

Integral Yugoslavism as Political Modernity in the Political Language of British and French Liberals around the Great War

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Abstract

This thesis portrays the British and French understanding of integral Yugoslavism around the Great War by analyzing the political language of liberals, the institutional context around them (with special attention given to the complex relationship between governmental and non-state knowledge production), and their contacts with the integral Yugoslavists from the Southern Slavic areas, mainly the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. Through the highly-contextualized tracing of conceptual history of the key concepts of political modernity (mainly nationhood, statehood, and democracy) this thesis portrays a dialogue and an intellectual exchange between the experts and the public moralists of the Great Powers, as well as those who aimed to create an independent South Slavic state upon the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The main argument hereby delivered is that the crisis of liberalism—which gradually deepened from the turn of the century onwards—enabled a supraethnic integral nationalism to enter the political language of the British and French liberals. Together with the developing epistemologies around racial science, statistics, and international relations, this nationalism placed them in the position of arguing for the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the establishment of a unitary Yugoslavia.

The thesis concludes that integral Yugoslavism did in fact represent a form of political modernity for the British and French liberal intellectuals around the Great War, but also that this was in part the result of a polysemic use of the key concepts and the neo-Hegelian idealistic approach to the international relations these liberals practiced. Furthermore, the conclusion also states that it was these key concepts and arguments, derived from the political language of integral Yugoslavism, which came to inform the overall conceptual change of the main facets of political

modernity and international order by the British and French, thus highly impacting their reasoning in the Versailles Peace Conference and tailoring both the successes and the failures of the interwar period and perhaps beyond.

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Introduction: terminology, objectives, relevance

The Great War and the period around it is considered one of the most crucial for the conceptual change in understanding the international order and all its categories, such as nationality, state, empire, citizenship, democracy, sovereignty, and self-determination. In other words, the vision of political modernity embodied in the peace settlement after the war was highly important in shaping both the twentieth century and the present day. Accordingly, it is important to disentangle the ways in which the public intellectuals and experts of the Great Powers such as Britain and France understood, as well as influenced, the ways in which these categories would be used for the peace settlement, in accordance with the various epistemologies of the period. However, the previous historiography usually tends to overlook or oversimplify the intellectual exchange between the intellectuals of the maritime empires who were “making the New Europe”¹ and those whose empire (in this case the Austro-Hungarian) was about to dissolve.

In contrast, this thesis provides a much more nuanced view and portrays the ways in which British and French, predominantly liberal, intellectuals came to know and understand one of the most important ideologies for the outbreak of the Great War, as well as for its settlement and the consequent change of their understanding of political modernity as such. That ideology, integral Yugoslavism, supposes that all the South Slavic peoples constitute a singular racial, ethnic, national, linguistic, or cultural community: one divided by history, but reunited by their heroic struggle in the First World War. While it often acknowledges the existence of certain cultural

¹ On the usage, semantics and the afterlife of the concept of 'New Europe' in this context see Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London: Methuen, 1981) and Drago Roksandić, “Koliko je bila doista 'nova' Nova Evropa? Povodom zbornika Nova Evropa 1920–1941” [How exactly 'new' was the New Europe? Regarding the proceedings New Europe 1920-1941] *Naučna kritika* 44 (2012): 225–241.

differences among various groups often conceptualized as tribes, it asserts that these will surely blend into each other after the common state is constituted.² In other words, rather than envisioning this relationship as two parallel streams of political thought or perhaps a unilateral transfer of concepts, this thesis outlines a dialogue between the two in the manner of a complex and heavily-contextualized *histoire croisée*³ without circumventing the influence of German, Italian, or Hungarian political thought, as well as expert knowledge. It furthermore poses questions about how the political thought of the Yugoslavists from Austria-Hungary and the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro influenced the ways in which British and French intellectuals understood their own empires, as well as the workings of the international order in general.

Since the Great War, in many ways, catalyzed the professionalization and institutionalization of a number of academic disciplines rendered important for establishing the peace and the new settings of international relations (such as history, geography, linguistics, statistics, ethnology, anthropology, IR), this thesis will also deeply inquire about the role both of these processes had on the British and French understanding of integral Yugoslavism, political modernity, and their intersections. The combination of their already-existing liberal and imperial conceptualizations of political modernity (often based on social Darwinism or civilizational hierarchies) with the ongoing debates in Austria-Hungary (during the crisis of dualism, the May Coup of 1903 in Serbia, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Friedjung and Agram Trials, and the Balkan Wars) resulted in the new, enriched political language which came to shape and define the world after the Great War. Furthermore, the influence of the general crisis of

² See more on the history, usage and contestations of this ideology in: Dejan Djokic, ed., *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), and Dejan Djokic, *Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

³ Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity,” *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (2006): 30–50.

liberalism, both in the British and French context, will be examined in light of the ways in which these intellectuals came to embrace integral supra-ethnic nationalisms such as Yugoslavism. This political language will be carefully dissected in my thesis, and all of its elements stemming from various local traditions of political languages (such as Balkan romanticism, neo-Slavism, and Croatian Rightist one) will be traced and analyzed in their complexity. The British and French efforts to inform their own governments, academic environments, and public opinions about the Yugoslavist project mostly went unsupported, despite the governmental policies or the war aims of their respective countries, until 1918. It is thus even more striking that it was they who gave a voice to Yugoslavist emigration and Serbian diplomacy, and who agitated for the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the establishment of an independent South Slavic state, ideologically legitimized by their expert knowledge and, consequently, integral Yugoslavism.

It was not until mid-1918 that the British and French governments eventually began advocating for the creation of an independent South Slavic state, and started funding various departments in their Foreign Offices to conduct propaganda in that direction. However, while the main principles of their political language and the newly developed epistemologies significantly contributed to bringing about peace and the “New Europe,” various problems and failings of the interwar period—both in terms of the Yugoslav state and the international order—could be traced back and ascribed exactly to the nature of the dialogue this thesis depicts. The liberals whose political language will herein be scrutinized will not necessarily be those who were the official members of the Liberal Party in Britain or the Parti Radical in France, but rather all those intellectuals who, in a certain way, shared the values of (classical) liberalism and can clearly be distinguished from the emerging leftist and established conservative ideologies and discourses of

the period.⁴ The main reasons why the liberals, rather than other political groups or parties, will be central to this inquiry are because they were in power in most of the relevant governmental institutions and structures, but even more importantly, they were producing the greatest amount of knowledge and propaganda in regard to the South Slavs and their political integration. Moreover, Yugoslavism will in that context be understood as an entirety of solutions or proposals made on the topic of the political integration of the Southern Slavs inhabiting the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Carniola), the Kingdom of Serbia, the Kingdom of Montenegro and, in exceptional cases, Bulgaria.

The designation *South Slavic* will be employed as a technical term for encompassing the relevant historical groups or lands; by contrast, the designation *Yugoslav* will imply a politically- and ideologically-charged historical understanding of those groups and lands by the historical actors under investigation. The understanding and employment of the notion of political modernity and its facets in this political language will be traced and reconstructed through analysis of the teleological philosophy of history inscribed to Yugoslavism, problematizing the overall relationship between Yugoslavism and temporality, outlining counter-concepts and concepts parallel to Yugoslavism, as well as providing an insight into the cluster of context-specific concepts of political modernity in general, such as the nation-state, empire, sovereignty, democracy, self-determination, homogeneous state, New Europe, Balkans, and so forth. However, the concept of political modernity is to be considered as a purely contemporary analytical category

⁴ Since this thesis is focused on a time period in which liberalism experienced a crisis and often had to accommodate and account for the new ideological content produced by its strongly emerging alternatives, it will be additionally historicized and in no way understood as the homogeneous version of classical liberalism from the mid-nineteenth century. However, the purpose of this intervention is to clarify that these intellectuals were, for the most part, not members of the liberal political parties and were thus perhaps in an even better position to negotiate the values brought about by the socialist, integral nationalist alternatives or the various epistemological debates of the period.

and an otherwise technical term for encompassing their stances on—and the meanings they ascribed to—the aforementioned concepts. Furthermore, the political language which will be analyzed in this thesis does not encompass the entirety of the relevant liberal political discourse, but in contrast designates specific, identifiable, and historically contextualized political language in the Pocockian sense of understanding the history of political thought.⁵ It is important to note that in this particular context, this specific language will reflect the crisis of liberalism and the anxieties around the opening of the horizon of possibilities of political organization and the conducting of international relations in general.

After this introductory section, a literature review will contextualize the scholarly traditions and approaches around this particular thesis and highlight its position and innovation. The subsequent chapter on theory and methodology will provide a more detailed description of the concept of political modernity and the history of political languages, as well as the nature of sources used and methods employed in this research. Following that, a chapter on the main historical actors, organizations, institutions and other political bodies will describe the circumstances in which this political language was produced. It is here that an extensive overview of the relevant discursive practices will emerge, together with a nuanced analysis of the various types of publications, as well as a clear-cut differentiation between the public and private spheres.

The main chapter on the relationship between the conceptualizations of Yugoslavism and the notion of political modernity will be organized into three subchapters revolving around a specific set of key concepts and rhetorical strategies selected as most relevant and exemplary for subsuming the essence of the political language under investigation. These are meant to establish

⁵ J. G. A. Pocock, “Languages and their implications: The transformation of the study of political thought,” in *Politics, language and time* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 3–41; and J. G. A. Pocock, “The history of political thought: a methodological inquiry,” in *Philosophy, Politics and Society (Second Series)*, ed. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), 183–202.

a coherent narrative and clearly present the British and French liberal understanding of both Yugoslavism and political modernity, as well as the important role of both for self-narrating, legitimizing the realization of their imperial interests, and winning the war by agitating for the collapse of Austria-Hungary from the inside. Lastly, this thesis will argue that a certain type of Yugoslavism (in contrast to the variety of “solutions” envisioned by the local South Slavic actors) was certainly favored by the British and French liberals, particularly because of their contemporary understanding of political modernity.

What would come to be known as integral or unitary Yugoslavism was mediated by the British and French liberals and offered up as a natural culmination of history, as well as a realization of modernity. Although this was certainly not blindly accepted, and was in fact widely negotiated by almost all of the political actors of the 1920s, during the 1930s it became an official state ideology, albeit with very limited success. However, it is still worth bringing the relevant South Slavic historical actors—especially those who were in a close relationship with the British and French liberals for a longer period—into the picture, inquiring about their agency and the extent to which their understanding of these concepts corresponded with that of their Western counterparts. Simultaneously, it is crucial to recognize that towards the end of the war a sort of cognitive dissonance appeared between the two, resulting in a polysemic use of the key concepts of political modernity.

This is further relevant for comprehending both the importance and the role of this political language in “explaining,” as well as “selling,” the idea of South Slavic political integration to the British and French governments, their respective publics, and those on the territories of the future Kingdom of Yugoslavia who were fighting on opposing sides. Moreover, it is essential for grasping the afterlife of the concept of integral Yugoslavism and all the alternative concepts for

the realization of modernity or creating a sustainable South Slavic state. Special attention will also be given to the main differences between the British and French cases, not only in terms of the levels of tension between the government bodies, expert knowledge production and intellectual associations, but also in terms of their political language and the impact the inner traditions of political thought (such as French republicanism, the heritage of the Enlightenment, debates around the Dreyfus affair, British monarchism, discussions on the Commonwealth, and the Irish question) had on them. This research will thus contribute to a deeper understanding of British and French intellectual traditions and approaches towards political modernity that were decisive for their articulation of Yugoslavism, as well as highlight the importance this discourse had on the British and French understanding of their own role in world history.

The choice of political language as the object of analysis will certainly contribute to a more sophisticated reconstruction of the intellectual exchange and engagement with these subjects, as well as allow for the most productive handling of the various kinds of primary sources relevant for this research. Through following their writings on the “oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary” or the “guardians of the gate” against the Ottoman Empire, this thesis will thus explore the British and French understanding and arguing for integral Yugoslavism, as well as deliver conclusions on how was this reflected on the balance of power in the process of unification in 1918. Finally, argument delivered and questions posed in this research will provide a solid foundation for future investigations into the formation of Yugoslavia and all the problems of its creation, but perhaps also of its collapse. It is, in conclusion, important to point to the possibilities of further research and comparison of this case with that of Polish national integration, Czechoslovakism, and the treatment that the Middle East received in the same intersections of British and French political thought, expert knowledge, and imperial interests. On a more abstract

level, this thesis can also be read as a sort of inquiry into the various intersections between the epistemological paradigm shift and the rupture in the political thought around the Great War.

Literature Review

This review will focus on the literature used for the different parts of this thesis, such as the theoretical and methodological framework, the chapters on the relevant state institutions, intellectual associations and individuals that produced the political language, as well as for providing a context around the intellectual exchange with the South Slavic political actors in the aforementioned period. Furthermore, the purpose of this literature review will also be to generally assess the existing literature on these topics and to position this thesis among its various clusters, through evaluating the described literature and highlighting its relation to this thesis. The primary sources, which also deserve to be critically evaluated, will be dealt with in the methodological chapter due to their specific character and role in this research. However, oftentimes, due to the nature of both literature and the sources, it is hard to discern whether it represents a primary source in the classical sense or is it in fact closer to what might be considered as the secondary literature. However, in these exceptional cases, the dual role of the publication will be explicitly highlighted and elaborated.

The literature will be grouped by the state or region of origin (for instance, Anglo-American, French, South Slavic) and the period in which it was published (for instance, interwar period, Cold War, contemporary), thus implying the historiographical tradition they broadly fall into. Additionally, this helps to avoid division by language, which would be vulnerable to interference from different historiographical traditions of assessment of the subject in question (for

instance, contemporary Serbian historians publishing in French, or Croatian Cold War émigrés publishing in English).

Finally, the South Slavic group of secondary literature will only be assessed in a fragmented manner when it is relevant for accentuating the peculiarity in historiographical approach or assesement (for instance, Croatian or Serbian literature published after the collapse of Yugoslavia, with a narrative about this topic distinguishable from the one accepted in the previous period). Although a considerable amount of scholarship has already been produced on the topic of British and French political and diplomatic activity in the context of Yugoslav unification, little of it was focused on the content of their political language or the intersections of integral Yugoslavism and political modernity therein. In Anglo-American scholarship, however, there is a solid foundation for such analysis, established by James Evans' *Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia* (2008),⁶ which provides a detailed insight into the British political language of the period and systematically outlines the way in which various sub-topics of the South Slav question (race, language, and so on) were understood by the British. Complementary with this study is Harry Hanak's *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War: A Study in the Formation of Public Opinion* (1962),⁷ which presents a substantial contribution towards the institutional history of British knowledge production, as well as propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and in favor of the creation of Yugoslavia.

Although neither of these studies extensively problematize the relationship between the facets of political modernity and integral Yugoslavism in the British political language, they still

⁶ James Evans, *Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia: Negotiating Balkan Nationality and Identity* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008).

⁷ Harry Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War: A Study in the Formation of Public Opinion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). Another merit of this book lies in the fact that the author based many of his findings on conversations with the relevant individuals involved, either in the British governmental bodies or in the intellectual associations crucial for this thesis.

provide a very useful and nuanced overview of the ideological, institutional, and intellectual context around it. In addition to these, works such as Sir Stuart Campbell's *Secrets of the Crewe House: The Story of a Famous Campaign* (1920),⁸ Mark Cornwall's *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (2000),⁹ and Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson's *The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (1981)¹⁰ can fill in the gaps by providing a considerable amount of information and detail about the relevant historical actors, institutions, and government bodies of not only Great Britain, but also Italy and France, as well as all the inter-governmental bodies they established in the given period (such as the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission, and the Padua Commission). With regard to the Foreign Office in particular, the studies of W. W. Gottlieb (*Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War*, 1957),¹¹ Michael Sanders and Phillip M. Taylor (*British Propaganda during the First World War 1914–1918*, 1982),¹² and Z. A. B. Zeman (*A Diplomatic History of the First World War*, 1971),¹³ although produced more in the manner of Cold War-embedded area studies than independent historiographical inquiry, provide key insight into the internal debates, various versions of memoranda, meetings, mediation, talks and genesis of secret agreements crucial for understanding the role of the Foreign Office in the context of this research. The British historiography also produced a special study on the role of the

⁸ Sir Stuart Campbell, *Secrets of the Crewe House: The Story of a Famous Campaign* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920). While written from an immediately postwar perspective and thus perhaps ideologically embedded, it could still be considered useful in terms of institutional history.

⁹ Mark Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). Relevant for the institutional history of inter-allied propaganda efforts during 1918.

¹⁰ Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*. Despite being written by Robert William Seton-Watson's sons and thus additionally influenced by their personal understanding of his role in dismembering Austria-Hungary, this work could nevertheless be considered useful for his personal history, as well as providing a synthesis of his views on various issues of international relations.

¹¹ W. W. Gottlieb, *Studies in secret diplomacy during the First World War*. (London: Alien and Unwin, 1957).

¹² Michael Sanders, Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda During the First World War, 1914-18*. (London: MacMillan Education, 1982).

¹³ Z.A.B. Zeman, *A Diplomatic History of the First World War*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971).

French foreign office in this context,¹⁴ which presents a further valuable reference for this thesis.

In order to introduce the overall debates, genres, and streams of political thought in Britain of the period, Stefan Collini's work *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain*¹⁵ will be used, in combination with the more abstract and theoretically-oriented multi-author volume *The History of Political Thought in National Context*.¹⁶ However, the most relevant works on this topic, which will serve not only for the history of political thought but also its entanglements with the arts and sciences of the broader period, are the *Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*¹⁷ and the *Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought*.¹⁸ Contemporary French historiography was significantly less active in assessing these topics, although the French knowledge production and propagandistic agitation was almost on the same level as that of Great Britain in the period around the First World War. One reason for this occurrence could be that many individuals who shared an interest in the South Slav question belonged to the same societies as their British counterparts (for instance, the New Europe Society) and published in the same journals (such as *New Europe*).

It is characteristic of French historiography to conceptualize these issues either by referring to a broader framework of the Balkans as a historical region (both during the interwar period and in the present day¹⁹) or through the widely accepted lens of the “nationality question” in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The latter, being more relevant to the overall topic, is exemplified by the

¹⁴ M. B. Hayne, *The French Foreign Office and the origins of the First World War, 1898–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

¹⁵ Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

¹⁶ Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampsher-Monk, eds., *The History of Political Thought in National Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.)

¹⁷ Gareth Stedman Hones and Gregory Claeys, eds., *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹⁸ Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy, *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹⁹ Georges Castellan, *Histoire des Balkans: XIVE - XXe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).

recent studies of Jean-Paul Bled, *L'agonie d'une monarchie: Autriche-Hongrie 1914–1920* (2017)²⁰ and Max Schiavon, *L'Autriche-Hongrie dans la Première guerre mondiale* (2011).²¹ A significant contribution to the understanding of individual and institutional agency in the creation and reproduction of the political language in question is offered by the obituaries or biographies of the French liberals most involved with the Southern Slav question: Louis Léger,²² Victor Bérard,²³ and Pierre Combret de Lanux.²⁴ Nevertheless, in order to contextualize this topic by introducing the French internal political debates of the period, the extensive inquiries published by Michel Winock, such as *Le siècle des intellectuels*²⁵ and *Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and Fascism in France*,²⁶ will be used. On the other hand, South Slavic (especially Serbian post-1990s) historiography compensates considerably for what the French lacks, both in terms of engagement with the relevant primary sources and analysis of the political language of the French liberals, as well as the receptivity of Southern Slavic political actors to their conceptualization of the new state. While the only Croatian engagement with the French sources can be found in Miro Kovač's *Francuska i hrvatsko pitanje: 1914.–1929.* (2005)²⁷ and Jasna Adler's *L'union forcée: la Croatie et la création de l'Etat yougoslave 1918* (1997),²⁸ the Serbian author Vojislav Pavlović's studies

²⁰ Jean-Paul Bled, *L'agonie d'une monarchie: Autriche-Hongrie 1914-1920* (Paris: Tallandier, 2017).

²¹ Max Schiavon, *L'Autriche-Hongrie dans la Première guerre mondiale : la fin d'un empire* (Saint-Cloud: Éd Soteca, 2011).

²² Paul Boyer, "Louis Léger (13 janvier 1844 - 30 avril 1923)," *Revue des études slaves* 3, no. 1–2 (1923): 127–132; R. W. Seton-Watson, "Louis Léger, Obituary," *The Slavonic Review* 2, no. 5 (1923): 423–425.

²³ R. D. "Victor Bérard," *Syria* 12, no. 4 (1931): 392–394; S. R. "Victor Bérard," *Revue Archéologique Cinquième Série* 34 (1931): 313–316.

²⁴ "Pierre André Véronge de Lanux," Famille de Lanux, <https://www.delanux.fr/pierre-de-lanux-un-diplomate/>, accessed June 5, 2019.

²⁵ Michel Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels* (Paris: Seuil, 1997).

²⁶ Michel Winock, *Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and Fascism in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

²⁷ Miro Kovač, *Francuska i hrvatsko pitanje: 1914.–1929.* [France and the Croatian question: 1914-1929] (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2005).

²⁸ Jasna Adler, *L'union forcée: la Croatie et la création de l'Etat yougoslave (1918)* (Chêne-Bourg: Georg edituers, 1997).

such as “La France et le programme yougoslave du gouvernement serbe” (2007)²⁹ and “La France et l'espace yougoslave: la naissance de la Yougoslavie 1878–1918” (2001)³⁰ present significant milestones and expertly complement the framework provided by the French historiography. Furthermore, Dragovan Šepić's book *Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje: 1914–1918*. (1970)³¹ provides a useful comparative study between different Allied agitators for South Slavic political integration, as well as the intellectual exchange between them and the local political elites. His other works, such as *Pisma i memorandum Frana Supila: 1914–1917* (1967)³² and *Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu: u povodu 50-godišnjice osnivanja* (1966),³³ address similar questions and are relevant for this thesis. Since the political language of the Croatian Party of Rights (both the one established by Ante Starčević in the 1860s as well as its later variants) greatly informed the British and French understanding of the South Slavic question, the exhaustive and valuable works of Mirjana Gross, such as *Izvorno pravaštvo: ideologija, agitacija, pokret*³⁴ and *Povijest pravaške ideologije*,³⁵ will certainly be taken into an account.

Lastly, there are two relevant, but divergent approaches to the underlying symbolical tension between “East” and “West,” which will constitute points of reference in this thesis and which were formulated by East Central European authors. One can be found in László Péter's *R.*

²⁹ Vojislav Pavlović “La France et le programme yougoslave du gouvernement serbe” *Balkanica*, vol. 37 (2006), p. 171-193.

³⁰ Vojislav Pavlović “La France et l'espace yougoslave: la naissance de la Yougoslavie (1878-1918)” *Revue des Études Slaves*, vol. 73, no. 2-3 (2001), pp. 481-488.

³¹ Dragovan Šepić, *Italija, Saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje 1914-1918* [Italy, the Allies and the Yugoslav question 1914-1918] (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1970).

³² Dragovan Šepić, *Pisma i memorandum Frana Supila: 1914 – 1917*. [Letters and memoranda of Frano Supilo: 1914-1917] (Belgrade: Naučno delo, 1967).

³³ Vaso Bogdanov, Ferdo Čulinović, and Marko Kostrenčić, eds., *Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu: u povodu 50-godišnjice osnivanja*, [Yugoslav Committee in London: regarding the 50th anniversary of the founding] (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1966).

³⁴ Mirjana Gross, *Izvorno pravaštvo: ideologija, agitacija, pokret* [Original ideology of right: ideology, agitation, movement] (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2000).

³⁵ Mirjana Gross, *Povijest pravaške ideologije* [History of the ideology of right] (Zagreb: Institut za hrvatsku povijest Sveučilišta, 1973).

W. Seton-Watson's Changing Views on the National Question of the Habsburg Monarchy and the European Balance of Power (2007)³⁶ and the other in Diana Mishkova's approach in her book *Beyond Balkanism: The Scholarly Politics of Region Making* (2018).³⁷ While they both problematize the same period and refer to the same political language, each in their particular methodological framework and overall scope, they provide a different interpretation of the dynamics between Western and South Slavic (Eastern) political thought and practice in terms of the level of receptivity and agency of the local political actors, as well as the nature of the intellectual exchange and/or transfer. In the context of this tension, it is important to mention the valuable study *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe Volume I: Negotiating Modernity in the 'Long Nineteenth Century'* (2016),³⁸ which will serve as a map of sorts throughout this inquiry and assist in navigating through the complexities inherent in the exchange of political thought and the questions of receptivity and agency hereby implied.

Regarding the theoretical and methodological literature, the most important for setting the tone of the entire thesis are those which encompass the debates about the nature of modernity and those that problematize the notion of political modernity in particular. As can be seen from all the previously mentioned studies, the historiography that would bring Yugoslavism into contact with the discussion on temporality is scarce and these two topics are usually studied in parallel; a notable historiographical exception is the volume *Regimes of Historicity in Southeastern and Northern Europe, 1890–1945: Discourses of Identity and Temporality*,³⁹ which will also serve as a relevant

³⁶ László Péter, “R. W. Seton-Watson's Changing Views on the National Question of the Habsburg Monarchy,” *Slavonic & East European Review* 82, no. 3 (2004): 655–679.

³⁷ Diana Mishkova, *Beyond Balkanism: The Scholarly Politics of Region Making* (London: Routledge, 2018).

³⁸ Balázs Trencsényi, Maciej Janowski, Monika Baar, Maria Falina, and Michal Kopeček, *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe, Volume I: Negotiating Modernity in the 'Long Nineteenth Century'* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

³⁹ “*Regimes of historicity*” in *Southeastern and Northern Europe, 1890-1945: discourses of identity and temporality*, eds Diana Mishkova, Balázs Trencsényi, and Marja Jalava. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).

reference point throughout this research. However, some other, mainly (post)colonial, spatial categories have received such treatment (including Latin America⁴⁰ and the Balkans to some extent) and have encountered the same issue this thesis will attempt to disentangle. Peter Osborne's article "Modernity is a Qualitative, Not a Chronological, Category" is the most appropriate reading of Reinhart Koselleck's conceptual history of modernity⁴¹ for the argument of this thesis and will thus be used, together with his book *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde*,⁴² to clearly define the nature of the concept of modernity, as well as to problematize its use in the given political language. Furthermore, the political language as an object of analysis or a way of understanding the history of political thought will be combined with the methods of Koselleck's conceptual history, as implicated in Iain Hampsher-Monk's "Speech Acts, Languages or Conceptual History?"⁴³, as well as in Melvin Richter's "Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe."⁴⁴ Lastly, the relevant convergences between the epistemological paradigm shifts and the ruptures of political thought will be partially understood through Thomas S. Kuhn's classic work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*,⁴⁵ as well as tracing the developments in South Slavic epistemological debates of the period.⁴⁶ To conclude, the literature reviewed hitherto displays a certain gap between the predominantly separate assesment of the political thought of British and French, on the one hand,

⁴⁰ Nicola Miller and Stephen Hart, eds., *When was Latin America modern?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

⁴¹ Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

⁴² Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* (London: Verso, 1995).

⁴³ Iain Hampsher-Monk, "Speech Acts, Languages or Conceptual History," in *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspective*, ed. Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998).

⁴⁴ Melvin Richter, "Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe," *History and Theory* 29, no. 1 (1990): 38–70.

⁴⁵ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁴⁶ Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Naučnici Srbije i stvaranje jugoslovenske države 1914–1920* [Serbian scientists and the creation of the Yugoslav state] (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1986).

and Southern Slavic intellectuals, on the other. Moreover, the concepts of political modernity (and their history), are rarely taken into an account and investigated from a transnational perspective which would allow for the inquiry into their reception and appropriation in different contexts. This thesis will thus aim to combine the two and depict it as a sort of dialogue between the South Slavic and British and French intellectuals on the topic of political modernity, as well as to portray how integral Yugoslavism in particular penetrated the political language of the liberals at the turn of century.

Theoretical framework

The aim of this section is to elaborate on all of the theoretical concepts and frameworks which will be used throughout this thesis and to explain the ways in which they will operate, as well as to introduce the methodological settings and their relation to the selection of primary sources which will constitute the basis of this research. In order to understand the broader theoretical framework that this thesis is speaking to, it is important to introduce the existing historiographical and philosophical debates around the concept of modernity in general, and political modernity in particular, as well as to define more specific concepts relevant for this particular context (such as philosophy of history, teleology, temporality, and historicity). Thus, the conceptual history of modernity will be outlined and then a multiplicity of relevant conceptualizations of political modernities presented.

These concepts will then be specifically placed in the context of British and French (classical) liberalism, which will be understood as a dominant ideology of the period that concerns this thesis, not least because the respective governments of the states in question were still

predominantly embedded in it. However, the understanding of political modernity displayed by the local Yugoslavist political language of the period will also be taken into an account, and the settings for their comparison with the British and French conceptualizations in that context will be stated. Moreover, the importance of the conceptual history of Yugoslavism will be explained and the methods around its reconstruction and positioning outlined.

Finally, the question of the receptivity, internalization, intellectual exchange or intellectual transfer will be addressed and the theoretical framework around its usage in this thesis elaborated. To start with, the concept of modernity has received a lot of attention in philosophy, the social sciences and historiography, but approaches and assessments of its role and usage are still diverging, not least because of the more general divergence in the epistemological contexts around the emergence of these interpretations. The social and political history of the twentieth century and processes such as decolonization, the end of the Cold War and globalization prompted authors from various disciplines to develop notions such as high modernity,⁴⁷ postmodernity,⁴⁸ liquid modernity (or late modernity),⁴⁹ as well as that of multiple modernities.⁵⁰ Many of these variants of modernity were conceived as a (sometimes critical) response to the theory of modernization, which was primarily used in the study and practice of international relations throughout the period. While in most of these cases modernity refers to the particular modes of social and political organization of society, often containing a teleological philosophy of history, the main discussion revolves around the sole nature of the concept and ranges between understanding it as either a chronological, universalist condition or a qualitative, particular one. Furthermore, many of the

⁴⁷ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

⁴⁸ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

⁴⁹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

⁵⁰ Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Multiple Modernities* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

critics of (ab)using this concept, most often positioned within the humanities, point out its immanent ideological and hierarchical character in constructing a historical future.⁵¹ Although the debate on historical future—which could have been seen as a reflection of a debate on the nature of modernity—seemed clear enough, Bo Stråth convincingly argues both in theoretical⁵² and concrete historical investigations⁵³ that the line between the Hegelian (universalist teleological) and Koselleckian (based on openness and plurality of historical development) understanding of historical future can be easily blurred. However, in order to be consistent and clear in its argument, this thesis will assume a stance formulated in the aforementioned Peter Osborne article “Modernity is a Qualitative, Not a Chronological, Category,” but consider the articulation of modernity by the British and French liberals around the First World War (together with their Yugoslavist contemporaries) as predominantly Hegelian in many respects. In other words, the aim is to deconstruct their understanding of (political) modernity, and disentangle the various intellectual traditions (as well as transmissions and appropriations) it was embedded in. Following Osborne's analysis of the conceptual history of modernity, three distinct approaches to the concept emerge: modernity as a category of historical periodization; a quality of social experience; and an incomplete project.⁵⁴ Modernity, as it operates in the political language of the British and French liberals in this period, will thus be understood as the form of latter, containing a vision of historical totalization and inscribing it to Yugoslavism. What will thus constitute a central object of analysis is the way in which they envisioned political modernity more specifically and how they combined

⁵¹ Lynn M. Thomas, “Modernity's Failings, Political Claims and Intermediate Concepts,” *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 727–740.

⁵² Bo Stråth, “The Faces of Modernity: Crisis, Kairos, Chronos—Koselleck vs. Hegel” in *Historical Teleologies in the Modern World*, ed. Henning Trüper, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

⁵³ Bo Stråth and Peter Wagner, eds., *European Modernity: A Global Approach* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017).

⁵⁴ Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and the Avant-Garde* (London: Verso, 1995), 5.

this vision with the already-existing political language of integral Yugoslavism. Political modernity in that context encompasses the complex negotiation between British and French understandings of the *modern* model of the nation-state (together with the related concepts of sovereignty, democracy, and self-determination) and the local Yugoslavist project of the period, resulting in an ideological hybrid which assumed a clear historical future based on its reconfiguration of the teleological narrative embedded in the new vision of historicity hereby developed.

Furthermore, the Yugoslavist projects which this thesis will consider the most relevant for the depiction of the conceptual and ideological dialogue with the British and French liberals includes both that which was revolving around the trialist positions in the late imperial Austria⁵⁵ and the more radical visions of the independent South Slavic state (in all possible forms proposed, whether federal or centralized). Along these lines, special attention will be given to the racial, genetic, ethnic, and anthropological (self-)understanding of South Slavs. All of these notions will be heavily contextualized throughout this inquiry by the interventions highlighting the influence of Austro-Marxist or Hungarian political thought on the political thought of the South Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as introducing ideological or conceptual continuities from previous periods (such as the Illyrism of Ljudevit Gaj or the Yugoslavism of Josip Juraj Strossmayer) when it is deemed relevant for the argument. The tension between these concepts and the understanding(s) of Yugoslavism displayed in the political language of political actors in the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro will also be reflected upon, especially in terms of the way they operated in the British and French reception and reconceptualization of these differences

⁵⁵ Mirjana Gross, “Hrvatska politika velikaustrijskog kruga oko prijestolonasljednika Franje Ferdinanda” [Croatian politics of the Greater Austrian circle around the Archduke Franz Ferdinand], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 2, no. 2 (1970): 9–72.

throughout the war. A crucial role in contextualizing and analyzing these various local conceptualizations of Yugoslavism will be played by the conceptual history of the term itself, as described by Drago Roksandić in his chapter “Yugoslavism before Yugoslavia,”⁵⁶ as well as the treatment it received in the chapter “Supranational theories and transnational movements” in the aforementioned volume *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe*.⁵⁷ Both of these works account for the rapid change of the meaning and usage of the term, especially during the war, which will also be elaborated in greater detail in this research.

Lastly, it is important to address the ways in which the interaction between the various relevant political traditions and thoughts will be considered. A significant amount of scholarship (especially in South Slavic languages after the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia) tends either to envisage these as insular, isolated phenomena and unique occurrences in local political thought, or alternatively portray a unilateral transfer of concepts from one side to another (usually depending on which national context the scholarship derives from). By contrast, this thesis will in turn engage with the complexity of the intellectual transfer by understanding it as a mutual and inseparable negotiation on the semantics of Yugoslavism and different elements of political modernity. However, neither of the contexts under scrutiny (Western and South Slavic) will be considered as monolithic, stable, or independent from their larger context. On the contrary, this thesis will attempt to encompass the dynamics and external (whether national or ideological) influences, while tracing all the changes and variants relevant to the overall objective.

⁵⁶ Drago Roksandić, “Jugoslavenstvo prije Jugoslavije” [Yugoslavism before Yugoslavia], in *Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi* [Yugoslavia in historical perspective] (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2017), 27–54.

⁵⁷ Chapter 12.3 “Supranational theories and transnational movements,” in Trencsényi et al., *A History of Modern Political Thought*, 529–544.

Methodology

The methodological parameters of this research rest on posing the political language as an object of analysis and a critical, contextualist evaluation of the primary sources which will be described here. Together with these, a concise outline of the chapter's structure will be introduced and elaborated. Firstly, it is important to note that the methodological framework of this thesis was inspired by the one which combines analysis of the political language and ideological configurations (based on the work of J. G. A. Pocock⁵⁸ and M. Freeden⁵⁹), as employed in *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe*.

The specific and heavily-contextualized political language that operates in the primary sources most relevant to this research consists of “narrative patterns, rhetorical devices, keywords”⁶⁰ and is centered around “clusters of thinkers, intellectual milieus, and networks of ideological transmission.”⁶¹ Furthermore, these aspects of a political language are defined by the intended meaning (self-positioning of the author), socio-institutional setting (of language production), and the meaning-generated processes of languages themselves (when concepts gain a life of their own through reception processes).⁶² This definition also serves as a foundation for the organization of the chapters in this thesis, that will follow the logic of first introducing the (socio-institutional, intellectual, political, receptional) context of the production of political language and then outlining the key tropes and rhetorical strategies that constituted the language

⁵⁸ John G. A. Pocock, “Languages and Their Implications: The Transformation of the Study of Political Thought” in *Politics, Language & Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 3–41.

⁵⁹ Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

⁶⁰ Trencsényi et al., *A History of Modern Political Thought*, 10.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid, 6.

itself, using a contextual approach for all of the relevant concepts and structuring based on the form of dialogue between the respective authors, ideologies and so on. Throughout the chapters, the connections with the Yugoslavist ideologues will be highlighted, as well as with the relevant German, Italian and Hungarian scholars of Southern Slavic topics or otherwise notable thinkers who came to (re)define the facets of political modernity.

The primary sources which are selected and collected for this research consist of several different genres and were developed for a number of different purposes. The main line along which they can be divided is chronological—consisting of prewar, wartime, and postwar periods—and it is clear that the political language significantly changes in each of them. Another important division line is the character of sources, which include government documents produced by experts for the peace settlement and were never meant to leave the Foreign Office or Quai d'Orsay), knowledge production (such as books and academic journals on history, ethnography, geography, and linguistics), propagandistic pamphlets and lectures (for instance, Kosovo Day in London and Paris in 1916), ceremonial language (openings of exhibitions or balls on the Yugoslav/Serbian topics), newspaper articles (especially interviews), private correspondence (from Frano Supilo, Ante Trumbić, Hinko Hinković, and others), private notes (as in the case of R. W. Seton-Watson and Arthur Evans), minutes from the meetings of intellectual associations (such as the Serbian Relief Fund, Serbian Society of Great Britain, Yugoslav Committee, New Europe Society), memoirs (including those of Wickham Steed and Ivan Meštrović), and so on. Some of these sources display a characteristic mixture of genres, especially in the case of knowledge production and propaganda which are most often combined in the sources. The term which will be used to encompass and define such occurrences is *political epistemologies*, because it allows for an immanent critical lens, as well as an understanding of the inseparable character of the two genres

in the primary sources in question. Another notion which could build upon this is *public moralism*, developed by the British scholar of nineteenth-century political thought, Stefan Collini, to refer to the similar body of primary sources. Finally, it is crucial to differentiate between those sources which were produced for circulation in the public sphere and those for the private sphere, because they often display very insightful and indicative differences in political language, important for a deeper understanding of its overall development.

Since some of the primary sources are co-authored (for instance, *Grammaire Elementaire de la Langue Serbe*),⁶³ additional critical tools for analysis will be employed in order to disentangle, if possible, the individual authorship of certain parts of the text. Although it would be very convenient if Wickham Steed's memoirs *Through Thirty Years, 1892–1922: A Personal Narrative* (1924)⁶⁴ could be used as either a primary source or even secondary literature, the fact that they were only published in 1924 casts too much doubt over their authenticity and the assumption that nothing was changed in light of the outcome of the war.

The same can be said of Ivan Meštrović's memoirs *Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje* (1993),⁶⁵ especially in regard to the temporal and institutional circumstances of their publication. They will thus both be used primarily in the context of the postwar accounts and assessments of the events and not as relevant sources for the study of political language. Lastly, the process of distribution and circulation of some primary sources will be reconstructed using the relevant archival documents from the SSEES UCL, Foreign Office and Bibliothèque nationale de France. This will generate a better understanding of their general impact on both the public and the governments their authors were trying to persuade to support the creation of a unitary Yugoslavia

⁶³ Pierre de Lanux and Tin Ujević, *Grammaire elementaire de la langue serbe* (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1916).

⁶⁴ Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years, 1892–1922: A Personal Narrative* (London: Heinemann, 1924).

⁶⁵ Ivan Meštrović, *Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje* [Reminiscences of political people and events] (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1993).

by showcasing it as an example of political modernity, as well as their own task to convey, legitimizing once again their alleged positions as civilized, developed Western powers. Thus, the main point of interest throughout all of the aforementioned groups of sources will be the intersections and entanglements between the articulations of Yugoslavism and the facets of political modernity such as nation-state, self-determination, sovereignty, homogeneous state, as well as the philosophy of history inscribed into them. However, special attention will be given to historicising and contextualizing the concepts and arguments central to this intersections, by introducing the alternative political languages simultaneously operating around the protagonists of this thesis, in the manner of the Cambridge School.⁶⁶

Changes and clashes of political thought, political culture and epistemologies in and around *fin de siècle* Britain and France

In order to appropriately contextualize the political language of British and French liberal intellectuals and experts on Yugoslav topics around the Great War, it is first necessary to introduce a broader field of political thought, political culture and epistemologies from the late nineteenth century addressing the war itself in Britain and France. The crucial notions which will hereby be explored are the crisis of liberalism and the appearance of strongly contrasting alternatives both from the left and the right, as well as the rapid developments in the arts and sciences of the period.

Moreover, in relation to both of these changes, the new forms of political culture will be presented and their role in shaping the former will be investigated. Since similar changes were ongoing in both Austro-Hungarian intellectual spaces and in the Balkans, whenever parallels could

⁶⁶ Gary Browning. „Quentin Skinner, the Cambridge School, and Contextualism“ *A History of Modern Political Thought: The Question of Interpretation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 67-88.

be highlighted, or have been acknowledged by the contemporaries of these events, they will be included in this inquiry. The scope and the nature of these changes call for a more encompassing category and will be considered as a *paradigm shift*, not only in its original meaning as one of the steps in the structure of a scientific revolution,⁶⁷ but as a broader category which can also embrace political thought, political culture and the arts. The aim of this subchapter is thus to point towards the most relevant changes and entanglements, not only within the aforementioned areas, but also on a larger spatial scope, in order to prove that these were primarily Europe-wide changes which mutually shaped each other and in many cases, arrived back to their original settings enriched by the facets of other contexts, just as integral Yugoslavism did.

To start with, the political culture of this period can be described as comprising *ad hoc* associations and societies dedicated to one-time causes, or a variety of *-isms* which simultaneously aestheticized politics and politicized aesthetics through publishing their manifestos and establishing journals dedicated to their cause. Thus, many of the anxieties about the cultural crisis and decadence,⁶⁸ as well as the fears of descent into mass-cultural barbarism, found their expression in the various types of modernist art, often converging with the corresponding political claims.⁶⁹ It is in this break with the symbolist movement in France, for example, that the roots of modernist nationalism, such as French cubism, German expressionism and Italian futurism, can be found.⁷⁰ Similarly, the aesthetic visions of the fascist ideologue Enrico Corradini, or the *École romane* established by Charles Maurras, as well as the popularity of the early aesthetics of Gabriele d'Annunzio among the French nationalist youth suggest that the new currents in art and literature

⁶⁷ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁶⁸ Michel Winock, *Décadence fin de siècle: L'Esprit de la cité* (Paris: Gallimard, 2017).

⁶⁹ Walter Adamson, "Modernism in art, literature and political theory," in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 412–413.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 420.

displayed a common change on a broader European level and were inspired by similar topics. Simultaneously in the South Slavic space the literary works of Antun Gustav Matoš, Tin Ujević, Milan Marjanović,⁷¹ and Jovan Skerlić, who all critically moved away from national liberalism, as well as the works of the famous sculptor Ivan Meštrović, matched the tone set by the emerging modernist nationalist aesthetic movements with which British and French liberals and experts were more familiar in the prewar period. Political youth organizations with a special inclination towards revolutionary integral nationalism became particularly widespread: these included the Action Française⁷² or Urdd Gobaith Cymru [Welsh League of Youth]⁷³ in the French and British contexts, as well as Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna),⁷⁴ the Young Croatian Movement (Mladohrvatski pokret)⁷⁵ and the Yugoslav Nationalist Youth (Jugoslavenska nacionalistička omladina)⁷⁶ in the future Yugoslav space, many of which found a role model in the political activism and the culture of “direct action” established by the Socialist Revolutionary Party of the Russian Empire.

Besides the most notable example of political violence committed by Gavrilo Princip's *Black hand* group, incidents such as the burning of the Hungarian flag during the visit of Francis

⁷¹ While fruitful in terms of publishing in the prewar period, Milan Marjanović used many of his integral Yugoslavist arguments for propagating the break-up of Austria-Hungary in the USA, where he spent most of the wartime. Although he was not officially a member of the Yugoslav Committee, his publications point to a close cooperation with Hinko Hinković and others who were designated agitators for the Southern Slavic emigration in the USA. His most relevant prewar work *Narod koji nastaje* [A nation in becoming] combines the elements of social psychology, national characterology and a unique categorization of Southern Slav peoples, independent of all others (such as those of Cvijić for instance). Marjanović also strongly relies on geographical determinism, but also incorporates elements of the vision of the „rising East“ against the „declining West“, thus posing the integral Yugoslavs as the new product of Enlightenment values.

⁷² Michel Winock, *Le siècle des intellectuels* (Paris: Seuil, 1997).

⁷³ Rhys Jones, Peter Merriman, and Sarah Mills, “Youth organizations and the reproduction of nationalism in Britain: the role of Urdd Gobaith Cymru,” *Social and Cultural Geography* 17, no. 5 (2016), 714–734.

⁷⁴ Miloš Vojinović, *Političke ideje Mlade Bosne* [The Political Ideas of Young Bosnia] (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2015).

⁷⁵ Mislav Gabelica, “Mladohrvatski pokret od odvajanja od Starčevićeve hrvatske stranke prava 1910. godine” [The Young Croatian Movement of separation from Starčević's Croatian Party of Rights in 1910], *Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti* 34 (2016): 213–238.

⁷⁶ Mirjana Gross, “Nacionalne ideje studentske omladine u Hrvatskoj uoči Prvog svjetskog rata” [The national ideas of student youth in Croatia on the eve of the First World War] *Historijski zbornik* 21/22 (1968/1969): 75–143.

Joseph to Zagreb in 1895,⁷⁷ the overtly politically violent behavior of Zagreb university students on their excursion to Belgrade in 1912,⁷⁸ as well as the assassination attempt on Slavko Cuvaj in 1912 by the students,⁷⁹ emphasize a radicalizing youth violence with a background of integral Yugoslavism. Many of these elements are intrinsically linked to the solidifying notions of public opinion,⁸⁰ mass politics, the polarizing role of the modern media, and life in the metropole. In this context the key protagonists, especially in the British (liberal) tradition, are the public moralists⁸¹ who, in a certain way, professionalized intellectualism by connecting the liberal notions of individualism and public service which resulted in their self-initiated “altruism,” based on their “strong character” and “upholding values.” In that regard, their political thought was often the result of a public conversation and a reaction to the events that broadly fell out of their domain of expertise, but which they were engaged in following for “patriotic” reasons.

In this period, however, many of these public moralists transitioned from officially being liberals to fellow-travelling, which was simultaneously followed by a gradual reconceptualization of liberal values, primarily from the individual to the collective-based notion of liberty. It was this rupture in political thought and culture that made the British and French liberals significantly more receptive to the Yugoslavist project and shaped their way of speaking and writing about it. Furthermore, an important facet of the political culture of the period can be found in highly-divisive treason accusations and trials. The stark connection between the most formative example in French political thought and culture, the Dreyfus affair (1894–1906), and two very similar and

⁷⁷ Ljerka Racko. “Spaljivanje mađarske zastave 1895. godine u Zagrebu” [The burning of the Hungarian flag in 1895 in Zagreb], *Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu* 23, no. 1 (1990).

⁷⁸ Mislav Gabelica. “Izlet zagrebačkih studenata u Srbiju u travnju 1912. godine” [The excursion of Zagreb students to Serbia in April 1912], *Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru* 56 (2014): 235–260.

⁷⁹ “Slavko Cuvaj” in *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, vol. 9, Pri-Sk, ed. Dalibor Brozović (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2007).

⁸⁰ It is not by chance that it was shortly after the First World War that the crucial theoretical developments in the field of public relations took shape. See Edward L. Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion* (New York: Liveright, 1923).

⁸¹ Collini, *Public Moralists*.

comparable cases inherently related to the Yugoslavist cause, the Agram and the Friedjung Trials (1909), was already recognized at the time by R. W. Seton-Watson, who noted the potential for bridging the two political contexts and cultures, perhaps intuitively sensing how soon this connection would gain value.⁸² Lastly, the political culture in France was arguably more receptive to the overall engagement of intellectuals, and the frontier between the government offices and intellectual societies was much more easily crossable and less defined. Conversely, the British experts and intellectuals mostly had to deal with significantly larger obstacles in influencing their government's opinion and policy, as the following chapter will display. In terms of the epistemological developments around the turn of the century, the most relevant for this study are those that were ongoing in racial science, in relation to social Darwinism, statistics and in the various roots of political science.

The entanglement between these disciplines can primarily be traced back to the tendency to replace the classical liberal individualism with more holistic and organic understandings of society and nationhood, often based on biological analogies rooted in application of Darwinistic concepts not only on human society, but also on international relations.⁸³ The notion of the inevitability of competition and survival of the fittest, notably employed in Germany,⁸⁴ together with palingenetic myths, the development of eugenics and the already existing imperial tensions (such as the Agadir crisis) might have significantly enforced the feeling of existential threat that legitimized warfare and would later become a common trope in wartime propaganda.⁸⁵

⁸² Mark Cornwall, "Treason in an Era of Regime Change: The Case of the Habsburg Monarchy," *Austrian History Yearbook* 50 (2019): 124–149.

⁸³ Robert C. Bannister, *Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), 227.

⁸⁴ Alfred Kelley, *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860–1914* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).

⁸⁵ An illustrative quote from the immediate postwar period in this context is: "The World War was a logical consequence of the idea that you must kill off your competitors in order to survive." Edgar L. Heermance, *Chaos or Cosmos* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922), 53.

The legitimization of violence could also be found in the works of a French socialist-turned-integral nationalist ideologue Georges Sorel who, in his influential 1908 work *Réflexions sur la violence*,⁸⁶ concludes that violence is a necessary evil which is in fact desirable and constructive because it purifies the social group and brings about a sort of regeneration. These views were complemented by those who claimed that conflict was, in fact, a natural state between the nations amid the ongoing debates on the militarization of society.⁸⁷ The study of race ran in parallel with these developments and has often proved complementary with the political thought and claims of various actors. Both the German and French racial science were based on geographical determinism, the best examples being the works of *Lebensraum* ideologue Friedrich Ratzel and the founder of the French school of geopolitics Paul Vidal de la Blache, who both claimed that they discovered a biological link between race and culture, as well as asserting that the national state (*völkische Staat*) should roughly correspond with the human geography of that very space.⁸⁸

While the *Südostforschung* produced its own knowledge in the prewar period, often rooted in the connection between geography, racial science (conceptualized somewhere between physical anthropology and biology, or *Völkerbiologie*) and culture, it was in fact the most notable scholar of Yugoslav(ist) human geography, Jovan Cvijić, who provided the British and the French with the most useful concepts and arguments in favor of integral Yugoslavism.⁸⁹ Through his research and fieldwork on geology, folklore and ethnography, he established himself as a Balkan expert and was known in Britain and France well before the war started. While his publications widely circulated around Europe in that period, it was during the war that he established a very fruitful

⁸⁶ Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence* (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1908).

⁸⁷ David E. Sumler, “Domestic Influence on the Nationalist Revival in France, 1909–1914,” *French Historical Studies* 6, no. 4 (1970): 517–537.

⁸⁸ Marius Turda and Maria Sophia Quine, *Historicizing Race* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 71.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

presence in Paris, where he could collaborate with a strong network of French geographers and scholars, most notably Albrecht Penck, Gaston Gravier, Jean Brunhes and Paul Vidal de la Blache.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, his work displayed a serious reliance on geographical (environmental) determinism, especially the type developed by the notable German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, and much less on the French possibilist school with whose influence he was primarily surrounded.⁹¹ Through mainly investigating the categories such as social structure, anthropological types and migrations, he arrived to the argument about the influence of the environment on the ethnopsychological characteristics of the population, which in most part corresponded with the integral Yugoslavist claims. He also ensured the spreading of his publications throughout the relevant departments of Quai d'Orsay, as well as kept in close contact with all the experts that were consulted by the French government on the Balkan, especially Southern Slavic, questions. Furthermore, Cvijić worked hard to strengthen the connections between the American, French and Serbian experts on these topics, thus not only promoting his own work as objective and impartial, but also building foundations for his image on the upcoming Versailles Peace Conference. His maps circulated in large numbers among disciplinary periodicals (the *Annals of Geography* and later the *Geographical Review*), the universities (most notably Sorbonne) and the expert groups employed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Allied countries. He was eventually also one of the most influential figures on the topics of the Balkan or Southern Slavic borders in Versailles, especially due to the data he collected about physical geography, demography, ethnography, anthropogeography and so on. Nevertheless, in some notable cases his opinion was discarded in favor of the Realpolitik, such as was the case with Trieste or Rijeka/Fiume, or as being politically

⁹⁰ Nicolas Grinsburger “Réseaux académiques et circulations savantes entre guerres et paix (1912-1919). Les expertises de Jovan Cvijić et de ses collègues géographes à travers les cas de Trieste et Fiume” *CyberGeo* (2016)

⁹¹ Vedran Duančić. „Nationalist Geographies in Interwar Yugoslavia: Maneuvering between National and Transnational Spaces“ *European Review of History*, vol. 25, no. 3-4 (2018), pp. 588-611.

charged by Serbian hegemonism (from the interwar period and beyond). Another interesting figure who embodies the emergence of European sociology, political science, and racial science⁹² is the Galician-born Austrian sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz. While he adopted the language of the subject nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy, he also attempted to argue that Croats are not Slavs,⁹³ later becoming an inspiration for the so-called Gothic ethnogenesis theory of Kerubin Šegvić which partially legitimized the so-called Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War.⁹⁴ However, Gumplowicz's ideas have been exploited without taking into account their original meaning, which was much more oriented towards understanding race as a cultural-political category shaped by the national activists, and not as a biological one.⁹⁵ Moreover, both the British and German messianistic claims often rested on the notion of racial hierarchy with the Teutonic race being on the top, while the Latin and Slavic were always underneath them.⁹⁶

The taxonomical nature of racial science reinforced its authority because it was deeply entangled with the development of statistics and thus additionally mathematized. Karl Pearson, the founder of modern mathematical statistics, developed the CRL (Coefficient of Racial Likeness) on the basis of the anthropometric method for pattern recognition.⁹⁷ It was not only used for determining which race is superior to another, but also which was the opposite of another. In French political discourse, especially during wartime, the Teutonic and Slavic races were conceptualized as opposite exactly on the basis of this methodology, which also corresponded to the political conceptualization of the integral Yugoslavists and French liberals.

⁹² Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf: sociologische untersuchungen* (Innsbruck: Wagner'sche univ.-buchhandlung, 1883).

⁹³ Ludwig Gumplowicz, "Le origini storiche dei Serbi e dei Croati," *Revista italiana di sociologia* 6, no. 4 (1902): 402–414.

⁹⁴ Kerubin Šegvić, *Die gotische Abstammung der Kroaten* (Berlin: Verlag Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1936) and idem, *Die Kroaten und ihre Mission während dreizehn Jahrhunderte der Geschichte* (Zagreb: Kugli, 1942).

⁹⁵ Trencsényi et al., *A History of Modern Political Thought*, 575–576.

⁹⁶ Turda and Quine, *Historicizing Race*, 39.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 23.

Another important discipline that was developed in this context was craniology. This subject was not reserved solely for legitimization of the argument about the civilizational hierarchies between the mainland and colonial subjects of the maritime empires, but was in fact used in the South Slavic context as well.⁹⁸ Indeed, the author of the most relevant work in the field, *Grundzüge einer systematischen Kraniometrie*,⁹⁹ was a Hungarian craniologist, Aurél Török, who developed his methodology researching Transylvanian skulls.¹⁰⁰ Many of these disciplinary occurrences were a consequence of the prevalence of positivism in scientific thought, and the same could be asserted about the social sciences, especially the political theory which was intensively becoming quantified and based on statistics and observations. The development of theories about advertisements,¹⁰¹ propaganda, crowd psychology, as well as the above-mentioned public opinion had a significant role on the manner in which warfare was legitimized in many countries, both by the government bodies and by the intellectuals themselves.¹⁰²

Ultimately, the political thought that was developed in and around the contexts of the changing political culture and the previously-described epistemological evolution, was not only displaying the crisis of (classical) liberalism, but was in fact rapidly producing a growing number of alternatives, stemming both from the right and the left. In order to even use the notion of liberal intellectuals in this study, it is crucial to historicize and contextualize this type of liberalism that will prove a useful analytical category later on, in the discussion about the British and French liberal understanding of integral Yugoslavism. The most useful debates that should inform the upcoming chapters are those about the definitions and understandings of nationhood (primarily

⁹⁸ Augustin Weisbach, *Die Serbokroaten der adriatischen küstenländer: Anthropologische studie* (Berlin: A. Asher & Co., 1884).

⁹⁹ Aurél Török, *Grundzüge einer systematischen Kraniometrie* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1890).

¹⁰⁰ Turda and Quine, *Historicizing Race*, 78.

¹⁰¹ Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913).

¹⁰² James Farr, "The New Science of Politics," in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought*, eds. Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy, 431–445.

between civic and ethnic-based), statehood (republicanism, monarchism, federalism), the imperial (should empires be reformed or abandoned) and the overall international order (debates around the collective security and collective organizing of international relations in general). While there were also certain alternatives which in many ways transcended these dichotomies—notably the socialist one—they were significantly less relevant for the British and French liberal understanding of integral Yugoslavism and only in part influenced their conceptualizations of political modernity. Furthermore, the socialist voices were additionally pacified in France by the harsh violence directed at the leadership of the *Confédération générale du travail* in 1909, and later with the creation of *Union Sacrée* during the war period. Thus, in the French context, many of the debates were in part a reflection on previous discussions about the nature of the French Revolution and the overall heritage of the Enlightenment, as well as the Franco-Prussian War of 1871.

While the French intellectual historian Michel Winock¹⁰³ uses the concepts of *open* and *closed* nationalism in order to depict the tensions between different conceptualizations of political modernity around the turn of the century, it is important to differentiate and historicize the particular occurrences in political thought without reducing their content solely to the continuation of old debates. In other words, the new integral nationalism that emerged around the turn of the century incorporated much more than just the Boulangerist vindictive discourse of the old conservatives. It is especially relevant to recognize how the prewar, and especially wartime, period opened an unexpectedly wide horizon of possibilities of political organization and change of the status quo, which not only reinforced the already-existing crisis of liberalism, but also enabled a more significant transfer of concepts and ideas from one side of the political spectrum to the other. Thus, the opposing semantics of nationhood from the prewar period, such as that developed by

¹⁰³ Michel Winock, *Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Fascism in France* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

Maurice Barrés (together with his concept of *l'enraciné*,¹⁰⁴ or the deep-rooted, set against the cosmopolitans) and the liberal republican one (which also entails emancipatory, civilizational, messianistic, and universalist connotations)¹⁰⁵ became not only blurred, but in fact closely entangled in the French understanding of integral Yugoslavism around the Great War. Ironically enough, many of the French nationalists came to adopt the German-Herderian understanding of *Kulturnation* while fighting against Germany, and it also found a way to creep into their understanding of integral Yugoslavism. Especially symptomatic in the French case was the anti-Semitism which genuinely epitomized the clash between the new political culture (mass mobilization), political thought (social conservatism, clericalism) and epistemologies (organicism, racial science, social Darwinism) of the period.

While in Britain it also played a relevant role,¹⁰⁶ in France it became a catalyst for the development of integral nationalism and political anti-liberalism in general. The socialist voices in Britain (especially the Independent Labour Party) not only executed a strong influence on the pre-existing liberal debates about social reform and perhaps the notion of self-determination by criticizing the empire itself,¹⁰⁷ but also gained momentum towards the end of the war in terms of political power. In fact, it was this gradual reconceptualization of the social problem, from an individual to a collective-based understanding,¹⁰⁸ that made its way inside the definition of

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰⁵ The famous quote from the 1882 lecture *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* by the historian and philosopher Ernest Renan, which states that nation is “a daily referendum,” best depicts what Winock considers open nationalism.

¹⁰⁶ In fact, Wickham Steed, one of (if not) the most relevant agitators for integral Yugoslavism in Britain, was widely known for his anti-Semitism, which is also reflected in his studies on the Habsburg Monarchy and Southern Slavs: “But the Serbo-Croatians are gradually learning the lesson [...] the necessity of husbanding their own resources, creating their own banks, and developing their economic potentiality in such a manner as to resist, first the local Jewish usurers and secondly international Jewish finance, which the Southern Slavs regard not without reason as the pioneer of Germanism.” Wickham Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (London: Constable and Co, 1913), 285.

¹⁰⁷ Nicholas Owen, “Critics of Empire in Britain,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume IV: The Twentieth Century*, eds. Judith Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 190.

¹⁰⁸ Michael Freedman, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 255.

nationhood itself and thus prepared a fertile ground for the more radical ideas of integral nationalism. While Michael Freeden argues that these changes could be encompassed by the category of *new liberalism*, and James Mayhall, in fact, identifies the “fifth column” inside the otherwise strongly ideologically-equipped liberal majority,¹⁰⁹ the turn of the century and the subsequent years were perhaps some of the most critical in the entire history of liberalism, because it incorporated many elements from its rival ideologies, to the extent of abandoning its most recognizable and foundational facets. One of the most relevant was the universality of its values and understandings of nationhood, statehood, citizenship, and later self-determination.

The crisis brought about by positivist scientism and essentialist, deterministic ethnonationalism made many liberals give concessions to the visions of integral nationalists and merge their messianism with the causes of “oppressed nationalities,” such as those of Austria-Hungary, and to partially employ their political language. This resulted in these British and French liberal intellectuals inscribing certain characteristics to (primarily drawing on previously existing neo-romanticist notions from Yugoslavist political thought), as well as making normative claims about certain solutions for the political organization of these peoples. Nevertheless, the situation was additionally complicated by the realities of the South Slavic political space. Some choices, such as that of republicanism versus monarchism, were not of ideological, but rather practical nature, which drove these liberal intellectuals either to find some creative ideological solutions for its legitimaition or simply to avoid these questions by referring to the future “Yugoslav state” (as opposed to the Yugoslav republic or the Yugoslav Kingdom). Lastly, many British scholars and intellectuals did not have to follow continental affairs to get more deeply acquainted with the facets of the (defensive) integral nationalism or the socialist solutions, the discussions on Irish Home

¹⁰⁹ James Mayhall, “Nationalism and Imperialism,” in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought*, eds. Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy, 110.

Rule, the Welsh Church, and even the suffragette question shortly before the war, proving that they also had a certain task of rethinking their own visions of political modernity at home.

To conclude, many of these changes and developments were in part a result of the process of democratisation and the expanding right of suffrage around Europe, and while many of these political visions were not valorizing the notion of democracy itself, they came to redefine it, together with various other related ones such as sovereignty, nationhood, citizenship, and the international order.

Institutional context and individual agency around the political language

In order to understand the emergence and the general nature of the political language in question, it is important to understand the institutional context around it, as well as to enquire about the key individuals who were the driving force behind its creation and development. Thus, this chapter will contain an overview of the most relevant (inter-)governmental bodies, institutions crucial for knowledge production (such as universities, research institutes, and publishing houses), and the intellectual associations established with the aim of influencing public opinion in their countries, as well as their respective governments. However, it is also necessary to understand that this relationship between the institutional framework and political language was not unilateral, but that there were in fact various notable instances in which it was the political language that was decisive for the formation of institutions.

While both knowledge production and non-governmental propaganda broadly shared the same visions for possible solutions of the Southern Slav question in this period, the governmental bodies were concurrently devising opposing modes of understanding the problem, as well as conducting diplomatic and war practices that highly contradicted the solutions proposed by the aforementioned experts, scholars, and intellectuals. In this way, the South Slavic political actors involved in communication with the British and French liberals received different information about the extent to which their governments or diplomatic circles would accept the Yugoslavist project, and if so, in which particular way. This can partially be explained by the First World War being a formative period of mass politics and propaganda in general, but also with the complex

nature of the “scientific peace” that was to be established.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, the incoherent content produced by the various actors which will be described in this chapter directly reflected upon the process of the forming of the new Yugoslav state and all the problems surrounding its international recognition. Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to portray the institutional settings around the creation of the political language in question, as well as to highlight all discrepancies, differences, and multiple layers of agency thereby entailed. Special attention will be given to the discursive practices of the analyzed institutions, as well as the complexity and nuances of individual agency, keeping in mind the multifaceted role most of these historical actors performed, most often simultaneously embodying a scholar and a propagandist.

One of the crucial elements for understanding the significance and the nature of the role these institutions and individuals played in agitating for the creation of (integral) Yugoslavia is the contact they established with the South Slavic political—and much more importantly, intellectual—actors, either directly or through reading their works and relying on their research. It is here worth noting that it was primarily these scholars and intellectuals that were in closest contact with their South Slavic counterparts in the pre-war period, or the political émigrés during the war, and that the communication between the most of the Yugoslavists and the official governmental bodies of both Britain and France was largely mediated and heavily influenced by these scholar-activists.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Glenda Sluga, *Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 1870–1919* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

¹¹¹ A paramount study in their relations, which particularly portrays the tension between the governmental bodies and the public intellectuals both in Britain and in France, was written by the first female professor at the Charles University in Prague and the contemporary of these events: Milada Paulová, *Jugoslavenški odbor (povijest jugoslavenske emigracije za svjetskog rata od 1914–1918)* [The Yugoslav Committee (History of Yugoslav Emigration in the World War of 1914–1918)] (Zagreb: Prosvjetna nakladna zadruga, 1925).

Governmental bodies

The most relevant governmental institution in the British context is the Foreign Office, within which various *ad hoc* departments were founded or dissolved throughout the war, depending on the particular circumstances and needs of the government. However, before 1918, when more extensive preparations for the peace settlement began, the majority of the South Slav-related content was either contained in the realm of non-governmental propaganda and knowledge production, or was conceptualized in terms of the enlargement of Serbia according to the London agreement of 1915 and the broader propaganda against the *Drang nach Osten*.¹¹²

The main reason for the Foreign Office's lack of interest in the Yugoslavist project during the first years of the war lies in the overall war policy which was strictly concentrated on winning the war on the western border of the German Empire, as well as maritime battles, without seriously considering the possibility of Austria-Hungary's dissolution. From the onset of the war, Wellington House (also known as the Department of Propaganda) was primarily focused on propaganda against the German Empire and the arguments against Austria-Hungary, such as the nationality question which was prevalent in the non-governmental political language, were not employed. It was only in 1917, when Crewe House (also known as the Department for Propaganda in Enemy Countries) was established under Lord Northcliffe and the War Cabinet, that there was a government-related institutional framework for undermining the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the basis of propaganda about the nationality question and the conceptualization of an independent

¹¹² While in this context *Drang nach Osten* encompasses just the British propagandistic vision of German expansionism which endangers the British (route towards) colonies, this syntagm will later be used and explained in the context of Yugoslavist political language of the Austro-Hungarian South Slavic political actors.

South Slavic state.¹¹³ Soon after, in March 1918, the Foreign Office established two other relevant bodies, the PID (Political Intelligence Department) and the Historical Section, which gathered scholars, experts and agitators who belonged to influential intellectual pressure groups like the New Europe Society and the Round Table with the purpose of producing policy papers on demand and preparing manuals for the peace negotiations.¹¹⁴ The PID also collaborated with its French counterpart, the Comité d'études (established and headed by historian Ernest Lavisse in February 1917), which simultaneously provided the same type of knowledge and advice for the Quai d'Orsay, as well as with The Inquiry (and its most notable scholar of South Slavs, Robert Kerner), established by Woodrow Wilson in the USA.¹¹⁵ The Comité had a sort of weekly peer-review seminar routine in the Salle des Cartes of the Institut de Géographie at the Sorbonne, in order to avoid inconsistencies in the reports it produced for the Quai d'Orsay and its communication with the parallel bodies of the Allied powers. The central questions of their memoranda and other publications became the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the establishment of the consequent borders between the new states, as well as those questions related to the extent to which the secret agreements made during the war would be respected.

For that very reason, most of the members of the aforementioned bodies were trained historians (often classicists) and geographers, who were expected to provide the *hard facts* for the establishment of the scientific and lasting peace, although in reality they alternated between various understandings of nationality to ensure the fulfillment of the interests of their respective empires. In the case of advising their governments about the South Slavic question, their task was additionally burdened by the inability of the South Slavic political actors (such as the Yugoslav

¹¹³ Campbell, *Secrets of the Crewe House*.

¹¹⁴ Sluga, *Nation, Psychology, and International Politics*, 25.

¹¹⁵ Lawrence Emerson Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963), 124.

Committee, People's Council of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the Serbian government) to take a unified stance on the mode of unification, which might have additionally enforced the choice of integral Yugoslavism as a dominant vision and argument for Yugoslav unification. The key memoranda produced by the PID shortly before the beginning of the Versailles Peace Conference, *The Future Frontiers of Hungary and South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans*,¹¹⁶ clearly illustrate the prevalence of the integral understanding of the future state and of Yugoslavism in general, thereby simultaneously serving the British imperial interest in a strong allied state in this strategically important area, but also the liberal, idealistic intellectual understanding of integral Yugoslavism as a political modernity, set in contrast to the allegedly anachronistic and essentially undemocratic Austro-Hungarian Empire, which would inevitably dissolve according to their particular philosophy of history. While the propaganda production within La Maison de la Presse was similarly limited to anti-German propaganda and Serbia-oriented reporting on the South Slav question, the Comité d'études was also heavily relying on the expertise of liberally-oriented historians and geographers who were, much like their British counterparts, also previously engaged in non-government driven knowledge and propaganda production.

This group, together with the Italian Padua Commission and their British counterparts, participated in the activities of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Committee¹¹⁷ which was tasked with distributing propaganda material on the battlefields during 1918 and which also played a significant role in the organization of the Congress of the Oppressed Peoples of Austria-Hungary in Rome in April of the same year.¹¹⁸ Thus, it can be asserted that in the case of governmental

¹¹⁶ Erik Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916–1920* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 132–133.

¹¹⁷ Mark Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary*.

¹¹⁸ Andrea Carteny, “All Against One: The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary (1918),” *The Department of Communication Working Paper Series*, University of Teramo (2010), 11–12.

bodies, the production of knowledge and propaganda was heavily conditioned by the war circumstances and the narrow imperial interests of the British and French governments in the context of peace-making. In other words, the content most relevant for analyzing the British and French liberal understanding of integral Yugoslavism and political modernity is to be found in the pre-1918 non-governmental works, in a genre that simultaneously incorporates knowledge production, propaganda, and public moralism, but also displays a crucial entanglement between the history of British and French liberal political thought and the broader epistemological debates of the period. Moreover, it was in fact these groups of scholar-activists who organized the mediation sessions for preparing the Corfu Declaration (between the Pašić government and the Yugoslav Committee) and the important talks between the Yugoslav and Italian delegations in regard to the problem of the London agreement (the postwar status of the Eastern Adriatic) in early 1918.¹¹⁹ To conclude, the work they were doing to ensure the victory of the Entente, as well as the establishment of an independent South Slavic state, was often not done in accordance with the official policies of their states, but on many occasions, in spite of them.

¹¹⁹ Ivo Petrinović, *Politička misao Frana Supila* [The political thought of Frano Supilo] (Split: Književni krug, 1988).

Academic institutions, intellectual associations, and pressure groups

The pre-war and especially wartime geopolitical and diplomatic circumstances both ran in parallel and partially enforced the development and professionalization of the various types of Slavonic studies in Britain and in France, particularly the non-Russian related topics concentrating on the other Slavic peoples. Furthermore, the experts on these subjects were often involved in rethinking the models and categories employed in their own empires, which additionally influenced the ways in which they were conceptualizing both Yugoslavism and political modernity.¹²⁰ Thus, the academic institutions that produced knowledge on the South Slavs included universities, research institutes, publishing houses, various societies devoted to different disciplines, and non-governmental pressure groups, all consisting of the same scholars.¹²¹

More often than not, most of these institutions published about the Yugoslavist project long before the war began, and their interest in the political integration of the South Slavs can be traced back to the contacts that the famous Yugoslavist bishop and philanthropist Josip Juraj Strossmayer established with William Gladstone in Britain and Louis Léger in France.¹²² While the British saw only a single relevant university department (the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at King's College, London) established in this liberal milieu in 1915,¹²³ the French case provides a much more fruitful example. The Collège de France, the Sorbonne, the École Normale Supérieure, the École libre des sciences politiques and the École des Langues orientales all had at least one or two experts in Slavonic languages and literature who published in relevant journals such as the

¹²⁰ Erik Goldstein, "The Round Table and the New Europe," *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 87, no. 346 (1998): 177–189.

¹²¹ Harry Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War*.

¹²² Paul Boyer, "Louis Leger."

¹²³ Harry Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War*, 125–128.

Nouvelle Revue française, *Revue des Deux Mondes* or *La Revue Hebdomaire*. Alternatively, they established new ones, often either related to Slavonic studies (such as *Le Monde Slave* in 1917 or *Revue des Études Slaves* in 1921), but also disciplinary journals (*Annales de Géographie*) and journals related to political theory or pure agitation (*Ligue internationale pour la défense du droits des peuples*).

In the pre-war period the South Slavic topics were mostly contained in the books and articles on questions related to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the trialist debates or the role of Serbia in the Balkan Wars, where works by scholars such as André Chedarme,¹²⁴ Victor Bérard,¹²⁵ Louis Léger¹²⁶ and Louis Eisenmann¹²⁷ played a major role in influencing public opinion about the history and present state of Austro-Hungarian politics. Topics such as racial—later conceptualized as national—distribution also featured, often based on the work of local scholars such as Jovan Cvijić¹²⁸ or Augustin Weisbach.¹²⁹ Those same authors and some others, primarily historians and journalists, continued publishing on the South Slavic question during the war period, now singling it out by conceptualizing it outside of the frameworks of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or even Serbian expansionism. Most relevant in that context are the works of Ernest Denis,¹³⁰ Pierre de Lanux,¹³¹ Louis Léger,¹³² and Bertrand Auerbach¹³³ which, as the war

¹²⁴ André Chedarme, *L'Europe et la Question d'Autriche au seuil du XXe siècle* (Paris: Librairie Plon-Nourrit, 1901); André Chedarme, *L'Allemagne, La France et la Question d'Autriche* (Paris: Librairie Plon-Nourrit, 1902).

¹²⁵ Victor Bérard, *Heroic Serbia* (London: Women's Printing Society, 1900).

¹²⁶ Louis Léger, *Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie depuis les origines jusqu'à l'année 1894* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1907).

¹²⁷ Louis Eisenmann, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867: Étude sur le Dualisme* (Paris: Librairie Georges Bellais, 1904).

¹²⁸ Jovan Cvijić, *Aneksija Bosne i Hercegovine i srpski problem* [The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian problem] (Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1908).

¹²⁹ Augustin Weisbach, *Die Serbokroaten der adriatischen küstländer*; Augustin Weisbach, *Die Slovenen* (Vienna: Anthropologischen Gesellschaft, 1903).

¹³⁰ Ernest Denis, *La Grande Serbie* (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1915).

¹³¹ Pierre de Lanux, *La Yougoslavie, La France et Les Serbes* (Paris: Librairie Payot, 1916).

¹³² Louis Léger, *La Liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1915).

¹³³ Bertrand Auerbach, *Les Races et Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1917).

progressed, more overtly conceptualized an independent South Slavic state based on their specific philosophy of history, understanding of political modernity, and a language-based or racially defined integral Yugoslav nationality.

Nevertheless, while most of the aforementioned individuals were university professors and researchers, they actively engaged in the work of (or established) a number of intellectual associations with the aim of influencing public opinion. In the French context, the most relevant ones for the South Slavic question were the Ligue internationale pour la défense du droits des peuples and Union des Nationalités. It was only in 1919, when Ernest Denis founded the Institut d'études Slaves, that study and opinion-making on the Slavic topics received a singular academic institutional basis.

However, these elements should not be regarded outside of the context of the history of the political thought in what was to become the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Not only were the many local arguments, concepts, and ideas directly informing the French and British liberal understanding of the Yugoslav problem, but institutions such as the Yugoslav Committee or the various diplomats such as Milenko Vensić¹³⁴ or Hinko Hinković,¹³⁵ published mostly in French during the war, and mostly in German in the pre-war period, making it possible for the British and French scholars to (re)produce similar content in their own political language. The Yugoslav Committee established the Bibliothèque Yougoslave in Paris with the aim of producing general knowledge about the South Slavs and evoking certain sympathies from the French,¹³⁶ as well as publishing the Bulletin Yougoslave between 1915 and 1918, both in Paris and in London,

¹³⁴ Milenko Vesnić, *Međunarodno Pravo u Odnosima Južnih Slavena* [International law in the relations of the Southern Slavs] (Belgrade: Štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1895).

¹³⁵ Hinko Hinković, *Les Croates sous le Joug Magyar* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1915).

¹³⁶ Comité Yougoslave, *Les Lettres, les Sciences et les Arts Yougoslaves* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1916); Comité Yougoslave, *Le Pays et le Peuple Yougoslave* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1916); Comité Yougoslave, *L'Unité Yougoslave: Manifeste de la Jeunesse Serbe, Croate et Slovene réunie* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1915).

in order to inform the public on the most recent developments around the Yugoslavist project. Interestingly, a journal named *Glas Crnogorca* [Voice of the Montenegrin], published in Neuilly-sur-Seine near Paris and funded by the exiled King Nikola I of Montenegro, provided a contrasting narrative and wrote about Yugoslav unification as a threat to Montenegrin historical individuality and statehood in general.¹³⁷ Nevertheless, the Yugoslav Committee was an ideologically diverse body consisting of various types of intellectuals and experts, ranging from literary critics, ethnologists, and artists to lawyers and journalists, as well as from the republican federalists towards the centralist monarchists and vice versa.¹³⁸

Members of the Yugoslav Committee came not only from a considerable variety of social, ethnic, and political backgrounds, but also oriented their individual agitational work towards very different types of public on several different continents. Perhaps one of the most influential political thinkers in this regard was Frano Supilo, a Cavtat-born and mostly self-taught journalist and political activist who began in the Dalmatian Rightist Party,¹³⁹ but soon became one of the key ideologues of the “New Course Politics”¹⁴⁰ in the Triune Kingdom of Croatia and developed into an integral Yugoslavist with a vision resting primarily on federalism and respect for the historical

¹³⁷ Nataša Ružić and Vladan Lalović, “Izvještavanje Glasa Crnogorca o osnivanju Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca,” *Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru* 58 (2016): 285–307. Moreover, this journal was a continuation of the one published in Cetinje from 1873 and which would continue being published from 1920—this time in Italy, under the name *La Voce del Montenegro*—until 1922. However, simultaneously during the war, a most notable agitator for the unification of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, Andrija Radović, was publishing in Ernest Denis's *Le Monde Slave*.

¹³⁸ Milada Paulová, *Jugoslavenski odbor*.

¹³⁹ On the genesis and evolution of the Croatian Party of Rights and its Dalmatian counterparts, see: Jaroslav Šidak, Mirjana Gross, Igor Karaman, and Dragovan Šepić, *Povijest hrvatskog naroda od 1860 do 1914* [The history of the Croatian people from 1860 to 1914] (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1968).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. “Politics of the New Course” entailed the claims for the unification of Dalmatia and Croatia-Slavonia, as well as achieving full sovereignty, together with a considerably closer cooperation with the Serbs, and not just those of Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, it incorporated a neo-Slavist orientation against the German expansionism in the perceived *Drang nach Osten* and—partially because of the charismatic political leaders such as Frano Supilo, Svetozar Pribičević and Josip Smolaka—proceeded to co-opt a significant body of the younger population. Two most relevant programmatic texts of the “politics of the new course” are the Fiume and Zadar Resolutions (Riječka i Zadarska rezolucija) from 1905, published by Croatian and Serbian political circles that came to shape Croatian politics the most in the upcoming years.

individuality of the various *peoples* or *tribes* (Serbo-Croatian: *naroda, plemena*) he envisioned forming the new state. After becoming infamous for accusations he received during the Friedjung Trial and leaving the Croato-Serbian Coalition, he developed a close contact with the Italian couple, Guglielmo Ferrero and Gina Lombroso Ferrero, both liberals leaning towards social-democracy, who were deeply invested in the entanglements of social reformism and racial science.¹⁴¹ Beside unsuccessfully using them to appeal to the official Italian circles throughout the war, Supilo proved to be the main link between the South Slavic émigrés and the British intellectuals and general public, primarily through his acquaintance with Wickham Steed.¹⁴²

A very prominent figure who embodied the contact between the Yugoslav Committee and the French intellectual, government, and diplomatic circles is the aforementioned Pierre de Lanux,¹⁴³ who co-authored several publications with members of the Yugoslav Committee,¹⁴⁴ as well as initiating the translation of the most important local Yugoslavist documents and creating the very ideologically-embedded language manuals for French soldiers in Serbia.¹⁴⁵ He is furthermore notable for being in contact with members of the New Europe Society in Britain and with the American government, as well as for fostering French-Yugoslav relations in the 1920s and within the League of Nations. The Yugoslav Committee also developed a close relationship with non-governmental institutions in Britain, primarily the aforementioned New Europe Society and its founder and financier R. W. Seton-Watson, whose organ *New Europe* was one of the most

¹⁴¹ In fact, both the father of Gina (Cesare Lombroso) and Guglielmo Ferrero himself, wrote extensively and influentially on the racial-biological background of criminality and prostitution; see Cesare Lombroso and Guglielmo Ferrero, *La femme criminelle et la prostituée* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1896); and Gina Lombroso and Cesare Lombroso, *Criminal Man: According to the Classification of Cesare Lombroso* (London: G.P. Putnam, 1911).

¹⁴² It was Wickham Steed who was crucial in assisting Supilo's escape from the Friedjung Trial without being convicted and who offered him a position of the Balkan correspondent of the *Times*. See Ivo Petrinović, *Politička misao Frana Supila*, 120, 131.

¹⁴³ "Pierre André Véronge de Lanux," Famille de Lanux.

¹⁴⁴ Milan Toplitza [pseudonym of Pero Slijepčević] and Pierre de Lanux, "L'Autriche-Hongrie en Guerre Contre ses Sujets," *La Revue Hebdomadaire*, September 4, 1915, 37.

¹⁴⁵ de Lanux and Ujević, *Grammaire Elementaire de la Langue Serbe*.

relevant for the dissemination of knowledge and propaganda about the Yugoslavist project in all the countries of the Entente. Before its establishment in 1916, the main organizations engaging in similar types of scholarly propagandist work were the Serbian Society of Great Britain, the Serbian Relief Fund, and the Balkan Committee, but their approach to Southern Slav political integration was rather limited and centered around Serbian expansionism.

Nevertheless, Seton-Watson himself, who was also behind the establishment and fundraising of the first two organizations, displayed a relatively large change of understanding of the problem between the pre-war period and wartime.¹⁴⁶ While in his early works, he clearly argues for the preservation of Austria-Hungary on the basis of the European balance of power and international order in general,¹⁴⁷ after the annexation of Bosnia in 1908 and especially after the Friedjung and Agram trials,¹⁴⁸ an evidently more pessimistic view of the future of Austria-Hungary appears in his works.

From conceptualizing the South Slavic question as one that needs to be solved by “an Austrian statesman” in the pre-war period,¹⁴⁹ Seton-Watson adopted a vision of an independent South Slavic state soon after the war broke out.¹⁵⁰ However, towards the end of the war, he started noticing and publishing about the crucial problems and differences between the South Slavic political actors, eventually arriving to the strong contrast between the “Serbian” solution and the

¹⁴⁶ Péter, “R.W. Seton-Watson's Changing Views on the National Question of the Habsburg Monarchy.”

¹⁴⁷ Robert William Seton-Watson, *The Future of Austria-Hungary and the Attitude of the Great Powers* (London: Archibald Constable, 1907).

¹⁴⁸ Robert William Seton-Watson, *Absolutism in Croatia* (London: Constable & Co., 1912).

¹⁴⁹ To which he dedicated his book, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (London: Constable & Co., 1911). Another interesting dedication, in his earlier book, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London: Archibald Constable, 1908), “A Hungar Nemzetnek,” also points to his adopting the argument for solving the “nationality question” in Hungary within the framework of a multiethnic unitary Hungarian nation.

¹⁵⁰ A similar change of attitude and opinion could be traced in the works of the notable French Slavist and historian of the Habsburg Monarchy, Louis Léger, who first conceptualized Austria-Hungary as a framework within which the problems of the Slavs could be resolved in his book *Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie: depuis les origines jusqu'à l'année 1878* (Paris: Hachette, 1879). However, he arrived at an entirely opposed argument several years later in his book *La Liquidation de l'Autriche Hongrie* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1915).

“Yugoslav” solution, which might have had a decisive role in him being excluded from most of the governmental bodies that were preparing for the peace settlement (such as the PID and the Historical Section in the Foreign Office). Nevertheless, many accounts of the period confirm that his Orange Bible (an informal name for the journal *The New Europe*) was one of the most sought-after publications around the Versailles Peace Conference.¹⁵¹

Although Seton-Watson had already attempted to establish a journal of this type in June 1914 either under the name *The European Review* or *The European*,¹⁵² due to financial limitations,¹⁵³ he could only establish *The New Europe* (the name most probably deriving from Masaryk) in October 1916. The importance, as well as the controversial status of *The New Europe* can be recognized by the fact that it had an average distribution of 4000 copies per issue in 1917, with a constantly growing number of subscribers from different Allied countries, while simultaneously being under governmental pressure which attempted to cut its production by limiting the paper production by 50 per cent.¹⁵⁴ Even under these circumstances, due to the adaptation of the size and the font (resulting in a reduction from thirty-two to twenty-four pages per issue), *The New Europe* still sold around 3000 copies per issue in 1918 and 1919.¹⁵⁵ The only French parallel example of such a journal with a list of influential contributors and a wide range of topics relating to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the establishment of an independent South Slavic state can be found in *Le Monde Slave* (only the 1917 and 1918 issues) which was significantly more positively oriented towards the Yugoslavist project than any other French

¹⁵¹ Goldstein, “The Round Table,” 181.

¹⁵² Interestingly, Oszkár Jászi was one of the first people Seton-Watson invited to contribute in this period, having been impressed by the special issue of his *Huszadik Század*, “La Hongrie Contemporaine et le suffrage universel,” in 1909. György Litván, *A Twentieth-Century Prophet: Oscar Jászi, 1875–1957* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), 65–66.

¹⁵³ UCL SSEES Archives, Seton-Watson Papers, SEW-2-1.

¹⁵⁴ UCL SSEES Archives, Seton-Watson Papers, SEW-2-2.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

periodical of the period.¹⁵⁶ Lastly, it is important to emphasize that the liberal intellectuals on both sides of the English Channel who were involved in producing knowledge and propaganda about the South Slavs, were deeply ideologically and epistemologically embedded into rethinking the categories of international order and the modes of practicing international relations.

The clearest instance of such entanglement can be observed in the close relationship between the New Europe Society and the Round Table Society which, although perhaps divided along the liberal-conservative axis, both highly contributed to the establishment of Chatham House (the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs) and the professionalization of international relations as a field of study in general. Moreover, their collaboration and common publishing about issues of imperial rule, both Austro-Hungarian and British, provides a number of examples of similar approaches towards political modernity in general. Many scholar-politicians who started their careers by agitating for the creation of Yugoslavia in these societies, such as Alfred Eckhard Zimmermann and Frederick Whyte,¹⁵⁷ later went on to become some of the predominant ideologues or executors of the British Commonwealth.

Their ideas about the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the future Yugoslav state thus cannot be viewed outside of the context of the more abstract debates about the League of Nations, nationhood, relations between the empire and the nation-state, democracy, federalism, (French) republicanism, self-determination, and sovereignty. Furthermore, their understanding of the conceptual change in all of the aforementioned elements of international order was, in this particular case, deeply intertwined with the already existing notions developed in the Balkan romanticist and neo-Slavist traditions of political thought in the South Slavic space.¹⁵⁸ To

¹⁵⁶ Antonia Bernard, “Le Monde Slave: première revue française consacrée aux pays slaves,” *Revue des études slaves* 74, no. 2–3 (2002): 397–409.

¹⁵⁷ Harry Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War*, 177.

¹⁵⁸ Trencsényi et al., *A History of Modern Political Thought*, 531–545.

conclude, these academic institutions, intellectual associations and individuals present the most relevant and fertile source of the political language that combines integral Yugoslavism and the liberal understanding of political modernity in this particular context. Thus, this political language will be under scrutiny in the following chapter and will serve to reveal the entanglements and mutual influences between the two, as well as to portray how certain public moralists had to quickly gain expert knowledge to maintain their influential positions and, conversely, how the prewar experts had to turn into public moralists in order to influence their government's policies.

Integral Yugoslavism as political modernity

With respect for the previous chapters which have introduced the political, epistemological and institutional contexts around the political language in question, this chapter will portray it through outlining the key concepts and rhetorical strategies revolving around the understanding of the Yugoslav past (roughly until 1867),¹⁵⁹ Yugoslav present (roughly from 1867 until the publishing date of the source), and Yugoslav future (primarily in terms of political organization and future role in the international order) by the British and French liberal intellectuals.

In adopting this division of their understanding of integral Yugoslavism, this analysis will better correspond with the nature of the sources themselves and extract the most useful tropes, concepts, and arguments used. Furthermore, this will enable the direct highlighting of the intertextual connections with the Yugoslavists' ones. Thus, special attention will be given to the intersections of the elements derived from the political language of integral Yugoslavism and the concepts taken from their own liberal—as well as imperial—outlook towards political modernity, together with the epistemological debates and the stage of professionalization at which academic fields such as history, geography, linguistics, ethnology, anthropology, and statistics were at that point in time. The majority of publications produced by these intellectuals has a heavy focus on historicizing the *Southern Slav question*.¹⁶⁰ While other types of content usually feature statistical

¹⁵⁹ Since the South Slavic topics are at the center of this thesis, it can be asserted that the year of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise is the most suitable for encompassing the relevant developments of the Yugoslavist political language and the ways in which British and French liberal intellectuals understood it from approximately 1900 onwards.

¹⁶⁰ As recently pointed out in Holly Case, *The Age of Questions: Or, A First Attempt at an Aggregate History of the Eastern, Social, Woman, American, Jewish, Polish, Bullion, Tuberculosis, and Many Other Questions over the Nineteenth Century, and Beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), it would be also indicative to follow when the Southern Slavs became a question and were, in fact, distinguishable from other similar questions such as the Austrian question, as was posed in André Chéradame, *L'Europe et la Question d'Autriche au seuil du XXe siècle* (Paris: Plon Nourrit, 1901).

data, maps, ethnological, geographical, linguistic, and anthropological descriptions, it is the historical overview which dominates the study and provides the strongest argument both for South Slavic political integration and for the direct involvement of British and French governments in realizing it.

Thus, this practice of strongly relying on the taxonomical historicization of the problem simultaneously displays a belief in the scientific treatment of the problem, following the Enlightenment notion that this science is universally applicable and relevant, while simultaneously depicting a crisis of liberalism because the knowledge hereby produced contradicts the civic enlightened understanding of the nation, and in fact adopts primarily the facets of integral nationalism. Nevertheless, by defining the role of their own countries in conveying the importance of South Slavic political integration, these intellectuals continued to perpetuate the notion of universal modernity and the universality of liberal values, stemming from them as the center of it, which could be recognized as a classical liberal notion of the nineteenth-century civilizing mission.

It is only after an extensive historical overview that the present situation is assessed, but in far lesser scope and detail. If produced during the wartime, they often include an overview of Serbian military achievements and relate them to a certain national characterization of Serbs in a Herderian way,¹⁶¹ containing references to the struggles against the Ottomans and cultural forms and expressions hitherto produced, most notably the folklore psychology of *hajdučke pjesme* (Serbian epic poetry), performed by *guslari* (a name deriving from the instrument, *gusle*) as a sort of oral transmission of national history. On the other hand, if produced before the war began, the

¹⁶¹ Especially exemplary in this context is the chapter “L'Esprit du Serbe Combattant” (pp. 53–121) in de Lanux, *La Yougoslavie, La France et Les Serbes*, which combines the author's impressions of the ethnological museum in Belgrade, the theater, villages and streets, as well as prisoners, refugees, hospital patients, parliament deputies, Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević, soldiers, and artists both of high and vernacular culture, all under the notion of the Serbian combatant spirit.

Southern Slavic topics are primarily conceptualized within the framework of a broader Austro-Hungarian sequence of contemporary crises related to it (the crisis of dualism, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Agram and Friedjung Trials, and so forth). The majority of these publications contain specific policy recommendations in their conclusion, as well as normative claims about the future Yugoslav state and the larger temporal and historical context around the necessity of its creation.

However, in order to understand all three of these categories (Yugoslav past, present, and future), it is necessary to first elaborate more on the two broader layers of understanding them in general. Firstly, it is important to investigate how the Southern Slavs were collectively conceptualized (races, tribes, peoples, nations) and which conceptual changes have occurred, especially between the pre-war and wartime periods. Secondly, it is worth enquiring about the influence and the reception that the conceptual development of *Slavdom* in this period had in the British and French contexts, because it in many ways preceded their research into the Southern Slav question, but also laid the ground for the way they conceptualized it.¹⁶²

To start with, an important role in creating collective conceptualizations was played by the racial element, and it is very telling that a majority of British and French authors conceptualized these peoples in terms of race. While this term was used flexibly and on many occasions in a non-essentialist manner, it proved very useful during the war because it was most compatible with the geopolitical situation and goals of the Entente.¹⁶³ Not only did it imply the racial-biological unity

¹⁶² This is clearly observable in the fact that the journal of Ernest Denis, *Le Monde Slave*, established in 1917 with the same aim as Seton-Watson's *New Europe*, generally conceptualizes most Slavs as oppressed races, except the Russians on whom there is otherwise the smallest amount of content.

¹⁶³ For example Seton-Watson, in his book *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy*, uses the concept of race to subsume origin or ancestry: "The Petrovic dynasty, which has ruled Montenegro since the year 1696, was originally a race of prince-bishops, or Vladikas, in which the nephew followed the uncle" (p. 11.); the social-professional group: "The famous race of Granitchars, or Frontiersmen, was the outcome of these measures" (p. 44), or uses the various expressions such as "Slav race," "non-magyar race," and "dual race" (for Serbo-Croats) to which

of the Yugoslavs, allegedly disrupted by the artificial labels imposed by Austria and spurious national identities, but it also conveniently excluded the Bulgarians who were seen as sharing the South Slavic language, but had “Tatar blood”¹⁶⁴ and were considered a “non-Slavonic race.”¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁶In other words, the differences among Southern Slavs were considered to be a *cultural* by-product of historical separation¹⁶⁷ and the similarities among them a *natural*, organic, scientifically-provable fact, most notably in terms of language and racial characteristics often also *observable* not only through biological inquiry, but also through ethnology, anthropology, and human geography. The two key notions employed from Jovan Cvijić's writings on the human geography of the Balkan peninsula are the Dinaric race and so-called metanastasic movements.¹⁶⁸ While the latter “scientifically” proved the immanent mixing and merging of peoples in the Balkans and thus additionally enforced the argument about the unity of Yugoslavs, the former also played a significant role in binding them, as well as “proving” the higher position they held in the

he ascribes certain hierarchies: for instance, “In curious contrast to Croatia, the Dalmatian Croats and the Serbs are the least musical of the Slav races” (p. 140).

¹⁶⁴ In the French case, the same argument was dominant: “Le Bulgare se distingue physiquement de ses voisins: il est osseux, trapu, a le crâne en pointe, le nez proéminent, les pommettes saillantes, les yeux petits et enfoncés, la face large; rien de la sveltesse du Valaque ou du Magyar. Le Bulgare a le moral de son physique: il est d'une mélancolie quelque peu lourde; il se ressent encore sans doute de la longue humilité où vécurent ses ancêtres et sa moralité laisserait encore à désirer. Mais il a jusqu'ici assez bien préservé ses traditions et ses mœurs; et ce n'est pas un mince mérite, vu sa faiblesse numérique, et sa condition sociale de petit cultivateur...” Auerbach, *Les Races et Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie*, 421.

¹⁶⁵ Evans, *Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia*, 17.

¹⁶⁶ “It is scarcely necessary to point out that the Magyars are of Asiatic origin, belonging to what it is now the fashion to describe as the Ural-Altaic or Finno-Ugric branch of the human race, claiming kinship with the Huns, Finns, and Turks, and speaking an agglutinative language which bears no resemblance to any European tongue. This origin, despite all the racial admixtures which have come to them throughout the centuries, is still traceable to-day in their temperament and political outlook. It is not uninteresting to contrast their fate with that of another kindred tribe, the Bulgarians, who almost at once discarded their original language, and were already talking some kind of Slavonic when the two great Slav apostles, Cyril and Methodius, preached to them, as contemporaries of Egbert.” R. W. Seton-Watson, *German, Slav and Magyar: A Study in the Origins of the Great War* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1916), 2.

¹⁶⁷ “Thus from the very outset the most marked feature in Southern Slav history is its dual character. The struggle between Latin and Slav culture, between the traditions of Rome and Byzantium, made itself continually felt alike in Church and in state, and led to an estrangement between the kindred races of Croat and Serb, which rendered their national consolidation impossible and made the two rivals the prey of foreign conquerors. Not till the nineteenth century did they begin to comprehend the simple truth that union is strength.” Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 16.

¹⁶⁸ Jovan Cvijić, “Mouvements métanastasiques dans la péninsule des Balkans,” *Le Monde Slave* 1 (1917): 84–98.

racial hierarchy, thus legitimizing the need for British and French to “repay” them for “guarding the gates” of civilization throughout the early modern period by arguing for their cause of integral Yugoslavia. In terms of *Slavdom* (from the German neologism *Slawentum*) as an overarching concept from which Yugoslavism in its various forms drew inspiration, it is crucial to understand it in its relation with *Deutschtum*, as well as all the historical occurrences of the nineteenth century in which they reinforced each other,¹⁶⁹ which might have also provided a basis for what the British and French racial conceptualization of Teutonic and Slavic races later echoed.¹⁷⁰

Thus, Yugoslavism began its conceptual life more on the basis of cultural reciprocity or mutuality (Serbo-Croatian: *uzajamnost*), much like Ján Kollár's broader claims about Slavdom in *Über die literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stämmen und Mundarten der slawischen Nation* (1837), and was an underpinning scope kept in mind by the standardizers of the Croatian (Ljudevit Gaj) and Serbian (Vuk Stefanović Karadžić) languages. It could further be argued that Yugoslavism—or more precisely its predecessor, Illyrianism—formed the most viable stream in Croatian political thought in the ages of “national awakening” and national integration. This was later ideologically developed, institutionally grounded, and internationally exported in the 1860s and 1870s by Josip Juraj Strossmayer, Franjo Rački and their People's Party (Serbo-Croatian: *Narodna stranka*), thus making the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia a fertile ground for the development of Yugoslavist political thinkers. However, the context most

¹⁶⁹ Roksandić, “Jugoslavenstvo prije Jugoslavije.”

¹⁷⁰ The preface of the book of a British historian and a wartime advisor in the Foreign Office, James Namier, *Germany and Eastern Europe* (London: Duckworth & Co., 1915), notes the following: “He regards it as the inevitable outcome of Germany's political association with Austria and of the deep-rooted and secular antagonism between Teuton and Slav. The war, in his view, is not primarily an African war, a struggle the roots of which are to be found in the rivalries generated by the partition of Africa, nor is it a war contrived to clear the way for a marine struggle with England, nor yet is it a blow delivered with the purpose of once and for all knocking all the nonsense about Metz and Strasburg out of French brains. It is an Eastern war, a continuation of that age-long struggle between Slav and Teuton which has entered as a problem into the lives of every ruler of the Eastern Marches since the days of Henry IV and has furnished one of the main strands of German history through recorded time.”

relevant for the development of integral Yugoslavism is that of neo-Slavism¹⁷¹ and Croatian Rightist movement,¹⁷² both of which, for the most part, had to be discovered by the British and French intellectuals only shortly before the beginning of the war.

Before the war, the term “South Slav” (in French *Slaves du Sud* or *Slaves méridionaux*) was considered more scientific and inclusive, as well as less politically charged than “Yugoslav,” which originally denoted a specific political project in the context of Austro-Hungarian trialism and not a national category. The latter also gained a new meaning in the initial stages of the war due to it being co-opted by Serbian diplomatic and propagandistic discourse and equated with Serbia and its war aims. In this first period it was oriented against Austro-Hungary as a state, as well as against the German racial element, especially in the ethnographic and anthropological discourse in both Britain and France.

However, after the agitational activities of the Yugoslav Committee gained momentum, from mid-1915 onwards, Yugoslavism was inscribed not only a certain ambiguity, but was also starting to be juxtaposed against the “Serbian” solution. The notion of “Greater Serbia” here played a crucial role in the reconceptualization of Yugoslavism due to its own change of meaning, from the positive diplomatic language of “Serbia as a Piedmont of South Slavs” and her reward for

¹⁷¹ Although the neo-Slavist movement was unable to achieve concrete results in the pre-war period (despite devising ambitious projects such as the foundation of a Slavic Bank, to counter the workings of the Deutsche Bank, with its branches in London and Paris), the connections established in its congresses and the discussions about the future of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in many ways eased the process of wartime cooperation between Czechoslovak and Yugoslav émigrés and encouraged their mutual understanding. For the institutional and overall history of the neo-Slavic meetings see Paul Vyšný, *Neo-Slavism and the Czechs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

¹⁷² Serbo-Croatian: *pravaštvo*, is in this context used as a sort of abbreviation from the Croatian Party of Rights (Serbo-Croatian: *Hrvatska stranka prava*), which in itself implies the Croatian historical right of independent statehood. While the original Party of Rights, led by Ante Starčević, laid strong ideological and political foundations in the 1860s, the party eventually branched out in several different directions, ranging from clerical Habsburg loyalists to integral Yugoslavists, with a special division between those in Dalmatia and those in Croatia-Slavonia. In this context, the most relevant are the turn-of-century Dalmatian Rightists who translated many of its concepts and historical arguments into the integral Yugoslavism with which British and French intellectuals were mostly acquainted. For the genesis and development of Croatian Party of Rights and its political language, see Gross, *Izvorno pravaštvo*; and Gross, *Povijest pravaške ideologije*.

military efforts,¹⁷³ towards signifying the hegemonistic political tendencies of Nikola Pašić's government.¹⁷⁴ Thus, “Yugoslav” was being more frequently attached to the question of Southern Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and to the federalist solution for the future state, as opposed to the centralist vision entailed in the new semantics of “Greater Serbia.”¹⁷⁵

Nevertheless, both notions and solutions these terms began to represent were based on the assumption of the Yugoslavs' oneness, both in French and in British political language. This unity was mostly legitimized through the arguments about the common language and by the frequent use of the designator “Serbo-Croat” or “Serbo-Croatian” to describe population, lands, language, culture, history and so on. The French political language was much more receptive to the concept of “Serb, Croat, and Slovene” (Serbes-Croates-Slovènes) unity during the war, while in the British it was almost non-existent until it appeared in the official name of the new state. The usage of this type of formulation reveals another ambivalence because it simultaneously implies unity and difference. It entered British and French political language most probably through the administrative language of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose censuses did not differentiate between the two, but rather conceptualized them as a singular whole. Along with this, another

¹⁷³ Denis, *La Grande Serbie*.

¹⁷⁴ “Any Serbian statesman who failed to perceive this truth would deserve to be regarded, not merely as an obstacle to the cause of Allied unity, but as a traitor to the best interests of his race. In Serbia, as elsewhere, our sympathy and support must be given, not to the old Oriental tendencies, now tottering to their fall, but to those new and democratic elements in whose hands the future of Yugoslavia lies.” R.W. Seton-Watson, “Serbia's Choice,” *New Europe*, August 22, 1918.

¹⁷⁵ Although the contemporary—mostly Croatian post-1990s—historiography tends to search for the origins of the centralist tendencies in Serbian conceptualizations of the Yugoslavist project in its inherent *hegemonical* character, it is particularly crucial for this reason to historicize it and draw attention to the fact that the Serbian intelligentsia (especially within law and political science) had been systematically directed by the state to study in Paris around the turn of the century and had thus been schooled in the theoretical and practical framework of French centralist conceptualizations of statehood and civic nationhood. In other words, the conceptual clashes of this and the Croatian, significantly more German-influenced, understanding of those same concepts in the interwar period can be seen as a sort of continuation or playing-out of the wider Franco-German debate about these questions. The centralized state as a concept will thus in this thesis be regarded more in this historicized context, rather than the contemporary readings of it. See more on the influence of French education on the Serbian intelligentsia before and around the Great War in Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Planirana elita: o studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku* (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 2003); and idem, *Naučnici Srbije i stvaranje jugoslovenske države*.

crucial source which informed British and French liberals of the concept of “Serbo-Croatian national unity”¹⁷⁶ is the above-mentioned Yugoslavist political language in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, especially of those members of the Croat-Serb Coalition (from 1906 onwards) who later fled the Monarchy and founded the Yugoslav Committee. An important aspect of this expression constitutes the exclusion of all other ethnic names (Bosnian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, and so forth), thus reducing the complexity and implicating unity and homogeneity of the peoples in question.

Robert William Seton-Watson, arguably the most relevant British expert on Southern Slavs of the period, can be considered as a paradigmatic example for tracing the change of the cultural/tribal conceptualization (dominant in the pre-war and the early wartime periods) towards the crystalization of the (somewhat racialized)¹⁷⁷ *nationality question* which came to dominate towards the end of the war and became increasingly inscribed with the values of democracy, modernity, and European peace in the British and French liberal political language once it translated into the *principle of nationality*.¹⁷⁸ It could furthermore be argued that they thus designated the names Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian (and others) as those of the (possibly primitive, tribal) past, while the name “Yugoslav” was one signifying the modern nation-state which emerged by overcoming the anachronistic artificial differences which were products of foreign domination.

¹⁷⁶ In Serbo-Croatian, “narodno jedinstvo.”

¹⁷⁷ In his earliest publications on these topics (primarily between 1907 and 1911), Seton-Watson quotes mostly the race-related works of French authors such as Bertrand Auerbach, Charles Loiseau and Louis Léger.

¹⁷⁸ Similar opinions on the relation between race and nationality were expressed by the British historian and Balkan expert, Arnold Toynbee, often conceptualized as the British Oswald Spengler. See Arnold Toynbee, *The New Europe: Some Essays in Reconstruction* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1916); and the French geographer and anthropologist, Bertrand Auerbach, in Auerbach, *Les Races et Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie*. The former asserts: “It is certain, for instance, that community of race, religion, and language does not, in itself, suffice to create a common and binding national sentiment” (p. iii), and the latter: “Ainsi, ni la race, ni la langue, ni la foi communes ne suffisent, prises isolément, à constituer la nationalité, et même réunies elles ne la réalisent pas encore [...] La nationalité est donc quelque chose de supérieur à ces divers éléments qu'on vient d'analyser, éléments qui se combinent en elle à des doses variables, mais dont l'ensemble, à supposer qu'il se rencontrât, serait impuissant à la consommer” (pp. xxi-xxiii).

While the Slovenian question received significantly more attention in France, not least because of its distinctive language,¹⁷⁹ it was generally diminished in favor of the argument of national unity.¹⁸⁰ Slovenians, together with Bulgarians, were the only ones to have the individuality of their *dialects* recognized, but the state of political unity was expected to contribute to the blending of those into Serbo-Croatian. The phrasing of the “Macedonian Slavs,” most frequently used to denote Macedonians, also reveals an implicit neutrality in terms of their ethnic and national belonging.¹⁸¹ Montenegrins were almost exclusively conceptualized as Serbs,¹⁸² not solely in the British and French discourse but also in the majority of South Slavic accounts of the period, although the process of joining the Kingdom of Serbia in 1918 revealed the significant cleavages in their identity, which still remain unresolved today.

However, many of these changes and discussions went in parallel with the ones on Czechoslovakism. In fact, Ernest Denis established a journal *La Nation Tchèque*, which was published between May 1915 and April 1917 under significant censorship, similarly to the journal *Le Monde Slave* he established soon afterwards. Despite its name being limited to the Czech element, *La Nation Tchèque* was strongly propagating Czechoslovakism and overtly argued for

¹⁷⁹ “Les peuples de ce groupe parlent deux langues, le slovène et le serbo-croate.” Léger, *La Liquidation de l'Autriche Hongrie*, 80.

¹⁸⁰ However, a Slovenian jurist and legal historian, as well as a member of the Yugoslav Committee, Bogumil Vošnjak, contributed to the Slovenian question by publishing a notable work in which he combined the usual arguments of integral Yugoslavism with a sort of Slovenian nation-building based on the struggle against pan-Germanism. See Bogumil Vošnjak, *A Bulwark against Germany: The Fight of the Slovenes, the Western Branch of the Jugo-Slavs, for National Existence* (London: Fleming Revell Company, 1919). Nevertheless, these British and French tendencies to downplay Slovenian linguistic or national individuality should not be interpreted merely as a result of their ignorance or imperial interest in a strong, unified South Slavic state, but as thoroughly corresponding with many of the Slovenian political thinkers of the period. For example, the neo-Illyrianism of the notable literary historian Franz Ilešič who argued for a radical rapprochement of the Slovene and Serbo-Croatian languages, together with the significantly more political and less cultural arguments in favor of integration pronounced by the writer Ivan Cankar, were widely known and cited among the British and French experts, and used as legitimation for incorporating the Slovenian element into the integral Yugoslavist vision of the future state. See more on Slovenian Yugoslavists and their intellectual context in Trencsényi et al., *A History of Modern Political Thought*, 536.

¹⁸¹ This might have also been influenced by the same phrasing employed in Jovan Cvijić. *Promatranja o etnografiji makedonskih Slovena*. [Observations about the ethnography of Macedonian Slavs] (Beograd: G. Kon, 1906.)

¹⁸² “Needless to say, the population of Montenegro is purely Serb and speaks exactly the same language as the Serbs of the kingdom of Serbia.” Neville Forbes, *The Southern Slavs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1915), 23.

the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: “Nous voulons la suppression de l'Etat autrichien, la dissolution de la monarchie austro-hongroise. Nous réclamons l'indépendance des divers groupes ethniques et moraux qu'écrase depuis des siècles la tyrannie germano-habsbourgeoise”¹⁸³ Otherwise, the dominant topics of the journal are the Czechoslovak soldiers, pangermanistic assimilatory and violent actions directed at Czechs, Slavic reciprocity, Slovak culture and history, Austro-Hungarian guilt for the break-out of the war, comparison of the Slovak and Romanian position within the Hungarian Kingdom and other similar topics. The contributors to this journal often made references to and cited both Seton-Watson and Steed, as well as used Enlightenment-related tropes such as *light* or *humanity*, while describing the history of Czechs and Slovaks, as well as their future. Beside this journal, which significantly aided Czechoslovak National Council stationed in Paris,¹⁸⁴ the Czechoslovak topics were also present in much of the literature on the Austria-Hungary and in the propagandistic discourse of the Allied nations. It is also arguable that Slovaks are in fact one of the most relevant cases for Seton-Watson's overall understanding of the *nationality question*, since it was them who he first encountered in his first visits to Austria-Hungary in the prewar period.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, Seton-Watson was very fond of the notable Slovak Catholic priest and political activist, Andrej Hlinka, and devoted to him much of his early works, accentuating his role (together with the catalyzing effect of dualism) for the

¹⁸³ Ernest Denis “Notre Deuxième Année” *La Nation Tchèque* (1st of May 1916), p. 5.

¹⁸⁴ Bernard Michel. “Le rôle d'Ernest Denis et du journal 'La Nation Tchèque' dans la naissance de la Tchécoslovaquie” *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, vol. 163 (1993), pp. 17-25.

¹⁸⁵ This is especially visible in his preface named “In Self-Defence: An Answer to Critics” in his book *Racial Problems in Hungary*, pp.1-3, as well as from this kind of quotes “The Slovaks are perhaps the most attractive and naturally gifted of all the Slav nations, and only await the removal of the tyrannous Magyar yoke in order to reveal their latent talents to the world at large” Seton-Watson, *German, Slav and Magyar*, p. 126; “In any study of the struggle between Teuton and Slav in Central Europe, special attention must be devoted to Bohemia, which has for eight centuries formed a bulwark against Germanization. Indeed, no Slavonic race has shown such tenacity and virility in the face of a powerful enemy and in a highly exposed geographical situation. General Fadejev, the Russian Panslavist writer, once wrote 'Without Bohemia the Slav cause is for ever lost; it is the head, the advanceguard of all Slavs'; it would seem as though every Czech is conscious of this fact and of the national mission which it implies” Ibid, p. 151.

Czechoslovak cultural rapprochement. In the French case, beside the role of Ernest Denis's journal, it was Louis Léger who devoted significant attention to the Czechoslovak topics. While in the prewar period he mostly investigates them from a rather neutral position of a Slavist expert, during the wartime he makes his position more explicit, especially in terms of racial claims and hierarchies, such as: „A ce moment la couronne de Bohême (Bohême, Moravie, Silésie) comprend une majorité de Tchèques et malheureusement aussi une minorité d'Allemands, infiltrés par voie de colonisation pour exploiter des mines ou défricher des forêts“ or „On connaît plus les Tchèques qu'elles Slovaques. Ces derniers n'ont pas eu de chance dans l'histoire. Ils n'ont pas créé un Etat: ils sont 2 millions, et, comme les Magyars les masquent de toute leur énergie, beaucoup de personnes, même des plus éclairées, ignorent leur existence“.¹⁸⁶ In terms of the more specific visions of their future, in the same book, Léger proposes the following:

Le groupe tchéco-slovaque ferait, comme le groupe sud-slave, partie de cette vaste fédération slave, autrement dite anti-germanique que je rêve de voir organisée sous le double patronage de la Russie et de la France. Privée des Serbo-Croates au sud-ouest, des Roumains de Transylvanie au sud-est, des Slovaques au nord-est, réduite à ne plus opprimer des nations étrangères, la Hongrie se développera dans le sens de sa nationalité propre et son alliance criminelle avec les Germains du Danube et de l'Elbe ne risquera plus de compromettre la paix du monde et l'équilibre européen.¹⁸⁷

Relatively similar idea of cooperation between the Yugoslav state and the Czechoslovak appeared again during the Versailles Peace Conference, in the suggestion proposed by Arthur Chervin, who envisioned a communication corridor named *Marche Slave*, that would simultaneously connect these two states and separate Austria and Hungary.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the main concepts of political modernity which most frequently accompanied the narratives on Czechoslovak past, present and future were typically Masarykian ones (often tracable to the heritage of František Palacký) of democracy and republicanism, but interestingly not federalism. It is here important to notice that

¹⁸⁶ Louis Léger, *La Liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, p. 3, p 19.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 64.

¹⁸⁸ Arthur Chervin. *De Prague a l'Adriatique: considérations géographiques, ethniques et économiques sur le territoire (Corridor) faisant communiquer les Tchèques avec les Yougoslaves*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1919.

the same British and French scholars who often support the idea of a federative solution for the Yugoslav state, which would entail respect for the historical administrative units, do not use the same for the future Czechoslovak state, despite recognizing various facets of Slovak, as well as Moravian and Silesian individuality in most of their works. While increasingly treating them as a single unit in map production and statistics during the wartime, and even officially recognizing the Czechoslovak National Council as the Provisional Government and approving its command over the army, they could not find a similar stable continuity of political expression of will for unification in an independent state, as they could for the Yugoslavs. However, although the tradition of conscious political rapprochement of the Southern Slavic peoples was much more visible and tangible, the inherent conflict between ethnic and supraethnic integral nationalism later resulted in Yugoslav Committee not receiving recognition analogue to the one of the Czechoslovak National Council, and more importantly – no chance of forming its own army, separate from the Serbian one.

Visions of the Yugoslav Past(s)

The pattern of writing the history of Southern Slavs in both British and French liberal contexts is telling in many ways. To start with, it typically follows the nineteenth-century Balkan-romanticist narrative¹⁸⁹ of the “golden age”¹⁹⁰ of strong Slavic kingdoms in the Middle Ages being destroyed in “paradigmatic defeats” (such as the Kosovo battle in 1389 or the Mohács battle in 1526)¹⁹¹ and followed by Ottoman rule, during which all progress stopped.¹⁹²

Since the political language of Croatian Rightists accentuates the legal-administrative continuities of Croatian statehood and individuality as a Habsburg subject (and with the previous structures), it also incorporates similar arguments and projects them onto the dualism project, claiming that it undermines the Croatian right of independent statehood.¹⁹³ What is similar in both of these is the rejection of what is conceptualized as “foreign rule” (whether Ottoman or Habsburg) and recognition of the role of South Slavs in bordering not only (perhaps understood as opposing) imperial structures, but also different civilizations and worlds. These arguments were equally

¹⁸⁹ Mishkova, *Beyond Balkanism*, 79.

¹⁹⁰ The aesthetics and themes of Ivan Meštrović's artworks around the Great War also significantly helped shape the image of the medieval greatness of Southern Slavic Kingdoms, otherwise contained in publications such as Charles Loiseau, *Le Balkan Slave et la Crise autrichienne* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1898); or R. G. D. Laffan, *The Serbs: The Guardians of the Gate* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918).

¹⁹¹ Although written shortly after the war, this quote genuinely illustrates the vision of Kosovo battle prevalent during the Great War and also exploited by the British and French propagandistic efforts in that period: “The battle of Kossovo, though it ended in the defeat of the Tsar Lazar's Serbian Army, is one of the most glorious feats of arms in the annals of Serbia, and its memory five centuries later spurred on the army of King Peter to fresh acts of heroism.” Gordon Smith, *From Serbia to Yugoslavia: Serbia's Victories, Reverses and Final Triumph, 1914–1918* (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920), 122.

¹⁹² Rokсандić, “Jugoslavenstvo prije Jugoslavije.”

¹⁹³ Although the original rightists (Serbo-Croatian: izvorni pravaši) of Ante Starčević rejected any type of Serbian or Slovenian historical-political individuality, their attitude towards the Habsburg Monarchy and its historical relation to its Croatian (and, indeed, Muslim) subjects is what became one of the pillars of integral Yugoslavism and the manner in which it was understood by British and French liberal intellectuals. This is not to say that the arguments of Croatian Rightists were undisputed among the integral Yugoslavist themselves; on the contrary, Jovan Skerlić explicitly and systematically rejected the heritage of the original rightists and argued that it inherently opposes the integral Yugoslavist sentiments of the new generation. See Jovan Skerlić, *Današnji srpskohrvatski nacionalizam* [Today's Serbo-Croatian nationalism] (Rijeka: G. Trbojević, 1913); and Jovan Skerlić, *Eseji o srpsko-hrvatskom pitanju* [Essays on the Serbo-Croatian question], ed. Vladimir Ćorović (Zagreb: Jugoslav. naklad. dioničarsko društvo, 1918).

recognized and adopted by the British and French authors who, in their historical analysis of these topics, often either omitted the Ottoman period of South Slavic history, or used it as a background against which they portrayed some other traits of Southern Slavs.

La conquête turque a été l'épisode le plus célèbre de ces invasions étrangères, non pas peut-être le plus dangereux. La domination musulmane, sauvage et féroce, était moins pénétrante et moins corrosive que l'insidieuse avance d'autres adversaires qui, s'attaquant par une sourde infiltration à l'âme nationale, menaçaient la race d'absorption et d'anéantissement: Allemands et Magyars dans le Banat, la Croatie et la Slavonie, — Italiens en Dalmatie, — Albanais en Vieille Serbie, — Bulgares en Macédoine. Heureusement, la trempe du peuple est bonne et, sur ce métal rebelle, l'acide étranger ne mord pas aisément. Au XIX^e siècle, à l'heure où le péril aurait pris un caractère grave, quand la facilité des communications, la rapidité des échanges et l'affluence redoutable du capital cosmopolite, en facilitant la pénétration étrangère, auraient pu miner les anciennes traditions et préparer l'assimilation des Serbes aux divers peuples dont ils avaient subi l'autorité politique, l'insurrection de 1804 et la formation d'une principauté semi-indépendante à Belgrade enrayèrent le mal, relevèrent les fidélités chancelantes et réveillèrent les espoirs prêts à l'abdication. La Serbie des Karageorgévitch et des Obrénovitch devint dès lors un centre d'attraction, dont le rayonnement s'étendit et la force s'accrut à mesure que le nouvel État s'affermissait.¹⁹⁴

Historical occurrences such as the military frontier (German *Militärgrenze*, Latin: *confinium*), which also intensively generated the mixing of South Slavic peoples, are understood through the typical trope of the *Antemurale Christianitatis* [bulwark of Christendom]¹⁹⁵ and inscribed a great amount of value for ensuring the peaceful civilizational development of the Western powers. While it simultaneously implies the “contamination” with different elements from the “worlds” they are connecting, it also sets Southern Slavs on a sort of historical mission of mediators between them, especially in the perspective of British and French liberal intellectuals around the Great War.

The Croats and Serbs occupy the border-line between West and East, between Rome and Byzantium, between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Broadly speaking, every Croat is

¹⁹⁴ Denis, *La Grande Serbie*, 11–12.

¹⁹⁵ Maciej Falski, “Croatian Political Discourse of 1861 and the Key Concepts of the Nineteenth-Century Public Debate,” *Acta Poloniae Historica* 108 (2013): 71–92.

a Catholic, every Serb an Orthodox. The Croat language is Serb written with Latin characters, the Serb language Croat written in the Cyrilline alphabet.¹⁹⁶

No country in Europe presents such a variety of complicated problems for solution as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; and among these, none is more important and more pressing than the Southern Slav Question. In it are involved the future fortunes of the whole Croat and Serb race. [...] On it depends the balance of power on the Adriatic, with all its bearings upon the international situation. Above all, the Southern Slav Question may at any moment exercise a decisive influence upon the foreign policy of Vienna, and upon the internal development of the Dual Monarchy.¹⁹⁷

Furthermore, it implies the immanent need for a sort of imperial protection of “small nations,” which is not only reflected in the local understanding of the geopolitical situation, but is intensively exploited by the British and French liberal intellectuals for legitimizing their own historical role in creating the independent South Slavic state: “Faith has assigned to Britain and to France an important share in the solution of the problem, and it is our duty to insist that this solution shall be radical and permanent, based on the principle of Nationality and the wishes of the Southern Slav Race.”¹⁹⁸

This notion of the “borderland peoples” also embodies a certain orientalist suggestion of “lagging behind” in development,¹⁹⁹ as well as being generally unknown to the broader “European public” for that very reason. In other words, what was for the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro the rejection of Ottoman heritage and highlighting the connections between modern states and medieval Kingdoms, for Croatian Rightists was the rejection of Habsburg domination and drawing inspiration from the age of the ruling dynasty of Trpimirović in medieval Croatia, as well as the

¹⁹⁶ R.W. Seton-Watson, “Austria-Hungary and the Southern Slavs,” in *War and Democracy* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1914), 140.

¹⁹⁷ Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question*, 7.

¹⁹⁸ Seton-Watson, “Austria-Hungary and the Southern Slavs,” 160–161.

¹⁹⁹ An illustrative quote which embodies the civilizational hierarchies, as well as a teleological view of history, can be found in Léger, *La Liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, 84. “Nous pouvons affirmer, nous autres loug'o-Slaves, que nous aurions aujourd'hui le même degré de civilisation que l'Europe occidentale si le mahométisme ne nous avait arrêtés au milieu de notre développement.”

anti-Habsburg arguments in the context of struggle against Ottoman expansion.²⁰⁰ This argument went hand in hand with the post-1867 critique of the Monarchy, especially Transleithania,²⁰¹ by claiming that there was a systematically-organized oppression of the non-Hungarian peoples resulting in economic, infrastructural and educational underdevelopment, and ultimately, political subjugation.

Croatia has been exploited economically by the Magyars, and the narrow interests of Budapest have prevented railway development and hampered local industries by skilful manipulation of tariffs and taxation. A further result is that even to-day Dalmatia (with the exception of Ragusa) has no railway connections with the rest of Europe, and those of Bosnia are artificially directed towards Budapest rather than towards Agram, Vienna, and Western Europe.²⁰²

This view was additionally enforced by claims about the *divide et impera* policy, of either the Habsburg dynasty or the Hungarian conservatives, aimed at Southern Slavs of the Monarchy throughout the nineteenth century and beyond.

Since then, one of these, the Turkish empire, has been eliminated; Kosovo Polje was avenged, after 523 years, at Kumanovo, the northern part of Macedonia has been added to the kingdom of Serbia and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar or Old Serbia, the real Balkan home of the Serb race, has been divided between Serbia and Montenegro. Even thus the Serbs have still to send their parliamentary representatives to five different legislatures, namely, Belgrade, Cetinje, Vienna, Buda-Pesth and Serajevo; and so it is not surprising that the consummation of national unity is a slow and arduous process. Needless to say the Austrians and the Hungarians have done all they possibly could to make the most of the accidental political barriers which have split up the Serbs. They have also done their best to foment the discord between Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Mohammedan, which in itself was quite enough to prevent co-operation between the different factions of the Serb people. As long as Serbia, both in political and in economic matters, submitted to Austrian dictation and was useful to Austria in the process of pushing Turkey out of Europe, she was flattered; as soon as Serbia began to

²⁰⁰ An exemplary work of this kind is *Croatia Rediviva* (1700) by Pavao Ritter Vitezović, in which he merged the Illyrian and Croatian proto-national claims with the anti-Habsburg and anti-Ottoman ones, through historicizing the wider role of Southern Slavs in these dynamic imperial borderlands of the early modern period.

²⁰¹ Léger, *La Liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, 2: “Assez longtemps le horde asiatique des Magyars aura exploité les peuples slaves soumis à sa domination et pratiqué à leur détriment la farouche maxime 'Tot ember, nem ember'. [Slovak man is not a man] Quand le jour des légitimes représailles sera venu, les vengeurs des nations exploitées devront se montrer implacables.”

²⁰² R.W. Seton-Watson, “Austria-Hungary and the Southern Slavs,” in *War and Democracy* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1914), 149.

grow strong and become a focus which could ultimately attract and concentrate the scattered elements of the race into one powerful whole, she was attacked.²⁰³

Through this series of claims and arguments about the Yugoslav past, British and French intellectuals reproduced the integral Yugoslavist narrative of “oppressed nationalities” historically divided by “foreign rule” and organically oriented towards each other in terms of political integration, which, as the following chapters will argue, is considered to be a crucial element of the lasting peace. Furthermore, they served to portray or legitimize various characteristics and values inscribed to the Southern Slavic peoples, which became especially relevant during wartime. These strategies were simultaneously complemented by those employed by the Yugoslav Committee which, in almost all of its publications, followed the same pattern of thought.

However, it is important to notice that there are not many parallels mentioned between the past they were describing and that of their own countries and peoples, especially the more comparable (for instance, in the British case the Irish example, or in the French, the colonial) cases, with the exception of somewhat ironic criticism aimed at the Croatian Rightists (pejoratively named “Croatian Jacobines” and their leader Ante Starčević “Croatian Parnell”).²⁰⁴ However, the French authors tend to accentuate the important unifying and civilizing role Napoleon's Illyrian provinces (1809–13) played for the Southern Slavs²⁰⁵ and compare the linguistic assimilation in their recently lost territories of Alsace and Lorraine to that of Slovaks and Rumanians in the Hungarian Kingdom.²⁰⁶ Lastly, this historization of the Southern Slav question, present in the

²⁰³ Forbes, *The Southern Slavs*, 29–30.

²⁰⁴ Robert Okey, “British Impressions of the Serbo-Croat speaking lands of the Habsburg Monarchy—Reports to the Foreign Office 1867–1908,” in *Great Britain and Central Europe 1867–1914*, ed. R. Evans, D. Kovác and E. Ivanicková (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 66.

²⁰⁵ This is especially relevant for understanding the vision of the notable French Slavist Louis Léger; see his chapter “La Confédération Illyrienne” in *La Liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, in which he envisions a larger Balkan Federation headed by this Illyric Confederation.

²⁰⁶ “L'exemple de la Prusse en Alsace, dans le Slesvig et la Posnanie, a prouvé combien il est malaisé de transformer un peuple. Tout le monde cependant trouve un incontestable avantage à savoir l'allemand; combien rares sont au

majority of these publications, could be seen as an element which is supposed to be strongly contrasted to the “modern,” “scientific inquiry” into the topic, as well as by introducing the most recent developments in the awareness of the local populace about their common belonging and the intellectual Yugoslavist movement.

Interpreting the present day

Since the analytical category of the *present* will hereby include the period between the establishment of dualism until the publication date of the source, it is important to parse the themes which came to dominate political language concerning the present into several categories. Firstly, there are a considerable amount of publications—or chapters within them—devoted to the topics of the day, both ongoing in Austria-Hungary (dualism crisis, universal suffrage, annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Friedjung and Agram Trials, integral Yugoslavist movement, neo-Slavist congresses, Sokol slets, and so on) and in Serbia (establishment of the independent Kingdom, May Coup, Balkan Wars, together with the consequent territorial expansion and eventually the topics regarding the Sarajevo assassination). These are additionally complemented by those that strongly reinforce the arguments in favor of integral Yugoslavism during the war, not least because of the special geopolitical position of the Southern Slavic peoples and lands. The most useful sources for analysing their understanding of the *present* are not only the short, concluding commentaries found in publications about the history of the Southern Slav question, but in fact the journals established

contraire les personnes qui auraient le courage de consacrer plusieurs années de leur vie à étudier une langue hérissée de difficultés, uniquement pour le plaisir de lire Pétoeff et deux ou trois poètes, qui, autant qu'il nous est permis d'en juger par les traductions que nous possédons, n'ont pas apporté de note vraiment nouvelle et ne sauraient sans ridicule être rapprochés des grands prêtres de la littérature humaine!” (p. 141) or “Elle n'est pas plus extravagante que la politique de l'Allemagne en Alsace et en Posnanie, que celle des Magyars en Slovaquie et en Roumanie.” (p. 190) in Denis, *La Grande Serbie*.

to keep the wider public informed and to influence their opinion, such as *The New Europe* and *Le Monde Slave*. Secondly, another layer of themes and key concepts is derived from the epistemological claims which aim to support the otherwise completely political and perhaps ideological narrative adopted from the local Yugoslavist language. In that context, the most useful sources are the publications centered around geographical, ethnological, anthropological, or linguistic research into Southern Slavic topics, which also (especially in the prewar period) heavily relied on existing research produced in German, Hungarian, or Italian. This subchapter will thus aim to portray both of these layers and investigate how they correspond to each other from the perspective of the British and French liberal intellectuals around the Great War.

To start from the latter, one of the paramount works in the French context,²⁰⁷ produced by the geographer and anthropologist with a special inclination towards the Alsace-Lorraine problem, Bertrand Auerbach, offers a variety of “scientific” concepts and arguments that eventually strengthened the claims of the integral Yugoslavist ideology. Under the somewhat strange taxonomical treatment Southern Slavs received in this book²⁰⁸ lies a primarily deterministic geographical and racial conceptualization of their individuality, with special attention given to questions of racial purity and authenticity: “Ils se sont fatalement croisés avec leurs voisins, mais n'ont point perdu à ce mélange; car ils ont transformé en Croates des Magyars, des Wendes et des Allemands. Ils auraient conservé, comme une réminiscence du régime de leurs anciens maîtres turcs, l'habitude de laisser le gros ouvrage aux femmes.”²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Auerbach, *Les Races et Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie*. In fact, it was so successful and deemed useful for the arguments against Austria-Hungary that it was republished in 1917.

²⁰⁸ For example, information about Slovenes can be found in the subchapter about the Slavic infiltration of the Austro-German race, and under the designation *Wendes* in the chapter about Southern Slavs. Furthermore, the information about Croats is scattered in the chapters about Adriatic and Balkanic Austria, Croatian lands, Fiume and the subchapter about the nationalities of Hungary. Lastly, the information about Serbs appears in the chapters about Southern Slavs and the nationalities of Hungary.

²⁰⁹ Bertrand Auerbach (1917), p. 418.

Perhaps one of the most indicative parts of this entire work, in terms of criteria used to determine the “anthropological” proximity of the Southern Slav peoples, is a rather large footnote²¹⁰ which combines the inquiry into the average height of the Southern Slav soldiers, dominant hair colour, cephalic index, facial physiognomy, overall beauty and ugliness in comparison to other races (Germans, Hungarians, Jews), types of houses and material with which they are constructed, as well as the structure of the house interior. These are additionally informed by the similarities and differences between urban and rural areas, males and females, as well as the different regions of Croatia (Zagorje, Lika, Dalmatia, and so on), but nevertheless overarched with the claim “L'anthropologie ne distingue pas les Croates des Serbes.”

Similarly in the British case, many relevant publicists and anthropologists, such as A. H. Keane,²¹¹ and even the *Encyclopedia Britannica* asserted the racial, ethnological and anthropological unity of the Southern Slavs, especially during the war, with a more intense diminishing of any individuality or particularity of what might have been conceptualized as sub-groups.²¹² However, it was Jovan Cvijić whose racial division based on geographic determinism, parsed between the Dinaric, Pannonian, and Eastern-Balkan and the so-called Central types, was often accepted into the most respected publications as a reference. Not only did it bypass the existing national or regional identification markers, it also inscribed values convenient for the wartime claims about the Southern Slav characterology.

In terms of geography and the emerging disciplines of geopolitics and international relations, many authors tended to ascribe value to the position occupied by the Southern Slavs, and thus the importance of their political integration for the outcome of the war, as well as for the

²¹⁰ Ibid, p. 435.

²¹¹ A. H. Keane, *Man, Past and Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 537–538.

²¹² Evans, *Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia*, 20–25.

lasting peace. A. H. E. Taylor states that “[t]he Southern Slavs occupy one of the most important strategic areas on the continent, all movements of conquest from nearer Asia into Europe and vice versa have perforce made their way through this land, and it is a European interest that the Southern Slav monarchy should be strong enough successfully to sustain the rôle thrust upon it.”²¹³ In this way, this author rather overtly claims that the unity of Southern Slavs is crucial because of their geopolitical position, which has wider implications on European warfare or peace, thus somewhat implying that this unity should be assisted from outside, by the Great Powers.

The Turks were now pressing on into Hungary and Serbia, which holds the gate of the East and therefore of the West, lay directly in their path, and suffered the fate of every State which holds an important strategical position with inadequate forces, just as at the present time she has been subjected to the reverse pressure of the German *Drang nach Osten* – only when there is a strong Southern Slav Kingdom will there be a tolerable guarantee of peace in the Balkans, and all efforts by whatever motive induced, to weaken the Serbo-Croats will be direct causes of further struggles.²¹⁴

Another crucial element in shaping the epistemological treatment of the Southern Slav topics was statistics, which experienced rapid development both in method and the prevalence of its usage around the Great War. Thus, there is hardly any publication concerning the Southern Slavs or Austria-Hungary around the Great War which does not use statistics to support its claims. In the British and French cases, they are rarely relying on their own data, but are rather referencing the German, Austrian, Hungarian, or Serbian sources, even during wartime, but in that context with overt skepticism.

The reason for this is not only due to the significant lack of their own data, but also the fact that the Yugoslavist émigrés were frequently using statistics to promote their cause in both Britain and France. The most usual features of these statistical interventions are the overall population numbers in each of the existing administrative units (Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Kingdom of

²¹³ A. H. E. Taylor, *The Future of Southern Slavs* (London: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1917), 321.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 56–57.

Serbia, Kingdom of Montenegro and so on), the number of people belonging to Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim confessions (the Jewish population is rarely mentioned), the number of Southern Slavic soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian army, and the number of non-Southern Slavic peoples (which came to be conceptualized as minorities after the Versailles Peace Conference) inhabiting those same areas. In this context, it was rarely the case that Serbian and Croatian would be employed as separate categories, or that the Muslim peoples received a treatment of national individuality. Furthermore, these statistics were often complemented with maps, either of the present state of affairs, or of a projection of the future Southern Slavic state in terms of external or internal borders.²¹⁵ Lastly, perhaps the most relevant argument both for the conceptualization of Yugoslav nationhood and for criticizing the existing imperial structures is the linguistic one. Most of the publications or chapters on the Yugoslavist movement before or during the war begin by asserting that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are peoples united by the same language, blood, traditions, economic and political conditions, as well as a common interest in creating a single nation.²¹⁶ This should however be historicized and understood as adopted from the Yugoslavist émigrés from Austria-Hungary, and thus as a continuation of the older and broader debate on linguistic minority rights, especially in Hungary.²¹⁷ It is not by chance that the language appeared

²¹⁵ See appendix for the most relevant examples of maps and statistics.

²¹⁶ This exact sentence appears in near-identical form in most of the British and French accounts of the Yugoslavist movement.

²¹⁷ This debate could best be exemplified by contrasting the arguments of the reform-era liberal József Eötvös—modelled upon the conceptualization of individual rights and democracy of French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville—with those of the aforementioned socialist Oszkár Jászi, which could also be seen as two generational answers to the same problems in Hungary. The original proposition of Eötvös's Nationality Act (eventually adopted in 1868 with significant changes due to both liberal and conservative pressures) displayed respect for the existing historical legal-administrative units and combined them with prioritizing the individual's linguistic rights (in their correspondence with different levels of government), as well as envisioning the dominance of the majority's language per unit (e.g. county, Hungarian: *megye*, Croatian: *županija*). The potential problem of this reconfiguration was that the majority-minority relationship would create pressures to rearrange the historical counties on a linguistic basis, as well as largely ensure the political representation of non-Magyar peoples which they previously did not have in that scope. See more in Paul Bödy, *Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840-1870: A Study of Ideas of Individuality and Social Pluralism in Modern Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). On the other hand, Jászi envisioned a multiethnic, multilingual Hungarian political nation, based on non-territorial autonomy and

as the main argument, not only for Yugoslav unification, but also for the (inevitably and inherently) democratic nature of the future Yugoslav state. In parallel with these types of epistemological claims around (“realizing”) the unity of Southern Slavs, the assessment of the ongoing political developments both in the Austro-Hungarian and the Balkan spaces also strongly echoed the local arguments and interpretations.

The main topics Seton-Watson was concerned with in this period were primarily those regarding constitutional or other legal reform in Austria-Hungary. Before he arrived to the wartime semantics of the *nationality question of Austria-Hungary*, most of his works featured headings such as “Electoral corruptions and electoral reforms,” “The Persecution of the non-Magyar Press,” “Judicial injustice,” “A Political Trial in Hungary and its Sequel,” and so forth.²¹⁸ Simultaneously, news arriving from Serbia portrayed a story of a successful (with the exception of the brutal May coup d’état in 1903), democratic, and expanding Balkan state which expelled Turkey from Europe and which was rapidly developing. The most often repeating tropes in that context are those of “heroic Serbia”²¹⁹ or “Serbia resurrected.”²²⁰

Thus, the concepts of linguistic rights, democracy (together with corruption) and political participation became linked and dominant in the political language of British and French liberals, traditionally inclined to support an “underdog,” and became an integral part of their understanding of the position in which Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary found themselves.

in the last days of the war even proposed a federalized Monarchy in which the Southern Slav question would be solved by the federative unit of Illyria with Croatia in the center; see Litván, *A Twentieth-Century Prophet*, 130–132. Both of these unsuccessful attempts at a comprehensive solution of the nationality question in the Kingdom of Hungary showcase an intrinsic link between linguistic rights, democracy, and political organization. It is in this context that the solutions proposed by the Yugoslavist émigrés were constructed and proposed, and later transferred to the British and French intellectual contexts around the war, thus becoming crucial for their vision of the future Yugoslav state.

²¹⁸ Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary*.

²¹⁹ Bérard, *Heroic Serbia*.

²²⁰ Gaston Gravier, *Les frontières historiques de la Serbie* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1919).

“Solving the Southern Slav Question” or the Yugoslav future

The envisioning of the future Yugoslav state was on the one hand, pragmatic, usually bearing in mind the realities in the balance of power between the Kingdom of Serbia and the rest of the lands and peoples to be unified with it; and on the other hand, highly idealistic. The sole fact that the Southern Slavic peoples shared a similar language and had expressed the will to unite through the Yugoslavist movement was often taken as strong evidence that the future state would be viable and sustainable.

In concrete terms, this meant choosing between a unitary solution or a federative one, the latter usually entailing respect for the previous legal-administrative units.²²¹ In terms of republicanism, it was, at least in both the British and the French cases, never a strong option since the dynasty of Karađorđević, especially the then-Prince Aleksandar, seemed a viable and in fact, rather moderate solution.²²² The centralist unitary structure would also guarantee a strong state which could provide resistance to the German or Russian (Soviet) influences (what Stéphen Pichon soon conceptualized as *cordon sanitaire*), and more easily convey the eventual blending of local identities, thus best corresponding with the vision of integral Yugoslavism in general. It is thus safe to assert that the opinions of the governmental structures rather favored the former and the intellectuals the latter argument, thus eventually both arriving to the same conclusion about the

²²¹ Illustrative of a wider British opinion is the following quote from Neville Forbes: “As regards the ultimate solution of the Southern Slav problem, it is safe to say that federation in some form or other is the only possible one. There is a strong party in Serbia which wishes to force all Bosnians, Croats, and Dalmatians, to call themselves Serbs and to bring them directly under the political control of Belgrade, and there is an equally obstinate section of opinion in Agram, the capital of Croatia, which would never consent to such a course.” Forbes, *The Southern Slavs*, 30–31.

²²² This is not to say that it was not present in the political language of the Yugoslavist émigrés from Austria-Hungary or even before the war. In fact, some of the key figures of the Yugoslavist movement, such as Frano Supilo and later the charismatic leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radić, often argued for the republican arrangement of the state, which was often related with the federalist division similar to the one that was realized in Socialist Yugoslavia (although without the individuality awarded to the autonomous provinces in the constitution of 1974).

necessity of achieving cohesion in the future state. However, it was the experts and intellectuals who were significantly more sensitive to the ambivalent nature of this unification and thus considerably more open about federative arrangements.²²³ Furthermore, many British and French authors speculated about the broader Balkan-based political integration that could ensue after the war. While eventually the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia did participate in the Little Entente and in the Balkan conferences of the 1930s, this idea did not prove especially fertile and was also later among the crucial reasons for the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, which drastically changed the geopolitical situation of Socialist Yugoslavia.

Depuis un demi-siècle les idées ont marché. En dépit d'une censure et d'une police ombrageuse, la conception de l'unité sud-slave a mûri. Le moment est venu de lui donner une forme concrète et définitive. Etablie solidement entre les Alpes, le Danube et l'Adriatique, la Confédération illyrienne compterait actuellement onze millions de sujets. Elle sera pour l'Europe orientale un élément d'ordre, de progrès et de paix. J'ose même rêver le moment où, d'accord avec la Roumanie intégrale, la Bulgarie intégrale, c'est-à-dire accrue de la Macédoine, poussée jusqu'à la ligne Enos-Midias, et la Grèce, elle pourrait faire partie d'une vaste fédération balkanique dont Constantinople serait la capitale. La question d'Orient serait ainsi définitivement résolue dans l'intérêt de l'Europe et de la civilisation. Mais il ne faut pas soulever trop de problèmes à la fois. Pour moi, la constitution intérieure de la fédération illyrienne serait celle d'une sorte de Suisse slave, où les cantons autonomes seraient représentés par les pays Slovènes, la Croatie, la Dalmatie, le royaume de Serbie, la Bosnie, l'Herzégovine et où Belgrade, siège du gouvernement central, jouerait le même rôle que Berne, dans l'ensemble du groupe helvétique.²²⁴

²²³ It is important to contextualize this discussion and clarify that this is not merely about the transition from the old (“artificial”) to the new (“natural”) legal-administrative units, but exactly about Serbian national integration, since many proposed federative units (tailored on the model of the historic ones), with the exception of the Slovenian one, would contain a significant Serbian population, thus perpetuating their position under “foreign rule” as conceptualized by the Serbian integral nationalists in the government of Nikola Pašić. This, combined with the genuine policy of Yugoslavist nation-building, as supported by the future King Aleksandar, made the case for a unitary, centralist Yugoslav state from their point of view. See more on these discussions, from a point of view similar to Pašić's, in Đorđe Đ. Stanković, *Nikola Pašić, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1984).

²²⁴ Léger, *La Liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, 86.

Furthermore, the strength and stability of the future Southern Slavic state, together with its very existence, was deemed one of the key pillars of the (lasting) peace in Europe. Since the Great War, in part, started because of the integral Yugoslavism movement, the solution of this problem was posed as a necessity for the victory of integral Yugoslavia and the European balance of power.

The first task of our time for Europe [...] is to lay firm the foundations of those nations by carrying to victory the twin principles of Nationality and Democracy to secure that the peoples of Europe shall be enabled to have governments corresponding to their national needs and responsible to their own control, and to build up, under the care and protection of those governments, the social institutions and the civilisation of their choice. So long as there are peoples in Europe under alien governments, curtailed in the use of their own language, in the propagation of their literature and ideas, in their social intercourse, in their corporate life, in all that we in Great Britain understand by civil liberty, so long will there be men who will mock at the very idea of international peace, and look forward to war.²²⁵

Nevertheless, many of the British and French experts and public intellectuals were well aware of the disputes and barely reconcilable differences between the Pašić government (together with a majority of key Serbian diplomats) and the leading part of the Yugoslavist émigrés (Ante Trumbić, Frano Supilo, Ivan Meštrović, Hinko Hinković, and so on), in terms of the future state. This was already recognized in the prewar period, but became entirely obvious towards the end of the war. Seton-Watson remarked that: “The pan-Serb idea would mean the triumph of Eastern over Western culture, and would be a fatal blow to progress and modern development throughout the Balkans.”²²⁶ Interestingly enough, even the experts assessing the situation upon the request of the Foreign Office reproduced a similar civilizational argument by asserting that the more advanced Croats and their political culture would be a prevailing element in the new state: “The relatively advanced Slavs of Croatia [...] will never consent to be bossed by the bands of dishonest and

²²⁵ Seton-Watson, “Austria-Hungary and the Southern Slavs,” 8.

²²⁶ Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question*, 336–338.

murderous intriguers which constitute the backbone of the Serbian Government.”²²⁷ Lastly, one of the most important arguments for the creation of the independent state of the Southern Slavs were the facets of political modernity itself, with democracy at the forefront. Particularly in the British context, there was a common strategy of comparison between the “autocratic,” “overly-militarized” Germany, and the “democratic” and “righteous” Allied nations.

If we are defeated, public law will have lost its value, for the Germans will have asserted their right to violate its fundamental provisions. The idea of Nationality will have received its death-blow; for not only will the independence of several of the smaller nations have been destroyed, but Germany will have reasserted her right to dominate her own minor nationalities, and to drain the life-blood of the 26 million Slavs of Austria-Hungary.²²⁸

The problems with this argumentation and its employment from the British and French propaganda was highlighted early on by the contentious Croatian rightist political thinker and publicist, Ivo Pilar, who in his 1915 booklet *Svjetski rat i Hrvati: pokus orijentacije hrvatskoga naroda još prije svršetka rata* [The World War and the Croats: an attempt at the orientation of the Croatian people before the end of the war]²²⁹ devoted a significant amount of space to portraying the perceived hypocritical nature of the involvement of the Great Powers in the disintegration of Austria-Hungary. After critically historicizing their imperial and colonial ventures, and outlining the statistical data about the contemporary land distribution and related increasing social stratification, Pilar arrived at a claim about the degeneration of the Anglo-Saxon race because of the virtual non-existence of the peasantry as a class (one which “should be the core of every nation”) and the overwhelming numbers of subjugated industrial workers, suffragettes and—

²²⁷ Evans, *Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia*, 174–175.

²²⁸ Alfred E. Zimmern, “Germany,” in *War and Democracy* (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1914), 241.

²²⁹ Ivo Pilar, *Svjetski rat i Hrvati: pokus orijentacije hrvatskoga naroda još prije svršetka rata* [The World War and the Croats: an attempt at the orientation of the Croatian people before the end of the war] (Zagreb: Komisionalna naklada knjižare Mirka Breyera, 1915).

interestingly—a rise in overall alcoholism.²³⁰ This served as a pretext for portraying the British and French “hatred” for the rapid German development and, ultimately, the critique of their propagandistic efforts, relevant in this context:

Everything else, that has been said—and Englishmen were especially keen to coin various schlagworts according to which the war should be conducted against Germany—it is all a humbug, calculated to infatuate those who cannot read from the living book of history with their own eyes. The protection of Belgian neutrality, the struggle against German militarism, the struggle of western European democracy (lovely in the mouths of English aristocrats?!) against the Prussian military aristocracy, those are merely phrases and this is about interests, as demonstrated above.²³¹

It is through an insight into these types of “pragmatic” opinions (in fact also integral nationalist, just not on a supraethnic, but an ethnic basis) that the alternatives to the “idealistic” integral Yugoslavism could be presented and understood as rightful competitors for the loyalty of both intellectuals and political elites of the future Southern Slavic state throughout the war and into the interwar period. The false dichotomy between the “pragmatic” and the “idealist” solutions of this kind managed to mask the real one, which was revolving around the differing understandings of nationhood and democracy, as well as the nature of the international order in general.

²³⁰ Ibid., 6–7.

²³¹ “Sve drugo, što se govori — a osobito su Englezi revni u kovanju raznih šlagvorta, pod kojima bi se rat proti Njemačkoj imao voditi, to je sve humbug, proračunan da zaludi one, koji svojim očima u knjizi žive povjesti čitati ne umiju. Zaštita belgijske neutralnosti, borba proti njemačkom militarizmu, borba zapadno-europejske demokracije (dražesno u ustima engleskih aristokrata!?) proti pruskoj vojnoj aristokraciji, to su sve fraze, po srijedi su interesi, kako smo ih gore izložili.” Ibid., 14.

Conclusion

To conclude, the “solutions” proposed for the Southern Slav question in many ways reflected the debates and divergences which existed among Southern Slavic political actors themselves, as well as the visions of political modernity produced during the crisis of liberalism in British and French intellectual and political milieus. While these contain some of the old liberal or enlightened assumptions and tropes, mainly entailed in the usage of universalist scientific and civilizational arguments, it is the reconceptualization of key concepts of political modernity, such as nationhood (from a civic to an integral understanding), democracy (from individual civil liberties to the inherent connection between linguistic rights and political participation), sovereignty (linking it intrinsically with national self-determination) that brought these experts and intellectuals to the position of arguing in favor of South Slavic political integration on the basis of integral Yugoslavism, as developed by the various political thinkers in the South Slavic space. Since this eventually corresponded with the official war aims of the British and French governments, these principles were mostly applied in the peace treaties of the Versailles Peace Conference, in the international recognition of the post-Habsburg states, as well as in the foundation of the system embodied in the League of Nations (mandate system or international protectorate).

It is thus possible to conclude that it was exactly their interest in and their study of questions such as the Southern Slavic one (although comparatively also the Czechoslovak or Polish cases), which provided them with the key concepts and arguments which came to be employed, notably under their agitation, for creating not only the “New Europe” after the fall of the four great empires, but in fact the key facets of international order of the twentieth century and beyond. However, this was done in form of a complex dialogue around the Great War, which often entailed different

understandings of the matters discussed and thus resulted in a sort of cognitive dissonance, and more importantly, the establishment of a somewhat unexpected state on particularly idealistic foundations which, although struggling to reconcile its differences and find a lasting solution to its internal organization, could not escape these same debates throughout the interwar period and during the Cold War. Furthermore, many of these expert communities either employed in the governmental bodies or in the civil academic setting, provide a useful example of how the political language in fact *translates* into institutions. The sole notion of the “scientific peace” that came to dominate the legitimation discourses of the Great Powers during the Versailles Peace Conference derives from that particular background.

However, it is important to ultimately recognize the predominance of the Realpolitik both during the wartime and in the peace-making process, as well as all the tension between it and the arguments of these expert communities. While many of the integral Yugoslavists, both from the Southern Slavic space, and Britain and France, genuinely supported their claims with expert knowledge and thus expected a stable, democratic state to emerge, others abandoned this approach in favor of defensive integral ethnonationalism and the claims about the existential threat their nationality was experiencing, together with their own political epistemologies and notions of democracy. In other words, the fear that integral Yugoslavism (and accepting it through abandoning the historical and then-dominant frameworks of identification such as Serbian, Croatian or Slovenian) will be used to assimilate one group into the other, mutually reinforced the pre-existing integral ethnonationalisms.

Nevertheless, this study offers an insight into the transfer, reception and general ways of understanding the integral Yugoslavism as political modernity shortly before the cleavages of the future state became evident. It is thus relevant primarily for the discussions on the emergence of

what is known as the Versailles order, as well as for the historization and contextualization of the conceptual change of the most relevant concepts that constituted the dominant visions of political modernity at the time. In this context, the future research might pay more attention to the other, arguably, formative cases for the (re)developing the key concepts of the Versailles order, such as the Middle East which experienced a transition from the framework of the Ottoman Empire to the mandate system under the auspice of the League of Nations. Furthermore, it could investigate the tension between the expert knowledge and the Realpolitik in depth, in the aforementioned cases of Czechoslovakia and Poland, but also in the newly formed Yugoslav state.

The historiography that deals with integral Yugoslavism, both in the Southern Slavic languages and in the Anglo-American or French scholarship, often treats it from a perspective of a predetermined failure and a weak alternative to perserving the existing historical frameworks of nationhood in the Southern Slavic spaces, which are conceptualized as significantly more natural and fitting to the Southern Slavic space. It is also interesting to notice that while this especially remains the case after the 1990s, the recent mainstream interpretations of the Habsburg experience have differ insignificantly from the ones brought about by the integral Yugoslavs around the Great War. However, the topic of Yugoslavism in all its historical forms has been re-actualized in the recent re-assessment of the experience of Socialist Yugoslavia, with much less attention given to the political thought of the interwar period (or before) and reinforcing the usual narrative about its inherent “nationality question”.

Thus, this thesis presents a contribution to the historical understanding of the wider impact of integral Yugoslavism on the broader European debates, outcome of the war itself and the categories used to establish a new international order. Furthermore, it portrays the intricate connection between the history of political thought and the development of the epistemologies,

especially in terms of social sciences and humanities, which were deemed crucial for the lasting peace. Ultimately, the cleavages in the transfer and the reception of the concepts of political modernity from East Central Europe to the Western Europe, hereby showcased on the example of integral Yugoslavism, became one of the crucial reasons for the fragility of peace in the short and turbulent period which for that very reason became the interwar one.

Appendices

Pseudonyms of authors

It was deemed relevant by the author to gather in one place some of the most important pseudonyms of the authors which are featured in this thesis, in the hope that one day it will make other researchers' work smoother and easier.

Milan Toplitza – Pero Slijepčević

L. v. Südland, Dr. Juričić – Ivo Pilar

Balkanicus – Stojan Protić

Vuk Primorac – Pavle Popović

Đuro Tugoljub – Jurislav Janušić

Scotus Viator – Robert William Seton-Watson

Beograđanin – Jovan Skerlić

Illyricus – Bogumil Vošnjak

D'après M. Vrbanic, le nombre des Croates était, en 1895, de 1.553.075 sur le territoire de la Croatie-Slavonie ; de 439.536 en Dalmatie et d'environ 260.000 en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Le dénombrement des Serbes accuserait les résultats suivants :

Royaume de Serbie.....	2.127.144
Principauté de Monténégro.....	250.000
Royaume de Hongrie.....	678.747
Croatie-Slavonie.....	567.443
Dalmatie.....	87.009
Bosnie-Herzégovine.....	673.246
Empire ottoman.....	992.000

(Ce dernier chiffre, donné, en 1889, par M. Gopcevic, est réduit des trois quarts par les statisticiens bulgares.)

Le contingent du *pleme* bulgare se ressent naturellement de la préférence donnée à ces estimations rivales, en matière de « démographie » macédonienne. La principauté de Bulgarie comptait, en 1892, 3.310.713 habitants, compris 676.215 musulmans, dont une partie, tout au moins, ne saurait être portée au compte des Slaves du Sud.

Figure 1, Charles Loiseau, *Le Balkan Slave et la crise autrichienne* (1898), p. 27.

¹ Population at the Census of 1900 :

Crown of St. Stephen	19,255,000
Hungary proper	16,838,000
Magyars	8,589,000

Figure 2, Arnold Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (1915),, p. 123.

¹ An analysis of the census taken in 1900 for the Kingdom of Hungary (exclusive of Croatia-Slavonia) is the best commentary on the result :

Nationalities	Numbers	Percentages
Magyars	8,589,000	51.00
Roumans	2,785,000	16.54
Slovaks	1,991,000	11.82
Germans	1,980,000	11.76
Serbs	435,000	2.59
Ruthenes	423,000	2.51
Croats	189,000	1.12
Others	446,000	2.66
Non-Magyar nationalities }	8,249,000	49.00
Total population	16,838,000	100.00

Figure 3, Arnold Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (1915), p. 145.

² Total population of Bosnia in 1895	1,568,000	
South-Slavonic element about	1,554,000	
Consisting of { Orthodox Serbs	670,000	(41.38%)
{ Moslem Bosniaks	550,000	(33.97%)
{ Catholic Croats	334,000	(20.63%)

For their distribution see Map III.

Figure 5, Arnold Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (1915), p. 184.

DÉMOGRAPHIE ETHNIQUE			29
ENFANTS JUSQU'À 10 ANS POUR 1.000 PERSONNES ¹			
	ALLEMANDS	SLAVES	
Bohême	250,04	259,71	
Moravie	237,37	272,36	
Styrie			
Carinthie	240,18	270,04	
Carniole			

Les Allemands tiennent le dernier rang, sans conteste : les Slaves l'emportent². L'élément tudesque est menacé de s'accroître plus lentement que ses rivaux, parce que les mariages y sont moins nombreux.

SONT MARIÉS À L'ÂGE DE 20 À 30 ANS SUR 1.000 INDIVIDUS		
1900		
DE LANGUE	SEXE MASC.	SEXE FÉM.
Allemande	338	321
Tchèque-Slovaque	375	355
Polonaise ³	328	317
Ruthène	378	380
Slovène	326	321
Serbo-Croate	343	365
Italienne	332	327
Roumanie	381	385 ⁴

Les mariages sont aussi plus tardifs chez les Allemands, et par conséquent moins féconds.

SONT MARIÉS À L'ÂGE DE :			
	21-30 ANS Hommes.	11-20 ANS Femmes.	21-30 ANS
Allemands	23,45 p. 100	1,34	40,73
Slaves	39,55 —	5,19	60,88

Figure 4, Bertrand Auerbach, *Les races et nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie* (1917), p. 29.

The following table shows the respective strengths of the different nationalities within the Austrian Crown-lands, according to the census of 1900, and the number of seats assigned respectively to each nationality in the parliament at Vienna by the electoral law which introduced Manhood Suffrage in 1906.

	Population.	Representation.
Germans	9,172,000	233=1 : 39,365
Tschechs	5,955,000	108=1 : 55,093
Poles	4,252,000	80=1 : 53,150
Ruthenes	3,382,000	34=1 : 99,471
Slovenes	1,193,000	37=1 : 51,459
Southern Slavs	711,000	19=1 : 38,263
Italians	727,000	5=1 : 143,000
Others	715,000	
Total	26,107,000	516

The representation of certain nationalities is thus still very far from being proportional to their real numbers.

Figure 6, Arnold Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (1915), p. 267.




Figure 7, Bertrand Auerbach, *Les races et nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie* (1917), p. 26.

En groupant par fraction serbo, croate ou slovène, on trouve les chiffres suivants :

Les Serbes sont en Serbie et Montenegro...	4.925.900
en Hongrie du Sud (1)	461.000
en Croatie-Slavonie.....	645.000
au total.....	<u>6.031.000</u>
Les Croates sont en Croatie-Slavonie.....	1.638.000
en Istrie.....	173.000
en Hongrie du Sud.....	195.000
au total.....	<u>2.006.000</u>
Les Serbo-Croates sont en Bosnie-Herzégovine et en Dalmatie.....	2.432.000
Les Slovènes sont en Carinthie, Styrie, Carniole, Goritsa, Trieste (60.000) et au Frioul.	1.313.000
	<u>11.782.000</u>

Figure 8, Pierre de Lanux, *La Yougoslavie, La France et Les Serbes* (1916), p. 130.

Maps



Figure 9, Pierre de Lanux, *La Yougoslavie, La France et Les Serbes* (1916), p. 196.




Figure 10, Ernest Denis, *La Grande Serbie* (1915), p. 1



Figure 12, R. W. Seton-Watson, *German, Slav and Magyar* (1916), p. 146.




Figure 11, Arthur Chervin, *De Prague a l'Adriatique* (1919), p. 1.

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