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Title:

An attempt to Re-imagine Pashtun Nationalism in Pakistan

A critical assessment of Pakistan's identity shift from inclusionary to exclusionary based on Punjabi ethnonational dominance

By: Shamsurrahman Ahmadzai

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"Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities."[1] Woodrow Wilson

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[1] Krasner, *Sovereignty*, 93.

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Abstract:

The nature of state creation in Pakistan does not account for later shifts in the national identify. Today more than ever Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan is on the rise and this paper studies the causes that led to the reinforcement of minority nationalism through exclusive shifts over time in the national identity. Pakistan emerged as a homeland for Muslims, it brought together different ethno-linguistic regions of the British India into one Muslim state. Islam constituted the main ideological base for the national identity of Pakistan, vested and empowered by their collective unity. This paper argues that not all regions of Pakistan shared the same level of national identification with Islam as did Punjab and Bengal. For instance, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan joined Pakistan not through their shared history of religious differences with Hindus under British India but rather through the exchange of wider social network and the promise of autonomy in its internal affairs that led to the its merger. The 1971 civil war between East Pakistan (current Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (Baluchistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Punjab) was the first stroke in the national identity of Pakistan towards exclusion. The separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan undermined the religious identity that led to the formation of the state compromising ethno-linguistic differences. Unlike Andreas Wimmer, who claims state identities at the time of creation are salient, this paper will try to establish a case argument that it is not, and state identity actually changes with the actions of state elites and outside intervention. In West Pakistan, Punjab remained as the core ethnic region with dominant majority and pursued exclusive policies including forceful assimilation of minorities into core nation. These policies resulted in spill over effects on security and socio-economic disparity among Pashtuns as network of social exchange between the new dominant majority group and the regional minorities weakened. This is mainly due to the population imbalance resulted in the post-1971 independence of East Pakistan and concern over Pashtun trans-border nationalism with the Pashtuns of Afghanistan posing a threat to the core nation. The networks in social exchange between center and region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa largely shifted in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in an overall shift in national identity of Pakistan from inclusive to exclusive reinforcing minority nationalism in Pakistan.

1. Introduction:

Historically, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been part of Afghanistan that was annexed by the British India. Following the Partition of India-Pakistan in 1947, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa became part of Pakistan. Unlike India, Pakistan witnessed problems in integrating its five ethnic regional groups that were initially divided into five regions and two wings, namely: East Pakistan (currently Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, and Sindh). After Bangladesh obtained its independence from Pakistan in 1971, Punjab remained a dominant majority who sought to build a 'nationalizing state'. Pashtuns as one of the minority groups in Pakistan has faced state discrimination as they are neglected their political and civil rights. Pashtuns constitute a transborder ethnic group shared between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And despite having calls for the unification of Pashtuns, they remain largely suppressed in Pakistan.

Andreas Wimmer in his book, *'Nation Building: Why some Country Come Together and Other Fall Apart'* explains the importance of networks of exchange relations between state and society to form an inclusive and exclusive state.[2] According to him political integration and national identification with a state can only be utilized through a relationship of hierarchy and support. To establish hierarchy between state and society they should have a social exchange relationship, which Wimmer's distinguishes in three aspects: voluntary organization, public goods and linguistic homogeneity. Furthermore, the level of network exchange in the aforementioned aspects determines the success and failure of a state to form an inclusive and exclusive state along ethnic lines. Such as, extensive cross-ethnic social relations lead to inclusive national identities; narrow networks of social relations lead to exclusive national identities. Moreover, the reason why some countries have inclusive and exclusive national identities depends on the social exchange networks at the beginning of the state formation. This is to say that what you have at state creation is what you always have for the future. As such, the elements of exchange in the time of state formation including how they are organized, what kind of resources are exchanged and how partners negotiate and communicate with each other sets the level of inclusion/exclusion that never does not changes after that.

To the contrary, this paper argues that identifies in the time of state formation are not fixed and can shift over time through the introduction of major incidents. Such as, inclusionary states can develop more exclusionary policies over time and vice-versa. Unlike Wimmer, who

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[2] Wimmer, *Nation Building*.

claims state identities at the time of creation are salient, this paper will try to establish a case argument that it is not, and state identity actually changes. To reiterate, Wimmer is right about the level of inclusion/exclusion networks of exchange relations but it does not account for later shifts in official national identity (more or less inclusive at different points in time). These shifts are reinforced by minority nationalism inside and interventions of outside actors that changed the networks of social relations, causing shifts in official national identities.

This paper aims to critically assess ethno-national dominance of Punjab in Pakistan, and its spill over effects on security and socio-economic disparity among Pashtuns. In assessing the question this paper counters Andreas Wimmer's argument to showcase shifts from inclusive to more exclusive official identity of Pakistan, this paper will be divided into three main chapters. Chapter One will highlight state construction of Pakistan based on religious ideology through the historic review of colonial Pakistan. Chapter Two will discuss disruption in power asymmetry after the secession of East Pakistan (current Bangladesh) reinforcing identity politics along dominant majority and trans-border nationalism, and its security implication. Chapter Three will highlight economic inequality paradigm as an important network of social exchange that has resulted in shifts in the national identity of Pakistan over time; Chapter Four will conclude the paper.

1.2.Literature:

Brubaker Rogers 'triadic nexus model' contributes to the paper in identifying what type of nationalism is more likely to result in shifts towards exclusion in the networks of exchange relations.[3] He identifies three types of nationalism: first, 'nationalizing nationalism', "when state is of and for one particular ethnocultural 'core nation' whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be promoted and protected by the state."[4] The central claim to this sort of nationalism is sense of entitlement to the ownership of the state due to discrimination experienced in the past. Second, 'transborder nationalism' that is based on 'ethnonational kin' outside the borders of the national homeland. It promotes the logic of outside national homeland to monitor the conditions, welfare, rights of ethno-nationals outside their borders. Brubaker adds this sort of nationalism transcends

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[3] "The Nationalism Project: Rogers Brubaker on 'Reframing Nationalism.'"
[4] "The Nationalism Project: Rogers Brubaker on 'Reframing Nationalism.'"

boundaries, territories, and citizenship. It counters 'nationalizing nationalism' that threatens the population categorized as ethnonational kin by an outside national homeland. Third, 'minority nationalism' promotes the cause of ethnic minorities against 'nationalizing nationalism' in a given state. minority nationalism is the adverse effect of 'nationalizing nationalism' and demands a special status within the state claiming its unique self-identification as a 'national minority'. It is also entrenched by the demand to the gain cultural and political rights based on their minority status as an ethnocultural nationality.

Henry E. Hale's adds more insight on how states with a dominant ethnic core tends to become more exclusive over time.[5] As mentioned before, exclusionary shifts are reinforced by ethnic nationalism inside the country and hence, Hale's ethnofederalism will help us understand how the relationship between ethnic federal regions affect nationalism in minority regions. He argues, that ethnofederalism with a territorial component vested in one core ethnic group tends to collapse, if, a single federal unit has more autonomy over its people. An ethnofederal state with core ethnic region is more likely to shift towards exclusion because: first, it creates 'dual power' situation between core ethnic region and union state; such as, core ethnic region poses a threat to other federal units due to clear majority in population; second, central government becomes insufficient to maintain the security of ethnic minority regions; finally, core ethnic region can form a collective action without incorporating the union state. In order for a region to constitute a core ethnic region it has to have an outright majority or that makes up at least 20 percent more than the second largest region. Moreover, greater number of federal units in a federal system balances shifts towards exclusiveness. However, ethnofederal states with one core ethnic region results in ethnically charged conflicts with its federal units due to more exclusive shift in ethnofederalism.

Finally, how outside factors like transborder ethno-nationalism can affect exclusionary shifts over time from 'societal security' perspective. Societal security is a threat associated with concern for social identity; hence it is important to understand what social identity 'societal security' takes into account. According to Ole Weaver, social identity is what enables a group of people to use the word 'we'.[6] Also it varies among groups based on its 'size' and 'intensity' to which group members associate themselves. It could be 'cool functionalism' that is short-term association of people to 'white heat' that is a hyper form of group aggregation around social identities like hyper-nationalism that contains a higher degree of devotion to social

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[5] Hale, "Divided We Stand."
[6] Ibid 17.

identity.[7] Weaver gives a classical distinction of social identity introduced by Tonnies as 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft': the former defines social identity as 'community' that is natural and organic, and the latter as 'association' that is based on social interaction among members to increase utility. To conceptualize social identity in the case of this paper, we refer to Tonnies's distinction of 'community' as ethno-national group and 'association' as nation, which according to Giddens is, 'a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity'.[8] It is a situation in which ethnic identity threatens a national identity. Thus, societal security is concerned with the more specific groups identity rather than a nation, which is fluid and embodies the body politic of a state. Furthermore, Securitization is defined as a 'speech act', which Weaver defines as, "something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so" [9] It's a tactic that presents an issue as an existential threat. The securitizing actors in the societal security is the society itself, as long as it is presented as such with certain recognition among the audience. Referent object of societal security is society and how cross border ethno-nationalism reinforces minority nationalism inside a ethnofederal state.

1.3. Background to the Question:

The nature of the state creation is not the destiny in the case of Pakistan but actually actions of state leaders can lead to a more excusive national identity.[10] Pakistan emerged as a nation based on Islam and it was through this ideology that state consolidated its multi-ethnic composition separated by geographic zones. For instance, after 71 years of partition between India and Pakistan, India celebrates its multi-ethnic diversity that constitutes its secular national identity with confident regional ethnic and linguistic bases. By contrast, Pakistan treats its diversity as a dilemma resulting in a weak state with strong local identities that accounts for internal instability and socio-economic drawback of the dominated ethnic groups.[11] To put it differently, Pakistan has failed to create a relationship between state and society through a hierarchy of power sharing and support. There are two important themes that will help us understand the exclusionary shift in the identity of Pakistan following its state creation: first, the idea of homeland for Muslims ignored cultural and demographic differences among

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[7] Ibid 20.
[8] "Waever_Societal Security.Pdf."
[9] Stone, "Security According to Buzan; A Comprehensive Security Analysis?"
[10] Wimmer, *Nation Building, 1*.
[11] Kaplan, "WHAT'S WRONG WITH PAKISTAN?"

Muslims; second, the ethno-national dominance of Punjab. This has resulted in forceful assimilation, ethno-political inequality, insecurity, and economic drawback of the dominated groups particularly Pashtuns that constitutes a minority in Pakistan.

The emergence of Pakistan based on the idea of homeland for Muslims of British India, disregarded all geographical and socio-cultural differences among the Muslims.[12] Historically Pakistan is home to four major ethnic and linguistic groups separated by geographic zones namely: Panjabis (48.3%), Pashtuns (13.1%), Sindhis (11.8%) and Baluchis (4.2).[13] Islam was used as the overarching inclusive national identity that accommodates all ethnicities in the state.[14] Although, as an identity it was able to establish a territorial sovereignty, due to later shift in national identity it became insufficient to cross-cut ethnic and linguistic cleavages. The emergence of Pakistan based on Islam goes back to the colonial governmentality (colonial attitude towards the colonized) of the British India; when religion was utilized as a medium of knowledge and control, which brought religion into public discourse.[15] Keeping this in mind, the larger Muslim-Hindu debate was the result of colonial governmentality of the British India and did not exist in the prior power structures such as the Moghul Dynasties, where centre ruled over regions giving them a quasi-autonomous status. Furthermore, the debate over Muslim-Hindu differences and homeland for Muslims was concentrated on Punjab and Bengal regions of the British India. It was extended to Sindh, Baluchistan and Pashtuns of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in the final stages of partition with '3 June Plan' also known as the 'Mountbatten Plan.'[16] Thus, in August 15, 1947 Pakistan emerged as a Muslim state divided by two wings: East Pakistan (currently Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa). The composition of East and West Pakistan, balanced the population asymmetry between the two wings. It prevented the dominance of either ethnic region in West Pakistan as mentioned in Hale's ethnofederalism that leads to exclusive national identity. In 1970, controversy over the results of elections between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan's People Party and Shaikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League, where both the candidates were announced winners erupted a civil war in Pakistan.[17] In 1971, ethno-national uprising in East Pakistan gave birth to Bangladesh, undermining the Islamic ideological base on which Pakistan

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[12] "Islam and Politics in Pakistan."
[13] Ahmed, "Pakistan."
[14] "Islam and Politics in Pakistan."
[15] Veer, "Religion in South Asia."
[16] "The Mountbatten Plan For India." The document drafted the geographic partition of India and Pakistan, by giving Sindh and Baluchistan a decision to decide for themselves, while the fate of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa was to be decided by a referendum
[17] In paper Magazine, "1970 Polls."

was founded. Islam was the overarching pillar for the new state of Pakistan, an inclusive national identity that held the ethno-cultural regions together. Following the separation of Bangladesh, ethnic balance was disrupted as Punjab became a dominant majority West Pakistan. This is more reflected in ethno-political inequality in distribution of power and resources in Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

The common attributes existed between Punjab and Bengal -including shared identity of Islam through colonial governmentality and relatively similar size of population- were not the same for other ethnic groups in West Pakistan. As part of the British India, Islam brought a uniform front that fought for economic and representative equality at the time. Furthermore, the Islam based separation from India was best echoed in the inclusive national identity of Bengal and Punjab, different ethnic groups with an inclusive ideological base. Therefore, it can be assessed that Islam in a political and geographic sense affiliated more with Punjab and Bengal through their common interaction with larger Hindu community in British India. In other words, Pashtuns, Balochis and Sindhis did not share the same level of affiliation with Islam as an identity as much as Punjab and Bengal in the founding moments of Pakistan due to their common struggle for independence from India. As for the Pashtuns, Balochis and Sindhis, they are Muslims, but they did not come in confrontation with another religion because of that. For East Pakistan (currently Bangladesh) it was the level of political representation and allocation of resources that resulted in the uprising and subsequent independence from West Pakistan. Where in the case of West Pakistan (Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), with the exception of Punjab, national identification with Islam was much weaker and it was the level of political integration balanced by East Pakistan that had formed an inclusive national identity. After the independence of Bangladesh this shifted as the essential regional bases that affiliated with Islam seceded. Thus, religion as an ideological base for the different region failed, and henceforth was used as a shield to maintain the dominance of Punjab in a highly divided regions, which Pakistan inherited from the British India after the 1947-parition from India. This is to say, Pakistan emerged with the ethno-national dominance of one ethnic group, Punjab, and the level of exclusivity came into effect over time starting with independence of East Pakistan (current Bangladesh) further concentrating power at the hands of Punjab based ethnic elites.

Today, the Pakistani national identity is exclusive of ethnonational minorities, reinforcing Pakistan's Pashtuns cross-border national identification with Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Pashtuns are transborder ethnic group, stretching from South of Amu Daria in

Afghanistan all the way to the west of Indus river in Pakistan.[18] It is a population of over 50 million people who constitutes a majority in Afghanistan and biggest minority in Pakistan. Historically, Pashtuns belonged to the administrative rule of Afghanistan; however, in 1893 after Durand Line agreement was signed between British Raj and Afghan King Abdurrahman, the predominant Pashtun region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa was separated from Afghanistan and came under the administrative zone of the British Raj. After the Partition of India in 1947, it was inherited by Pakistan. It created an imagined scar in the Pashtun nation that exists to modern day, as nationalists on both sides Afghanistan and Pakistan calls for the unification of the Pashtun lands. This was first manifested in 1947, when Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan to UN. The transborder ties between Pashtuns of Pakistan and Pashtuns of Afghanistan has proceeded apace; and calls for Pashtunistan, a homeland for Pashtuns, hindered the political integration of Pashtuns in Pakistan has likewise increased. This thesis will investigate the reasons for the shift from inclusive to exclusive Pakistani identity, tracing the effects of growing exclusivity for the stability of the state and the region. The local and transborder politics of the variable integration of Pashtuns in Pakistani national identity has left Punjab as the only ethnic group who not only affiliated with the state identity 'Islam' but also the only ethno-national group committed to the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan.

Therefore, the intertwined relationship of Islam and Punjab in forming national identity and the accumulation of power and resources due to fear of internal and transborder ethno-nationalism, resulted in an exclusive Pakistan based on dominant ethnic majority. This resulted in ethnopolitical competition for provincial rights, regional autonomy and self-determination against the monopoly of power among Pashtuns today. As mentioned, it's a dynamic of ethno-national dominance of Punjab coined with state identity 'Islam' that has caused spill-over effects, strengthening reinforcing minority nationalism in Pakistan. This is where Brubaker's 'triadic nexus' comes into picture where dominant and minority ethno-national identities compete against each other increasing exclusive national identity in Pakistan. This is further elaborated with 'societal security' where an ethno-national minority seeks a special status and seeks to preserve its identity as a minority group with transborder ethnic affiliation outside country.

The aim of this paper is to identify a critical juncture in the rise of Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan, that has emerged based on ethno-national dominance of Punjab, and to trace its causes and effects. The lack of extension of political integration and national identification in

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[18] history et al., "Who Are the Pashtun People of Afghanistan and Pakistan?"

the initial stages of Pakistan's emergence coincide with the logic of survival of the state. In this respect, the political and economic supremacy of Punjab is understood to be an imperative factor that has resulted in a negative impact on ethnic minorities that will be studied from identity and economic perspective.[19] The former will be analysed using 'societal security' concept when state's less inclusive identity reinforces ethno-national identity; and the latter will focus on socio-economic disparity to showcase the exclusionary shift over time. The inclusive/inclusive paradigm are studied based on the level of political integration and national identification of ethnic groups following state formation. In other words, state elites can respond to events in such a way that they can impact the level of exclusiveness of the national identity many years after state creation. The exclusionary shifts in the case of minority Pashtuns were mainly triggered by the succession of East Pakistan (current Bangladesh). The paper explores the nation building in Pakistan based on ethno-national dominance to explain exclusionary shifts in national identity reinforcing the current rise of Pashtun nationalism post-1971 independence of Bangladesh.

2. Colonial Pakistan:

The issue of minorities is invaluable to ensure local and regional political stability as indicated by Wilson, a lesson learned the hard way in the European context where strong states used coercion and imposition rather than contracts and conventions to address minority rights in the Vienna at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Treaty of Versailles at the of First World War and Dayton Accords in 1995.[20] We witness a similar case in South Asia where Pashtun minorities in the region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa were subject to coerced imperial policies of Great Britain. Although Pashtuns of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa was annexed from Afghanistan and merged into British Raj, they never became an integral part of the Indian subcontinent and remained exclusive part of the larger India administrative and social body. Pashtuns constitute the majority of population in Afghanistan that stretches all the way to the northern part of the Indus River in Pakistan.[21] The population is divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with predominant political influence in Afghanistan as they compose the largest ethnic group and has remained in power for most part of its history. This part of the paper will highlight the

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[19] Hale, "Divided We Stand."
[20] Krasner, *Sovereignty*, 103–4.
[21] "Pashtun | People."

marginalization of Pashtuns by British India and later Pakistan in the following order: first, the merger of Pashtun region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa into larger India under British Raj; second, the role of Pashtuns in the larger anti-colonial struggle to conceptualize the political position of Pashtuns prior to the emergence of Pakistan; third, 1947-parition and merger of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa into Pakistan, a homeland for the Muslims of the British India.

Much like most of the colonial boundaries the 'Durand Line', which is an agreement signed in 1893, between the ruler of Afghanistan at the time Amir Abdurrahman Khan and secretary of the British Indian government Sir Mortimer Durand, with the strategic purpose to create a buffer against the expansion of the Russian Empire without taking demographic realities on the ground.[22] Furthermore, the line became a major source of upset for the identity of the people of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The separation of Pashtuns from their native homeland resulted in a negative reaction in the tribal areas. However, they were given semi-autonomous status under British Raj; however, the cross-Durand Line movement was unhindered by the new reality and it helped preserve Pashtun's kit-and-kin relations and avoided radical change in the colonial order of the tribal areas till the emergence of Pakistan in 1947. Going back to the agreement, we have to keep in mind that the line initially didn't mean a permanent separation of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa from Afghanistan. It was an attempt to keep control of the strategic Khyber-pass in the Great Game rivalry between Great Britain and the Russian Empire.[23] Moreover, the initial plan to deter Russia's further encroachment of Central Asia towards south, Great Britain twice invaded Afghanistan only to taste a humiliating defeat in the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars in 1842 and 1878.[24] Thus, the Durand Agreement was a strategic alternative to achieve the purpose of gaining geostrategic location against the encroachment of the Russian empire without the invasion of Afghanistan. This way British Raj created a double buffer against the Russian empire, with Afghanistan as the main buffer that has to remain under indirect influence of the British Raj and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as the second buffer and last line of defence to protect its rule in larger Indian subcontinent.

Bijan Omrani and Frank Ledwidge gives a historical understanding of the Durand Line through the perspective of the British officials and Durand himself, "the tires on the Indian side are not to be considered as within British territory." adding, "They are simply under our influence in the technical sense of the term, that is to say, so far as the Amir is concerned and

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[22] Omrani, "The Durand Line."
[23] Hamm, "Revisiting the Great Game in Asia."
[24] Ibid

as far as they submit to our influence or we exert it."[25] To draw a clear interpretation of the statement is to conclude that the agreement was made on 'consensus' between British Raj and Afghan King rather than on legal implication of it, which could have been breached at any given time by the Amir of Afghanistan. Moreover, the very nature of the agreement does not exceed time period beyond Amir's rule as put by the Viceroy, Lord Elgin in 1896, "the Durand Line was an agreement to define the respective spheres of the influence of the British Government and of the Amir, its object was to preserve and to obtain the Amir's acceptance of the status quo." The understanding of the scope of the Durand Line agreement is important to unfold the current nature of violence in the region and why security dominates the current discourse on nationalism in Pakistan.


Figure 1.1. Durand Line: disputed border between Afghanistan and Pakistan[26]

It is also equally important to know that the historic agreement brings little disruption to the kit-and-kin relations of Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line.[27] Furthermore, the

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[25] Omrani and Ledwidge, "Rethinking the Durand Line," October 1, 2009.

[26] La linea Durand: http://amisnet.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/2016/11/durand.jpg

[27] Bezhan, "The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947–1952."

cross-Durand Line movement of Pashtuns still continues without much hindrance through formal and informal routes. Although, the tribal areas were separated from Kabul's sovereign and were given semi-autonomy in the larger British administered India. The British maintained their control and influence through political agents and legal framework of Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR) that included a framework of *'collective responsibility'* and *'collective punishment'*,[28] a colonial legacy that remained effective until 2018.[29] Contrary to the shift in the control of the political sphere from Kabul to British Raj Pashtun nationalism remained unchanged. This can be credited to Pashtun cultural and traditional rules vested in *'Pashtunwali',* a set of rules from which deviation can bring shame to a Pashtun. This is best explained by Earnest Renan, who defines a nation's existence as a 'daily plebiscite' that is remembrance of the collective past and presence of continual consent to live together.[30] This strong cultural bond with Pashtuns of Afghanistan on the one hand, and political integration with the British-Indian on the other, created an ambiguity in the identity of the people of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in the anti-colonial struggle that will be discussed below.

Ayesha Jalal explains the formation of new identities and emerging notions of nationalism through the study of anti-colonial struggle in South Asia.[31] It was these movements that initially emerged as a reaction to British Imperialism that later constructed discourses on nation making around themes of *'secular India'* and *'religious communalism* (separate homeland for Muslims). In this part of the paper I will highlight two emerging notions in the form of anti-colonial struggle in South Asia: first, *'secular nationalism'* that came and bourgeoned with the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885; and second, 'religious communalism' that took on the public sphere in the post-fractionalization of the pre-colonial power structure in the early colonial encroachment of the continent. The latter became politically active in the later stages of the anti-colonial struggle in the 1920s, as religious cleavages between Muslims and Hindus grew.[32] Both *'secular nationalism'* and 'religious communalism' are the results of colonial experience as I will try to explain drawing on Aysha Jalal and Van Der Veer's arguments. The Indian Congress under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru led the quest of a secular India. It can be understood as an Indian alternative or copy of the colonial governmentality of the British as a neutral

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[28] Yousaf, "Pakistan's Colonial Legacy."
[29] Dastageer, "Problems in Fata's Merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa."
[30] Renan, "WHAT IS A NATION?"
[31] "Ayesha Jalal, South Asia in Encyclopedia of Nationalism-2.Pdf."
[32] Veer, "Religion in South Asia."

arbitrator in the diverse Indian continent. David Scot explains the post-colonial system in India in the light of anti-colonial resistance that was inevitable. It left Great Britain with two choices: first, face an inevitable anti-colonial revolution that would rupture the colonial system and bring about a system on the old Indian footing; or second, set the stage for the locals following their 'modular form' of nation-creation so that they do not resort to the old Indian footing but rather create a national state, 'set bricks on the already established colonial social and pollical order'.[33] Thus, secular nationalism became one ground under which anti-colonial movements mobilized and led the struggle.

Religious communalism as Aysha Jalal explains did not constitute the main political element of the pre-colonial order in South Asia.[34] Jalal adds, religious identity became prominent in the subsequent shift of power from Muslims to the British Raj. Furthermore, the sovereign's relations with the people were not defined by religion, and people under the Mughal dynasty had a quasi-autonomy defined by the power structure between the centre and regional designation. It was the fall of this power structure that allowed the emergence of new ideas of nation and religion in the context of all-India territorialism and communitarianism.[35] Apart from the shift in power dynamic from Muslims to British Raj, there are two more reasons that made religious nationalism prominent in the colonial South Asia, which in turn led to the partition of India and Pakistan. First, the creation of separate electorates for Muslims in 1909, as Aysha Jalal claims is one of the main reasons that brought 'religious communalism' at the center stage of the public discourse. It was done by the Muslim League, founded 1906, and comprised of 36 Muslims from all around the British India with the exception of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.[36] To keep a population balance in the parliament and prevent it from the dominance of the Hinuds.[37] As mentioned earlier '*religious communalism*' was not the focal point for identity in the pre-colonial South Asia. The electoral grant for minority representation along print capitalism brought elites and educated classes of the Muslim and Hindu societies at the center of politics, who used communalism as a source of political legitimacy. Communal or religious politics became a tool at the hands of elites and educated, despite the fact that there was a huge discrepancy between the elites and the social base they represented. Another more important reason that drove the card of '*religious communalism*' at the hands of elites was

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[33] Scott, "Colonial Governmentality."
[34] "Ayesha Jalal, South Asia in Encyclopedia of Nationalism-2.Pdf."
[35] Ibid
[36] Hardy and Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*.
[37] Ibid.

economic inequality between Muslims and Hindus.[38] The Hindu-Muslim economic inequality had grown drastically under the British Raj, and in order for Muslims to gain control of the resources the elites promoted the idea of a separate homeland as Hindus had preoccupied most businesses.[39] This concern is made obvious in the statement of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan who also served as the leader of all-Muslim League, "We claim that we are a nation of one hundred million strong, and yet have one bank out of the scores which operate in India."[40] Timur Kuran and Anantdeep Singh put this argument as such that, Muslim's premodern commercial and wealth-management around 'Waqf' system hindered their economic advancement introduced by the colonial authority, which resulted in the economic underperformance of Muslims for a half-century.[41] Thus, Muslims dependency on the Islamic inheritance system of 'Waqf' altered their economic choices to join corporate enterprises that required resources pooling. Therefore, economic inequality along separate electorates for Muslims motivated elites to drive the policy of 'religious communalism' that resulted in the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.

On the Western frontiers, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under British India was already resentful to the merger with India. Bacha Khan, also known as the frontier Gandhi, a Pashtun independence activist and founder of the *'Khudai Khidmatgars'* movement, led the anti-colonial struggle in the Pashtun region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.[42] When the call for a separate Muslim home in the Indian mainland around the theme of 'religious communalism' struck Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Bacha Khan rejected it. Unlike Muslims of the north Indian Ashraf class who concurred with the views of Sayyid Ahmed Khan disassociating themselves from Congress through a clear line of division between religion and nationalism.[43] Bacha Khan found himself aligned with the view of Islamic universalism preached by Jamaluddin al-Afghani, who called for Hindu-Muslim unity against the British Raj.[44] Furthermore, Bacha Khan shared the view of Indian Congress as part of all-India territorialism based on the idea of secular nationalism, and opposed the idea of a separate Muslim home. In addition, he also sought to reunite with the native homeland, Afghanistan. The coerced decision to move with Pakistan came on 14 June 1947, after Jawaharlal Nehru announced the approval of partition plan on behalf of the Indian

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[38] "Economic Modernization Hindus Muslims.Pdf."
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid, 508.
[42] "Bacha Khan and Indira."
[43] "Ayesha Jalal, South Asia in Encyclopedia of Nationalism-2.Pdf," 12.
[44] Ibid, 13.

Congress, turning his back on the promise made to Bacha Khan that Congress will not agree to the partition.[45] The merger of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa with Pakistan happened through a referendum held by the British. Initially, Bacha Khan boycotted the referendum, saying that the referendum was unfair as it did not include the choice to become independent or join Afghanistan, as they were only given two choice between India and Pakistan. Not left with many choices, Bacha Khan along the '*Khudai Khidmatgars*' pledged with Pakistan on the condition they be given increased autonomy in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.[46] As such, Pakistan formed an inclusive national identity through political integration and national identification at the time of creation of state.

This paper investigates an historic event that led to the separation of the Pashtun region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa under coercion and imposition by Great Britain. It explains how the Durand Line was drew based on political need rather than demographic realities on the ground. Furthermore, the kit-and-kin relations of Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line added little significance to the realization of the line. However, it did result in the disfranchisement of the region as Pashtuns of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa remained external and isolated from both Afghanistan, the native homeland and the Indian subcontinent under the British Raj. This fact was made vivid in the larger discourse on separate home for Muslims under British Raj. The debate over 'religious communalism' in South Asia excluded Pashtuns not only in their preference to remain part of a secular India under the leadership of Congress but also in their right to self-determination in re-joining their cross-border co-ethnics in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa joins Pakistan leading to an inclusive national identity based on power sharing and increased autonomy. It is worth noting, that this inclusiveness of Pakistan's national identity was intertwined with all its five zones namely: Bengal, Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Baluchistan. It was the balance between the five zones divided into East and West Pakistan that kept the inclusive identity at the creation of the state until the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, resulting in population and power imbalance in the West Pakistan, where Punjab constitutes a clear majority.

Unlike India where diversity is cherished and is based on an inclusive secular identity, diversity in Pakistan become a dilemma where state identity based on Islam proved insufficient to create an inclusive identity that could cross-cut pervasive regional identities in Pakistan. in the words of Anatol Lieven, Pakistan emerged as a weak state with strong societies.[47] The

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[45] Shah, "Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Khudai Khidmatgars,."
[46] Ayaz, "Bacha Khan."
[47] Kaplan, "WHAT'S WRONG WITH PAKISTAN?"

regional identities were stronger than the newly constructed one based on common Islamic identity. The breakdown between East and West Pakistan was the first shift towards states exclusiveness towards minority ethnic groups. This proved more difficult in the case of Pashtuns who were mostly the untouched part of the Indian subcontinent and with a pervasive ethnic pride vested in the Pashtunwali codes. The next chapter I will talk about shifts towards ethno-national dominance of Punjab, reinforcing minority nationalism among the Pashtuns.

3. Assimilation of Pashtuns Into Core Nation 1947-1978:

This section focuses on Pashtuns as an ethno-national minority in Pakistan and how the exclusiveness in the networks of social exchange resulted in the rise of Pashtun nationalism after the succession of Bangladesh in 1971. In order to prevent the balance of power in one region, Pakistan enacted One Unit plan.[48] According to this plan, the four administrative regions in West Pakistan (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, Sindh, and Punjab) became under one administrative zone. It not only made a balance between the population asymmetry between East and West Pakistan but also helped widen networks of social exchange in West Pakistan. This wider network of social exchange is mostly vivid in the military of the Pakistan that is mainly composed of two ethnic groups: Punjab (80%) and Pashtun (13%).[49] Furthermore, it was this time that national identity was more inclusive such as, from 1947 to 1971 two Pashtun serving in the military of Pakistan held president's office namely: Ayyub Khan (1958-1969) and Yahya Khan (1969-1971).[50] It was under the presidency of the latter, Yahya Khan, that Bangladesh seceded from West Pakistan in 1971. In other words, East and West Pakistan balanced one another such as, on the one hand, East Pakistan comprised a bigger population had stronger monopoly over the legislature; on the other, four regions of West Pakistan were brought under single administrative unit to balance populations proportionality between the two wings and control of central government. It allowed for an inclusive national identity where no one ethnic side dominated the central government.

Another factor that kept networks of social exchange wider was the lack of centralization of power between regions and the center. Although, there were constant incursion

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[48] "One Unit Scheme of Pakistan, 1955-1970 Revisited – South Asia Journal."
[49] Kaplan, "WHAT'S WRONG WITH PAKISTAN?"
[50] "A Look at the Presidents of Pakistan over the Years | Samaa Digital."

from Afghanistan into Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa posing a territorial threat to Pakistan, but it still didn't change the autonomous status of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa's tribal region.[51] The military of the country were only deployed at the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, while the North-western frontiers were left to self-rule. The tribal areas of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa formerly known as FATA, were represented by Political Agents who had authority over economic welfare, security, peace and tribal councils called Jirga whenever needed.[52] The power sharing between center and regions brought a sense of national identification among the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with Pakistan. It was because of this wider political network that cultivated a sense of national identification that prevented Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from attempting to get independence from Pakistan during the civil war in East Pakistan. However, after the independence the balance has erupted, and Punjab became the absolute majority in terms of size and control of central government.

The centralization of power in Punjab on the one hand and constant threat from Afghanistan on the other, threatening of another secession to the North-western frontier of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa dominated state politics. Henceforth, networks of social exchange previously established to counter East Pakistan were no longer viable. Thus, networks started shrinking and with it the identity of Pakistan also started shifting towards less inclusive. This imposition of ethnonational dominance of Punjab reinforced ethno-national minorities that will be explained through societal security It is focused with preservation of ethno-national minority due to exclusionary shifts in the national identity.

Thus, central state engages with forceful integration of ethnic minority without doing so through political integration or alliances. Furthermore, societal security arises when there is lack of harmony between ethnic minority and state (dominant majority), over the identity of the minority group.[53] It shows how the identity shift post-Bangladesh secession leads to forceful assimilation of minority groups by Punjab. As such, fearing another independence in the case of Pashtuns of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa who has a long history of ethno-cultural ties with Afghanistan. Societal security studies this paradigm through the ethno-national dominance perspective and how it further shifts the national identity towards less inclusive. Such as that, state security is connected with 'sovereignty' and 'territory' of a state; whereas, societal security is concerned with threats to 'identity' of a society.[54] For instance, societal insecurity

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[51] Schaffer, "Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir."
[52] Shah, "Too Little, Too Late: The Mainstreaming of Pakistan's Tribal Regions."
[53] "Waever_Societal Security.Pdf." 26.
[54] Ibid 25.

arises when a society feels its identity is threatened and cannot live together as 'us', but also have the ability to resist those threats.

A dual situation where a society is both threatened and unchanged. Furthermore, if a society and state are in harmony then societal insecurity becomes state insecurity; however, if state and society does not coincide the security of society increases the insecurity of the state. In this paper I will try to implement the concept of 'societal security' in the case of minority Pashtuns in Pakistan, who also constitute a trans-border ethnic group between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As such, the ethno-national dominance of Punjab and shift in national identity reinforces ethnic minority to associate themselves with their local identity rather than the state. for instance, the more exclusive national identity with narrower networks of social exchange loses national identification among the minority group. Rather they associate more to with their ethnic group than the state.

Therefore, it turns into a matter of state security for the ethnonational dominance of Punjab, where ethnic minority group feels threatened from being forcefully integrated into state identity losing its own social identity in the way. It results in a resistance from minority groups that triggers state insecurity about its sovereignty and territory looking at the historic Durand Line in the case of Pashtuns. Such as an ethno-national group in this respect forms a nation of its own that 'normally tends to produce a state of its own' says Weber.[55] The case of Pashtuns in Pakistan presents a similar shift increasing its insecurity and persistence against the national identity that has political and ideological base in Punjab as mentioned in background part of the this paper.

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[55] "Waever_Societal Security.Pdf." 19.

Figure 1.2.[56]   Source: Heritage foundation

The annexation of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa from Afghanistan, the native homeland for Pashtuns took place under the 1893 Durand Line agreement under coercion by the British India.[57] The agreement limited the Afghan King Amir Abdurrahman Khan's influence on the Pashtun region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa which had become part of the then British administered India. Although under the administration of the British India, the distinct demographic and linguistic character allowed Pashtuns to remain autonomous from the larger Indian subcontinent. This autonomous status of Pashtuns in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa was shifting as Punjab dominated state politics drawing narrower networks of social exchange due to clear population imbalance after Bangladesh's secession. The integration of Pashtuns to Pakistan was contractual ending Pashtuns with larger autonomy in their internal affairs. This is to say, that the ethno-national dominance of Punjab resulted in power imbalance between the center and the region as both power and allocation of resources fell in the hands of the center, drawing narrower networks of social exchange and reinforcing ethno-nationalism among Pashtun minority of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. To reiterate, the population imbalance and the constant threat of incursion by Afghanistan were the two main reasons that narrowed the networks of social exchange vested in the power sharing mechanism that gave Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa autonomy in its internal affair. In return, the more the narrow the network of social exchange

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[56] Omrani and Ledwidge, "Rethinking the Durand Line," October 1, 2009.
[57] Omrani, "The Durand Line."

grew between Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab the more Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa reaffirmed identified itself along the ethnic lines rather than the state. This also meant, strengthening of the trans-border identity of Pashtuns of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa with the Pashtuns of Afghanistan as shown in the Figure 1.2. Therefore, the narrower the networks of social exchange became between the center and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa the stronger it resulted in self-identification along ethnic lines. Counter affecting the overarching attempt of the dominant majority to protect the state sovereignty and territory from another civil war by narrowing networks of social exchange and vesting power in one core ethnic region, Punjab.

Before we go further into the causes of shift in Pakistan's national identity post-1971 independence of Bangladesh. It is important to reiterate that society is about 'identity', which is not tied to territory; as oppose to state security that encompasses the logic of dominant nationhood or ethno-national dominance of one group, which is concerned with threats to 'sovereignty' and 'territory'.[58] Following the civil war in East Pakistan, wider networks of social exchange through common identity of Islam in the case of Bangladesh and political integration through regional autonomy in the case of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa was no longer a viable option to secure the state. In order to safeguard state sovereignty and territory, Pakistan has followed two strategies 'defensive' and 'offensive': The former is connected with state's practice of securing its borders. As Wendy Brown writes in, 'walled state, winning sovereignty', she conceptualizes state practices of building walls as a mean to secure state from global connectedness that is something which threatens state security. Similarly, in the Pashtun case, Pakistan has relentlessly tried to build fences along the 'Durand Line' as a way to secure its state security by limiting connectedness between Pashtuns on both sides. According to one source, the cross-Durand Line movement of people on daily base is around 60,000 to 70,000.[59] These people are mainly Pashtuns and as long as this fusion is not broken Pakistan's security is challenged. Defensive strategy is more pervasive in the between 1947 to 1971, with predominant self-autonomy in the local governance. The post-1971 civil war in East Pakistan, the strategy shifted towards more aggressive narrowing networks of social exchange between the region and the center and by penetrating both the quasi-autonomous region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as well as Afghanistan in an attempt to install a client regime, also known as Pakistan's 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan.[60] Here we move beyond societal security of

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[58] Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, *Security*. 119.
[59] Qassem and Durand, "Pak-Afghan Relations."
[60] Marshall, *Prisoners of Geography*.

Pashtuns, to state security of Pakistan and how the former drives the insecurity of the later whose referent object is the state itself.

In the aftermath of 1947-partition, Pashtuns in the new state of Pakistan were entitled to regional autonomy but with growing tension with Afghanistan, who sought a revisionist policy for the future of the Pashtun nation across borderlands, the elites of Pakistan exerted strong control over the Durand Line. In addition, it was only in the later stages after 1971-indpendenc of Bangladesh that the military of Pakistan penetrated the regional autonomy of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which was promised otherwise as time permitted. Pakistan's attempt to exert more control over the Pashtun lands will be taken in a historic sense in three time periods as part of the offensive strategy in 1950s, 1970s, 1980s. Following the independence from India, Pakistan faced the challenge of internal division as the population's loyalty was stronger towards their cultural regions rather the state of Pakistan.[61] The first two decades from 1950s onwards accounts for wider networks of social exchange through regional autonomy as mentioned before. Although, exchange network was not extended to all political activists in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa due to what Robert D. Kaplan calls, problem of the new geographic origin. He adds, the region that is today Pakistan, had no historical implication as a single political unit, and has been used as a cross-road between civilizations on two sides of the Indus and the Ganges river.[62] This has worried some tribal chieftains for their ethno-national identity in the new state in which they were a minority. Furthermore, the merger also had risk of creating further gap and separation from the Pashtun homeland, Afghanistan. These concerns were mostly pioneered by of Ghazi Mirzali Khan (1897-1960), also known as the Faqir of Ipi, born and raised in the region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The Faqir of Ipi spent his whole life in struggle for Pashtun nationalism. Before the independence of Pakistan, he fought with the British India over the status of the Durand Line, and in the post-1947 partition, refused to recognize the state of Pakistan and declared the Bannue Resolution, a demand for plebiscite wherein Pashtuns of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is given a third option 'Afghanistan' in addition to Pakistan and India. Faqir Ipi fought the state of Pakistan and didn't surrender until his death in April 1960. Despite Faqir Ipi's decade struggle for Pashtun nationalism, the national identity of the state remained inclusive due to political alliances at the creation of the state for increased autonomy.

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[61] Marshall, chap. 7.
[62] Kaplan, "WHAT'S WRONG WITH PAKISTAN?"

In 1970s, the networks became weak as central government sought more power over Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. It became a problem as Punjab constituted the 'linguistic, demographic, and cultural organizing principle' of the new Muslim state.[63] Of the different cultural regions like Baluchistan, Sindh, Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and the distant East Pakistan (modern day Bangladesh). The latter two showed a greater resistance in the face of ethno-national dominance of Punjab. The independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 is a robust manifestation of the threat that originated from the concern to their social identity following Pakistan's one language policy, an utter failure, to give Pakistan a uniform linguistic identity.[64] It was an attempt to create a dominant and prevailing culture internally to bring about a social coherence as Donald G. Morrison describes:

"The process by which members of a social system develop linkages and cohesion, so that the boundaries of the system persist over time, and boundaries of sub-systems become less consequential in affecting behaviour. In this process, members of the social system develop an escalating sequence of contact, cooperation, consensus, and community"[65]

Thirdly, Pakistan national identity became father exclusive after the collapse of the Afghan state post-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978. Throughout, the mid-1950s Afghan state pursued a revisionist policy to unite the Pashtuns on both sides of the line. Laitin expalins this in his Goldilocks theory, that when a homeland is revisionist then the best option for an ethno-national group is to secede.[66] This has been one of the main causes for the consolidation of power by Punjab and weakening of networks of social exchange between the center and region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. However, after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan used religion to reaffirm its national identity.[67] Another gaol in Pakistan's offensive strategy that only tried to fully assimilate regional identities within the state of Pakistan but also a tool to subdue Afghan ethno-national claim over Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. It was pioneered by Zia al-Haq, a military dictator in Pakistan, who started promoting jihad in Afghanistan. One of the reasons for Pakistan's blatant support for the Afghan uprising against the Soviet invasion was the window opportunity it grasped to promote its own Islamic political identity, which had

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[63] Kaplan.

[64] Trends, Issues and challenges in English Language education in Pakistan

[65] Shad et al., *Managing Ethnic Conflict*.

[66] Goldilocks

[67] Ole Weaver.

weakened after the secession of East Pakistan. Support of Islamic groups fighting Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was done under General Zia's Islamization Policy (1979-88), a top-down approach of institutionalizing Islamic canters also known as 'madrassas' that became Pakistan's proxy tool to crackdown anti-state elements within Pakistan especially Pashtun and Baloch separatist movements but also democratic entities that opposed the elitist military rule in Pakistan. Madrassas constitute a social and cultural institution that cope with the state identity of Pakistan, and it was highly manipulated to downplay ethno-nationalism of Pashtuns in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in the aftermath of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Marco Corsi in his article, 'internal conflict in Pakistan' gives a shocking statistic on the raise of students enrolled in madrassas from 900 in 1971 to more than 30,000 in 1988.[68] According to the Hanif Atmar, former National Security Advisor of Afghanistan, the number increased to 15,000 madrassas by 2008, with 1.5 million enrolments, he adds, "in Pakistan students studying religious subjects have been also trained for terrorism".[69] Weaver writes, in the case of clash between ethno-national identities and existing political construction such as in the Ottoman and Russian empires, the state chooses either to 'suppress dissident identities, co-opt them, or replace them with a newly constructed idea of nationalism'.[70] Madrassas became the new institutional form that created a patron client relations with the state back on the religious identity needed to form an inclusive identity. It only strengthens religious institutions that became the new organizational form between state and region, meaning it achieved both suppressing dissident identities and securing the sovereignty and territory of the state. It proved successful in forming an inclusive identity in the 1980s but failed in the post-2001 invasion of Afghanistan and international coalition's 'war on terror' damaging religious institutions that promoted Islamization.

Today, over reliance on madrassas as institutions to reinstate an inclusive national identity at the cost of supressing ethno-national autonomy became very exclusive and did not serve as the medium for patron client relations at the state and regional level. It is highlighted through the murder case of Naqebullah Mehsud in January 2018.[71] Mehsud, a young Pashtun man, was killed and then falsely convicted with terrorism charges by a Senior Superintendent of Police, Rao Anwar in Karachi, Pakistan.[72] The murder took place as part of a long-series of

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[68] CORSI, "INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN PAKISTAN."
[69] Borchgrevink, "Beyond Borders: Diversity and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious Education."
[70] "Waever_Societal Security.Pdf." 37.
[71] Siddiqui, "The PTM in Pakistan."
[72] Ibid.

extrajudicial killings in the country under the umbrella of 'war against terrorism' waged in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in the post-9/11 attacks, and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by the coalition forces. Pashtuns fell victim to racial profiling as 'suspected terrorists' in relations to six major military operations that were conducted in the name of 'war on terror' as Taliban and Al-Qaeda members fled across the Durand Line from Afghanistan into the tribal areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. It resulted in massive exodus of the Pashtuns from their homeland.[73] According to National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) the operations resulted in 428,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), 1.1 millions of whom faced serious economic challenges and were not able to return to their homes due to violence.[74] The conflict destroyed social-economic life of the Pashtuns in their homelands and those who tried to move between different regions of Pakistan to settle, specially Sindh and Panjab, faced racial profiling.[75] The continued insecurity in the region also worried those who called the operation a so called 'double game' of the Pakistani state to infiltrate the semi-autonomous region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa to strengthen its military presence as well as target groups that oppose the state of Pakistan.[76] The game is often referred to sarcastically as "good Taliban" and "bad Taliban", good and bad are used as synonyms for friends and foes of the state, and that the state was not intending to eliminate the threat of Taliban but rather those whom opposed the state. Pakistan's alliance with Taliban is purely based on its ideological bases which not only help in intimidating ethno-national movements in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, as Taliban are primarily Pashtuns, and keep trans-border nationalism between Afghanistan and Pakistan in check.

The decades long manipulation and suppression of the Pashtuns under the name of 'war on terror' was given a new voice by the Pashtun Tahafuz Moment (PTM). It is a human rights movement that seeks equal and fair treatment of Pashtuns and accuses the military of Pakistan for orchestrating violence in the Pashtun region. The movement became popular after their protest in response to the murder of Mehsud by Rao Anwar the police commissioner of Karachi, Pakistan. Initially the protested started with a sit-in in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, to bring justice for Mehsud's murder. The movement grew larger and so the demands, the key demands of the movement includes: judicial inquiry into the murder of Mehsud, establishment of truth and reconciliation commission to investigate extrajudicial killings by the law enforcement, inquiry into forced disappearances, degrading treatment of Pashtuns at military

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[73] Ahmad, "Implications of the War on Terror for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan."
[74] Ahmad.
[75] Diplomat, "Pakistan's Pashtun Profiling."
[76] Boone, "Pakistan Dares to Ask."

checkpoints.[77] Despite the movements protest on the principle of non-violence and claim to be constitutional the government has responded with media blackout and attempts to label the movement as anti-state. The movement is largely supported by Pashtuns across Afghanistan and Pakistan, which has worried Pakistan military. Asif Ghafoor, Director General Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) of Pakistan has shared this concern calling the 'just demands' of the movement concerning "security, dignity and basic rights, is neither unjust nor illegal".[78] However, warned PTM "not to cross the red line" referring to the support and sympathy of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, troubled by succession of East Pakistan in 1971. In the same year, when a leading PTM activist, Arman Loni, a professor of Pashtu literature at the University of Baluchistan, was killed by Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Attaur Rehman Tareen while he was participating in a sit-in to protest a suicide attack that killed policemen and civilians.[79] The extrajudicial killing of a Pashtun activist came with a respond from the president of Afghanistan, Muhammad Ashraf Ghani, tweeting in his official account, "the Afghan government has serious concerns about the violence perpetrated against the peaceful protestors and civil activists in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan".[80] Furthermore, it was seen as an attack on the sovereignty of Pakistan and was referred to as "gross interference" by the Pakistan's foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi. A concern Pakistan has since its emergence as Afghanistan does not recognize the borders that divide the Pashtun on both sides of the Durand Line.

The narrowing of networks of social exchange between state and Pashtuns of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa led to the current rise of Pashtun nationalism and exclusive identity of Pakistan. On the one hand, Pashtuns never lost their essential character and social identity that defines them; on the other, there has been a constant struggle by the state of Pakistan to consolidate social identities in the country into a collective state identity around Islam, rather than power sharing that proved essential in the first two decades post-state creation of Pakistan. The initial years of state creation included defensive approach with focus on sustaining state boundaries with and extension of autonomy to self-governance; while in the latter stages post-independence of East Pakistan, it centralized authority weakening networks of social exchange with ethnic regions creating and conducing exclusive national identity.

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[77] Jalil, "PTM Seeks Formation of Commission on Extrajudicial Killings."

[78] "DG ISPR On PTM."

[79] "The Murder of Arman Loni - Daily Times."

[80] "Detention Of Ethnic Pashtun Activists Fuels Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions."

4. Economic inequality: Ethnic Majority and Minority Split:

The process of manufacturing and economic welfare plays an important role in creating inclusive and exclusive national identities. According to Andreas Wimmer, allocation of goods brings political loyalty and national identification with the state.[81] This is to say political closure along ethnic lines has crucial economic implication that leads to the rise of minority ethnonationalism. Apparently, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is the poorest region of Pakistan. As such, it has remained for 150 years under deficit from British India to the emergence of Pakistan. Historically, strict adherence to religious and cultural codes, and resistance to foreign occupation has prevented colonial development in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. In the Post-partition Pakistan, the region was given autonomy to self-govern its economic welfare. Beyond that, central government paid little attention to the development of the region. Such as under the framework of Islam, Pakistan has pursued policies of a 'nationalizing state' that Brubaker defines, "when state is of and for one particular ethnocultural 'core nation' whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be promoted and protected by the state."[82] It has increased high socio-economic inequality between the dominated groups. According to a report, 60 percent of the population in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa lives below the poverty line.[83] The unemployment rate is 40 percent among the adults, with a literacy rate of 38 percent as compare to 45 percent in the rest of Pakistan, which is very high keeping population size in mind.[84] According to Pakistan's investment plan, resources should be allocated in proportion to regional population divided into four federal zones, namely: Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Baluchistan. Since Punjab constitutes the largest regional majority, it receives the biggest portion of the state fund.[85] In other words, investments are mainly focused on the 25.8 percent of total landmass of Pakistan.[86] This is further illustrated through agricultural and industrial sector in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

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[81] Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict*.
[82] Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*.
[83] Khan, *Agricultural Development in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*.
[84] "Pakistan: Where and Who Are the World's Illiterates? - UNESCO Digital Library."
[85] Khan, *Agricultural Development in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*.
[86] "Safety Nets and Transfers - CCT Program Profile - Pakistan."

Agriculture accounts for one the main areas of the household incomes in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.[87] It accounts for 48 percent of the total labour force that accumulates up to 48 percent GDP of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.[88] However, there are a lot of restraints on its development and according to a report, the current yield is only 23 percent of its total potentional.[89] Furthermore, absence of agricultural-based industries, infrastructure including roads and storage facilities, widespread poverty among farmers, and shortage of irrigation of water are the main causes for the underdevelopment. This is mainly due to unfair distribution of welfare by the state as former Senator Haji Adeel explains, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has no control over its resources and spends only 5 percent out of the 95 percent of the wealth it accumulates, and the rest goes to the federal government.[90] He adds, up to 93 percent of its financial needs come from the federal and foreign support. Another shocking revelation in the report indicates, in 64 years post-independence Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has only received 4 percent of the public development and financial funds; while Punjab and Sindh have received 95 percent of it.[91] In addition, State funds also varies on provincial level, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has received 4.9 percent for farm and 1.7 percent of non-farm loan; whereas, Punjab has received 81.9 percent for farm and 88.9 percent for non-farm loans. Apart from agriculture sector, business ranks the lowest in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has over 2 million labour immigrants abroad that makes up 8 percent of the household income with another 30 percent form internal labour migration.[92] The growing economic inequality among Pashtuns has created a strong resistance that threatens state stability.

Regional ethno-national socio-economic development is important to create an inclusive state. One of the main reasons for the current rise of Pashtun nationalism is the economic disparity that is perpetuated by the state. Ernest Gellner explains the raise of nationalism as a result of uneven distribution of modernisation. The exposure of disadvantaged groups to the development of advantaged groups strengthens a sentiment of difference between the two, which leads to an overall resentment in the disadvantage group. Gellner explains this through the story of Ruritania and Megalomania (fictional country used as a model), where uneven development between the two, results in the rise of nationalism in Ruritania, a peasant

[87] Khan, *Agricultural Development in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Amjad and Arif, "ANALYSING THE IMPACT OF OVERSEAS MIGRATION AND WORKERS' REMITTANCES IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHAW (KP): SUGGESTED MEASURES FOR MAXIMISING DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS."

society. As Ruritania explores Megalomania it invokes their self-identification with their country and language, and discrimination meted out to them by Megalomania. The moral of the story Gellner tries to speak, is how self-identification strengthens from exposure to unequal development in the part of the advantaged group. The urban and industrial development of Megalomania is what triggered self-identification and the discriminatory polices meted out to their co-ethnics. Similarly, structured discriminatory policies meted out to Pashtuns in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as a result of unequal allocation of resources, has resulted in the raise of self-identification along ethnic lines rather than the state.

Economic disparity is also associated with the rise of violence in the region. Less economic incentives by the government has attracted gun and drug business along the tribal built of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa that connects with Afghanistan.[93] It is considered is one of the major sources of income for militancy in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The region is famously described by the U.S. president Barack Obama as "the most dangerous place in the world."[94] Such as, lack of economic structure and political representation has left the tribal region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa devoid of rule of law. Throughout the 1980s, during Afghan soviet war the region has provided for military training of the Afghan *Mujahedeen* and has remained a safe haven for international terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda post-Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan.[95] Moreover, militancy further grew in the post-2011 coalition invasion of Afghanistan. As Taliban leadership retreated to the tribal belt along Afghanistan-Pakistan, providing them with safe haven and control over gun and drug economy.[96] It's a volatile region, and not all the militant factions operating in the region are Afghanistan oriented. Such as, Tahrek-i-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan's main target is the state of Pakistan and has resented the state for its mistreatment of Pashtuns.[97] It is said to be a nationalist group within the ranks of Taliban who blames the state of Pakistan for orchestrating violence in the Pashtun region of the tribal belt of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and across Afghanistan. The military of Pakistan has conducted many operations against TTP that has negatively affected the socio-economic welfare of the Pashtuns. As such, in 2104 military operation 'Zarb-e-Azb', more than a million Pashtuns became internal displacement persons (IDPs) with the destruction of over 13000 shops in the heart of tribal regions economic hub, Miranshah.[98] Furthermore, Pashtun Tahafuz Movement

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[93] "Guns, Smuggling, Militancy."

[94] Ibid.

[95] "Pakistan's Tribal Areas."

[96] Ibid.

[97] "The Complicated Relationship Between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban."

[98] Refugees, "Refworld | The Successes and Failures of Pakistan's Operation Zarb-e-Azb."

(PTM) that emerged in January 2018, is also the main victim to these military operations and seeks justice against the state.

Donald L. Horowitz writes about 'pattern of ethnic separatism' and identifies secessionist movements mostly with backward regions.[99] According to him ethnic conflict emerges mostly in these two following scenarios: first, when there is a greater level of ethnic antipathy between minority group and titular elites whose ethnic groups successfully claims the ownerships of the state; secondly, succession movement are most likely to appear first among backward groups in backward regions. The current wave of Pashtun nationalism mostly takes form in the backward Pashtun region devasted by wavering economy and violence. The has strengthened ethno-cultural transborder nationalism among the Pashtun in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as they feel on a socio-economic periphery compare to the rest of Pakistan, especially Punjab on state designed inequality in resources distribution. Political loyalty with state and national identification is interlinked with the distribution of wealth. Just like Wimmer explains relational and exchange relationship between state and society through the distribution of public goods.[100] National identification or pride he explains, comes from public goods and the lesser public goods are allocated the more there is shift in the national pride from state to alternative identities. The lack of public funds and incentives as briefed above has left Pashtun nationalism intact and across border with core ethno-cultural group. Thus, it is justified to conclude that economic disparity is equally important in supplementing ethno-national identity of Pashtuns and resentment against the state.

The Pashtun question in Pakistan is often viewed along ethno-political closure. As such, gradual increased economic disparity as Wimmer explains has resulted in exclusive national identity in Pakistan. The economic aspect connects the idea of national identification with a state through a relational framework where the more economic good is provided, the more masses identify with the state. Thus, economic-inequality plays a major in keeping ethno-nationalist movement pervasive in the Pashtun case in Pakistan. This is to provide an alternative view that maybe it is not all about nationalism but the fear of it that results in the economic disparity meted out towards Pashtun minorities that has caused exclusive national identity in Pakistan. Hortwitz, explains the occurrence of secessionists movement more often in economically backward regions.[101] It shows how economic disparity is imperative in understanding the failure of Pakistan to from an inclusive nation after 71 year of independence

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[99] Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism."
[100] Wimmer, *Nation Building*.
[101] Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism."

where ethno-national dominance of Punjab the monopoly of power. A state is said to be inclusive nation when it successfully establishes a relationship of power hierarchy and support. Wimmer makes it clear that provision of public good is coined with authority. Although, in the 1980s, with Pakistan's Islamization policy and support of patron client relations through religious intuitions like madrassas. It was the effect of economic inequality and unequal development in general that led to the rise of PTM in 2018. This is to say; inclusive nation can only form when authority is accepted through recognition and power sharing such as in the starting moments of Pakistan. While, unequal development might not result in quick reaction from minority groups but its long-term effects can affect both religious or ethnic national identity.

Conclusion:

Political integration and national identification are two key components of Pakistan at the time of creation. This paper critically assesses the case of Pashtuns in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, that has been historically part of Afghanistan and annexed by the British India under the Durand Line agreement. And later inherited by Pakistan post-1947 partition between India and Pakistan. The case of Pashtuns is studied with a focus on the national identity of Pakistan at the time of state creation. Andreas Wimmer explains, that in order to establish hierarchy between state and society they should have a social exchange relationship, which he distinguishes in three aspects: voluntary organization, public goods and linguistic homogeneity. As such, the level of networks of social exchange in the aforementioned aspects determines the success and failure of a state to form an inclusive and exclusive state at the time of state creation. As such, the outcome of these networks of social exchange at the time of state creation determines the nature of the state identity that stays unchanged. This paper counters Wimmers determinist claim about the identity of a state at the time of creation and argues that shifts over time can occur due to actions of state elites and outside interventions.

This paper focuses on the case of Pakistan's national identity at the time of state creation. How Pakistan at the time of creation formed an inclusive nation that shifted over time to more less inclusive with the introduction of different historical junctures. These shifts from inclusive to exclusive are presented in three historical periods: first, colonial Pakistan, how the national identity around religious theme constituted the main difference between the Muslims and the Hindus under British India that led to the 1947-partition between Indian and Pakistan.

Here the paper makes a distinction between Bengal and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in their process of integration into the national identity of Pakistan at time of state creation. First, Bengal like Punjab were part of the long religious discourse happening between Muslims and Hindus under British India. After the formation of Pakistan, these two cultural and linguistically different groups symbolized the national identity of Pakistan based on Islam. As for Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, it became part of Pakistan not due to a common religious struggle in the British India such as in the case of Bengal and Punjab, but rather it choose to became part of Pakistan due to wider networks of social exchange at the time shared through the membership of Pashtuns in the military of Pakistan, and extension of patron client relation through increased autonomy. The second part of the paper highlights the secession of Bangladesh and how it heightened power imbalance in West Pakistan narrowing networks of exchange relations exclusive to national minorities. It shows the shift from Pakistan's defensive approach to regional autonomy to aggressive approach seeking forceful assimilation of the ethnic minorities disrupting political alliances and prior patron client's relations with the region. The shift also had spill over effects on the security and economic inequality among the minority nationals, reinforcing ethno-national identity of the Pashtuns. The aggressive policy through forceful assimilation of Pashtun ethnic minorities was further enhanced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978. It gave Pakistan a chance to reiterate its undermined religious ideology through the Islamization program introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq. It brought a new patron client relation in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa along religious institutions 'madrassas' that not only wsa used to reinstate Pakistan Islamic narrative that was undermined in the 1971-secesion of Bangladesh but also crackdown Pashtun ethno-national and liberal voices in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. lastly, the longue-duree social inequality due to these policies of the state resulted in unequal development of the minority regions that has caused the current raise in Pashtun nationalism voiced by PTM.

In assessing inclusion/exclusion of Pakistan's national identity in the aforementioned three periods it's important to reiterate that extensive cross-ethnic social relations lead to inclusive national identities; narrow networks of social relations lead to exclusive national identities. Therefore, the reason why some countries have inclusive and exclusive national identities depends on the social exchange networks at the beginning of the state formation. Pakistan is a good example for this research by assessing how it emerged as an inclusive nation and what caused shifts over time in the national identity to less inclusive. Pakistan as a state emerged with five zones and two wings namely: East Pakistan and West Pakistan (Bengal, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Punjab). The region was cultural and linguistically

heterogenous with Islam constituting the national identity of the state, based on what it has emerged. However, after the independence of East Pakistan (current Bangladesh) the national identity started to weaken. It brought increased population asymmetry in the West Pakistan, where Punjab made a clear majority. Before the secession of Bangladesh, cross-cut ethnic political networks were extensive along the center and the regional patron clients as the regional zones enjoyed autonomy; however, to prevent another secession looking the turbulent history of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and trans-border relations with Afghanistan, networks of social exchange narrowed which not only increased power in the core ethnic region of Punjab, but resulted in intervention of the autonomous tribal region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Apart from the ethnic closure along political lines, unequal developmental and economic inequality between regions has also reinforced ethno-national identities shifting the national identity towards exclusiveness.

To reiterate, the balance asymmetry as a result of East Pakistan's secession has caused the later shifts in Pakistan national identity from inclusive to exclusive, leaving Punjab as the dominant majority. The ethno-dominance of Punjab undermined the network of social exchange established prior East Pakistan secession to balance the two administrative units including powers positions in the military and regional autonomy to self-rule. These networks of social exchange were disrupted by the 1971-seceiion creating power imbalance in West Pakistan. Punjab pursued a policy of nationalizing state excluding Pashtun minorities in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. As such, Punjab became the core ethnic region in Pakistan and instead of political integration it has used forceful assimilation of ethnic minority especially Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa into core nation. It narrowed the networks of social exchange established at the creation of the state and prior to the East Pakistan secession. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that national identities at the time of creation are not salient and does not remain unchanged. The case of Pakistan national identity shows the shift form inclusive identity at the time of creation to less inclusive after two historical conjectures such as, the secession of East Pakistan and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Invasion allowing for counter Pashtun-trans border nationalism with new patron client relations through madrassas that had spill over effects in instigating violence and creating economic disparity, which too has reinforced local identity due to unequal development as Horowitz mentions, backward regions are more prone seek secession. Thus, this paper showcases how the internal power asymmetry along trans-border nationalism from Afghanistan has shifted Pakistan's inclusive national identity over time reinforcing ethno-national identities.

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