SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I FOUCAULT: THE BIOPOLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

By
Joe Watkins

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Supervisor: Professor Boldizsár Nagy

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Abstract

This research utilises Foucauldian analysis to examine the novel climate change migration programmes being enacted in the South Pacific region. The region represents an interesting case as the climate change migration, generally a mixture of voluntary labour migration and resettlement initiatives, are among the first to be implemented in the world. Therefore, the region provides unique empirical insight into the process and outcomes of such procedures with evidence from the cases of Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, The Solomon Islands and Tuvalu utilised to provide analysis on the intersection of international legislation and policy and the implementation at the national and local level. Through this, prior critiques of the practice of neoliberal governmentality at the international policy level were compared with the evidence from the region to find whether such claims were substantiated. The findings highlight that there are promising cases of community consultation and participation emerging in the South Pacific Islands, showing the utilisation of local knowledges as well as resistance to biopolitics which aids in maintaining community integrity, traditions and livelihoods. However, in many cases the native populations are drawn into relations of neoliberal governmentality, responsible for self-regulating and increasing their own resilience according to the needs of the market. Therefore, although the region does not show conclusive evidence that climate change migrations need entail the practice of biopolitics this has often been the case.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

This thesis sets out to examine climate change migrations programmes (CCMPs) in the South Pacific where the island states are facing the worst effects of environmental change with migration increasingly becoming tabled as a facet of the nation's adaptation strategies. The events occurring in the South Pacific mirror a wider trend in global planning for the effects of climate change with a shift in policy circles in recent years, migration increasingly being viewed outside of a security frame and instead as a viable adaptation strategy.[1] In addition, there is recognition of this strategy in a number of key recent policy documents as well as several key regions that are already experimenting with resettlement as an adaptation strategy.[2] Although this seems to mark a shift away from the securitisation of migration, the resilience and adaptation approach is still viewed by many as a continuation of biopolitical power which seeks to discipline and place responsibility upon the populations affected by climate change, drawing them into a relationship of neoliberal governmentality.[3]

This apparent pervasiveness of biopolitics in climate change migration policy calls for a Foucauldian approach to the issue to provide valuable evidence on the dynamics of policy implementation in the region, at the intersection of the international, national and local. This approach is also useful in providing a more holistic viewpoint of the processes which are a result of a combination of socio-economic, historic and environmental factors. In taking this approach,

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[1] Lauren Nishimura, "'Climate Change Migrants'" Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies," *Journal of Refugee Law* 27 (2015): 107–34; Vesselin Popovski and Kieran G. Mundy, "Defining Climate-Change Victims," *Sustainability Science* 7, no. 1 (January 2012): 5–16.

[2] A. de Sherbinin et al., "Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate Change," *Science* 334, no. 6055 (October 28, 2011): 456–57.

[3] Giovanni Bettini, "Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)Politics of Adaptation," *Global Policy* 8, no. S1 (February 2017): 33–39; Giovanni Bettini, Sarah Louise Nash, and Giovanna Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration," *Geographical Journal* 183, no. 4 (2017): 348–58; Andrew Baldwin, "The Political Theologies of Climate Change-Induced Migration," *Critical Studies on Security* 2, no. 2 (July 2014): 210–22.

the aim is to provide more conclusive empirical evidence as to the practical and theoretical implications of such CCMPs, particularly whether such policy seeks to create governable flows of people, subjugates local knowledges and whether there is resistance to these processes. Although literature in the field to date has offered extensive critique of the use of migration as an adaptation strategy, it has offered little in the way of empirical evidence backing the hypothesised claims, thus negating a critical aspect of Foucauldian research. Therefore, this research aims to fill this gap, offering more conclusive evidence as to whether such CCMPs amount to a biopolitical tool of neoliberal governmentality.

To achieve this aim, this research will first review the literature related to climate change-induced migration, examining the related international law and policy up until the most recent developments. Subsequently, the practical and theoretical issues that have arisen will be discussed, concentrating on the biopolitical analyses. The theoretical framework will then be introduced before moving on to outline the socio-economic and environmental conditions in the South Pacific region. Findings from the region will then be presented, examining the implemented CCMPs which generally include voluntary labour migration and pre-planned resettlement schemes, before a discussion of their relation to the prior criticisms at the policy level. Finally, the research will offer conclusions as to whether migration utilised as an adaptation strategy is in fact a biopolitical tool of neoliberal governmentality.

In analysing the findings, the biopolitical processes will be traced using evidence from the reports now emanating from the region's CCMPs. This includes reporting on the process of such migration procedures, as well as the socio-economic conditions post-migration to gain a holistic viewpoint. The conclusion then argues that although there is evidence of forms of resistance to biopolitics in the region as well as some promising cases of the utilisation of local knowledge, limitations created by historic dependency in the islands as well as a pervasiveness of neoliberal

rationality in the programmes highlight the exercise of neoliberal governmentality in the region. Therefore, the CCMPs do not constitute biopolitical tools in absolute terms but are often implemented in such a way.

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

2.2 - Previous Work in The Field

Previous work in this subject area has widely examined the development of migration in relation to climate change from legal perspectives, to the securitisation process and finally to the recognition of migration as an adaptation strategy and the consequent issues, both from a practical and theoretical perspective. This research will examine literature related to climate-induced migration which according to Kälin can be caused by a number of scenarios including slow and sudden onset disasters, 'sinking' small island states, zones becoming classified as too dangerous for human habitation and public order disturbed as a result of the effects of climate change. These circumstances can induce both internal and cross-border displacement. However, classical flight does not apply as the populations affected are generally not fleeing state persecution.[4] The following sections will detail the key areas that the literature examining climate-induced migration has focused upon.

2.2.1 - Lack of international framework/recognition

In regards to overarching refugee law, there is no protection for persons displaced by climate change under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol.[5] 'Regime Stretching' of the Convention is a possibility but not an inevitability and there is no specific convention related to cross-border climate change induced migration and a general lack of political will for the process despite calls.[6]

[4] Walter Kälin, "Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement," in *Climate Change and Displacement : Multidisciplinary Perspectives / Edited by Jane McAdam* (Hart Publishing, 2010), 81–89; Alexander Betts, "State Fragility, Refugee Status and 'Survival Migration,'" *Forced Migration Review* 43 (May 2013): 4.

[5] Kälin, "Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement," 88.

[6] Alexander Betts, "Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework," *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organisations* 16, no. 3 (September 2010): 363; Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini, "Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees," *Harvard Environmental Law Review* 33, no. 2 (January 2009): 349–405; Benjamin Glahn, "'Climate Refugees'? Addressing the International Legal Gaps" (International Bar Association, June 11, 2009), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=B51C02C1-3C27-4AE3-B4C4-7E350EB0F442; Roger Zetter and James Morrissey, "Environmental Stress, Displacement and the Challenge of Rights Protection," *Forced Migration Review* 45 (February 2014).

The guiding principles for internally displaced people (IDPs) do apply to those affected by climatic events as it refers to natural disasters, affording people the "same domestic rights and freedoms… as do other persons in their country."[7] Concurrently, the Hyogo Framework acknowledges that efforts to prepare for and reduce disaster risks must be considered at the national and international level.[8] Therefore, IDPs are afforded some level of protection whereas those migrants forced to leave their country by the effects of climate change occupy somewhat of a legal grey area. Furthermore, there is a general absence of institutional capacity to deal with the issue, with no specialised agency, a lack of focus on climate change migration, little consensus on the division of responsibility and a general inability on the part of civil society to advocate effectively on issues related to climate change induced displacement.[9] To add to these issues, climate change related migration is complex with migration falling on a broad spectrum between forced and voluntary, making it difficult to categorise and process such movement.[10] Therefore, what little protection there is for affected populations is applied inconsistently, dependent on pre-existing political conditions and domestic legislation.[11]

2.2.2 - Securitisation

Initially, climate change related migration entered the international agenda as a result of the 'mobilisation power' of securitisation.[12] Reports from Myers and Homer-Dixon in the 1990s took

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[7] "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" (UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), July 22, 1998), Principle 1, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c3da07f7.html.

[8] "Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters" (World Conference on Disaster Reduction, January 18, 2005).

[9] Nishimura, "'Climate Change Migrants'" Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies," 109.

[10] Kälin, "Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement," 95.

[11] Betts, "Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework," 378.

[12] Rita Floyd, "Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. 2 (April 2007): 328; Betsy Hartmann, "Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse," *Journal of International Development* 22, no. 2 (March 2010): 233–46; Angela Oels, "From 'Securitization" of Climate Change to "Climatization" of the Security Field: Comparing Three Theoretical Perspectives,'" in *Scheffran J., Brzoska M., Brauch H., Link P., Schilling J. (Eds) Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict.*, vol. 8, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 185–205.

a maximalist approach, detailing the causal links between climate change, mass-scale migration and possible conflict and going as far as estimating the numbers of 'climate change refugees' to be in the hundreds of millions by 2050.[13] Following this development there was an abundance of government commissioned reports in developed Western states examining the security implications of climate change as well as numerous statements by military personnel.[14]

Despite the issue being placed on the international agenda, securitisation has been criticised in numerous accounts, including the 'degradation narrative' which shows that relief efforts are consequently focused in the wrong place, creating a culture of blame for those most affected by climate change as well as ignoring other contributing social and political factors.[15] Furthermore, it works to de-politicise the issue, which leads to an addressing of the symptoms as opposed to the root causes.[16] Hartmann highlights that this has contributed to the bolstering of a 'aid-military' complex with much of the alarmist rhetoric driven by private defence contractors and military think tanks.[17] This has also been said to negate the importance of localised solutions to avoid such potential conflict scenarios. Additionally, barriers to migration are heightened, presenting significant obstacles to the poorest amongst populations and potentially creating 'trapped populations'.[18] Therefore, despite the acceptance of climate change related migration as a pressing

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[13] Norman Myers, "Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena" (Washington, DC: Climate Institute, 1995); Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton University Press, 1999).
[14] Nicholas Stern, "Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change" (Cambridge, United Kingdom: UK Cabinet Office, 2006); R. Schubert et al., "Climate Change as a Security Risk" (London: German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), 2008), https://www.wbgu.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wbgu.de/templates/dateien/veroeffentlichungen/hauptgutachten/j g2007/wbgu_jg2007_engl.pdf; "Military Experts: Climate Change Could Lead to Humanitarian Crisis" (Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, 2016), http://eciu.net/press-releases/2016/military-experts-climate-change-could-lead-to-humanitarian-crisis.
[15] Hartmann, "Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse," 234.
[16] Richard Black, "Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?," Working Paper, New Issues in Refugee Research (University of Sussex: UNHCR, March 2001).
[17] Hartmann, "Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse," 240.
[18] Richard Black et al., "Climate Change: Migration as Adaptation," *Nature* 478 (October 27, 2011): 449; Richard Black et al., "Migration and Global Environmental Change - Future Challenges and Opportunities," Final Project Report (London: The Government Office for Science, 2011), 9.

issue, academic and policy circles have effectively highlighted the downsides of securitisation in this field.

2.2.3 - Recognition in International Law

International law has tended to follow a more nuanced recognition of migration as an issue with the UN acknowledging that its institutions must engage more effectively with the issue.[19] The UNHCR have provided deliberations on migration with the need to address the normative gaps in migrant protection recognised and acted upon with the creation of the Nansen Principles.[20] This novel analysis is mostly focused upon voluntary labour migration and resettlement initiatives which attempt to recognise the historical and cultural relevance of migration with populations not seen simply as victims but as 'agents of adaptation'.[21] This is to be enacted by way of community consultation; "the process of soliciting and listening to people's opinions and perceptions of affected populations" and participation; "deeper engagement that may imply the affected community's control over decision making, and/or contribution of labour, skills or material inputs."[22] This is further supported by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which emphasises the freedom of indigenous peoples to exercise their political, economic, social and cultural rights as well as their right to land.[23] There is also broad consensus in case studies on adaptive migration and resettlement that it should only be carried out on a voluntary basis,

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[19] "The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention," Conference of the Parties (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 15, 2011).

[20] Nishimura, "'Climate Change Migrants'" Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies," 117; "The Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century," Nansen Principles (Oslo: The Nansen Initiative, June 2011).

[21] Bettini, "Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)Politics of Adaptation," 35.

[22] "Moving beyond Rhetoric: Consultation and Participation with Populations Displaced by Conflict or Natural Disasters" (Washington, DC: The Brookings – Bern Project on Internal Displacement, October 2008), 4, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10_internal_displacement.pdf.

[23] "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (UN General Assembly, A/RES/61/295, October 2, 2007), http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html.

generally as a last resort and must account for social disarticulation to ensure that resettled populations have the best chance of self-sufficiency and integration into their new environment.[24]

2.2.4 - Policy Shift

Following the most recent international law and recognising the pitfalls of securitisation, there has been a marked shift in policy orientation. Reports from international organisations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as well as from governments are being couched in the language of resilience and adaptation with migration seen as a solution to environmental change.[25] The focus in these policy documents is upon creating resilient populations, able to migrate on an individual basis as opposed to requiring mass, forced migrations. These policies usually take the form of voluntary labour migration or resettlement procedures in which community migration is facilitated to allow relocation to safer destinations. Such procedures are already underway across the globe including in the South Pacific Islands, Vietnam, Mozambique, Alaska and China with varying levels of success thus far.[26] Although many of these affected communities have been removed from immediate danger, a range of issues has emerged as these policies have been implemented despite the guidelines regarding the conditions for climate change related migration.[27]

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[24] Jonas Østergaard Nielsen and Anette Reenberg, "Cultural Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation: A Case Study from Northern Burkina Faso," *Global Environmental Change* 20, no. 1 (February 2010): 142–52; Sarah Rogers and Mark Wang, "Environmental Resettlement and Social Dis/Re-Articulation in Inner Mongolia, China," *Population and Environment* 28, no. 1 (September 2006): 41–68; Robin Bronen, "Choice and Necessity: Relocations in the Arctic and South Pacific," *Forced Migration Review* 45 (February 2014): 17–21; A. de Sherbinin, Koko Warner, and C. Ehrhart, "Casualties of Climate Change," *Scientific American* 304, no. 1 (May 2011): 64–71.

[25] "World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change." (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010); "Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific," Final Report (Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank, 2012); "Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change," Final Project Report (London: The Government Office for Science, 2011), 10.

[26] de Sherbinin et al., "Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate Change."

[27] "The Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century."

2.2.5 - Issues of Migration Used as an Adaptation Strategy to Climate Change

One of the most prominent issues is the loss of livelihood, especially if there are not sustained efforts to reconstruct productive activities.[28] Furthermore, populations are often liable to migrate to environmentally vulnerable areas which may lead to continued vulnerability to climate related shocks.[29] There is also the distinct possibility of disease, further environmental losses and the flaring of existing tensions between ethnic or marginalised communities.[30] The issue of mass relocations taking place for political or financial gain without the consent or participation of the affected communities is also raised, as this approach may well negate the need for states to protect their citizen's rights.[31] Furthermore, the countries most likely to receive migration flows will largely be developing, often lacking the necessary resources to afford migrants protection from exploitation and potential violence.[32] This also creates issues with the provision of compensation to the affected communities in that both the sending and host countries may be unable or unwilling to bear such costs. Therefore, there are a wide range of practical issues that have been identified in relation to migration utilised as an adaptation strategy to climate change.

Alongside the practical issues are the theoretical implications of such a shift in policy. Migration as an adaptation strategy is largely viewed as a 'resilience approach', with the onus upon the community's ability to adapt as opposed to at the state or international level, as climate change increasingly becomes framed as an inevitability.[33] This marks a move away from the precautionary

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[28] Nishimura, "'Climate Change Migrants'" Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies"; de Sherbinin et al., "Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate Change."

[29] Black et al., "Climate Change: Migration as Adaptation," 448.

[30] de Sherbinin et al., "Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate Change."

[31] Nishimura, "'Climate Change Migrants'" Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies," 131; Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration," 351.

[32] Chris Methmann and Angela Oels, "From 'Fearing' to 'Empowering' Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-Induced Migration in the Name of Resilience," *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 1 (February 7, 2015): 62.

[33] Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration," 349; Methmann and Oels, "From 'Fearing' to 'Empowering' Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-Induced Migration in the Name of Resilience," 54.

principle towards a culture of preparedness where preventative measures are largely abandoned in favour of adaptation. Through this, the normalising aspect of such rhetoric becomes apparent, increasing the acceptance that large population segments will lose their homes and be forced to give up their livelihoods due to unstoppable climatic change. This new brand of adaptation is labelled "transformational resilience" where systems are transformed into something entirely new as opposed to retaining their inherent characteristics.[34] The ADB understands climate change migration as being tied to "infrastructure investment, regional integration and cooperation, and urban development", highlighting that migration is seen as an opportunity.[35] This process is viewed as 'governing through contingency' in which catastrophic events become learning processes that may increase prosperity and development. This self-determinism central to the resilience rhetoric surrounding climate change related migration serves as a general indicator of the post-interventionism that global politics has undergone.[36] Therefore, migration related to climate change is framed in a positive light, adaptation and potential economic opportunities now the primary focus at the behest of social and cultural losses that may occur.

2.2.6 - Biopolitical Analysis of the Policy

This leads to the most recent category of literature which has utilised Foucauldian analysis at the policy level to assess the political intention behind the novel framing of climate change migration. In examining the relevant documentation and finding continuations of neoliberal thought processes within these papers, these studies have reached a general consensus that such policy measures represent an exercise of neoliberal governmentality.[37] Strategies utilising migration as

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[34] Methmann and Oels, "From 'Fearing' to 'Empowering' Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-Induced Migration in the Name of Resilience," 54.
[35] "Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific," 1.
[36] Methmann and Oels, "From 'Fearing' to 'Empowering' Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-Induced Migration in the Name of Resilience," 59.
[37] Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration"; Bettini, "Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)Politics of Adaptation"; Giovanni Bettini, "Climate Migration as an Adaption Strategy: De-Securitizing Climate-Induced Migration or Making the Unruly Governable?," *Critical Studies on Security* 2, no. 2 (August 2014): 180–95; Baldwin,

adaptation have the potential to individualise the problem, with those undertaking responsibility and successfully migrating seen as the fit and those that are unable to as the unfit.[38] Migration is thus split into a dichotomy between the 'good'; the resilient able to successfully migrate and integrate due to superior labour capital and the 'bad', those that are unable to migrate in a planned manner which fits with global labour demand. Labour and circular mobility are seen as the penultimate forms, feeding into neoliberal conceptions of familial, community and societal relations.[39] Essentially, it ends up being a means by which to create a governable population, shifted according to their means of labour at the will of the relevant governments, with market forces the predominating factor or subjected to exclusionary or degrading measures if they are unable.[40] Therefore, it is hypothesised that the underlying political intention behind the framing of climate change migration in such a positive light is the creation of governable populations conscripting to the neoliberal rationalities of the current global political economic system.[41]

Therefore, there is a general emphasis upon the need to successfully 'manage' migration to ensure it is beneficial and controlled, avoiding 'chaos' with huge flows of unmanaged people.[42] This is seen as amounting to a form of political subjugation, acting to channel climate change migrants into neoliberal relations with little regard for the 'varied sensitivities' that actors may exhibit, the pre-existing social and cultural factors that influence community's decisions about whether to migrate and how.[43] For instance, Grove points towards the Insurance Development Security

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"The Political Theologies of Climate Change-Induced Migration"; Simon Dalby, "Biopolitics and Climate Security in the Anthropocene," *Geoforum* 49, no. 1 (October 2013): 184–92.

[38] Romain Felli and Noel Castree, "Neoliberalising Adaptation to Environmental Change: Foresight or Foreclosure?," *Environment and Planning A: International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 44, no. 1 (January 2012): 1–4.

[39] Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration."

[40] Bettini, "Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)Politics of Adaptation."

[41] Nikolas Rose, "Governing," in *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: University Press, Cambridge, 1999), 15–60.

[42] Baldwin, "The Political Theologies of Climate Change-Induced Migration," 19.

[43] Nielsen and Reenberg, "Cultural Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation: A Case Study from Northern Burkina Faso," 142.

complex, in which "biopolitical technologies of risk management intersect with geopolitical practices of exclusion and containment to produce "*flexible spaces*" of entrapment that channel the possibilities for adaptation to secure the existing global capitalist order".[44] There is the illusion of choice in the matter with potential migrants granted a degree of freedom in the process but the main point is that this freedom is limited to pre-ordained locations and occupations within a neoliberal system that communities may well have existed outside previously. Therefore, it can be drawn from the critical literature that one of the central underlying aims at policy level is the incorporation of population segments into neoliberal relations, creating a mass of people more attuned to the needs of global demand.

Overall, the literature to date has offered a neat critique of the policy and research emerging on migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change. Generally, the authors utilising Foucauldian analysis have concluded that there is indeed underlying biopolitical intention that aims to create governable masses from the populations affected by climate change. However, a gap remains in this line of research as such biopolitical analysis has generally been based upon hypothetical situations in which the authors envision the potential effects of such climate change migration procedures. There has been little work carried out to examine whether these apparent underlying biopolitical intentions are reproduced when migration procedures take place, neglecting one of the critical insights that Foucauldian analysis can offer.[45] As Grove states, populations may "take up, modify, and utilise the transfers of knowledge, technology and funding in surprising ways that meet their own needs and interests".[46] Therefore, research examining the implementation of such

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[44] Kevin J. Grove, "Insuring 'Our Common Future?' Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security," *Geopolitics* 15, no. 3 (August 25, 2010): 557.

[45] Kim McKee, "Post-Foucauldian Governmentality: What Does It Offer Critical Social Policy Analysis?," *Critical Social Policy* 29, no. 3 (August 1, 2009): 467.

[46] Grove, "Insuring 'Our Common Future?' Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security," 557.

strategies can yield interesting insights into the implementation of biopolitical practices or on the converse, resilience to such measures.

2.3 - Theoretical Framework [47]

2.3.1 - Biopolitics

Foucault introduced the concept of biopolitics in his *"Society Must Be Defended"* lectures, exploring the disciplining of human functions which are constituted as control mechanisms in society.[48] These can manifest themselves in numerous different areas of life and are concerned with the 'regularisation' of the biological processes of 'man as a species', quantifying and limiting the 'aleatory features' of populations on a mass scale by enabling specific 'natures' or patterns of behaviour.[49] The first way in which such processes of governmentality can be tracked is through political rationalities, the systemised modes of thought that problematise certain behaviours. The second is through political technologies, the mechanisms or techniques by which the state apparatus seeks to subjugate and control the functions of a population to fulfil their self-designated function of letting live.[50] This has been achieved with ever greater success due to the development of more precise population measurement tools that map everything from the birth rate to death rate as well as people's "more or less rational choice, interests, intentions and capabilities".[51]

Through this lens, Foucault sees power as a process of governmentality, circuitous in that one must subject oneself to repression, force and self-control to constitute the relationship. Despite

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[47] The theoretical framework draws from a paper submitted by the author for class INTR5045 at CEU in the Winter Semester, 2018.

[48] Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended", Lectures at The College de France, 1975-76* (Picador, 2003).

[49] Michael Dillon, "Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance," *Political Geography* 26, no. 1 (January 2007): 44.

[50] Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended", Lectures at The College de France, 1975-76*, 241; Michael Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35, no. 1 (December 1, 2006): 183–84.

[51] Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, "Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 2 (April 2008): 267.

this, Foucault makes a distinction between more liberal forms of governmentality and the police function of the government, acting as a menace against straying from the bounds of liberality set by society.[52] Therefore, in Foucault's view power sits on a continuum between a strategic relationship in which state and population can both exercise power and domination in which only one party has the ability to exercise power.[53] Biopolitics thus functions as a security apparatus, the legitimacy of the state and its management of human life posited as necessary on the premise that insecurity and possible death await out-with its bounds.[54] In this conception, politics becomes reliant on the 'othering' of populations with the state seen to be responsible for preserving an "apparent normalcy of an imagined social order".[55] Using this conception to explore CCMPs can shed insight into the political technologies and rationalities utilised in the process and whether these sway towards the positive or negative dimensions of power.

2.3.2 - Biopolitics in the 21st Century

Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero's work seeks to update Foucault's conception of biopolitics according to the novel security concerns in the 21st century, particularly the regularisation and prediction of circulations; the global flows of goods, labour, capital, disease and everything else enabled by global movement and trade.[56] Globalisation has acted as the primary driver behind this shift as increasingly complex international infrastructure makes circulations more difficult to predict and control. Therefore, the function of governing institutions is altered, adapting to the new meanings of security and leading to an increased concern for the incidence of

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[52] Dillon, "Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance," 42.

[53] Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond," 191.

[54] Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, "Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction," 265.

[55] Andrew Baldwin, "Premediation and White Affect: Climate Change and Migration in Critical Perspective," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 41, no. 1 (January 2016): 81.

[56] Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, "Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction."

'events', both good and bad, with security apparatus' seeking to prevent or increase their probability dependent upon their value to the system.[57]

However, this prediction process can never be fully accurate and subsequently one of the primary aims of modern biopolitics is the creation of a resilient populace, that is able to adapt rapidly and effectively respond to 'events' that occur with less predictability in globalised political economic systems. This individualises responsibility for security, removing some elements of state responsibility and replacing it with individual capacity to adapt to exogenous economic, political, social and environmental shocks. This follows a wider trend of neo-liberalisation in which individual freedom has come to be understood in different ways, populations expected to self-regulate within the bounds of capitalist society.[58] This relates closely to the subject of CCMPs as much of the critique has been based upon the individualising aspect of such policy under the guise of enhancing 'resilience'.[59]

2.3.3 - Subjugated Knowledge

In arriving at his conception Foucault emphasises the role of subjugated knowledges as alternative stories and histories to the large, existing 'blocks of knowledge' in social science.[60] These accepted 'blocks of knowledge' contribute to the marginalisation of certain experiences, histories and stories in the study of social sciences, as they are viewed as non-expert, inferior and are subsequently buried within an encompassing historical image, labelled the subjugation of local knowledges. This process is reinforced by the role of expert labels such as scientist which serve to add weight to

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[57] Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 279; Dillon, "Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance."
[58] McKee, "Post-Foucauldian Governmentality: What Does It Offer Critical Social Policy Analysis?," 469; Dillon, "Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance," 45–46.
[59] Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration"; Bettini, "Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)Politics of Adaptation"; Uma Kothari, "Political Discourses of Climate Change and Migration: Resettlement Policies in the Maldives," *The Geographical Journal* 180, no. 2 (June 2014): 132.
[60] Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended", Lectures at The College de France, 1975-76*, 1–19.

such accepted 'blocks'. Therefore, these blocks remain largely unchallenged in study and subsequently constitute a site of power, in that the system that works to define how people think and understand things thus holds the ability to define knowledge.

Foucault calls for the need to challenge these systems of definition by examining the wider historical picture through a process he labels 'genealogy' which utilises such subjugated knowledges.[61] He denotes the importance of such an inclusive approach as allowing for a more nuanced view of the causal chains that lead to the production of certain structures and systems that are often taken for granted in study. As Merlingen sums up, a key advantage of governmentality theory is its ability to link macro and micro drivers by examining "*local conceptual devices*".[62] This is highly useful in the examination of CCMPs as one of the primary concerns is the subjugation of local knowledge and experience in the process.[63] Academic, policy-maker or expert knowledge may take precedence, pushing aside pre-existing local knowledge and experience of migration and other adaptation strategies that may be better suited to the affected communities.

Such analysis has proven useful in a case of climate disaster before with Protevi applying a Foucauldian approach to examining the 'multiplicities' in the response to Hurricane Katrina.[64] His analysis underlines the state subjugation of local knowledge, the altered circulations of segments of the population that were ultimately seen as 'bad' due to historical political categorisation of the African-American community and the individualisation of the disaster response, based largely on the pre-existing 'resilience' of the communities.. Furthermore, he points towards the "*entrainment*"

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[61] Foucault, 1–19.

[62] Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond," 189.

[63] Hartmann, "Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse"; Nielsen and Reenberg, "Cultural Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation: A Case Study from Northern Burkina Faso."

[64] John Protevi, "Hurricane Katrina: The Governmental Body Politic," in *Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 163–83.

taking place, which channels people into certain patterns of behaviour. [65] The poorest communities were framed as a functioning part of the crisis by both the government and media, shaping people's responses by triggering their "*affect programs*" (fast acting, pre-programmed emotional responses), generating negative emotions and de-politicising the subjects, putting them outside of the state's responsibility to let live.[66] This raises important issues that should be at the forefront of biopolitical analysis of climate events including the effects of historical political categorisation, the individualisation of responses and the framing of the events.

2.3.4 - Foucault and Climate Change Migration

Overall, a Foucauldian approach to examining the issue provides a useful means of analysis on multiple fronts, with a variety of themes emerging from the literature related to biopolitics and climate change migration. The first theme to be examined in the cases will be the potential for CCMPs to act as tools of neoliberal governmentality aimed at the creation of governable flows or circulations of population. Secondly, the potential subjugation of local knowledges in CCMPs is a key concern of many of the authors offering critique at the policy level. Much of the emerging adaptation research has shown that adaptation measures integrated with existing practices and decision making processes are most effective in building overall adaptive capacity.[67] Therefore, biopolitical analysis should shed interesting insight into the dynamics of such a procedure in the selected cases. Finally, as stated by Merlingen, the modes of resistance to biopolitics is often under-analysed in Foucauldian studies.[68] As aforementioned and further emphasised by Felli and Castree, climate change policy transfers often take a very different shape to the recommendations that

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[65] John Protevi, "Above, Below, and Alongside the Subject," in *Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 5.
[66] Protevi, 26.
[67] "Migration in Response to Environmental Change," Science for Environment Policy (UWE Bristol: European Commission DG Environment by the Science Communication Unit, September 2015); Karen E. McNamara, "Taking Stock of Community-based Climate-change Adaptation Projects in the Pacific," *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 54, no. 3 (December 2013): 398–405.
[68] Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond."

preceded them.[69] Therefore, this will be the final theme of analysis examined in the chosen cases,

to explore the opposition to biopolitics displayed in the cases and ensure a balance to the analysis.

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[69] Felli and Castree, "Neoliberalising Adaptation to Environmental Change: Foresight or Foreclosure?," 1; Grove, "Insuring 'Our Common Future?' Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security," 557.

Chapter 3 – The South Pacific Region and Research Methodology

3.1 - The South Pacific Region

In total, there are 22 political entities in the Pacific region, including a number of low lying atolls signifying 'climate hotspots', including Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Carteret Islands in Papua New Guinea, Vanau Levu island in Fiji and areas of the Solomon Islands.[70] The populations in these regions vary from 1200 on the Carteret Islands, 10,000 in Tuvalu to around 100,000 people on Kiribati, 130,000 on Vanua Levu.[71] The countries are archipelagos with populations that tend to be concentrated in urban centres such as in Kiribati where half the population is located in the nation's capital, Tarawa or Fiji, where over 87% of the country's population live on the two islands of Vanua Levu and Viti Levu.[72] The islands have a colonial history and were faced with a number of historical resettlements during this era which have created long-lasting tensions as well as issues in regards to resource access.[73] For example, islanders on the island of Banaba, Kiribati were deliberately misinformed by the British administration to facilitate their removal from the island, allowing for widespread phosphate mining and eventual mass environmental degradation.[74] This episode has left a legacy of injustice amongst the affected communities and McAdam highlights

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[70] John R. Campbell and Richard Bedford, "Climate Change and Migration: Lessons from Oceania," in *Routledge Handbook of Immigration and Refugee Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 306.

[71] Campbell and Bedford, 307; Volker Boege, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region," Environmental Degradation and Migration (Bad Salzuflen, Germany: Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development, 2011), 8; John Connell, "Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls," *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 57, no. 1 (April 2016): 4; Karen E. McNamara and Helene Jacot Des Combes, "Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji," *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science* 6, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 315, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2.

[72] McNamara and Des Combes, "Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji," 315; "Fiji Population 2018" (World Population Review), accessed May 13, 2018, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/fiji-population/.

[73] John R. Campbell, "International Relocation from Pacific Island Countries: Adaptation Failure?," *Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability* International Conference 9-11 October 2008 Bonn, Germany (January 1, 2008): 1–9; Jane McAdam, "Disappearing States, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law," in *Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 105–29.

[74] Jane McAdam, "Historical Cross-Border Relocations in the Pacific: Lessons for Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change," *The Journal of Pacific History* 49, no. 3 (September 23, 2014): 301–27; Julia B. Edwards, "Phosphate Mining and the Relocation of the Banabans to Northern Fiji in 1945: Lessons for Climate Change-Forced Displacement," *Journal de La Société Des Océanistes* 138–139 (December 2014): 121–36.

that without extensive community engagement, similar processes are not unforeseeable in modern

CCMPs.[75]

Figure 1: Map of the Pacific Islands

3.1.1 - Socio-Economic Issues

The island states continue to face a range of socio-economic issues in the modern era. The majority

of the countries face rapid population growth and urbanisation, increasing the strain on already

over-used natural resources and infrastructure.[76] In Kiribati, high unemployment rates, pollution,

poor sanitation, rapidly increasing population and a general lack of resources causes severe issues,

a trend mirrored throughout the region.[77] Food security has been decreased on many of the islands

by poor agricultural practices, overfishing by large business ventures in the region and a general

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[75] McAdam, "Historical Cross-Border Relocations in the Pacific: Lessons for Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change."

[76] Richard Bedford and Charlotte Bedford, "International Migration and Climate Change: A Post-Copenhagen Perspective on Options for Kiribati and Tuvalu," in *Bruce Burson (Ed.) Climate Change and Migration. South Pacific Perspectives*, 1st ed. (Wellington, New Zealand: Institute of Policy Studies, 2010), 96–102.

[77] Jane McAdam, "Refusing 'Refuge' in the Pacific (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in International Law," in *E. Piguet, A. Pécoud and P. de Guchteneire, Eds., Migration, Environment and Climate Change* (Paris: UNESCO, 2011), 108–10.

reliance on aid and imports.[78] There is generally a disproportionate gendered effect with women bearing the brunt of the manual labour associated with food security on the islands. Sithole also highlights that damaged infrastructure has led to issues including under-education with journeys to school becoming more difficult and buildings becoming damaged. Often, local sea defences have caused the depletion of coral stocks in the region as locals are forced to use them to create makeshift sea walls. These socio-economic conditions have caused many outer islands to experience depopulation as their resilience to disasters and other climatic events is reduced by a lack of early warning systems, healthcare and building materials for resilient housing. The customary land tenure prevalent throughout the region is also seen to create issues as land infertility and erosion cause further tensions.[79] Therefore, the island communities already face a range socio-economic issues, not accounting for the effects of climate change.

3.1.2 - Climate Change in the South Pacific

The evidence that much of the population in the low-lying atolls of the South Pacific Island nations will be forced from their territories is undeniable, with climate change causing soil erosion, flooding, severe storm surges and cyclones. Kiribati and Tuvalu in particular are frequently lauded as 'sinking islands', soon to produce the world's first climate change refugees.[80] Despite these claims often being premature and needlessly alarmist, the islands' highest point is only two metres thus there is very little capacity for long-term internal migration as a strategy to adapt to climate

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[78] Michael Green, "Contested Territory," *Nature Climate Change* 6 (September 2016): 817–20; Wonesai Workington Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," Technical (International Organization for Migration, October 2015), 22; Connell, "Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls," 9; Roy Smith, "Should They Stay or Should They Go? A Discourse Analysis of Factors Influencing Relocation Decisions among the Outer Islands of Tuvalu and Kiribati," *Journal of New Zealand & Pacific Studies* 1, no. 1 (2013): 26; Justin T. Locke, "Climate Change-Induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis and Long-Term Developments," *The Geographical Journal* 175, no. 3 (September 2009): 174.
[79] Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 25–30.
[80] McAdam, "Refusing 'Refuge' in the Pacific (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in International Law," 108–10.

change.[81] The latest studies show that rather than flooding , saline contamination of groundwater may be the most pressing issue on the islands, leading to a lack of fresh-water and further decreasing food security.[82] There is already anecdotal evidence from some islands such as Kiribati that groundwater has a saline taste and this will seriously limit the island's capacity to host communities.[83] In the Carteret Islands, it is estimated that since 1994, 50% of the island's land mass has been lost to erosion with food security decreasing at an alarming rate due to inundation and salination.[84] Tuvalu suffers environmentally with ocean acidification and increasing surface water temperatures damaging the surrounding coral, removing a natural line of defence for the island and increasing the rates of inundation and soil erosion.[85] The effects of climate change are felt throughout the region and are generally similar from island to island. Therefore, preparing for the worst effects of climate change by planning and implementing migration programmes has become a key concern in the region. However, if disasters are understood as pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities exposed by ecological events then it will be a combination of these that eventually force people from their lands in the Pacific.[86]

3.1.3 - Migration in the South Pacific Region

The World Bank describes expanding labour mobility as 'vital' for the South Pacific region, beneficial not just for the sending states but also for the prosperity and stability of the region, in

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[81] Boege, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region," 8.

[82] Curt D. Storlazzi et al., "Most Atolls Will Be Uninhabitable by the Mid-21st Century Because of Sea-Level Rise Exacerbating Wave-Driven Flooding," *Science Advances* 4, no. 4 (April 25, 2018).

[83] Edwards, "Phosphate Mining and the Relocation of the Banabans to Northern Fiji in 1945: Lessons for Climate Change-Forced Displacement," 130.

[84] Boege, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region," 10; Green, "Contested Territory"; Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 22.

[85] Elizabeth Marino and Heather Lazrus, "Migration or Forced Displacement?: The Complex Choices of Climate Change and Disaster Migrants in Shishmaref, Alaska and Nanumea, Tuvalu," *Human Organization* 74, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 344.

[86] Marino and Lazrus, 341; "Impacts of Climate Change and Disasters on Human Mobility in the Pacific: Challenges and Opportunities," Outcome Report (Lami Bay, Fiji: The Nansen Initiative, August 2014); Colette Mortreux and Jon Barnett, "Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu," *Global Environmental Change* 19, no. 1 (February 2009): 105.

particularly Australia, New Zealand and South Korea.[87] According to estimates, the number of Pacific labour migrants may increase anywhere between 100,000 to 250,000 by 2040, not accounting for community relocations and forced migration.[88] Internal migration is generally found to be predominant but is seen to exacerbate vulnerabilities in many cases, particularly due to already strained urban resources and infrastructure.[89] Although solidarity amongst the island nations is prevalent, if mass relocations become a reality the absorptive capacity of many countries will be tested as they deal with their own expanding populations, high population densities and internal displacement, highlighting the issues in developing-developing nation migration.[90] There exists a range of migration types in the Pacific region with differing challenges to be faced according to the options. Migration will fall on a blurred scale between voluntary and forced and incur progressively higher costs, the more borders crossed and the greater the distance migrated.[91]

However, what these figures fail to highlight is that migration has been a prevalent feature of life in the Pacific Islands for centuries. This usually denotes cyclical or return migration with the homeland representing an important social and cultural focal point for outward migrants.[92] This form of migration is largely due to the extremely strong ties to the land in the South Pacific region

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[87] Richard Curtain et al., "Pacific Possible: Labour Mobility" (World Bank, July 2016), i; Richard Bedford, Bruce Burson, and Charlotte Bedford, "Compendium of Legislation and Institutional Arrangements for Labour Migration in Pacific Island Countries," Enhancing the Capacity of Pacific Island Countries to Manage the Impacts of Climate Change on Migration (Fiji: UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, August 2014).

[88] Curtain et al., "Pacific Possible: Labour Mobility," 4.

[89] "Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific: Links, Attitudes, and Future Scenarios in Nauru, Tuvalu, and Kiribati" (UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, December 3, 2015), http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Pacific_Climate_Change_Migration_Survey_Fact_Sheet.pdf; L.A. Nurse et al., "Small Islands," in *Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Barros, V.R., C.B. Field, D.J. Dokken, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L.White (Eds.)]*. (Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1623; Boege, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region," 19.

[90] Campbell and Bedford, "Climate Change and Migration: Lessons from Oceania," 309; Methmann and Oels, "From 'Fearing' to 'Empowering' Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-Induced Migration in the Name of Resilience."

[91] John R. Campbell, "Climate Change and Population Movement in Pacific Island Countries," in *Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 43.

[92] Sara Baptiste-Brown, "Behind the Words - Migration with Dignity in Kiribati," in *Gesing, Friederike, Herbeck Johannes, Klepp Silja (Ed.) Denaturalizing Climate Change: Migration, Mobilities and Space* (Bremen, Germany: Universität Bremen, 2014), 44–55.

that play a huge part in the islander's communal identity, tradition and spirituality. [93] Therefore, there are strong calls from multiple Pacific Island communities for homelands to be retained even in the case of forced resettlement to maintain spiritual and cultural ties with the land. Due to this general community desire to remain in their locations until unfeasible, the call is made for an adaptive governance framework that will ensure that populations are not resettled unless absolutely necessary, based on socio-ecological indicators and looking beyond dependence on humanitarian aid towards self-sufficiency.[94] This highlights that the intentions of state authorities within the Pacific region are, on face value, generally in keeping with the aims of the Nansen Initiative and human rights to land and the pursuance of political, economic, social and cultural development.

3.2 - Methodology

The above sections highlight that the region represents a string of countries experiencing very similar socio-economic problems, compounded by the environmental effects of climate change. Therefore, study of the region offers unique insight into the outcomes and effects of various CCMPs with the countries devising and implementing widely differing adaptation strategies to similar issues despite the calls for a unified regional migration policy.[95] However, as shown previously, examining the official policy only explains the macro-level and does not suffice in exploring the dynamic interplay between the macro and the local, particularly in the complex decision-making involved in migration.[96] Therefore, this research will go on to investigate the cases of climate change linked migration in the Pacific Island region, gaining insight into the implementation of such policies and the depth that Foucauldian analysis can offer.[97]

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[93] Dhrishna Charan, Manpreet Kaur, and Priyatma Singh, "Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji," in *Leal Filho, Walter (Ed.) Climate Change Adaptation in Pacific Countries: Fostering Resilience and Improving the Quality of Life* (Springer, 2017), 19–33.
[94] Bronen, "Choice and Necessity: Relocations in the Arctic and South Pacific," 20.
[95] Amy Louise Constable, "Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific: Options for Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands," *Regional Environmental Change* 17, no. 4 (April 2017): 1030.
[96] Ilan Kelman, "Difficult Decisions: Migration from Small Island Developing States under Climate Change," *Earth's Future* 3, no. 4 (February 2015): 133–42.
[97] McKee, "Post-Foucauldian Governmentality: What Does It Offer Critical Social Policy Analysis?"

3.2.1 - Research Question

In filling this gap, the research seeks to answer the question of how 'migration as an adaptation strategy' is being implemented at the local level. In answering the aim is to ascertain whether the reality of the policy implementation lines up with scholarly criticisms that such policy is a biopolitical tool of neoliberal governmentality.

3.1.2 - Research Approach

To answer the research question and fulfil the aim, a case study approach is utilised, comparing the cases of climate change related migration programmes in the South Pacific Islands from Kiribati, the Carteret Islands (Papua New Guinea), Fiji, The Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. Therefore, the approach will be qualitative which allows detailed insight into how such procedures take place and the relevant outcomes. Using an approach similar to Protevi's in his application of biopolitical analysis, the multiplicity of events that lead to the perpetuation of biopolitical power will be examined.[98] In looking at the response to CCMPs through a similar lens, the meanings and the assumptions behind the policy decisions will be questioned allowing for insight into the interaction between policy implementation and political intent. In Protevi's analysis, he examines factors such as the geographical distance people were moved, whether certain communities were affected in a discriminatory manner and the discourse and rhetoric that arose as the events and disaster management unfolded. This provides useful insight into the way in which historical and structural inequalities are reproduced and reinforced in disaster responses.

This research will attempt to implement a similar approach on a more international scale to ascertain whether comparable reproductions of biopolitical power are taking place in the context of communities affected by climate change. This will allow for the utilisation of material evidence

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[98] Protevi, "Hurricane Katrina: The Governmental Body Politic."

to understand the "specific and concrete '*art of governing*'" connecting the rationality of governmentality with the social relations that constitute such rationalities.[99] The research will examine the data thematically, utilising the three key areas that arose from the literature review to guide the exploration of the data. The South Pacific region offers a wealth of secondary sources regarding conditions both during and after the CCMPs were implemented. This data will be examined to ascertain whether the policies are implemented effectively and regarding the appropriate guiding principles on displacement.

3.1.3 - Research Limitations

Unfortunately, the time constraints of the research did not allow for the collection and utilisation of primary data on the cases in the South Pacific region. Such data would have allowed for a richer understanding of the connection between social relations and the political rationalities guiding regional climate change policy. Further research in the subject area should consider detailed field work to gather more specific data from locals as well as those employed to implement such policies as to their opinion regarding the implementation and outcomes of CCMPs. Despite this limitation, the secondary data gathered was highly sophisticated, providing nuanced accounts of the implementation of the programmes as well as utilising information from the local people as to their thoughts on the political rationalities behind the programmes. The following sections will detail the findings compiled from this secondary data before discussing the findings to examine the role of governmentality in the procedures.

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[99] McKee, "Post-Foucauldian Governmentality: What Does It Offer Critical Social Policy Analysis?," 473.

Chapter 4 – Findings/Analysis

Drawing data from the South Pacific region sheds interesting insight into what form CCMPs are taking when implemented, including the actors, forms of migration, destinations and outcomes. The first section will look at voluntary labour migration as a facet of the CCMPs, analysing the intentions behind its utilisation and the outcomes. The following will analyse whether community consultation and participation have been prevalent in the process of climate change induced relocations and the final section will examine resistance to top-down CCMPs at the local level. Finally, the findings will be discussed thematically, according to those drawn from the literature review, drawing conclusions as to whether the criticisms of neoliberal governmentality at policy level have held up in the implementation of CCMPs.

4.1 – Voluntary Labour Migration

Voluntary labour migration has been championed by many Pacific states as an integral part of their climate change adaptation strategies. The most prominent of such strategies has been Kiribati's 'migration with dignity' scheme, largely based upon investment in education and English skills to give people the necessary resources to facilitate voluntary labour migration.[100] By increasing the employability of the I-Kiribati [101] it is hoped they will avoid becoming a burden upon host societies whilst preserving self-determination, culture, community and identity.[102] The long-term strategy is to augment existing labour migration programmes to its developed, neighbouring nations as well as those further afield. There already exist schemes to New Zealand which allows the opportunity

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[100] "Kiribati Adaptation Program" (Office of the President, Government of Kiribati, 2003), http://www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/adaptation/kiribati-adaptation-program/; Karen E. McNamara et al., "The Complex Decision-Making of Climate-Induced Relocation: Adaptation and Loss and Damage," *Climate Policy* 18, no. 1 (2018): 111–17.

[101] The official demonym for the residents of Kiribati is I-Kiribati.

[102] Baptiste-Brown, "Behind the Words - Migration with Dignity in Kiribati"; McAdam, "Disappearing States, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law."

of permanent residence based on a lottery system under the Pacific Access Category (PAC). There are seasonal working opportunities based largely in the agricultural sector to both New Zealand and Australia and training programmes being implemented by Australia, Croatia, Canada and Taiwan for the I-Kiribati such as the Kiribati-Australia nursing initiative.[103] As Klepp and Herbeck comment, although these are not explicitly linked to environmental migration by the receiving countries, the debates around them are inextricably linked to climate change and are a central tenet of the 'migration with dignity' scheme implemented in Kiribati.[104]

Although Kiribati is the most prominent case, there is a succinct focus upon remittances as part of migration strategies across the Pacific islands, often couched in the terms of development.[105] Labour migration is prevalent across the region, largely based upon seafaring contracts, fishery work, seasonal working permits to Australia and New Zealand and nursing contracts.[106] In the Reef Islands and Ontong Java, Solomon Islands, over half of the households interviewed have a member currently residing outside of the islands. International networks in the country are established and maintained largely through inter-marriages and trade, particularly with their neighbouring islands. People of both genders were found to migrate, albeit more males, with mostly young people moving for work, education and a "modern" lifestyle.[107] Despite the central role that remittances play in households across the region, numerous issues arise regarding the outcomes of voluntary labour migration.

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[103] Bedford and Bedford, "International Migration and Climate Change: A Post-Copenhagen Perspective on Options for Kiribati and Tuvalu."

[104] Silja Klepp and Johannes Herbeck, "The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region," *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment* 7, no. 1 (March 2016): 54–73.

[105] Bedford, Burson, and Bedford, "Compendium of Legislation and Institutional Arrangements for Labour Migration in Pacific Island Countries"; Connell, "Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls," 11; McAdam, "Refusing 'Refuge' in the Pacific (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in International Law."

[106] Bedford, Burson, and Bedford, "Compendium of Legislation and Institutional Arrangements for Labour Migration in Pacific Island Countries."

[107] Thomas Birk and Kjeld Rasmussen, "Migration from Atolls as Climate Change Adaptation: Current Practices, Barriers and Options in Solomon Islands," *Natural Resources Forum* 38, no. 1 (2014): 6.

There are severe gender implications in labour migration with the majority of jobs in the urban centres being male-dominated, encouraging largely male migration, uneven rates of higher education and leaving women in more vulnerable situations.[108] There is also evidence that general inequalities and adaptive capacity are worsened in the sending communities. Established social networks, skills and education are vital for voluntary labour migration and therefore, opportunities are limited for the vast majority of islanders, particularly those without strong colonial ties to nearby developed nations.[109] The loss of skilled workers has undermined community leadership, reducing the effectiveness of local structures to combat the effects of climate change as more skilled and educated members of the population leave.[110] There is also the express concern that cultural traditions are lost in such moves, as much due to the fragmentation of the community as the loss of natural resources in the home country due to climate change.[111]

The migrants that moved to urban centres were generally found to experience poor living and working conditions as well as continued or worsened vulnerability to climate shocks with poor quality housing and services and little effort on the part of local councils to improve the situation.[112] In interviews, the islanders raised concerns such as the stress of competition, uncertainty, inferiority, alienation and marginalisation in more developed countries.[113] Unemployment and under-employment rates were high with much of the work short-term, manual contract labour and frustrations arose at the temporary nature of residence permits, particularly in New Zealand with

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[108] Birk and Rasmussen, "Migration from Atolls as Climate Change Adaptation: Current Practices, Barriers and Options in Solomon Islands," 6.

[109] Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 24; Campbell and Bedford, "Climate Change and Migration: Lessons from Oceania," 310.

[110] Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 20; Klepp and Herbeck, "The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region"; Baptiste-Brown, "Behind the Words - Migration with Dignity in Kiribati," 50.

[111] Elfriede Hermann and Wolfgang Kempf, "Climate Change and the Imagining of Migration: Emerging Discourses on Kiribati's Land Purchase in Fiji," *The Contemporary Pacific* 29, no. 2 (August 2017): 254.

[112] Birk and Rasmussen, "Migration from Atolls as Climate Change Adaptation: Current Practices, Barriers and Options in Solomon Islands," 9.

[113] Hermann and Kempf, "Climate Change and the Imagining of Migration: Emerging Discourses on Kiribati's Land Purchase in Fiji," 254; Baptiste-Brown, "Behind the Words - Migration with Dignity in Kiribati."

the system viewed as expensive and circular.[114] Many were vulnerable to abuses without the education or support to defend themselves from violations.[115] There are numerous contentions regarding the seasonal work programmes with agricultural wages experiencing declines due to the utilisation of foreign workers and widespread exploitation and abuse of said foreign workers taking place. In Australia, Pacific workers are put in direct competition with backpackers and illegal workers, meaning opportunities are further limited.[116] There are also discrepancies in the sending countries in the Pacific, with the majority of workers coming from the wealthier Pacific nations such as Tonga.[117]

Furthermore it was found that families residing in New Zealand with a migrant background from the Pacific Islands were inclined to help newly arrived migrants due to the lack of government support in the process.[118] This has meant that the Pacific community have had to create an independent, community social support network to ease people's socio-economic integration.[119] Unfortunately, the commitment by many migrant families to aid others presents monetary pressures with many often working two jobs to earn enough for their family and their guests.[120] Due to such pressures, training costs and allowances to improve employment situations were often found to be unattainable.[121] There are even reported cases of people becoming trapped in cycles of dependency with loan providers in an effort to provide assistance to relatives affected by climate

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[114] Deborah McLeod, "Potential Impacts of Climate Change Migration on Pacific Families Living in New Zealand," in *Burson, Bruce (Ed.) Climate Change and Migration South Pacific Perspectives*, 1st ed. (Wellington, New Zealand: Institute of Policy Studies, 2010), 147; Matt Gillard and Lisa Dyson, "Kiribati Migration to New Zealand: Experience, Needs and Aspirations" (Impact Research, 2012), 27.
[115] Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 35; Birk and Rasmussen, "Migration from Atolls as Climate Change Adaptation: Current Practices, Barriers and Options in Solomon Islands," 8.
[116] Peter Mares, "Objections to Pacific Seasonal Work Programs in Rural Australia," *Public Policy* 2, no. 1 (2007): 68–87.
[117] Curtain et al., "Pacific Possible: Labour Mobility," 14.
[118] McLeod, "Potential Impacts of Climate Change Migration on Pacific Families Living in New Zealand."
[119] McLeod, 154.
[120] McLeod, 153.
[121] Gillard and Dyson, "Kiribati Migration to New Zealand: Experience, Needs and Aspirations," 27.

disasters.[122] Therefore, voluntary labour migrants were largely expected to be self-supporting, providing the necessary resources to fund their journey and integration.

Despite the various issues, Klepp and Herbeck's research highlights that climate change narratives in the region have largely increased people's willingness to migrate. For example, the increasing prominence of the 'migration with dignity' campaign was seen to have shifted people's perceptions of climate change, creating a more willing and open feeling amongst the population towards resettlement.[123] This has been emphasised in other regions with perception seen to play an important role in people's willingness and readiness to migrate.[124] Therefore, disaster oriented discourse is a powerful tool in the context of environmental migration in the Pacific region and people's readiness to undertake moves away from spiritual homelands. There are also continued suggestions that opposed to creating expensive, planned relocation strategies, governments would be better served to invest in the living scenarios of voluntary labour migrants as well as addressing inequalities to encourage migration and allow the islanders to realise their potential adaptive agency. Currently, poor investment in infrastructure such as transport and living conditions are seen to limit the islander's income and undermine adaptive capacity.[125]

However, to date voluntary labour migration in the region has caused a range of social issues and is a highly limited facet of adaptation strategies. It brings up issues of dependence, gender and lack of self-sufficiency with the islanders expected to plug gaps in more developed nations labour markets as opposed to creating livelihoods at home. Migration opportunities for those affected by climate change in the South Pacific to nearby developed nations remain extremely limited with

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[122] John R. Campbell and Olivia Warrick, "Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific," Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project (Fiji: UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, August 2014), 23.
[123] Klepp and Herbeck, "The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region."
[124] Mortreux and Barnett, "Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu."
[125] Birk and Rasmussen, "Migration from Atolls as Climate Change Adaptation: Current Practices, Barriers and Options in Solomon Islands."

options generally limited to skilled migration programmes, semi-skilled micro-state visa's, seasonal worker programmes and lottery assigned residence such as the PAC, which are all subject to quotas.[126] Even in the Marshall Islands where there is a Compact of Free Association with the USA, the funds required for the journey are substantial and limit accessibility considerably.[127] Opportunities are becoming further limited due to shifts in public opinion regarding migration.[128]

4.2 – Agents of Adaptation

Climate change is a field in which the subjugation of local knowledges in favour of expert 'blocks of knowledge' is a strong possibility due to its complex and often scientific nature. However, Finucane points towards the shortfalls of such a science-only approach to climate change in the Pacific as it ignores how that science will be interpreted and implemented in the local setting, labelling it the 'science-society gap'.[129] There is mixed evidence emerging from the relocations taking place under CCMPs regarding the subjugation of local knowledge. Even cases where there has been a degree of community engagement and participation, the outcomes have been varied with the sustenance of livelihood proving difficult even in the most proximate of relocations.

The Carteret Islands are said to be the first islands that have required the complete resettlement of segments of their population.[130] The islands have a poor history with resettlements in the colonial era and early attempts of relocation were fraught with issues with the communities unable to access land for agriculture.[131] The International Organisation of Migration found an absence of participatory process in the island's adaptation strategy to which they attribute a general lack of

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[126] Bedford, Burson, and Bedford, "Compendium of Legislation and Institutional Arrangements for Labour Migration in Pacific Island Countries," 9; Marino and Lazrus, "Migration or Forced Displacement?: The Complex Choices of Climate Change and Disaster Migrants in Shishmaref, Alaska and Nanumea, Tuvalu," 346.
[127] Constable, "Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific: Options for Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands," 1032.
[128] Constable, 1033.
[129] Melissa L. Finucane, "Why Science Alone Won't Solve the Climate Crisis: Managing Climate Risks in the Pacific," *AsiaPacific Issues* 89 (August 2009): 1–8.
[130] Connell, "Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls."
[131] Connell; Campbell, "Climate Change and Population Movement in Pacific Island Countries," 35.

longer term development and sustainable solutions.[132] The initial issues surrounding the relocations highlight the need to consider the access to land and resources, with the islanders becoming economically marginalised and dependent in their new location and the possibility for conflicts remaining.[133] Therefore, it can be drawn that local knowledge and experience were not utilised effectively in these early resettlements in the Carteret Islands as well as their right to land, territory and resources ignored.

Relocations from Vunidogoloa Village to Kenani, Fiji are instructive as a case of greater community engagement in relocation procedures.[134] After approaching the government for assistance in moving, the community made the decision on the location as well as the structure of the new village.[135] The intent seems admirable on behalf of the government ministries and NGOs, enabling the move via a holistic approach that accounted for livelihood, culture, tradition and housing. The locals were provided with education and training in order to make well-informed decisions throughout the process.[136] For instance, fish ponds were built to allow for continuation in traditional ways of life despite the lack of proximity from the ocean and the community was involved in planting and developing the new site due to the inability to continue livelihoods in exact terms.[137] Customary timber from their traditional housing was also utilised in building the new settlements and local women were trained and employed to install solar panels for the housing energy.[138]

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[132] Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 20.
[133] Boege, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region."
[134] Charan, Kaur, and Singh, "Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji"; Clothiilde Tronquet, "From Vunidogoloa to Kenani: An Insight into Successful Relocation," The State of Environmental Migration 2015 (International Organization for Migration, 2015).
[135] McNamara and Des Combes, "Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji."
[136] Tronquet, "From Vunidogoloa to Kenani: An Insight into Successful Relocation," 128.
[137] Tronquet, 130–33.
[138] McNamara and Des Combes, "Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji," 317; Tronquet, "From Vunidogoloa to Kenani: An Insight into Successful Relocation," 134.

Despite this community consultation and participation and the relatively small distance the community had to move, there were still significant social impacts. The people's communal identity caused the move to be an "emotional and harrowing headway for the villagers especially since they had to retreat from their customary land."[139] In addition, the planning was largely carried out by government ministries and was facilitated by the Fiji Police Force with the use of force a possibility, highlighting Dillon's link between the state's liberal bounds and the ability to coerce if necessary.[140] The relocation was largely enabled due to financial contributions on the part of the community, showing that the onus was upon the community's ability to adapt as is posited in critiques of a resilience approach to adaptation.[141] Furthermore, the speed at which more recent top-down national initiatives are being implemented in Fiji has given doubt as to the degree of community engagement as well as worries that new established guidelines may pre-empt climate change relocations for political aims as opposed to the impending effects of climate change.[142] Therefore, local knowledge was utilised only to an extent and was not supported by exterior sources to facilitate a successful relocation.

The Solomon Islands have numerous cases of relocation including parts of its provincial capital, which represent an interesting range of issues and advantages due to the ad-hoc, community-driven nature of the relocations.[143] This process utilised local knowledge, allowing communities to select their new sites, prepare them in advance and make use of their subsistence knowledge. Furthermore, Leon et al. highlight a promising area of science-society collaboration in the Solomon Islands with participatory three-dimensional modelling taking place in which local

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[139] Charan, Kaur, and Singh, "Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji," 20.

[140] Dillon, "Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance," 42.

[141] Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration"; Methmann and Oels, "From 'Fearing' to 'Empowering' Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-Induced Migration in the Name of Resilience."

[142] McNamara and Des Combes, "Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji."

[143] Megan Rowling, "Township in Solomon Islands Is 1st in Pacific to Relocate Due to Climate Change," *Reuters*, August 15, 2014.

knowledge was used to map resources and at-risk areas of the island, providing both a forum for community discussion and engagement and a more nuanced view of the island for further adaptive plans.[144] However, the lack of funding and planning has given rise to issues including lack of infrastructure, sanitation, transport and fresh-water access as well as relocation to endangered sites. There has also been a degree of community fragmentation despite the relative proximity of the relocations.[145] This raises some interesting questions as many of the criticisms levelled at the policy highlight loss of culture and community as central downsides to migration utilised as an adaptation strategy. However, these cases show that even in community-driven relocations many of these issues still appear despite the enhanced ability to utilise local knowledges.

This evidence highlights that across the pacific region there are varying levels of community consultation and participation in relocation procedures. Early relocations in the Carteret Islands highlight the dangers of an expert-only approach that completely subjugates local knowledge as the affected population fell victim to economic marginalisation and lack of self-sufficiency. Although community-driven relocations in Fiji and the Solomon Islands do show better consideration of the extremely close relationship between people and the land as well as livelihood there were evident limitations that arose with a lack of funding and planning.[146]

4.3 – Resistance to Governmentality

Perhaps the most interesting findings from the South Pacific region show that there are pockets of resistance to migration programmes implemented by experts. Some communities have realised their own conception of migration or have resisted it altogether to sustain their identity and

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[144] Javier Leon et al., "Supporting Local and Traditional Knowledge with Science for Adaptation to Climate Change: Lessons Learned from Participatory Three-Dimensional Modeling in BoeBoe, Solomon Islands," *Coastal Management* 43, no. 4 (2015): 424–38.

[145] Simon Albert et al., "Heading for the Hills: Climate-Driven Community Relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska Provide Insight for a 1.5 °C Future," *Regional Environmental Change*, November 27, 2017, 1–12.

[146] Campbell, "Climate Change and Population Movement in Pacific Island Countries."

spiritual homeland. For example, following early issues with top-down initiated resettlement in the Carteret Islands in Papua New Guinea, a community-led NGO named Tulele Peisa was formed.[147] The organisation worked to create the Carterets Integrated Relocation Programme, aimed at a more holistic relocation procedure that accounted for the specific social, economic and cultural elements that were of greatest importance to the islanders in the migration process.[148]

Recent relocations to Tinputz, Bougainville involved significant community consultation and participation by both the sending and receiving societies to foster integration and avoid tension.[149] Chief exchanges and youth education tours were enacted as well as a joint venture in cocoa plantation to provide a means of livelihood and a space for social integration.[150] More regular transport links to the Carteret Islands are planned as well as the creation of a Conservation Area to maintain customary fishing grounds for the community.[151] In conjunction with other non-state actors such as the Pacific Conference of Churches which aided in securing land for the initiatives and other NGOs, the group was able to facilitate a largely community driven relocation for the Carteret Islanders which accounted for both the needs of the migrating communities and the host communities.[152] Much of the funding distributed for climate change adaptation takes a top-down approach in which funding is allocated to national governments and then distributed further.[153] This can create problems as both economic and funding gaps can occur in which the necessary funds do not reach the communities that are most in need. However, the Carteret Islanders could

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[147] "Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific," 5; Campbell, "Climate Change and Population Movement in Pacific Island Countries," 35.
[148] Boege, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region," 11–12.
[149] Boege, 12.
[150] Sophie Pascoe, "Sailing the Waves on Our Own: Climate Change Migration Self-Determination and the Carteret Islands," *QUT Law Review* 15, no. 2 (December 17, 2015): 78–84.
[151] Boege, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region," 15.
[152] Maryanne Loughry and Jane McAdam, "Kiribati – Relocation and Adaptation," *Forced Migration Review* 31, no. 1 (October 2008): 51–52.
[153] Benjamin K. Sovacool, Björn-Ola Linnér, and Richard J. T. Klein, "Climate Change Adaptation and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF): Qualitative Insights from Policy Implementation in the Asia-Pacific," *Climatic Change* 140, no. 2 (January 2017): 209–26.

access decentralised, community-driven funding that allowed the community to gain much greater control over the dispersal and utilisation.[154]

Despite the advantages of decentralised, community funding, the lack of community capacity was exposed at some stages of the process with a chronic lack of funding and weak national institutions hindering efforts with the country still suffering economically from the civil war ending in 1998.[155] In addition, nationwide vulnerabilities to climate change may render these relocations as interim efforts on the migration journey to truly sustainable new lands and livelihoods. However, the role of Tulele Peisa still highlights the importance and potential success of community level initiatives in securing migration options that account for the social, cultural and economic considerations of the island. Unfortunately, the success of Tulele Peisa in securing a successful relocation for its people is undermined by the lack of national and international funding representing a major hindrance and limiting the scope of the programme.[156]

The case on Tuvalu entails a different story of resistance with the Tuvaluan's strong sense of national identity, cemented in the nation's post-colonial independence, and very strong ties to the archipelago's land playing a key role.[157] This made retention of homeland and maintenance of traditional rural practices essential for the Tuvaluans. Therefore, the planning of CCMPs has been largely resisted by the islanders with preservation of lifestyle, identity and community cited as the primary reasons, despite concerns including future uncertainties and environmental concerns.[158]

[154] Maxine Burkett, "Lessons from Contemporary Resettlement in the South Pacific," *Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 2 (January 2015): 75–91.

[155] Green, "Contested Territory"; Port Moresby, "The World's First Climate Change 'Refugees,'" *IRIN*, June 8, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2008/06/08.

[156] Boege, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region," 17.

[157] Elaine Stratford, Carol Farbotko, and Heather Lazrus, "Tuvalu, Sovereignty and Climate Change: Considering Fenua, the Archipelago and Emigration," *Island Studies Journal* 8, no. 1 (May 2013): 70; Marino and Lazrus, "Migration or Forced Displacement?: The Complex Choices of Climate Change and Disaster Migrants in Shishmaref, Alaska and Nanumea, Tuvalu," 347.

[158] Constable, "Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific: Options for Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands," 1035; Mortreux and Barnett, "Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu"; Andras Vag, "EACH-FOR: Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios" (European Commission, May 14, 2009), 30.

However, the situation continues to worsen with the case of the Nanumea Island in Tuvalu highlighting the complex interplay between climate change discourse and development. The island's fresh-water tanks, largely installed by international organisations in the 1980s and 90s, are coming to the end of their lifespan necessitating renewal. However, the island now struggles to attract infrastructure investment and development projects from both the national government and international organisations due to its touting as a soon-to-be uninhabitable island by the mass media.[159] Furthermore, colonial histories on such islands have created a relationship of dependence with the communities becoming reliant on external aid and resources for survival. International efforts to aid adaptation have mostly led to the building of sea walls which are tangible results of investment but have tended to cause unintended damage.[160]Therefore, despite Tuvalu's resistance to climate change migration, representation of the island in science, policy and media is having a negative outcomes and pushing the population further towards the eventuality of loss of homeland.[161]

This highlights the historical relationships that have made the islanders dependent upon the global political economy and international aid to continue living in the archipelago as well as the apparent move away from the precautionary principle towards adaptation. The sentiment that Tuvalu's population will be forced to migrate is becoming largely accepted, normalised by media representation and subsequently branded as an opportunity for the population, negating the deep social costs of migration.[162] Therefore, even in cases of community-driven resistance to top-down initiated CCMPs, it can be viewed that the success of resistance is limited by the historically

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[159] Marino and Lazrus, "Migration or Forced Displacement?: The Complex Choices of Climate Change and Disaster Migrants in Shishmaref, Alaska and Nanumea, Tuvalu," 345–47; Jon Barnett, "The Dilemmas of Normalising Losses from Climate Change: Towards Hope for Pacific Atoll Countries," *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 58, no. 1 (April 2017): 3–13.
[160] Marino and Lazrus, "Migration or Forced Displacement?: The Complex Choices of Climate Change and Disaster Migrants in Shishmaref, Alaska and Nanumea, Tuvalu," 344.
[161] Barnett, "The Dilemmas of Normalising Losses from Climate Change: Towards Hope for Pacific Atoll Countries."
[162] Barnett.

induced dependency of the islands in the South Pacific. The capacity of communities is drastically reduced by the unwillingness shown by many national and international organisations to fund community-driven projects that may not show tangible results and which they have little control over. Furthermore, disaster related discourses have intensified the strain upon deprived communities as they seek to remain in locations that are framed as uninhabitable with investment quickly becoming elusive.

4.4 – Discussion

Overall, the implementation of CCMPs in the South Pacific Islands has provided mixed findings regarding the critiques that were made at policy level. From the literature, there arose three key areas that act as themes in the following section. These were the political intention of creating governable flows of people subject to neoliberal relations, the subjugation of local knowledge in the process of CCMPs and the resistance to governmental systems of orderliness. This discussion section will analyse the key findings from the South Pacific region thematically to find whether the claims that CCMPs were a tool of neoliberal governmentality are substantiated.

4.4.1 - Migration with Dignity?

The voluntary labour migration schemes throughout the Pacific, exemplified by Kiribati's 'migration with dignity' strategy, show in empirical form that critiques regarding migration as an adaptation strategy appear to have taken form. It was contended that the underlying political concern of the policies was to create a mass of people more attuned to the demands of the global labour market, responsible for their own wellbeing within the neoliberal system.[163] The reported

[163] Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration"; Bettini, "Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)Politics of Adaptation"; Bettini, "Climate Migration as an Adaption Strategy: De-Securitizing Climate-Induced Migration or Making the Unruly Governable?"; Baldwin, "The Political Theologies of Climate Change-Induced Migration"; Felli and Castree, "Neoliberalising Adaptation to Environmental Change: Foresight or Foreclosure?"; Dalby, "Biopolitics and Climate Security in the Anthropocene."

outcomes of voluntary labour migration in the Pacific region provide ample evidence of this process taking place. The centrality of voluntary labour migration and the remittances it provides in regional climate change adaptation strategies is a strong indication of the self-regulation that populations are expected to undertake within the neoliberal system.[164] The evidence highlights that populations in the region are largely seen as responsible for enhancing their own and their community's resilience to climate related shocks. This highlights the rationality of neoliberal thinking is ingrained into this aspect of CCMPs in the region.

It was hypothesised that such a strategy may also create a dichotomy between migrants, split into the resilient, 'good' migrants and the 'bad', those unable to move voluntarily and becoming a 'burden' upon global society.[165] The evidence suggests this has been the case in several ways. Foremost is the highly limited access to voluntary labour migration opportunities for the populations of the South Pacific Islands. The opportunities are generally the reserve of the most educated, skilled and able-bodied islanders, targeted at plugging gaps in the more developed regional nation's labour demands.[166] Therefore, the few able to migrate are evidently viewed as the resilient, 'good' migrants, able to manage themselves effectively, utilising their value to fill labour shortages as well as return on circular migration routes with renewed skills and knowledge.[167]

[164] McKee, "Post-Foucauldian Governmentality: What Does It Offer Critical Social Policy Analysis?," 469; Dillon, "Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance"; Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration"; Bettini, "Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)Politics of Adaptation."

[165] Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration"; Bettini, "Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)Politics of Adaptation"; Bettini, "Climate Migration as an Adaption Strategy: De-Securitizing Climate-Induced Migration or Making the Unruly Governable?"; Baldwin, "The Political Theologies of Climate Change-Induced Migration"; Felli and Castree, "Neoliberalising Adaptation to Environmental Change: Foresight or Foreclosure?"; Dalby, "Biopolitics and Climate Security in the Anthropocene."

[166] Bedford and Bedford, "International Migration and Climate Change: A Post-Copenhagen Perspective on Options for Kiribati and Tuvalu"; Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 24; Campbell and Bedford, "Climate Change and Migration: Lessons from Oceania," 310.

[167] Baldwin, "The Political Theologies of Climate Change-Induced Migration"; Bettini, Nash, and Gioli, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: The Fading Contours of (in)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration."

The social and gender implications in the sending societies highlight the converse, the plight of the 'bad' migrants worsened as their adaptive capacity is diminished, creating heightened vulnerability to socio-economic and environmental shocks and growing dependency.[168] These inequalities are only emphasised by the financial and legislative barriers to migration such as the cost of the journeys and the quotas placed upon migration from the Pacific region.[169] This entails that migration is not based upon the vulnerability of populations and is unlikely to become so with regional developed countries showing reservation towards including climate change in migration policy.[170] Therefore, the shift in modern biopolitics toward the regulation of circulations is evident with an emphasis upon 'good' circulations, those with pre-existing skills that are useful for the labour market in juxtaposition with 'bad' circulations, the unskilled and non-able bodied still subject to exclusion, outside of the bounds of state protection.[171]

Furthermore, upon arrival in migration destinations, the living and working conditions of migrants were shown to be testing, with little in the way of government support to ameliorate the situation.[172] Pacific migrants were largely responsible for their own wellbeing, evidenced by the importance of remittances and trying economic conditions as they attempted to maintain support to their wider communities.[173] Therefore, we view Grove's "flexible spaces of entrapment" at work, channelling the possibilities of the migrants to set conditions within the neoliberal system.[174]

[168] Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 20; Klepp and Herbeck, "The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region"; Baptiste-Brown, "Behind the Words - Migration with Dignity in Kiribati," 50.
[169] Constable, "Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific: Options for Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands"; Bedford, Burson, and Bedford, "Compendium of Legislation and Institutional Arrangements for Labour Migration in Pacific Island Countries"; Marino and Lazrus, "Migration or Forced Displacement?: The Complex Choices of Climate Change and Disaster Migrants in Shishmaref, Alaska and Nanumea, Tuvalu," 346.
[170] Jillian Ash and Jillian Campbell, "Climate Change and Migration: The Case of the Pacific Islands and Australia," *Journal of Pacific Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 53–72.
[171] Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, "Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction."
[172] Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change," 35; Birk and Rasmussen, "Migration from Atolls as Climate Change Adaptation: Current Practices, Barriers and Options in Solomon Islands," 8–9.
[173] McLeod, "Potential Impacts of Climate Change Migration on Pacific Families Living in New Zealand"; Campbell and Warrick, "Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific," 23.
[174] Grove, "Insuring 'Our Common Future?' Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security," 557.

The population is given a 'regulated freedom', with autonomy and responsibility largely devolved to the communities.[175] They then display this capacity for self-control as they form support initiatives to ease incoming migrant's integration.[176] Furthermore, despite the poor conditions experienced by migrant workers, voluntary labour migration continues to be framed as a positive aspect of adaptation strategies as media and development policy alike shift perceptions of the affected populations.[177] Through this, a process similar to the effects of crisis narratives in Hurricane Katrina becomes apparent, with people pushed into highly complex decisions that entail large losses by crisis framing that works to generate emotional, fast-acting responses.[178]

Therefore, the evidence highlights a central role of neoliberal governmentality in CCMPs that entail voluntary labour migration. These programmes appear to have created a dichotomy between 'good' and 'bad' migrants from South Pacific Island states, subjecting the 'good' to neoliberal relations in which they must self-regulate and neglecting the 'bad', whilst framing it in the terms of a crisis narrative.

4.4.2 - Subjugation of Local Knowledge

The relocations related to climate change taking place in the Pacific Islands represent mixed findings regarding the subjugation of local knowledge. Earlier relocations in the Carteret Islands, among the first in the South Pacific region, highlighted a strong case in favour of the thesis that such processes would heavily involve the subjugation of local knowledge.[179] This was despite the

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[175] McKee, "Post-Foucauldian Governmentality: What Does It Offer Critical Social Policy Analysis?," 469.

[176] Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond," 190.

[177] Klepp and Herbeck, "The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region"; Barnett, "The Dilemmas of Normalising Losses from Climate Change: Towards Hope for Pacific Atoll Countries"; McAdam, "Refusing 'Refuge' in the Pacific (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in International Law"; Bedford, Burson, and Bedford, "Compendium of Legislation and Institutional Arrangements for Labour Migration in Pacific Island Countries."

[178] Protevi, "Hurricane Katrina: The Governmental Body Politic"; Protevi, "Above, Below, and Alongside the Subject."

[179] Connell, "Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls"; Sithole, "Carteret Islands: When Migration Is the Last Option of Surviving the Impact of Climate Change."

warnings regarding a science-only approach that negated the importance of local knowledge as well as the guidelines offered by the Nansen Principles, the IDP guidelines and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which emphasise the central role that the community must play in the process, the continuation of people's livelihoods and protection from being arbitrarily displaced.[180] This fulfils Foucault's elements of subjugation, with the local people's knowledge and experience marginalised in the relocation process in favour of expert knowledge.[181]

However, later migration programmes show contrasting evidence. Cases from Fiji and the Solomon Islands highlight that communities were highly involved in the process, with consultation and participation on multiple key issues including location, housing, livelihood and education.[182] This represents an interesting finding as Foucault denotes the use of inferior, local knowledge as a promising avenue for social science but in this case, it can be viewed that such knowledge is being utilised in policy implementation.[183] The report by Nakashima et al. highlights the continued value of local knowledge and the combination of traditional measures with modern technology to provide holistic and inclusive solutions in the diverse South Pacific Islands.[184] The role of traditional knowledge is also emphasised in the post-colonial literature with scholars highlighting that traditionally the islands and nation states that make up the region were viewed as a network, interconnected by the ocean in which mobility and migration were commonplace. It was only in the colonial period that firm border demarcations were set in place, limiting the mobility and

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[180] Finucane, "Why Science Alone Won't Solve the Climate Crisis: Managing Climate Risks in the Pacific"; "The Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century," Principle 10; "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement"; "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples."
[181] Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended", Lectures at The College de France, 1975-76*, 1–19.
[182] Charan, Kaur, and Singh, "Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji"; Tronquet, "From Vunidogoloa to Kenani: An Insight into Successful Relocation"; McNamara and Des Combes, "Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji"; Albert et al., "Heading for the Hills: Climate-Driven Community Relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska Provide Insight for a 1.5 °C Future."
[183] Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended", Lectures at The College de France, 1975-76*.
[184] Douglas Nakashima et al., "Weathering Uncertainty: Traditional Knowledge for Climate Change Assessment and Adaptation" (Paris and Darwin, Australia: UNESCO and United Nations University Traditional Knowledge Initiative, 2012).

subsequent adaptive capacity of the peoples. Therefore, there are now calls to realise this understanding again, creating a Pacific solidarity that can increase the adaptive capacity of the islands.[185] Therefore, a strong case can be made for the utilisation rather than subjugation of local knowledge in the climate change relocations taking place in the South Pacific.

However, these cases highlight Baldwin's statement well in that although the communities are viewed as having right and agency, they are actually carefully managed, only involved to a certain extent, allowed to make decisions but within the confines set by those deemed expert.[186] Even in the cases of the Solomon Islands and Fiji, a lack of financial support hindered community-led efforts, with a range of social costs experienced.[187] As aforementioned, "the cultural and spiritual significance that indigenous people attach to their lands and territories goes far beyond any monetary or productive value or even the value of their life."[188] Therefore, it remains questionable to what extent neoliberal policies can account for such important ties when economic rationality is imbibed ever further into the social sphere.[189] Although there are early cases where this has been largely accounted for, doubt is cast on the ability to carry out such operations on a mass scale if environmental conditions are to drastically worsen in the region.[190]

Overall, concerns about the subjugation of local knowledge in the process of climate change relocation in the South Pacific are not entirely unfounded.[191] The earliest case highlighted that top-

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[185] Klepp and Herbeck, "The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region."

[186] Baldwin, "The Political Theologies of Climate Change-Induced Migration," 19.

[187] Charan, Kaur, and Singh, "Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji"; Albert et al., "Heading for the Hills: Climate-Driven Community Relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska Provide Insight for a 1.5 °C Future."

[188] Charan, Kaur, and Singh, "Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji," 26.

[189] Thomas Lemke, "'The Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality," *Economy and Society* 30, no. 2 (2001): 190–207.

[190] Tronquet, "From Vunidogoloa to Kenani: An Insight into Successful Relocation," 139.

[191] Hartmann, "Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse"; Nielsen and Reenberg, "Cultural Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation: A Case Study from Northern Burkina Faso."

down initiatives did indeed lead to subjugation and consequent social and economic issues. However, later cases have shown the utilisation of local knowledge and experience in the process of relocations despite some evident limitations. If this is a process that continues to develop, it could be a promising example of the use of local knowledge in complex processes usually deemed the realm of the expert.

4.4.3 - Sustainable Resistance?

As highlighted in the literature review, although international agencies have a set vision of the implementation of CCMPs, in transferring such technologies there can often be surprising results as people modify and utilise the various aspects according to their own knowledge, needs and experience.[192] Merlingen highlighted this as a valuable area of research and subsequently this section analyses the cases where interesting evidence of resistance was found at the level of local implementation.[193] As shown in the findings this has been the case in several countries in the Pacific region, particularly those that have shown defiance to top-down relocations. Through this it can be stated that integration into neoliberal relations via biopolitical rationalities and technologies is not a certain as some of the critiques at the policy level would lead one to believe.

The role of Tulele Peisa in the Carteret Island's later relocations highlights the importance and potential success of non-state, community level actors. In conjunction with the Pacific Conference of Churches and other NGOs, the group facilitated a community-driven relocation which accounted for the needs of both the migrating and the host communities. This community-driven approach allowed the Carteret Islanders to bypass many of the convoluted controls that go hand

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[192] Grove, "Insuring 'Our Common Future?' Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security," 557; Felli and Castree, "Neoliberalising Adaptation to Environmental Change: Foresight or Foreclosure?," 1.

[193] Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond," 190.

in hand with top-down dispersal of climate change adaptation funding.[194] The group could effectively account for the key socio-economic concerns for the locals in the relocation process, to a far greater extent than top-down implemented initiatives elsewhere in the Pacific region. Livelihoods were continued and where impossible, integrative new ventures were established to provide economic subsistence as well as social cohesion with the hosting community. Therefore, it can be argued that the community avoided unwanted integration into neoliberal structures that would have led to greater social and cultural disarticulation. However, the lack of community capacity was compounded by a lack of funding and weak national institutions.

Tuvalu represented a similar story in that the islanders had largely resisted any attempts to push them into CCMPs that would involve loss of homeland, culture and identity.[195] Therefore, the Tuvaluans, also demonstrate resistance to biopolitics at the local level, with the islanders eschewing the expert advice that imminent migration was a necessity for the community. However, narratives of the island becoming uninhabitable proved harmful have caused responses that are considered to be a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts, forcing premature migration.[196] Historical political categorisation of the islanders as an inferior population during the colonial era has led to a severe lack of modern capacity that undermines community-led adaptation, similar to that which Protevi highlighted in New Orleans with the marginalisation of the African-American community in the disaster response limiting their adaptive capacity.[197] Instead of listening to the wishes of the islanders, the situation in Tuvalu can be viewed as a case of Methmann and Oel's 'transformational

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[194] Sovacool, Linnér, and Klein, "Climate Change Adaptation and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF): Qualitative Insights from Policy Implementation in the Asia-Pacific."
[195] Constable, "Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific: Options for Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands"; Mortreux and Barnett, "Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu"; Vag, "EACH-FOR: Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios."
[196] Jon Barnett, "Don't Give up on Pacific Island Nations yet," *The Conversation*, November 15, 2017, http://theconversation.com/dont-give-up-on-pacific-island-nations-yet-83300.
[197] Protevi, "Hurricane Katrina: The Governmental Body Politic."

resilience' with little attempt being made to sustain and invest in the current system with the emphasis now heavily upon adaptation as opposed to preventative measures.[198]

Therefore, it can be said that despite pockets of resistance in the South Pacific region to top-down implemented CCMPs that push them away from their homelands and traditional livelihoods, historical structural inequalities are pushing them towards relations that constitute the established norm in modern, neoliberal societies.[199] Complex relations of dependence created in the colonial era have limited many of these community's capacity to adapt on their own terms to climatic events, despite their proven capable in the past.[200] The issue is further compounded as migration is framed as the sole viable solution in many media, policy and development narratives with development and infrastructure investment quickly drying up as a result. Therefore, it would appear that these communities will eventually have their resistance eroded, their ability to live outside neoliberal relations diminished over time.

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[198] Methmann and Oels, "From 'Fearing' to 'Empowering' Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-Induced Migration in the Name of Resilience," 54.
[199] Rose, "Governing"; Lemke, "'The Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality."
[200] Nakashima et al., "Weathering Uncertainty: Traditional Knowledge for Climate Change Assessment and Adaptation," 90.

Chapter 5 – Conclusion

This research explored the early CCMPs taking place in the South Pacific region to find how they were implemented at the local level. Much of the criticism at the policy level utilised biopolitical theory to critique on the grounds of the separation of migrants into a dichotomy of 'good' and the 'bad', subjugation of local knowledges and seeking to create governable 'flows' of people in the neoliberal political economy. However, these critiques failed to utilise empirical evidence in the process, neglecting the strength of Foucauldian analysis in determining the interplay between the international, national and local. Therefore, this research utilised such analysis to gain further insight into the form that CCMPs were taking in the South Pacific region, particularly the effects on the local populace and whether this amounted to an exercise of biopolitics.

Voluntary labour migration was found to be a prevalent aspect of CCMPs throughout the region. This was exemplified by the 'migration with dignity' programme implemented by Kiribati, the aim to expand existing labour migration arrangements. Although remittances were seen to augment economic conditions in the home countries, poor living and working conditions as well as inadequate government support for the labour migrants showed that they were expected to self-regulate in keeping with the expectations of neoliberal relations. The severe limitations on the numbers received based on skill and education levels created divisions amongst the population in the receiving countries which can be viewed as creating a dichotomy between 'good' and 'bad' migrants with those left behind suffering worsening social conditions. Therefore, it can be argued that voluntary labour migration as a facet of CCMPs in the South Pacific is utilised as a biopolitical tool of neoliberal governmentality.

In terms of resettlement procedures, early implementations were seen to subjugate local knowledge in favour of experts with the Carteret Islanders experiencing a loss of livelihood and

marginalisation due to a top-down resettlement initiative. However, there have been promising instances of community consultation and participation in more recent procedures in Fiji and the Solomon Islands that have worked to utilise local knowledge to lower the costs of resettlement. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that CCMPs necessarily subjugate local knowledges. Despite this, even in these cases social costs were incurred and there are also evident financial and time limitations to such an approach that cast doubt upon the ability to enact such inclusive procedures on a larger scale.

The research also showed that there were signs of resistance to neoliberal governmentality in the South Pacific region. In the Carteret Islanders, a community NGO was formed to enable community-driven resettlement procedures which allowed for community integrity, tradition and livelihood to be maintained. Restrictions due to top-down distributed funding were avoided but limitations on the availability of decentralised funding hindered the resettlement efforts significantly. In Tuvalu, the community seek to resist migration to maintain their spiritual ties with their homeland. However, development and infrastructure investment have become increasingly difficult to attract as media, policy and development discourses continue to cast the islands as uninhabitable. Therefore, although resisted to date, deteriorating conditions on the island look set to force the islanders to migrate, becoming subject to neoliberal governmentality.

Overall, the evidence from the South Pacific highlights that CCMPs need not entail a form of neoliberal governmentality over the populations. There are cases of community consultation and participation in procedures in both Fiji and the Solomon Islands working to utilise rather than subjugate local knowledge. Resistance in the Carteret Islands and Tuvalu to migration into neoliberal relations shows that community integrity can be maintained despite the push for voluntary labour migration. However, in the cases where voluntary labour migration is prevalent the poor conditions in both the sending and receiving communities highlight that migrants appear

to have been split into a dichotomy and are largely expected to self-regulate under neoliberal governmentality.

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