Strengthening African Institutions for the Continent's Rapid Economic Growth and Social Development.

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Submitted to

Central European University

Department of international Relations

In Partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of international Relations

Supervisor: Xiang Li

Word Count: 15940

Budapest, Hungary 2019

Abstract

The African continent faces many challenges that restrain its development. Most of these challenges have their roots in the weakness of the continent's institutions. Africa is without any scholarly or scientific objections the world's richest continent in terms of natural resources. However, the continent is also known as the world poorest in terms of its economy and social development. The reasons for this paradox will be scrutinized in this thesis. The arguments of this thesis are based on the role of Africa's regional and domestic institutions as causes of the current poor economy and social development of the continent. This paper seeks to evaluate the continent's institutions from the past administrations to current ones. The paper will take aim on four majors institutions: political, security, economic, and social development institutions. First, this paper argues that the African continent's colonial history still handicaps the economic growth and social development of the continent. Second, the natural resource and oil curse are often applied to most of the African countries because African countries, relative to many other countries rich in natural resources, are still less developed despite their immense and diverse resources. In this part of the paper we will also claim that African countries are victims of a double curse: the natural resources curse and the colonialization curse.[1] The third and most important part of the paper will discuss African institutions and will argue that strengthening the continent's institutions at regional and domestic levels will assure economic growth and social development. This thesis research argues that the cause of African countries' development misfortune lies in the continent's weak institutions. Thus, strengthening institutions in the continent will be the most important way to drive Africa from its current situation to a flourishing social and economic development.

[1] This paper suggests that the African countries are been hitting by double curse: the well discuss natural resource curse and the colonialization curse. We believe that the curse of colonialization help increases the natural resource curse in Africa.

Acknowledgments

To begin, I would like to thank the almighty Lord for helping me get through the most difficult year of my educational career.

Second, I present my sincere gratitude and thanks to my supervisor Mr. Xiang Li for his help and guidance during the process of this paper. I thank all my professors for the priceless knowledge transmitted and their assistance during this academic year. I extend my thanks you my mother, my brothers and sisters and all friends who support and encourage during the process of this thesis.

I dedicate this thesis to my father who on his sick bed gave me his blessing and encourage to continue my education at CEU before he passed away. I also dedicate this thesis to my nephew Ayefoumi Atchrimi who at just five years had an amazing, brave but in the end a losing fight against cancer. May their souls Rest In Peace

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List of abbreviations and Acronyms

ADF:………………..The African Development Fund

AEC:……………….African Economic Community

AfCFTA:………….. African Continental Free Trade Area

AfDB:…………….. African Development Bank

AMU:……………… Arab Maghreb Union

AQIM:……………...Al-Queda in the Islamic Maghreb

AU-PSC:……………AU Peace and Security Council

AU:………………… African Union

AUDA:…………….. Union Development Agency

CCC:………………. COMESA Competitions Commission

CCJ:……………….. COMESA Court of Justice

CEMAC:………….. Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale

CEN-SAD:………… Community of Sahara-Sahel States

CFA:………………. Franc des Colonies Francaises d'Afrique

COMESA:…………The Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

DRC:……………….The Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC:………………..East African Community

EBID:……………… ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development

ECCAS:…………….The Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS:…………The Economic Community of West African States

GIABA:……………. The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa

IGAD:………………The Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IMF:…………………International Monetary Fund

NEPAD:……………..The New Partnership for Africa's Development

NTF:…………………Nigeria Trust Fund

OAU:…………………Organization of African Unity

RIA:………………… The Regional Investment Agency

SADC:……………….The Southern African Development Community)

UEMOA:………………Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine

UNAIDS:…………….United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS

WAHO:………………West African Health Organization

Introduction

Context & Background

"The African continent is arguably the richest continent in term of its natural resources" (Kshetri, 2011), as well as its human capital."[2] The continent is blessed with all known precious stones and other very important natural resources. Yet, the continent is home to some of the world's poorest people who live in some of the worst conditions. Africa is endowed with much of the world's most precious natural resources, but its populations lack the basic needs of everyday life. The paradox of this situation will be scrutinized throughout this paper. Many are often surprised to hear that Africa is the richest continent in the world. In fact, the continent is mostly represented in the Western hemisphere as the poorest continent in the world. Therefore, few people, even among intellectuals in Western countries, know much about the continent's natural wealth. However, as the richest continent, Africa is where many if not all Western countries import most of their raw materials from. The question one may ask is, why despite all these immense resources, Africa is still the poorest continent where meeting some of the most basic human needs is an everyday challenge for many African populations? It is very important to research the cause of this paradox in order to understand the deep roots of the economic underperformance and the horrible social development in most African countries.

Several scholars have conducted research to explain the economic situation of the continent. Some believe that African countries are economically under-performing because of the absence of a developed manufacturing sector lack of infrastructure and institution for example Acemoglu, D.,

[2] See Nir Kshetri. 2011. Institutional and Economic Foundations of Entrepreneurship in Africa: an Overview doi: 10.1142/s1084946711001756

Johnson, S., Robinson, J. (2001). Others argue that the continent is a victim of three major curses, an idea developed by political economists to explain some countries' poor economic situations despite the abundant natural resources: the "natural resources curse", the "oil curse," and the "foreign aid curse". Some also believe that African countries still suffer from their past colonial history, where the former colonial power still maintains some type of power over the decision and policy making in their former colonies. Furthermore, other scholars claim that the economic condition of the continent is due to lack of African leaders' political commitment and lack of strong institutions. Mazrui A.A. and Wiafe-Amoako. F (2016), describes institutions as "the humanly derived constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions. Institutions consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, and property right)."[3] As such, institutions are societal constraints that help monitor and to ensure the reduction of bad behaviors in the society for better cohesion. Thus, the existence of effective institutions is crucial not only for growth and development but also for the wellbeing of an entire population.

The purpose of this paper is to bring light to questions concerning the continent's slow or stagnating economic development since the independence of most African countries in the 1960s through the analysis of the continent's institutions. Most of the previous research on the continent's development either touches upon one or some aspects of the main issues, or else totally focus on superficial factors instead of the root causes of the African economic and development disease. In the following, this research will try to elucidate the truth about Africa's poor economic growth and social development. While the economic growth, political reform and development, and social development of the Western world and some Asian countries has increased since the end of the second world war, African

[3] Mazrui A.A. and Wiafe-Amoako. F (2016). African Institutions: Challenges to Political, Social, and Economic Foundations of Africa's Development. P. 4

countries' economic growth and social development is still in the developing stage compared to Western countries and even some Asian countries which at some point in the past were at the same economic and development level. Even though the World Bank in Africa projects Sub-Saharan Africa's growth to reach 3.6 percent in 2019-2020, the growth still doesn't reflect the huge natural resources and human capital the continent possesses. However, the Africa Agenda 2063 expects to transform the continent into a global powerhouse of the future through inclusive and sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress, and collective prosperity pursued under the concepts of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.[4] But can the Agenda 2063 vision happen without reforming and strengthening the continent's current institutions?

Research Questions

In the first part of the research we will use empirical data to explain the arguments by supporting them with significant research work done in regard to the economic performance of Africa. This work relates to the curse of natural resources and the importance of institutions in the economic growth of African countries, and how African countries' institutions still fail to play an effective role in the development of the continent. The official report of the World Bank and other world institutions will be used for these case studies. For instance, the research will use the "African Development Report Regional Integration for Inclusive Growth" to give a clear details on the economic, development and institutional perspective of the selected African countries.

[4] Agenda 2063 The Africa we want. https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview

This research will focus on continental, regional, and domestic institutions of the continent and how investigate how strengthening these institutions could help in the development and prosperity of the economic, social, and security conditions, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The detailed study of these institutions will help explain how these institutions were established, what were their main objectives, and whether these objectives can be achieved base on the past and current functioning of the institutions. A special look at the institutions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the unique case of Botswana in the continent will help us in understanding the important role of strong institutions in the development of a country.

This paper will use historical and contemporary data to support its arguments. The research will also use ideas from secondary sources from different scholars and recent data reports from well known international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as reports from many African institutions. The main research method of the paper will use Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) concept of historical institutionalism, which links contemporary institutions to the former colonial institutions, and the dependency theory of Raul Prebisch (1950s). Dependency theorists assert that so-called 'third-world' countries were not always 'poor,' but became impoverished through colonial domination and forced incorporation into the world economy by expansionist 'first-world' powers. Thus, 'third-world' economies became geared more towards the needs of their 'first-world' colonial masters than the domestic needs of their own societies. This international relations (henceforth, IR) theory can help us provide some explanations of the economic under-performance of the African countries despite the abundance of natural resources. The theory will also help us to explain the dependency of institutions in Africa on Western countries, primarily the former colonial powers.

The end goal of this thesis is to show the importance of strong institutions for economic growth and social development. We will explore this through the following questions.

Why are African countries still poor despite being richly endowed with natural resources?

How can African countries escape the influence of Western countries to beat the "paradox of plenty," more apparent in the continent of Africa than any other part of the world? This thesis argues that strengthening institutions (political, economic, and social) in the continent will serve as a rampart against further exploitation of the African continent by exterior influences and encourage strong development.

Chapter One: Literature Review

This research will incorporate multiple scholarly research frameworks on the continent's colonial history. It is argued by several IR political economics scholars that former colonial powers' institutions still dominate the political and economic spheres of their former colonies. In fact, some believe that the fundamental cause of the large differences in income per capita across the African countries is the existence of colonial institutions established by different colonial powers with different objectives.[5] According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), the colonial history of countries in Africa persists in their contemporary institutions. The colonial institutions did not introduce much protection for private property, nor did they provide checks and balances against government expropriation. In fact, the main purpose of the extractive state was to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer.[6] Unlike Acemoglu and his colleagues, the arguments of this paper will not focus much

[5] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. (2001) 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation', The American Economic Review, 91 (5): 1369- 1401.

[6] Ibid.: 2

on past colonial history but rather on the historical institutionalism of the continent's institutions. That is to say, the unwillingness of the continent's elites to change the ineffective existing institutions for the common good of the populations and the for the development of the continent. Although this paper will not linger long on the colonial impact on the continent, it is worth mentioning the Western world strategy towards Africa from the beginning of the colonization up to the current geopolitical perspective of the rest of the world toward Africa.

Despite the continent's crucial place and the contribution of its resources to the world economy and development, Africa is still considered, according to Jean-Francois Bayart's (2000) statement, as a primitive place for many in the West. "The vast literature produced by journalists and academics which refers *ad nauseam* to the marginalization of the sub-continent, or to its 'disconnection', even if it is only 'by default', does no more than reproduce Hegel's idea that this part of the globe is an 'enclave', existing in 'isolation' on account of its deserts, its forests and its alleged primitiveness."[7] It is very important to notice that this sentence of Jean-Francois Bayart was written in 2000, during the peak of the expansion of globalization in which Africa was and still is playing a major role due to its resources. Yet the continent was still considered to be a primitive continent even after at least 40 years of independence of many of its countries at the time Jean-Francois Bavart gave his argument. This Western mindset about the continent could be the reason why colonial powers still have an influence on institutions in African countries and continue their exploitation of the continent.

[7] Jean-Francois Bayart, 'Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion', *African Affairs* 99 (2000): 217-267.

The research will also look at the work of several political economics researchers on the natural resource and oil curse and how these so-called curses affect the development of African countries. The aim here is to explain the natural resource and oil curse in a different way than it was previously, and to judge based on comparison with other parts of the world whether the abundance of natural resources and oil should be a curse or a blessing. Thus, this paper will use ideas from Andersen and Aslaksen's (2008) work on *Constitutions and the Resource Curse*, from Bruecker's (2010) *Natural Resources and Economic Growth*, from Isham et al.'s (2005) *The Varieties of Resource Experience*, from Robinson, Torvik and Verdier's (2006) *Political Foundations of the Resource Curse*, among other authors relevant to the resource curse issue. This research will conclude that Africa's colonial history is still a big handicap for its economic growth and development. We also believe that the natural resource curse still applies most strongly to African countries because they are still the least developed despite their immense and diverse resources. Furthermore, the solution to the continent's so called resources curse can only come from the strengthening of its institutions, both at the regional and the country levels, which will assure the continent's economic growth and social development.

Colonialism

The colonial past of Africa is one of the darkest parts of the continent's history or even the history of the world's exploration and colonization by the Europeans. All the current 55 African countries with the sole exceptions of Ethiopia and Liberia were under some form of colonization, under which the local populations were enslaved, tortured, killed. and the countries' wealth looted and sent to the European countries. The most influential colonial Europeans in Africa were the British, and the

French. However, some other European powers obtained very good slices of the “African Cake”[8] during the Berlin conference, also known as the Congo Conference, of 1884-1885. Colonial powers such as Portugal, Spain, and Germany received their share, and Belgium under the leadership of king Léopold II inherited one of the biggest and richest parts of the continent in the famous Congo Basin, which was and area disputed by the colonial powers and was the main reason for the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.

The Belgian Congo was a vast territory about 60 times the size of Belgium.[9] It covered the current Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. According to Anghie (2004) cited by Matthew Craven in his review article *Between law and History: the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the logic of free trade,* published in 2015, Berlin “transformed Africa into a conceptual ‘*terra nullius’,* silencing native residence through the subordination of their claims to sovereignty, and providing, in the process, an effective ideology of colonial rule.” He adds that it was [the] conference “which determined in important ways the future of the continent and which continues to have a profound influence on the politics [and other institutions] of contemporary Africa”[10]. Denoon (1983), cited by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000), states that “settler colonies had representative institutions which promoted what the settlers wanted and that what they wanted was freedom and the ability to get rich by engaging in trade. He [adds] that ‘there was undeniably something capitalist in the structure

[8] Pakenham (1991) cited in the review article of Matthew Craven. Between law and history: the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the logic of free trade London Review of International Law, Volume 3, Issue 1, 2015, 34

[9] Stephen Bates the hidden holocaust Was Belgium's King Leopold II a mass murderer on a par with Hitler or a greedy despot who turned a blind eye to a few excesses? A new book has ignited a furious row in a country coming to grips with its colonial legacy. *The Guardian* https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/may/13/features11.g22

[10] Matthew Craven (2015) Between law and history: the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the logic of free trade London Review of International Law, Volume 3, Issue 1, 2015, 33

of these colonies'…"[11] The case of the Congo that we will discuss later in this paper is the perfect illustration of the colonial powers' exploitation of the continent and the long-time impact on the country's institutions to the present day. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) cited Bogumil Jewsiewicki (1983) in this context: "…during the period when Leopold was directly in charge, policy was 'based on the violent exploitation of natural and human resources,' with a consequent 'destruction of economic and social life ... [and] ... dismemberment of political structures.' "[12]. The argument that African institutions are still influenced by the colonial institutions is highly debated among scholars. However, much evidence on the ground in the continent confirms the hypothesis of those who argue that colonial institutions still exist in Africa and are handicapping the continent's development.

Young (1994), cited by Acemoglu et al. (2001), argues that "…although we commonly described the independent polities as 'new states,' in reality they were successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and practices, and its more hidden normative theories of governance."[13] In his arguments, Young claims that the assumption that African countries became free after their independence to freely manage and enjoy their immense resources is an illusion. Young (1994, p. 101), again cited by Acemoglu et al. (2001) quoted a French official in Africa in these terms "the European commandant is not posted to observe nature,... He has a mission... to impose regulations, to limit individual liberties...., to collect taxes." Acemoglu wrote that the Europeans had no incentive to "invest in institutions or in infrastructure in Africa" but the main strategy was to exploit the continent.

[11] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. (2001) 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation', The American Economic Review, 91 (5) 1375
[12] Ibid P. 1374.
[13] Young, Crawford. The African colonial state in comparative perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994. P. 283. cited by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000)

According to Acemoglu et al. (2000) the extractive institutions set up by the colonialists persisted long after the colonial regimes ended. We argue at this point that the extractive institutions set up by the colonialist still exist. An example of colonial extractive institutions currently existing in Africa is the case of the *Franc des Colonies Francaises d'Afrique* (CFA Franc) currency currently being used by 14 former French colonies and protectorates in Africa. According to Brandon Locke's (2019) report, the French CFA franc was established in 1948 to economically and politically control the subjugated countries. The CFA franc zone is divided into two monetary unions. The first is the *Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine* (UEMOA), or *West African Economic and Monetary Union* (WAEMU), which was signed in January 1994. This organization transformed the former WAMU into WAEMU implying that the West African monetary union had become an Economic and Monetary Union;[14] The second union is the Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), or Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC), to achieve both their monetary and economic objectives, which treaty was signed on March 16, 1994. The use of the two currencies is totally controlled by the French government and the French treasury. Pierre Canac and Ragelio Garcia-Contreras (2011) explain the status of the two CFA currencies in four steps:

"First, the convertibility of the two CFA francs is guaranteed without any limits by the French treasury. Second, the two CFA francs are convertible at a fixed exchange into French francs. Third, despite plenty of restrictions, there are no de jure controls on the movements of capital within the zone. And fourth, the French Treasury guarantees the convertibility of the two CFA francs through a formal agreement with the zone members that require them to pool together a minimum of 65 percent

[14] Pierre Canac and Ragelio Garcia-Contreras (2011). Colonial Hangover: The Case of the CFA. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 46(1) 54–68
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0021909610388476

of their international reserves, corresponding to 20 percent of the monetary base of each central bank, into an Operations Account at the French treasury. Under these Cooperation Conventions, the pegs are defined as adjustable. However, such adjustments can only occur for economic reasons after consultation with the French government and with a unanimous vote of all members. This explains why the two CFA francs were devalued only once in 1994."

Pierre Canac and Ragelio Garcia-Contreras (2011).



Economist.com

This CFA example is one example of many showing the persisting dependence of African countries on the colonial powers. It is important to highlight with this example that the French government and the French treasury control not only the economic institutions of 14 countries but also the political institutions, because the French treasury dictates the financial and monetary mobility of these countries, which the political leaders depend upon to govern their countries. These 14 countries are (WAEMU) Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte D'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo; and

(CAEMC) the Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon, and the Republic of the Congo. Canac and Garcia-Contreras claim that these countries remain extremely poor because their ties to their France, the former colonial power. The authors argue that the reasons that the CFA countries are extremely poor is that, "[b]ecause most of the African countries that belong to the CFA franc zone are producers and exporters of raw materials, including oil, minerals, wood, and agricultural commodities, they are highly sensitive to world price fluctuations and the trade policies of their trading partners, mainly the EU and the US."[15] It must be understood here that Canac and Garcia-Contreras acknowledge that the CFA countries are extremely poor despite their richness in the natural resources that they list. This analysis from Canac and Garcia-Contreras brings us to the second part of this literature review and specifically to the matter of the natural resource curse.

Natural Resource Curse

The natural resource curse, also referred to as the "paradox of plenty," is the term used by political economists to describe the situation that countries with an abundance of natural resources generally tend to be less economically developed and have less democratic institutions than countries with fewer natural resources. We observe through many scholarly researches that the resource curse is attached more to the African continent than any other part of the world. The question is why are the African countries particularly susceptible to the resource curse? There is much discussion in the literature about the natural resource curse. To the question whether there is a resource curse, Michael L. Ross (1999) responds that "there is now strong evidence that states with abundant resource wealth perform

[15] Ibid. P 58.

less well than their resource-poor counterparts but there is little agreement on why this occurs."[16] Ross argues that some of reasons that the resource curse occurs are that governments fail to diversify their export bases and fail to maintain fiscal discipline in the face of export instability which political economics calls "Dutch Disease"[17] Some authors link the resource curse to economic growth and socio-development, some to political institutions, and others to conflict. All these causes of the curse can be found together in many African countries, whereas elsewhere only one or two categories will be found. Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006) argue that many resource abundant countries are not democratic. The authors claim that the abundance of resources encourages politicians to engage in rent-seeking activities, which simply means that the politicians exponentially increase government spending on non-productive expenses with complete disregard to the rest of the population. Robinson et al. state that politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the socially efficient extraction path because they only care about the future stock of resources if they remain in power.[18] According to many resource curse scholars, most politicians in countries rich in natural resources don't really care about the economic growth of their countries but rather about their own personal political careers and how to become rich quickly. This idea is in Wallich and Levin, cited by Ross (1999). They are argued that the development path of sugar-exporting states was distorted by a "sugar mentality" that led to lax economic planning and insufficient diversification[19]. For Nurske and Watkins, also cited by Ross (1999), resource rents lead to irrational exuberance, producing a "get-rich-quick mentality"

[16] Michael L. Ross . The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.
World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jan., 1999), pp. 297 Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054077
[17] The poor economic linkages between natural resources and nonrecourse
[18] J.A. Robinson, Torvik and Verdier Political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics 79 (2006) 447 – 468. www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase
[19] "Sugar mentality" is defined by Wallich and Levin (1960) as the lack of economic planning and insufficient diversification. This explains, according to Michael Ross, the cause of the resource curse. p.309

among businessmen and a "boom-and-bust" psychology among policymakers, marked by bouts of excessive optimism and frantic retrenchments.[20]

For these reasons decision makers make irrational and dangerous financial calculations which impact their country's economic growth despite the abundance of resources. Politicians sometimes even resort to criminal activities by collaborating with or turning a blind eye to companies and firms involved in exorbitant and unlawful extraction of natural resources. Because of the states' inability or unwillingness to control individuals' and companies' property rights, as Ross argues, manufacturing firms earning resource rents turn to private militias, criminal gangs, or nascent rebel armies to protect their properties and maintain their profits[21]. In other words, politicians in countries rich in natural resources are willing to be corrupt in order to achieve their political agenda. When talking about corruption, Markus Bruckner (2010) agrees with the political economics literature that traces the natural resources curse to socially sub-optimal rent-seeking activity. Bruckner argues that "the resource curse is a function of corruption and the constraints placed on political leaders and sluggish checks and balances on political decision-making"[22] Indeed, the resources curse is very likely to occur in countries with highly corrupt leaders. Some leaders become *de facto* autocratic leaders because of their access to the natural resource wealth, and to maintain themselves in power they encourage the political appointments of their supporters. According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.28), "[a]utocrats can be forgiven bad policy but are not likely to survive the elimination of patronage or

[20] "Get-rich-quick mentality" and "Boom-and-bust" mentality. The first as irrational exuberance among businessmen and as excessive optimism and frantic retrenchments among policymakers
[21] Michael L. Ross . The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.
World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jan., 1999). Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054077 P. 320
[22] Buckner, M. 2010. Natural resource dependence, non-tradables, and economic growth. P. 470
Brueckner (2010). Natural Resource Dependence, Non-tradables and Economic Growth.pdf

the corrupt benefits of cronyism." Furthermore, the authors affirm that thanks to autocratic leaders' control of their country's resources, it is often impossible for challengers to convince electors to vote against the incumbent autocratic leaders because the challengers' promises lack long-term credibility.[23] Briefly, according to J.A Robinson et al. (2006) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), natural resource wealth encourages autocratic and dictatorial governments rather than democratic ones. For these scholars, natural resources promote autocratic leaders who use their countries for their own benefit with complete disregard to their populations and without any accountability. This means less democracy in natural resource-rich countries. Kevin K. Tsui (2005) states that oil abundance has a long term effect on democracy. According to him, more oil means less democracy.[24] Tsui takes this to explain the existence of the resources curse in resource-rich countries. Other authors like Jørgen Juel Andersen and Silje Aslaksen (2007), although they believe in the fact of the natural resource curse, claim that there are differences in how the resource curse is distributed among countries, even when they have comparable levels of natural resources. Anderson and Aslaksen believe that the resource curse depends largely on countries' constitutional arrangements. They argue that the resource curse is present in democratic presidential countries but not in democratic parliamentary countries.[25]

According to Anderson and Aslaksen, a country's institutional design can either positively or negatively affect its economic growth. For these authors, institutions determine whether natural resources are a curse or source of growth. They argue that there is a "significant interactions effect of

[23] Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolf M., Morrow, James D., 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. P. 95
[24] Kevin K. Tsui 2005. More oil, less democracy: evidence from worldwide crude oil discoveries p. 89
[25] Jørgen Juel Andersen and Silje Aslaksen. Constitutions and the resource curse. Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Journal of Development Economics 87 (2008) 227, 239

institution quality and the natural resource abundance on long-term economic performance."[26] Anderson and Aslaksen are not the only scholars who refer to the quality of institutions as a possible remedy to the resource curse. Magali Dauvin and David Guerreiro (2016) agree that high quality "institutions are definitely a mitigating factor of the resource curse." Dauvin and Guerreiro are joined by Bruckner (2010) in support of the idea of the important role of high quality institutions in overcoming the resource curse. As Bruckner affirms, "[o]ne strategy that resource-rich countries may hence consider to escape the resource curse is institutional reform that strengthens political checks and balances."[27]

At this point, the literature confirms the existence of the natural resource curse which impacts natural resource-rich countries. Based on the review of the articles and books we mentioned earlier, the resources curse affects only developing countries, many of them in the African continent, a couple of countries in Latin America, and some in Asia. One important remark is that, when it comes to Asian countries listed by authors in the literature, they define the resource curse in terms of autocracy and democracy instead of economic growth and social development. That is the case of Tsui (2005), who claims that oil-rich countries are less democratic than countries who have little or no oil. Let's take note of the fact that among all the oil rich countries with the exception of the United States, Canada, and Russia, among the 14 countries that represent OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), 6 of them are African countries.[28] None of these African countries is as economically developed as the other 8 countries, and they have some of the lowest GDP per capita among the OPEC

[26] Ibid. p. 228
[27] Bruckner, M. 2010 p. 470
[28] (OPEC) Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries has 14 countries from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Here are the Countries Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Gabon, ,Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
The seven African countries are Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria. Two Latin America countries: Ecuador and Venezuela. And five Asian countries Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate

members. The OPEC African countries are even lower on the scale of development and economic growth than the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.[29] This argument is based analysis of the recent OPEC report.[30] This is evidence of colonization's impact on African countries more than any other part of the world , which resulted in weakened institutions and begot the continent's high number of countries afflicted by the natural resources curse. This bring us to the argument of a double curse on the African nations. The first being the colonization curse and the second the natural resource curse. As I will argue in what follows, the best way to undo these curses is to reform and strengthen African institutions. The following chapter will be dedicated to an examination of institutions in Africa. The chapter will scrutinize the existing African institutions from their genesis to their current role and assess their effectiveness towards the goal of the development of the continent.

Chapter two: African institutions

Africa has many established continental and regional institutions, some of them dating back to 1963. However, these institutions are not well known by the general public nor even by some international scholars. As one can notice from the first chapter, Africa is represented by almost all scholars as a single entity in the discussion of colonization, the natural recourse curse, and institutions. The generalization of Africa in the field of research limits scholars in fully understanding the continent's

[29] The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar (left OPEC in September 2018) and the United Arab Emirate. Those who are members of the OPEC with the exception (of Iraq which destabilized by the invasion of the United States military and its NATO allies in 2003 under a false pretension of nuclear weapons), these countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate and Kuwait are very economically developed
[30] Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/index.htm

place on the global stage. The discourse concerning Africa's role and position in the international system is highly split between those who take a western-centrist view of Africa as one entity of study and those who suggest that African countries should be scrutinized in individual detail as well as other continents in the world. To some extent this thesis also falls victim to the marginalization of Africa in the scholarly works as a single entity. However, this paper will show different aspects of the continent and its countries through their institutions. The discourse concerning the marginalization of Africa is mostly seen within the discipline of International Relations (IR), which according to critics of IR scholars like Abrahamsen (2016), is "unable to capture the historical specificity of the postcolonial African state, to perceive of difference as anything but deviance from a norm, and therefore also unable to capture the continent's globality."[31] Hence, Africa's voice, its institutions and inhabitants are often ignored in the world when it comes to international decision making. However, the continent has many "functional institutions"[32] which must be discussed in this paper in order to propose policies that can help strengthen them to improve the continent's development and the living standard of its inhabitants. The purpose of this chapter is not to list the African institutions but to present information about them and the goals they were created in order to fulfill, and at the end to evaluate their performance in order to better understand how they can be improved.

Continental institutions

The African Union

[31] See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318225535. Article in African Affairs · January 2017

[32] "Functional institutions" is put in quotes because the existing African institutions are not very functional compared to other continents' institutions.

The African union (AU) is a continental institution which was officially launched in 2002 to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 with 32 African countries, all of them except Ethiopia having freshly gained their independence from colonial powers.[33] The African Union currently consists of 55 members representing the 55 African states. The African Union has many objectives, among them some important ones such as: "to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa, to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States, to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent, to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples, to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent, and to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance."[34] The main vision of the institution is to have an "Integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena."[35] We can argue with the objectives of the AU we listed and note that the organization has an interesting and ambitious agenda toward the unity and the development of the continent. The question now it to what extent, in the transition from the OAU to the AU, the organization was able to pursue or achieve the objectives it has set for itself. It is without doubt that before the AU, the OAU was able to help all African countries to become independent. Also, in the area of globalization, economic development and geopolitical dynamics, the AU has proven itself to be a strong and preeminent African platform in international forums and to be able to negotiate on behalf of its members states. The AU as an African institution also plays a very important domestic role and has helped to enact multiple other continental African institutions in different sectors such as trade, economics, development, banking, and security.

[33] See African Union at: wehttps://au.int/en/overview
[34] See the objectives of the AU. African Union. Web: https://au.int/en/overview.
[35] Ibid

The African Continental Free Trade Area

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a newly enacted continental institution in Africa. President Paul Kagame, the host president, states that "The Continental Free Trade Area is the culmination of a vision set forth nearly 40 years ago in the Lagos Plan of Action, adopted by Heads of State in 1980. That undertaking led directly to the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community in 1991."[36] The African CFTA entered into action last year in March 2018. Upon the creation of AfCFTA, it already became the world's largest free trade zone in terms of the number of its member states, including as members all African states except Nigeria which hasn't yet signed the Agreement. According to Moussa Faki Mahamat, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, "AfCFTA will make Africa one of the largest economies in the world and enhance its capacity to interact on equal terms with other international economic blocs."[37] For the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, "(The African) CFTA means an end to poverty. CFTA means prosperity for our continent. CFTA means jobs for our young people who today struggle and are fleeing our own continent. CFTA means peace and security because we have gainfully engaged our population. CFTA means Africa being able to be self-reliant. CFTA means the African Union meeting to discuss what to do with our prosperity and not what to do with the problems we suffer."[38] According to the African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), "[t]he African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will cover a market of 1.2 billion people and a gross domestic product (GDP) of $2.5 trillion, across all 55 member States of the African Union. In terms of numbers of participating

[36] See Tralac at https://www.tralac.org/news/article/12865-10th-extraordinary-session-of-the-assembly-of-the-african-union-on-afcfta-held-in-kigali.html#moredownloads
[37] Ibid
[38] Ibid

countries, AfCFTA will be the world's largest free trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organization."[39]

This creation of this new institution shows some effort and the engagement of the African leaders to steer the continent towards a new development strategy. However, as the Chairperson Faki concluded with Kwame Nkrumah's words,

"*The task ahead is great indeed, and heavy is the responsibility; and yet it is a noble and glorious challenge – a challenge which calls for the courage to believe, the courage to dare, the courage to do, the courage to fight, the courage to achieve – to achieve the highest excellencies and the fullest greatness of man. Dare we ask for more in life*."

Indeed, the task ahead to achieve these goals is heavy and uncertain, especially because many continental institutions existed before AfCFTA. Even though the objectives of these institutions seem to have some differences to those of AfCFTA, their vision for the future of the continent are much the same. Some of these institutions are The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Development Bank (AEC), the African Economic Community (AEC), and the AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC).

New Partnership for Africa's Development

[39]See African Continental Free Trade Area Questions & Answers https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36085-doc-qa_cfta_en_rev15march.pdf

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is, like all the other institutions previously listed, under the umbrella of the AU. Thus, the AU officially adopted NEPAD in 2002 as the primary mechanism to coordinate the pace and impact of Africa's development in the 21st century. It was renamed the African Union Development Agency (AUDA) in July 2018. Its main objective is to provide a new mechanism, spearheaded by African leaders, to eradicate poverty, place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process, accelerate the empowerment of women, and fully integrate Africa into the global economy.[40] The NEPAD's main task is to help improve the socio-economic development of Africa. This task is a long way from completion, given the reality of the socio-economic development of the continent at this time. Landry Signe (2019) argues that among the problems facing African institutions are the relationships between institutions and actors, and between programs and their implementation. He argues that the actors in charge of the institutions don't produce results in conformity with the intentions and objectives of those institutions.[41] He adds that in the case of NEPAD, the ineffectiveness of the institution can be explained by "the excessive ambitions of objectives that do not account for actual capacities; limited or unappropriated involvement by national and local decision-makers charged with the implementation; inadequate institutional configurations; a political often not suited to policies; an excessively outward-looking attitude; numerous programs without appropriate prioritization; human capital that is still insufficient; and the complexity of policies to be implemented."[42]

See African Union. https://au.int/en/organs/nepad

[41] Landry Signe .2019. African Development, African Transformation: How Institutions Shape Development Strategy. p. 153

[42] Ibid. p 153

The African Development Bank

The African Development Bank (AfDB) is one of modern Africa's oldest institutions. The AfDB, also known as the parent institution, is a multilateral development finance institution. Its holistic objective is to support economic development and social programs in the continent through public and private investment in programs targeting the reduction of poverty to improve living conditions within African populations. It was established in 1963 by the then 23 newly independent African states and officially began operations in 1966.[43] Currently, all 55 African countries are members of the AfDB as well as 27 non-African countries including the world biggest economies like the United States of America (USA), China, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, India etc… The AfDB provides non-concessional loans to regional Member States as well as policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.[44] The AfDB has two annex branches: The African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) that help boost the institution's activities. The ADF which was established in 1972 and started operations in 1974 is specialized in concessional loans and grants to regional member states with a primary focus on poverty reduction. The NTF was created by the government of Nigeria in 1976 with a focus on concessional loans to regional member countries.

The AfDB and its sub-institutions, as well as the AfCFTA and NEPAD, aspire to move the continent to a new level of economic growth and social development. These institutions are joined by other institutions with the same or similar objectives. Among these is the African Economic Community (AEC), with the objective of "[promoting] economic, social and cultural development, and the

[43] See African Union. African Development Bank. https://au.int/en/organs/afdb
[44] Ibid

integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained development,"[45] and the Aid for Trade (AfT) organization, with the objective to build trade-related infrastructure and capacity in order to facilitate trade between the African nations.

We cannot talk about institutions without talking about security, which is a big concern on the continent and often seen as problematic for the development of the Africa. The continent does take very seriously the security issues it faces. Thus, Africa has a peace and security institution, which is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), also known as the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC)

The African Union Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC)

The AU-PSC is also an organ of the AU which is charge of the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts on the continent. It also aims to be the key element of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is the umbrella term for the main AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa.[46] The AU-PSC was established in 2003 to be a collective security force to respond with efficiency and rapidly to conflict and crisis on the continent. The AU-PSC has a gigantic and wide peace and security task in a continent in constant turmoil. The AU-PSC's roles include anything from preventing conflicts, resolve crisis situations, build and maintain peace, promote democratic practices, recommend intervention to prevent war crime, genocide and crimes against humanity, and to prevent and combat international terrorism. The AU-PSC is currently the

[45] See Organization of African Unity. Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7775-treaty-0016_-_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_e.pdf
[46] African Union Peace and Security Council. https://au.int/en/organs/psc

leading and only institution in Africa to promote peace and assure security on the continent. As with all the above-listed institutions, the AU-PSC still requires reform in order to achieve its objectives.

Africa also has many other continental institutions which aspire to increase the economic growth and social development of their member states. However, unlike the continental institutions these sub-continental institutions focus only on the development of the regional countries while maintaining close connections to other regional institutions as well as the continental institutions. There are many regional institutions, but we will focus only on a few, specifically on those in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Regional institutions

Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

The Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was formed in December 1994 to replace the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which was created thirteen years earlier. The Current 21 COMESA member states "agreed to co-operate in developing their natural and human resources for the good of all their people' and as such it has a wide-ranging series of objectives which necessarily include in its priorities the promotion of peace and security in the region."[47] The COMESA areas of focus are free trade, a customs union, and trade promotion in a vast geographical area of about 12 million km^2, a vast market of over 560 million people, and a global trade in goods with a value of US$235 billion according to COMESA's latest report.[48] The main mission of the institution is "to provide excellent

[47] See COMESA. https://www.comesa.int/company-overview-2/
[48] Ibid

technical services to COMESA in order to facilitate the region's sustained development through economic integration."[49] The institution has set very ambitious goals that will boost the economic growth of its members states, promote social development, and assure the integration of its populations. However, COMESA acknowledges the challenges and the barriers that face each member state and the institution commits to focus on these.

Economic Community of Central African States

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) or La Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) is another regional organization that aspires to promote economic co-operation in Central Africa. The ECCAS was set up in 1983 and has as its goals to achieve collective autonomy, raise the standard of living of its populations, and maintain economic stability through harmonious cooperation.[50] The ECCAS is also a vast business market covering an area of 6,640,490 km^2 and a population of over 174,359,130 in 2019. Its member states are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe and Chad. The ECCAS missions are to promote and to strengthen harmonious cooperation and a standard and self-maintained development in the economic and social domains, specifically in the domains of industry, transportation and communication, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, borders, finance and currency, human resources, tourism, education, culture, science and technology, and peace and security. "Environmental protection, notably of the rich and diverse Congo Basin ecosystem…strengthen direct and peaceful relations between its member states and to contribute to the progress and the development

[49] Ibid
[50] See. International Democracy Watch. Economic Community of Central African Stateshttp://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/economic-community-of-central-african-states-

of the African continent."[51] With over six and half million square kilometers, the ECCAS embodies the richest lands in Africa in terms of natural resources, oil, and the world's second largest rainforest after the Amazon basin. The 11 current ECCAS member states have everything it takes to be the economic power region of the continent. However, according to the ECCAS, many challenges still impede the achievement of the institution's missions. Some of the challenges include security issues, infrastructure, telecommunication, ethnic conflicts, and political instability.

The Economic Community of West African States

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established on May 28, 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria. It currently has 15 member states which are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d' Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. ECOWAS is "Considered one of the pillars of the African Economic Community, ECOWAS was set up to foster the ideal of collective self-sufficiency for its member states. As a trading union, it is also meant to create a single, large trading bloc through economic cooperation."[52] Like the other regional organizations, ECOWAS covers a vast area of about 5.1 million square kilometers with a population of over 300 million people.[53] Some ECOWAS core principles are: "equality and inter-dependence of Member States, solidarity and collective self-reliance, inter-State co-operation, harmonization of policies and integration of programs, non-aggression between Member States, maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good

[51] See La Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale Cohttp://www.ceeac-eccas.org/index.php/fr/a-propos-de-la-ceeac/presentation. Personal translation from French to English while leaving out parts of the listed ECCAS missions due to the length of the list and their replacement by the dots.
[52]See Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/
[53] Ibid

neighborliness, peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active Co-operation between neighboring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development, recognition promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,"[54] and many more. As a pioneering institution in the establishment of regional organization, ECOWAS aspires to lead by example in order to prove the importance of regional institutions. Unfortunately, ECOWAS, like many other African institutions faces many challenges that prevent it from pursuing its objectives. Challenges that inhibit ECOWAS activities include weaknesses in infrastructure, technology and telecommunication, but the most crucial challenge facing ECOWAS is security, with the threat of multiple terrorist organization such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),[55] which operate in countries including Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and recently in the north of Nigeria and Benin. Despite those challenges, ECOWAS security ministers in a recent security summit in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2019, vowed to tackle the security challenges through "greater collaboration with Nigeria in order to engender a safer and more stable region."[56]

The Southern African Development Community

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the last important regional institution this paper will discuss in this chapter dedicated to the African institutions. "It was established as a development coordinating conference (SADCC) in 1980 and transformed into a development

[54] See Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/
[55] al-Queda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) emerged in early 2007 in Algeria and spread out to the whole North Africa and to the West African countries. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17308138
[56] See Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) https://www.ecowas.int/leaders-pledge-to-collectively-confront-regional-challenges-as-first-ordinary-session-of-ecowas-parliaments-fourth-legislature-opens/

community in 1992. It is an inter-governmental organization whose goal is to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good governance and durable peace and security among fifteen Southern African Member States."[57] The current 15 SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, DRCongo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, covering another vast area of about 9,864,980 square kilometers, with a total population of about 327 million inhabitants, according the SADC 2016 report.[58] Adding to the objectives listed above, SADC member states also agree to alleviate the problem of poverty, and to enhance the standard and quality of life of the people living in SADC countries. The organization engages member states to evolve common political values, systems and institutions, promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the inter-dependence of Member States, achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programs, promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the region, achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment, and to strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region.

Like all other African regional institutions, SADC in not exempt from challenges. SADC member states face various issues such as environmental sustainability and food security, gender inequality issues (common in all the regional institutions), science and telecommunication issues, and most importantly, health issues. The SADC region has the highest HIV/AIDS rate in the world, and the region remains the area most affected by the HIV epidemic. According to the UNAIDS 2010 Global Report cited on the SADC web page, "out of the total number of people living with HIV worldwide

[57] See Southern African Development Community. https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-facts-figures/
[58] See Southern African Development Community. https://www.sadc.int/opportunities/employment/direc/

in 2009, 34% resided in ten SADC countries."[59] The SADC region has an estimated 13.4 million people living with HIV/AIDS, of which about 53% are women. The Southern African Development Community is seriously focused on strategies to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The region is also affected by all the issues compromising the prosperity of the other regions, such as poverty, illiteracy, stigma and discrimination, etc… However, the tasks remain very hard to accomplish considering the number and the scale of the issues.

This chapter focused on the most well-known and the most active continental and regional African institutions. There are many more institutions, especially sub-regional institutions derived from the main regional ones, SADC, ECOWAS, COMESA and ECCAS. These sub-regional institutions operate under direct supervision and in collaboration with the regional institutions. This is the case for the ECOWAS Commission, the Community Court of Justice, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), the West African Health Organization (WAHO), and the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA), and many others under the umbrella of ECOWAS. As for the SADC, it operates in collaboration with sub-institutions like the Summit of Heads of State or Government, the Summit Troika of the Organ, the SADC National Committees, the SADCAT or SADC Tribunal in charge of legal issues. The ECCAS also has sub-institutions specializing in different domains such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX).

The last major regional institution that was discussed in this chapter is COMESA. It functions together with many sub-institutions such as the COMESA Business Council (CBC), the COMESA Competitions Commission (CCC), the COMESA Court of Justice (CCJ), the Federation of National

[59]See SADC/issues. https://www.sadc.int/issues/hiv-aids/

Associations of Women in Business in Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (FEMCOM), the Regional Investment Agency (RIA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahara-Sahel States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), etc.. One of the main regional institutions we ignore in the following is the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which along with SADC, ECOWAS, COMESA and ECCAS form the five big regional institutions on the continent. The Arab Maghreb Union currently has 5 member states which are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. It covers an area of 5.8 million square kilometers with a population of 94.2 million inhabitant[60]; as such it is the least populous regional institution on the continent. Leaving out the AMU is not a mistake since the goal of this thesis is to focus on Sub-Sahara Africa. In the following chapter we will discuss the role of strong institutions in the development of a continent or a country.

Chapter three: The role of strong institutions in development of continent or a country

Evaluation of the African institutions

In the previous chapter the paper focused on Africa's institutions on the continental and regional level. All of the institutions this paper targeted have precise and definite objectives to overcome some of the problems or challenges that the continent, the regions, or even a single country suffer from. However, despite the good will expressed by the African leaders and the regional leaders when establishing the

[60] See the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. AMU-Arab Maghreb Union. https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/amu-arab-maghreb-union

institutions, the leaders don't live up to their promises once they return to their respective states. The latest report of all the institutions we listed above since their creation show that the institutions are struggling to achieve the objectives, they assigned to themselves.

Continental institutions

Since the OAU was created in 1963, it aspired to unify the continent as one force to tackle the countless problems and challenges it faced during the centuries of slavery and colonization. One of the objectives was to ensure the independence of all African countries, which we can agree is an achieved goal since all 55 countries on the continent are currently independent. But what type of independence are we referring to? Of course, the independence from former European colonial powers was achieved some years ago, mostly in the 1960s, when African populations were given the freedom and the authority to choose their own leaders, those who would lead them out of servitude to liberty, from conflicts and wars to peace and from poverty to prosperity. However, as cited earlier, the continent was never fully independent: "…although we commonly described the independent polities as 'new states,' in reality they were successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and practices, and its more hidden normative theories of governance."[61] Furthermore, Acemoglu et. al. (2000) argue that the early European institutions persist to the present in Africa. The colonial institutions are so deeply rooted in the African countries that there is less confidence between the member states of the African Union than individual countries have to their former colonial power or to any other foreign power. Also, 56 years after the creation of the AU, African states are still less integrated and less unified than the European Union (EU), which was formally established in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989.[62] The EU free

[61] See footnote 10
[62] See European Union. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en#1980-1989

trade agreements (FTAs) which were initiated in 1960 and led to an international linked market in the 1990s is today one of the world's strongest and most unified markets thanks to the power and effectiveness of the EU institutions.[63] For instance, despite the AU member states' agreement to have free border transit of goods and services, there are still strict controls and restrictions to naviagate when crossing from one African country to another, even within the regional and sub-regional organizations. Therefore, intra-Africa trading often presents more challenges than extra-African, which is profitable to the Western colonial countries. African countries trade less between each other than they do with other countries outside Africa. According to the AU Assembly report published in 2012, "[o]n average over the past decade, only about 10 – 12 per cent of African trade is with African nations, whilst 40% of North American trade is with other North American countries, and 63% of trade by countries in Western Europe is with other Western European nations."[64] This disparity between the objectives set by African institutions and the reality on the ground is an issue that affects not only the development of the continent but also the integration and cohesion of the African population. The newly signed African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is tasked to confront the lack of trade between African countries by, for example, eliminating tariffs on a large variety of goods, eliminating customs barriers and excessive paperwork procedures. If it becomes effective, the AfCFTA is expected "both to boost intra-African trade by 52.3 per cent by eliminating import duties, and to double this trade if non-tariff barriers are also reduced."[65] At the same time, the AU and its other continental institutions such as the AfCFTA, NEPAD, AfDB and AU-PSC still under perform

[63]See European Free Trade Association. https://www.efta.int/about-efta/european-free-trade-association

[64] See African Union. Assembly of the African Union Eighteenth Ordinary Session 29 - 30 January 2012 Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32456-doc-boosting_iat_assembly_au_2_xviii_english.pdf

[65] African Union. African Continental Free Trade Area. African https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36085-doc-qa_cfta_en_rev15march.pdf

and seem obsolete compared to European and North American institutions, or are totally dependent on Western countries.

In term of Western dependency, the AU-PSC seems to be totally dependent on European and American leadership for every security issue in Africa. Since its establishment, the AU-PSC has remained incapable of facing security issues on the continent without the intervention of European and American forces. This is the case of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to provide protection to Somalian institutions and to eliminate the Al-Shabaab terrorist group; in a regional cooperation initiative for the elimination of the lord's resistance army (RCI-LRA); to combat the atrocities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) founded by Joseph Kony and operating in the Central African region; and for Operation Serval, led by the French and based in Mali to deal with the AQIM and other jihadist groups in the Sahel area in Africa. Furthermore, we can list the Sangaris military operation in the Central African Republic to stop the civil war, and the AFRICOM (United States Africa Command), "in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity."[66] And last but not least, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), which is currently the longest-running United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission. The mission started in 1999 with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by UN resolution 1279 and "renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect the new phase reached in the country, by UN Security Council resolution 1925."[67] At the peak of its mission MONUSCO had a strength of

[66] See United States Africa Command. https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do
[67] See MONUSCO https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background

19,815 men and women[68]. Although usually commanded by African generals, most of the mission's special operations and intelligence gathering were under the control and leadership of foreign powers like the U.S and the European forces.[69]

The African institutions' inability to fully take charge of diverse issues and challenges facing the continent, especially in the security sector, raises the need to call for the strengthening of the institutions. It is inconceivable that after nearly 60 years of independence and the establishment of multiple institutions, the continent's leaders still extend their hands towards Europe and North America, notably the United States, for help in order to combat the continent's issues.

Regional Institutions

Like the continental institutions, the five major regional institutions SADC, ECOWAS, COMESA ECCAS, and AMU are no better. Each of these institutions have the man power and the financial means to responsibly tackle the issues and challenges they face in their respective region, if one takes into account the natural wealth of each regional institution and the continent's natural wealth and the age of the population in general. "Africa has the youngest population in the world with more than 400 million young people aged between the ages of 15 to 35 years."[70] The example of the regional institutions discussed above shows the presence of major initiatives to move the regional institutions towards integration and development, and in doing so to move towards the integration of the whole continent. But the absence or weakness of the implementations of their stated objectives prevents the institutions from achieving their goal to integrate. According to the African Development Report 2014, the main issue of the states' non-compliance to the continent's initiatives' ambitions is that,

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[68]Ibid
[69] Ibid
[70] See African Union. Youth Development. https://au.int/en/youth-development

"[g]enerally the major impediment has been inadequate guidance on what needed to be done at the country and regional levels. Notably, many of the regional initiatives required the ceding of some sovereignty to agencies at regional and continental levels but this proved too difficult to implement, owing to coordination challenges, the imperative of national interests, and lack of resources."[71] Furthermore, the report also states that the membership of some states in more than one regional institution is also a critical barrier to regional integration and inclusive regional development since these states receive a range of sometimes conflicting approaches from different institutions. However, the report acknowledges that instead of being a barrier to integration and growth, the overlapping membership could allow the states in question to profit from their multiple membership in order to further boost integration and regional development.[72]

In regard to the overlapping states' memberships, this paper has no objections or criticisms about it. Based on the analysis of all the institutions from continental to regional institutions we observe that all the institutions have common objectives and the most common among them are integration and regional or continental development.

Indeed, all the African institutions have initiatives to further the ambition of a fully integrated and developed Africa. The main issues have nothing to do with overlapping states' membership but rather the leaders' political unwillingness and lack of commitment to implement and to comply with the institutions' objectives. The first steps towards the continent's integration and inclusive growth is to have strong and transparent regional institutions.[73] Strong and transparent regional and continental institutions with mechanisms to enforce members states' compliance to the institutions' objectives and

[71] See. African Development Bank. African Development Report 2014: Regional Integration for Inclusive Growth. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/ADR14_ENGLISH_web.pdf . p. xvI
[72] Ibid .p.28
[73] Ibid .p 28

regulations are required in order to meet these primary goals. During his first visit to Africa and during his speech in Accra, Ghana on July 11th, 2009, the U.S president, Barack H. Obama, summed this up by stating that "Africa does not need strong men; it needs strong institutions"[74]

Unfortunately, almost all the African countries since their independence have been ruled and some are still being ruled by strong men instead of strong institutions. "Some African leaders spend a significant part of their tenure in the office trying to hold on to power" said Mazrui A.A. and Wiafe-Amoako. F (2016). These "strong" African leaders are basically autocratic and have no regard for strong institutions since these could work against them. Instead, they trample down all institutions and rule through corruption and bribery by looting the wealth of their countries. Thus, these leaders ignore the mismanagement of their countries' natural resources by multinational corporations and other private companies often owned by individuals from former colonial powers. The example of strong leaders is commonplace on the continent. For instance, Paul Biya in Cameroon is president since 1983, Denis Sassou Nguesso in the Republic of Congo is president since 1997, Omar Bongo was president of Gabon from 1967 until his death in 2009, Gnassingbé Eyadema was president of Togo from 1967 to his death in 2005, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo is president of Equatorial Guinea since 1979, Mobutu Sese Seko of former Zaire and current DRC ruled from 1965 until he was overthrown in 1997. The number of African strong men is too long to list all of them here. But this short number gives a sense of how many strong leaders lived or are still living as leaders of African countries. The existence of these strong men in the continent hinders the integration and development of not only their countries' institutions, but the regional and the continental institutions as well. What is the difference

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[74] The New York Times. Obama Delivers Call for Change to a Rapt Africa. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/world/africa/12prexy.html

of strong institutions in comparison to strong men? Africa is so full of strong dictators and corrupt governments to the point that it is difficult to single out one good country with strong institutions and transparent government. Nonetheless, Botswana stands out as exception with strong institutions, good governance, and strong and developed economic growth. What makes Botswana different from other African countries and especially developed in comparison to one of the richest countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo?

The difference between strong institutions and strong men: the example of DRC & Botswana

This section of the paper will examine the role of institutions in the process of development by comparison of two African countries diametrically opposite in terms of strong institutions and good governance. The reason for choosing these two countries is not to conduct a full case study of each of them but a brief analysis of the countries' colonial past, their political institutions and governance, and their natural wealth. Obviously, each category listed above about these countries is in itself a research question. But this paper will only select some key elements of each category to explain what effect it has on the country and how it affects the country's institutions and development. This example will to link colonization to governance and institutions, and the natural resources curse.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The Democratic Republic of Congo is Africa's second largest country behind Algeria, with about 2,345,410 square kilometers and nearly 77 million inhabitants according to the World Bank.[75] Furthermore the World Bank reports that "[w]ith 80 million hectares of arable land and over 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the potential to become one of the richest countries on the

[75] See Democratic Republic of Congo. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview#1

continent and a driver of African growth if it can overcome its political instability."[76] In reality the country's political instability started in the 1960s during the fight for independence which was proclaimed on June 30th, 1960. As mentioned above, the DRC was colonized by Belgium from the time of the Berlin conference in 1884-1885 until its independence in 1960, during which time occurred the Belgian "rape and plunder"[77] of the country. Belgium ruled the Congo with coercion and exploitation and relied almost entirely on the income from the Congo's resources. Countless scholars have written about the Belgian Congo and how Belgium richly benefitted from the immense natural resources of the country. Due to the importance of the wealth of the Congo to the economy and power of Belgium, as with many African countries in relation to their Europeans powers, Belgium never fully granted Congo independence. According to David Smith's report for *The Guardian*, "Belgium continued to meddle and was blamed, along with the CIA, for the 1961 assassination of Patrice Lumumba, Congo's first democratically elected prime minister. Both Belgium and the US then supported the 32-year dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, a pro-Western leader seen as a bulwark against communism. He robbed his people of an estimated $5bn and made corruption a political way of life."[78] David Smith's statement is reinforced by Josh Kran (2011) who claims by citing Haskin M. J (2005) that "Mobutu enjoyed strong Western support as he stripped the parliament of its authority, re-wrote the constitution and ruled by decree."[79] Indeed, the 32-year rule of Mobutu is one example of the strong leaders president Obama mentions in his speech from 2009. As the scholars stated, Mobutu ruled by decree and with an iron fist during which time political, judicial, economic and social

[76] Ibid
[77] David Smith. Is colonialism still to blame for the Democratic Republic of Congo's woes? Celebrations marking 50h anniversary of Congo's independence reignite debate over legacy of colonialism in Africa. *The Guardian* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/04/colonialism-democratic-republic-of-congo-independence
[78] Ibid
[79] Josh Kran 2011. Conflict in Congo, Can the Violence be Stopped? *CQ Press.* P. 171. http://library.cqpress.com.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/cqresearcher/getpdf.php?id=cqrglobal2011040500

institutions were not allowed to function freely and transparently for the Congolese population but in order to serve the Belgian masters and other Western multinational corporations.

Briefly, the regime of Mobutu continued the operations of the colonial institutions long after the country's independence, causing unrest and ethnical and political conflicts. Thus, all the country's enormous resources were left without government control and open to Belgian and other Western companies to do business with the blessing of the dictator Mobutu and his close personnel as long as they received their share. In return, Belgian and other Western companies and business moguls posed as saviors helping to solve the country's problems, while in reality plundering its wealth. So, as we can be deduce from this brief summary of the DRC's history, the lack of strong institutions in the DRC is the consequence of the country's colonial past, with Belgium still influencing the country's institutions by supporting leaders that work for its advantage. Thus, strong men prevent the establishment of strong institutions which could be detrimental to their power. Let us sum up this case of the DRC by saying that the country most likely wouldn't have a had Mobutu as strong man if wasn't for the support of Belgium and other Western powers. Without the continuation of colonial institutions, the Congo's over 1,100 minerals and precious metals might be a blessing not curse. Therefore, the first and major curse on Congo is Belgian colonization and not the natural resources. Like Congo, many other African countries experienced and some are still experiencing colonial institutionalism and political pressure. This is for instance the case of the CFA operating in the countries mentioned earlier in the paper. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) refer to the history colonization as "inevitable consequence of deep-rooted forces"[80] which "creates vicious and circles

[80] Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, A. J. (2012).Why Nations Fails: The origins of Power Prosperity, and Poverty. *Crown Publisher*. New York, USA pp. 133

contingency"[81] while writing about the case of (Bechuanaland)[82], and its leader Seretse Khama to transform, strengthen and modernize the country's traditional institutions. Indeed, the only country that escaped from the pressure of European power and instill strong institutions that actually contributed to economic development, growth, and prosperity is Botswana, also known as Bechuanaland while under British control.

Botswana escapes the natural resource curse with strong institutions

Botswana is a landlocked country located in the center of Southern Africa between Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The country covers an area of about 582,000 sq.km² with a population of about 2,024,904 according to SADC's 2011 census. According to the World Bank, Botswana was one of the world's poorest countries when it became independent in 1966. However, the country "rapidly became one of the world's development success stories. Significant mineral (diamond) wealth, good governance, prudent economic management"[83] were the main factors of the country's economic development. The highly dependence of Botswana's economic on mining contradicts Isham, J., Woolcock Pritchett, L, and Busby, G. 2005. that "countries' dependent on point source natural resources (those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base, such as oil and minerals) and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity."[84] Botswana maintains strong institutions strong economic and strong social cohesion despite relying mostly on minerals.

[81]. Ibid
[82] Currently the Republic of Botswana and former British protectorate under the High Commissioner of the South Africa Apartheid regime.
[83] See the World Bank in Botswana. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/botswana/overview
[84] Isham, J., Woolcock Pritchett, L., Busby, G. 2005. The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth. Oxford University Press. pp. 141

The transformation of Botswana from a poor country at independence to the only upper-middle-income country in Africa is not an extraordinary event or miracle as some may think. The change of the country came from the unselfish vision of one man, Seretse Khama, who led the country to its independence and laid the foundations for the country's development and prosperity. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) say that "Khama was an extraordinary man, uninterested in personal wealth and dedicated to building his country."[85] Furthermore, the authors argue that many other African countries were not fortunate to have leaders with the personality of Khama. Of course, other African countries did have the chance to be led by the democratic, transparent and development-oriented vision and charisma that Khama had to change the destiny of his country and its population. Like Khama, many other leaders of African countries had the same vision and brilliant ideas toward the development of their countries. But they were pushed to exile, silenced, or killed by their own with the complicity of the colonial powers after the countries' independence. This was the case for Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sylvanus Olympio in Togo, and Patrice Lumumba in the DRC which we previously mentioned, to list a few. The eliminations of the visionary leaders who fought for the independence and the development of their countries led to the rise in power of Western-supported dictators who crushed the initiative and the establishment of strong institutions and in doing so the dream of a free, developed and prosperous Africa.

The context of Botswana contradicts the theory of the natural resources curse widely popular within the scholarly community. It is obvious to see here that natural resources are not a curse, as the Botswana case clearly shows. Moreover, Botswana is not an exceptional case to the resource curse in developing countries, as Sachs and Warner (2001) have stated, but an example of the impact of strong

[85] Acemoglu D.and Robinson A. J (2012). Why Nations Fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. P 133

institutions and the example of the absence of the colonization curse. Evidence shows that unlike many African countries, and specifically the DRC, Botswana didn't experience much of the impact of colonization since it was a British protectorate under the control of South Africa. In any case, the unselfish vision of Khama to establish strong modern institutions in line with domestic institutions put Botswana on the path of development which helped the country to become a role model for African countries, African regions and the continent to follow. The example of Botswana corresponds to Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako's suggestion that: "[t]he institutionalization of democracy in Africa need not be attached to any foreign assistance. It needs to be structurally developed by the incorporation of traditional beliefs and practices-those that the people understand, own, and will support."[86] Therefore, to strengthen the African continental and regional institutions, it must start from the domestic country level and propagate up to the regional and then up to the continental level Visionary and independent African leaders free from colonial and post-colonial interference and with the support of their people to implement transparent and democratic institutions can transform their country's situation from one of poverty to prosperity. This is the reason why this paper refers to the example of DRC and Botswana. Indeed, based on what the paper shows through these two examples, it will be easier for the Botswana government to implement regional and continental objectives than it will be for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thus, the example of Botswana is the perfect example for the continent's leaders to follow to move towards integration and development.

Conclusion

[86] Mazrui A.A. and Wiafe-Amoako. F (2016). African Institutions: Challenges to Political, Social, and Economic Foundations of Africa's Development. P 81

Strong and effective institutions are the key to growth, development, and integration. Much evidence shows that well-functioning institutions can be the driving force for economic integration and, obviously, growth. The European Union, despite some political issues, shows an example of growth and development through strong and well-functioning continental institutions. The issues concerning Africa's underdevelopment, lack of growth and the high poverty rate among the African population is not due to the absence of institutions. The number of different institutions listed in this paper proves that Africa has enough institutions ready to promote growth in the continent and to reduce poverty in countries and areas that are suffering. Yet, Africa is still struggling to find solutions for its problems and heavily relies on the mercy of the West to help resolve issues and problems ravaging the continent. One of the issues contemporary scholars often refer to as the main problem of the continent is the so called natural resources curse, also referred to as the paradox of plenty. Of course, Africa is undoubtedly the richest continent in the world with thousands of minerals and precious metals, as well as oil. Yet, it is also the poorest continent in the world: this appears to confirm the theory of the natural resources curse. However, the literature reviews, reports and examples cited throughout this paper try to create a clear picture of African issues that are due to the lack of strong and effective institutions. Africa does have multiple institutions, some of them dating back to the 1960s, like the African Union, with clearly defined goals and objectives for the continent.

The core elements of all the institutions this paper analyses are integration, development, growth and the eradication of poverty. However, since the creation of the African regional and continental institutions they seem to have done little to nothing to help the continent move from precarity to development, poverty to prosperity, and to escape from the natural resources curse. This paper argued that the natural resources curse is seen most prominently in African countries because they are the most undeveloped despite their enormous natural resource wealth. The paper also argues that when it comes to the natural resources of other part of the world, notably the oil-rich gulf nations, the natural resources are linked in the literature to autocracy and democracy rather than to poverty, development and growth, and also autocracy as is the case of African countries which have more, and more diverse, resources than those rich Arab countries. The reason for this disparity is that despite the autocratic regimes of the Arab nations most of them are economically developed and their populations enjoy the wealth of their countries. Only the liberty of expression is highly limited, but people enjoy every day basic needs, unlike most of the African people. Therefore, the thesis claims that Africa is not only suffering from the natural resource curse but also suffering from the colonization curse. The latter, according to the analysis of this paper, is the main curse of the African continent which begets and increases the natural resource curse. So, Africa is a victim of a double curse: the colonization curse and the natural resources curse. The paper shows that the historical institutionalization of colonial practices (Colonization curse) like the continuation of the use of a colonial currency like the Franc CFA is a big burden on the 14 African countries which are still using it and have no absolute control of the printing, the distribution, nor the exchange rate of the currency. The only way for Africa to escape from this double curse is to reform and strengthen the continent's institutions.

Reforming and strengthening the continent's institutions won't be an easy task due to the complexity of African countries' colonial powers' malicious involvement in African institutions, especially political institutions through the support of dictators who do their bidding. Because of this, the establishment of strong and effective domestic regional and continental institutions to transform Africa into a global powerhouse for years to come is actually the agenda set for 2063 by the AU. To arrive at this conclusion the paper used the case of Botswana and the DRC. The two countries show an interesting example of the role that strong, effective, and transparent institutions can play in promoting growth and development. Botswana's example shows how the "installation of responsive and democratic institutions that promote accountable and transparent government and sustainable socioeconomic development" as Asfaw Kumssa and Isaac M Mbeche (2004) put it, could promote growth and reduce poverty, and most importantly help Africa escape the colonial and natural resource curses and provide full economic, political, and social independence. The case of Congo shows the exact opposite of this situation, in contrast to Botswana, and the result is total political, economic, and social dependency, and a high poverty rate, causing social unrest, ethnic conflicts, and wars.

Recommendations

Africa needs strong institutions as Obama stated in Ghana in 2009. To achieve these, African leaders need, as Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako suggest, to move away from colonial or Western institutions and to modernize and promote domestic institutions that are in line with the cultural reality of the African populations. It is imperative that African leaders promote strong institutions and transparent and inclusive governments that will represent the demography of their countries. Leaders should lead by democratic principle and with development views for their countries without seeking personal wealth, just like Khama did in Botswana. Before talking about regional and continental unity, solidarity, and integration, the mechanisms of African institutions should ensure that leaders are held to a high standard with respect to the goals and objectives of the institutions, and delinquencies be dealt with according to the rules and regulations of the institutions and the responsible be held accountable.

At a regional level, the African institutions need to be strengthened with strict polices and rules to legitimize the institutions. The rules should solve the challenge of members' noncompliant behaviors.

According to the African Development Report 2014 previously mentioned, the main challenge to the regional institutions' objectives is the absence or weakness of member states' compliance due to the political ambitions of the members at a national level, which prevents member from implementing the institution's agenda. Therefore, "To hasten the pace of integration, implementation needs to be grounded in a legal architecture that requires states to accept the legitimacy and necessity of judicial remedies as part of rules-based governance. Regional courts and arbitration, in some cases, have met challenges, but these could be overcome through adjustments in their design and increased recognition by member states of their importance."[87]

This rules-based institutions that are valuable to the regional institutions should also be implemented at the continental level. In the meantime, the regional institutions should think about creating one single market with one currency. This will allow the CFA countries to have monetary freedom and a strong economic market with the other members of the regional institution. A unified currency could be created at the continental level after a few years of experience at the regional level. At the continent level, the African Union needs to strictly work on the 5 focal areas identified by the pan-African advisory team in July 2016. These five areas are: to focus on fewer priority areas with continental scope, a need to review the structure and operations of the AU and ensure international realignment for better service delivery, a need to connect with African Citizenry, need to become operationally effective & efficient in the performance of its mandate, need to identify and implement Sustainable financing for its programs and reduce over reliance on development partners. Furthermore, Africa needs to be a free trade market with no border restrictions and taxes on goods and services for all African countries, businesses and citizens. And as the continent with the youngest population in the world and a signification number of female, the Africa needs to promote an inclusive development

[87] African Development Report 2014: Regional Integration for Inclusive Growth https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/ADR14_ENGLISH_web.pdf . P.19

strategy with emphasis on the youths and the females. Achieving these recommendations will promote the continent to the world global powerhouse the Agenda 2063 has set.

This paper touches various interesting and controversial topics like the natural resources curse and the new colonization curse the paper unveiled to be the underlying factor producing the natural resources curse. Each of these topics is very complex to digest through a small research paper like this. However, these topics are still very productive research topics. The paper will encourage further researchers and scholars to take a deep look into the colonization curse to evaluate its impacts on the African natural resource curse. The paper concludes that without the colonization curse African countries could easily strengthen their intuitions and the continent will experience economic growth, development, and social prosperity.

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