CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2019
| Author | Asasi Josheghani, Kamyar |
|---|---|
| Title | In Defense of Statistical Evidence: From Epistemology to Courtrooms |
| Summary | Statistical methods can produce extremely reliable results even in situations where other techniques fail, however, many of us feel uncomfortable at the idea basing knowledge or conviction (in a court of law) on statistical evidence. In my thesis, I argue that, in principle, statistical evidence can be a basis for knowledge and conviction, and there is no rationale for discriminating against statistical evidence; the intuitive difference between non-statistical and statistical evidence is merely psychological and can be understood in the light of consideration like the historical development of our intuitions. * * * First, I suggest some scenarios in which the belief is based on statistical evidence yet, according to the criteria from many accounts of knowledge in the market for knowledge. To extend knowledge assignment to even more cases of statistical evidence, I apply a famous distinction from Wilfrid Sellars between ‘manifest image’ and ‘scientific image’ of the world and ourselves to the case of knowledge; I enumerate some of the problems with the intuitive notion of knowledge, discuss some historical considerations to better understand such intuitive reactions and, briefly, explore the possibility of a move towards a more scientific notion of knowledge which not only allows knowledge assignment to many cases with statistical evidence but also can help with addressing some long-lasting issues in epistemology. Then, I turn to a parallel issue with statistical evidence in the context of legal cases. Discussing three proposals to distinguish the non-statistical and statistical evidence, I argue that none of them manages to provide an independent rationale for such discrimination. Finally, I address some worries about the reliability of the current statistical methods that are used to produce statistical evidence as well as some concerns regarding the applicability of statistical methods to particular cases and propose some criteria that can help to decide whether a piece of statistical evidence is relevant and can be used as a basis for judgment in each scenario. |
| Supervisor | Crane, Timothy Martin |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2019/asasi_kamyar.pdf |
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