resulted in the choice of three case categories. First, Donbass and Eastern region as the case with high pro-government oligarchic party voting and low far-right voting, and prevalence of Russian speakers or balance between the Russian and Ukrainian native speakers [9]. Second, Southern region with moderate voting for the pro-government party, the

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[7] Data from Central Election Commission of Ukraine
[8] Data from State Statistics Service of Ukraine
[9] Except for Dnipro, which has a prevalence of the Ukrainian native speakers and higher than the on the average voting for the far-right in the region. Dnipro is still included in the case.

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equal division between Ukrainian and Russian native speakers to two-thirds of Ukrainian native speakers, but low voting for the far-right Svoboda. And finally, the Western region with high oppositional oligarchic and far-right party voting and prevalence of Ukrainian-native speakers. Table 2 demonstrates the regional cases selected respective to the data available per region.

Table 2. Regional case selection criteria. Per cent of votes in the 2012 parliamentary election per region and per cent of Russian and Ukrainian native speakers per region.

County	Party of Regions	Batkiv schuna	UDAR	CPU	Svob oda	Region	Ukrai nian speake rs	Russia n speaker s
Donetsk	65,09	5,26	4,71	18,85	1,20	Donbas	24,1	74,9
Luhansk	57,06	5,49	4,74	25,14	1,29	Donbas	30,0	68,8
Kharkiv	40,98	15,51	12,82	20,84	3,83	Eastern	53,8	44,3
Dnipro	35,79	18,38	14,61	19,38	5,19	Eastern	67,0	31,9
Odessa	41,90	15,49	13,77	18,16	3,30	Southern	46,3	42,0
Rivne	15,80	36,59	17,25	6,21	16,63	Western	97,0	2,7
Ternopil	6,40	39,04	14,68	1,92	31,22	Western	98,3	1,2
Ivano-Frankivsk	5,18	38,21	15,25	1,78	33,79	Western	97,3	2,5
Lviv	4,70	36,48	14,44	1,99	38,02	Western	95,3	3,8

4. Protest coalitions of Maidan: analysis

4.1 Common enemy but not the future

This section investigates the assumption on ideology as a foundation for coalition building. The assumption is that ideology, as a dispatcher of identities and interests, lays a foundation for alliances or non-alliances. In other words, organizations that have a proximity in their ideology build coalitions because of recognition of common identity and interests.

For the analysis of the collective SMO identity, I define it as a sense of an affinity that links an individual to an organization. Next, the interest is defined as an object of a specific focus of an organization believed to yield an increased benefit. Also, I suggest differentiating between strategic long-term interests and immediate protest interest of participating SMOs. Next, to account for the ideological proximity criteria, I suggest scaling the SMOs with respect to their position as perceived by the participating SMOs. The suggestion is to differentiate the degree of pragmatism of an organization versus idealism. In other words, to distinguish whether the organization is perceived to be driven by an ideology or by immediate problem-solving principles. Another point of comparison crucial for investigation of the research question is a distinction between progressive and conservative ideologies. The first is defined by a preference for preservation of exclusive national culture, non-democratic methods of governance and medium to high market regulation, whereas the second by a preference for an inclusive modification of culture and values, democratic methods of governance and minimally regulated market.

The research tentatively confirms the hypothesis about the positive effect of ideological proximity. The ideological proximity has limited positive effect on coalition building among

the far-right, NGOs, pro-democratic and oligarchic parties. The analysis identifies some common points which bond the groups: immediate geopolitical opposition to Russia and anti-oligarchic grievances. The Donbass fully confirms the hypothesis. The local NGO member recognizes the proximity to oligarchic oppositional parties based on the anti-Russian vector.

While most of the organizations recognize their ideological distance from the parties, questioning their strategic interests, they still participate in the protest. More important, interviews provide evidence that the human rights NGOs recognize the distance to oligarchic parties and far-right but they show some willingness to compromise their identities and strategic interests and interests to participate along with other organizations.

The parliamentary and extra-parliamentary far-right provide the strategic justification of the ideology. The parliamentary far-right 'Svoboda' members claim the identity that is indispensable from their interest, namely, the provision of national social and national interests of Ukrainians achieved not only through conventional means of party politics – participation in Supreme and local councils but also revolutionary means. Next, they draw a distinction between representatives of national interests and those who oppose it. In this schemata, Yanukovych, government, and oligarchs, especially pro-Russian, are to be the political enemies and the source of corruption. According to interview evidence, the oligarchs are hindering the attempts of establishing national social and economic justice and do not allow for Ukrainian culture and historical memory to be recognized. The parliamentary rightists demonstrate the skepticism towards the EU as a common market of goods and labor. They are rather concerned about independent economic vector and geopolitical recognition of Ukraine and see the West rather as a civilizational choice and a domain for nation states.

Figure 1. The ideological proximity of SMOs

The extra-parliamentary rightists similarly demand a nationalist systemic change. They are more explicit in their statement of ethnic exclusiveness criteria for being Ukrainian. Along those lines, they emphasize socio-economic and cultural rights of Ukrainians threatened by pro-Russian oligarchs. Moreover, they hold more skepticism towards EU as an entity promoting hostile for Ukrainian nationalism values: multiculturalism, human rights and tolerance towards minorities. Artem Skoropadsky, press-secretary of the 'Right Sector' – the most active extra-parliamentary rightist SMO on Maidan (Artem Skoropadsky, extra-parliamentary far-right, press-secretary of 'Right Sector', Kyiv) in his interview expresses the tension between the interests of the organization and pro-EU agenda:

"...right on EuroMaidan, we said that we are against Eurointegration. It's not that we are hypocritical guys, who went on EuroMaidan, despite being against joining the EU. On

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EuroMaidan we were saying that we are against accession to the EU. We were not against signing, why not? Visa-free regime. If someone wants, he travels. Who has a lot of money, let him travel. We do not see anything wrong with this. Trade cooperation with the EU, we do not see anything wrong with this. But we were explicit on the Maidan, we declared that we go to Maidan for a single purpose, to overthrow this power in a revolutionary way, we are against joining the EU. Undoubtedly, our goals and tasks differed from the goals and objectives of those who declared that their main task is to join the EU. We were explicit about declaring that both from the Maidan scene and in our newspapers, leaflets, and interviews."

Neither EU satisfies their vision of an economy with two extra-parliamentary far-right respondents questioning EU as a way to get out of peripheral economic position. Simultaneously, despite the negation of human rights, the interviews with rightists provide some evidence that they care about police brutality and misconduct, mainly because it resonated with their experiences of state repressions. Except that one informant among parliamentary far-right does sympathize with the human rights issue as the driver of protest after 30th of November beatings.

Despite the similarities within the far-right category, the extraplanetary rightists recognize that they do not match the strategic interests with their parliamentary counterparts. As anticipated, the extra-parliamentary far-right condemn the parliamentary far-right for developing a coalition with oppositional oligarchic parties on Maidan and over the years.

The interviews deliver a limited amount of information on the ideology of pro-democratic parties, namely, 'Democratic Alliance'. The visible difference is that the democrats were initially strategically interested in pro-EU agenda. Similarly, to the far-right, they also pursue anti-oligarchic agenda. Democratic Alliance members also do not share a belief in the proximity of their interests and oligarchic parties. Yet, they do not provide an emphasis on anti-Ukrainian oligarchs' harm, instead, they stress conventional means of taming the oligarchs, need for accountability and government transparency.

Another bonding point acknowledged by the democrats is the support of anti-Russian geopolitical vector. However, the view on the proximity of far-right ideology is not conventionally shared by the Democratic Alliance, as one member is also suspicious about corrupted rightists claiming that they were following orders of oppositional oligarchic parties or even Russian command to participate in the protest and escalate the violence. In other words, the far-right who cooperated with parliamentary parties were not particularly perceived as close ideological allies. The evidence is also found on Southern regional Maidan in Odessa where the Democratic Alliance members had a conflict over the rightists' slogans emphasizing Ukrainian ethnic and racial superiority.

The NGO participants provide multi-interest perspective in their dissatisfaction with the government for the reasons of violation of rule of law, police brutality, corruption, suppression of middle-income business, or hardships for development of Ukrainian culture. This is also mediated by the interview subsample that includes participants of NGOs concentrated on different issues, such as human rights, LGBT, minority rights, political rights of electoral transparency or cultural rights and promotion of Ukrainian culture. Still, the respondents can consciously identify groups of their strategic ideological proximity. In this way, the member of Ukrainian electoral transparency NGO claims proximity of Ukrainian political rights NGOs, and more generally civic protesters, to the pro-democratic party – Democratic Alliance as the latter had a previous experience of grassroots activism and shared the distrust for oppositional oligarchic parties (Vladyslav Grezev, NGO participant, Opir.org, Kyiv). Other NGOs concerned with the development of Ukrainian culture, demonstrate closeness to 'Svoboda'.

 The interviews, as rather an exception, also provide an evidence that anti-Russian geopolitical orientation of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna was sufficient to be considered allies of NGOs in

Donbass case. The NGO participant of Maidan in Luhansk, claims that the parties were credible enough as they most definitely were not for pro-Russian vector (Olexiy Bida, NGO participant, Postup, Luhansk).

The human rights NGOs consciously acknowledge the gap between their strategic interest and that of other organizations. Similarly, to other, they sense the distance between their identities and interests and those of oligarchic parties. The evidence on ideological distance is provided by the episodes of fights over the protest slogans in capital and regions - at first, the NGO participants tried to stop the spread of the far-right protest slogans. However, this is less true for national-culturally oriented NGOs who shared the interest in the promotion of Ukrainian culture and history. Yet, the human rights NGOs were ready to accept the geopolitical argument of the anti-Russian choice of the far-right stating, in that way the NGOs were concerned about the implications of differences between Russian and EU human rights protection.

Despite the differences, political and human rights NGOs demonstrate readiness to compromise their strategic interests in exchange for the opportunity for coalescing and fulfillment of immediate protest interests related to anti-government grievances. They acknowledge that the rightists' anti-Russian grievances are not equal to pursuing the pro-EU geopolitical vector and human rights agenda. LGBT activist community leader and member of Amnesty International states that the Maidan coalition initially had an ideological conflict between part of progressives among LGBT activists, extra-parliamentary leftists, and feminists. While those were ideologically close strategic allies of the human rights NGOs, they were ideological enemies of the far-right. That resulted in the forceful exclusion of the part of progressives by the extra-parliamentary far-right early during the protest. The threat of physical harm made the human rights activist to compromise their narrower strategic demands and

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visibility to engage in the anti-government protests. (Zorian Kis', NGO participant, Amnesty International and Tochka Opory, Kiev).

Lastly, the movement organization members, such as self-defense units and protest coordination committees, provide the most heterogeneous set of ideologies and preferences with some similarities to Svoboda and extra-parliamentary far-right standing for Ukrainization and the others acknowledging their aim of universalism incompatible with the rightist ideology. Additionally, the movement organization participants state skepticism towards oligarchic party protest organizers.

Hence, the most common points bonding the organizations are an immediate interest in anti-Russian geopolitical vector and anti-oligarchic grievances, including suspicion towards the oppositional oligarchic parties. Those similarities do not exactly constitute ideological proximity bonding all the organizations as the strategic interests differ among all the SMO categories. The underlying identities of the organizations varied within and among the SMO categories which is further confirmed not only by the factual data on the ideological preferences but also acknowledged in the cross-assessments of the SMO members themselves. For instance, the far-right and human rights NGOs had to participate in the coalition that had potentially conflicting identities. Moreover, the interviews provide evidence that some human rights NGOs had to compromise their identities and strategic interests to coalesce. However, having the differences in strategic interests, the organizations were bonded by the immediate interests: anti-government, anti-oligarchic demands and the choice against pro-Russian geopolitical vector.

4.2 By any means necessary? Political opportunity and threat of coalition-making

In this section, I deal with political opportunity/threat coalition forming effect. The hypothesis is stated as follows: the SMOs build a coalition if they perceive that it allows expanding their political opportunities compared to previously existing ones without an increase in political threat.

The research concludes that political/opportunity threat hypothesis has limited confirmation in Kiev and Western case. Other than that, limitations are stated as follows. First, the effect of opportunity threat had also a negative effect on the inclusion of extra-parliamentary far-right in Kiev and the Western case. Second, both hypothesized positive and negative effects in the cases last prior to 16th of January when an increase in political threat appears. After that, the relation of political opportunity/threat is different from the hypothesized one. Namely, the organizations rather calculate the increase of political opportunity and a decrease of political threat. The same goes for the Eastern, Donbass, and Southern cases which reject the hypothesis.

The evidence is that the calculation of political opportunity/threat accounts for the coalition among oligarchic, parliamentary far-right parties, NGOs, and movement organizations in Kiev and had a negative effect on the coalition with the extra-parliamentary far-right. This effect is manifested only prior to the anti-oppositional law of the 16th of January. After that, the organizations forming a coalition with the extra-parliamentary far-right calculate the chances of increase of political opportunities and minimization of political threat. In the regions, there is no single effect of the political/threat opportunity.

To begin with, let us investigate how the SMOs perceived the political opportunity before the Maidan and how the calculus of threats and opportunities changed during the protest across the SMO categories.

The interviews provide evidence that both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary rightists perceived their political opportunities as largely limited before the Maidan. They claim to have scarce options to achieve their ideological goals through institutional politics as they were limited by Yanukovych, pro-Russian oligarchic rulership. More particularly, Svoboda members argue that they had low odds of achieving their goals had Yanukovych remained the president. They anticipated that Yanukovych would forge the following elections securing second presidential term. The extra-parliamentary far-right, in addition to what Svoboda members have said, claim being in a more challenging situation. Namely, during Yanukovych, the far-right were experiencing constant repressions: imprisonments and criminal cases.

The interviews deliver evidence that in the situation of the anticipated political threat and limited opportunities they were actively seeking a way to expand the institutional access by getting rid of Yanukovych and his allies. How exactly they planned to achieve that? Here the interviews provide unequivocal perspective on the rightists' strategy. Namely, they were actively seeking an opportunity for what they call 'national revolution' well before the Maidan.

"Because our main slogans, with which we went out on the first march in the Dnipro, or when we traveled to nationwide marches to Kiev, we had one of the slogans - revolution. And the leaders prepared us for a revolution. In principle, when I communicated with the youth, I said that there would be our revolution." (Kyrylo Dorolenko, Parliamentary far right, Svoboda deputy assistant, Dnipro)

In the previous section, I mentioned that there were some ideological boundaries between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary rightists, yet both currents share the idea of a revolutionary change of power in the name of national interest. More importantly, both currents sensed the increase of political opportunity leading to joining the coalition after the beating of protesters on the night of the 30th of November 2013 in Kiev. Pro-EU agenda was not only hostile to the rightists but in their perception, was not compelling enough to mobilize strong anti-government grievances compatible with the idea of violent revolutionary ouster.

"We were shaking the situation, we talked about the necessity of revolution from the first day Yanukovych came to power. We did not recognize him as president at all. Neither we, nor the Stephan's Bandera 'Trizub', nor autonomous nationalist movements. Naturally, when it all came about [talks about the beginning of Maidan]*, we used it as an occasion* […]

[…] *People unaffectedly came out, let's say, originally with the demand of European integration. Then the beating of students outraged them and they went out with righteous anger, sorry for the pathos. And for the nationalists, there was a completely different purpose and task. We realized that it was simply possible to take advantage of the current situation and, by and large, overthrow this power, taking advantage of the existing revolutionary moment. Everyone had completely different goals, a different vision of how things are. And so, everyone took advantage of what was happening."* (Artem Skoropadsky, extra-parliamentary far-right, press-secretary of Right Sector, Kyiv)

Unlike the far-right, NGOs and movement organizations initially, do not demonstrate the revolution seeking attitude in their calculation of coalition making political threat and opportunity. Many of them mobilized for pro-EU agenda and switched to anti-government grievances after student beatings of 30th of November 2013. Subsequently, they radicalized after the anti-oppositional law of the 16th of January 2014 promising the threat of an authoritarian backsliding. Yet, despite the initially uncertain tactics of NGOs and movement organizations what calculus of threats and opportunities was involved when making a coalition? Let us look at the evidence from the coalitions in Kiev and regions.

While initially, the NGOs were concerned that the parties might monopolize the protest, the first hint on the coalition between political parties, movement organizations, and NGOs in Kiev appeared after Yanukovych publicly declined to sign the EU-association agreement and on the 30th of November 2013 violent repressions tool place. The members of NGOs and movement organizations claim that the civil society did not have much to offer in terms of a perception of how to use the protest for their cause later. Instead, they argue that Maidan had only occasionally become an opportunity to build a stronger civil society. Likewise, the Democratic Alliance members in South and West argue that Maidan had occasionally become an opportunity to include the demands of government accountability and transparency on the national level.

In Kiev the there is an indication that despite the initial distancing from the oligarchic parties the NGOs could not come up with a plan on how to achieve positive government response after the repressions of the 30th of November 2013. In that situation the NGOs sensed they had to include the parties, allowing for the pre-existing political oppositional alliance of oligarchic Udar, Batkivschyna and far-right Svoboda to negotiate on the behalf of protesters producing an opportunity to facilitate their demands:

"We decided to compromise and unite with the political Maidan only when the coercion scenarios began, and when people saw that there were no leaders among the community, from the inside. In fact, they did not appear until the end. This is another indicator of the fact that such a maturity was not at that moment in our Ukrainian society. Instead, we delegated the negotiations with the then-political regime to Tyagnibok, Yatsenyuk, Klitschko [talks about Ukrainian oligarchic and far-right party leaders]. *And somewhere the society felt that they, acting as ambassadors, could carry some kind of benefit. And then we realized that it makes no sense to split with them because we now have common interests."* (Vladyslav Grezev, NGO participant, Opir.org, Kyiv).

Yet, the scenario of expansion of political opportunities to negotiate with the government had a negative effect on the coalition with the extra-parliamentary far-right. Between the 21st of November 2013 and beginning of December NGOs, movement organization self-defense units, and parties distanced from the extra-parliamentary far-right. The parties and NGOs condemned the extra-parliamentary far-right labeling them as provocateurs. This hints on the calculus that initially considered that their inclusion into coalition might impede negotiations with the government. This is also presumed by the rightists themselves who argue that it might be the argument for distancing from them. The Batkivschyna security guards and Svoboda tried to isolate and exclude them. Simultaneously, the rightists report an unknown organization spread leaflets encouraging to avoid or report their presence.

In the words of the extra-parliamentary far-right, the popular perception of the rightists in the capital started to depart from negative after the 30th of November as they secured some part of the protesters during the beating and controversially occupied Kiev city administration to sustain the protest. At the same time, after capturing the administrative buildings the extra-parliamentary far-right started to share the buildings producing some coordination with then-emerging movement organizations such as self-defense units and political parties.

Yet a more robust evidence related to change in political opportunities/threat calculus is that the parties, movement organizations, NGOs in the capital formed a coalition with the extra-parliamentary far-right after the parliament voted for the law criminalizing NGOs and opposition on the 16th of January. The interviews provide the evidence that the SMOs saw the law of 16th of January and further fights with law enforcement as an increasing political threat. Thus, then existing coalition was ready to join with organizations that decrease a political threat of government and law-enforcement repressions and increase political opportunities.

The rightist report two episodes of negotiations between Right Sector and oligarchic Udar at that time. First, the rightists had the Udar leader Klychko brought for negotiations. They offered to promote a violent revolutionary scenario. In their words, they promised Klychko, as then publicly supported oppositional politician, the presidential position. Yet, again they state that Klychko was hesitant to give a permission for an execution of the scenario on his behalf. Later, the 'Right Sector' had unofficial negotiations with Udar representatives who encourage them joining the march to the parliament 'making the revolution to happen' (Artem Skoropadsky, extra-parliamentary far-right, press-secretary of Right Sector, Kyiv). In exchange, the Udar negotiators promised combat equipment and various material support.

On the 19th of January 2014 during the fights with law-enforcement Berkut, it has also become evident that the extra-parliamentary rightist got increased support of Maidan movement organizations. The rightist report that after the fights Samooborona self-defense unit members had increasingly joined the 'Right Sector' ranks. Hence, alliance with the rightists opportunely formed when the organizations met an increasing political threat from law-enforcement and the government, however still preserving some opportunities for negotiation through the oligarchic and far-right oppositional party leaders.[10]

The research provides evidence that the calculation of political opportunity/threat accounts for the coalition among oligarchic, parliamentary far-right parties, NGOs and movement organizations in Kiev and produced distancing from the extra-parliamentary far-right. That effect got manifestation only prior to the anti-oppositional law that got voted by the parliament

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[10] I do not explicitly deal with radicalization and mobilization assuming that the processes had distinct calculation of threats and opportunities.

on the 16th of January. Yet, after that, the emphasis on political threat takes over bonding the extra-parliamentary far-right with the rest.

Also, contrary to the expectation, the Kiev case interviews provide evidence that while distancing from the rightists the SMOs put more attention to the political opportunity, maximizing support and establishing negotiations with the government. Otherwise, the SMOs of Maidan in the capital disregarded the possibility of an ethnic polarization when coalescing with the far-right in the capital. The protesters had in mind the following scenarios regarding the Yanukovych supporters and the counter-movement threat. First one - the counter-movement was a function of Yanukovych`s informal coercive apparatus and it would dissolve after Yanukovych goes away. Second, the radicalization of counter-movement would not happen if Russia does not interfere.

The regional cases provide more evidence on the coalition making political opportunity/threat calculus of the Maidan SMOs. Despite the concerns that oligarchic party might monopolize the protest deputies got into coalition as they helped to withstand law-enforcement repressions which started in regions earlier than in the capital, prior to 30th of November 2013. The party members provided support to withstand government repressions which have also got sensed by the other SMOs, as it happened in Odessa.

Even though political parties and NGOs had a preexisting knowledge about pro-Russian organizations and generally pro-Russian attitudes in the city that had mainly positive effect on the inclusion of the far-right. The SMOs recognize they helped to withstand the threat from the counter-movement. In that way, in Odessa case, contrary to Kiev case, opportunity/threat

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calculation had initially logic of decreasing political threat during the end of November 2013 and further episodes of confrontation with the government and counter-movement.

In the West, the negative effect of opportunity/threat, similarly to Kiev, included limiting of the rightists' influence on the protest slogans, as it happened in Ternopil, Rivne, and Ivano-Frankivsk. Those from the beginning were about the promotion of a revolutionary government change. That initially did not resonate with the protesters due to increased chances of repression and lose of then existing opportunities for negotiations. The evidence is also that the oligarchic parties were trying to forbid nationalist slogans 'Glory to Ukraine!' and 'Glory to the nation, death to the enemies!' in the early days of protest. Svoboda members reflect on those decisions being aimed to involve more bystanders. In other words, the oligarchic parties tried initially to maximize the protest support in the regions without an increase in political threat by restricting the far-right. In Lviv, the NGO protest stage moderators of Maidan were attempting control the far-right's access to the stage in order not to radicalize the protest before the December 2013.

However, Svoboda took over the protest stage in Lviv in December to lead the protest in anti-government direction, while no information on extra-parliamentary rightist's inclusion is given for that period. The respondents hint that most of the extra-parliamentary rightists of the Western regions mobilized to the capital. The Western region's coalition was, like in Kiev, prioritizing the political threat of the government repressions and foreign intervention after the 16th of January. The interviews provide evidence that the NGOs and movement organizations were anticipating the high-intensity coercion provided that the protest loses after the 19th of January 2014. Rather than seeking ways to extend the protest support among the Eastern regions the coalition in the West was preparing for state coercion and was itself considering resistance and pro-separation scenarios provided that the protests in Kiev and the regions fail.

In Donbass region and East, the protests, similarly to Odessa, were exposed to the counter-movement which, however, did not influence the protest coalition opportunity/threat calculus. The interviews rather provide the evidence that they calculated withstanding political threat by including the rightists. While in Kharkiv the NGOs and movement organizations had negotiation a with counter-movement 'Oplot' organization, that was disrupted by the far-right who attacked the counter-movement offices. Nonetheless, that did not result in the exclusion of the rightists. At most, the parliamentary Svoboda (Artur Shevtsov, parliamentary far-right, head of Svoboda in Donetsk, Donetsk) member at Donetsk argues that, in principle, the distinction between the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary rightists was mutually beneficial as it allowed for taking more radical action for latter without discrediting the party in the eyes of Western audience. He further explains that Svoboda by keeping non-radical image could potentially get more moral and political support of the West.

Hence, the research confirms the hypothesis about political threat/opportunity effect on coalition building in Kiev for a limited time prior to 16th of January 2014. In that period the calculation of opportunity/threat ratio had also negative effect, excluding the extra-parliamentary far-right from the coalition. The interviews provide evidence that then coalescing SMOs perceived the extra-parliamentary rightists as potentially decreasing bystanders' support and obstructing negotiations with the government in Kiev. Yet, there is a limitation to the confirmation of the political opportunity/threat hypothesis as the threat decrease was prioritized after the 16th of January in Kiev. Hence, building the coalition under the different relation of political opportunity to political threat from the hypothesized one.

Simultaneously there is no single effect of opportunity/threat in the regions with differences among the cases. In Western regions, the effect, like in Kiev, was initially negative for the inclusion of the extra-parliamentary far-right. Other than that research finds confirmation of the hypothesis about the positive effect in the Western case. Yet, in the cases of Donbass, East and South the hypothesis is rejected.

4.3 Friends are not always welcomed

In this section, I investigate the hypothesis about prior ties as a coalition forming factor. The hypothesis is stated as follows. If SMOs had prior ties, including social or private ties among the SMO members, joined activism, then coalition is built.

The research confirms the hypothesis about the positive effect of prior ties in Eastern, Donbass, and Southern regional cases. Yet, contrary to the expectation, the prior ties had no effect in the Western regional case. Simultaneously, the interviews do not provide any evidence that prior ties had a manifested effect in Kiev.

In the Western region, the preexisting ties, contrary to the expectation, did not always produce an immediate coalition. For example, in Rivne, the organization members such as anti-corruption NGO Opora, Fourth power and local oppositional deputies had a preexisting commitment for participation in local illegal area development activist group which constituted the core of regional Maidan and developed movement organizations such as protest coordination committees. Yet, that did not result in the immediate coalition between movement organizations, NGOs and oppositional far-right and oligarchic parties. The NGOs reported that

they were distancing and not sharing an organizational structure, such as movement organization protest coordination centers, until the middle of December 2013.

In Ternopil, it is more problematic to investigate the effect of the prior ties as NGOs and the parliamentary parties started protesting at about the same time. Moreover, the Svoboda at that time was holding positions of the city mayor and majority in local councils and provided a support for the cause of the protest. In Lviv, in its turn, the prior ties did not result in the cross-SMO category immediately.

Yet the prior ties had a positive effect in the Southern case of Odessa, as well as in Donbass and Eastern regions. First, in Odessa, the interviews provide evidence on the preexisting connection among the extra-parliamentary far-right and pro-Ukrainian culture NGOs. This includes previous experience of nationwide pro-Ukrainian language campaign of 2010-2011. Similarly, in East and Donbass cases the cultural pro-Ukrainian and pro-democratic NGOs had pre-existing ties with local oligarchic party members and far-right party activists which brought them together to coordinate protest on their local Maidans.

4.4. Oligarchic patronage or when the far-right need a compassion

This section deals with the investigation of the effect of resources on the coalition making. The research hypothesis is stated as follows. If organizations, consider that another SMO possesses resources to be important for the success of the protest (expansion of opportunities/withstanding threats) then coalition is built.

The research confirms the hypothesis about the positive impact of resources on coalition making in Kiev and the regional cases. To begin with, the section four point two mentions that

the far-right and oligarchic parties were useful in negotiations with the government and protesters. Yet, this does not limit the coalition with the oligarchic and far-right parties to the positive impact of socio-organizational resources allowing for negotiations with the government. Simultaneously, the interviews provide evidence that NGOs and movement organizations realized that through patronage the political parties provide no less important for success material and human resources. The NGO protesters claim that after the parties joined the civic Maidan in Kiev they brought their equipment, organized the stage and provided continuous financial support allowing for sustaining the protest infrastructure. In the word of NGO and movement organization members, the protest would not achieve the scope and infrastructure it had provided that it rely only on the input of civic protesters, movement organizations and NGOs.

Moreover, they claim that parties not only provided material resources but had an important human resource capacity. First, the interviews provide evidence that they also raised connections to businessmen nationwide to support the protest. Second, they hired experienced protest organizers to establish first movement organizations, such as self-defense units: security guards and former Afganistan veterans.

Next, the interviews provide evidence that the extra-parliamentary far-right also had interests in the attainment of resources through coalescing. Namely, they were interested in moral support for anti-government contention. The rightist acknowledged that they could not provide a revolutionary popular contention that would sympathize with their interests. They argue that it was important that Maidan was able to mobilize a large number of supporters for anti-government cause after the protesters' beating of 30th of November 2013. Precisely they claim that the pro-EU protests barely certified then president Yanukovych as an unworthy ruler. In

their words, the repressions of 30th of November 2013 provided exactly that certification as it was delivered by other SMOs. In that situation, the rightists claim to get more opportunities to fight for their cause.

The extra-parliamentary rightists' resources on Kiev Maidan had also received the demand of other SMOs such as self-defense movement organizations and oppositional oligarchic parties. The interview evidence is mainly about human resources of the rightists as military trained fighters able to withstand government repression. Yet, the demand for the far-right's resources mainly coincides with the episode of increase in the perceived political threat, as discussed in the section four point two, or during the episodes of direct violent confrontations between the protesters and law-enforcement. For example, exactly in the episode of negotiations between the Right Sector and Udar the latter acknowledge that the Right Sector in addition to its capacity to fight in violent revolution was one of the most organized professional defence forces of Maidan able to defend the protesters (Artem Skoropadsky, extra-parliamentary far-right, press-secretary of Right Sector, Kyiv).

The regional coalition cases deliver the similar picture. In the Western region, the oligarchic oppositional and far-right parties provided coalition for themselves through securing the protest sites. The availability of positions in the regional administration allowed, as in Ternopil, to make decisions in favor of NGOs and more generally protesters providing an argument for bonding. In that way, the Ternopil Svoboda also was among the first to initiate the movement organizations such as protest coordination structures. As early as at the beginning of December the Svoboda affiliated town mayor along with NGOs suggested establishing the coordination committee providing a material support such as place of gathering. From then on it served to coordinate the actions among the SMOs, including the oppositional oligarchic parties.

In the Southern region, the oligarchic deputies, while being generally in minority and not having the degree of administrative capacity also produced a coalition with NGOs and Democratic Alliance affiliated youth organization. Using the available deputy rights they secured the protest site legitimizing it as their public offices. That bought them tickets into movement organizations of the protesters. Next, the resource effect for the inclusion of the extra-parliamentary far-right is about the same as the coalition recognized their skills of dealing with government repressions, counter-movement provocateurs. In that way, the rightists protected the protesters during major events such as marches and demonstrations which got recognized as crucial activities for the protesters' security among SMOs.

In the Donbass region, the interviews provide similar evidence. Despite the resource-scarce environment, the NGOs in Luhansk and Donetsk had to coordinate their actions with the local oligarchic party members. While the parties could not mobilize more than ten to twenty supporters the NGO appropriated their socio-organizational resources for their own purpose: to spread their messages and demands. In that way, by appropriating the party resources, coordinating their effort and building the coalition, they hoped to mobilize more supporters.

5. Conclusion

The original research question I investigated is why the middle-class Ukrainian Maidan protesters of 2013-2014 developed coalitions with oligarchic parties and far-right, despite the prevalence of universalist values and pro-democratic preferences of the participants. By doing so I deal with puzzling for the theories of modernization question. To put it more directly, why the individual demographic characteristics of the protesters and pro-democratic preferences do not translate into pro-democratic action.

For the investigation, I chosen the social movement organization (SMO) meso-level approach. It allows to fill in the gap in understanding of the links between an individual and collective as far as organizations play the role of facilitators of a collective action and interaction among the protest movement, the government, and bystanders. I investigated SMO collations of Maidan questioning each SMO`s ideology, strategic interest, resources and prior ties and opportunity/threat calculus as possible explanations.

Table 3 demonstrates the main research findings. In all cases the research confirms the hypothesis about the positive effect of SMO resources on coalition making. In other words, if Maidan SMOs sensed that the resources of other organization allow for the protest to be more successful they formed a coalition - be it resource-scarce environment, as in the cases of Eastern, Southern and Donbass regions or rich ones – Kiev and Western region. The research tentatively confirms the hypothesis about ideological proximity. While there are differences in strategic visions of the organizations, such as the EU benefit, or nation-building, democratic development, the research finds that the SMOs had proximate immediate interests. Namely, the anti-Russian geopolitical preference and anti-oligarchic grievances. The research also confirms the hypothesis about the effect of prior ties in regional cases where the far-right

Svoboda and oligarchic oppositional parties had the lowest presence. Namely, in Southern Region, Eastern Region, and Donbass. At the same time, the research rejects the hypothesis in Western Region and Kiev as no effect or no evidence is found.

Yet, the most unexpected results were revealed by investigating the hypothesis about political opportunity/threat calculus effect. The research confirms the hypothesis to a limited extent in the Western case and Kiev. Namely, oppositional oligarchic and far-right parties, NGOs and movement organizations were calculating the increase in political opportunities without a change in political threat when coalescing. That also excluded the extra-parliamentary far-right from the coalitions. But that effect is limited to a certain period. Namely, it changes after the government repression threat arises and the protesters start to prioritize the decrease of political threat. In addition, contrary to the expectation, the SMOs disregarded the ethnic polarization threat. The protesters did not recognize the polarization of pro-Yanukovych bystanders and then-emerging counter-movement as an independent threat presuming that it would either disappear after the ouster of Yanukovych or increase due to Russian foreign intervention.

Simultaneously, the research revealed one more unexpected result on opportunity/threat calculus of the SMOs. Namely, in the Donbass, Eastern, and Southern regional cases where the SMOs had the limited political opportunities and the highest chances to meet the government and counter-movement repressions the protesters had a different calculus from the very beginning. Namely, when deciding on the coalition they calculated the increase in political opportunity and a decrease of political threat. That is also, contrary to Kiev and Western regional case, immediately brought together extra-parliamentary far-right with other SMOs.

Table 3. The summary of the research hypotheses tests and findings[12]

Case	Kiev		Western		Southern		Eastern		Donbass	
Time[11]	01.12.13	16.01.14	01.12.13	01.01.13	21.11.13	22.02.14	01.12.13	21.02.14	01.12.2013	21.02.14
DV: Coalition composition	NGOs, oligarchic parties, parliamentary far-right, movement organizations	Extra-parliamentary far-right joined	NGOs, oligarchic parties, parliamentary far-right, movement organizations	Extra-parliamentary far-right joined	NGOs, oligarchic parties, parliamentary far-right, movement organizations, extra-parliamentary far-right	No change	NGOs, oligarchic parties, parliamentary far-right, movement organizations, extra-parliamentary far-right	No change	NGOs, oligarchic parties, parliamentary far-right, movement organizations, extra-parliamentary far-right	No change
Ideological proximity	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+	+
Opportunity/threat perception	+-	+*	+-	+*	+*	+*	+*	+*	+*	+*
Prior ties	0	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Resources	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

[11] The first date is the one when the first coalition appears, next date per region marks another SMO joining the coalition. Otherwise the last date of research timeframe is given

[12] Legend:1) (+) original hypothesis confirmed, positive effect 2) (-) negative effect 3) (+-) mixed, positive only to some extent 4) (+*) positive effect, but relation is different from the hypothesized, original hypothesis rejected 5) (0) no effect/no evidence provided by the data, hypothesis rejected

What do the research findings reveal about the SMO protesters of Maidan and how do the findings explain the puzzling protest alliance? The first thing is that the protesting SMOs are still largely dependent on the patronage of oligarchic parties and their ability to lead the protest in a winning direction. Second, despite the tangible presence of ideological boundaries among the protest organizations the protesters neglect their strategic interests and identities to keep the protest going or to satisfy some short-term interests. This includes ambiguous compromises between progressive NGOs and far-right radical nationalists.

Another interesting research finding that goes contrary to the expectation is about the relationship between the oligarchic parties and other SMO protesters in Donbass, East and South of Ukraine where the parties are perceived to be not only pragmatic. The NGO participants recognize their role in support of geopolitical orientations to be genuine and sufficient to be considered proximate for the alliance.

Next, uncertain but promising development revealed by the study of prior ties in the Western region. The results provide a hint on a political separation between NGOs and oligarchic political parties. While the local environments are prone to produce social contacts between the two groups which transcend the politics, the Western regional case of Rivne reveals that the organizations do not cooperate immediately having the prior ties in place. Yet the result is uncertain as in another Western case of Ternopil there is no that clear line between the protesters and the parliamentary far-right Svoboda.

More important, despite the findings on the progressiveness of some of the SMOs, the presence of strive for democratic governance, transparency and accountability the research reveals that the protesters disregarded an invention of a potential solution for Ukraine that would settle the

politically produced ethnic and political splits within the country. The situation is worsened by the fact that the protesting SMO alliances had occasionally opened an increasing opportunity for the far-right whose visions of Ukraine as an ethnic nation potentially transmitted a negative signal to Yanukovych-supporting bystanders engaging them in a further contention or alienating them from Ukrainian state (Kudelia 2017, 217)

A couple of caveats should be mentioned. First, the research revealed that there is a variation in time and composition of coalitions per case. In other words, not all organizations coalesced as immediately as one would expect. That is especially applicable to oligarchic parties and the extra-parliamentary far-right. The research data hint that some part of the explanation can be attributed to the effect of interaction with the government and law-enforcement, as well as the further interaction between the radical flank far-right and all other SMOs. Yet, a further research on radicalization should confirm that. A promising approach is to use multi-method design combining qualitative case analysis and statistical modeling of SMO co-participations network, conditioned by the intensity of repressions per period and region using the data available by UPCD (2014) protest event database.

Another important issue to address in further research is related to coalition making, is the behavior of oligarchic parties. The research provides tentative evidence that contrary what D'Aniery (2006) suggests was the case for the 'Orange revolution', oligarchic parties do not necessarily care about the perception of their legitimacy among the counter-movement and government supporters when choosing coalition partners and can subsequently radicalize. A further research should explain the radicalization of oligarchic parties.

Another research limitation is concerned with validity and reliability. First, in some of the regional cases, the research sampling procedure does not provide enough respondents for all the SMO categories. This makes the research conclusions for those cases less reliable. Second, the conclusions for democratic party SMO group and oligarchic parties are less reliable due to the low response rate. The problem is also mediated by the fact that Ukrainian oligarchic parties have less partisan members in the regions. The limitation can be remedied by using relevant secondary data, such as interviews with the elite oligarchic party and 'Democratic Alliance' members both for additional data and triangulation.

Finally, the research findings also relate to those of Onuch (2014) and Shestakovskii (2015). My research fills in the gap addressed by Shestakovskii (2015). Namely, it allows to produce a better understanding of how the pro-democratic preferences interact with some nationalist developments that happened during the Maidan.

Second, it allows to address some claims made by Onuch (2014). In contrast to the findings on socio-demographic parameters and policy preferences of individual protesters providing a ground for democratization my research reveals a troublesome patterns of within movement interaction. Similar to Ohuch (2014) my research finds the variety of preferences among the protesters. Yet, the SMO preferences reveal a different picture. While Onuch (2014) argues that the role of far-right was negligible, my research provides the evidence that it had an impact on the ideological preferences and behavior of the pro-democratic protesters and SMOs, such as human rights ones. The rightists limited the expression of their narrower but nonetheless crucial for democracy interests of inclusiveness. Not to mention that the research provides evidence that the far-right considerably restricted participation of some currents of progressive SMOs who did not compromise the visibility of their demands within the protest. The research

provides evidence that unlike the democrats and NGO organizations, the far-right had arguably the most systematic grasp on how to use the protest coalition for their own cause. A further case study research should reveal how much the democrats and anti-corruption, human rights NGOs used the political opportunities versus far-right after the Maidan and whether their interests are non-conflicting.

Yet, my research also shares limitations with Shestakovskii (2015) and Onuch (2014). Namely, the research does not allow to estimate how much the pro-democratic protesters were involved into the SMO organizations of Maidan or how intensively they participated throughout the protest. The results are also not generalizable for the overall population of Ukraine.

In the meantime, the research provides some policy directions. Both progressive role of pro-democrats put forward by Onuch (2014) and Shestakovskii (2014) and post-Maidan far-right radicalization remain assumptions in Ukrainian case unless other evidence is provided. Yet, my research concludes that the pro-democratic individual attitudes not that easily constitute coherent pro-democratic protest coalitions or make the pro-democratic forces a protest vanguard.

While revolutions presumably result in a rapid change of society and political regime the examination of the design of political institutions is as important as the political processes in civil society. The research suggests that civil society SMOs serve as an active gatekeeper of ideologies, interests, identities, resources, and access to political opportunities. A mismatch within SMO alliances can compromise the aim of democratization and polarize the population. Hence, the policy advice for the NGOs includes the following recommendations.

First, for international NGO donors, the suggestion is to provide incentives encouraging institutionalization of parting between civic NGOs and far-right. Second, for the government to ensure that right-leaning cultural NGOs do not fall into trap of radicalization set by the far-right by providing separate channels of institutional access and controlling the spread of radical nationalist discourse. Third, for NGOs, the task is to control reproduction of radical nationalist discourse that may impede the pro-democratic development of civic identity. More importantly, the task is to control political cooperation between the far-right and oligarchic parties. The combination of oligarchic lobbies with the right-wing groups can potentially create a tool for consolidation of an authoritarian regime through the provision of an infrastructural executive power to the far-right.

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7. Appendix A

Table A. Number of informants per city/town and SMO category

	Donbass		Eastern			Kyiv	Southern	Western				Total
SMO	**Donetsk**	**Luhansk**	**Dnipro**	**Kryvyy Rih**	**Kharkiv**		**Odessa**	**Ivano-Frankivsk**	**Lviv**	**Rivne**	**Ternopil**	
Democratic party							2	1				3
Extra-parliamentary far-right		1			3	1	1	2	1	1	1	11
NGO	1	1	2			5	2	1	2	3	1	18
Movement organization			1		1	3	3	1	2	1	1	13
Oligarchic party					1		2	1	1		1	6
Parliamentary far-right	1		2	1		1		1		2	3	11
Grand Total	**2**	**2**	**5**	**1**	**5**	**10**	**10**	**7**	**6**	**7**	**7**	**62**