SECURITIZED MIGRATION: INVESTIGATING THE PUZZLE OF DETERRING MIGRATION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT AID

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Abstract

Why do prominent donor countries opt for a policy to deter migration through development-aid, in defiance of inefficient results (increases, instead of decreasing migrations in long-run) of such a policy of aid on 'low to middle income' countries? The paper proposes that it is the level of securitized migration such ineffective policy towards the use of development-aid. The hypothesis explains that the high level of securitized migration leads to a policy of deterring migration and a drastic increase in dissemination of development-aid; whereas, a low level of securitized migration does not lead to a policy to deter migration and depicts a consistent pattern in dissemination of development-aid. This paper therefore, sheds light on the development-aid puzzle and elaborates on aid to sectors that deter migration. Furthermore, it illustrates why the 'Paris school of thought' is most suitable, compared to alternative security theories to define 'mechanisms for determining level of securitized migration'. The paper uses these mechanisms to analyze the case study of Germany to show; that Germany had a history (narrative premise) of de-securitized migration, it observed a low level of securitized migration during the 2000's and a high-level of securitized migration by the 2015 EU migration crisis – with a gradual shift occurring around pre and post 2013. The research uses a macro (overall ODA) and micro (ODA by sectors related to deterrence) level-analysis to support the hypothesis and bridge the empirical gap in literature. In conclusion, the research depicts a significant correlation between level of securitized migration and development-aid.

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Introduction

The asymmetric trends of current globalization have often-times generated inequality and lack of inclusive growth. One prominent puzzle created by the mismanagement of global trends is related to migration. The burgeoning international-flow of capital, technology and information opens various venues for global advancement, yet if not matched by the socio-political progress, this also creates a tumultuous 'cultural lag'.[1] This cultural lag in the flow of human movement and labor is one example that restricts the socio-political progress. The vision of this paper is to encourage lenient policy and managed migration for both irregular and regular migrants, while the 'strategic aim' of the paper is to show that development aid to deter migration is a frequently opted inefficient policy which is provoked by high level of securitized migration. Securitizing the immigrant in this globalizing world and deterring migration through various means, including development aid, will only increase burden on the financial aid in an unsystematic manner. Moreover, instead of serving the purpose of reducing or controlling migration, especially from low-middle income countries, this policy based on anxiety will only exacerbate the situation of migration.

This paper intends to shed light on the prominent reason which provokes the policy trend of development aid to be used for deterring migration. Even though development aid is not entirely associated with deterring migration, aid to certain sectors can be linked to a 'policy' of deterring migration - an increase of migrants from home country to Organization for Economic Co-operation

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[1] A sociological term coined by "William F. Ogburn", which emphasizes the gap between progress of different cultures. This can occur as a gap between technology and social culture; therefore, the latter needs adjustment, as explained by Rudi Volti. Rudi Volti. "Classics Revisited: William F. Ogburn, Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature," Technology and Culture, 45, 2, (April 2004). doi: 10.1353/tech.2004.0107.

and Development (OECD) countries increases the aid towards home country by $242 on average per migrant.[2] Overall, the real question that this paper seeks to answer is if the 'anxiety built towards migrants' or 'securitized migration', especially in situations of inflow of migrants, plays a role in dissemination of more development aid. For this purpose, the research intends to look at 'whether the level of *securitized migration* has a causal and linear impact on development aid (as a driving force to deter migration by giving aid to certain sectors)':

>Hypothesis (H:1) - *"The paper hypothesizes that the 'high level of securitized migration' sets the main discourse for policies of deterring migration through 'more development aid' and vice versa".*

This paper will initially 'highlight' the puzzle regarding the purpose of development aid to deter migration and how the foreign aid use of such a policy does not attain effective results, especially towards the low to middle income countries. While doing so the paper will also present a case that foreign aid to specific sectors can potentially be associated with aid given to decrease the flow of migration. However, the focus of the paper would be to investigate what causes the inefficient policy of using development aid to deter migration (for long term basis), as a prominent policy among eminent donor countries. Since the paper proposes that securitized migration is one of the significant causes that provokes the increase in aid for the purpose of reducing migration, the paper will aim to understand the process of securitization of migration and the most appropriate lens/school of thought that can be used for understanding the phenomenon.

The paper will propose that the subjective concept of securitization of migration can be better associated with the dissemination of aid if we focus on the general unease and gradual

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[2] Sarah Blodgett Bermeo and David Leblang. 2015. "Migration and Foreign Aid". *International Organization* 69 (3): 627-657. doi:10.1017/s0020818315000119, 644.

securitization process presented by the Paris school of thought in Security Theory (ST). The proposes that the categorization of securitized migration under the Aberystwyth school of thought and Copenhagen school of thought is either too pessimistic, state centric or inconclusive about the gradual intricacies of securitizing migration (simplistic). Therefore, the paper will discover the factors contributing to unease and security threat stemming from issue of migration in order to analyze the impact on the increase or decrease in development aid through the lens of Paris school of thought.

The goal of delineating the impact of securitized migration on development aid is also to fill in the 'gap' highlighted in literature of ST, as some authors emphasize the need of creating a link between securitization of migration and its 'empirical (positivist) usage' in policy analyses.[3] In order to do that the research will first define the 'mechanisms' through which high or low intensity or level of securitized migration can be accessed. Since Paris school of thought endorses a gradual pattern of securitization; therefore, the paper will analyze (by delving into the conceptual understanding of securitization) the indicators that can explain the gradual process that creates a low or high intensity of security concern towards migration. Furthermore, the paper will discuss the methodology for the research which focuses on tracing the 'shift' in the level of securitized migration in the case study of Germany. Concomitantly, the paper will explain why this task cannot be performed at a European Union (EU) level, and why Germany is an eminent case study to discuss the hypothesis. All the details of the methodology and choice of case study will be outlined in the first two sections of the Chapter 3, after which the paper will discuss the case of Germany, in order to trace the shift in level of securitized migration.

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[3] Stéphane J., Baele and Olivier C. Sterck. 2014. "Diagnosing The Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method For Stronger Empirical Claims". *Political Studies* 63 (5): 1120-1139, doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12147, 1121.

The German identity towards immigrants will be discussed briefly in order to lay the platform for, historical identity, one of the basic mechanisms, which contributes to securitized migration. The change in the stance of security actors, management of migration and the role of the audience will be discussed, to analyze the gradual change (estimated to be pre and post 2013); however, the most significant analysis will focus on the conditions that highlight a shift in level of securitized migration around the time of EU migration crisis 2015. Overall, process tracing to determine the shift in the case study of Germany will be used by the paper to illustrate a link between level of securitized migration and development aid to deter migration in the Chapter 4. This final chapter will perform a macro and micro level analysis to demonstrate a link between level of securitized migration and dissemination of development aid – in order to prove that securitization instigates policy of deterring migration. The macro level analysis will investigate the overall aid dissemination during the time period[4] of pre and post gradual shift from low level to high level of securitized migration. Whereas the micro level analysis will gauge the same shift at sector level (sectors connected with deterring migration); however, in order to augment the robustness of the research, it will delve into the sectors of aid that insinuate a policy of deterring migration.

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[4] Mainly from 2000 to 2017.

Chapter 1: Development puzzle, deterrence aid and the lens of securitization theory

This chapter will explain the main puzzle associated with deterrence of migration through development aid towards low to middle income countries. This chapter will also illustrate how the policy of deterring migration can be imbedded in certain forms of development aid, in order to gauge that aid given to certain sectors reflect a high possibility for a policy to reduce migration. Furthermore, this chapter will elaborate on the 'hypothesis' of the thesis, which proposes that there is a significant link between policy of deterring migration through development aid and 'level of securitized migration' in a country. The anxiety generated by sense of belonging and alienation of 'the other', augments securitization towards the immigrant. The intensity of securitized migration translates into the policy of deterring migrants through development aid.

In addition, for the purpose of understanding the intensity or level of securitized migration this chapter will highlight prominent school of thoughts of security theory (ST) and explain why it is proficient to utilize the Paris school of thought in order to discern the securitization of migration as a gradual process of unease which can vary over time; instead of being an event that generates existential crisis and securitization.[5] This framework will be used to analyze the process of securitization because the gradual unease provides room to perceive securitized migration as a continuous process. In this process there is a high and low intensity of security perception towards migration, framed by the security actor and absorbed by the audience - which can be analyzed (in the later chapters) given time-period to gauge the effect of securitized migration on dissemination of development aid to deter migration. Therefore, this chapter will elaborate on the details of the

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[5] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. (London: Lynne Rienner Pubishers, 1998). doi:10.2307/40203739.

puzzle related deterrence of migration through development aid and how certain sectors are linked to the policy to deter migration through development aid. Lastly, while doing so this chapter will focus on why it is more logical to consider gradual approach and Paris school of thought in analyzing level of securitized migration.

1.1 Development aid puzzle and the deterrence of migration

From the perspective of development aid, migration policy and development aid encounter an interesting phenomenon. The work of Sarah Blodgett Bermeo and David Leblang indicates that an increase in the diaspora and the inflow of migrant towards host country results in an increase in the aid towards the home country – this policy, as explained by the authors, is chosen to deter more people (migrants) from coming in.[6] However, the intriguing 'puzzle' emerges when the policy of deterring migration and increase in development aid, instead of reducing migration flow through dissemination of aid, increases the migration, especially from the low to middle income countries.

The work of Michael A. Clemens and Hannah M. Postel explains that development aid when given to low to middle income countries encourages migration through networking and financial capacity effect - especially when this development aid is not continued over a long-term period. On the other hand, a policy of 'managing migration and aid' for mutual benefit can provide a long-term solution for migration.[7] Similarly, the key argument regarding the policy of deterring migration also revolves around development aid being given in long term pattern with consistent increase. Since policy of reducing migration flow through development aid can work only

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[6] Bermeo and Leblang "Migration and Foreign Aid", 627.
[7] Clemens and Postel "Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid", 18.

'indirectly' and only in 'long-run' as illustrated by Mauro Lanati and Rainer Thiele - if development aid given only for short term basis the 'budgetary constraint channel' effects the decision of migration and the people especially in low to middle income countries get the capacity to migrate to the donor countries.[8]

The literature shows adequate evidence to claim that certain sectors are connected with the deterrence of migration. The research by Clemens and Postel shows that the current evidence clearly generates possibility to doubt the intention of aid in certain prominent sectors.[9] Aid targeted to sectors that include '*vocational training, small and medium enterprise support, agricultural development, environmental preservation, urban development, food aid, and disaster preparedness*' are susceptible to the purpose of deterrence of migration. For example, the aid to enhance youth employment and vocational training program contribute to policy that is aimed to control sudden economic shocks and prevent surge of sudden migration.[10] The methodology in the research of Clemens and Postel for determining the link between aid and deterrence of migration explains:

> *[…] a similarly granular approach to assessing aid targeted at ameliorating the root causes of migration. As a preliminary approach to this question, we compile an index of 'migration-relevant' aid, drawing on specific program types detailed for both the EU Trust Fund and the 1990 report of the US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development (notably entitled "Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response).[11]*

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[8] Mauro Lanati, and Rainer Thiele. 2018. "The Impact of Foreign Aid On Migration Revisited". *World Development* 111: 59-74.
[9] Clemens and Postel "Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid", doi:10.1016/j.worlddev, 2018.06.02, 4
[10] Figure 1 Ibid 23
[11] Ibid 4

Clemens and Postel perform a regression in which the 'root cause' programming of development aid is measured around five different streamlines for DAC donor countries in year 2015. In this research the 95 percent confidence interval measures the amount of aid significantly relatable to deterrence of migrants.[12] Even though this amount is not high enough to make a robust claim for specific root causes to be defined only in this sector; there is a credible probability in which there can be 'more or less sectors' that may affect deterrence policy. As a reference this is shown in Figure in Appendix 1 from the work by Clemens and Postel.[13]

However, robustness can be claimed since other literature also elaborates on the issue. One of research, done by Luca Barana shows that the 2015 migration crisis caused the EU to pursue a stricter policy of high level of securitized migration in order to deter the root causes of migration. This policy of deterring migrants was aimed towards Africa, specifically at low to middle income countries.[14] The research focuses on the EU Trust Fund (EUTF) development aid and the purpose it endorses, by giving fund to strategized sectors outlined below (Also correlate to the sectors mentioned in the previous paragraph and depicted in Figure in Appendix 1), in order to eradicate the root causes of 'irregular migration':

> *The EUTF is envisioned as a means to eradicate the root causes of migration, targeting origin and transit countries in five priority areas: 1) creating employment opportunities; 2) supporting resilience and basic services for local populations, in particular the most vulnerable, notably refugees and displaced people; 3) improving migration management; 4) enhancing stability and governance, by promoting conflict prevention, combatting forced displacement and enforcing the rule of law; 5) improving policy by exchanging best practices and filling knowledge gaps.[15]*

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[12] Refer to Appendix 1
[13] Refer to Appendix 1
[14] "The Fund defines three geographical areas of intervention: the Sahel and Lake Chad Region, the Horn of Africa and North Africa" Luca Barana. 2017. "The EU Trust Fund For Africa And The Perils Of A Securitized Migration Policy". Istituto Affari Internazionali, Issue: 17|31. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/eu-trust-fund-africa-and-perils-securitized-migration-policy.
[15] European Commission, The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa. Strategic Orientation Document, 15 February 2016, p. 11- 14, http://europa.eu/!bn43Gq; Barana " "The EU Trust Fund For Africa", 1.

The majority of the funding of the EUTF came from the European Development Fund (EDF) and European instruments aimed at development aid. Furthermore, the crisis of migration also augments due to the contradiction inside the aid dissemination policy of EU. The EU recognizes curbing migration to be a long-term process, yet most of the EU aid policies are tailored for short-term methods to target a few sectors.[16] The European Parliament's Committee on Development (DEVE) has strongly criticked trends of using development funds for purposes other than development and framing security threats in a manner to induce crisis.[17] All these factors bolster the previous research by Clemens and Postel. that proposes the use of development aid for the purposes of deterring migration as a phenomenon of securitized policy. The specific sectors once again are difficult to determine in order to perform a regression. However, a much clearer picture is determined regarding the use of specific methods (that are based on securitized policy) to deter migration through the use of funds allocated for development aid. This understanding will be used in the paper ahead to perform a process tracing of the phenomenon that highly securitizes migration and can be linked to the instances of increase in development aid to certain sectors or through the above-mentioned certain methods.

Since there is a variation and broadness in the literature, regarding the areas to which aid may impact in a manner to deter migration, the table below highlights the prominent qualities organized against the aid sectors that deter migration, based primarily on the understanding of the work by Clemens and Postel, and Barana:

Table 1 Development Aid Sectors that Deter Migration

Defining Sector Category	Qualities Discussed in Literature
Disaster Management, Rehabilitation and Emergency Response	– Supporting resilience

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[16] Barana "The EU Trust Fund For Africa", 2.
[17] Ibid 3.

	– Services to most vulnerable, notably refugees and displaced people – Disaster preparedness – Improving migration management
Country Production	– Creating employment opportunities – Vocational training – Small and medium enterprise support – Urban development
Conflict, Peace and Security	– Enhancing stability and governance by promoting conflict prevention – Combatting forced displacement and enforcing the rule of law
Food Development Aid/ Food Security	– Agricultural development – Food aid
N/A[18]	– Improving policy by exchanging best practices and filling knowledge gaps

1.2 Outlining security theory to understand securitized migration

The basic *"hypothesis"* that the thesis propounds is that the securitized migration plays a seminal role in the explanation of why countries opt to disseminate short term development aid with a policy intend to deter migration. There is a lack of sustained and well-defined policy to control migration flow, if the development aid is given for a short period of time due to increase in intensity of securitized migration. Therefore, development aid given without long term commitment and focus on sectors that endorse deterring migration, is mainly based on the anxiety which instigates inefficient use of development aid.

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[18] 'N/A' has been allotted to discard this term, since It implies spread of soft power, which a too broad of a term to analyze and claim a link to the hypothesis.

Securitization theory (ST)[19] has several schools of thoughts, such as the Aberystwyth school of thought or critical security school of thought, the Copenhagen school of thought and Paris school of thought, which endorse specific process of securitization of migration. Alexandria Innes elaborates on the three main school of thoughts in ST and emphasis that the Copenhagen and Paris school of thought are more relevant in defining securitization of migration.[20] Innes initially explains that Aberystwyth school relies upon 'emancipation'[21] of individual, as means of securitization – in which emancipation is not at the expense of the others. In case of migration the main referent object becomes the migrant, who intends to emancipate itself from the state, and in this process, the state becomes a threat. The initial criticism that Innes raises is towards the pessimistic approach Aberystwyth school of thought entails:

> *Although the Aberystwyth School offers valuable insight into the oppressions of the state, its weakness appears in the lack of attention to alternative productive forms of security by bodies other than the state. It offers what Buzan and Hansen describe as a 'pessimistic view of global security: states make individuals insecure and the Neoliberal economic structure further exacerbates this condition.[22]*

In case of achieving security, Aberystwyth school's perspective makes the individual, in case of migrant, either reliant upon the agency of the state to rectify its repressive barriers on freedom of individual or reliant upon the society under the state to stand up and reduce the suppression against the freedom of allowing movement. In both cases the individual is trapped in

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[19] Securitization is moving an issue out of the realm of politicization and identify as an emergency issue of imminent security threat. Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde. "*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*"

[20] Alexandria Innes (2015) "*Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security: An Ethnographic Approach*". Studies in International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781137495952

[21] "[…] emancipation seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others" Alexandria Innes (2015) "*Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security: An Ethnographic Approach*", 26; Ken Booth (2005) "Critical Security Studies and World Politics. Boulder", CO: Lynne Rienner.

[22] Innes "Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security" 27; Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen. "The Evolution of International Security Studies". (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 206.

the ambiguity of either being the security actor or the object that needs to be secure. Furthermore, the second drawback in the emancipation as a concept is that migrant as 'the other' develops its identity through the oppression of the state; however, for many critics the movement of migrant in itself is already an act of emancipation against the state.[23] Therefore, the logic of emancipation proposed by Aberystwyth school does not sufficiently fulfil the security concern of securitization of migration (in which securitized is suppressed).

Innes explains that the Copenhagen school and the Paris school, despite their flaws, are comparatively more apt security theories in order to understand securitization of migration. Innes discusses that both the theories are more pertinent to securitization of migration; however, implies that Paris school of thought holds more credibility and flexibility to comprehend the issue of securitized migration (due to the gradual nature of securitization of immigrant). As far as Innes elaborates, Copenhagen school presents a state centric approach in which the security actors inside state use speech acts to depict an issue as security concern, whereas the society is the object that needs to be secured. Even though the society can absorb an issue as a security threat or reject it, it again does not initiate a security process. Similarly, the security process is generated by security actors such as the state based on an existential threat that is generated due to a sharp and measurable event.[24] As far as migration is concerned Copenhagen school adopts a discursive deeper analysis, whereas Jef Huysmans defines securitization of migration to be understood in Copenhagen school as a 'political insecurity':

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[23] Innes "*Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security",* 26-28.
[24] Ibid 30.

Securing citizens and national territory against external and internal dangers is one of the defining functions of modern states. Both the raison d'etre of the sovereign state as a political form and the legitimacy of political authorities can be powerfully asserted and seriously challenged in the name of security… Cross-border movement and the presence of aliens is bound to evoke questions… It should therefore not be surprising that framing immigration and refuge in security terminology strongly evokes categories of statehood.[25]

Furthermore, Innes also elaborates on Paris school of thought by highlighting the core component of the school to be the gradual unease which defines the securitization, rather than an existential crisis based on a sharp and measurable event. The Paris school looks at the internal discursive of security practices of the actors which define security in a gradual manner. In case of migration the object which is securitized here can be the society or the political integrity (will) of the political elite, which gets insecure due to the disturbance in their control over the borders and their authority of state affairs. The attack on sovereignty and political power provokes the security actors to securitize the 'other' or the migrant by framing any un-perceivable threat as a security concern linked to migrant. Yet the acceptance of audience in this framing process is highly important to securitize an issue even if the threat may not exist for society (and may just be a politicized issue to guard the motives of the political elite or security actors).[26] Innes elaborates: "[...] the Paris School has examined migration most explicitly given that the securitization of migration and the normalization of violence towards migrants provides an example of how bureaucratic politics serve to systematize disciplinary procedures against migrants as everyday processes".[27]

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[25] Jef Huysmans (2006). "The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU". New York, NY: Routledge, 30-31; Innes "Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security" 31.
[26] Innes "*Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security*" 28-30.
[27] Ibid 28.

1.3 The significance of the Paris School over 'alternative approaches'

While unfolding the two main school of thoughts that place pertinent emphasis on securitization of migration, it is important understand why Paris school of thought stands out as a more flexible and substantial approach for analyzing the securitization of migration and deep-rooted occurrence of anxiety that generate a security threat. These aspects are explained and criticized below in a detailed perspective by Innes and other authors, in order to justify gradual process of securitization as a more comprehensive lens to pursue the 'hypothesis' of the paper.

In the prominent work of Copenhagen school of thought produced by Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde elaborates on securitization - the authors focus on an event-based existential threat, while highlighting a seminal universal concept related to securitization; they explain that the securitization of migration requires a security actor, the referent object and the audience. Furthermore, the work also relates to the role of 'audience' in securitization, the authors explain: "A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object, does not by itself create securitization—this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such..."[28] And furthermore: "...Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act".[29] This explanation emphasizes that every school of ST needs to focus more on the framing of the audience.

However, the criticism that confronts the Copenhagen school opines that this school of thought depicts mostly a state and elite centric approach. Even though the audience is essential to either accept or reject the speech act of the elite in order to securitize an issue, the minority groups

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[28] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde. "*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.", 25.
[29] Ibid 31.

do not possess a 'voice' as they are over shadowed – only the upper hierarchies and patriarchy are considered as 'audience' in this approach while the subaltern and marginalized get suppressed - and this leaves the understanding of audience incomplete.[30] This lack of individual level approach and analysis of subtle imperceptible aspects declines the comprehensiveness of the theory. Similarly, the identity of the object is fixed in the Copenhagen school; for example, the identity of migrant is defined as the person who does not belong.[31] However, the identity of migrant does not shift to any other meaning in a gradual manner, thus according to the Copenhagen school of thought a migrant is always securitized since he or she does not belong inside the state or inside the state defined society. The Copenhagen school does not delve into the layers of societal security to understand that anything external will be a threat to society, if it is not a threat to a state. Therefore, it is essential to understand the variation in the meaning of migrant in order to talk about securitization of migration.[32] This needs to be done in order to understand the movement of migrant inside the state and society and reach a deeper understanding of the audience.

Thus, this leaves the most relevant method of gauging the complex issue of securitization of migration to be found in the gradual perception of 'unease' explained in the Paris School of thought in ST. The work of Didier Bigo elaborates on this phenomenon as the 'Governmentality of Unease';[33] the agitation produced by power-relation against the 'other'[34], generates different

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[30] Innes "*Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security",* 31.
[31] Innes "*Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security",* 31-32.
[32] The diagnosis of different security perception to the meaning of migrants is also performed by Baele and Sterck, to show a high securitization towards some forms of migrations - Asylum seekers etc., Baele and Sterck. 2014. "Diagnosing The Securitisation Of Immigration At The EU Level, 1130 1131.
[33] Didier Bigo. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 27, no. 1, Feb. 2002, p. 63, 63.
[34] Bigo builds on the struggle of inclusion and exclusion which prescribes the migrant as someone who does not belong, and thus a threat to society. Bigo "Security and Immigration", 88.

aspects of fear and can be exploited by the security actors. The security actors use their own techniques to associate fear with the 'other', while taking advantage of the 'unclarity of a threat'. Bigo's main argument illustrates that the 'immigrant' which is a symbol of ontological insecurity to the society represents the unease even when there is not a particular security threat attached to the migrant.[35]

Analyzing the Paris school of ST, it can be observed that the gradual perspective of securitized migration does permit contestation to the 'migrant identity' and delves deeply in the layers of security actor and audience relation to determine when the issue of migration is securitized. To illustrate the concept more vividly, the approach of Paris school provides the leverage of society to resist the threat framed by the security actor, thus reducing the state centric approach of the theory.[36] Even though, this quality is also present to a certain extent in the Copenhagen school yet the flexibility to comprehend different layers/levels when determining the acceptance of a threat by the society as audience is mainly present in the Paris school of thought. This gap is filled in by the Paris school of thought more adequately and this especially leaves more room for exploration in determining the intensity of securitization - since diverse factors of audience and security actors are included in the Paris school of thought perspective. Therefore, in order to highlight the conclusive points, Innes explains in her work the comparative advantage of Paris school of thought, despite some drawbacks similar to that of Copenhagen school of thought,[37]

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[35] Ibid 71

[36] Innes "*Migration, Citizenship & the Challenge for Security*", 29.

[37] "The Paris School approach, notwithstanding its plausibility, still overlooks two issues. First, an analysis of how discursive and non-discursive practices are embedded in professional, including juridical and technical contexts of power. And second, an explanation of how security and insecurity are linked as a result of securitization policy". Ayelet Banai & Regina Kreide (2017).

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in the analysis of securitized migration: "For Bigo, when society intervenes and does not accept the dehumanization of migrants, society thus resists the sovereign decision [...]."[38] Innes later further elaborates:

> [...] Paris School of security studies, to consider in more depth how migrants are constituted as criminal and States in a World of Asylum Seekers: Agency, Rights, Security 91 illegal, drawing on work on governmentality in global governance, and on Didier Bigo's theorization of the 'Banopticon.' Scholarship in this vein has offered much insight into the processes that cast migrants outside of the state.[39]

The words by Innes illustrate that the society can intervene to resist the state and include migrants in it. Despite being reliant on the agency of the society for the move, unlike Copenhagen school of thought, Paris school of thought recognizes the movement of migrants within the society and gauges the effect of the mobility inside the audience (through gradual assimilation and losing the identity of being seeing as a migrant), and the social structure, to become a part of resisting securitization.

"Securitization of migration in Germany: the ambivalences of citizenship and human rights", Citizenship Studies, 21:8, 903-917, DOI: 10.1080/13621025.2017.1380649, 906.

[38] Ibid 30.
[39] Ibid 90-91.

Chapter 1 also proposes a hypothesis and null hypothesis for the research in the paper, as illustrated:

Hypothesis (H:1):

Level of securitized migration ————(Direct impact)———▶ Policy of deterring migration through development aid

H:1a - High level of securitized migration ———▶ Policy of deterring migration ———▶ Drastic increase in development aid and deterrence aid sector

H:1b - Low level of securitized migration ———▶ No policy to deter migration ———▶ Consistent pattern or marginal fluctuation in development aid and deterrence aid sectors

Null Hypothesis (H:0) - Level of securitized migration ————(No impact)———— Policy to deter migration through development aid

Figure 1 Hypothesis

Chapter 2: Understanding the 'mechanisms' involved to determine the 'level of securitized migration'

This chapter will investigate the feasibility of the securitization theory and perspective of gradual unease to analyze the process and mechanisms of securitized migration. As a result, in order to understand the impact of securitized migration on the aid utilized to deter migration it is essential to bring forward mechanisms or ways in which securitization as a theory is comprehensible. To comprehend the process and understand the intricate level of securitized migration a pertinent theoretical framework and a relevant subject of analysis required; as Iov and Bogdan elaborate:

> *There are two legitimate questions regarding the emergence of migration securitization: (1) What are the mechanisms involved in the securitization process? And (2) How do we account for the variation in the level of securitized migration across cases? At an EU level, migration can be securitized through two processes, the first at a discursive level (especially used by political actors, more pronounced during election campaigns) and the second aiming at the creation of security agencies, based on Jeff Huysmans analysis [...]*[40]

Therefore, this chapter will elaborate on the securitization theory (from the lens of the Paris school of thought) in order to build a basic understanding for analyzing a shift in securitized migration of a case study (mentioned later in Chapter 3).

For this purpose the chapter will outline the mechanisms involved in determining the level of securitized migration. The first mechanism illustrates that a narrative premise or national identity can be created to effect community, sovereignty or culture of a country to either securitize migration or not – this is the basic platform to understand where the country stands on the issue of securitization of migration. Similarly, the second mechanism discusses the exploitation of lack of

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[40] Iov, Claudia Anamaria, and Maria Claudia Bogdan. 2017. "Securitization of Migration in the European Union - Between Discourse and Practical Action." *Research and Science Today*, pp. 12-19.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.rescito13.5&site=eds-live, 14.

clarity in threat, mismanagement of policy that ends up targeting the 'will' and 'authority' of security actors and low restraint by audience towards security actors, all of which can highly securitize migration. The last mechanisms illustrate the challenge to political unity 'framed' in form of welfare system or national security and promotion of the idea of belonging (at external borders or internal regions), which can highly securitize migration by increasing the security threat perspective inside the audience.

2.1 Challenge to the community, sovereignty and culture

The process of securitization involves a perception of threat that is framed by security actors and absorbed by the audience. When it comes to the concept of securitized migration, the historical build up towards the perception is also a significant aspect. Alkopher Tal Dingott propounds that securitization of migration is caused by the past narratives that stimulate a socio-psychological 'reaction' towards migration. Similarly, the security perception of different regions are defined by the narrative they face. The Visegrad four countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) witnessed a tumultuous past under communist regimes, which infused a sense of 'lack of control' in their identity. Therefore, irregular influx of refugees in 2015 induced a 'cognitive dissonance' and 'traumatic breech', which caused securitization and ontological insecurity.[41] Germany on the other hand had a 'lack of perceived security' due to its position on keeping a pro human rights approach and open-door policy, based on the divided past of post-World War II.[42] Therefore, Germany initially reacted to the irregular influx of refugees towards Europe in 2015, in a manner which 'attempted' to de-securitized the issue. All these aspects are

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[41] Tal Dingott Alkopher (2018) Socio-psychological reactions in the EU to immigration: from regaining ontological security to desecuritisation, European Security, 27:3, 314-335, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2018.1497981, 316.
[42] Ibid 326.

endorsed by one seminal driving force; which is that of 'narrative', through which a country perceives itself in a certain manner and securitizes based on who belongs and who does not belong.

According to Bahar Rumelili the ontological insecurity, which is generated by 'narrative premises',[43] introduces a sense of distinction in the collective identity. This identity is not constructed by interaction with external actors but instead is constructed by the 'self-narrative of history', and the creation of this identity through self-narrative can cause securitizing of outsider who attempts to breech the 'space' of identity. Rumelili explains that the 'narrative premises' of Europe's past memory creates a unique sense of identity[44] – temporal otherness towards the past plays a vital role in this process. As Rumelili explains: "That the EU constructs contemporary European identity predominantly by Othering its own past rather than external actors is taken and presented as an assurance that EU is unlikely to engage in the antagonistic power politics characteristic of nation-states."[45] The words essentially illustrate a sense of 'internally' created narrative that defines securitization against the other and therefore, endorses the perspective highlighted in the previous paragraph by Alkopher, in which the sense of past narrative is a seminal aspect that can highly provoke securitization of migration.

Furthermore, Huysmans once again meticulously explains that the distribution of fear and trust is conducted on the base of 'unity of community'. The belonging and assimilation into a community based on the identity constructed by the past narratives, generates the sense of insecurity against immigrants. Therefore, this enables the securitization of the community against

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[43] Bahar Rumelili. "Breaking with Europe's Pasts: Memory, Reconciliation, and Ontological (In)Security." *European Security* 27, no. 3 (September 2018): 280–95. doi:10.1080/09662839.2018.1497979, 282-287.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid 290.

the other if the past narrative is firstly, more hostile towards the 'foreign identity' or secondly, it

very closely holds a 'sense of community and national identity due to glorification of history'.[46]

The important point highlighted in Huysmans' perspective is that is with the prominence of this

past narrative, there emerges a continuous insecurity towards the *'autonomy or sovereignty of the*

community' and fear towards prosperity or smooth sustenance of the community culture.

Huysmans also elucidates on this by stating:

> *It is inevitably a political act in which the unity and autonomy, or in other words, the*
> *sovereignty of the community, is asserted […] In itself this statement does not immediately*
> *play out a fear of the too culturally different outsider. But if immigrants with lesser ability*
> *to assimilate endanger the effective functioning of a community they can easily be*
> *politicized into outsiders that should be feared.[47]*

Overall, this implies that a high level of pride in cultural identity, disruptive past towards

foreign intervention or closed borders all account for fears that security actors can frame to

securitize migration through their respective technology, as highlighted by Bigo, in the

governmentality of unease. While performing a comparative analysis between the level of

securitization of migration between Canada and France, Philippe Bourbeau constructs a

framework for accessing 'level of securitized migration'[48] and also does an in-depth study through

empirical (positivist) research how France had a high intensity of securitized migration due to its

narrative premises:

> *French concerns about the movement of people are not a function of fear of unemployment*
> *or the loss of a job for a "Frenchman." Rather, concerns are framed as fear of the loss of*
> *national identity […] In 1989, nearly three out of four French citizens feared that France*
> *would lose its national identity if immigration was not limited […][49]*

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[46] Huysmans (2006). "*Securitizing migration: freedom from existential threats and the constitution of insecure communities", Ch 4 in "The Politics Of Insecurity: Fear, Migration And Asylum In The EU"*. The new international relations series. Ed. Barry Buzan and Richard Little. London: Routledge, 50.
[47] Ibid 50-51.
[48] Philippe Bourbeau (2011). Part II "The securitization of migration in Canada and France" in "*Securitization Of Migration: A study of movement and order*. London: Routledge, 49.
[49] Bourbeau "Securitization of migration", Table 6.2; 120.

Therefore, the fear pertaining to 'community identity and security' (or narrative premise) plays a pivotal role in the securitization of migration. A significant discourse analysis could investigate the strength of cultural identity and the public opinion towards the sustenance of community, in order to determine the intensity of securitized migration.

Table 2 Narrative Premise

Narrative Premise	
Securitizes Migration	*Does Not Securitize Migration*
Hostility towards foreign identity or insecurity to community	No hostility towards foreign and welcoming (labor or otherwise) inclusive community
Strong sense of national identity due to glorification of past	Weak sense of national identity or changing the image of past
Suppressed sovereignty and closed borders	Self-identity and open borders

2.2 Structuring the alienation and promoting threat/violence

This section elaborates on few of the prominent reasons due to which a threat can be framed to cause securitized migration; however, if the 'level of audience perception' remains low then the 'level of securitization' also remains low. The framing can be done due to lack of clarity in the threat. Similarly, mismanagement in defining threat or security policy can also assist framing – since any breech of unmanaged issues becomes a challenge to the 'will' of security actor to uphold security. Most prominently, lack of 'constraint' by mass population can allow framing to take place easily; since a restrain by the audience – civil society or the public – can prevent the moves of security actors to frame and securitize migration. All these three aspects will be explained in detail below.

The lack of clarity in the threat, gradual unease and usage of technology by security actors produces securitization and fills in the gap between the actor and audience relation in

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securitization. Bigo explains that alongside narrative premises that are only a part of the overall 'unease', there are other factors that securitize migration. It is the gradual creation of 'us' vs 'them' (othering) and the alienation which allows uncertainty.[50] Bigo claims the Foucauldian 'power relations' as the key cause which creates the sense of belonging (inclusion) and othering (externalization). The uncertainty of threat gives an opportunity of 'customization and plasticity' and can be used (by implementing their technology) by any security actor to associate the blame of their problem on something imperceptible (in this case the immigrant).[51] However, the use of technology by security actors to securitize migration is essential in this process and without the 'framing' of the audience by the security actor, no issue can be securitized based on just the internal 'narrative premise' or memory from the past.

In order to observe the 'use of technology' and 'lack of clarity' in threat by security actors, we can analyze the case study of securitization of migrant/refugee ships arriving from Sri Lanka to Canada. In this case the 'narrative premise' was constant, and the level of threat that the arriving migrants 'may' cause was also the same, even though in both cases the threat was ambiguous. However, since the security actor in-charge were different, and their framing technology was different the securitization of migration had different level of perception. Corey Robinson analyzes these two situations, during which irregular migrant ships carrying 'Tamil' asylum seekers from Sri Lanka were to arrive at the shores of Canada. In the first case in 1986, the Tamil refugees encountered no prominent scrutiny; in fact, they were depicted as vulnerable people fleeing

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[50] Bigo "Security and Immigration", 88.
[51] Ibid 80.

persecution.[52]   However, a similar group of refugees arriving in 2010 were depicted as *'queue jumpers', 'human smugglers'* and *'Tamil terrorists'*.[53] The contrasting results toward securitized migration between the events of 1986 and 2010 occurred because in 2010 both prominent Canadian border security agencies - Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) (anti migration) and Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) (pro migration) - had a conflict of interest. The CBSA over-powered IRCC and implemented its motives to securitize immigrants by slandering IRCC and framed migrants as the other with deviant behavior, who do not belong.[54]

The structuring of alienation of the migrants allows the security actors to merge all migrants into one category of 'the other' and take away the individuality. Since the threat is unknown and the only confirmed aspect is that it is external, the generalization of all migrants into a collective force gives rise to fear against invasion of outsiders or aliens. The violent actions are highlighted, and essentialism enables the negative labeling of all migrants. Securitization often involves a systematic political framing, in which a sense of insecurity is created only to an extent to which the security actors can affirm the audience that they have the capacity to resolve the issue (and not all security is lost).[55]

Even though the security actors may have a particular stance against migrants, yet the securitization can only happen if the audience does not reject the securitizing moves. The gradual approach allows the audience to often restrain the securitizing moves of the security actors, thus becoming integral part of setting the discourse of security move itself. Bourbeau explains that the mass audience not only accepts or rejects the security move but also constrains the securitization

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[52] Corey Robinson. "Tracing and Explaining Securitization: Social Mechanisms, Process Tracing and the Securitization of Irregular Migration." *Security Dialogue* vol. 48, no. 6, pp. 505–523, 518.
[53] Ibid 516.
[54] Ibid 513-517.
[55] Huysmans "The politics of insecurity", 57-60.

of migration, which gives it the chance to play a strategic role in influencing the securitization move. As Bourbeau explains:

> *Hence, evidence suggests that the power of the Canadian mass audience has not been merely in approving securitizing agents' moves, as ST currently posits. The role of the Canadian mass audience has been more complex than that, and one feature of that complex role is that of a constraining force throughout the years that my study covers. In France, the situation is strikingly different [...].*[56]

Thus, this implies that in order to understand the process of securitization, we can observe the countries where the 'mass population opinion constraints' the securitization of migration. Where this is the case the level of securitization of migration is low and despite the presence of security moves and acceptance of few audience members (audience in form of bureaucratic institutions or some fraction of population) the intensity of securitizing migration remains restricted. Vice versa, where the audience plays a less role to restrain the moves of securitization, there the level of securitization can be considered high.

2.3 Challenge to political unity and belonging (external and internal control)

This section will cover few of the techniques in which security actors successfully frame the audience to highly securitize migration. The technologies used to frame audience and highly securitize migration mainly revolve around challenge to political unity in the form of challenge to welfare or economy, and challenge to security threat of terrorism or crime. Similarly, an issue is highly securitized if there is externalization of migrants at borders and inside borders. This is done by shunning away migrants or refugees at borders and also keeping conditions of segregation, both physically and identity wise - 'the other', (by creating differences) inside the borders. These aspects will be explained in detail below.

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[56] Bourbeau "The securitization of migration", 115.

The process of securitizing migration as mentioned in the previous section – due to lack of clarity in the threat perception and through the usage of technology by security actors – also has a dimension of threat to 'political unity'. Huysmans elaborates that in Europe migrants are framed as one of the sources for weakening national tradition and societal homogeneity. Furthermore, the securitization of migration in Europe is related to three themes: internal security, cultural security and crisis of the welfare state.[57] The last theme, which is the crisis of the welfare state, adds to a socio-economic dimension of securitization. The migrant is witnessed as a collective identity of the other that does not belong and thus, a phenomenon that harms the political unity of the country or the EU as a whole. The various technologies by security actors are deployed to garner insecurity towards the migrant and blame several ills of the society on the unknown threat. As Huysmans explains:

> *The securitization of immigration or refugees depends on instituting credible claims that they are an important factor endangering the survival of political units. There are many different ways in which this can be done [...] For example, a sudden inflow of a high number of immigrants can destabilize the labour market resulting in an increase in unemployment, popular unrest, and a legitimacy problem for the government. Such a development can subsequently weaken the state's competitive position in the international system. The number of immigrants mediated through the labour market is the central element for linking immigration to an existentially dangerous situation in this argument. 'Flood' and 'invasion' are powerful metaphors Securitizing migration for securitizing increases in numbers of migration.*[58]

The discourse that endorses a securitization of immigrant similarly claims that migrants challenge the political unity of a country in form of labor force, insecurity to welfare system and threat of terrorism. The threat to labor force and threat to welfare system have been highlighted in the above discussion, however, the physical threat of terrorism can also be explained along similar line of thought, in the work of Husyin Cinoglu and Nurullah Altun - as they state:

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[57] Huysmans, 2000. "The European Union And The Securitization Of Migration". *JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies* 38 (5): 751-777. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00263, 758.
[58] Ibid 47-48.

Migration and border control policies have been used as main instruments for combating international terrorism in the post-September 11 period. Despite the fact that there is no organic link between international migration and terrorism [...] Use of migration control instruments as a specific tool for combating the global terrorism phenomenon might lead to a policy which may somehow include biased and racist approaches within it.[59]

The counter-terrorism policy depicts the unwarranted securitization of migration, despite insignificant link between terrorism and migration. The lack of clarity in threat from terrorism instigates a strict policy towards an ambiguous entity 'the other' or immigrant and this policy shows a high intensity of securitization. Therefore, when it can be analyzed in the policy of a country that the internal and external restrictions against migration are being opted due a threat from terrorism, it can be implied that the level of securitization of migration is high. The recent example of Trump travel ban[60] on Muslim countries vividly illustrates this point, as the level securitized migration intensifies due to policy of restriction based on lack of clarity against terrorist threat.

Furthermore, various technologies are used on both the external and internal forums by the security actors to disassociate the migrants.[61] Firstly, this task is performed at external borders to keep migrants and refugee population from entering a 'space'. Secondly, this segregation is performed to keep the immigrant at a distance from the host population - a population which is allowed to 'belong'. The external border control with strict use of force and internal control with deportation regimes and detention camps with segregated socio-economic conditions or long process of asylum application are some of the examples.[62] Actions taken towards such policies and

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[59] Huseyin Cinoglu. 2013. "Terrorism International Migration And Border Control". *European Scientific Journal (ESJ), v*olume 9, issue 20. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2013.v9n20p%25p, 111-112.
[60] Rick Gladstone and Satoshi Sugiyama. "*Trump's Travel Ban: How It Works and Who Is Affected"*. Published online: 1, July, 2018. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/americas/travel-ban-trump-how-it-works.html.

[61] Cinoglu "Terrorism International Migration And Border Control", 107-109.
[62] Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia. 2015. *The Securitisation Of Migration In The EU*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 52-53.

akin public opinion; therefore, show a high level of securitized migration. Huysmans also elaborates:

> *Internally immigrants and refugees are controlled by means of various technologies, including registration, benefits, special identity cards, etc. A variety of instruments can also be used to sustain distance between the host population and refugees. One such instrument is locking up refugees, who are still applying for asylum or who are waiting to be deported, in detention centres. Expulsion of refugees whose asylum application has been refused is another tool of articulating the need to keep a distance between people in the host society and people who try to enter it […] Administering distance towards immigrants and refugees produces a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion […].* [63]

Therefore, in summary, when migration is seen as a challenge to belonging and political unity, we can analyze the level of securitization in three ways. Firstly, the level of blame by security actors or public opinion towards the migrant to harm labor economy or welfare system (inside the EU countries) shows level of securitized migration. Secondly, the strict policy and association of migrants as a root cause of terrorism also shows high level of securitization. Finally, the restriction of migrants in the external or border process and the segregation of migrants internally (in order to keep the other from blending inside the population) also allows us to understand the level of securitized migration to be high at a given period inside a country.

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[63] Huysmans "The politics of insecurity", 55.

Chapter 3: Methodology, case study and shift in level of securitized migration

The following chapter will relate the mechanisms (elaborated in Chapter 2) for understanding the level of securitized migration, to the further research of case study analysis. To do that, this chapter will elaborate on the research methodology for analysis,[64] the choice of the case study and the in-depth analysis of shift in level of securitized migration in the case study of Germany.

3.1 Research methodology

This paper will utilize the framework of mechanisms defined in the chapter above, in order to analyze the low and high intensity or level of securitization of migration in the case study. Due to the normative nature of the mechanisms there can be various interpretations of the process of securitization; yet, the paper specifically focuses on the lens of 'Paris school of ST' (illustrated in chapter 1). This paper will adopt a longitudinal approach of "*process tracing*" to analyze a specific time-frame of pre and post shift in the intensity or level of securitized migration in the case study of 'Germany'.

While doing so, the paper will also attempt to succinctly highlight a diverse period of timeline, in order to build a context for the narrative premise[65] and the stance of Germany on initial level of securitized migration. Similarly, the paper will follow the logic of mechanisms in chapter 2 and process presented by Bourbeau[66] in tracing the significant shift in the level of securitized migration which is mentioned in his book (and explained in the section 2.1.1 above in the mechanisms). In order to demonstrate the shift in the level of securitized migration this paper will

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[64] Analysis to be used in both Chapter 3 and 4

[65] This exceptionality occurs in the approach of process tracing since narrative premise, which impacts the security perception of audience is a factor that also needs to be defined in the case study

[66] Method used to measure level of securitized migration in the Ch 6 "The Power of Contextual Factors". Bourbeau "The securitization of migration", 98.

use the descriptions and analytical approaches from secondary resources. The paper will also rely on policy papers and briefs which utilize the primary data from European Commission (EC) sources, such as Eurobarometer (EB) and other authentic sources such as European Social Survey (ESS).

Furthermore, in order to analyze the link between securitized migration and dissemination of aid, the paper will investigate the '*secondary data*' and '*raw research data*' from European Commission, the World Bank data on Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the OECD. Initially a macro level analysis of aid will help "*affirm"* the overall hypothesis pertinent to the case study of Germany. Later, in order to *'confirm'* the overall hypothesis the micro level analysis of aid sectors pertinent to deterring migration will be investigated, through *'pattern matching'* technique – this will be done in order to gauge the significance of correlation of both parts of the hypothesis with the distribution of development aid to different sectors affiliated with the purpose of deterring migration (highlighted in the chapter part 1.2).

3.2 Choice of case study

The main goal of this paper is to show the link between shift in level of securitized migration and the development aid which is presumed to be used as a component of deterring migration. Therefore, this section aims to present a case study that can be observed through mechanisms highlighted above, in order perform process tracing on a shift in 'securitized migration'. The main limitation of this paper is the space of analysis for one case study and a need to focus on limited time frame. This implies the choice of case study should be feasible and unique in a manner to cover most qualities needed to represent a good case. Similarly, the case study should have prominent instances of shift in security perspective towards migrants. Given the case of migration crisis in the EU around the period of 2015, Germany is a notable case study, which

holds a leading position inside the EU, has a prominent contribution in development aid and also sets the discourse on migration policy inside the EU. However, it is important initially to understand why the EU as a region[67] is not a suitable choice for this case study, and why a country, such as Germany serves the purpose prolifically to prove the hypothesis? This section will systematically answer both these questions and similarly highlight the significance in the choice of the case study.

It is initially, important to understand why the EU as a single entity would not be a suitable choice for analyzing the shift in the securitized migration. Securitization is perceived to occur in a diverse manner; however, the gradual process of its occurrence is the most applicable in case of securitization of migration. This significant concept explains that in the case of securitized migration there is no 'sharp distinction' between the issue of migration being shifted from the 'realm of normal politics to being securitized'. Instead there is 'gradual politics of unease', which also helps reflect in determining different levels securitized migration. Andrew W. Neal elaborates on the EU's perspective and explains that the securitization of migration through an existential threat perception and speech acts is not an adequate method of analyzing FRONTEX in the EU.[68] Instead the bordering practices of FRONTEX depicts a gradual discursive and non-discursive (events apart from speech act) "governmentality of unease" as explained by Bigo. Bigo demonstrates that the issue does not need to become an existential crisis in order to become securitized, and there is not a requirement of a sharp shift out of the political sphere.[69]

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[67] Which is a prominent case of struggle with securitization of migration
[68] Andrew W Neal. "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, no. 2 (2009): 333. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswst&AN=edswst.1492288&site=eds-live. 351-353.
[69] Ibid 49-51

Yet the overall concept of securitization barely works on the institutions of the EU. Since in the case of the EU as a collective organization the 'audience' gets dispersed; therefore, there is designated audience to articulate the national context or societal insecurity. The complexity of the political legal and institutional process inside the EU imply that the policy outcomes may not delineate the securitization framework presented in the ST.[70] The second question is that of exceptionalism; since the EU as an institution does not possess the constitutional, political or legal capacity to use extra ordinary means. It is also questionable whether the EU institutions have the capacity to mobilize insecurity as well as a political elite, through its technology to act as security actors and securitize an issue.[71] Therefore, the securitization theory does not fully define securitized migration at the EU institutional level and it is important to delve into individual cases of countries inside the EU to consider the link of securitized migration with the development aid disseminated.

Therefore, a country inside the EU would be a more relevant choice for case study and Germany fulfils several aspects of this purpose. Firstly, Germany conforms to the securitization mechanisms outlined above in chapter 2, as a most observable case. This observability of the case enhances when there is a vivid shift in the securitized migration. Since, Germany is one of the countries which, in its history, prominently held a lenient stance on migration and shares a narrative past which defines its ontological security to uphold human right values;[72] it experiences a vivid change when there is partial or significant increase in the level of securitization - with observability in security actors making framing security threats and the opinion of audience to either absorb it partially or fundamentally. Secondly, Germany as a leader in the EU has a

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[70] Ibid 337.
[71] Ibid 338.
[72] Alkopher "Socio-psychological reactions in the EU to immigration", 316.

significant position in setting the discourse towards migration policy; this makes Germany a relevant case study when trying the analyze the securitization as a restriction to EU external border policy.

Thirdly, Germany has been a distinguished provider of development aid in Europe and has exceeded many other countries in Europe in the dissemination of aid towards 'low to middle income' countries (an aspect which is relevant to the puzzle of development aid towards low to middle income countries). This has also made Germany prominent in providing aid to alleviate migratory pressure. The notable projects such as the "Marshal Fund with Africa" which have been associated with 'development assistance as a means to externalize migration control',[73] show that the Germany has been the biggest contributor.[74] Furthermore, Germany and France[75] have been working together to form a deal similar to that of EU-Turkey deal (used for externalizing the flow of migrants), with the region of sub-Saharan Africa.[76] Therefore, Germany has an inclination of also being an eminent leader in alleviating the migrant crisis through development aid, in an attempt to reduce migrant pressure. Finally, due to a unique narrative premise[77] of desecuritizing

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[73] Lucas Rasche. 2018. "Change And Continuity In Germany's Migration Policy – Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin". *Jacques Delors Institut - Berlin*. https://www.delorsinstitut.de/en/all-publications/change-and-continuity-in-germanys-migration-policy/, 4-5; "Two of the main pillars form of components entirely for deterring migration aid sectors. BMZ report" Africa and Europe- a new partnership for development, peace and a better future". "Africa And Europe - A New Partnership For Development, Peace And A Better Future". 2017. A Marshall Plan With Africa. The Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, abbreviated BMZ. https://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/information_flyer/information_brochures/Materialie270_africa_marshallplan.pdf, 12.

[74] European Commission. EU Trust Fund. April 2018. Table 1 https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/the_eu_emergency_trust_fund_for_africa_0.pdf

[75] "Whereas similar interests thus exist, especially with regard to the protection of external borders and the mitigation of root causes […]." Rasche "Change And Continuity In Germany's Migration Policy", 5.

[76] Ibid 5.

[77] Discussed in the Section 3.3 for the case of Germany

migration[78] issue inside a vastly growing populist European region, Germany provides the most interesting case; since one, it allows vivid pattern of shift from one end to the other and second, it presents with a case study that enables the paper to gauge the shift in one of the countries least possible to securitize migration (and yet it does). All the above-mentioned aspects make Germany an promising case study to analyze for the hypothesis of this paper.

3.3 Analyzing the shift in level of securitized migration in the context of Germany

The German perspective has been lenient towards migrants, especially before the period of 2013 and the surge of migration crisis in Europe. This low intensity or level of securitization towards migrations has been due to Germany's 'narrative premise'[79] which has been endorsing a pro humanitarian and migrant stance. Whereas the mass population constraint has played a seminal role in 'constraining' the security moves that were present even before the surge in the flow of migrants - yet only resulted in the increase in the intensity of security perspective towards migration later due to the loss in mass constraint. The main focus of this section will be on '*process tracing*' and justifying a shift in the securitization towards migration in recent past - the period, focusing on post 2000,[80] pre and post shift to high securitized migration (identified as 2013 in the analysis below) close to 2015 migration crisis in Europe. Firstly, this section will succinctly, explain historical aspects of narrative premise. Secondly, the section will depict the role of civil society constraint despite pressure of security actors to increase the intensity of securitized

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[78] Alkopher "Socio-psychological reactions in the EU to immigration", 318; Definition of de-securitization: "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere." Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde. "*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.", 4.
[79] Rumelili. "Breaking with Europe's Pasts".
[80] Since this period introduced a detailed policy of managing migration for the first time in Germany (identified in the analysis below)

migration. Finally, in order to revert-back to the main aspect and highlight the shift in the securitized migration this section will investigate through the mechanisms, the shift in the level or intensity of securitized migration in German audience during the period of migration crisis approximately around the year 2013 to 2015.[81]

3.3.1 The narrative premise of Germany

The narrative premise which constructs the perspective towards migration and contributes to low level of securitized migration, revolves around the history of post-World War II Germany. Firstly, the migrant-inflow was during post World War II in order to help construction and industry sector of Germany, and that made immigration to be perceived as a norm - foreign workers were endorsed to boost the economy of Germany. Throughout 1950's active agreements with the European countries and Turkey lead to an influx of migrants. The before and after time of the creation of Democratic Republic of Germany in 1960's further changed the perception towards migrants and cemented agreements that bolstered consistent flow of migrants, this time also from African countries (Morocco, Tunisia etc.).[82] The growth in the migration schemes allowed the immigrant to be normalized into the society.

Secondly, the marred history of human rights violations during the World War II set the tone for Germany to become a proponent of human rights concerns and refugee issues. As

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[81] Years of shift.
[82] Asiye Kaya. Ch 3 "Inclusion and Exclusion of immigrants and the politics of labeling: Thinking beyond guest workers," "ethnic German resettlers," "refugees of the European crisis," and "poverty migration". p 56. in Wilhelm, Cornelia. 2018. *Migration, Memory And Diversity: Germany From 1945 To The Present*. [S.l.]: Berghahn books, 59; Maren Borkert and Wolfgang Bosswick. 2007. "Migration Policymaking In Germany : Between National Reluctance And Local Pragmatism". *European Commission; International Migration Integration Social Cohesion - IMISCOE*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/migration-policymaking-in-germany-between-national-reluctance-and-local-pragmatism, 4.

explained by Alkopher, this 'socio-psychological' reaction is an agenda to improve and sustain a better self-image and disassociate oneself from the crude past. This identity which caters to the values of justice and human right also sets the discourse to discourage the perception of migrant as a threat or an unwanted alien. Instead the identity of being a human rights normative power augments the similarities between the Europeans and those who migrated.[83] Therefore, both these aspects of narrative premise become embedded in the ontological security of Germany, and this perception has been contributing mostly to desecuritization and low level of securitized migration through-out the 20th century and can be seen in the German migration policy in the recent past of 2000's as an attempt to manage migration[84] (especially till 2007-2008).[85]

3.3.2 Security threat framing and slight shift towards low level of securitized migration

Despite some agitation and lash back against migration and migration policy, the overall narrative premise prevented from evoking security actors or the audience to intensify securitized migration, and this mindset translated in the low level of securitized migration even during and right after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Therefore, the narrative premise kept the security concern towards the influx of migrant's passive. One example is that during the emerging trend of political discourse to vilify and securitize migration by rightist groups,[86] halt on recruitment in public policy and encouragement for voluntary return in the post 1973 Germany, the family reunion program

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[83] Alkopher "Socio-psychological reactions in the EU to immigration", 318.

[84] Paul Roe discusses the idea of 'managing' securitization of migrants and minority: "Managing securitization' is a constant renegotiation of exclusion/inclusion with 'the other'". Paul Roe. "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization." *Security Dialogue*35, no. 3 (2004): 279-94. doi:10.1177/0967010604047527, 279.

[85] "Since 2000, the German government has undertaken a series of steps to reform laws and shape public opinion in order to bring about better integration and managed migration" Rita Süssmuth. "The Future of Migration and Integration Policy in Germany." *Migration Policy Institute*, October 2009. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/future-migration-and-integration-policy-germany, 2.

[86] Banai and Kreide. "Securitization of migration in Germany", 908.

was still allowed and the massive refugee influx from the Yugoslavia war was mostly granted

access by Germany and Austria (refugee migration movements culminated in 1992 at a peak of

438,000 applications).[87] The Figure 2 in the work of Borkert and Bosswick shows prominent

internal and external events (significance of some of which is discussed above) that define early

migration patterns towards securitization and help understand narrative premise:

Figure 2 Time-line of events significant to migration in Germany
- pre low level of securitized migration (reproduced from Borkert and Bosswick. "Migration policy making in Germany", 20)

Furthermore, referring to table in Appendix 2 the policy towards migration mostly

delineates pattern of managing migration (which causes a slight shift towards securitized

migration), yet overall it does not highly securitize migration because it intends to pursue a

constant struggle with the internal and external, rather than vilifying 'the other'[88] - this occurs in

case of Germany due to the low insecurity of the audience and public. To highlight a few prominent

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[87] Borkert and Bosswick. "Migration policy making in Germany", 4.
[88] Roe. "Securitization and Minority Rights", 290-91.

changes, the 2000 green card policy and drastic changes to 2005 immigration law improved the situation for foreign labor recruitment. Furthermore, the law of 2007 transportation of the EU directives and later the Meseberg 2008 decision allowed equal opportunity for the EU citizens and especially the acceptance of 'third country nationals' in the job market.[89]

Even though the post 9/11 conditions in Germany generated tremendous insecurity towards immigrants especially from Muslim background,[90] the 'constraint' on security actors, from the mass public and civil society played a seminal role in reducing level of securitized migration and promoting a policy of managing migration. The challenge to political unity, welfare, economic labor and terrorism caused a surge in securitized migration. The shift in the OECD countries stance was derived from within, as various countries such as Germany, who were seen as migrant welcoming country became a country with an average or standard policy on migration.[91] Yet the percentage of people who thought 'there are too many migrants in Germany' decreased from 71 to 53 percent from 1998 to 2008. Whereas during the same time period the percentage of people who thought 'there are not enough migrants (increase in migrants needed)' increased from 17 to 24 percent.[92] Similarly, according to 2006 survey despite the notoriety of fundamentalist Islam in

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[89] Table 1 Sussmuth. "The Future of Migration and Integration Policy in Germany", 3.
[90] "Since 9/11, similar to other countries in Europe, integrating Muslim immigrants and Islam into German society has often been discussed within the framework of security issues and the fear of terrorist attacks". Oya S. Abali "German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration". *Migration Policy Institute*, October 2009. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/german-public-opinion-immigration-and-integration, 10.
[91] Holger Kolb. "Afterword: Structures and larger context of political change in migration and integration policy: Germany between Normalization and Europeanization". p 323. in Wilhelm, Cornelia. 2018. *Migration, Memory and Diversity: Germany From 1945 To The Present*. ([S.l.]: Berghahn books), 330.
[92] Figure 1 Abali "German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration.", 3.

the German society, even the conservative Germans could differentiate between Islam as a religion and Muslim fundamentalist/extremists associated with terrorism.[93]

These trends overall depict a constraint by mass population despite the growing security concerns of imperceptible threats, since the threat to German culture and threat from extremist elements both had ambiguity as far as their origin was concerned, making the migrants to be the first target in the post 9/11 conditions.[94] Therefore, due to the constraint in the audience, the security actors striving to target the immigrants and asylum seekers were not able to highly securitize migration.[95]

3.3.3 Shift towards high level of securitized migration

A prominent shift towards can be observed in the security perspective towards immigration by 2013, which translates into high intensity or level of securitized migration in the security actors and the audience by late 2014. The right-wing political parties and security actors in Germany started gaining ground with the change in the coalition government in 2013 and the agenda they proposed towards migrants was highly securitized, especially towards third country nationals (even more than the center right coalition government before 2013).[96] The creation of Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) in 2014 and the growth in membership and influence of Alternative for Germany (AfD)[97] played an integral part in contributing to the drastic change in narrative toward migration. The introduction of cap and then

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[93] Ibid 11

[94] "Although in December 2005 several NGO's, churches, welfare organisations, the Unions, the parties SPD and the Greens as well as the Federal Commissioner for Integration Böhmer (CDU) and the Laender Hessia, North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin supported a permanent residence status for a part of the 200,000 tolerated refugees in Germany, the bill died due to the opposition of the Laender Bavaria, Saxony and Lower Saxony ruled by the conservative CDU/CSU." Borkert 18

[95] The 2010 Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) shows that Germany landed on the 13th number out of 40 Migrant receiving countries.

[96] Rasche "Change And Continuity In Germany's Migration Policy", 1.

[97] Ibid 1-2

reduction in the value of cap on the immigrants can be seen as a prominent sign of this securitization.

However, another example (which none the less can have a dual interpretation) is that of the ease in the dual citizenship policy in 2014. The 2014 law in Germany demolished the obligation in the previous law of 1991 and 1993 law that did not allow German citizenship on blood ties alone. The new law of 2014 eased the process for those born to German parents to attain dual citizenship (and not just be forced to opt for German citizenship) even if they were not living in Germany, yet this was only limited to migrants with 'German descent' - and no ease of dual citizenship was made to migrants coming in from other countries with no German decent.[98] The development in Middle East and the breaking down of migration system to handle the influx of migrants in 2015 clearly showed the rejection of any migrant friendly steps.[99] The panic-stricken reaction of German public was mobilized by xenophobic and racist movements, and media cells; in which both these security actors framed the threat towards migrants and mobilized audience against migration and any lenient policy.[100]

The burgeoning influence of populist parties and organization, in the main stream policy has been something new in Germany; however, the policy restrictions on migrants and the methods of encouraging voluntary returns of migrants has been in practice (in form of the post-cold war history, especially in various forms during the late 20th century and the 2000's managing migration trends). The aspect which differentiates the security perception of time around EU migration crisis from previous security actor moves is 'the absorption of the migrant security threat at a mass

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[98] Kolb. "Afterword: Structures and larger context of political change in migration and integrtion policy", 307.

[99] In fact the public showed retaliation to any leniency in laws

[100] Patrice G. Poutrus. "Refugee reports: Asylum and massmedia in divided Germany during the cold war and beyond". p 86 in Wilhelm, Cornelia. 2018. *Migration, Memory And Diversity: Germany From 1945 To The Present*. ([S.l.]: Berghahn books), 97.

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audience level' - this includes public opinion, civil society and governmental bureaucratic organizations. Most importantly the public opinion took tremendous influence from the 'framing' of the other by the populist agenda after the influx of the migrants during the Arab spring in 2011 and close to the 2015 migration crisis that afflicted Europe.[101] The ill-preparedness to manage asylum and refugee migration inside the EU also added fuel to the fire,[102] as the chaotic situation exacerbated the perception towards immigrants of all kinds (decreasing the possibility of managing migration).

The islamophobia and the securitization of migrants had been a looming issue in Germany which can be seen as an indicator of securitization. Firstly, the framing of gradual threat related to cultural insecurity and danger to the economic prosperity has been consistent against Muslims in Germany, which is a clear indicator of stimulating conditions for intensifying securitized migration. The 2009 Ludin case, against the wearing of headscarf or religious symbols in the government offices portrayed the agitation towards 'the other'. Whereas, the second form of threat was constructed by targeting the welfare and financial prosperity of those who belonged in Europe. The prominent book in 2010, by former executive of German Central Bank *"Germany Abolishes Itself"* that stirred up questions about the financial pressure due to migrants, highlighted a threat not just to cultural identity, but also to economic prosperity from migrants (mainly Muslim).[103]

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[101] Dr. Marcus Engler. "Germany in the refugee crisis – background, reactions and challenges". Published on April 22, 2016. Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Warsaw Poland. https://pl.boell.org/en/2016/04/22/germany-refugee-crisis-background-reactions-and-challenges

[102] Kate Connolly. "Refugee Crisis: Germany Creaks under Strain of Open Door Policy." The Guardian. October 08, 2015. Accessed May 20, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/08/refugee-crisis-germany-creaks-under-strain-of-open-door-policy.

[103] Banai and Kreide. "Securitization of migration in Germany", 910.

Secondly, the securitization against the migrant had been gradually created by labeling the marginalized as the other and not giving them proper rights.[104] All these aspects of framing of the other as threat delineates securitization of migration stimulating inside the Germany.[105] Around the time period of 2015 the tremendous influx of migrants instigated a lash back towards entertaining more immigrants.[106] The growing skepticism of the German population around this time allowed the new German coalition (as explained in the previous paragraph the coalition after 2013 was more populist) to adopt stricter policies on external border control and push for shared solidarity based on fair relocation mechanism (instead of Germany catering to the bigger share of migrants coming in).[107] This implies that the change in the intensity or level of securitized migration resulted mainly due to the lack of restraint towards the security actors - as most of the audience became a part of the security agenda.

In order to elaborate on the growing security threat perception in German audience Timothy J. Hatton brings in the idea of 'Salience' defined as: "[…] the degree of importance that the individual attaches to immigration as a policy issue".[108] Hatton uses a method of regression to develop the relationship between 'preference of other issues over migration' and the 'salience' as defined above. The data utilized in the research includes European Social Survey (ESS) and

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[104] Ibid 913.

[105] The discourse of Islam not 'belonging' in Europe is pursued by various security actors inside German rightist politics. Deutsche Welle. "German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer: 'Islam Doesn't Belong to Germany' | DW | 16.03.2018." DW.COM. Accessed May 20, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/german-interior-minister-horst-seehofer-islam-doesnt-belong-to-germany/a-42999726.

[106] "The arrival of 1,400 000 people seeking asylum since 2015 has certainly contributed to a shift in the public discourse about migration in Germany. Promoting anti-immigrant sentiments, the country's right-wing populist party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), and nationalistic groups such as PEGIDA (an anti-Islamisation group founded in 2014) grew in membership and influence" Rasche "Change And Continuity In Germany's Migration Policy", 1.

[107] Rasche "Change And Continuity In Germany's Migration Policy", 6.

[108] Timothy J. Hatton. "Public Opinion on Immigration in Europe: Preference versus Salience." *Institute of Labor Economics IZA* IZA DP No. 10838 (June 2017). http://ftp.iza.org/dp10838.pdf, 3.

Eurobarometer (EB) from the year 2002 till 2014. The research takes into account the country level and individual level comparison between preference and salience, in order to monitor a shift in audience.[109]

While monitoring Germany, Hatton's research highlights that Germany observes a strong inverse correlation between preference and salience,[110] 'drastically' in the year 2013 and 2014.[111] This indicates that Germany experienced changes in the policy toughness due to the command of salience over preference relation at national level.[112] The data used in Hatton's research is highly authentic and belongs to one of the most primary source of survey on the EU countries, and covers a relevant timeline to show the shift in the security perspective of the public opinion or audience and its impact on the trend of policy changes in Germany (direction of trends shown in the previous paragraph), during migration crisis 2015 by security actors. Therefore, the research by Hatton and the aspect of change in security perception of 'the other' vividly contextualize that the shift in the level of securitized migration in Germany happened due to drastic change in the role of the audience and the increased influence of (populist) security actors, who framed the security perspective as, migrants being a challenge to the political unity and the belonging inside of Germany.

The chapter concludes that the historical events, need for migrants and socio-psychological reaction to human right values have constructed a narrative premise for Germany, which translated into a low level of securitized migration or a force in mass population to restrain the framing of

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[109] Ibid 5-6.
[110] Ibid 11.
[111] Fig 2 Ibid 31.
[112] "Changes in policy toughness are related to salience and preference at the national level for 15 countries that are covered by both the ESS and Eurobarometer. These are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Sweden [...] As the policy index runs to 2014 there is a maximum of 11 observations per country, of changes in policy, from 2002-04 to 2012-14." Ibid 18.

security actors. The early period of post war Germany created a norm of foreign workers (immigrants) and the later reluctance to cater to migrants (refer to section 3.3.1) did not securitize migration despite a growing policy to reduce migrations in post 1973 migration law till late 1990's. The policy of 'managing migration' was mainly introduced in 2000's to deal with Germany's struggle with its mismanaged stance on dealing with immigration. This leads the paper towards the main time period of analysis on pre and post 2013, in which, despite the security framing of actors the managing migration policy and audience constraint enabled the intensity or level of securitized migration to shift slightly towards securitized after migration being a norm or de-securitized issue (refer to section 3.3.2). Whereas the period of post 2013 (refer to section 3.3.3) which later links with the 2015 EU migration crisis, depicts the drastic shift towards a high intensity or level of securitized migration; and this shift can be used for making a robust link with the dissemination of development aid in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Analysis of link between level of securitized migration and development aid

This chapter will investigate the main hypothesis of the paper by tracing the gradual changes and analyzing the links between dissemination of development aid to low to middle income countries (overall and by sector) and the shift in the level of securitized migration (highlighted for the case study of Germany in Chapter 3). The macro level analysis uses World Bank data of German bi-lateral ODA towards low to middle income countries. Whereas, the micro level analysis will investigate the sectors connected to deterring migration (mentioned in Table 1) in order to gauge if the rise in aid (due to buildup of securitized migration) was aimed to deter migration. It shows that, despite few variations, overall there is a credible correlation of data with the main hypothesis.

4.1 Macro level analysis[113]

Figure 3 Germany ODA towards low to middle income countries
World Bank Source, US Dollar, Billion

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The overall dissemination of development aid by Germany to low to middle income countries can be observed around the period in a pre and post shift in high level of securitized migration, as elaborated in Chapter 3. The German identity endorses a perception of leniency towards migration and human rights due to narrative premise and the lack of an organized securitization policy against migration – this less perception of security threat among audience and

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[113] Overall correlation to the level of securitized migration and development aid.
[114] Figure copied from the data source of the World Bank that depicts overall ODA of Germany in form of bi-lateral aid to low to middle income countries. The time period has been kept limited to 2000 to 2017 in relevance to the analysis for the paper. World Bank. Source link: <iframe src="https://data.worldbank.org/share/widget?end=2017&indicators=DC.DAC.DEUL.CD&locations=XO&start=2000&view=chart" width='900' height='600' frameBorder='0' scrolling="no" ></iframe>.

security actors resonates till late 20th century (before 2000). This illustrates the basic stance of Germany towards migration, which helps us understand the initial time period of late 2000's especially after 2005 and close to 2007 and 2008,[115] in which we witness a more defined management of migration policy. The post 2000's time period recognizes migration as a security issue in a more organized policy framework; however, it only results in a 'low level of securitized migration' due to the restrain from audience and the less influence of populist (anti-migrant) security actors. During this time period the graph in Figure 3, shows the overall development aid disseminated by Germany, and it portrays a gradual rise in the development aid, with minor fluctuations and slight sporadic increases. The 2004 to 2005 rise and minor fluctuations from 2006 till 2013 show the pattern of gradual rise but consistent policy of disseminating aid.[116] Both of these aspects are correlated to the hypothesized (H:1b) pattern of link between low level of securitized migration can result in a marginal yet consistent trend of development aid - with less inclination to deter migration.

Even though the gradual increase in level of securitized migration is present in the late 2000's till 2013, a shift towards high intensity or level of securitized migrants occurs around the time period of 2014 to 2015. The subtle shift is discussed in the Chapter 3 for the case study of Germany, while the main indicators have been the rise in the influence of framing by anti-migrant security actors[117] and the reaction of the audience - which loses restraint under the influence of security framing and securitized external and internal policy against migrants.[118] This shift is prominently reflected in the deterrence policy through the method of aid, as there is a spike in the development aid for Germany during the time period of high securitization. The drastic rise in the

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[115] Refer to table in Appendix 2.
[116] Not a drastic change in the amount.
[117] Irregular influx of migrants allowed the construction of an unknown threat.
[118] Depicted by Hatton.

dissemination of development aid depicts a strong movement towards deterring migration, through aid, from low to middle income countries. One aspect, however, needs to be addressed is that, even though we observe an increase in the aid from 2012-2013, this amount of aid[119] holds a similar value as the aid given in 2008 and can be repudiated on the bases of probability of being gradual fluctuation till 2013. However, right after 2013, the development aid observes a tremendous rise in year 2014 to 2015 and then in year 2015 to 2016 which is vividly correlated with the high level of securitization and perception of threat towards migrants. The data reveals a mammoth increase of 107% moving from year 2013 to 2016.[120] This again supports the hypothesis (H:1a) and shows a significant correlation between high level of securitized migration and increase in aid - aid that can be associated with deterring migration.

The macro level analysis clearly shows a correlation with the overall hypothesis (H:1). Even though the gradual process of gauging the link between security perception towards migration and development aid change, has an aspect of 'lagging impact' and 'inertia in perception (that allows impact to resonate for a longer time period)a, the distance between the shift in level of securitized migration and trends in aid dissemination show 'longitudinal accuracy' (same or less than a year) in order to endorse a 'significant correlation'. None the less, in order to produce a robust research,[121] it is essential to analyze either the repetition of this trend in various 'other cases' or delve deeper into a micro level analysis of sectors related to deterring migration to follow the same trends as hypothesized. Due to limitation of space this paper will perform the latter.

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[119] Approximately 9 billion. Refer to Figure 3.
[120] From 9.405 to 19.497 billion USD. Refer to Figure 3.
[121] To prove that low or high level of securitized migration impacts the development aid trends, in order to prove that deterrence policy present inside development aid which is based on security anxiety towards migration.

4.2 Micro level analysis[122]

This section will perform a robust research through *"pattern matching"* to analyze the sectors connected with deterring migration. In order to justify the hypothesis, the numerical pattern will also be gauged with evidence of discursive and non-discursive events of securitization (mentioned in Chapter 3) impacting the trends of development aid.

### 4.2.1 Disaster Management, Rehabilitation and Emergency Response

Figure 4 Emergency Response, Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation and Disaster Prevention & Preparedness Sectors: Germany ODA
in US Dollar, Million, 2017.[123]

Defining Sector Category	Qualities Discussed in Literature
Disaster Management, Rehabilitation and Emergency Response	− Supporting resilience − Services to most vulnerable, notably refugees and displaced people − Disaster preparedness − Improving migration management

Reproduced portion from 'Table 1' I

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[122] To improve robustness by sector connected with deterring migration
[123] Figure reproduced from the data source of OECD.Stat website. Data available at:
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE5

The data for this section was located in the OECD statistical directory under the categories of emergency response, reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation, and disaster prevention and preparedness. A combination of all three has been plotted in Figure 4 from a limited time period (due to data limitation) of 2008 to 2017.[124] Whereas, the qualities of this sector are defined in the Table 1 as they are derived from the literature which explains how development aid to this sector can contribute to deterring migration. There is a consistent pattern of aid during 2008 to 2012 which clearly correlates with the low level of securitized migration, while there is an 'aggregate' slight increase during the year 2013, 2014 and 2015 which shows the security concern to increase aid is present around the time perceived as a gradual shift in the level of securitized migration. However, the aid witnesses a drastic rise of almost 225 % from the year 2015 till 2017 at a time period which vividly illustrates a shift towards a high level of securitized migration. Overall, this contributes to the affirmation that the policy of deterring migration is practiced through development aid due to correlating trends of level of securitized migration - thus justifying the overall hypothesis (H:1a, H:1b).

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[124] This is done due to the limitation of available data. Yet the data suffices the relevance to focus on the deeper analysis of sectors for pre and post shift in level of securitized migration, which is close to 2013.

4.2.2 Country Production

Figure 5 Production Sector: Germany ODA

in US Dollar, Million, 2017[125]

Defining Sector Category	Qualities Discussed in Literature
Country Production	− Creating employment opportunities − Vocational training − Small and medium enterprise support − Urban development

Reproduced portion from 'Table 1' II

The aid to increase production inside a country covers the qualities for this section, which

are to generate employment and job opportunities in certain fields to deter migration – as illustrated

in Table 1. The data for this section could be found in the OECD database for German aid for

increasing production. Initially the aid data shows a consistent flow of aid from 2008 till 2013,

which again clearly correlates with the period of low securitized migration. In later years, the

Figure 5 illustrates a prominent yet gradual aggregate increase in the aid for these sectors for the

year of 2014 (included) to 2017. This rise in aid shows a 125 % increase in the development aid

from 2013 till 2017. Even though there is a decrease in the year 2015 and 2016, it is not drastic

enough to debunk the correlation with an overall rise till 2017. The overall analysis can imply a relatively credible correlation; with consistency of aid during low securitized period and despite few dips (of meager amounts) in the aid at critical junctures, there was a rise during the period when there is a gradual shift towards high level of securitized migration. This once again correlates with the overall hypothesis (H:1a, H:1b).

4.2.3 Conflict, Peace and Security

Figure 6 Conflict, Peace and Security Sector: Germany ODA
in US Dollar, Million, 2017126

Defining Sector Category	Qualities Discussed in Literature
Conflict, Peace and Security	– Enhancing stability and governance by promoting conflict prevention – Combatting forced displacement and enforcing the rule of law

Reproduced portion from 'Table 1' III

The data for this section was prominently outlined in the OECD database. The graph in the Figure 6 shows a gradual rise since year 2013 however, the most drastic spikes could be observed

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[126] Figure reproduced from the data source of OECD.Stat website. Data available at:
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE5.

in the year 2016 and 2017. The observation in the graph is correlated to the hypothesis, initially, there is a fluctuation (increase and decrease) and consistent aggregate aid amounts before the period of 2013 (which is a period of low securitized migration). However, after the change in coalition in Germany, rise in influence of populist politics and organizations, and gradual move towards high level of securitized migration there seems to be simultaneous increase in aid to this sector as well. Lastly, the drastic increase in aid, compared to 2013, can be seen in 2016 and mainly in 2017 as the shift towards a high level of security perception has been established. There is clear correlation with the hypothesis (H:1b) that proposes low securitized migration to link with consistent aid pattern. However, there is a slight delay (lag) in the increase of aid with shift of high level of securitized migration developed by 2014-2015. Yet the drastic rise of development aid in 2016 and 2017 clearly show the establishment of security concern and spike in reaction. Overall, the section concurs to the established hypothesis.

4.2.4 Food Development Aid/ Food Security

Figure 7 Development Food Aid/Security Sector: Germany ODA
in US Dollar, Million, 2017[127]

Defining Sector Category	Qualities Discussed in Literature
Food Development Aid/ Food Security	– Agricultural development – Food aid

Reproduced portion from 'Table 1' IV

The indicators of food development aid and food security assistance both represent the qualities outlined in Table 1 which are connected with deterring migration. A rise in the aid with the shift in securitized migration is analyzed to support the hypothesis; however, the pattern of aid presents some anomalies, which do not significantly correlate to the hypothesis. The pattern in Figure 7 shows tremendous fluctuation (increase and decrease) in the years before 2013. There does seem to be a gradual and prominent rise in aid after 2013, yet the drastic rise can only be seen

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[127] Figure reproduced from the data source of OECD.Stat website. Data available at:
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE5.

in 2016, which is followed by a prominent fall in 2017 (even though the amount is still higher compared to 2014 and 2015) - which implies maybe 2016 could be an anomaly. None the less, the aggregate amount (average of aid amounts) shows some consistency to satisfy second part of the hypothesis (H:1b), while a credible aggregate rise in the time period after 2013,[128] shows a clear correlation with the first part of hypothesis (H:1a). The drastic shift can be found in the one of the years, which makes the overall correlation with hypothesis relatable yet not highly significant.

The pattern tracing analysis in this section reveals that two of the section (4.2.1 and 4.2.2), completely correlate to the hypothesis, which means both these sectors witness more aid with the high level of securitized migration and less aid with low level. Furthermore, section 4.2.3 satisfies the correlation with low aid, yet evidence shows slight delay in provision of drastically more aid with rise in level of securitized migration. Despite that the sector explain in section 4.2.3 still shows significant correlation. Similarly, the sector in section 4.2.4 depicts same level of correlation. The rise in aid due to high securitized migration is apparent, yet there are fluctuations in aid during the period of low securitized migration. This issue can be pacified when an aggregate is taken, which shows a consistent line, which shows overall less variation in the amount of rise and fall in aid, from the aggregate amount. These trends are summarized in the Table 3 below.

Table 3 Micro level analysis: Aid sector affiliation with hypothesis

Aid Sector Connected with Deterrence Policy	Analysis: Correlation with the Hypothesis (H:1a, H:1b)
Disaster Management, Rehabilitation and Emergency Response	Both Correlated
Country Production	Both Correlated

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[128] Which implies a gradual movement towards high level of securitized migration-.

Conflict, Peace and Security	(H:1a) Evident Correlation yet Slight Delay (Lag) in Increase (H:1b) Correlated
Food Development Aid/ Food Security	(H:1a) Correlated (H:1b) Fluctuation but Correlation on Aggregate (*Average of Aid Amounts Show Consistency)*

Conclusion

The research examines why countries opt to deter migration by providing development aid, when there is high possibility that the deterrence policy through aid is ineffective towards inflow of migrants from low to middle income countries. Through process tracing and pattern matching, this research explains that it is the high level of securitized migration which generates anxiety and policy of disseminating development aid to deter migration. By first defining the process of gauging the level of securitized migration under the most appropriate lens, which is the Paris school of thought,[129] this research determines the period of low and high level of securitized migration in Germany[130]. Simultaneously, the research also identifies a 'gradual shift' from low to high securitization (along the period of influx of migrants during migration crisis in EU).

Therefore, the analysis in this research, fills in the gap between the normative concept of securitized migration and its positivist application. This way the research contributes to the existing literature which meticulously raises the question regarding the need to access and utilize the concept of securitized migration for empirical usage through a positivist approach. The research also contributes to the literature by providing an answer to the puzzle regarding the usage of development aid when there is an influx of migrants from low to middle income countries.

The research verifies the hypothesis of correlation between level of securitize migration and policy to deter migration through development aid by firstly, performing a macro level analysis. This is done to gauge the overall ODA of Germany during the time period defined as a low and high level of securitized migration and it shows that there is consistency during the low securitized period and an increase in aid during the time period of high security perception towards

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[129] Justified in the chapter 1.
[130] Depicted as pre and post 2013 in the chapter 3.

migrants. In order to increase the confirmation of the hypothesized relation, the research delves into a micro level analysis to demonstrate that the pattern of securitized migration also significantly correlates with sectors connected with deterring migration through development aid. The aid given to disaster management, rehabilitation and emergency response, and country production show vivid correlation with high securitization to verify both aspects of hypothesized relation (H:1a, H:1b). Whereas, the conflict, peace and security, and food development/security sector show correlation in one of each component of the hypothesis, yet there is a slight lag and fluctuation in the correlation, respectively, towards a second aspect of hypothesis in both sectors. However, the research in Section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 demonstrates, that these variations due to lag can be traced through the gradual understanding of securitized migration. While the fluctuations can be deciphered by comparing results of aggregate patterns of aid. Overall, the research shows credible correlation in both macro and micro level analysis to satisfy the hypothesized relation between level of securitized migration and deterrence of migration through development aid.

The current research takes an audacious step to steer the normative understanding of securitized migration and implement it in an empirical direction. The satisfying correlation of hypothesized result show the potential to investigate the research in a more generalized manner. Therefore, the current research builds the platform to understand the hypothesized relation in other countries, particularly in the EU. A robust research to confirm *generalizability* of the theory can ideally be done through 'Qualitative Comparative Analysis' (QCA). Further research through the process tracing of cases similar to Germany can firstly, be done to determine the level of securitized migration, narrative premise and shift periods, if they exist. Secondly, the correlation of level of securitized migration with dissemination of development aid to deter migration can be investigated to determine a *vast range* of indicators through pattern matching at macro and micro

level analysis of data. This will enable sufficient amount of data on the results from overall dissemination of aid and dissemination of aid to different sectors and their correlation to level of securitized migration, in order to perform a QCA study and enhance the generalizability in the current concept of research.

Appendix 1

Fraction of ODA to 'root causes' programming in major migrant origin countries, 2015[131]

Vertical axis shows fraction of aid in 2015 targeted to migration-relevant sectors including vocational training, small and medium enterprise support, agricultural development, environmental preservation, urban development, food aid, and disaster preparedness. Unit of analysis is recipient country. The first column shows the average fraction for all aid recipients, with a 95% confidence interval on the estimated mean fraction. The second column shows the same fraction for the ten countries that were the origins of the largest absolute numbers of asylum-seeker flows to DAC donor countries in 2015. The third column shows the ten aid recipient countries that were the origins of the largest asylum seeker flows to DAC donor countries relative to the origin-country population in 2015. The fourth column shows the ten countries with the largest emigrant stocks residing in DAC donor countries in absolute numbers—where emigrant is defined as any person born in that country who lives in a DAC donor country. The fifth column shows the ten countries with the largest emigrant stocks in DAC donor countries as a fraction of the origin-country population.

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[131] Figure directly adapted from the work of Clemens and Postel "Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid", 23.

Appendix 2

The table has been reproduced from the work of Sussmuth[132]

Type of Reform, Date	Summary of Reform
Citizenship Law, January 2000	− The ius soli principle, granting birthright citizenship, is introduced. Children born in Germany to foreign parents for the first time acquire the right to citizenship (with some exceptions). − Foreigners can be naturalized after eight years of lawful residence (instead of the earlier 15 years). − A language requirement is introduced for naturalization. − A limited option of dual citizenship is introduced for third-country national minors. Such minors can be granted dual citizenship temporarily (until age 23)
Green Card, February 2000	− 20,000 temporary visas are created for IT specialists. − This regulation is a further exception to the 1973 "halt on foreign labor recruitment."
Immigration Law, January 2005	− A package of reforms is adopted that impacts the Residence Law, Right of Asylum, Employment Ordinance, and Integration Course Ordinance. − Federally regulated and funded integration courses for adult immigrants are created. These are mandatory only for newcomers with poor German language skills and voluntary for other newcomers. − The number of visa categories is consolidated into two types (temporary and permanent). − Residence and work permits are issued simultaneously and by a single government office.

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[132] Sussmuth "The Future of Migration and Integration Policy in Germany", 2-3.

	– Regulations for self-employed immigrants are implemented, providing visas for those who invest at least €1,000,000 and create ten or more jobs.
	– International students are given the opportunity to extend their student visas for up to one year upon completion of their studies in order to find employment.
	– Regulations for high-skilled immigrants are enacted. Those who have a job offer with annual earnings of at least €86,400 qualify for a visa.
	– Persecution by nonstate actors and for gender-specific reasons becomes grounds for asylum in Germany.
Law on the Transposition of European Union (EU) Directives, August 2007	– Adult German citizens with limited German language skills may participate in federally funded integration courses.
	– Integration contracts are introduced for immigrants who receive social security. These make their participation in integration courses mandatory.
	– Citizenship acquisition becomes dependent on showing adequate knowledge of the German language and culture (legislative groundwork is laid for a uniform test that is introduced in January 2009).
	– Pre-departure language tests for third-country national spouses are introduced.
	– So-called "tolerated persons"3 who have lived in Germany for at least six years receive temporary residence status and work authorization.
	– Regulations for self-employed immigrants are eased. An investment of €500,000 is required and five jobs must be created to qualify for a visa.
	– The income requirement for highly skilled immigrants is reduced to €64,800.

	– Citizens of EU Member States no longer require a visa to legally reside in Germany. – A temporary residence permit for victims of human trafficking is introduced.
Labor Law, October 2007	– Restrictions for work in certain jobs in Germany are eased for citizens of the A8, the Eastern European nations that joined the European Union in 2004. Such persons have travel rights across the European Union but face restricted labor markets in certain countries.
Citizenship Regulation July 2008	– Federally regulated and uniform citizenship tests are implemented based on 2007 legislative reforms. Test questions and preparatory materials are published; the first tests are administered in September 2008.
Meseberg Cabinet Decision July 2008	– Since January 2009, academics (persons with a tertiary degree) from the new EU Member States4 have equal opportunities for jobs in Germany. The "domestic worker preference" regulation (Vorrangprüfung) is no longer permissible for such academic workers. – Since January 2009, third-country national academics may be employed in Germany if no qualified German or EU citizen applies for the job (Vorrangprüfung).

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