Being Part of the Club: A Synthesis Essay on Voter Turnout and Expressive Behavior

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Abstract

Expressive voting has been proposed as a solution towards resolving the paradox of voting. Often, it has been described by pitting it against an instrumentalist, consequence-oriented voting behavior. Yet, this does not fully answer what expressive behavior is. Rather, it shows what it isn't. In my thesis, I have attempted to show that non-consequentialist voting behavior is linked to the individual perception of a group's opinion homogeneity or its heterogeneity. To this end, I attempt to measure voter turnout by measuring between-group heterogeneity and homogeneity. To do this, I draw from survey data collected from a survey study on the 2016 Romanian parliamentary election. Using this body of data, I operationalize opinion homogeneity and heterogeneity as distances between expressed opinions on the similarity and dissimilarity of competing political parties in the 2016 parliamentary elections. In order to measure these similarities or dissimilarities between parties, I employ the method of multidimensional scaling through Euclidean distances. This is not an exhaustive study, but rather a proposed roadmap towards future studies on expressive behavior. Finally, I find that the survey instrument works well in conjunction with the method of multidimensional scaling. However, limitations remain in pinpointing the exact nature of expressive behavior and, consequently, developing effective hypotheses is still a problem. In this regard, though much work has gone into the examination of the theoretical concept of expressive voting, work still needs to be done in unifying different strands of interpretation of expressive behavior.

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In his book, The Habsburg Empire: A New History (2016), historian Pieter M. Judson opens by giving an account of the third election in the history of the Habsburg empire. Aside from the relevance of the historical context – after all, this thesis uses data from the 2016 Romanian parliamentary elections – there are other several details which are relevant to this thesis.

On the thirteenth and nineteenth of June 1911, subjects of the Habsburg empire turned out to elect a new parliament. Across the empire, subjects' religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds could hardly be more diverse. It is worthwhile to try to understand what voters from Graz or Czernowitz or Dubrovnik had in common so much so that they would be equally incentivized to turn out and vote. After all, these sparsely linked communities had little experience with elections. This was the third election taking place across the empire and the second one after 1907, the year of the universal adoption of universal suffrage for parliament (Judson, 2016: 15).

Furthermore, due to various political and social factors, Judson proposes that local elites were incentivized to see to it that turnout would be as low as possible. In Judson's account, the local authorities in Drohobych, a small town in Galicia, set up just one polling station that was supposed to accommodate 8,000 potential voters. Members of the local Jewish community were worried that this constituted a sign that local authorities would try in tamper with the election results with a view towards keeping them from electing a Zionist member of parliament. Eventually, local bureaucrats ordered mounted troops to shoot the crowds gathered in the town square and disperse them. In total, twenty-six people lost their lives (2016: 15). s episode is illustrative issues connected to the respective historical context. Equally, it speaks to the intensity of voter mobilization and the high cost of voting.

When one thinks about what mobilized voters across the Habsburg empire, the Drohobych massacre – in all of its constituent parts – is even more striking. The parliament in faraway Vienna had considerably less power compared to that of the local elites which could directly determine basic rights such as how much local peasants had to work or if they could move from one village to another. Yet, despite this, Judson writes that "parliamentary elections held immense cultural and social significance to people across the empire" (2016: 16).

This thesis, in many ways, is also an examination of what drove these multiethnic and multiconfesional voters to take to the polls, though the discussion here is not a historical one. However, the Drohobych massacre is an episode not examined in traditional electoral scholarship but one that offers a very modern paradox. It posits the question of what makes people vote while incurring high costs when there are, apparently, small tangible gains?

Expressive voting has been offered as a solution to this question, though it is hard to exactly pin down what it is: what constitutes Judson's aforementioned "immense cultural and social significance"? How does it relate to the modern, economics-originating

narrative of individuals as self-interested maximizers? And equally important, how can we operationalize expressive behavior in scholarly work and measure it?

In this thesis, I offer an exploratory roadmap of the study of expressive behavior. For this reason, it is necessary to highlight the historical development of the concept. I also draw from other sub-disciplines of political science and economics in order to reduce the policentrality of the concept. In the end, I propose an operationalization and a survey instrument with which to measure expressive behavior. As it stands today, the study of expressive is fractured and tends to thread out in diverging directions. Hopefully, this thesis answers more questions than it poses.

Chapter 2

The Logic of Expressive Voting

We wish to find the mathematically complete principles which define "rational behavior" for the participants in a social economy...

— John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern

In the introduction I have set out the general principles under which I will write this thesis, though I have done little to elucidate on the actual subject matter. In this chapter I will unfold the theory behind the paradox of voting. I will dive into said theory and the history behind it, and show how political scientists have hit upon this impasse. By the end of this chapter I will have accomplished two aims: 1. I will have situated this thesis in a theoretical space which serves as an appropriate framework for research into expressive voting; and 2. I will have shown why the theoretical concept of expressive voting is necessary and how it can fit with other concepts in political science, not just as an answer to the paradox of voting, thereby uniting disparate theoretical themes.

2.1 The Paradox of Voting

It is appropriate to start with highlighting the difference between positive political science and normative political science as the paradox of voting has occurred with the adoption of positivist methods of inquiry. In the early 1950's, political science was very much concerned with normative questions about large state systems. As a consequence, the field lacked a common method, or set of methods, and the scope of study was equally stretched. Eisenman writes: "The political sciences are a very fair illustration of the following: as a whole they are sure neither of their methods nor even of their subject matter, but [are] hesitant and groping; and further, taking it all in all, can they really boast of a sufficiently abundant harvest of achievement to resolve doubts about their essential premises?" (1950: 91). Eisenman's statement describes an underwhelming state of affairs yet this state was one that could hardly be doubted. Political scientists scattered in all manner of different theoretical directions in an urgency to give substance to their field (Cook 1950, Klausner and Lidz 1986). Thus, many branches of political science took shape centered around subject matter as diverse as public administration, law, political theory, democratic theory, public opinion and survey research, behavioral and psychological studies etc. In the midst of this Brownian motion, William H. Riker stood out for his work. It seemed as if political science was finally at a turning point and would veer from philosophy to an actual body of work which fully embraced the scientific method as its primary tool for inquiry. Riker's work was deliberate in adopting not just a scientific veneer, but the building of theories from axioms, a procedure akin to natural sciences. The ultimate goal of this fresh method was to provide a unifying framework for the field, one that could accommodate questions about personal choices, collective outcomes, systemic features and phenomena within the realm of politics. A very ambitious task indeed, which is perhaps why Amadae and de Mesquita would write the following about Riker: "[a] visionary and an institution builder

who founded and established the Rochester school of political science" (1992: 270). Though Riker came to be influenced by writers such as John Von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, Duncan Black, Kenneth Arrow or Anthony Downs, it is important to remember that he himself was grounded in the kind of normative political science common in the 1950's. Riker writes: "democracy is self-respect for everybody. With this phrase is all that is and ought to be the democratic ideal ... If self-respect is the democratic good, then all things that prevent its attainment are democratic evils." (1953: 19). Von Neumann's and Morgenstern's epigraph to this chapter is indeed a far cry from what Riker wrote in 1953. The theoretical and personal journey needed to traverse the chasm between the two quotes is indeed a great one. Yet, traverse is what Riker did and deliberately so because his goal was to effectively cultivate a more systematic discipline of political study with all that was supposed to go with it: formalized language, hypothesis testing, axiomatic theorizing, unified methods. This provided the spark for a positivist study of political phenomena.

The contributions of positivist political study are many. The contributions of the Rochester school primarily had to do with spatial modelling of voter preferences, game theory, agenda control, heresthetics, and – perhaps most importantly – a new set of epistemologically important questions (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1992: 283).

It is important to note that the body of work produced by scholars trained in the Rochester school tradition produced questions that helped advance the study of political phenomena in a systematic way: axiomatic hypotheses built upon previous research taking debate further in order to pose an entirely new set of questions. The subfield which this thesis will srutinize is that of voting behavior. Indeed, voting behavior constituted one of the major preoccupations of positivist scholars. Throughout what follows, I will trace the theoretical development of questions within the field of voting behavior and contrast the different approaches to answering them. Ultimately, I will end the chapter with an

explanation on the paradox of voting and how expressive voting is a strong candidate for solving the paradox.

2.2 L'effect Condorcet and Onwards

Similar to the paradox of voting, Condorcet's question with regards to preference cycling followed the same theoretical trajectory. The paradox of preference cycling was a long-standing question for the precursors of the Rochester school. This phenomenon is traced back to the French mathematician Condorcet (Black, 1958). He recognized that, collective decision-making processes can have outcomes where individual preferences do not reflect any clear winner, be it in terms of policy or candidates. In other words, it is possible that a majority decision rule will not deliver a clear winner. This is due to the property of transitivity among individual preferences when ranked against each other. Condorcet showed that preferences were likely to cycle within a group of any three decision makers which have to choose between any three options. An impasse indeed.

Further still, Kenneth Arrow then showed that it was possible to extend this paradox to larger groups of people through what later became known as Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (1951). The criteria for selecting a clear winner among three or more alternatives – a Condorcet winner – is that any one of the options needs to win in a paired race against all other options in all races. Though there are certain assumptions and conditions that come along with the Impossibility Theorem, they do not constitute the focus point of this chapter. Instead, my aim is to take a snapshot of the systematic epistemological progress of Condorcet's paradox, as the concept of expressive behavior is predicated on a similar theoretical scaffolding, parallel to that of preference cycling, highlighted above: growing from a basic question, examining or extending its scope, to then theoretically or empiri-

cally assess its importance, voicing new questions in the meanwhile. Niemi and Weisberg (1968) continued the examination of Condorcet's paradox in exactly this systematic vein. They showed that the importance of the preference cycling rises and falls across different optioned-scenarios and with the number of voters involved. The probability that there is no Condorcet winner rises along with the number of alternatives, given an odd number of voters (1968: 322). And so on, from basic question to systematic investigation.

2.3 The Book of Downs

Kenneth Arrow was a student of Anthony Downs (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1992: 277). It is, therefore, not surprising that he was heavily influenced by Downs' ideas. Yet, there is a distinction to be made with regards to the focus of Arrow's and Downs' works. While Arrow was concerned with large-scale, systemic phenomena and collective choice, Downs' most famous work was focused, on the other hand, on individual rationality and how it played a part in voters' decisions. Ultimately, Downs' goal was also to examine the efficacy of collective decision-making. Yet, his examination aimed at building from the ground up, from a theory of the individual voter's rationality and inferring from that individual behavior in order to comment upon collective choices.

In 1957, Anthony Downs published 'An Economic Theory of Democracy' and from it emanate the basic working premises of the positivist approach to voting. In his work, Downs argues that voters act rationally when making political choices. More specifically, government connects its policy propositions and policy stances to how it thinks citizens will vote. It follows that rational individuals will cast their votes for the party which they think will provide them with the most benefits in the future (1957: 36). Downs defines benefits as streams of utility derived from government activity. These benefit flows or streams are the

ratio of utility unit per time unit. In other words, in being rational there is a "conscious" (Riker, 1963: 11) choice to maximize benefit streams from government activity. From this emerges a discounted formal representation that encapsulates the rationality of voters:

$$E(U^A_{t+1}) - E(U^B_{t+1}) \quad (fig.\ 1.1)$$

where "A" is the incumbent, "B" is the opposition candidate while "t+1" is the future election. Downs postulates an adjustment factor which allows for ad-hoc changes in government positions to factor into the utility discount equation. In situations where both parties promise to or enact the same policies voters fail to discount between benefit flows:

$$E(U^A_t) - E(U^B_t) = 0 \quad (fig.\ 1.2)$$

where the utility from incumbent "A" is equal to the expected utility from the opposition "B" the voter uses a performance rating model:

$$\frac{U^B_t}{U^A_t} \quad (fig.\ 1.3)$$

where the numerator is the hypothetical utility to be gained from the opposition per real utility point provided by the incumbent. These rules are enough to cover the full spectrum of possible choices for election situations. To come back to the words of von Neumann and Morgenstern, these rules apparently constitute the "complete principles" of rational voter behavior.

It is important to note that, while possibly antiquated now, these simple choice rules really were regarded as all-encapsulating of the way in which voters behave. They were enough. For that reason, they do not constitute a strawman but a pivotal argument which allows for a closer examination of voter rationality and, implicitly, for validating the

scaffolding of this thesis. The reason behind making this step is that, while Downs concedes that his choice rules constitute an idealized version of voter rationality and that, in reality, the voter can only "make estimates" and not maximally discounted judgements with respect to utility flows, he also makes this crucial statement: "nevertheless, we are interested in elections solely as a means of selecting governments" (1957: 48). This is most intriguing as Downs affirms that the function of elections is the formation of governments and that, barring institutional factors, the crucial variable is voter rationality and, in Downs' vision, ipso facto, correlated voter behavior. This is however problematic. In this thesis, the main theoretical thrust of my argument is that voters do not regard elections simply as a way to choose governments. Indeed, they view elections with a myriad of other lens – other than the Downsian functional lens – and remain rational in the classical – Rochesterian! – sense at the same time. In other words, while voters are rational with respect to expected benefits, I argue that we are wrong to assume that individuals locate the source of benefit flows in government activity alone. Indeed, as we shall see, it is possible for some voters to not locate the benefits of voting in government activity at all, but rather in the very act of voting itself.

2.4 Homo Oeconomicus, Homo Politicus

In assuming that voters derive utility from other sources outside policy-originating ones, I argue that the Downsian view that elections are purely functional is to be challenged. Other approaches, therefore, can prove meritorious when examined.

To this end, William Riker and Peter Ordeshook (1968) provide a reinterpretation of the formal proof of voter rationality. The opportunity to do so is provided by the notion that there is a paradox of voting whereby, taking into account classic rationality

assumptions, voters should not ordinarily find it useful to vote. Riker and Ordeshook write that "much recent theorizing about the utility of voting concludes that voting is an irrational act" (1968: 25). No good paradox should go untheorized about. As such, they begin to argue that, starting from the simple Downsian choice rules - labeled above from (1) through to (3) - the voter benefit equation can be rewritten in a simpler form such as:

$$R = PB - C \quad (fig.\ 1.4)$$

Where "R" represents the expected benefits stream derived from government policy that a voter expects to get from casting her vote and "C" represents the costs – defined by Riker and Ordeshook as time spent on deciding how to vote but which could be expanded towards other resources as well. Equation (4) is a formalization of the expected utility hypothesis. Riker and Ordeshook rightly point out that it is incomplete. They rightly observe that some groups of voters, in specific circumstances, choose to vote while others do not. That is, for some groups the benefits outweigh the costs – $R > C$ – whatever the magnitude of the costs, C, while for others the costs will always outweigh the benefits – $R < C$ – cetteris paribus and, consequently, 'any theory of the utility of voting must reflect and explain this difference' (1968: 26). As a result of this paradox, a solution is brought to the fore:

$$R = PB–C + D \quad (fig.\ 1.5)$$

The equation above is crucial because it signals a break with a scholarly tradition dating back to the early positivist authors who insisted on the discovery of the complete and empirically tested of mathematical rules of social phenomena, such as von Neumann and Morgenstern. Some of these authors have been mentioned in the first part of this chapter and I will not go into further details as an exhaustive analysis of the historical influence of these earlier scholars on American political science is outside of the scope of this text.

Instead, I will again refer the reader to this chapter's epigraph to catch a glimpse of the – fascinating – inner workings and ambitions of the above-mentioned scholars. Having said that, the "D" term is Riker's and Ordeshook's continued insistence on the fact that political individual political decisions are rather more "deliberate", less intransigent than economic decisions. The acknowledgement of the existence of benefit streams outside of Downsian decision rules – outside of $PB - C > R$ or of $PB - C < R$ – opens the door to a minute examination of the differences between homo oeconomicus and homo politicus.

Riker and Ordeshook draw a preliminary distinction between individuals as maximizers and individuals as approximate estimators (1968: 30) - one can almost hear the word "naïve" placed before "maximizer". While reexamining Downs' discounted benefit stream equation they observe that:

$$q(U_{t+1}^1 - C) + (1 - q)(U_{t+1}^2 - C) \quad (fig.\ 1.6)$$

where "q" is the estimate of being the pivotal voter. "P" then is clearly the discounted equation between the possibility of being the pivotal voter by the possibility of not being the pivotal voter (q'):

$$P = q - q' \quad (fig.\ 1.7)$$

Equation (7) chimes very well indeed with other theoretical hunches. Hebert Simon commented on the non-ideal capacity of individuals to maximize or locate benefits stream sources eleven years prior to Rikers and Ordeshook: "The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world – or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality" (1957: 198). This diminished capacity for problem solving is what is known as "bounded rationality" and forms the theoretical core of the individual as a "satisficer" (Simon, 1959: 263). Saturation plays

a big role in Simon's "satisficer" concept. Individuals misidentify the endpoint to a choice problem because of their drive for utility. Essentially, Simon says that individuals may fail to correctly identify the scope of a choice problem and mistake it for obtaining their own personal utility at which point efforts toward solving the problem cease due to the fact that the threshold for utility saturation had been reached. Thus, individuals fail to exogenously maximize but instead achieve a state of endogenous utility saturation.

The effects of utility saturation show us that there is a mismatch between exogenous, ideal states and endogenous, non-ideal states where individuals fail to maximize. The debate is thus firmly in the area of psychological research disciplines. Perhaps, Riker and Ordeshook did not wish to go as far and preferred to only nod towards psychological phenomena, especially since a debate on psychological "saturation" would have seemed to be specious given the state of empirical research at the time. In doing so, they merely alluded to situations where the "D" term from equation (5) might be triggered by attributing qualitative features to said term. Perhaps if a citizen is socialized he receives satisfaction from 'compliance with the ethic of voting'. Or perhaps people can receive satisfaction from 'affirming a partisan preference' or from 'affirming [their] allegiance to the political system' (1968: 28). The list goes on. Yet, we cannot conclude that the instrumental gains – PB-C – of (5) do not play a role in individual decision rules. To see how and why instrumental considerations play a role in individuals' decision-making process, and ultimately why expressive and instrumental gains are different, we must dive deeper into the nature of individual decision-making.

2.5 The Two-Hats Thesis

Running through a list of possible "expressive" – as opposed to "instrumental" – benefit streams is an exercise prone to fallacy. Therefore, the name of the game becomes to attempt to find a commonality between them. In allowing for the necessary space for expressive returns, we do two things: 1. That benefit streams are not sourced just from government policy; and 2. That elections are not restricted in the Downsian sense of having one function: that of electing a government or deciding a policy, that is, as far as individual voters are concerned. Instead, because benefit streams have different sources outside of government so too elections have different functions. Again, it is vital to reemphasize the fact that I do not refer to election function from an institutional perspective – i.e. the legal effects of elections – but rather as a variable in the voter decision rule.

Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky provide us with an exhaustive descriptive account of the theoretical scaffolding of voting motivated by expressive returns. In order to avoid a post-Condorcet paradox of voting – another one – they reconcile empirical observations with a positivist approach to voting by making the distinction between rationality in economics and rationality in politics starkly clear. After all, positivists cannot be thought of as 'pirates on economic waters, stealing concepts at their fancy' (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1992: 290). Consequently, Brennan and Lomasky develop their two-hats theory about individuals by comparing behavioral consequences within market and political contexts.

Paul Samuelson's work on preference revelation sits at the heart of the 'two-hats' theory, the latter being an essentially comparative exercise of this dynamic but within two different contexts. Preference revelation occurs when a consumer has to choose between a number of different products and, based on the information she possesses, ranks and chooses

one product. In the process of doing so, it is said that this person has revealed her preference for the product that she has chosen. In other words, within the marketplace, there is no disconnect between preference and behavior (Samuelson, 1948, 1955). Yet, it must be observed that part of the reason for this insular relationship is that the individual's choice is decisive. Though this discussion is beyond the scope of this text, it is worth mentioning that the decisiveness feature of individual choices is challenged even by economists through arguing that, if the spectrum of choices increases, then it is hard to believe that the game will not be repeated because, ultimately, self-interested individuals want to maximize – or satisfice – and need a great deal of information to achieve their goals, and will repeat the choice setting to gather more information (Houthakker 1950, Richter 1966). More so, even Samuelson himself hints at the lack of decisiveness being a problem with revealed preferences outside the marketplace by pointing towards an unregulated incentive structure in the absence of pricing mechanisms: "there is still this fundamental technical difference going at the heart of the whole problem of social economy: by departing from his indoctrinated rules, any one person can hope to snatch some selfish benefit in a way not possible under self-policing competitive pricing of private goods; and the external economies or jointness of demand intrinsic to the very concept of collective goods and governmental activities makes it impossible for the grand ensemble of optimizing rules to have that special pattern of zeros which makes laissez-faire competition even theoretically possible as an analogue computer."(Samuelson, 1954: 389). To further contextualize, it has to be said that the onus of Samuelson's statement falls on how the rational individuals which administer public expenditure economies seldom resist the temptations to abuse their station. It is interesting to see how even Samuelson acknowledges that the differences within public and private systems enable rational individuals to predictably find different behavioral solutions, sometimes leading to paradoxical behavioral patterns. Hence, Brennan's and Lomasky's "two-hat" thesis term (1993: 15).

Brennan and Lomasky, having established that revealed preferences in the marketplace hold sway amongst researchers, argue that revealed preferences do not have the same normative authority in non-market situations, the reason being that individual choice is not decisive within an election setting. Recall equation (7): 'P' – the probability that one's preferred candidate will win – is usually too small to realistically incentivize people to vote, which means that the probability of being the pivotal voter (q) is smaller than the probability of not being decisive (q') and voters can predictably estimate these two parameters. A small side note: Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) argue that 'P' is not in fact small but rather that it motivates voters to come out and vote even in large-scale elections. However, it is my view that their argumentation, thought compelling, is unfortunately a strawman argument. They begin by assuming that 'PB' is zero and counter this by observing that D-C is then supposed to be near constant, consequently. They opine that variation in turnout in different elections of large scale, proves with sufficient empirical authority that D net of costs is not constant. They finally write that "the conclusion from these simple models is not a true paradox, it is a logical fallacy" (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983: 10). Yet, as I have outlined above, the effects of 'P' are evident in small scale elections. In other words, there is a directly proportional relationship between the role 'P' plays in equation (5) and vote decisiveness. I put it that the burden of proof is on those who wish to say that 'P' only has a role in large-scale elections and that there is no role it can play in small elections. Why the difference? Because the Palfrey's and Rosenthal's argument comes back to, in the end, vote decisiveness. In the case of small voting bodies, it can be argued that 'P' can effectively incentivize body members' turnout simply because these voters know their vote stands a realistic chance to be pivotal, to be decisive. Therefore, the argument stands that 'P"s role is diminished as the body of voters grows. The causal mechanism which explains why 'P' incetivizes turnout to different degrees depending on different election scales is vote decisiveness.

Let us examine the consequences of the 'two hats' theory. Having potentially established a credible role for 'P' in equation (5), it is time to see how Brennan and Lomasky dispense of their burden of proof: that of arguing against "behavioral uniformity" (1993: 12) – the concept that voters display the same behavioral patterns across institutional settings – while maintaining the concept of "motivational neutrality" intact – a consequence of the concept of rationality. Behavioral uniformity seems to carry through the flag of those who argue that positivist political science suffers from "economic imperialism", the idea that positivist political science simply borrows the rationality concept from economics and applies it to other topics in politics like voting, coalition building, public spending, and so on. Brennan and Lomasky themselves seem to suggest that within public choice studies operationalizing the concept of homo economicus while answering politics-themed research questions is a recurrent method of inquiry, a situation from which – they argue – political scientists have to retreat. The reason for this is that homo economicus seems to violate the 'rules' of rationality in political settings, thus apparently ending the implication that rational behavior has a "behavioral uniformity" attribute. I have stated above that the reason for behavioral variation across institutional settings is that large-scale elections provide a low chance for any one individual to be decisive. For Brennan and Lomasky, the consequence of low voting decisiveness is clear: "the strict one-to-one logical connection between preference and behavior, characteristic of market choice, is severed at the ballot box" (1993: 21). Rational behavioral variation across institutional settings provides the first axiom from which a theory of expressive returns is derived, assuming motivational neutrality across institutional systems:

Assumption 1: the connection between preference and outcome is not strict in large-scale elections.

Any theoretical account of voting behavior has to reconcile empirical observations

with derived implications. Political scientists have been able to observe a panoply of voter behavioral patterns. For example, voters turn out in some elections more than in others, effectively distinguishing between election types (Heath et al, 1999; Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 2004; Soderlund, Wass, and Blais, 2011). There is statistical evidence to show that patterns emerge with regards to how campaigns are run with voters responding differently to different methods of campaigning (Gerber and Green, 2000; Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008). Collective behavioral patterns, in turn, have macro-level consequences which are, at first glance, surprising. Incumbency effects (Erikson 1971; Gelman and King, 1991; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997) appear to be a paradox which cannot be explained while maintaining the assumption of rationality. Surely if voters are policy demanders – more specifically demanders of benefit flows from public policy – they should be responsive towards prior performance of candidates, meaning on average, incumbency effects should not exist. These findings, as well as others, should help us understand that the expected returns vary across voters, depending on the circumstance. Macro-level effects are averages of these expected returns functions, therefore we must conclude that the same cost function from equation (5) has different results because variables take on different values, depending on the context while the model – equation (5) – remains the same. Therefore, assuming motivational neutrality across institutional systems, we get a second assumption:

Assumption 2: individual voters benefit, on average, differently from participating in elections.

The above statement seems to be a truism. Let me explain why it is not. Arguably, voters receive a flow of benefits throughout the campaign from participating or consuming political events. This also extends to a post-election time span where voters might get the same type of benefits plus the instrumentally induced benefits: those who have voted for the winning candidate, or the winning policies, get to derive benefits from said executive

effects which are par for the course. However, let us concentrate on the pre-election benefits. Time-indexed benefits during political campaigns come from preference revelation. That is, they do not imply some net causation from executive benefits derived from government policies, but rather they are intrinsic to the act of voting specifically or to that of responding to expressive incentives generally (Schuessler, 2000: 60-61). Equally, Brennan and Lomasky contend that for some voters, preference revelation has intrinsic benefits which is why authors writing on this topic have dubbed these returns expressive (1993: 36).

Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that non-instrumental returns are present throughout and do the 'heavy-lifting' during large-scale elections. To take the point further, let us recall 'D' from equation (5) and unpack it. If we argue that expressive consumption is different among individual voters then we can assume that net expressive benefits peak at different moments during the election. Thus, let us assume that at a moment 'ti' we register benefits that occur during the election campaign and a certain period prior to the consumption of instrumental benefits which occurs at 'tj'. This means that the formula for time indexed net expressive benefits can be written like this:

$$D = \frac{B_{ti} - B_{tj}}{\sigma(Cr)} \quad (fig.\ 1.8)$$

Where 'B' are the benefits occurring for a single voter and 'Cr' is the consumption rate of individual voters. In other words, equation (8) is a model which assesses how well an individual voter is compensated per peak consumption rate in terms of net expressive benefits. This is a theoretical model which results from the two assumptions enunciated above. It is a way of thinking about the effects of expressive returns but it is not and should not be considered the only way to think about the issue of expressive returns effects. It is also vital to think of expressive returns effects in this way so as to further examine the effects of opinion heterogeneity, which I will discuss in the next chapter. To conclude with,

the two-hats thesis derives naturally from assumptions (1) and (2). That is, motivational neutrality or uniformity can – at least for now – stand while the concept of behavioral uniformity across market and political institutional settings needs to be reassessed. This is not to say that the concept of homo economicus should be thrown out the window, but rather that we should admit to its limits outside of market settings and adjust our theoretical operationalization of the concept accordingly.

Concluding this first chapter, I will address theoretical challenges to the model of expressive benefits.

2.6 Theoretical Challenges to the Expressive Benefits Model

In this part, I will offer some answers to criticism put forward against the idea of expressive behavior. Beforehand, note that in no way do the answers put forward here constitute definitive or concluding statements to the debates concerning expressive behavior. Also, note that I have already showcased my substantive position on expressive voting and its philosophical underpinnings. The following section should be viewed as an attempt to deal with some of the more salient ramifications of my position.

John Barry (1970) raises the question that, if expressive incentives do most of the 'heavy-lifting' in determining turnout, then why is it necessary to include instrumental elements in the rational voter model? In Barry's view, voting is a completely non-instrumental act. John Aldrich (1993: 275) answered this critique by saying that expressive incentives, whether they denote tastes, values or anything else, are also relevant to the strategic behavior of politicians who vie for votes. In other words, turnout is a function of the voter behavior that is responding, in part, to campaign messages from the politicians. These messages include appeals to both instrumental – programmatic – incentives as well as to

expressive incentives. Viewing turnout as a purely expressive or non-instrumental eliminates the possibility that party programmatic issues become salient and, therefore, relevant for voter decision rules. Going even further, I would add that viewing the act of voting as an act of either instrumental or expressive determination makes sense only within a classic rationality assumption.

The second criticism comes from Richard Niemi (1976) and John Aldrich (1993) which point out that voting usually happens in low cost, low reward circumstances. More specifically, this is to say that, because voting rewards and costs are small, then one ramification would have to be that small alterations in the magnitude of these variables should not affect turnout. Duffy and Tavits (2008) make a convincing case that individuals do not compute the probability in a linear way which absolves them of a high cost of cognitive resources. Key (1966) reports that most voters have a 'default' voting position set at their partisan leaning and vote otherwise only when given a good reason. Therefore, the reality is evident that voting is a low cost, and possibly, a low reward affair for most voters. Yet, underlying this assumption is the notion that individuals are homogeneous in the amount of resources they expend on the act of voting. John Zaller (1993: 20) had this to say: 'political awareness has strong effects on many aspects of public opinion and voting behavior, but these effects are strongly nonlinear.' If political awareness is a 'marriage of predisposition and opinion', as Zaller (1993: 6) put it, then we must accept that resources – cognitive resources, information resources, time etc. – do constitute a factor in the model. This is not something Aldrich negates. However, the degree to which these resources are spent to the act of voting varies greatly and is not linear. There is no reason why the calculus of voting model should be a linear function. In fact, that would only be so if individuals were monotonistic maximizers when, in fact, I have made the explicit claim that they are not. Research shows that citizens are generally poorly informed about the issues that concern them: Converse (1964), Iyegar (1990), Delli Carpini and Keeter (1990), McGraw and Pin-

ney (1990), Price and Zaller (1990). However, the main lesson here is that individuals vary greatly. The low mean of 'awareness' does not mean that people are homogeneous in their awareness nor does it mean that they don't vary greatly, individually, given enough time. In fact, as I have pointed out, research shows otherwise. Again, 'there is high variance in political awareness around a very low political mean.' (Zaller, 1993: 18). All of this is to say that the average 'debit' of information involved might be low but individual variance of information intake can be in some cases very high. Thus, small changes in the variance of costs and benefits of an election are not effective simply because they either 'preach to the choir' or are not salient enough to be effective. However, the present situation does not entail a change in the model. Overall, it feels that this is a critique that misses to 'bullseye' of the idea of the calculus of voting, though at first it appears to be hard to argue against.

To conclude this chapter, I want to summarize by stating that the ontological niche for expressive behavior is, hopefully, clear. I have stated empirical evidence to support this, while putting together some of the theoretical background necessary to clarify the concept. Expressive behavior, conceptually, is ripe for criticism. Indeed, this thesis can be viewed as an attempt to get over the critique of it being too lose or too elastic. In my next chapter, I will elaborate on the on how we can measure expressive behavior by introducing the concepts of opinion heterogeneity and homogeneity. In chapter 2, I will expand on the empirical findings related to expressive behavior. I will focus on some of the most interesting attempts at measuring expressive behavior and will elaborate on the broad methodological implications.

Chapter 3

The Kaleidoscope of Motivation

Butter on the head is symbolic in so far as it is compared to butter as ordinarily consumed
— Daniel Sperber

In the first chapter, I have shown how the theory on expressive behavior has evolved. There have been a multitude of disciplinary tracks that examine expressive behavior. Indeed, this is perhaps a consequence of the concept of expressive behavior's reactionary nature to the paradox of voting. Researchers have hypothesized a myriad of effects and have set about examining them. It could, perhaps, be no different when attempting to resolve a crucial paradox in one's theoretical framework. Not surprisingly, examining the empirical work linked with expressive behavior is a bit like looking through a kaleidoscope: researchers all look for the same object, yet they have different points of focus resulting in a polycentral study of expressive behavior. In this chapter, I will examine some of the empirical work linked with expressive behavior. The outcome of this exercise should be to persuade the reader of the congruence between the evolution of the theory and that of the empirical work,

but also of the heterogeneous ideas still located within the subfield of expressive behavior.

While there are multiple strains of research asserting that expressive behavior is of one nature or another, I will narrow the scope of research to the two most frequent types of expressive research: identity based expressive behavior and expressive behavior linked to the dynamics of social settings. The latter of the two has taken many forms but it essentially focuses on the relationship between instrumental goals and expressive goals and avoids ascribing a specific nature to the concept of expressive behavior. Finally, I will argue for taking the social view of expressive behavior by virtue of my initially stated goal: to make the theory of expressive voting less ad-hoc.

3.1 Short Notes on Empirical Studies of Expressive Behavior

Empirical work on expressive behavior has been conducted mostly through social experiments and often involves constructing social mechanisms whereby the probability of decisiveness is varied. One of the earliest examples of experimental work on expressive behavior has been that of Carter and Guerette (1992). Their experimental design involved facing participants with the choice to either have an amount of money donated in their names or to keep for themselves a different amount of money. The probability of vote decisiveness was varied thus effectively increasing or decreasing the instrumental returns that might be had – the PB term (recall figure 5 from chapter 1). The hypothesis was that, as the probability of being decisive went down, and with it the probability of gaining instrumental rewards, participants would still express their preference for having the sum of money donated anonymously. The results of the experiment provide, at best, weak evidence supporting the hypothesis (1992: 257). However, there are a few confounding factors present. After the experiment was over, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire.

One item asked them to account for why they voted the way they did. Of those who opted to keep the cash, three-fifths reasoned that they did so because the possibility of direct donation was missing. It is therefore clear that had there been an expressive effect for these respondents the design made it impossible for researchers to pick up on it. Another possible confounding factor was the small sample size: 64 respondents in total. While this number is adequate, this sample was further stratified to a point where only handfuls of respondents account for each category of treatment. Additionally, design made so there was an implicit third option: because of the lack of possibility to directly donate to charity themselves, it can be argued that participants were perhaps motivated by the possibility of donating the experiment cash to charity themselves. If this is true, then the appeal of the expressive option was undercut by the flawed instrumental option which was interpreted, in fact, as an expressive action, thus biasing numbers in both categories. Finally, because there was a cash difference between what respondents would receive and what respondents would have donated, there exists the possibility that the design further biases the respondents in favor of opting to keep the cash. This is due to the possibility of being able to split the larger amount between themselves and the donation recipient.

Responding to Carter's and Guerette's work, Fischer (1996) conducted an experiment on expressive voting while improving on their design. The initial sample was increased to 107 undergraduate, economics students, with each voting 8 times. The sum was increased to 200 dollars so as to offset the 'low cost, low reward' trap (recall Niemi: 1976 and Aldrich: 1993 from chapter 1). Additionally, one student is chosen at random and they act as a mechanism through which Fischer is able to vary the probability of other students being decisive. This design offset the flaws in Carter's and Guerette's experiment, but it also transformed the experiment into a partial dictator game the consequences of which will be discussed further in this chapter. For now, I will take the results of Fischer's experiments at face value: evidence provided by the experiment clearly supports the hypothesis

of expressive behavior effects (1996: 177).

Note how both experiments focus exclusively on the relationship between vote decisiveness and preference. In neither Carter's and Guerette's nor in Fischer's designs is there a value placed on the expressive option. Instead, it is taken at face value as the expressive value. The failure to properly consider the nature of the expressive option is the source of experimental misdesign and of much of the theoretical debate surrounding expressive behavior. As we peel back layers, the conceptual basis of expressive behavior should become more parsimoniously defined. Hamlin and Jennings (2011) distinguish between identity motivation, social motivations, and moral motivation within a larger concept of expressive behavior. This alludes to the conceptual elasticity of expressive. In their concluding remarks, Hamlin and Jennings have this to say: 'the broad range of substantive ideas that may be relevant within the category of the expressive may, at first sight, seem to restrict the value of the expressive insight there can be no easy argument that expressive behavior is always of a particular type, or always carries a particular normative implication. But closer consideration recognizes that the variety of ideas within the expressive domain is no more problematic than the variety of preferences in the instrumental domain. What is important is that the heterogeneity of expressive consideration, as well as the heterogeneity of more instrumental interests, is reflected in our political and institutional analysis at an appropriate level of granularity.' (2011: 32). While I am in complete accord with this statement, I pose the question: what can be done if one wishes to diminish this kaleidoscope effect of expressive behavior theory? What tools does one have at their disposal?

Hillman (2010) describes expressive behavior when 'people behave rationally in seeking expressive utility from acts or decisions that substantiate or confirm personal identity' (2010: 403). Recall the 'two-hats thesis' from chapter 1. It assumed that people behaved rationally but simply managed to locate utility elsewhere than in achieving in-

strumental goals. Hillman's description of expressive behavior is in line with the 'two-hat thesis'. Yet, in one crucial aspect, it departs from it: Hillman attributes the totality of expressive effects to the domain of identity. That is, expressive utility is ascribed to those actions which individuals pursue in accordance to whom they feel they are. While this restricts the kaleidoscope phenomenon of expressive theory and is therefore useful in making the concept appear less ad-hoc, is there empirical evidence for such a claim?

Klor and Shayo (2010) examine the effects of social identities on preferences over redistribution. They argue that an individual identifies with a social group if the individual cares not only about their own interest but also about the status of that group (2010: 270). Therefore, their design is aimed at testing whether group membership has any effect over individual preference in the context of social redistribution. The experiment comprised a sample of 180 undergraduate students from the faculties of social science and of humanities. The design divides the students into groups based on their preference over income distributions. Students in the treatment group are told that there are other groups involved in the experiment with different preferences over distribution. The students in the control group, on the other hand, are not told about this fact. Each group is randomly assigned an income distribution and gets to vote between different income redistribution schemes, effectively revealing their expressive preference. The results show that the groups in the treatment group have a higher probability to vote according to group allegiance than those groups in the control group (2010: 274-276). Interpreting results, the authors see a strong expressive effect when participants are incentivized to take into account their social identity rather than when they are not. In short, if the institutional incentive is there for people to vote expressively, then people will take expressive considerations into account along with instrumental considerations (2010: 277).

Constructing a similar setting, Jean-Robert Tyran (2004) examines individual pref-

erences over redistribution. The participants were recruited from among undergraduate students from the University of St. Gallen and from the University of Innsbruck. In all, there were two hundred and twenty participants that took part in the experiment. The participants were endowed with a sum of money which they could either keep or choose to donate. This choice was operationalized via proposals on which participants voted. For the proposals to pass, they needed to exceed a necessary quorum or approval rate. The participants in the experiment could choose between two different voting rules: 1. According to the first rule, all participants have to donate their endowment; 2. While in the second voting rule, only those participants who approved of the donation proposal can donate their endowment. The rest get to keep their endowment. Across all voting scenarios, Tyran finds that voters consistently exhibit a tendency to vote as they expect others to vote (2004: 1658). In other words, Tyran's experimental participants exhibit behavior consistent with what the expressive hypothesis predicts but more specifically, his participants behave in such a way as to suggest that they are subject to bandwagon effects. Again, experimental findings suggest behavior inconsistent with instrumental behavior hypotheses leading researchers to conclude that expressive behavior is a better explanation for their results. Yet, the kaleidoscope effect is present with the origin of expressive behavior being different.

Much in the same vein, Shayo and Harel (2012) conduct an experiment where the probability of being the pivotal voter is exogenously varied so as to show whether or not expressive motivations might be at work. The participants are recruited from among students from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2009, totaling three hundred and sixty. The participants are then divided into two roles: two random students are assigned the role of observers while sixteen are regular participants, thus making a total of eighteen participants per session. Each group is endowed with a sum of about fifty dollars and has to then decide how to divide this sum amongst themselves. The distribution rule is decided through a voting system whereby the group is allotted a fixed number of ballots.

The experimental treatment varies in that the total number of ballots assigned to a group varies and how the ballots are distributed among group member varies as well. By varying ballots in this way, the probability of being the pivotal voter is varied from session to session and so expressive effects should come into play. Each participant takes part in only one such session except for the observer who takes part in four sessions. Participants do not interact amongst each other and they do not know what roles the other in their groups play. Participants have to choose from amongst two distribution rules: 1. The first rule describes a distribution whereby each member of the group is distributed an equal amount of the cash to what all other members get; 2. The second rule describes a system where an individual member may receive seventy percent of the cash while the rest of the group is distributed with thirty percent. The observers choose from amongst these two possibilities and they participate in all of their four sessions in their group. The number of ballots that an observer gets is different to what a regular participant gets and, consequently, in three out of four scenarios observers act as a counter weight to decisions taken by regular observers. Results show that variation in the probability of being the pivotal voter does have an effect on voter preference – not turnout (2012: 310). However, Shayo and Harel do not name the type of expressive motivation at play. Instead, they suggest future research be conducted to distinguish between various types of expressive motivation.

The experiments above should not be viewed as forming an exhaustive list of empirical examples on expressive behavior but rather as a list of examples of where the debate is at the moment. The resulting survey of the field brings to bare two categories: research based around identity-based group behavior; and research based around bandwagon effects. In the next part of the chapter, I will examine in greater detail the theoretical underpinnings of bandwagon effects. The outcome of this exercise will be to narrow down the possible avenues of description of the origin of expressive behavior and dilute the kaleidoscope effect within the study of expressive behavior. To further strengthen the bandwagon argument, I

will provide empirical examples throughout.

3.2 Towards a Diminished Polycentrality

Recall that in the previous section I have asked the question of how to reduce the polycentric study – or reduce the kaleidoscope effect – of expressive behavior to a more focused area of study. The mechanism I employ in this paper is that of working with those approaches which make the fewest assumptions while retaining internal consistency across a heterogeneous range of empirical settings. During the first chapter of this thesis I engaged with Brennan's and Lomasky's two-hat thesis of expressive behavior (see Chapter 1, pages 11 through 16). Although in the background, the discussion on the two-hat thesis rests on the principle of making minimal assumptions. It is only consistent to – at least at first – pursue theoretical models of human behavior which make minimal assumptions while illuminating previously nebulous or paradoxical circumstances. For this reason, I will, in this thesis, discard that empirical work focused on identity-based research and focus, instead, on approaches that place no a priori demands on behavioral outcomes versus preferences. Thus, I will look at expressive effects on behavior within the context of voting, while maintaining the analogous discussion on the market context in the background. I have made the conceptual choices outlined above in an attempt to soften the blow of the perennial critique to the study of expressive behavior: "most so-called tests of expressive voting are bedeviled by lack of clarity in what is being tested" (Greene and Nelson, 2002: 425).

It seems clear that voting decisions are, to a certain extent, influenced by our environment (Huckfeldt: 1986, 2007). Early theoretical work on the group effects on individual behavior was conceptualized with an emphasis on market settings (see for example Morgen-

stern: 1948, Liebstein: 1950). This strain of what would later be generically encompassed into Veblenian economics – though erroneously so – motivated voting behavior scholars to ask questions about collective behavior effects on individual behavior early on (Zech: 1975). Indeed, though the studies on voting behavior conducted by Lazarsfeld et. al (1944) set out to demonstrate the effects of mass media on voting behavior, they also discovered that the group to which an individual belonged provided a sort of 'cross pressure' which kept individual preferences stable.

Evidence for the effects of collective behavior on individual behavior has been steadily coming in over the years. Starting with the 1980s, there exists evidence that the context surrounding individual voters has a non-negligible effect on individual political decisions in a myriad of ways. For example, we now know that mobilization effects on political participation are strongest within networks of acquaintances (Rosenstone and Hansen: 1993, Verba et al.: 1995). Diving deeper and arriving at an even more granular level, we can point to evidence distinguishing between general contexts in relation to individuals and the immediate informational networks that they construct and the distinct, resulting effects of the two on settings (see Huckfeldt and Sprague: 1987, Huckefeldt et al.: 1995). This body of work directly emphasizes the important consequences that contextual factors have on political attitudes, behavior, and preferences. Corroborating evidence from literature not focused on voting behavior but on political violence, intergenerational studies, and psychological studies supports the claim that individual political identity, attitude, and behavior can be shaped by contextual factors and that these relationships are transmitted further through the environment in which individuals are embedded (Bernard: 1994; Wood:2006; Hobfoll, Cannetti-Nisim, and Johnson: 2006; Lupu and Peisakhin: 2017). In light of this evidence, it is fitting to ask questions with regards to the nature of political environments and how they affect individual political behavior, attitudes, identities. In this paper, I focus on the effects of homogeneous versus heterogeneous political environments on political

behavior.

The effects of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of social environments on individual behavior is understudied but evidence is slowly coming in, allowing us to form theoretical expectations. For example, a more homogeneous environment allows for greater political cleavages and reduces voting volatility by strengthening voter allegiance (Bartolini and Mair: 1990). The claim of greater political polarization within more homogeneous social environments is further strengthened by Huckfeldt (2004), while the corollary is shown by Mutz (2006) by illustrating how exposure to politically-opposed discussants increases individual tolerance for diverse political opinions. Empirical work on the effects of environmental homogeneity has been conducted both on voters in the United States – as illustrated above – as well as on voters outside of the United States, namely in Spain (Morales: 2010). This last note is important as various social contexts have been shown to be systemically more diverse or more homogeneous (see the discussion Morales, 2010: 204-206).

3.3 Scope and Hypotheses

What is expressive voting? It is traditional to begin by saying what it is not and to that effect, I have gone into detail in chapter one. Indeed, it is useful to think of expressive and instrumental voting as two dimensions of the voting act occurring at once.

To reconcile empirical evidence with rational choice theory, expressive choice must explain what constitutes the impetus to vote while, at the same time, not altering the logic of the theory of rational choice. Therefore, the main challenge of expressive choice theory is to explain turnout while arguing that it is, in fact, rational to vote even though there is only a marginal chance for any one voter to be pivotal, implicit being the fact that the voter's preferred candidate winning is the reward.

Morales found that an increased political homogeneity of discussant networks serves to mobilize voter networks (2010: 216-217). The conclusion leads us to believe that if there is a high homogeneity of information within discussant networks, then individuals are more likely to vote. I propose to take this investigation a step further and see whether the correlation between discussant network homogeneity and higher turnout is spurious or not. Therefore, I ask the following question: are voters with an increased degree homogeneity in their opinions more likely to vote? Having discussed the theory and some of the empirical investigation – though not nearly all – we can form the following expectations:

Hypothesis 1: a high degree of homogeneity among voter opinions with respect to political options at the ballot box will correlate with a high turnout.

Hypothesis 2: a high degree of heterogeneity among voter opinions with respect to political options at the ballot box will correlate with a low turnout..

Null Hypothesis: a high degree of homogeneity among voter opinions with respect to political options at the ballot box will not correlate with a high turnout.

The added value of this investigation is three-fold. Firstly, because opinions can be regarded as vehicles for the influence of a myriad of effects, they are a more contiguous link in the causal chain between system-wide effects and individual behavior. In other words, because opinions are a result of intermediary environments – but, crucially, not only of intermediary environments – they aptly constitute the focus of expressive choice studies, if we regard expressive choice as having two components: a more fixed, instrumental impetus to vote, coupled with a more flexible, expressive component. Secondly, there have been limited attempts to operationalize expressive behavior and measure it with a survey instrument. Fieldhouse (2018) develops an instrument for measuring expressive behavior

based on the self-declared strength of voter attachment to different options in the survey. He then conducts an online experiment to test the instrument and finds that the instrument is at least partially valid, across different settings (Fieldhouse, 2018: 17-18). Nevertheless, as I will illustrate in the next chapter, I will attempt to construct a survey instrument that assesses expressive behavior which is not based on self-identification. Thirdly, my thesis adds to a small body of research on expressive voting behavior conducted outside of the United States, as the empirical part of this thesis is based on data drawn from the 2016 Romanian parliamentary elections.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore some of the theoretical consequences of the homogeneity and heterogeneity of political opinions between groups of voters by further extending the D term. Figure 8 from the first chapter enunciates the underlying mechanics of expressive voting. It states that, based on the consumption rate by voters of expressive benefits, voters gain varied expressive returns. Thus, there are, hypothetically, peaks and saturation points where the D term could amount to zero or one. Assuming that, for any individual voter, expressive benefits are such that:

$$B_{\mathrm{ti}} - B_{\mathrm{tj}} = 0 (fig.\ 2.1)$$

Then, by reductio ad absurdum we have the case where expressive and instrumental benefits in different moments are equal thus giving us the following equation:

$$D = \frac{0}{\sigma(Cr)} \quad (fig.\ 2.2)$$

Thus D, expressive benefits, is equal to 0, which, when plugged into the expressive benefits model gives us:

$$R = PB – C + 0 \quad (fig.\ 2.3)$$

To be clear, figure 2.2 represents a hypothetical point whereby the effects of expressive consumption are cancelled. For a more thorough discussion of how saturation points can hypothetically occur, see Schuessler's discussion in chapters six through eight (2000). Concurrently, figure 2.3 represents the situation whereby a voter can get a positive reward exclusively based on instrumental returns. In this situation, she retains a high chance of being the pivotal voter. Otherwise, and more commonly, we have the following scenario:

$$-R = PB–C + 0 \quad (fig.\ 2.3)$$

There are two observations to be highlighted in figure 9. The first is regarding the consumption rate. Note that the consumption rate is assumed to be a number other than zero. The substantive reasoning behind this is that, during an election campaign, it is unrealistic to rule out both an intentional and a passive consumption of expressive benefits. Thus, a consumption rate can get very close to 0 but never actually reach zero. Mathematically, any expression divided by zero is undefined. The second observation to be highlighted in this scenario is that, based purely on the individual chance to become the pivotal voter, the individual reward for voting is negative which remains consistent with the model of expressive voting.

Does expressive consumption have peaks? It must follow from what I have shown that it does and, mathematically they occur at the points where:

$$B_{\mathrm{ti}} - B_{\mathrm{tj}} = 1$$

And, simultaneously, the consumption rate tends towards zero:

$$\lim_{-\infty \to 1} \sigma(Cr) - 1 = 0 \quad (fig.\ 2.4)$$

Again, the above equation highlights the relationship between expressive returns and their respective consumption rates. From the figure 2.4, we can argue that because the consumption rate is infinitely decreasing, then D can, concurrently, infinitely increase. Substantively, this shows how non-consequentialist voting can override instrumental voting, with the D term potentially dwarfing all other terms in figure 1.5, chapter 1.

A review is in order to summarize the material covered so far. In chapter 1, have briefly covered some of the historical circumstances which led to the adoption of positivist research methods by political scientists. Though the historical picture is by no means exhaustive, it should serve to give the reader some sense of the reasons and ways of the popularity growth of positivist methods in political science. The reason why it is important to start with this historical account is that it is not always clear to what degree shifts in paradigms lead to better questions. The materialization of the paradox of voting seems to be proof that positivist political science has predictably shipwrecked. Yet, the logic behind the rational voter concept coupled with the introduction of expressive behavior should counter this assessment and put to rest accusations of economic theoretic imperialism. Instead, the practice of not throwing the baby out with the bathwater and reconciling empirical observations with new concepts should become a normal scientific practice. In this case, the logic of choice revelation and the assessment of expressive incentives sets the stage for a comprehensive, unified theory of voting behavior, one which does not pettily disregard empirical contradicting empirical observations as vestigial or anachronistic but rather takes firm steps towards discovering causal mechanisms behind collective social phenomena. The policentrality of expressive behavior should not disqualify the concept from investigation. The potential for a formal model to explain voting behavior should be recognized in the 'witch's bubbling cauldron' that is expressive behavior at the moment.

In the next chapter, I will put forward the empirical analysis and discuss my

results. I will first measure opinion homogeneity among Romanian voters based on primary data drawn from a survey conducted prior to the Romanian parliamentary elections in 2016. Then, I will see to what degree the indicator of opinion homogeneity correlates with voter turnout. Additionally, I will test to what degree expressive consumption can be measured. Finally, I will discuss the results. Throughout the chapter, I will explain the political context of the election, the nature of the data, give a description of the statistical method used, and assess to what degree I can reject the null hypothesis.

Chapter 4

Methodology, Data, and Analysis

I want to remind the reader that this thesis has had an exploratory character so far and this chapter makes no exception. Based on the results that I will show and explain below, I will outline avenues for future research and the limitations of the research featured in this thesis. In order to analyze opinion homogeneity and heterogeneity and their effects on voter turnout I chose the method of multidimensional scaling. In this chapter, I will explain how the method works and how I test the hypotheses. I will conceptualize what constitutes evidence and, consequently, whether we can reject the null hypothesis mentioned in the second chapter. Additionally, I will introduce a new survey method for testing for opinion homogeneity and heterogeneity and provide details for the political context from which the survey data was extracted. By the end of the chapter, the reader should be able to understand why the political context warranted the data extraction, how it is substantively relevant and why and how valid the conclusions from the data analysis are.

4.1 Basic Principle of Multidimensional Scaling

The mathematics of multidimensional scaling (MDS) can accommodate a variety of research perspectives (Borg and Groenen: 2005). To this end, MDS can be used to conduct four different types of research: 1. to conduct psychological research which primarily focuses on studying underlying decision mechanisms and their relative weight within the context of decision-making processes; 2. to conduct exploratory studies by isolating associative patterns among well-defined concepts within non-structured datasets; 3. in contrast to exploratory studies where researchers are aided by a theoretical grounding, MDS can also be used to distinguish among theoretical items, thereby uncovering their relative distance. This type of research serves those researchers who cannot make use of theoretic concepts which are defined apriori; 4. Finally, MDS is used to measure similarities or dissimilarities in judgements. It is this final feature of MDS which I will use in this thesis to assess the homogeneity or heterogeneity of public opinion on parties in the runup to the Romanian 2016 parliamentary elections.

Nation		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Brazil	1	–											
Congo	2	4.83	–										
Cuba	3	5.28	4.56	–									
Egypt	4	3.44	5.00	5.17	–								
France	5	4.72	4.00	4.11	4.78	–							
India	6	4.50	4.83	4.00	5.83	3.44	–						
Israel	7	3.83	3.33	3.61	4.67	4.00	4.11	–					
Japan	8	3.50	3.39	2.94	3.83	4.22	4.50	4.83	–				
China	9	2.39	4.00	5.50	4.39	3.67	4.11	3.00	4.17	–			
USSR	10	3.06	3.39	5.44	4.39	5.06	4.50	4.17	4.61	5.72	–		
U.S.A.	11	5.39	2.39	3.17	3.33	5.94	4.28	5.94	6.06	2.56	5.00	–	
Yugoslavia	12	3.17	3.50	5.11	4.28	4.72	4.00	4.44	4.28	5.06	6.67	3.56	–

Figure 4.1: Similarity Matrix.

Though the idea of MDS has been around for a long time (Kruskal and Wish: 1978), researchers have brought improvements to the method (Groenen and Mair: 2013). The basic idea of MDS is that it measures distances between items. By measuring distances and observing the relative closeness of the items, a researcher is able to draw conclusions with respect to the similarity of the items. For example, Wish (1971) asked 18 students to rate the relative similarity of different pairs of nations on a 9 point scale, where 1 means the pair are very different, and 9 means the pair are very similar. What resulted was a matrix of average similarity scores based on the ratings given be students, in figure 3.1 (Borg and Groenen, 2005: 10).

Interpreting the numbers in the matrix, it holds that the higher the number will be for any one pair of countries, the more similar those two countries will be, and the more closely they will be plotted as per figure 3.2 (Borg and Groenen, 2005: 10):



Figure 4.2: Interpretation

Take, for example, the pair of USSR-Yugoslavia. The average similarity score is 6.67, meaning that they are, on average, regarded as very similar the students. Therefore, they are plotted very close to one another.

Another feature of which to take note is constituted by the two dashed lines, superimposed in the figure. The two lines constitute a graphical representation of the theoretical interpretation by Kruskal and Wish (1978). The lines are not an intrinsic feature of MDS, but, rather, an interpretation of the graphical attributes of the figure. The resulting areas in the graph are called facets. A priori theoretic considerations determine the number and position of facets in the graph.

Conceptually, I operationalize homogeneity and heterogeneity of opinions as the varying magnitudes of distances between various data points. To do this, I transform the direct distances measured in survey items into a projected Euclidean distance projected in a flat, low-dimensional space according to the following distance formula:

$$d_{ij}(\mathbf{X}) = \sqrt{(x_{i1} - x_{j1})^2 + (x_{i2} - x_{j2})^2}$$

The formula above is a distance function that helps us compute the distance between any two points 'i' and 'j' in a Cartesian space. Basically, the distance 'd' between points 'i' and 'j' is equal to the straight line segment between the two points. The segment is computed as the Pythagorean theorem for the hypotenuse of a right triangle. There are other types of distance functions as well that can be used in MDS analysis. They can accommodate analyses of data points in curved, multidimensional spaces where a priori theoretic considerations warrant their use. However, such examinations are beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, there two types of data that can be used to conduct an MDS analysis: direct and indirect distances. That is, distances to be analyzed can be directly

collected or derived from other items. The only difference between the two is the number of transformation through which the two types of data go. Transforming data items into Euclidean distances typically requires ad hoc data wrangling whereas direct distances can straight away be used in an MDS analysis.

4.2 Types of MDS Models and Measures of Fit

There are multiple ways to categorize MDS algorithms. The two classic and most encompassing ways to classify MDS algorithms are to distribute them in either ratio or ordinal models. MDS ratio models is elaborated the same way as described in the first section of this chapter. Additionally, there are a number of admissible transformations which allow researchers to shift or rotate distances and the planes against which they are projected so as to gain different perspectives. Below you have a short list of transformations along with a list of transformations, however an exhaustive examination of transformations to the MDS distances or plane is beyond the scope of this paper(Borg and Groenen, 2005: 24). Finally, invariances are those geometric features which remain constant throughout the transformations of the MDS plane or distances.

Transformation Group	Transformations	Invariance
Rigid motion (isometry)	Rotation Reflection Translation	Distances
Similarity transformation	Rotation Reflection Translation Dilation	Ratio of distances

Figure 4.3: Transformation Groups and Invariances.

While ratio MDS models work by projecting direct or indirect distances on a Cartesian plane, ordinal MDS models work by taking a rank or an order of relationships

between any two items and projects them onto a Cartesian plane. More specifically, instead of working with direct or indirect distances, ordinal MDS rather works with the rank of those distances. That is, there may be a rule whereby the closer the relationship between two items is, the higher the rank. Consequently, an MDS algorithm will place all data points onto a Cartesian space relative to one another in terms of what ranking rule is relevant. Ordinal MDS models are typically more indeterminate than ratio MDS models because they have more relaxed rules about where exactly a specific data point will be projected in the Cartesian space. To exemplify, consider the existence of negative distance in between an item pair in ratio models. The interpretation that an MDS algorithm gives to this situation is that it will project the second item in the pair lower in the Cartesian space relative to the first item in the pair. This is a very strict interpretation of a data point. Compared to this situation, an ordinal MDS algorithm is free to project the second item in a pair in any direction, so long as it respects the relative position of all items relative to one another as a function of their ranks.

Finally, there are measures of fit for MDS models which are reported for every analysis. The most widely reported measure of good fit for MDS ratio models is a stress function. The stress function assesses how well a distance between any pair of items is represented in the Cartesian space. Mathematically, the stress function dij-hat should be as close to the actual distance 'dij' so that the final relationship between any one point and all other points mimic the actual, non-Euclidean, relationships collected by the researcher. The global goodness of fit stress function is represented on a plot where the stress coefficient is represented on the Y-axis and the number of dimensions of the Cartesian space is represented on the X-axis. Generally, the more dimensions the model has the further the global stress function will decrease. Borg and Groenen (2005: 48) give the following empirical benchmarks for stress coefficients: 0.2 = poor fit; 0.1= fair fit; 0.05= good fit; 0.025= excellent fit and 0.0= perfect fit. However, they caution that thorough inspection

of the results is needed as such benchmarks can invariably fail. Though the discussion of goodness of fit of MDS models is an interesting one, it is also beyond the scope of this paper. However, for a more detailed look at the interpretation of complex MDS models and measures of fitness see Leeuw and Mair (2011).

4.3 Data and Analysis

Having discussed the basic principles for MDS analysis, I will devote this section to describing the data used and evaluating the analysis of this paper.

I use a primary data source from a survey conducted on 13 April, 2017. The survey is conducted after the Romanian legislative elections which were held on 11 December, 2016. The questionnaire focuses on collecting the direct distances between parties, among voters, which warrant an MDS analysis. To that effect, crucial items[2] in the questionnaire focus on a grading system where voters are asked to judge the differences between pairs of Romanian political parties. If the difference between any two parties is high, then the grade will be proportionately high for that pair. For example, the highest average grade – meaning the highest degree of perceived heterogeneity – occurs between the PSD and USR political parties. The smallest grade – and highest degree of homogeneity – occurs between the PSD and ALDE political parties, two parties which campaigned on the same electoral program and later formed a government coalition. After having calculated all the mean grades per pairs, the similarity matrix 3.1 resulted. For example, the highest average grade – meaning the highest degree of perceived heterogeneity – occurs between the PSD and USR political parties. The smallest grade – and highest degree of homogeneity – occurs between the PSD and ALDE political parties, two parties which campaigned on the same electoral program and in coalition. For a complete overview of mean perceived difference between political

parties, see matrix 3.1.

Table 4.1: Similarity Matrix

	PSD	USR	PNL	ALDE	PMP
PSD	–				
USR	6.318	–			
PNL	5.763	4.375	–		
ALDE	3.057	6.048	4.919	–	
PMP	5.712	4.742	4.333	5.363	–

The sample size consisted of 845 observations. After discarding observations with missing data and those observations with a low variance, the remaining sample size consisted of 333 observations. It is possible that this survey item suffers puts some respondents under considerable intellectual strain due to the fact that respondents need to cycle through multiple pairs of similar items. Even so, I have preferred to only use those responses which demonstrate a clear understanding of the survey question, beyond any doubt. The result has been a very conservative analysis overall.

The main variable used in the analysis was 1086_Q12 which asked people how to rate similarities between pairs of parties on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 meaning completely different and 0 meaning completely similar. It is important to note that this grading system is modeled exactly on the grading system ubiquitous throughout the public education system in Romania. This means that, no matter the education level, most responders would have had at least a minimal exposure to the grading system, thereby increasing the probability of them accurately grading the perceived differences between the political parties. The 1086_Q12 item is a 9 question-series which asks respondents to rate perceived differences between a pair of political parties, one at a time. As shown in table 3.1, the questions concerned were asked vis-à-vis the top 5 parliamentary parties, excluding smaller, non-parliamentary parties. On a side note, the questionnaire item also excluded the UDMR

– the ethnic, Hungarian party – as there is a high probability that Romanians outside of the immediate vicinity of the ethnically Hungarian areas have little contact with the UDMR party's campaign message. For a more detailed look at the survey items used in this analysis and the code used to transform the data, skip to the notes on the third chapter. After obtaining the direct distances via the grading system in the questionnaire and cleaning the data, I have transformed the distances into Euclidean distances. I then constructed a matrix of Euclidean distances which I plotted in a Cartesian space using a ratio MDS algorithm. The resulting plot can be examined below:



Figure 4.4: Party Heterogeneity in a 2-dimensional Space

As could have been predicted from the similarity matrix above, there is a clear divide between the two coalition parties on the one hand, and all other parties on the other hand. This visual examination demonstrates the existence of a heterogeneous perception of political parties that ran in the Romanian 2016 parliamentary elections. Of course, the validity of this plot has to be reported as well. I have used a global stress function to evaluate goodness of fit:



Figure 4.5: Average Stress Level per Dimensionality

The graphic above shows how, as the number of dimensions goes up, the level of indeterminacy evaluated through the global stress function goes down. As can be extrapolated from the graph, a two dimensional representation has a good fit according to the benchmark outlined in the section above, as it has an average stress level of 0.058. Any model with a lower stress level than this can be comfortably accepted, not least because there are no outlying pairs in the similarity matrix.

4.4 Discussion of Analysis and its Limitations

The chart above shows that there is a definite divide between party blocks among public opinion. Yet how to interpret this result? What insight does is offer us vis-avis voter turnout? And to what extent is it a valid result?

Recall the two assumptions in chapter one. Assumption one stated: the connection between preference and outcome is not strict in large-scale elections; and assumption two stated: individual voters benefit differently from participating in elections. Though almost truistic in their nature, they are logical assumptions given the lack of reconciliation between epirical observations and aprioric statements inferable from a positivist model of voting behavior. Hence, Riker's fix was to introduce the D term signifying, more wishfully than in any other manner, the factor which pushes rational individuals to vote even when their chances to be the pivotal voter are slim. The two assumptions capture this state of affairs and say that, yes, large-scale elections sever the connection between preference and outcomes, but individuals must be able to seek out and access new benefit streams which researchers have dubbed expressive benefits. Yet, what are these expressive benefits exactly? I have written before in chapters one and two that expressive benefit streams have been interpreted as having multiple possible sources. Most recently, as outlined in chapter two, there was a focus on identity-based expressive benefits. Readers will notice that I have outlined one way of interpreting expressive benefits: those benefits which are not instrumental. But, as with any negative definition, there is a great deal of indeterminacy. Indeed, the policentrality of expressive benefits was treated – extensively though not exhaustively – in chapter two. In tandem, I have also abstained to isolate one specific interpretation of expressive benefits as the correct interpretation. Instead, I have proposed that, give Schuessler's interpretation of expressive voting and other effects identified in network-based research, expressive benefits are identified by voters in those circumstances when there is

opportunity to consume expressive incentives. In other words, the opportunity to create an identity, to feel like you belong to a group or, indeed, other opportunities which are beyond my imagination constitute potential benefit streams. But the thrust of my thesis is that such opportunities are created in a homogeneous environment. As a result, those groups which have an homogenous opinion towards an issue provide ample opportunities for expressive benefits to be consumed by voters.

Were Romanian voters in 2016 seeking expressive benefits? Given what I have written so far yes, it is likely that, theoretically, they were seeking expressive benefits. Consequently, since we have seen a degree of heterogeneity n public opinion towards political parties, is this what kept voters away from the ballot box? It is possible, yes. The Romanian public did not see parties as being similar. Instead, they identified strong dissimilarities between two blocks of parties: the PSD-ALDE alliance on the one hand, and everyone else on the other hand. This state of affairs would have significantly diminished the opportunities for expressive benefit consumption because homogeneously-opined groups were smaller than they otherwise would have been. According to the Central Bureau for Elections, out of 18,403,044 registered voters, a total of 7,261,300 voted making the percentage of turnout 39.46

There are two major limitations with this analysis. The first is fairly obvious: this analysis is a between group analysis. For a complete picture, there need to a within group analysis. This would provide the opportunity to construct a comparative benchmark: compare homogeneously-opined groups to heterogeneously-opined groups and see whether or not there is a difference in turnout propensities. Yet, this would mean introducing a new assumption in our analysis which would have to say that, approximately, all political groups are similar with respect to their dynamics. In other words, different groups with different values promote and demote ideas using the same mechanisms and, therefore, they

are comparable. The second limitation, and strongly related to the first one, is the absence of a benchmarks. While the MDS methodology is self-contained in allowing us to judge results and the validity of the analysis, there still remains one question: does this mean that we can reliably predict turnout based on the opinion homogeneity or heterogeneity of groups? The answer is still that we are not sure. While the evidence presented here supports hypothesis two, as presented in chapter two since a relatively low turnout correlates with high opinion heterogeneity, we still need to apply this type of analysis across elections, across different geographies and across different time spaces.

Yet, what has worked in this analysis? It is salutary that the survey items have worked in tandem with the MDS methodology. The items have isolated the right kind of data needed to judge the similarity of judgments of large groups of individuals. This and the fact that there is evidence to support hypothesis two, lead me to propose that further inquiry into this not only needed but also warranted. Opinion heterogeneity and homogeneity of groups can be reliably collected using the proposed survey battery in the annex to this thesis and can be analyzed using the MDS methodology. For this reason, I find future research in this sub-field to be valid.

Notes

1. This analysis has been coded using RStudio. A commented code script, a .CSV of the data and the accompanying questionnaire can be accessed through my GitHub account.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have examined the concept of expressive behavior in the context of the paradox of voting. In doing so, I have attempted to answer to question of non-consequentialist voting.

In order to thoroughly accomplish this, it has been necessary to examine the history of how the concept of expressive behavior. In the first chapter, it has been necessary to show why the concept of expressive behavior is the best ontological candidate to solve the paradox of voting. Epistemologically, it leads to disparate strains of study and I have treated this policentrality of expressive behavior in the second chapter. Here, is perhaps, a week point as there does not seem to be a definite criteria for choosing one operationalization of expressive behavior over another. Instead, I simply point out that, if we wish to squeeze as much insight from studies of the expressive concept, it is helpful to focus on those studies which, rightfully or not, focus on perpetuating the paradigm of instrumental versus expressive voting behavior studies.

In the third chapter, I have attempted to create a roadmap for future studies of

expressive behavior. I have used data from a survey of the 2016 Romanian parliamentary elections and, in doing so, I have created one of the few instances in which expressive behavior is studied outside of American political scholarship. However, shortcomings remain. Firstly, constructing useful hypotheses is difficult. Not only because operating a polycentral theoretical concept is difficult and, ultimately, unsatisfactory, but also because of the relatively few past studies of expressive behavior. Indeed, while the concept has been theoretically expressed, empirical studies remain few. This thesis, unfortunately, managed in no way to be theoretically exhaustive.

My hope is that, above all, I have succeeded in showing why microeconomics cannot, and probably should not, assert itself in the study of politics. The Rikerian study of politics is not one and the same with microeconomics and should not be considered as such. The paradox of voting should not be considered a fault within the edifice of positivist political science but rather a stepping stone in the evolution of a positivist political science. And though I may not have shown that in the empirical study encased in this thesis, I hope that the spirit of my work does show that.

Can we answer why the Austrian subjects risked their lives in 1911 to vote even though their actions had little consequence? No, we cannot. However, we can show the way to providing a unified, systematic theory that will be able to answer that at some point in the future.

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