

Interpretation on Left and Right-Wing Populism with Foreign Policy:

Evo Morales and Viktor Orban

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Abstract

Cas Mudde warned the academia that there is an isolation in current populism study when it comes to geographic location of case choice, and the connection between populism and diplomacy is not emphasized. This thesis will focus on locating the role of populist discourse in foreign policy in the cases of Morales and Orban. Inclusionary and exclusionary theory will be employed to interpret the populist discourse of both cases. The research uses types of populism, left-wing populism and right-wing populism in the case of our research, as independent variables; foreign policy aggressiveness for selected regimes is the dependent variables in our this research; the democratic level of chosen regimes is the controlled variable which will be explained in content that populism can be democratic or not, but we need to avoid the influence of this issue to get a more clear conclusion on the dependent and independent variables.

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Introduction

During the United States presidential election in 2016, a political term “populism” swept media outlets, which was mainly associated with candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, both of whom were considered by the main stream media reporters like NBC News Chuck Todd as typical representatives of populists, only with the difference of left or right-wing ideological stance between them. The vogue of “populism” did not ebb as the U.S. presidential election wraps up, but diffused in European media outlets due to the election results in Germany, Italy and Hungary in 2017 and 2018. Vigilance against populism is among one of the main reasons that the rise of populists drew distinctive attention from the public, and even among academia where opinions are usually numerous in numbers, the consensus this time seems to be dominating, such as Sterne and Rama’s article warned: in the incoming years, the wave of populism is going to be a threat politically and economically to the stability of global community and regional organizations¹. Sterne confidently assumes a connection between the rise of populism and the shift of foreign policy in near future by implying the newly rising populist politicians across western states will alter the existing world order and disrupt the global as well as regional harmony in international relations. The legitimacy and validity of this argument can only be justified or negated when the day comes, but there is still one aspect can be inspected about this argument for now: is there a tangible correlation between populist leaders and foreign policy aggressiveness? More explicitly in the context we are discussing, what are the foreign policy consequences of two distinctive types of populist leader (left and right) in contemporary regimes?

¹ Sterne, G., & Rama, M. (2017). And a Populist New Year: Global Hopes and Fears Framework. *Economic Outlook*, 41(1), 17-22.; summary of bullet points across paragraphs.

The thesis will attempt to explain how populist discourse shapes the foreign policy preference of several state leaders by locating the correlation between populist regimes in certain states and foreign policy aggressiveness of those states, with considering the differences and impacts of left and right-wing populism in this correlation. The impact of democratic level of states within the presumably existing correlation will also be examined when choosing populist cases since populist regimes does not necessarily equal to democratic government², hence populism may no longer have impact on the foreign policy aggressiveness when power distribution is altered within a state.

The first chapter of the thesis will clarify the definition of populism, answering primarily two questions: what is populism; who are populists. Four main approaches of populism as well as a minor approach will be introduced and direct quotes will be used as definitions in the consideration of accuracy. Within this chapter a breakdown of left and right-wing populism analysis will be conducted based on the exclusionary and inclusionary theory to prepare for a further discussion of whether two sides of this term can equally steer foreign policy flow. Identification of populist leaders will then be discussed because what standard do we use to choose sample cases for the comparative study is crucial for this thesis. Based on the left and right category, Evo Morales and Viktor Orban will be separately introduced in the following two chapters since they both have been in office for long time and is still in charge of their states which would allow us to find recent diplomatic actions of them. To figure out a potential connection between populism and their foreign policy preference, interpretations on various speech, interviews and publications from them will be assessed to establish a framework of how populism is shaping their views, rhetoric and restricting their policy choices. From this point on the analysis of specific diplomatic

² Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. *Journal Of Political Ideologies*

actions and foreign policy interactions will be infused to check if the presumed framework did have impact on their foreign policy choices. After the analysis, a short projection will be conducted for both leaders about their foreign policy tendency in the future based on the discoveries of previous discourse.

The problem with the analysing method is that, to expound populism and politicians' viewpoint on specific issues, language interpretation is uniquely necessary, but interpreting altered language may lead to inaccuracy, hence for certain citations direct quote will be used so that I can pick out vocabularies directly from these quotes and interpret them in the context further. Another problem is the source availability, especially when it comes to foreign policy intention because at one point of analysis in Orban a cabinet suspicious move will be discussed but no further discovery can be done on the topic because when it is about alleged corruption there is no available or trustworthy data for outsider. Choices of interview and speech will be based on specific purpose, which should be different from each other. The foreign relation collection of two states would focus on news report because it is more up-to-date to collect diplomatic interactions based on regularly updated media. Presumably correlations between foreign policy preference and both left and right-wing populism should exist, and desirably the conclusion of this thesis would contribute a tiny but visible fragment to the overall populism and foreign policy interaction study.

To achieve the purpose, the case selection should be based on more recent leaders, and the geographic location of cases should avoid the isolation issue in populist study which we will explain in detail in the following section. The guiding principle of discourse in the thesis is that we solve one issue a time, that is: only after clarified the definition of populism will we dive into identifying left and right-wing populism, and only when we figured out what is left and what is right in the context of populism will we start to select populist leaders. In the interpretation of

politicians' rhetoric, any implication of diplomatic preference linked to populist characteristics shall be reserved, and in the end whether these characteristic caused preferences affected the actual diplomatic actions will be discussed.

Chapter 1: Populism

This chapter aims to clarify one issue: how to identify a populist. Two theoretical perspectives will be assessed: based on mainstream approaches, what is populism; what are the differences between left and right-wing populism. With two perspectives been resolved we shall be able to proceed our discussion to select appropriate populist examples for further comparative case study.

What is populism?

The academia has never failed to demonstrate how intense the debate about the definition of populism is, but mutual recognitions on several features of populism/populist frequently appear in different texts, such as a general Manichean view of societal struggle between “good people” and “bad elite” where the schemes of political establishment are always antagonistic to the mass population's fundamental interests³; same degree of emphasis on the implementation of rhetoric evoking homogenous people to convene and lavishly boasting the charisma of populist leaders⁴

³ Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (n.d). *Populism : a very short introduction*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017; Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2012). *Populism in Europe and the Americas : threat or corrective for democracy?*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012; Rovira Kaltwasser, C., Taggart, P. A., Ochoa Espejo, P., & Ostiguy, P. (2017). *The Oxford handbook of populism*. New York, NY; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017

⁴ McDonnell, D. (2017). Populist Leadership. *Social Alternatives*, 36(3), 26-30

appears in texts as well. There are by far four cardinal approaches of populism study, and I chose four scholars' work to represent these approaches: Cas Mudde and populism as an ideology; Kurt Weyland and populism as a strategy; Ernesto Laclau and populism as a political logic; Kirk Hawkins and populism as a discourse. Although four approaches share diverse levels of recognition in academia, they will be equally discussed below for a thorough explanation. A recent research even suggests that while it makes sense to categorize populism as either an ideology, a strategy, a discourse or a political logic, a political style instead would be more appropriate to epitomize contemporary populism⁵. This new argument will also be mentioned for comparative purpose.

Cas Mudde when arguing populism as an ideology used a realistic thinking pattern by calling populism as:

“a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *Volonté générale* (general will) of the people.”⁶

There are three points to extract from this definition: populism as a thin-centered ideology would mean that it has no core stance, but rather to be a multifunctional combination with other explicit ideologies and values on specific issues to have practical purposes; the belongingness of populism to mass population is exceedingly prime that the leaders have to foment dispute between general public and elite so that people will persistently regard populist leaders as their sole legitimate representatives; the general will of the people simply refers to the preference, which has nothing to do with the ethnic, moral or sustainability of the society.

⁵ Moffitt, B. (2016). *The global rise of populism : performance, political style, and representation*. Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2016

⁶ Mudde, C. *The Populist Zeitgeist*, p543

Ernesto Laclau took a philosophical path when analysing populism as political logic by discussing the relationship between “the leader” on symbolic meaning and “the people” on individual level which suggests:

“an assemblage of heterogeneous elements kept equivalentially together only by a name is, however, necessarily a singularity...the quivalential logic leads to singularity, and singularity to the identification of the unity of the group with the name of the leader...the symbolic unification of the group around an individuality – and here I agree with Freud – is inherent in the formation of a ‘people.’”⁷

The individual level discussion focuses on the formation of the “people” in populist rhetoric, seeking for the origin and implication of this identity. In this definition, Laclau regard the process of the formation of the populist “people” as an inevitable consequence of assemblage under any cause, even negatively a reclame. What it implies is that the unity of populist groups can hold self-righteousness by all means, but the unadulterated incentive would have no indispensable bond to morality: it is only the consequence of any assemblage based on identification.

Kirk Hawkins when assessing populism as a discourse emphasizes on a larger scale analysis stating:

“I define populism in terms of worldview and discourse, and I change the word into an adjective – populist movement, populist leader, etc.- when I want to refer to actual instances of populism. This cannot entirely eliminate our confusion, as we naturally tend to use the term ‘populism’ to refer not just to a set of ideas but to the larger set of practices of which they become a part (as in ‘populism in Latin America first emerges in the early twentieth century’), but I try to use these terms carefully in order to preserve as clear a boundary as possible between ideas and actions.”⁸

The separation of ideas and actions was stressed in his argument, which means practical value of populism is not as essential as previously mentioned political logic approach. Hawkins even pointed out that a common recognition on populism is how a set of ideas should bond to practice and actions, which is a clear challenge to other existing approaches because at this point

⁷ Laclau, E. (n.d). *On populist reason*. London ; New York : Verso, p10

⁸ Hawkins, K. A. (2010). *Venezuela's Chavismo and populism in comparative perspective*. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010. P41

populism would exist beyond practical use, which is purely philosophical in his view. That being said, a political entity would not associate with a firm populist evaluation, so the assemblage no longer generates populism but the discourse matters more.

Kurt Weyland's practical emphasis is even stronger when comparing his strategy argument with the ideology argument, where he says:

“populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers...a charismatic leader wins broad, diffuse, yet intense support from such a largely unorganized mass by ‘representing’ people who feel excluded or marginalized.”⁹

Government power is brought up in his approach, which is the first among four approaches, and it underlines two features of ‘people’ and leaders: mass are unorganized and leaders are charismatic. What it offers is the contention that ideas could vary in populism, even contradictory to each other, but the practice of such strategy is the key that defines populism as it is. This approach shares significant common ground with the ideology approach and strengthen the theory of thin-centered and multifunctional populism as a political term.

In addition, there is another innovative approach on the rise which argues that unlike ordinary “-ism” in political science, economy and philosophy, populism underlines more on political style than having a core value¹⁰, and anti-pluralism will always be the primary strategic target of populism even though pluralism could fit in various ideologies and mean opposite things in different contexts¹¹. Benjamin Moffitt is one of the most identical representatives in this approach and he explained how the radical evolution of media outlets and political environment in recent decades catalysed a populism with globalization characteristic where global media

⁹ Kurt Weyland, a. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. *Comparative Politics*, p14

¹⁰ Cox, M (2017). Understanding the Global Rise of Populism. LSE IDEAS, p28

¹¹ Müller, J. (2016). *What is populism?*. Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, [2016].

environment is becoming high priority to populist movements and an overlap with media strategy of political style resulted in the populism to become a gradational process that the boundary of whether the movement is populism or not can shift quickly based on tactic demand.¹² The similarities between political style approach and political strategy approach is considerable, but the accent on “evolving process” as new populist feature is uniquely valuable.

Although five different views on populism contradict to each other from various perspectives, there are still mutual recognitions we can extract as our standard for populist leader selection process in this thesis. The implementation of rhetoric attaching populist leaders to homogenous people as brethren can be spotted in all approaches, and within the rhetoric elite is consistently depicted as schemers who jeopardizing the society for their own interests. Also, the self-portraits of populist leaders contain the characteristic of charisma, which is presented in all approaches, and the unmediated linkages between leaders and population is the kernel to sustain this charisma image, although the degree of charisma can be vary upon individuals’ interpretation¹³. The command from populist leaders to the “people” reflects one specific principle based on political logic, ideology and political strategy approach, that is the hostile and aggressive nature of political actions against the existing establishment, or “elite” in populist rhetoric, which ultimately resulting in the inevitable clash between the “people” and “elite” where populist leaders would be able to seize power in the turbulence. With the mutual features of populism in mainstream approaches been clarified, we can safely identify populist leaders in a general way, but the new question is: how do we tell the differences between left and right-wing populist?

¹² Moffitt, B (2016). *The global rise of populism : performance, political style, and representation*.p149, p44-46

¹³ McDonnell, D. (2017). Populist Leadership. *Social Alternatives*, 36(3), 26-30

Left and Right-Wing Differences: Who Are Populists

Before analysing the correlation between populism and foreign policy aggressiveness, it is worth to notice that left and right-wing populism may have different impact on foreign policy, hence a clarification of both sides is required for discretion purpose. To begin with, left and right-wing populism do share the hostile viewpoint on political establishment¹⁴, but some scholars suggest that the existing researches did not emphasize much on left-wing populism cross-over with right-wing populism in the case of cross-regional Latin America and Europe comparative study, and the regional isolation of previous study resulted in an overlook of some significant contradictions between two terms¹⁵, thus comparing left and right-wing populism is not only in urgent demand, but should also be upgraded with regional based analysis.

The primary target of populism, as we have mentioned above, is usually referred to as the evil “others” that are not “we the people” despite left and right difference. However, what “others” represent is not explicitly the same in the context of left and right rhetoric. The “others” in left-wing populism according to Ostiguy is

“the rich, the oligarchy, the 1%, financial capital, the *cuicos* or *pitucos*, the rich white folks, all of whom, moreover and importantly, are always foreignizing and globalizing in league with imperialism, colonialism, the U.S., the U.K., global capital, ‘Europe’, etc”¹⁶.

On the contrary, right-wing populism tends to refer “others” as

“immigrants, illegal aliens, Muslims, Mexicans, Maghrebins and *sans-papiers*...culturally distinct-who, moreover and importantly, clearly deteriorate our nation and neighbourhood environments, and are associated with delinquency and/or repulsive cultural practices.”¹⁷

¹⁴ Ostiguy, P., Casullo, M. (2017). Left versus Right Populism: Antagonism and the Social Other. *The political Study Association*. p6

¹⁵ Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (n.d). Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government and Opposition*. 147-148; Hawkins, K. A., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). The Ideational Approach to Populism. *Latin American Research Review*, 52(4), 513-528. doi:10.25222/larr.85

¹⁶ Ostiguy, P., Casullo, M. (2017). Left versus Right Populism: Antagonism and the Social Other. 7

¹⁷ Ibid

What Ostiguy tells us is that the focus of left-wing populism would primarily be based on financial/economic perspective (saving the poor public), while right-wing populism stresses more on cultural/social perspective (repelling the barbaric alien), and in both cases

“the source of indignation is that the government, the political establishment protects these ‘obviously nefarious’ social Others (and their interests), instead of ‘the people of this place’.”¹⁸

The above definition would be a valuable standard for us to identify left and right-wing populists in order to compare their differences on impacting foreign policy aggressiveness, but for accuracy concern, at least two theories are required so that selected populist cases can be more accurately described and analysed. Another definition is offered by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Kaltwasser based on regional studies mentioned above, and the keyword of this theory is exclusionary and inclusionary populism. In his geographically based analysis he claims

“Latin America populism predominantly has a socio-economic dimension (including the poor), while European populism has a primarily sociocultural dimension (excluding the ‘aliens’) ... Today, European populism is predominantly exclusive, while Latin American populism is chiefly inclusive.”¹⁹

The linkage between Mudde’s summary and Ostiguy’s argument is overt that whether the focus of the populist movement is on economic issue or cultural ethnic issue determines the left and right-wing category of the movement. An existing theory to comprehend this conclusion would be that Europe’s elevated level of development has caused post-material politics to surpass socioeconomic politics in terms of importance, while Latin America is still struggling and combating the poverty and employment issue²⁰. By locating the common ground of these two theories, it is now possible to identify a populist’s left or right-wing stance based on their focus of social issues, which would allow us to pick precise cases for further discussion.

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (n.d). Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government And Opposition*, 48(2), 147-174

²⁰ Inglehart, R. (n.d). *The silent revolution : changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1977.

What the concentration of left-wing populism tells us is that we should expect to see our left-wing populist leader example to be extremely focused on inclusive rhetoric and mobilization to unite against the elite and dominators of the world order²¹. In this sense, the socialism features like equality among people, anti-capitalism, anti-elitism, egalitarian and anti-globalization should be the driving forces of left-wing populist foreign policy. These driving forces should produce a state policy direction where racism and sexism is strictly extinguished, nationalization on economic sectors are being pushed forward, grassroots politics and lower-class people are emphasized, redistribution of social welfare and reduction of income gap as well as protectionism with a hostile gesture against western giant corporations. At this point there are already some leaders whose regimes conform with these criteria such as Cristina Kirchner of Argentina, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia. A selection will be made based on further comparison.

The concentration of right-wing populism on the other hand would demonstrate a distinctive exclusive rhetoric and hostile attitude towards whoever is considered to be the alien. Nationalism features on ethnic purity, state consolidation and sovereignty first would be expected to see, and conservatism in cultural as well as economic perspective can be anticipated. Anti-globalization and anti-immigration which are both existing issues of the contemporary politics shall also be represented. These features would generate a state policy direction where hostile attitude against Inter-Governmental Organization and Non-Governmental Organization is obvious, anti-existing world order and mainstream norms is guiding principle, fascism level state fanaticism is practised and non-native immigration is fiercely insulted. Reaching the culturally pure society and unite will be a primary goal, and further the aim will be pushing for a glorious state influence

²¹ Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (n.d). *Twenty-first century populism : the spectre of western European democracy*. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

on neighbours. Populist leaders that fit these descriptions are primarily in Europe such as Viktor Orban of Hungary, Mteusz Morawiecki of Poland and Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey. Further discussion of selecting standard will be discussed below.

Populist Case Selection

The purpose of this thesis is to figure out whether populism consequentially induce aggressive foreign policy, which means the selected cases shall be able to reflect several traits of the study: whether the regime is populist or not has impact on foreign policy aggressiveness; whether the populist regime is left or right-wing has impact on foreign policy aggressiveness; and as mentioned in the introduction, the populist regime can be democratic or not, which suggests that this variety shall be taken into consideration as well. The research hypothesis for this reason will be: In the selected cases, the leaders' foreign policy aggressiveness is indeed affected by their populist discourse in the context of both left and right-leaning populism. Also, because we are aiming to analyse foreign policy acts, only those populist leaders who successfully assumed office will be considered, hence typical populists such as Haider of Austria and Le Pen of France will not be discussed. For these concerns, our choosing cases should contain at least: one left-wing populist regime, either democratic or not; one right-wing populist regime, either democratic or not; a democratic or non-democratic populist regime if previous selections lack one feature.

After setting types of populism (left or right) as our dependent variable and regime's foreign policy aggressiveness as independent variable, we need to control another variable which is the democratic level of the regime. As mentioned in the introduction, populist regime can be democratically elected, undemocratically elected or democratically elected with flaw. For such reason, two regimes we choose should have a similar democratic situation, either good or bad. To

determine whether the regime is democratic or not, *polity data series*, *democracy ranking* and *democracy index* will be used for regime type assessment. Due to the regional isolation argument by Cas Mudde in the previous section, it is more ideal and discreet to pick regimes from different continents and making comparison, thus Latin America and Europe where most of the populism studies focused on should contribute at least one case each.

Based on above standards, the first regime I chose is Bolivia's 80th president Evo Morales. As Cristobal Kaltwasser and Cas Mudde have argued above, Latin America is particularly known for been a fertile soil of left-wing populism, and Evo Morales is not a heresy of this trend which we will give more details in his own chapter 2 below. He has been in office since 2006 by winning three elections in 2005, 2009 and 2014, and during the period of his presidency, the Polity IV gave Bolivia a score of 8 from 2005 to 2008, and a score of 7 from 2009 to 2016, which falls under the category of Democracy (6 to 9) based on Polity Data Series standard. The Democracy Index ranked Bolivia 89 in 2017, with an overall score of 5.49 out of 10, and electoral process and pluralism criteria is scored 7 out of 10 and concluded Bolivia as a hybrid regime. The Democracy Ranking marked Bolivia a score of 53.8 out of 100 in 2011 – 2012 which is 61 among all states and increased the score to 55.4 for 2014 – 2015 and the political system criteria score increased 1.9 to 61.7 from 2011 – 2015. The interpretation is that although Evo Morales is legitimately elected and re-elected for his presidency, Bolivia in general is on the edge between flawed democracy and open anocracy with a trend indicated above that polity evaluation of his regime is having a slowly decline. With these features summarized, Evo Morales would serve the criteria of left-wing populist and flawed democratic leader.

The second case I chose is Viktor Orban who is the 56th prime minister of Hungary. Europe as Cas Mudde argued above is particularly known for being a fertile ground of right-wing

populism, and Viktor Orban is one of the most identical leaders in Europe who fits Mudde's description which I will explain in detail in chapter 3. He served as the prime minister of Hungary from 1998 to 2002, and with several years in opposition after 2002 he was elected as prime minister again in 2010, and won all three elections with his party since. From 1998 to 2016 the Polity IV gave Hungary a stable 10 points which falls under the category of full democracy (10). The Democracy Index ranked Hungary 56 in all states in 2017 with an overall score of 6.64 and the electoral process and pluralism criteria has a score of 8.75, but the political participation criteria score is extremely low with 4.44, which is one of the lowest among all flawed democracies, hence Hungary was put under flawed democracy category. The Democracy Ranking marked Hungary a total score of 65.4 in 2011 – 2012, and downgraded it to 64 in 2014 – 2015, which makes it 42 on the ranking table of all states. It is worth to notice that the democracy improvement criteria for Hungary has a loss of 107 in terms of states ranking in 2012, which is among the 10 worst states of that period. The interpretation of this would be that Hungary is suffering a consistent decline in democratic level during Viktor Orban's regime, but the state is still valid for been called in a state between anocracy and democracy. With these features summarized, Viktor Orban would serve the criteria of right-wing populist and flawed democratic leader.

Chapter 2: Juan Evo Morales Ayma

This section of the thesis will analyse the regime of Evo Morales from the perspective of populism discourse and how populism interacts with his specific foreign policy actions. His political party, Movement for Socialism (MAS), is claimed to be a left-wing party that aiming to

achieve equality for general population, improve living standards for the poor people, increase the working-class salary and boost the economy of Bolivia²². When the party is self-claimed to be left-wing socialism institution, Morales' behaviour and rhetoric in general is align with the party principles and socialism features, as well as Mudde's inclusionary populism discourse.

2006: Inaugural Speech

On December 18, 2005 the Bolivian general election was held and Evo Morales as the presidential candidate of Movement for Socialism party claimed 1,544,374 out of 3,102,417 votes, which is 53.74% of the total votes thus secured his victory in the election²³. One month later January 22, 2006, Morales participated in his first presidential inauguration, where he gave a speech at La Paz. There are several points to extract from his speech, and first of which is his emphasis on economy:

“When we talk about recovering the territory we are talking about recovering the natural resources, and these need to be in the hands of the Bolivian people and the Bolivian state...We were told 10, 15, 20 years ago that the private sector was going to resolve the country's corruption problems and unemployment, then years go by and there is more unemployment, more corruption, that economic model is not the solution for our country, maybe it is a solution for an European country or African but in Bolivia the neo-liberal model does not work.”²⁴

Two terms were attacked by him in this part of his speech: private sector and neo-liberal model. Although the private sector is mainly a domestic level economic term and neo-liberal refers to a global level strategy and ideology, there is still a mutual feature of two terms in Morales's context: they all represent western style economy and principle, and this is exactly why he brought up “the hands of the Bolivian people and Bolivian state” because by making this contrast, the

²² Harnecker, M. *MAS-IPSP: Instrumento político que surge de los movimientos sociales*

²³ International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) *ElectionGuide*, <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=183>

²⁴ Morales inaugural speech, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4638030.stm>

image of capitalist or even foreign bourgeoisies holding Bolivian people's back can be properly presented to the public, plus he used "more unemployment, more corruption" to strengthen his point, linking major social issues with the capitalists he is criticizing. Such rhetoric further proved that Morales is a left-wing populist leader if we compare this part of the speech to Ostiguy's summary in last chapter. There is one short part of his speech about himself being the brethren of his supports:

"...after I have seen many brothers in the city in the middle class, the working class, the professionals, even the businessmen...proud of the middle class, the working class, the professionals and businessmen. I invite you as well to be proud of the indigenous people who are the moral reserve of humanity... we must serve not live off the people."²⁵

What we can tell from this short statement is that he wants to create the atmosphere that his supports are all fellow brethren without any difference in his eyes, and the use of "humanity" puts himself in an ultra-justified position that his presence in the government is for nothing but mutual prosperity, which he later brought up again by stating how he will end the injustice and oppression²⁶. The incentive is for a presence of the inclusionary populist discourse where he basically rejected any types of discrimination in his regime, no differences based on economy (working class), professional (businessmen) or race (indigenous people). Later he also used his mother as a example to illustrate how women were oppressed in this country so that all major types of discrimination were stressed in his speech.

Except for his underline on economic and domestic societal issue, there is one more statement to pay attention to, which is about foreign relations of Bolivia:

"However, the fight against drug trafficking can not be an excuse for the U.S. government to dominate our nations. We want true dialogue without conditions or oppressions or bribes."²⁷

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Ibid

This is the first time in his inaugural speech that he brought up a foreign nation, and more importantly a supposed leader of western world, but treated it with tough rhetoric. The use of “dominate”, “oppressions”, and “bribes” generated a negative projection to U.S. national image among his audience, which presumably could influence his foreign policy preference in the following years that he shall not harmonizing the diplomatic relation with the United States or his own argument would become invalid. We can later see that this is exactly what Morales followed, that he kept pushing for the agenda of saving Bolivian interests from the hands of greedy capitalist and Americans.

2006: Interview with SPIEGEL

On August 28, 2006, Der Spiegel, one of the most influential and largest German media, did an interview with the newly elected Bolivian president Evo Morales. During the interview questions on domestic policies as well as diplomatic issues were raised and his answers potentially teach us how his foreign policy stance is shaped by his left-wing populist identity. The interview began with Morales recognizing himself as a “leftist” and explaining what it means to be a leftist:

“Injustice, inequality and the poverty of the masses compel us to seek better living conditions. Bolivia’s majority... always excluded, politically oppressed and culturally alienated. Our national wealth, our raw materials, was plundered...being leftist means fighting against injustice and inequality but, most of all, we want to live well... we do not want to oppress or exclude anyone”²⁸

It is crucial for us to notice how the idea of “we want to live well” is formally expressed by Morales, which further confirms the socioeconomic concentration and inclusionary theory mentioned in previous section, and because of this inclusionary it is no longer possible for Morales to challenge or argue with anyone who shares the common stance of inclusionary left-wing

²⁸ SPIEGEL Interview with Bolivia’s Evo Morales. *Der Spiegel*. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/spiegel-interview-with-bolivia-s-evo-morales-capitalism-has-only-hurt-latin-america-a-434272.html>

populist view, which is instantly reflected in the following part of the interview when asked of natural gas dispute with Brazil:

“Lula (president of Brazil at that time) is showing his solidarity. He behaves like a big brother. But we are having problem with Petrobras, the Brazilian energy company... this (dispute) is not coming from the Brazilian government, but from a few Petrobras executives.”²⁹

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who was still the president of Brazil during the year of interview, is also known for being a left-leaning leader with socialist characteristics. Morales emphasized the term “solidarity” in the beginning of his answer to show how he understand Lula is only trying to take care of his Brazilian fellows as well, and for this reason Morales would sensibly avoid using tough words against Lula because inclusionary means a cherish attitude towards people with humble background, even they are not necessarily your citizens³⁰. Similar emotion is expressed by him when asked about the relation with Chilean president Michelle Bachelet and related sea access dispute, where again he stressed the idea of come together and mutual interests³¹. Not only was him exhibiting amicability to democratic leaders in neighbouring states, but he also did not hesitate to express fraternization with non-democratic leaders and questionable leaders like Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez by using solidarity as a mutual linkage between all which is:

“what unites us with Chavez is the concept of the integration of South America. This is the old dream of a great fatherland, a dream that existed even before the Spanish conquest... We want a South America modelled after the European Union, with a currency like the euro, one that is worth more than the dollar...there are social democrats and other who are marching more in the direction of equality, whether you call them socialists or communists...capitalism has only hurt Latin America.”³²

This quote is what makes Cas mudde’s inclusionary theory expand beyond the border of one specific state, where the solidarity should ultimately lead to an inclusion of all ordinary people

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Dunkerley, J. (2007). Evo Morales, the 'Two Bolivias' and the Third Bolivian Revolution. *Journal Of Latin American Studies*, (1), 133.

³¹ SPIEGEL Interview with Bolivia’s Evo Morales. *Der Spiegel*. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/spiegel-interview-with-bolivia-s-evo-morales-capitalism-has-only-hurt-latin-america-a-434272.html>

³² Ibid

in multiple states in Morales's view, and whether they are radical communists or social democrats does not matter because as long as it brings equality, it should be respected. However, capitalism is called out and criticized which can be expected since in his socioeconomic prioritized rhetoric, capitalism has always been the tumour of Bolivian society. Even when talking about the issue of racism, he did not forget to bring in capitalist – oligarchic groups in this case, where he continuously claims it is the oligarch treating ordinary people as inferior and waging dirty war in media against indigenous and working people³³. Last but not least, Morales commented on the relation with United States, where he accuses America for using war on drugs as an excuse to expand control in Latin America and blaming his predecessor as a “capitalist accomplice”³⁴. If his foreign policy actions shall be interfered by his left-wing populist characteristics, then we should expect him to use aggressive policy against the United States.

2014: G77 Summit Speech

The difference between this speech and previously cited rhetoric of Morales is that this speech is given in an international convention, hence more diplomatic agenda and global arrangement can be expected from this speech. Without a surprise, the issue of inequality was brought up as the very first topic in his speech, where he argues

“Today, 10 countries in the world control 40% of the world's total wealth and 15 multinational corporations control 50% of the global output... a handful of imperial powers invades countries, block trade, imposes prices on the rest of the world, chokes national economies, plots against progressive governments and applies espionage to the population worldwide in the name of the free market and democracy... About 0.1% of the world's population owns 20% of the asset base OF MANKIND. In 1920, a US business manager made 20 fold the wage of a worker; at present, the difference is 331 fold.”³⁵

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Morales, E. (2014). *Towards a New World Order for Living Well*. G77 Summit Meeting Speech. <http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Reports/G77/moralesspeech.html>

The capitalist is called out and criticized again, but this time there is a significant difference on how he criticizes the object, that is the attaching of capitalist identity to the wealthy nations, particularly the United States. The way he describes wealthy elites is no longer limited to individuals, but state is also one type of such abuser of capital, not to mention that the first sentence of this statement is state level based claim. He also used two words “imperial” and “invade”, which if putting together can remind audiences the image of colonial period European states, and understandably this is an effective way to recall the sympathy from other states considering most of the G77 attendees are victims of colonial period³⁶. Moreover, it is possible to get other states to answer his summoning if mutual sufferer card is played out properly. The ending of this quote is an assumption, which he could have used any state as an example because income gap is not unique in few states, but a broad global issue. However, the choice he made is the United States, and no wonder such choice still serves the same purpose of calling out western models and principles just like what he did in the interview.

In the following part of his speech, he argued that the current neo – liberal economic world order will not work for global south, and he proposed nine points to establish a sustainable system. There are common knowledges that are already recognized by the mainstream view such as environmental protection and conserving natural resources, but one essential point on the global financial system reflects his foreign policy tendency. In the fourth point, he appealed to the audiences that an emancipation is needed to free all developing states from the current international financial architecture, and sovereignty should also be prioritised over global financial transactions. International financial institutions, IMF for instance according to him, was slashed harshly as an

³⁶ Brien, M. (2016). A Populism of Indignities: Bolivian Populism Under Evo Morales. *Brown Journal Of World Affairs*, 23(1), 77-92.

“imperial power”. Such rhetoric is enough to be regarded as an open challenge to the existing world order and major western states, thus we should expect tough diplomatic actions from Bolivia to western major powers if the correlation between populism and foreign policy aggressiveness exist.

Foreign Relation

As implied above in the interview as well as by some scholars, the push for a common and united Latin American identity by Morales is in the consideration of pragmatism to strengthen the self-image of guardian of the oppressed ordinary people³⁷, and as we have suspected above when analysing selected speeches, Evo Morales ideally is supposed to take tough actions when interacting with the United States if his populist characteristics does have influence on his foreign policy choices.

The interactions between Morales and his neighbours are primarily in the perspective of economy. In 2006 Bolivia joined a trade organization named Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America which was founded by Venezuela and Cuba in 2004, and the purpose of this organization is to achieve closer economic bonds between Latin American states and balance the influence of Free Trade Area of the America, which was initiated by the United States³⁸, hence making his regime the least friendly Bolivian government ever³⁹. Under Morales, Bolivia became the first nation to withdraw from the International Center for the Settlement of Investment

³⁷ Querejazu Escobari, A. (2015). 'Indigenidad' in Bolivia's Foreign Policy During Evo Morales' Government. 147 – 161

³⁸ Latin America Energy Policy and Regulations Handbook Volume 1 Strategic Information and Programs, IBP Inc. (2015). 55 – 57

³⁹ Sivak, M. (2010). Evo Morales: The First Extraordinary Rise of the First Indigenous President of Bolivia. *New York: Palgrave MacMillan*, 160

Disputes, with him criticizing the organization for favouring multinational corporations frequently instead of judging fairly which enhanced imperialism⁴⁰. Morales also announced several American ambassadors in Bolivia as persona non- grata because he claims the ambassadors were conducting secret meeting with opposition⁴¹, which the United States in return expelled Bolivian ambassador. On November 1, 2008, Morales even announced that U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents who were stationing in Bolivia fighting drug trafficking must all leave within three months because the agents have been secretly assisting separatists to overthrow him⁴².

Despite contradictions with the United States, Morales's behaviour to other nations seems to be condescending, especially when it comes to antagonists of the United States. Bolivia established full diplomatic relationship with Iran after Morales became president, and reached economic agreements with the note that "both are revolutionary countries"⁴³. Russia also reached wealthy amount of economic agreements with Bolivia after Morales came into power⁴⁴. Libya is another case where Bolivia reached \$80 million investment agreement with it the same year Bolivia reached deal with Iran⁴⁶.

In terms of the relationships with corporations, those of whom were criticised as robber against the nation and poor people by the president, Morales extended the government presence in

⁴⁰ Farthing, C.; Kohl, Benjamin H. (2014). *Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 73

⁴¹ U.S. Diplomat Tells Why He Was Ousted from Bolivia, 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/us-diplomat-tells-why-he-was-ousted-bolivia-88569>

⁴² Morales: Government will take over for DEA in Bolivia. (2008). <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/11/01/bolivia.dea/>

⁴³ Iran forging ties to Latin America. (2008). <https://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Iran-forging-ties-to-Latin-America-1754809.php>

⁴⁴ Russia to aid Bolivia drugs fight. 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7894176.stm>

⁴⁵ Bolivia proyecta comprar armamento ruso por varios millones de dólares. 2009. https://elpais.com/internacional/2009/05/22/actualidad/1242943210_850215.html

⁴⁶ Morales: "histórica" visita a Libia. (2008). http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7589000/7589799.stm

economic sectors from 17 percent to 35 percent compared to the neoliberal regime before him⁴⁷. He also nationalized a major telecom company Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Entel), which was owned Italian consortium⁴⁸. Zinc and tin production were both nationalized in 2012 as a consequence of him redistributing the profit of essential natural resource industries⁴⁹. Electric grid was seized from a spanish-owned firm Red Electrica de Espana in 2012 and was regarded as another outcome of fear mongering on the investors' image⁵⁰.

A more recent statement from Morales further suggests his consistency. On May 22, 2018 a news conference was held in La Paz and Morales commented on the Venezuela election that it is the proof of how people can unite and defend against the interventionism from U.S. and its allies. Despite the mainstream regarding Donald Trump as a populist, Morales viewed Trump as a representative of corporations and warned that the world shall not be Trump's property⁵¹. His contemporary speech indicates his consistency on the foreign policy stance which is still significantly established around the left-wing and unite of ordinary people against United States flag.

As previously mentioned, the harmony between Morales and other Latin America states is bonded with the inclusionary discourse of a general Latin American identity, which is the practice of a left-wing populism. What happens during 2008 to 2009 when Bolivia grandiloquently

⁴⁷ Agencia Boliviana de Información. (2013, December 26). Participación del estado en la economía permitió cambiar la imagen financiera del país [Participation of the State in the Economy Changed the Financial Image of the Country]. Retrieved December 1, 2013, from <http://www.abi.bo/abi/>

⁴⁸ Pineo, R. (2016). Progress in Bolivia: Declining the United States Influence and the Victories of Evo Morales. *Journal Of Developing Societies (Sage Publications Inc.)*, 32(4), 421-453. doi:10.1177/0169796X16667170

⁴⁹ Costoya, M.M. (2011). Politics of trade in post-neoliberal Latin America: The case of Bolivia. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 30(1), 80–95.

⁵⁰ Nationalization, Bolivian Style: Morales Seize Electirc Grid, Boosts Oil Incentives. 2012. <https://nacla.org/blog/2012/5/10/nationalization-bolivian-style-morales-seizes-electric-grid-boosts-oil-incentives>

⁵¹ World is not Trump's Estate: Bolivia's Evo Morales Condemns US Sanctions on Venezuela. 2018. <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/World-is-Not-Trumps-Estate-Bolivias-Evo-Morales-Condemns-US-Sanctions-on-Venezuela-20180522-0010.html>

interacted and cooperated with 3 major U.S. rivals that are not in Latin America can be regarded as a gesture of pragmatic application aiming at left-wing objective which is to counter the imperialism from neo – liberal factions at all cost, even connect with governments that are not in the left-wing socialist faction. No severe conflict can be found between Bolivia and non-U.S. nations except for the 2013 grounding incident with three European states, but the incident was not triggered by Morales so it cannot reflect what he wanted in the diplomatic relationship with other states. In general, the anti-imperialism, anti-neoliberal, Bolivian people first and inclusionary principles, which are all attached to his left-wing stance, made Morales significantly hostile to American influence both rhetorically and operationally, but such reaction is not significant to other states, or even made Morales more willingly to cooperate with the rivals of the United States. In terms of his attitude towards national investment, it seems like he is willing to take a tough stance on western investors which is align with his populist claim, and to do so he even used force to seize several companies' property as previously mentioned. In general, it can be concluded that his diplomatic actions do show a coherence with his left-wing populism discourse, and the populist discourse constrained his diplomacy that repairing relations with the United States and neo – liberal corporations is hardly possible⁵².

Based on the finding of his bond with populist discourse, it is also possible to make projections in terms of the future foreign policy tendency. The first idea would suggest that Morales's future relations with corporations, particularly western investors, would only worsen because his socialist track is not allowing him to slow down the process of nationalization economic sectors and firms. As he has criticised repeatedly how the United States together with

⁵² Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. *Journal Of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 269-288. doi:10.1080/1356931042000263528

western capitalist only plundering Bolivia by far, nationalization would be a viable way to continue saving his popularity. Due to his diplomatic missions with Russia, Libya and Iran, it is safe to assume that he is willing to cooperate with any state that has the same rivalry as him, and in the contemporary context where China is having a trade war with the United States, and clashing with U.S. navy in South China Sea, it is highly likely that a diplomatic mission can be expected soon from Morales to China in the form of economic cooperation just like many South American states. For the same reason, if the European Union and the United States tension in trade war gets too severe, Morales may lobby himself a chance of penetration in the vacuum between two giants. On the international stage, Morales may actively present himself as a progressive leader in terms of environmental protection and resource conservation because the United States president Donald Trump is presenting himself the exact opposite way of being progressive, which would allow Morales to take a chance to make higher media exposure and recognition. In Latin America, because the left-wing populist leaders faded out in several once crucial allies of him such as Brazil and Chile, and those are still in power is also having their own shake like Cuba and Venezuela, Morales could use a more aggressive way to save the socialist factions in these states, and potentially consider the activity as a salvation for his own popularity in Bolivia. Because he lost the referendum in 2016 to allow him run for a fourth term, he might create domestic as well as foreign imaginary enemies as an alternative path to stay in power. However, his consistency in populist might prevent him this time from doing so considering how much he has been invested in embellishing his self-image full of merit and personality as a true guardian of the poor instead of a schemer.

Chapter 3: Viktor Mihaly Orban

This section will be about the current prime minister of Hungary Viktor Orban and discourse on his populist tendency. His political party, Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), is described as a conservative right-leaning party that oppose European integration and more skeptical about the neo-liberal economy even than domestic leftist⁵³. The party has a strong anti-immigration stance and Viktor Orban is showing more authoritarian tendency in recent years, hence there are opinions claiming Fidesz for sliding into right-wing category⁵⁴. In general, Mudde's exclusionary populism is fairly presented in Orban's rhetoric, but there are more specific issues to discuss in this section that how his situation is different from Morales's.

2018: Ceremonial Speech

On March 15, 2018, one month before the parliamentary election of Hungary, Viktor Orban gave a speech on the 170th anniversary of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution, and because this is the last public speech he gave before the election, supposedly the content of the speech would hint his economic and ideological stance for next few years. He swiftly leaded the talk into his favourite topic of refugee and immigration, and it was only in the second paragraph of his speech. When he was claiming that there are powers who want Hungarian people to hand over the state to foreigners voluntarily, he repeatedly stressed the point of how the foreigners are not compatible with Hungary by arguing:

“...coming from other continent, who do not speak our language, and who do not respect our culture, our laws or our way of life... the defence of borders, the family and the value of work are on one

⁵³ Hegedus, Z. Orban Igazi Szocialdemokrata. *Fent és lent - gátlástalan patriotizmus*. Retrieved 14 February 2015

⁵⁴ Hungary's Orban courts far-right voters ahead of 2018 vote. (2017). <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-farright-analysis/hungarys-orban-courts-far-right-voters-ahead-of-2018-vote-idUSKBN19L244>

side... and opposing us are those who want open society, a world without borders or nations, new forms of family, devalued work and cheap workers – all ruled over by an army of shadowy and unaccountable bureaucrats.”⁵⁵

The Mudde’s exclusionary theory and Ostiguy’s object summary are both almost perfectly reflected in this part of Orban’s speech. He employed the common strategy of populism mentioned in chapter 1 to decorate himself as one among all the ordinary folks by repeatedly referring “we” as a whole and listed few traditionally crucial ideas like borders and family to exaggerate the potential damage people are facing. It is then essential to notice how he brought in “open society” because although in here it does not stand for the name of the organization but a value and norm, audience would have no trouble connecting this term to the Open Society Foundations. At this point Orban’s strategy of choosing target is already visible: he avoided directly attacking immigrants and refugees, but instead he steered the hatred towards foreign influential figures so that he would not lose the moral high ground. Such strategy continued to emerge in the later part of his speech, where he described the shadowy schemers as “an international network which is organised into an empire”⁵⁶, and immediately he condemned media outlets controlled by oligarchs and foreign funded activists. Although left and right-wing populists should share mutual stance, it is still unexpected to see Morales and Orban blaming the exact same object which is oligarchs and foreign influence, considering there are 12 years gap between the Morales interview and this Orban speech and their causes are not necessarily the same. The name of George Soros was cited as a primary source of social turbulence, which would suggest to us that if the correlation between right-wing populism and foreign policy exists, we should expect Orban to behave more aggressive

⁵⁵ Orbán Viktor’s ceremonial speech on the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. (2018). <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/orban-viktor-s-ceremonial-speech-on-the-170th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-of-1848>

⁵⁶ Ibid

towards international non-governmental organizations and European Union administration. Later in this section you will see how the presence is no longer as simple as the first Morales case.

2018: Interview With BILD

On January 9, 2018, Viktor Orban had an interview with a major German newspaper the Bild. The seriousness of Bild when reporting and commenting does not match the popularity it has across Europe⁵⁷, but combining it with Viktor Orban who are always serious on exaggerating the incoming danger would be a distinct experience since bold questions can be awaited. Also, the audiences of the Bild is primarily German, and Germany is one of the major leaders within European Union, which means we would be able to extract Orban's rhetoric, as well as diplomatic stance, to German influence or even European Union power when talking to this media.

The criticism from Martin Schulz is the first topic they talked about. Martin Schulz was the head of the second largest German political party, and he warned that the largest German political party should be cautious when honouring Orban. Orban answered with the point that Schulz might be good in Brussels, but he does not understand how to capably make differences in domestic politics in Germany. As short as the answer can be, it is enough for audiences to get Orban's implication: Schulz is not a capable politician; politicians like him are common and well received in Brussels⁵⁸. By saying Brussels Orban is implying the European Union administration because that is the location of European Union headquarters, and such implication can be interpreted as a scorn on the incompetent of European Union. He then legitimized his regime by

⁵⁷ Sex, Smut and Shock Bild Zeitung Rules Germany. Der Spiegel. 2006. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/sex-smut-and-shock-bild-zeitung-rules-germany-a-412021.html>

⁵⁸ "You wanted the migrants – we did not!". Bild. 2018. <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/viktor-orban/exclusive-interview-with-viktor-orban-54405140.bild.html>

stating the success of economic development and budget control in Hungary since he came into power in 2010 and how bad the situation was before his regime⁵⁹, which can be regarded as a presence of Weyland's strategy approach in populism that Orban wants to paint himself as the guardian of the Hungarian people's interests. The action of legitimizing himself can be spotted again when he was talking about the European Court of Justice verdict on how Hungary needs to take-in refugees, where he dodged the question of refusing refugee but redirected the topic into how the verdict came out after the EU decision expired, hence with the state of law principle they can legally decide how to deal with the situation on their own⁶⁰. The exclusive characteristic is particularly obvious in his answer about why Hungary does not want refugees, where he stated that refugees would set seeking for a stable location as top priority, but they did not stop when they are entering Europe from Balkan states where all nations in that region are safe but not as rich as Germany, hence they are economic migrants. What worsens the situation is that as they "steeped into your home, they did not ask your permission" which is entirely against the norm of law society⁶¹. This part is a perfect demonstration of exclusionary theory because Orban did not just exclude refugee from Hungarian citizens, but also economic migrants from refugees, which would justify his decision of rejecting the refugees, and further he even called multiculturalism an illusion that Christian and Muslim societies can only be parallel. Also, he used a metaphor of entering home to depict himself as a victim, which serves the same purpose of legitimizing his decision. George Soros and European Union were brought up together when he was discussing foreign manipulation, and he excluded the term of EU from Brussels bureaucrats and elites who "consider themselves to be Europe"⁶². Based on above interpretation, one would assume that Viktor Orban

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² Ibid

would prefer to act tough to liberal influences and international organization, typically European Union as an example.

2018: Interview with Sunday News

On March 25, 2018, an interview was conducted by a radio programme Sunday News with Viktor Orban. What makes this interview different from the previous interview is that this programme is stationed in Hungary and its intended audiences are supposed to be Hungarian. Also, because the news agency is Hungarian and a governmental propaganda branch, the rhetoric of interviewer and tone of interviewee should be different from the last one, in a harmony but hypocritical way.

Refugee dispute is brought up in the beginning, where Orban again exaggerated an “incoming danger” with economic concern embellished that European Union might be planning to raise tax for EU citizens and distribute it to the refugee⁶³. Fear mongering should be enough to describe the strategy of his tax statement, but one thing to notice from this statement, as well as I will show in the later part, is that cultural integration and social stability are no longer the stand-alone arguments for his rejection of refugee. Financial concern is brought up, and this time even became the primary argument when he says

“According to the plan, the financial provision for each migrant would be 9 million forints. Hungary would be unable to withstand this: it would crush us...not only for cultural reasons, and not only for the defence of European culture; but also for financial and economic reasons. It is unacceptable... and destroy the economic result that it (Hungary) has finally achieved with such great effort.”⁶⁴

⁶³ Interview with Viktor Orban on the Hungarian radio programme “Sunday News”. 2018. <http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-viktor-orban-on-the-hungarian-radio-programme-sunday-news/>

⁶⁴ Ibid

A switch from nominal excuse to practical excuse indicates that financial agenda is having an increase in term of importance, but more crucially if we take the possible audiences into consideration: this radio broadcasting station is for the propaganda purpose of Orban, and its audiences are primarily already supporting Orban no matter what, so the reason why he brought in financial issue to his supporters might be the strategic flexibility⁶⁵, that means when we can find Morales using economic argument to defend himself (left), we will not see Morales waging a controversy based on culture to exclude someone (right). However, Orban does not hesitate to incorporate both socioeconomic (left) and sociocultural (right) perspectives to serve his own agenda, which suggests that opportunism presents in his strategy and thinking patterns. If that is the case, then the linkage between his right-wing stance and foreign policy preference would be weak.

Although we have been talking about how inclusionary matters in the left-wing populist discourse and exclusionary matters in the right-wing populist discourse, one part of this interview refreshed such cognition. When asked which states are support Hungary's stance on rejecting the refugee proposal, Orban noted that:

“V4... always speak out forthrightly and with appropriate force when required. The Romanians and Bulgarians, the orthodox countries... are with us. The Austrians are with us...this evokes memories of fine old historical times. I have the feeling that we are sitting in the same boat as our cousins.”⁶⁶

This is the first time in the whole thesis we introduce an inclusionary rhetoric from the mouth of a right-wing populist, and it serves us the purpose to illustrate how exclusionary does not necessarily equal to alienating every foreign citizen. In this part he used three distinctive types of bond to achieve his inclusionary purpose: the political bond between V4, the religious bond with

⁶⁵ Nyíri, P. (2016). What Do Cambodia and Hungary Have In Common? Trump!. *Global-E: A Global Studies Journal*, 1.

⁶⁶ Ibid

orthodox Christians, and the historical bond with Austrians. What it implies about the foreign policy preference of Orban is that as a right-wing populist, he is willing to take pragmatism path to strengthen his voice within EU which would not be identical with his exclusionary views, and in a short way of saying this is opportunism. For example, when he is citing the brotherhood with Austria, the fact was when Austria and Hungary formed a union the Austro-Hungarian Empire had such a huge ethnic diversity that German and Hungarian speaker summed up was less than 44 percent, and yet he seemed to ignore this “impure” situation of the society. Again, such implication would suggest the weak linkage between Orban’s right-wing stance and foreign policy preference.

Foreign Relations

Viktor Orban’s agenda on pushing for the idea of sovereignty priority and cultural purity would potentially make him tough to any international influence when it comes to topics that his campaign is based upon such as refugee issue, plus Orban is usually regarded as a Euroscepticism representative⁶⁷ so it will not be a surprise if Orban shows aggressive tendency when dealing with EU relation. The rhetoric of exclusionary repeatedly appeared in his speech and interview when it is about non-Europeans, however, it comes to my attention that opportunism has a potential role in his rhetoric choice because he did not hesitate to call states with completely distinct cultures the cousins.

Since 2017 Orban’s regime started to attack George Soros and his organizations, claiming the connection between Soros and refugee crisis in Europe⁶⁸. A typical attack from Orban on the

⁶⁷ Nyíri, P. (2016). What Do Cambodia and Hungary Have In Common? Trump!. *Global-E: A Global Studies Journal*, 1.

⁶⁸ Orban Accuses Soros of Stocking Refugee Wave to Weaken Europe. 2015. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-30/orban-accuses-soros-of-stoking-refugee-wave-to-weaken-europe>

Non-Governmental Organizations is his dispute with the Central European University, where he claims the university to be invalid because it is taking advantage of the regulation which is unfair for other domestic schools, hence his government rushed a bill to marginalize the institution so that it will be forced to move out the country⁶⁹. The Open Society Foundation is another organization that was under pressure, and has already moved out of Hungary⁷⁰.

His attack on liberal institutions and NGOs may suggest him as a conservative or even far-right, but his opportunist characteristic restricted him from taking radical actions. Orban has claimed in multiple occasions that Hungary is not leaving the EU⁷¹, despite the constant criticisms he made about EU administration. His attacks on EU administration are endless, especially when it comes to refugee related issue such as calling EU administration “madness”⁷², but the verbal conflict never escalate into severe conflict and he is still enjoying the membership of EU. Also, criticising international organizations is one thing, but sheltering under the protection of organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is another thing where the military expenditures is among one of the lowest within NATO⁷³. While he was bluffing about how foreign influence potentially could cause huge damage to Hungarian identity and how international oligarchs have always been conspiring to penetrate Hungarian society during his election campaign, he called for more foreign investment and technologies to Hungary in the 2017 China-CEEC summit.

⁶⁹ Once-fringe Soros conspiracy theory takes center stage in Hungarian election. 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/once-fringe-soros-conspiracy-theory-takes-center-stage-in-hungarian-election/2018/03/17/f0a1d5ae-2601-11e8-a227-fd2b009466bc_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.05248783e291

⁷⁰ Soros Foundation leaving Hungary under government pressure. 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/world/europe/soros-philanthropy-hungary-viktor-orban.html>

⁷¹ Hungary and Poland to EU. 2018. <https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-poland-tell-eu-dont-shut-us-out/>

⁷² Migration crisis: Hungary PM response madness. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-viktor-orban-europe-response-madness>

⁷³ "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence". NATO. 24 February 2014. Retrieved 8 June 2015.

A closer look at Orban's ethnic purity stance and the strange reflect it has on policies when it comes to China is the Chinese migrants in Hungary. Hungary right now has the largest size of Chinese merchant group in central and eastern Europe⁷⁴ and Budapest usually is considered as the distributing center of Chinese in central and eastern Europe⁷⁵. In 2014, the Orban government proudly announced that there are about 20 percent of increase in the Chinese population flow in Hungary, and even noted it as the success of "eastern opening" policy. One of the most striking example is, in 2012 the Hungarian government passed a law to grant anyone permanent residency if he or she purchases at least 250,000 Euro in Hungarian state bonds⁷⁶, press reports noticed Asian businessmen are the dominating majority who applied and the proposer of this plan has tight link to the Chinese firm that acquired BorsodChem⁷⁷. What this tells us is that the inconsistency of Orban's statements and activities might not only be the consequence of opportunist pragmatism, but also cabinet corruption.

More recently, Orban stated in a speech on May 10, 2018 after got re-elected by lawmakers as prime minister of Hungary that "we (Hungary) need the EU and the EU needs us" and Hungarian government wish to see a strong European Union with more agreements reached⁷⁸. As a speech right after the election it is viable to compare it with his campaign mobilization, and a distinctive contrast has been demonstrated that while his campaign is filled up with exclusionary towards not

⁷⁴ L. Wong and H. Primecz, "Chinese Migrant Entrepreneurs in Budapest: Changing Entrepreneurial Effects and Forms," *Journal of Asia Business Studies* 5, no. 1 (2011): 61–76; F. Chang and S. Rucker- Chang, eds., *Chinese Migrants in Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 2012).

⁷⁵ Cf. <http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/243221-chinese-keep-themselves-budapest>. Also CEED 2012: 32.

⁷⁶ The amount was later raised to €300,000 in five-year bond purchases. Through March 2015, approximately 2800 such residency permits have been issued. Converting residency to citizenship generally requires residency of at least eight years.

⁷⁷ <http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/offshore-companies-make-usd-185-million-on-sale-of-hungarian-residency-bonds/18802> (accessed 23 July 2015).

⁷⁸ Orban: 'We need the EU and the EU needs us'. 2018. https://bbj.hu/politics/orban-we-need-the-eu-and-the-eu-needs-us_149145

only refugee, but also EU establishment, his after victory speech declared an evident inclusionary towards EU, even endorsed the purpose of EU for Hungary, which is again not aligned.

In a general way of summarizing his diplomatic actions, it is common to see him being tough in diplomatic rhetoric, but that is also where he stops because he never takes any actual actions to end relationships with the governmental organizations he criticised about, which is exactly the opposite to Morales who made Bolivia withdrew from the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dispute and expelled ambassadors of the United States. He used significant right-wing populist discourse of exclusionary in the refugee context, and did not hesitate to smash the EU administration because of this exclusionary stance, but in action he remained in the framework of EU unlike his extremely tough rhetoric. Based on the incoherency of his diplomatic rhetoric and diplomatic actions, it can be concluded that Orban's diplomatic policies were not determined by his populist discourse, and by far economic interest matters more in his diplomatic actions, plus personal interests could have involved.

To project Orban's future move, several directions can be taken: his relationship with EU; his relationship with Russia; his relationship with China; his relationship with U.S. and western investors. Hungary by far enjoyed more benefit staying in EU, and in short term such beneficial situation would not change. A more important status quo is that the right-wing populist factions are on the rise in huge portion within Europe that not only Poland and Slovakia would stand by Orban on issues, but potentially also the newly formed Italian government and German right-wing who seized an unexpected amount of vote in last election would align with Orban on issues. Under this circumstance Orban would actively seek to extend his influence within EU, as well as domestic politics. While Russians are trapped in in Syrian civil war, the involvement of the United States could force Orban to take a more discreet stance with Russia hence Orban has not shown any

radical provocation activity when dealing with major powers, which means the endorsements between Orban and Vladimir Putin might not be as frequent as past few years. China on the contrary, has been an active player in Hungarian related investment, and Orban not only did not avoid the connection, but also deliberately elaborated the importance to both domestic and regional audiences. He also did not hesitate to take the role as a coordinator between Central and Eastern Europe and China, which can be regarded as an outdoor ambition after his dominating victory at home. For this reason, the connect and interaction between China and Hungary might accelerate remarkably, and Orban would introduced himself to the neighbours with a new title: coordinator and courier of China, with already established tremendous amount of investments in his hand. His attitude to investment has always been passionate, but for western investors and firms it could not be the case anymore. In order to further extend the Chinese influence in Europe, more sectors would be demanded from Chinese side, and business that have already stayed in Hungary for long might become the victims of this demand. It is possible to see Orban go strict on the western firms to push them away and make rooms for Chinese investors.

Conclusion

I used Kurt Weyland's definition to assess whether the politician is populist or not based on whether there is a mobilization of people against a supposed dominating faction, and Cas Mudde's theory to separate two distinct types of populist by examine the exclusionary and inclusionary presence in both leaders' languages. Although populism is regarded as thin-centered and there is no consensus on what exactly it is, the identification of it does not seem to be as difficult as imagined after the first section clarified how to identify two sides of populism. The

discourse in two cases study is not as thorough as idealized analysis due to the fact that when interpreting the populist, and in our case Viktor Orban, it is possible that his inconsistency in policy choice is the result of a personalistic interruption, which means he might be a unique case. However, as I was choosing cases, another option for right-wing populist in declining democracy, Tayyip Erdogan, is showing the same tendency that his swinging between Russia and United States due to Kurdish and Syrian dispute also demonstrated the same inconsistency, hence I still used Orban and is making conclusion based on him. Despite all the uncertainties, there are still discoveries to obtain.

In terms of the similarities between Evo Morales and Viktor Orban, both of fit the populist discourse when it comes to object of their political agenda. For Morales, the fundamental argument is that the Bolivian people are been oppressed and robbed by the oligarchs and foreign powers, and he intends to be the guarding of this nation⁷⁹. For Orban, it is similar that he argues how Hungarian people is under threat from foreign powers and oligarchs who want to loot the prosperity of Hungary, and he will defend the Hungarian identity at all cost. Their arguments further enhanced the ideological and strategic approaches because the use of rhetoric almost perfectly match the theoretical discourse of both approaches. Also, it is worth to point out that despite the differences in discourse based on socioeconomic and sociocultural path, their stance on self-portrait is consistent: they always paint themselves as defenders, and their supporters as victims, which means no invading tendency can be spotted and their policy is always concentrate on the domestic defence instead of overseas interference or expansion. It is also worth to notice that investment, or economic interests in general, plays a primary part of their diplomacy. When establishing relationship with a specific U.S. rival is profitable for Bolivia, Morales sought to build

⁷⁹ Farthing, C.; Kohl, Benjamin H. (2014). *Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

close relationship with high – profile, such as the case of Libya, Russia and Iran, but for those poor nations like Nicaragua which is on the same faction, such attempt is not seen. In the case of Hungary, Orban’s national security concern only awakes when it is about refugee and NGOs, and when there is money to earn such as EU cohesion fund and Chinese One Belt One Road investment, he gladly took all the money and stayed connected to those entities.

There are also differences for Morales and Orban in terms of diplomatic coherence with populism discourse. Morales managed to stay consistent with his leftist claim, and his diplomatic missions were circling around the idea of Latin America inclusionary and anti-imperialism. By examining his first day speech in presidency and statement from several weeks ago it is strikingly obvious that his abiding belief to socialism against the United States has not changed, and his support to the allies with mutual goals is steadily determined even when Venezuela can no longer offer the financial support to Bolivia as it used to. Orban on the other hand uses tough rhetoric just like Morales, but always shows his flexibility and opportunism in diplomatic relations. Not even examine the historical speech of him, we have already found remarkable inconsistency of his rhetoric in various occasions, as well as his diplomatic reactions. When using inclusionary and exclusionary theory to assess both leaders, it appears that Morales attached himself firmly with the inclusionary characteristic and only targeted the United States, but Orban on the other hand employs both inclusionary and exclusionary whenever he needs to without even considering how the inclusionary argument he made is contradicted to his exclusionary agenda. If we go back to look at the original four approaches of populism discourse, we may notice that while Morales does take the content discourse as something serious, Orban is using strategic approach more to consider populism as his tool for political management, which would make Orban and Morales a viable

comparison between discursive approach and strategic approach, and further proves that multiple approaches existing simultaneously.

A short projection done to both leaders based on their existing populist features and tendencies found on the discourse suggests that both leaders could take advantage of the currently blamed U.S. administration and swing their influence for a higher level of international relevance. As appeared in both projections, China is suggested to be a viable tool for Morales and Orban to stay under media spotlight, and recent diplomatic moves by both Hungary and Bolivia has started to show such tendency⁸⁰. The U.S.- China relationship would serve Morales and Orban differently, where Morales would be more determined to get in touch with China due to his discourse against the United States, but Orban when is interpreted as an opportunist and pragmatist showed more tendency to stay connected to all major powers without offend any concern party. However, the priority for Morales and Orban would not be the same: after losing the 2016 referendum, Morales lost his first attempt to run extend his presidency, and the next election is around 2019 which means his time to make attempt is eagerly precious, hence how to stay in power will be the first thing to consider for him; Orban just won another election, which secured him more time and resource to amend the constitution for power consolidation as well as foreign policy missions dispatching.

For that the conclusion would be: in the cases of Evo Morales and Viktor Orban, left-wing populism does constrain and direct the choice of diplomatic relations for the Morales, both rhetorically and operationally. However, for right-wing populism it only shows impact on the diplomatic rhetoric, but no determine effect on diplomatic relations in the case of Orban. What the conclusion offers is that when dealing with Evo Morales in diplomatic missions, ideological stance

⁸⁰ Casen, C. (2013). Adrian J. Pearce (ed.), *Evo Morales and the Movimiento Al Socialismo in Bolivia*. The first term in context, 2006-2010.

shall be prioritized to appeal his willingness of cooperation, but when interacting with Orban an economic/financial interest prioritized strategy shall be inserted to acquire his cooperation.

This thesis used interpretation that separated a leader's rhetoric and action of populism discourse, which is some how related to Laclau but not exactly the same. The reasoning behind is that giving tough rhetoric is not on the same level of commitment to ideological discourse as policy applied in practice. This is only for the purpose of academia discussion, so the statement does not represent that the leader's rhetoric on issues shall be overlooked.

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Appendices

	Rank	Overall score	Electoral process and pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Papua New Guinea	75	6.03	6.92	6.07	3.89	5.63	7.65
Ecuador	76	6.02	8.75	4.64	5.56	4.38	6.76
Hybrid regime							
Albania	77	5.98	7.00	4.71	5.56	5.00	7.65
Moldova	78	5.94	7.50	4.64	6.11	4.38	7.06
Georgia	79	5.93	8.67	4.29	6.11	5.00	5.59
Guatemala	80	5.86	7.92	5.71	3.89	5.00	6.76
Fiji	81	5.85	6.58	5.36	6.11	5.63	5.59
Honduras	82	5.72	8.25	5.36	4.44	4.38	6.18
Ukraine	=83	5.69	6.17	3.21	6.67	6.25	6.18
Montenegro	=83	5.69	6.08	5.36	5.56	4.38	7.06
Zambia	85	5.68	6.17	5.00	3.89	6.88	6.47
Mali	86	5.64	7.42	3.93	4.44	6.25	6.18
Benin	87	5.61	6.50	5.36	5.00	5.63	5.59
Macedonia	88	5.57	6.50	5.00	5.56	3.75	7.06
Bolivia	=89	5.49	7.00	4.64	5.00	3.75	7.06
Malawi	=89	5.49	6.58	4.29	4.44	6.25	5.88

	Rank	Overall score	Electoral process and pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Lithuania	37	7.41	9.58	5.71	6.11	6.25	9.41
Greece	=38	7.29	9.58	5.36	6.11	6.88	8.53
Jamaica	=38	7.29	9.17	7.14	4.44	6.88	8.82
Latvia	40	7.25	9.58	5.71	5.56	6.88	8.53
South Africa	41	7.24	7.42	7.50	8.33	5.00	7.94
India	42	7.23	9.17	6.79	7.22	5.63	7.35
Timor-Leste	43	7.19	9.08	6.79	5.56	6.88	7.65
Slovakia	44	7.16	9.58	6.79	5.56	5.63	8.24
Panama	45	7.08	9.58	6.79	6.11	5.00	7.94
Trinidad and Tobago	46	7.04	9.58	7.14	5.56	5.00	7.94
Bulgaria	47	7.03	9.17	6.43	7.22	4.38	7.94
Argentina	48	6.96	9.17	5.00	6.11	6.88	7.65
Brazil	49	6.86	9.58	5.36	6.11	5.00	8.24
Suriname	50	6.76	9.17	6.43	5.56	5.00	7.65
Philippines	51	6.71	9.17	5.71	7.22	4.38	7.06
Ghana	52	6.69	8.33	5.71	6.67	6.25	6.47
Poland	=53	6.67	9.17	6.07	6.11	4.38	7.65
Colombia	=53	6.67	9.17	6.79	4.44	5.00	7.94
Dominican Republic	55	6.66	9.17	5.36	6.11	5.63	7.06
Lesotho	=56	6.64	9.17	5.00	6.67	5.63	6.76
Hungary	=56	6.64	8.75	6.07	4.44	6.88	7.06

Democracy Index of Bolivia and Hungary, 2017