HOW DOES THE LEFT EITHER EXCLUDE OR INCLUDE? NATIONALISM AND SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war (2011), Turkey received huge number of the Syrian refugees. Expectedly, the influx of refugees caused a dissonance among the political parties of Turkey and their migration policies. In this research, I analyze why two left-wing parties might respond in an opposite manner to a refugee influx, with different levels of inclusion. Also, I demonstrate the dissonance between minority and majority party status. I trace minority party politics as inclusive for refugees. This is a rational strategy for minority parties to maximize their constituencies. On the other side, majority party politics demonstrates that ideology is not enough to interpret the migration policies of the political parties. In other words, there are other reasons to see different level of inclusion within the party politics. I refer to historical nationalism as a source of exclusion of the left for their electoral considerations. The method of analysis relies on minority party, political party, and nationalism literature. Hence, in this research, the comparison between ideologically inclusive parties, CHP and HDP, aims to show the failure of scholars who argue conflictual, destabilizing, and polarizer role of minority parties by demonstrating a certain degree of inclusion in a minority party.
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To the whole victims of forced migration
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INTRODUCTION

Political parties aim to represent their constituencies, and their behavior is motivated by material incentives to win. For the electoral periods, all political parties formulate their issue-specific policies. In general, ideologically similar parties have consistent policies on similar issues. Especially case of minorities and immigrants are formulated similarly by the ideologically similar parties. The aim of this research is to demonstrate why two left-wing parties might respond in an opposite manner to a refugee influx, with different levels of inclusion.

In the existing literature of the left-wing politics, inclusion and aim to establish an inclusive society for humanity are clear.¹ Scholars argue that inclusion of the left-wing party politics is related to its core principles such as economic equality, social rights, internationalism, and solidarity.² “Redistributionist message” of the left-wing politics aims to consolidate equality not just for “the proletariat”, but also for everybody.³ Moreover, in general, the left-wing politics accepts the national identities as constructed and weak because they see ideologies more rigid and important.⁴ However, for Alonso and Da Fonseca, the left-wing parties can also exclude some part of the societies, especially immigrants, because of economic, social, electoral reasons or against the pressure of the right.⁵ However, while the American Socialist Party was

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³ Ibid 34.


against immigrants from the Eastern Europe in the USA, social democratic and ethnically minority party of Ireland, Sinn Féin, has an inclusionary rhetoric and strong relations with immigrant groups for their rights and representations. As another example, Swedish Social Democratic Party “implemented legislation making it possible for differential treatment of refugees based on country of origin in 1976.” However, ethnically Quebecois party of Canada, Parti Québécois, try to include also all immigrants to the society. Thus, my answer to see the dissonance between migration policies of the left-wing parties comes down between minority politics incentives and majority politics incentives.

In the existing literature of minority parties, one school says that minority parties are harmful in the democracies due to their risk to cause conflict and polarization. On the counter that they are also analyzed beneficial for the sake of their democracies by representing the unrepresented parts of the societies. Scholars who argue minority parties as potential sources of conflicts fail to explain their inclusionary policies in democracies because minority parties rationally come to close to include the interests of the disadvantaged groups into their agendas for their electoral considerations.

Differentiated migration policies of minority and majority parties with different levels of inclusion are seen between two left-wing parties in Turkey: The Republican Peoples’ Party

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(CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP). CHP is a majority and social democratic party, and it has an inclusionary party agenda that is consistent with the left. However, it extensively excludes immigrants, especially the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Despite a possible tendency to exclude in the left, CHP excludes in a similar manner with extreme right. In other words, CHP totally excludes the immigrants, and does not volunteer to accept & integrate them. However, minority and social democratic party of Turkey, HDP, follows an inclusionary politics for the immigrants. Although they exist in Turkey, and they have a common party ideology, they differ in their migration policies. CHP has historically never aimed to include ethnically different groups of the society in its electorate because the founding leaders of modern Turkey (and CHP) aimed to consolidate Turkish nation state by fetishizing Turkish identity. Especially in 2010, with the new leadership, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a reconciliation is observed with the native minorities in a consistent manner with the left-wing politics. However, after the Syrian civil war (2011), Turkey welcomed huge number of the Syrian refugees, and for CHP, the Syrians are the new threat in Turkey. In its changed electorate from founding years to now, exclusive nationalism is seen, and currently it is seen against the Syrians. However, in HDP, there is no exclusionary nationalism when it states its migration policy. Moreover, HDP defines itself as a party also for the immigrants and refugees in its party constitution. Why is the historical nationalism seen in a majority party? Why do minority parties directly aim to include immigrants? In this research, these questions are responded.

In the wide literature on minority parties, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania’s minority parties directly aim “the representation and pursuit of minority interests”.12 In other words, minority parties also aim to represent the interests of the population who are not represented by the other parties. In Latin America, the political mobilization of ethnic (indigenous) groups

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proved the improvement of “the quality of democracy by placing new issues and values (justice, equality, tolerance of difference) on the political agenda”.13 As a specific example, the indigenous party of Ecuador, Pachakutik, insists on diversity by not focusing on one ethnic/indigenous group.14 Hence, its rational inclusionary policy and ethnic tolerance are concrete.

Most assume minority parties are “left”-wing parties. In the case of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, an Armenian minority party which is also member of the Socialist International, in Lebanon, pro-Syrian refugee rhetoric and daily policies are irrefutable in Lebanon.15 Moreover, the Republican Left of Catalonia, pro-independence left-wing party, depicts its sensation on the issue of the refugees and their lives in Catalonia by not referring to ethnocultural differences.16

Hence, when expected inclusionary behavior of the left-wing party politics overlaps with minority party politics, in general, exclusion is unlikely to be visible especially for the ethnic minorities and immigrants. Scholars who argue conflictual, destabilizing, and polarizer role of minority parties in democracies fail to explain their political inclusion. In this research, I present that in light of the ideological similarities of the two left-wing parties in Turkey how there is a sharp dissonance between them against the Syrian refugees.

After a brief introduction, I show theoretical frameworks on minority parties and political parties for immigrants in the first Chapter. Then, I demonstrate applicable nationalism theories to associate them with political parties. In the second Chapter, I explain the research design to see how the hypotheses of the research are proved, and which methods are applied for the case of Turkey within the Turkish party politics. In the third Chapter, I make a comparative analysis between selected cases, CHP and HDP, to demonstrate their similarity in terms of their ideology. In the fourth Chapter, I discuss how CHP and HDP differ on their migration policies in light of empirical evidences. In the final part, I conclude the research.
CHAPTER 1: HOW DO POLITICAL PARTIES EITHER INCLUDE OR EXCLUDE IMMIGRANTS?

1.1. Minority party politics

For Von Beyme, minority parties are just one of the nine categories of the political parties to define them more precisely.\textsuperscript{17} Previous literature has looked at the definition of minority parties by focusing on demands or interests of specific ethnic groups. To Horowitz, the core of minority parties is just to serve for the interest of the ethnic group(s).\textsuperscript{18} For Van Cott, minority party “is defined here as an organization authorized to compete in local or national elections; the majority of its leadership and membership identify themselves as belonging to a non-dominant ethnic group, and its electoral platform includes demands and programs of an ethnic or cultural nature.”\textsuperscript{19} In the words of Chandra, a minority party is defined “as a party that is the champion of the particular interests of one ethnic category or set of categories”.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, it is clear that minority party is intrinsically associated with the interests, demands or future of the supporter ethnic group(s) in the political arena. In this paper, this emphasis is conserved when the case selection, HDP, is analyzed in relation with the Syrian refugees.

Most early research investigated minority parties as a potential source of “ethnic conflicts” and “ethnic outbidding”.\textsuperscript{21} Rabushka and Sheple’s Model for “ethnic outbidding” demonstrates that competition among ethnically minority parties causes ethnically

\textsuperscript{17} Von Beyme, Klaus. Political Parties in Western Democracies. England: Gower Publishing House.
\textsuperscript{21} Rabushka. Alvin, and Kenneth, Shepsle. (1972) Politics in plural societies: A theory in democratic instability. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill., Horowitz, Donald. (1985) Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. – This term directly refers a sharp increase in the numbers of the ethnic parties if just one of them is allowed to be founded. Then, newly emerged ethnic parties are assumed to be harmful in their democracies.
“polarization” in the democracies. For Horowitz and his Model, “zero-sum game” is inevitable among the interests of the ethnic groups, so when minority parties represent their demands or interests, there will be a crush among them because of their centrifugal competition. As a result, minority parties are not seen as beneficial for the democracies due to their potential risk to polarize and lead a conflict. At this point, the hidden focus on minority parties is about their exclusionary position at least against one group in their societies. This analysis is similar with the argument of Gunther and Diamond. They state that “the electoral logic of the minority party is to harden and mobilize its ethnic base with exclusive, often polarizing appeals to ethnic group opportunity and threat ... the ethnic party’s particularistic, exclusivist, and often polarizing political appeals make its overall contribution to society divisive and even disintegrative.” Furthermore, for Linz and Stephan, in “multi-ethnic states”, stable democracy is hard to observe because of politization of ethnic groups. Also, Brancati observes that minority parties just tend to dominate the interest of their founding ethnic groups, so a compromise in democracies cannot seen easily. For Fearon and Laitin, the tendency of conflict in minority parties is explained by the elites of them because “antagonistic ethnic identities” are constructed by prioritizing their ethnic demands to “strengthen their hold on power”. So, minority parties’ position within the democracies becomes a contested issue though lens of the sceptics against ethnic cleavage. However, these scholars fail to explain a possible inclusionary behavior of minority parties for immigrants by not prioritizing their founding “ethnicity”.

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23 Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 141-228.  
25 Linz, Juan. and Stepan, Alfred. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration.  
26 Brancati, Dawn. “Pawns Take Queen: The Destabilizing Effects of Regional Parties in Europe.”: 144.  
Other research demonstrates the importance of minority parties for democracies and representation arguing against conflictual, destabilizing and polarizer orientation of minority parties. For Ishiyama, “ethnic parties do mobilize minority ethnic groups to engage in protest, but there is no natural connection between the appearance of ethnic parties and the extent to which the minority group engages in communal conflict.” Moreover, he shows that in the post-communist world, “ethnic parties have served to assist in bringing into the political process those who would have been otherwise alienated by the emerging democratic systems in the region.” For Stroschein, “ethnic parties do not cause ethnic conflict but emerge as the result of it.” Hence, ethnically minority parties are not drivers of ethnic violence but protections against it. The argument against “ethnic outbidding” comes from the remarkable research of Chandra on minority parties. She states that “ethnic parties can help sustain democracy if these parties are institutionally encouraged to compete on multiple dimensions rather than on just the unidimensional axis of ethnicity.” In line with her argument, for Birnir and Waguespack, the rate of the representation of populations will increase when minority parties participate in democracies, hence political stability and an inevitable leverage vis-à-vis diverse policies emerge within the societies. The existing literature holds that minority parties have the impact of increasing political inclusion.

For Chandra, a minority party “may champion the interests of more than one ethnic category, but only by identifying the common ethnic enemy to be excluded” hence inclusion can be more concrete than exclusion which is inevitable part of the party politics. As a concrete

29 Ibid 59.
example, Plaid Cymru, a social democratic and pro-Welsh party in the UK, demonstrates in its party agenda how citizenship is accessible for immigrants without any discriminatory policy.\textsuperscript{34} Hence, despite the literature on the conflictual, destabilizing and polarizer role of minority parties, the literature mostly sees minority parties as mechanisms of political inclusion which is consistent with inclusionary behavior of HDP. These researches are necessary but insufficient to see political inclusion of minority parties for immigrants.

In the context of inclusion and minority parties, for Bloemraad and Schönwälder, minority parties can also serve “important mediating structures between new-comers and host country”.\textsuperscript{35} This is a key argument to see politically inclusionary position of minority parties in their democracies. Moreover, for Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst, minority parties have tendency to address different the problems of different ethnic groups “during legislative debates”.\textsuperscript{36} It also bases on vote competition among the political parties, and also minority parties have more capacity and visibility to address the problems of immigrants because of their multi-dimensional party formation. For Al-Haj, in practice, the main reason of the closeness between minority parties and immigrants is about material interest of immigrants in the host states.\textsuperscript{37} He refers to voting behavior of the former Soviet immigrants in Israel, and he associates it what minority parties provide for immigrants such as jobs and other benefits.\textsuperscript{38} Hence, minority parties have a capacity to include immigrants in their societies using multi-dimensional party structure. This is a result of rational inclusive politics of minority parties.


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
1.2. Political parties and immigrants

Social democratic or socialist, i.e. the leftist, parties are also one of the sub-categories of the “Familles Spirituelles” by Von Beyme, so ideologic cleavage becomes visible when the political parties are defined. For Mudde, “party ideology is defined as ‘a party’s body of normative(-related) ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and purposes of society (italic in his writing).’” In the previous literature on party politics, “party ideology has been the missing factor in understanding concrete immigration policies.” The aim of this part is to depict nationalism and dilemma within the leftist parties against immigrants.

Firstly, I present the orientation to include in the left-wing parties to see why nationalism and exclusions are dilemma in the left. Inclusive society is embedded in the definitions of the left-wing party politics. For Haupt, left-wing parties favour redistribution of wealth for everybody without dismissing a certain group of societies. Adams, Haupt, and Stoll argue that the left-wing parties are “activist privileging and tied to social groups”. In other words, they try to be voice of the excluded groups. March and Rommerskirchen state that the left-wing parties aim to achieve “unity in diversity”.

Moreover, to be able to understand the aim of “unity in diversity” of the left-wing, a comparative evaluation is healthier between the right and the left in the existing literature by referring to immigrants. In the previous researches, for Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer

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39 Von Beyme, Klaus. Political Parties in Western Democracies.
“where political left placed relatively more emphasis on providing aid to refugees and the political right placed relatively more emphasis on stricter border control to protect the safety of EU citizens.” Also, in the dichotomy of the extreme left and the extreme right, to Holbrook, López-Rodríguez, Fessler, Vázquez, and Gómez, the extreme left is assumed more positive for all refugees on the road of their asylum-seeking process, and for the extreme right, this positive approach and humanitarian understanding are not seen in general. Hence, it is clear and easy to summarize in the words of Alonso and Da Fonseca, the right-wing parties see “the mixing of different ethnicities poses a threat to national culture; ethnicities have to be kept separate in order to prevent cultural extinction.” On the other hand, expectedly, in the ontology of the leftist parties, “they have good reason to be more inclusive regarding societal diversity” and it can be explained the driving force behind the left that is “greater equality and inclusion”. Furthermore, Loxley and Thomas observe that in the left-wing, “there is a strong undercurrent of inclusion.” For Suny, inclusion of the left depends on obtaining the supports of the masses for a mobilization. To Brooks, inclusion is directly related to equality, and “the adaptation of integrative as opposed to a class-conflict ideology” is targeted by the left.

47 Alonso, Sonia. and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. “Immigration, left and right.” 6: 871.
48 Ibid 866.
50 Loxley, Andrew. and Thomas, Gary. “Neo-conservatives, Neo-liberals, the New Left and Inclusion: Stirring the pot.” 293.
To understand inclusion and the left, especially social democracy, Giddens’s book, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, is important because it clearly states the tie between them. For Giddens, the core of social democracy is an inclusive society.\(^{53}\) Also, for him, “nations are a product of relatively recent history”, and different ethnonational groups can exist in the same society.\(^{54}\) This is important for the inclusive social democracy because it aims “ethnic and cultural pluralism”.\(^{55}\) Hence, to Giddens, to establish an inclusive society, successful cultivation of ethnic pluralism is must.\(^{56}\) In this inclusive society, social democracy serves to include everybody. In other words, exclusions are also the result of rigid ethnonational identities, and they do not have meaning in the social democratic parties or states.

On the other side, scholars investigated that equality, humanity, and inclusionary policies within the leftist parties generally matter for their own people. Alonso and Da Fonseca state that “in Austria, the Social Democrats turned more anti-immigrant before the electoral jump of the extreme right.”\(^{57}\) Van der Brug and Van Spanje observe that two economically leftist parties, the Danish Social Democrats and the Finnish Centre Party are consistent on the idea of “helping asylum seekers and migrants return home are bundled together.”\(^{58}\) Moreover, as Hinnfors, Spehar, and Gregg stated in their research, “Gordon Brown, former Labour Prime Minister in the UK, pledged that his government would create ‘British jobs for British workers’ in 2007.”\(^{59}\) These are clear examples that depict relatively hidden nationalism in the leftist parties against especially immigrants. This looks like paradoxical in the ontology of the left,


\(^{54}\) Ibid 131-132.

\(^{55}\) Ibid 132.

\(^{56}\) Ibid 107.

\(^{57}\) Alonso, Sonia., and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. “Immigration, left and right.” 877.


\(^{59}\) Hinnfors, Jonas., Spehar, Andrea. and Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. “The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy.” 600.
but there could be legitimate reasons to understand exclusionary rhetoric of the leftists, and by the harshness of these reasons, the level of exclusion change.

For Hinnfors, Spehar, and Gregg, the main reasons could be about “political institutions”, “national economic conditions”, “cultural context”, “vote-maximization behaviour of the political parties”, and “the behaviour of right-wing and populist right parties”. Under these conditions and circumstances, the leftist parties in their migration policies “can be observed in three types of scenario: convergence with the main competitor, congruence and divergence or polarization.” Thus, according to the domestic conditions, the left-wing parties try to reframe their policies vis-à-vis the other political actors for their electoral considerations. CHP and HDP, as ideologically left-wing parties, fit in contrast positions in Turkey for the Syrian refugees.

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61 Alonso, Sonia. and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. “Immigration, left and right.” 877.
1.3. Theories of nationalism and stories of orientalism(s)

In the literature of the nationalism studies, the roadmap of exclusions and inclusions are discussed from different aspects and dimensions. Before analyzing them, the core debate is important to correlate nationalism within the party politics. One of the most contested issues in the literature of the nationalism studies is whether national identities and ethnicities are either socially constructed, flexible and not rigid or rigid-fixed from the beginning, i.e. primordial identities. For Chandra, the supporters of the natural ties of the minority parties in relation with a possible conflict, they assume ethnic and national identities as primordial. 62 In this research, mainly, I will use primordial, virulent, exclusive and defensive nationalism to define the nationalism of CHP because they have common patterns to exclude the national other.

For Geertz, primordial nationalism is about social existence, and it “stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices.” 63 In the words of Bieber, virulent nationalism “rejects the status quo and seeks to reassert the will of an imagined community over a political or cultural space is different from.” 64 Also, Wimmer states that “political project of nationalism” is oriented to exclude others, and this directly refers to exclusionary nationalism. 65 For Öniş, defensive nationalism constitutes “a series of resistance” for the future of a nation by preserving its national priorities. 66 Therefore, all these definitions of nationalism have common patterns to draw the boundaries of a self and to exclude the national other.

Anderson in his classic book, *Imagined Communities*, defines nationality as a socially constructed and as a result of modernity. Also, for Gellner, nationalism is modern, top-down, and constructed. As mentioned above, socially constructed nationalism is not rigid like primordial nationalism, and its exclusionary rhetoric is less harsh than primordial one. It does not refer to historical narratives. Hence, if minority parties and leftist parties are evaluated in the framework of nationalism, their nationalism is closer to socially constructed one. For Bauer, national identities will “disappear once a socialist order had been achieved.” Also, in inclusionary policies of minority parties, a desire is seen for “the representation of the interests of marginalized groups” by not just focusing their constructed national interests.

At this point, it is necessary to mention the literature of ethnic conflicts to see the core of the constructed national and ethnic identities vis-à-vis the escalation of tensions. For Kaufmann, ethnic identities are the main reasons of the conflict due to their rigid and fixed characteristics. However, Kalvays refutes the explanation and argument of Kaufmann by referring to the conflicts that have ideological dimensions, i.e. the Spanish civil war. Hence, for Kalyvas, ideologies are fixed, and ethnic or national identities are socially constructed. To be able to see and analyze social democratic and socialist parties, Kalyvas’s argument is highly important because when either the inclusions or the exclusions are observed, they are consistent with ideological explanations of the parties and their socially constructed nationalisms.

As referred in the former research on nationalism, exclusion and process of otherification are inevitable parts of both constructed and primordial nationalisms, but the

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70 Htun, Mala. (2016) *Inclusion without representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations*. Cambridge University Press. 2
73 Ibid.
degrees of exclusions change. For Smith, “the impact of waves of migrants and guest-workers on the economies and societies of European states [...] may differentially affect their attitude and priorities.”74 It is also stories of the ideologically cleaved political parties where it is possible to see the core of the inclusion and exclusion in the domestic politics vis-à-vis immigrants. For Giddens, solidarity is also the milestone and one of the cores of the social democratic and socialist parties.75 But, according explanation of Wimmer and Schiller Glick, “immigrants destroy the isomorphism between people and solidarity.”76 That’s why although nationalism is not seen rigid and exclusionary within the left-wing politics, anti-immigrant attitude of the left is more likely to protect their own people and solidarity in their societies.

To see the paradox of exclusion in the left-wing parties how they excluded and exclude are important to see historical continuation to preserve nationalism. Said’s book, Orientalism77, that establishes a certain hierarchy between the Orient and the Occident and starts the process of (re)writing of otherization in an oriental sense. After sixteen years when the Orientalism was published by Said the first time, Bakić-Hayden discussed the issue of “nesting” orientalism(s) that depends on the tensions of the times and geography to other people orientally.78 This is also story of the exclusionary nationalism in the 21st century by the extreme right European parties against the refugees and asylum seekers as called as neo-Orientalism79, but also it is seen in the left-wing parties as a continuation of their exclusionary exergies in their pasts (and their presents).

Also, for Wimmer and Schiller Glick, nationalism is also about defending their own lands. For anti-immigrants, refugees and asylums seekers don’t do that, and this is problematic for the whole interpretations of nationalism in the different degrees. In the next Chapters, these theoretical and thematic arguments and explanations are implemented into the case of the left-wing parties of Turkey.

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2.1. A brief background

To understand the visible differentiation between the two leftist parties in terms of their migration policies, the background of the Syrian refugee crisis and Turkey’s volunteer policy and rhetoric for the Syrians should be demonstrated. Since 2002, Islamist AKP rose to power in Turkey and its foreign policy in the Middle East blurred the borders between domestic policy and foreign policy. To be an imperial power in the Middle East, AKP and Erdoğan referred to the problems of this region in the Turkish politics. Catastrophic relations between Assad and Erdoğan opened the window of an opportunity for Erdoğan to be an effective voice in the region using the Syrian refugees. Erdoğan used ethnicity and religion on the road of acceptance of the Syrians. Hence, the acceptance of the Syrian refugees is legitimized one of the columns of Islamist AKP’s general policy either in its domestic or foreign policy.

According to current data of the UNHCR, there are registered 3.600.000 Syrian refugees in Turkey. From the beginning of the acceptance of the refugees, the failure of AKP and Erdoğan’s Syria policy is the case by looking at the situation of the refugee camps and lives of the Syrians. This catastrophic foreign policy and its direct effects in the daily lives of “the people” of Turkey caused a polarization within the society. That’s why this polarization,

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different solution alternatives, and differentiation are also visible between CHP and HDP, as discussed despite their ideological similarities.

After the official foundation of HDP in 2012, it aims to stay positive towards CHP. Kılıçdaroğlu’s “less nationalistic more social democratic” party aim is crucial to see closeness of the two left-wing parties against Islamist AKP. Before the Syrian refugee crisis, they followed similar inclusive agendas for their electorates that are dismissed by AKP. During the refugee crisis, they started to state different and contrast statements over time for the Syrians. HDP started to criticize CHP’s exclusive statements against the Syrians despite their alliance against AKP during all electoral periods. From the beginning of the crisis to now, HDP developed more inclusive policies, but CHP supported exclusion of the Syrians. In the current Turkish politics, there is still an alliance which is not clearly stated but visible between them against AKP, but their differentiation vis-à-vis the Syrians is concrete. In the fourth Chapter, I present empirical evidences to show the dissonance between their migration policies.

2.2. Research puzzle and question

With the Syrian refugee crisis, the first time, all political parties had to formulate, a policy position on the appearance of millions of refugees, particularly on the extent to which they would be welcomed in the Turkish polity. As I discussed in the previous Chapter, the ideological cleavage among the political parties provides to estimate their reactions and behaviours vis-à-vis the refugees. For Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer, “the political right is more concerned [with] preserving cultural traditions, and therefore less tolerant of minority groups, than the political left.”

This is also expected and general interpretation for the party ideologies for immigrants.

However, in a deeper analysis on social democratic and socialist parties, an inclusionary policy for immigrants is not seen in each case. For Alonso and Da Fonseca, the “anti-immigrant turn” of the leftist parties “can be observed in three types of scenario: convergence with the main competitor, congruence and divergence or polarization.” As a social democratic majority party, CHP fits in “divergence or polarization” against its main competitor, AKP that is the ruling party of Turkey and accepts the refugees. Moreover, exclusionary policies of CHP are closer to exclusion of extreme right against the immigrants. Hence, I trace the exclusion of the left-wing parties.

In the case of CHP, its historical nationalism and strategies cause its severe exclusion against the Syrians. CHP repeats its former reactions in the past against ethnically different groups. That’s why exclusionary nationalism of CHP is harsher than a possible exclusion of the left-wing. It is possible to say that inclusionary policies of the social democratic and socialist

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90 Alonso, Sonia. and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. “Immigration, left and right.”: 877.
91 In the section of 4.1. A brief background, AKP’s Syrian refugee policy is discussed.
parties are mainly about their own people. In the exclusionary nationalism of CHP, electoral considerations are in the center. When CHP was founded and rose to power in Turkey (1923-1950), its electorate was the ethnonational core group. In other words, CHP was the party for the Turkish population who were not non-Muslim and Kurd, that’s why it excluded periphery of Turkey from its electorate. Now, the Syrians are the new periphery of Turkey that are not a part of “real” Turkish population, and they are excluded again.

On the other side, minority parties serve as camps to represent the people who are not represented politically. This is similar also with the story of HDP in Turkey. Although all the Syrian refugees are not citizens, their health conditions, integration into society, lives, and rights integration into society matter for HDP. Rationally, HDP reflects its multi-dimensional minority party feature for the Syrians in its migration policy. Unlike CHP, HDP does not refer to historical patterns in its migration policy because as Chandra states, it tries to be “champion the interests of more than one category”. So, for the case of the ethnically leftist party “congruence” is the case for the inclusion of immigrants.

In light of the ideological polarization in Turkey, a visible alliance between the two leftist political parties in Turkey against AKP is observed. However, in their migration policies, specifically for the Syrian refugees, there is a sharp dissonance between them as stated above. Exclusionary policies are clearly observed in CHP, but in HDP, inclusion is concrete for the Syrian refugees. Then, both represent the same ideological camp, and they have relatively close relations in the Turkish politics, so why two left-wing parties might respond in an opposite manner to a refugee influx, with different levels of inclusion is the puzzle of this research. My
answer comes down to differences between minority politics incentives and majority politics incentives.
2.3. Hypotheses of the research

In light of the research puzzle, two hypotheses are tested for a scientific answer. The first hypothesis is that the left-wing parties are welfare chauvinists despite the parties’ humanitarian and egalitarian core. To test welfare chauvinism of CHP, nationalism and possible reasons to exclude immigrants are analyzed within the left-wing politics over time. In this research, I analyze the ontology of the left and exclusionary nationalisms-orientalisms in order to see exclusion of a left-wing party despite its internally inclusionary rhetoric for its electoral considerations.

The second hypothesis of the research is that the left-wing minority parties are more inclusionary than the left-wing majority parties for the immigrants. To test it I will present how the left-wing party politics nourishes minority parties in terms of inclusionary party policies and rhetoric is discussed over time. This is mainly correlated with multi-dimensional and inclusive party formation of minority parties for immigrants that is not discussed in detail in the literature.

I expect that all hypotheses are right. For the first one, I expect to see that the left-wing majority party excludes immigrants from the society. It aims to protect the interests of the ethnonational core because the ethnonational core is its electorate, and they are against the refugees. For the second one, I expect to see inclusionary policies of the minority party as concrete. Moreover, it should include the immigrants more than the majority party. Also, the constituencies of the minority party should be inclusive for them. Thus, minority party also acts in a consistent manner with its electorate as rationally.

Dependent variable of this research is level of inclusion of the left-wing parties, and independent variable is their electoral considerations. I will measure over time with CHP and HDP, looking at policies, statements, and political positions.
2.4. Methodology: Comparative case study and process-tracing

In this research, mainly, comparative case study and the method of process-tracing will be applied to see the differentiation between the two left-wing political parties and to locate them into theoretical frameworks that are discussed in the first Chapter.

Turkey is the unique state in terms of acceptance rate of the Syrian refugees since the beginning of the crisis in 2011. That’s why Turkey is selected as a modern and an extreme case aspect of the refugee number. For comparative case study, the selection of the cases depends on method of difference. In other words, for the unit level analysis, the political parties are selected according to their common categorization, their ideology. How they differ despite their ideology and closeness is the starting point for this research.

Former researches on CHP and HDP aspect of their ideologies, nationalism, exclusions and inclusions, relevant speeches of party members and party leaders, party manifestos, electoral manifestos, past experiences, future plans, and any migration related books or documents are analyzed by applying the method of process tracing to see casual mechanism. I translated documents and speeches from Turkish to English. In the method of process-tracing, the main purpose is to see the chain of events behind the ideologies and either exclusionary or inclusionary policies of the parties.
CHAPTER 3: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHP AND HDP: VISIBLE IDEOLOGIC CLEAVAGE

3.1. The left-wing party politics and CHP

Before historically analyzing of the CHP in terms of either inclusionary or exclusionary policies in Turkey, it is necessary to indicate that in 2010, with the new party leader of CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, social democracy became the official ideology of the party. In this research, when either the current face or the historical part of CHP are analysed, the aim is not to discuss in detail the economic aspect of social democracy within the party politics. The main aim is to measure its level of inclusion and solidarity in leftist parties in light of Giddens’s inclusionary society in social democracy.

When Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was nominated and selected as a new party leader of CHP, his inclusionary rhetoric becomes visible in the party agenda. It can be interpreted either reconciliation process with the non-Muslim people of Turkey who were othered during the early Republican era of Turkey by CHP or reconciliation with the Kurds who are all their own people of Turkey. It is consistent with the explanation of Giddens in terms of an inclusionary society understanding of a social democratic party in terms of ethnic pluralism.

However, when we look at the historical evolution of CHP, the core of social democracy cannot be seen even in the rhetoric of the party leaders. CHP excluded the non-Muslims in the early Republican era during its single party rule (1923-1950). Hence, for Öniş, calling it a social

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95 Uysal, Ayşen. (2011) “Continuity and Rupture: The ‘New CHP’ or What Has Changed in the CHP’.” Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 4: 140.
98 Ibid 7.
99 Ibid 7.
100 Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. 105.
democratic party was inappropriate\textsuperscript{101} because there were just visible tendencies to become social democratic in a comparison with the right of Turkey. During 1960s workers’ movements, CHP had started to adopt social democracy in Turkey because of intrinsically overlapping points and consistency between CHP and social democracy that were thought by the party elites at that time.\textsuperscript{102}

At that point, defensive nationalism\textsuperscript{103} is the repeated concept in the literature before mentioning ideological cleavage in CHP. It has become both in the written and unwritten manifestos of the party, and it is tried to be protected as a legacy of Kemalism, the founding ideology of the party.\textsuperscript{104} Hence, otherifications, orientalizations, and exclusionary nationalism against non-Muslims and the Kurds during 1930s by CHP government can be analysed with its historically sharp defensive nationalism understanding which is contrast to social democracy and its inclusionary understanding.

In the era of post-2010, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his elites, they are becoming social democratic and directly adapting the inclusionary understanding of Giddens’s analysis on social democracy. With the beginning of his leadership, Kılıçdaroğlu states, “a less nationalistic and more social democratic position” for the party.\textsuperscript{105} Then immediately, he focused on improvement of human rights in Turkey.\textsuperscript{106} However, currently CHP excludes the Syrians from the Turkish society.

Thus, when CHP faces a similar situation that was seen in the history of the party, the remanences of the former party patterns and strategies are more likely to be visible vis-à-vis the

\textsuperscript{102} Cingi, Aydin. “CHP: A Party on the Road to Social Democracy.”: 3.
\textsuperscript{103} Öniş, Ziya. “Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey.”: 251.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid 293-294.
\textsuperscript{105} Cingi, Aydin. “CHP: A Party on the Road to Social Democracy.”: 1.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid 8.
new case that has an ethnic dimension to follow an exclusionary policy although the adaptation of social democracy is clear in the rhetoric of the party. In March 2016, Kılıçdaroğlu clearly stated how CHP responded the Syrian refugees:

“The Syrians will corrupt Turkey. We do not know their exact economic burden on us. They will occupy the underground of our country and damage our welfare. If you do not believe in me, you can ask the mayor of Gaziantep where many refugee camps are. AKP’s Turkey is responsible for that number of Syrians who live in Turkey. We are not guilty when we propose to resend them back to Syria.”

In this quotation, it is clear that Syrians are not wanted by CHP. As Mardin (1973) referred, historically, CHP is a center-orientated party, and its constituencies are not disadvantaged groups of the society. Hence, CHP’s electoral considerations derived from its constituencies’ expectations. In the early Republican era, during the single party rule of CHP, non-Muslims and Kurds are othered by CHP and its constituencies. In 1946, when the first plural party election made, CHP was still dominant party. Hence, othered and excluded part of the society did not cause a certain reaction against CHP by its constituencies.

The Syrian refugee crisis and the acceptance of the refugees caused to repeat the exclusionary nationalism of CHP against another ethnic group because now its electorate is against the Syrians. As discussed in the next Chapter, CHP excludes in a similar manner with the extreme right because it directly excludes the Syrians due to national differences between them. CHP’s repeated defensive nationalism against a disadvantaged group, even harsher than the exclusionary nature of social democracy against the immigrants, is an example of


chauvinist and exclusive party structure. When CHP’s voters are analyzed, according to the research of Doğan in KONDA research center, among the voters of Turkey’s political parties, voters of CHP are the most suspect people against the acceptance of the Syrians in Turkey.\textsuperscript{109} In her research, in general, CHP voters assume that Syrians come to Turkey for their economic considerations, there is no threat of war, and they are burden in Turkey.\textsuperscript{110} To understand CHP’s current exclusionary nationalism, their voters’ approach is key. The changed electorate of CHP is still exclusionary nationalist, but the new enemy is the Syrians.


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid 38-40.
3.2. The left-wing party politics and HDP

Despite certain ethnic character of HDP as a Kurdish party for the democratic autonomy\textsuperscript{111}, in the current party politics, also, it is defined as a left-wing party.\textsuperscript{112} HDP, founded in 2012, is the most leading Kurdish party in Turkey. However, when it is analyzed either as a continuation of the Kurdish party tradition that has a Marxist core or directly as a left-wing party, its social democratic and inclusionary rhetoric, policies, and party agenda have a priority for the marginalized people of Turkey.\textsuperscript{113} This is a clear example of how minority parties are inherently incentivized to be inclusionary in their policies.

As discussed in the first Chapter, social democracy aims to establish an inclusive society. Moreover, equality and solidarity are key principles for an inclusive society. In general, these grand concepts are tried to be targeted for their own people. However, in the case of HDP, its inclusionary rhetoric is clearly visible, and it includes all segments of the society. This is especially true for people who are marginalized by the other political parties from their electorates, via HDP’s inclusionary discourse of bizler (plural version of “we” in Turkish).\textsuperscript{114}

When HDP was founded, there is a clear target to be “a party of Turkey”, not just for one ethnic group in its party agenda.\textsuperscript{115} This is a clear example of multi-dimensional party understanding of a minority party that is discussed by Chandra for the consolidation of democracies by minority parties and their roles of representations for people who are not represented by the other parties.\textsuperscript{116} Hence, there is also a clear consistence between Giddens’s inclusionary society understanding of a social democratic party and HDP. Moreover, it does

\textsuperscript{111} Tekdemir, Omer. (2016) “Conflict and Reconciliation between Turks and Kurds: the HDP as an agonistic actor.” \textit{Southeast European and Black Sea Studies}, Vol. 16, No. 4: 656.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid 652.
\textsuperscript{114} Tekdemir, Omer. “Conflict and Reconciliation between Turks and Kurds: the HDP as an agonistic actor.”: 657
\textsuperscript{116} Chandra, Kanchan. “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.”: 235.

29
not exist for the sake “the people” of Turkey because it aims to cover “people of Turkey”. It means people who live in Turkey currently without any discrimination. This is embedded in the discourse of bizler.

HDP does not refer to historical strategies of its founding ethnic group in its migration policy. It aims to be a party of Turkey, and the most important proof of that is embedded in the party constitution:

“HDP is the party for the excluded part of Turkey. It is for all folks, all religion communities, women, workers, the unemployed, immigrants, LGBT+. We came together against exclusion and exploitation.”\(^{117}\)

History, historical patterns and interest of its founding ethnicity are just one of the chapters of the party. If HDP prefers to refer to historical patterns and behaviors of its ethnic group, ethnic demands and traumas of the Kurds are repeated in general. It does not fit in multidimensional party formation. In 2016, Demirtaş stated overall how HDP responded the Syrians in Turkey:

“Syrian refugees may apply to the status of Turkish citizenship. They are not guilty, and the law of citizenship is clear. We should not accuse them, and they did not do anything. AKP is responsible for the current living standards of the Syrians in Turkey. We should not behave them racist.”\(^{118}\)

HDP’s rhetoric and policies for the immigrants do not have any signal of defensive nationalism that is generally attached to CHP in the Turkish politics. Defensive nationalism could be seen for the sake of the Kurdish people who live in Turkey by HDP, but as a contrast


to the counter-minority party scholars, HDP does not create a sort of hierarchy between the Kurdish identity and other ethnic or other identities. This is a clear example why HDP tries to protect the Syrians and their rights, lives, and future in Turkey.\textsuperscript{119}

When the protectionist and inclusive features of HDP are analyzed, it is important to say that HDP is nourished by the core of the social democratic and socialist party understanding.\textsuperscript{120} As an evidence, Filiz Kerestecioğlu’s speech, an MP of HDP, before June 2018 election is important:

“\textit{We will get the votes of the leftist people in Turkey. We are the real left of Turkey because of our inclusive policies for all people.\textsuperscript{121}}”

This is a rational strategy for a minority party to survive during the elections.

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CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRANTS AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE IN TURKEY:
DO THE LEFTISTS DIFFERENTIATE?

4.1. The Syrian refugees and CHP

CHP excluded the non-Muslims in the early Republican era during its single party rule (1923-1950). This is a clear example of its ethnonational exclusion and nationalism vis-a-vis the Greek people who were exchanged with the Turks of Greece in 1923. There were loyal Greek origin-Turks, and they were also sent to Greece because of their Orthodox identity. In a consistent manner of its exclusionary policies, “1934 anti-Jewish Thrace riots were planned actions by CHP.” It was resulted in an expulsion of the Jews and a visible decrease in their population in Turkey. The main pattern of expulsion(s) of both Greeks and Jews was to destroy their economic position in Turkey and create a space for the Turks to maximize their economic activities. As indicated in the previous Chapter, in the first plural party elections of Turkey, 1946, there was no reaction against CHP by its electorate to protect the rights of the non-Muslims. This is a clear example of how the voters for CHP is the dominant part of the Turkish society and nationalist because when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded modern Turkey in 1923, he aimed to consolidate civic Turkish identity for the sake of the Turkish nation state. CHP was also founded by him, and it aimed to represent dominant Turkish part of the society. Excluded part was pushed to define themselves as Turk (and Muslim).

124 Ibid 896.
126 Ibid., Akturk, Sener. “Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood.”
Furthermore, civic nationalism-based exclusion was also seen in the ontology of CHP against Kurds because of Turkey’s suppression of its citizens by naming them as Turks.\textsuperscript{127} In other words, there was no binary-either Turk or Kurd-in the early Republican era by CHP, and everybody was named as Turk. This demonstrates how the Turkish identity is important for CHP from the beginning of its foundation. For Atatürk, Turkish identity is the future of Turkey.

As discussed in the third Chapter, during 1960s, the inclusionary social democracy started to become an ideology of the party. Moreover, with Kılıçdaroğlu, solidarity and equality as new principles are targeted to integrate in both party and Turkey and a reconciliation with their own people of Turkey, native minorities, who were othered in the early Republican era started. Hence, if the early Republican era is also evaluated as the left, for Belge, it is not a kind of the history of Turkish socialism, this is a typical example of Turkish fascism.\textsuperscript{128} Kılıçdaroğlu tries to include the motto of “tolerance”\textsuperscript{129} that belongs to left on behalf of the party. However, it works and is accessible for their own people in the current situation. In other words, the refugees and asylum seekers are not subject to Kılıçdaroğlu’s grand inclusionary policy. As Kaya observed in his research that despite the electoral decisions of native minorities, Greeks or Jews, are not visible in Turkey, a certain reconciliation is a part of Kılıçdaroğlu’s rhetoric with native minorities of Turkey.\textsuperscript{130} However, for now, the pattern to exclude is observed against the Syrians who live in Turkey by CHP. Furthermore, Doğan’s research proves, in

\textsuperscript{127} Eligur, Banu. “Ethnocultural nationalism and Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities during the early republican period.” : 158.
general, nationalism of electorate of CHP against the Syrians by perceiving them as national threat and burden.\textsuperscript{131} Thus, they do not want the Syrians in Turkey.

![Diagram 1: Work Permit Perception](image)

![Diagram 2: Residence Permit Perception](image)

“KONDA Clauster of Voter: Voters of CHP” 41-42.

When I analyze the electoral manifestos of CHP for the elections after the Syrian refugee influx started to come in Turkey, there are clear points that were preserved in each of them for the refugees. In the manifestos of June 2015, November 2015, and June 2018 parliamentary elections; aspect of the Syria refugees, the repeated argument is to prevent “unfair competition in the labour market”\textsuperscript{132} It means, the burden of the Syrian refugees causes this problem


\textsuperscript{132} (First) This manifesto could not be accessed via the official website of CHP. It was retrieved from Radikal (daily newspaper in Turkey). “CHP’nin 2015 seçim bildirgisinin tam metni.” (In English, “The whole text of 2015
because of their existence in Turkey. CHP’s constituencies are working class, therefore most threatened by job losses with the immigrants. This reminds us ethnonational exclusion of CHP in the early Republican era by referring to economic reasons. In the last electoral manifesto, inclusionary rhetoric, especially for the Syrian refugee children are also seen. Moreover, in the Migration Report of CHP, ethnographic researches and daily problems of Syrian children and women are discussed in detail. Hence, in the written documents of CHP, exclusion is not as harsh in the statements of both Kılıçdaroğlu and party members. After the analysis on Kılıçdaroğlu’s five speeches and interviews that contain the issue of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, exclusion is concrete against the Syrians.

Moreover, in the selected five speeches and actions from the party members vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees who live in Turkey, the consistency with Kılıçdaroğlu is seen, but inclusion, solidarity and equality principles of the social democratic party understanding are not clear. Social democracy is close to exclude less harshly than the right and extreme right because of its ethnic pluralism. But, in this case, historical nationalism of CHP and its electorate demonstrate why the left-wing parties are welfare chauvinist despite the parties’ humanitarian and egalitarian core. Social identity theory explains this. People who “belong to a social category and group” categorize themselves as self, so out-group is not important. Hence, in

general, ideology does not matter in the dichotomy of either exclusion or inclusion of immigrants. Ideology is an expected way to think possible party patterns for them, but the other reasons, as the discussed historical nationalism, matter for the degrees of exclusion among the left-wing parties for their electoral considerations.

Chronologically, firstly, in 2014, he participated in one of the discussion programs in CNN Turkey with Ahmet Hakan. During his round, firstly, he mentions the current grievances of the Syrian refugee children and women in Turkey referring to the international reports. As a conclusion, he adds that “being traitor is to allow the 1.500.000 Syrians to enter in Turkey.”

Hence, the Syrian refugees are seen as a burden for Turkey, and acceptance of them is a national anomaly for him because of their economic cost on the Turkish nation.

Secondly, In the Summer of 2016, the issue of citizenship for the Syrians became a scandal for CHP, and according to news of Al Jazeera, Kılıçdaroğlu’s one of the first reactions is close to virulent nationalistic arguments. He says that “the acceptance of the Syrian refugees at that level aims to destroy Turkish genetic code.” This claim also refers to hate and primordial understanding that is observed during the expulsions of early Republican period.

Thirdly, just before the election in June 2018, in his one of the interviews, he states, “there is no conflictual and catastrophic situation in Syria anymore, then they (the Syrian refugees) should go back to their hometown now.” However, just after one day, according to the news of Al Jazeera, “Syrian President Bashar al-Assad warned US-backed Kurdish forces


he wouldn't hesitate to use force to retake one-third of the country they currently control.”

Hence, there is no total peaceful conditions for the refugees in Syria when he speaks on behalf of them, and an expulsion is aimed for the refugees.

Fourthly, in October 2018, one of the labour workshops of Turkey, Kılıçdaroğlu criticizes AKP and its refugee policy by comparing Turks and Syrians. He says, “you donated $35.000.000.000 for the Syrian refugees who live in Turkey, but for the pensions of Turkey?”

“I am not fascist; I just protect the rights of my own people.” Therefore, the focus on “their own people” is seen again in a nationalistic sense for electoral considerations.

Lastly, in December 2018, in an interview for Hürriyet, a daily Turkish newspaper, he responded the questions of Deniz Zeyrek. He concludes that “educate the Syrians, they should fight for their country.”

By referring to these arguments that are stated by Kılıçdaroğlu during his tenure as a party leader of CHP, exclusionary understanding is concrete against the Syrians. Moreover, he gets close to virulent nationalism by referring to “Turkish genetic code”. Also, he clearly depicts how he does not care the lives and security of the Syrians by offering to resettle them without peaceful conditions in Syria. And, the focus and main desire to protect is seen for their own


141 Ibid.

people, not refugees. The focus on protection of their own people is about electoral considerations to obtain the votes of nationalist dominant part of the society like in the past.

Exclusionary and nationalistic rhetoric within CHP is not unique for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Among party members, there are similar statements vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees. Firstly, in March 2018, an MP of CHP, Erdoğan Toprak speaks similar with Kılıçdaroğlu’s rhetoric against the refugees. He states, “they live in Turkey, but my young boys will die for them. Turkey donates money for them and protects their health (rights). Turkish citizens have to pay for their health (insurances), but they don’t. Turkish citizens have to pay tax, but they don’t. The time for the watch is for them (the Syrian refugees who live in Turkey).” In this quotation, it is clear that he thinks they should join the Free Syrian Army to defend their country. This argument is consistent with Wimmer and Schiller Glick who explained that one of claims of the nationalists who are against the immigrants in their societies is to accuse the immigrants.

Additionally, Muharrem İnce, the last presidential candidate of CHP in the former presidential elections of Turkey, in his one of the public speeches in TV channels, talks about the Syrians. He questions “how the Syrians return to Syria to visit their families during the religious fests.” He says, “if they prefer to visit their relatives, I won’t receive them back to Turkey.” “Turkey is not a kind of public soup-kitchen. My own people are unemployed.” In this speech, the focus on their own people is protected. But also, celebration of the religious fest is seen as criteria that the refugees should not be part of it due to their refugee identity and


145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.
current trauma. If they prefer, it means there is no trauma for them and there is no chaotic situation in Syria. This is a clear example of nesting-orientalism(s). The Syrians are othered because of their identity and the situation in their state. They are also othered orientally by referring their religious celebration.

Another comparison between their own people and the Syrian refugees is made by Ayhan Barut, an MP of CHP. In his one of the parliamentary speeches in October 2018, he refers to seasonal workers of ÇAYKUR. He states that “ÇAYKUR, a Turkish tea company, has seasonal workers, and they cannot work six months.”\(^\text{147}\) Barut discussed this issue in the Turkish Parliament to solve the future-related problems of these workers. He compares their situation with the Syrians and “criticizes AKP due to its spending for the lives of the Syrians in Turkey.”\(^\text{148}\) When CHP is analyzed historically, in the early Republican era, the non-Muslim workers were dismissed from their positions\(^\text{149}\), and this is a similar way to alienate the Syrians in social and economic spheres of Turkey by prioritizing their own people.

Moreover, in March 2019, CHP’s Platform of Science criticizes AKP. The main focus is how the refugees stole the jobs of our citizens when they criticize the wrong migration policy of AKP.\(^\text{150}\) They demonstrate the main discourse of the xenophobia against the Syrians. Just after around one month these critiques, in the municipal elections of Turkey, CHP increases the numbers of its mayors. Tanju Özcan was elected as a new mayor of city of Bolu from CHP.

\(^{147}\) It is a parliamentary speech of Ayhan Barut, MP of CHP. “CHP Milletvekili Barut: Suriyelilere Para Varken ÇAYKUR Mevsimlik İşçisine Neden Para ve Kadro Yok.” (In English, “CHP’s MP, Barut: There is money for the Syrians, but there is no money and official cadre for the seasonal workers of ÇAYKUR.”) October 10, 2018. Retrieved from [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxF8fOLbBy](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxF8fOLbBy).

\(^{148}\) Ibid.

\(^{149}\) Eligür, Banu. “Ethnocultural nationalism and Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities during the early republican period.”: 166

first action was to stop any sort of aids for the Syrian who live in Bolu from the budget of municipality.\textsuperscript{151} Hence, alienation of the refugees from Turkey, in an economically sense, is also a repeated action by the party members of CHP for the sake of their own people and electoral considerations.

4.2. The Syrian refugees and HDP

HDP does not refer to Kurdish issue and demands of Kurdish people in its migration policy on the Syrians. There is no hierarchal understanding in HDP when it analyses the Syrians in Turkey, and it does not alienate them from its party agenda because HDP sees immigrants and refugees as a part of its constituents. It is clearly indicated in the party constitution:

“HDP is the party for the excluded part of Turkey. It is for all folks, all religion communities, women, workers, the unemployed, immigrants, LGBT+. We came together against exclusion and exploitation.”

Although some of the Syrians have citizenship, therefore they are effective actors during the vote competition, HDP does include all refugees in an inclusive way. It is important to see (in)visible weak nationalism of social democracy and political inclusion of HDP in a consistent manner with its multi-dimensional minority party politics.

Moreover, in contrast to nationalistic pattern of CHP against the Syrians, there is no reference for historical patterns and behaviors of ethnically Kurdish group in Turkey. HDP consciously avoids referring to historical Kurdish issue in its migration policy to depict itself as a totally inclusive party as it can be understood from the rhetoric of bizler (plural version of “we” in Turkish and the motto of the party). One of the most concrete examples of its inclusive and separate migration policy is that there is no room to refer to PKK, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kurdish militant political organization. It is not reframed or associated with the Syrians. PKK is a guerrilla movement in Turkey for the democratic autonomy of

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153 Tekdemir, Omer. “Conflict and Reconciliation between Turks and Kurds: the HDP as an agonistic actor.”: 657
Kurds. Although HDP does not block the whole channels with PKK, it never repeats its name and its arguments in its other policies.\textsuperscript{154}

To understand the migration policy of HDP for the Syrians, I will analyze electoral manifestos of the last three parliamentary elections that HDP participated, migration report of HDP, and statements of party leaders and party members. In the formulation of migration policy, the target is to demonstrate HDP’s both leftist and minority party position for the Syrians by not referring to historical patterns for political and total inclusion of the refugees.

In the electoral manifesto of June 2015 elections, there was no direct article for the Syrian refugees as a specific subtitle or article. HDP stated the Syrian refugees in its electoral manifesto in November 2015 elections to include them in Turkey. Hence, HDP realizes why the Syrians are also important for its constituencies in its second election. However, in terms of the foreign policy of HDP, the party states to “work to end the civil war in Syria. We struggle for a solution that depends on brotherhood and equality.”\textsuperscript{155} Moreover, at the beginning of the manifesto, the repeated concepts are “rights of all of us”, “freedom of everybody”, “justice” and “equality”.\textsuperscript{156}

For the elections of November 2015, the same focus of the June electoral manifesto for Syria is preserved:

“We work to end the civil war in Syria. We struggle for a solution that depends on brotherhood and equality.”\textsuperscript{157}


\textsuperscript{156} Ibid 3.

\textsuperscript{157} This manifesto was retrieved from the official website of the HDP for the 1 November 2015 parliamentary election. “HDP 2015 Seçim Bildirgesi: Büyük İnsanlık, Biz’ler meclise.” (In English, “HDP 2015 Electoral Manifesto: Grand Humanity, We(s) into the Assembly.”) Accessed date May 2, 2019.
Furthermore, under the title of “Struggle against Unemployment”, there is a specific article for inclusionary policies of immigrants:

“All discriminations are tried to be prevented against women, LGBT+ members, and migrants who have different native tongues, identity, and culture.”158 Historically marginalized people are integrated into the agenda of the party in a leftist sense.159

Also, in the same manifesto, there is a specific chapter named as “Humanitarian Attitude for the Immigrants”:

“Migrant workers will be worked as if they were citizens of Turkey.”160 “Secure living conditions, secure corridors to reach Turkey, and making easier the visa application processes are other points.”161 In the articles of this chapter, the main focus is on right to live and right to work for the refugees without any discrimination.

For the electoral manifesto of June 2018 elections, the same focus for the sake of independent Syria is also preserved.162 Also, the problems of the refugee women are targeted to be solved due to their refugee and woman identity.163

As seen in the electoral manifestos of the CHP in the three consecutive parliamentary elections, inclusionary rhetoric is also visible in the case of HDP. HDP’s rhetoric gets close to
solve the problems of the immigrants and for the protection of their lives by depending on equality principle of the social democracy.

In HDP’s report for the problems of refugees, the same inclusive narrative for the refugees is observed:

“When HDP analyzes the case of refugees it is necessary to say that it is an internal issue, and it should be dealt with in the borders of Turkey.”164 “Another focus is on the total acceptance of the refugees in Turkey and provide them rights in the social and economic spheres in a structured manner.”165 “HDP decides to fight against religion-based and ethnicity-based discrimination against the refugees.”166

Thus, when HDP indicates the issue of religion and ethnicity-based discrimination, it is clear that defensive nationalism of CHP is not visible in HDP.167 The process of orientalization and otherification cannot find a place in the party agenda. This is key to see how HDP formulates an inclusive party structure in a rational manner to maximize its numbers of voters.

In the statements of party leaders and members, in contrast to certain exclusion of CHP, human rights and equality-orientated explanations are observed for the Syrians. Before analyzing the speeches and actions of party members, it is necessary to remind that as Tarlan stated, the electoral camp of HDP is more positive and inclusionary for the Syrians in a comparison with the other parties of the current Turkish parliament. So, HDP also represents

165 Ibid 66.
166 Ibid 66.
the people who care the Syrians in Turkey. In a consistent manner with Tarlan’s argument, KONDA’s research demonstrates inclusive ideas of the electorates of HDP for the Syrians:


It was retrieved from the official website of the HDP, and it is a parliamentary question by Pervin Buldan to Efkan Ala, the Minister of Internal Affairs at that time. “Buldan AFAD kampındaki tecavüz iddialarını Ala’ya sordu.” (In English, “Buldan asked the rape scandals in the camp of AFAD to Ala.”) December 3, 2014. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/guncel/meclis-calismalar/buldan-afad-kampindaki-tecavuz-iddialarini-alaya-sordu/5607.

That’s why they criticize AKP how it could not establish secure living conditions for the refugees. There is no point to accuse the Syrians and to target to resend them

What do HDP's electorates think of the Syrian refugees?

- 53% The Syrian refugees should be accepted in Turkey because of the historical and geographical responsibility of Turkey
- 47% The Syrian refugees should be accepted in Turkey because of humanitarian responsibility
- 0% Against the Syrian refugees in Turkey

“KONDA Clauster of Voter: Voters of CHP”-February 2016

In October 2014, the current chairwoman of HDP, Pervin Buldan, questioned the marriage scandals of fifty-four child-girls in one of the refugee camps. She conducted an ethnographic research, and according the claims of the refugee families, they have to allow these marriages due to the security of their daughters. In the rhetoric of HDP, it directly accuses AKP in a similar manner with the elites of CHP, but they totally care the right and welfare of the refugees. That’s why they criticize AKP how it could not establish secure living conditions for the refugees. There is no point to accuse the Syrians and to target to resend them

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169 It was retrieved from the official website of the HDP, and it is a parliamentary question by Pervin Buldan to Efkan Ala, the Minister of Internal Affairs at that time. “Buldan AFAD kampındaki tecavüz iddialarını Ala’ya sordu.” (In English, “Buldan asked the rape scandals in the camp of AFAD to Ala.”) December 3, 2014. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/guncel/meclis-calismalar/buldan-afad-kampindaki-tecavuz-iddialarini-alaya-sordu/5607.

170 Ibid.
to Syria as a solution in the agenda of the party members and no reference for ethnic demands of Kurds.

In July 2016, Demirtaş, before he was arrested, mentioned the possibility of citizenships of the Syrians:

“Firstly, we should give them, the Syrians, the refugee rights. Then, if some of them prefer, they can be citizens of Turkey.”\(^{171}\)

In contrast to CHP, there is no perception of threat by the Syrians against the Turkish race via citizenship. In the news of *Al Jazeera*, at the same meeting, Demirtaş states, “when I proposed the idea of referendum for the citizenship of the Syrians, I could not explain myself correctly. I did not want to *exclude* anybody, and it is not our party politics. We care about the rights of the Syrians in Turkey.”\(^{172}\) He also clarifies his blurred explanation *vis-à-vis* the refugees to depict the total inclusion of the party.

In October 2018, Sezai Temelli, current chairman of HDP criticizes Erdoğan because he argues how Erdoğan does not obey the law of the refugee and how he uses the bodies of the refugees for his corrupted politics.\(^{173}\) In a similar manner with CHP, HDP argues the failure of AKP in its Syrian policy, but there is no visible or embedded hate or exclusionary attacks against the Syrians who live in Turkey in contrast to CHP.

In a consistent manner with former and current party leaders, party members also argue the issue of the Syrians extensively inclusionary. This is certain in their speeches and also in


\(^{173}\) This speech was made for an evaluation of Brunson affair between Turkey and the USA by Sezai Temelli and retrieved from a Turkish daily news website, Evrensel. “Sezai Temelli: Mevzu pazarlık, rahip bir figür.” (In English, “Sezai Temelli: The case is bargaining, priest is just a figure.”) October 13, 2018. Accessed date May 2, 2019. [https://www.evrensel.net/haber/363515/sezai-temelli-mevzu-pazarlik-rahip-bir-figur](https://www.evrensel.net/haber/363515/sezai-temelli-mevzu-pazarlik-rahip-bir-figur).
their actions. Inclusion of the Syrians is generally argued as a compulsory step of the migration policy of HDP.

“Integration policies for the Syrians should be prepared to protect their cultural differentiation. They should continue to speak in their native tongue, and we should respect for their religion/rituals of religion.”

In July 2016, in the interview that was conducted by the DW Turkey with Mithat Sancar, an MP of HDP, by Hilal Köylü, he clearly depicts the party policy of HDP for the Syrians. He states, “HDP always cares the rights and lives of the Syrian in Turkey and will say yes for everything to contribute positively to their daily lives. However, AKP uses them in its polices, and clearly this is a depiction how AKP corrupts the case of the Syrians in Turkey.”

Before June 2018 election in Turkey, Yağış Yanık, an MP candidate of HDP who has African root, mainly defends the proletariat and losers of the society. He is also familiar among the Syrian refugees who live in İzmir and he tries to solve the daily problems of the Syrian refugees. This is quite important example because an African root MP candidate defends the rights of the refugees. This is a clear illustration of how HDP is “the champion of more than one ethnic groups” as a minority party in consistent with Chandra’s argument.

In 18 January 2019, HDP wanted to investigate the issue of human trafficking, especially for the refugees, with a parliamentary inquiry. The focus is generally on the Syrian


https://www.dw.com/tr/suriyelilere-vatanda%C5%9F%C4%B1k-tart%C4%B1%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1/a-19377980.

refugees, and how their lives destroyed during the process to refuge. This is quite important because during a parliamentary session, the issue of Syrian refugees is argued by HDP. So, as for Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst stated, minority parties can serve political voices of the migrants during legislative processes.

Moreover, in one of the parliamentary speeches of Ertuğrul Kürkçü, honorary president of HDP, argues the foreign policy of AKP on Syria. He concludes that “today we have the Syrians in Turkey, and now we have to share our bread.” He also focuses on the issue of citizenship as a solution which depends on equality principle of the HDP’s “grand humanity”.

As a response to Erdoğan Toprak who wants the participation of the Syrian refugees in the Free Syrian Army as fighter, Gülsüm Ağaoğlu, the spokeswoman of the Commission of Migrant and Refugees in HDP blames him. Ağaoğlu:

“We totally against a new warfare, and we against the death of the refugees. Otherizations and exclusions against the refugees cannot be accepted though the human rights and by us.”

Ağaoğlu’s statement is a way to see the main differentiation between CHP and HDP in their migration policies for the Syrians. There is a difference from the beginning when they formulate the issue of the Syrians in their agenda. That’s why contradiction is inevitable and sharply visible.

In January 2019, in the parliamentary question hour, Garo Paylan, Armenian MP of HDP, proposed five refugee-related questions in terms of their right to work, identities, rights,

177 It was retrieved from the official website of the Turkish Parliament, as an official parliamentary inquiry. https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d26/10/10-20425gen.pdf.
and refugee status for the Minister of Family, Labour, and Social Services, Zehra Zümrüt Selçuk. In other words, he questioned their lives in terms of their legal rights and freedoms in Turkey as a receiver state, and he referred several scandals. As Bloemraad and Schönwälder observed, minority parties can work as mediating institutions between newcomers and host states, and HDP’s questioning is an important example of it.

In light of the parliamentary discussions and multi-ethnic representation of HDP, its politically inclusion and humanitarian rhetoric is sharply visible. Syrians are welcomed, their problems are internalized and equally treated as problems of Turkey. This fits in the discourse of bizler. Adopted core of the left is never close to CHP’s historically nationalist position and when HDP borrows from the arguments of the left: No reference for “defensive nationalism”. Stories of orientalism(s) are concretely eliminated from both written and rhetorical policies of the party. Thus, HDP’s migration policies are consistent with scholars who argue inclusive role of minority parties. HDP does not prioritize just Kurds, and rationally includes more than one group of the society. This is the strategy for maximization of the votes all around Turkey.

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181 Ibid.
CONCLUSION

This thesis explores why ideologically similar parties do not always support similar migration policies in their states. Inclusive or exclusive policies cannot be generalized by referring to ideologies of the parties. In other words, there can be a dissonance between ideologically inclusive parties/left-wing parties. I selected Turkey as a case study because since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis (2011), Turkey received huge number of the Syrian refugees, and the acceptance rate of the Syrians caused a dissonance between the political parties of the Turkish parliament.

Selected parties define themselves as social democratic and left-leaning parties in terms of their inclusive society formulation. Majority left-wing party, CHP, excludes sharply the Syrian refugees. Despite weak nationalism of the left to exclude immigrants, CHP excludes them in a virulent nationalistic path, and its exclusion against the Syrians draws heavily from a reservoir of ethnosymbolism\textsuperscript{182} embedded historical nationalism of the party and that of its electorate. In the early Republican era of Turkey, CHP excluded non-Muslims, especially Greeks and Jews, from Turkey via expulsion and dismissing from state offices in consolidating ethno-cultural control over the state. Also, for the sake of civic Turkish nationalism, CHP excluded Kurdish identity during the single party rule (1923-1950). As Mardin argued that CHP focused on the votes of Turkey’s center. In other words, the dominant Turkish nation was the goal of CHP in the elections. Hence, in the early Republican era, native minorities and Kurds are dismissed from its electorate. In the first plural party election of Turkey, 1946, the absolute victory of CHP is a way to understand that its electorate was not suspicious of the CHP due to the exclusion of non-Muslims and Kurds. In its current migration policy, the targeted aim is to exclude and expulsion of the Syrians from Turkey for the sake of their own people, and their

social and economic welfare. Therefore, CHP comes close to the extreme right by reflecting its historical nationalism which is part of party formation and its electorate.

On the other side, ethnically left-wing party of Turkey, HDP, tries to include all segments of the society by not prioritizing its ethnic friends/Kurds. Hence, even the weak nationalism of the left is not visible in HDP when it formulates its migration policy for the Syrians. In this thesis, the aim is to demonstrate the political inclusion of minority parties especially for the disadvantaged groups. Giddens’s inclusionary society structure of social democracy nourishes ethnically left-wing parties, so in general, the focus on protection of their own people is not seen among these parties because they rationally prefer to include everybody. Moreover, HDP’s inclusive policies for the Syrians is consistent with Chandra’s focus on “multiple dimensions of ethnic (minority) parties”. On the road of more inclusive minority party politics, they avoid referring to historical patterns of its founding ethnic group. This situation is seen risky for an inclusive minority party, and that’s why the problems of their ethnic group is seen as one separate chapter of their party agendas. HDP’s migration policy and approach for the Syrians fit in inclusive multi-dimensional understanding of minority parties in a rational manner for the elections. Hence, in this research, the comparison between ideologically inclusive parties, CHP and HDP, aims to show the failure of the scholars who argue conflictual, destabilizing, and polarizer role of minority parties by demonstrating a certain degree of inclusion of a minority party which is unexpected.
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