DOES INCUMBENT LEADERS’ PERSONALITY MATTER IN A PEACE PROCESS? 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF JUAN MANUEL SANTOS AND RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN

by
Péter Tibor Bányai

Submitted to 
Central European University
Department of Political Science

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Matthijs Bogaards

Budapest, Hungary
(2018)
Abstract

The thesis seeks to demonstrate that incumbent leaders bear a significant role in peace processes. Applying a multidisciplinary approach, including Zartman’s ripeness theory, first it is shown that the two conflicts reached the state of ripeness and therefore peace became viable. Using Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) at a distance then it is concluded that the difference in the ability of Juan Manuel Santos and Recep Tayyip Erdogan to challenge domestic and regional constraints is an explanatory variable for the diverging outcome of the negotiations in Colombia (2012-2016) from those in Turkey (2013-2015). It is finally concluded that both political psychology and comparative area studies have a significant relevance to investigate the behavior of political leaders in context.
Acknowledgement

First and foremost, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Matthijs Bogaards, for his guidance, advice, encouragement and endless support.

I would also like to thank Professor Julia Buxton for her advice and insight into the Colombian conflict and Professor Eamon Gilmore for the special information about the inner dynamics of the negotiations in Colombia.
Table of Contents

Abstract............................................................................................................................................. i
Acknowledgement.............................................................................................................................. ii
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1
1. Theoretical background and related literature .............................................................................. 4
   1.1 Intractability and ripeness........................................................................................................ 4
   1.2 Leadership Trait Analysis......................................................................................................... 6
2. Case selection, methodology, and the two leaders’ traits ............................................................... 9
   2.1 Case selection ........................................................................................................................... 9
   2.2 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 9
      2.2.1 Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA).................................................. 10
      2.2.2 Validity ............................................................................................................................ 12
      2.2.3 Limitations ....................................................................................................................... 13
      2.2.4 Resources ....................................................................................................................... 13
   2.3 Constructing and comparing the two profiles .......................................................................... 14
      2.3.1 Erdogan ........................................................................................................................... 15
      2.3.2 Santos ............................................................................................................................. 16
3. Ripeness, historical background, and the region ......................................................................... 18
   3.1 Turkey and the Kurdish question ............................................................................................. 18
      3.1.1 Historical background ..................................................................................................... 18
      3.1.2 Ripeness .......................................................................................................................... 19
      3.1.3 The region ....................................................................................................................... 21
      3.1.4 The process begins .......................................................................................................... 23
   3.2 The Civil War in Colombia ...................................................................................................... 24
      3.2.1 Historical background ..................................................................................................... 24
      3.2.2 Ripeness .......................................................................................................................... 25
      3.2.3 The region ....................................................................................................................... 27
3.2.4 The process begins ............................................................... 27

4. Domestic politics and the impact of leadership.......................................... 29

4.1 Turkey ......................................................................................... 29

4.1.1 Domestic politics in Turkey ......................................................... 29

4.1.2 Erdogan and the army ................................................................. 32

4.2 Colombia ................................................................................... 32

4.2.1 Domestic politics in Colombia ...................................................... 32

4.2.2 Santos and the military ................................................................. 35

4.3 Erdogan and the domestic challenges .................................................... 36

4.4 Santos and the domestic challenges ..................................................... 39

4.5 Comparing the two leaders ............................................................... 42

Conclusion ......................................................................................... 44

Bibliography ....................................................................................... 46
Introduction

In the 2010s two civil wars showed the signs of opportunity for resolution. The recent negotiations between the Colombian government and the Marxist insurgency group FARC have drawn special attention from the international community. The Nobel Peace Prize received by Colombian President Manuel Santos rewarded his dedication and efforts to drive the negotiations to a successful outcome as a peace agreement had been reached. Almost at the same time, another but far less transparent peace process took place at the borders of Europe between the Turkish government and the Kurdish PKK from 2013 to 2015. Unfortunately, it ended without any positive outcome. Considering the importance and impact of individual leadership in both countries’ political scene, it seems intriguing to delve into how salient role Santos and Erdogan had in the processes.

The two conflicts have a lot in common. Both countries have long been strategic allies of the United States and the insurgent organizations have been condemned by the developed world. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world system eroded the ideological support for both rebel groups. While the regional situation made fighting the guerillas a very complex challenge both the Turkish and the Colombian armies had the upper hand militarily, preceding the peace negotiations in the 2010s. The two relatively new state leaders, Erdogan and Santos gave an impetus to conflict resolution and both them and their initiatives for peace enjoyed strong public support in the beginning. Although considered as intractable for a long time (Coleman 2000) the two conflicts started to show the patterns of ripeness (Zartman 2001) before the commencement of the peace talks as both the mutually hurting stalemate and the perceived way out – two essential elements of ripeness – had been present (Ünal 2015). (International Crisis Group2012) Another important factor, namely the political control over the armed forces of the two states was also ensured as both Erdogan and Santos were capable of gaining sufficient support among the ranks of the military leaders. Despite all these circumstances, added to that a favorable international context, one may contemplate what led to the failure of the Turkish attempt whilst Colombia managed to upend the conflict. The importance of individual politicians and the president over ideological or party cleavages in Colombia (Diamint, Tedesco 2015) and the strong influence of Erdogan in Turkish domestic politics (Görener, Ucel 2011) highlights the role and impact of incumbent leadership in both countries.
In the light of this I argue that Erdogan’s and Santos’ different personalities and consequently their contrasting reactions to domestic political challenges are responsible for the diverging outcomes of the Colombian (2012-2016) and Turkish (2013-2015) peace processes.

While the salience of leadership has been present in certain theories of international relations such as neoclassical realism or neoliberalism and regularly appeared in analysis focusing on foreign policy behavior of states it is most prominent in the field of political psychology. Methodologies such as Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis or LTA (2002) have enabled researchers to create complex personality profiles of politicians and leaders at distance. In addition, the method makes it possible to focus on one or two of the three aspects of personality if required for the analysis (in this case the responsiveness to constraints). One excellent example is the paper by Hermann, Preston, Korany, and (Hermann et al. 2001), where the writers examine the behavior of state leaders in international conflicts. However, with the complexity of personal profiles created one may raise the question why these analyses have been limited to leaders’ impact on foreign policy and not so on domestic or intrastate conflicts and peace processes. The aim of this MA thesis hence is to fill this gap. By comparing the personalities of R.T. Erdogan and J.M. Santos during the period of the two peace processes I seek to demonstrate that personality traits of incumbent leaders do matter and their reactions to challenges in domestic politics have a serious impact on the success of civil war termination. Thus, in the present thesis I endeavor to answer the following research question:

Can the different personalities of Juan Manuel Santos and Recep Tayyip Erdogan and consequently their different responses to domestic political challenges explain the diverging outcomes of the two peace processes in Colombia and Turkey?

In order answer the question above I will seek to test the following two hypotheses:

1. There is a significant difference between the personality of Erdogan and Santos in at least one of the three main constituents of leadership style.

2. This difference between their personalities are responsible for reactions to domestic political challenges which then influence the outcome of the peace process.

The thesis is a cross-regional comparison, based on the most similar system design, in which the dependent variable is the outcome of the peace process. The independent variables that display similarity are the two prerequisites of ripeness: MHS and the perceived way out, the complex dynamics in the region, and the relationship between the new leaders and the army.
Finally, the leadership of the two incumbent politicians and their reactions to domestic political challenges constitute the independent variable that is different in the two cases and hence responsible for the diverging outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International context</th>
<th>Ripeness</th>
<th>Regional dynamics</th>
<th>Control over state army</th>
<th>Leadership style</th>
<th>Outcome of the peace process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-?</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the theoretical background and related literature review in chapter one, this MA thesis is divided into three further chapters.

In chapter two I will show why the two peace processes and the respective leaders were chosen for analysis, then a detailed description of the applied methodology will follow. Finally, using Hermann’s method, Erdogan and Santos’ leadership traits and their personality will be constructed. This way I will demonstrate that the first hypothesis is true.

In chapter three the Turkish and Colombian civil wars are presented in a historical context, then it is demonstrated that they reached the state of ripeness in order to facilitate the two cases’ comparability. This is followed by a brief introduction of the regional dynamics.

The main objective of chapter four is to demonstrate that the second hypothesis is true by contextualizing the two leaders’ leadership style in the domestic, and to some extent, regional politics. Concentrating on their ability to challenge constraints is the key tool to reveal that the difference between two of their traits is an explanatory (independent) variable for the diverging outcome of the two peace processes.

Finally, in the conclusion I will summarize the findings of my MA thesis, identify some limitations and suggest topics for further research.
1. **Theoretical background and related literature**

The following pages will introduce two main tracks. Within the field of conflict resolution, the definition of intractable conflict and several interpretations of ripeness are provided as both are features of the two civil wars under scrutiny. Furthermore, the original interpretation of ripeness by Zartman is one of the key independent variables of this thesis. Afterwards, a short insight is presented on civil war duration and termination. Finally, Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis, the methodology used in the present research, and related studies from the field of political psychology close this section. Further studies on leadership are described in Chapter two.

### 1.1 Intractability and ripeness

Political psychologist Peter T Coleman (2000; Goldman and Coleman 2005) underlines the traumatic and destructive nature of intractable conflicts. He argues that by time, people accept violence in a conflict as routine part of their life. Consequently, this adaption to the severe circumstances have an impact on the belligerents in a way that they are less willing to get engaged in peace negotiations and as a result they became embroiled in a seemingly endless cycle of violence and counterviolence.

Ripeness is a key theory in the field of conflict resolution. One of the most significant theorists, W. I. Zartman highlights timing as the most decisive factor of ripeness. In other words, it is crucial to find the right point of time for the beginning of negotiations so that there is a chance that they can lead to a peaceful solution. Zartman categorically stresses that without reaching “ripeness” there is no point in commencing any peace talks (Zartman 2000). While the right timing is crucial, two other elements are also necessary for the ripe moment in his theory: The Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) and the perception by the belligerent sides that there is a real opportunity to exit the conflict. Zartman defines these two ideas as follows: “The concept is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or Way Out.” (Zartman 2000, 1) While Coleman emphasized the influence of emotions and hence laid the ground for the salience of subjective perception, Zartman highlights the subjective
perception of ripeness explicitly. He points out that both in the case of MHS and “the way out” the required conditions are “perceived” by the belligerents and this perception is subjective. Therefore, even if objective criteria confirm the presence of MHS but either of the sides do not recognize it “subjectively”, the moment cannot be considered ripe for resolution. (Zartman 2000, 5) Besides this, Zartman also adds that even if ripeness is established, a successful resolution is not guaranteed as ripeness is a “necessary but not sufficient” criteria for peaceful conflict termination.

Analyzing four different models of ripeness, Christopher R. Mitchell (1995) finds that while these models differ in the required structural conditions, they must all include a “change in the mentality of decision makers themselves” (Mitchell 1995, 10) otherwise the ripe moment will never be attained. Adding to this that these decision makers’ subjective perception of the “structural conditions” is what determines ripeness, the writer bolsters Zartman and Coleman’s argument about the role of subjective perception. Mitchell critically notes the lack of distinction between internal and external ripeness in the four models. He argues that a more thorough examination of internal factors and processes or “intraparty conditions” in other words “internal ripeness” within the belligerent parties is just as important as analyzing the external factors or “external ripeness” (Mitchell 1995, 12) Examining internal ripeness is essential since political leaders’ domestic politics and interests consequently affect external politics or peace processes. It is especially true in the case of politicians whose common practice is to divert the attention of voters from unpleasant domestic issues to external ones.

The psychologist Dean R. Pruitt offers a modified version of Zartman’s ripeness theory which he calls “readiness theory” (Pruitt 2005). Like Mitchell, he also concentrates on mental attitudes in the conflict and claims that motivation and optimism are the two key factors to achieve peace. His readiness theory follows a methodologically different approach from that of Zartman’s as he introduces a more flexible, “compensatory model”, (Pruitt 2005 9) which includes the use of variables. He argues that while motivation and optimism are prerequisites for readiness, their level and even their sources may be different in each belligerent party. Using historical examples from the cold war he underlines that „the side with grater readiness should make more concessions” (Pruitt 2005, 13) Finally, Pruitt adds the analysis of the internal political processes that affect leaders’ decisions.

---

1 He uses the example from the cold war when the west finally started negotiations with the Soviet Union even though the west was not in crisis and hence for them it was not so crucial, still because of the optimism in the west negotiations finally began (Pruitt 2005, 10)
Linking theory and empirical evidence, historian Daniel Lieberfeld examines ripeness in conflicts that resulted in negotiated settlements despite their seemingly intractable nature. (Lieberfeld 2016) His “empirically based theory development” (Lieberfeld 2016 20) scrutinizes 5 cases of civil war and focusing on the role of the government side he argues that leadership change and the political recognition of the rebel organization by the government enhances the chances for a negotiated solution. Lieberfeld lists four factors which, as he claims, do not bear sufficient emphasis in Zartman’s ripeness theory. (Lieberfeld 2016 21) First, to reach the perception of ripeness, it is the change on the government side that counts most. Once this change occurs, the opportunity of a peaceful solution improves even if the prerequisite conditions for ripeness are not perceived by both sides symmetrically. Second, Zartman’s view that ripeness achieved by the rise of the militarily weaker side so that it equals to the level of the stronger one (lower hand vs. upper hand), is again not true in many cases. Third, the timing of the initiation of negotiations are in a causal relationship with the domestic interests of the incumbent political leaders’ in government and thus domestic political processes are decisive. In this respect, Lieberfeld’s findings correspond with those of Mitchell’s. Finally, following the same thread again akin to Mitchell’s, Lieberfeld calls the attention to the “ideological and non-rational constraints” (Lieberfeld 2016, 22) of some leaders when “calculated costs and benefits”(Lieberfeld 2016, 22) are considered in peace negotiations.

Literature on civil wars considers armed conflicts from a different angle. Instead of ripeness, these studies focus on the conditions that influence civil war duration and termination. The essays usually research on one aspect or issue and use large N samples in their respective quantitative methodology. A wide range of topics are analyzed such as the impact of natural resources, change of leadership, foreign military intervention, rebel group motivations etc. The Journal of Peace Research dedicated the issue vol. 41, no. 3, 2004 to these topics. Hegre highlights four main themes: rebel group motivation, rebel group financing, problems related to misperceptions and credible commitments and finally military factors. (Hegre 2004, 245)

1.2 Leadership Trait Analysis

Leadership style is the core issue in Margaret Hermann’s paper: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders. (1980) She has written several other papers on the same issue.
developed a Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) also applied by many other scholars that help describe a leader’s personality traits at a distance using content analysis. In order to measure the personal characteristics, she evaluates interviews of the politician under analysis. She considers these texts to be more spontaneous and thus less susceptible to the influence of others (advisers, communication experts of the political leader etc.) then for example public announcements. She conceptualizes and operationalizes six personal characteristics that are later reduced to four main characteristic types: “beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style” which may “have an impact on the content as well as the means of political decisions” (Hermann 1980, 8). Hermann wrote a refined version (2002) of her study providing practical advice on methodology as well as a more concise typology of the different leadership types. The LTA carried out in the present research is based on this later version.

Political psychology with LTA provides the missing link to explain foreign policy behavior as the mostly structural explanations of IR theories lacked that. The effect of a state leader is greatest when he is considered to be a dominant leader and his role in domestic and foreign policy processes can further increase in crisis situations (Görener and Ucal 2011, 360). The significance of a predominant leader is highlighted by Hermann and Preston: "When a single individual has the power to make choice concerning how a state is going to respond to a foreign policy problem, he or she becomes a decision unit and acts as a predominant leader." (Hermann et al. 2001, 84)

Two features make Herrmann’s research unique. One is the application of personality trait analysis at a distance that does not require direct interview with politicians. The other is the emphasis on the importance of a leader, its personality and motivations that can influence political decisions and although she applies this to foreign policy, her approach can be useful in other fields as well.

Following Hermann’s approach and the Leadership Trait Analysis methodology Aylin S. Gorener and Meltem S. Ucal (2011) examines the link between Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s personal characteristics and Turkish Foreign policy to shed light on the recent foreign policy changes of Turkey. They argue that due to political and cultural traditions in the country, individual leaders have great influence on policy making therefore the profound study of their personality and leadership style is essential to understand Turkish politics. They analyze Erdogan in the period between 2004 and 2009. A more recent paper by Baris Kesgin (2013) examines and compares secular and Islam prime ministers using leadership trait analysis at a distance. Bringing political psychology and LTA closer to the field of peace processes, José
Manuel Rivas and Adrián Tarin (2016) analyze the characteristics of two political leaders in the Russia-Chechen conflict. Their goal is to examine the “impact of leadership styles on peace policies in contexts of armed conflicts” (Rivas and Tarin 2016, 14-15) They define a certain type of leader or the “trouble shooter” who is far more likely to promote peace policies than others.
2. **Case selection, methodology, and the two leaders’ traits**

In the first chapter I present the reasons why the two civil wars and peace processes have been chosen for a comparative analysis. This will be followed by the description of the applied methodology focusing on Margaret Hermann LTA and finally it will be used to determine the leadership traits and personality profiles of Erdogan and Santos.

### 2.1 Case selection

First, both conflicts are regarded as intractable, in other words they are deeply rooted and extremely difficult to reconcile. (Coleman 2000) Most importantly, however, they displayed the patterns of ripeness, which is a necessary precondition for a possibly successful peace process and therefore a prerequisite for comparability. Furthermore, as the present thesis delves into the impact of leadership and personality, it is also important that both Santos and Erdogan are predominant leaders. (Hermann et al. 2001) While it must be noted that the Turkish conflict has a serious ethnic pattern, both the Colombian and the Kurdish insurgencies are rooted in ideological enmity that dates back decades to the cold war and with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world system, both FARC and PKK have lost their greatest ideological supporter from outside. In addition, after the elections of the new state leaders Santos and Erdogan, the possibility of a peaceful resolution emerged. Another essential similarity is that both leaders had enough control and influence on the state’s armed forces, while regional dynamics took a turn that bolstered the peace negotiations, too. Besides the international environment, at the beginning of the two processes domestic public support also provided great legitimacy for Santos and Erdogan for the negotiations, too. Thus, the conundrum that this thesis seeks to unravel is why the negotiations in Colombia were concluded successfully while the Turkish process failed despite the above-mentioned similarities. I argue that one possible explanation lies in the diverging personalities of Santos and Erdogan.

### 2.2 Methodology

The thesis is a paired comparison, based on Mill’s method of agreement (Gisselquist 2014) in which the dependent variable that is the outcome of the peace process is different while the independent variables show a high degree of similarity. These factors include ripeness, the
regional dynamics, and the relationship between the armed forces and the two leaders. (Hermann 2001) However, one of the independent variables, namely individual leadership, in particular, the personality of the two political leaders must show significant difference and hence has a decisive impact on the political process. To demonstrate this difference, Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is applied which is a content analysis method and is carried out with the help of a software developed by Michael D. Young.\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{2.2.1 Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)}

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the importance of leadership got a new impetus. The paper of Byman and Pollack (2001) emphasizes the somewhat forgotten impact of leadership and personality by elaborating on the role of well-known historical figures such as Bismarck, Napoleon or Hitler. In the same year Hermann (2001) highlighted the conditions under which a leader can be considered predominant and therefore has a salient effect on policy formation. From the political psychological point of view, David G. Winter (2003) posits that “personality explanation supplement rather than replace rational choice explanation” (Winter 2003, 112) As a consequence of the grown interest in the field, several studies were then carried out mostly seeking to explain and analyze the foreign policy decisions of statesmen (Taysi and Preston 2001; Dyson 2006; Schafer and Walker 2006; Mitchell 2007). They mostly applied either operational code analysis (Schafer and Walker 2006) or Hermann’s LTA (Dyson 2006; Mitchell 2007). This latter methodology was also used in studying leaders in the field of terrorism (Hermann and Sakiev 2011) and in interstate conflict (Rivas and Tarin 2017). For the objective of this thesis, that is to examine the leader’s reaction to domestic constraints separately from other traits, Hermann’s methodology is the one that needs to be applied.

Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis is a quantitative content analysis-based method, used to construct complex personality profiles of political leaders at a distance. It has gone through refinement by professor Hermann since 1980. This process also included the continuous enlargement of the pool of world leaders used as a benchmark for measurement. (Hermann 1980, 1999, 2002) Whereas Hermann’s 2002 paper contains the profiles of 122 state leaders and 87 Heads of Government, the present thesis uses the pool of 284 world leaders including 13 from Latin America and 46 from the Middle East and Northern Africa, which data

\textsuperscript{3} It is available on profilerplus.org.
was provided by Michael D. Young and was last updated in 2012. A software tool is provided by profilerplus.org for a straightforward and reliable process. It counts certain types of words, their positions and calculates their overall ratio to the total number of words in the submitted text. The obtained numerical results describe the seven personality traits, namely, the belief in one’s own ability to control events (BACE), need for power and influence (PWR), self-confidence (SC), conceptual complexity (CC), task focus (TASK), ingroup bias (IGB), and finally distrust of others (DIS). These figures are essential for two purposes. First, they help situate the analyzed person’s traits compared to other politicians. Second, by the aforementioned comparison they help determine whether the person is low, high, or average on that trait and this way lay the base for the full and detailed description of the given person’s leadership style.

Calculating the figures of the seven traits help the construction of the three main variables of personality, namely challenging or respecting political constraints (BACE and PWR), openness to new information (CC and SC) and finally motivation to power (TASK, DIS, and IGB). One advantage of Hermann’s method is that it fosters to construct a complete personality profile. However, another even more important one is that it provides the opportunity to focus on one or two particular traits as in the case of Erdogan and Santos it is essential. The aim is to shed light on how domestic politics and the leaders’ personality influenced the peace process. Thus, the presidents’ reaction to constraints, in particular to domestic ones are the main subjects of scrutiny. Consequently, to demonstrate that the second hypothesis is right there need to be significant divergence in the two leaders’ BACE or PWR (or both). By being able to determine the level of BACE and PWR, Hermann’s method can clearly measure leaders’ attitude to constraints and therefore it is a more preferable method than operational code.  

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BACE – belief that one can influence or control what happens</td>
<td>Responsiveness to constraints: How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment – do they respect or challenge such constraints?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWR –the need for power and influence</td>
<td>Personal leadership style</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 http://maihold.org/mediapool/113/1132142/data/Walker.pdf  
5 Based on Hermanns description (Hermann: 2002, 10)
| CC – conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one’s environment) | Openness to information: How open are leaders to incoming information – do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their response? |
| SC – self-confidence | |
| TASK – the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others’ ideas and sensitivities | Motivation for power: What are the leaders’ reasons for seeking their positions – are they driven by an internal focus of attention within themselves or by the relationships that can be formed with salient constituents? |
| DIS – an individual’s general distrust or suspiciousness of others | |
| IGB – the intensity with which a person holds an ingroup bias | |

### 2.2.2 Validity

There have been several pieces of research to empirically validate the findings of LTA and they have demonstrated that the actual leadership style of politicians are consistent with the predicted ones based on the LTA method for example (Hermann et al. 2001) The methodology has been applied in various studies scrutinizing state leaders’ impact on foreign policy (Taysi and Preston 2001; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Mitchell 2007; Dyson 2007) The reliability of translated materials compared to the original ones has also been tested and based on several studies, the inter coding reliability is .92. (Taysi and Preston 2001)
2.2.3 Limitations

The analysis faces certain limitations such as the time span of the pool of interviews used for content analysis. This is due to the changing pattern of personality traits through time. What matters is the personality traits and leadership that can be observed throughout the peace processes. (Görener and Ucal 2011, 365; Hermann 2002, 4) Consequently, the time in which interviews can be considered for content analysis should span the period of the Solution Process in Turkey between 2011 and 2015 and the Peace process in Colombia between 2011 and 2016. Because of this and the strict rules of Hermann’s methodology, the number of available interviews is limited. However, the volume of text still surpasses the minimum requirement set by Hermann. There is no explicit requirement for the types of sources the interviews must be taken from (Hermann 2002; Rivas and Tarin 2017) as long as they display a certain degree of spontaneity. While no LTA based scrutiny of Santos’ personality has been found in the literature so far, a description of Erdogan is provided by Görener and Ucal (2011) and later by Kegsin (2013) but the texts analyzed cover the period preceding the peace process. Only speeches in English have been chosen as the language suitable for profiler plus in English or Spanish. As neither of these politicians’ mother tongue is English, the available number of texts have obviously been limited. Furthermore, in case of Erdogan, most of his responses have been translated into English albeit this should not influence the LTA results.

2.2.4 Resources

Hermann clearly points out that interviews are far more useful for analysis than speeches or statements by political leaders. (Hermann: 1980, 2002) This is because in the first case the interviewee’s responses are more spontaneous and not prepared or even written by advisors. This feature of spontaneity makes interviews help reveal the real traits of the examined person as opposed to the planned and hence distorted nature of the latter one. Hermann and Görener and Ucal refer to resources as New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, or Wall Street Journal but they either do not explicitly reveal the interview resources or they used data resource that is not available anymore such as Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Hermann 1980). The overall emphasis is on spontaneity and the importance of wide range of topics.
Throughout the selection of interviews and collection of the texts for the content analysis in this thesis, Hermann’s rules (2001) have been applied. According to Hermann (2001), at least 50 interview responses must be considered, each of which should exceed one hundred words. In addition to this, the interviews should preferably cover different topics in various settings and material selection should span over the period examined in the research. In case of Erdogan, 8 interviews have been considered, from which 95 responses were analyzed consisting of 17 577 words. In case of Santos, 11 interviews were collected, 63 responses have been analyzed consisting of 14 979 words. Throughout the collection process, best efforts have been put on selecting materials from the widest time range possible within the given period of the peace processes. A significant part of the analyzed texts contains live interview responses transcribed manually to increase the amount of spontaneous material.

2.3 Constructing and comparing the two profiles

There are three levels of comparison. First constructing the personality profile, the figures of the traits of each leader can be either compared to the pool of world leaders or to the respective regional leaders. While regional comparison help construct the complete personal profile, using the pool of world leaders as benchmark is helpful in the second step when a certain score does not fall into either low or high category or when moderate trait may seem ambiguous to be described and further enhancement is needed. Most importantly, however, examining the difference between the scores on the two leaders’ traits directly help reveal divergence between their traits.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traits</th>
<th>Erdogan</th>
<th>Leaders of the Middle East and Northern Africa</th>
<th>Santos</th>
<th>Leaders of Latin America</th>
<th>World Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACE</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWR</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Erdogan has high scores on belief to control events compared to both regional and world leaders which refers to more direct involvement in policy making, extending his control over political processes. Although his score on need for power is rather moderate, the result is still a personality that is willing to challenge constraint more often than respect them, but he is “too direct and open in the use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence” (Hermann 2002, 13). Thus, we can posit that
Erdogan does not always challenge constraints successfully, his ability of doing so is rather volatile depending on the challenge.

While he scores moderately on conceptual complexity and a bit higher in self-confidence compared to regional leaders, this difference almost diminishes when compared to the pool of world leaders. In addition, his moderate conceptual complexity score also suggests that he is only slightly closed to incoming information, his openness or closedness depends on the situation. Finally, his scores on task focus and in-group bias suggest a moderate leaning towards problem orientation. As a result, Erdogan displays the attributes of an expansionistic or evangelistic leader. (Kesgin 2013)

2.3.2 Santos

Santos is definitely a constraint challenger. This is demonstrated by his high scores both in BACE and PWR. The former one is more than 2 standard deviation higher compared to both regional and world leaders. In case of PWR the difference is also significant when compared to the regional pool. His high scores in both BACE and PWR suggest that whilst he challenges the particular constraint, he can do it in a skillful way and his high PWR implies that he is good at manipulating others in order to achieve his goal which reveals skills that are “highly Machiavellian” (Hermann 2002, 16) This kind of leaders prefer to be actively involved in policy making which can refer to active role in conflict negotiations. This direct involvement is the key aspect that can make them successful as in the case of Santos in the Colombian peace talks.

Considering openness to information, Santos has higher than average scores in both CC and SC, albeit reaching significant level is only observed in SC. This results in a very similar description to that of Erdogan’s in these two traits which reveal a person rather closed to new information from the environment. It is important to note, that “these leaders are more likely to organize the decision-making process in a hierarchical manner in order to maintain control over the decision” (Hermann 2002, 18). As Santos was born to a family actively involved in politics and journalism it was relatively easy for him to obtain high and influential positions in the government. Added to this his studies in prestigious universities, he could easily get acquainted with state administration and bureaucracy and develop a skill to achieve the above-mentioned control in issues with special relevance for him during his tenure. Additionally, Hermann also mentions that high score in self-confidence enables the leader with patience to wait for the right moment in his environment to be able to succeed. This feature partly seems to explain the
Colombian president’s seemingly U turn: the once hawkish Santos initiated secret and then institutionalized talks with the FARC in 2010 and 2012 respectively. As a result, Santos cannot be described as a person fully closed to incoming information. He is rather a politician who, while knowing exactly what he intends to achieve and that is the right thing, acts when the moment is ripe. Thus, he is between the closed and the open type. This is also reinforced by Hermann and Kaarbo (1998), who consider solely the score on conceptual complexity to determine closedness or openness to information.

His high leaning but moderate task focus connotes a rather problem focus behavior. Based on these figures, just like Erdogan, Santos falls within the category of an expansionistic or evangelistic leader (Hermann et al. 2001).

Concluding the first part of the analysis it may be surprising that both leaders seem to fall in the same personality type but comparing each of their traits one by one reveals that Santos is far more a constraint challenger than Erdogan and he is supposed to do it more successfully than the Turkish leader as not only does Santos score higher in belief to control events but he overpasses Erdogan in his trait in need for power as well. Hermann says that leaders who are not high in both traits “will not be as successful in having an impact as those high in both traits” (Hermann 1999: 12) as opposed those, who are high in both traits. (Hermann 1999). Added to this Santos’ higher task focus, the LTA lays the foundation to explain that difference in traits had an impact on the way these two politicians handled domestic issues related to the peace process.
3. Ripeness, historical background, and the region

To understand the complexities of the two civil wars it is essential to delve a bit into the historical context of the two conflicts. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, the state of ripeness is essential for a viable resolution thus in the following pages I will elaborate on these two topics adding to that a short description of the regional dynamics as well.

3.1 Turkey and the Kurdish question

3.1.1 Historical background

Consisting of about 15 million people, 20 percent of the Turkish population the Kurds are the biggest ethnic group in Turkey. (Marcus, 2007 76) Including those living in Iran, Iraq, and Syria their population exceeds 20 million.

The roots of the Kurdish problem can be traced back to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Oppression and violence led to the securitization of the Kurdish problem (Ensaroglu 2013, 9) and the result was a deepening divide between the minority and the Turks. Consequently, the Kurds had to suffer from “denial, intolerance and marginalization” defined as the “classical approach” of the Turkish state. (Yildiz 2012, 152)

As a result, the Kurds radicalized and the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) was founded on a Marxist ideological platform in 1974, originally fighting for an independent Kurdish state (Bruno 2007). Although Öcalan, the founder of PKK was captured and jailed in 1999 in Turkey, he is still considered to be the leading figure of the organization and any peace process is unimaginable without him. PKK has often applied terrorist measures and is now listed as a terrorist organization both in the European Union and the United States. A contradiction of Kemalism is that while it strives to defend the secular nature of Turkey against Islam and safeguards the western orientation, its reliance on the military deprives the country of the level of democracy that the EU would require, and it prevented any attempts to resolve the Kurdish issue, denying its mere existence.
The first Turkish politician to address the Kurdish issue was president Turgut Özal in 1991, who was followed by Prime Minister Erbakan in 1996 but also ended without any result. (Ensaroglu 2013, 11)

A turning point was the capture of Öcalan in 1999. He ordered the PKK fighters to terminate the armed struggle and leave Turkey, he also announced that the aim of the Kurdish struggle changed to autonomy instead of independence. (Tezcür 2009, 775) However, the moderate Islamic AKP, winning the elections in 2002 and forming a government displayed a new approach to the Kurdish problem. As the EU approved Turkey as a candidate country in its Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the “democratization process” began. (Tezcür 2009, 778) As part of this, from 2002 the new government showed willingness to introduce new democratic measures that seemed beneficial for the Kurds. These steps included some concessions for the Kurdish minority such as the use of Kurdish language in broadcasting and in classes from 2002 (Marcus 2007, 82). In 2005 Prime Minister Erdogan openly spoke about the “Kurdish question” and as a result earned the sympathy of many Kurds and progressive intellectuals in Turkey. This was followed by direct but secret talks between the government and the PKK, known as the Oslo Process (International Crisis Group 2012). But as the negotiations were highly secretive not much information is known about the details. The talks lasted until June 2011 when AKP won again the parliamentary elections as international Crisis group reported. (2012) The Turkish society received these first steps and direct engagement between the PKK and the Turkish government overall positively. This also provided the background for the Peace Process known as Solution Process between 2012 and 2015, revealed by the Turkish Prime Minister in December 2012, when he announced that the National Intelligence Agency was in direct contact with the PKK.

3.1.2 Ripeness

As theorists like Zartman, Pruitt and others stressed, what matters is that the belligerents perceive conditions to be ripe. According to Zartman (2000), two prerequisites for ripeness are the mutually hurting stalemate and the perceived way out of the conflict, which is optimism in Pruitt’s version. Several sources such as the International Crisis Group or Ünal (2015) state that the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK reached the condition of ripeness. These studies refer to both Turkish officials and representatives of PKK who admitted that they were
in a stalemate. The process of ripening had started well before the resolution process, which was clearly visible when the Turkish state finally recognized the military “deadlock” in 2007. This was mainly due to PKK’s new tactics that rebels had begun to use in 1994. This year the insurgent group’s leadership acknowledged that they had lost the war in military terms which affected the balance of power, namely at that moment the state’s position was far superior to that of the insurgents. However, Ocalan drew the necessary conclusions and consequently, PKK opted for classical terrorist warfare to apply “political coercion” after 1994. (Unal 2015, 95), this included “urbanized terrorist attacks, such as targeting civilians, extortion, kidnapping” (Unal 2015, 103) This was also the point when PKK started its transition “from a heavy military organization to a politico-military organization” (Unal 2015, 100). So, after 1994 the dynamics of the conflict started to change approaching a mutually hurting stalemate. This was exactly the process which Zartman describes as the lower hand rising towards the upper hand and finally the two hands - one symbolizing the state the other the rebels - are at the same level⁶. This process finally culminated in the state of mutually hurting stalemate by 2007.⁷ This explains why there had been attempts to resolve the conflict between 2007 and 2012, already before the Solution process itself. As a result of ripeness realized by both sides, the AKP government’s new and more realistic approach to the conflict contributed to the beginning of peace talks. Kurdish political leader, Selahattin Demirtas was among others who admitted the existence of the stalemate when he said in an interview that “It was clearly expressed from the vantage point of both sides that neither the PKK nor the state was going to resolve the matter with violence.” He also made a reference to the change in the attitude of the Turkish leadership to the Kurdish problem during the Oslo process. Demirtas underlined that the government had realized the inevitability of involving Ocalan in the negotiations without which no peace could be achieved (Hess 2012). To the government’s surprise, after the leakage of the secret talks with Ocalan, the public reaction was rather supportive. This latter factor gave a boost to the government’s reconciliatory approach and certainly had implications for the next, Resolution process. This was of crucial importance as the Turkish state had for long consequently denied the existence of meetings with PKK representatives for fear of public anger.

The long presence of the mutually hurting stalemate did not automatically generate a decrease in the intensity of the conflict. Violence escalated towards the end of the “Oslo Process”, and especially in 2012 just preceding the Solution process, which began officially in

---

⁶ Zartman (2001) refers to the dynamics as the lower hand rises and upper hand descends
2013. The escalation again raised the government’s concerns about losses that could prove unbearable in long term. Crisis Group report estimates that 711 people lost their life in armed incidents between June 2011 and August 2012, which far exceeded the number of fatalities of 2009 or the period between 2000-2004. (International Crisis Group 2012) The series of events causing a big number of fatalities led to a “plateau” as Ünal (2015) described, referring to the term introduced by Zartman. However, it was not primarily the rising number of fatalities that concerned the politicians but rather the impact of the recurring violence on the country’s social and economic stability. From the point of conflict resolution, what is intriguing is that on one hand this “plateau” of the conflict occurred at the end of the Oslo process, but on the other hand, the escalation just preceded the beginning of the Solution process, reinforcing the theory that escalation or “plateau” can trigger the beginning of peace negotiations.

Apart from the domestic state of affairs, however, there was another issue that helped trigger the restart of negotiations. This was quite similar to what Lieberfeld described in his empirical analysis of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The scholar pointed out that one of Yitzhak Rabin’s main motives to seek a peaceful solution with the Palestinians was the emerging threat from the region. Israel feared that both Iran and Iraq were intending to develop nuclear capacities that could have had serious repercussions and was perceived as “existential threat” (Lieberfeld 2016, 27) to Israel. The already complex security and political situation in the surrounding region of Turkey took a turn following the Arab spring, which caused Turkey to become seriously concerned. As both Ünal and Crisis Group reports suggest, this contributed to the ripeness of the situation within Turkey and motivated the Turkish government to open initiate negotiations with the PKK in 2012.

3.1.3 The region

Kurds constitute minority groups in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the biggest one in Turkey. Since the start of the PKK insurgency, Turkey’s regional foes used the opportunity to take advantage of the conflict and supported Ocalan’s organization. Syria provided retreat for him until he was captured in 1999. But the emergence of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is a more complex issue and can be traced back to 1991 when the US provided shelter for the Kurds who had rebelled against Saddam Hussein. Since then the history of KRG has included internal fights between the two dominant parties, sometimes even with
the intervention of the Turkish army on Masoud Barzani’s side (KDP) against his main rival, Talabani (PUK).\(^8\) Barzani and the political leadership of the KRG is more conservative and religious than PKK therefore it laid a common ground with Erdogan’s initially moderate Sunni religious approach and for cooperation against PKK. The main problem is that Barzani has been willing to contain PKK so long as it has served his domestic political interests which often were different from those of Turkey’s. Thus, his political alliance could never have been taken for granted by Ankara. Still, for geopolitical reasons the KRG has always been dependent on Turkey.

Despite his sometimes controversial stance, Barzani is a key Kurdish ally for Turkey. He made clear that he was supporting the peace process in a public speech in Diyarbakir during a rally with Erdogan. They both sent a message to the Kurds in the region as they embraced the peace process and in a reconciliating tone Erdogan even used words such as “Kurdistan” and “brotherhood” but criticizing the Syrian PYD underlined that not all Kurdish groups are considered friends. (Hurriyet 2013 Nov 16)

Davutoglu’s “zero problems with neighbors” paved the way for a better relationship with the Syrian regime after 2002 (Davutoglu 2010). But the break out of the civil war in Syria in 2011 completely changed the state of affairs. Assad’s violent reaction to the insurgency in Syria and the ensuing civil war alienated Ankara from the Assad regime and soon Turkey began to support militias fighting against Damascus. The once cooperative relationship quickly turned antagonistic Turkey becoming the fiercest enemy of the Assad regime. (Park 2012).

By the emergence of ISIS, the USA found only one reliable and strong military ally: the PYD in Syria. This raised security concerns in Turkey. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the “solution Process”, in 2013 there were attempts from both Ankara and PYD to forge partnership. First, Turkey invited PYD to join the Syrian National Council, a rebel formation supported by Turkey. Unfortunately, Ankara’s demands from the PYD made an agreement for the Kurds difficult to accept. According to Hurriyet these demands would have obliged PYD to openly take a position against both PKK and the Assad regime and to abandon the claim for Kurdish autonomy within the Syrian borders. In 2012 the Kurds soon established three de facto autonomous regions near the Turkish border in Syria. As a reaction to weaken the Kurdish military power, Ankara started to back the Salafist al-Nusra front, which was labelled as a terrorist organization in the EU and USA for its affiliation to al-Qaeda (Gunter 2014). Al Nusra

---

\(^8\) For more detailed info see: International Crisis Group Middle East Report 81
carried out attacks not only against Assad’s forces but against the PYD as well. Still, meetings between representatives of PYD and the Turkish government continued, and Ankara even managed to persuade PYD leader Salih Muslim to “pull back” the declaration of the constitution for the Kurdish enclaves in Syria. (Gunter 2014 24)

Turkey considered these Kurdish enclaves along its southern border as a possible security threat for the future because of the assumed PKK-PYD relationship. However, Gunter emphasizes that by that time, the Syrian Kurds would also seek closer ties with Turkey for a similar reason to that of the KRG: geography, their “landlocked” (Gunter 2014, 25) position would provide no other sensible option but to retain friendly relations with Turkey anyway.

There were two events that left both Iraq and Syrian Kurds ambiguous about the reliability of Turkey and thus could be considered as turning points in the Kurdish - Turkish relationship. One was the case of Kobani, while other one was the ISIS threat at Erbil in 2014. The first demonstrated the controversy of Turkish attitude to the Syrian Kurds and caused friction between Turkey and the USA. The second case caused disappointment in the KRG, when after the fall of Mosul, the troops of ISIS approached the de facto capital of KRG and Turkey did not take any measures to defend its ally (Ahmed 2014). It was finally the US that intervened with swift airstrikes.

3.1.4 The process begins

At the end of 2012 during a visit in the Kurdish region of Turkey, prime minister Erdogan reiterated his belief in peaceful coexistence between Kurds and Turks based on common cultural and religious heritage. While condemning the atrocities committed by PKK he also referred to a possible restart of peace talks with the insurgent organization including Ocalan. Newspapers also hinted that secret talks between the jailed PKK leader and Turkish politicians had already commenced (Seibert 2012). The first reactions to the government’s plan to send representatives of the Kurdish BDP party to Ocalan to involve him in the peace process and de facto accepting him as the representative leader of the PKK were positive. Even the opposition CHP gave its “credit” to Erdogan (Yetkin 2013). Both key players of the process, Turkish prime minister Erdogan and the imprisoned leader of the PKK Ocalan included reconciliatory statements in their communication. One of the surprising announcements emanated from Ocalan when he offered his support for Erdogan as the would-be Turkish
president (Hurriyet 2013 February 28). Ocalan and the PKK also reacted positively to the government’s demand to lay down arms as part of the process (Hurriyet 2013 January 29).

3.2 The Civil War in Colombia

3.2.1 Historical background

Robin Kirk’s (2004) book gives an insight into the violence and historical background of the Colombian civil war. The armed conflict in Colombia is rooted in a ten year long, extremely violent period called „la Violencia” between 1948 and 1958. The country was polarized between the two main political parties, the liberals and the conservatives. After the assassination of the liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, violence erupted. The civil war was fought between paramilitary forces and the army loyal to the conservative government and guerrillas supporting the liberals. To upend the bloodshed, the elites of the liberals and the conservatives agreed upon sharing the political power, which pact on one hand consolidated the system but on the other hand hindered any reform as no other political party or movement could gain influence. One of the guerrillas fighting in the war on the side of the liberals was Pedro Marín, who later joined the communist guerrillas and finally established Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1966. FARC has maintained a Marxist-Leninist ideology since its foundation although they included Bolivarianism in the 2000 to attract more recognition and support in the region as it was the leading principle of Chavismo in Venezuela as well (International Crisis Group 2012). While the military capabilities of the FARC kept increasing up to the late 1990s, the organization’s political appeal for the Colombians has been in decline for a long time as it could not keep pace with the demographic and economic changes in the country. Although the group managed to retain its popularity among some of the marginalized rural population, the urbanization, and the decreasing relevance of agriculture in the Colombian economy curbed its appeal to other segments of the society.

The military strength of FARC reached its peak in 1998, when it launched several assaults on government forces, many of which resulted in victory for the rebels. By that time territorial influence and military capabilities of the organization had reached such a level that US specialists warned of the possibility of rebel victory in Colombia (Gray 2008). The reasons that FARC could emerge to such a dreaded and powerful force are several. Weak state capacity
is one of them as the government has never had the capability to control the whole territory of Colombia mainly due to its diverge landscape with natural barriers as the Andes or remote Amazonian swamps (Grey 2008). As the state could not operate institutions in these places, paramilitary, guerrilla, or even criminal forces took foothold and locals became dependent on them. They were often the only institutions that provided work mostly in illegal business such as drug trade. One good example for the power of such criminal groups is Medellin, where drug lord Pablo Escobar even financed social institutions (Kirk 2004). While violence and vengeance entered vicious circles, citizens especially in the rural areas found themselves trapped between paramilitary groups and the guerrillas. The failure of the political integration of the peace process of the Betancour administration in the 1980s triggered even more severe security situation than before. Originally, Betancour’s initiative included the integration of left-wing rebels into a political party, Union Patriótica (UP). However, paramilitaries and armed forces close to the government as well as criminal gangs carried out a series of killings of party members which finally disappeared from politics.

President Betancour’s failed attempt for peace in the 1980s was followed by the peace negotiations of president Pastrana with similarly disappointing outcome and this paved the way for the popular demand for a more hawkish politician.

3.2.2 Ripeness

Alvaro Uribe was elected as president in the first round, with an overwhelming majority of the votes in 2002 (Election Guide) and he was re-elected in 2006 with an even wider margin, obtaining almost two thirds of the votes. This high popularity was the result of his consequently hard line policy towards FARC and other rebel groups. As opposed to his predecessors who had mostly sought a peaceful resolution, Uribe opted for a completely different strategy and considered FARC as well as other left-wing guerrilla groups as a military problem thus a security issue. His aim was to debilitate the military capacity of the insurgency enough to force them to negotiate (International Crisis Group 2009).

By 2010 at the beginning of the Santos administration, the efforts and policies Uribe began to bear fruits. FARC was seriously weakened in its human capacity as some of its leaders had been killed while Pedro Marin or “Manuel Marulanda”, the founding father of the organization died of natural cause in 2008 (Espectador 2008 May 24). FARC was defeated and
forced out of several Andean state departments and tens of thousands of its fighters were eliminated between 2002 and 2009. Paramilitary groups also decimated FARC and they also had a leading role in pursuing the rebels out of the urban areas. Consequently, the state managed to regain control of more territory in the country (International Crisis Group 2010). However, FARC responded to this challenge by changing tactics and applied different warfare by avoiding direct confrontation with the military and using unconventional devices such as cylinder bombs. This way FARC managed to rebalance the playing field militarily, but this fighting tactic alienated the population. Their heavy involvement in criminal activities such as drug trade, kidnappings, extortion earnings and sabotage in the extraction industry made them gradually unpopular too. A Gallup poll in 2008 showed that the government’s strategy against FARC was supported by 82 per cent of the citizens (International Crisis Group 2012). International Crisis Group reported that while tens of thousands marched on a demonstration against the right-wing paramilitary groups in Bogotá in March 2008, later that year a demonstration against FARC drove millions to the streets. Uribe’s military policy clearly bore its fruits as can be seen in the declining number of homicides. The rate of murder between 2012 and 2013 was almost threefold compared to the period of 2009-2010, the last two years of Uribe’s presidency (Comisión Colombiana de Juristas). Although lacking popular support, the rebels generated a different but increasing security threat, while by the growing number of sabotage and extortion earnings as well as kidnappings, the terrorists directly endangered economic growth. They also engaged a significant portion of the Colombian security forces in remote areas while the army had already been busy protecting urban areas and infrastructure (International Crisis Group 2009). The country’s military relied on “Plan Colombia”, which was aimed to tackle the drug problem, help arm government forces and provide intelligence and training for the soldiers and which was mostly financed by the USA. Yet, it proved ineffective (Alpert 2016). International Crisis Group Report (2012) underlines three main reasons that hinder the government from defeating FARC; the organization’s continuous access to finances, its persistent ability to counterbalance human loss among its ranks and finally “it has a strong institutional structure and organizational culture that have grown over five decades”. Despite heavy losses the rebels still posed a serious danger to the state. Realizing the mutually hurting stalemate or the stage, which Zartman calls ripeness, President Santos introduced a new strategy against the FARC in 2011 (Semana 2012 February 25).
3.2.3 The region

While Colombia has borders with five countries, two of them, Venezuela and Ecuador have been the most problematic neighbors. These borders of Colombia are relatively poor and lack sufficient security, in addition, the presence of the extraction industry attract intense guerilla activity. As these lands were neglected, criminal activity, including coca cultivation, arms trade, kidnappings etc. increased especially in the 1990s and 2000s. The diverging ideologies between the Colombian and the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments exacerbated the situation during the Uribe administration. In many cases Venezuelan and Ecuadorean authorities did not tolerate the criminal activities of the rebels, but on other occasions the authorities and the police followed a “modus vivendi” (International Crisis Group 2004). Uribe’s militarization of the FARC problem intensified armed activities at the borders, which periodically resulted in a flux of refugees to Ecuador and Venezuela, causing tensions with the neighboring population (International Crisis Group 2004).

In 2003 the Venezuelan president rejected to declare FARC and ELN terrorist organizations and the following year the relationship between Uribe and Chavez further deteriorated. The ideological difference, the personal mistrust between him and Uribe and the fact that Colombia is the most reliable and important partner of the USA exacerbated the volatile relations in the 2000s. Tensions soared, and even open war came close when the Colombian army killed several people in an airstrike over the border in Ecuador in 2008. Raul Reyes, an important member of the FARC leadership was also killed. The relations started to thaw only with the new Santos administration from 2010. Santos had two aims, to improve bilateral relations with the neighboring countries and to strengthen the presence of state institutions in these poor and insecure areas. While the situation at the borders are far from ideal, the normalized diplomatic and political relations contributed to better cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador (International crisis Group 2011).

3.2.4 The process begins

The Colombian government initiated exploratory meetings with the representatives of FARC in 2011 and by the end of these negotiations in October 2012 both sides agreed to
commence official peace talks. At the opening ceremony of the peace process both the representative of FARC and the Colombian government emphasized their desire for a “stable and lasting peace” (BBC 2012 October 18) As a sign of optimism, or what conflict resolution theorists call sensing “the way out”, they gave their consent to a five-point agenda for the peace process, which included agrarian reform, the political participation of FARC members including transitional arrangement to guarantee parliamentary representation and a program to help their reincorporation into the society. The inclusion of three other topics, disarmament of the FARC guerrillas, victims of the civil war and finally the topic of drug trafficking were more of a preference of the government side. The process had a very high popular support in the beginning, a survey showed that 74 per cent of the citizens were in favor of the negotiations (Tiempo 2012 August 25). According to Eamon Gilmore, the EU representative in the peace talks, the negotiations were a fully Colombian process even if international experts and representatives of other countries were present on some of the meetings.

In this chapter, it has been shown that while the Turkish conflict is rooted in ethnic enmity as opposed to the Colombian one, both civil wars bore the signs of ripeness and therefore are comparable. In addition to this, another variable, the regional contexts also had similar dynamics although the Turkish case is more complex. What must be noted though is that while the Syrian and Iraqi situations offered an opportunity for exploitation for Erdogan (which he then failed to do), in the case of Santos, the president’s active policy measures were prerequisites for the better regional situation.

---

9 Based on the information from Professor Eamon Gilmore 2017 March
4. **Domestic politics and the impact of leadership**

The following pages will give a summary of the domestic political situation of the two countries to provide the context in which the two leaders’ personalities are scrutinized. I then seek to analyze the two independent variables: the relationship between the two leaders and the army and above all, the role of Erdogan and Santos and their abilities to challenge domestic and to some extent regional constraints based on the findings of the LTA in chapter two.

4.1 **Turkey**

4.1.1 **Domestic politics in Turkey**

Turkey has had a multiparty system with the dominance of AKP since 2002 as it is the party winning all the elections afterwards and therefore it has always been the mayor if not the only party in government. It was established in 2001 as a socially conservative party appealing to moderate Islamist voters but also to those who favored liberal economic policy. Its success can be attributed to the rising importance of the Islam religion for voters (Yesilada 2016, 21) but most of all to the vacuum on the center right as right-wing secularist parties gradually lost popularity. To the left of AKP, is the oldest of the parties currently in parliament and advocates a social democratic, center-left policy. It is a defendant of secularism and republicanism and is regarded as a Kemalist party. Kemalism explains why CHP originally took a harder line on the Kurdish issue. Modern Turkey’s founding father, Kemal Ataturk considered “Turkishness” the essence of a united Turkey and recognizing minorities would pose a serious threat to the secular Republic of Turkey. (Ensaroglu 2013) To the right of AKP, MHP was established in 1965 as a far-right nationalist party. It is very skeptical and hostile to the Kurdish issue and does not support Turkey’s accession process to the EU either. Its voters have lately been important for Erdogan to obtain majority.

For the Kurdish issue HDP is the most important and the most controversial actor in the political spectrum. By gaining more seats than expected and surpassing the threshold of ten percent in the elections in June 2015, it appeared as a major obstacle to Erdogan’s ambitions to become a president with absolute power. It strives to represent Kurdish interests as well as
supports the idea of the peace process. The party was founded in 2012 as a left-wing progressive organization. It maintains unofficial relations with PKK.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>percent</th>
<th>CHP</th>
<th>percent</th>
<th>MHP</th>
<th>percent</th>
<th>HDP</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>seats</td>
<td></td>
<td>seats</td>
<td></td>
<td>seats</td>
<td></td>
<td>seats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>34.42</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>19.42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>46.58</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>20.88</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11.27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>49.83</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>25.98</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 (7 June)</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>40.87</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>24.95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16.29</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>13.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 (11 Nov.)</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>25.32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>10.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Erdogan is the decisive leader of Turkey and his name is now linked to authoritarianism and he is also considered as an advocate of illiberal state. He is widely perceived as a figure who has recently restrained democratic rights as well as the system’s checks and balances in the country. (Görener and Ucal 2011) But this negative image has not always been the case. After AKP first gained power under his leadership in 2002, moderate conservatives and progressive liberals too anticipated a more democratic and market friendly Turkey than in the preceding period. (Karavely, 2018)

Fradkin and Libby underscores three important patterns in Erdogan’s domestic policy. The first one is the slow but gradual assault on the military especially on the old leaders who have always been supposed to defend Ataturk’s secular legacy, the second is promoting Islam in general, and third the attempt to solve the Kurdish issue emphasizing Islam religion as the bond between Turks and Kurds. (Fradkin and Libby 2013, p44) He also tried to appeal to Kurdish voters by reiterating their common ground of suffering from the previous secularist regime. His famous speech in Diyarbakir in 2013 included all these elements, what’s more, he even referred to “Kurdistan”, a word that nobody would have imagined a Turkish leader using in public before (Candar 2013).

Two domestic factors threatened Erdogan’s power. One was the so called “Gezi Movement” in 2013 The chain of events started as a peaceful demonstration against the government’s plan to destroy Gezi Park in order to carry out a new development project. However, the brutal reaction by the police sparked demonstrations in Taksim Square and all-around Istanbul, soon attracting hundreds of thousands of people and the case becoming a
symbolic protest against government policies. The demonstration generated a city-wide demonstration against Erdogan and the AKP’s new political measures with conservative Islamic tendencies. The protesters represented a wide spectrum of the society and it became a symbolic chain of events against the government. (Kotsev 2013)

The emergence of HDP, the new progressive or some say populist left-wing force which was also able to articulate the voice of the Kurdish minority in politics, was another game changer. It was not simply the party of the Kurdish minority nor a simple party of the left. As opposed to the other, traditional parties in Turkey, such as AKP or CHP, HDP could neither be defined as a Kemalist nor as an Islamist political party. Therefore, it hardly fit into the party system that political leaders had been accustomed to for decades. HDP strives to have a new approach to Turkish politics and has a diverse pool of voters. (Tekdemir 2016, 657) On 7 June 2015 the party managed to gain 80 seats in the Turkish Parliament while AKP failed to secure a majority. No Kurdish party had succeeded in reaching the ten percent threshold to get into the parliament before. (Coskun 2015) HDP posed a threat to Erdogan because it deprived the AKP of the absolute majority by attracting Kurdish voters. In addition, with its new agenda and wide support it challenged the political system as well. By demanding a more democratic Turkey to provide a wider range of rights to all its citizens they touched upon issues that had implications far beyond minority problems. In 2015 HDP declared that its aim to curb Erdogan’s ambitions to become a president with a wide range of powers. Emphasizing the slogan “We will not let you become president” (Coskun 2015, 48) contributed to the alienation of Erdogan and laid the ground for future enmity.
4.1.2 Erdogan and the army

In the meantime, Erdogan gradually faced off another threat: the secularist Turkish army. The military was regarded as the guarantor of pro-western Kemalism in Turkey until the 2000s. Kemalist approach to foreign policy preferred maintaining strong relations with the West, the EU, and the USA in particular. Consequently, the Middle East was not a priority, not only because the secularist leaders prioritized western values but also because they did not want Turkey to be embroiled in the Middle Eastern quagmire. The main reasons for the military’s influence rooted in the cold war as it was the “ideological fears of ‘Islamic reactionism’, ‘Kurdish separatism’ and ‘communism’ “(Kuru 2012, 37) However, the influence of the Turkish military gradually began to fade after 2007. In 2007 after the AKP’s landslide victory, the military leaders made an unsuccessful attempt to hinder the election of AKP supported Abdullah Gül to be president. (Kuru 2012, 37) Later, the AKP led government and Erdogan used the Ergenekon case, which revealed the existence of a secret organization with alleged links to military officers. (Cook 2013) As a consequence several army leaders were taken to court. By 2012 Erdogan did not have to face any significant resistance to his policy from the army.

4.2 Colombia

4.2.1 Domestic politics in Colombia

Colombia is a presidential republic and has a bicameral parliament. The representatives are elected by a “party-list proportional representation constituency popular vote”. in the same year as the president, who is elected by popular vote. There usually is a second round unless one of the candidates obtain more than fifty percent of the votes cast in the first round as this was the case with Uribe in 2002 and in 2006 when he obtained 53,5 and 62,35 percent of the vote respectively. (Pachón and Hoskin 2011)

While the political system was dominated by two big parties, the liberal and the conservative party for a long time, the 1991 constitutional amendment contributed to the

---

10 CIA World Fact Book
collapse of bipartidism giving birth to a new, extremely fragmented political system. There was another electoral reform process in 2003, which somewhat mitigated the fragmentation and in the coming years the number of parties participating in elections gradually decreased. (Pachón and Hoskin 2011). While there is a cleavage between right and left, policy making processes and the whole system can best be described with “a pattern of extreme individualism” (Carroll and Pachón 2016)

Political parties have been founded to support an individual and they are not so much based on ideology. This was the case of Uribe and the Party of the U, which was established by Santos who was at that time a close ally of Uribe. Something similar happened after Santos and Uribe were at loggerheads, Uribe established Centro Democratico. Individual based approach is also significant in voters’ behavior. There is also an informal system of so called local “barons” or local leaders, who influence voters in exchange for financial or other gains from the political candidates. (Diamint and Tedesco 2015)

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st round %</td>
<td>2nd round</td>
<td>1st round %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uribe</td>
<td>62.35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaviria</td>
<td>22.03</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santos</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.68</td>
<td>69.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mockus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.51</td>
<td>27.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vargas Lleras</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuluaga</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramirez</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>López</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Parliamentary Elections</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes %</td>
<td>Seats (102)</td>
<td>Votes %</td>
<td>Seats (102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the U</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Center</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Change</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative democratic Pole</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Alliance</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Election Guide

Colombia’s two traditional parties are the Conservatives and the Liberals. The Liberal Party has become more progressive and also opened towards social democracy, presently it is a member of the Socialist International. Recently both organizations’ influence has been gradually decreasing. Uribe was once a politician of the Liberal party but running as an independent candidate against the official liberal one generated a split within the party in 2002 and his ultimate departure weakened the liberals. Later, the party became part of the governing coalition of Santos in 2010. The Conservatives backed Uribe in 2002.

Originally founded by Juan Manuel Santos in 2005, the Party of the U or Social Party of National Unity is a centrist party. In 2010 the party supported the candidature of Santos after it had become clear that Uribe could not run for a third term. After the fallout between Santos and Uribe, the latter politician founded a new party in 2013 called Democratic Center, with the
aim to oppose Santos’ ambitions to pursue the peace negotiations with FARC. Although DC represented a right-wing platform mainly on the issue of security, its members in the Parliament had come from various political backgrounds. A conservative party, Radical Change also supported Uribe’s government in 2002 and later the constitutional amendment to allow the president to run for a second term. Nevertheless, as Uribe’s ambitions to run for a third term was declared unconstitutional the party split and some of the candidates left for the Party of the U in 2010. After the elections Radical Change allied with the other parties in Santos’ coalition.

The role and leadership of Santos cannot be analyzed without considering his relationship with Uribe, once his strongest ally and then his bitter political rival. Serving as minister of defense in Uribe’s second term he managed to convey his image as an uncompromising politician, supporting tough military measures against FARC. Coming from a well-known family which have long time been involved in the policy making of the Liberal Party and having been educated abroad in reputed universities Santos had already had positions in governments before the Uribe presidency. He also participated in the peace process under the Pastrana administration which then foiled. In the 2000s he left the Liberal party and soon established the Party of the U to back Uribe’s ambitions for presidency in 2005. While Santos respected democracy and is a good negotiator seemingly seeking compromise and coalition building, Uribe has the opposite personality and his legacy is an extremely polarized political life in Colombia. Uribe did not have a good relationship with neither the press nor with the opposition and tried to use all means to defeat his opponents. His name is also linked to paramilitary forces which he used to subjugate FARC. Uribe managed to combine “efficiency and populism” (Diamint, Tedesco 2015) He managed to weaken FARC and by this gained popular support, but he also tried the limits of democratic institutions. Santos was absolutely the opposite. (Colombia reports)

4.2.2 Santos and the military

The role of the military and its relationship with political leadership had gone through great changes already before Santos became minister of defense. The 1991 constitution of Colombia limited the power of the military over civilians, in the same year the country had its first civilian minister of defense (International Crisis group 2012). While the military was less of a concern for worry, the increasing role of paramilitary forces posed a serious threat to the
peace process. The problem was further exacerbated by the growing but officially usually denied cooperation between the military and paramilitaries. Not only had they committed atrocities against civilians, but they had also been responsible for earlier “spoilers” that had derailed previous peace processes and without enough disarmament they could threaten future negotiations with the guerrillas (International Crisis Group 2012). Realizing the risk and under pressure, a great part of the paramilitaries were disarmed under Uribe and though they were not completely neutralized their influence eroded during the presidency of Santos.

An excellent example to demonstrate the shift in the attitude of the military leadership is the speech given by of general Alejandro Navas, head of the Colombian Military Forces in June 2012 (Nuevosiglo 2012 June 13). On one hand he underlined that military victory must precede any political solution, on the other hand he clearly admitted that military means would not be able to provide a resolution. This new approach among the top ranks of the military was a result of a long process partly due to the constitutional amendments and legal changes. However, it must also be noted that personal relationships mattered greatly, too. Like Uribe, Santos managed to maintain a good relationship with the army not only because of having been a minister of defense but also because of his charisma and respected personality. Although there were still figures among military officers who did not endorse the president’s new strategy, they were far outweighed by others who were supportive. The role and growing presence of the younger generation among the military ranks was also advantageous for Santos (International Crisis Group 2012). The Colombian president also made gestures to military leaders, one of them was including retired general Jorge Enrique Mora as a representative of the military in the peace negotiations in Havana (Semana 2012 April 9)

4.3 Erdogan and the domestic challenges

In Turkey, Erdogan’s aim was to strengthen and widen his political base among voters and this concerned those of the Kurdish minority. As AKP was a moderate conservative Islamic party it had been an appealing choice for a significant number of moderately conservative Kurds. The approach of Erdogan and AKP to the Kurdish issue made them a more likeable alternative for those who refused both the anti-Kurdish legacy of the Kemalist movement and other right-wing nationalists. The peace process was hence a tool for the Turkish leader to gain the sympathy of the Kurds as the cessation of violence in the Kurdish regions was desirable for
a wide pool of citizens irrespective of the political stance. What helped Erdogan was a relatively stable economic boom during the AKP era and a favorable public opinion as well.

Erdogan supported secret negotiations with the PKK and with Ocalan from 2012. Avoiding direct involvement in the talks, he was represented by head of Turkish Intelligence Hakan Fidan, who already had a great deal of experience in negotiations with PKK (Aljazeera 2013 March 22). Following that, Erdogan used the Wise Men’s Committee, which consisted of well-known public figures including academics and journalists to promote the peace process. The nationalist MHP refused the whole idea of negotiations with PKK, however the attitude of CHP was far more flexible. While CHP was highly critical of the process, especially with the Wise Men’s Committee, accusing the members of being biased towards Erdogan’s government, the Party leaders articulated clearly that the idea of peace negotiations were favorable for them. CHP had the fear that Erdogan might exploit the Kurdish case and secretly ally with the political representatives of the Kurds in order to gain their help to construct a strong presidential system (Hurriyet 2013 March 16)

At his time the Turkish Prime minister fully supported the peace process irrespective of the attitude of the opposition parties, he did not even mind being on the same platform with the Kurdish BDP. Clearly the opinion polls suggested a supportive public, even if they were critical of the present state of negotiations. With a clear majority of the AKP and Kurdish support, Erdogan had no real challenger and domestic political constraint to fear. Erdogan himself did not participate in the talks, he had a preference to delegate the risky tasks instead of taking charge, while clearly supporting the process so long as his political power did not have to face serious constraints. The strong public support and continuous AKP majority still made him feel comfortable. This trend had actually started in 2005 when Erdogan first openly spoke about the “Kurdish question”. So far everything made Erdogan feel strong enough, even the leakage of the secret talks to the public did not challenge his support base while the military was seriously weakened by the Ergenekon scandal while it had been cleansed of its Kemalist leaders with the help of Gulen. Using indirect means and harsh rhetoric against his opponents he could successfully challenge domestic constraints.

The change came in 2013 when more serious constraints both domestically and regionally challenged his stance. A regional issue complicated the situation, when Erdogan probably misinterpreted the impacts of his decision not to help break the ISIS siege around the Kurdish enclave of Kobani in 2014 October (Tastekin 2014). According to KRG officials, despite promises neither did he help the Peshmerga in Erbil against ISIS. This lack of actions
alienated both Kurds in the respective regions and those in Turkey sympathetic to their Iraqi or Syrian counterparts. The Turkish attitude in both cases were rather strange. Historically Erdogan considered the KRG and its leader, Barzani as an ally. On the other hand, the Turkish leadership did have serious concerns about the Syrian PYD due to its direct links to PKK. However, the PYD leadership attempted to establish good relations with Turkey but the unacceptable conditions imposed by the Turkish leadership finally foiled any rapprochement. Turkish inaction in Kobani and the tense relationship with the Syrian Kurds also complicated the relations with the USA. It seems that Erdogan could not resolve the challenges successfully and did not count enough on the scope of possible collateral damage in the future either. As a result, in 2015 AKP lost its majority. However, the setback for AKP cannot solely be attributed to the regional turmoil and its mismanagement. New domestic political challenges were responsible, too.

Two best case examples to demonstrate Erdogan’s mismanagement of serious challenges and constraints are the Gezi protests and the conundrum of HDP, the new political actor. While the former indirectly, the latter directly contributed to the failure of the peace process. The Gezi protests were the signs of widespread frustration of the Erdogan led government and the scale and wide spectrum of participants made them remarkable. Some alternative interpretation even say that the demonstration was the result of dissatisfaction with the incapability of the Turkish opposition (Ete 2013). Erdogan’s harsh style and aggressive rhetoric was again palpable during the demonstrations. Although first he seemed to offer concessions but then the deadly crackdown on the demonstrators triggered open criticism from his once natural ally, Fethullah Gulen according to Hurriyet. It again showed Erdogan’s weakness in dealing with serious domestic constraints and not only did his reaction trigger open criticism from Gulen, but it also started to affect negatively his and his party’s popularity.

The relationship between Erdogan and HDP finally ended up in an antagonistic affair. Even though there had been gossips about a secret deal between Erdogan and Kurdish politicians (Marcus and Karaveli 2015) according to which Erdogan would have had the backing for his long desired constitutional reform in exchange for freeing Ocalan, the HDP leadership persistently denied the existence of any secret agreement (Hurriyet 2015 March 17). Erdogan did not have to confront a charismatic political figure as the opposition parties lacked this type of personality – almost a necessity for successful politics in a country where the role of predominant personality is essential – until the emergence of HDP and its leader Demirtas. One interpretation is that for Erdogan, the core problem with HDP was not that they stood
against AKP and the government but that they were perceived as a threat to the gradually changing political system itself. (Tekdemir 2016) Following the Gezi protests, the ambiguous Turkish policies regarding the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds threatened by ISIS, segments of voters that had supported the AKP before, were hesitant to do so, which finally culminated in the above mentioned disappointing electoral results of AKP. At the same time, unexpectedly for Erdogan, HDP successfully passed the 10 percent threshold and this together with the electoral slogan “we will not make you the president” (Hurriyet 2015 March 17) made HDP politicians the prime target for his revenge.

Erdogan’s mismanagement of the previous regional and domestic constraints seems to be reinforced by his score on BACE and PWR. The scores on these two traits assume that while he challenges constraints he does not always do it successfully. As the examples showed, the bigger the challenge and the constraint, the more likely that Erdogan will challenge it unsuccessfully. On one hand, the Gezi protests and corruption scandals started to erode the support of moderate conservative voters. On the other hand, the cases of Erbil and Kobani – which revealed Erdogan’s relatively high distrust of the Kurds as his score shows as well - in addition to the harsh rhetoric towards HDP made a lot of Kurdish voters turn to Demirtas’ party. The consequence was that to extend the base of AKP, Erdogan’s discourse and politics became more nationalistic, he had no choice but to turn right. As a consequence of allying with the right wing MHP, his mostly reconciliatory speeches about the Kurdish minority and the peace process were replaced with harsh rhetoric targeting HDP and other Kurdish politicians and denouncing their alleged cooperation with PKK. Although through obtaining right wing votes in the second parliamentary elections in 2015, AKP regained its majority, for the peace process there was no turn back as Erdogan could not have endangered the freshly gained support of his right-wing nationalistic base.

4.4 Santos and the domestic challenges

In order to understand what domestic challenges Santos had to face in his tenure it is inevitable to keep in mind that he was considered as the successor of the previous president Uribe when he won the presidential race in 2010. Uribe himself openly called Santos his great hope and the leader who would keep his legacy (Mendoza 2010) especially his tough “democratic peace” policy regarding the FARC (Loalza 2018). Santos himself had participated
in masterminding the militarily successful and hawkish policy against the insurgency as Uribe’s minister of defense from 2006 to 2009 and following that he benefitted from the popularity of the Uribe administration. The Party of the U, originally established to foster the election of Uribe, was fully supporting Santos as a presidential candidate. Having liberal roots, he could also gain the backing of a lot of liberal voters.

But problems appeared soon as the popularity of Santos fell dramatically between 2011 July and 2012 April from 71 percent approval rate to 58 according to La Semana. It further deteriorated to just 47 percent according to CNN in July. Although the sample for the poll was taken by different polling companies, the trend in his popularity revealed an increasing dissatisfaction with him as president. This decrease in popularity could be due to unrealistic expectations by the public after a landslide victory and the promises by Santos that followed in 2010. Other factors included the perceived deterioration of security in the country, the high level of unemployment and the faulty implementation of government policies such as measures to reduce poverty. According to professor Zuluaga in an article of Los Angeles Times (2012 August 01), the emergence of criminal gangs and their bad impact on the general security as well as the end of the economic cycle in the international economy responsible for the boom of the Uribe era, were among the factors that made the first 2 years difficult for Santos. An unsuccessful amendment of the justice system of Colombia, which ended up in the resignation of the minister for justice also contributed to the decreasing popularity (Kraul and Gonzales 2012).

His relationship also had a bitter turn with Uribe as Colombia reinstated the diplomatic relations with the Chavez led Venezuela and this sparked fierce criticism from the ex-president. Since this point their personal relationship had continued to deteriorate. In 2012 after Santos had announced the beginning of negotiations with FARC, Uribe clearly condemned the president’s decision and considered this new turn as a betrayal of his legacy. The ex-president reiterated that no peace negotiations can be pursued with terrorists. He also accused Santos of helping the reelection of the Venezuelan president Chavez when Colombia entered a phase of thaw with Venezuela. However, after the announcement of the peace talks on 4 September 2012 Santos’ approval rating jumped dramatically. (Pais 2012 September 4)

Exploratory talks backed by the president had already begun in La Havana 1.5 years before the peace process openly started in Oslo in October 2012. (Santos’ initiative for peace had the full support of once president Pastrana.) This implies that Santos’ change of political attitude towards the conflict started right after his election as president in 2010 and his persistent
determination led to the beginning of the peace process while his break with the hardline policy of Uribe materialized as soon as he took his new elected position in 2010.

In November 2013 Santos announced that he would run for the presidency in the following year and made it clear that his main message is to continue peace talks with the FARC. His announcement was preceded by a bilateral meeting between him and Venezuelan president Maduro in July to overcome renewed tensions in the bilateral relations. This meeting again demonstrated Santos’ ability to resolve issues diplomatically and preferring his direct involvement in crucial talks. The support for the peace process from Ecuadorian president Correa and Venezuelan Chavez (Semana 2013 February 3) who was then succeeded by Maduro was pivotal for Colombia. While opinion polls revealed very moderate support for Santos at that time, he did not face any popular candidate from the opposition parties except Uribe’s favorite, Zuluaga, who still was polling far behind the incumbent president. He managed to persuade the Liberal Party and radical change to rally behind him as the candidate of National Unity coalition including his original Party of the U. Meanwhile Uribe’s candidate had only the Democratic Center behind him. But a new trend posed a challenge to his power: while opinion polls showed fluctuation in Santos’ public support, the main rival Zuluaga began to catch up and shortly before elections he fared better in some surveys than Santos (Reyes 2014). Zuluaga was clearly opposing Santos’ policy for a peace deal with the insurgency and although his stance was moderated before the second round, his criticism clearly echoed that of Uribe reiterating that no peace talks were possible before the FARC stopped the armed rebellion and laid down weapons. Uribe and Zuluaga’s condemnation focused on the possible political “impunity” that FARC members could have if the process succeeded.

After a recent slow progress, the Colombian government and the FARC reached an agreement on 3 of the 5 main points of the agenda of the peace process just before the first round of presidential elections. This was beneficial for the incumbent president as a final deal with the insurgency seemed more imminent than before and hence reinforced Santos’ campaign. Furthermore, the FARC agreed on a unilateral ceasefire to secure the presidential elections (Valdés and Murphy 2014).

The campaign in 2014 was called the dirtiest one ever in Colombia (Pais 2015 May 25). What seems to be clear is that Uribe and Zuluaga had all intentions to derail the peace process. The fierce attacks of the Uribe camp included the accusation of Santos’ campaign adviser J. J. Rendon of accepting drug related money to help drug lords escape from extradition. Another scandal was the case of a hacker named Andres Sepulveda who was hold responsible for
intercepting and tapping senior members’ communications of both delegations of the peace talks with the ultimate goal to thwart the whole process (Fiscalía general de la Nación). Zuluaga himself insisted on not having been involved in this crime but he did not manage to clear himself of the accusations.

As the result of the first round, the candidate of Democratic Center, Óscar Ivan Zuluaga secured 29 percent of the votes whilst Santos obtained a bit more than twenty-five percent. The incumbent president reiterated his resolve to achieve peace and made this aim de facto the sole theme for the campaign of the second round. With the agenda of the peace process he was a more appealing candidate for voters in the center and on the left while he also managed to obtain the backing of two more parties: The Democratic Pole and Green Alliance. This way Santos’ alliance consisted of five parties. His opponent, Zuluaga with the addition of the Conservatives had only two. The president successfully managed to profit from this and garnered a sufficient number of extra votes to win the final round and reached fifty-one percent as opposed to the forty-five percent of Zuluaga. In the following period Santos dedicated all efforts to accomplish his promise and conclude the negotiations successfully until the final agreement was signed. It is very important to note that – according to Prof. Eamon Gilmore, who was the EU special envoy to the Colombia Peace Process – Santos’ involvement in the talks proved to be crucial as he was the main driver when it came to a halt and the Colombian president’s dedication and negotiating skills prevented the process from failing. The negotiations were de facto accomplished with the handshake of Santos and the FARC leader Timoschenko and the peace deal was signed by both parties on September 26, 2016 (Colombia reports).

Although the popularity of Santos had been fluctuating and had an overall decreasing tendency, at the time of the beginning and then in 2014 before the second round of the presidential elections and finally in 2015 and 2016 with the prospective conclusion of peace talks, his approval rating increased (Colombia reports). Therefore, the prospects for peace still influenced public opinion even if people tended to become disillusioned by Santos’ domestic policy by time.

4.5 Comparing the two leaders

Comparing two leaders’ behavior seems to reinforce the numerical findings of the LTA. One of the three aspects of personality style, namely the ability to challenge constraints showed
a significant difference between the Colombian and Turkish leader. The figure of BACE revealed a difference of one standard deviation while PWR almost had that divergence. The consequently differing leadership was demonstrated. Santos was more successful in challenging the constraints that could endanger the peace process. He took the risk and started secret then official negotiations with the FARC. He was aware of the short-term consequences and although he was not a popular president, he used the agenda of the peace process to manipulate the society and this way he was reelected in 2014. He managed to achieve so far that a politician in the Colombian system could achieve, being elected twice as president and accomplishing his main goal: the peace process. However, Erdogan, having been less successful in resolving domestic and regional challenges, finally had to sacrifice the peace negotiations to bolster his and his party’s support. He was not as a talented constraint challenger as Santos. He almost always could have had a different way to choose in the case of Kobani or the Gezi protests or even HDP but as a result of his personality his measures took him farther from peace with the Kurds and finally the whole process was abandoned.

In the previous pages I have demonstrated the two leaders’ differing abilities to challenge constraints in domestic and to some extent in regional dimensions by contextualizing the results of the leadership trait analysis. The empirical evidence seems to reinforce the LTA results. The different leadership style of Erdogan and Santos is hence an explanatory variable for the diverging outcome of the two peace processes. Consequently, the second hypothesis is true. In addition, it has also been shown, that another independent variable, the relationship between the Colombian and Turkish leader and the army had a dynamic that did not hinder the peace process.
Conclusion

The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that incumbent leadership is an important factor in a peace process. The two selected conflicts and their conditions display several similar features that make them comparable and thus allow for a detailed comparison of the two state leaders, Erdogan and Santos. They were both ripe for resolution and other independent variables such as the crucially important control of the two leaders over the armed forces were present. Furthermore, the regional dynamics had a favorable turn in both regions. Bearing in mind these factors, with the methodology of Margaret Hermann, the difference between the two leaders’ personality traits has been identified. As a result, the two hypothesis that assumed that Santos and Erdogan’s different ability to challenge domestic constraints is responsible for the diverging outcome of the two peace processes proved to be true.

It must also be noted, however, that the ethnic nature of the Kurdish issue must not be forgotten. I argue, that even if it makes the conflict in Turkey and its region a bit more complicated than the Colombian one, it does not decrease the significance of the two leaders’ decisive role. In other words, contemplating whether Santos would have acted the way that Erdogan did during the peace negotiations can show what has been concluded. Based on the results of this MA thesis, the answer is clearly no. While it is not posited that a person with the leadership style of Santos could have concluded peace quickly, it certainly means that the dynamics of domestic politics and the peace talks would have taken a different direction. The idea of lasting peace would not have been sacrificed so easily for short term political gains and a leader like Santos would definitely have challenged the domestic and regional constraints more persistently and probably even more successfully.

LTA is an effective way to construct complete personality profiles while at the same time it makes it possible that, if identified salient, certain traits can be scrutinized in more details. This has been a crucial element in the hypothesis test. Consequently, even if two leaders fall within the same leadership category, details are essentially important and can reveal differences that are not obvious from the broader profile. The direct comparison of the traits of BACE and PWR revealed that there is a significant gap between the ability of Erdogan and Santos when challenging constraints are considered.

These findings suggest that first of all, the study of personal leadership style and politicians’ behavior should not be neglected as this field of political psychology has increasing
relevance especially today, when democratic institutions are more frequently challenged by leaders with authoritarian tendencies. In addition to this, it has become clear that the methodology of Margaret Hermann can be applied in cases that are outside the realm of foreign policy. Nevertheless, for future research it could be an intriguing topic to further refine or adapt LTA to the scrutiny of leadership styles in the context of domestic politics or intrastate conflicts. A real obstacle is, however, that there is a tendency that authoritarian leaders refuse to give spontaneous interviews and thus make LTA nearly impossible or at least cause serious limitations. To find a methodologically viable solution to this problem can be a real but exciting challenge.

It has also been demonstrated that using Mill’s classical comparative methodology from political science, the theory of ripeness from the field of conflict resolution and finally Margaret Hermann’s LTA from political psychology, a multidisciplinary approach has been effective. Additionally, as in-depth information about Colombia and Turkey’s civil wars as well as domestic politics was imperative for the research, the relevance of comparative area studies has also been reinforced.
Bibliography


47


Interviews used for content analysis:

Juan Manuel Santos


———. 2013b. OBG talks to Juan Manuel Santos, President of ColombiaOBG. https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/interview/regional-integration-obb-talks-juan-manuel-santos-president-colombia-0.


Recep Tayyip Erdogan


———. 2013. »We see a human tragedy before our eyes« Interview by Bo Lidegaard and Michael Jarlner. Politiken. https://politiken.dk/newsinenglish/art5707165/Exclusive-Erdogan-interview-%C2%BBWe-see-a-human-tragedy-before-our-eyes%C2%AB.
