

**Food Security and Nationalism: Case of Import Substitution
Project in The Russian Federation**

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Abstract

Since 2006 Russia has been banning food goods from different post-soviet countries, such as Georgian wines and Ukrainian sweets. In 2014 Russian government banned the food import from the European Union, the USA, and Canada and made a decision to launch the Import Substitution project which aims to support domestic producers. In contrast, the international Slow-Food movement promotes protection of traditional gastronomy and sustainable agriculture all over the world. This thesis attempts to investigate how food politics can influenced on the development of national identity and how it relates to the idea of anti-globalism. To address the research goal the thesis explores the development of Russian international trade politics, the dynamics of “consumer culture” in Russian society and the correlation between international Slow-Food movement and the Import Substitution Project in the Russian Federation.

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Introduction

In 2014 after the annexation of Crimea Western governments, (the European Union, the U.S, Canada etc.) had imposed sanctions on the Russian Federation on political activists and Russian companies. After that, in August 2014 Russian government banned the food import from the European Union, the USA, and Canada. The list of banned food included meat and dairy products, fish, vegetables, fruits and nuts. Since 2006 Russia has been banning food goods from different post-soviet countries. There are cases of Georgian and Moldovan wines, Baltic fish and one of the last was the case with Ukrainian sweets and wine in 2018.

In contrast, in 1986 the strong anti-globalization movement was established in Italy. The aim of the Slow-Food movement which has become international is to promote protection of traditional gastronomy and sustainable agriculture all over the world. Nowadays the organization has expended 1300 chapters all over the world. Both of the projects are oriented on support of domestic producers and farmers but they are operating on different levels and through different initiatives.

Proposed Project Objectives

I argue that food politics is the key tool for the development of national identity that might be used both state and activists from a civil society. Thus, the thesis consists of three chapters. The aim of the first chapter is to provide the background of the food security politics in Russia and to investigate the case of the embargo through the framework of the politics of the protectionism that was started with the adoption of the Food Security Doctrine in 2010. The second part will be about the development of the “Import Substitution” Project as a base for new national ground that aims to investigate the ground of the consumer culture in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia. The third part aimed to compare the case of the international Slow-Food movement

and the case of Russian Import Substitution project in the field of food. On the one hand, the idea of the “Import Substitution” has become the new ground of national identity and relates to the global anti-globalist movements like the “Slow-Food” movement. On the other hand, the concept of Import Substitution project does not fit the discourse which had already existed in food security studies and projects like Slow-Food movement. If activists from Slow-Food movement argue about the importance of sustainable development of agriculture and the support of domestic producers, the Russian state using the protectionist politics only as a political tool.

Literature Review

When it comes to scientific research on food in the context of anti-globalization, it has a long history of being investigated by various scholars in different fields, from food security, political economics and economic nationalism to the theory of consumer choice. Important to note that there are no researches where the case of Russian countersanction’s politics and the Slow-Food movement in Italy were compared.

The concept of economic nationalism is connected with a broader theory of nationalism, but the two are not the same. Both are based on the idea of national identity while economic nationalism emphasizes using economic means to increase the power of the state. This focus may entail the limitation of foreign influence and the protection of domestic production and labor. According to Rawi Abdelai (2005)¹, economic nationalism is oriented on the priority of national (state) interests above profit and private property. Thus, decisions in the field of

¹ Rawi Abdelai, *"The Profits of Power: Commerce Andrealpolitikin Eurasia,"* Review of International Political Economy 20, no. 3 (2013)

national economies have the aim to unite the nation and to improve the power of the state. Key theories in this field were developed by Liah Greenfield (2003)² and Andreas Pickel (2003)³.

One of the important fields that relates to the research is the concept of food security which emerged after the Second World War as a principle that provides all people to get access to food:

“All people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”⁴

This principle was enshrined in different legal documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1958) and International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966). Also, the concept of food security has been using in different international organizations such as FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) and the World Bank, thus, key documents of this organizations will be used in further research.

Scholarly research that deals with food security are rather oriented on the problems of the global South rather than on cases from the global North. Even though the case of some developing countries such as Indonesia are important for further research because it provides an overview of the development of concepts of food security and food sovereignty. For example, Indonesian scholar Arianto Patunure (2018) ⁵ in his latest research investigated the negative influence of food sovereignty on Indonesian consumer culture and economics.

The most well-known Russian scholars dealing with the concept of food security in Russia are Svetlana Barsukova and Aleksey Althukov, who should be considered as pioneers of food

² Greenfeld, Liah. *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

³ Helleiner, Eric, and Andreas Pickel. *Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.

⁴ . *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, "Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: 5

⁵ Arianto Patunru, "Rising Economic Nationalism in Indonesia," *Journal of Southeast Asian Economies*, December 2018, , accessed April 12, 2019.

security studies in Russia. Svetlana Barsukova (2012)⁶ made one of the first researches in Russia about discussions on food security issues in post-soviet Russia with the focus on historical context while Althukov(2018)⁷ explored the role of different regions of the country on the realization of food security doctrine. The critique of the concept of Russian Food Security Doctrine was defined by Russian scholars Pappe and Antonenko (2012)⁸. They argued that one of the problems of the doctrine is the lack of explanation of why all components such as the food self-reliance are important for consumers. Important to note that this field has not been widely researched yet, thus, it is important to investigate approaches on definitions of food security. For instance, Russian economist M. Ksenofontov argued that there are two types of definition of food security in the country: a “positive” and a “negative”. (2017) The ground for negative definition is a list of potential threats which could face the state. The positive definition is based on the concept of “Food Well-Fare” (Prodovolstvennoe blagopoluchie) which means that the agricultural center should be developed under any conditions.

The case of food embargo has become one of the key strategies in Russian international politics, therefore, it is necessary to provide a framework of researches in the field of Russian international affairs. Modern scholar Cheng Chen (2016) The case of food embargo has become one of the key strategies in Russian international politics, therefore, it is necessary to provide a framework of researches in the field of Russian international affairs. Modern scholar Cheng Chen (2016) in his book entitled as “*The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism*” investigated the cases of the Russian embargo on wines from Georgia and Moldova. These cases are important for further research because they showed how and under

⁶ Svetlana Barsukova, "Doktrina Prodovolstvennoy Bezopasnosti: Otsenka Ekspertov," *Terra Economics* 10, no. 4 (2012).

⁷ Aleksey Althukov, “*The Role of Russia's Regions in Its Food Security*,” problems of Economic Transition. 2018, Vol. 60 Issue 5/6.

⁸ Y. Pappe, "Prodovolstvennaya Bezopasnost Rossii: Sovremennyyi Podhod," [Modern Approaches on Food Security in Russia] *Problemyi Prognozirovaniya*, 2017, 65.

which conditions the Russian government used sanctions as a political pool. Also, American researcher Chris Miller (2016)⁹ had investigated sanctions War in 2014 and its political context. The focus of his research is to explain the strategy of Russian government in international economics.

However, the case of the Russian embargo on Georgian and Moldovian wines has not widely researched neither Russian of international scholars. Thus, some quantitative dates from marketing researches of two international companies – Euromonitor International (2006)¹⁰ and Discovery Research Group will be used in the first part of this paper.

The focus of the second chapter is the Import Substitution project as a new national ground in the country and it's aimed to explain the consumer culture of the post-soviet Russian society. The culture of consumption has been researched mostly by non-Russian scientists. For example, an American anthropologist Jenifer Patico (2008)¹¹ have been conducted research on the culture of consumption in Saint Petersburg at the end of 1990s. According to her results, most of her interviewees had preferred Russian food because of the importance of patriotism. Here is important to mention the theory of banal nationalism by Michael Bilig (2018)¹² and the dialectic between remembering and forgetting to understand the development of Russian consumer culture.

The focus of the third chapter is the comparison of Slow-Food Movement which was raised in Italy and the case of Import Substitution project in the Russian Federation. For example, Italian researcher and activist Carlo Petrini (2004)¹³ argued that the future of food consumption should

⁹ "Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia on JSTOR." Accessed April 15, 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469640686_miller.

¹⁰ Euromonitor International, "Vremya Bolshih Peremen. Obzor Rossiyskogo Vinnogo Ryinka*," <https://www.sostav.ru/news/2007/04/13/1issl/>, April 13, 2007, , accessed April 13, 2019.

¹¹ Patico, Jennifer. Consumption and social change in a post-Soviet middle class. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2008. P.75

¹² Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, Los Angeles: Sage, 2018.

¹³ Carlo Petrini, *Slow Food: The Case for Taste* New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

be based on preserving traditional practices and support of local farmers and consumers and the development of the ideas of sustainable development all over the world. The case of Slow-Food movement was chosen because it represented the discourse which existed in the field of food security. Important that leaders of the Slow Food movement are also scholars, for example, Andrews,(2008)¹⁴; Sassatelli & Davolio, (2010)¹⁵ and Kjørstad, (2007).¹⁶ Moreover, the chapter aims to compare the Slow-Food Movement and the Import Substitution Project in the context of globalization. The concept of modernity which was created by British sociologist Anthony Giddens will be used.¹⁷ Thus, this chapter will help to investigate possible ways of the development of Russian Import Substitution project and to provide the context of the development of “protectionist” ideas in social science and policy-making processes.

Methodology

The thesis uses a combination of research methods, but mostly focusing on historical and legal analysis with a view to include statistical data. Historical analysis will focus on scholarly researchers, media and web sites. Since the focus of the first chapter is food security politics in the Russian Federation, various primary sources such as laws and normative directives are available, and the analysis of media will be implemented to situate the topic with the research narrative of the thesis. However, some aspects of Russian international politics have not widely researched yet, thus, quantitative data from marketing companies and Russian federal agencies will be used.

¹⁴ Andrews, Geoff. *The Slow Food Story Politics and Pleasure*. London: Pluto, 2008.

¹⁵ Sassatelli, R., & Davolio, F. (2010). Consumption, Pleasure and Politics Slow Food and the politico-aesthetic problematization of food. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 10(2), 202-232.

¹⁶ Kjørstad, I. (2007). *Slow Food. Counteracting fast food and fast living. Proceedings: cases in sustainable consumption and production: Workshop of the Sustainable Research Exchange*

¹⁷ Giddens, Anthony. *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age*. 1991.

The Food Security Politics in Post-Soviet Russia

The aim of this chapter is to introduce some of the legal and historical features of politics in the field of food security in Post-Soviet Russia. For example, some necessary terms such as the Food Security Doctrine, the embargo and the Sanction War will be explained in this part of the research. The chapter will start with an overview of the legal background and important terms of the concept of food security in post-Soviet Russia. After that, the chapter will focus on cases of food embargo in 2006 and the “Sanctions War” that happened after the crisis in Crimea in 2014 which influenced the strategy in the field of food security of the Russian Federation.

1.1 Food Politics in Russia: From Food Security to Food Sovereignty

The concept of food security emerged after the Second World War as a principle that provides all people to get access to food:

“All people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”¹⁸

This principle was enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The USSR was one of the countries who signed this convention.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the first discussions about politics in the field of food security took place in Russian parliament (*Gosduma*). The initiative came first from one of the left-wing parties and the aim was to change the situation in the agricultural industry in the country. According to this party the concept of food security should be constructed around the state as a key political agent. Thus, they defined food security as “*a number of local goods that*

¹⁸ . *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, "Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: 5

guarantee a sovereignty from food import"¹⁹ In the above definition state defined as an individual who should be protected from foreigners. This definition fits the narrative about "Ours" and "Non-Ours" good which is common in Russian consumer culture and food politics in general.

The second understanding of food security based on the idea of consumers interests. Here security means access to resources. Under the economic situation of the country, import could be justified because it provided affordability on the food market. This neoliberal position was supported by different organizations such as FAO and the World Bank. According to Russian scholar Svetlana Barsukova, this position had the only ideological argument against the politics of protectionism. As a result, the discussion did not have any legal outcome:

"Even leftists could not ignore the logic of neoliberals in the parliament: economic conditions did not provide any opportunity for self-reliance in the country. Therefore, the reduction of import can result in social upheavals"²⁰

The next attempt to discuss the concept of "Food Security" in the parliament happened in 2008. The Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF) created a draft law entitled as "About the State Politics in the Field of Food Security" but they were not successful because the government was focused on negotiations with World Trade Organization about Russian's membership.

Finally, in 2010 the Food Security Doctrine (*Doktrina Prodovolstvennoy Bezopasnosti*) was adopted and still applies in Russia. According to this doctrine, the main aim of food security is to provide access for the population to safety agricultural and marine products. This goal will be achieved in case of the stability of local producers and the availability of necessary stocks

¹⁹ Svetlana Barsukova, "Doktrina Prodovolstvennoy Bezopasnosti: Otsenka Ekspertov," *Terra Economics* 10, no. 4 (2012): 38.

²⁰ Svetlana Barsukova, "Doktrina Prodovolstvennoy Bezopasnosti: Otsenka Ekspertov," [*The food Security Doctrine: the Expert's Review*] *Terra Economics* 10, no. 4 (2012): 39

in the country.²¹ The “availability of necessary stocks” relates to medical norms that are recommended by the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation. Thus, the doctrine provides three criteria for aiming food security of the country: the quality of the food, the access of the population for the food and the share of local production. The criteria shows that the doctrine is less politicized compared to drafts that were discussed by politicians in the 1990s. Furthermore, it is more orientated of satisfaction of needs both Russian citizens and local businesses.

One of the reasons that influenced the content of the doctrine is the growth of the agricultural sector, according to Barsukova:

“Since the 2000 the value share of agricultural sector has grown, especially, poultry and pig farming. Even during 2009 the growth of the agricultural sector was 1,2%.”²²

In the first version of the doctrine, one of the key terms is “food independency” (Prodovolstvennaya nezavisimost) was defined as:

“sustainable domestic production, while food security refers the physical and economic availability of safe foodstuffs for every citizen.”²³

It is important to note that production should be located in the country and this understanding is not common in Western countries or international organizations. According to the methodology that was adopted by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), self-reliance is not a necessary condition for food security even it is one of the key indicators that measure the current state of food security. Moreover, FAO argued there are differences between the terms “food security” and “food sovereignty”:

²¹ Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 30.01.2010 N 120 "Ob utverzhdenii Doktrinyi prodovolstvennoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii" [Decree N120 On Approval of Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation] (2010). 6

²² Ibid., 40

²³ Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 30.01.2010 N 120 "Ob utverzhdenii Doktrinyi prodovolstvennoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii" [Decree N120 On Approval of Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation] (2010). 8

“Food security referred to a condition regarding access to adequate food, while discussions of food sovereignty were more explicitly political in seeking to address inadequate access to food and land rights. over time, the two concepts have increasingly been referred to as oppositional rather than relational to one another. This has resulted in an ideological debate that is in many ways more confusing than helpful to policy dialogue”²⁴

The concept of “Food Sovereignty” has been used since the 1990s in laws of some developing countries such as Brazil or Indonesia. For instance, in Indonesia, the concept of food sovereignty was realized through the politics of protectionism. This country is one of the key rice importers in the world but imports have been banned since 2004.²⁵ Indonesian researcher Arianto Patunure argued the policy resulted in a negative effect even the import ban aimed at the development of local producers and agricultural sector in general. According to Patunure, the price of the domestic rice has become high and it hurt some poor consumers in the country.²⁶

Important to note that in 2015 the new version of the doctrine was adopted in the Russian Federation. According to this version, the concept of “food sovereignty” is equal to “food self-reliance”.²⁷ It means that the country can be considered as independent in terms of access to food only if the economics of the country is able to meet consumption needs from own production rather than by importing food. The level of self-reliance was increased in all fields of food production, for example, 90% for sugar and oil while in the previous version of the doctrine 80% was a sufficient number.²⁸ This doctrine was adopted after the “Sanction-War” with the European Union that resulted in total embargo of food from this region. Overall, Russian doctrine in both versions can be considered as a compromise between the left and the

²⁴ "Agricultural Policies and Commodity Markets," 2008, 20.

²⁵ Arianto Patunru, "Rising Economic Nationalism in Indonesia," Journal of Southeast Asian Economies, December 2018, , accessed April 12, 2019. 150

²⁶ Ibid., 340

²⁷ Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 30.01.2015 N 130 "Ob utverzhdenii Doktrinyi prodovolstvennoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii" [Decree N120 On Approval of Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation] (2015). 10

²⁸ Ibid., 15

right positions. The new Food Security Doctrine shows that the idea of food sovereignty and the thesis about affordability should be equal and important goals for Russian politics.

The next important feature of Russian Food Security Doctrine is the lack of explanation of reasons for all components such as the food self-reliance being important for consumers. Russian researchers Pappe and Antonenko argue that this is one of the weaknesses of the doctrine.²⁹

Moreover, even the embargo was imposed the food sovereignty as it defined in the Doctrine it could not satisfy the needs of all citizens in the country because there are many types of non-food goods, such as seeds and equipment that complicated to replace with local analogs. Important to note that Russia can face external and internal risks in the field of global food markets. The growth of global prices on different types of agricultural goods is the main external challenge that could result in the reorientation of local producers on export, therefore, there is a chance of the growth of local prices or the lack of food for Russian consumers.³⁰

The concept of food security in post-Soviet Russia has a long history of being explored by various scholars. For instance, Russian economist M. Ksenofontov argued that there are two types of definition of food security in the country: a “positive” and a “negative”. The ground for negative definition is a list of potential threats which could face the state. The positive definition is based on the concept of “Food Well-Fair” (*Prodovolstvennoe blagopoluchie*) which means that the agricultural center should be developed under any conditions. The idea of “Food Well-Fare” can be defined in two different ways. The first option is the orientation of the state consumer needs. It means that the “well-fare” as access to food should become the key

29 Y. Pappe, "Prodovolstvennaya Bezopasnost Rossii: Sovremennyyi Podhod," [Modern Approaches on Food Security in Russia] *Problemy Prognozirovaniya*, 2017, 65.

³⁰ Ibid., 66.

aim of food politics in Russia. The second option is about the idea of the consumer basket and this option is the ground for the Doctrine. As a result, the concept of the consumer basket become the ground for policymaking.³¹

According to Ksenofontov, the concept of “well-fair” might become the best solution for discussions about the creation of new food security strategy because, first of all, the term has a neutral connotation in contrast to the concept of “food sovereignty. Secondary, this concept provides a framework for discussions. Different criteria such as a group of consumers or a consumer basket can be discussed among both scholars and politicians.

Also, one of the external events that shows the realization of principles of the doctrine was the process of Russian accession to the WTO (World Trade Organization). The negotiations have begun in 1993 and finally, Russia joined the WTO in August 2012. It is important to note that this initiative was not supported by business and society, as a result, the huge anti-WTO movement was established:

“Agricultural producers argued that the obligations to be assumed by Russia under WTO rules were a threat to the country’s food security. Representatives of agricultural business insisted that there was an either/or alternative: either WTO accession or Russia’s food security”³²

According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, in 2002 approximately half of the population supported WTO accession and by summer 2012 this number dropped by 25%.³³

Local producers considered membership in WTO as a threat that came from the reduction of future import duties and possible cut of the support for domestic farmers and agricultural business. One of the key cases was the case with pig farming who benefited from domestic support:

³¹ Ibid.,. 68.

³² Svetlana Barsukova, "Doktrina Prodoovolstvennoy Bezopasnosti: Otsenka Ekspertov," [*The food Security Doctrine: the Expert's Review*] *Terra Economics* 10, no. 4 (2012): 39.

³³ VCIOM Poll: Opinion of Russians about the World Trade Organization. 2012. Available at: <http://gtmarket.ru/news/2012/08/27/4916>. (In Russian.)

“Pig farmers, once the main beneficiaries of the AIC Development project reputed to be the drivers of agriculture, were faced with a fait accompli: duty on imports of live pigs was reduced eightfold (from 40% to 5%), while in-quota imports of frozen pork became duty-free”³⁴

Currently, in Russia, the main type of agricultural organization is an “agroholding” a set of agrarian companies operation at least 10 thousand hectares. For instance, in 2006 less than 1% of agrarian companies owned half all pig and seed markets, according to Russian researcher Davydova.³⁵ The development of these organization is higher compare to the Soviet collective farms (kolkhozy) because they include not only farms but transport and business unites. Moreover, after the financial crises in 1998 agrarian industry has become popular in the country and the state launched new projects of financial support of this industry. Also, Svetlana Barsukova argued that the system of agroholdings is the outcome of institutional environment in the country: the support from the state and the lack of institutes for medium-size companies are leading to the development of large agrarian corporations.³⁶ This system explains why some of companies, for example, pig farms supported the government on the discussions about membership at WTO.

However, the name of the movement was “Stop WTO” and it was the first time when the patriotic rhetoric was used in discussions about food security. One of the projects of the movement was the creation of the agency entitled as the “Russian National Line” (*Russkaya Natsionalnaya Liniya*). The aim of the agency was to provide “real truth” about the process of negotiations with the WTO. The base for the rhetoric related to the lack of trust towards

³⁴ Ibid., 45.

³⁵ Davydova I., Franks J. (2015) The Rise and Rise of Large Farms: Why Agroholdings Dominate Russia’s Agricultural Sector // *Mir Rossii*. Vol. 24. No. 3. 140.

³⁶ Barsukova, Svetlana. "The Dilemma of the “Farmers vs Agricultural Holdings” in the Context of Import Substitution." *Social Science and Modernity*5 (2016): 65-73. Accessed April 4, 2019.

international organizations. According to Russian researcher Galina Zabolotnaya, international organizations represented Western ideas such as the ideas of liberal democracy and were perceived as outsiders to the old Soviet political culture. Thus, any international organization was seen as “agents” of foreign western countries which may influence at the expense of a new Russian state.³⁷ One of their arguments against the WTO was that the membership in WTO contradicts to food security doctrine and politics in the Russian Federation. It shows the contradiction between the Food Security doctrine and acts of Russian authorities.

Overall the situation with the creation of the Food Security Doctrine is ambiguous: on the one hand, the main thesis of the doctrine is not only to provide access for healthy food for citizens but also achieve food reliance as a liberation from import. On the other, the government made a decision to join WTO that is oriented on the development of international trade, which was not supported by all domestic farmers and rose “patriotic” rhetoric about the food security in the country.

1.2. The Sanctions War in 2014: Political Games or The Rise of Protectionism?

In 2014 after the annexation of Crimea some western governments, (the European Union, the U.S, Canada, etc.) had imposed sanctions on the Russian Federation on political activists and Russian public corporations. After that, in August 2014 the Russian government banned the food import from European countries, Canada, the USA, and Canada. This case was not the first time when Western countries imposed restrictions on trade with Russia. For example, the US trade with the USSR was limited in 1974 because of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The idea of this Amendment was to put pressure on the USSR to respect human rights, particularly

³⁷ Galina M. Zabolotnaya, "Social and Political Capital of Civil Society in the Conditions of Post-communist Transition: Regional Aspect," *The Public Sphere, Civil Society, and Power*, 2008, 46.

with the case of Soviet Jewry.³⁸ The Soviet Union did not provide an opportunity for Soviet Jewry to leave the country and to resettle in Israel that contradicted to the freedom of emigration. After the year when the Jackson-Vanik Amendment came into force almost half of a million of Jewish people got a chance to leave the USSR.³⁹

At the same time, Russia has been using embargo as a political tool since the 2000s. Sanctions were imposed mostly on the Post-Soviet countries when those countries were focused more on cooperation with the West rather than with Russia. For instance, in 2006 the Russian food agency Rospotrebnadzor imposed a ban on wines from Moldova and Georgia that resulted in a diplomatic conflict between countries.⁴⁰ According to Rospotrebnadzor, the quality of wine did not satisfy Russian standards, moreover, some of the wines were falsified alcoholic beverages labeled as wines. The Georgian state argued that the problem was with the low control and food standards in the Russian market, as a result, it had easy access for low-quality products.⁴¹

Important that Russia was a key market for Georgia: 80% of all Georgian wine companies exported wine to Russia, as a result, some companies faced ruin.⁴² The political context of Russian-Georgian relations could become the reason for this anti-Georgian campaign. For example, this period was well-known for the development of the partnership between Georgia and the European Union. At the same time, Russia was not the member of the World Trade Organization yet, thus, any of external agents such as, for example, the EU, could not take any

³⁸ The Jackson-Vanik Amendment in Perspective," *The SHAFR Guide Online*

³⁹ Noam Kochavi, "Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, Soviet Jewish Emigration, and the Demise of Detente*," *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 3 (2005): , doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00501.x.

⁴⁰ Cheng Chen, *"The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism, 2000–15*. Ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. 15

⁴¹ "Russian Wine Move Draws Protests," BBC, accessed April 11, 2019, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4860454.stm>.

⁴² Ibid.,.

measures of the quality of wine in case of Moldova. After 2013 the ban was canceled and both countries have started exporting wine to Russia. However, in both cases Russia was only the country who imposed the ban on production: both Georgia and Moldova have been exporting production in different regions of the post-soviet space for a long time and did not face any problems with the quality of beverages.⁴³

The case with wine from Moldova had two stages in 2006 and in 2013. In 2006 Russia embraced one-year embargo on Moldavian wine because of its low quality like in the case with Georgia. In 2013 the Rospotrebnadzor had found traces of plastic in Moldavian wine, as a result, the wine was banned again. Important that in 2013 Moldova was going to sign a Trade Agreement with the European Union, thus, this ban aimed to put political pressure on Moldova rather than to develop the domestic wine industry. According to the research by marketing company Euromonitor International, the value share of domestic wine was approximately 25% and there were no external factors that could influence the development of the market:

“For the last 10-15 years, the number of vineyards has been reduced, thus, domestic companies relied on import. In 2006 Russia imported different types of wines from more than 35 countries. At the same time, the sales of domestic wine declined while the demand on elite wines from Europe and the New World has been grown.”⁴⁴

The case shows that even local businesses were more oriented on the import of wines rather than on the development of local production because of consumer behavior. Moreover, during this time the discourse about “food-sovereignty” did not exist in Russian politics, even the Food Doctrine will be adopted later in 2010.

Here is also important to mention predictions of the development of this market in this period. For example, an agency Euromonitor International expected the process of replacement of

⁴³ "Russian Wine Move Draws Protests," BBC, accessed April 11, 2019, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4860454.stm>.

⁴⁴ Euromonitor International, "Vremya Bolshih Peremen. Obzor Rossiyskogo Vinnogo Ryinka*," <https://www.sostav.ru/news/2007/04/13/1issl/>, April 13, 2007, , accessed April 13, 2019.

Moldavian and Georgian wines by some Eastern European countries, for example by Macedonia or Armenia.⁴⁵ The reason was a price category of wines from this region: they are only the one who is close to Moldovan or Georgian wines. This prediction was not absolutely accurate: banned wines were replaced by wines from Bulgaria, where the value share has grown from 7,6% to 15,8% and wines from Western Europe (France and Spain) where the growth was approximately 10%, according to research by Discovery Research Group.⁴⁶

Actually, during this period the Russian government did not adopt any laws that could protect domestic wine producers. Thus, the situation with the embargo of wines from Georgia and Moldova can be considered as an international political action rather than the support of local industry.

After the case with Crimea Western countries-imposed sanctions on Russian companies in July 2014. There were sanctions from the side of the U.S, Australia, Canada, and the European Union. The “sanction war” started as a ban on Russian energy firms and state-owned banks such as VTB or Gazprombank in the United States. After that, the European Union also followed with its sanctions toward Russian financial companies. As a result, Russia has decided to impose “countersanctions” and to forbid the food export from the US, the European Union, Canada, and Australia.

In 2014 Putin signed the Order 560 entitled as “*On Special Economic Measures to Protect the Russian Federation’s Security*” According to the first version of the order the duration of the embargo was only one year and covered only the US and the EU. Overall, the process of implementation of the food ban had three key stages. In 2014 the was imposed against the US

⁴⁵ Euromonitor International, "Vremya Bolshih Peremen. Obzor Rossiyskogo Vinnogo Ryinka*," <https://www.sostav.ru/news/2007/04/13/1issl/>, April 13, 2007, accessed April 13, 2019.

⁴⁶ Discovery Research Group, “Issledovanie ryinka vina”, <https://www.press-release.com.ua/content/view/1943/>, June 6, 2007, accessed April 13, 2019

and the EU, in 2015 its influence was expanded on Albania, Iceland, and Lichtenstein and finally on Ukraine.

The list of products from “punished” countries which are prohibited for import into Russia for the year was created in 2014. The list included different categories of goods: meat, fish, dairy products, fruits, vegetables, nuts, and prepared products (except for vitamin and mineral additives).⁴⁷ In 2016 salt was added to the list and the embargo was extended.

The aim was the same as in the case of Georgia and Moldova – to put political pressure on Western countries. However, American scholar Chris Miller argued that “countersanctions” could not have any strong influence on the economics of the United States:

“Only 1 percent of U.S. agricultural exports were sent to Russia, so sanctions had an even less significant effect on America”⁴⁸

The situation for the European Union was not the same as for the US. In 2013 the value share of imported food (dairy products, meat and vegetables) on Russian market from Norway, Germany and the Netherlands were 26,8% Even though, the ban has not become a threat for the development of agricultural sector of the European Union:

“Compared to the equivalent period one year before, overall EU agri-food exports to Russia between August 2014 and May 2015 decreased from € 9.4 billion to € 5.4 billion (-43 %). This was the result of the near complete disappearance of exports within the banned product categories and a slight decrease for products not subject to the ban, the latter partly driven by

⁴⁷ "Amended List of Products Banned from Import to Russia." October 27, 2017. Accessed April 12, 2019. <http://government.ru/en/docs/29853/>.

⁴⁸ "Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia on JSTOR." Accessed April 15, 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469640686_miller.

the devaluation of the Russian ruble. At the same time, however, total EU agri-food exports to third countries increased in value by 4.8 %”⁴⁹

Moreover, farmers from the European Union got an opportunity to find new markets for a product that previously was exported to the Russian Federation. According to Chris Miller, the “Sanction War” aimed to get support from the agricultural lobby in the European Union:

“If they [European Farmers] turned against sanctions on Russia, one might surmise, support for sanctions in Europe would decline. This has happened to a certain extent, but the utility of agricultural lobbies as an antisandictions force was not as significant as Russia apparently hoped.”⁵⁰

However, under certain conditions when countersanctions have not become a threat on European economics, Russian government has decided to show that sanctions can benefit on the development of domestic farmers and producers:

"We have imposed the embargo not to annoy our Western partners but mainly to develop our economy. Russian businesses asked us not to cancel it because of the opportunities they have”⁵¹

This political strategy can be considered as protectionism. There is no formal definition exists either in laws or academia of “protectionism”. Thus, there is a need to identify the most appropriate for further research approaches. French historian Paul Bairoch argued that protectionism is a type of economic policy that aims the restriction imports from foreign countries.⁵² The implementation of quotas in on special categories of goods or embargo are the most common strategies of protectionism.

⁴⁹ Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia on JSTOR." Accessed April 15, 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469640686_miller.

⁵⁰ Ibid.,. 45

⁵¹ "Medvedev Says EU Food Embargo Remains in Response to Anti-Russian Sanctions," Russian Today, December 15, 2016, , accessed April 14, 2019, <https://www.rt.com/business/370415-medvedev-food-embargo-stays/>.

⁵² Paul Bairoch, "Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes," Bibliovault.org, , accessed April 15, 2019, <http://www.bibliovault.org/BV.book.epl?ISBN=9780226034621>.

However, in the case of Russia where the value share of European products on Russian market was approximately 30%, the embargo contradicts to the aim of the food doctrine to provide access to resources for all citizens of the country. According to Russian scholar Svetlana Barsukova, the idea of the government to focus on agricultural policy is the outcome of economical external factors. First of all, 2014 was the year with the collapse of the oil market, thus, the government was looking for new opportunities in terms of export. Secondary, the unstable situation of the Russian currency has become a threat to food imports from other partners, such as Argentina or Brazil. Also, the government expected that because of the weak currency income of the households will fall:

“Agriculture is among the few sectors where import substitution can be promising due to the availability of resources (fresh water, fertile land, etc.) and low-income elasticity of demand for food, which means that people will buy food even if their income falls in the coming recession.”⁵³

Overall, the sanctions have become important tool for Russian government to put pressure on different countries: from Georgia and Moldova in 2006 to the European Union in 2014. Even the embargo aimed to “punish” the EU in the beginning, it became the start for the realization of the principles of the Food Security (Sovereignty) Doctrine that was upgraded in 2015. Finally, the government has decided to change the situation with the domestic market where previously European goods had the one-third of the market.

⁵³ Svetlana Barsukova, "Doktrina Prodovolstvennoy Bezopasnosti: Otsenka Ekspertov," [*The food Security Doctrine: the Expert's Review*] *Terra Economics* 10, no. 4 (2012): 40

The Revolution of “Consumer Culture” in Russia: From Soviet Beryozka to the Import Substitution in 2015

The main aim of this chapter is to introduce the development of the “Import Substitution” Project as a base for new national ground. The first part of the chapter will deal with the consumer culture in the Soviet Union with a focus on the case of Beryouzka chains. The second part will investigate consumer culture in Post-Soviet Russia to and how it has become a ground for the nationalistic discourse present in the country. The last part will be about the process of creation of “the Import Substitution” project, particularly about its legal aspects and results. The chapter will be concluded with an investigation on nationalistic discourse in media towards the project.

2.1 The “Consumer Culture” in Soviet Russia: The case of Beryozka Chains

The ideology of the Soviet state was based on the idea of equality for all citizens that was opposed to the Western consumer society. Important that at the same time, the Soviet state organized a chain of retail shops entitled “Beryozka” (little birch tree) where Soviets citizens could buy different luxury goods for foreign currencies. This chain operated in big Soviet cities like Moscow or Kiev, in resorts, for example, in Odessa or in international ports in Vladivostok or Sevastopol. Importantly that in this chain people could use only foreign currency or special certificates that were changed on any type of the currency.⁵⁴

According to Russian scholar Anna Ivanova, the aim of this project was to derive foreign currencies from Soviet and foreign citizens who stayed in the country, thus, the state has

⁵⁴ Anna Ivanova, *Magaziny "Berezka". Paradoksy Potrebleniya V Pozdnem SSSR { Beryouzka chains. The Paradoxes of Consumerism in the USSR}*(Moskva, 2018).

decided to organize a marketplace where people could exchange their currencies on luxury goods such as caviar or chocolate.⁵⁵ Even this chain contradicted to the ideology of equality because not all citizens had access to any kind of foreign currency, the idea to have additional income in foreign currency was important for the Soviet State because of economic reasons – the Soviet heavy industry was less developed compare to European, thus, the Soviet State had to purchase equipment abroad.⁵⁶

In Beryozka only imported and Soviet shortage goods were sold and, as a result, the cult of foreign goods has been developed in the society.⁵⁷ At the same time, many shops in the Soviet Union had lines and the lack of goods. As a result, the Beryozka chain with wide range of goods provided unique experience for Soviet consumers. Every person who had a foreign currency got a chance to buy any type of goods. Thus, this system showed that the goods with the best quality could be bought only for foreign currencies such as American dollars or Deutsche marks while Soviet Ruble did not have any purchasing power. This situation can be considered as a conflict between Soviet ideology and real economic conditions: even according to Soviet laws, citizens cannot have any kind of foreign currency, the state was interested to invest foreign currency to the development of the economics. As a result, it was also interested in exemption of the currency.

Overall, there were some groups of people like journalists or people from military services who was working in Soviet-friendly regions like Africa or Asia who had salaries in different types of foreign currency, but the most of customers of Beryozka got it as gifts from foreign tourists or colleagues.⁵⁸ As a result, this chain with the access to luxury goods created a difference in

⁵⁵ Anna Ivanova, *Magaziny "Berezka". Paradoksy Potrebleniya V Pozdnem SSSR { Beryouzka chains. The Paradoxes of Consumerism in the USSR}*(Moskva, 2018). 40.

⁵⁶ Ibid.,.12.

⁵⁷ Ibid.,. 48.

⁵⁸ Ibid.,.150.

the social structure that was based not on the loyalty to the regime but on the access to foreign currencies which can be also considered as a paradox.

However, during the 1970s foreign goods became extremely popular among Soviet citizens: with the rise of income from oil export the state has purchased the big number of daily goods abroad but it was not enough for all citizens, as a result, their meanings has become sacral for Soviet people. Ivanova argues that Beryozka had become a realization of the Soviet consumer dream where there are no lines and a large variety of goods. Beryozka was a chain where both food and non-food good were sold and it was only one place where people could buy Soviet luxury chocolate and caviar.

During the period between 1965 and 1976 Soviet citizens had the opportunity to buy food in the Beryozka chains. The most products were made in the USSR, for example, fresh vegetables and fruits were delivered from the south of Russia and consumers could buy them during any season when it was impossible to do it in an ordinary chain or a market. For example, one of Ivanova's interviewers mentioned that he was impressed by the range of food in Beryozka:

"We did not have any food at home and when I came to this chain it was a culture shock. I saw good beef, vegetables, a ham, and fresh cottage cheese! None of those were nowhere to be found." ⁵⁹

It shows what was the situation with access to food in the Soviet Union. Even Beryozka had a great variety of food it was not common to do daily shopping here and consumers preferred to visit it only for special occasions like the New Year or birthday parties of the family members:

"We could buy imported drinks, amazing fruits and vegetables, and foreign ham. But I did not visit this shop often. If I had some currency I would prefer to spend it on clothes for my girls – wife, and children rather than just on food." ⁶⁰

After 1976 it was allowed for Soviet citizens to buy food in this chain because of ideological reasons: the idea to sell food for foreign currency in "successful" socialist country was

⁵⁹ Anna Ivanova, *Magaziny "Berezka". Paradoksy Potrebleniya V Pozdnem SSSR { Beryouzka chains. The Paradoxes of Consumerism in the USSR}*(Moskva, 2018). 150.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 160

considered as a challenge towards the ideology where well-fare for all citizens was a key value. American scholar Alexey Yurchak in his research on the Soviet daily life argued that the key feature of the Soviet consumer culture was an “imagined West”. Foreign mostly Western books movies and goods were important part of the soviet life that was an essential part of the perfect life that could not be accessible for the most of Soviet people.⁶¹ Soviet activist and writer Vladimir Bukovskiy noted that the West for ordinary Soviet citizen was something perfect but unaccusable like the Beryozka chain.⁶² It explains why goods from this chain were popular among Soviet citizens.

Overall, during the Soviet time with the shortage in different fields of imported goods were considered as better than Soviets because it had better quality and it provided an opportunity for Soviet people to live the life where they have a choice in terms of consumer behavior

2.2 The Concept of Ours and Non-Ours Goods: the Post-Soviet Consumer Behavior

After the dissolution of the USSR Russian society had survived the «consumer revolution» in all areas of life starting from food practices and finishing in a consumption of impressions. According to Russian scholars the country went from being a “society of shortage” to a new type of consumer society that have already existed in Western countries. It means that people started to spend money not only to fit their needs but to show a status. This definition of consumerism was created by Thorstein Veblen in the beginning of 20th century:

⁶¹ Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More* (Princeton University Press, 2006), 80.

⁶² Bukovsky, Vladimir. *To Build a Castle: My Life as a Dissenter*. London, 1978.

“It is true of dress in even a higher degree than of most other items of consumption, that people will undergo a very considerable degree of privation in the comforts or the necessities of life in order to afford what is considered a decent amount of wasteful consumption; so that it is by no means an uncommon occurrence, in an inclement climate, for people to go ill clad in order to appear well dressed”⁶³

In the case of Russia this shift happened because of change of economics where new economic agents appears on the market. At the same time western sociologist like Caldwell and Patico argue that the type of consumer behavior in Post-Socialist countries was differ from Western because of cultural and economic conditions. Moreover, after the dissolution of the USSR Soviet people got into the environment of disorientation because of the change of economical paradigm. The most of them did not know how to behave and how to fit new economic conditions, as a result some previous habitus like the idealization of Western production were transported into new economic and social context. Overall, this shift can be defined as a shift from the consumption of some basic goods to the overconsumption with the special focus on Western goods.⁶⁴

However, the culture of consumption has been researched mostly by non-Russian scientists. For example, an American anthropologist Jenifer Patico conducted research on the culture of consumption in Saint Petersburg in the end of 1990s. According to her results, the most of her interviewees had preferred Russian food because of the importance of patriotism. It means that the process of consumption of local goods caused a feeling of pride to be a part of an imagined Russian community in terms of Benedict Anderson. Moreover, interviewees had correlated the origin of product with the quality. It is important to note, that preferences were given to “Not Our” non-food goods, such as clothes or gadgets.⁶⁵ In that sense food could be considered as

⁶³ Thorstein Veblen and C. Wright Mills, *The Theory of the Leisure Class ; an Economic Study of Institutions.* ; with an Introduction by C. Wright Mills (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970).

⁶⁴ Caldwell Melissa, "The taste of nationalism: Food politics in postsocialist Moscow," *Ethnos*, 3rd ser., 67:300

⁶⁵ Patico, Jennifer. Consumption and social change in a post-Soviet middle class. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2008. P.75

sacral part of the Russianness. However, it is not unclear what does it mean Russianness in terms of food. According to Caldwell, Russian food was correlated with the feeling of home:

“Respondents preferred ‘Russian’ foods – even when ‘Russian’ foods were pizza or hamburgers that their mothers had prepared at home.”⁶⁶

Thus, this approach on Russianness means the way of how the food was cooked rather than the geographical location of an item. The case of this dichotomy fitted the theory of banal nationalism by Michael Bilig and the dialectic between remembering and forgetting. There are many items that had name or design that are correlated with the image of the past of the history of Russia - cigarettes with the name of the Peter the Great and a beer «Siberian Crown». Also, one of the FMCG companies had produced dairy products “Little House in the Village” (*Domik v derevne*) with the face of an old Slavic lady who was standing in a field. Those cases are examples of popular marketing plots, but it is important to note that all those products have been produced by different foreign FMCG companies. For example, Cigarettes “Peter the Great” is a brand of Japan American Tobacco⁶⁷, “Siberian Crown” produced by Ab Inbev⁶⁸, while “Little House in the Village» is owned by American PepsiCo. It is one of the paradoxes of understanding “our” products: most of the are produced in the country but by transnational foreign companies and it show the processes of capitalization of national feelings. This paradox can be considered as a continuous of the idealization of Western products and the lack of trust to the state.

However, many companies have been using this feeling of Russian nationhood in marketing campaigns. One of the strategies is to show that goods have been produced in the country and

⁶⁶ Caldwell Melissa, "The taste of nationalism: Food politics in postsocialist Moscow," *Ethnos*, 3rd ser., 67:307.

⁶⁷ "Russia," Japan Tobacco International – a global tobacco company,c, 2017, <https://www.jti.com/ru/europe/russia>.

⁶⁸ “Sibirskaya Korona,” Ab InBev, accessed April 05,2019, <http://www.ab-inbev.com/our-brands/sibirskaya-korona.html>.

the proof of that the phrase “Made in Russia» and the official number of the certification number (*GOST*). Some of the local companies had preferred to design the labels with the correlation to the city or region, for example, the company «Russian milk» have been producing the number of dairy products with the name that refer to one of the areas in Moscow Region “Ruzskoe Milk” (*Ruzskoe moloko*).⁶⁹

Overall, the dichotomy “Our” or “Non-Our” is a necessary part of the construction nation identity in modern Russia. On the one hand, according to some researchers, post-Soviet people had preferred food items that have been correlated to the Russian history and have been produced in the country. On the other hand, goods with Russian names can be produced by foreign countries and can be considered as ours. Thus, during the period between 1991 and 2015 there are two key trends in Russian consumer culture: the idealization of the Western product that has its roots in the Soviet Union and the nostalgia about Soviet food and the quality of food.

2.3 The Import Substitution Project as a Realization of Food Ethnocentrism

The understanding of food as “Our” or “Non-Our” had changed after the beginning of the Sanction war in 2014. If during the period between 1991 and 2015 there were two key trends in Russian consumer culture: the idealization of the Western product that has its roots in the Soviet Union and the nostalgia about Soviet food, the new trend of considering European food emerged after the embargo. According to the research by leading Russian university RANEPA (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration) in 2017, more than 80% of Russian consumers would prefer food products

⁶⁹ “Russkoe Moloko,” accessed April 05, 2019, <http://www.russkoe-moloko.ru>.

with Russian origins rather than a food that was produced in any other country.⁷⁰ This type of consumer choice can be considered as a food ethnocentrism because the food that was being produced in the country has a special meaning for consumers. For example, sociologist Van Ittersu argued that consumers tend to the country of origin as a measure of food quality.⁷¹ Consumer ethnocentrism exists in different countries, for example, in emerging economies are going through political changes domestic products are considered as high quality goods. The case of Sanction War in the Russian Federation can be considered as a political change.

For instance, one of the RANEPА's interviewees mentioned that the main aim of the European Union is to destroy Russian population by products with low quality and to take over on oil and gas resources in Russia.⁷² This type of opinion shows the stereotype that was created in Russian society after 2014 about the Western food as a threat for Russian population. Moreover, some interviewees motivated their consumer choice as a political support of Russian government. For example, an interviewee from Moscow region noticed that she is not going to buy candies that were produced by a factory of Victor Poroshenko, Ukrainian president.⁷³ His factory "Roshen" operated in Lipetsk Region till 2014 and was one of the key candy brands in Russian market: the value share of all chocolate candies was almost 53% in 2013.⁷⁴ In 2014 the factory was closed and the import of Roshen production was banned in the Russian Federation. The case of Roshen candies can be considered as a political act rather than economical project to

⁷⁰ Shagaida, Natalia and Nikulin, Alexander and Uzun, Vasily and Trotsuk, Irina and Shishkina, Ekaterina, *Monitoring Sostoyaniya Prodovolstvennoy Bezopasnosti Rossii v 2014-2016 gg.* (Monitoring of the State of Food Security in Russia in 2014-2016) (May 14, 2019). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160045> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160045>

⁷¹ Van Ittersum, "The Influence of the Image of a Product's Region of Origin on Product Evaluation", *Journal of Business Review*, 3rd ser., 53 (2003): , accessed May 12, 2019.

⁷² *Ibid.*,. 45.

⁷³ *Ibid.*,. 60.

⁷⁴ *Monitoring of the State of Food Security in Russia in 2014-2016*, 89.

support domestic production because the most of the players on the market are big international companies who operates on the territory of the country.

The change of the attitudes towards Western food correlated to the project of import substitution (Importozameschenie) which was launched as policy in 2014. It was created as a set of instructions for stimulating the growth of Russian economy and addressed to the current government. For example, Instruction 1159 required the state to access by the end of 2014 the ‘possibility of competitive import substitution in industry and agriculture’.⁷⁵ Also, this instruction consisted of the list of goods and serviced that can be purchased by national government agencies in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union.⁷⁶

However, according to researchers from Chatham House, even the import substitution was launched in all industries from high-tech to oil industry, as a success story it has been presented only in agribusiness:

“The counter-sanctions adopted in the summer of 2014 against imports of food from countries sanctioning Russia provided a clear opportunity for domestic producers to supplant foreign ones and enhance national food security. Increasing food security by reducing the share of imports in total consumption is a long-standing policy objective.”⁷⁷

Even Russian agribusiness showed high results compare to other industries American researcher Richard Connolly provides skeptical view on this success: external conditions like the dramatic fall of Russian currency and positive weather conditions impacted to the development of agribusiness.⁷⁸ At the same time, some types of businesses such as beef or dairy products have fallen while the rest of this sector has increased levels of activities in terms

⁷⁵ Richard Connolly, "Import Substitution and Economic Sovereignty in Russia," Russia and Eurasia Programme: , accessed May 16, 2019.

⁷⁶ Ibid.,. 16.

⁷⁷Ibid.,. 18.

⁷⁸ Richard Connolly, "Import Substitution and Economic Sovereignty in Russia," Russia and Eurasia Programme: , accessed May 16, 2019. 19

of sales and the amount of produced goods. The reason for this difference is the uncertainty about the duration of the “sanction war” – different types of businesses such as crops or pigs have different payback periods, while cattle requires long horizon investments.⁷⁹ Moreover, by the end of 2017 the level of import from Europe dropped while the export of Russian agricultural goods has increased on 5%.⁸⁰ Thus, the development of Russian agribusiness can be considered as positive. At the same time, the consumers of domestic had negative opinion on Russian agribusiness. According to RANEPA’s research in 2017, agricultural holdings were considered by consumers as main threats for the development of Russian economy because they have more opportunities to win one of the calls for bids and, as a result, to increase prices on different types of food.

Thus, prices on food has been increased for 10% during the period between 2014 and 2017 and more the half of RANEPA’s respondents mentioned that they started to limit themselves in food purchasing.⁸¹ For instance, half of consumers had spent more than the half of their income on food even the 30% of them were raising fruits and vegetables for self-reliance. However, even under these conditions consumers preferred to buy Russian food rather than any kind of foreign goods even if Russian goods were more expensive. Moreover, the most Russians would prefer Russian goods rather than with foreign origins in case of same price while almost 70% of respondents answered that Russian products had better quality. At the same time the purchasing power of Russian households dropped and, as a result, almost 25% of respondents

⁷⁹ Zateychuk, M. (2015), ‘Natalya Zubarevich: “Svini moloka ne dayut”’ [Natalya Zubarevich: “Pigs don’t give milk”], *Economy Times*, 17 December 2015, <http://economytimes.ru/kurs-rulya/natalya-zubarevich-svini-moloka-ne-dayut>.

⁸⁰ "The Import Substitution Program Works," *Regnum.nu*, April 27, 2019, , accessed May 16, 2019, <https://regnum.ru/news/2268960.html>.

⁸¹ Shagaida, Natalia and Nikulin, Alexander and Uzun, Vasily and Trotsuk, Irina and Shishkina, Ekaterina, *Monitoring Sostoyaniya Prodovolstvennoy Bezopasnosti Rossii v 2014-2016 gg.* (Monitoring of the State of Food Security in Russia in 2014-2016) (May 14, 2019).

had spent 50% of their income on food in 2015 while in 2016 the value share of this group grew to 40%.

However, one of the key ideas of the food import substitution project is to produce any type of food even food which has unique local context such as Italian Parmesan or Spanish Hamon could be produced in Russia.⁸² It gives a new perspective of the problem: the state united all non-Russian products in one group and believed that the main difference of this goods is their non-Russian origin. As a result, modern Russian citizens should choose between consumption of foreign goods or not to consume at all. According to Russian researcher Anna Tolkochova, nowadays there are two types of consumers in Russia – a citizen consumer and a customer consumer.⁸³ For the first type of consumers the key thing is to be a part of the political community while the second is oriented on taking pleasure from daily consumption. The representation of banal nationalism is possible only for a consumer citizen: he gives the special meaning for goods that he is buying in the daily life. As a result, the act of buying a good is considered as a special sacral act.

One of the widely discussed topics in Russian media about food embargo was the case with banned cheese. According to WCIOM's research on consumer's preference one third of Russians who were travelling abroad have a tradition to take different type of food as souvenirs from their European trips.⁸⁴ In 2019 Russian National Meat Association (NMA) had the request to forbid Russian citizens to take dairy or meat products with them in hand luggage when travelling in or out of the Russian Federation. The justification of this restriction was based on

⁸² Ntv.ru// .Ru. December 18, 2017. Accessed April 30, 2019. <http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1963104/>.

⁸³ Proceedings of Seminar «Kriticheskiy podhod k potrebleniyu i issledovaniya potrebleniya v postsovetskikh obschestvakh», Kazan, 182.

⁸⁴ Sergey Dobrynin, "Parmezan, Hamon I Drugie Inostrannyye Agentyi," [Parmesan, Hamon and Other Foreign Agents] Svoboda.org, April 26, 2019, , accessed May 16, 2019, <https://www.svoboda.org/a/29905865.html>

the threat of some animal diseases such as African Swine Fever.⁸⁵ Currently Russian citizens are allowed to carry up to 5kg of meat and dairy products per person even when they return from one of the countries that subjected to the food embargo. As a result, this proposal got a negative feedback in Russian social networks, for example, some of Facebook users claimed:

“the authorities were trying to leave them without one of the few opportunities to taste some good quality food that is impossible to find in the country these days.”⁸⁶

At the same time the leader of one of the biggest agrarian companies in Russia argued that for the society the development of the country should be more important rather than consuming of Parmesan or Spanish hamon.⁸⁷ In 2017 Russian researcher Mirzobobo Yormirzoev conduct research about cheese preferences of Russian citizens in Perm Region. One of the key outcomes of the research was the perception of domestic cheese as lower quality to imported hard cheese. However, almost 70 percent of respondents would prefer to buy Russian cheese instead of European. The reason for this consumer behavior is the belief that buying Russian cheese is the good act, since it supports the industry in the country:

“Around 50 percent of respondents disagreed that domestically produced cheese is of high quality, whereas over 40 percent agreed that it is of high quality. In combination with the answers regarding the taste statement, these results indicate that for a certain segment of consumers taste is not the dominant quality indicator.”⁸⁸

This outcome shows that consumers do not trust quality of Russian products but at the same time their consumer behavior changed because of political strategy of Russian government.

⁸⁵ "Miratorg's President under Fire in Russia," PigProgress, May 17, 2019, , accessed May 17, 2019, <https://www.pigprogress.net/World-of-Pigs1/Articles/2019/5/Miratorgs-president-under-fire-in-Russia-428569E/>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.,.

⁸⁷ Ibid.,.

⁸⁸ Mirzobobo Yormirzoev, Ramona Teuber, and Tongzhe Li, "Food Quality vs Food Patriotism," British Food Journal 121, no. 2 (2019): , doi:10.1108/bfj-02-2018-0088.

Even food with Western origins has a better price, Russian consumers would prefer to buy domestic food. At the same time, the attitudes towards international companies who producing goods on the territory of the Russian federation have not been changed yet. Thus, for Russian consumers there is a difference between agents who can be a threat for the development of the country: corporations with business on the territory of the country and Western countries who were producing food abroad. Despite, HQs of all multinational companies operating in Russia are located in Western countries like the USA or Belgium Russian consumers still purchase their items.

Overall, consumer culture in Russia has been dramatically changed from the 1960s to current time. The narrative about western products as about products with high quality emerged during the shortage in the USSR but still was common during the period from 1991 to 2014. As a result, the perception of Western food become paradoxical: on the one hand, Russian consumers do not trust domestic agrobusinesses, on the other hand, they prefer to purchase domestic goods because of their political views.

Global Slow-Food Movement VS. Import Substitution in Russia

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the case of the global Slow Food movement that was developed in Italy and to compare it with the Import Substitution Project in Russia. The chapter will start with an overview of Slow Food movement its history, ideology, and influence in the field of policy-making. After that, the chapter will focus on the comparison of the ideology of the Slow-Food Movement and the Import Substitution project. It will show the correlation between Russian politics and the context of the Slow-Food movement.

3.1 The Rhetoric of Slow-Food Movement: from Local Protectionism to Global Justice

The Slow Food Movement is an organization, founded in Italy which aims the development of local traditional gastronomy and biodiversity all over the world. It was established in the 1980s under the leadership of one of the local activists Carlo Petrini. The idea of the movement was to confront the concept of fast-food, thus one of the first actions of the group was to protest against openings of global fast-food branches like McDonald's in Italy:

“Slow Food is the alternative, the avant-garde's riposte. Real culture is here to be found. First of all, we can begin by cultivating taste, rather than impoverishing it, by stimulating progress, by encouraging international exchange programs, by endorsing worthwhile projects, by advocating historical food culture and by defending old-fashioned food traditions. Slow Food assures us of a better quality lifestyle”⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Slow Food (1989) Foundational Manifesto p.1

The development of the organization was very fast, for example, in 1989 the first international event was organized where were involved activists from different parts of Europe. The main document of the movement the Manifesto was signed by delegates from 15 countries and as a result, the international movement was established. Thus, the history of this movement has two key stages. The first stage relates to the time when the organization existed only in Italy and the second is about the period when the movement has become international.

By the beginning of the 2000's the organization had opened first chapters outside of Europe in the USA, Mexico, and Australia. The rhetoric of the movement had hedonistic philosophy as a base where high-quality food was considered as a pleasure and the part of socialization that was traditional for Mediterranean countries like Italy or Spain. The activists argued that it is necessary to struggle against globalization, particularly against the agrarian corporations and at the same time to keep the idea of food consuming as an important daily practice.⁹⁰ Thus, the movement was not only a political project that aimed protection of domestic producers but also the intersection of ethics, food security and gastronomy.

However, the movement had been criticized in the 1990s and the 2000s because of this hedonistic ideology and the orientation of the organization on the Western regions.⁹¹ This is the time when discourse about social justice and the division of the Global North and South were emerged. According to Martin Müller, the discourse about the division of the world on the Global South and Global North based on the idea of a gap between those regions in terms of development:

“The Global North and South today signify primarily a political and epistemological project: a turn away from the language of developmentalism and teleological progress that characterized the attitudes of the Global North towards the South for decades and continues to characterize it today”⁹²

⁹⁰ Carlo Petrini and Gigi Padovani, *Slow Food Revolution: A New Culture for Eating and Living* (New York: Rizzoli, 2006), 50.

⁹¹ Ibid., 60.

⁹² Muller, Martin. "In Search of the Global East: Thinking between North and South." *Geopolitics*. doi:10.1080/14650045.2018.1477757.

Thus, the ideology of Slow Food movement did not match this discourse because of the ideas about the importance of food as daily pleasure and the concept of saving local heritage in Western Europe, particularly in Spain and Portugal. If in the 1990s the organization had elitist attitudes mostly because of members who were working for gastronomy business or media, nowadays it has more members from different sectors of civil society.⁹³ It was an outcome of the development of the organization at the international level.

However, the first chapters outside of Italy were opened by Italians who lived in these countries or by locals from restaurant businesses.⁹⁴ With the development of the organization to the international level, the structure and the rhetoric of the organization was changed. For instance, in 2003 the Slow-Food Foundation for Biodiversity was opened to support sustainable agriculture in Africa. The foundation organizes different projects from the field of protection of domestic industries to the development of ecology in developing regions like Africa. It shows that the Slow Food movement is oriented not only on the development of local production but to solve social issues. Thus, the ideology of the organization had become more leftist with the focus on the idea of social justice as fairness.

This idea of justice was created by American philosopher John Rawls who argued that justice can be realized through the distribution of goods among all members of the community irrespective of age, national identity, gender, and income. The fact that a citizen was born rich and male provides no reason in itself for the citizen to be favored by social institutions in any state, according to Rawls.⁹⁵ This theory was developed in the middle of 1980s and was adopted by different states as a part of the ideology of “well-fare state.” This understanding of justice

⁹³ Schneider, Stephen. "Good, Clean, Fair: The Rhetoric of the Slow Food Movement." *College English* 70, no. 4 (2008): 384-402. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25472277>.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 390.

⁹⁵ John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 55.

has been used by the Slow-Food movement since the 2000s and was realized through different initiatives, for example, through the establishment of Slow-Food Foundation for Biodiversity and organizing the “10,000 gardens in Africa” project that aims to provide access to healthy food in African schools.⁹⁶ However, the idea of the localizing food productions relates to the idea of equality among all people because it provides an opportunity for everyone to get access to “good, clean and fair food”⁹⁷.

Also, one of the key values of the movement is to provide an opportunity for all members to make an impact in their community which can be also considered as a realization of the philosophy of social justice. For example, journalists use their experience and media space to spread the knowledge about slow food philosophy while policy-makers have a chance to realize ideology of the movement in public policies. It is important to note that the movement is flexible with memberships: any person who supports values and philosophy of Slow-Food movement can join the network and their economic or national background is not important.⁹⁸ Thus, the movement tries to spread consumer ethics which was considered before as elitist among all people in different parts of the world.

In terms of theory of consumption, the organization offers the new structure of relations between consumers and producers: the producer of the food should be acknowledged while consumers should have information about the way how the food was produced and how much resources were invested in the process of production.⁹⁹ This approach can be considered as a

⁹⁶ "10,000 Gardens in Africa." Slow Food Foundation for Biodiversity. Accessed May 19, 2019. <https://www.fondazione Slow Food.com/en/what-we-do/10-000-gardens-in-africa-2/>.

⁹⁷ Schneider, 2008, 392.

⁹⁸ Carlo Petrini and Gigi Padovani, *Slow Food Revolution: A New Culture for Eating and Living* (New York: Rizzoli, 2006), 60.

⁹⁹ Ibid.,. 80.

radical shift in the consumption paradigm because consumers will have the power to change food productions systems in the local context.

However, this idea of the importance of the local context is close to the idea of a nation which is untied around the past of the community. For example, through the efforts of Slow-Food activists *lardo* (Italian ham) is included in the Arc of Taste and considered as heritage food.¹⁰⁰

The special meaning of *lardo* relates to the way how it is produced and to the place which it took in the past of Italian community:

“In diets distinguished by protein scarcity, *lardo* was an essential calorific food for men who, in the past, laboured up to fifteen hours a day cutting and hauling huge blocks of marble. To eat *lardo*, especially in the carnivalesque space, where hundreds of kilos of pork fat are consumed over four hot days in late August, is to remember and celebrate this past as collective history and corporeal memory”¹⁰¹

The feeling of unity exists on two levels in case of the movement: on the local and international one. For instance, the members of the chapter in Spain share identity with their culture and territory but at the same time it is important to them to be a part of the global movement that connects people from different parts of the world who want to make an impact in the development of the planet. This unity can be considered as the realization of the ideology of the movement because it provides opportunities to be responsible for saving local food heritage and influencing on global issues in the field of sustainability and social justice.

However, the organization realized its ideology through particular political steps. For example, they have a support by the Tuscany Regional Authority and some UN organizations like FAO which recognized this movement as a non-profit organization in 2004. Moreover, FAO had established special agreements that aimed support of local small farmers in rural areas in Italy

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 95

¹⁰¹ "Slow Food and the Politics of Pork Fat: Italian Food and European Identity." Taylor & Francis. Accessed May 21, 2019.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0014184032000160514>.

after discussions with activists from the Slow-Food Movement.¹⁰² Overall, the organization aims to be a mediator between consumers, political and economics agents in different regions that can influence on the lobby of international food corporations. The narrative about the negative influence of international corporations is common in the rhetoric of the Slow-Food movement. There are two key political points of Slow Food movement ideology – the support of small producers and GMOs free agriculture. For example, the movement launched several campaigns against GMOs in the European Union and was involved in local coalition in Italy in the field of protection of the country's farming heritage and gastronomy. In the 1980s the movement participated in national debates in Italy about the new food and safety legislation in the European Union.¹⁰³ The legislation could become a threat to the production of some type of food, as a result, some of the local cultural traditions could disappear.

Overall, the concept of the Slow Food movement has features that relate to different social and ecological issues. On the one hand, the philosophy of the movement is based on the idea of a pleasure as necessary daily practice, on the other hand, the movement point by its Manifesto that all people in different parts of the world should have access to fair and quality food and to have a chance to save their food traditions like in the case of Italian Largo. Also, the activists of the movement argued that it is necessary to organize discussions between policymakers and consumers about food security. Thus, it provides another perspective on the concept of food security and the support of domestic producers – it can become a moral law which is orientated not on achievement any special political goals but to help individuals to realize their freedom as a choice.

¹⁰² Carlo Petrini and Gigi Padovani, *Slow Food Revolution: A New Culture for Eating and Living* (New York: Rizzoli, 2006), 90.

¹⁰³ Schneider, Stephen. "Good, Clean, Fair: The Rhetoric of the Slow Food Movement." *College English* 70, no. 4 (2008): 384-402. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25472277>.

3.2 Slow-Food Movement VS. Import Substitution Project in the Era of Globalization

Initially, both the Slow-Food Movement and the Import Substitution project in the Russian Federation can be considered as a reaction on the development of globalization. First of all, it is necessary to define the concept of globalization. One of the most common concepts was created by British sociologist Anthony Giddens in his book “The Consequences of Modernity” (1991). He argued that globalization is the intensification of global social relations linking different locations in such a way that local events are shaped by events occurring thousands of kilometers away. Overall, there are four key dimensions of globalization – world capitalist economy, the system of national states, the world military order and industrial development, according to Giddens.¹⁰⁴ All of dimensions are important for understanding the correlation between Slow-Food movement and embargo politics in Russia.

Giddens argued that the influence of the world capitalist economy is the base for the development of globalization because states in which capitalism is the developed are centers of political power in the world:

“The domestic and international economic policies of these states involve many forms of regulation of economic activity, but [...] their institutional organization maintains an “insulation” of the economic from the political.”¹⁰⁵

Despite there are some global corporations like Coca-Cola or Google who have budgets larger than some national states they do not have any political power in questions like control of

¹⁰⁴ Giddens, Anthony. 1991. *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age*. 45

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 89

violence.¹⁰⁶ Thus, they cannot rival of the political power of nation-states. According to Giddens, the balance between nation state and global corporations are based on the level of wealth of national state, its military strength and connections with corporations.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, both corporations and countries are interested in cooperation and development.

However, in cases of Slow-Food movement and the strategy of Import Substitution in Russia there are different views on cooperation with global corporations. The position of Slow-Food movement is purely against multinational corporations. It was mentioned in the previous subchapter that one of the first acts of the movement were protests against McDonalds branches in Italy. Moreover, in one of the last articles about seed protections a Slow-Food activist described the current state of the global market of seeds and pesticides. Michela Marchi an activists from the Slow-Food Movement argued that half of the market is controlled by seven global companies from the USA, Germany and Switzerland and the author of article argued that it is a threat for the market because it would give corporations “unconditional control over the markets and a monstrous power to influence governments and parliaments.”¹⁰⁸ Thus, Slow-Food activists consider corporations as a threat for the development of sustainable seed market.

In contrast to the Slow-Food movement Russian government support global corporations in the country. For example, all key players in the field of agribusiness and FMCG (Fast-moving Consumer Goods) are presenting in the Russian market. Moreover, in some markets such as diary industry global corporations have the biggest value share. The value share of French

¹⁰⁶ According to the 2017 Annual Report of Coca-Cola the revenue of the company was \$35,410 million while, for example, Bolivia’s GDP in 2016 was \$34,053. Thus, if Coca-Cola would be 95th national state in the world according to GDP. (My note) <https://www.coca-colacompany.com/annual-review/2017/index.html#p>

¹⁰⁷ Giddens, Anthony. 1991. *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age*. 45

¹⁰⁸ Marchi, Michela. "“Whoever Has the Seeds Has the Power”." Slowfood.com. February 24, 2017. Accessed May 20, 2019. <https://www.slowfood.com/whoever-seeds-power/>.

Danone on Russian market is approximately 25% while the second player PepsiCo has 20%.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, Danone has opened a 60 hectare farm with 5000 near Tyumen to decrease costs of production and to stop the increase of price of dairy products.¹¹⁰ This case shows that the corporation is oriented on keeping its position at the market. At the same time, Russian government has not launched any anti-corporation policy which could become a threat for the development of multinational companies in the country.

The second important criteria that could show the contrast between Slow Food ideology and the Import Substitution project is their positions about the preservation local cuisine and heritage. The value of Slow-Food is to provide an opportunity for consumers to keep the food of their regions as “an enormous yet underestimated resource, gastronomy treasures the entire history of a territory and embodies how different cultures have merged over the centuries”¹¹¹ It means, that the organization promotes knowledge about cooking as intangible cultural heritage that can leverage social integration of the community of the region. This statement is a part of Slow Food’s strategy in the field of heritage where food is considered as recourse which need to be protected. In case if food would be considered as a heritage it can be useful for promotion of tourism in cities in different region where, as a result, local actors would have an opportunity to valorize this strategy:

¹⁰⁹ Khrennikov, Ilya. "Danone Sends 5,000 Cows to Siberia in Quest for Cheaper Milk." Bloomberg. August 28, 2017. Accessed May 20, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-27/danone-sends-5-000-cows-to-siberia-in-quest-for-cheaper-milk>.

¹¹⁰ Khrennikov, Ilya. "Danone Sends 5,000 Cows to Siberia in Quest for Cheaper Milk."

¹¹¹ "SLOW FOOD – CE: Culture, Heritage, Identity, Environment and Food." SlowFood.com. November 20, 2017. Accessed May 19, 2019. <https://www.slowfood.com/slowlife/en/progetti/slow-food-ce-culture-heritage-identity-environment-and-food/>.

“Cities are a perfect laboratory where such a change can be successfully achieved: small enough to strongly influence the entrepreneurial and social scene but also large enough to serve as gateways to international markets.”¹¹²

This approach on food as a tool for tourism can also fit the discourse of “Our” and “Non-Our” goods that was investigated in previous chapter. For the Slow-Food movement the understanding of food as unique regional heritage does not have any political meaning. The creation of special meaning of food provides an opportunity for the region to have a unique heritage, thus, the link between the heritage and region is creating like in case with Lardo in Toscana. The situation in Russia is the opposite because of the political meaning of food consumption.

However, there are two key trends in the understanding of food security in the Russian Federation – the perception on Western food as a threat for food security and attempts to produce food which is not typical for the region. According to the concept of Import Substitution, any kind of food can be produced in Russia even food with special local context.

¹¹³ For example, in 2017 the government of Moscow Region launched a financial support project for local cheese producers with focus on production of Parmesan cheese. As a result, the value share of cheese from this region has grown by 15% in 2018 . ¹¹⁴ Thus, the food consumption became a political act because Russian consumers have a dilemma to support the government and to consume local food with “foreign” meanings such as local Parmesan or not to consume at all. In this case the position of the Slow-Food movement can be considered as more nationalistic because the organization aimed the development of local cuisine while there is no state-projects in Russia in the field of food substitution which had a similar aim. At the

¹¹² Carlo Petrini and Gigi Padovani, *Slow Food Revolution: A New Culture for Eating and Living* (New York: Rizzoli, 2006), 70.

¹¹³ Ntv.ru// .Ru. December 18, 2017. Accessed December 31, 2017. <http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1963104/>.

¹¹⁴ “Million on Camembert and Parmesan: The Support of Cheesemakers in Moscow Region [milliony Na Kamamber I Parmezan: Kak v Podmoskove Podderzhivayut Syrovarov].” *Gazeta.ru*. November 13, 2018. Accessed May 20, 2019. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2018/11/12/n_12279691.shtml?updated.

same time the movement promotes the idea of keeping traditional cuisines in all parts of the world without a connection to any of national states. Probably this statement can be considered as a cultural right for all communities to promote their traditions.

Also, there is a branch of Slow-Food movement in the Russian Federation which was established in 2002 in Moscow. As a result, in 2016 the first Russian chefs joined the network entitled as “International Chefs’ Alliance of Slow Food”. Nowadays there are 60 members of the Slow-Food movement in Russia with branches across the country but they do not have any support from the Russian government in the context Import Substitution project.

Conclusion

The thesis investigated the influence of food politics in the case of state policies in the Russian Federation and what is the role of food in the development of civil society in the case of activists from the Slow-Food movement.

Overall, there are three key outcomes of the research. First of all, the dynamics of food politics in the Russian Federation was investigated in the first chapter of the thesis. The development of food politics in Russia can be divided into three key stages. This division shows the dynamic in food politics in the Russian Federation from the first discussions about the sovereignty from food import in the 1990s to adopting embargo politics against Western countries in 2014. Moreover, trade sanctions became a political tool to put pressure on different countries: from Georgia and Moldova in 2006 to the European Union in 2014. Even the embargo aimed to “punish” the EU in the beginning, it became the starting point for the realization of the principles of the Food Security (Sovereignty) Doctrine that was upgraded in 2015. As a result, the government has decided to change the situation with the domestic market where previously European goods had one-third of the market and the Import Substitution Project was launched. Thus, the thesis shows that the position of the Russian state on trade relations with Western partners was changed from and became more protectionist.

The second outcome of the thesis, is the investigation of dynamics of the “consumer culture” in the Soviet and Russian societies. The narrative about western products as about products with high quality emerged during the shortage in the USSR but still was common during the period from 1991 to 2014. After the Sanction War, the perception of Western food changed and as a result, this food is considered as a threat to food security of the country. Thus, it changes the proportion between domestic and foreign producers in the market and the domestic food items became more popular among Russian consumers.

The third outcome of the research is the exploration of the context of anti-globalism movement and its correlations with the Import Substitution project in the Russian Federation. The concept of the Slow Food movement has features that relate to different social and ecological issues. On the one hand, the philosophy of the movement is based on the idea of pleasure as an necessary daily practice, on the other hand, the movement points through its Manifesto that all people in different parts of the world should have access to fair and quality food and to have a chance to save their food traditions. In contrast to food consumption in Russia has more of political meaning. For example, in the 2000s Russia banned import from Georgia and Moldova because of its pro-Western politics and in 2014 the embargo on food items from the European Union and the U.S was imposed. Thus, the position of the Slow-Food movement can be considered as more nationalistic because the organization aimed the development of local cuisine while there are no state-projects in Russia in the field of food substitution which had the same aim.

Overall, the contribution of the thesis and its originality in the research on food studies comes with the thesis's concentration on the case of Russian food security politics particularly on its legal and political aspect. Moreover, the thesis provides two different approaches to food protectionism in the case of Russian and Slow Food movement that provides an opportunity to discover it from different perspectives – from the perspective of the global justice and from food security as an ideology.

However, the thesis provides a basis for future research on Russian propaganda in the field of Import Substitution project. Due to the scope of the research, I was unable to focus on the discourse analysis of Russian propaganda but it remains a promising topic for further research.

Also, the thesis leaves open several possible research options for future research. One of the possible research topics is what is the influence of food protectionist politics on the

development of local culinary traditions, and if the idea about the threat coming from the West can be considered as a rise of nationalism in the country.

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