States and Similar Things
— A Configurational Typology of State and Its Diminished Subtypes

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Abstract

While the concept of "state" is central to "the discipline of the state" (Goodin 2009), it has not had a universally accepted definition. This deficiency has become an acute obstacle for the study on "states with adjectives", where the conceptual innovation has been plagued by both terminological confusion and conceptual over-stretching. This thesis first explores the problems of conventional wisdom in making sense of the state then critically engages with the growing literature on "states with adjectives" and rebel governance to create a "configurational typology". Drawing upon the classic Weberian ideal-typical definition of the state and recent developments in social science concepts (radial categories and diminished subtypes), this thesis offers an updated Weberian definition as well as a three-tiered typology based on different degrees of resemblance. It contains three diminished subtypes of state: de facto states, states-within-states, and rebel rulers. The typology is subsequently applied on trajectories of three different entities (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Wa State) to test its fitness and utility. The first two are from the South Caucasus, where the literature on "states with adjectives" has traditionally focused on. The last one is from northern Myanmar, where the issue of rebel governance has been an important feature for the past seven decades.

Keywords: de facto states, states-within-states, rebel governance, radial category, diminished subtype, configurational typology

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Table of Contents

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ..... **III**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... **IV**

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION **1**

1.1 The Conception and Its Problems 1

1.2 From Quasi-States to De Facto States 2

1.2.1 The Confusing Facts of De Facto States *3*

1.2.2 Limited Geographic Outlook, Limited Conceptual Validity *7*

1.3 The Blueprint of This Research 9

CHAPTER 2: THE STATE OF THE CONCEPTS AND THE CONCEPTS OF THE STATE **12**

2.1 Radial Categories and Diminished Subtypes 12

2.2 Configurational Typology 14

2.3 State, the Ideal Type and the Prototype 16

2.4 Dissecting the State 18

Group 1: The Baseline Attributes that Delineate the Turf *19*

Group 2: The Configurational Attributes That Make The Difference *21*

CHAPTER 3: THE PROTOTYPICAL STATE AND ITS DIMINISHED SUBTYPES **26**

3.1 State — The Prototype 26

3.2 Diminished Subtypes 27

3.2.1 De Facto States — A First Degree Diminished Subtype *27*

3.2.2 States-Within--States — A Second Degree Diminished Subtype *30*

3.2.3 Rebel Rulers — A Third Degree Diminished Subtype *34*

CHAPTER 4: THE CAUCASIAN DUO **37**

4.1 South Ossetia Before the August 2008 War 39

4.2 Gaining Coherence but Losing Agency 46

4.3 Comparing the Caucasian Duo 49

CHAPTER 5: THE ZOMIAN SINGULARITY **53**

5.1 BCP the Proxy — 1968-1979 54

5.2 BCP the Rebel Ruler — 1979-1989 57

5.3 The Post-Communist De Facto WA State 58

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION **62**

REFERENCES **67**

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List of Figures and Tables

Table 1: The Configurational Typology of State and Its Diminished Subtypes

Figure 1: State and Its Diminished Subtypes

Figure 2: Approximate Extent of the LTTE's Territorial Control, June 2006

Figure 3: Soviet Administrative Map of the South Caucasus 1957-1991

Figure 4: Map of the Georgian SSR at the End of the Soviet Union

Figure 5: Map of South Ossetia Before and After 2008

Figure 6: Map of Abkhazia Before and After 2008

Figure 7: Map of Burma at the Time of the Collapse of BCP

Figure 8: The Location of the Wa State

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List of Abbreviations

ABL: Administrative Boundary Line

AO: Autonomous Oblast

ASSR: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

BCP: Burmese Communist Party

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

EAO: Ethnic Armed Organization

EUMM: European Union Monitoring Mission

FPNCC: Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GNI: Gross National Income

GoSL: Government of Sri Lanka

IPKF: Indian Peace Keeping Force

JCC: Joint Control Commission

JPFK: Joint Peacekeeping Force

LDC: Least Developed Countries

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MNDAA: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army

MTA: Mong Tai Army

NEC: North-East Command

NKAO: Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast

NKR: Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

PA: People's Army

PRC: People's Republic of China

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ROC: Republic of China

RSO: Republic of South Ossetia

SOAO: South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast

SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USSR: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UWSA: United Wa State Army

UWSP: United Wa State Party

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Three concepts and two regions have received my sustained attention among all things that could be labeled, broadly, as political. The three concepts are "state", "power", and "violence" which happens to constitute the center of the political universe — virtually all intellectual explorations into the political realm seek to address them in one way or another. The two regions are the Caucuses and Zomia (see Michaud 2010 for the definition of Zomia), where the states are weak, power is fluid, and violence tends to be rife.

While these two regions might be the perfect embodiment of the word "peripheral" in the grand picture of global geopolitics, they nevertheless deserve a central place in the conceptual universe since their existence and political experience offer the best raw materials for analyzing the core concepts of politics.

Sitting squarely in the center of these issues is the concept of state, a social phenomenon that is not only the "pre-eminent" container of power (Giddens 1985, 120), but also the dominant inhibitor and/or exemplary perpetrator of violence (Gat 2013; Hobbes and Gaskin 1998; Tilly 1985). However, while being central to "the discipline of the state" (Bartelson 2001, 11 and 33; Bluntschli 1885, 1; Goodin 2009), i.e. political science a.k.a. politology (Schmitter 2017), the concept of state nevertheless lacks "standard and precise meaning or measurement" (Gerring 2012, 736). It has been, and still is, a rather difficult job to answer a simple question: what is a state and what is not? (Byman and King 2012, 44; Markedonov 2012, 192)

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1.1 The Conception and Its Problems

There is indeed a growing appreciation of the (supposed) flexibility of the concept of state and a set of recent literature has successfully brought "states with adjectives" (Collier and

Levitsky 1997; Hoffmann, Bouziane, and Harders 2013, 9)[1] into scholarly purview (Bakke et al. 2014; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011; 2012; Caspersen 2008c; 2008a; 2008b; 2009b; 2009a; 2015a; 2015b; Caspersen and Stansfield 2011b; Geldenhuys 2009; Jackson 1987; 1993; Kolossov and O'Loughlin 2011; Kolstø 2006; Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008; 2012; 2013; Kolstø and Paukovic 2014; Lynch 2001; 2002; 2004; O'Loughlin et al. 2011; O'Loughlin, Kolossov, and Tchepalyga 1998; Pegg 1998b; Pegg and Kolstø 2015; Toal and O'Loughlin 2013a; 2013b). However, two major problems still critically hinder the viability and utility of these recent works: the unchecked propagation of new terms for often similar, and sometimes the same, entities (Pegg 2017); as well as, the unprincipled stretching of the core concepts.

1.2 From Quasi-States to De Facto States

The earliest systematic exploration into "states with adjectives" is probably Robert Jackson's work on "quasi-states" (Yemelianova 2015, 220). He was among the first to anatomize the contemporary concept of state and did so by differentiating between "negative sovereignty", i.e. the freedom from foreign intervention, and "positive sovereignty", i.e. the capacity of self-government (Jackson and Rosberg 1986, 14). However, while he spilled much of his ink on entities that have only "negative sovereignty" and "ceased to be 'states' in the empirical sense" and accurately named them "quasi-states", he only noted the existence but did not give much consideration to the opposite of them: entities that have "positive sovereignty" and established "an effective monopoly of force over significant territories and populations for extended periods" but were not being treated as states on the international stage (Jackson 1987; 1993).

[1] Collier and Levitsky initiated the term "democracy with adjectives", Hoffmann et al. followed the formula and coined "states with adjectives" to describe Arab states that are "defect, hybrid, failed, or failing" (p.9).

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This missing piece was identified, analyzed, and named as "de facto state" by Scott Pegg (1998b), whose work "laid the foundations for what is now a growing field of study in international politics" (Ker-Lindsay 2017). He defined de facto states as entities that seek but do not enjoy "any degree of substantive recognition" but have "long-term, effective, and popularly-supported organized political leaderships that provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area" (1998b, 4 and 26). While this concept has great potential for furthering our understandings of the concept of state as well as bridging it with the emerging field of rebel governance (Kasfir and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2007; 2011a; 2011b), it has also been the focus of extensive terminological battles and conceptual confusion (Ker-Lindsay 2017; Pegg 2017). Therefore, rather than telling us what is "de facto" about "states", the existing literature on de facto states is deeply trapped in a conceptual quagmire.

1.2.1 The Confusing Facts of De Facto States

On the one hand, there are a plethora of terms for entities that control territory and people but do not have substantial international recognition (Caspersen 2017, 13; Ó Beacháin, Comai, and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili 2016, 441 and 442), perhaps even more terms for "these entities than there are entities themselves" (Anderson 2011, 183). A quick skim through the literature yields at least ten similar terms: "de facto states" (Pegg 1998b), "unrecognized states" (Caspersen and Stansfield 2011b), "quasi-states" (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008), "unrecognized quasi-states" (Kolstø 2006), "separatist states" (Lynch 2004), "secessionist states" (Coggins 2014), "pseudo-states" (Kolossov and O'Loughlin 1998), "states-within-states" (Spears 2004), "para-states" (Pełczynska-Nałęcz, Strachota, and Falkowski 2008), "phantom states" (Byman and King 2012), "contested states" (Ker-Lindsay 2012), and "informal states" (Isachenko 2012).

On the other hand, while Pegg's term, "de facto state", has been widely (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011, 179; Caspersen 2017, 13; Kolossov and O'Loughlin 2011, 631; O'Loughlin et al.

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2011, 2), but not universally, adopted by many authors (Ker-Lindsay 2017; Pegg 2017), it has been applied on a wide variety of entities (Berg and Kuusk 2010; Florea 2017). Therefore, as noted worryingly by Pegg in a review of the twenty years of research on de facto states (Pegg 2017), the number of existing cases identified by different authors differs greatly. It ranges from as low as half a dozen (Kolstø and Paukovic 2014) to as high as eighteen (Florea 2014). These entities are as different as the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Berg 2018; Berg and Toomla 2009; Caspersen 2017) and the State of Palestine (Tschirgi 2004). The former is only recognized by less than 20 UN member states but has unquestionable control over a clearly delineated territory and a quality of governance surpasses most recognized states, past and present, whereas the latter is recognized by the majority of UN member states and, since 2012, sits as a non-member observer state at the UN, but were only allowed, by Israel, to exercise a highly restricted autonomy in a number fragmented enclaves in the West Bank (Anderson 2011, 186; Heller and Sofaer 2001, 28; Kopeček, Hoch, and Baar 2016, 87; Krasniqi 2018, 6-7).

Part of the problem can be attributed to the non-consensual consensus on Pegg's concept of "de facto states". While Pegg's term has gained predominance, at least among those actively involved in the debate (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011, 179; Caspersen 2017, 13; Kolossov and O'Loughlin 2011, 631; O'Loughlin et al. 2011, 2), there is only a superficial agreement on the, supposed, superiority of the term but not enough discussion, let alone concurrence, on its definition and application. Furthermore, there has not been not enough investigation on the core concept of "state" and its connection to "de facto states". Therefore, it also has been little clarification on what is "de facto" about "de facto states" (Knotter 2018, 3).

This situation could be traced to both the theocratical disposition and the conceptual framework of the existing research. First of all, working on entities that are not well accommodated within prevailing view of the international order, most authors started from a position that is, according to Knotter, "liberal…constructivist…critical" or "postmodern and

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poststructuralist" (2018, 3-5), which "ironically" and "paradoxically" focuses on the "non-material" and "legal-normative" rather than the "material" and "realist" aspects of political power (2018, 1-15). Therefore, although they are usually critical of "the traditional notion of sovereignty", they are "very lenient" on the distinction between "the supreme political power over a territory and population", i.e. factual control on the ground, and other forms of power (Knotter 2018, 3-4). Furthermore, also with a sense of irony, much of the existing literature are obsessed with "full, *de jure*, independence" (Caspersen 2011a, 338; 2012, 9) and included the "goal" or "aspiration" of achieving it in their definitions of "de facto states".

Defining "de facto states" as such, on the one hand, either makes the candidacy of certain relevant entities problematic or miss them completely, on the other hand also leads to epistemological problems. Entities such as the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Jaksa 2017b, 43; Riegl and Doboš 2017, 90; Toomla 2013, 56) and Iraqi Kurdistan (Caspersen 2017, 13; Harvey 2010, 27 and p.47; Kopeček 2017, 112; Kopeček, Hoch, and Baar 2016, 87; Sadoon 2017, 20) are either excluded because they do not display clear secessionist goals, or included by stretching the criteria to take into account the presumptions of "fearful" neighbors (Caspersen and Stansfield 2011a, 4 and 8; Toomla 2013, 56). Moreover, by giving the pursuit of international recognition a central position the definition (Caspersen 2011a, 338; 2012, 9), one could not help but will fell into the heuristic trap and use it as an explaining factor for everything from state-building to democratization (Caspersen 2008c; 2009a; 2011a, 338; Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2012; Kopeček, Hoch, and Baar 2016; MacQueen 2015, 3; Voller 2012, 4-5) and neglect more pressing material concerns such as physical security, political survival, as well as economic development.

Secondly, most authors only work with a single concept, be it "de facto state" or anything else, and do not engage with, let alone distinguish between, related concepts. A single concept, if it only exists as a singularity without a definitional web that connects it to other

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related concepts, would inevitably be a "thin" one (Plato, Cooper, and Hutchinson 1997, 302)[2]. When a variety of cases are fitted under such a concept, it would inevitably be overstretched (Knotter 2018 is a rare exception for analyzing a negative case), which, in the worst case, would "degenerates into almost anything [and]…signifies or distinguishes almost nothing" (Pegg 2004, 39).

One consequence of this over-stretching is de facto states' lack of unfruitful engagement with emerging field of rebel governance. Studies on rebel governance, like those on de facto states, strive to bring attention to areas which are neglected by mainstream political discourse and shed light on political order in situations which are generally thought to be anarchical and chaotic (Keister 2014; Mampilly 2011a, 40; Rabasa 2007; Stanislawski 2008). Starting under the framework of "insurgent governance" (Mampilly 2011a) or "governance in areas of limited statehood" (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006), especially under the condition of civil war (Arjona 2009; Huang 2012; Péclard and Mechoulan 2015; Risse 2011), the literature on rebel governance, comparing to those of de facto states, paid more attention on the empirical issue of governance rather than the legal-normative issue of recognition and generally has more awareness of real existing power and violence (Mampilly 2003).

While this once largely overlooked field (Arjona 2009) gathered considerable momentum after the publication of Mampilly's "Rebel Rulers" in (2011a), it has an uneasy relationship with de facto states. Partly due to the lack of existing research on rebel governance at the time (Arjona 2009) partly due to the conceptual and terminological confusion on de facto states, Mampilly initially tried to situate his work in the literature on de facto states and considered "rebel ruler" as a better term for these and similar entities, despite the fact that the cases selected by him are all relative much more inchoate comparing to those studied in the de

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[2] In a conversation between "the visitor" and the young Socrates, the visitor referred to the ancient Greeks' conception of the "barbarians", i.e. anyone who is not a Greek, as a "thin cut" since it expects the diverse groups that might or might share any similarities with each other to constitute a "real class".

facto state literature (Mampilly 2011a, 34-39). This tendency was followed by some researchers on de facto state who view a de facto state as either a successful rebel with a specific goal (Florea 2014, 792 and passim) or an end on a continuum of rebel governance (Caspersen 2017, 13-14). Meanwhile, some authors on rebel governance, such as Kasfir, explicitly excludes the usual suspects of de facto states such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh from their scope of studies, and consider them "technically…no longer…rebel organization[s]" (Kasfir 2015, 31). However, there are still important questions left unanswered concerning how they differ and where do they overlap.

1.2.2 Limited Geographic Outlook, Limited Conceptual Validity

Another problem, as well as strength, of the existing research on de facto states is its heavy Eurasian, especially Caucasian, focus (Harvey 2010, 26; Kopeček, Hoch, and Baar 2016, 88; Pegg 2017). The collapse of the Soviet Union has produced a number of entities, especially in the South Caucasus i.e. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, that have been studied under the framework of "de facto states" (Kopeček 2017, 112; Yemelianova 2015). The empirical studies on these entities have offered illuminating insights on their institution building (Kopeček 2017; Panossian 2001), democratization (Caspersen 2008c; Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2012; 2013; Kopeček, Hoch, and Baar 2016; Popescu 2006), public opinions (O'Loughlin et al. 2011; Toal and O'Loughlin 2013a), as well as foreign policy (Berg and Vits 2018). However, this limited geographical outlook also brings two sets of complications. It, first of all, feeds into the conceptual problem. By working with a relative definite set of entities, the overarching concept has to fit all of them, and, as an unintended consequence, these entities would further inform the concept. Therefore, all of these entities are considered de facto states without seriously questioning their fitness, and the particularities of these entities often became the paradigm of de facto states while what is inferred from these entities is, perhaps subconsciously,

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assumed to also apply to other de facto states (Harvey 2010, 19; Pegg 1998b, 27-28). Secondly, the dearth of cross-regional comparative studies has not only left entities out of the region, such as Taiwan, Somaliland, and Iraqi Kurdistan, to be "treated in isolation" (Pegg 2017), but also neglected regions that might be of relevance to the research on de facto states and reduced them to, sometimes factually incorrect, footnotes.

One such region is Zomia, especially northern Myanmar[3]. While the post-Soviet space is said the have "the highest concentration of de facto states in the world" (Kopeček 2017, 112), a number of entities within the internationally recognized border of Myanmar have also been identified, almost always very briefly, as contemporary de facto states. This gives Myanmar, if these observations are correct, the second highest concentration of de facto states. However, due to the unfamiliarity with the region, the entities listed in de facto states literature, i.e. Kachin State, Shan State, and Karen State (Florea 2014; Pegg 1998b, 7; 2000, 91), are often far off by a large margin. All of these "states", just like the New York State in the United States of America, are administrative divisions of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. That is not to say that these writers are looking at wrong place. There are indeed many relevant political entities in this region. They simply did not look close enough and did not have appropriate conceptual tools.

On the other hand, the literature on rebel governance generally has an African and Latin American focus and has only been extended to the context of Myanmar very recently (Brenner 2017; Brown 2013; Jagger 2018; Lall and South 2014; McCartan and Jolliffe 2016; South and Joll 2016). There has not been much engagement with the research on de facto states nor has there been enough feedback into general discussion on rebel governance.

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[3] The Burmese military government changed the official English name of the country from "Burma" to "Myanmar" in 1989 together with some other geographic names, e.g. from "Rangoon" to "Yangon". While this name change has been boycotted by much of the world due to the illegitimacy of the military junta, the new names are gaining currency in recent years. Therefore, I will use them interchangeably but generally use to older terms for things before 1989 and the newer terms for things after.

1.3 The Blueprint of This Research

This thesis will argue that these conceptual innovations are better understood as diminished subtypes of state while the terminological confusion and over-stretching are best addressed through a clearly formulated configurational typology which could put the relevant subtypes into distinct but interrelated categories. The conceptual problem with "state with adjectives" bears striking resemblance with the discussion on "democracy with adjectives" and the conceptual innovations in the latter, i.e. radial categories and diminished subtypes, have great potentials for former. I will adapt this conceptual innovation in Chapter 2 and related it to the discussion on "state with adjectives". This will involve, firstly, updating the Weberian ideal-typical definition of the state, and, secondly, dissecting the core concept of "state" into seven attributes: **agency, violence, territory, people, stateness, statehood, and coherence**. These attributes will then be repacked and rearranged to construct a configurational typology of state and its diminished subtypes, with the first four attributes delimiting the domain and the latter three attributes configuring the subtypes. The typology will not aim to be exhaustive, since under a configurational framework there would be too many logically possible but empirically non-existent subtypes (Møller and Skaaning 2010, 266-267). Moreover, due to the limited space, I will also not address the international recognized but nevertheless diminished subtypes of state: "quasi-states" (Jackson 1993), "failed states" (Gros 1996), "fragmented states" (Vinci 2008) etc. While this typology could also be extended to these entities, that would require a separate treatment. I will only focus on the subtypes that are most salient to the empirical aspects the concept of state, i.e. de facto states, states-within-state, and rebel rulers. Doing so would not only clarify the conceptual confusion concerning "de facto states", but also go "beyond them to … other adjacent phenomena" (Pegg 2017). Most importantly, it will offer us a better understanding of root concept of "state" as well as its relevant diminished subtypes by

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situating them into a clearly formulated conceptual framework. Furthermore, by emphasizing the empirical dimension of the concept of states, it will not only reveal what is "de facto" about "de facto states" but also help to bridge the gap between "de facto states" and "rebel governance" in the existing literature.

The typology will then be taken to the conceptual homeland of "state with adjectives", the South Caucasus, where most of the current research has focused on, and compare two entities there according this typology: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It will offer both a test of the fitness of the typology and some additional insights to the existing research on this region. Both entities are the direct products of the collapse of the Soviet Union and emerged around the same period, the early 1990s, following similar trajectories and have often been talked with the same breath. While these entities display significant differences both temporally and across cases, the existing conceptualization of de facto states has not been able to satisfactorily capture these variations. The focus will be on South Ossetia, the smallest and weakest among the two, which, before the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008, existed as a state-within-state rather than a de facto state and became practically part of the Russian Federation after war.

The typology will further be taken to the Wa State in northern Myanmar, to bridge the geographical gap in the "state with adjectives" literature, enhance the theoretical grounding of the existing research on the region, as well as offer a preview on the potential of the typology for cross-regional (Basedau and Köllner 2007, 110) subnational (Arjona 2019; Snyder 2001) comparative area studies (Köllner, Sil, and Ahram 2018) of these entities. The Wa State is a de facto state that currently governs an area that has been made famous by James Scott's work on "the art not being governed" (Scott 2009). While being largest and most powerful armed actor in Myanmar besides the Burmese state, the Wa State, according to Staniland, still has "no obvious place in existing literature" (2017). Not only will our typology find a place for the Wa

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State, it will also reveal how it emerged from a similar collapse of a different type of communist regime, that of the rebel ruler Burmese Communist Party (BCP).

We will conclude with a short discussion on the similarities and differences of these two regions as well as offering some ideas for further research.

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Chapter 2: The State of the Concepts and the Concepts of the State

2.1 Radial Categories and Diminished Subtypes

Radial category was originally a theory in cognitive linguistics. It was first proposed by George Lakoff to refer to certain results of the prototype effects (1990). Lakoff's theory is, in turn, built on Eleanor Rosch's earlier work in cognitive psychology on prototypes. According to Rosch, "prototypes of categories are reference points based on representativeness" which includes "types [that are] considered ideal types either because they are never actually seen … or because they embody the essence but not the typicality of the category" (1983, 81). "Prototype effects" refers to the asymmetries in human cognition when certain members of a given category are considered to be "more representative of the category than other members", e.g. "robins are judged to be more representative of the category BIRD than are chickens, penguins, and ostriches" (Lakoff 1990, 41 capitalization from the original).

The idea of radial categories was first introduced, *mutatis mutandis*, into politology by Collier and Mahon to account for the conceptual innovation following the "third wave" of democratization. However, they initially framed it as the inverse of Sartori's classical category and was, therefore, still subject to the "law of inverse variation", i.e. the alternative concept that would be applied to the new phenomena has greater extension but less intension comparing to the root concept. Therefore, in this early framework, both "electoral democracy" and "electoral regime" would have fewer defining attributes and cover more cases comparing to the root concept "democracy". Thus, while carrying different labels, these two new terms, and others that follow this formula, are not very different from each other and did not offer much added value comparing to Sartori's classic category (Collier and Mahon 1993). This problem was duly recognized and polemicized by Møller and Skaaning (2010). They saw the radial structure of the concept of democracy proposed in Collier and Mahon (Collier and Mahon 1993) as a

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"delusion" and reverted to Sartori classic framework as well as his ladder of abstraction to analyze the derivative concepts of democracy (Møller and Skaaning 2010).

However, they failed to fully appreciate the benefits (Collier and Levitsky 1997) of "diminished subtypes", i.e. subtypes that are defined by the presence of some, but not all, of the defining attributes of the root concept in combination with the concurrent *absence* of some other defining attributes of the same root concept (Collier and Levitsky 1996). According to Collier and Levitsky, although diminished subtypes "do not constitute the full form of the root concept" and thus "might be seen as having *fewer* defining attributes" and providing "less, rather than more, differentiation", they actually "increase differentiation…and…refers to a *different* set of cases than does [the root concept]", because they contain not only positive but also the negative defining attributes (1997, 438 and 448 emphases from the original). For a case to be considered as an instance of a given diminished subtype, it must fulfill not only the positively defined attributes, but also the negatively defined ones. While electoral regimes would include both full democracies and defective democracies, illiberal democracy, understood as a diminished subtype of the full democracy, does not include or overlap with full, i.e. liberal, democracy (it might become a full democracy or full autocracy over time, though neither direction is guaranteed). Therefore, a radial category comprising a prototype and its various diminished subtypes is able to meet the "twofold challenge" of conceptual innovation simultaneously — "increasing analytic differentiation in order to adequately characterize… [a diverse set of cases] …and maintaining conceptual validity by avoiding conceptual stretching"[4] (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 448).

[4] A task Møller and Skaaning's reversion to the classic categories certainly could not fulfill.

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2.2 Configurational Typology

While seeing the new derivative concepts through a radial lens could comfortably avoid the problem of conceptual stretching and, when they are framed strictly as diminished subtypes, retain differentiation, this practice still could not shed the appearance of an *ex post facto* attempt to legitimize certain conceptual innovations that were, at least initially, *ad hoc*. It, unavoidably, lacks systematic rigor.

The remedy shall be found in a conceptual typology (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012, 222) that sorts related concepts into discrete cells "that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive" "on the basis of a uniform categorization principle or principles" (Gerring 2011, 144; 2012, 727). However, it is a pity that Collier's recent writing on typologies made no attempt to build on his earlier work on radial categories and diminished subtypes (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012, 222). Meanwhile, although Gerring did mention the possibility of constructing a conceptual typology from radial categories and referred to such typologies as "configurational typologies" (Gerring 2011, 147; 2012, 728), he neither elaborated on how this kind of typologies would work nor provided any example.

Three major issues need to be addressed in order to put "configurational typologies" to work (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012): domain, degree, and empirically non-existent categories. If the conceptual domains under discussion are not clearly specified, there might be an illusion that the only attributes the diminished subtypes have in common with the root concepts are those explicitly stated as positive in the diminished subtypes' definitions and, therefore, obscure the fact that all of them fall within the same domain. These domains are electoral regimes for both full, liberal, democracies and "democracies with adjectives" (Collier and Levitsky 1997) and agentic territorially-based armed actors (Vinci 2008, 299) for states and the like. All the categories in a typology, be it the root concepts, the classic subtypes, or diminished subtypes, must, first of all, fulfill all the baseline attributes of the domain.

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Furthermore, the political naturalization of the theory of radial categories has left behind two important ideas — degree of representativeness and non-existent categories — both of which have been addressed by Lakoff in his original works in cognitive science. According to Lakoff, "composite prototypes", i.e. prototypes that contain multiple attributes, impose "representativeness structures" on the radial categories, i.e. the closer an instance is to the prototype, the more representative it is (Lakoff 1990, 82). There are not only diminished subtypes but also different degrees of the diminished subtypes. Moreover, as Lakoff has also noticed, not all possible combinations of the attributes of the root concept could exist as valid categories (1999, 401). This observation seems directly contradict with the idea that the cells in a typology should be mutually "exclusive *and* exhaustive"(Gerring 2012, 727 emphasis is mine). While the pursuit of exclusivity, i.e. clear conceptual boundaries, lies in the very heart of conceptual refinement, chasing exhaustiveness under a radial framework would produce monstrous effects: there are simply too many logically possible combinations. If one were to populate the typology by creating categories deductively from the configurational attributes, many, if not most, of the resulting categories would be empirically non-existent — they would not have any empirical referents — a problem which was explicitly pointed out by Møller and Skaaning in their discussion on "radial delusion" (Møller and Skaaning 2010, 266-267). However, rather than following Møller and Skaaning and giving up radial categories, we shall utilize the "iterative logic of abduction" (Charmaz 2009, 137; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013, 32) to "put…[configurational] typologies to work" (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012) i.e. to move between facts and concepts, repetitively, to look for empirically important concepts as well as conceptually salient facts.

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2.3 State, the Ideal Type and the Prototype

The most famous and influential empirical definition of a "state" is that of Max Weber's ideal type: "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (1965). While this definition captures some of the most important defining attributes of "state" and will remain the core of our conceptual framework, it was formulated against a drastically different historical background and could not be applied accurately and consistently across all the contemporary cases without some necessarily clarifications and updates. While it has not always been dealt systematically, most of the works on "states with adjectives" mentioned in the previous chapter have already made some necessary movements away from the Weberian paradigm. Therefore, on the one hand, some entities that fit the Weberian definition perfectly well, such as Pegg's "de facto states", are no longer considered "states" in the full sense and need to carry the label "de facto"; one the other hands, some entities that have clear failed Weber's test, such as Jackson's "quasi-states", are nevertheless still seen as "states", albeit "quasi".

This scenario is similar to the "mismatch between the case and the formal definition" mentioned by Collier and Levitsky where, "as the concept [of democracy] is extended to new settings, researchers may confront a particular case that is classified as a democracy on the basis of a commonly accepted definition yet is not seen as fully democratic in light of a larger shared understanding of the concept". And in such a case, what we need is an updated version of the ideal type, which is to be done through "'precising' the original definition by adding defining attributes" (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 442).

However, before we proceed to add anything, we firstly need to clarify a part of the original definition that has becoming increasingly confusing in today's context — "legitimate". Weber defined "legitimacy" as "the prestige of being considered binding". It does not matter where this prestige comes from, be it "tradition, faith, [or legal] enactment", the only thing that

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matters is its acceptance (Clements 2014, 13-14; Weber 1978, 31 and 35). It could be understood as the effect (Painter 2006, 756) that, "under normal circumstances and for most people", the state's actions and demands (backed by violence) "will be accepted or, at least, not actively resisted" (Pierson 2011, 18).

While this reading of "legitimate" ought to be unproblematic, the term itself is not. Although some authors proposed to term the above-mentioned acceptance "empirical legitimacy" (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 12), the term "legitimacy" itself still carries too much normative baggage and it is impossible to divorce it with the stroke of a pen (Berg and Mölder 2012, 529). It is as difficult to argue that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not a "state" as to claim that it has a monopoly over the "legitimate" use of violence. Meanwhile, it is also hard to maintain that there is no different between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" use of violence (1985, 171), since it is impossible to monopolize all forms of violence (Waltz 1979, 103-104). It would be better to use the word "routinized" here to qualify the kind of violence which the state holds a monopoly over. Being routinized is the effect that the state's hold on violence has been internalized to such a degree that the state's directives (backed by violence) are carried out without the need to constantly deploy physical force (Clements 2014, 13).

With the issue of "legitimacy" settled, we need to "precise" the Weberian ideal type by adding a missing attribute that has come to assume vital importance in the post-WWII world — international recognition (Vu 2010, 165). While during Weber's time "[o]nly effectively organized states…could survive" and "weaker states" would be "incorporated into stronger ones"(Jackson and Rosberg 1986, 4), not a single internationally recognized state has been forcefully annexed by another since the end of WWII. Being recognized has become such a highly consequential fact that it virtually guarantees the continued legal, sometimes even factual, existence of the recognized.

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Therefore, we shall define a state as "*a human community that practices an internationally recognized monopoly over the routinized use of physical force within a given territory*". Such a definition is no longer an ideal type in the classic sense but a prototype[5] or root concept that would serve as the point of departure for comprehending a "radial category"[6] (Collier and Mahon 1993) which could in turn encompass the various "diminished subtypes" (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 442) into a "configurational typology" (Gerring 2012, 728). While the "precising" of the definition of the state might seem counterintuitive in light of the aforementioned seemingly increasing fluidity of the concept, the added features should rather be seen as an explicit restatement of attributes that have been "otherwise…taken for granted" (Collier and Levitsky 2009, 270) and whose inclusion is necessary for delineating the subtypes with both precision and clarity (for the combination of precising and creation of diminished subtypes see Collier and Levitsky 1996) as well as answering the fundamental question about any diminished subtypes: "diminished in relation to what?" (Collier and Levitsky 2009, 272). The ostensible fluidity and flexibility are only an illusion that come from misconception. It is the job of an adequately constructed typology to reduce, if not completely do away with, the confusion.

2.4 Dissecting the State

The prototypical definition of the state can be divided into two sets of attributes that are distinct but interrelated. The first group consists of the baseline attributes that set our subjects of investigation apart from phenomena that are substantially and qualitatively different. The

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[5] According to Eleanor Rosch, "(p)rototypes of categories are reference points based on representativeness" which includes "types [that are] considered ideal types either because they are never actually seen…or because they embody the essence but not the typicality of the category". (1983, 81) While the updated definition is still an ideal type in the Weberian sense, it would be exclusively referred to as "prototype" or "root concept" in this thesis in order to indicate the role it plays in the typology and differentiate it from original Weberian ideal typical definition of state.

[6] Collier and Mahon regard "categories" as synonymous with Sartori's "concepts". (1993, 853)

second group comprises the "configurational attributes" which, added on top of the baseline attributes, would constitute the prototypical concept of the state when they are taken *in toto* or create different diminished subsets when they are taken in various other combinations.

Group 1: The Baseline Attributes that Delineate the Turf

A state is, first and foremost, a territorially-based human community that partakes in a special activity, the use of violence, or put in other words, an agentic and territorially-based armed actor (Vinci 2008, 299). It has four core attributes: **agency**, **violence**, **territory, and people**. As long as an entity fulfills these attributes, it should be considered, according to Vinci, as "units in the international system[7] proper" (2008, 297) and would be subject the logic of "systemic theories of international relations, particularly Neorealism", a logic which "is not based on the juridical boundaries of a state" but "the de facto realities of power" (2008, 296 and 307-308).

Agency

Agency is what makes an entity an entity on its own rights rather than part of another entity. Generally speaking, "an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity" (Schlosser 2015). "Agency", as used here, is similar to this general idea and denotes a political entity's ability to act on its own. It requires a combination of Weber's autocephaly and autonomy which, in Weber's context, means, "the order governing the group has been established by its own members on their own authority" and "the chief and his staff act by the authority of the autonomous order of the corporate group itself". According to Weber, if a corporate group is "at the same time completely heteronomous and completely heterocephalous, [it] is usually best treated as a 'part' of the more extensive group" (Weber 1964, 148).

[7] "International" is actually a misnomer here, "interstate system" would be a more accurate term.

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It is worth noting that we should not take this capacity too far and set the bar too high. External influence is the rule rather than the exception (Toomla 2013, 57) — the main purpose of foreign policy and diplomacy is to influence the decision of others, by persuasion, if possible, by inducement, if required, and by coercion, if necessary. Agency is the separate existence of a group that others have to persuade, induce, or coerce, rather than simply decide for or give orders to (certainly such an agentic group might also persuade, induce, or coerce the other groups).

Violence

Violence, i.e. physical force, is a means of coercion but not all forms of coercion involve violence. It is the ultimate form of coercion. An agentic actor endowed with violence is an actor able to apply violence both internally and externally as well as go beyond the legal realm to make the decision on when to fight and against whom (Suganami 2007, 527; Vinci 2008, 301-302). "[I]t is the means specific to the state" (Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004, 33) and categorically sets states and the like apart from other forms of human organizations such as political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious orders, and commercial enterprises (Vinci 2008, 299). It is not simply "the ability and capacity to exercise power" (Knotter 2018, 4; McConnell 2010, 764), but rather "the ability to kill, punish, and discipline with impunity" (Hansen and Stepputat 2006, 16.1).

Territory

A territorial base is a physical space where the members of an agentic armed group could live under an order established through their own hold on violence (Vinci 2008, 301). It is an "essential defining feature" (Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004, 33) which sets states and the like (Kasfir 2015, 25) apart from criminal organizations as well as the classic and "pure" terrorist organizations (la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2015). These groups, because they do not have a territorial base, have to stay "underground" and operate according to a quite different logic (see la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2015, 797). Their members are usually citizens of

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existing states and their "freedom to move and communicate is not guaranteed by their own military strength but by the institutions of their host" (Mackinlay 2000, 60). Furthermore, in situations where a functioning host state is absent, the territorial base also differentiates states and the like, stationary bandits in Olson's words, from roving bandits (2000, 7). Without a strong connection to a certain territory, the roving bandits face a different set of incentives that prioritizes short term gains and discourages the provision of public goods (Olson 2000, 8-11).

People

The state, according to Weber, "represents a relationship in which people *rule over* other people" (Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004, 34 emphasis from the original) and there is no state without people (Bluntschli 1885, 16). It is needless to say that an armed group itself is necessarily made up of a plurality of *Homo sapiens*. We also need the existence "the governors and governed" (Bluntschli 1885, 17) before we could talk about a state. Or, if we take Fukuyama's words, there would be "a separate caste of warriors", people who specialize in the use of violence, as soon as we move beyond the band level human organization (2011, 74). Similarly, as noted by Kasfir, in order to fit into the scope of rebel governance, an armed group also needs to "control territory populated by non-combatants" (Arjona 2017, 758; 2015, 22).

While the difference between combatants and non-combatants is not always clear and usually "depends…on the specific situation" (Förster 2015, 208; Kasfir 2015, 24), it is enough if we could find people who derive the majority of their means of survival from their hold on violence, i.e. full time combatants (Arjona 2017, 758; Kalyvas 2006, 415), and people who derive it from their participation in material production.

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Group 2: The Configurational Attributes That Make The Difference

The baseline attributes are the entry ticket for both Vinci's realist formulation of the interstate system (Vinci 2008, 297) and our empirical configurational typology of state and its diminished subtypes. The configurational attributes are what differentiates the proto-typical

state, an agentic territorially-based armed actor that meets the three configurational attributes concurrently, and its diminished subtypes, agentic territorially-based armed actors that miss one or some of the configurational attributes. The configurational attributes are: **stateness**, **statehood**, **and coherence**.

Stateness vs. Statehood

"[T]he English language lacks the words to talk about" the state in terms of its different aspects (Painter 2006, 755). "Statehood" has usually been used to denote the quality of being a state, while "stateness" has sometimes been used for a similar purpose. These two words are often treated as synonyms or near-synonyms without any clear-cut distinction (Bilgin and Morton 2002, 64; Kingston 2004, 4; Toomla 2013, 25). However, a closer reading (Ilyin et al. 2012) will reveal that "statehood" is used "almost exclusively…[for]…the recognition of a state in international law" (Painter 2006, 755), whereas "stateness" tends to refer to the internal and empirical functions of the state on the ground (Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning 2014, 1206; Fukuyama 2004 p.xi and 6; Melville et al. 2010, 10), or the "prosaic manifestations of state processes" in Painter's words (2006, 753 and 755).

Stateness

States practice violence and practice it in various ways, from engaging in world wars to issuing traffic tickets. Stateness is the latter form which is, in essence, the routinization (Tilly 1975, 32; 1990, 14) of violence. The more routinized violence is, the more mundane and invisible it becomes.

The routinization would require, first and foremost, professionalization, i.e. a division of labor. There needs to be a division within those involved in the business of violence, i.e. between those who perform the prosaic daily tasks of governance and those who back it up with force when it is not followed through (Weber 1946, 82). The second test for routinization is its internalization, a generally held belief that a demand, be it a law, a bureaucratic directive, an executive order, or simply an undetected administrative mistake, would be imposed by force

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when necessary. While empirical certainty certainly does matter, the perceived certainty is what internalizes the routinization of violence (Kasfir 2015, 38-39). The further this internalization goes; the less physical violence will be dispensed (Caspersen 2017, 14; Clements 2014, 13; Kalyvas 2006, 204). Stateness is, in essence, the bureaucratized and internalized power relationship back by violence. Although Hannah Arendt had a different reading of power and violence, her observation about their relationship is rather pertinent to the relationship between stateness and violence: "where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent" (1970, 56).

Thus, while stateness could come in different shades and degrees, its minimum test would be the a functionally differentiated personnel and general internal peace so that people could "go about…[their] daily business without fear of being killed or robbed" (Fukuyama 2011, 250) and the state would not need to frequently resort to exceptional violence to ensure compliance.

Statehood

Statehood is the *de jure* international recognition. It refers to the international consensus of other internationally recognized entities to consider an entity as one of their own. This does not, on its own, make a state a state, e.g. the international recognition of Somalia does not make Somalia a proto-typical state, nor would the absence of it make an unrecognized entity disappear. However, it does carries important practical significance and "is in essence a form of power", "like a strong military or large economy" (Vinci 2008, 302). It is "a luxury" which an agentic territorially-based armed actor could live without" (Vinci 2008, 302), but nevertheless offers "easier access to gaining military or other supplies" (Vinci 2008, 302). It also contains the official undertaking by the recognizing party to promise not to invade or interfere within the recognized state (unless it is deemed necessary) (Thompson 2006, 256) and to protect its existence (when doing so is considered beneficial for the recognizing party).

The official membership in the United Nations is, undoubtably, the golden test for statehood in the contemporary era (Crawford 2012, 150; Kim 2006, 344; Scharf 1995, 31). It

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embodies the consensus of the majority of UN members as well as at least the tacit acceptance of the major powers, i.e. the Permanent Five of the Security Council (Kim 2006, 346; Pegg 1998b, 38; Toomla 2013, 51-52; United Nations n.d.; n.d.). Therefore, even if some members of the UN are not recognized by all of its members, such as the case of the State of Israel and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, they nevertheless possess full statehood (Toomla 2013, 51). Furthermore, as in the rare case of the pre-2002 Switzerland (Hug and Wegmann 2013), a non-member entity could also enjoy statehood as long as it is recognized by most UN members as well as the major powers.

Coherence

An agentic territorially-based armed actor operates on both the human and physical terrains, sometimes they coincide, sometimes they do not. Coherence refers to the coincidence of both terrains. It is the manifestation of monopoly and requires the majority of the people under the group's coercive power to live within the its territorial base and the majority of people live within the group's territorial base also subject to its coercive control.

It would normally require a relatively congruent territory which is more or less identifiable. It enables the group to practice its monopoly over routinized use of violence without frequent interruption nor the need to share its space and subjects with another group (Kalyvas 2006, 88). However, it is important to note that the only thing that matters is factual control rather than "claims". Competing territorial claims are a common feature in the interstate system (Toomla 2013, 49-50), but it is different from a situation where two or more actors are actively applying their coercive control over the same territory and/or the same population. Therefore, while Chile claims a large part of the Antarctic (Hemmings et al. 2015), and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) claims to be the legitimate government of the whole Korean peninsula (Park and Chang 2005, 4), since neither of them are actively engaged in a competition over the use of coercive force there, neither of them lacks coherence.

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Chapter 3: The Prototypical State and Its Diminished Subtypes

3.1 State — The Prototype

As we have defined above, a prototypical or proper state is "a human community that practices an internationally recognized monopoly over the routinized use of physical force within a given territory". It is an agentic and territorially-based armed actor which possesses stateness, enjoys statehood, and manifests coherence. It is worth noting that not all internationally recognized entities possess all of these attributes. Many entities, such as "quasi-states" (Jackson 1993), "failed states" (Gros 1996), "fragmented states" (Vinci 2008), all enjoy statehood but miss other attributes. Although these entities will not be included in the current typology due to the limited time and space, sometimes we might need to refer to entities that fully meet the definition of the prototypical state as "proper states" to avoid confusion.

Table 1. The Configurational Typology of State and Its Diminished Subtypes

Categories \ Attributes		Stateness	Statehood	Coherence
Primary Category	Proper State	+	+	+
First Degree Diminished Subtype	De Facto State	+	-	+
Second Degree Diminished Subtype	State-Within-State	+	-	-
Third Degree Diminished Subtype	Rebel Ruler	-	-	-

Note: (+) indicates the presence of the column attribute; (-) indicates the absence of it.

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3.2 Diminished Subtypes

Diminished subtypes of state are those categories that meet all the baseline attributes but only meet some, but not all, of the configurational attributes. They are further divided into three degrees with the ones possessing more attributes bearing more resemblances with the prototypical state than ones possessing less. While there might be many different kinds of diminished subtypes of the prototypical state, we are only going to focus on three diminished subtypes which are most relevant to the empirical aspects of the state: **de facto state, state-within-state, and rebel ruler**.

Figure 1. State and Its Diminished Subtypes



3.2.1 De Facto States — A First Degree Diminished Subtype

A de facto state is a (relatively) coherent entity that is able to enforce its will on the territory it controls and engage with external actors but does not have substantial international recognition. It is similar to Toomla's definition in the sense that it meets all the defining attributes of the prototypical state *except* it is not substantially recognized (Toomla 2013, 58).

De facto states, as defined here, have three major differences with other definitions offered in existing literature.

First of all, it does not matter whatever goals an entity might have. The studies of de facto states, to this day, are still largely obsessed with the issue of secession (Berg 2018; Berg and Vits 2018; Berg, Riegl, and Doboš 2017; Ker-Lindsay 2017; Ker-Lindsay and Berg 2018), and most definitions, in one way or another, require a "secessionist goal" (Caspersen 2011b, 78; Florea 2017, 338; MacQueen 2015, 2; Pegg 1998b, 33) and view a de facto state as essentially "a secessionist entity" (Pegg 1998a). However, as noted by Pegg "with the benefits of hindsight: a) "goals shift and change over time"; b) entities "have a serious incentive not to proclaim secessionist goals even if they actually harbor one"; c) some time it is difficult to tell what they really want (2004, 38). This is not saying that such goals do not matter, they certainly do. They might also have some explaining power for some aspects of some cases (Kasfir 2015, 40-41). However, they should be left out of definition and treated separately. As noted by Toomla, sometimes "the goal of overthrowing a government could actually be a reason for a de facto state to emerge" (2013, 56), so as the goal to support one. Even if "an entity functions as a state…[ostensibly]…against its own will", it should, according to Toomla, be "considered [as] a de facto state" (2013). An agentic actor might want to pursue this or other goals, but to do that, it needs to maintain its agency first, which makes actors with different goals "in effect…functionally undifferentiated" (Vinci 2008, 300).

Secondly, this definition does not bother itself with whatever territory a de facto state might claim (Toomla 2013, 49-50 and 56-57). Before her terminological conversion to "de facto states", Caspersen defined a "unrecognized states" as controlling "two-thirds" (2012, 9) or "most" (2011a, 3) of its claimed territory. This is certainly important for differentiating de facto states, which generally exist in a situation of empirical peace, from entities that are engaged in active contestation over most of its territories. However, the difference should be found in the

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existence and absence of coherence rather than claims. As I have mentioned above, the mismatch of claims and control is a common feature in the interstate system, which is true for both proper states and de facto states. While the Republic of China (Taiwan) officially claims all the territories of the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Hickey 2013, 11), but only controls a few islands (which has never been under the control of the PRC), as long as the Republic of China does not actively exercise its coercive power over the PRC's actual territory and population, it is a perfect de facto state. As far as the definition goes, the only thing that matters is the coherence of a de facto state's factual control on the ground, which is the crucial attribute that differentiates it from states-within-states.

Thirdly, there is no arbitrary time span in this definition of de facto states. Many existing definitions follow Pegg's initial arbitrary cut-off criteria of "two years" of existence as a necessary requirement for an entity to be considered a de facto state (Caspersen 2012, 11; Florea 2014, 792; 2017, 338; Hoch and Rudincová 2015, 39; Kolstø 2006, 726; Kopeček, Hoch, and Baar 2016, 87; MacQueen 2015, 2; Pegg 1998b, 32). However, one of the major problems about this formulation is: two years since when? The formation of the group, the date when it achieved substantial territorial control, or the time when it declared independence? And it if a de facto state needs to exist for two years before it could be considered a de facto state, what is it during these two years? There seems to be no consensus or consistency on these questions (Anderson 2011, 186). Therefore, the estimated longevities of de facto states vary greatly (Pegg 2017).

It is indeed very important to differentiate de facto states with "more ephemeral entities" (Caspersen 2012, 7) or "political contraptions" (Kolstø 2006, 726) which are "here today and gone tomorrow" (Pegg 1998b, 32). However, this shall be found in the substantive facts rather an arbitrary and hard to find time span. A de facto state is a de facto state as soon as it meets all the defining attributes. The defining attribute stateness already in itself implies a sense of durability. The routinization of violence takes time to achieve and its widespread compliance

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requires the generally held belief that it is going to last. While this might be hard to discern, it is exactly where an in-depth study of any particular entity is called for. Moreover, although sometimes it is almost impossible to find a clear-cut time spot when a particular de facto state came in to existence, this is not fuzzier than the finding the murky start of the arbitrarily clear two-years span.

De facto states are a durable and long-term phenomenon in the interstate system. While the possibility of warfare might indeed be "forever present" for de facto states (Caspersen 2012, 26), this threat and possibility is the basic feature of the realist understanding of the interstate system. The threat faced by de facto states might be higher, but not much more than those faced by other entities. All entities in the interstate system "conduct…[their] affairs in the shadow if violence", recognized or not (Waltz 1979, 102). However, because the full control of coherent territories contributes to a de facto state's ability to consolidate its stateness and its stateness also further enhance its control, the combination of both could help the de facto states to achieve (often with the help of powerful patrons) a (sometimes uneasy) power balance, where its opponents could not gain much against it through military actions without suffering prohibitive costs. Therefore, de facto states are indeed "fixtures" (Jaksa 2017a, 3) in the interstate system and have "considerable staying power" (Caspersen 2011b, 88; 2017, 11).

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3.2.2 States-Within--States — A Second Degree Diminished Subtype

A state-within-state is an agentic territorially-based armed actor that lack *both* statehood and coherence. The lack of coherence sets them apart from de facto states, and the existence of a higher degree stateness distinguish them from rebel rulers.

While this term "states-within-states" has been used earlier by Ian Spears, he "intentionally…left [the concept] imprecise" to include both de facto states and rebel rulers, as well as other "state-like structures" (2004, 16-17). This, according to Pegg, constitutes "the

most significant flaw in Spear's work" (Pegg 2004, 39). States-within-states, properly defined and differentiated from de facto states and rebel rulers, is where the phenomena of de facto states and rebel governance converge. It functions like a de facto state in the core area where it has full control and often engages in rebel governance in the contested areas. Meanwhile, unlike what was proposed by Pełczyńska- Nałęcz et al., it does not matter whether a state-within-state pays lip service to an internationally recognized entity or not (2008, 371 and 374), the only thing that counts is if it meets the defining attributes in the typology.

While there might be some territorial disputes or low-intensity armed conflict between a de facto state and its neighbors, such as the border dispute between Somaliland and Puntland (Hoehne 2015), the territory and population under a de facto state's control generally coincide. The majority a de facto state's subjects generally live under its exclusive control and in a condition of practical peace. However, for a state-within-state, the boundary is murkier, especially in terms of the human perspective, a state-within-state often extends it coercive influence onto people living in areas where it does not fully control and/or has other actors extending their influence onto people in areas ostensibly controlled by it.

For example, the only entity that has subject to extensive studies under the frameworks of both de facto states and rebel governance — Tamil Eelam under the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka (Kubota 2017; Mampilly 2009; 2011a; Mulaj 2011; Pegg 1998b; Terpstra and Frerks 2017; 2018), was among the least state-like of the former, due to its lack of coherence, and the most state-like of the latter, due to its higher level of stateness. It would, therefore, be better categorized as a state-within-state for most of period between the departure of IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) in 1990 and its final demise in 2009.

During much of its existence, the LTTE controlled substantial territories in the north and east of Sri Lanka which reached one-third of the whole island of at its peak (Mampilly 2011a, 21). However, its territorial holdings were never congruent (Mampilly 2011a, 119;

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Terpstra and Frerks 2018, 1013). Although this *per se* does not necessarily render the entity incoherent, since the LTTE fashioned itself of the ruler of all Sri Lankan Tamils, "wherever…[they]…are" (Thiranagama 2011, 26), it actively extended its coercive influence onto people living outside of its territories (Goodhand 1999, 75; Mampilly 2011a, 107). It captured GoSL's local administrative structures in adjacent areas (Stokke 2006, 1030), adjudicated civil cases happening in GoSL's area of control (Mampilly 2011a, 119), and enforced arbitrary "justice" beyond its own turf (Terpstra and Frerks 2018). Moreover, the LTTE also had a "negatively symbiotic relationship" with the GoSL which allowed the latter to provide public services such as education and health care within the LTTE's territories through a "convoluted power sharing arrangement" (Mampilly 2011a, 94-115).

Figure 2. Approximate Extent of the LTTE's Territorial Control, June 2006 (Stokke 2006, 1023)



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While this lack of coherence is not unique to states-within-states, since it also a defining feature of rebel rulers, the existence of a higher degree of stateness sets them apart. Unlike rebel rulers, a state-within-state has core territories and population, usually in the form of cities or other population centers, which are either under their full control or not actively contested by other entities. This could either be the result of tacit or explicit agreements or the factual military predominance of the state-within-state in its core territories. A fully controlled core area is necessary for the group to routinize its hold on violence. As noted by Kalyvas, the higher control there is the less the physical will be dispensed (2006, 203-204), and full control would make "violence redundant" (2006, 220-222).

In the case of the LTTE, it was able to bureaucratize (Lalwani 2017, 124) and routinize its use of coercive force in its core areas to the degree where it was generally accepted by its subjects (Mampilly 2011a, 213; Terpstra and Frerks 2017). In addition to monopolizing the security sector and establishing an effective and well-received police force and judicial system totally independent from the Sri Lankan government (GoSL) (Mampilly 2011a, 116-118; Terpstra and Frerks 2018, 1014-1016), it had also built up "a comprehensive governance system that met most civilian needs and was largely embraced by the civilian population" (Mampilly 2011a, 105). While there were large "grey areas" where the use of exceptional violence by both sides were common (Goodhand 1999, 72-75), the LTTE had achieved a decent level of stateness in its core territories, within which local residents lived with "a measure of confidence and stability" (Goodhand 1999, 77).

Unlike in a de facto state, where the condition of empirical peace generally prevails, a state-within-state could either exist under a condition of, often uneasy, peace, or, usually limited, war. The former could be the result of either an official agreement (Kasfir 2015, 25) or practical stalemate, while the latter could exist even when there is officially a ceasefire in place. Either war or peace, the condition of states-within-states is generally more unstable than that of de

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facto states, since the competition over land and people's loyalty is bound to be a daily occurrence. If a state-within-state goes to close to bigger entity with which it overlaps, it might gradually lose its agency and become part of the bigger one. Meanwhile, if the condition deteriorates and the competition moves to open confrontation, it might lead to a proper war and change everything once for all. This is exactly what happened to the LTTE in 2006 and led to its eventual defeat in 2009 after three years of tense fighting (Lalwani 2017, 126).

3.2.3 Rebel Rulers — A Third Degree Diminished Subtype

A rebel ruler is a rebel group which governs people and space. It meets all the four baseline attributes of the prototypical state, agency, violence, territory, and people, but lack *all* three configurational attributes: stateness, statehood, and coherence. As it has been noted by Kasfir, "it is hard to find rebels who control populated territories but do not establish some form of government" (2015, 26). In order to make sure that the people under their control do not descend into chaos (Arjona 2010) or actively resist their presence (Arjona 2010, 200; 2017, 757), an armed group needs to "establish at least some rules of conduct for civilians" and "usually engages in some form of rule" (Arjona 2010, 200; 2014, 1361-1362; 2017, 756) and either co-opt existing social institutions or establish their own (Arjona 2014, 1375; 2016b).

However, because a rebel ruler lacks a core territory and population under its complete and sustained control, it cannot achieve the level of stateness which is present in de facto states and states-within-states. The factual condition or "expectation of protracted violence" is always present throughout its territories (Arjona 2014; Kasfir 2015, 30). This lack of stateness might be hard to discern, especially when comparing to a state-within-state, since the latter might also engage in rebel governance in territories outside its complete control. The existence or lack of a "capital" could be a helpful, but not always reliable, shorthand. A secure territorial core could enable de facto states and states-within-states to situate their central organs in a relatively fixed

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space and from which their administrative tasks could also be carried out. Since exceptional violence is absent and predictability could be assumed, civilians could also live near these places to sell their goods and services to the personnel as well as take part in other activities, which would further require the groups to regulate more social interactions. Meanwhile, since a rebel ruler does not enjoy this luxury, it would either have a secret and/or mobile headquarters to avoid attacks by its opponents, or a fixed one that could not offer the condition to attract or keep a large number of civilians.

A rebel ruler is a rebel irrespective of its goals. By being an agentic armed actor, its very existence challenges other entities' attempts to monopolize the routinized use of violence. It operates beyond the law and is inimical to competing political entities. While it might be possible for other entities ignore a de facto state and pretend it does not exist, it is not possible for the case of rebel rulers, as well as states-within-states. Their lack of coherence requires continuous sharing of people and space with other entities. Therefore, although rebel rulers are usually involved in active conflicts, even if they are not, the threat of violence is always present and small clashes are often a routine occurrence.

However, not all rebels get to be rulers, nor do all instances of rebel governance involve rebel rulers. Apparently rebel groups that do not hold territory and people would be considered (Kasfir 2015, 29). Conversely, armed groups that engage in governance activities, but lack agency, also could not become rebel rulers. The research on de facto states has been traditionally agent-based, i.e. it focuses on individual agentic actors and take them as the unit of analysis. Meanwhile, the current trend in rebel governance tends to be temporally and spatially specific, i.e. it looks at specific localities and specific time periods and take them as units of analysis (Arjona 2010; 2014, 1362; 2016a). Therefore, the literature on rebel governance also includes similar practices by non-rebels, e.g. pro-incumbent militias (Arjona 2016b; Brewer Norman

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2012). The term "rebel governance" has sometimes been reframed as "governance by armed groups" to take this into account (Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra 2017, 258).

While our typology, being agent-based, identifies the prime agents of rebel governance, rebel rulers, and situates them along other diminished subtypes of state, it does not rule out or downplay the importance of other forms and actors of rebel governance. Both states-within-states and, to a lesser degree, de facto states could also be involved in rebel governance, as well as their armed affiliates. What the typology tries to capture is the predominant characteristic of individual actors, which might change over time. While near linear transformation is possible, such as the case of the Chinese communists, which started as a rebel ruler in the 1920s and 1930s, ran a state-within-state during the WWII and the Chinese civil war, existed as a de facto state in the 1950s and 1960s after the practical end of the war, and became a proper state in 1971 after replacing the ROC in the UN. This kind of trajectory is nowhere uniform or guaranteed. De facto states might stick in their place for a fairly long period of time in the contemporary world. Meanwhile, for rebel rulers, and states-within-states to a lesser degree, the lack of coherence breeds both contention and fluidity. This usually creates impetus for changing the status quo. However, there is no general certainty in the particular forms of change for different actors.

Although the typology does not include all diminished subtypes of states or all cases of rebel governance, by differentiating de facto states, states-within-states, rebel rulers, it offers a conceptual framework under which the transformation between them could be traced. Furthermore, it also connects the fields of de facto states and rebel governance, so they could be meaningfully related.

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Chapter 4: The Caucasian Duo

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) has already disappeared from the world map for more than a quarter century, but its institutional legacy is still lingering in the South Caucasus. There are three entities that enjoy full statehood in the region, as well as three that do not, all of which could trace their origins to Soviet era administrative divisions.

In order to reconcile the universalist ideal of socialism and the potent political appeal of nationalism (Pearson 1997, 7; Slezkine 1994, 420), the Soviet Union adopted a strategy that "nested" the rights of self-determination within a multinational federation. Under this system, the USSR, while functionally a unitary state, was nevertheless officially a federation of fifteen ethnically defined Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) (Connor 1984, 51). Presuming that the more "freedom to secede the less frequent and less ardent will the desire for separation be in practice" (Connor 1984, 40 and 47-48; Lenin 1974, 146), all of the fifteen SSRs were, "[a]ccording to the Soviet constitution", considered "sovereign states" (Koehler and Zurcher 2003, 4) and had the full rights of leaving the union (Connor 1984, 51).

However, in addition to these fifteen "first-order" ethno-federal units, i.e. the Union Republics, there were also a number of "second-order" ethno-federal units within them (Koehler and Zurcher 2003, 4), i.e. twenty Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) and eight Autonomous Oblasts (AO, sometimes known as "Autonomous Regions") (Raffass 2012, 66; Zurcher et al. 2005, 260). There were three first-order units in the South Caucuses: the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic as well as six second-order units within two of them: the Abkhaz ASSR, Adjarian ASSR, and South Ossetian AO in the Georgian SSR as well the Nakhichevan ASSR and Nagorno-Karabakh AO in the Azerbaijan SSR (Figure 3). While both levels of units had their own political symbols, constitutions, borders, and usually titular ethnic groups, only the first-order units officially enjoyed the rights of secession.

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Figure 3. Soviet Administrative Map of the South Caucasus 1957-1991 (www.armenica.org 2007)

Despite the federal appearance of the Union, the real power laid in the hands of the centralized structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Pearson 1997, 38; Zurcher et al. 2005, 260) which practically ruled the USSR as a unitary state during much its existence. After the party was critically weakened during Gorbachev's reform (*perestroika* and *glasnost*) in the late 1980s (Suny 1993, 142; Zurcher et al. 2005, 261), the centrifugal force of the ethno-federal structure started to take its effect. In a process aptly named "parade of sovereignties", all of the first-order units and most of the second-order units "declared sovereignty in some form or other" between November 1998 and August 1991 (Hale 2000, 39; Suny 1993, 142). Although not all of them intended to dismember the union, since some of them were only trying to secure "a bargaining position in negotiations to reconstruct" it (Hale 2000, 39), and the nine out of the fifteen the Union Republics preferred to stay in a reformed federation, the Union nevertheless fell apart after the center "committed suicide" in August 1991(Suny and Martin 2001, 16).

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all first-order units, including the three South Caucasian ones, promptly gained statehood per their Union Republic status (Koehler and Zurcher 2003, 4) and gradually consolidated their stateness (Driscoll 2015, 1-4). Meanwhile, although all the other second-order units have been successfully absorbed into the Soviet successor states which they were legally assigned to, three out of the six second-order units in the South Caucasus have violently resisted their internationally designated masters' efforts at incorporation through force of arms and stayed out of their control for more than twenty year. They are: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

All of them are armed actors that effectively govern territory and population without substantial international recognition, i.e. they all meet the definitional attributes of violence, territory, people, stateness, and miss the attribute of statehood. While they have become the quintessential post-Soviet de facto states in the existing literature (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012; Broers 2013; Kolossov and O'Loughlin 2011; Kopeček, Hoch, and Baar 2016; Lynch 2004; O'Loughlin et al. 2011; Toal and O'Loughlin 2013a), they nevertheless exhibit significant differences (Hewitt 2013, 352-353; Mitchell and Cooley 2010, 24) that are not adequately captured by the existing conceptualization of de facto states. One of them, South Ossetia, lacked coherence and is better categorized as state-within-state for more than half of its existence (1992-2008). Another one, Abkhazia, although went through a similar path, nevertheless consistently possesses coherence and agency and exists as a de facto state.

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4.1 South Ossetia Before the August 2008 War

It now appears that the dissolution of Soviet Union was the inevitable demise of an evil empire which oppressed various ethnic minorities in its periphery. However, things were not so certain at the time. Some of its ethno-federal units agitated to undermine it, whereas others, specially the second-order ones, afraid of changing the bad master for a worst one, struggled to

preserve it. During the final year of the Union, the Georgian SSR, home republic of the former Soviet dictator, Josif Djugashvili (a.k.a. Joseph Stalin), was, ironically, at the forefront of the nationalist upheaval. Seeing Georgia as the homeland for ethnic Georgians (Hewitt 2013, 53) and believing the Soviet center had oppressed their ethnic rights, the Georgian nationalists were eager to capitalize the growing political space created by Gorbachev's reform (Saparov 2014, 148-149). Under the banner of "Language, Homeland, Faith", language became an issue of priority for them (Hewitt 2013, 53 and 58) and concrete efforts had to be made to restore it to its rightful place.

Figure 4. Map of the Georgian SSR at the End of the Soviet Union (Hewitt 2013 p.xxix)

It was August 1989, "a month before the start of the new academic year", when the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SRR "adopted a language law…[which]…stipulated that Georgian should be the principal language of instruction in the entire territory of Georgia" including the SOAO (Saparov 2014, 149). The SOAO, perceiving the Georgian action as a

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policy of assimilation, "reacted by adopting a similar law" (Saparov 2014, 149) that made Ossetian the sole official language of the SOAO (Souleimanov 2013, 123-124). The dispute soon evolved into a "war of laws" (Cornell 2002a, 192), during which the SOAO and the Georgian SSR transformed their "formerly rubber-stamp Soviet parliament[s][8]" (Cornell 2002b, 268) into vehicles for conflict and issued competing and contravening legislations through them (Hewitt 2013, 86). Meanwhile, sporadic physical violence also appeared on the ground, with armed bands of Ossetian and Georgian nationalists clashing with each other (Cornell 2002a, 192-193), which escalated into a "full-scale military confrontation by December 1990(Saparov 2014, 149). While the violence last for more than a year, intense fighting only took place during the spring of 1992(Saparov 2014, 150), after the complete disappearance of the USSR, and ended in June through the Sochi agreement. The South Ossetians were consistently unionist in contrast with the militantly secessionist Georgians (King 2008, 210; Souleimanov 2013, 124-125; Zurcher et al. 2005, 266) during this period, and made repeated efforts to appeal to the Soviet center for help (Hewitt 2013, 92-93; Souleimanov 2013, 125). However, after the Union had ceased to exist, the unionists were left on their own and had to become an orphaned republic, the Republic of South Ossetia (RSO)[9] since December 1991(Hewitt 2013, 107).

[8] Supreme Soviets for SSRs and ASSRs and Soviet of People's Deputies for AOs.
[9] Renamed Republic of South Ossetia–the State of Alania in 2018 (Krasniqi 2018, 19)

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Figure 5. Map of South Ossetia Before and After 2008 (Hewitt 2013 p.xxx)



The Sochi agreement established a Russian-led tripartite Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) with Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian troops as well as a quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) with the participation of Russia, Georgia, North Ossetia, and South Ossetia as the supervising body (IIFFMCG 2009, 93-94; International Crisis Group 2004, 4-5). While these "mechanisms…stabilised the situation on the ground" (IIFFMCG 2009, 94) and, together with the legacy Soviet government structure, made the consolidation of stateness easier (Driscoll 2015, 1-4), it also froze the situation and rendered coherence all but unachievable. The ceasefire left the RSO with an open and ill-defined cease-fire line as well as a patchwork of territory which was far less congruent than that of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia. The RSO controlled most of the ethnic Ossetian populated parts of the former SOAO including some ethically mixed villages while Georgia controlled most of the Georgian populated parts and other mixed villages (Lynch 2006, 19; Saparov 2014, 150). The roads from one village

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under South Ossetian control to another often passed through some territory under Georgian authority and vis versa while the movement of people and goods were largely left unrestricted (IIFFMCG 2009, 93-94). While South Ossetia maintained full control of its capital, Tskhinvali, it was impossible to go from there to its sole land connection to the outside world, the Roki tunnel[10], without going through the Georgian-controlled villages that strategically straddled the Transcaucasian Highway (International Crisis Group 2007a, 2; Welt 2010, 79). There were also overlapping controls over large areas of the former SOAO and it was "impossible for [either] sides to establish clear lines of control" (International Crisis Group 2007a; Saparov 2014, 150)

While an incongruent territory *per se* does not necessarily render coherence impossible, if concrete efforts were made to establish clear separation. However, since the "ceasefire … held quite firmly" "throughout the 1990s" (Lynch 2006, 20), the RSO actively exploited the situation and infringed on Georgia's monopoly on routinized violence. It allowed ordinary Georgians and South Ossetians to engage "in lively exchanges and uncontrolled trade" (International Crisis Group 2007a, 1; Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze 2007, 84) and filled its coffers, 54.5% of total revenue in 2000(Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze 2007, 73), with the custom duties which the Georgian government either did not want to (Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze 2007, 74; Welt 2010, 77) or unable to collect (George 2009, 126; IIFFMCG 2009, 103). Goods were usually brought into South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel (under RSO control), taxed by the RSO, passing through both South Ossetian and Georgian controlled areas, and sold at the Ergneti market "just a kilometer south of …Tskhinvali" on the border of the RSO and Georgia (Freese 2005, 109; Oltramonti 2011, 162-163). While these economic opportunities had resulted in an integrated network of corruption that connected the elites of both sides (George 2009, 97; Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze 2007, 74;

[10] Connecting South Ossetia with the Russian Federation

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Mandic 2015, 138), it also had made the RSO highly depend on its access to the Georgian territory and economy as well as on the benign neglect of the Georgian government. Being too close to Georgia was chipping away South Ossetia's desire for independent agency and made its aspiration for real separation from Georgia "utterly demobilized" (Mandic 2015, 137). The RSO parliament declared, in 1996, that they would rejoin Georgia under an autonomous arrangement and seemed to be holding this position until 2000(George 2009, 125-127; Mandic 2015, 141). If this proposal were not rejected by the Georgian side (George 2009, 125-127; IIFFMCG 2009, 129), South Ossetia as a state-within-state would have long disappeared.

As we have discussed earlier, the lack of coherence makes the situation of states-within-states inherently more unstable than that of de facto states. This instability could lead to either peaceful incorporation, violent confrontation, or all-out war. It not only makes gaining full control of the overlapping territories desirable, but also makes it looks possible. With a resurgent Georgia under Saakashvili (Mandic 2015, 135; Mitchell 2009, 179), the RSO's profitability was quickly turned into a liability. After ousting the old Soviet ruler of new Georgia, Shevardnadze, during what came to be known as the "Rose Revolution" in November 2003, Saakashvili initiated his own term as the president of Georgia by literally blowing up roads connecting Georgia proper and South Ossetia, which, according to him, were used for contraband trade (Freese 2005, 17; Welt 2010, 69). As part of his anti-crime drive, the bustling market at Ergneti was closed in June 2004, which cut South Ossetia's revenue in half and increased the revenue collection at Georgia's customs point with Russia four-fold (International Crisis Group 2004, 10-11).

By closing the most important forum of South Ossetian-Georgian interaction and "the symbol of Georgian-Ossetian friendship" (IIFFMCG 2009, 104), Saakashvili effectively cut off the umbilical cord that connected both sides and resolutely moved toward a confrontational, if not necessarily violent, project of territorial (re)conquest. Capitalizing on the South Ossetia's

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lack of coherence, Saakashvili launched two offensives, one "peaceful" (Lynch 2006, 42) and another, while still not inherent violent, obviously more hostile. On the peaceful front, Saakashvili sent various Georgian ministers and his Dutch wife to visit the area in the former SOAO where the Georgian government still had access, offered free fertilizer and cheaper medicine, established a free ambulance service and an Ossetian-language TV station, built cinemas and a concert hall, and resumed pension payment to Ossetian pensioners (IIFFMCG 2009, 107; International Crisis Group 2007a, 4 and 22; Lynch 2006, 42; Welt 2010, 73).

On the hostile front, the Georgian government allegedly bought a former defense minister (1996-2001) and prime minister (July-December 2001) of the RSO, Dmitri Sanakoyev, by paying off his gambling debt (International Crisis Group 2007a, 6). With an ethnic Ossetian who had a "powerful enough name and background" in their service, the Georgian government actively extended its influence onto the RSO's territory and population by sponsoring a parallel election in the Georgian-controlled territories inside the former SOAO during South Ossetia's own presidential election on 12 November 2006. Sanakoyev was elected with 94% of votes and set up a Georgian-supported alternative government of South Ossetia. From his based in Kurta, a Georgian-controlled village about 5 kilometers from Tskhinvali, Sanakoyev administrated the Georgian controlled parts of the former SOAO and strived to insert his control into mixed villages and RSO controlled areas (Asmus 2010, 82; Gogia 2009, 36; International Crisis Group 2007a, 3-4 and 6).

The Georgian actions did not meet friendly response from the South Ossetian side. The RSO promptly cut all official communications with the Georgian government outside of Joint Control Commission (JCC) after the closure of the Ergneti market and blocked fertilizer delivering Georgian officials from accessing Georgian-controlled villages through South-Ossetian-controlled territory. Some government officials were also fired or arrested for

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communicating with the Georgians under the table (Freese 2004) and civilians were punished for assisting the Georgians or accepting their offer (Freese 2005).

Sporadic fighting started to emerge in summer 2004 after twelve years of peace (Welt 2010, 84) and, with the bilateral relationship deteriorating, it gradually intensified. Under the increasing hostility, the overlapping controls soon became a problem for both sides. While both sides were able to access the other side's people and territory, both sides were also capable of disturbing the other side's routinized control. This exactly what happened. With hostility rising, both the RSO and Georgia frequently used road closures as a tool of conflict, which led to further violent clashes (International Crisis Group 2007a). Facing an increasing threat of further escalation, the RSO turned to Russia for protection (Illarionov 2015, 56-57 and 59-60) while Georgian embarked on a path of rapid military build-up (George 2009, 171; IIFFMCG 2009, 14; International Crisis Group 2007b, 12) in preparation of a war that could solve everything once for all (Illarionov 2015, 56-57 and 59-60).

4.2 Gaining Coherence but Losing Agency

The war did come, and indeed changed everything once for all. However, it did not make South Ossetia a de facto state, nor did it make it part of Georgia. The disproportionate Russian forces rolling over from the north of the main Caucasus range soon turned out to be an enemy which the revamped Georgian army had no way to match. Not only did Russia come to South Ossetia's aid, it also offered South Ossetia official diplomatic recognition. After five days of active fighting during the first weeks of August 2008, the previously porous and ambiguous boundaries have been transformed into a clearly demarcated administrative boundary line (ABL) with Russian border guards patrolling the South Ossetian side (German 2016, 160; Hewitt 2013, 264) and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) watching the Georgian one (De Waal 2011, 32). All cross-border traffic is halted with the only exception

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given to the about 2,500 mostly ethnic Georgian residents of the previously Georgian administrated Akhalgori/Leningori district who are allowed to cross to and from Georgia proper with their local documents (Hewitt 2013, 245; International Crisis Group 2010, 3).

However, while excluding Georgian access from the area of the former SOAO has given South Ossetia coherence, the Russian help has cost its agency. First of all, it is not autocephalous anymore. Spending billions of rubles to rebuild the war damaged South Ossetia (Kolossov and O'Loughlin 2011, 637) and seeing it going into the pockets of various unaccountable local officials (Skakov 2011, 2-3), Moscow could not help but would like to control them (International Crisis Group 2010, 10; Skakov 2011, 2). The presence of former Russian government officials with no prior connection with South Ossetia increased significantly after the war (Mühlfried 2010, 10) and spread into all spheres of the administration including the top leadership. An ethnic Russian from Ozersk in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russian Federation, Vadim Brovtsev, became the prime minister of South Ossetia in 2009 (Hewitt 2013, 322; Skakov 2012, 72) and brought with him a whole team from his hometown (the "Ozersk team") to work in the South Ossetian administration (Skakov 2011, 2-3). When the South Ossetians elected Alla Dzhioyeva as their president rather than Moscow's preferred candidate in 2011, the result was quickly cancelled (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012, 285; Nilsson 2014, 116). Brovtsev stepped up as the acting president between late 2011 and early 2012 (Skakov 2012, 75) before a candidate acceptable to Moscow could be produced. With Russian controlling its "leadership and all strategically sensitive appointments in its cabinet and security services" (Mitchell and Cooley 2010, 24) and "staff[ing] over half of the government" (International Crisis Group 2010 p.i), South Ossetia has transformed from an autocephalous corporate group into a heterocephalous one (Weber 1964, 148).

Secondly, it is also no longer autonomous either. South Ossetia today "almost entirely under Russian control" (M. E. Smith 2018 182). The International Crisis Group (ICG) in a 2010

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report titled “the burden of [Russia’s] recognition” argues that “South Ossetia” lacked “true political economic or military autonomy” and was “no closer to genuine independence” then than before the war (International Crisis Group 2010 i). With its physical access to Georgia and the economic opportunities that came with it all but disappeared, South Ossetia has no real economy to speak of and no way of sustaining its personnel and its residents. It has to rely on direct economic handouts from Moscow (German 2016, 161) and it is no position to do anything that might displease Russia. Moreover, consistently preferring to live in a polity ruled by Moscow, be it Soviet or Russian (German 2016, 163; Kolossov and O'Loughlin 2011, 639; Sotieva 2014, 10; Suny 2010, 12), the South Ossetians have little will to interact with the outside world (Sotieva 2014, 11) or resist the strengthening Russian control of their homeland (M. E. Smith 2018, 183). Rather, their actively embraced Russia’s influence. With the conclusion of the “Treaty on Alliance and Integration” in 2015(German 2016, 159), South Ossetia officially transferred most of its political power to Russia (Ambrosio and Lange 2016, 683-686) and formed a “single space for defense and security” (German 2016, 159) with the latter. Following the substantial integration, only the Russian Federation has the power to decide who is a friend and who is an enemy. South Ossetia has no more ability to reconcile with or act against Georgia, or anybody else, without Moscow saying so (M. E. Smith 2018, 196).

Being both heterocephalous and heteronomous, South Ossetia is no longer an agentic actor and is for most practical purposes part of a more extensive entity (Weber 1964, 148), i.e. the Russian Federation. Moreover, since it is now securely under Russian protection, South Ossetia has also drastically downsized its violent personnel after the war (International Crisis Group 2010, 9). The 3,000 strong armed forces before the War (International Crisis Group 2010, 9) has been reduced to 800 by 2016 and is scheduled to be integrated into the Russian army (Kucera 2016; 2017). Therefore, not only has it lost agency, it is also ceasing to be an armed actor. It is being absorbed into Russia and is further away from being state-like (German 2016,

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156-157). While the territorial shell is still in place, it is being turned into a "Russian garrison" (International Crisis Group 2010, 9) rather than any diminished subtype of state.

Figure 6. Map of Abkhazia Before and After 2008 (Hewitt 2013 p.xxix)



4.3 Comparing the Caucasian Duo

Among the three former second-order units in the South Caucasus, South Ossetia was and still is the least state-like and has the least will of being a state. It lacked coherence before the 2008 and lost agency after it. Meanwhile, Abkhazia, another former second-order unit within the former Georgian SSR, has existed as a de facto state with both coherence and agency before and after 2008. Although Abkhazia also went through a similar trajectory of a war of independence in the early 1990s against Georgia, more than ten years of relative peace, and another war against Georgia in 2008 followed by Russian recognition, it nevertheless displayed remarkable differences comparing to South Ossetia. After reaching a ceasefire with Georgia

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through a different Sochi agreement in July 1993, the Republic of Abkhazia controlled all of the territories of the former Abkhaz ASSR except the remote, sparsely populated, and inaccessible upper Kodori valley (Markedonov 2013). This relative congruent territorial base allowed Abkhazia to consolidate its stateness in a much more coherent manner not possible for South Ossetia. While Abkhazia had only tenuous control of the mostly Mingrelian (a sub-group of Georgians speaking a mutually unintelligible dialect/language) populated Gali district in the south near the de facto border with Georgia before 2008 (Lynch 2006, 20) and the local situation remained somewhat unstable afterwards (Tekushev 2013, 85-86), it effectively controlled and quickly established order over the majority of its de facto territory. Therefore, although Georgia did set up an "Abkhazian Government in Exile" 1995, it had to be based in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, and concerned itself mostly with managing the mostly Mingrelian/Georgian refugees from Abkhazia living in Georgia (Markedonov 2013, 50) and was not able to extend its reach into Abkhazia. This situation did not change much even after the Georgian government moved the government in exile to the mostly Svan (a sub-group of Georgians speaking a mutually unintelligible dialect/language) populated upper Kodori valley in 2006 (Markedonov 2013, 54). Unlike "the alternative government of South Ossetia" (a.k.a Provisional Administration of South Ossetia) ran by Sanakoyev, which could access both the territory and people of South Ossetia, the exiled Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in Kodori (led mostly by ethnic Georgians) was not able to access Abkhazian territory or disturb its coherence. Meanwhile, Abkhazia also did not attempt to extend its control into Georgia proper. Although it had been involved in battling Georgian paramilitary groups (Forest Brothers and White Legion) in the Gali district (Lynch 2006, 20), the issue was rather localized and did not pose much a threat to Abkhazia's existence as a coherent de facto state.

While riding the Russian chariot and capturing the upper Kodori valley during the 2008 war did improve its coherence a little bit (which was already satisfactory for definitional

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purpose), it did not come without a cost. However, unlike the South Ossetians who welcomed the Russian dominance (German 2016, 163), The "cost" or "burden" of Russian protection became a significant concern for Abkhazia (International Crisis Group 2010; Markedonov 2013, 59). While most South Ossetians responded in a survey research that they would like South Ossetia to join Russia (Toal and O'Loughlin 2013a), the majority of respondents in Abkhazia prefer Abkhazia to stay independent from Russia (O'Loughlin et al. 2011). This opinion is also shared by the Abkhaz political elites, most of them are "still suspicious of Russia" (De Waal 2015). Therefore, the de facto state navigated carefully during the post-2008 era to maintain its independent agency (Ambrosio and Lange 2016, 677-678).

Unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia adopted an active foreign policy to reach out to the outside world, especially its diaspora in Turkey, in order to reduce its reliance on Russia, and in doing so, "distanced itself—albeit slightly—from Russian control" (M. E. Smith 2018, 202). A clear indication of Abkhazia's agency and South Ossetia's lack of it is perhaps in the names of two comprehensive agreements they concluded with Moscow in 2014 and 2015: "Agreement on Alliance and Strategic Partnership" for Abkhazia and "Agreement on Alliance and Integration" for South Ossetia (Ambrosio and Lange 2016, 683-686). While South Ossetia happily accepted "integration", Abkhazia insisted on changing it to "strategic partnership" to stress its distinct existence (German 2016). Moreover, it also negotiable substantial alterations to the Russian draft so that "Abkhazia will retain its own armed forces" as well its own foreign policy (Ambrosio and Lange 2016, 683-686; German 2016, 164) and continue to be a de facto state.

As noted by Jesse Driscoll, the post-Soviet wars were generally "shorter…and far less bloody…than similar civil wars" elsewhere. After the collapse of the Union, "order [was] consolidate[d] [rather] quickly…[across] the post-Soviet space" (Driscoll 2015, 1-2) in to either proper states, de facto states, or state-within-state. Even these diminished subtypes "were 'born

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strong' in important respects, inheriting huge institutional advantages comparing to the postcolonial states". "The Soviet experience bequeathed to the first generation of post-independence elites a well-organized party network, borders and administrative units…as well as an educated and largely literate population that anticipated that these institutions would endure" (Driscoll 2015, 4). While their economic situation might look dire for their richer neighbors to the West and for those local residents who still remembers the Soviet time, it is not so bad in the wider world. Abkhazia had an estimated GDP per capita of 1,886 USD in 2015 and South Ossetia had 1,233 USD (Baar and Baarová 2017, 276). According to a UN report of the same year, about 25% of its member states were listed as LDCs (Least Developed Countries) with GNI[11] per capita lower than 1,242 USD (United Nations 2015, 17). Many of them are involved in decades-long civil wars and struggling to consolidate their stateness. While a number of these LDCs might claim the distinction of having the world's longest civil war, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar undoubtably stands out among the contestants.

The Burmese military (Tatmadaw) has been involved a civil war since the country's independence in 1948 to construct a modern polity according to a map which the British has only envisioned but never materialized. However, even within this grand background of unremitting violence, there are zones of peace, sometimes substantial, that emerged out from this chaos. The Wa State is one of these places (Renard 2013, 175).

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[11] GDP plus remittance and other things.

Chapter 5: The Zomian Singularity

In 1989, when the Soviet Union was being dismantled, another communist regime in the Zomian hills across the Eurasian landmass also came to a similar fate. The deceased was the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), a revolutionary movement which had engaged in an armed insurgency against the Burmese government since 1948, right after its independence. However, the organization that occupied much of the Sino-Burmese border from the late 1960s to 1980s and fell apart in 1989 (Lintner 1990) bore remarkably little resemblance to the communist cell formed in a small downtown apartment in Rangoon[12] in 1939 by a group of young intellectuals[13](Lintner 1990, 3). Its later incarnation was more the product of a Chinese attempt at exporting revolution than a genuine awakening of Burmese class consciousness.

While the party had made considerable gains during the first a few years of its revolution, it soon had a turn of fortune by the end of 1951 and its cadres started to make the trip the newly formed People's Republic of China (PRC) to seek assistance from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Lintner 1990, 19). Unwilling to jeopardize its relationship with the first non-communist government that offered it official recognition (Maung Aung Myoe 2011, 11), the PRC instead offered these Burmese communists refuge and settled them in Sichuan province (Lintner 1990, 19). However, this policy began to change after the onset of the cultural revolution (1966-1976) and was completely abandoned after a series of anti-Chinese riots took place in Burma and claimed at least few dozen lives in June 1967 (Fan 2012). "China started to openly support the BCP's armed struggle" (Maung Aung Myoe 2011, 78). It arranged an alliance between the BCP cadres and a group ethnic Kachins led by "the…[WWII] hero and Kachin nationalist Naw Seng" (Lintner 1999, 249) that arrived in China in 1950 after a failed

[12] "Yangon" after 1989

[13] One of them, Aung San, will later become the father of independent Myanmar, its military (Tatmadaw), and its current de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

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rebellion against Burmese government (Maung Aung Myoe 2011, 78-79). The People's Liberation Army (PLA) provided them with training and weapons then sent them to the border (Maung Aung Myoe 2011, 79-80). Together with Chinese volunteers and local ethnic minority PLA soldiers, the BCP launched a three-pronged military offensive into the Shan State of Burma in January 1968 (Fan 2012, 244; Lintner 1990, 25; Maung Aung Myoe 2011, 80). Through both military conquest and co-optation of local tribal armed forces, the BCP "managed to…control…a 20,000 square kilometer area…[along]…the Chinese border…[running] uninterruptedly from the Mekong river and the Lao border up to the border town of Panghsai…where the Burma Road crosses into Yunnan" "within six years" (Lintner 1990, 26; Maung Aung Myoe 2011, 80). This area would constitute the bulk of BCP's territorial base and later be known as the "North-East Command" (NEC) (M. Smith 1991, 247).

5.1 BCP the Proxy — 1968-1979

Following its entry into the Sino-Burmese borderland in 1968, the BCP existed as an extension of the PRC for eleven years before it was transformed into a rebel ruler. It was armed, had a populated territorial base, and concurrently lacked statehood, stateness and coherence before its final demise in 1989.

First of all, not only did the BCP lack statehood, so did its patron. When the BCP crossed into Burma, the ROC was still sitting in the UN as the legitimate government of China. It would take almost four more years and through what would now be referred to as "engagement without recognition" in the de facto states literature (Ker-Lindsay 2015), i.e. the "ping-pong diplomacy" between the PRC and the United States, before the former could enter the UN under tacit acceptance of the latter in 1971.

Secondly, it lacked stateness as well. It was not able to routinize its use of violence to the degree where it commands could be carried out without the need to frequently resort to

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exceptional violence. Since it was preoccupied with gaining control of all of Burma, the BCP chose the path of least friction and did not insist on gaining complete control over its base area. Its strategy was to form "alliances with local warlords and chieftain" by "offer[ing] them unlimited supplies of guns and ammunition" as long as they submitted to the BCP's nominal leadership (Lintner 1999, 253). While some these preexisting military structures were incorporated into its People's Army (PA) (Renard 2013, 147), many local tribal leaders and their armed retainers were simply left alone. The BCP's personnel often ran into violent stand-offs with tribal leaders and had to disarm them with military force (Interview with Wa State Official 2014). Perhaps because of this reason, in contrast to their professed communist ideology, the BCP also "never…tried to implement a land reform in the" NEC (Lintner 1990, 30). Furthermore, since it did not engage in much governance activities, it also could not attract people to move to its headquarters, which reminded only a small village with a few grass huts until its very end (Interview with Wa State Official 2014; Shi Lei 2012, 180).

Thirdly, the BCP also lacked coherence. In addition to the NEC, it also had several unconnected small pieces of "liberated" areas across the remote areas of Burma (Lintner 1990, 28-29), but not a substantial area where it maintained exclusive control. In order to achieve revolutionary success in all of Burma, it waged guerrilla warfare wherever possible, sponsored ethnic local militias whenever needed, and built clandestine party cells deep in Burma's heartland as long as they were not exposed (Lintner 1990, 28-29; Shi Lei 2012, 141 and 179). Meanwhile, it could also not prevent the Burmese government's covert as well as overt infiltration into its own base areas, including the NEC (Bao Youliang 2002, 9-18; Shi Lei 2012, 172).

Most importantly, it lacked agency before 1979. Armed and funded by the PRC, with Chinese volunteers making up "the bulk of [its] fighting force" and military advisors attached to all major units (Lintner 1990, 35), the BCP of the 1970s was neither autocephalous or

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autonomous. It is, therefore, better considered an extension of the PRC for this period. However, a quick turn of events in the latter half of the 1970s soon endowed the BCP with independent agency, but at a considerable cost.

Figure 7. Map of Burma at the time of the collapse of BCP (M. Smith 1991 p.xv)



Note: CPB (Communist Party of Burma) = BCP (Burmese Communist Party)

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5.2 BCP the Rebel Ruler — 1979-1989

When the BCP was gaining control of its territorial base, the Cultural Revolution in China was also coming to an end. Misjudging the political trend in China, the BCP sided with communist hardliners rather than the eventual victor of the post-Mao political struggle, Deng Xiaoping (Lintner 1990, 29-30). Not long after Deng had consolidated power in China, the BCP's "entire China-based central office…was forced to return to Panghsang, its official headquarters" in the Wa Hills right across the border from China in 1978 (Lintner 1990, 30). Chinese military advisors who were staffed to the BCP's People's Army (PA) were withdrew back to China in 1979 whereas the volunteers were also being recalled (Lintner 1990, 35). This left the BCP with a mostly ethnic Burman leadership and a rank and file mostly made up of local hill people. More than two-thirds of them were ethnic Wa people (Lintner 1990, 35) who had not been governed by anyone and had little contact with the Burmans before the arrival of the BCP (Scott 2009). While this had paradoxically boosted the BCP's autocephaly and reduced China's influence, it also laid the foundation for its eventual demise. With the one-way street to China open not only for the Chinese but also ethnic Burman members of the BCP, whoever did not agree with party's hardline Maoist position was free to go to the "revisionist" China for retirement (Lintner 1990, 35-36 and 45). This increased the BCP's autonomy but also gave more power to the old guard hardliners and made the party's position further radicalized (Lintner 1990, 36). While agency was gained, it cost the BCP Chinese assistance as well as a more moderate position that might had helped it to survive.

After gaining its agency and concurrently fulfilling all the baseline attributes but missing all the configurational attributes, the BCP had successfully transformed into a rebel ruler in 1979 and remained such until 1989. However, since the BCP viewed the people under its control as exploitable resources and the rank and file soldiers as "dispensable cannon fodder"

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for their revolution (Lintner 1990, 36-37) but offered little in return, the situation was far from durable.

5.3 The Post-Communist De Facto Wa State

The "liberated zones" of the BCP was divided in to a number of regions (Lintner 1990, 25; M. Smith 1991, 255) within which the local commander generally had substantial autonomy. But the time of 1989, it had three major regions left: the Kokang region in the north, the Mongla region in the south, and the Wa region in the center where the headquarters was located in (M. Smith 1991, 355).

Similar to the way that the Baltic Republics led the way of the Soviet dissolution and Slovenia led the way of the Yugoslav one, the first region to leave the BCP was also the one that, by local standard, the most prosperous and with the most contact to the outside world. It was the Kokang region. It is mostly populated by ethnic Han (a.k.a. ethnic Chinese) people who, while sharing the same ethnicity with the majority of the PRC's citizens, nevertheless have a distinct regional identity. They have a long history of interaction with Burma and are recognized by the Burmese government as an indigenous ethnic group (Khun Sai 1991), unlike other Chinese who are generally considered immigrants.

When the mostly Chinese BCP forces, led by a Kokang native Peng Jiasheng, entered the region in1968, the defeated anti-Communist local militia, led by Peng's old acquaintance and longtime rival, Luo Xinghan, retreated to the Burmese controlled city Lashio (Lintner 1999, 250 and 256). Twenty years later, Luo, working the on behalf of the Burmese military intelligence, started to secretly persuade Peng to abandon the BCP cause. Peng mutinied against the BCP on 12 March 1989 and quickly seized control of his home region (Shi Lei 2012, 183; M. Smith 1991, 375-376). The leaders of the BCP then ordered the Wa soldiers stationed near the headquarters to put down Peng's rebellion. Fed up by years of fighting and unwilling to turn

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on their former comrades, the Wa soldiers, led by two local Wa commanders, instead launched their own munity. After a largely bloodless confrontation, the Wa commanders, Zhao Nilai and Bao Youxiang, took control of the BCP headquarters and sent the its ethnic Burman leaders across the border to China for retirement (Shi Lei 2012, 184 and 191; M. Smith 1991, 376). In a way similar to the Soviet dissolution, after the center was gone, regional commanders in Mongla as well as a few smaller regions also declared their independence from the BCP (M. Smith 1991, 376-377) and "[w]ithin a month" after the Kokang mutiny, the BCP had "ceased to exist" (Lintner 1990, 46). After some secret talks between April 1989 and January 1990, a series of ceasefire agreements were concluded between the Burmese government and each of the former BCP break-away units (Lintner 1990, 52-53; M. Smith 1991, 380) which allowed them complete control of their own affairs while acknowledging nominal Burmese territorial integrity (Renard 2013, 149).

Like what happened with Russia in the Soviet case, after taking over control of the center, the Wa mutineers inherited the majority of the former communist regime's territory, population, military force, assets, as well as the bureaucracy (Renard 2013, 141). However, rather than tracing their political existence to any preexisting entity, the Wa State is quite honest with their stateless past (Wa State 2014, 2). While criticizing the BCP for its misrule, the Wa official historiography nevertheless credited the BCP for uniting the Wa State for the first time in history (Bao Youxiang 2009, 3) and enabling the " disparate Wa groups to think of themselves as…one" group (Renard 2013, 147). Moreover, unlike Yeltsin, the Wa leaders also inherited the party and its members (Shi Lei 2012, 191) rather than outlawing it. Either seeing value in the party structure itself or afraid of Chinese intervention, they clearly stated that they were only against the Burman leaders, but not communism itself (Kramer 2007, 19). The party was reformed into the United Wa State Party (UWSP) and the remaining BCP members were

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collectively transferred to the new party (Shi Lei 2012, 191). The former BCP headquarters Panghsang were renamed "Pangkham" and became the capital of the Wa State.

Gaining their agency through the mutiny and taking control of most of the rebel ruler BCP's legacy, the Wa State then achieved coherence through both defensive and offensive actions. On the defensive front, through a verbal ceasefire with the Burmese government, both sides agreed to restrain from interfering in other side's territory. The Wa State gained complete control over its territory (Renard 2013, 142) and withdrew the former BCP forces, now under its control, completely from the BCP's guerrilla zone in the west of Salween river in 1993 (Chen Ying and Wang Shuangdong 2003, 27). On the offensive front, the Wa State finished the BCP's war against Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) through an alliance with the Burmese government and took control of most of his previous territories on the Thai-Burmese border. While this new acquisition made the Wa State's territory somewhat less congruent, the bulk of the Wa State's territory and population still lie in the north and both the Wa State and the Burmese government have generally held fast to their commitments and respected each other's turf.

Moreover, the Wa State also quickly consolidated its stateness. Unlike the BCP leaders, who were both unwilling and unable to implement complete control over a territory populated by people cut off from them by ethnic as well as linguistic divisions. The new leaders of the Wa State, being natives with prominent tribal backgrounds, were able to combine their traditional authority with the bureaucratic structure left by the BCP to construct an administrative system that is able to command much more compliance than the BCP ever did. This newly gained stateness was put to test when they decided to eradicate poppy cultivation in their territories by 2005. This was probably as difficult as confiscating all firearms in the United States. Opium poppy, as the essential anti-state crops (Scott 2009, 202), has been cultivated in the Wa Hills for generations. Most of the people in the Wa State relied on growing poppy for livelihood and

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did not know how to grow anything else. In what might be called "authoritarian high-modernist" social engineering under a Leninist party (Scott 1998), the Wa State, according the manager of the UNODC Wa Project at the time, conducted what was "likely…the most effective and efficient banning of opium in history with perhaps 99 percent of cultivation ended within the first year" (Renard 2013, 141). It did so without provoking a rebellion or meeting violent resistance.

Possessing both coherence and stateness and lacking statehood, the Wa State, although having "no obvious place in exiting literature" (Staniland 2017), nevertheless has an appropriate place in our typology, that of a de facto state.

Figure 8. The location of the Wa State (Mudie and Jackson-Han 2010)

Note: the dark red area is under the control the Wa State. The dark brown area in the upper left used to belong to the MNDAA before 2009. The dark brown in the lower left belongs to the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), aka the Mongla group, which is a different entity. All of them were breakaway regions from the BCP.

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Chapter 6: Conclusion

> *[T]here is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self-governed if possible, well-governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, governed*[14]*. (Cited in Huntington 1968, 2)*

Huntington believed that we all ought to be governed. However, knowing who is governing us might be as important as knowing how we are governed. Proper states are not the only ones involved in the business of governance nor are they the only ones participate in the interstate relations through "soldiers and diplomats" (Kolodziej 1985, 6; Vinci 2008, 299). Diminished subtypes are equally important actors in both fields. While the existing research on rebel governance and de facto states have shed important light on the existence of these actors, they have not able to do it with a clear or unified conceptual framework. By constructing a configurational typology of state and its diminished subtypes, this research not only seeks to find order in disorder, like many researches on de facto states and rebel governance did before, but also tries to differentiate these alternative orders. With the assistance of the theories on radial categories and configurational typology, this thesis is able to dissect the prototypical concept of state into four baseline attributes and, most importantly, three configurational attributes and create a typology that could capture the most empirically salient features of these subtypes and situate them in a clearly demarcated conceptual framework.

As we have defined earlier, a state is "a human community that practices an internationally recognized monopoly over the routinized use of physical force within a given territory". Routinization breeds predictability and predictability begets order. Order is in short supply in many parts of the world. However, this is often not the result of the lack of suppliers, but too many would be ones. Order, as it turns out, is not like other commodities, the more the suppliers there, the less there will be. To successfully produce it, one needs monopoly. As our

[14] Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald Tribune*, Dec. 10, 1963, p. 24

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typology and analysis have shown, different kind of monopoly and routinization, i.e. existence or absence of stateness and coherence, will produce different kind of orders and not all orders are created equal. Diminished subtypes of state exist in different configurations and create different forms of orders. Sometimes they change over time and this typology is well-endowed to capture this change.

However, this thesis was not able to explore further into how and why particular kinds of changes occur. Institutional history and its impact on the political changes in diminished subtypes state might be of importance for further research. While the Soviet dismantling of the party structure breathed life into the dormant territorial institutions, lacking well-developed territorial institutions, the Wa State had to make use of what was left of the party. Mampilly's observation that insurgents using Maoist organizational structures are "more likely to develop…effective governance system" (2011a, 217) is of particular relevance here. He was very pertinent to differentiate between professing the ideology and adopting "the internal organizational structure" and only the latter counts (2011a, 218). The driving force of this difference might well lie in the centralized and rationalized Leninist party mechanism, which, in areas without the tradition of being governed by modern states, might be the closest thing to a Weberian bureaucracy. The Wa State, while sharing a communist past with its Caucasian cousins, is nevertheless remarkably different in this aspect. The Caucasian case is a situation where, after the collapse of party structure, the existence of various attributes of state was interrupted but quickly reconstituted based on the territorial administrative structure. This calls forward future researches on governance practice that existed after the onset of violence but before their respective ceasefire as well as the interplay of the party and other institutions during this time. For the Wa State, its state-building in the 1990s is still under researched. It is important to find out how the top-down hierarchical governance now existing in the Wa State replaced the traditional "decentralized clan-based" social structure (Renard 2013, 143) and how the party

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structure was put to this use. This might need to take an anthropological approach, so we could zoom into the prosaic aspects of stateness and get some substantive knowledge on the real-life micro power structure and its transformation in these entities.

Moreover, even in the absence of statehood, some subtypes, i.e. de facto states, appear to be more durable than others, i.e. states-within-states. International recognition might not be as important as it has been widely regarded in analyzing these entities. Substance matters. Shifting away from international recognition and unrecognition might provide more insights on different types of political entities. However, although formal statehood itself might not be that important, how actors approach it might be of some interests for further researches. Taking away the secessionist goals from the definition gives us space to analyze actions of actors without taking these goals *a priori*. While in the Soviet case almost every ethno-federal units declared sovereignty in one way or another (Hale 2000, 39; Suny 1993, 142), whether they intended on real separation or not (Hale 2000, 39), in the Wa case, as well as for many other actors in its neighborhood, the language of sovereignty has generally been shied away from, even though it enjoys the ultimate authority in all practical ways (Renard 2013, 149). As argued by Stephen Krasner, the interstate system is "characterized by organized hypocrisy" (Krasner 2001b, 173) and this hypocrisy has its regional variations. While European hypocrisy mostly involves the language of "formal equality and autonomy", the East Asian one in the nineteenth century, argues Krasner, stressed on "hierarchy and dependency" (Krasner 2001b, 173). Under this system, smaller polities offered "symbolic obeisance" to the bigger ones, while having "*de facto* autonomy over their external as well as…internal affairs" (Krasner 2001b, 178-179 emphasis from the original). It seems that the "organized hypocrisy—East Asian style" has lingered on. Not only in the Zomian hills, the situation of another Asian de facto state, the ROC (Taiwan), also seems to embody the same logic in the sense that it officially maintains, although

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increasingly reluctantly, the pretension the One-China policy (Cheng 2017, 451; Krasner 2001a, 338; 2013, 174).

While the "logics of consequences…[dictate] behavior" and "logics of appropriateness…[are] rhetorically embraced" (Krasner 2001b, 174), rhetorics also have practical consequences. The ethno-federal units of USSR declared sovereignty, so they could enhance their bargaining positions, even if they did not seek to break apart the Union (Hale 2000, 39). The Wa State, by up-holding Myanmar's nominal sovereignty, not only avoids irrigating China, which has a substantial Wa minority right across the border, but also gained practical advantages *vis-à-vis* other armed actors. Therefore, when the Mong Tai Army (MTA) led by Khun Sa broke the hypocrisy and declared the independent "Shan State Republic" and named himself its president in 1993(Li Chenyang 2005, 5), the newly emerged Wa State was able to seize this opportunity. By ostensibly fighting for the territorial integrity of Myanmar, the Wa State managed to defeat Khun Sa and, following his surrender to the Burmese government in 1996, occupied most of his territory. While this thesis was not able to explore this avenue further, there are substantial benefits to be gained by analyzing the organized hypocrisy of diminished subtypes of state.

As the interaction between the Wa State and the Shan State Republic as well as the Burmese government has shown, there has been and still is an interstate system at work in highland Myanmar. We would need to go beyond the individual agents to analyze the interstate system of diminished subtypes of state. While the post-Soviet entities do not share borders with each other and do not have very extensive interactions other than offering each other symbolic gestures of recognition through an organization called the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations, the Wa State exists in a microcosm of agentic territorially-based based actors. After minding mostly its own business for about two decades, the Wa State has recently taken a leading role in Myanmar's "peace process" and hosted four summits with several other armed

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groups in its capital Pangkham. It is now chairing the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), an organization of seven armed actors created in 2017 at the fourth summit to coordinate their negotiation with the Burmese government. Current researches on the issue of conflict/peace in Myanmar either treat these actors, as well as those outside of the FPNCC, in isolation or group them together under the undifferentiated umbrella of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and neglect their different agencies and agenda. By taking a systematic view on their interactions, we will not only "bridge the Burma 'gap' in conflict studies" (Mathieson 2018) but also bring the realist interstate relations theory to a setting where conflict, alliance, and power-balance is practiced by a diverse group of agentic territorial-based armed actors (Vinci 2008).

States are not going away. They are here to stay, both the proper ones and the diminished subtypes. While we might dream a world free from their domination, as long as we are not perfect, we would need states. And as long as the world is not perfect, states will also not be perfect. Diminished subtypes of state are part and parcel of the interstate system and will remain such for the foreseeable future.

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