

How (not) to reconcile: An analysis of media coverage of ICTY verdicts in Croatian and Serbian media

by

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Abstract

This thesis investigates media coverage of International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia's verdicts in Croatia and Serbia in three cases. This Court was established to deal with atrocities committed during conflict between these two countries in the 1990-es and it set out to perpetrate the guilty. By using thematic and framing analysis on more than 250 articles in four newspapers, it can be seen that the observed verdicts to Gotovina et al., Karadzic and Prlic et al. were perceived ambivalently in two countries, which extends to the ongoing duality of narratives present in understanding common history between Croatia and Serbia. If the verdict's outcome was perceived as favorable to the country, it was portrayed as just in the media, and vice versa. Given that this Court's indirect aims were to individualize guilt and facilitate reconciliation, this study argues that this was not achieved. Namely, by media reporting that helped encourage collectivity of the guilt or innocence as an outcome of a verdict to an individual, reconciliation process between two nations was not made easier.

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List of abbreviations

BIH – Bosnia and Herzegovina

CIS – Case Information Sheet

EU – European Union

ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia

JNA – Yugoslav National Army

SDS – Serbian Democratic Party

SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

UN – United Nations

Introduction

Year 1990 in Europe was marked by many significant changes in many of its countries. The Iron curtain has fallen: the influence of the USSR decreased to a point of no return and its republics started declaring independence, West and East Germany have reunited in a single state, and Yugoslavia started to disintegrate in its former republics. Although none of these events passed without turmoil, one can surely say that the biggest one happened in ex-Yugoslav territory. The war that was going on in the following years was the biggest one on European soil since the Second World War (WW2).

Because of the atrocities that were committed during this war, a special Tribunal was established by United Nations (UN) in The Hague, Netherlands, with an intention to deal “with war crimes that took place during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990’s” (Icty.org, 2018). Apart from that, International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has stated it has been able to “contribute to ending of impunity and help pave the way for reconciliation” (Icty.org, 2018). The verdicts made by this war tribunal have echoed in international community but had ambivalent impact in the region. The much-needed reconciliation of Balkan nations seemed to be progressing slowly, with persisting bickering on national level, and it seems like there is still many discrepancies among people’s understanding of the past.

Since ICTY claims its impact on the process of reconciliation, I am interested in seeing to what extent is this goal achieved. More specifically, I will try to unveil this by looking into how daily newspapers from Croatia and Serbia, which were main adversaries in the war, have covered three verdicts made by The Hague tribunal. Since media functions are, among many, informing, agenda

setting, education and socialization (Rus-Mol, Zagorac-Kerser in Jurcic, 2017, 130), I want to see how ICTY and its verdicts are portrayed in the media. In other words, media not only inform, but also signal values, spread discourses and have power to integrate people. Furthermore, even though ICTY has the official jurisdiction on these matters, its rulings are not automatically accepted on societal level. In interpreting an issue such as the outcome of a ruling, an individual relies on media, which can bring forth both expert and layman opinions, to create his own. Surely, her social circle's stances as well as her potential previous knowledge on the matter influence her opinion, as well as the type of the media and how much she consumes it. For that reason, I am interested in seeing how the ICTY rulings are reported in various newspapers.

The research question of my thesis is therefore, how the ICTY's rulings are covered in Croatian and Serbian media. My aim is to see how the same issue, namely a particular verdict, is reported in two countries, and whether the national discourse interferes or biases the coverage in the aftermath of a conflict. Moreover, I will try to reflect on the differences in reporting within both countries, showing nuances of opinion on that matter.

To address these points, I analyze how were the trials covered in mass media in mentioned countries. I chose three cases i.e. verdicts to follow – those to Gotovina et al., Karadzic and Prlic et al. These cases were picked based on the outreach they have had in the region – all the cases picked were fairly important to respective countries in regard to responsibility that is implied by their conviction. Therefore, they were well covered and controversial to some extent. Following media outreach of mentioned cases, I analyzed four newspapers (two per country) that have high readership numbers and/or long tradition of publishing. More specifically, I looked into Croatian daily newspapers 24sata and Jutarnji list and Serbian newspapers Politika and Blic. I identified all

the relevant articles published on topic of verdicts in three cases – Gotovina et. al, Karadzic and Prlic et al. – within two weeks after the verdict took place. I conducted thematic and framing type of analysis, identifying main themes of the coverage and the way they were framed.

By analyzing these articles, I found out how the verdicts were received in these two countries, and how were they framed. The results of my analysis have shown that all the observed verdicts were received ambivalently in Croatia and Serbia: if Croatian newspapers portrayed the outcome of the verdict as favorable in terms of its justice, Serbian newspaper have not and vice versa. Also, the framing of the verdicts had a borrowing nature – namely, when the outcome of the verdict was not perceived as favorable, similar frames were used to discredit the ICTY. For example, Serbian newspapers portray ICTY as an anti-Serbian court that tends to re-write history as the “West” wants; and when Croatian generals were found guilty of joint criminal enterprise came up, officials said that we (Croats) cannot let ICTY write our history and will appeal the verdict. The discreditation of the court as “foreign” sits well with discourse of involvement of USA in the war in Balkans, but at the same time is in contrast with efforts both countries made/are making on path towards European Union.

This study is relevant because it will directly refer to one of goals ICTY has said to pursue – reconciliation in the region. Did the rulings bring the understanding of the common, conflicting past? Were they perceived as bringing guilty to justice? As I will show in my analysis, the verdict to one group of generals was perceived as innocent being wrongly convicted in Croatia, while the acquittal of another group was perceived as proclaiming the guilty as innocent in Serbia. Furthermore, since ICTY aimed to protect entire communities from being labeled as “collectively responsible” by showing that “those suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for atrocities

committed can be called to account” (Icty.org, 2018), did these rulings fail by transcending the “individuality” specific to them?

My thesis also reflects on the duality of understanding the war in the 1990-es. In particular, it inquires whether the trials pave the way to a more cohesive understanding of the war happenings, or is the comprehension rather contaminated by the duality of narratives that stem from conflict’s two-sidedness. Namely, Croatia and Serbia were opponents in the war, and since the last years and the break-up of a common ex-state Yugoslavia were extremely complex, the main discourse of both opposing countries was created by separate interpretation of certain events. In a way, history is on trial in the Hague, so I will show that the duality of understanding the war in the 1990-es was extended to the understanding of this court’s rulings, and that they achieved the goal of “coming to the terms of the past” only in particular and very narrow instances.

My thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter provides a historical overview of the war in the Balkans, accentuating the matters relevant for this paper. I will also present ICTY’s objectives and scholarly work that deals with its importance and perception. Following that, I will present characteristics of media systems in Croatia and Serbia. In the second chapter I develop my expectations and discuss my hypotheses, after which I will present my method and its limitations. In the third chapter, I will present my findings in detail, after which I will discuss them cumulatively and refer to the scholarly sources in fourth chapter. Finally, I will conclude my thesis by summarizing my findings with respect to the before announced aims and hypotheses, discuss their relevance, limitations, and reflect on further ways of developing them.

Chapter 1 - Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I will present the theoretical background that will serve as foundation to my research question: how are ICTY's rulings portrayed in Croatian and Serbian media? Therefore, I will deal with all the elements from the question as follows: First, I will give a concise account of historical events that led to the war among ex-Yugoslav states. This will enable better understanding of the on-going tensions between Croats and Serbs, as well as duality of narratives that explain them. In the section of about war(s) for independence, I will clarify the timeline of a conflict which is relevant for my thesis. After that, I will discuss ICTY – its importance, goals and scholarly work that deals with its perception and success. That is of crucial importance for this thesis, as my research will reflect on the issues previously brought up by other scholars. Finally, I will talk about media systems in Croatia and Serbia in order to situate the newspapers I use in my analysis in a broader media context. This will provide a sense of conditions in which these newspapers operate and to which extent is their professionalism expected.

1.1 Serbo-Croatian conflict: brief historical overview

In order to understand the context of the civil war that happened between Yugoslav Republics after it collapsed, one would have to get into comprehensive historical endeavor. There are many factors of secondary importance to it and they cannot all be covered in this paper. In this paragraph, I will try to provide a succinct overlook of the conflict and its causes.

Croatia and Serbia have a long history of being under foreign rule, even though in brief moments during history there were entities (kingdoms, principalities) with Croatian and Serbian rulers. In the aftermath of WWI at the Paris Peace Conference, a deal was made between leading Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian politicians to form a joint state, with the blessing of international forces

that came out of the war as winners (Rogel, 2004, 6). The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was formed in 1918, soon to be renamed into Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with common Serbian ruler. Later, it was renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This state ceased to exist in the WWII.

It is vital to understand that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's short existence was troubled. Even though all nations were proclaimed equal, Slovenes and Croats were often accusing the Serbian leadership of centralism. After all, king Alexander proclaimed royal dictatorship in 1921 that lasted until 1929 (ibid., 8). Not to go into historical details, there were many tensions among three nations, but mostly between Croats and Serbs. Many issues dealing with Croatian dissatisfaction were treated clumsily in Belgrade (ibid., 8) and Croatian separatist movement was growing.

The story of WWII in the former Yugoslav territory is a very complex one. For the sake of this paper, it is important to know a few facts. The historical understanding of these will provide an insight to aspects of duality of narratives that persisted in the 1990-es and are crucial for my thesis.

Large part of Croatia's and Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BIH) territory was under Ustasha regime from 1941 to 1945. This fascist puppet state was called The Independent State of Croatia and was supported by Germany and Italy at the time. The Catholic Church played a questionable role in this regime as well, with many priests collaborating with Ustashe. While its existence, many Jewish and Roma people were either killed or persecuted, but biggest number of victims were Serbs in the Croatian territory. Since Ustasha regime wanted an ethnically pure state, Serbs were either exiled to Serbia, forcefully baptized as Catholics or taken to concentration camps. The biggest concentration camp was Jasenovac: the myth of Jasenovac played an important role in subsequent Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The guiding narrative was that half million Serbs were killed by Ustashe in Jasenovac. Later revisions made by many historians

counted around 80 000 victims, which was seen as dangerous opposition to the myth of anti-fascism upon which SFRY was built.

During the WWII, a partisan movement under Tito opposing fascist forces was created. It encompassed national divisions and its participants were of all Yugoslav nations. SFRY was created in 1945 and it included today`s territories of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, BIH, Montenegro and Macedonia. These six constituents had statuses of Republics, while within Republic of Serbia there were two Autonomous Provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo. Although SFRY was seen as a model of successful communist regime during its existence until 1990, it had many internal troubles. Most of them were related to inequalities between its nations or Republics. More prosperous constituents Croatia and Slovenia were not satisfied with the money distribution within Federation, and there were many other tensions along national lines, with Croats and Slovenes feeling repressed culture-wise.

After Tito`s death in 1980, dissatisfaction with the overall situation was growing from all sides. During the 1980es, several important events took place: an economic crisis caused by international oil crisis, protests in Kosovo over its status and status of Albanians in SFRY, leaked memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts accusing Croatia and Slovenia of political and economic domination over Serbia and rise of new leaders of communist party such as Milosevic (Baker, 2015, 24-37). These and many more factors contributed to SFRY`s collapse in 1990. International factors, such as fall of USSR and Iron curtain helped to speed up the process, but main reasons for its downfall were internal.

1.2 War(s) for independence

Although the conflicts in the beginning of 1990es have been scattered throughout the ex-Yugoslav territory, I will deal with the ones in Croatia and BIH since it is relevant for my thesis. The accused whose verdicts I will analyze oversaw events during this time in mentioned territories.

It is estimated that around 100 000 people, mostly Bosniaks (83%) have been killed by direct military violence in Bosnia (almost 40% of them civilians) and around 20 000 in Croatia, out of which cca 75% were non-Serbs (Nettlefield; Tabeau and Bijak; Hoare in Baker, 2015, 95; Britannica.com, 2018). Another significant conflict with many casualties during 1990-es took place on Kosovo.

After Serbian leadership refused the proposals of party reform made by Slovenes, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia collapsed forever (Rogel, 2004, 18-19). Croatian and Slovenian representatives walked out of the meeting and soon went on to hold the elections during 1990. In Croatia, a party called Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won with 60% of the vote, but disproportional electoral system gave them more than same share of the seats in the parliament (ibid., 19). Franjo Tudman, former communist dissident, formed this party in 1989. As Grbesa (2011) says in Klepac Pogrmilovic (2013, 58), “national interest of Franjo Tuđman was basically ethnical interest of the Croats: divide Bosnia and achieve Great Croatia, clean Croatia from the Serbs, create a ‘small power’ in the Balkans that will play the role of policeman in the region, build authoritarian and autarchic state which will develop its own democratic model that will in reality be a nationalistic dictatorship”.

The invoking of “natural” boundaries is of utmost importance to the war. BIH was of mixed ethnic composition: Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks (sometimes referred to as Muslims as an ethnic category) lived there and no group was in absolute majority. Certain territories of BIH have been part of both

Croatia and Serbia during history. In Serbia, the idea of Great Serbia was revived by Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts's Memorandum and implicitly repeated by Slobodan Milosevic, leader of Serbian branch of Communist Party. Its origins can be traced back to 19th century and it spoke of a country that would include all Serbs in a single state (Baker, 2015, 16). The interests of two countries clearly clashed, because both wanted parts of BIH territory. Additionally, Croatia had large Serbian population (around half million) that were feeling nervous after HDZ's rise to power. Serbian side often invoked memories of WWII and Jasenovac, where Croatian Ustasha movement took lives of around 50 000 Serbs. Yugoslav constitution amendments did not provide enough security for ethnic minorities anywhere on the Republic level.

The relations between states have been complicating. Milosevic took control over Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which was comprised mostly out of Serbs. The initial plan, according to Baker, was to help Serbs in Croatia (which were under leadership of Serbian Democratic Party - SDS) enlarge their territory and force out the Croatian population, so later the larger territory could be added to Serbia (2015, 52-53). Croatian army, newly formed and unprepared, took longer than expected to reply to advancing Serbian forces.

The most intense phase of war in Croatia ended in 1992. After that, open war in BIH begun: members of SDS, JNA and paramilitary volunteers "began attacking towns they envisaged as part of a Serb nation-state" (Baker, 2015, 57). The war in BIH lasted until 1995 and infamously became known for being a conflict in which international diplomatic and peacekeeping interventions failed to prevent genocide (ibid., 57).

The aim of previous two sections of text was to provide a brief overview of long history of conflict between Croatia and Serbia, which was known in informal circles as a "centuries old hate between two nations". I believe that the context gives an extra weight to the war happenings, since accused

from all three cases I analyze were directly in charge of the events that took place in this period and on these territories. Because of the intertwined nature of historical accounts and accusation points at the International Criminal Tribunal, I will give account of each of three cases in the analysis chapter. This way, it will be easier to grasp and connect to the analysis and main findings.

1.3 ICTY formation, goals, importance

Because of the serious violations of international humanitarian law that were performed during this war on territories of today's Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo and BIH, an independent court was set up by UN in Den Haag. International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was founded in 1993 and held its last trial in 2017, marked by suicide of the convicted general Slobodan Praljak inside the courtroom. Although the ICTY today claims it has "laid the foundations for what is now the accepted norm for conflict resolution and post-conflict development across the globe" and that "leaders suspected of mass crimes will face justice" (Icty.org, 2018), its rulings have been received with enormous amount of both approval and outcry throughout the region.

ICTY was also of crucial importance to Croatia and Serbia, because since the collapse of Yugoslavia, they became interested in joining the European Union (EU) just like all other ex-republics. The mechanisms that were developed in the previous EU enlargement to the East European Countries had to be reinforced because of the post-war environment. Therefore, preventing more troubles and potential conflicts became a priority for EU to guarantee security as synonymous for the European area (Doucot-Rubigny, 2014, 146). The specific conditions set out in the Association and Stability Acts, contracts between EU and each Western Balkan country, included implementation of obligations set out in peace agreements (for BiH and Macedonia), and the duty to cooperate with the ICTY (Doucot-Rubigny, 2014, 149). Specifically, that meant that

countries had to extradite the accused individuals to ICTY, which did not always sit well with the public opinion and therefore the actions of political elites. Moreover, the cooperation was hampered, and processes lengthened because some of the accused such as Gotovina and Karadzic were on the run.

Turkovic says that ICTY is intended to be “much more than a mere criminal court”, as it is expected to function as an instrument of history as well (2018, 29). ICTY’s judicial proceedings were “characterized by a dual relationship between trials and history – in part history is expected to be in the service of the judicial process and in part the judicial process is expected to be in the service of history” (2018, 29). This is something that will become very clear in the analysis chapter. Namely, military actions that took place are being judged, but the outcome of the judicial process will confirm which version of an event “counts” as truthful formally – because there are many perspectives on what actually happened. In this way, ICTY is perceived as a co-author of history of this conflict.

1.4 ICTY – reconciliation

One of the main goals ICTY has stated was reconciliation. Touquet and Vermeersch noticed that the project of reconciliation is also “of key relevance to current affairs in European Union and to the process of European integration” (2013, 58). However, while deconstructing this term, it becomes apparent that the concept is vaguely defined. In a sense, reconciliation is seen as the most important element of processes going on post-conflict, but there is no consensus on what the exact steps in order are to achieve it (Touquet, Vermeersch, 2016, 58).

Reconciliation is framed in varying ways. In their 2016 paper, Touquet and Vermeersch were examining in which ways the term reconciliation was used in post-Yugoslavia. The focus of their

paper was to see “how the term was used in political discourse, and more particularly, analyze the ways in which term has been framed in different fields of political discussion” (2016, 57). They have observed that ICTY’s idea of reconciliation rests on “three pillars: avoiding the recurrence of conflict by convicting the perpetrators, the individualization of guilt, and the creation of historical record” (2016, 68). Although individualization of guilt had a goal of “preventing entire groups of being stigmatized” (Touquet, Vermeersch, 2016, 59), in my analysis I will show that the verdict to the individual was still perceived as a verdict to the entire nation in various cases. As Ahmetasevic and Matic have shown (2014), through biased local media reporting, which focused on the perpetrators and not the victims of violence (in Subotic, 2015, 368), perception of justice became ethnic, in contrast to ICTY’s intention to “individualize” guilt. With this in mind, my study’s relevance is twofold: first, in my analysis I show that there is variation in the reporting – so some newspapers produce this “ethnic” perception more and others less; second, my analysis covers cases that resolved after Subotic wrote her article, meaning it builds up on previous knowledge. Finally, I will show that the tension between individuality and collectiveness of the guilt is directly acknowledged by important political figures that co-create public discourse.

1.5 ICTY – Finding the truth/justice

The debate of judicial institutions’ ability to establish historical truths is an ongoing one among scholars. The historical record that was created at ICTY is being framed and reframed in the outside world, and many examples of denial of court rulings, especially regarding Srebrenica massacre, have prompted doubt in a direct link between court rulings and reconciliation (Touquet, Vermeersch, 2016, 60). People often failed to see the discrepancy between the law and the justice, as the ICTY verdicts were lawful but not seen as just by many (Rowen, 2012, in Subotic, 2015, 368). Theoretically speaking, ways in which societies deal with legacies of past violence are

known as transitional justice (Subotic, 2015, 361). Its three principal concepts are justice, truth and reconciliation and they encompass a wide variety of mechanisms, such as human rights trials, truth commissions, lustrations, memorialisation practices etc. (Mihir, 2013 in Subotic, 2015, 362).

As international environment becomes increasingly regulated, institutionalization of transitional justice made states accept its mechanisms as a standard practice after the conflict (Vinjamuri, Boesenecker, 2007 in Subotic, 2015, 363). Furthermore, the pressure to adopt international norms regarding transitional justice was made bluntly clear by EU's condition of the cooperation with the ICTY towards Croatia and Serbia in the accession processes (Subotic, 2015, 363).

As Subotic shows (2015, 365), international pressures for truth seeking and reconciliation building, as transitional justice elements, were much weaker than the justice seeking element. She says that was partly because it was expected that ICTY's work would deliver on all of these aspects. Furthermore, ICTY's work is somewhat measurable, while concepts such as truth or reconciliation are unclear in their operationalization, so they have mostly been neglected (366).

The expectations that the ICTY would embody the international justice norms and produce just outcomes were soon let down (Subotic, 2015, 367). There was a clash between international concepts of justice (incarnated through ICTY rulings) and local people's understanding of it (Subotic, 2015, 368). As I will show in details in the analysis chapter, the perceptions of justice are different in deeply divided societies in the region. None of the verdicts I analyzed were perceived as just by all ethnicities. Sometimes, even if the sentence was perceived as just (such as Karadzic case was perceived by Croats and Bosniaks), it is also perceived as overdue, which then seems as self-defeating.

1.6 Media systems in Croatia and Serbia

In order to situate newspapers I analyzed into their respective environment, I will provide a concise overview of Croatian and Serbian media systems. Hallin and Mancini (2004) introduced three models of the relations between media and political systems: Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, Northern European or Democratic Corporatist Model and North Atlantic or Liberal Model. Countries' media systems were situated within or between these models according to several dimensions: newspaper industry, political parallelism, professionalization and role of the state in media system (66-68). This research included what we would call Western European Countries, plus USA and Canada. Thus, none of the Eastern European Countries or Southeast European Countries were classified in this manner at first.

The countries that are observed in this case, Croatia and Serbia, are ones that underwent a significant regime change during the 1990s, and therefore do not have highly developed components that provide the foundations for the media-democracy relationship: the informative, control, representative, forum and the participatory function (Siebert et al., 1956, 7, in Carpentier, 2007, 159). This can also be seen in the work of Popescu et al. (2010) in European Media Systems Survey, which is “a regularly repeated academic study that measures differences between national media environments in how they cover politics and public affairs” (Mediasystemsineurope.org, 2018). This research shows average expert opinion about national media on scale from 0 (untrue) to 10 (true). A few relevant data from this research can be found in Table 1. More specifically, it can be seen from this information that Croatia and Serbia score numbers that indicate poor quality of aspects of their media systems.

Table 1. Excerpts from European Media Systems Study in 2010

Question about national media that expert was giving opinion on	Average score: Croatia	Average score: Serbia
Do news media enjoy a lot of credibility?	4.5	4.1
Do politicians, business people and interest groups influence what the news media report and how by pressurizing and bribing individual journalists?	6.1	7.7
Is there little difference between the way tabloid and quality newspaper cover public affairs?	7	4.7
Do news media focus too much (0), just enough or too little (10) on information about sensational aspects of events and stories?	8.9	8.9

Source: Popescu et al. (2012)

Chapter 2 - Research design

In previous chapter, I provided the essential theoretical background for my thesis. I gave account of relevant war happenings, and I discussing the aims ICTY has set out to achieve. However, as the scholarly articles in the last section suggest, expectations of ICTY bringing forth justice was let down. Based on this theory, I will present my thesis' research question and hypotheses, after which I will discuss the method I used, as well as from where and how I collected data.

2.1 Research question and hypotheses

The research question I am pursuing in my thesis is following one:

How are ICTY's rulings portrayed in Croatian and Serbian media?

With this question and theoretical background in mind, I also formed few hypotheses. First, I expect that Croatian and Serbian media will portray ICTY rulings ambivalently. This stems directly from the duality of narratives about events that took place during the war, but also from the argument about ethnicity or collectivity of guilt. More specifically, I expect to find that if the outcome of a verdict is perceived as favorable to the specific country, its newspapers portray the verdict as just; and if the outcome of a verdict is not perceived as favorable to the specific country, its newspapers portray the verdict as unjust. By doing this, I expect the newspapers to reinforce the ethnic or collective feeling of guilt or innocence that is transferred from the individual(s) on trial.

2.2 Data and cases

To develop upon my research question and hypotheses, I will observe two Croatian and two Serbian newspapers to gather data. I chose three verdicts (cases) to follow: Gotovina et al., which happened in 2012, Karadzic, which happened in 2016, and Prlic et al., which happened in 2017. I will discuss the reasoning behind choosing these three cases below.

My analysis contains 277 articles from four newspapers. In each case, I identified the date of the verdict and analyzed the related newspaper articles published from that point up to two weeks after. This time frame seemed adequate, because it allowed me to capture the coverage when the news were highly relevant as well as after the initial reactions and sensationalism attached to them. For example, in case of Gotovina et al., the final verdict was on November 16, 2012, so I singled out and analyzed articles that were published from November 17 to December 1.

The newspaper I chose for my analysis were two Croatian daily newspaper and two Serbian ones. Croatian newspaper was 24sata, which has the biggest readership - it had 30-40% of market share in 2016 (N1info.com, 2017) - and Jutarnji list. While tabloid 24sata is known for its sensationalistic reporting and often printing of additional materials with it, such as cookbooks, religious prayer books, short novels etc., Jutarnji list has been going out since 1998. It had 66 000 copies in circulation in October 2014 (Media release report, 2014), and according to Fokus-tjednik.hr is third most read daily newspaper in Croatia; in 2016, it was second with market share between 20 and 30% (N1info.com, 2017). In EMSS 2010 report, Jutarnji list agrees equally with two leading parties HDZ and SDP in its reporting, while 24sata agrees with right-wing HDZ more (Popescu et. al, 2012).

I accessed these newspaper's archives in paper version with the help of City of Zagreb's libraries association. I went to the library where printed editions of these two newspapers were kept; I picked the ones I need (according to the aforementioned criteria) and took photos of articles.

For the Serbian newspaper, I chose to analyze Politika and Blic. Politika has over a century long tradition of publishing. On their website, it says that "Politika is a daily political newspaper that uphold to high professional journalist standards" that is printed in 100 000 copies daily (Politika.rs, 2018). In 2016, it was sixth most read daily newspaper according to Informer.rs (2016), with tabloids occupying first five spots. Blic, on the other hand, had more readers than Politika (more than 60 000 in June 2016 according to Informer.rs) and is characterized as tabloid. I accessed the articles for Gotovina et al. and Karadzic cases through Ebart database (www.ebart.rs), which is an online archive of printed media in Serbia. For Prlic et al. case, I accessed the articles by using the same key words but on Blic and Politika's website due to impossibility of access through Ebart (this case happened 6 months prior and the data was not updated). I searched the articles with the key words that can be seen in Table 2.

As I already said, in these four newspapers I chose three cases to follow. The selection of these cases was arbitrary to a certain degree, but I picked them for three reasons that I will now list. First one was their relative essentiality in historical and political perspectives. The case of Gotovina et al. was of key importance to Croatia's EU accession. More specifically, failure to find and extradite Gotovina slowed down Croatia's progress with EU accession process. Also, the military action that Gotovina was in charge of was a disputed one among Croatia and Serbia, and ICTY's verdict proved to be very important in aspect of "co-authoring" historical events, which I wrote about in theoretical chapter. Furthermore, the case of Karadzic seemed fit to my analysis due to his role of Supreme commander of Republika Srpska's armed forces, under whose command Srebrenica

genocide was committed. Finally, Prlic et al. case is important because the accused (Croatian generals) were found guilty of crimes against Bosniaks, which made the role of former Croatian president Tudman in joint criminal enterprise questionable.

The second reason for picking these cases was their media coverage, which proved to be fruitful in all cases (least was written on Karadzic's case). The case of Gotovina was heavily covered because its importance for EU accession and the fact that Gotovina was a fugitive until 2005, which gave it a sensationalistic aspect. Also, the acquittal of Gotovina and Markac was surprising (and therefore well covered) to both domestic and international community because the first-degree verdict which found them guilty was reversed. Karadzic was also found only in 2008, in Serbia, posing as a doctor of alternative medicine. It is hard to evaluate if Prlic et al. case was mediatized so much because the accused were found guilty (it implied transmission of guilt to highest Croatian officials), because of the fact it was the last trial of ICTY, or because of infamous suicide of general Praljak inside the courtroom.

Third reason I picked these cases is that they are different from each other regarding their outcome – in two cases, accused were found guilty, and in one, they were acquitted. Also, two cases processed Croatian military leaders (generals) – one group was active in territory of today's Croatia, and the other on territory of BIH; one case processed a Serbian politician and military leader for crimes committed on BIH territory. All in all, I believe the cases' specifics provided a good balance for my analysis: there are variation in outcomes, both in guilty-not guilty department as well as their expectedness. This is beneficial for my study because it encompasses various reactions to verdicts and provides more insight to determine the overall perception of ICTY's rulings.

Table 2. Overview of analysis plan

Newspaper	Case	Analyzing period	Number of articles	Key words
24sata	Gotovina et al.	17.11. - 01.12.2012	40	/
	Karadzic	25.03. - 07.04.2016	7	/
	Prlic et al.	30.11. - 13.12.2017	27	/
Jutarnji list	Gotovina et al.	17.11. - 01.12.2012	52	/
	Karadzic	25.03. - 07.04.2016	10	/
	Prlic et al.	30.11. - 13.12.2017	25	/
Politika	Gotovina et al.	17.11. - 01.12.2012	29	Gotovina, Markac, verdict
	Karadzic	25.03. - 07.04.2016	12	Karadzic, verdict
	Prlic et al.	30.11. - 13.12.2017	13	Prlic, Praljak, verdict
Blic	Gotovina et al.	17.11. - 01.12.2012	15	Gotovina, Markac, verdict
	Karadzic	25.03. - 07.04.2016	8	Karadzic, verdict
	Prlic et al.	30.11. - 13.12.2017	39	Prlic, Praljak, verdict

2.3 Method

In analyzing the newspaper articles, I will rely on the method of thematic analysis, which will be accompanied with frame analysis. According to Braun and Clarke (2006, 82), thematic analysis is a type of qualitative analytic method, which allows analyzing complex data in detailed and rich fashion. Its main goal is to discover repeated patterns and themes, selecting and reporting on ones that are of interest. Braun and Clarke add that thematic analysis is useful in “unpackaging” and “unravelling” the surface of reality: “acknowledging the ways in which individuals make meaning of their experience”, and in turn, “the ways the broader social context impinges on those meanings, while retaining focus on the material and other limits of reality” (2006, 82).

When it comes to framing, another type of analysis I use, Grbesa writes in her 2012 article that Goffman (1974) described it as ‘schemata of interpretation’ that provides a context for under-

standing information (90). Also, “news framing refers to ‘the process by which a communication source constructs and defines a social or political issue for its audience’” (Nelson et al., 1997: 221 in Grbesa, 2012, 90). Thus, she writes, “framing is the work that both media and their audiences do in making sense of the social world” (2012, 90). It is also important to highlight that “the creation of news frames is strongly linked to issues of power, hegemony and ideology (e.g. GUMG, 1980; Philo, 1990; Hackett, 1984; Carragee and Roefs, 2004; Zaller, 1992 in Grbesa, 2012, 91).

2.4 Limits to analysis

There are limits to my analysis and most of them are due to time and resource constraints. I did try to give a sense of printed media landscape in Croatia and Serbia by choosing these four newspapers, but there are other relevant newspapers to bear in mind if a more complete picture is to be presented. Nevertheless, with these newspapers I encompass a vast majority of readers in Croatia (tabloid 24sata is most read newspaper overall, while Jutarnji list is second or third, depending on the year) and a significant majority in Serbia (Politika is the most read daily political newspaper, and Blic is one of the most read tabloids). Furthermore, the time frame I chose for analysis (two weeks after a verdict) was picked arbitrarily. My logic was to cover immediate reactions of the public and the ones following them when passions are a bit lower. Finally, I believe there is another limitation I must acknowledge: one is that by the time I was collecting the data and had the access to Ebart site (online archive of Serbian printed media), the data from the last case (Prlic et al.), which was six months before, were still not available on this site. Instead, I had to research the archives of Politika and Blic on their websites, and do not know which of the articles from online edition made it to the physical newspaper copy: therefore, there is a slight imbalance compared to other cases and newspapers.

Chapter 3 - Analysis

Following the details of research design I proposed, in this chapter I will present my analysis following the timeline of cases. I will first discuss Gotovina et al. case, followed by Karadzic case and finally Prlic et al. case. In every instance I will present the results from my thematic and framing analysis of a single case from all newspapers analyzed, in order to give a rounded picture of media coverage per case. In the next chapter I will discuss each newspaper separately to reflect on their overall tone of reporting.

3.1 Gotovina et al.

Gotovina et al. case was of the utmost importance to Croatia on her road to European Union. The extradition of general Gotovina, who was on the run for several years until his capture in 2005, was one of the main preconditions for accession process to start (reference) . This case originally included three people: Ante Gotovina, operational commander of the southern Krajina region during “Operation Storm”, commander of the Knin Garrison Ivan Cermak and commander of the Special Police Mladen Markac. All three men’s charges were related to Operation Storm, which was a military offensive launched with “the objective of re-taking the Krajina region of the country” (CIS Gotovina et al., 2018, 3). Krajina was a Croatian region that extended next to the Bosnia and Herzegovina border and was populated mainly by Serbian people.

To be more specific, Gotovina “possessed effective control over all units, elements and members of Croatian Army (...) present (...) during Operation Storm”, Cermak “possessed effective control over members of Croatian Army units who (...) operated in Knin¹ Garrison”, and Markac, as Assistant Minister of the Interior “possessed effective control over all members of the Special

Police who were involved in Operation Storm” (CIS Gotovina et al., 2018, 3). All in all, according to the Case information sheet of Gotovina et al. Case (2018, 4), three men were charged on the basis of individual criminal responsibility with following: persecution on political, racial and religious grounds, deportation and inhumane acts; plunder of public or private property and wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages; murder; inhumane acts; cruel treatment.

In the initial Trial Chamber judgement in 2011 Cermak was acquitted of all charges, while Gotovina and Markac were found guilty and sentenced to 24 and 18 years in prison. Because of the initial ruling in 2011, appeals chamber judgement in 2012 which acquitted Gotovina and Markac was surprising to many. It was due to the abolishment of controversial 200 meter rule: if bombing happened within 200 meter radius from a legitimate object, it was deemed as legitimate military action. This rule was applied in the initial Trial Chamber judgement, but revoked in the appeal.

Unsurprisingly, Gotovina and Markac’s acquittal was covered heavily in the observed Croatian newspapers, and a bit less in Serbian ones. In two weeks from the date of the trial, Gotovina et al. case was featured on more than 80 pages in each Croatian newspaper, including several covers. Serbian newspapers have in the observed period printed 29 (Politika) and 15 (Blic) articles related to this subject.

3.1.1 Gotovina et al. in 24sata

In case of Croatian newspaper, the articles initially dealt with the coverage of celebration and welcoming of generals in Croatia’s capital. Later, the stories in 24sata ranged from war times and praised Gotovina's military expertise to coverage of welcoming party that people threw in his birthplace. Overall, in 24sata photos dominated over text in all the articles, a lot of them showing close up of Gotovina's face or thousands of people with Croatian flags celebrating the acquittal.

The main narrative seemed to be the praise of Gotovina's innocence, and his heroism (word "hero(es)" became almost synonymous with Gotovina and Markac). Journalists have focused on portrayal of Gotovina's personality, covering stories about Markac only marginally but in the same personalistic manner. To list some of the stories and headings: (Gotovina and his family) Together after 11 years..., They have let my child go (from his mother), We have prayed for Mladen (Cermak) - story covering pray gathering in his birthplace, Citizens weep of joy for generals, Short biography of judge who set generals free, She could not speak – she only cried (Gotovina's wife) etc. There is a couple of stories about Gotovina's religious commitment and his "fulfilling of the sacred vow" to Virgin Mary.

As far as 24sata goes, there is a couple of dominant frames which can be observed in the articles. First of them is the emotional frame: the story-telling manner of reporting generals' travel to Croatia and their welcoming in the cities throughout the country revolves heavily on the emotions either generals or the people have expressed. For example, in many instances 24sata reports how people are crying from happiness and are ecstatic. This frame gently collides but plays well with the frame of "true soldier" created around Gotovina's image: many war stories as well as reporting of his behavior during welcoming tell about his attitude, posture, restraint and discipline, which are all characteristics of a true soldier who follows order, is apolitical and unideological. This image of him was strengthened after his speech, in which he was brief and surprisingly apolitical, thanking all the state institutions and telling the mass to turn to future and let past be past.

Another important frame was dignity/honor one. The notion of Gotovina and Cermak defending the honor of Croatian state, of the Operation Storm, of the veterans who have fought the oppressor (Serbia) can be observed in many reports, coming either from interviewees or journalists. I believe that this reflects the relief brought by this verdict, in a sense that Operation Storm, one of the

biggest military actions in the war, was justified. However, the ICTY never ruled so: it was judging solely on individual responsibility. Since Gotovina was a symbol of martyrdom for many people (innocent in prison), his acquittal was in a way a catalyst for national approval of innocence and righteousness that was achieved by making hard decisions in war.

All in all, I would say that 24sata reporting was done in a very personalistic manner in this case. The articles focus mainly on an individual, mostly Gotovina, followed by Markac and judge Meron who was the presiding judge in their case. The personal lives' details of Gotovina represent his honesty, Markac is described as brave, and judge Meron as an individual that knows the horrors of war, since he spent time in concentration camps as a boy. This sensationalistic way of reporting is usual for tabloids, and it is one of the examples which Ahmetasevic and Matic (2014) write about (in Subotic, 2015, 368): through the biased local media reporting, which focuses on the perpetrators and not the victims of violence, perception of justice becomes ethnic in contrast to ICTY's intention to "individualize" guilt, or in this case, innocence.

24sata does frame the acquittal itself as "justice being served", but the acquittal itself seems just as an initial news which is followed by heavy reporting on Gotovina's personality, plans and whereabouts.

In the whole spread, there is not one article even questioning or mentioning the righteousness of the ICTY: its ruling is accepted as the truth. Also, the innocence of Gotovina et al. was automatically translated to innocence of Croatian people in the war, and in one article there were undertones of gloating over Serbian politicians who were appalled by the verdict.

3.1.2 Gotovina et al. in Jutarnji list

Some things become clearer only in comparison – and I realized the lack of subjects covered in 24sata only when I analyzed Jutarnji list. First of all, Jutarnji list has much more text. Lacking the better analysis method, I would estimate it has two to three times more text than 24sata, whose articles have mainly focused on short texts and big pictures. Another noticeable difference is that 24sata mainly focuses on coverage of the celebrations/welcomings and personal details of generals, while Jutarnji list pays a lot of attention to political or historical consequences of the acquittal and the effect of it in international terms. Jutarnji list has in two weeks of the coverage printed short interviews/opinions of many domestic politicians, hosted relevant columnists and published a public opinion poll and legal expert’s opinion on the matter.

Other than diversity in its sources and coverage, Jutarnji list’s main framing of the acquittal consists of two ideas: first one being the “internationally proven fact that Operation Storm was legitimate military action”, and second, more important one is the “Operation Storm was legitimate, but crimes were committed during it”. I found the second frame essential, especially in context of euphoria that was present at the time of the acquittal. This frame does not come only from interviewees’ or columnists’ opinion, but I believe a conscious editorial decision was made to publish a report from Serbian refugees that were deported during Oluja, and to criticize the state because of avoidance to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against Serbs.

When it comes to “internationally proven fact that Operation Storm was legitimate military action”, Jutarnji list has in details explained the verdict and its legal background, as well as conveyed the news of European Commission’s message of the acknowledgement of the verdict. The reactions from Serbia and many disapproving opinions were also published in a very objective manner, purely reporting what the sentiments were.

Once again, I believe that the important finding I noticed was in the difference between these two newspapers. For example, while 24sata has filled many of its pages with regular people's opinion taken from their Facebook or Twitter pages, Jutarnji list mainly focuses on experts (legal, historical, political) to deliver their understanding of the event. While both newspapers have printed some "gossip" material, i.e. personal details of Gotovina and Markac (stories about their wives, kids etc.), in 24sata this takes most of the pages while in Jutarnji it is only secondary to the analysis of the acquittal and its effects. Moreover, 24sata dedicated a lot of attention to Gotovina's trip to the sanctuary to "fulfill his vow to virgin Mary", while Jutarnji barely covers it.

Overall, the Croatian newspaper have payed a lot of attention to this event, but the observed newspapers have had a different approach to it. To my estimation, 24sata's reporting is much more personalistic and sensationalist, which is indeed a characteristic of a tabloid: it focuses on personal stories and details that vouch for generals' character, while Jutarnji list focuses on a broader picture of this event and takes into the account its complexity. This is also in line with its nature of a broadsheet.

3.1.3 Gotovina et al. in Politika

As I moved to the Serbian newspaper, I expected the gap and the complete shift in the frames and way of writing about this issue because there were reports in Croatian newspapers of reactions from Serbia. First, I analyzed newspaper Politika, that I expected to be closer to Jutarnji list in narrative (i.e. less sensationalist, more focused on international/political implications).

What I noticed first is the style of reports. To be more specific, there are much more interviews and quoting of someone's statement than columns and articles which express journalist's opinion. I found this to have a distancing effect – you can vaguely figure out what Politika's stance on this issue is. However, this does not mean that a reader does not get a sense of how the acquittal of

Croatian generals is framed – it is just a question of how much did Politika consciously “create” this frame or merely report on it.

The biggest difference is of course in the overall sentiment of the acquittal, which is overwhelmingly positive in case of the Croatian newspaper and entirely negative in case of Serbian newspapers. All in all, I recognized three main frames of this issue in Politika that I will discuss.

The frame “selective justice” is the most dominant one. Within this frame, many sentiments of shock with the verdict are expressed, saying how the ICTY is “anti-Serbian” and how it does not recognize “the biggest genocide in Europe after WW2”², it being the persecution of Serbs from Krajina done during Operation Storm. The interviewees often said how there is a tendency to accuse Serbs of everything that happened during the war, and liberate others (Croats, Bosniaks and Kosovar) from the blame. The added weight of this frame can be seen through one of the statements reported, which says that “the ICTY has once again killed the victims of Operation Storm with this verdict”.

Another highly important frame in Politika was the “international influence”. A lot of meaning is packed into this frame. First and foremost, there is a belief that the generals were acquitted because Croatia is about to enter EU – and EU cannot have a criminal state as its member; therefore, generals, i.e. Croatia, must be acquitted of these charges. Of course, what is extremely visible in this frame is the transfer of the guilt/innocence on the national level. This was present in Croatian newspapers as well – they proclaimed in a lot of instances that with this acquittal the Croatian state is now clean from the dirt it was imposed on it. International influence frame also consisted of speculative statements claiming the involvement of NATO and USA in the ICTY’s decision making. Namely, Croatia is a part of NATO, therefore has ties with USA, which cannot let the generals be convicted because it would mean a lot of their military officers would be convicted

(200 meters rule). Furthermore, there are various reports/statements claiming heavy involvement of CIA in the Operation Storm. Jutarnji list has also reported on Gotovina's secret meeting with CIA officials before the Operation Storm took place, but Politika's sources go much further in saying CIA's officials planned it. Although marginal, another statement played into this frame very well: a Serbian politician said: "do you really think that the Clintons would allow truth to win in Hague?". The third frame I observed in case of Politika is the "modification of the first verdict". I believe it to be a very important one, as the first two could be portrayed as an emotional reaction to this verdict. This frame, however, seems less as an emotional reaction with more facts supporting it. In many instances it was discussed as surprising and shocking that the generals were found guilty in their trial chamber judgement in 2011 only to be acquitted in appeals chamber in 2012. How did the same judges find them unanimously guilty at first, and then three of them not guilty a year later? - asks himself one of the interviewees. The excerpts from separate legal opinions of judge Pocar who found them guilty both times and of ICTY's ex prosecutor Carla del Ponte support this frame, saying the verdict is "problematic and flawed".

3.1.4 Gotovina et al. in Blic

As was the case with Croatian 24sata, I noticed that Blic initially frames the acquittal in a certain way but then moves on to more sensationalist reporting which fill out most of the text on Gotovina and Markac's acquittal. The Blic's focus is first and foremost on the "explosion of nationalism", reporting from Croatia's welcoming of generals. From that, they move to the financial segment of the acquittal: they list how much money has been spent on generals' attorneys by Croatian government and compare it with money spent on Serbian accused. To this they add information about "all inclusive" treatment of generals' families in Hague, portraying a picture of a bought verdict and generous state aid to Gotovina and Markac. The framing of the acquittal itself is best

seen in the following excerpt: “five judges reach a conclusion by outvoting three to two: there is no one guilty of crimes committed in 1995, when 2000 were killed and 220 000 deported”. This seems like an oversimplified statement, and is in complete opposition with one of the main frames observed in Jutarnji list (i.e. the acquittal does not mean there were no crimes and that the perpetrators should be processed).

Since Blic was the one that published Carla del Ponte’s opinion on the matter, Gotovina’s attorneys threatened with lawsuit because of her alleged breach of lawyer’s ethics. Blic has therefore reported on the announced lawsuit, portraying del Ponte as a victim for expressing sympathies with Serbian victims. Gotovina is personified as a person with no shame in this case (“Disgrace: Gotovina resents someone for ethics”), and furthermore described as a person who is now idolized in Croatia for his peace-evoking statements, which is subtly mocked.

The international influence frame, that was present in Politika, is also noticeable in Blic. Blic writes about the Americans, namely Bill Clinton, orchestrating the Operation Storm, and they report statements from a Serbian historian claiming that the “interests of two world powers – Germany and USA – with the support of Vatican, are on Croatian side”. The notion of “anti-Serbian court” is very strong in both observed newspapers. Blic also reports the analysts’ statements on difficulties this acquittal creates for Serbia on its path towards EU, because of the undermined trust in Western institutions by Serbian people.

One of the most obvious finding from this newspaper were the so-called clickbaits: for example, one headline stated: “ICTY: the revision of the process is possible”, only to discover that it is indeed possible but only in case there is new relevant evidence brought in within the year of the final verdict. Also, I noticed a pattern similar to 24sata’s reporting – relying on an individual level, namely reporting on an individual, be it Gotovina as a person, or a refugee from Krajina. As I have

stated before, one limit I face in my analysis is the fact I did not have access to full printed version of Serbian newspaper – ergo I did not see the pictures or the arrangement of the text, the textboxes etc. I believe this would accentuate my experience with Blic, which is known for its graphic reporting.

3.2 Karadzic

Radovan Karadzic is undoubtedly one of the biggest names persecuted in ICTY, but there was much less speculation or possibility of surprise in his case than in Gotovina and Markac's. The final reading of his judgement was pronounced in 2016. Karadzic, as the sole president of Republika Srpska and the Supreme Commander of its armed forces until July 1996, was “found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war committed by Serb forces during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. He was convicted of genocide in the area of Srebrenica in 1995, of persecution, extermination, murder, deportation, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), terror, unlawful attack on civilians and hostage-taking. He was acquitted of the charge of genocide in other municipalities in BiH in 1992” (CIS Karadzic, 2018, 2). Karadzic was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

In accordance with his unsurprising conviction, there is significantly less articles devoted to Karadzic's conviction in 2016 in all the observed newspapers. The number of the observed articles can be seen in Table 2.

3.2.1 Karadzic in 24sata

24sata brings the personalistic view to the reader once again. It covered the stories from Muslims whose families were killed under Karadzic's military leadership (mostly from Srebrenica), but also the political side of this verdict (which were missing in Gotovina case). The interesting novelty is

questioning the Hague court's principles, which are accused of the fact that Karadzic was made into a hero by Serbs.

When it comes to framing, there are a few that stand out. First of them is the “inconsistent sentence” of 40 years sentence, which is dubbed as inconsistent because Karadzic’s subordinates got life sentences. The authors do recognize that these sentences are effectively the same due to Karadzic’s old age, but deem the court unprincipled, naming all the atrocities committed under his command in Srebrenica and often portraying it from the individual level. Karadzic is portrayed as a cruel individual that has a grand plan against Muslim population, which is confirmed by this statement: “does the Europe not know who we have fought against after Paris and Bruxelles?”.¹ His sentence is also deemed as insignificant because “he knows what he did and does not regret it”. Finally, this “late justice” means nothing in the end: it “leaves a man empty and indifferent.”

The second important frame present in 24sata is the “guilty, but not guilty”, questioning why Karadzic is not proclaimed guilty of genocide in other municipalities, mainly populated by Croats. Killing in those other municipalities was proclaimed as organized and systematical as well, and the authors of articles once again list the atrocities committed by Serbs under

Karadzic’s rule.

I have identified another frame, which was mentioned in only one article, but I still believe it’s important because of its message. Namely, 24sata reports of the personality cult created out of Karadzic’s image in Republika Srpska, but while doing so warns us to look in our own back yard, stating that us vs. them rhetoric is also present in Croatia when it comes to dealing with the Homeland war. Although very marginal, I found this interesting because it represents a shift in the

24sata's approach compared to Gotovina et al. case, whose reporting seemed superficial and unquestioning of the "truth" established by generals' acquittal.

3.2.2 Karadzic in Jutarnji list

The Jutarnji list's coverage of Karadzic's case was much more similar to 24sata one than in case of Gotovina et al., where I noticed a substantial difference in the nature of reporting. However, Jutarnji list did again bring more text than 24sata to the analysis.

The most important frames do not differ from ones in 24sata: "the inconsistent sentence" and "guilty, but not guilty" dominate Jutarnji list's reporting, although there is added depth to them. Jutarnji list explains that his private issues, previous agreements with American deputy and good behavior in prison are taken into consideration while proclaiming the sentence, hence its inconsistency. His innocence in case of other municipalities is explained by lack of evidence: namely, the genocidal intentions for Srebrenica are obvious from the excerpts of a phone call with another official, while hard evidence like this one is missing in case of other municipalities.

Jutarnji list, as in case with Gotovina et al., goes into the meaning of the verdict and its international echo. It states that the fact joint criminal enterprise was a part of the verdict, it means Karadzic had support from Belgrade in his doings – which Jutarnji list highlights as very important. Furthermore, they look in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina and repercussions it faces because of Karadzic's doings. The frame of "important creator of politics" in BIH is evident in various instances: Jutarnji list covers the opening of student center in Republika Srpska named after Karadzic and opened by Dodik, today's president of this legal entity of BIH. They discuss how Dodik takes over the rhetoric and maneuvers of Karadzic to exert his power, as well as uses his image to consolidate it. Furthermore, columnist Jergovic writes how Karadzic's sentence is irrelevant, because today's BIH looks how he would have wanted – "carved up" and divided in the

minds of the people who still either look up to him or hate him. Still, a paradox mentioned by a Bosnian imam resonates: Karadzic has, through his actions and wish to exterminate Muslims, contributed to the islamization of BIH and emancipation of Muslims in it. Although this statement is controversial, it does fit into the importance frame – however importance is seen.

3.2.3 Karadzic in Politika

Karadzic's verdict was not covered heavily in the observed Serbian media as well – I suppose it is due to the expectedness of its outcome. However, in twelve articles published on this subject in Politika in the observed period (two weeks after the verdict), there is a few frames that are extremely important and clash heavily with ones in Croatian newspapers.

Although the initial reporting on the verdict, its details and reactions from BIH's capital Sarajevo is done in a manner of transfer of news – the judge said this, this politician says that, these are the statistics, these is the list of the crimes he was accused of – in later articles a few frames are observable. I believe two of them are main ones and can be seen in various articles and contexts. The first one is “whataboutism”: a diversion tactic noticeable in acknowledging an event marginally and emphasizing another matter. Here are few examples of it. in one article, Politika reports on a legal expert's opinion that Srebrenica was a horrible massacre, but it was not a genocide. Another article, by a columnist, states that “there was no angels or demons in BIH; everybody did crimes. But all these crimes derive from the biggest crime of all – breaking-up of Yugoslavia”. The columnist continues to explain how the spark of the war was brought from Croatia, and how Karadzic did not start the war, “but only he knows if he knew what he was supposed to know”. Furthermore, the question of “why nobody was prosecuted for the crimes against Serbs” comes up again.

The second important frame is the “anti-Serbian” one. This frame was also visible in case of Gotovina et al., and here it is portrayed in several cases. The ICTY is once again described as hypocritical court where truth about the civil war in Yugoslavia is interpreted in two ways. Also, the verdict is dubbed as a political one. Since March 24, the day of Karadzic’s verdict is a date on which NATO bombed Serbia 17 years prior, one columnist writes how “we identify this day, when we remember how NATO bombed a small European state without the permission of UN’s Security Council, with a place² where they grieve for all the victims – with the condition it is not a Serbian one”.

Last but not least, “the sovereignty of Republika Srpska should not be questionable” is another important but fairly marginal frame in this case. The statements from Serbia’s prime minister Vucic and other prominent personas, as Karadzic’s daughter, share this sentiment.

3.2.4 Karadzic in Blic

As I progressed in my analysis, I developed a sense of what might be the underlining sentiment in a newspaper I will observe next. After I analyzed the case of Karadzic in Politika, I expected findings in other Serbian newspaper to be similar to a certain degree. I must admit I was surprised it was very different. That being said, Blic did publish a very small amount of articles on this subject (even less than Politika), only 8 in period of two weeks after the verdict took place. This is relevant as well, because it shows that this was not a very popular issue although it bears a large significance to Serbia and its politics.

Following the verdict pronouncement on March 24, Blic published three articles in following days that brought the general overview of the list of points Karadzic was found guilty on and those he was found not guilty on. These articles had purely informative purpose and were presented in a informative manner, with comments from Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian politicians which were

very balanced in nature – some claimed this was expected and fair, some that the sentence is too short, and some that it was unfair.

In one fairly long article, Blic justifies its sensationalistic nature: it publishes “unknown details” of Karadzic’s life in hiding and arrest that followed.³ This article shows some elements of admiring which were also present in Politika – how cunning he was and how no one knew where he hid.

The main finding, in contrast with expected, is a critique of Serbian state – which uses the breakup of Yugoslavia to rob its citizens today and to fabricate its own history. Again, this frame is observable in only a few articles since there were not many to start with. The authors of these articles warn that “the state works hard to change the perception of history within younger population that has not seen the terrors of war. The circumstances of losing assets or life, and many other casualties, are only secondary to the main theme: God, how much injustice do Serbian people suffer from”. Moreover, the anti-Serbian frame is criticized, saying how “we always believe that we are victims of a world-wide conspiracy”. I found this frame extremely important and surprising, albeit it is not supported by a lot of writing, because it represents a complete clash with the so far observed sentiment in Serbian newspapers and is in clear contrast with much more antagonistic framing of the matter present in Politika.

3.3 Prlic et al.

Prlic et al. case revolves around six men – Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Coric and Berislav Pusic. They were officials or high-ranking officers of Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna or its armed forces, which was a short-lived entity within BIH that was supposed to encompass all of its Croatian residents. These Croats, out of whom two were

born in Croatia and four in BiH, were charged with “willful killing; inhuman treatment (sexual assault), unlawful deportation, transfer and confinement of a civilian; (...) extensive destruction of property and appropriation of property; cruel treatment; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages; (...) persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; murder; rape; inhumane acts” (CIS Prlic et al., 2018, 5). To clarify, all the listed crimes were perpetrated against Muslim population in claimed territory of Herceg-Bosna. Moreover, “troops of the Croatian Army fought alongside the HVO¹ against the ABiH² and that the Republic of Croatia had overall control over the armed forces and the civilian authorities of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna” (CIS Prlic et al., 2018, 6). One of the most important and discussed excerpts of the judgement was founding that “a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) existed and had as its ultimate goal the establishment of a Croatian territorial entity (...) to enable a reunification if the Croatian people” (CIS Prlic et al., 2018, 6).

Coverage of the Prlic et al. case was a very fruitful one. The number of pages covered within two weeks from the verdict is the most balanced one among all the newspaper – this might be due to the sensationalistic element of suicide inside the courtroom which was discussed heavily on both Serbian and Croatian side. Also, the outcome of the verdict was unfavorable for Croatia – which is the only one of three cases I observed. I will explain my results as I did in previous two cases, starting with Croatian 24sata, followed by Jutarnji list and then Serbian Politika and Blic. I will focus on the reactions to the verdict itself and cover the suicide of Slobodan Praljak if I find it relevant to the verdict reactions. Finally, I have to disclose an important deviance in methodology, more specifically the sources I used. Since there was no data available on this case through Ebart

¹ Croatian Defence Council

² Army of BiH

website I used for access to Serbian newspaper, I accessed the archives of Politika and Blic through their online editions. This means I do not know which of the articles observed in this case made it to printed edition and therefore differ from the other cases.

3.3.1 Prlic et al. in 24sata

In the first days following the verdict, 24sata has covered Prljak's suicide and stories about him: how he read Shakespeare's sonnets about injustice, his war-time friends testifying about his strong character and his subordinates saying he never ordered them to do what he was convicted for. The undertones of the reporting were melancholic.

When the parallels were drawn with the role of Croatian leadership at the time, 24sata columnist was very straight-forward: "let's be clear, Croatia was not the aggressor in BIH". The frame "unjust accusation of JCE (joint criminal enterprise)" is a predominant one. It includes the blunt negation of the ICTY's ruling and disapproval of the image of being the (only) aggressor in BIH, while JCE was never proven in case of Serbian involvement. The sentiments of injustice and regret that ICTY did not recognize that Milosevic is the one that started the war are expressed. Prljak's suicide fits into this narrative, as this act is explained as a desperate move by a person who (said he) knew was not guilty and "refuses the verdict". Moreover, the guilt of Prlic et al. is openly transferred to all Croatian people, which is a familiar (sub)frame I have observed in prior case of Gotovina et al., where the innocence was extended to an entire nation.

Another important frame which collides with the previously mentioned one is the "failure of the ICTY". It is said that the ICTY has let down all the goals that were at the core of its founding, failing to recognize Milosevic's guilt and Serbia's involvement in JCE, while at the same time

crimes against Croats in BIH were not judged the same. This frame is clearly “borrowed”, since it feels like it fits Serbian “whataboutism” very well, and resembles the “anti-Serbian” court, both observed in Karadzic case.

The third important finding from this case is the usage of the Praljak’s suicide for political gains. Namely, Croatian parliament, led by right-wing HDZ (Tudjman’s party) has held a moment of silence for Praljak, which bothered some members of parliament that expressed outcry for mourning the convicted war criminal. Some members of parliament accused HDZ of using his suicide for political gains. Another marginal persona, also linked to the right-wing parties, has called out Facebook for banning the posts which mourn/glorify Praljak as banning the freedom of speech.

3.3.2 Prlic et al. in Jutarnji list

Although the leading Croatian politicians’ statements about absurdity of not having Serbian political elite charged with starting the war, this frame was a marginal one in Jutarnji list. Predominantly, Jutarnji has dealt with implications of JCE conviction: it framed the issue mainly as “Tudjman wanted an ethnically clean western Bosnia”, presenting many historical allegations of Tudjman’s plans for BIH. In a way, Jutarnji does seem to accept the fact that Tudman was involved in the war in BIH, but fails to recognize that not all the territories were “ethnically clean”.

The frames in Jutarnji list were scattered on this matter and it was a little bit challenging to recognize the underlying tone of this clearly polarizing issue. Jutarnji has given voice to both sides – one claiming the absurdity of this verdict and other calling for acceptance of the verdict. In one column, it is very visible that there is a fear of change in the myth of Homeland war – namely, that Croatian state was founded in bloody and strictly defensive war. The columnist writes how “Vukovar³ will be forgotten and the new image of war and Croatia, a state founded on crimes”.

This “change of history” frame seems to explicitly worry some – an influential Croatian politician also calls for appeal to judgement because “ICTY cannot write our history”.

A contrasting frame “guilt of individual, not a nation” is one visible in Croatian President’s statement, who issued a couple of statements. She said that “we, Croats, must have strength to admit that some of our countrymen did commit crimes in BIH” and “we reject the blame of the people”, but both of these statements followed after her claim that Croatia did not attack anyone and expressing condolences to Praljak’s family. These paradoxical statements seem like “catch-all” phrases to encompass all the opinions on the matter. However, Jutarnji did add to this frame by writing about concentration camps Praljak was in charge of and dire conditions in them, as well as publish an article by an expert saying how the state of democracy in Croatia is poor because we do not seem to recognize other nation’s victims, only our own.

Finally, a relatively strong sentiment of Croatian friendship with BIH is present throughout the reports. How is it possible that Croatia was an aggressor in BIH when it prevented other large crimes by its actions, and it hosted many BIH’s refugees, Irregardless of their religion or nationality – this is one of the examples where either/or solution is offered. Once again, Croatian president called for unity of Bosniak (Muslim) and Croatian people in BIH, for sake of both nations.

3.3.3 Prlic et al. in Politika

In Politika, the coverage of this subject in the observed period clearly focuses on reactions of Croatian politicians and people on Praljak’s suicide. The frame “Croatia honors a war criminal” is portrayed trough many reports of statements coming from president Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic and prime minister Andrej Plenkovic, who have expressed their condolences to Praljak’s family and partly or wholly rejected the verdict as just. They also report on Croatian Parliament’s moment of

silence in honor of Praljak (and about the protest of some parliament members). Mostly, the frame is visible in an outrage by international newspapers, who write of Croatia's wrong path and that "Croatia does not belong in EU because they celebrate a war criminal". Related to this, I noticed how the same statement president Grabar Kitarovic is accentuated differently in Politika and Jutarnji list, as they accentuate different parts of it – namely, Politika frames her speech as an attempt to blame Serbia and Milosevic for everything that has happened during the war just days after ICTY has convicted former Croatian political elite of JCE. Furthermore, Politika reports of Praljak's commemoration and deems it unfit to have this man celebrated and grieved for.

Other than that, I did not notice any dominant frames. However, I noticed that in comparison with Croatian media, who have used a formulation of conviction of JCE with the goal of creating ethnically pure Croatian state, Politika uses the formulation "conviction of JCE with the goal of elimination of Bosnian Muslims in BIH". Although it is just a matter of formulation, I find it insightful. Another small sentiment that can be read between the lines is the subtle mockery to the people celebrating Praljak, which is observable in reports of Praljak's "plaintive" letter, and "sad attempts" of a small Croatian football club commemorating Praljak before a match in BIH which they lost afterwards.

Other than that, Politika has published one article that stands out between these sentiments, saying how ICTY did not contribute to reconciliation in the Balkans.

3.3.4 Prlic et al. in Blic

Out of all observed newspapers, Blic has written about this case the most, although it mainly focuses on details of Praljak's death – how did he get the poison inside the courtroom, which poison was it, what was he like privately etc., with which they justify their sensationalistic nature (very similar to Croatian 24sata). Blic covers the verdict and its political implications vaguely – it

focuses on Croatian president and prime minister's statements, Praljak's commemoration and nation-wide grief caused by his suicide.

I was not able to establish more than couple of frames other than "scandalous suicide of Praljak", which is self-explanatory one. Blic does write about how Croatian Youth Initiative and women groups call for "acknowledgment of Croatia's own crimes", which is similar to one observed in Jutarnji list but names two Non-Governmental Organizations, which were never mentioned in Jutarnji.

Although the article I am about to provide details on is too short to be deemed as providing a frame of some kind, I found it important. Namely, the article about "main ICTY's oversights" lists seven cases, among which are Praljak's suicide, the acquittal of Gotovina, Seselj's coming-out of prison, the unfinished Milosevic trials and two Kosovo officials' acquittal. The cases are only listed with very few details said about them, but it still left me under the impression of balance between the choice of oversights.

The most noticeable thing in the analysis of Blic's coverage of Prlic et al. Case speaks of the nature of this newspaper. Its sensationalistic nature really comes through, with clickbait headlines that are written in all-caps, reports that consist of a single tweet and down-right extreme themes, such as a psychiatrist claiming that "rise in suicide rates in Croatia is expected". This observation is probably more visible because I approached Blic and Politika archive on their respective websites in this case (it was a recent event and the Ebart site still did not upload the articles from that period). Not all the articles observed in this case can be found in printed edition of the newspaper, therefore they have provided me a wider and more disperse analytical base.

Chapter 4 - Results of the analysis

Since my thesis follows the timeline of my investigation and analysis, I believe it can be seen how with every other newspaper/case I observed, the report builds up and a sense of complexity is brought up. In this section, I will discuss the results of my analysis in a different manner – I will discuss two national newspapers at a time by comparing them, respective of the cases I analyzed in them. I believe this to be the best way of summarizing my results as it will be less repetitive. Later, I will present the result of the comparison of newspapers in Croatia vs. Serbia manner and reflect on the theory I introduced earlier in my thesis.

Before I start, I have to recognize that all the cases I observed were extremely polarizing issues. Gotovina's acquittal was received with joy and relief in Croatia, while it was shocking and disappointing to Serbia. Croatian newspaper followed upon Karadzic's sentence with a sense of "he got what he deserved", while in Serbia the "anti-Serbian court" sentiment was strengthened. Finally, Prlic et al. verdict was shocking and disappointing to Croatia, while Serbian newspapers expressed their shock by Croatia's refusal to accept this conviction. The polarizing nature of these issues reflects the duality in narrative that comes up very often between two states politically.

In all the cases I have observed but the Karadzic one in Serbian newspaper, Blic, the individual guilt/innocence was being transferred to national level. I just want to acknowledge that is one of the most important things that ICTY has tried to avoid in its ruling. It stated very clearly in its goals that it perpetrates individuals, not nations. In some instances, journalists did recognize the individuality of the charges, but I would say that the overall sentiment is the collectiveness of the outcome of the verdict.

4.1 Croatian newspapers

24sata is a newspaper where pictures dominate over text, and its coverage of the observed cases seemed fairly shallow. It predominantly focuses on personalistic perspective, often writing about a person (Gotovina, Karadzic's victims, Praljak) and its personal traits or difficulties. On the other hand, Jutarnji focuses more on political implications of a certain event and tends to publish many experts' opinion on the matter at hand. The difference between two newspaper is visible in every case, but I believe it is most noticeable in case of Gotovina et al. 24sata has not published any articles regarding this subject that remotely depart from the main theme of celebration, proudness and innocence of Croatia, while Jutarnji has repeatedly written of need to acknowledge the crimes despite the favorable verdict.

In case of Karadzic, both newspapers' focus is on the fact this verdict will not bring the victims alive and that 40 years of imprisonment is an inconsistent sentence. 24sata once again departs from Jutarnji list in its coverage of individualistic war horror stories, while in Jutarnji the critique of today's BIH's functioning is published. This "late justice" found in Karadzic's conviction is proclaimed unmeaningful, but in case of Gotovina, frame on justice was that it's "late, but attainable".

Prlic et al. case marked the first unfavorable verdict among three cases, and both newspapers mainly focused on sensationalistic nature of Praljak's suicide and its consequences. While 24sata's reporter openly says "Croatia was not an aggressor in BIH", Jutarnji is more careful with statements as strong as this one. It did emphasize the "guilt of an individual, not of a nation" stance, but this was not the overwhelming sentiment expressed in this newspaper.

With regard to ICTY, I believe that Croatian newspaper have reflected the overall sentiment of acceptance of ICTY as a competent authority when it ruled in "Croatian" favor. The anti-ICTY

sentiment is obviously most noticeable in case of Prlic et al., but it does not go as far as strong “anti-Serbian court” frame. However, one must ask itself would it be so if rulings were less approved among Croatian citizens.

In conclusion to Croatian newspaper, I find both newspapers’ reporting as typical for their niche: 24sata is a predominantly sensationalistic newspaper/tabloid, while Jutarnji list balances somewhere between the market demands (sensationalism) and more “serious” audience that recognizes the political insight.

4.2 Serbian newspapers

Before getting into the analysis, I expected Blic to be close to 24sata in nature and Politika to be close to Jutarnji list in nature. At the first sight, it is so, but some relevant differences do occur. Since the first case of Gotovina et al., it can clearly be seen that these newspapers portray the West as their enemy – be it ICTY, NATO, USA, EU or Croatia. ICTY is openly dubbed as an “anti-Serbian court”, whose political task is to convict Serbs and acquit members of other Balkan nations. This frame is not visible in case of Prlic et al., which confirms one of my findings: ICTY is proclaimed anti-Croatian by Croats (more implicit in Croatian case) and anti-Serbian by Serbs if unfavorable convictions happen.

In case of Karadzic, Politika express complete reject of the blame and escape to “whataboutism”: NATO bombed us, why are the perpetrators of crimes against Serbs not prosecuted? In my opinion, the most surprising finding came from Blic in case of Karadzic. I expected “low passions” to be served and Blic to serve nationalistic sentiments, but I found the main framing to be that Karadzic and other important politicians from that time are responsible for Serbia’s hard conditions today, and that their image is used to teach younger generations of historical one-sidedness. Moreover, Blic’s reporting on Karadzic’s verdict is the only case I did not observe a transfer of

guilt/innocence to an entire nation, with respective Jutarnji's try to do so in case of Prlic et al. What also needs to be said is the fact that I found only 20 articles all together in Serbian newspaper on Karadzic. This relative silence is present either due to expectedness of the verdict or the tabooization of the subject to a certain degree.

Finally, coverage of Prlic et al. case in the observed Serbian newspapers has the same approach to the matter. Both rely on reactions from Croatia, which show clear disaccord with the ICTY's ruling. In this matter, Blic again shows more diversity in its articles, but standard "shallowness" is present as well. Unfortunately, the ruling of JCE is recognized by Croatian newspaper much more – Jutarnji dwelves upon this accusation heavily in attempt to discover if it is "true" - but Politika and Blic merely mention it and report on Croatia's politicians' defends ("we did not attack BIH").

4.3 Summary of results

All in all, I would say that all the newspapers I observed have to somewhat fulfilled my expectations. I knew about 24sata and Jutarnji list's styles so I knew what to expect. Still, both Serbian newspapers have surprised me – I did not expect Politika's reporting to be as skimpy as I found it, and I did not expect for Blic to cover Karadzic topic in the way it did, albeit it did surprise me with the range of sensationalism.

I believe that one of the findings is the borrowing of the frames. When an issue is polarizing – the dissatisfied side uses more or less similar frame to dismantle the "unjust truth" (Serbian newspapers in case of Gotovina et al. and Karadzic, Croatian newspapers in case of Prlic et al.). This "whataboutism" frame goes to the next level in Serbian newspapers, where "anti-Serbian court" rhetoric is very strong in cases of Gotovina et al. and Karadzic.

In accordance to my expectations, the verdicts are portrayed ambivalently in two countries. If the verdict was perceived as favorable to the country, it was portrayed as just; if it was perceived as not favorable, it was portrayed as unjust. The findings connect directly to scholarly work I introduced in theoretical framework. Namely, there is dual relationship between ICTY trials and history – one is expected to be in service of other and vice versa (Turkovic, 2018, 29). The verdicts were therefore either applauded for creating a truthful historical record (reactions from Croatia in case of Gotovina et al.) or rejected as wrong historical accounts (reactions from Croatia in case of Prlic et al.). Furthermore, one of the three pillars of reconciliation by ICTY mentioned by Toquet and Vermeersch (2016, 68) - individualization of guilt – was not achieved through media reports. In all cases we see the transfer of the outcome of a verdict to a national, or rather ethnic level, as Ahmetasevic and Matic discuss in Subotic (2015, 368). Moreover, given the detailed account of newspaper coverage, the statement of clash between international concepts of justice and local people's understanding of it (Subotic, 2015, 368) is reinforced.

Conclusion

The main aim of my thesis was to show how ICTY rulings are portrayed in Croatian and Serbian media. To achieve this goal, I analyzed 277 articles in four newspaper, two from each country. The cases I followed were Gotovina et al., Karadzic and Prlic et al. The main findings of my thesis point out that ICTY rulings did not facilitate reconciliation in post-war area of Croatia and Serbia, nor was it facilitated through media.

According to my expectations and as I discuss in Results of analysis chapter, there is still duality in narratives in Croatia and Serbia. If the verdict's outcome is favorable, it is portrayed as just and vice versa. One of ICTY goals, reconciliation, was set to be achieved by individualization of guilt, but this was not facilitated through any media observed, although there is differences between newspapers and some facilitate it more than others.

My study is relevant in broader perspective because it illuminates persisting ambivalences in two countries, seen through media. The ongoing impossibility of common understanding of the past and collectivity of guilt point out to hardships of post-war environment. I believe that this study's relevance is also in showing that poorly defined aims such as reconciliation need to be elaborated into very specific steps in order to be more achievable. Also, media cannot be expected to facilitate reconciliation in a media system that shows characteristics of under average quality. Having said that, this analysis could be beneficial to scholars investigating role of the media in other post-war areas and contexts.

My study could be further broadened by including more cases of ICTY and seeing their outreach in the media of the region. Maybe, in cases less polarizing and mediatized than these, journalists have more agenda-setting power because of lack of pressure. Also, I believe that including a Bosnian newspaper to see how it portrayed these verdicts would really add importance to this

study. I believe negligence of Bosnian newspaper in my study is its main limitation, because BIH is a state that was damaged by this war the most and has highly polarized and ethnically divided society. The reconciliation process and truth-seeking is indeed most important in BIH. Another thing that could be added to my analysis is other media, such as television, which is the most used media outlet in these countries and therefore has more impact than written media I observed.

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