

‘Abd al-Qādir’s Idea of *jihād* (1808-1883)

By

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Abstract

The project of intellectual history traces the gemology of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s Idea of *jihād* within the context of Sufi revivalist movements of North Africa and reformist thought of Naqshbandiyya. To establish it, this project traces the ideas of Sufi revivalist movements of the nineteenth century and the reformist thought of Damascus in the nineteenth century. It also offers a brief biographical account of ‘Abd al-Qādir. The main hypothesis of this study is that ‘Abd al-Qādir’ idea of *jihād* developed first within the context of Sufi revivalist movements and then evolved during his involvement in reform movement in Damascus.

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no material accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no material previously written accepted and/or published by another person, except where an appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Signed:_____

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Note on transliteration

I have followed the transliteration system of IJMES (International Journal of Middle East studies). The transliteration chart can be found here.

<https://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/docs/TransChart.pdf>

1: Introduction

This project is an attempt to investigate the genealogy of idea of *jihād* in ‘Abd al-Qādir’s thought. Abdul Qadir, a *jihād* leader, a politician, a Sufi, a ruler, a spiritual reformer has been the subject of numerous studies. However, still some aspect of his life and thought need scholarly attention. The historiography of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s life analyzed his struggle and interpreted his thoughts from different perspectives. The earliest writers were French military commanders, who depicted him as a symbol of a fanatical culture that needs to be civilized by the “*mission civilisatrice*” (civilizing mission).¹ The British historians portrayed him as an Arab warrior leader, who had the potential to be a British ally in the imperial domination.² During the 20th century, the Algerian nationalist discourse interpreted him as the father of the Algerian nation.³ After the Algerian independence from French colonialism, ‘Abd al-Qādir received scholarly attention on the religious and spiritual aspects of his thought. However, his idea of *jihād* was perceived only as an outcome of the French colonialism and was not contextualized in the broader setting of western Algeria and Morocco. My research endeavors to contextualize ‘Abd al-Qādir’s idea of *jihād* within the context of western Algeria, Morocco and the Sufi revival movements. This thesis will also investigate how ‘Abd al-Qādir’s idea of *jihād* evolved from an active military armed struggle to a spiritual struggle of purifying one own self.

¹ These narratives can be seen in Alexandre Bellemare’s *Abd-el-Kader, sa vie politique et militaire* Paris, 1863 and in Paul Azan’s *L’Emir Abd el-Kader 1808–1883 – du fanatisme musulman au patriotisme française*, Paris, 1925.

² Colonel Churchill, *The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria; Written from His Own Dictation and Compiled from Other Authentic Sources* (Chapman & Hall, 1867); Wilfrid Blunt, *Desert Hawk: Abd El Kader and the French Conquest of Algeria* (Methuen, 1947).

³ John King, “Abd El-Kader and Arab Nationalism,” *Problems of the Modern Middle*, 1992.

Revival and Reform

Throughout the Islamic history, Muslim states protected the Muslim interests or at least had a policy to foster Muslim way of life and learning.⁴ However, with the decline of the Muslim states starting from the eighteenth century and the socio-economic challenges posed by the European imperialism, many Muslim intellectuals started to think about the question “What went wrong? And What is the remedy to the situation? The famous eighteenth-century Muslim scholar Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al- Wahhāb’s (d. 1791) conceptualization of what went wrong was the inclusion of the dangerous local *bid‘ah* (innovations that are religiously impermissible) in the pure religion.⁵ He saw the solution in cleansing the *bid‘ah* and return to pure Islam to save Muslims from divine anger.⁶ ‘Abd al-Wahhāb not only provided an intellectual solution but also started a movement to create an Islamic society on the basis of sharia, which eventually happened in Saudi Arabia. He stressed a return to the simplicity of Prophet’s time and rejected any idea of intermediaries between human beings and God.⁷ Although the movement was politically limited to Arabia, however its simulative effect was widespread.⁸ Usman dan Fodio in Sudan (d. 1817), Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (d. 1831) in India, The Sanusi movement in Libya, Kurdish revolts against Ottoman rule and the resistance in Daghistan all were inspired by Wahhābi movement. They had small differences, however, what united them was the quest of the return of what they conceptualized as pure Islam. Secondly, the use of *jihād* to fight against the external enemy or against those who oppose to their envisaged Islamic order.⁹

⁴ Barbara D. Metcalf, “Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860–1900, Princeton, 1982,” *Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent*, 1860, 177–84.

⁵ Asad Abu Khalil and Mahmoud Haddad, “Revival and Renewal,” *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* 3 (1995): 432.

⁶ Abu Khalil and Haddad.

⁷ J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 105.

⁸ *Ibid*, 105

⁹ Metcalf, “Islamic Revival in British India.”

Sufism was severely attacked due to its tomb worship and for indulging in ecstatic rituals. In reaction to this attack, a Sufi revival movement started in the Muslim world in the late 18th century from Egypt.¹⁰ The Sufi order of the Khalwatiyya initiated the revival movement, but many other Sufi orders also joined, as for instance the Qādiriyya order, which participated in this revival movement actively and militantly.¹¹ This Sufi revival was particularly significant in North and West Africa, where Sufi orders started to play a militant role. This role was based on a new interpretation of the concept of *jihād*. The revival movement had both, traditionalist and reformist aspects, which led to the founding of two most vigorous orders, the Tijāniyyah and the Darqāwiyya.¹² In the early nineteenth century both these Sufi orders led several revolts against Ottoman authorities in western Algeria, based on the conception that Ottoman authorities are corrupt. This is the context in which I intend to situate my research. I will argue that ‘Abd al-Qādir’s *jihād* was not only the product of French colonialism, but it was the outcome of these Sufi revival movements. I will argue that ‘Abd al-Qādir’s *jihād* was aimed to respond to two challenges. On the one hand, it was *jihād* against infidel and on the other hand it was an attempt to establish a Sharia-governed state.

Contrary to revivalist attitude, Some Muslim Intellectuals sought the remedy of Muslim decline in spiritual training. According to Weismann, the combination of deep knowledge and profound commitment to Sufism paved the way for profound orthodoxy and a reformist middle way¹³. This tradition which was started with Ahmed Sirhindi (d. 1624) in India now had a representative in Damascus in the name of Shaykh Khalid Naqshbandī (d. 1827)¹³. After returning

¹⁰ Mervyn Hiskett, “The Nineteenth-Century Jihāds in West Africa,” *The Cambridge History of Africa* 5 (1976), 125–169.

¹¹ Hiskett, “the Nineteenth-Century,” 125-169.

¹² J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 106.

¹³ Itzhak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Brill, 2000), 126.

from France, ‘Abd al-Qādir spent twenty-seven years of his life in this atmosphere. This project also investigates how ‘Abd al-Qādir’ idea of *jihād* was influenced by this type of intellectual environment.

Sources

‘Abd al-Qādir’s has been the subject of bulk of literature. The historiography of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s life analyzed his struggle and interpreted his thoughts from different perspectives. The earliest writers were French military commanders, who depicted him as a symbol of a fanatical culture that needs to be civilized by the “*mission civilisatrice*” (civilizing mission).¹⁴ The British historians portrayed him as an Arab warrior leader, who had the potential to be a British ally in the battle of imperial domination.¹⁵ During the twentieth century, the Algerian nationalist discourse interpreted him as the father of the Algerian nation.¹⁶ After the Algerian independence from French colonialism, ‘Abd al-Qādir received scholarly attention for his religious and spiritual aspects.

A variety of primary literature both in Arabic and English language will be used for the investigation of the desired topic. A project will critically engage with texts authored by ‘Abd al-Qādir during his conflict with French and Algerian rivals and written during his spiritual endeavors in Damascus. This includes his essay on hijrāh¹⁷ and his magnum opus “*Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī al-Wa‘z wa-al-‘Irshād*” (The Book of Stops for Preaching and Guidance) a collection of his lecture

¹⁴ These narratives can be seen in Alexandre Bellemare’s *Abd-el-Kader, sa vie politique et militaire* Paris, 1863 and in Paul Azan’s *L’Emir Abd el-Kader 1808–1883 – du fanatisme musulman au patriotisme français*, Paris, 1925.

¹⁵ Colonel Churchill, *The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria; Written from His Own Dictation and Compiled from Other Authentic Sources* (Chapman & Hall, 1867); Wilfrid Blunt, *Desert Hawk: Abd El Kader and the French Conquest of Algeria* (Methuen, 1947).

¹⁶ King, “Abd El-Kader and Arab Nationalism,” 1992.

¹⁷ This essay is reproduced in Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Zā‘ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā‘ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 2 vols. (Egypt: al-Iskandarīyah, 1903).

notes.¹⁸ The biographical account will be derived from the two Arabic texts written by ‘Abd al-Qādir’s contemporaries; biography written by ‘Abd al-Qādir’s son Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir and his disciple Abd al-Razāq al-Baytār.¹⁹ Another biography which was written on ‘Abd al-Qādir’s dictation by Charles Henry Churchill will also be part of our discussion.²⁰ The major works on ‘Abd al-Qādir’s Algerian career on which this project will draw are the Raphael Danziger ‘Abd al-Qādir and Algerians and Amira Bennison’s work *jihād* and its interpretation in pre-colonial Morocco.²¹ Both of these works are a product of systematic archival research. They depict a convincing story of ‘Abd al-Qādir. The work of Danziger focuses upon the period from 1832 to 1839. He challenges the existing interpretations of ‘Abd al-Qādir such as a *jihād* leader or understanding of him as the Algerian nationalist patriot. Contrary to these images of the ‘Abd al-Qādir, Danziger portrays ‘Abd al-Qādir as a pragmatic political leader who did not hesitate to compromise abstract religious principles to advance his own interests. However, the part in which he deals with ‘Abd al-Qādir’s concept of *jihād* one can notice his lack of scholarship about Islam. Danziger does not discuss the theory of practice of *jihād* nor he compares ‘Abd al-Qādir *jihād* with *jihād* movements in Africa. His view of *Jihād* is clichéd. According to which *jihād* is continuous holy war with no peace agreements no negotiations. This simplified understanding of *jihād* led Danziger to several wrong conclusions. He considered the establishment of a "non-Quranic tax," the *ma'una*, to finance the war; the signing of several peace treaties with the French, leaving Muslims under French rule; and his opposition to the impetuous *jihād* of al-Hāji Musa, as

¹⁸ Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Al-Mawāqif Fī Al-Tasawwuf Wa Al-Wa’z Wa-Al-Irshād* (Beirut: Dār Al-Kotob Al-Ilmiyāh, 2004)

¹⁹ Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Zā’ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā’ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 2 vols. (Egypt: al-Iskandariyah, 1903)

²⁰ Colonel Churchill, *The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria; Written from His Own Dictation and Compiled from Other Authentic Sources* (Chapman & Hall, 1867)

²¹ Raphael Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (Holmes & Meier New York, 1977); Amira K. Bennison, *Jihād and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria* (Routledge, 2003)

violations of *jihād*. His lack of understanding of Islamic Scholarship is also evident when he provides a Webster's definition for Sufism. He defines Tariqa (generally translated as "way" A term for Sufi brotherhood) as a manner. The work of Bennison is a systematic study of political theology of Moroccan state. 'Abd al-Qādir is not the focus of the study alone. However, Bennison's work provides a lucid narrative of the period of 1830-47, The period in which the relations between 'Abd al-Qādir , Moroccan state, and French were extremely complex and consistently changing. The work of Benison deals with the state and society relations; the relationship of West Algeria with Morocco; and the implications of French invasion of Algeria and rise of 'Abd al-Qādir. This is the only work which contextualizes 'Abd al-Qādir *jihād* with his regional context. This work will be most important source of 'Abd al-Qādir 's understanding of the idea of *jihād* in his Algerian career.

For 'Abd al-Qādir 's career in Algeria, this project will primarily draw upon the 'Abd al-Qādir 's own text, *Kitāb Al-Mawāqif Fī Al-Tasawwuf Wa Al-Wa'z Wa-Al-Irshād* and Taste of Modernity, Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus by Itzhak Weismann.²² Weismann's work tells us the story of Sufi intellectual thought of nineteenth century of Ottoman province Damascus. Weismann's book focuses on the Sufi intellectuals of Damascus laid the foundation of Islamic reform movement, which accommodated the challenges posed by the West while adhering to the Islamic ideals. His work deeply focuses on 'Abd al-Qādir's activities and his intellectual thought in Damascus.

²² Itzhak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Brill, 2000)

In addition to these works, a vast bulk of secondary literature will also be brought into debate to discuss concepts such as just war, jihād, and fasad, for the historical context of Algeria starting from sixteenth century to nineteenth century.

Structure of the Chapters

The research consists of an introduction, four chapters and Conclusion. The introduction deals with the background of thesis, sources and theoretical framework. Chapter one will begin with an overview of the concepts such as just war, jihād and fasad, which are important to grasp the main argument of thesis. The second chapter focuses on the historical context of Algeria starting from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century. After briefly exploring the history of Ottoman rule and its political system the chapter concentrates on the role of Sufism in Algerian society and politics. Later, it also offers the justification and background of French invasion of Algeria. It concludes with the story of Moroccan intervention in West Algeria and its implications for local population. Third chapter illustrates the three stages of the life of ‘Abd al-Qādir . First it discusses the Algerian career of ‘Abd al-Qādir and then brief story of his imprisonment in France. In the end it informs us the intellectual environment of Damascus and ‘Abd al-Qādir ’s place in it. The chapter four explores the genealogy of ‘Abd al-Qādir ’s idea of jihād first in Algeria and then in Damascus.

Theoretical Framework

The idea of jihād in ‘Abd al-Qādir ’s thought will be analyzed through a close reading of his letters, essay on hijra and his magnum ups “*Kitāb Al-Mawāqif*”. I will use the German analytical framework model as a theoretical framework (Begriffsgeschichte) also known as conceptual history. I will not just contextualize ‘Abd al-Qādir ’s idea of *jihād* but also investigate

its evolution during the course of time. This thesis will also consult the biographical account of ‘Abd al-Qādir.

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2: Just war, *jihād* and *fasād*

2.1 Introduction

The moral reasoning of violence is perhaps a universal phenomenon. Every major civilization throughout history has engaged itself in thinking about the moral justifications for the use of violence. These justifications were grouped under three rubrics: Just War, Holy War, and *Jihād*.²³ The intuition behind these justifications is that both the attitudes: pacifism (condemning all kind of violence) and total war are impossible to maintain, so there is need to find a system which falls in between these two attitudes. Christian theology named this attitude as just war and Islamic thought labeled it as *Jihād*. Just war and *Jihād* both were articulated to answer similar questions, and both were used to achieve similar objectives²⁴ This chapter focuses on the question how the Islamic and Christian theology legitimize war and how it evolved from their beginning to the nineteenth century. In addition to these two concepts, the chapter also explores the concept of *fasād* which through which Islamic theology legitimized the use of force against the Muslims who rebelled against Muslim rulers.

2.2 Just War - tradition and legitimation

The New Testament did not provide a clear answer to the Question whether Christians should participate in war or not, therefore, the attitude of Christians towards war evolved from

²³ Benjamin Claude Brower, "Just War and Jihad in the French Conquest of Algeria," in *Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 1.

²⁴ Brower, "Just War," 4.

pacifism to just war, and then to the crusades. The attitude of the early Christian Church and its followers were pacifist until the fourth century.²⁵ Exegetes of the New Testament such as Quintus Tertullianus (d. 240), Origen Adamantius (d. 253), and Lucius Lactantius (d. 325) did not approve the participation of Christians in war. Tertullian wrote an article condemning military service based on their aversion to Rome and identified the danger of idolatry in the army.²⁶ Origen also condemned the participation of Christians in military service and Lactantius said: “a just man may not be a soldier”.²⁷ However, late in the second century, there were Christians in Roman Empire who served in the Roman Army but were not excluded from the communion because of their profession.²⁸

In the fourth century, however, when the Byzantine emperor Constantine (d. 337) converted to Christianity and Christianity became the religion of the empire, the attitude of Christian theology towards the war gradually evolved from the idea of pacifism to *jus ad bellum* (just war). The pacifist attitude of the early Church could not fit in with the Empire which often built on war. As Richard Regan notes with regard to Christian rulers: "On one hand, their religion was antithetical to the use of killing force; on the other, their failure to use killing force would entail dire consequences for the community."²⁹ Therefore, they needed to find a way to reconcile with the requirements of the Empire and the requirements of the religion. These were the circumstances in which the Christian theory of just war had emerged. The theological foundation for just war was laid down first by St. Ambrose (d. 397) and then by St. Augustine (d. 430).³⁰ St. Augustine did not

²⁵ Ibid., 4.

²⁶ Preston Sprinkle, *Fight: A Christian Case for Non-Violence* (David C Cook, 2013), 202.

²⁷ Eoghan P. Moloney and Michael Stuart Williams, *Peace and Reconciliation in the Classical World* (Taylor & Francis, 2017), 119.

²⁸ Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 89.

²⁹ Richard J. Regan, *Just War* (CUA Press, 2013), 17.

³⁰ Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 90.

write any specific treaties on just war theory. Therefore, his rejection of pacifism and articulation of just war theory is extracted from his different books. The central idea of St. Augustine's just war *jus ad bellum* argument is that the injustice of opposing side lays the duty of waging war on wise man.³¹ St. Augustine argues that 'war' in its essence is not 'evil'. War is the punishment of sin and its remedy as well.³² While justifying his argument he argues that

“the real evils in war are the love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like; and it is generally to punish these things when force is required to inflict the punishment”.³³

St. Augustine argued that war punishes peoples' crimes and sins even though these are not related to war. He rests his argument on Moses' wars and compares the punishment of a wicked person by war with a father's punishment to his son for his evils. He further states that

“the account of the wars of Moses will not excite surprise or abhorrence you, for, in wars carried on by divine command, he showed not ferocity but obedience; and God in giving the command, acted not in cruelty, but in righteous retribution, giving to all what they deserved, and warning to those who needed warning.”³⁴

For him, war was an act of fatherly love.³⁵ He also argues that the just warrior stops people from committing sins even when it might be against their will, but that is in their best interest. He asserted that a wicked person can also serve the divine by punishing the sinful.³⁶

After justifying war, St. Augustine also describes the *jus ad bellum* (causes of just war when and why a just war could be waged). According to him, the cause of war must be just, and a legal process must be followed before waging a war. Therefore, he argues that a war could be just in

³² Seth Lazar and Frowe Helen, *The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War* (London: Oxford University Press, 2018), 116.

³³ *Contra Faustum*, *Contra Faustum?*, Book XXII, 74.

³⁴ *Contra Faustum*, Book XXII, 74.

³⁵ John Mark Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War* (A&C Black, 2006), 136.

³⁶ Aurelius Augustine, *The City of God, Volumes I & II* (Lulu. com, 2017), 14.

reaction to the violation of international law or to deter an enemy.³⁷ It could also be just to avenge injuries which means that if a country neglected to punish the evildoers who did not return what was taken wrongfully, waging a war upon them is just.³⁸ Another aspect of St. Augustine's just war theory is that war is the task of higher authority with the right intention behind it. Any war with the intention of expansion of territory, victory or for earthly goals is sinful. However, if the war is waged in order to bring peace and justice then it is just.³⁹

St. Augustine viewed the Empire as an instrument of God. Hence, if the Empire starts a war intending to bring order, peace, and morality to the conquered, it is just war.⁴⁰ It also suggests that the war is the domain of a just government, not the individual.⁴¹ St. Augustine's just war theory requires three preconditions; a legitimate sovereign authority declaring war; a just cause either punishment of evildoers or stopping them from committing further sins; a right intention behind the war.

In the late eleventh century, Pope Urban II (d.1099) expanded the just war theory. In his sermon at the Council of Clermont, Urban II argued to start a defensive war against the pagans to protect the holy lands from them which resulted in the first crusade.⁴² Expanding the 'avenge injuries' argument, Urban II said that it is God's will to start a crusade against the pagans.⁴³ The purification of the holy land from pagans and destruction of pagans consequently became the most

³⁷ Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford University Press, 2001), 55.

³⁸ John Mark Mattox, *St. Augustine*, 45.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁴⁰ Richard Sorabji and David Rodin, *The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 219.

⁴¹ Mattox, *St. Augustine*, 59.

⁴² Edward Peters, *The First Crusade: "The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres" and Other Source Materials* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 27.

⁴³ Peters, *The First Crusade*, "27.

important task of liberating the conquered people in just war tradition.⁴⁴ He also declared the crusade march as a pilgrimage.⁴⁵ The war which was only justified in special circumstances by St. Augustine now became the will of God.

In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) further expanded the just war theory and added two important changes in it. First was the theoretical shift from voluntarism to rationalism to grasp the political community, and in the wake, stress was laid upon the principle of justice, based on the law of nature, of participation in the war. The second was the practical change in which rules for the right conduct of war were designed, specifically for the protection of non-combatants.⁴⁶

In the sixteenth century, Francisco de Vitoria (1480– 1546) applied Aquinas's just war theory to the Spanish colonialism against America's while making certain additions to it in order to justify the colonial invasion. Drawing upon the natural laws of Aquinas, Vitoria argued for the laws of nations and played an important role to legitimize European colonialism and imperial practices against non-Europeans. Vitoria argued for the Spaniards' legitimate right for trade and propagation of Christianity in American lands and argued that any attempt to resist these lawful rights in a violation of laws of nations and will provide a just cause for war against them.⁴⁷ He also argued that war will also be just to protect the converts, to overthrow infidel rulers of the Christian peoples, and to defend allies.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid, 27.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁶ Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Just War Theory* (NYU Press, 1992), 19.

⁴⁷ Jérémie Gilbert, *Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors* (Brill, 2006), 25.

⁴⁸ Stephen C. Neff, *Justice among Nations* (Harvard University Press, 2014), 117.

2.3 *jihād*

The Arabic term for *Jihād* literally means to strive or to struggle in order to achieve a morally laudable or just cause.⁴⁹ In the Islamic legal tradition, *Jihād* means the “exertion of one's power in Allah's path, that is, the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word supreme over this world”.⁵⁰ There are several ways to exert oneself in Allah’s path, however, the focus of this chapter will be *Jihād* as an armed struggle.

In this chapter, first I will explain the Quranic narrative of jihad and afterwards I will explore its development in Islamic legal jurisprudence. In the beginning, Muslims were asked to avoid confrontation if someone attacks them. As the Qur’ān states:

“Profess openly what you have been
commanded, and turn away from the idolaters, for
We are sufficient for you against the scoffers.”⁵¹

In 622, when Muslims left Mecca and migrated to Madinah, the order of passive resistance, however, changed with the defensive aggression and Muslims were prescribed to defend themselves against enemy’s aggressions As the Qur’ān states:

“Permission (of fight) is given to those who fight because they have been wronged.
God is Most Powerful for their aid. Those who have been unjustly expelled from
their homes only because they say: ‘Our Lord is God.’”⁵²

After ten years of this passive attitude, this was the first time when Muslims were allowed to engage in a fight.⁵³ After two years of migration, Muslims were allowed to initiate war against the idolaters, those who worshipped idols, because they would deliberately create hindrance for

⁴⁹ Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 10, no. 3 (2005): 321–343.

⁵⁰ Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2006), 25.

⁵¹ Qur’ān 15, 94–95.

⁵² Qur’ān 22, 39–40.

⁵³ Al-Tabari, *Tafsir Al-Tabari* (Beirut Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyya, 1999) V. 17, 172.

Muslims while performing their religious rituals, as well as against people who had expelled Muslims from the sacred Mosque (Ka'bah). As the Qur'ān states:

“They ask you about the sacred month - about fighting therein. Say, "Fighting therein is great [sin], but averting [people] from the way of Allah and disbelief in Him and [preventing access to] al-Masjid al-Harām and the expulsion of its people therefrom are greater [evil] in the sight of Allah. And fitnah is greater than killing." And they will continue to fight you until they turn you back from your religion if they are able. And whoever of you reverts from his religion [to disbelief] and dies while he is a disbeliever - for those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and those are the companions of the Fire, they will abide therein eternally.”⁵⁴

And at another place, the Qur'ān states:

“When the sacred months are past, kill the idolaters wherever you find them”⁵⁵

This verse clearly allowed the Muslims to wage war against idolaters. Muslim jurists developed the Islamic law of warfare based on different interpretations of Qur'ānic verses and Hadith reports regarding *Jihād* during the second century *hijri*. The attitude of classical Muslim jurists evolved within the context of their political situation. In the first two centuries, in classic Islamic scholarship, the idea of *Jihād* was mostly aggressive.

Imam Al-Shafi‘I, some Ḥanbal‘I, and Zahiri jurists argued that the justification of waging *Jihād* is infidelity (kufr).⁵⁶ Therefore, Muslims are required to wage war until not even a single infidel is alive.⁵⁷ However, later in the eleventh century, the Ḥanafī and Al-Shafi‘i, two major schools of thoughts, placed the concept of *Jihād* among the relatively broader obligation of Muslims “to command the good and forbid the evil”.⁵⁸ The purpose of *Jihād* according to these

⁵⁴ Qur'ān 2, 217.

⁵⁵ Qur'ān 9, 5.

⁵⁶ Ibnu Rusydi, *Bidayatul Mujtahid Wa Nihayatul Muqtashid* (Trigenda Karya, 1996), 437.

⁵⁷ Ibn Taymiyyah, “Qaida Mukhtasra,” *Riyad: Matabe'al-Riyad* 1382 (1963), 88.

⁵⁸ Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, 142.

two schools of thoughts was to sabotage the power of the polytheists and magnify the religion as Ḥanafī jurist al-Sarakhsi points out.⁵⁹ In the words of the Al-Shafī'i jurist Māwardī, God “made *Jihād* a duty so that Muslims may give victory to his religion.”⁶⁰ The implication of this concept of *Jihād* was that the order of Islam is universal. Therefore, Muslims must wage *Jihād* until Islam becomes the most superior religion all around the world. This scholarship of Islam saw *Jihād* in the context of the world in which the world is divided into two parts. One of them is “*Dār al-Islām*” which literally means all the territory which is under control of the Muslim rule and “*Dār al-Harb*,” which implies the territory of war controlled by non-Muslims. The people of *Dār al-Harb* were divided into the people of the book, *ahl-e-kitāb*⁶¹, and polytheists.⁶² According to this understanding, Muslims were required to continue waging *Jihād* (armed struggle) against polytheism and non-Muslim polities or territories to serve primarily two purposes; first, to establish and promote the Islamic faith, and second, to expand Islamic rule.

However, it did not mean spreading Islam by waging war against the non-Muslims throughout the world, because forced conversion is not allowed in Islam as the Qur'an states “there is no compulsion in religion”.⁶³ The ban on forced conversion allows the existence of adherents of the holy books i.e. Christians, Jews, and *Madjus*, within the Islamic community itself but they must submit the authority of the Muslims and have to pay *jizya*(tax).⁶⁴

Another purpose of *Jihād* defined by the Islamic jurists is the material and the religious welfare of Muslims. The objective of *Jihād* is to “prevent the enemy from seizing the lands of

⁵⁹ Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 142.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 142.

⁶¹ The term *Ahl al-kitab* is used in Islamic religious thought for the Jews, Christian who possess divine books.

⁶² Muhammad al-Idris Al-Shafī'i, *Kitab Al-Umm* (Dar Al-Marifa, 1973) V 4, 103.

⁶³ Qur'ān, 2, 256.

⁶⁴ Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 10, no. 3 (2005), 321–343.

Islam, so that Muslims may travel therein, secure in their persons and property.”⁶⁵ Al-Sarakhsi argues that the objective of *Jihād* is the security of Muslims so they can sustain their material and religious affairs.⁶⁶

Another justification/objective of *Jihād* according to Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and most Ḥanbalī jurists is aggression against Muslim and *fitna* (persecution of Muslims because of their religion).⁶⁷ The implication of this concept is that Muslims can have peaceful relations with the other powers up until they decide to commit aggression against the Muslims. This argument states that Muslims can only wage *Jihād* in their defense.

2.4 *fasād* (Rebellion)

The primary goal of the Muslim jurists, who developed Islamic laws, was to preserve order, peace, and maintain stability in the Muslim community. To achieve this goal, Muslim jurists drew the laws addressing the issue of *fasād* (rebellion) and the ordinance of political authority. The source for making law are the Qur’ān and the *Sunnah* and finally, their judgments stem from these two sources. The Muslim jurists of premodern times placed the discourse of rebellion under the doctrine of *fasād fil ard* (‘disturbing peace and order in the land’).⁶⁸ In order to maintain peace and order in society, the ruler is given the authority to deal with *fasād*. Muslim jurists place this duty under the broader duty of Muslims “to command the good and forbid the evil”.⁶⁹ There are various forms of *fasād*. The two of the most important types of *fasād* discussed in the Qur’ān are *hirābah*⁷⁰

⁶⁵ Syams al-Din Al-Sarakhsi, *Kitāb Al-Mabsūt* (Dar-al-Ma’rifah, 1978) V 10, 3.

⁶⁶ Sarakhsi, *Kitāb Al-Mabsūt*, 3.

⁶⁷ Taymiyyah, “Majmu Fatawa Shaykh Al-Islam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah”, 96.

⁶⁸ Sadia Tabassum, “Combatants, Not Bandits: The Status of Rebels in Islamic Law,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 881 (2011), 121–139.

⁶⁹ Tabassum, “Combatants, Not Bandits,” 121-139

⁷⁰ Qur’ān, 5, 33.

and baghy.⁷¹ In both these forms, a group of people engage in armed conflict with the government and challenge the writ of the government. According to Islamic jurisprudence, the *hirābah* is dealt with the criminal law but the baghy (rebellion) is dealt with the law of war.⁷² In this chapter, we will only focus on the baghy (rebellion).

The reading of the Qur'ān, hadith, and the classical Islamic jurisprudence suggest that the rebellion is not allowed if the ruler is not just. The Qur'ān commands Muslims to obey Allah, the Prophet (Muhammad), and the people having authority over them and make it a religious duty. The Qur'ān states:

O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.⁷³

Similarly, the Hadith literature also condemns rebellion and one saying attributed to the Prophet argues ‘whoever disapproves of something done by his ruler then he should be patient, for whoever disobeys the ruler even a little will die as those who died in the Pre-Islamic period of ignorance.’⁷⁴ The central assumption behind the Islamic legal discourse on rebellion in Islamic legal scholarship is that Allah is the ultimate authority in the world, however, there are human beings who represent Allah’s authority. Khalid Abou el Fādl argues, that, “from an institutional and social point of view, God’s will could be represented by a variety of political or social realities... From a doctrinal and, perhaps, dogmatic, perspective, God’s will be represented primarily by the ruler and the jurists who are considered God’s special agents on earth”.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Qur'ān, 48, 9–10.

⁷² Tabassum, “Combatants, Not Bandits,” 121-139

⁷³ Qur'ān, 4, 59.

⁷⁴ Imam Bukhari, “Sahih Al-Bukhari,” *Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr* 1405 (1981), Hadith 176.

⁷⁵ Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.

The events after the death of the Prophet such as the rebellion of the khawārijs⁷⁶, the two civil wars, and the revolts of first two centuries motivated the jurists to highlight the obligation of obedience of the ruler whether the ruler is unjust or just.⁷⁷ The early Muslim jurists allowed the ruler to deal with the rebellions within the framework of the law of war. However, the rules for war against the rebels were different from the rule of war against the external enemy. The major four schools of Islamic jurisprudence agree that the ruler cannot start the fight against the rebels until the rebels start first.⁷⁸ However, the Ḥanafī school of thought argues that if rebels are preparing for attack then the warning before attacking them is not necessary.⁷⁹ It is the duty of the ruler to first ask the rebels to accept his authority, and if they have any objection or concern the ruler should clarify it. If they still insist on war, then the ruler can initiate the war against them.⁸⁰

However, when the influence of Abbasid caliphate was reduced to virtual impotence in the eleventh century, the Fatimids were ruling Egypt. The Shafī‘ī jurist Al-Māwardī was the first one who tried to legitimize the revolt against any Muslim ruler.⁸¹ Al-Māwardī argued that if a usurper group comes to power in a province and pledges its alliance to the caliph and fulfills certain conditions, then he potentially becomes the agent of the Caliph.⁸² The attitude further developed in later centuries and according to Gibb, the majority of jurists of that time had begun to authorize the authority of rebellions and had also declared their obedience as a religious obligation.⁸³ In the

⁷⁶ The term khawarijs was used for the group of people which appeared in the first fitna after the death of prophet.

⁷⁷ El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law*, 243.

⁷⁸ El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence*, 243.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 245.

⁸⁰ Abd al-Rahman Al-Jaziri, *Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools: Al-Fiqh ‘Ala Al-Madhahib Al-Arba ‘Ah* (Észak-Holland: Fons Vitae, 2009) V.5, 420.

⁸¹ Tasha Solomon, “Law and Theory: Pre-Modern and Contemporary Development of Islamic Discourse on Rebellion,” *Journal of Mason Graduate Research* 3, no. 3 (2016), 128–142.

⁸² Solomon, “Law and Theory,” 128-142.

⁸³ Ibid., 12-142

thirteenth century, Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1263- 1328) brought the rebellion discourse under the concept of *Jihād*. Ibn Taymiyya argued that the ruler who is unable to force sharia or unable to conduct *Jihād* loses his legitimacy. Hence, he argued the *Jihād* for not only the crusades but also against the Muslim Mongols ruler of the time as well.⁸⁴

2.5 Conclusion

With this brief overview of these moral justifications of use of waging a war, we can conclude that there are more similarities between the concepts of just war, as it has evolved, and *Jihād* than differences. Both just war and *Jihād* were conceived as means to legitimate use of force against the enemy. *Jihād* was conceived as a means to achieve an end, which is war to attain peace. In order to achieve this peace, impose their rule, expand their political and religious ideologies, religious theorists argue for violence in the form of *Jihād* but only under special circumstances as discussed in detail above. The chapter also discusses the concept of *Fasād* which dealt with conflicts within the Muslim communities in order to eliminate any form of dissent which questioned the legitimacy of the appointed Muslim rule and/or ruler.

In the subsequent chapters- three and four, I analyze how the concept of *Jihād* and Just War were used to legitimize the conflicts in Algeria and how these historical events had a profound impact on Abd al-Qādir's concept of *Jihād*.

⁸⁴ Mohd Farid Mohd Sharif, *Ibn Taymiyyah on Jihād and Baghy (Penerbit USM)* (Penerbit Usm, 2011), 4.

3: The Historical Context of Algeria

3.1 Introduction

An understanding of ‘Abd al-Qādir's idea of *jihād* needs an analysis of the socio-political situation and a survey of intellectual thought of Algeria. A close look at Algerian history starting from Ottoman rule to the French occupation suggests that *jihād* as an armed struggle and the concept of just war played an important role. The Ottoman Empire had been ruling in Algeria for three centuries presenting itself as the defender of Islam and the Algerian people against Christian rulers. Similarly, the motivation behind the intervention of Morocco in western Algeria in early nineteenth century was motivated by the concept of *jihād*. Similarly, the French also used the concept of just war to justify their expedition on Algeria. Therefore, in the following chapter I will focus on the historical conditions and developments as they relate to the question of just war, war, and military intervention in the context of imperial politics. Thus, firstly, I will discuss the establishment of Ottoman rule and its political system, the political role of Sufi orders in North Africa, and their significance in society and politics as well as how the revival movement impacted the concept of *jihād*. Secondly, I will focus on how the French Monarch Charles X used the concept of just war *jus ad bellum* to justify his expedition on Algeria with in French politics. Finally, I will discuss the Moroccan intervention in 1830 and the concept of *jihād* used to justify this intervention.

3.2 Ottoman Rule (1530-1830)

After the defeat of the Naṣrid dynasty of the Kingdom of Granada by the Spanish monarchs, Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile in 1492, the Muslim rule in the Iberian Peninsula had come to an end, while the crusade mission of the Catholic monarchs expanded

further to North Africa.⁸⁵ Mers el-Kébir (1505), Tenes (1508), Bajaia and Oran (1509), and two years later the Dellys, Cherchell and Mostaghanem were subsequently conquered by Ferdinand II. By 1509, all of the coastal cities in the Maghrib were under the control of the Spaniards.⁸⁶ It was during this period that the Muslim notables of Algeria recognized the intensity of the situation and, therefore, called upon the Ottoman Muslim corsair 'Urūj Ra'īs (Oruç Reis) for help against the Spanish Christian conquest.⁸⁷ 'Urūj Ra'īs along with his three brothers, known as the 'Barbarossa' brothers, were well-known Ottoman soldiers and sea-men who owned their own fleet of ships. The Barbarossa brothers were able to establish a military state in Algeria in just two years.⁸⁸ However, despite the initial success against the Spaniards, the Barbarossa brothers realized that they would only be capable to fight successfully the Spanish conquest, if they formally aligned themselves with the Ottoman Empire. When 'Urūj Ra'īs was killed in 1518, his younger brother Khayr al-Dīn succeeded him as the ruler of Algiers. He sought the help of the Ottoman Empire by sending a letter to Sultan Salim I, willingly placing Algiers under Ottoman rule.⁸⁹ In return, Sultan Salim I sent 2,000 troops, accompanied by about 4,000 volunteers with the same privileges as the Janissaries and also sent artillery to Algeria.⁹⁰ In 1529, when Khayr al-Dīn overthrew the Spanish holding the fortress at the island of Penon, Sultan Salim I appointed him as Grand Admiral of the Ottoman fleet. Thus, the Ottoman Regency of Algiers in the heart of the Maghrib came into being.⁹¹

⁸⁵ Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. (1987), *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 146.

⁸⁶ McDougall, James (2017), *A History of Algeria*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 10.

⁸⁷ McDougall, *A History*, 10.

⁸⁸ Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 151.

⁸⁹ Christine Woodhead, *The Ottoman World* (Routledge, 2011) V.3, 518.

⁹⁰ Tal Shuval, "The Ottoman Algerian Elite and Its Ideology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no. 3 (2000), 323–344.

⁹¹ McDougall, *A History of Algeria*, 11.

The Ottomans ruled the regency of Algiers with four different types of administration systems: Beylerbeys (1518–70), Pashas (1570–1659), Aghas (1659–71), and finally Deys (1671–1830).⁹²

The political system of Ottoman Algeria was relatively more complicated, especially as compared to other Ottoman regions, S Abun-Nasr argues that the indigenous Algerian tribal society was ruled by local authorities with the help of the Ottoman troops, while the capital city Algiers was directly under Ottoman rule since 1570s.⁹³ The Ottoman troops, as foreigners, were exercising their authority over the Algerian population while consciously not integrating within the Algerian society. In 1569, the authority of the Beylerbeys (representative of the Ottoman Sultan) was usurped by rebellious Ottoman troops, who felt Beylerbeys were corrupt representatives and, therefore, needed to step down. This led to a change in the political system of the Ottoman regency of Algeria which was constituted on two assumptions: First, the rural population of the country would be ruled by the Algerian tribal leaders and the big cities would be ruled by the Ottoman troops. The second assumption was that the Algerian people will continue to recognize the Ottoman troops as the defenders of Islam and the Algerian population against the Christians.⁹⁴

In 1587, the Ottoman authorities divided the regency of the Algiers into three different provinces and appointed a pasha from Istanbul to govern the provinces for a three-year term.⁹⁵ The pasha was appointed without the consultation of the local notables or the tribal leaders. Over the next ninety years, thirty pashas were appointed, each serving their term of three

⁹² Shuval, "The Ottoman Algerian Elite and Its Ideology."

⁹³ Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 158.

⁹⁴ Abun-Nasr, *A History*, 159.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 158.

years.⁹⁶ In 1659, the Ottoman army emerged as the ruler of Algeria.⁹⁷ The Agha (commander in chief of the Ottoman army) took over the control of the regency arguing that the pashas sent from Istanbul are corrupt. Therefore, Algeria was ruled by the Agha till 1671.⁹⁸

In 1671, the political system underwent another significant transformation when the last Agha, ‘Alī (1664-1671) was killed by a member of his own people, as were all four of his predecessors.⁹⁹ The regency consequently became a military republic ruled in the name of the Ottoman sultan by officers chosen by and in the interest of the Ottoman military.¹⁰⁰ The title of the chosen officer was *Dey*.¹⁰¹ This political system worked until the French colonial forces took over in 1830.¹⁰² Throughout Ottoman rule in Algeria, the Ottomans ruled over the diverse tribes of Algerian society as a foreign military elite that was unable to integrate into the local population and was not able to establish a coherent political system. Therefore, when the French invaded Algeria, the Ottoman elite did not receive support from the local population.

3.3 Sufi Orders

The weak political system during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to the development of an alternative authority that was centered around the *zāwiya*.¹⁰³ *Zāwiyas* are an integral part of the North African Sufi tradition. Often established in mountains and in rural areas, a *zāwiya* is a self-funded institution led by a master affiliated with a recognized Sufi order. It could contain multiple facilities, such as boarding schools, spiritual centers, and a hostel for disciples. In

⁹⁶ Adīb Ḥarb, *Al-Tārīkh Al-‘askarī Wa-Al-Idārī Lil-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir Al-Jazā‘irī, 1808-1847*, 1983rd ed., vol. 1, 2 vols. (Algeria: al-Sharikah al-Waṭanīyah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī’, 30.

⁹⁷ Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 160.

⁹⁸ Shuval, “The Ottoman Algerian Elite and Its Ideology.”

⁹⁹ Ḥarb, *Al-Tārīkh Al-‘askarī Wa-Al-Idārī Lil-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir Al-Jazā‘irī, 1808-1847*, 20.

¹⁰⁰ Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 160.

¹⁰¹ Nasr, *A History*, 160.

¹⁰² McDougall, *A History of Algeria*, 11.

¹⁰³ Ladjal Tarek and Bensaid Benaouda, “A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF OTTOMAN ALGERIA (1516-1830): THE NORTH-SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN PROGRESS GAP” 5, no. 4 (October 2014), 567–85.

later years of the Ottoman rule, *zāwiyas* played an important role in Algerian politics and society. The educational and religious character of the institution was the basis of its legitimacy, which resulted in a powerful influence on the opinions of the people and the future political authorities.¹⁰⁴ *Zāwiyas* quickly spread all over the region and earned them numerous audiences within the first two centuries of Ottoman rule.¹⁰⁵ Since both, the Ottoman and Moroccan sultans had a positive attitude towards Sufism, the Sufi institutions and practices enjoyed a favorable atmosphere during the next three centuries of Ottoman and Moroccan rule in North Africa. The positive environment for Sufism attracted Sufis from different parts of the world.¹⁰⁶ The Tijāniyyah, Hansaliyya, Raḥmāniyya, and Shābiyyā orders flourished in eastern Algeria while the ʿĪsāwiyya, Qādiriyya, and dominated western Algeria.¹⁰⁷

In the sixteenth century, large parts of the world were ruled by Muslim empires. In the east, the Ṣafawid and Mughal dynasties were ruling over Iran and much of the Indian subcontinent respectively, while the Ottoman rule expanded from Central Europe up to North Africa. However, this century also marked the peak of Muslim power over much of the world. Since the beginning of the 16th century, the regions ruled by Muslim empires step by step were invaded by European powers. A British missionary observed in 1897 that “our Queen has more Mohammedan subjects than the Sultan of Turkey.”¹⁰⁸ The increasing loss of political power lead Muslim intellectuals in different parts of the world to conclude that the Muslim community also had lost its vigor and had degenerated. This situation produced a reaction, which W. G. Palgrave called “Muhammad

¹⁰⁴ Tarek and Benaouda, “A Cultural Analysis,” 567–85.

¹⁰⁵ Mueed Alaqbi Slah, *Al-Turuq Al-Sufia Wa Zwaya Bil-Jzair: Tareekha Wa Nashtuha* (Berut: Dar al-Buraq, 2002) 132.

¹⁰⁶ Slah, *Al-Turuq*, 132.

¹⁰⁷ Tarek and Benaouda, “A Cultural Analysis,” 567–85”

¹⁰⁸ Ron Geaves, *Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam* (Kube Publishing Ltd, 2010), 172.

revival.”¹⁰⁹ The most important manifestation of the Islamic revival was the puritanical Wahhābī movement founded by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792). It came into being in the Arabian Peninsula, where the Wahhābiyya established a regime between 1747 and 1818. The movement quickly started to spread to South Asia as well.¹¹⁰ The Wahhābī movement since then has had a strong impact on the Muslim world. Sufism was severely attacked for its tomb worship and for indulging in ecstatic rituals. In reaction to this attack, a Sufi revival movement started in the Muslim world in the late 18th century, firstly in Egypt.¹¹¹ The Sufi order of the Khalwatiyya initiated the revival movement, but many other Sufi orders also embraced it, as for instance the Qādiriyya order, which participated in this revival movement actively and militantly.¹¹² This Sufi revival was particularly significant in North and West Africa, where Sufi orders started to play a militant role. This role was based on a new interpretation of the concept of *jihād*. The revival movement had both, traditionalist and reformist aspects, which led to the founding of two most vigorous orders, the Tijāniyyah and the Darqāwiyya.¹¹³

Jihād movements in West Africa created a new concept of *jihād* linking the spiritual *jihād* with the military *jihād*. These *jihād* movements aimed at forming an ideal Muslim community as well as creating a clear divide between what they perceived as Muslims and infidels. It asserted that those Muslims, who did not accept their interpretation of Islam are apostates.¹¹⁴ Hence, the targets of *jihād* were not only non-Muslims but Muslims as well. Even though these *jihād* movements did not emerge in North Africa, the intellectual atmosphere, which produced the

¹⁰⁹ William Gifford Palgrave, *Essays on Eastern Questions* (London: Macmillan, 1872), 111.

¹¹⁰ Anwer Haroon, *History of Saudi Arabia & Wahabism* (Xlibris Corporation, 2014), 67.

¹¹¹ Mervyn Hiskett, “The Nineteenth-Century Jihāds in West Africa,” *The Cambridge History of Africa* 5 (1976), 125–169.

¹¹² Hiskett, “the Nineteenth-Century,” 125-169.

¹¹³ J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 106.

¹¹⁴ M. Last, “Reform in West Africa: The Jihād Movements of the Nineteenth Century,” in J.F. Ade Ajayi and M. Crowder, (ed), *History of West Africa*, (London, Longman Group, 1974), 3-14.

Wahhābī movement, the Sufī revival, and then the new concept of *jihad*, substantially influenced North African Muslim thought. Muslim intellectuals, who performed the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) during that time were also influenced by these revivalist movements.

In Algeria, Muṣṭafā al-Mukhtār, the grandfather of ‘Abd al-Qādir, took part in this revival movement and gave a new lease of life to the Qādiriyya. He visited Baghdad, the center of the Qādiriyya, and received the *khirqā* (robe of investiture) from the head of the Baghdadi *shurafā*, the Naqīb al-ashraf. Following his return to Algeria, Muṣṭafā al-Mukhtār revived the Qādirī Sufi order and became its Grand Shaykh in western Algeria. He founded a *zāwiya* in Guetna upon his return and within a few years Guetna emerged as a center for the Qādirī Sufi order.¹¹⁵ Al-‘Arabī al-Darqāwī revived the Jazūlī Sufi order in Morocco. The reformist Sufi order of the Tijāniyyah enjoyed a massive following in Algeria and Morocco.¹¹⁶ Thus, all the three North African Sufi orders and their offshoots were highly influenced by the revivalist movement. Furthermore, they shared similar ideas of *jihād* as the West African *jihād* movements. Therefore, the revolts of the Darqāwiyya and the Tijāniyyah in the early nineteenth century against the Ottoman empire were, apart from social and economic reasons, motivated by revivalist ideas that regarded the policies of the Ottoman establishment as anti-religious.¹¹⁷

2.4 French Occupation (1830-1832)

The plan for attacking the Ottoman regency of Algiers was first devised in 1808 when Napoleon sent a military engineer to investigate the strength of Algiers’ defenses.¹¹⁸ However, this

¹¹⁵ Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Zā’ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā’ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 2 vols. (Egypt: al-Iskandarīyah, 1903), 929.

¹¹⁶ Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, 112.

¹¹⁷ ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Zā’ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā’ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 115.

¹¹⁸ Brower, “Just War and Jihād in the French Conquest of Algeria,” 222.

plan was suspended by Napoleon. In 1827, when Charles X was trying to consolidate his political position against his opponents within France, he hoped that a victory over the Ottoman regency of Algiers would help his position. However, in order to launch such a campaign a strong justification was required. Hence, Charles X looked for the ideals and rationales that would make his war “just”. In October 1827, Clermont-Tonnerre, minister of war, designed a justification for Charles X’s ambitions by presenting a report, in which he provided appropriate arguments for a just war against the Ottoman regency of Algiers.¹¹⁹ The report starts with Saint Augustine’s traditional argument of the “just war” theory that states “just wars avenge injuries.”¹²⁰ This argument was firstly presented by the just war theologians, such as Saint Augustine of Hippo (d.430), according to which just war is permissible in order to restrain sinners from doing evil.¹²¹ It is argued that the war is in the best interest of those being attacked, even though they do not recognize their mistake. Hence, the punishment of the evildoers by preventing them from doing more sins is also an act of love.¹²² Earlier in that year, in April 1827, the dey of the Ottoman regency of Algiers had destroyed two French trading posts on Algerian coast and furthermore, insulted the honor of France by hitting the French consul in the regency with a flywhisk. According to Clermont-Tonnerre, the attack on the Ottoman regency could be considered an act of “just war”, as the intention was to stop the dey from committing the crime again.

The background of this conflict was that since 1780, the French army was purchasing grain from the Ottoman regency of Algiers through two Jewish merchants.¹²³ Yet, they never paid the

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 222.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 222

¹²¹ Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge University Press, 1975), 63.

¹²² Ane Bysted, *The Crusade Indulgence: Spiritual Rewards and the Theology of the Crusades, c. 1095-1216* (Brill, 2014), 209.

¹²³ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 7.

merchants, which is why the merchants could not pay their debt to the Ottoman regency. In 1827, when the governor of the regency, Husayn Dey (1765- 1838) asked the merchants to pay their debt, they replied that they could not pay it until the French army would pay them. The dey wrote letters to the French government but received no response.¹²⁴ On April 29, 1827, the dey summoned the French consul, Pierre Deval, and asked him to pay the debt. The French consul refused to pay the debt and answered that Charles X (1757-1836) could not deign to reply a dey. Thereupon, the dey lost his temper and hit the consul with a flywhisk.¹²⁵ In response, France called back the consul and terminated its relations with Algeria and launched a naval blockade on Algiers.¹²⁶

Clermont-Tonnerre further argued in the light of the danger of revolutions in Europe that the just war on Algeria would promote the mission of the French crown to expand the western conservative order into the southern Mediterranean and integrate the entire region into an international system dominated by the European monarchies. During the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, one of the most important topics was the suppression of piracy that was unanimously considered as a danger to European powers.¹²⁷ In this context, Clermont-Tonnerre helped to create an image of Algerians as the universal enemy and, therefore, as a threat for all civilized nations.¹²⁸ He concluded his argument that a war against the Berber pirates would be just by stating that “Sire, you have undertaken a just war in the interest of *your* country, that of *your own* glory, in consequence, *must alone mark the limits* of the satisfaction that you

¹²⁴ Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 249.

¹²⁵ Evans, *Algeria*, 8.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²⁷ Brower, “Just War and Jihād in the French Conquest of Algeria,” 221.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 223.

demand.”¹²⁹ This line of argument concerning just war was sufficient to justify Charles X’s expedition of the Ottoman regency of Algiers.

On Monday, June 14, 1830, the French commander General Bourmont (1773 -1846) landed on the shores of Sidi Fredj with eighty-four ships and 37,000 troops to “civilize” lgeria. The troops were motivated by the slogans “the civilized nations of the *deux mondes* have their eyes fixed upon you” and “the cause of France is that of humanity.”¹³⁰

At first, the French army did not face any strong resistance. However, on June 19, 1830, a strong army of 35,000 Ottoman troops attacked the French forces,¹³¹ but they were defeated by the French, who headed towards the capital of the Ottoman regency and entered Algiers on July 5. Thus, the Ottoman regency of Algiers was turned into French occupied Algeria in just twenty-one days.¹³²

Even though the idea for an Algerian campaign was hatched long before the actual expedition, the French adventure was not properly planned. The French administration was indecisive about the question whether to expand to other regions or to limit themselves to the capital alone.¹³³ The situation of Algeria further worsened when the Bourbon dynasty was overthrown in July 1830 and the new administration did not know how to deal with the Algerian campaign. Therefore, the French occupation initially was limited to the capital, Algiers, as well as

¹²⁹ Ibid., 224.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 225.

¹³¹ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 7.

¹³² Evans, 8.

¹³³ Raphael Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (Holmes & Meier New York, 1977), 38.

Oran, the port Mers el-Kébir in the west, and Bone in the eastern province.¹³⁴ Its impact was minimal in the interior.

The Ottoman government was eventually overthrown by the French despite their limited influence, which resulted in anarchy in several provinces in Algeria. Anarchy and public disorder were mostly caused by clashes between tribes that either seized the opportunity to acquire the privilege to rule, to pillage, or simply to settle old blood feuds. Roads were cut off, killings, robbery and extorting payments from the travelers become normal.¹³⁵ As the situation created a power vacuum, the French General Clauzel decided to step in by concluding a treaty with the Tunisian Bey Ḥusayn that transferred the control of the province of Oran to the bey for the payment of a tribute to France. However, the French administration did not approve of the treaty. Instead, the Algerians abandoned trade relations with Oran and consequently, the Tunisian bey left Oran on August 22, 1831.¹³⁶ This was the end of France's first attempt to take over the control of Algeria's interior.

3.5 The Moroccan Occupation of Tlemsen (1830-1832)

Since the 16th century, Tlemsen was part of the Ottoman regency of Algiers. However, Algerians had enjoyed close relations with the Moroccan monarchs, who regarded themselves as rivals of the Ottomans. These relations strengthened during the early 19th century as the Sufi orders of Morocco, the Darqāwiyya, Wazzāniyya, and Tijāniyyah of Algeria developed a massive following in both countries. These relations had a huge impact on the political situation in Algeria, as the Moroccans supported the Darqāwa revolt against the Ottomans, while western Algerian

¹³⁴ Danziger, 39.

¹³⁵ Danziger, 43.

¹³⁶ Danziger, 44.

communities offered their allegiance to Moroccan sultans twice in early nineteenth century because of the corrupt Ottoman authorities.¹³⁷

On July 13, 1830, the Moroccan sultan Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān received the news of the fall of Algiers and considered it a religiously motivated attack on Muslims rather than a political attack against the Turks.¹³⁸ According to the concept of the *umma* (religious community) that implies that the nearest Muslim ruler is supposed to help Muslims in need, he warmly welcomed the refugees from Algiers. In August 1830, devastated due to anarchy in several provinces of Algeria, the notables of Tlemsen decided to offer their allegiance to Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān and to request him to take over the control of Oran.¹³⁹ This offer of allegiance was however, unsuccessful, because ‘*ulamā*’ of Fez objected it and issued a *fatwā* ruling that acceptance of allegiance is against the *sharī‘a*. The religiously significant afternoon prayer on Friday in the Grand Mosque of Tlemsen was continued to be offered in the name of the Ottoman sultan, which signified Tlemsen’s allegiance to him.¹⁴⁰ However, this *fatwā* was challenged in another appeal that argued that the allegiance to the Ottoman sultan was just in name as the Ottoman Sultan had failed to send help to Algeria when it was under attack. Furthermore, the Dey of Algeria had lost his legitimacy as the right ruler because of his tyrannical and corrupt rule. The ‘*ulamā*’ approved the second appeal and asked the Moroccan sultan to protect the territory on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan, and obliged him to lead the *jihād* against the French.¹⁴¹ The Moroccan sultan accepted the

¹³⁷ Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria* (Routledge, 2003), 76.

¹³⁸ Amira K. Bennison, *Jihād and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria* (Routledge, 2003), 87.

¹³⁹ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 43.

¹⁴⁰ Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 11.

¹⁴¹ al-Slawi al-Nasiri and ibn Maid. Ahmad, *Kitab Al-Istisqa Li-Akhbar Duwwal Al-Maghrib Al-Aqsa*, vol. 3, (Casablanca: Dar al-Kitab, 1955), 26.

responsibility of leading the *jihad*, calculating that a defeat of the French authority would consequently expand his rule to western Algeria.

In October 1830, Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān nominated his cousin Mawlāy ‘Alī b. Sulaymān to govern Tlemsen in his name. The 15-year-old Mawlāy ‘Alī lead seven hundred soldiers to Tlemsen on November 7, 1830.¹⁴² He was welcomed by the people of Tlemsen celebrating the arrival of the Moroccan governor. Mawlāy ‘Alī asserted in his first speech that his mission is a religious obligation of protecting the Muslim community from the internal as well as the external threats by the act of waging *jihād* against the enemy.¹⁴³

The Ottoman bey in Tunisia opposed the Moroccan expedition and reminded Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān that this region was under the possession of the Ottomans. The sultan replied that the region had seized to do so and that he had come to suppress *fitna* (civil war). Since the Ottomans had failed to do so, the people of Tlemsen themselves had asked for his help. Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān further asserted that his actions are only motivated by the religious considerations and that the Ottoman Sultan must not disagree with his actions.¹⁴⁴

In the meantime, the new July monarchy¹⁴⁵ of France decided to pursue the colonialist policy that regarded all the territory previously under control of the Ottomans as French. This policy clashed with the Moroccan claims over Tlemsen and accordingly, the French requested the Moroccan sultan to withdraw his forces from Tlemsen in December 1830.¹⁴⁶ However, the Moroccan sultan refused to do so and instead wrote letters to the tribal leaders of Oran calling

¹⁴² al-Nasiri and Ahmad, *Kital Al-Istiqā*, 29.

¹⁴³ al-Nasiri and Ahmad, 30.

¹⁴⁴ Bennison, *Jihād and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco*, 96.

¹⁴⁵ July Monarchy was a liberal constituently monarchy in France from July 1830 to 1848.

¹⁴⁶ Bennison, *Jihād and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco*, 96.

them to *jihād* against the French. His call for *jihād* was answered positively. The head of the Qādiriyya, ‘Abd al-Qādir's father, Muḥyī al-Dīn guaranteed him that all the tribes of Oran were willingly ready for *jihād*¹⁴⁷ and all of the major tribes offered their allegiance (*bay‘a*) to the sultan. In March 1831, the Moroccan sultan sent 9,000 soldiers more to Tlemsen and also warned the tribes to not pledge their allegiances to the French authorities and not to trade with the enemy.¹⁴⁸ However, the unanimous support for him did not last long. When Mawlāy ‘Alī arrested a number of Turkish and Kulughlan chiefs, the Turkish and Kulughlan tribes withdrew their *bay‘a* for the Moroccan sultan. This resulted in several revolts against the Moroccan forces and eventually they withdrew their support from Tlemsen in April 1831.¹⁴⁹

In the meantime, the French authorities persistently denied the Moroccan intervention and sent a mission to Morocco for negotiations on January 1832.¹⁵⁰ After long and tedious negotiations, the Moroccan sultan agreed to withdraw his forces and fixed the border at Wajda in April 1832.¹⁵¹ Though no official Moroccan governor remained in West Algeria, ‘Abd al-Qādir's father, Muḥyī al-Dīn acted as the deputy of the Moroccan governor.¹⁵² Even after the end of the Moroccan rule, the Sultan of Morocco was regarded as the only source of legitimate authority in the region.

3.6 Conclusion

The accounts presented show that how the concept of *jihād* and just war was used in historical context of Algeria. The states are using these concepts to legitimize their expansion. However, in late nineteenth century the Sufi revival movements also started to legitimize their use

¹⁴⁷ Bennison, 98.

¹⁴⁸ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 12.

¹⁴⁹ al-Nasiri and Ahmad, *Kitab Al-Istisqa Li-Akhbar Duwwal Al-Maghrib Al-Aqsa*, V 3, 27.

¹⁵⁰ Bennison, *Jihād and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco*, 97.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 97.

¹⁵² Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 158.

of violence against what they imagined corrupt rulers and societies. It also shows how the concept of *jihād* evolved during the Sufi revival movement in late eighteenth and nineteenth century. The concept of *jihād* took a shift. Earlier it was used to motivate Muslims to fight against the external enemies. However, during the revival movement, to fight against those Muslims who do not agree with the interpretation of Islam were also became the target of *jihād*. This was the intellectual and political atmosphere in which Amīr Abd al-Qādir was educated.

4: Amīr ‘Abd al Qādir (1807-1883) Portrait of a Sufi Mujāhid

4.1 Introduction

The main purpose of this study is to analyze Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir’s understanding of *jihād* by critically examining his life and writings. In this chapter, I focus on intellectual encounters, experiences, and transformative events in his lifetime. As ‘Abd al-Qādir’s idea of *jihād* constantly evolved throughout his life, it will make better sense, if we look at the factors that contributed to its formation. Thus, a brief account of his biography provides us with the context necessary for the understanding of the changes in the concept of *jihād*, ‘Abd al-Qādir promoted.

In the early years of his life, ‘Abd al-Qādir was trained in an atmosphere that was dominated by neo-Sufi reform movements, while in the second part, he interacted with French intellectuals and eventually, he formulated his ideas in the framework of the thoughts of al-Shaykh al-Akbar Muḥyī l-Dīn b. al-‘Arabī (d. 1240). All these three phases of life had an impact on his idea of *jihād*. As he was a warrior, a statesman, a symbol of resistance, a scholar, and a reformer, ‘Abd al-Qādir encountered several intellectual and political challenges, ranging from French colonialism to internal rebellions that made him constantly rethink his concept of *jihād*. His life was a constant struggle, in which he influenced the politics and intellectual currents of his time and region. During the first part of his life, he encountered an armed force seeking occupation and the second part was dominated by intellectual challenges faced by Muslims. Nevertheless, ‘Abd al-Qādir transmitted an influential legacy. Many still draw inspiration from it today.

This thesis is limited in scope and it is impossible to draw a full sketch of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s life. Therefore, I only provide a comprehensive overview of those intellectual encounters, which

had a fundamental impact on his thought. This project divides ‘Abd al-Qādir’s life into three parts: It starts with his early education; the experiences and encounters he had during his education in a number of institutions under the supervision of different scholars; his pilgrimage to Mecca with his father, his encounter with numerous prestigious Muslim scholars in Cairo, Damascus, and the Hijāz. In the second part, I briefly discuss his intellectual encounters during his imprisonment in France. Finally, I conclude with an overview of his time in exile in Damascus until the end of his life.

It is important to note that all of the available sources on the biography of ‘Abd al-Qādir stem from the time after his rise to power and most of these accounts have been written by his followers. However, to give an overview of his life, I mostly draw from “*The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria*” by Charles Henry Churchill.¹⁵³ This book was written with ‘Abd al-Qādir’s own dictation and compiled from other authentic sources. Furthermore, I use the biography written by his son Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir “*Tuḥfat al-za’ir fī Tārīkh al-Jazā’ir wa-l- Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir*” and Raphael Danziger’s doctoral thesis, “*Abd al Qādir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation*”.¹⁵⁴

The loss of the regency of Algiers to the French occurred in a period, when the major Muslim Empires, including the Ottoman Empire were losing the political influence over their territories, while European powers, foremost the British and French, were on the rise. Some Muslim intellectuals such as Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), Shah Waliullah Dehlawi (d. 1762) perceived the rise of European powers and the decline of Muslims’ political power as a manifestation of the Divine anger against Muslims, because they had become morally and

¹⁵³ Churchill, *The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria; Written from His Own Dictation, and Compiled from Other Authentic Sources*.

¹⁵⁴ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*.

intellectually corrupt. This perception generated a series of internal reform movements throughout the Muslim world including the puritanical Wahhabī movement.¹⁵⁵ Even though this movement was not welcomed in North Africa due to its negative attitude towards Sufism, it nevertheless triggered a Sufi revival movement in North and West Africa. The revived Sufi groups started to play an active and militant role in society which produced new interpretations of religious ideals especially concerning the concept of *jihād*.¹⁵⁶ Most of the major Sufi orders, such as the Tijāniyyah, Darqāwiyya, and Qādiriyya were influenced and inspired by these revival movements, which resulted in a series of revolts against the Ottomans during the first three decades of the 19th century.¹⁵⁷

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Muṣṭafā al-Mukhtār, the grandfather of ‘Abd al-Qādir, took part in these revival movements and gave a new lease of life to the Qādiriyya. He became the Grand Shaykh of the Qādiriyya in western Algeria and founded a *zāwiya* (compound of a Sufi order) in Guetna which emerged as a center for the Qādirī Sufi order within a few years.

Abd al-Qādir’s father, Muḥyī al-Dīn not only inherited the leadership of the Qādirī Sufi order but also assumed responsibility to lead the social and economic affairs of Guetna. He served as a judge for the disputes in Guetna as well as in the neighboring parts of western Algeria.¹⁵⁸ The students and the spiritual disciples (*murīds*) came from different parts of Algeria to gain spiritual and religious guidance from Muṣṭafā al-Mukhtār’s son and spiritual successor Muḥyī al-Dīn.

¹⁵⁵ Mervyn Hiskett, “The Nineteenth-Century Jihads in West Africa,” *The Cambridge History of Africa* 5 (1976), 125–169.

¹⁵⁶ Glover John, *Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal: The Murid Order* (University of Rochester Press, Rochester USA, 2009), 24.

¹⁵⁷ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 26.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

Guetna became a diverse hub of students, travelers, scholars, and adherents of the Qādiriyya in the late 18th century.

4.2 The Making of a Mujahid

In this cosmopolitan atmosphere of al-Qayaṭana, ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥyī al-Dīn b. Muṣṭafā al-Hasanī was born on September 26, 1807.¹⁵⁹ From his early childhood, ‘Abd al-Qādir enjoyed the full privilege of being part of one of the most knowledgeable and influential families of western Algeria. He made full usage of all available educational opportunities he had in his early childhood. ‘Abd al-Qādir received his early education at his father’s *zāwiya* in al-Qayaṭana. After his early education, his father sent him to Arzew for further education under the supervision of Qāḍī Aḥmad b. Ṭāhir, one of the best-known academics in Algeria during this time. In addition to the traditional Islamic lore, he was also familiar with certain western ideas. Apart from the religious education, he taught ‘Abd al-Qādir astronomy, mathematics, and geography.¹⁶⁰ This first encounter with the scientific method and inquiry may have played an important role in the formation of his thought.

‘Abd al-Qādir later attended an elite Ottoman school in Oran for two years and studied under the famous scholar Sīdī Aḥmad b. Khoja.¹⁶¹ There, for the first time, he experienced the behavior of the Ottoman administration towards local inhabitants, which he perceived as inappropriate and abusive. He also regarded them as morally corrupt and negligent towards Islamic values. Despite the severe famine in Oran, the Ottoman authorities did not reduce taxation, and when a number of notables of the Oran tribes requested a tax reduction, the Ottoman bay had some of their chiefs killed. Furthermore, when Muḥyī al-Dīn planned to perform the *ḥajj*-pilgrimage

¹⁵⁹ Charles Henry Churchill, “The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria. 1867,” *Trans. in French as La Vie d’Abdelkader*, 1925, 1.

¹⁶⁰ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 55.

¹⁶¹ Philip Mattar, “Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East & North Africa: Vol. 1 AC,” ISBN 978 (2004), 15.

with his son, Ḥasan Bey put them under house arrest for two years, fearing a rebellion masked under the pilgrimage caravan.¹⁶² Two years later, ‘Abd al-Qādir and his father were released from the house arrest on the condition of leaving the country immediately. This experience developed a deep resentment against the Ottomans, which also played a role in the formulation of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s idea of *jihād* that will be discussed in the next chapter.

Following their release, Muḥyī al-Dīn and ‘Abd al-Qādir left Algeria for the *hajj* in 1826. Leaving his homeland certainly must have been a difficult experience. However, spending two years abroad under the umbrella of *hajj* was a great opportunity for ‘Abd al-Qādir to deepen his knowledge and experience of the world and he seemed to have used it well. This journey played an important role not only in his education, but also bolstered his credibility among the population of Oran. The first stop of their journey was Tunis. Visiting al-Zaytuna mosque, a prominent center for Islamic learning since centuries, was ‘Abd al-Qādir’s first encounter with the diverse Muslim tradition. The next destinations on their pilgrimage were Alexandria and Cairo and from there they went to Mecca and Medina. They stayed for a month in the Ḥijāz and then they went to Damascus and Baghdad. After staying three months in Baghdad they went again to Mecca to perform another *hajj* and finally, they returned to Algeria in 1828 via Egypt and Tunis.¹⁶³

During this pilgrimage, every city at every stage played an important role in the development of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s scholarship, as his horizon was constantly enlarged through his work with prominent scholars and institutions. Additionally, he met with some great scholars during his trip, who left a long-lasting impact on his thought.

¹⁶² Churchill, “The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria. 1867,” 8.

¹⁶³ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 58.

In Egypt, ‘Abd al-Qādir took full advantage of the opportunities the country had to offer. His religious knowledge was deepened by enrolling himself into Al-Azhar University, the most prestigious university in the Arabic world and hub of Islamic learning in Egypt.¹⁶⁴ He closely studied the statecraft of the famed Egyptian reformer Muḥammad ‘Alī, and his social, administrative, economic, and political reforms of the Egyptian society as he later mentioned in his correspondence with French officers.¹⁶⁵ During their stay in Egypt, it is possible that ‘Abd al-Qādir and his father even had a private meeting with Muḥammad ‘Alī. During their stay in Mecca, ‘Abd al-Qādir met the founder of the Sanūsī Sufi order, Muḥammad b. ‘Ali al-Sanūsī ((1787–1859). The Sanūsī Sufi order is known for its resistance against the French and the Italian incursions and is also famous for their reformist approach that promotes the practice of *ijtihād*, the method of reasoning by analogy on the basis of the Islamic sources Quran and *sunna* (the tradition of the prophet Muḥammad), while rejecting the principles of *ijmā’* (the unanimous agreement of the *umma* on a regulation), *qiyās* (inductive reasoning), and *taqlīd* (acceptance of or submission to authority). ‘Abd al-Qādir and his father were invited by Muḥammad b. ‘Ali al-Sanūsī to his lodge. During their meeting, Muḥammad b. ‘Ali al-Sanūsī was impressed by ‘Abd al-Qādir’s intellect and appreciated his passion for religion. He encouraged them to raise the banner of *jihād* and proclaimed to Muḥyī al-Dīn that ‘Abd al-Qādir is prescribed by God to play an important part for Algeria and for the Muslim community. He specifically said:

The religion of Islam requires every Muslim to defend it, as far as he is able to, and forbids the Muslim to surrender to the enemy. I say to you that I have the best wishes for our son ‘Abd al-Qādir, indeed he is of those who are going to make the sacred lands of Islam expand and raise the banner of *jihād*.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 58.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 58.

¹⁶⁶ Vikor S. Knut, *Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muhammad b. ‘Ali Al-Sanusi and His Brotherhood* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 126.

The meeting with his fellow Algerian, a well-known scholar and famous Sufi as well as hearing the remarks about himself had a great impact on ‘Abd al-Qādir’s thought process. Both characteristics of Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Sanūsī’s thought: the promotion of *jihād* and *ijtihād* later played an important role in ‘Abd al-Qādir’s life. It can be said that this meeting encouraged him to lead his own *jihād* against the French invasion of Algeria three years later. These interactions with Sufi scholars most likely had a great influence on his idea of *jihād* as an armed struggle at the beginning of his struggle for independence of his homeland.

When coming back from their first *ḥajj*, ‘Abd al-Qādir and his father went to Damascus, where they attended lectures on the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of the traditionist al-Bukhārī at the Umayyad Mosque by the famous Muḥaddith Shaykh ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kuzbarī. In Damascus, they were introduced to the Naqshbandī Sufī order as well. Shaykh Khalid Naqshbandī was the leader of the Naqshbandiyya in Damascus and was actively involved in spreading his spiritual reformist and revivalist thoughts in the Ottoman Empire. Abd al-Qādir spent four months studying the teachings of the Naqshbandiyya under one of the disciples of Shaykh Khalid Naqshbandī, Muḥammad al-Khānī.¹⁶⁷

The second important destination after the Ḥijāz was Baghdad. There, father and son went to pay their respects to the tomb of ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 1166), the founder of their own Sufi order, the Qādiriyya. They spent four months in Baghdad and attended the lectures of Shaykh Muḥammad Qādirī, the head of the local branch of the Qādiriyya. Muḥyī al-Dīn and ‘Abd al-Qādir received a formal initiation (*ijāza*) from Shaykh Muḥammad Qādirī. Upon their return to Algeria in 1928, they were consequently greeted as leaders of Qādirī order. Their journey, which

¹⁶⁷ Itzchak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Brill, 2000), 160.

was full of educational and spiritual credentials contributed to their popularity and made them highly influential. ‘Abd al-Qādir devoted the next two years for studying and practicing the Sufi path, while refraining from politics. However, this apolitical period of his life ended when the French invaded Algeria in 1830.

As mentioned above, after the defeat of the Ottoman troops, the French occupation was initially limited to the coastal towns, while the impact of French rule was minimal in the interior. Using the power vacuum, the tribes of Oran and Tlemcen sent two delegations to the Sultan of Morocco Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (1778-1859) to offer submission and request him to take the control of Oran, which resulted in the nomination of the sultan’s cousin ‘Alī b. Sulaymān and then Muḥammad b. al-Āmiri as deputies in Tlemcen.¹⁶⁸

The two-year Moroccan rule of the western Algerian province of Oran ended when the French representative Count Charles de Mornay landed at the port of Tangier in a French warship on January 24, 1832. After several rounds of negotiations and threats, the sultan agreed to withdraw all his troops and support across the border. Meanwhile, Muḥyī al-Dīn, the father of ‘Abd al-Qādir acted as an informal deputy of Al-Āmiri in his absence. During this period, different tribes of Oran offered their political allegiance to Muḥyī al-Dīn several times several times to lead the *jihād* against the French occupation, but he repeatedly supported the Moroccan rule. However, when the Moroccan sultan withdrew his troops, the tribes of Oran again asked Muḥyī al-Dīn to accept their allegiance. He then accepted on the condition that his son ‘Abd al-Qādir will serve as the leader of the *jihād*, that started in autumn 1832.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 43.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

‘Abd al-Qādir’s first mission was to unite all tribes of Oran under one government. Soon after he was elected by the tribes of Tlemcen, he wrote to all tribes as well as to other groups living in the Oran province, demanding their submission to his authority and to accept him as a leader of the *jihād*. He also asserted that failure to submit will be an act of rebellion (*fasād*), which will affect the Muslims ability to wage *jihād* against the French infidels.¹⁷⁰ ‘Abd al-Qādir established his government in Mascara, the capital of Oran and led a series of military attacks on the French throughout the next two years. In 1834, upon French request, a peace treaty was signed between ‘Abd al-Qādir and the French General Desmiches.¹⁷¹

However, the peace ended soon, and hostilities reignited. Another peace treaty was signed in 1837.¹⁷² After this treaty until the second round of war in 1839, he undertook a lengthy correspondence with a variety of French leaders, including personal letters to the king and his wife. In this correspondence, he stressed the beneficial qualities of peace and the desirability of non-military options as long as the French respected their obligations towards Algerians. This correspondence suggests that ‘Abd al-Qādir did not, in fact, see the armed struggle as the only or even the preferable response to the French invasion.¹⁷³

In 1839, the French changed their policy and started a full-scale war to take over the control of western Algeria with the aim to destroy ‘Abd al-Qādir’s strength.¹⁷⁴ ‘Abd al-Qādir spent the next decade fighting against the French with the strategy of ‘*karr wa farr*’, which literary means a ‘hit and run’ strategy. However, on December 21, 1847, after spending more than fifteen years in

¹⁷⁰ Amira K. Bennison, “Jihad and Its Interpretations in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 81.

¹⁷¹ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 89.

¹⁷² Ibid., 138.

¹⁷³ Sohail H. Hashmi, *Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 238.

¹⁷⁴ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 169.

resistance against the French incursion, ‘Abd al-Qādir recognized that he neither had enough strength nor the support by the sultan of Morocco, so that he decided to declare his formal surrender in December 1847.¹⁷⁵

4.3 The Imprisoned Amīr

As part of his surrender agreement, ‘Abd al-Qādir was promised to live his life in the Muslim Western world. However, this promise was not upheld by the French government and ‘Abd al-Qādir was kept as a prisoner of the state.¹⁷⁶ He spent five years in France, first in Toulon and then at Chateau d'Amboise along with his family and close supporters. During his imprisonment, ‘Abd al-Qādir devoted most of his time to his personal study.¹⁷⁷ Since he was allowed to receive guests and to have access to books, he met many European notables and had scholarly discussions with them.¹⁷⁸ He developed good relations with Melchior Joseph Eugène Daumas (1803-1871), a former military general and director of Algerian affairs in the Ministry of War in Paris.

‘Abd al-Qādir realized quite early the impressive material progress attained by the Europeans through their new rationalist-scientific approach. At the same time, he saw an acute spiritual crisis there. While in prison, he wrote the essay *‘Al-Miqrāḍ al-ḥādd li-qaṭ’ lisān muntaqis dīn al-islām bi’l-bāṭil wa’ l-ilḥād’* (The Sharp Scissors, for Cutting the Tongue of him who Disparages Islam with Falsehood and Heresy’) that was written in reply to the accusations by a

¹⁷⁵ Danziger, 237.

¹⁷⁶ John King, “Abd El-Kader and Arab Nationalism,” *Problems of the Modern Middle* (1992), 143.

¹⁷⁷ King, 143.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 143.

Catholic priest of the immorality of Islam. In the text, he sought to establish both the existence of God and the reality of prophethood, specifically through the use of reason (*‘aql*).¹⁷⁹

Louis Napoleon granted ‘Abd al-Qādir release from prison into exile in 1852, after a number of his friends from the French elite repeatedly had requested the king to do so.¹⁸⁰ He first went to the Ottoman city of Bursa and then in 1855, he moved to the Amara District in Damascus.

4.4 Amīr in Damascus

In Damascus, ‘Abd al-Qādir enjoyed great prestige, as he had personal connections at the highest levels in the Ottoman capital as well as in Europe. His position became stronger because of his efforts to protect local Christians and European consuls when religious riots erupted in Damascus in 1860. However, the next three decades of his life were mainly devoted to religion and specifically to the study of the spiritual thoughts of Ibn al-‘Arabī. He had become familiar with his thoughts in the course of his discussions with Shaykh Khalid during his *hajj*-pilgrimage. However, it was after his arrival to Damascus that he finally had the chance to acquaint himself with Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theosophical mysticism which he acknowledged as the prescription to the predicament the Muslims of his time were facing. Therefore, he dedicated himself fully to the teaching of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thoughts.

When ‘Abd al-Qādir arrived in Damascus in 1856, The Sufi order of Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya was active in spreading his reformist spiritual thoughts throughout the Ottoman Empire. The Sufi order founded by Shaykh Khālīd (d. 1827), was deeply involved in generating a

¹⁷⁹ David Commins, “‘ABD AL-QĀDIR AL-JAZĀ’IR? AND ISLAMIC REFORM,” *The Muslim World* 78, no. 2 (1988), 129.

¹⁸⁰ Churchill, “The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria. 1867,” 204.

religious awakening in Damascus. His reformist movement, under the guidance of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya rapidly spread in Syria.¹⁸¹

As mentioned before, ‘Abd al-Qādir had visited Damascus on his way back to Algeria after performing the pilgrimage to Mecca with his father in his twenties. During that visit, he had met Shaykh Khālīd, who welcomed him into the Naqshbandiyya path under the mentorship of Muḥammad al-Khānī. When ‘Abd al-Qādir came again to Damascus in 1856, Muḥammad al-Khānī (d.1862)¹⁸² was the key figure of the Khālidiyya leadership. ‘Abd al-Qādir rekindled his friendship with Muḥammad al-Khānī as well as with his key disciples, such as Muḥammad al-Ṭanṭāwī, and al-Khānī’s son, Muḥammad al-Khānī. ‘Abd al-Qādir started to teach them the doctrine of Ibn al-‘Arabī.¹⁸³ The spiritual encounters of ‘Abd al-Qādir in the last three decades of his life were recorded by these students in the *Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī al-Wa‘z wa-al-Irshād* (The Book of Stops for Preaching and Guidance). This collection includes interpretations of verses from the Quran and the prophetic traditions as well as clarification of the difficult points in the writings of Ibn al-‘Arabī in response to the questions of his disciples.

‘Abd al-Qādir began to spread his spiritual reformist thoughts under the guidance of the Naqshbandiyya and within a few months, he managed to attract a huge circle of disciples mostly of those families who were related to Shaykh Khālīd's reform movement. The later apolitical and spiritual period of his life also left an indelible influence on his idea of *jihād* which became more passive than it was in his early years. ‘Abd al-Qādir emerged as one of the most influential

¹⁸¹ Abu-Manneh, the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century. *Die Welt des Islams* 22 (1982), 1-36.

¹⁸² Muḥammad al-Khānī condemned Abd al-Qādir’s *jihād* against French in 1841

¹⁸³ Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, 204.

interpreters of Ibn al-‘Arabī in his time. The eagerness to spread the reformist thoughts of Ibn al-‘Arabī continued until his death in 1883.

4.5 Conclusion

From his life, three of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s experiences arguably influenced his conception of *jihād*. Firstly, his upbringing, education and most of his early experiences were constructed under the influence of neo-Sufism reform movements and the hatred he inherited against the Ottomans and French infidels. Secondly, ‘Abd al-Qādir’s encounter with the French officials and the diplomats first in Algeria while negotiating with them and later with the French intellectuals in his imprisonment in France. Third, and the most influential factor was his introduction to the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order and to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thoughts. Under the influence of Ibn al-‘Arabī, he interpreted the basic texts of Islam and used his thoughts in his attempt for a Islamic reform.

5: Genealogy of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s Concept of Jihad

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the development and evolution of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s idea of *jihād* during his struggle for Algerian independence and later during his Sufi endeavors in Damascus. The historiography of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s life analyzed his struggle and interpreted his thoughts from different perspectives. The earliest writers were French military commanders, who depicted him as a symbol of a fanatical culture that needs to be civilized by the “*mission civilisatrice*” (civilizing mission).¹⁸⁴ The British historians portrayed him as an Arab warrior leader, who had the potential to be a British ally in the imperial domination.¹⁸⁵ During the 20th century, the Algerian nationalist discourse interpreted him as the father of the Algerian nation.¹⁸⁶ After the Algerian independence from French colonialism, ‘Abd al-Qādir received scholarly attention for his religious and spiritual aspects. However, his idea of *jihād* was perceived only as an outcome of the French colonialism and was not contextualized in the broader setting of western Algeria and Morocco. In this chapter, I will argue that ‘Abd al-Qādir’s interpretation of *jihād* was deeply rooted in the Sufi revival movements that appeared in Africa during the late 18th and 19th centuries. I will also point out that ‘Abd al-Qādir’s struggle was not driven only by the idea of fighting the so-called infidels, but it was inspired by the interpretations of *jihād* by the Sufi revival movements. Thus, ‘Abd al-Qādir saw as the enemies of his *jihād* not only the infidels, but also the corrupt Muslims. I will finally

¹⁸⁴ These narratives can be seen in Alexandre Bellemare’s *Abd-el-Kader, sa vie politique et militaire* Paris, 1863 and in Paul Azan’s *L’Emir Abd el-Kader 1808–1883 – du fanatisme musulman au patriotisme français*, Paris, 1925.

¹⁸⁵ Colonel Churchill, *The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria; Written from His Own Dictation and Compiled from Other Authentic Sources* (Chapman & Hall, 1867); Wilfrid Blunt, *Desert Hawk: Abd El Kader and the French Conquest of Algeria* (Methuen, 1947).

¹⁸⁶ King, “Abd El-Kader and Arab Nationalism,” 1992.

argue that his idea of *jihād* evolved from an aggressive approach to a passive one, because of the religious and historical context in which he was living.

The chapter deals with the analysis of ‘Abd al-Qādir’ speeches, his *risāla* on hijra and ‘Abd al-Qādir’s magnum opus “*Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī al-Wa‘z wa-al-Irshād*” (The Book of Stops for Preaching and Guidance). I will draw upon Raphael Danziger’s work “*Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation*” for the translation of the speeches and sermons of ‘Abd al-Qādir.¹⁸⁷ The article written by Tom Woerner-Powell on ‘Abd al-Qādir’s *risāla* on hijra will inform this research.¹⁸⁸ To analyze magnum opus “*Kitāb al-Mawāqif*” I will use Itzhak Weismann’s translation when available otherwise I will translate the text by my own.

5.2 Revivalist *jihād* in Algeria

In the early decades of the 19th century, Africa was the hub of Sufi revival movements.¹⁸⁹ The most prominent Sufi orders that took part in this movement in western Algeria were the Darqāwa and the Tijāniyya Sufi orders that actually initiated several revolts against Ottoman administration of Algeria.¹⁹⁰ As mentioned earlier, both ‘Abd al-Qādir’s grandfather, Muṣṭafā al-Mukhtār as well as his father, Muḥyī al-Dīn had played an important role in the Sufi revival movement and the reviving of the Qādiriyya Sufi order in Western Algeria.¹⁹¹ At the heart of these Sufi revival movements was the belief that the political downfall of Muslims on the one hand and the progress of European powers on the other was a sign for the Divine displeasure on Muslims about the tyrannical rule and the moral corruption of the Muslim societies. As the only way to

¹⁸⁷ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*.

¹⁸⁸ Tom Woerner-Powell, “‘Abd Al-Qādir Al-Jazā’irī, Migration, and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Certain Persons of Distinction,” *Studia Islamica* 106, no. 2 (2011): 214–240.

¹⁹⁰ Amira K. Bennison, *Jihād and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria* (Routledge, 2003), 75.

¹⁹¹ Bennison, 75.

throw out the infidel enemy was regarded the restoration of Islamic values in the government and the society.¹⁹² This understanding lead to a formulation of a new interpretation of *jihād*, which was to initiate *jihād* both against the external enemy as well as against the Muslim opponents of an envisaged *sharī'a* state.¹⁹³ This was the intellectual atmosphere in which Abd al-Qādir's idea of *jihād* developed. Abd al-Qādir's was of the view that only remedy to current situation is the restoration of Islamic values in society and in rule. Therefore, first and foremost task of Abd al-Qādir was the establishment of the *sharī'a* state. Abd al-Qādir express his ideas in his speeches, letters and in writings as I will present some of them below.

As the extract from Abd al-Qādir's first speech after becoming Amir in November 1832 suggests, the formulation of a *sharī'a* based state as well as the fight against the infidels, both are targets in his concept of *jihād*:

“I accept this position of Amir, although with reluctance, hoping it will be a vehicle for uniting the Muslims, for preventing strife and dissension among them. for assuring the safety of the roads, for terminating activities which are contrary to the pure Sharia, for protecting the country from the enemy, and for establishing law and justice for the powerful and for the feeble alike [...] Know that my utmost goal is the unification of the Islamic community and the execution of the Islamic practices. In all this my trust is in Allah.”¹⁹⁴

This passage shows that his primary goal though is the creation of a state that enables the enforcement of the *sharī'a*, the establishment of law and justice for everyone and the implementation of the Islamic practices. The struggle against the infidel enemy gets very little

¹⁹² Bennison, 78.

¹⁹³ Hiskett, “The Nineteenth-Century Jihads in West Africa,” 1976.

¹⁹⁴ Raphael Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (Holmes & Meier New York, 1977), 72.

attention in his first speech. That the focus was on the building of a *sharīʿa* based state first, becomes more evident from ‘Abd al-Qādir’s message to the tribes of Oran on the same day:

“Know you communities of Arab and Berbers that the Islamic rule and the execution of the rites of Islam now reverted to Abd al-Qādir [...] He became our Amir, responsible for the upholding of the bounds (hudud) of Sharia. He will not order the subjects to do anything ordained by the pure Sharia.”¹⁹⁵

The trusted companion of ‘Abd al-Qādir, Muḥammad Ruwayla, who wrote the constitution of Abd al-Qādir’s army also expresses this view:

“He came to the assistance of the religion of his prophet, our Lord Muhammad – peace be upon him – and he gathered what forces he could against the unbelievers, and he used his judgement (ijtihad) to restore the Muhammadan community (al-milla al-muhammadiyya). He spent the most precious years of his life on this, fighting in the path of God [...] God made him ruler of His lands from Wajda to Tunis and he propagated the rulings of the Sharia after they had been swept away.”¹⁹⁶

Besides the primary goal of establishing a *sharīʿa* based state, a further aspect, which is also relevant within the wider context of the Sufi revival movements is addressed by ‘Abd al-Qādir: the initiation of *jihād* against those Muslims, who do not accept the own interpretation of an Islamic order.¹⁹⁷ Thus, ‘Abd al-Qādir labelled the Muslim rivals, who did not acknowledge his rule as *mufsid*s (corrupt). Immediately after the pledge of allegiance (*bayʿa*) ‘Abd al-Qādir wrote letters to the Oran tribes to expand his rule. He asked the tribes to accept him as a legitimate ruler and the leader of *jihād*. He also said that the inability to accept him as a *jihād* leader and ruler will be considered as an act of *fasād* (rebellion).¹⁹⁸ To strengthen his claim to declare the Muslim rivals,

¹⁹⁵ Danziger, 72.

¹⁹⁶ Ruwayla, Muhammad, ‘*Wushat al-makatib wa zinat al-jaysh al-muhammadi al-ghalib*’, D1542, Bibliotheque Generale, Rabat, 6–7.

¹⁹⁷ Hiskett, “The Nineteenth-Century Jihād s in West Africa”, 134.

¹⁹⁸ Bennison, *Jihād and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco*, 81.

who opposed him as rebels, ‘Abd al-Qādir twice sent a series of questions and seeking a *fatwā* against his opponents, first in late 1836 and later in 1839.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, ‘Abd al-Qādir sent a questionnaire in which he asked the ‘*ulamā*’ of Fez to confirm his opinion about the people, who are opposing his rule. In his reply, the famous Moroccan scholar ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-*Tasūlī* (d. 1861) firstly elaborated on the principle that an *imām* has the right to punish those, who undermine the wellbeing of the *umma*. Al-*Tasūlī* argued that God placed the responsibility of enforcing the *sharī‘a* in the society on the shoulders of the *imām*, because if a community fails to adhere to the *sharī‘a*, it would lead to the destruction of the faith. He argued that the *imām* is the representative of God on earth. Therefore, if a Muslim fails to obey God’s representative on Earth when he is commanded to fight or by refusing to pay taxes, he becomes a rebel and the *imām* has the authority to fight against him and seize his property.²⁰⁰

The second *fatwā*, dating from 1839 also declared those subjects as rebels, who opposed to the ruler, however, it also stated that the ruler should avoid killing the rebels as much as possible.²⁰¹

In ‘Abd al-Qādir’s idea of *jihād*, the establishment of *sharī‘a* based state was so important that ‘Abd al-Qādir could get the help of infidel to consolidate his state and to fight against the opponents of his *sharī‘a* state. As Raphael Danziger argues that one motivation behind ‘Abd al-Qādir’s peace treaties with French authorities was to get their support to fight against his rivals.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Zā‘ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā‘ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 2 vols. (Egypt: al-Iskandarīyah, 1903), 244.

²⁰⁰ Ali al-Tasūlī, *Ajwiba ‘ala as’ilat Al Amir ‘Abdulqadir Al Jaza’iri* by A. Tsuli (Beirut: DAR AL-GHARB AL-ISLAMI, 1996) 88.

²⁰¹ ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Zā‘ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā‘ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 387-9.

²⁰² Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, P 87.

In 1843, ‘Abd al-Qādir wrote a *risāla* (treaties) in order to explain his views to the people who lived under the rule of the infidels. In ‘Abd al-Qādir’s biography by his son, the text bears the title *Husām al-dīn li-qat’i shabah al-murtaddīn*.²⁰³ The *risāla* is a reply to questions asked by different persons about the obligation of the migration from the territory of the infidels. However, the text actually does not answer the question, but informs on the broader issues by contextualizing the question of migration. The *risāla* was written in the context, when ‘Abd al-Qādir was losing his fight against the French, as he had lost much of his support from the tribes as they pledged their allegiance to the French establishment, furthermore, the treaty of Tafna was terminated by the French administration, and after ‘Abd al-Qādir had lost the *zmala* (a vast tent city able to move).²⁰⁴ Although the main theme of the *risāla* is focusing on the question of migration, however, the content suggests that it is ‘Abd al-Qādir’s attempt to justify the war against those Muslims who submitted to the French rule. Thus, Tom Woerner-Powell states, “‘Abd al-Qādir’s treatise on migration is tantamount to a declaration of war against those Muslims who willingly subject themselves to rule by France.”²⁰⁵

‘Abd al-Qādir perceived the conquest of the regions formerly ruled by Muslims by non-Muslims as *fitna* (trial) by God against the Muslims. He perceived it as God’s test of the faith of the believers in order to differentiate between the truthful and disingenuous.²⁰⁶ In the *risāla*, he quotes the prophet’s saying that “Before the Last Hour there will be commotions like pieces of a dark night, in which a man will be a believer in the morning and an infidel in the evening, or a

²⁰³ ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuhfat Al-Zā’ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā’ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 268.

²⁰⁴ Mukhtar Khamami, “Khiwar Al-Zat Wa Mualim Al-Ijtihad Ind Al-Amir ‘Abd Al-Qādir,” *Islamic Civilization Journal* 13, no. 17 (n.d.): 405–16.

²⁰⁵ Woerner-Powell, “‘Abd Al-Qādir Al-Jazā’irī, Migration, and the Rule of Law.”

²⁰⁶ ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuhfat Al-Zā’ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā’ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 268.

believer in the evening and infidel in the morning.”²⁰⁷ Thus, ‘Abd al-Qādir argues that the last day has come and the situation around him is the application of the saying of the prophet.²⁰⁸

‘Abd al-Qādir divided the Muslims, who lived under the rule of infidels into two categories. Firstly, those, who submitted their allegiance to the infidels and aided them, and secondly, those who did not. Those who pledged their allegiance to the infidels and aided them, were to be killed.

“If he supports them materially and they take from him taxes or his pledge of allegiance to them which give comfort to them even the littlest bit—then, says the Qādī Ibn al-Hāj al-Tujini al-Andalūsi, that legal principle dictate that material aid makes licit that material, and spiritual aid makes licit the souls. Imām al-Maghili, in his *Masābih al-Falāh* said that kill them and seize their property, even if they read the Qur’ān.”²⁰⁹

If a person living under infidel rule is capable of fighting, but still remains under infidel rule, the person is not to be considered a Muslim.²¹⁰ However, those, who are unable to leave the infidel land are excused, if they have the intention of migration.

“God - the Most nigh - does not excuse dwelling under the protective compact of the un-believer, except for him who is unable to escape and who cannot take to any road, such as a blind man who can find no-one to guide him or the invalid with none to bear him away.”²¹¹

‘Abd al-Qādir argues in his *risāla* based on Quranic verses, sayings of the prophets and pre-modern Islamic scholarship. As ‘Abd al-Qādir was a follower of the Mālikī school of jurisprudence, he quoted several Mālikī scholars to prove his points as well as some Shāfi‘ī scholars.

²⁰⁷ Abu Dawood and Sulaiman bin Ashath, “Sunan Abu Dawood,” *Dar Ihya Turath, Beirut, Lebnon, ND, Dress*, 1981, Book 37, Hadith 20.

²⁰⁸ ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Zā’ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā’ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 269.

²⁰⁹ Woerner-Powell, “‘Abd Al-Qādir Al-Jazā’irī, Migration, and the Rule of Law.”

²¹⁰ ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Zā’ir Fī Tārīkh Al-Jazā’ir Wa-Al-Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir*, 270.

²¹¹ ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir, 270.

Furthermore, the terms used by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir to describe his father’s opponents also indicate the opinion of ‘Abd al-Qādir about them. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir calls them *khawārij*, *murtād* and *fasād*. The tribes, who first gave their allegiance to ‘Abd al-Qādir and then broke it, were called *murtād* (apostate). *Khawārij* (a term, used for the group that revolted against the authority of the fourth caliph ‘Alī) and *ahl al-fasād* (people of rebellion) both were considered not only as enemies of the Muslim ruler but as enemies of Islam.²¹²

Another evidence, which strengthens the argument is ‘Abd al-Qādir’s attitude towards Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, the sultan of Morocco. ‘Abd al-Qādir’s pledged allegiance to Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān right after he was elected as Amir in 1832.²¹³ However, later in the 1840ies, when Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was unable to support ‘Abd al-Qādir military *jihād* against French authorities and signed a peace treaty with them, ‘Abd al-Qādir began to challenge his legitimacy.²¹⁴ ‘Abd al-Qādir argued that Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s failure to wage *jihād* against the enemy made his rule illegitimate.²¹⁵ This is the same argument which was brought up by the ‘*ulamā*’ of Fez for the legitimization of Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s claims over Tlemcen.²¹⁶

Again, to declare war against what he perceived *mufsid*, ‘Abd al-Qādir solicited fatwa from Egyptian Mufti Muhammad ‘Illaysh (d. 1882) which criticized Sultan for not doing a lawful *jihād* and allowed ‘Abd al-Qādir to wage *jihād* against Moroccan Sultan.²¹⁷

²¹² Bennison, *Jihād and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco*, 79.

²¹³ Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 82.

²¹⁴ Amira K. Bennison, “‘Abd Al-Qādir’s Jihād in the Light of the Western Islamic Jihād Tradition,” *Studia Islamica* 106, no. 2 (2011): 196–213.

²¹⁵ Bennison, 81.

²¹⁶ al-Slawi al-Nasiri and ibn Maid. Ahmad, *Kitab Al-Istisqa Li-Akhbar Duwwal Al-Maghrib Al-Aqsa*, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Casablanca: Dar al-Kitab, 1955), V 2, P26.

²¹⁷ Benjamin Claude Brower, “The Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir and the ‘Good War’ in Algeria, 1832-1847,” *Studia Islamica* 106, no. 2 (2011): 169–195.

5.3 Spiritual *jihad* in Damascus

However, ‘Abd al-Qādir idea of *jihād* transformed from military *jihād* to spiritual *jihād* when he came to Damascus after being imprisoned for five years in France. ‘Abd al-Qādir arrived in Damascus in 1856 and stayed there for next twenty-seven years until his death.²¹⁸

Upon arrival of ‘Abd al-Qādir in Damascus, the Sufi order Naqshbandīyya-Khālidiyya was very active in spreading the reformist spiritual thought throughout the Ottoman Empire.²¹⁹ The Sufi order founded by Shaykh Khālīd Baghdādī (d.1827) was deeply involved in generating a religious awakening in Damascus.²²⁰ As mentioned before, ‘Abd al-Qādir met Shaykh Khālīd during his hajj pilgrimage and Shaykh Khālīd allowed him in to the Naqshbandī path. He enrolled him under the mentorship of his deputy Muhammad Al-khānī who mentored ‘Abd al-Qādir for four months.²²¹ Right after ‘Abd al-Qādir’s arrival in Damascus, ‘Abd al-Qādir rekindled his affiliation with Muhammad al-khānī and joined Naqshbandīyya-Khālidiyya.²²² Upon Muhammad al-khānī request, ‘Abd al-Qādir started to give lecture to his disciples on Islamic sciences, Mālikite jurisprudence and Sufism. ‘Abd al-Qādir’s ‘magnum opus’ the “*Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī al-Tasawwuf wa al-Wa‘z wa-al-Irshād*” was the final product of these lectures.²²³ This is the only source of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s understanding of Sufism. In one of these lectures ‘Abd al-Qādir presented a critical view of *jihād* as an armed struggle and its place in Islamic practices.

²¹⁸ John W. Kiser, *Commander of the Faithful: The Life and Times of Emir Abd El-Kader* (Monkfish Book Publishing, 2010), 274.

²¹⁹ Itzhak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Brill, 2000), 120.

²²⁰ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century,” *Die Welt Des Islams*, no. 1/4 (1982), 1–36.

²²¹ Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, 127.

²²² Ibid., 127.

²²³ ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Al-Mawāqif Fī Al-Tasawwuf Wa Al-Wa‘z Wa-Al-Irshād* (Beirut: Dār Al-Kotob Al-Ilmiyāh, 2004), 2.

Contrary to the Sufi revivalist movements which adopted to use military *jihād* against the corrupt rulers, the Naqshbandīyya-Khālīdīyya order chose to play spiritual role in ensuring the just nature of the ruler. Shaykh Khālīd maintained his adherence of the traditional Sufi attitude towards politics and considered any resistance to the government as a sin.²²⁴ Although he believed that “the righteousness of the kings and ministers... is the righteousness of the people, and their corruption... is the corruption of all the subjects,” he, therefore, also blamed Muslim rulers for the political decline of Islam.²²⁵ However, the idea to start a domestic *jihād* against the Muslim ruler did not convince him.²²⁶ Hostile to Sufi revival and Wahābi tendencies of taking arms against the Muslim rulers,²²⁷ Shaykh Khālīd ordered his deputies to treat the rulers with respect and pray on behalf of them.²²⁸ In his attempt to understand the cause for the decline of political rule of Islam and the Muslim rulers, Shaykh Khālīd expresses his view by stating that the Muslims have lost their spirituality and are caught into the clutches of *dunyā* ("materiality") and, therefore, the only remedy is to spiritually revitalize these societies.²²⁹

Trained in such an atmosphere, ‘Abd al-Qādir adopted a reformist approach rather than revivalist. According to Weismann, ‘Abd al-Qādir found “The Lock to the Key” in the ‘Path of the Sufis’. ‘Abd al-Qādir argued for the interpretation of Quran which neither revoked the literal meaning nor Sufis say that only their interpretation is valid one.²³⁰ ‘Abd al-Qādir contended for the interpretation of Quran which neither contradicts the Islamic establish tradition nor it

²²⁴ Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, 50.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 50

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 50

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 53.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 53

²²⁹ John Curry and Erik Ohlander, *Sufism and Society: Arrangements of the Mystical in the Muslim World, 1200–1800*, vol. 12 (Routledge, 2012), 56.

²³⁰ Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, 175.

exclusively based on reasoning.²³¹ Here after adopting this reformist approach, ‘Abd al-Qādir critically reviewed his idea of military *jihād* against the corrupt rulers which was the core aspect of the revivalist movements.

The idea of Sufi revivalist movements in North Africa was used to establish a moral and just Islamic society and state.²³² ‘Abd al-Qādir who had accepted this idea earlier, now changed his views and argued that it is duty of the ruler and not the Sufis to remove evil by using force. While interpreting the Hadith of the Prophet “He among you who observes an evil shall remove it by his hand; if this is beyond his power, [he shall remove it] by his tongue; if this is beyond his power, [he shall remove it] by his heart; and this is the minimum of faith.”²³³ ‘Abd al-Qādir asserted that it is

“incumbent upon the ruler and his governors; by tongue, upon the ulama who profess to be knowledgeable; and by heart, upon common believers who recognize the evil. Action by the first two is beneficial for the community, and action by the last is beneficial for him. The Sufis, however, do not belong in ‘Abd al-Qādir’s eyes to any of these three categories and, therefore, are not obliged to remove evil at all!”²³⁴

Following the teachings of Shaykh Khālid, ‘Abd al-Qādir stressed that Sufis should avoid indulgence in any political role. Furthermore, ‘Abd al-Qādir was offered several times to lead the Syrian independent movement and in return he was offered governorship by European consuls in Damascus. However, ‘Abd al-Qādir refused the offer every time and chose to remain outside of the realm of the politics.²³⁵

²³¹ Ibid., 176.

²³² M. Hiskett, “The Nineteenth Century Jihads in West Africa,” in *The Cambridge History of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 126.

²³³ Muslim bin Al-Hajjaj, “Sahih Muslim,” *Riyadh: Darussalam*, 2007, Hadith 34.

²³⁴ ‘Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Al-Mawāqif Fī Al-Tasawwuf Wa Al-Wa’z Wa-Al-Irshād*, 191. (Translation Itzhak Weismann)

²³⁵ Brower, “The Amīr ‘Abd Al-Qādir and the ‘Good War’ in Algeria, 1832-1847.”

During this time, ‘Abd al-Qādir also reviewed his understanding of military *jihād*. While explaining the Hadith "We have returned from the lesser *jihād* (*al-jihād al-Asghar*) to the greater *jihād* (*al-jihād al-Akbar*),²³⁶ ‘Abd al-Qādir states that the spiritual *jihad* (*jihād al-Akbar*) is better than the military *jihād* (*jihād al-asghar*). ‘Abd al-Qādir argues that the distraction of the creature of Allah, spreading bloodshed is not the purpose of Islam and wish of Allah. The *jihād al-Asghar* is only legitimate if it is done to protect Muslims from the wrongs of infidel. However, the Spiritual *jihād* and purifying one’s own soul is the purpose of Islam and wish of Allah itself.

The prophet described *jihād* against the infidel as the minor because the fighting and eliminating infidel is not the goal of itself. Destroying the creatures of Allah, annihilation of them, demolishing what Allah has built, and devastating His land is not the will of Allah. All this is against the wisdom of Allah. The only purpose of fighting is to eradicate the wrongs of infidel and protect the Muslims from them. contrary to that the Spiritual *jihād* is the purpose itself.²³⁷

However, it must be clearly noted that ‘Abd al-Qādir never rejected the idea of waging *jihād* against the enemies of Islam, unless and until they submitted their allegiance to the Muslim ruler and would agree to pay the taxes. However, he argues that for the Sufis it is extremely difficult to oblige to military *jihad*.²³⁸

5.4 Conclusion

The transformation in ‘Abd al-Qādir’s interpretation of *jihād* is the result of his personal understating of what went wrong with Muslims and what is the solution. ‘Abd al-Qādir’s conceptualization of “what went wrong” in Algeria was the divine anger because of corruption of Muslim rulers and society therefore only remedy is to establish a sharia governed state and use

²³⁶ Abu-Bakr Al-Bayhaqi, “Al-Sunan Al-Kubra,” *Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah*, Beyrouth, 1994, Hadith 384.

²³⁷ Abd al-Qādir, *Kitāb Al-Mawāqif Fī Al-Tasawwuf Wa Al-Wa’z Wa-Al-Irshād*, 133.

²³⁸ Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, 190.

force for it. However, in Damascus, the remedy in ‘Abd al-Qādir’s thought was the personal spiritual development which changed his interpretation of *jihād*.

6: CONCLUSION

‘‘Abd al-Qādir’s upbringing with exception of some weeks in Ottoman empire took place in Sufi revivalist milieu in North Africa. These Sufi revivalist movements conceptualized the decline of Muslim community as the result of moral corruption of the society and its rulers and the only remedy is to establish a sharia governed state in which their interpretation of Islamic ideals prevails. During this time the Sufi revivalist movements were playing a didactic role which produced a new interpretation of the idea of *jihād*. According to this interpretation a domestic *jihād* could be waged against the opponents of their imagined Islamic order combining it with the external *jihād* against infidel. This was the atmosphere in which ‘‘Abd al-Qādir’ idea of *jihād* was developed. ‘‘Abd al-Qādir’s *jihād* was two folded affairs; on the one hand it was *jihād* against the infidel, on the other hand it served as a weapon against the Muslims who did not accepted ‘‘Abd al-Qādir’ as *jihād* leader. For almost fifteen years ‘‘Abd al-Qādir’s theorized and practice this conception of *jihād* and managed to establish a Sharia governed state for eight years in West Algeria. However, when ‘‘Abd al-Qādir’ came to Damascus and placed himself in a reformist atmosphere of Damascus, he critically reviewed his interpretation of *jihād* and set aside himself from political affairs.

‘‘Abd al-Qādir’s variable relationship towards *jihād* exhibits that just like any other tradition *jihād* is a subject of critical impetration. Hence, in order to understand properly, *jihād* both as an idea and as a practice, should be historicized. Contextualization and historization of ‘‘Abd al-Qādir’s idea of *jihād* provides us a great model of thinker within the Muslim intellectual community who experienced the both domestic and external *jihād*, came to stress on nonmilitary *jihād*.

Given the time constraint and the limitation on the space, I could not include various French sources that could have been useful in bringing out the argument in a more nuanced way. This thesis is particularly important for historians interested in tracing of the genealogies of current interpretations of *jihād*. I would like to pursue this subject in my future in academia and would further explore in more detail the in-depth analysis of Sufi revival movements.

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