

SMALL STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: LEBANON AND THE INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates how Lebanon, as a small and developing state, was able to exert disproportionate influence in the United Nations Security Council to establish a no-fly zone over Libya in 2011 through UNSC resolution 1973. By focusing on the most successful cases of small states, scholars propose certain qualitative and quantitative characteristics (such as extensive knowledge of a thematic issue area, norm entrepreneurship, forerunner reputation, material capacity to support policy initiatives, etc.) as requirements for small state influence in the international arena. However, the study argues that a majority of small states do not possess these characteristics and utilize alternate sources of influence. Lebanon, as the only state in both the Arab League and the Security Council, played a bridging role between the two organizations which helped delegates otherwise opposed to each other to overcome their oppositions and build the Resolution. The study shows that small states who lack the characteristics proposed by small state literature may utilize other means, such as their intrinsic regional and cultural positions to influence the decision-making process in multilateral settings.

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INTRODUCTION

This study investigates how Lebanon, as a *small developing state*¹, was able to exert influence and play a significant role in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during the Libya intervention. Although it lacks the certain qualitative and quantitative characteristics that small state scholars propose as requirements for small states influence, Lebanon was able to significantly shape the Libya intervention agenda. When Lebanon was elected in 2010 to be a part of the UNSC, several experts and scholars were skeptical about its potential to contribute to the Council.² Notwithstanding these views, Lebanon played a significant role in the drafting and adoption of the Security Council Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly zone over Libya. As a small and developing state, how was Lebanon able to position itself as a relevant actor in drafting these Resolutions and, further, play a determining role in the adoption of Resolution 1973? This thesis argues that Lebanon, as the only state in both the Arab League and the UNSC, played a bridging role between the two organizations which helped delegates otherwise opposed to each other to overcome their oppositions and build the Resolution. Consequently, Lebanon showed its capacity to be a unique *determining*³ factor by utilizing its regional expertise, disproving the critics cited above. This shows that small states who lack certain qualitative and quantitative characteristics as proposed by small

¹ Small *developing state* in this study refers to small states who are not economically advanced and who are located in a non-benign geopolitical environment vis-à-vis European forerunner small states.

² When Lebanon was elected to the Security Council in 2010, analysts were skeptical about its contribution to the body's work and noted that "Lebanon and Bosnia may impede the Security Council's ability to act". For instance, Jeffrey Laurenti, a UN expert at The Century Foundation, stated that "It's an unusual collection of cripples and non-performers joining the council," and "Look at Lebanon and Bosnia. At least Gabon doesn't have a UN peacekeeping force holding it together." He further gave the example of Rwanda's UNSC membership back in 1994 and stated that "When you have country on the council that is itself a subject of the Security Council actions, it can be a major stumbling block to promote effective international response." Retrieved from: <https://www.thenational.ae>

³ Regarding the Lebanese delegation's role in UNSC during the Libya intervention, A Western delegate (name is not given) stated that "The Lebanese delegates were a unique regional pulling-factor. They were an inter-linkage between the Security Council and the Arab League." Quoted in Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, "Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 899.

state literature may utilize other sources, such as their intrinsic regional and cultural positions to influence the decision-making process in multilateral settings.

Newly emerging international actors and diversified global issues paved the way for ascending multilateralization of the international relations. In line with such developments, formerly *small powers*⁴ became more influential in the international arena, especially through their membership in international organizations.⁵ Such multilateral settings offer an optimal stage for small states to achieve their foreign policy goals and counter-balance their lack of material capacities and human resources. In order to highlight small states' capability to achieve their goals in the international arena, post-Cold War small state literature has focused heavily on qualitative measures of power, rather than the traditional quantitative measures. Therefore, the high number of small states and the great diversity of qualitative means of power which are available to them raise the question whether all these small states have the same abilities to use influence to achieve their goals in the UNSC.

In terms of the behavior of small states and their success in international organizations, scholars propose some strategies or list certain requirements for small states to exert influence for achieving their foreign policy goals. However, these scholars mainly focused on the most "successful" examples of small states, such as European countries, while often ignoring small and developing countries and their capability to achieve such goals. By concentrating on successful cases, authors have argued that certain qualitative means, such as reputation, norm entrepreneurship, policy initiatives and leadership etc. are relevant factors for small states to exert influence in international organizations. These well-analyzed developed states are mainly the Nordic states, alongside Ireland, Luxembourg, and New Zealand. The latter-mentioned

⁴ Term used by Rothstein to describe states who lack traditional quantitative measures of power and have different behavioral patterns vis-a-vis Great Powers during the Cold War. see Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

⁵ Maria Nilaus Tarp and Jens Ole Bach Hansen, "Size and Influence: How Small States Influence Policy Making in Multilateral Arenas," *DIIS Working Paper*, no. 11 (2013): 2.

countries have long traditions of being norm entrepreneurs or forerunners in widely accepted policy areas, such as peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and development assistance.

A vast majority of small states, however, does not possess the qualitative assets put forward by scholars. The Post-Cold War international order redefined the geostrategic positions, security values, and foreign policy objectives of small European states, such as the Nordic countries. This change in the international order enabled such countries to concentrate on indirect but common security threats, which enabled them to increase their spheres of influence in international arena.⁶ However, a majority of small states does not enjoy the geostrategic position that European small states do. Subsequently, their foreign policy objectives often prioritize their geostrategic environment and territorial security, which most likely limits their ability to influence their immediate environment. Thus, the existing literature on small state influence is insufficient to rigorously explain what other strategies and means small developing states can use in order to achieve their goals in the international arena.

This study argues that, although some small states do not enjoy certain means as forerunner small states do (e.g. extensive knowledge of a thematic issue area, forerunner reputation, material capacity to support policy initiatives, etc.), they may utilize other means, such as their intrinsic regional and cultural positions, to play a determining role on specific issues during the decision-making process in international organizations. The Forerunner small states often exert influence through certain international institutions based on their extensive knowledge of and investment in certain thematic issue areas such as peacebuilding, environmental protection, etc. Therefore, these thematic issue areas, which are perceived to be common goods, enable them to exert influence which usually is not limited to a certain geographical area. However, I will further argue that since a majority of the small developing states who are located in a non-benign geopolitical environments prioritize their territorial

⁶ "Spheres of influence" here is meant in its informal, not technical, meaning.

security as a significant part of their foreign policy objectives, this often times limits their influence to a certain regional context.

My study proceeds in three chapters. The first chapter will provide an overview of the small state literature and how it presents the concept of power available to small states. Furthermore, the same chapter will give an overview of what strategies and requirements small state scholars propose for small states to exert influence in international organizations. Chapter two will give an overview of Nordic states activities in international organizations to illustrate through what means and strategies forerunner small states achieve their foreign policy goals in international organizations. The second chapter will further analyze how Nordic states are able to adopt these strategies proposed by small state scholars and how they are able to exert influence in different international bodies, determined by their good reputations gained over time. The third chapter presents the means and strategies Lebanon used during the Security Council's decision-making during the intervention in Libya. Since it lacks many of the qualitative and quantitative means of power as proposed by small state scholars, I focus here on its alternate sources of influence. During the UNSC negotiations regarding the situation in Libya, Lebanon as a small developing state, utilized its regional and cultural affinity to Libya to set itself as competent actor in the Council. Utilizing its intrinsic regional position as an alternate source of power in the Security Council, Lebanon was able to exert ad-hoc/case-specific influence which is limited to its immediate environment.

CHAPTER 1 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Research Design and Case Study Selection

This study highlights the differences among small states' abilities to achieve goals in international fora. The main aim is to find out what kind of strategies relatively weaker, small developing states can use to achieve their goals. These states lack the qualitative and quantitative sources of power, such as reputation or economic advancement to invest in UN causes, that are enjoyed by Nordic states. Therefore, the majority of the strategies and requirements for influence discussed in the small state literature are not applicable to small, *developing* states like Lebanon.

To highlight the difference between forerunners and small developing states, my second chapter will focus on Nordic states' activities and achievements in the UN to show how these economically advanced forerunners are capable of applying the strategies put forward by the small state literature. I single out the Nordic states because they are the most successful group of small states and their analysis has dominated and shaped the small state literature. I will use secondary sources alongside with Nordic states' official webpages to analyze their stated foreign policy goals, what issue areas they prioritize, what UN experiences they gathered, how much they have invested to attain their good image and how this good image/reputation enabled them to achieve their goals.

In the third, main analytical chapter, I will analyze Lebanese UNSC membership during the Libya Intervention in 2010-2011. The Lebanon case is especially interesting for three primary reasons. First, Lebanon has hosted a UN peacekeeping mission, UNIFIL, since 1978⁷ due to its conflict with Israel, a situation which has posited Lebanon itself on the UNSC agenda for decades. The majority of the small state scholars argue that their small population and

⁷ "UNIFIL | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," accessed April 17, 2019, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/>.

relatively high domestic cohesion enable these countries to perform better in the international arena. However, the Lebanon case is rather different. Lebanon has a tense domestic political situation where different ethnic and sectarian groups fight for political power in the parliament.⁸ As mentioned above, the complexity of the situation in Lebanon has led to skepticism that it might contribute meaningfully to the Security Council.

Second, Lebanon is a small developing state located in a conflict prone-geopolitical area—a far cry from the Nordic states, which have enjoyed peace and good relations with one another for many decades. It is therefore worth analyzing in its own right as a “small state” that does not fit the usual small state profile or meet small state expectations. Despite being traditionally influenced by Syria, Lebanon still managed to play a significant role in drafting and adopting Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 and establishing the no-fly zone over Libya. Considering the strategies and requirements discussed above, Lebanon did not have the traditional capabilities that would allow it to exert this kind of influence. Therefore, what kind of means Lebanon utilized is especially interesting: examining the Lebanon case should enlarge international relations’ understanding of how small state influence world political outcomes—importantly, beyond those conclusions derived from Nordic-centric studies.

Last, the Libyan intervention remains a defining foreign policy event of the Obama administration and recent NATO history, and one of the few post-Cold War interventions that generated wide regional support in the Middle East. Lebanon played a significant and, according to existing theory, unexpected role in shaping the dynamics of the intervention. Examining Lebanon’s role can contribute to international relations’ overall understanding of this controversial case.

⁸ Matthijs Bogaards, “Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions: A Comparison of the National Pact and the Taif Agreement in Lebanon,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 25, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 32.

This thesis argues that although Lebanon lacks the qualitative characteristics suggested by small state scholars to exert influence, it was able to exert disproportionate influence in the Security Council, which in turn had an impact on the Council's course of action. In order to explain how Lebanon was able to wield such influence, I seek to answer, "What kind of qualitative or quantitative sources of power/comparative advantage Lebanon utilized to achieve its goals in the Security Council?" Furthermore, to unpack the decision-making process, I will further analyze how Lebanese delegation operationalized these qualitative/quantitative sources of power to set itself as a competent actor in the Council. To analyze what kind of strategies Lebanese delegation to the Security Council used, I examine UNSC debates, press releases and Security Council resolutions as primary sources. Furthermore, I will use academic secondary sources which are based on interviews with the UNSC delegations of different states during the Libya intervention. The outcomes of the study will contribute to the small state literature by highlighting the different capabilities of small states to exert influence in the UNSC and what kind of strategies and qualitative means of power these small developing states can use to achieve their foreign policy goals in UNSC.

1.2 Defining Small States – Lack of Agreement

Although there is no internationally agreed upon definition of small states, one of the widely used definitions is to set a certain population threshold which is also known as absolute size approach. This study uses Matthias Maass' definition of small states where he describes small states as states possessing 10 to 15 million citizens.⁹ I use this definition because it provides a wider analytical framework to analyze small states in international organizations compared to other approaches. This approach focuses on the size of the population while disregarding other indicators which enables one to compare small states which are located in

⁹ Matthias Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State," *International Politics* 46 (January 1, 2009): 76.

different geopolitical environments and possess different means of power. In line with Maass, David Vital uses the same absolute size approach, but distinguishes between economically developed and underdeveloped states. Developed small states possess 10 to 15 million citizens while underdeveloped small states possess 20 to 30 million citizens.¹⁰ Furthermore, international organizations such as Commonwealth and World Bank also adopted the population criterion to define small states. Commonwealth defines small states as “sovereign states with a population of 1.5 million or fewer.”¹¹ In the same line, the World Bank also defines small states as countries that have a population of 1.5 million or are members of the Small States Forum.¹² Although 1.5 million upper population limit includes more than 40 states¹³ in the UN, this upper limit does not cover the cases of this study.

Other scholars who define small states stress the importance of their geopolitical environment and self-perception rather than just focusing on population. Since the rise of systemic IR theories, small states have also been defined according to their relative size and--the external power a state can wield in relations with other states in a given context. Both Szalai and Bailes argue that activities of a given small state are mostly limited to its region, and its size can be called large or small according to the size of its neighbors.¹⁴ However, the relative size approach is mostly applicable for studies which analyze small states in certain regional contexts. Therefore, relative size approach does not provide a sufficient framework for this study since it compares small states from different geopolitical environments. Furthermore, self-perception approach highlights the “small states’ belief in their inability to protect

¹⁰ David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*. (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1967), 4–12.

¹¹ Commonwealth Secretariat, “Small States and the Commonwealth: Strengthening Resilience for Sustainable Development” (The Commonwealth, 2014), 1.

¹² “Small States,” accessed April 17, 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/smallstates>

¹³ “World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision | Multimedia Library - United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,” accessed March 3, 2019, <https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/world-population-prospects-the-2017-revision.html>

¹⁴ Mate Szalai, “Small States in the Middle East: The Foundations and Application of the Complex Model of Size” (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Corvinus University of Budapest, 2018), 29; Alyson JK Bailes, “Does a Small State Need a Strategy?,” in *Centre For Small State Studies Publication Series* (University of Iceland, 2009), 12.

themselves without the help of others.”¹⁵ This approach was widely used to analyze small states’ behavior during the Cold War. Nevertheless, since the military coercion does not dominate IR as it used to during the Cold War period, this security deficit-based self-perception approach lost its prominence.

1.3 Defining Influence

Defining influence is a difficult task since concepts of power and influence are hard to distinguish. Since there is no commonly agreed indicator of influence, one needs to put it into a context in relation to a certain goal. Honkanen and Goetschel argue that participation in an international organization already gives small states the capability to influence others, since they become part of a bigger entity.¹⁶ In line with this study’s goal, the definition of influence should be able to explain; whether small states have an impact on the decision making to achieve their goals during the decision-making process in international organizations and in so, through what means? Goetschel defines influence as “one’s ability to modify others’ behavior in a desired manner”.¹⁷ Although modifying one’s behavior would well define the ability of exerting influence in a bilateral context, it would be too narrow in the context of multilateral negotiations and majority-based decision-making systems. Therefore, *this study treats influence as one’s ability to have an impact on the decision-making system in a desired manner.* In other words, influence will be small states’ ability to get what they want in line with their foreign policy goals during the decision-making process in multilateral settings. This definition is especially relevant for my study since coercion is not an option for small states due to their

¹⁵ Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 23.

¹⁶ Laurent Goetschel, “The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe,” in *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: Interests and Policies*, ed. Laurent Goetschel (Boston: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., 1998), 17–18; Karoliina Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic* (Stockholm: Sweedish Defence Research Agency, 2002), 16.

¹⁷ Goetschel, “The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe,” 15–16.

lack of traditional means of power. To exert influence, they must rather rely on attraction to convince other actors to implement policies and take actions that lead to the outcomes they want. In the case of Lebanese influence on UNSC decision-making, the influence will be analyzed in two ways;

- 1- The state's role and impact on the agenda setting,
- 2- The state's role and impact on an issue which is already on the UNSC agenda, i.e., what kind of role did the state play in this issue, and did it achieve its goals?

According to Honkanen, state influence over agenda-setting is considered to be a more active type of influence where one state tries to draw attention of others on a specific issue one wants to discuss while the second one is more reactive since there is an issue at hand to be discussed.¹⁸ Honkanen illustrates this difference by comparing the activities of Nordic states in NATO as founding members to activities of Czech Republic and Hungary as the newcomers in the late 1990s. She concluded that while Nordic states played a significant role in drafting the "Harmel report" which defined détente as NATO's second most important task after defense, Czech Republic and Hungary's influence was related to the NATO's enlargement to the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since these countries were the only CEE countries to join the alliance in 1990s.¹⁹ In line with this, an argument made in this study is that while forerunner small states significantly influence agenda-setting by policy initiatives, small developing states are not as active as agenda setters. However, while influence is not restricted merely to high levels of activity in this study, it affects the reputation/good image of small states and enables them to exert influence. Therefore, the above mentioned two steps enable this study to highlight the different capacities of influence for small states in the UNSC.

¹⁸ Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, 15.

¹⁹ Honkanen, 58–112.

1.4 Concepts of Power in the Small State Literature

Recent works on concept of power in small state literature focus heavily on the qualitative variables since small states cannot utilize the traditional, material, sources of power to the same extent as larger states. For instance, Mearsheimer defines power as states' possession of particular material capabilities.²⁰ However, a focus on the material conceptions of power would give a minimal chance to small states for exerting influence in the international arena. Therefore, this study will mainly focus on the qualitative sources of power available to small states while not ignoring the importance of material ones. In line with this study's argument, this approach highlights the importance of how different qualitative means are utilized by different small states to achieve their goals in the international arena. Furthermore, it helps us better understand how these differences in qualitative means enable some small states to be more successful in international organizations than others.

Although the previous section of this chapter defined how the concept of influence is used in this study, this section differentiates power from influence so that the difference between the two is clear. Power has always been a contested concept in the field of IR.²¹ Absence of an agreement on the concepts of power and influence in the IR literature makes it difficult to distinguish these two intertwined concepts. Although this study does not suggest any deep conceptual discussion between the two phenomena, it argues that the qualitative means of power available to small states can be turned into influence, but this conversion is not automatic, and hence power as capability and actual influence remain conceptually distinct. In other words, possession of any qualitative means of power cannot be automatically turned into influence unless small states operationalize them to achieve their goals. Mearsheimer argues that states might possess two kinds of power: latent and military power which the previous

²⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, 2001), 55.

²¹ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (2005): 41.

being socio-economic ingredients to contribute into building military power.²² In other words, Mearsheimer treats latent power as the basis for the ultimate goal of military power which leads to influence. In line with this, Goetschel also makes a distinction between the two concepts by referring to “power” as concrete military and economic resources while describing “influence” as the ability to make an impact on the behavior of others.²³

As the military coercion does not dominate world politics as much as it did during the Cold War, post-Cold War IR has tended to broaden its definitions of power to include non-material sources. This broadening has paved the way for the reinterpretation of categories like small states. Guzzini, for example, forwards a concept of power that emphasizes context.²⁴ Barnett and Duvall describe social aspect of power by noting “how the social capacities of actors are socially produced, and how these processes shape actors’ self-understandings and perceived interests”.²⁵ Furthermore, in terms of diverging sources of power, Keohane and Nye argue that power cannot be considered a homogenous phenomenon and can vary dramatically across issue areas.²⁶ Placing this issue-area-specific conception of power in the small state literature, Baldwin argues that small powers can actually influence larger powers: while small powers can be weak in one policy, they can be stronger in another.²⁷ In the same line, Dahl, in this taxonomy of power, stresses that small states’ relative lack of traditional bases of power incentivizes them to specialize in other bases and means of power.²⁸ Therefore, the increased focus on non-material aspect of power after the Cold War highlighted the importance of small states and how they can compensate their size related disadvantages.

²² Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 55.

²³ Goetschel, “The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe,” 16.

²⁴ Stefano Guzzini, “The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis,” *Millennium* 33, no. 3 (2005): 495.

²⁵ Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 55.

²⁶ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (1987): 91–95.

²⁷ David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979): 164.

²⁸ Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1957): 203–6.

Other scholars, who also use post-material approaches to explain small states' success in international arena, highlight certain qualitative means of power which are available to small states. Honkanen argues that although small states are weak according to quantitative indicators, they might be good at utilizing the qualitative resources of influence by playing "non-coercive bridge-building and mediation role[s]," giving them bargaining leverage.²⁹ Thorhallsson argues that qualitative variables such as reputation/image, norm entrepreneurship, coordination capacities and administrative competence, aims and priorities of state leaders etc. are significant factors to explain small state influence.³⁰ Although some of the qualitative variables that Thorhallsson points out are significant for many small states to exert influence, some are not available to others. For instance, as the next chapter will discuss in more detail, reputation/image is a significant qualitative variable for Nordic states to exert influence in certain policy areas. However, earning reputation in a certain policy area requires long-term effort, investment and experience which makes it harder to earn for some other small states. For instance, Iceland built its 2010 UNSC campaign mainly on the Nordic ideals of human rights, development assistance, and women rights without having substantial experience and investment in these policy areas. Consequently, Iceland failed in its campaign and was not elected to the UNSC. Thorhallsson argues that Icelandic campaign failed mainly because of free-riding on these Nordic ideals without proper experience and competence in this field.³¹ The reputation and expertise of Nordic states in these policy areas were built over experiences and practice. Therefore, divergence in qualitative means of power has a significant effect on small states' influence in the international arena.

²⁹ Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, 15.

³⁰ Baldur Thorhallsson, "Small States in the UN Security Council: Means of Influence?," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7 (January 1, 2012): 139.

³¹ Thorhallsson, 155.

Bailes argues that cultural reputation and expertise in certain policy areas also serve as qualitative sources of power.³² Moreover, Tom Long defines his “particular-intrinsic power” concept as “power based on particular-intrinsic resources which can become salient in world politics only through their exercise.”³³ He uses the example of Cuba’s world-class medical capabilities and how this non-conventional basis of power has been used to further Cuba’s foreign policy objectives. In addition, by extending the traditional understanding of material resources, he further argues material aspect of particular-intrinsic power is not limited to oil or gas but it could be based on the possession of a geographical property: Panama’s isthmian canal lets it play a more important role than its neighbors in issues related to global commerce, for example.³⁴

All the above point out what a significant impact culture and strategic location of small states have on the exercise of influence in the international arena. This is especially relevant for small developing states since they often lack the international reputation possessed by forerunner small states. Honkanen exemplifies the importance of close-cultural relations and strategic location in the cases of Czech Republic and Hungary’s initial membership in NATO. Hungary and Czech Republic used their close cultural relations and strategic locations to organize joint military operations with the prospect CEE countries for the future enlargement of NATO. They further used their strategic locations to prove their commitments to NATO during the Kosovo War.³⁵

To summarize, traditionally small states have been understood as small powers that need protection from bigger ones because of the anarchical, self-help nature of the international order until the end of the Cold War. However, after the Cold war, the increased focus on non-material

³² Bailes, “Does a Small State Need a Strategy?,” 17.

³³ Tom Long, “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power,” *International Studies Review* 19, no. 2 (2017): 196–97.

³⁴ Long, 197–200.

³⁵ Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, 88–102.

aspects of power paved the way for further researches on small states in the IR literature. Material aspects of power lost its prominence, to some extent, when we compare small states with the larger ones. However, level of economic development is still an important factor to explain how and why some small states are more successful than the others in the international arena. Therefore, while mainly focusing on the qualitative means of power which enable one to better understand small state behavior in IR, this study does not ignore the importance of economic aspect of material power as well.

1.5 Literature on Strategies for Small States to Exert Influence

This section will analyze some certain factors and strategies put forward by small state scholars and explore whether these strategies are applicable by all small states. The factors to be addressed are helpful to analyze and increase certain small states' influence in the international organizations, mainly economically advanced forerunners. However, the main aim of this study is to argue that these factors and strategies are, to some extent, insufficient to explain how some other small states, mainly small developing states, exert influence to achieve their goals in international organizations. This is mainly because a majority of these scholars focused on economically advanced small states' influence—small states that enjoy certain qualitative means of power, such as reputation, in international arena. Although some scholars focus on small developing states' impact on decision-making systems in international organizations, they mostly focus on their influence on economic policies which this study will not discuss.³⁶

³⁶ Katzenstein and Thorhallsson have analyzed small states' influence on EU economic policy, while others-- Carlyle Corbin, Donna Lee, and Andrew Cooper-- have examined small states' influence on the WTO decision-making system. See: Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., *The Diplomacies of Small States Between Vulnerability and Resilience* (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2009); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985); Baldur Thorhallsson, *The Role of Small States in the European Union* (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2000).

Thorhallsson highlights four important sources of small states influence: knowledge and prioritization; diplomatic skills and image/perception; initiatives and leadership and coalition building.³⁷ In the context of small states' influence in the EU, Panke puts forward three strategies for small states to counter-balance their structural disadvantages: the use of bargaining power, argumentative power and reputational power.³⁸ Also in the context of the EU, Jakobsen argues that the main attention on military aspect of the ESDP overshadowed Nordic states' significant influence on the development and implementation of the civilian aspect of the ESDP. He puts four requirements forward for small states to exert influence in the international organizations: forerunner reputation; convincing arguments to back their initiatives; coalition building; and material capacity (personnel and treasure to support implementation).³⁹ As mentioned above, these strategies and requirements for small states to exert influence were based on Nordic states' case analyses. Therefore, this raises the question of whether these strategies and requirements can be met by other small states.

In terms of knowledge and prioritization, Thorhallsson argues that due to their lack of administrative capacities, small states have to prioritize and decide upon what issue areas can be best dealt with by the small state. This is mainly due to small states have to gather necessary amount of information on the issue and lack of administrative capacity hinders gathering and processing information on various issue areas. Panke also argues that compelling claims are necessary for policy initiatives and require certain knowledge and expertise on the issue area to convince others. According to her, small states can compensate for their disadvantage in argumentative power through close contacts with the EU commission (in the context of EU) and prioritization of issue areas.⁴⁰ In order to highlight the importance of compelling claims,

³⁷ Thorhallsson, "Small States in the UN Security Council," 152–58.

³⁸ Diana Panke, "Small States in the European Union: Structural Disadvantages in EU Policy-Making and Counter-Strategies," *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, no. 6 (September 2010): 799–817.

³⁹ Peter V. Jakobsen, "Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 47, no. 1 (2009): 81–102.

⁴⁰ Panke, "Small States in the European Union," 803.

Jakobsen notes that “small states should do their homework in terms of gathering necessary information and knowledge to put convincing and appealing arguments on the negotiation table”⁴¹ Although these arguments still hold for every small state in the UNSC due to small states’ lack of human capital, some small states are significantly better than the others since they host better knowledge institutions such as prestigious universities and research institutes at their home which would facilitate their knowledge gathering greatly.⁴²

As I argue in this study, forerunner small states, thanks to their expertise and knowledge on widely accepted issue areas such as peacebuilding and peacekeeping, are more likely be active agenda-setters in the UN while small developing states like Lebanon, which are located in non-benign geopolitical environments for instance, focus more on regional issues where they have intrinsic geographical knowledge. In line with this argument, East and Hey argue that the importance of geographical location might lead small states to concentrate on the state’s imminent region that deems to have vital interests.⁴³ In other words, this knowledge on widely accepted issue areas enable some economically advanced forerunner small states to become more influential and active by focusing on agenda setting while some small developing states like Lebanon can play active role and exert influence on the issues which are closer to home. This narrows the range of issue areas where small developing states can exert influence compared to forerunners.

In terms of diplomatic skills and image/perception, Thorhallsson points out the importance of competence and reputation of small states diplomatic services which is gained through experience. He gives the example of Norway’s various successful mediation efforts in different parts of the world. For instance, Norway’s successful mediation efforts in the Middle

⁴¹ Jakobsen, “Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP,” 87.

⁴² Thorhallsson, “Small States in the UN Security Council,” 152–53.

⁴³ Maurice A. East, “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models,” *World Politics* 25, no. 4 (1973): 557, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009952>; Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Introducing Small State Foreign Policy,” in *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 5.

East and Sri Lanka provided Norway certain reputation to lead the Eritrean-Ethiopian Committee in the UNSC. These experiences gained through various mediation efforts enabled Norway to draft the UNSC resolution regarding this issue.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Panke argues that arguments are more effective if the speaker/negotiator has a reputation of being impartial and fair. These factors can create cognitive shortcuts that makes the arguments more acceptable.⁴⁵ In the same line, Jakobsen argues that in order to become more influential, state and state representatives should enjoy a certain level of reputation and must be recognized as leaders in the issue area at hand. Therefore, reputation in a certain policy area gained through experiences enables some small states to become forerunners which results in their increased influence. These experiences and reputation enable forerunners to achieve their foreign policy goals in the international organizations. In other words, previous successful initiatives and efforts in line with their foreign policy goals gradually increase their reputation to enable these states to achieve their foreign policy goals.

Often small developing states' foreign policy goals might not be widely accepted as common interest for all the actors unlike in the case of Nordic states since they adopt more norm entrepreneurship roles. For example, Danish official foreign policy objectives include sustainable development, protection of universal human rights, contribution to global peace and stability with humanitarian efforts etc.⁴⁶ These widely accepted global foreign policy goals enable these states to play more active role in the international arena and increase their influence and reputation. A significant example of this can be seen in these countries' membership in international organizations. Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland have 45, 47, 43 and 48 memberships respectively in international organizations while Lebanon has 22 and important amount of this number is membership in regional organizations such as the Arab League, the

⁴⁴ Thorhallsson, "Small States in the UN Security Council," 151.

⁴⁵ Panke, "Small States in the European Union," 803.

⁴⁶ "Danish Foreign Policy," accessed May 26, 2019, <http://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/>.

Arab Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank etc.⁴⁷ Furthermore, in line with their foreign policy goals, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland are involved in respectively 3, 6, 3 and 5 current UN peacekeeping missions.⁴⁸

Thanks to their successful initiatives and dedication to the UN missions, Nordic states attained many leadership positions at different UN bodies, which is a significant factor in helping them influence outcomes at the UNSC. Thorhallsson argues that these leadership positions are not merely restricted to the UNSC but states' representatives leading positions in other UN bodies are also significant to highlight the small states' leadership in certain policy areas. Some examples of initiatives and strong leadership are Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide's UN Special Representative position to Afghanistan which was only replaced by Swedish Steffan de Mistrura in 2010.⁴⁹ These positions indirectly increase the influence of Nordic countries in the UNSC by increasing their reputation in the international arena. Therefore, while these countries enjoy high level of reputation, leadership status most often cannot be used by many other small states.

Economic advancement is another significant factor to explain forerunner small states' success in international arena since these states have the capability to invest substantially in certain policy areas in international organizations. Jakobsen argues that backing initiatives with financial and human resources will prove small states' commitment to the UN causes and enable them to increase their influence.⁵⁰ To highlight the difference between forerunners and small developing states, Goetschel argues that small states who are not economically advanced and located in non-benign geopolitical environment tend to prioritize and promote their

⁴⁷ "Lebanese Membership of International Organization," accessed February 21, 2019, <http://www.imuna.org/resources/country-profiles/lebanon>

⁴⁸ "Country Profiles of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden," accessed February 21, 2019, <http://www.imuna.org/resources/country-profiles>

⁴⁹ Thorhallsson, "Small States in the UN Security Council," 156–57.

⁵⁰ Jakobsen, "Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP," 88.

geopolitical interests in international organizations.⁵¹ Therefore, the core values of these states' national foreign and security policies often might be questioned which highlights the difference between forerunners norm entrepreneurship in many policy areas vis-à-vis small developing states. However, these core values of states' foreign and security policies are not stationary and might change over time. For instance, in the case of Denmark, Honkanen highlights that the end of the confrontation between the two blocks after the Cold War abolished the direct military threat to the fundamental security values of Denmark, and thereby significantly improved Denmark's geostrategic position. This enabled Denmark to focus on indirect security threats further home which in turn increased Denmark's honest-broker reputation and normative image in the international arena.

Last but not least, there is consensus among these scholars on the importance of coalition-building being the most effective small state strategy at the UNSC and therefore, it should be adopted by all small states. Since small states will use the support of their coalitions especially when they are shaping the agenda during their presidency, common interests among states play a significant role in this process. Jakobsen and Panke argues that bargaining leverage of a small state can be enhanced through strategic partnerships with larger states or institutionalized regional co-ordinations to overcome challenges that a state would not overcome alone.⁵² These coalitions, mostly based on common interests, will enable states to act collectively to increase their influence on the issue at hand. Therefore, among all the strategies and requirements that these scholars put forward, coalition-building is the most important one that all small states need regardless of their differences since they rely on attraction rather than coercion. Framing an issue as a common interest to build a coalition was significant for Lebanon

⁵¹ Goetschel, "The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today's Europe," 17.

⁵² Panke, "Small States in the European Union," 804; Jakobsen, "Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP," 87.

to achieve their foreign policy goal and gain recognition in the UNSC, as chapter three will discuss more in detail.

Due to differences in qualitative means of power and economic development, the applicability of these strategies by all small states become more questionable. After observing differences in activity patterns among the small states in the EU, Panke argues that this difference is caused by different levels of co-ordination capacities among the domestic institutions in small states and by different levels of experiences and knowledge. Based on her analysis, developed experienced small states in the EU, such as Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, rank on the top while small developing states like Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania and Estonia rank on the bottom of her scheme based on activity level of small states.⁵³ This highlights the importance of different levels of experience, reputation and development among small states and makes us question whether the above-mentioned factors and strategies can be adopted by some other, mainly developing, small states. Therefore, Panke's finding among small states' activity levels also highlights the importance of this study, which tries to analyze if the above-mentioned strategies are not applicable by small developing states, and what kind of strategies they use to achieve their foreign policy goals in international organizations.

After analyzing what small states scholars put forward as strategies and requirements for small states to exert influence in this subchapter, in the following two chapters, this study will try to highlight how these differences in qualitative means of power, reputation and different foreign policy objectives affect the strategies that different small states use in international organizations. In the second chapter, I will analyze how these strategies were adopted by Nordic states in the UN. The third chapter will analyze whether these strategies were applicable by Lebanon in the UNSC since Lebanon does not enjoy the certain qualitative

⁵³ Panke, "Small States in the European Union," 806–10.

means of power, such as reputation etc., that Nordic states do and if not, what kind of strategies were available for small developing state Lebanon.

CHAPTER 2 – ACTIVITIES OF NORDIC STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This chapter will analyze in detail how and through what means the above-mentioned strategies are adopted by the Nordic states in different international organizations and why these strategies cannot be adopted by some other small states. I do not solely focus on Nordic countries' activities in the UN but in other international organizations as well. This is mainly because Nordic good practices in the international arena opened a window of opportunity for them to obtain reputation in various international organizations. For instance, Nordic countries' significant efforts and achievements in the field of conflict prevention in the EU set them as forerunners and give them bargaining leverage in this issue in the UN as well.

What the subsections below show is that the Nordic states, which are the paradigmatic small states and have defined the literature on that subject, enjoy several unique characteristics that in fact make them different from the bulk of small states, which have developing economies and are often located in areas with geopolitical tensions. Thus while the literature examining the Nordic states has improved our knowledge of their ability to influence international outcomes, their lessons are not transferrable to many other small states which differ from the Nordic states on key means-of-influence criteria: expertise in certain global issues, high levels of national consensus and economic prosperity, and low levels of post-Cold War geostrategic insecurity. This consequently means that the small state literature, focussed as it is on the Nordic states, can less satisfactorily explain small states' influence on international outcomes like the Libya intervention considered in Chapter 3.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section will analyze through how Nordic states were able set themselves as norm entrepreneurs and prioritize global common goods issues as their foreign policy objectives. I argue that their redefined post-Cold War geopolitical

position and domestic cohesion enabled Nordics to focus on indirect global security threats played a significant role in setting them as norm entrepreneurs. However, as this study argues, the majority of the small states do not enjoy this domestic cohesion and geostrategic security as in the case of Lebanon. The second section will highlight how these norm entrepreneurship and prioritization of widely accepted global issue areas provided Nordic states with certain reputation in the international arena. Thanks to this reputation and expertise on certain global issues, Nordic states became more active on agenda-settings in various international organizations. On the contrary, small developing states most likely to prioritize their geopolitical interests at the first place and therefore, they are perceived as self-interest actors vis-à-vis Nordic states. The third and last section of this chapter will illustrate how Nordic states support their policy initiatives with material support in international organizations. This is especially crucial for them to become forerunners in certain issue areas and proves their commitment to certain international causes.

2.1 Norm Entrepreneurship, Knowledge and Prioritization in the Case of Nordic States

Due to their lack of material resources, small states must identify and prioritize certain policy areas to invest their limited resources. Issues concerning the common or public goods problems (e.g. environmental policies, peaceful solutions to conflicts etc.) are better for them to establish a good image than issues areas where they have a visible self-interest (e.g. agriculture or industrial policy areas). As mentioned above, this is mainly because these obvious special interests of small states might be perceived as extreme by some other states. This is one of the most significant aspects of Nordic states' success in the international organizations, since these states strongly emphasize the importance of common issues such as environmental protection, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and development. Therefore, Nordic states'

prioritization of these issue areas in line with their foreign policy objectives enable them to earn strong norm entrepreneur image and distinguish them from many other small states.

Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norms become more important once they are institutionalized and they often shape states' interests and identity. Norms themselves, however, do not become salient in IR but only through the norm advocates and how they frame and propagate them.⁵⁴ Therefore, the norm advocates should have certain competence which are; good diplomatic and rhetorical skills to propagate these norms and; moral authority and legitimacy to identify the "right" behaviour.⁵⁵ In terms of legitimacy and moral authority, Björkdahl argues that the norm entrepreneurs should "practice what they preach" to set an example and become forerunner.⁵⁶ If a state advocates a certain behaviour as "desired for all" but does not practice it, this might not be recognized as legitimate as Thorhallsson argues in the case of Icelandic UNSC campaign which mentioned above.

For instance, when explaining Sweden's success in conflict prevention, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hjelm-Wallén emphasized how Swedish domestic values and experiences overlap with Sweden's international actions in the field of conflict prevention.⁵⁷ Another former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh, criticized the military development of ESDP while neglecting the necessary civilian aspect of ESDP. She further stated that "civilian management and conflict prevention are mainly about protecting fundamental values such as respecting human rights, democracy and rule of law".⁵⁸ Therefore, it can be said that Swedish advocacy for conflict prevention in international organizations are

⁵⁴ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 902.

⁵⁵ Christine Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics," *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 1 (2002): 11–23.

⁵⁶ Annika Björkdahl, "Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU," *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 1 (2008): 137.

⁵⁷ Björkdahl, 138.

⁵⁸ "European Commission - Press Releases - 2356th Council Meeting - General Affairs - Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001," accessed April 3, 2019, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release PRES-01-226 en.htm>

partially successful because Sweden practices what it preaches to set an example. Sweden's advocacy for conflict prevention, both in the EU and in the UN, shows us that regardless of which international institution particularly, norm entrepreneurs enjoy a global reputation in their prioritized policy areas. However, in terms of small developing states, the applicability of norm entrepreneurship is difficult for various reasons. As mentioned above, norm entrepreneurship requires practicing these norms both; domestically and internationally. Domestic practice of these norms requires national unity, domestic cohesion, and efficient domestic institutional structures. In the case of Lebanon, for instance, domestic power struggles among the ethnic and sectarian parties hinder such domestic cohesion and national unity. Lack of these certain domestic qualities often hinders small developing states to establish a good image in the international arena.

Ingebritsen argues that embracement of welfare state was a significant impetus for Nordic states to increase their commitment to foreign aid as donors. These countries' domestic commitment to eradicate poverty within their own society generated a norm of social solidarity. Therefore, the domestic achievement of social solidarity extended to a Nordic goal for achieving to global welfare to some extent.⁵⁹ Furthermore, these countries' consistency in "domestic commitment to consensus in policy making and social partnership"⁶⁰ set an example as they are trying to promote these in the international arena. These highlight the importance of how domestically-embraced values can shape one country's foreign policy objectives and role in the international system. However, this unique domestic political consensus and high levels of public support for normative acts might not be enjoyed by many other small states especially the ones which are economically less advanced since these states tend to prioritize their economic development in the first place. Thus, norm entrepreneurship can mostly be seen

⁵⁹ Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs," 18.

⁶⁰ Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets*.

economically advanced small states due to their high levels of national unity and domestic coherence. Nordic states' comparative advantage in issue areas like environmental protection, development aid, peacebuilding etc. are strongly supported by their public which provides legitimacy for their normative acts in the international arena. This domestic legitimacy consolidates their international reputation since they practice what they preach domestically.

To explain the link between norm entrepreneurship and prioritization, Grøn and Wivel argue that norm entrepreneurship offers small states to gain influence in international organizations by singling out particular policy areas. The norm entrepreneurs can set the standards and be forerunners in those special policy areas that enable them to exert significant influence.⁶¹ As Tarp and Hansen put it, small states should “choose their battles carefully” and invest time and effort in these areas which constitutes strategic interest for them.⁶² Small states build their comparative advantage in the international arena through these prioritized issue areas. Moreover, providing credible information is crucial for norm entrepreneurs. This often necessitates these norm entrepreneurs to establish institutions to produce quality knowledge on these prioritized issue areas.⁶³ Therefore, comparative advantage in widely-accepted policy areas provides significant leverage for Nordics to increase their influence in the international arena. Nonetheless, small developing states who are located in non-benign geopolitical environment often prioritize their immediate security concerns which often delimits their capability to exert influence in the international arena.

The knowledge on their prioritized issue areas becomes especially important when proposing a policy initiative, setting agenda or drafting resolutions. For example, Denmark played a key role to identify UNDP's strategic priorities in post crisis countries by funding an evidence-based study in 2011. Following this, Denmark funded a number of research projects

⁶¹ Caroline Grøn and Anders Wivel, “Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy,” *Journal of European Integration* 33 (2011): 534.

⁶² Tarp and Bach Hansen, “Size and Influence,” 16.

⁶³ Björkdahl, “Norm Advocacy,” 138.

to analyse the efficiency of UN funds in post-conflict recovery. The outcomes of this research produced high-profile reports such as World Development Report.⁶⁴ This research have two implications for Denmark: first, it increases the reputation of Denmark due to its investment in UN causes and second, it augments the country's knowledge further in this specific policy area which is development. The advantage of norm entrepreneurship is that norm advocates attain reputation in certain issue areas where they set themselves as forerunners which happens through long experience, investment and practice. The majority of small developing states, however, prioritize their short-term goals rather than focusing on thematic issue areas where they can have an impact further home. Therefore, this situation often depicts small developing states as self-interested actors in the international arena.

In terms of foreign and security policies, Nordic states have traditionally been strong supporters of multilateralism and rules-based international order. Furthermore, Nordic states have closely cooperated on defense issues with dialogue and information sharing within the framework of peacekeeping and crisis management.⁶⁵ Ulriksen argues that with close cooperation, Nordic states are trying to influence international affairs through collective good image and perception building. In order to do so, they pursue social power by promoting a specific view of the good society.⁶⁶ Another factor which helps Nordic states exert influence in the international arena was their longstanding foreign policy strategy of non-alignment and neutrality as preferred foreign policy strategies. This image, alongside their non-colonial past, distinguishes them from other large and small European states and enables them to play significant roles in conflict management as trusted honest-brokers. This image was used by

⁶⁴ Tarp and Bach Hansen, "Size and Influence," 17.

⁶⁵ Kaisa Korhonen, "Introduction: The State of Nordic Affairs," in *Norden – Making a Difference? Possibilities for Enhanced Nordic Cooperation in International Affairs*, ed. Teija Tiilikainen and Kaisa Korhonen, vol. FIIA Report 29 (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2011), 8–24, <https://www.fia.fi/en/publication/norden-making-a-difference>.

⁶⁶ Ståle Ulriksen, "Deployments for Development? Nordic Peacekeeping Efforts in Africa," *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 4 (August 2007): 554.

Sweden and Finland to establish Helsinki Accords to bring opposing sides into the negotiation table during the Cold War; the Accords served as an impetus for change in Eastern Europe.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Norway reinforced its impartial third party mediator reputation with its active participation with the UN conflict resolution which extended with the Oslo process in the Middle East. This process established a significant framework for cooperation in the Middle East through informal negotiations.⁶⁸ However, some small states' geopolitical positions and colonial pasts are not suitable for neutrality due to external interventions in their domestic politics. For instance, as the next chapter will discuss more in detail, Lebanon has been a geopolitical battleground to various external actors which, in turn made it subject to a UN peacekeeping mission.⁶⁹

Although many other small states are strong supporters of multilateralism as well, most of them lack a collective brand like the Nordics or honest broker reputation gained through long-term practices. However, keeping above mentioned factors in mind, there are other important factors which enable Nordic states to play more active role in international arena than other small states. For instance, Honkanen argues that Denmark's geostrategic location significantly improved after the Cold War which in turn gave Denmark more freedom in its security policies. In the same line, Ingebritsen also argues that Nordic countries became norm entrepreneurs thanks to their remote geographical position in contemporary international politics.⁷⁰ After the collapse of Soviet Union, Denmark has shifted its security policy focus from territorial defense to international peace operations which also increased Denmark's activism and influence in the

⁶⁷ Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs," 16.

⁶⁸ Thorhallsson, "Small States in the UN Security Council," 151.

⁶⁹ Waleed Hazbun, "Assembling Security in a 'Weak State:' The Contentious Politics of Plural Governance in Lebanon since 2005," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 6 (June 2, 2016): 1055.

⁷⁰ Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs," 13.

international organizations in 1990s.⁷¹ This redefinition of foreign and security policy objectives has changed low profile cautious behaviour to international activism.

Mouritzen and Wivel argue that the EU and NATO memberships had significant effects on the foreign policy objectives of small European states especially after the Cold War.⁷² For instance, the end of the confrontation between the two blocks after the Cold War and its implications on Denmark's foreign policy objectives reflected on 1993 Danish Defense Act. The 1993 Act notes that "there is no direct military threat to fundamental security values of Denmark".⁷³ Furthermore, 1997 annual Defense Report stated that "Denmark currently enjoys a geostrategic location with almost unprecedented security."⁷⁴ These changes in the Danish geostrategic position have shifted Denmark's focus to promote indirect common security threats. Thus, this focus further from home increased Danish activity in international organizations.

This highlights the geostrategic advantage that Nordic states enjoyed after the Cold War and how it increased their level of activism in the international arena. Shifting focus from territorial defense to international peace was perhaps one of the most significant impetus for Nordics to set themselves as forerunners in different thematic issues. Therefore, it can be said that foreign and security policy objectives are significant determinants of small states' role in the international arena since their activities are driven by these objectives in international organizations. Thus, geopolitical position is among the most significant factors for determining small developing states' foreign policy objectives and roles in the international arena. Besides

⁷¹ Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, 58.

⁷² Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel, eds., *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*, Europe and the Nation State 9 (London: Routledge, 2005), 25.

⁷³ Nikolaj Petersen, "Adapting to change: Danish security policy after the Cold War" cited from Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, 76.

⁷⁴ "'Defense for the future', Summary of the Report by The Danish Defense Commission of 1997" cited from Honkanen, 58.

the domestic factors as mentioned above, small states' geopolitical positions play a significant role in prioritization of certain issue areas. Small states who are located in a complex geopolitical environment often tend to prioritize regional issues vis-à-vis Nordic states' prioritization of widely-accepted thematic issue areas. As this study argues, however, this regional expertise can be turned into compelling arguments during the decision-making process regarding the small state's immediate environment. As the next chapter will discuss in more detail, Lebanon utilized geographic and cultural affinity to make compelling arguments during the Security Council decision-making regarding the situation in Libya.

In terms of small states' norm entrepreneurship and their influence in the UNSC, Tarp and Hansen argue that although P5 members traditionally have more influence in the decision making over contested issues, smaller states have a better opportunity to influence issue areas like environmental protection, fragile states, conflict prevention.⁷⁵ This argument is especially important to explain Nordic states' success in international arena since they have substantial amount of knowledge and expertise in issue areas like sustainable development and conflict management. Their expertise on common goods policy areas such as conflict prevention, peacebuilding, development aid, and environmental protection, thanks to the researches they fund and conduct, are widely acceptable regardless of specific geographical context. Thus, while small developing states regional expertise often enables them to exert ad-hoc/case-specific influence, forerunner small states' leadership positions in certain thematic issue areas enable them to exert influence in long-term through international institutions.

2.2 Nordic Initiatives, Reputation and Leadership

Based on their prioritized policy areas, Nordic states have benefitted from their positive reputations in international organizations. This forerunner reputation in certain policy areas

⁷⁵ Tarp and Bach Hansen, "Size and Influence," 10.

such as peacebuilding and peacekeeping, conflict prevention, development aid, civilian aspect of conflicts etc. enabled these states to propose several policy initiatives in the UN, NATO and the EU which were adopted successfully. Kingdon argues that policy entrepreneurs are most likely to succeed if they are recognized as leaders or experts in that specific policy area.⁷⁶ According to Jakobsen, if policy initiatives appeal to common fundamental values they become harder to reject.⁷⁷ Therefore, Nordic states' consistent activism to promote widely accepted values often leads them to gain further reputation and enables them put forward successful policy initiatives.

Nordic states had significant initiatives regarding conflict management in the UN and they were often asked to mediate in international conflicts. For instance, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Norway played a significant role in the Middle Eastern conflict management which led to establishment of Oslo Process in the 1990s. Beside the efforts in the Middle East, Norway also facilitated the talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers guerrilla force.⁷⁸ Norway used its "honest-broker" reputation to mediate between the conflicting parties thanks to its long-term neutrality. In addition to its reputation for fairness, Norway also used its expertise to effectively settle these conflicts which highlights the importance of knowledge.

As for Denmark, the Danish government played a crucial role in establishing the Political Military Framework for NATO's Partnership for Peace operations. Honkanen argues that this initiative was a means through which Denmark wanted to increase the cooperation even further between the NATO members and NATO partners. This Danish initiative and its success to strengthen the relations between NATO and its partners won the recognition of U.S.

⁷⁶ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, 2nd ed (London: Longman, 1995), 189.

⁷⁷ Jakobsen, "Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP," 87.

⁷⁸ Thorhallsson, "Small States in the UN Security Council," 151.

representatives, which was followed by Clinton's visit to Copenhagen in 1998.⁷⁹ Another successful Danish initiative occurred during its temporary membership in the UNSC. In the first half of the 2000s, Denmark brought up the issue of peacebuilding and how the existing international bodies inefficiently managed post-conflict peacebuilding. Denmark organized a number of workshops in Copenhagen in 2004 to analyse how an international body can deal with post-conflict peacebuilding more efficiently. Following these workshops, during its 2005-2006 UNSC membership, Denmark managed to put this issue on the UNSC agenda, leading to the birth of Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund, and Peacebuilding Support Office. Due to its significant role in agenda-setting, Denmark enjoyed a certain leadership position and legitimacy in this policy area in the UN.⁸⁰

Sweden and Finland played substantial roles in EU agenda-setting by having conflict prevention included in the ESDP. Sweden further initiated the establishment of committee of civilian crisis management and managed to put conflict prevention in the Helsinki European Council's Presidency Conclusions. Swedish diplomats kept conflict prevention on the EU agenda, despite opposition by France and Belgium.⁸¹ However, Swedish diplomats' successful bilateral talks with Germany, Italy and France further convinced these countries to take the issue of conflict prevention to the G8.⁸²

Through these policy initiatives, Nordic states consolidated their forerunner reputations in their prioritized issue areas, which overlapped with their foreign policy objectives. Their forerunner reputations and successful activities in the UN is also demonstrated by the times that these countries have been invited to the UNSC under the Rule 37. Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council "provide for invitations to be extended to non-

⁷⁹ Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, 69.

⁸⁰ Tarp and Bach Hansen, "Size and Influence," 10.

⁸¹ Panke, "Small States in the European Union," 89.

⁸² Björkdahl, "Norm Advocacy," 143.

members of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in certain circumstances.”⁸³ Between the 2000 and 2007, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland were invited to Security Council meetings respectively 25, 78, 37 and 34 times without being elected members of the UN Security Council.⁸⁴ Alongside the Nordic states, Israel and Lebanon were also invited 80 and 67 times respectively to the UNSC meetings under rule 37.⁸⁵ However, Lebanon and Israel were invited mainly because they were parties to a conflict, whereas the Nordic states were invited without being party to any conflict. Thorhallsson argues that Nordic states were invited to these meetings because of their expertise and forerunner reputation in conflict management and peacebuilding. Although the Nordics are not the only ones who were invited to the UNSC meetings under the rule 37, their numbers are as high as some other larger states such as India and Germany, which were invited 79 and 61 times, respectively.⁸⁶

These forerunner reputation and policy initiatives further enabled many Nordic representatives to become heads of certain UN missions and bodies. For instance, due to active Finnish involvement in Kosovo, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari was entrusted with the task of achieving peaceful settlement of the Kosovo crisis.⁸⁷ During the Cold War, former Defense Minister of Norway, Otto Tideman played the mediator role between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the anti-ballistic missile treaty negotiations.⁸⁸ Furthermore, thanks to Norway’s leadership role in sustainable development in the UN, Norwegian politician Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland led the World Commission on Environment and Development to prepare a report for analyzing the linkage between the people, resources and environment on a

⁸³ “Provisional Rules of Procedure | United Nations Security Council,” accessed January 22, 2019, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/provisional-rules-procedure>

⁸⁴ Thorhallsson, “Small States in the UN Security Council,” 149.

⁸⁵ Thorhallsson, 149.

⁸⁶ Thorhallsson, 150.

⁸⁷ Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, 10.

⁸⁸ Honkanen, 10.

global scale.⁸⁹ Therefore, these positions held by Nordics in international organizations illustrate their forerunner and leadership roles in certain policy areas.

2.3 Backing Policy Initiatives with Material Capabilities

Nordic states' material support for certain policy areas is a significant determinant for their forerunner positions. Nordic countries' financial and personnel support for their policy initiatives prove their commitment to international causes despite their limited material capabilities compared to larger states. The new threats and uncertainties emerged after the Cold War shaped political discourses in Nordic countries and encouraged these countries to participate actively in the international system.⁹⁰ Furthermore, domestic unity and public support for the UN helped Nordic countries to support these UN causes materially. For instance, Sweden, Norway and Denmark were the 3rd, 7th, and 9th largest donors to the UNHCR in 2018, contributing USD \$139, \$73 and \$65 millions respectively.⁹¹ Sweden with this contribution in absolute terms is in front of many larger advanced economies like Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Nordic states especially Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, have traditionally met the UN target of 0.7% of their GNI as foreign aid.⁹² Since 2004, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden consistently gave development assistance amounting to more than 0.8% of their GNI.⁹³ Furthermore, the consistency of this commitment is especially important since earning reputation in international arena requires long term good practices. Not only in the post-Cold

⁸⁹ Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs," 14.

⁹⁰ Clive Archer, "Still Nordic After All These Years: Nordic Security in the Post-Cold War Period," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 3 (September 1, 2005): 398.

⁹¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "2018 UNHCR Donor Ranking," UNHCR, accessed March 10, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/partners/donors/5baa00b24/2018-unhcr-donor-ranking.html>

⁹² Scott Gates and Anke Hoeffler, "Global Aid Allocation: Are Nordic Donors Different?," CSAE Working Paper Series (Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 2004).

⁹³ "Official Development Assistance (ODA) - Net ODA," accessed February 10, 2019, <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>

War context but also during the Cold War, 25% of total UN peacekeeping missions consisted of Nordic military personnel.⁹⁴ Their considerable investment in international organizations provides them the opportunity to take part in how these organizations operate and provides them the leverage to influence the decision-making procedures.⁹⁵

Consequently, thanks to the changes in the international system after the Cold War, Nordic countries' foreign and security policy objectives shifted significantly, enabling them to focus on widely-accepted issue areas such as peaceful solutions to conflicts, development, and environmental protection etc. The substantial improvement in their geostrategic location shifted their focus from territorial defense to international peace, which in turn increased their activity in the international arena. Moreover, adoption of welfare state system and economic advancement enabled these states to invest more in their prioritized policy areas which correspondingly increased their reputation and credibility in these institutions. Furthermore, due to their successful societal systems, Nordic efforts to become more proactive in international arena enjoys a substantial public support home. Domestic cohesion and national unity therefore, plays an important role in Nordics' high level activity in the international arena.

Nordic states work closely on a number of issues in international arena, with a special emphasis on post-conflict peacebuilding, which created the perception of a "Nordic Brand." These certain qualities enable Nordic states to adopt the strategies mentioned in the previous chapter. The significant cooperation among Nordic states also highlight the importance of their common foreign policy goals. Commonalities such as, advanced economies and relatively secure geostrategic locations, made for their Nordic brand.

However, it becomes harder for one to pursue such idealistic foreign policy goals and cooperate on wide range foreign policy issues with one's neighbors if one lives in a complex

⁹⁴ Baldur Thorhallsson, "Can Small States Choose Their Own Size? The Case of a Nordic State — Iceland," in *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, International Political Economy Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 132.

⁹⁵ Tarp and Bach Hansen, "Size and Influence," 16.

geopolitical environment. As this study will show in the case of Lebanon, small developing states in complex geopolitical environments often prioritize their immediate security. Furthermore, disagreements arising from regional rivalries make it harder for states to cooperate on foreign policy matters in conflict-prone regions. As Hinnebusch argues, foreign policy making in the Middle East is complicated due to high level of intransigence between the region's states and identities.⁹⁶ This hardship is especially significant for small Middle Eastern states since their foreign policy is prone to be manipulated by the other regional powers which has a direct effect on their influence and reputation in the international arena.

Thus means-of-influence factors such as geostrategic location, level of economic advancement, societal system etc., prevent some small states from becoming norm entrepreneurs in international arena on par with the Nordic states, since these states have to prioritize their economic development or territorial security in the first place. Their level of activity and reputation in the international arena are lower compared to the Nordics. Therefore, they rather utilize different intrinsic sources available to them for influencing the decision makings in the international organizations. In line with the main argument of this study, Lebanon, as a small developing state in a non-benign geostrategic location, does not enjoy a majority of the qualities that Nordic countries do in the international arena. Therefore, the next chapter will analyze the case of Lebanon in the UNSC during the Libya intervention to show what kind of sources and strategies Lebanon utilized to affect the decision making in the UNSC.

⁹⁶ Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Foreign Policy in the Middle East," in *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, ed. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, (2014), 9.

CHAPTER 3 – LEBANESE INFLUENCE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION-MAKING REGARDING THE SITUATION IN LIBYA

This chapter analyzes the role that Lebanon played in UNSC during the 2011 NATO-led Libya intervention. As I argue in this thesis, although Lebanon did not enjoy the qualities usually identified by small states scholars as vital for small state influence (e.g. good reputation, norm entrepreneurship, material capabilities to support policy initiatives, good level of institutional coordination etc.), the country utilized its unique position as the only Arab member of the Security Council to shape the institutional side of the intervention. Furthermore, during the decision-making on the situation in Libya, Lebanon became a unique “pulling-factor” by providing a linkage between the Arab League and the UNSC, as one Security Council delegate puts it while describing the Lebanese role in the Council.⁹⁷ The Lebanese influence was also recognized by number of Security Council delegates as will be discussed in detail below.

3.1 *Lack of National Unity and Cohesion in Lebanon*

In contrast with Nordic states’ national unity and domestic cohesion, Lebanon has a diverse ethnic and religious population which impedes the formation of a common Lebanese national identity. The Lebanese population mainly consists of three major religious groups: Christians (36% of the population), Shia Muslims (28%), and Sunni Muslims (28%).⁹⁸ The cultural and ideological cleavages among these groups make each group support their own vision of Lebanon vis-à-vis others. These cleavages gave birth to mainly two different identities in Lebanon: *Lebanism* and *Arabism*. While supporters of Lebanonism emphasize Lebanon’s Mediterranean heritage, supporters of Arabism emphasize its history as being part of the Arab

⁹⁷ Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, “Power in Practice,” 899.

⁹⁸ “Middle East: Lebanon - The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency,” accessed March 3, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/LIBRARY/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html>

world.⁹⁹ The cleavage among local actors further entails them to seek external support to increase their power in domestic political struggle. Due to these local groups' diverse external ties, the IR scholarship depicts Lebanon as a geopolitical battleground for various external actors.¹⁰⁰ Bassel Salloukh argues post-Syrian Lebanese foreign policy has re-emerged as a battleground between domestic and international actors trying to redefine Lebanon's position in the international arena in line with their own interests.¹⁰¹

However, "Arabism" became more prominent in Lebanon with the *Taif Accord* in 1989.¹⁰² The Taif Accord is a post-war power sharing agreement which regarded Lebanese cultural identity as "belonging to Arab identity" committed Lebanon to pro-Arab oriented foreign policy. The agreement shifted the executive power away from the Maronite President to the Sunni PM's office. For instance, previously the Maronite president had the exclusive power to negotiate and conclude international treaties on behalf of the country.¹⁰³ However, the Taif agreement stipulated that international agreements should be approved by PM and his cabinet. Furthermore, this agreement acknowledged that there is a special relationship between Syria and Lebanon and that they share common interests. Considering Syrian-Lebanese relations, Salam notes that regardless of the ruling party in Syria, Lebanon constitutes a significant foreign policy tool for Syria as part of its regional efforts vis-à-vis the United States and Israel.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, the agreement enhanced the position of the Shias in the country by increasing the power of the Shia parliamentary speaker. Therefore, the overall changes that came with the Taif agreement decreased the executive power of the Maronite Christians and relatively increased the power of Shia and Sunni Muslims in the country.

⁹⁹ Bassel F. Salloukh, "The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon," in *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization*, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (American University in Cairo Press, 2010), 284.

¹⁰⁰ Hazbun, "Assembling Security in a 'weak State,'" 1055.

¹⁰¹ Salloukh, "The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon," 285.

¹⁰² Hazbun, "Assembling Security in a 'weak State,'" 1057.

¹⁰³ Bogaards, "Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions," 32–33.

¹⁰⁴ Nawaf Salam, *Prospects of Lebanon: An Essay on Political Opportunities and Constraints*, 1987, 18.

The ambiguity in Lebanese foreign policy, due to the above-mentioned factors, can be observed in Lebanese behaviour in the UNSC as well. While in spring 2011 Lebanon adopted a normative and humanitarian stance, along with the Arab League members, against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, Lebanon objected to a Security Council attempt to condemn the Syrian regime on 28th of April 2011. Regarding the Syrian situation, the Lebanese ambassador to the UN, Nawaf Salam, emphasized his country's concern about Syria's territorial integrity and sovereignty and suggested that the peace should be reached by political means.¹⁰⁵ In terms of the Lebanese-Libyan relations, the two countries have had strained relations since the 1970s and majority of the Lebanese population was against the Gaddafi regime in 2011.¹⁰⁶ However, much of the country was divided on the Syrian issue: while Shias supported the Assad regime, Sunnis in the country decided the back the opposition. In 2013, Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah explicitly stated his organization's support for Assad's regime against the uprising in Syria.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, Lebanon had a different foreign policy behaviours between the situation in Libya, where it advocated Libyan peoples' rights, and in Syria, where it refrained from condemning the Assad regime for its human rights violations. This shows that Lebanon's domestic factors play a significant role in shaping the foreign policy objectives of Lebanon, and prevents it from adopting a consistent normative stance in international affairs, contrary to the Nordic states. Furthermore, the complexity of Lebanon's geopolitical situation means that external factors play a significant role in the Lebanese policy-making process, making Lebanon prioritize its territorial security. Therefore, in line with this study's argument, Lebanon is most likely to exert influence on the issues regarding its immediate environment, rather than on a global scale, as Nordic states do.

¹⁰⁵ UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," accessed March 27, 2019, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10403.doc.htm>

¹⁰⁶ James Denselow, "Libya and Lebanon: A Troubled Relationship," *The Guardian*, March 16, 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/16/libya-lebanon-un-security-council-resolution>

¹⁰⁷ Ian Black and Dan Roberts, "Hezbollah Is Helping Assad Fight Syria Uprising, Says Hassan Nasrallah," *The Guardian*, April 30, 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/hezbollah-syria-uprising-nasrallah>

3.2 Situation in Libya and Security Council Resolution 1970

The major protest against the Gaddafi regime started on 15 February 2011, in Benghazi. Two days later, on the so called the “day of revolt”, the number of demonstrators had increased incrementally in the other cities such as Ajdabiya, Darnah, and Zintan. However, the demonstrations were repressed by Gaddafi’s forces, who fired on demonstrators, consequently causing the death of dozens. After the civilian casualties, anti-regime protests on Libyan streets continued to escalate and there were reports mentioning that Gaddafi hired mercenaries to support his forces for repressing the demonstrations.¹⁰⁸ On 10 March, Gaddafi regime’s air forces started to bomb the rebelling cities of Brega and Zawiyah. Regime’s repression of demonstrations by air attacks in Zawiyah broke the momentum for demonstrators and made them reluctant to revolt against the regime.¹⁰⁹

The first Security Council resolution regarding the situation in Libya, S/RES/1970 (2011)1970, was adopted unanimously on 26 February 2011. It condemned Gaddafi regime’s use of force against civilians, refers the situation to the ICC, and urges the Libyan authorities to cooperate with the ICC’s prosecutor. Although resolution 1970 did not call for no-fly zone or authorize any military action, it outlined certain measures under UN Charter Chapter VII, which authorizes sanctions and the use of force, urging Gaddafi’s regime to stop its violence against its own people. Furthermore, the resolution established arms embargo, a travel ban on certain people affiliated with the humanitarian crimes, and an asset freeze.¹¹⁰

Notably, paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Resolution 1970 express the commitment of the Security Council to take additional measures.¹¹¹ However, the regime did not stop its use of

¹⁰⁸ “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” accessed March 16, 2019.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/10/20111020104244706760.html>

¹⁰⁹ Aaron Gray-Block, “Exclusive: Gaddafi Pre-Planned Attacks on Civilians: Prosecutor,” *Reuters*, April 5, 2011.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-icc-exclusive-idUSTRE73443V20110405>

¹¹⁰ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, “UN Doc. S/RES/1970.”

[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1970\(2011\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1970(2011))

¹¹¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, “UN Doc. S/RES/1970.”

force against civilians and already on 8th of March, the Security Council started to discuss further measures against the Gaddafi regime.¹¹² Based on the interviews Adler-Nissen and Pouliot conducted with the UNSC delegations during the Libya intervention, one P3 diplomat (P3 refers to the US, British and the French delegations) stated that “Resolution 1970 was adopted on a Saturday and put in a bin already on Sunday”.¹¹³ Therefore, the far-reaching 1970 Resolution exhausted all the precautionary measures to deter the Gaddafi regime from using force against the civilians and set the bar too high for the next resolution.

3.3 Lebanon and Security Council Resolution 1973

Two weeks after Resolution 1970 was adopted, the Gaddafi regime had not responded to the Security Council resolution and disregarded the Council’s calls for ending the violence in the country. The Arab League held an emergency meeting on 12th of March, a Saturday, in Cairo to discuss the situation. In the written document published after its extraordinary session, the Arab League called on the Security Council to “bear its responsibilities towards the deteriorating situation in Libya and take the necessary measures to impose a no-fly zone on the Libyan military aviation, and to take precautionary measures to protect civilians in the country while respecting the territorial integrity of neighbouring states”.¹¹⁴ However, the same document also rejected “all forms of foreign intervention in Libya”.¹¹⁵ The Arab League’s call for a no-fly zone changed the Security Council’s course of action regarding the situation in

¹¹² “Libya Chronology of Events: Security Council Report,” accessed April 17, 2019.

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/libya.php>

¹¹³ Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, “Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya,” *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 900.

¹¹⁴ “The Arab League: Outcome of the Council in Its Extraordinary Session on Libya,” accessed March 5, 2019. <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/190-crisis-in-libya/3249-the-arab-league-outcome-of-the-council-in-its-extraordinary-session-on-libya>

¹¹⁵ “The Arab League: Outcome of the Council in Its Extraordinary Session on Libya.”

Libya. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that “if the Arabs were willing to take the lead, perhaps an international intervention was not impossible after all”.¹¹⁶

Lebanon, acknowledging its unique role as the only Arab League member on the Security Council, immediately took the initiative to contact the Council president and its members individually on Sunday, 13 March. However, during the initial meetings, no consensus could be reached on the issue of how a no-fly zone over Libya could be established.¹¹⁷ On 15th of March, Russian ambassador Churkin stated that “a no-fly zone over Libya cannot be adopted quickly unless the enforcement strategy and air forces are clearly defined. Otherwise, it is just beating the air”.¹¹⁸ In reference to ambassador Churkin’s points, Nawaf Salam said that “these are legitimate questions and we are working on them”.¹¹⁹ Germany advocated that a military operation against Gaddafi should take place only with the regional support of Arab states. However, after the Arab League’s call for a no-fly zone over Libya, German ambassador Wittig expressed his doubts about the sincerity of the Arab League.¹²⁰ Both German and Russian delegates expressed their concerns about the contradiction between “no-fly zone” and “rejection of foreign intervention” during the Security Council meetings. Wittig emphasized that the necessary transition in Libya should occur through political means and not military action. He further expressed his concern that “the military confrontation could have its results on the wider region as well.”¹²¹ Russian

¹¹⁶ Manuel Fröhlich and Natalie Tröller, “Decision Making in Times of Crisis: Germany’s Decision to Abstain from Security Council Resolution 1973” (Reformkompass.de, 2014), 14. <https://regierungsforschung.de/teaching-case-decision-making-in-times-of-crisis-germanys-decision-to-abstain-from-security-council-resolution-1973/>

¹¹⁷ Fröhlich and Tröller, 15.

¹¹⁸ Jerome Delay, “Details Sought on Libya No-Fly Plan,” The Moscow Times, March 15, 2011. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2011/03/15/details-sought-on-libya-no-fly-plan-a5622>

¹¹⁹ Delay.

¹²⁰ Melanie Marjanovic, “Germany’s Voting Behaviour in the United Nations Security Council on Resolution 1973: Explaining the Case with Neoclassical Realism and Social Constructivism” (Radboud University Nijmegen, 2015), 51.

¹²¹ “United Nations Security Council Meeting 6498” (United Nations Meeting Records, March 17, 2011). <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.6498>

ambassador Churkin likewise stated that “the military action would be regrettable and would further undermine the peace in the entire North African region.”¹²²

In response to this skepticism, Lebanese ambassador Salam, who drafted the statements, assured that the no-fly zone would not be considered as a foreign intervention from the West.¹²³ During the press briefing after the Security Council meeting on 17 March, ambassador Salam stated that “Arab or non-Arab pilots participating in no-fly zone, will be participating under a UNSC resolution in accordance with the charter of this institution. This is pursuing the international law in response to the Arab request itself and based on a call from the Libyan population. Therefore, this in no way could qualify as foreign intervention.”¹²⁴ As the only Arab representative in the Security Council, ambassador Salam played a significant role in eliminating the scepticism of other members, to a certain extent, regarding military action in Libya. Salam’s comments were taken seriously since Lebanon is located in the same geopolitical environment as Libya and consequences of the resolution regarding situation Libya would have direct effects on Lebanon as well.

When drafting resolution 1973 along with France and Britain, Lebanon mostly focussed on establishing the “no-fly zone” while “excluding foreign occupation” on Libyan territory. In line with these priorities, according to Salam Lebanon particularly contributed to the preparation of paragraphs 4, 6, and 8 of the resolution, which concern the provisions of “foreign occupation force”, establishing “no-fly zone,” and authorizing member states to “take all necessary measures to enforce the compliance with no-fly zone”.¹²⁵ Therefore, when drafting

¹²² “United Nations Security Council Meeting 6498.”

¹²³ Marjanovic, “Germany’s Voting Behaviour in the United Nations Security Council on Resolution 1973: Explaining the Case with Neoclassical Realism and Social Constructivism,” 52.

¹²⁴ *Nawaf Salam (Lebanon) on Libya, Security Council Media Stakeout*, 15 March 2011. <http://webtv.un.org/watch/nawaf-salam-lebanon-on-libya-security-council-media-stakeout/5238083601001/?term=&lan=english>

¹²⁵ Adeeb al-Sufi, “Libya: Maghzi Qarar Majlis al-Aman al-Duwali wa Tabiatih, mulakhat ma’a Nawaf Salam,” MCD, March 18, 2011. <https://www.mc-doualiya.com/articles/201106318-nawaf-salam-decision-united-nation-vote>. Transliterated and translated from Arabic. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from works written in Arabic are my own.

the resolution 1973, the Lebanese objectives were to ensure that the resolution would not have as its consequence the occupation of any part of the Libyan territory. During the 17 March Security Council meeting, Salam further underlined the importance of close cooperation between the Security Council and the Arab League. Lebanon also urged the Security Council to act immediately, before a no-fly zone would be ineffective, by providing specific information such as statements by Gaddafi's son, which indicated the rebels would be defeated within 48 hours.¹²⁶

Strategically, Ambassador Salam decided join with British and French diplomats since they were the most active other delegates. This was especially important since the Lebanese, British, and French diplomats had certain informational advantages that enabled them to make compelling arguments. The Lebanese delegation further utilized its cultural and regional affinity to make compelling arguments as no other delegation could. Lebanese delegates called the Libyan people "brothers and sisters," which positioned them in the centre of the debate.¹²⁷ Related to this, some Western delegates stated that "The Lebanese delegates were highly engaged and involved in the discussions being held in the Council. The delegates were advancing efforts to the Arab League to put forth demands while arguing: "we are sitting there in the region, this is our patch, and we are telling you that you should do X, Y and Z"".¹²⁸ The last statement above shows how Lebanon set itself as one of the main actors in the Council by utilizing its unique regional role.

Security Council resolution 1973 was adopted on 17 March 2011, with ten votes in favour and five abstentions. The members who abstained were China, Russia, Germany, India, and Brazil.¹²⁹ The paragraphs 4, 6 and 8 of the resolution included the Lebanese priorities of

¹²⁶ "UN Authorises No-Fly Zone over Libya," March 18, 2011.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201131720311168561.html>

¹²⁷ "United Nations Security Council Meeting 6498."

¹²⁸ Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, "Power in Practice," 901.

¹²⁹ "United Nations Security Council Meeting 6498."

“no foreign occupation”, “no-fly zone,” and “all necessary measures to impose the ban of flights” clauses. Lebanese efforts as the only Arab representative in the Security Council and its interlinkage with the Arab League helped push skeptic countries toward abstention rather than votes against, or veto in the case of China and Russia.

After the resolution 1973 was adopted, Russian ambassador Churkin stated that “Our position regarding the unacceptability of the use of force against the civilian population of Libya remains unchanged. However, the Arab League turned to the Security Council requesting to take immediate measures to ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. We gave that request our full attention.”¹³⁰ In the same line, Chinese ambassador Li Baodong stated that “China is always against the use of force in international relations. We asked specific questions during the consultations on resolution 1973 (2011). However, regrettably, many of those questions failed to be clarified or answered. Meanwhile China attaches great importance to Arab League’s request to establish a no-fly zone over Libya. Considering this and the situation in Libya, China decided to abstain from the voting on resolution 1973.”¹³¹ Regarding this, Bellamy argues that in the absence of Arab League’s support, China and Russia would veto the resolution 1973.¹³² Regarding the role of regional actors, Chesterman argues that Arab League and African Union’s support for the resolution 1973 left the opposing members in the Council unwilling to be seen as an obstacle to the resolution.¹³³

Regarding the Lebanese influence on the decision making, a Security Council delegate stated that “the Lebanese delegates were a unique regional pulling-factor. They were an inter-linkage between the Security Council and the Arab League. They did not only interpret what

¹³⁰ “United Nations Security Council Meeting 6498.”

¹³¹ “United Nations Security Council Meeting 6498.”

¹³² Alex J. Bellamy, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2011): 266.

¹³³ Simon Chesterman, “‘Leading from Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2011): 282.

the Arab League said or did but also followed up these issues in the Security Council.”¹³⁴ This highlights the disproportionate influence Lebanon was able to exert in the Security Council through its unique regional expertise and position. Although Lebanon did not have certain characteristics such as forerunner reputation, the Lebanese delegation was able to set itself as a competent actor in the Security Council through its unique Arab seat.

As mentioned above, in the early stages before the resolution 1973 was adopted, the U.S. position in the council was not certain regarding a military action in Libya. After the Arab League’s decision to call on the Security Council to establish no-fly zone over Libya, American and British diplomats tried to find a formula to enforce the Gaddafi regime to stop its violence against the Libyan people and to meet the Arab League’s requirements, whose position revolved around refusing to place “foreign boots” on Libyan territory at the same time.¹³⁵ Ambassador Salam played a key role overcoming this deadlock by using the innovative language of “excluding foreign occupation” which was later placed in the resolution. Regarding this, a diplomat in the Council stated that “it was a very diplomatic and creative wording and this compromise was crucial to overcome Russian opposition to the resolution”.¹³⁶

During its presidency in the Security Council in September 2011, Lebanon further followed up the situation in Libya and took the initiative to draft Security Council resolution 2009. This resolution formed a UN mission, UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya), which aimed to help the people of Libya to get more stability, prepare their constitution, prepare for elections as well as enhance and protect the human rights in the country.¹³⁷ Furthermore, the initial statement of the resolution reaffirmed Security Council’s strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Libya, also a

¹³⁴ Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, “Power in Practice,” 899.

¹³⁵ Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 900.

¹³⁶ Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 901.

¹³⁷ “United Nations Security Council Resolution 2009, UN Doc. S/RES/2009.” (September 16, 2011). [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2009%20\(2011\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2009%20(2011))

significant provision of the resolution 1973. Topics put forward by Lebanon during its presidency in the Council further highlights the importance the Lebanese delegation attached to the regional issues.

Consequently, it is safe to say that the situation in Libya opened up the window of opportunity for Lebanon to raise its profile and to play more proactive role in the international arena. As Alaaldin notes, the UN's sanctioned intervention in Libya came to exist because of Arab states' endorsement of a no-fly zone decision.¹³⁸ Lebanon's role in this matter cannot be ignored since Lebanon played a determining role in the Council on behalf of the Arab League. Regarding the importance of Lebanese participation in the Security Council, Salam said that "the Lebanese delegation pushed the Council to act immediately which prevented a massacre that would have taken place in Benghazi if the resolution was not adopted on time."¹³⁹ Furthermore, when commenting on whether Lebanon was successful in the Security Council or not, Nawaf Salam stated that "There is no doubt that the presence of Lebanon within the Security Council gave him a special position in defense of his issues, and on the other hand, Lebanon has proved to be the best defender of Arab issues."¹⁴⁰ Ambassador Salam's comment highlights the importance and priority of regional issues for Lebanese foreign policy objectives. Particularly, "in defense of his issues" part of his comment mainly refers to the Lebanese-Israeli conflict while the rest claims a significant role in the Arab world. Considering this, it can be said that the Lebanese foreign policy focus on regional issues delimits its sphere of influence to the regional context than the global one.

¹³⁸ Ranj Alaaldin, "Libya and the Arab League," in *Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya*, ed. Karin Larssen and Dag Henriksen (Oxford University Press, 2016), 114.

¹³⁹ "Salam: Naglu Malaf Suriya li-Majlisi al-Aman la Yumkin an Yahsula illa Bina ala Talabi Arabi," December 29, 2011. <https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/content/print/233412.html> Transliterated and translated from Arabic

¹⁴⁰ "Salam: Naglu Malaf Suriya li-Majlisi al-Aman la Yumkin an Yahsula illa Bina ala Talabi Arabi." Transliterated and translated from Arabic.

As I have shown in this chapter, although Lebanon lacks the above-mentioned certain characteristics that small state scholars propose as requirements for small states influence, it played determining role in the Security Council by transforming its cultural and regional affinity to Libya into influence. Although Lebanon does not enjoy forerunner reputation in the international arena, the Lebanese delegates were able to establish themselves as competent actors utilizing its regional affinity to Libya in the Security Council. They made certain statements claiming that “we are sitting in the same region” and Libyan people are our “sisters and brothers.” Furthermore, their unique regional role enabled them to overcome certain delegates’ oppositions to the Resolution 1973. In the case of Nordic states, the substantial improvement in their geostrategic location after the Cold War redefined their values of their foreign and security policies which in turn increased their activity in the international arena. Their prioritization of widely-accepted issue areas and domestic coherence enabled them to adopt more active roles in the international arena. They have acted as mediators in a number of conflicts in different regions and continents. Thus, Nordics’ focus on normative issues as foreign policy objectives increased their spheres of influence to a wider scale regardless of certain regional context while small developing states’ spheres of influence often limited to their immediate region.

CONCLUSION

This study has proposed and extended the existing literature about small states in several ways. The most frequent mode of analysis within the literature has focused on comparative case-studies of large states as compared to small states. The points that I have added with this study have concentrated on a comparison between small states from two different regions and continents. Such a comparison shows how certain features that differ at the national level may also affect the foreign policy goals of the countries, and their overall foreign policy coherence. More than this, a comparison between European and non-European small states shows how differences in foreign policy aims within two different regions, while at the same time contrasting the differences in the means utilized by these countries. Although Lebanon lacks certain qualitative means-of-influence as suggested by the small states literature, it played a significant role in the drafting and adoption of Security Council Resolution 1973 by transforming its cultural and regional affinity to Libya into influence. On behalf of the Arab League, Lebanon played, to a certain extent, a legitimizing role to adopt the Resolution 1973 which authorized a military action against the Gaddafi regime.

Although most research has been done in small state literature by considering cases from the European region, this study offers a comparative examination to highlight how lack of certain qualitative and quantitative characteristics can be compensated through utilizing other sources for small developing states vis-à-vis forerunner small states. The geostrategic position, as well as cultural and economic factors, of small states directly impact their ability to influence political outcomes in institutionalized contexts. In the case of the Nordic European states analyzed in this study, by utilizing the above-mentioned qualities Nordic states became active agenda-setters which, in turn increased their influence in the international arena to achieve their foreign policy goals. Furthermore, their norm entrepreneurship and focus on widely-accepted

policy areas as foreign policy objectives provided them with the opportunity to increase their spheres of influence in international arena whereas small developing states' influence is often limited to a certain regional context. Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and human rights are their main objectives, and they do not face pressing concerns with regard to their own regional security interests. Moreover, their advanced domestic economies enable them to invest in these thematic issue areas which consolidates their commitment to the common goals of the international community. In addition to these factors, their national unity and high-level public support for UN causes illustrates that, domestically, these countries practice what they preach in the international arena, a significant criteria of norm entrepreneurship.

In the Lebanese case, cultural and regional affinities played a much more relevant role as a means of influence deployed by Lebanon in the Security Council discussions. Despite the fact Lebanon does not possess certain qualitative means suggested by the small state literature that can translate into international influence, the country utilized its regional and cultural affinity to the issue at hand—Libya—to influence the Security Council. This regional affinity, plus the fact that Lebanon is a member of the Arab League, contributed to the weight and relevance of its delegates' views on Council proceedings. As one delegate in the Security Council put it, “Lebanon became a regional pulling-factor” which enabled the Council to adopt resolution 1973 as early as possible. In order to make compelling arguments, Lebanese delegates argued that Lebanon was the only state on the Council that would be directly affected from the outcomes of the situation in Libya. These arguments were crucial to reducing opposition to the Resolution 1973.

After Lebanon's membership in the Council, Lebanese ambassador Nawaf Salam stated that the “Security Council gave Lebanon a special position in defense of his issues, and on the

other hand, Lebanon has proved to be the best defender of Arab issues.”¹⁴¹ This statement highlights the importance of regional issues and territorial security for Lebanese foreign policy objectives. Therefore, based on its foreign policy goals and in recognition of its competence in the Council, Lebanon was able to exert influence on the issue concerning its immediate environment. However, considering the issue areas Nordic states prioritize as their foreign policy objectives—e.g. peacebuilding, environmental protection, civilian aspect of conflicts etc.--their influence is not limited by a specific geographic area or crisis situations such as Libya. These widely accepted issue areas provide Nordic states with impartial reputation in the international arena which increases their potential to exert influence.

Limitations of the present study and avenues for future research

This study focused on a comparison of small states means-of-influence to broaden the small state horizon to encompass the important case of Lebanon. The multilateral setting involved in the decision-making process within the Security Council provides an opportunity for small states to follow and incentivize other states to pursue their own foreign policy aims, while at the same time reducing the negative effects of their lack of material capabilities and human resources. Therefore, it is important to analyze small states' behavior in international organizations, since coercion is not an option for them.

Two limitations of the present research need to be highlighted. First, the fact that I employed one case-study, the Lebanese case, to contrast developing small states with Nordic states means the lessons of Lebanon for other small states is limited. Secondly, connected to the future research on this topic, another limitation is that this study serves as an exploratory analysis of the international political behavior of small states in certain situations, without

¹⁴¹ “Salam: Naglu Malaf Suriya li-Majlisi al-Aman la Yumkin an Yahsula illa Bina ala Talabi Arabi.”
<https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/content/print/233412.html>

focusing on any prior theoretical framework. However, the main aim of the study was to build upon certain cases and ideas in order to construct theoretical knowledge through the analysis of more cases.

There are several paths which can be taken by further studies on the topic at hand. Investigating the regional characteristics and the rhetoric of various officials from small states would help delimit what elements of the Lebanon case are unique to it and what elements are used by other developing small states, particularly regional expertise in crisis situations. In this regard the role of African states in shaping UNSC resolutions by using their regional expertise or acting as conduits for regional consensus could be a fruitful area to explore. Further study could also illustrate when these means-of-influence work, and when they do not. That said, this study has hopefully shown through its one case why it is relevant to look not only at well-analyzed developed countries, but also less examined cases of small state influence.

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