CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2018
| Author | Ten, Yuliya |
|---|---|
| Title | A Reassessment of Public Reason in the Context of the Neutrality-Perfectionist Debate |
| Summary | The aim of the thesis is to offer a refinement of Rawls’s conception of public reason. For this, one of the central discussions within the neutrality-perfectionist debate is utilized. In particular, it is claimed that public reason can be effectively analyzed when placed into the solution for the incoherence charge of the asymmetry objection, which emphasizes the alleged difference of attitudes towards the issue of justice and the issue of the good by political liberals. The thesis proposes a two-staged argument. First, it claims that the differentiation argument, that is the idea that it is possible to defend political liberalism against the incoherence charge by arguing that the issue of the good can be at least partially deliberated and agreed on. This argument says that there are two levels at which the goods can be considered – individual and societal, and it is at the latter level when the goods can be effectively debated on. For this, the argument goes on, it is necessary to rely on public reason. However, it is problematic to apply public reason in the form Rawls presents it. Consequently, second, the macroanalysis of public reason is offered and several vital changes are promoted. There are two groups of the changes. The primary change concerns two elements of Rawls’s public reason: the kind of issues (fundamental political questions) and the basic principles (political conceptions of justice). Both of these elements are broadened to a degree it seems desirable and appropriate for the purposes of the differentiation argument’s strategy. The secondary (or reactionary) change concerns the changes of the further two elements of public reason that are affected by the primary change. These are the kind of practices (political advocacy and voting) and a condition for cooperative behavior (a criterion of reciprocity). It is concluded that the idea of public reason broadened in this way can be a more effective framework for the deliberation process on the issue of the good, and potentially for other issues that Rawls put aside in his own conception of it. |
| Supervisor | Moles, Andres |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2018/ten_yuliya.pdf |
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