Consociationalism and Ethnic Cleavages; Redefining the Boundaries of Consociationalism

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Abstract

"A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively." (Mill, 1873, 308). With this, John Stuart Mill opened chapter sixteen of his book *Considerations on Representative Democracy,* and established his case for why democracies need to have a uniting factor. But what about countries that do not have this uniting factor? Countries that have divides. Almost 200 years after John Stuart Mill published his book, Arend Lijphart wrote about just that, democracies in divided societies. Lijphart coined the theory consociational democracies, which are democracies that have divides based on factors such as language, religion, ethnicity or culture, but they still function as democracies (Lijphart, 1969). However, Lijphart's theory has not been without controversy, as some criticize the idea that consociationalism can work for countries that have an ethnic divide (Barry, 1975). The question about whether democracy can work in ethnically divided societies is now more relevant than ever, with globalization and international migration, more and more societies are becoming ethnically diverse. This paper will look deeper into the question of how consociational societies handle ethnic divides, and by doing that hopes to show that an consociationalism is incompatible with an ethnic divide.

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Introduction

In his paper *Consociational Democracy,* published in 1969, Arend Lijphart called attention to a type of democracy that he found to have gone unnoticed. Lijphart mentions the classification of political systems by Gabriel A. Almond, who classifies political systems in three different categories (Lijphart, 1969, 207). First, he mentions the political system in countries such as Britain and the US, which he classified as the Anglo-American political system (Lijphart, 1969, 207) Second, Almond mentions the political system in France Germany and Italy, which he classified as the Continental European political system (Lijphart, 1969, 207). The third category was not specified by Almond, but includes the Low Countries of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries (Lijphart, 1969, 207). Almond does not go deeply into the political system of the third category, instead saying that they are a combination between both the Continental and Anglo-American political system (Lijphart, 1969, 207). While the qualifications have specific geographical names, Almond's classifications were not tied to any geographic location, as Lijphart mentions (Lijphart, 1969, 207-208). Lijphart focuses his paper on the third classification that Almond made, the Low Countries and Scandinavia. While Almond claims that these countries are hybrids of the two other categories, Lijphart claims that these countries are actually their own separate political system, which he names as consociational democracies (Lijphart, 1969, 207). Lijphart describes consociational democracies as the following; "Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy." (Lijphart, 1969, 216). This is a very concise way of describing consociationalism, so perhaps a broader description might be better. Consociationalism is a political system for divided societies, this divide might be caused by race, religion, language, or ethnicity, and the divide is also seen in the

political system, where political parties represent their own segment of society (Bogaards, 2017, 1). Consociationalism focusses on the political leaders of the different segments of society, who, realizing that they will have to cooperate to run a stable country, decide to accommodate each other (Bogaards, 2017,1). Consociational democracy is built on four principles, which were described by Bogaards in his entry into *the Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Theory,* which are the following; "a grand coalition government with the leaders of all main parties/communities; proportionality in political representation and the distribution of resources; segmental autonomy; and a mutual veto" (Bogaards, 2017, 1). However, these principles are not absolutely set, they can be adapted to the country that decides to use consociationalism to deal with the divisions in the society (Bogaards, 2017, 1). Lijphart's model was used around the world to bridge divides in society and end conflict (Bogaards, 2017, 1).

While consociationalism was embraced by parts of the political science community as a way to handle conflict in divided societies, there was also criticism against the theory. Part of this criticism was against the use of consociationalism in societies divided by ethnic conflict. In his paper, *Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy*, Brian Barry writes about his criticism against consociationalism. While he first discusses how he does not believe all countries that are claimed to be consociational are consociational, he later goes further into how consociationalism is not compatible with ethnic conflict. Barry mentions three reasons why consociationalism could not be compatible with ethnic division. The first is the fact that acts of gross inhumanity are mostly aimed at groups that are ethnically different from the perpetrators, especially when the victims also have physical or cultural differences (Barry, 1975, 502). The second is that religion and class different are about organizations, specifically belonging to a certain organization, whereas ethnic differences are about solidarity groups, while they might have an organization, it is not necessary to have an

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organization to start riots just the ability to recognize who belongs to which groups (Barry, 1975, 502). Third, is the fact that ethnic groups do not have a set way of interpreting the world, religion can follow a certain set of rules which can be used by political leaders to explain why a policy is necessary, but that is not true for an ethnic group (Barry, 1975, 502). The fourth is perhaps the most important one, a religious or class conflict is about how the country is run, what values are more important for instance, however an ethnic conflict may not be about how the country is run, but if it should be a country at all (Barry, 1975, 503). This is important because it is something that cannot easily be solved by cooperation nor accommodation, as it is about the fundamental existence of the country itself.

Rabushka and Shepsle are also critics of consociationalism in ethnically divided societies. In their book, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*, the authors describe several cases where ethnically diverse societies experienced conflict. Rabushka and Shepsle question how consociationalism can solve these conflicts, especially because many of their cases experienced civilized power-sharing at one point, and violent conflict at another (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 207-208). They offer several solutions that could be used to deal with ethnically divided societies, although they argue that the feasibility of these solutions is not guaranteed (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 213). The first solution is the "Denial of independent, decision-making authority" (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 213). With this they show that leaders from different ethnic groups can work together in times of colonial conflict, but not when the colonial powers are gone, by not allowing these countries to be independent, the ethnic conflict will not come up (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 213-214). The second point is "Restrictions on independent, decision-making authority" (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 215). This means decentralizing the government and putting most decisions on the local level not the federal level (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 215). The third point is "Restrictions on free political competition" (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 215).

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With this, the authors argue, the elites would practice a level of secrecy when it comes to policy making, and disregarding the pressure of the mass electorate (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 215-216). The fourth solution is "Restrictions on the scope of government" (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 216). By taking away the government's ability to distribute public goods, they argue, the reason for ethnic conflict will also be diminished, as distributing public goods can lead to the government giving more than one ethnicity over the other (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 216). The fifth solution is "Creation of homogenous societies" (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 216). This would mean a form of ethno-nationalism, allowing countries to break up in accordance with ethnicity (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 216-217). The sixth solution is "Creation of permanent external enemies" (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 217). This would mean uniting the people against a common enemy, forcing them to work together through that (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 217). However, while the authors offer many solutions, they also critique the solutions they give, seeing most of them as not completely viable, and some as going directly against the democratic process. In the end, they conclude, that there is no way a society with intense differences can be manageable, painting a bleak picture for the countries that have ethnic difference (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 217).

The debate regarding consociationalism and its success for multiethnic societies is still open, and in his book *Power-Sharing in South Africa*, Arend Lijphart responds to his critics as well. While this research might not be as influential as the book by Rabushka and Shepsle or the response from Arend Lijphart, it would like to add to that discussion. By looking deeper into ethnically divided societies, looking at how they function, and if they are even still consociational.

Chapter 1

1.1 Research questions

As was presented above, the criticism against consociationalism is not rare, and specifically the criticism against using consociationalism for ethnic conflict. But with the world becoming more globalized, there are more and more societies that have ethnic cleavages. The Netherlands, the country that Lijphart used as his first model on consociationalism, has also started experiencing ethnic differences (Bogaards, 2017, 1). The country took in guest workers in the 1960's and 1970's fro countries such as Morocco, Turkey, Spain and former Yugoslavia (De Valk, Esveldt, Henkens, Liefbroer, 2001, 50). At the same time the Netherlands also lost its colony of Surinam, which led to immigration from Surinam to the Netherlands as well (Biervliet, Bovenkerk, Köbben, 1975, 337). This led to the Netherlands currently having 1.2 million people who are decedents of immigrants from Suriname, Turkey, Morocco, or the Dutch Antilles (CBS, 2017). With the arrival of new immigrants, the Netherlands also experienced a growth in its Muslim population. In 2017, about five percent of all citizens in the Netherlands identify as Muslim (NOS, 2017). This added a new religion to the power sharing structure in the Netherlands, which was based on different denominations of Catholics, and Protestants, and a general power which mostly consisted of Liberal and Socialist (Lijphart, 1990 ,96). One would assume that, because the societal cleavages were based on religion, the Muslim power would easily integrate into the power sharing structure, but this was not the case. There have been many lawsuits about Muslim education in the Netherlands, while there are parties of different denominations in the Dutch parliament, there is no Muslim party (Driessen, Merry, 2006, 204) (Tweede Kamer der

Staten-Generaal, 2019). The question here is, is it really about the Muslim religion? Or would things have been different if the growth of the Muslim population came from the conversion of white Dutch people? Of course, there has been a lot of criticism regarding ethnic conflict and consociationalism already, some of which was mentioned earlier. But this paper would like to look beyond just the theoretical approach of ethnic conflict and consociationalism, and look at different consociational or formally consociational countries. By looking at consociational and former consociational countries this paper would like to show that countries that have mainly an ethnic divide, instead of a religious or class divide, are more likely to have conflict, and could even be more likely to fail at implementing a consociational democracy. By looking at not just success cases of consociationalism, but also look at cases that failed, we can see what exactly made consociationalism fail in different countries, and how this can be prevented for other countries, or how we can see if a country is about to fail as a consocational democracy. Of course, this paper does not advocate for the idea that people of different ethnicities cannot live together in one society, but instead would like to show how, if a society does have different ethnicities, one can spot when consociationalism is failing. In order to do this, this paper will look at two different research questions. The first is, are societies that are ethnically divided and claimed to be consocational still consociational? And if not, what is the reason that these societies are no longer consociational? This paper hypothesizes that most ethnically divided societies are no longer consocational, and the main reason for that is the ethnic divide in the society.

1.2 Definitions

In order for the question of consociationalism and ethnic cleavages in a society to be studied, first we must establish some definitions for different concepts. The first concept is

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that of ethnicity, or ethnic. When it comes to ethnicity, this paper will use the research from two different sources, the definition given by Barry in his paper on consociationalism, and the research from Rabushka and Shepsle on politics in plural societies. In his paper on consociationalism, Barry refers to ethnicity as belong to a 'people' or a 'race' (Barry, 1975, 503). Barry used his definition mostly to indicate that ethnicity, unlike religion or class, is something that is visible, such as skin colour or large cultural differences. This definition is good but not complete, because how would we define a 'people'? Or what definition would we use for race? For this we will turn to Rabushka and Shepsle, and look at what they use to define ethnicity. In their book Rabushka and Shepsle use four different indicators for ethnicity, race, religion, language, and tribe and custom (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 8-10). They argue that these are all ethnic divisions, and that the ethnic divisions coincide with political divisions (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 10). However, the authors consider some indicators of ethnicity more important than others. When it comes to the religion indicator and the language indicator, the authors argue that both are part of a larger ethnic division and are not the only indicators of different ethnicities (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 9-10). They argue that, while language and religion can be a division in society, it is part of a larger ethnic division (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 9-10). As an example for this they discuss the case of Belgium when it comes to a language division; "For example, Flemings and Walloons in Belgium each insist they are the product of a long history of different cultural experiences of which language is only a surface characteristic." (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 9). They argue that it is the same way for religion, religion can be a divide in society, but only when related to a larger divide, and a common religion also does not mean there is no divide in a society (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 9-10). Therefore, for the definition of ethnicity in this we will consider mainly race and tribe and customs, and consider religion and language to be able to be linked to ethnicity, however, they are not a main ethnic characteristic. Now the

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question of what exactly race and tribe and customs are comes up. When it comes to race, the authors were very clear, phenotypical features, meaning any features of looks that are visible, for example, hair type, skin colour, and facial form (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 8). Tribe and customs are different from race, as in people of the same race can belong to a different tribe and have different customs, however tribe and customs are self-explanatory, belonging to a certain tribe or having certain distinct customs as a people means that you have a different ethnicity (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 10). To summarize the definition provided by the two sources that we used we will consider ethnicity to be the following; *Belonging to a 'people' or a 'race' that have distinct customs, phenotypical features, or are considered to be a tribe, religion or language can be part of ethnicity but are not the main distinguishing factor.*

The second concept that is necessary to define, is the concept of ethnic conflict. Conflict is difficult to define, as it can involve many different things. Conflict can mean violence, as in an armed conflict, or it can be a conflict on an individual level, between two individuals. However, the use of ethnic conflict in this research will be one on a national level, between groups in society. Of course, there is also differences between conflict, and ethnic conflict is just one type of conflict out of many. However, because this research looks specifically at societies that have conflict because of an ethnic divide, we will only look at ethnic conflict. When it comes to the use of violence in conflict, this paper will look at both violent and non-violent conflict. While violent conflict shows and obvious failing of the consociational democracy, non-violent forms of conflict also show that consociationalism has not worked, as consociationalism is about managing any form of conflict between groups. For the definition of ethnic conflict, this research will look at the definition provided by Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff. Cordell and Wolff describe conflict as "a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspective entirely just, goals."

(Cordell and Wolff, 2011, 4). However, ethnic conflict goes a little further than that, as Cordell and Wolff put it, ethnic conflict is "that in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions." (Cordell and Wolff, 2011, 4). This means that the conflict itself must be motivated by ethnicity by at least one party, and that the main part of the conflict itself is related to ethnicity. By taking from the definitions of conflict and ethnic conflict provided by Cordell and Wolff, this research shall use the following definition of ethnic conflict; *the incompatibility of goals between two or more actors, where at least one of the actors' goals are based in ethnicity and where the main part of the conflict is motivated by ethnicity.*

Chapter 2

2.1 Data

The countries that will be used in this study are selected from a list first created by Paul Dixon. Dixon made a list of countries that were claimed to be consociational and put them in a table, depending on when and by whom they were claimed to be consociational success stories (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 68-69). The list comes from the book *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*, by Arend Lijphart (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 68-69). The list itself contains all countries that are considered consociational by Lijphart, as of 2007 which is when the book was published (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 68-69). Because this research is based on consociational democracies that have ethnic divides, we will first look at what type of divide each country has, ethnic or non-ethnic. We will do this by going over each country and using the definition of ethnicity provided above to establish whether the divide is ethnic. The data used for this will be presented in table 1

First, let us look at the list of countries that are included. These are the following; Afghanistan, Antilles (NL), Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Fiji, India, Israel, Kosovo, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Macedonia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Suriname, Switzerland, Uruguay (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 68-69).

Afghanistan is an incredibly diverse country when it comes to ethnicity. While religiously the country is mainly homogenous, according to the Central Statistics Authority of

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Afghanistan ninety-nine percent of the country is Muslim, with eighty percent being Sunnis (Adeney, 2008, 538). Although this is an old number and the accuracy is not absolutely guaranteed, it is safe to assume that Afghanistan is relatively heteronomous when it comes to religion (Adeney, 2008, 538). However, when it comes to ethnicity, Afghanistan is incredibly diverse, with forty two percent of the country being Pashtun, and the rest of the country being compromised by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, and other small tribes. (Adeney, 2008, 538). However, the main divide in Afghan society is not an ethnic one, while the society is ethnically very diverse, the different ethnic communities do not seem to have large amounts of conflict, and there have been no secessionist groups (Adeney, 2008, 539). This does not mean that there is no conflict between different ethnic groups at all, but instead that there is a larger divide in Afghan society that sometimes spills over into the ethnic divide. This is the religious divide, mainly the divide between the extremely conservative Muslims, the less conservative Muslims, and the different types of sects within Islam (Mishali-Ram, 2011, 264-268). While the religious divide and the ethnic divide are largely tight together, the main divide is an inter-religious divide within the Islamic religion. While ethnicity might come into play, for instance with the Hazaras who are Shia their religion is tied to their ethnicity, the religion is not necessary for the ethnic groups to divide themselves (Adeney, 2008, 539). Therefore, we will not consider Afghanistan to have an ethnic divide.

The Dutch Antilles were an autonomous territory within the Dutch kingdom (van Aller, 1994, 575). A former colony of the Netherlands, the territory became semi-independent in 1948 (van Aller, 1994, 573-574). The divide in the Dutch Antilles was largely based on the competition between two of the islands, Aruba and Curacao (van Aller, 1994, 574). Aruba wanted to be independent of Curacao and instead have its own independent relationship with the Netherlands (van Aller, 1994, 574). This came from the fear of Aruba that Curacao would

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become too powerful within the island group, Curacao's population was bigger than that of Aruba, however Aruba was more densely populated (van Aller, 1994, 577). The Dutch Antilles stopped existing in 2010, with Aruba and Curacao becoming separate countries within the Dutch kingdom, and the rest of the islands that were part of the Dutch Antilles becoming "special cities" within the Dutch kingdom (Parool, 2010). Nevertheless, the divide within the Dutch Antilles was not an ethnic divide, but one of nationality, a competition between two different islands. Therefore, we will not consider the Dutch Antilles to have an ethnic divide.

Austrian society has several cleavages which play out into political cleavages. First there is the economic cleavages in Austrian society, between the upper class and the working class (Hafez and Heinisch, 2018, 652). Second there is the religious cleavage, which is between Catholics and seculars (Hafez and Heinisch, 2018, 652). These cleavages play out in the political arena with party association, the working-class usually votes for the Socialists, while the upper class votes for the People's Party (Bingham Powell, 1976, 3). The same goes for the Catholics and seculars, while the Catholics vote for the People's Party, the seculars vote for the Socialists (Bingham Powell, 1976, 3-4). However, the Austrian political cleavages have also changed over time, the introduction of parties such as the Freedom party and the Green party means that there are now more parties that represent similar cleavages (Hafez and Heinisch, 2018, 658-665). This leads to two parties fighting over the votes from one group, such as the Socialists and the Freedom party both fighting over the working-class vote (Hafez and Heinisch, 2018, 658). However, while the Austrian society does have political and religious divides, it does not have an ethnic divide.

Just as Austria, Belgium has several cleavages, the most noticeable one being language. Belgium is divided up in two main language groups, with the Flemish speaking part in the North, and the French speaking part in the South (Deschouwer, 2012, 8). But language

is not the only cleavage that exists in Belgian society. There is also a divide between the Socialists and the Catholics, with the Catholics being more represented in the Northern Flemish speaking part, and the Socialists being more represented in the Southern French speaking part that housed more industrial areas (Deschouwer, 2012, 8). This divide further plays out in politics, there are different Flemish and French parties, while the parties might be similar, for example the Christian-Democrats are a Flemish party and a French party, they represent two different groups (Billiet, Maddens, Frognier, 2006, 913). The divide is further seen in the media, with the Flemish and French watching different television networks, listening to different radio stations, and reading different newspapers (Billiet, Maddens, Frognier, 2006, 914). However, while the French and Flemish communities might be separate in a lot of ways, they do not belong to different ethnic groups. The two groups do not have different phenotypical features, nor do they belong to different tribes or have distinct cultural differences. Therefore Belgium will not be considered as having an ethnic divide.

The divide in Bosnian society is mainly between the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Croats (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005, 575). This divide resulted in a conflict during the Bosnian war in the 1990's, with the Bosnian Muslims being caught between the Bosnian Serbs who wanted Bosnian Serb regions to be a part of Serbia, and the Croats who wanted their regions to be part of Croatia (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005, 575-577). The war ended in 1995, with the Dayton Peace Accords, but this was after many, especially Bosnian Muslims, lost their lives (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005, 578-579). The Peace Accords ended up effectively splitting up Bosnia, into two semi states, one for the Bosnian Serbs, and one for the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, effectively splitting up the society amongst ethnic lines more (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005, 580). However, while the conflict in Bosnia was horrible, it was not an ethnic divide. The Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs do not have different phenotypical features, and while they might have a different religion, they do not have largely

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different customs nor do they belong to different tribes. Therefore, Bosnia will not be considered as having an ethnic divide but instead a religious divide that also included nationality as a divide.

Burundi, much like Bosnia, is a clear case of an ethnic divide as well. The country has two main ethnicity groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis (Lemarchand, 2006, 7). The ethnic divide has led to violent conflict in the past as well, with over 100,000 Hutus being killed in 1972 by the Tutsi controlled army (Uvin, 1999, 258). More violent conflict took place over the years, but went down after an attempt at democratization in 1990, however after a coup that killed the democratically elected leader in 1993, the violence returned, with both sides killing each other (Uvin, 1999, 261-262). The democratization process also brought with it two political parties that each represented one ethnicity, although not officially, the Frodebu represented the Hutus, and the Uprona the Tutsis (Lemarchand, 2006, 8). An attempt to end the violence was made in 1994, with the introduction of the Convention de gouvernement, which instituted power sharing, but took it to an extreme, to the extend where even embassy personal was divided up in Uprona and Frodebu members (Lemarchand, 2006, 9). In 1996 another coup took place, one that ended the Convention de gouvernement, and in 2000 the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was passed; however, the violence has still not fully ended (Lemarchand, 2006, 12). Nevertheless, what is clear is that the divide in Burundi society is an ethnic one, and, like Bosnia, one that has led to violent conflict.

Canada, like Belgium, has a language divide in its society. Canadian territory is divided up between a French-speaking part and an English-speaking part (Cannon, 1982, 52). While the divide in Canadian society can play out in religious, regional, and cultural, divides as well, it is mainly a language divide (Cannon, 1982, 52). Therefore, Canada will not be considered as having an ethnic divide, but instead a language divide.

Colombia's case is one that can be summarized quickly. The divide in Colombia is not ethnic, not religious, and not even class based, but instead a political divide between the Liberals and the Conservatives (Dix, 1980, 304). The divide led to what was called a 'quasi-civil war' in the 1940's, and cost the lives of over 100,000 Colombians (Dix, 1980, 304). Nevertheless, while the divide ran deep, it is not an ethnic divide, but still just a political divide.

Cyprus is a prime example of an ethnic divide in a society. With the main divide being between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 157). The island of Cyprus is divided up in two parts, the Greek part, and the Turkish part (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 163). Cyprus is a former British colony, after being transferred to the British from Turkey in 1878 (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 158). There are two main communities on Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots, and the Turkish Cypriots, with Greek Cypriots making up about eighty percent of the population (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 158). There are different accounts on how the conflict between the two groups started, but what is known is that the Greek Cypriots wanted independence from the British after the second world war, and become a part of Greece, the Turkish Cypriots saw this as a threat as they were in the minority and sought for a dividing up of the island into two separate territories (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 158-159). The fight against the colonial rule started in 1955, and while the Greek community chose to fight against the British, the Turkish community joined the side of the British, fearing that if the British would leave, the violence would turn against them (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 159). Eventually the violence did turn against the Turkish community, which led to Turkey getting involved in the conflict as well, and in 1959 an attempt to end the fight was made by use of the Zürich-London Agreements (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 160).The question of whether the divide in Cyprus is an ethnic one is clear, the two communities have different customs and have different phenotypical features, this is

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further enforced by a difference in religion, Greek Orthodox or Muslim, but the divide is clearly ethnic even without the religious differences. Therefore, we shall consider the divide in Cypriot society to be an ethnic one.

Czechoslovakia is another country where the divide in society runs along national lines. The Czechoslovak divide existed between the Slovaks, two different nationalities that lived united under the Czechoslovakian government, but who also had large amounts of autonomy (Macek-Macková, 2011, 620). The country ended up being divided in 1992, after political leaders from both countries seemed to differ on what they saw as the future of the country, and how to handle things such as the economy (Macek-Macková, 2011, 620). The divide was not a violent one, but done through a referendum and political negotiations (Macek-Macková, 2011, 620). Nevertheless, while the country technically no longer exists, the divide in Czechoslovakia was one between two different nationalities, not an ethnic one.

Fiji's divide is clearly an ethnic one. The Fijian society consists of two main racial groups, indigenous Fijians, and Indian Fijians, and one smaller group that consists of other racial groups such as Europeans, Part-Europeans, and Chinese (Milne, 1975, 414). The Indian Fijians are descendants of indentured laborers who were send to Fiji when it was still under British rule (Iyer, 2007, 132). The two communities are divided in multiple ways, which includes different phenotypical features, but also language, customs, religion, and culture (Iyer, 2007, 132). The divide is also played out in the economic sphere, where the Indian Fijians might have started as indentured laborers, they ended up economically more powerful than the indigenous Fijians, which has led to a fear within the indigenous Fijian community of being dominated by the Indian Fijians (Iyer, 2007, 132). This has also led to the indigenous Fijian community to seek special privileges for themselves in the political sphere, something which the Indian Fijians see as discriminatory (Iyer, 2007, 132). Nevertheless, the divide in Fijian society exists in a lot of different ways, including economic and political, but the main

divide is an ethnic one, with the two groups having different customs, belonging to different tribes, and having different phenotypical features. This means that Fiji has ethnicity as a main divide.

When Lijphart argued that India was a consociational democracy, he claimed that, while India has a majority Hindu population, the Hindus are so divided by language, cast, and sect, that they do not form a political majority (Lijphart, 1996, 261). However, that is exactly what happened, in 2014 the Indian people elected the BJP party (Burke, 2014). The BJP is a Hindu nationalist party, which means that it believes that, first and foremost, India is a Hindu nation (Seshia, 1998, 1036). While Lijphart was right, there are a number of different minorities in India regarding caste and language, the main divide in Indian society is a religious one. This is even more exemplary by the large amount of violence especially between the Hindu community and the Muslim community, an example of which is the 2002 Gujarat pogroms, which was started with the killing of 58 Hindus and resulted in the widespread murdering of members of the Muslim community in the state of Gujarat (Bilgrami, 2013, 143). This shows that, while there is a lot of diversity in India, the main divide is religious one, not an ethnic one.

Israel has historically been an immigrant country, and therefore it is not surprise that the country is ethnically diverse (Phinney, et al., 2001, 500). However, the ethnic divide is both within and outside of the Jewish population. Within the Jewish population, the main ethnic divide is between those of European origin, which are known as the Ashkenazim, and those whose origin is Arab or from Muslim countries, who are known as the Mizrahim (Lewin-Epstein and Cohen, 2018, 2). Outside of the Jewish population there is the Palestinian population, who have Israeli citizenship but are mainly Muslim or Christian (Kook, 2017, 2046). The divide between the Jewish and Palestinian population is also a language divide, with the Palestinians speaking Arabic and going to Arabic language schools (Kook, 2017,

2046). These divides are also played out in the political arena, there is a Palestinian party and a Jewish ultra-orthodox party both being represented in the Israeli parliament (Kook, 2017, 2045). While the divide within the Jewish population between the Ashkenazim and the Mizrahim is significant, it is not as significant as the divide between the Palestinian population and the Jewish population. The Jewish population has different customs, a different language, and mainly a different religion from the Palestinian population, and while they are ethnically diverse, they are united by their religion. Therefore, we would consider the Jewish population to be an ethnicity, while the Jewish population might have different phenotypical features they do have the same customs and are also united with the same religion. Because of this we will consider Israel to have a mainly ethnic divide between the Jewish population and the Palestinian population.

Kosovo's divide is similar to the divide in Bosnia. The society is consists mainly of Albanians, but also has a Serbian group (Taylor, 2005, 440). The divide in Kosovar society mainly stems from the fact that the Albanians want an independent Kosovo, while the Serbians want Kosovo to remain a part of Serbia (Taylor, 2005, 440). This divide has let to violent conflict in the past as well, with the Kosovo independence war only ending after NATO bombed the Serbian government (Jenne, 2009, 281). However, while the divide in Kosovo is one that has led to violence, it is not an ethnic divide, but one based on nationality.

The main divide in Lebanese society is religious divide, to the extend where the political system is divided up by religion as well (Dekmejian, 1978, 254). Certain post in Lebanon are reserved for certain religious groups, the Maronites hold the presidency, the Sunnis hold the premiership, the Shi'ites hold the Chamber Speakership (Dekmejian, 1978, 254). While the divide in Lebanese society has led to violence at some points, it is mainly a religious divide, not an ethnic one.

Like many European countries, the divide in Luxembourg society is based on language (Magone, 2016, 97). There are three major languages in Luxembourg, French for the public administration, German which is one of the main languages in the country, and Luxembourgish which is considered the native language of Luxembourg (Magone, 2016, 97). Luxembourg also has a large population of foreign nationals, mainly from Portugal, Italy, or former Yugoslavia (Magone, 2016, 97). The divide between languages is not a main source of conflict, as many children are raised with the Luxembourgish language while learning French and German in schools, however it has caused problems for children immigrants to Luxembourg who do not learn the language from home (Magone, 2016, 97). This however, is not an ethnic divide, as in this case, the languages are not part of a greater ethnic conflict. Therefore, we will not consider Luxembourg to have an ethnic divide.

The divide in Malaysian society is mainly an ethnic one, between the indigenous Malay and the Chinese (Singh, 2001, 45-46). While there are several subcategories within the two groups, for instance the Chinese can be Cantonese, Hokkien, or Kheks, and the indigenous Malay can be Javanese, Jakun, or Banjarese, the two main ethnic groups are seen as indigenous Malay and Chinese (Singh, 2001, 46). Even Rabushka and Shepsle mention Malaysia as having an ethnic divide in their book, where they mention that, while indigenous Malay and Chinese belong to the same Mongoloid race, they are subcategory of that race, and therefore there is an ethnic division (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 8). This research would agree with that, and therefore the divide in Malaysian society will be classified as an ethnic divide.

The two largest national groups in Macedonia are the Macedonians and the Albanians (Staniševski and Miller, 2009, 557). While there are some smaller groups or Turks and Roma, most the population belongs to the Macedonian or Albanian group (Staniševski and Miller, 2009, 557). The divide between the two groups has caused some conflict in the past,

for example, the ethnic Albanians protesting the government's decision to not allow the Albanians to fly their flag on public buildings during the holidays next to the Macedonian flag, these protests have ended in riots (Staniševski and Miller, 2009, 558). However, while the Albanians and Macedonians might be two different national groups, they are from the same ethnic group when it comes to our definition of ethnicity, which means that they have the same phenotypical features and do not belong to a different tribe. This means that the main conflict in Macedonia is based on the different nationalities, not on different ethnicities.

When it comes to cleavages in Dutch society, the main divides are political and religious. The Netherlands has historically had a fragmented party system; however, the fragmentation seems to have grown (De Sio, Paparo, 2018, 53). The Freedom party of Geert Wilders is openly anti-Muslim, and has even been powerful enough to support a minority coalition (Marzouki, McDonnell, Roy, 2016, 67-74). At the same time, the Dutch political system has also been changed by Wilders, with more parties discussing the "Dutch identity" and opposing Islam (De Sio, Paparo, 2018, 54). This has created a cleavage in the Dutch party system between the more cosmopolitan parties and the more nationalist parties, with the cosmopolitan parties focusing more on the environment, and the nationalist parties focusing more on the national identity (De Sio, Paparo, 2018, 55). The Netherlands also has a religious divide, with a substantial Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim community (Schmeets, 2016, 5). However, while the Netherlands is ethnically diverse, with about twenty-two percent of the population having an immigrant background, the main divide in Dutch society is a political one (CBS, 2017). Therefore, the Netherlands does not have an ethnic divide.

Nigeria has many different tribes living within its borders (Jinadu, 1985, 74). There is the Igbo population, the Edo population, and the Ijaw population (Jinadu, 1985, 74). While the different populations in Nigeria all belong to the same race, they do belong to different tribes (Jinadu, 1985, 77). The main divide is clearly tribal based, belonging to a different tribe

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meant having a better position in society (Jinadu, 1985, 73). The Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani, for instance, long had a hegemony on the political, social, and economic life in the country (Jinadu, 1985, 73). The different tribes do not have their own separate country, which means that it cannot be seen as a divide based on different nationalities, but instead as an ethnic conflict. Because the different tribes are the main divide, Nigeria will be considered as having an ethnic divide.

At the core of the conflict in Northern Ireland is a divide between nationalities. Northern Ireland is divided up in two ethnicities, the British and the Irish, with the British being the majority (Tonge, 2002, 1). The difference between the British and the Irish is found in different cleavages. The majority of the people in Northern Ireland are Protestant, and many of the Protestants are British, less than fifty percent of the population is Catholic, and many of the Catholics consider themselves to be Irish, creating a religious cleavage as well (Tonge, 2002, 1-2). The cleavages are also visible in the political arena, with a majority of the British favoring the remaining of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, they are known as Unionists, and a majority of the Irish population favoring a return of Northern Ireland to Ireland, known as Nationalist (Tonge, 2002, 1). However, the British and the Irish do not have different phenotypical features, nor do they belong to different tribes or do they have different customs besides their religious customs. Therefore, the divide in the society of Northern Ireland will not be considered an ethnic divide, but instead a divide based on nationality that also includes religion.

South Africa is perhaps the best example of a society that has an ethnic divide. South Africa is a multiracial country, which includes black, Indian, white, and mixed South Africans (Lijphart, 1985, 3). The racial diversity in South Africa has led to the creation of Apartheid in the past, which was a form of segregation created by the white South Africans to oppress the non-white South Africans (van der Vyver, 1991, 745-746). The system of Apartheid became

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official state-policy in 1948 (van der Vyver, 1991, 745). In 1994 Apartheid officially ended with the passing of a new constitution, but that does not mean that the racial divide in society ended suddenly (Lijphart, 1998, 144). The racial divide still existed in the creation of political parties in South Africa, with the National Party representing the white South Africans and the ANC representing the non-white South Africans (Lijphart, 1998, 148). This means that the main divide in South Africa is a racial one, which is also an ethnic divide according to the definition of ethnicity used in this paper. Therefore, we will consider South Africa to have an ethnic divide.

Suriname is an ethnically very diverse society. The society is comprised of East Indians, Maroons, Creoles, Javanese, and mixed, with a small group of Chinese and native tribes (Veenendaal, 2019, 6). While the ethnic diversity does not necessarily mean that ethnicity is the main divide in society, for example Afghanistan is ethnically very diverse, but it does not have ethnicity as a main divide. However, in the case of Suriname, ethnicity does appear to be the main divide, the first political parties were established on the different ethnicities, and ethnic differences have led to tensions in the past (Veenendaal, 2019, 7). Suriname had a coup in the 1980's, after which a civil war broke out between the Surinamese military and a Maroon insurgency (Veenendaal, 2019, 7). Therefore, it is clear that the ethnic divide is the main divide in Suriname society, and we will consider Suriname to have an ethnic divide.

While there are several divides in Switzerland, most of them do not seem to be very strong divides. There is a religious divide, between the Protestants and the Catholics, the language divide between different regions of Switzerland, and a political divide between different parties on the political spectrum (Vatter, 2016, 66-67). However, these divides become bigger when bringing in a different religious group, mainly the Muslim group (Cheng, 2015, 570). Currently about 5 percent of people in Switzerland are Muslim, most

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them having immigrated to Switzerland in the 1960's from Turkey, Albania, or Yugoslavia, or being descendants of those who immigrated (Cheng, 2015, 570). However, the main divide in Swiss society is a regional divide, and not an ethnic one.

The divide in Uruguay society is similar to the divide in the Colombian society, in that it is a political divide. There are two main parties, the Colorado, and the Blanco parties (Cason, 2002, 92). The divide has led to civil wars which happened periodically until 1904 (Cason, 2002, 92). Uruguay also experimented with a consociational democracy system, but that ended in 1967 (Lijphart, 1969, 213). Nevertheless, the divide in Uruguayan society was not an ethnic one, but a political divide.

Country	Ethnic	Non-Ethnic
Afghanistan		X
Antilles (NL)		X
Austria		X
Belgium		X
Bosnia		X
Burundi	X	
Canada		X
Colombia		X
Cyprus	X	
Czechoslovakia		X
Fiji	X	
India		X
Israel	X	
Kosovo		X
Lebanon		X
Luxembourg		X
Malaysia	X	
Macedonia		X
Netherlands		X
Nigeria	X	
Northern Ireland		X
South Africa	X	
Suriname	X	
Switzerland		X
Uruguay		X

Table 1

2.2 Consociational democracy or not?

Next let us look at the political system that the countries with ethnic conflict have,
these are the following countries; Burundi, Cyprus, Fiji, Israel, Malaysia, Nigeria, South
Africa, and Suriname. While these countries were all once seen as being consociational, that
does not mean that they all are still consociational. Therefore, we will go over each country
that has an ethnic divide to see if they are still consociational democracies or if they were
really consociational democracies to begin with. We will use the four principles of
consociational democracy mentioned above that were described by Bogaards to determine
whether a country can be considered consociational or not (Bogaards, 2017, 1). However, it is
also important to note that not all countries might have been democracies at the time that they
were consociational. This seems counterproductive, after all consociationalism requires
cooperation between different groups, something which looks like a democratic process.
However, this research will not see democracy as a requirement for being considered a
consociational country, as this research only looks at the four principles of consociationalism,
and democracy is not one of those principles. Not all countries will meet all the standards of
being consociational, we will consider meeting two principles as enough to be considered
consociational. Because this research is aimed specifically at countries that were
consociational but are no longer considered consociational, we will look at when countries
were considered consociational and if they can still be considered consociational, the results
of this are in table 2.

Burundi started democratizing in 1992, which led to the elections of June 1993
(Vandeginste, 2009, 67). The government after the elections was compromised of ministers

from the two different ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, which can be seen as the forming of a grand coalition (Vandeginste, 2009, 68). However in practice the election mostly led to the Hutus becoming dominant, which resulted in a coup and ethnic violence in October of 1993 (Vandeginste, 2009, 68). After the coup and the ethnic violence that ensued, several peace agreements were passed, however the Arusha Agreement was the most influential one, and the one still used today (Vandeginste, 2009, 71-74). The Arusha Agreement was the most consociational one, it included a need for a grand coalition, an a form of a veto (Vandeginste, 2009, 74). This was established through laws that stipulated that the president shall have two vice presidents of different ethnic groups, each list of electoral candidates must reflect Burundi's ethnic and gender diversity, and out of every three party candidates at least one has to be from a different ethnic group (Vandeginste, 2009, 74). While the Arusha Agreement did not stipulate any ethnic quotas, the constitution did, a maximum of sixty percent of the ministers can be Hutu, and a maximum of thirty percent can be Tutsi, the Minister of National Defense has to be of a different ethnic group than the Minister in charge of the National Police (Vandeginste, 2009, 74-77). This means that the grand coalition does involve people from all different groups, which is the first principle of consociationalism. The constitution also stated that two-thirds of the National assembly had to agree to change the constitution in order for changes to go through, while this is not a formal veto, it is an informal veto, seeing as neither side can hold two-thirds of the National assembly both sides have to agree for the constitution to be changed (Vandeginste, 2009, 77). However, the idea that this is a formal veto is disputed by political scientists, and has been proven to not be fully true. Because of the requirement that all parties are multiethnic, out of three candidates at least one has to be off a different ethnicity, meant that ethnic parties could not be created (McCulloch and Vandeginste, 2019, 9). This meant that candidates could not vote against something without going against their own party, even if it was something that their ethnicity might be against

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(McCulloch and Vandeginste, 2019, 9). Since 2009, party members have been sanctioned for going against party policy, which effectively made it unable for people to use their veto power (McCulloch and Vandeginste, 2019, 9-10). While this does not mean that opposition parties cannot use it to block legislation, it does mean that the groups itself have not been given veto powers, a stipulation when it comes to the consociational democratic principle of veto powers (Bogaards, 2017, 1). Therefore, Burundi is not considered to have veto powers, and only meets the grand coalition principle. While it does have proportional representation, it does not have proportional distribution of resources as mandated in the constitution, so it does not fully meet the proportionality principle of a consociational democracy (Bogaards, 2017, 1). Burundi also does not have segmental autonomy, although some political scientists have argued that this is not completely necessary (Vandeginste, 2009, 74). Nevertheless, Burundi does not meet two out of the four principles of a consociational democracy, and shall therefore not be used further in this study.

As was written about Cyprus earlier, the Zürich-London Agreements were made to attempt to deal with the conflict, but they did not last long (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 160). The Agreements were the only attempt made at instituting consocational democracy on the island, which lasted for three years (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 160). The Agreements made sure of a certain number of things, such as creating a form of a grand coalition government by instating quotas and reserving certain positions for the different ethnic communities, for example, the Supreme Constitutional Court needed to have two Greeks, one Turk, and one foreign judge (Kyriakou and Skoutaris, 2016, 458-459). This also created a mandated proportionality in political representation, with the Council of Ministers, which consisted of ten ministers, having to have a ratio of 7:3 between the two communities (Kyriakou and Skoutaris, 2016, 459). The Agreements also allowed the president and the vice

president, who each had to be from a different community, to have veto power, which is part of a consociational democracy as well (Kyriakou and Skoutaris, 2016, 459). The Agreements also led to two separate electoral processes, as each community only voted for their own representative, meaning that each community had a different electoral process (Kyriakou and Skoutaris, 2016, 459). With this, Cyprus met at least three of the principles of being a consociational democracy, a grand coalition government, proportionality in political representation and the distribution of resources, and a mutual veto. However, this consocational democracy only lasted for three years, in 1963 violence resumed, and the Agreements broke down (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 162). Therefore, while Cyprus was a consociational democracy for three years, it is now no longer considered a consociational democracy. Why this is will be discussed further in this research.

Fiji is a former colony of the United Kingdom, and became independent in 1970 (Iyer, 2007, 132). The first post-independence constitution required the country to have separate rolls for indigenous Fijians and Indian Fijians, with a third roll for 'general' voters (Iyer, 2007, 132). However, this proved to be a problem, in 1987 an Indian dominated government was elected, which created unease within the indigenous Fijian community who were afraid of being ruled by Indian Fijians (Iyer, 2007, 133). In 1990, a civilian government was put in place, however the new constitution that passed in 1990 was favored towards the indigenous Fijians, who were the only ones allowed to hold the office of Prime Minister (Iyer, 2007, 133). In 1995, the constitution was reviewed again, and it was replaced in 1997 with a new constitution that was fairer towards the Indian Fijians (Iyer, 2007, 133). The new constitution mandated that every party that won more than ten percent of the seats had to be represented in the cabinet, effectively forcing a grand coalition (Iyer, 2007, 133). However, the new constitution also introduced the alternative vote system, which would hamper the principle of proportional representation (Reynolds, 2005, 62). But this was made up by quotas that were

mandated in the constitution, with 23 out of the 71 seats in the House of Representatives being reserved for candidates elected by indigenous Fijians, 19 elected by Indian Fijians, and four from other racial groups (Reddy, 2011, 197). This means that there was a form of proportional representation in Fiji, and a grand coalition. There also was a form of segmental autonomy in Fiji, however this is only reserved for indigenous Fijians. Segmental autonomy came in the form of The Great Council of Chiefs which is composed of indigenous Fijian Chiefs who had a strong role in dealing with issues with land and affairs pertaining to indigenous Fijians (Reddy, 2011, 193-194). The Great Council of Chiefs also had a veto when it came to changes to protective Fijian legislation (Ghai and Cottrell, 2007, 664). Fiji did meet some principles of consociationalism, segmental autonomy, a veto, and a grand coalition. However, when it comes to the segmental autonomy and the veto, they were both given mainly to the indigenous Fijians. Nevertheless, we will consider Fiji to have had a consociational system, mainly because it institutionalized the consociational principles to deal with the fear that the indigenous Fijians had to be dominated by the Indian Fijians, which meant giving more power to the indigenous Fijians. The system of power sharing ended in 2006, with another coup, which will be further discusses later in this research (Ghai and Cottrell, 2007, 640).

The case of Israel is an interesting one. The country itself has always had a strong tie between religion and the state, and for a long time this tie was dealt with in consocational ways (Lipshits and Neubauer-Shani, 2019, 1). Israel first starting experiencing government coalitions in 1949, which is when consociationalism was started in Israel (Hazan, 1999, 118). While Israel has known violent conflict in the past, this mostly came from the conflict with the Palestinians, who are not a part of the electoral system in Israel, and therefore that type of conflict will not be mentioned in this paper. The divide in Israel is mainly based on religion. Israel has fourteen different state supported religions, which include Judaism, Islam, Druze,

Bahai, and different forms of Christianity (Fox and Rynhold, 2008, 509). Because of the support of the state of the religious institutions, Israel meets the standard of segmental autonomy. The Israeli state funds religious institutions, religious schools, and religious services for all religions, and allows judicial authority to religious courts in personal matters (Fox and Rynhold, 2008, 511). When it comes to the democratic system, Israel is a multiparty state, with proportional representation (Halperin-Kaddari and Yadgar, 2010, 907-908). Because of the proportional representation, the Israeli government mainly consists of party coalitions, which include both religious and non-religious parties (Kaddari and Yadgar, 2010, 907-908). This means that Israel has met at least three principles of a consociational democracy; Segmental autonomy, grand coalition government, and proportional political representation and distribution of resources. While the country does not have a mutual veto, it does meet enough standards to be considered a consociational democracy and still be considered a consociational democracy today.

Malaysia is another former British colony, and gained independence in 1957 (Sani, 2009, 98). The divide in Malaysian society is mainly one between ethnic Malays and ethnic non-Malays, with the ethnic Malays being afraid of being dominated by ethnic non-Malays (Sani, 2009, 99). This mostly results from the fact that the ethnically non-Malays are economically dominant (Ishak, 2002, 107). Malaysia is assumed to have had a consociational system between 1955-1969 by Lijphart (Lijphart, 1979, 512). This is in part to the grand coalition known as the Alliance, which had UMNO for the Malays, the MCA for the Chinese, and the MIC for Indians (Haque, 2003, 246). The Alliance was first elected in 1955, and formed the government in 1957 (Haque, 2003, 246). The consociational system also came with a constitution that allowed for "special rights" for ethnic Malays, which included special rights in education, business, and the public service (Haque, 2003, 244). This means that Malaysia had both a grand coalition, and a form of proportional distribution of resources.

Malaysia also had an informal veto, even though the veto power was not explicitly put in the constitution. However, it was impossible to change the constitution without a two thirds majority, meaning that the parties had to accommodate each other for them to change the constitution, as no party in the Alliance held a two thirds majority (Haque, 2003, 246-247). There was no real form of segmental autonomy however, nevertheless Malaysia met at least two out of four principles of consociationalism, with a grand coalition, a veto, and a form of proportional distribution of resources however no proportional representation electoral system, nor a form of segmental autonomy are present. Because of this Malaysia can be considered a consociational democracy in 1955, but the system also led to race riots in 1969, which signaled the end of the consociational system (Haque, 2003, 245). The race riots and the end of the consociational system will be discussed further in the research.

Nigeria experimented with consociationalism for some time before fully becoming consociational in 1979 (Jinadu, 1985, 75-89). In 1979, Nigeria got a new constitution, which started the era that is known as the Second Republic (Jinadu, 1985, 89). The new constitution explicitly stated that the federal government appointments should reflect the country itself, and that no one ethnicity nor region shall be overrepresented (Jinadu, 1985, 89). This was done through putting the four principles of consociationalism in the constitution. First was the grand coalition, which was made by the President who had to include an indigenous person from every state, meaning one person from every ethnic group, in his cabinet (Jinadu, 1985, 89-90). This made it that every group was represented in the grand coalition, even if they did not represent all parties (Jinadu, 1989, 89-90). Proportionality in both proportional representation and proportional distribution of resources was also part of the constitution (Jinadu, 1985, 92). The constitution stated that there should be no predominance in the federal government for one ethnic group, which meant that the federal government had to be a proportional representation, however the constitution did not put any specific quotas in place

(Jinadu, 1985, 92-94). There were, however, quotas in place for education, admission to federal universities followed a quota system related to the different ethnic groups (Jinadu, 1985, 94). This can be seen as a proportional distribution of resources, even if it was just for education. Nigeria also had a form of segmental autonomy, with state governments being in charge of education in the state (Jinadu, 1985, 97). However, the segmental autonomy also lead to discrimination in some situations, as some state governments refused entry into primary school and secondary school for children who were not of the state's indigenous ethnicity (Jinadu, 1985, 97). Nevertheless, while Nigeria's consociational system had some issues, it was a consociational system. The system had a grand coalition, proportional representation, the proportional distribution of resources, and segmental autonomy, three out of the four principles of consociationalism. However, in 1983 a military coup took place, and consociationalism ended in Nigeria, why that happened will be discussed further in the research.

South Africa is a historically divided society, and the history of Apartheid divided the society even further, with divisions being along ethnic lines, which divided the society up into four groups, white, colored, Indian, and black African (Traniello, 2008, 28-30). With the end of Apartheid also came a call for a different type of political system, as the Apartheid system had excluded most of the society, the call for a consensus-based system came from the need to avoid uncertainty and volatility (Traniello, 2008, 35-36). In 1994, a new system was adopted, which involved the passing of a new interim constitution (Lijphart, 1998, 147). The interim constitution called for a Government of National Unity, which included all parties that had a minimum of five percent of the seats in the National Assembly (Lijphart, 1998, 146). The Government of National Unity included several different parties, including the National Party, which represented the white population and the ANC which represented the black African and Indian population (Lijphart, 1998, 147-148). The constitution also guaranteed a

right for people to establish an educational institution based on things such as culture, language, or religion, as long as there was no discrimination based on race (Lijphart, 1998, 146). This meant that the constitution also guaranteed a form of proportionality of resources and segmental autonomy, as it gave everyone the right to have their own form of education, and insured equal access to that education. Elections were also done by proportional representation, and a two thirds majority was necessary for amending the constitution (Lijphart, 1998, 146). Therefore, both an informal veto was present and proportional representation (Lijphart, 1998, 146). The 1994 constitution of South Africa was a consocational constitution, it included all four principles of consociationalism, even if some were stronger than others. However, in 1996 the constitution was changed again, making it much less consociational, why that was will be explained further in this research.

Suriname is a former colony of the Netherlands (Singh, 2014, 133). The country became independent in 1975, and adopted the consociational model of its former colonizer, the Netherlands (Veenendaal, 2019, 6). Democracy was restored in 1987, but with that also came a new form of governing (Veenendaal, 2019, 6-7). The political system in Suriname changed from a parliamentary system to a mixed republican system, with a lot of power given to the office of the president (Veenendaal, 2019, 6). This does not change the fact that proportionality was still an important part of the political system. The country is comprised of multiple ethnic groups, East Indians, Maroons, Creoles, Javanese, who are from the island of Java in Indonesia, and Chinese, there is also a part of the population that is mixed (Veenendaal, 2019, 6). Suriname uses a proportional representation electoral system, and the country also has multiple parties which represent the different ethnic groups (Veenendaal, 2019, 6-7). For a long time, Suriname had a grand coalition, which consisted of the parties of different ethnic groups and was known as the Front for Democracy and Development (Veenendaal, 2019, 7). This meant that Suriname had both a grand coalition, and proportional

representation. Suriname also has different electoral districts, which gives a small amount of segmental autonomy to the people in each district, as they can chose their own representatives (Veenendaal, 2019, 6). This means that Suriname meets at least two out of the four principles of consociationalism, it has a grand coalition, a form of segmental autonomy, and a form of proportional representation, which made Suriname a consociational country. However, in 2010 the grand coalition ended with the election of Desi Bouterse, who was the leader of the 1980 coup, and the electoral victory of his National Democratic Party (Veenendaal, 2019, 7).

Country	Consociational	Non-Consociational	Consociational Period
Burundi		X	-
Cyprus	X		1960-1963
Fiji	X		1997-2006
Israel	X		1949 -
Malaysia	X		1995-1969
Nigeria	X		1979-1983
South Africa	X		1994-1996
Suriname	X		1987-2010

Table 2

Chapter 3

3.1 The end of consociationalism?

Let us now look at the countries that had a consociational system, but stopped being consociational. What made these countries stop being consociational? Specifically, what were the defining factors in the ending of their consociational democracy? The countries that have had a consociational system but stopped being consociational are the following; Cyprus, Fiji, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Suriname.

The ending of consociationalism in Cyprus is attributed to several factors by different political scientist. First is the fact that the consociational system of power-sharing was forced upon the people of Cyprus (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 160). Lijphart has attributed the failing of consociationalism in Cyprus to this as well, arguing that consociationalism cannot be implemented if groups in society are against it, especially the majority group, which, in the case of Cyprus, were the Greek Cypriots (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 161). The second factor the contributed to the ending of consociationalism in Cyprus was the fact that the consociational system did not follow consociationalism perfectly (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 161). Lijphart argued that consociationalism required a parliamentary system, not a presidential one (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 160). This was because a presidential system is often associated with a majoritarian democratic system, something that goes against the idea of power-sharing (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 160-161). A third factor came mostly from critics against consociationalism, who saw the separate elections and the overrepresentation of the Turkish Cypriots in the cabinet and the civil services as a direct link to the failure of consociationalism (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 160). But perhaps the most telling part of the why consociationalism ended in Cyprus is by how the people in Cyprus view the consociational agreement. The Greek Cypriots saw it as their step to uniting the

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country with Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots still wanted the island to be split up (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 162). The incompatibility of their demands, mainly how they viewed the future of the country, was not something that could be solved through a power-sharing agreement. Just as in the definition of ethnic conflict that was presented above, their goals were incompatible, and for a part rooted in their ethnicity. The breakdown of the consociational system in Cyprus led to the militarization on both sides which resulted in violence (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 162). In 1974, Turkey invaded the island, creating a Turkish Cyprus part in the north, and it has been that way ever since (Jakala, Kuzu, Qvortrup, 2018, 163).

In 2006, Fiji had a coup, there were no casualties, however it put a definitive end to the consociational system that had existed in Fiji before that (Reddy, 2011, 182). Prior to the coup, Fiji went through political controversy as well. The prime minister in 2006, Qarase, ordered early elections, which resulted in a parliament that was strongly divided among racial lines (Iyer, 2007, 137). The consociational system that was enforced through the constitution made it so that the prime minister had to invite the Fiji Labour Party to join (Iyer, 2007, 137). The Fiji Labour Party was an Indian Fijian party, while the prime minister Qarase was a member of the United Fiji Party, which was an indigenous Fijian party (Reddy, 2011, 194-195). The Fiji Labour Party joined the government, but made it a condition that the leader of the FLP was to remain part of the opposition, something which was found to be unconstitutional by the Government Solicitor (Iyer, 2007, 137). More controversies followed, including a FLP minister saying that he would not support the government if it went against the wishes of his own party (Iyer, 2007, 137). In December of 2006, the political controversies ended, when the Fiji Military Forces staged a coup, claiming that the lack of action from the Prime Minister in to prosecute those who were involved in the 2000 coup was one of the reasons for the coup (Iyer, 2007, 137-138). However, the coup was not something

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that was largely supported by the indigenous Fijians, something that is evident in the fact that in the election earlier in 2006, four out of five indigenous Fijians voted for the party that was overthrown in the coup. The time after the coup gave way to more indigenous Fijian nationalist sentiments, which was exactly what the consociational system tried to prevent (Fraenkel, Firth Lal, 2009, 72). In the end, consociationalism mostly failed because of the tensions between the Indian Fijians and the indigenous Fijians, who both felt that they were being disadvantaged.

In Malaysia, the end of consociationalism can be found in the 1969 riots. In 1969, the ruling coalition known as the Alliance, which consisted of parties from three different ethnic groups, failed to receive a two thirds majority in the elections (Singh, 2001, 49). The loosing of the two thirds majority meant the loss of dominance by the ethnic Malays, which resulted in violent riots that killed hundreds of ethnic Chinese (Singh, 2001, 50). The root cause of the riots is seen as being about the fact that the Chinese, while not being politically dominant, were economically dominant (Singh, 2001, 50). The loss off the elections signaled the loss of political power for the ethnic Malays, which they also saw as a potential loss of future economic power (Singh, 2001, 50). The ethnic non-Malays saw themselves as disadvantaged as well, because of the fact that many of the governments public goods, such as scholarships and recruitment into the armed forces and police were seen as often being given to ethnic Malays over ethnic non-Malays (Singh, 2001, 50). The 1969 riots in that sense were about incompatible goals, mainly the goals of who was the most powerful in the country, and who received the most favor. The riots were used by the ethnic Malay political elites to enforce a state-building strategy that was about Malay culture, religion and language, effectively forcing the Chinese Malays out of the picture, and ending consociationalism by becoming the dominant political power (Singh, 2001, 50).

Nigeria's consociational system ended in 1983, with a coup that was carried out by officers in the Nigerian armed forces (Jinadu, 1985, 98). The coup is seen as a result of conflict between the elites, which was then reflected in party politics (Jinadu, 1985, 98). The conflict between elites led to the questioning of the legitimacy of the government on both the federal and the state level by the army officers (Jinadu, 1985, 98). The coup, in that way, was a direct result of fighting between the elites, and led to elections that were rigged in obvious ways, and with that, the consociational system ended in Nigeria (Jinadu, 1985, 98).

South-Africa's failure of consociationalism was much more peaceful than the previous countries. In South-Africa, consociationalism ended with the National Party, which was a party for the white South-Africans, leaving the coalition government in 1996 (Lijphart, 1998, 147). The National Party leaving the coalition government happened simultaneously with the passing of the 1996 constitution, which stated that there was no need for a Government of National Unity, which meant the end of the grand coalition governments. With that consociationalism ended in South-Africa, since then the ANC has won every election, becoming a de facto one-party state (Campbell, 2014).

Suriname is similar to South-Africa, in the sense that it also did not have a coup or violence to end its consociational system. In 2010, the National Democratic Party of former coup leader Desi Bouterse won the elections, bringing an end to the grand coalition that existed before (Veenendaal, 2019, 7). In 2015, the party was elected again, this time being the first party to win a majority in the Surinamese parliament (Veenendaal, 2019, 7). The National Democratic Party is mainly a party for the ethnic Creoles, even though it likes to present itself as a party for all Surinamese (Veenendaal, 2019, 8). With the election, the Creoles became the dominant ethnicity in the Surinamese political system, effectively ending consociationalism in Suriname.

3.2 What is the common factor?

When looking at the cases that are presented in this research, a couple of factors become clear. One is the same factor that Barry described in his criticism of consociationalism in ethnically divided societies, mainly that the divide is different from a religious or political divide. A religious or political divide is related to values, it is about how you view the world around you and your relationships with others, but an ethnic divide is about how you view who belongs in your country. This complicates things, because how can you share power with those who you do not see as being allowed to hold power in the first place? This is something that can be seen in almost all the countries studied. In Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots did not see the Turkish as belonging to the country, in Malaysia the ethnic Malay did not see the ethnic non-Malay as being part of the country, the only exception to this seems to be Nigeria and Suriname, however whereas Nigeria is more tribal based, and therefore tribal competition seemed to be the main source of conflict, and in Suriname this is similar as well, only there while there were different ethnicities from different countries, the question was not about belonging and more about competition.

The second thing that is important to note here is the presence of inter-elite competition. Inter-elite competition is seen in several countries, Malaysia, Suriname, Nigeria, Fiji, and South-Africa, with the only exception being Cyprus. The inter-elite competition is interesting because it goes exactly against the idea of consociationalism proposed by Lijphart, who saw inter-elite conflict as being one of the problems that could aggravate tensions and instability (Lijphart, 1969, 211-212). The fact that this is something that was found in almost all consociational systems that experienced an ethnic divide shows that it might be harder to get the elite the cooperate when it comes to ethnic divides. While this is not a claim that can

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be made just by looking at this study, it is something that can be further researched and could contribute to how we look at ethnic divides in society.

A third factor that is seen here is the competition between ethnicities when it comes to economic and political power. In both Malaysia and Fiji this is something that directly contributed to the end of consociationalism and to the ethnic divide itself. This shows that who holds power not just in a political system but also in an economic system is important. Especially when it comes to post-colonial countries such as South-Africa this can become important, because the former colonizers often hold the land still, which gives them more economical power, even if they have lost the political power. As South-Africa is currently discussing land reforms in relation to dividing up land of white farmers, this is something to watch, would the loosing of the economic power lead to ethnic conflict in South Africa that same way losing political power led to conflict in Malaysia? (Clark, 2019)

The last thing that is important especially in the case of Cyprus is the forcing of power-sharing by elites. While Cyprus did not seem to have any inter-elite conflict, it did have conflict because the elites forced the power-sharing upon the citizens of Cyprus. This is something that goes against consociationalism as well, as was mentioned earlier, as Lijphart claimed consociationalism cannot work if one group in society, especially the majority group, is unwilling to cooperate. This means that, while the elite might be an important part of the consociational process, consulting the citizens is just as important. Even if the citizens are not able to actively get involved in the power-sharing process, they should still have a say in the matter.

3.4 Conclusion

"Give me an example, of a multi-ethnic or multicultural society, where the original population are still living as well. (...) And where there are peaceful community relations. I'm not aware of any." (Zembla International, 2018). In the summer of 2018, the Dutch minister of foreign affairs, Stef Blok, made a speech in front of Dutch citizens who work for international organizations, in it he claimed that multicultural societies do not work, and that this is because people do not like to be around those who are unfamiliar to them (Zembla International, 2018). The statement caused much controversy, but did not lead to the end of Blok's political career (Ast and Keultjes, 2018). But was Blok necessarily wrong? If we found anything by looking at these cases is that, while most of these societies might not experience violent conflict right now, they have gone through violent conflicts and coups in the past. But that does not mean that multi-ethnic societies will always have conflict. There are some policy recommendations that are useful here. The first being putting quotas in the constitution, in many of the cases including Malaysia, South-Africa, Fiji, and Suriname, the power-sharing arrangement was dependent on the election of grand coalitions, however when those grand coalitions did not get enough votes, the power-sharing system fell apart. Putting quotas in the constitution and mandating how the power-sharing must work will prevent this. At the same time, it is also important to prevent inter-elite competition, this can be done through more forms of segmental autonomy as well. If elites can control more of their own areas, it might prevent them from internal fighting, an example of this can be Belgium, which grants large amounts of segmental autonomy to the French and Flemish speaking communities (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, 2015, 279).

Another policy recommendation is one that might be harder to implement, but which is nevertheless important. This is the taking away of dominance of one ethnic group in either the political or economic sphere. The dominance of one ethnic group in the economic sphere has led to problems in both Malaysia and Fiji, and led to the non-dominant ethnic group trying to gain power in the political sphere. This is a dangerous thing, because what was seen in both societies is that both the politically dominant and the economically dominant groups saw themselves as being disadvantaged in favor of the other group. So how would one avoid a political or economic dominance of one group? It could start with the quotas that have been mentioned earlier, and by making it easier for the non-dominant economic group to start businesses or receive loans. Nevertheless, this is still a complicated issue, and more studies, perhaps with other disciplines such as economics, will be necessary in order to avoid this type of divide.

This brings us to the last part of this research, which is not so much a policy recommendation, but rather something to use when it comes to implementing consociationalism in ethnically divided societies. The main conflict in all societies studied that caused conflict is that one ethnic group became dominant at the expense of the other because of a question as to what an equal division was. In Fiji and Malaysia, one ethnic group was given more political power because the other was more economically powerful. In South-Africa the National Party which represented the white South-Africans left a coalition with ethnic groups that they had so long oppressed. In Cyprus both groups wanted different things for the island that they lived on together. In Nigeria, the lack of specific quotas led to inter-elite conflict about how to divide up the political power, similarly in Suriname the lack of quotas or a mandatory government coalition led to one party dominating the system. In all of these cases it was not necessarily a lack of willingness from the elites to share power, but

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instead a question regarding how that power should be shared. The societies studied all had different issues regarding their division of power, but all did not handle them in a way that the power-sharing was sustainable and done in a fair way. The problem with these societies was not necessarily the fact that consociationalism does not work for ethnically divided societies, but that the wrong kind of consociationalism does not work for ethnically divided societies. Each society is different, and each society has a different ethnic divide, whether that is a long-standing oppression done by one ethnicity, as in South-Africa, or a monopoly for one ethnic group within the political or economic system. When it comes to policy it is not just important to look at what policies are best for a consociational system, but what policies are best for the system that the country is in. Therefore, this research will not give specific policy recommendations for the different societies, but instead recommend that the societies implement consociationalism in a way that has been proven to work in societies like it, instead of taking consociational features without looking how they would work in their own society.

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