Minority Claim-making:

A Look Inside Collective Identity

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the less researched, internal aspects of minority claim-making. Previous theories explain minority-claim making by external factors, usually using a rational-choice framework, which cannot aptly integrate certain considerations and seemingly irrational behaviour of group-members. In contrast, the thesis argues that internal group entitativity, group norms, conceptualizations and subsequent discourses on national minority identity affect the claim-making process. The qualitative analysis of focus group discussions and participant surveys of the Hungarians in Romania confirm the effect of group entitativity and discourses, but not of group-wide norms. The conclusions are helpful in offering an in-depth analysis of claim-adoption from the perspective of the group. Findings help us to better distinguish between ethnic and national minority groups, refine claim-making theories that can be utilized in ethnic conflict theories.

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Introduction

The accommodation of ethnic minorities still presents a significant issue in many societies around the world. Hence, it is safe to say that studying ethnic minorities is not only of intellectual interest, but also of practical and political importance. The academic literature is extremely rich, covering various facets of the conflict between majority and minority ethnicities: finding the optimal regime type for plural societies (e.g. Horowitz, Lijphart, Dixon, Brancati, Kaufmann), discussing how a common political identity may be formed, theories and transition from ethnic conflict (e.g. Snyder 2000, Carothers 2002, Cedeman et al 2011, Cruz 2000, Salehya 2007), conflict management (Jenne 2015), nation-building etc. However, one question has received less attention: how do demands of minority groups come to life, and specifically what are the facilitating factors that make groups demand political rights? This question is motivated further by the fact that actual instances of ethnic conflict remain rare, compared against the wide universe of possible ones (Brubaker and Laitin 1998 from Vermeersch 2012). Thus, negotiation is much more common in plural states than violent conflict, and in this negotiation, the main tool of the minorities is to make claims.

Sometimes discriminated groups do not word their grievances, nor formulate demands to the regime simply because the regime does not tolerate opposing voices. In other cases, the equation is complex, involving careful political calculations of opportunities and constraints. Minority claims may be defined as calls and demands made by representatives of an ethnic community against the majority or the state (E. Jenne 2004) to obtain rights that are either enjoyed collectively, or individually, as a member of the group. Minority claim-making, in turn, refers to the process and circumstances through which these claims arise from the group itself. Understanding how minorities come forward with claims is crucial, for it is the first step towards the possible recognition of group-specific rights. Moreover, the genesis of claim-making helps explain the aims of the minority group, disputes and conflicts between the

minority and the majority, the short-term alteration of claim intensity, the way ethnic leaders manage to elicit compromises, the possibility of conflict management and many other questions that may arise in the relationship between majority and minority groups. The process of claim-formulation must, evidently, be explained from the perspective of the minority group. The process follows some generic steps: first, a collective identity should exist on the social level; second, collective action dilemmas must be overcome within the group; third, the appropriate claim has to be identified, contested and agreed on, which will eventually lead (although not directly) to the political adoption of a collective claim. The thesis mostly deals with the third phase, aiming to analyse how claims are chosen internally. Thus, the research question asks the following: Does group identity play a role in minority claim-making? This question attempts to augment claim-making theories by focusing on how group entitativity, its norms and discourses alter its perceptions of leverage power.

One of the goals of this thesis is to critically analyse and offer improvements to the theories of minority claim-making. The thesis focuses on how group members arrive at their claims, how homogenous these are, and how they view the claims formulated by their respective political elites. The thesis investigates the specificities of national minority communities and whether claim-making is bound by discourses and whether it depends on group cohesion or entitativity as well.

This introduction is followed by six chapters. Chapter one deals with the presentation of claim-making theories, and it identifies a possible point of their improvement. It also offers definitions of basic concepts: collective or group identity, nationalism, nations and national minorities. The second chapter focuses on constructing the theoretical basis for understanding how group identity influences claim-formulation, an element previously omitted by theories of claim-making. The third chapter looks at how national minorities formulate their claims and what are the group's main considerations. The fourth chapter elucidates the methodological

structure and design of the fieldwork study. The empirical research is comprised of focus group discussions mapping variation in national identity as well as in discourse and a simulation of claim-making in each focus group. The fifth chapter presents the empirical results which partly confirms the hypotheses, finding that while norms and values do not, but contestation and different discourses do influence claim-making. The final part reintegrates the results in the claim-making theories discussed in the beginning of the thesis. The last chapter also considers the limitations of the study and draws the final conclusions.

1. "It's what's inside that counts" – An Initial Look into Identity

1.1 Claim-making Theories

In the following, I review current theories discussing minority radicalization and claim-making, with a special emphasis on bargaining theory, which I consider the advanced. Eventually, I will highlight the deficiency of the theory and I will attempt to address it.

There have been several theories explaining the demands and radicalization of minorities by attempting to identify one main determinant for claim-making (I follow, but also supplement the summary of E. Jenne, 2007). *Primordialist* and *perennialist* theories argue that the ethnic narrative and symbolism are the main initiating causes of ethnic conflict, which are attributed to the existence of tribal feelings (Petersen 2002). *Economic theories* focus on existing economic inequalities (both positive and negative) between the minority and majority, but also on taxing and redistribution issues giving rise to demands (Cedeman et. al. 2011; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). *Institutionalist* accounts concentrate on how domestic institutional arrangements provide a focal point for salient ethnic identities, or, the contrary, incentivize the formation of a common identity. *Elite-driven* theories view leaders as the catalysts of ethnic mobilization. According to these theories, minority political elites are led by the ambition to maintain popular support and a grip on the political agenda (Rabushka and Kenneth A. 1972). The *ethnic fears* approach uses a security dilemma structure, arguing that groups mobilize in occasions of a power vacuum or in the lack of credible safety guarantees from their counterpart (Posen 2004). Lastly, theories focusing on *neighbour effects* (Salehyan 2007) demonstrate how neighbouring states might affect ethnic radicalization (through spill-over and diffusion effects).

In contrast, I argue that while focusing on one causal element is legitimate in specific cases of ethnic radicalization and conflict, these approaches cannot be applied universally.

Therefore, I insist that a better approach is to account for the multiplicity of factors of claim-making. There are theories adopting exactly this approach. Among these, Brubaker's triadic nexus theory (Brubaker, 1996, 4–7) is perhaps the most influential one.

For the purposes of the thesis, the most important novelty of Brubaker's theory is its focus on the interaction between relevant actors. The triadic nexus theory (ibid.) conceptualizes the interplay between national minorities, kin-states and 'nationalizing states' i.e. the majority. It also describes how minorities radicalize, depending on the relationships between these actors. For instance, if the kin-state is supportive of the minorities, while the host state is permissive, minorities will likely radicalize.

Partly building on Brubaker's theory, bargaining theory, put forward by Jenne (2007) aggregates the different possible explanations of claim-making and places them in an interactive network. Jenne argues that minorities formulate claims when they perceive an increase in their leverage power. Leverage power, in turn, is a function of structural characteristics such as size, compactness, economic wealth, cleavage structures etc. These are long-term traits that cannot explain claim alteration, even if it strongly influences claims. Thus, if everything else remains the same, opportunity structures can be identified, that change the perception of leverage power (Jenne, 2007). For instance, a change in the institutional setting, such as the establishment of the League of Nations' minority regime, brought about the proliferation of minority communities' claims. Minority claims may also intensify for other reasons: strengthened kin-state support, changed majority attitude etc.

Here, the word '*perception*' is the key. On the one hand, perception of leverage power is not only influenced by factors that we usually deem objective, but also by beliefs. In this model, minorities assess their leverage power on the different levels (that were previously identified by the literature as having influence on minority-majority relations), which they, in turn, compare to the power of the majority. Therefore, how the group perceives their

counterpart's power matters just as much, as it defines what are the possible claims the group can push for. If, for example, the leaders of the minority group perceive an increased leverage power, as a result of increased kin-state support, ceteris paribus they will predictably intensify their claims towards the majority. But, if the majority group's power has risen similarly, the intensity of the claims will stay stable.

In general, the strength of the theory of ethnic bargaining is in its focus on the interaction between actors, and its capacity to integrate previously analysed factors by introducing perception of leverage power. The theory is also capable of explaining short-term alteration in demands by pinpointing the changes in perception. Previous theories struggle with short-term changes, as they were hard to explain by the usually gradually changing structural features of a group, such as its economic power and homogeneity. On the other hand, perception implies certain imperfections. Such an imperfection is the existence of private information, that not all actors are conscious of, or, the existence of incomplete information, that is not capturing fully a state or situation (Fearon 2009). Accordingly, it also implies the possibility of misinterpretations. Thus, focusing on perception does not only mean that information may be asymmetric on both sides, but that the same information can be interpreted differently. Even though Jenne operates with the sense of perception outlined above, the theory ultimately remains within the logic of bounded rationality. This I argue is advanced by the possibility of (mis)interpretations, thus, it is not capable to integrate the volatility in perception. My claim is that the way a group perceives signals and its own leverage power, is impacted both by its norms and current discourse and by group cohesion i.e. the complexity and homogeneity of a collective identity.

To summarize, the theory of Jenne successfully integrates the multitude of features influencing claim-making in a bounded cost-benefit calculus, to determine if the minority group, and especially its leaders, will formulate escalated or de-escalated demands. For

example, if they perceive a circumstance as a window of opportunity for possibly acquiring extended rights, without much to lose, then the group will formulate claims. Conversely, if the perceived leverage power is comparatively low, the group will moderate its claims. Thus, one underlying assumption of this theory is that if the circumstances are right and promising, minority groups will always mobilize. This claim would be easy to refute as many groups do not meet this expectation. Similarly, the group to be examined later – Hungarians in Transylvania – have maintained the same level of claims, regardless of changes in leverage power.

This apparent contradiction of the theory partially serves as a starting point. I only provide a short list of problematic assumptions here, that are to be examined later on: the actors are taken to be internally homogenous; the bounded rational-choice perspective is too narrow; the influence of society on claim-making elites is not considered and finally, as I will argue, groups can set non-negotiable claims that are explainable by their respective group identity and discourse. The violation of these crucial claims might initiate a seemingly irrational behaviour, without any regard to cost-benefit analyses, or, in its lighter form, might bound the rational calculus of claim-makers, representing boundaries that should not be crossed.

In my thesis, I address these interrelated objections by building on the concept of collective identity and explaining how it is related to claim-making. Collective identity is ultimately the motivational basis of claim-making, as it is what keeps a group together and renders collective action possible. Thus, the general hypothesis of the thesis would be that group identity does represent a factor that affects convergence and divergence of support for claims. If one uses the framework of bargaining theory: group cohesion moderates the perceptions of what the group is capable of, thus changing intensity of claims; norms, discourse but also, collective identity itself delimit the minimal and maximal intensity of claims.

H1: A more cohesive group has larger capacity to make claims.

H2: Non-negotiable claims are set by the group's norms and discourse.

The first hypothesis claims that perception of leverage power is filtered by the group identity's cohesiveness i.e. how strong, unifying and exclusive the collective identity is versus how contested it is. In other words, if the group is cohesive, claim-making becomes considerably simpler, as the group members identify with the group to a high degree and have no alternate identities. As a consequence, claims will be the most obvious tool to seek to better their position and as such, it will be easy to reach common claims and also, claims with high intensity. The second hypothesis posits that there are certain claims that stay the same, no matter of changes in the cost-benefit calculation or the perception of group leverage power. The underlying logic being that when compared to national groups, minority national group identity can become a stronger, constitutive in the life of group members. In other words, when compared on the basis of structure and group-formation, national minorities are an involuntary group, opposed to associative groups (Sanderson 1938). In this fashion, H2 proposes that unchanging claims, and what these claims specifically are, is motivated in a large part by the significance of the national minority identity and the subsequent constitution and discourses on this identity. Moreover, I expect that the discourses and meanings attached to the group identity will filter perception and configure claim preferences. As a first step, I identify specific characteristics of minority identity and see whether these truly vary in salience within the group. Next, I observe how these traits contribute to the support of claims with varying intensity, but also, how these individuals motivate their answers.

Current theories focus more on the elite-level description of claim-making, while the aim of the thesis is to see how claims are formulated and supported on the level of the group itself. This would mean exploring identity and identifying substantive elements of it, that are

widely held by the group and are connected to claim-making. If for example, the group constitutes their identity as mainly linguistic, claims for territorial autonomy may not be of much concern. Similarly, if the group sees itself as peaceful, tolerant, claims that elicit more confrontation with the majority group (e.g.: symbolic claims) will get side-lined.

The main method – focus group discussions – locates widely held norms and analyses discourse to make use of the internal variation of the collective identity, as no single collective identity is homogenous. At the end of the theoretical part, I draw up a matrix, containing the factors and aspects of collective identity, identified as potentially influential in bringing about divergence or convergence of claim-formulation. The empirical part tests the relationship between these and the intensity, as well as types of minority claims.

1.2 Defining Basic Concepts

My study of the effect of collective identity on claim-formulation – makes use of several core concepts: collective identity, nationalism and minority groups. In order to explain claim-making, this chapter defines these basic concepts to be used and ensure that they are properly understood. Rather than offering a comprehensive overview of the theoretical approaches to the concepts, I use a reconstructive critical approach, to present my understanding of the concepts and elucidate the way in which they are used in the rest of the thesis.

Collective Identity

I discuss identity as a concept within political science and political theory, while also making use of findings from the literature of political psychology. Following Anderson (2006) and Gellner (1983), I delineate three important levels of analysis: the *sentiment of group belonging*, explaining the attachment of the individual to the group, the *content of identities,* concerning the attached meanings and characteristics of an identity, and lastly the *political* and organizational aspect that is usually discussed within political science and political theory.

Identity seems to be a ubiquitous term, both in our everyday life and within scholarly discussions, having been debated in areas ranging from philosophy to political science. Nonetheless, its meaning is far from settled. Erik H. Erikson defined identity as a simultaneous "sameness and continuity" and difference from others (Erikson, 1968, 22, 67). Moving on from this preliminary definition, I will offer a conception of identity by considering some central questions: how is individual identity connected to collective or group identity? Is collective identity something given and static, or does it allow for changes? Is ethnic identity a unique case on its own?

First, it is important to note that there is a dual meaning to identity, comprising of the singular, individual identity and the shared common identities, that the individual feels a part of. Following Erikson, these might be coined personal and social identity (J. Fearon 1999). Interaction between these two, the individual and its larger sociocultural context, is a considerable part of identity development (Erikson 1964). Here, there is two possible ways to proceed: one is to analyse how individual characteristics configure group identity. The other is to see how group identity brings together various individual identities to support common claims. In this thesis, I take the second route.

I consider three possible scholarly approaches to the use of identity as a concept, among which I place my working definition. One of the two main schools in analysing group identities (e.g. gender, nationality, religion) is *essentialism,* which in its most radical form takes identity as a given and stable phenomenon, presupposing an unchanging core or essence that serves as a base-point of the identity (Fearon and Laitin 2000). In other words, this core is what unites a group together. Would it disappear, the group itself would cease to exist. Essentialism is not widely supported by scholars but has been useful to describe the phenomenological experience of some groups'. *Constructivism,* on the other hand, contends that identity is malleable and subject to change. According to this view, group identity has a history, a process of becoming

and changing, which may be influenced by many external factors, such as institutions, language, politics etc. (Chandra 2012; Wimmer 2008).

A third theoretical approach, suggested by Brubaker and Cooper (2000), proposes to abandon altogether group identity as a category of analysis. Let us investigate this approach in some detail, since it directly concerns the topic of the thesis. The core claim is that the concept of identity is either overloaded with too many mutually conflicting connotations, or—like in constructivist theories—simply too empty, seemingly repudiating the original core meaning of 'sameness', in order to make it theoretically useful and unequivocal (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 13–14). Brubaker and Cooper argue that identity, in fact, flattens the many meanings people assign to certain constructs such as race, ethnicity and nationality. What one should do instead, is to assign different and more descriptive concepts to represent each different possible meanings in which identity might be used.

Nevertheless, I contend that Brubaker and Cooper's approach would not be useful for several reasons. First, one could apply Gerring's criteria of conceptual goodness (Gerring 1999), which show that concepts are always a trade-off between several functions[1] that a concept should fulfil. Doing away with high-order concepts is not a solution to the problem, as it will preclude us to construct large-scale, meaningful explanations. Brubaker and Cooper fail to see that replacing identity with referential and descriptive substitutes might eventually result in easily applicable terms that will be too excessively specific to provide theoretical generalisations. Group identity is crucial in understanding the general sense of how individuals experience group-belonging. Identity as a concept is meant to encapsulate many different factors of social life that distil into one large phenomenon of self- and group-understanding and allow for comparisons between these (Lawler 2014, 9). Given that the thesis aims to do exactly

[1] These are: familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility, field utility (Gerring, 1999)

this, i.e. the functioning and effect of identity – in practice – on minority group claims, I do not renounce identity as a concept.

Nonetheless, Brubaker and Cooper rightly note that 'identity' tends to be an inherently objectifying term, often precluding the possibility of analysing emergent features that lie behind it (2000, 27). Similarly, Brubaker's critique on "groupism" (Brubaker 2002) is right in pointing out that groupness is rather an event, than something in itself, meaning that in certain times ethnicity may gain importance, motivating individuals to act as group members. Even though the term groups and ethnic group will remain to be used, this will be done so bearing in mind that it is a category of practice that individuals identify with.

For this reason, I adhere to an understanding of collective identity which considers the social world a constructed one, but still accepts short to medium term stability in the intersubjective field of the social world. This position sits in-between the previously presented approaches of radical essentialism and constructivism. Essentialist theories are blind to the embeddedness of identities into concrete social, economic etc. contexts; radical constructivism fails to account for historically important identities that do not change on the short-term (e.g. ethnic identity).

In the constructivist approach, social identities do not exclude those objectively identifiable characteristics and social markers that a group yields (be it a common religion, language, practices, socio-economic status etc.), simply because these are the social blocks upon which a social identity is built. However, the rules of membership and the characteristics of the group are taken as the products of the group and its members. Thus, these are social facts subject to change (Fearon and Laitin 2000). How freely are these social identities alterable (especially ethnic identity) is the question that causes disagreement. Often, social identities seem rigid, even in the face of favourable circumstances (e.g. seeds of a common identity are still to be seen in Northern Ireland (Tonge and Gomez 2015)) yet, sometimes they seem highly

malleable (Posner 2004). In contrast, instrumentalist theories, a subgroup of constructivist theories, which view ethnicity as a tool of manipulation (Tishkov 2019; Chandra 2004; Gagnon 2004), struggle with providing a full account on the receptiveness or even outright willingness of masses to take part in ethnic conflict. My aim is to examine more deeply the motivating factors of group cohesion and to see how certain features of ethnic identity might translate to political action.

I consider that the sentiment of belonging to a nation, an ethnic group or a minority are not substantially different, as all of these are sub-types of group belonging. The differences will appear in the content of identity. The claim is that national minority communities are not only different from majority nation in their position vis-à-vis the state, while having the same nation-building aspirations. Their identity is different in having to contend with a majority nation: being more constricted, this collective identity is more rigid and places more emphasis on traditional, cultural content.

In sum, I define group identity as constructed, resting on shared forms of cognition, values and rules (Schermerhorn 1970; Weber 1968). This definition is meant to capture the fact that groups are stable on the short-term but still subject to change. It is largely in line with Bush and Keyman (1997), who argue that identity is contingent and contextual, instead of primordial and instrumental. Contingency here refers to the possibility of members defining themselves along different and even competing axes of group identification. Even if cleavages are mutually reinforcing, thus creating a well-defined group, these might vary in intensity from region to region. Contextuality stresses collective identities' path-dependence: e.g. past conflicts harden identities (Nagle and Clancy 2012). This was also confirmed by field studies such as the one done by Meriona and Tileaga (2011) which studies ethnic minority identity construction in practice, highlighting that collective identities are continuously constructed and negotiated (for a similar argument see Sata 2006).

Ethnic Groups

Having defined the central concept of the thesis, I move gradually to the definition of national minorities by first defining ethnic groups. Following constructivist thinking, ethnic identity is a special type of collective identity, which is determined by descent-based attributes (Chandra 2006) – be it genetic, cultural or historical – around which a belief in common descent is formed. The belief component is the subjective, constructivist element of ethnic identities, while the selected social features represent an ascriptive element in ethnic identity. This might clarify the reason of confusion between ethnicity and nationalism, while also explaining nationalism's affinity for ethnicity. Nationalism is often based on constructing a myth of ethnic origin as a constitutive character of a nation.

Another issue to be addressed is the connection between ethnic groups and political claims. Weber conceptualizes ethnic groups as pre-national, containing the possibility of becoming a nation. This has been developed further, focusing on the claim that the difference between a nation and an ethnic group is that the former is self-aware and politically active (Connor 1978). Yet, I argue that his definition would be too vague since ethnic groups, like all stable groups, experience moments of groupness. Furthermore, Weber argues that: "in our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere" (Weber 1996, 36). The assumption here is that ethnic groups do not have political aims, but can be politicized. This needs correction: ethnic groups might act as collective agents and express political claims (e.g. the Roma frequently mobilize politically, see Vermeersch 2012). Granted, these are not programs aiming to create a coterminous nation-state, for these are only just a specific type of political behaviour. Ethnic groups, thus, contrary to what many scholars argue, are capable of crafting political claims and political behaviour, simply in virtue of them being a stable group, spanning over time (one such example would be aboriginals wanting to achieve certain rights). Therefore, using a negative

definition, I consider ethnic groups as communities that can raise political claims, but have not fulfilled the central aim of a nation—state capturing—and do not intend to do so.

Hutchinson and Smith combine the subjective and objective criteria and argue for six essential features of ethnic groups: a common proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of common culture, a link with a homeland, a sense of solidarity (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996., 6–7). Moreover, it is pointed out that ethnic groups lack the institutional embeddedness characteristic of a national identity (Spencer and Wollman 2003, 47). However, merely emphasizing the content of ethnic identity misses the role of boundary-making in enclosing a group's identity (Spencer and Wollman 2003, 67). As I will argue later, this is applicable to national minorities as well, since these identities are expected to interact with another group more frequently, thus, boundary-making and differentiation figures more prominently in constructing their group identity.

In sum, I define ethnic groups as socially constructed communities of individuals, who share a common identity and culture, in form of rules, values, shared traditions, institutions and practices, but which do not put forward a political programme similar to nationalism (following Horowitz, 1985). Ethnicity is taken as a thin-structured category, capable of becoming dense when filled by other content (e.g.: another common social cleavage be it religious, cultural or social).

Nation and Nationalism

The concepts of nation and nationalism are much discussed and elusive. This pertains especially to questions concerning the genealogy of nations: its origin, typology and driving forces of its development. The dissonance is partly due, in my opinion, to the multidisciplinary of the area, within which anthropology, sociology, political theory all mingle together, interpolating different perspectives, which not only enrich the field but also pose compatibility

issues. It is not this thesis' aim to discuss these and related issues in length so let me explain my working definitions of the concepts.

One of the main axes of the debate on nationalism has been formed around primordialism versus modernity. As collective identity was not discussed in primordialist terms, it would be illogical to adhere to a primordialist account of the nation and nationalism, which would entail that nations are rooted in biological and psychological traits of humans and it is a natural part of social organization (Spencer and Wollman 2003). Anderson famously defines the nation as an imagined political community, that is limited and sovereign (Anderson, 2006). Nationalism, on the other hand, is an ideology and political programme that seeks to empower the titular group, usually in the form of a nation state. Nationalism effectively extrapolates relations of kinship to a more abstract community and combines it with the idea of self-determination, which can only be realised as a group. The sentiment of nationalism can be defined as a force producing devotion to the nation[2] (Attila 2013a) on which further layers are built (nationalism as identity, ideology, social, political movement) (Hearn, 2006, 6).

National Minority

As the name suggests, a national minority is composed of two elements. First, a minority is numerically inferior to the dominant group (Jenne 2007b, 14). It is defined by relation to the majority, expressing its subordinate position, which may result in various kinds of direct and indirect oppression. The majority or dominant group has primary control over the state, allocation of resources and acts as a value authority (R. Schermerhorn 1996).

Second, adopting Kymlicka's definition, national minorities are similar to ethnic minority groups, but the *differentia specifica* is that the former yield a stronger form of societal culture[3] in addition to shared descent-based characteristics (Kymlicka, 1995). The high level of

[2] I note that I do not choose here between an emotional, rational or behavioural explanation.

[3] "I call it a *societal* culture to emphasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyles" (Kymlicka and Opalski 2002, 33).

societal organization, in turn, is mainly a result of the group's previous experience of self-governance, autonomy or being the titular group of a nation state. Claims of national minorities differ from those of ethnic groups' in that they view themselves as a distinct society, wishing to maintain their own community parallel to the majority society. While ethnic groups do have political claims, these are usually less intense, such as requesting affirmative action in the case of the Roma community. National minorities are quite similar to majority nations, except the fact that they are not the dominant national group. This definition would be extended by the characterization of national minority identity. National minorities, thus, are numerically inferior ethnic, distinct groups that have established a long presence on a certain territory, and that aim to sustain their identity and form a coterminous institutional structure.

Summary

I defined group identity as a constructed sense of belonging to a social community, comprised of social categories (including behaviour, common history, attitudes etc.) and their subsequent shared interpretation. With this, collective identity is taken as given in short-term and will be analysed as such. Moving forward, I used this definition in outlining the concept of the nation. The definition of a national group was then used to define national minorities. I take that the nation, an ethnic group and a national minority group, are all based on the above identified concept of constructed collective identity. In contrast to ethnic groups, national groups were defined by the capacity to act as collectives and by desire for a coterminous state with their own nation. National minorities have a similar ambition, but are constrained to a minority role vis-à-vis the majority, the titular group of the state. The focus of these working definitions was on making possible to capture how identity, especially national identity, as a mode of experience works.

2. Creating the Link: Collective Identity and Claim-making

2.1 Why Would There Be a Group Claim at All?

To get to how thinking about identity influences claim choices of minority groups, first it has to be analysed whether group identity is a meaningful political platform for national minorities. In other words, why would be there group-wide claims at all? Identity affirmation (Tajfel 1981) may serve as an answer. Tajfel, the founder of social identity theory in social psychology, argues that groups are striving to achieve positive group identity by employing strategies that aim to better the group's social position. This is especially true in the case of national minorities, as it was mentioned, group members can hardly escape from being associated with the minority group, and the cost of deferring to the majority group is high. Accordingly, group identification can obtain two roles. Social identity can become salient in intergroup contexts (e.g. a person can interact with a person from an out-group as a person or, as a member of his/her group); or during intragroup interaction (e.g. when the quality of group membership is experienced with other individuals). In both of these cases, the persons "lose" part of their individuality and give space to interacting and acting as group members. This way, the general question for establishing the link between group identity and claim-formulation is to examine how political cohesion comes and group salience comes along. With the presence of group cohesion, group members will feel and formulate the need to be able to act as a member, represent and express their membership. In the case of national minorities, this need would manifest in claims towards the majority.

Part of the answer behind cohesion is a sense of commonality that encourages political involvement (Stokes 2003; Sanchez 2006; Chong and Rogers 2005). Group identity is thus one possible platform for political action (e.g. it has been demonstrated to have an effect even on preferences on redistributive policies Duell, n.d.; Shayo 2009). The question is, what exactly creates this political platform? Leonie Huddy identifies five major strands within the literature

that explain group-based political cohesion (2013): *cognitive approaches*, focusing on self- and external categorization as conditional to political cohesion; *realistic interest-based* theories consider that group-membership is consequential insofar they entail certain gains or losses, which will drive members' decision; *symbolic approaches* argue that the group's social standing vis-à-vis the majority is inducive of group cohesion, *social constructivist* focus on how the meaning of identity and its consequences on political cohesion and political action and the *evolutionary perspective* stresses the need for cooperation in order to survive. We learn from these theories that national minority group's claim formulation is best explained only by a subset. It is mostly connected to interest-based interpretations (i.e. claims are formulated to gain economic benefits, status recognition etc), to enforce the symbolic standing of the minority group, and, following the constructivist approach, to change and intensify meanings attached to minority membership.

Another approach is suggested by van Zomeren et. al (2008) and confirmed empirically by Thomas, Mavor, and McGarty (2012). It explains collective action (in this case claim-making) through considering identity as a perceptual focal point that catalyses mobilization through two defining features. These would be injustice i.e. how an unjust action or state is recognized as a function of group-belonging, and efficacy, or the perceived group ability to resolve the identified grievance. Along similar lines, relative deprivation theory (Kawakami and Dion 1995) suggests that groups carry out collective action when they experience group-based relative deprivation. Thus, collective action is first and foremost a matter of evaluation of the group-based incentives for it**.** I argue later that the type of the group, in our case, national minorities, configures this evaluation, because national minority groups prioritize aims specific to them. In contrast, usually, collective action is theorized as incentivized by the provision of benefits and goods (Olson 2003).

Lastly, the process of collective action, such as claim-formulation, is expected regulated by common norms and discourses. Thus, this finding leads us to discussing two board mechanism that influence claim-making, from the perspective of the group: group cohesion and the content of identity.

2.2 Two Mechanisms Relevant for Claim-making

The relationship between group identity and the individuals is a reciprocal one: individuals internalize group characteristics and values. In this sense, the group is something greater than the individuals[4]. Starting from this, claim-making is recognized as an action that strives to achieve an aim that is not exclusive to the individual as a group-member, but pertains also to the whole group qua group. Let me now discuss how group cohesion and content of identity could affect claim-making.

Group Entitativity

Group cohesion or entitativity (the latter term was introduced by Campbell 1958, meaning the unity of the group and its perception as a distinct entity) can be broken down into different components (for a summary, see Table 1.) *Group identification* captures the extent to which members internalize group belonging. (Huddy 2013). The more people identify with a group, the more salient it becomes. Through probing the grades of identification, one is able to map the salience of different group memberships and compare them. What triggers group identification? On its most basic level, groups are held together by intragroup interaction, which present benefits, in the widest sense of the word, that are greater than intergroup interaction (Bunce and McElreath 2017). Crucially, benefits are not only of instrumental, rational nature (e.g., improvement of economic condition). In the case of substantial groups, that the individual deeply cares about, a non-instrumental benefit could be the simple satisfaction of experiencing

[4] I also acknowledge that individuals are the interpreters and constitutive elements of the group. The freedom of individuals to reconfigure group identity is bounded by the particular social context of the group.

group-belonging together with other group-member (e.g. because this group is subjectively seen as having high social status (Shayo 2009)). Overall, according to social identity theory (Tajfel 1979) the fundamental motivation for individuals within a group is to be able to define themselves and the group in a positive manner (Hymans, 2002).

The socio-psychological self-categorization theory (Turner and Onorato 1999) refines social identity theory further, differentiating between multiple levels of self-categorizations. Thus, *distance between group-members, commonality and group identification* are all primary condition which allow claim-making (White and Burke 1987). On the level of members, those that are more distanced from the group are expected to support claims with lower intensity. Minority groups usually have higher rates of commonality and individuals develop psychological attachment to these group (Dickson and Scheve 2006, 8). As we have discussed above, Brubaker notably theorized groupness as an event, as a category. Applied to my question, periods of high group identification can be seen as moments when groupness is constituted and claim-making becomes important (Brubaker 2002). Put differently, individual's actions can be placed on an axis ranging from interpersonal to intergroup interaction (Tajfel 1978). Those, who interact and see the world on the intergroup end of the axis, will support claims with higher intensity and more communitarian claims.

The strength of *group boundaries* i.e. the easiness of transferring from one group to the other is also affecting cohesion. This feature has long been described as crucial in differentiation between groups (Barth, 1969) and thus form an additional basis for identification as there is no other viable social group to identify with (e.g. racially enslaved people had no choice, but to stick with their group identity because of impenetrability of their group). In the case of national minorities, these boundaries are assumptively strong. Then, if it is hard to defect, group members have no choice but to better their positions via the group they are in.

Interaction with the majority group can have two results. If the relationship between the groups is asymmetric or unequal between the groups, it will likely lead to erosion of cultural and norm differences, leading to assimilation (Bunce and McElreath 2017). The unmarked, default group is the norm-setter (e.g. if there are two language communities, the default group's language is used by all individuals when interacting with strangers whose group membership is not identified). Depending on the local context and the social position of the national minority, the group might be the marked or the unmarked community (e.g. if the minority has a local, numerical majority, the unmarked, default interaction is among the minority group; a visible consequence would be that discussions are initiated in the minority language). When a group is unmarked, assimilatory trends are lower. Intergroup contact is non-derogatory and not negative to groups if four conditions are achieved (following the social psychology contact hypothesis e.g. Samii 2013): equal statuses, common goals, cooperation, integrative aims that are supported by authorities (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998 from Samii 2013). Moreover, the frequency of interaction may either amplify or weaken this effect. The presence of *other horizontal identities* has been identified as possibly weakening group cohesion if these are cross cutting (Bartolini and Mair 1990).

Table 1. Relationship between factors of group entitativity and claim intensity

Factors of group entitativity	**Change**	**Claim intensity**
Group identification	↑	↑
Positive intergroup interaction	↑	↓
Group boundaries	↑	↑
Other identities (cross-cutting)	↑	↓

The Contents of an Identity

Content describes the meanings that are typically attributed to a certain identity (e.g. being American is often synonymous with the idea of freedom and democracy). *Contestation* is the process through which this meaning is created and changed. According to Abdelal, the content of group identity is structured into 4 types (Abdelal et al., 2009). Constitutive norms are those formal and informal attributes of the group, which regulate group-proper behaviour and recognition. Social purposes are group-specific goals, which outline expected group member practices. Relational comparisons refer to what the group is vis-à-vis other. Lastly, cognitive models are worldviews through which the members make sense of the world and adopt specific 'ways of reasoning'. During the empirical investigations, the role of these types would be tested. Contestations are the internal disputes over interpretations of one or the other feature of content, which effectively decide what collective identity means.

The degree of contestation signals the level of group *fragmentation* on all the mentioned types of content. Moreover, through this selection of features, others remain insignificant (Barth, 1969, 14). One example of this process would be the well-known study of Posner (2004) illustrating how two groups (Chewas and Tumbukas) can become adversaries in one state and allies in another, due to differing conditions that downplay certain cultural features and emphasize others within the groups. My claim is that this process through which particular national identities gain a character directly influences the political aims of the group. For the purposes of this inquiry, it is important that the way a group constructs and reflects on its identity, might influence the kind of claims that it will support. This is the second causal link to be explored during the empirical analysis.

One should be careful not to err in over-ethnicizing the life of the individual (Brubaker et al. 2006), for this would result in a biased examination. While for groupism an ethnic group is taken as ethnic at all times, in reality, individual social behaviour is ethnicized less frequently.

When individuals consider supporting the claims of their ethnic group, a question is how ethnicized their personal life is. Consequently, this sheds light on the fact that group cohesion also determines the norms the group as a collective of individuals adopt.

As noted, collective identity is not merely a moderator variable, but plays a constitutive role as well, which cannot be explained by structural factors only. Social psychology, in studying crowd dynamics, notes that in case of interacting with an out-group, individuals tend to act on a corresponding level, not as individuals, but as members of their group. (Reicher 1984; Reicher 1987). Similarly, during minority claim-making oriented toward the majority, collective identity serves as a basis for behaviour. Consequently, the type and content of the group identity will motivate/serve as a normative basis on which actions to take as a group (Spears 2011). I expect to see norms figure most prominently in symbolic behaviour, because in the case of symbolic claims no instrumental rationality is present. Symbolic considerations are not connected to immediate results for the member, but to the reinforcement of their identity (having a value and meaning in itself) by validating group claims. Moreover, symbolic claims are an effective tool to signal group belonging as an expressive behaviour (Hamlin and Jennings 2011), reaffirming commitment to the group.

Norms and shared meanings might have two types of effects: setting a widely held minimums of claims and prioritizing certain demands in claim-formulation. Thus, the effect of group identity is manifested in how a group interprets and sees itself in the light of its collective memory, current situation, the "normative constitution" (Cruz 2000, 303) i.e. comprising all the values and norms of the group and cognitive frames it adopts.

In a similar vein, Consuelo Cruz argues that groups manifest a dominant rhetorical frame, that circumscribes the "collective field of imaginable possibilities" (Cruz 2000) i.e. outlines the latitude of movement for elites but also for the group as a whole. In his comparative case study of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Cruz demonstrates that the Costa Rican discursive

frame of being peaceful and diligent people lead to the restraint of internal political fights, increased consensus-building and the execution of crucial developmental policies (idem, 278), in sharp contrast with Nicaragua. This rhetorical frame became a constitutive element of identity and it was continuously referenced and enacted by the elite, so that it imposed a constraint on any selfish actions.

Elites may aim to take ownership or establish a new rhetoric. However, this activity is constrained by anything the group deems credible. This restriction is all the more present as the elite itself, by being part of the group, is embedded in the same collective field of imaginable possibilities. Here, a possible objection would be that within this framework, actors are overdetermined by their social groups. This would be a manifestation of the momentous agent-structure debate within sociology (Ritzer 2011, 224–26). One would have to emphasize the dialectic and co-determinant relationship between the two. Actors are free to challenge the dominant rhetoric, to use contestation and reconfigure meanings as long as the discourse remains to ring true for the wider society. Thus, the second hypothesis claims that group discourse bounds the range of possible claims and can also set the non-negotiable ones. More specifically, I expect to see two things. First, certain type of discourses on ethnic identity may result in higher or lower intensity claims. Second, discourses may also be selective towards certain claim types which will be explored later (linguistic, symbolic, economic, territorial).

To repeat, a degree of contestation is always present within the group, but the "collective field of imaginable possibilities" (Cruz 2000, 277) should define the basic common denominator. The more dominant and uncontested the rhetoric is, the stronger are the adopted claims. On the other hand, if contestation is high, group-wide claims should be weaker. What are then the sources of this internal fragmentation of groups in cases as vital as claims for rights (as arguably, the group interest would be to show a strong front to the majority)?

2.3 Turning Back to Perceived Leverage Power

Earlier I have noted how apparent misperceptions and the issue of interpretation is not sufficiently addressed in bargaining theory. The dominant discourse or widely held norms may serve as an explanatory factor. In the case of claim-making, the normative constitution of the group should set widely held minimums, which go beyond the mere fact that a group, whenever it becomes salient, strives to survive. An example would be an occasion when the current, momentary bargaining power of the group does not warrant a claim, either because it is lower or higher in intensity. These cases might be explained by the presence of a certain discourse that prioritizes the relevant claim in force. A dominant discourse (e.g. as a result of intra-elite competition) changes the groups' perception of its leverage power and sets a strong claim, which could not be explained by the current leverage power. Or, conversely, a discourse of being tolerant and peaceful, could result in claims of lower intensity than what the group's perceived leverage power would indicate, or, it configures this perception. Moreover, if the dominant discourse is stable, without much contestation, bargaining would become insensitive, on the short-term, to changes in leverage power. On the other hand, discourse is dampened and strengthened by the levels of group entitativity, more so than by ethnic elites, were this not true, there would be no substantial difference between ethnic and national minority groups (see Figure 2. for the relationship between entitativity, discourse and claims).

The next question is whether the group's rhetorical frame or its values should set, in addition to a minimal limit, an upper limit as well. Previous experience suggests that national identities can quickly become virulent and violent. Can it be possible that group norms and discourse prevent radicalisation, or at least the intensification of claims against favourable circumstances?

One more point is in order regarding discourse. Ethnic conflict theory argues that the discursive construction of a group is necessarily antagonistic to an out-group and that it is

partially responsible for an ensuing conflict. Yet, this clam is at odds with much that social psychology has diagnosed. It claims that individuals rather display in-group solidarity than out-group hostility. This is substantiated by research done in minimal group paradigm, studying the very bases of group-formation through thinly defined groups. It was found that individuals tend to identify based on positive biases to their group, rather than on negative biases to the other group. This holds true even in the case conflict of interest between the groups (Tajfel and Turner 2001; Spears 2011; Spears et al. 2009). While it is hard to apply this finding to thick groups, such as national minorities, it seems to be in line with the basic findings of social identity theory. According to this, claim-making is seen as a group-wide strategy to better the social status of the group, deemed illegitimate or unfair (Spears 2011). The preoccupation of the group with this positive endeavour is a sign of in-group favouritism.

When analysing group discourse, group are not seen as passive bodies enacting roles of an antagonistic discourse, as much of the ethnic conflict theory posits. Moreover, the discourse analysis will focus on the group level, instead of the elite-level discourse. Therefore, my analysis focuses on group characteristics, the content and discourse of group identity and its connections to claim-making.

We have identified two mechanisms connected to group identity that have a role in claim-making. Group cohesion or entitativity is a moderator variable, affecting the strength of the structural variables that influence claim-making (see Figure 1.). Entitativity influences the occurrence of groupness understood as an event (Ruane and Todd 2004; Brubaker 2002). Given that ethnicity as a category exists alongside other social categories and can vary in strength, cohesion moderates the ethnic group's claim-making capability. Therefore, as it was presented, H1 claims: the group's entitativity moderates the groups' claim-making capacity. According to H2, norms and group discourse, as a newly identified variable, bounds claim-making. This

boundedness emerges not only from the survival instinct of the group, but also by how the group interprets its current context and history.

Figure 1. Groupness as a moderator variable



Figure 2. Relationship between entitativity, values, discourse and claim-making



3. National Minorities: A Special Case?

Having explored the general features of claim-making, I proceed by applying the findings to national minorities. Let us characterize nations and nationalism first.

3.1 Characterizing Nations and Nationalism

I have argued that the content (especially norms and discourse) of collective identity influences the political aims of the group (bottom-up), often independently of economic interest. I expect that this is the same in the case of national groups as well. An example of identity construction's effect would be that of the difference between conceptions of civic and ethnic nations that—it is argued—influences the choice of the citizenship regime that a state adopts, one being more territorially and the other more culturally-ethnically focused (Vink and Bauböck 2013).

There is, however, a complication. Kedourie argues that it is also possible that political aims influence the character of a group (top-down). This was so at the advent of the modern nation: "It is very often truer to say that national identity is the creation of a nationalist doctrine, than that nationalist doctrine is the emanation or expression of national identity" (1993).[5] The question is how pervasive is the influence of the nationalist doctrine on the national identity? This question is highly important as the thesis intends to examine the bottom-up effect of group identity and corresponding discourse on political claims. By arguing the national doctrine is a determining factor, one would have to assume an instrumentalist conception of nationalism. The argument would be that the national doctrine (controlled by the elites) is used to instrumentalize ethnicity for gaining political power and private benefits. This would not be

[5] It is then, not surprizing at all, that national identity has an ethnic basis, as in most cases this is a fertile soil of nation-building. Especially so, that national sentiment relying on ethnicity can gain a powerful primordial, essentialist character by creating the appearance that the national group has long been bounded by a common ethnicity.

without problem either. Even though that this strategy is sometimes successfully applied, it grant elites too much agency and cannot explain the stickiness of these identities (Boix, Stokes, and Varshney 2009). The question of how independent national identity and individual claim-making is from the elite's instrumental rationale, however still persists but is outside of the scope of this thesis.

To grasp what a concrete nation is, one must consider its specific content of the identity and the subsequent political and ideological claims that can be a result of this. Scholars of nationalism frequently refer to the historical and sociological context in which the nation emerged and how the ideological formulation of the group's main characteristics (propagating one national identity, within which everyone is seen as equal) motivated the political aims of sovereignty and equality. Phrased differently, the political claims depend on the type of collective identity and its meanings (Huddy 2013; Schatz et al., 1999; Wong 2010).

In virtue of the size of a nation (both territorial and numerical), relations of kinship are extrapolated to a more abstract community (Anderson, 2006). Consequently, since every groupmember connects directly only to a small fraction of its compatriots, the content of the national identity may vary to great degrees. From another aspect, a nation is like an "empty signifier" (Laclau 2005, 67–100), a vessel, that can be filled with content and houses much pluralism. This fact will be taken use of, as the variation within national identity will be used to detect the norms that are central in the group's life and the ones that are not.

3.2 National Minorities and Claims

According to the initial definition, national minorities are very similar to nations, except that the state they reside in is not coterminous with the group and there is a majority society. However, given that the minority group identity has to either directly or indirectly reflect on the existence of a majority group, to fully understand the substantive content of its identity, one has to consider it in the context of the nation-state, in which it most often exists. the question is

how exactly national minority identity differs and whether this difference manifests itself in claim-making. In order to do this, I shortly compare and contrast it with the majority national identity.

From the viewpoint of minority identity, group cohesion is often called forth by the external pressure of the majority group (Young 1989). Schermerhorn describes this through what he calls surface pointers (including dressing, language and other physical features) (Schermerhorn 1996). These might not be prominent symbols of the group, nonetheless, serve as notable indices of interaction. External identificatory practices i.e. labels that the outgroup uses to characterize the minority, are usually linked to these and might become internalized by the group itself, whether to their liking or not. In the case of minority group's identity, boundaries of group differentiation, compared to majority groups, are enforced in a greater proportion from the outside as these groups are exposed to the majority society. Relational elements of the group identity will be more frequent and salient as compared to that of majority national identity.

On the other hand, national minorities, being well organized, have relatively *well-identifiable group boundaries*. These boundaries are, in most cases, hardly permeable for several reasons: the cost of changing the group is high, while integration into the other group is usually difficult or not desirable (assimilation). I hypothesize that this results in national minority identity often being more cohesive than the majority one – if the majority's identity is not challenged – as there is more ground (voluntary and involuntary) for identification.

Inter-group comparisons of group-members *are relatively high* (lower than that of ethnic groups, as these do not have a developed institutional network reinforcing their collective identity) in virtue of being a minority. It also follows that *symbolic and representative issues/conflicts are highly salien*t (Horowitz, 1985), given that minority groups strive for equal social status with the majority. Lastly, national minorities are mirroring majority nations it their

pluralism. Members have different views on what it means to be a member of the minority group and what the accompanying values are. This is partly tied to the fact that national identity can integrate many non-ethnic types of identities and this interplay of identities can result in differing choices for the individuals. One major difference is that the minority group, given its political situation, is highly oriented towards certain issues (survival of the community, maintenance of clear boundaries and an equal symbolic status with the majority). The reason of this preoccupation is another crucial characteristic of national minority identity, namely, that de-ethnicizing the collective identity or deferring to a non-ethnic basis of self-organisation is much harder.

To summarize, I have argued that several elements influence the choice of minority claims. Under the name of group entitativity or cohesion, the first model of connection between internal group features and claims deals with more objective, quantitative characteristics of the group that potentially influence claim-making, while the second focuses on normative rules and discourse within the group. The analysis of in-group features complement current claim-making theories by mapping how individuals come to identify with the group and also how patterns of social identification and group cohesion influence claim-making. The attributes of the group constrain or predict identity choices, what's more, attributes configure the elite's latitude on claim-making.

Groups can have non-negotiable claims that current theories of claim-making struggle to explain. The thesis takes the case of national minorities (groups that are arguably one of the most cohesive within ethnic minority groups) and focuses on group heterogeneity, aiming to show that even within a relatively closed-off group, internal variation configures claims. The empiric research thus analyses if there is any connection between claim intensity, claim types and the two previously identified factors.

3.3 Fuzzy Relationships

As observed, there might be several causal relations that are cyclical or contain a feedback-loop. Surely, group entitativity or cohesion bringing about groupness is one such example and can even have an amplification effect. Similar mechanisms were long observed by scholars of ethnic conflicts: increasing cohesion reproduces intra-group solidarity, while the increase in the salience of ethnicity creates a vicious cycle for both groups (Stojanović 2014). Sometimes, the identified characteristics of groupness as cohesion are created by external threats, economic inequalities etc.

It has also been established that elites are prone to instrumentalize nationality for personal benefits or that group-members have similar cost-benefit calculations. This suggests that group claims might be artificially induced and intensified by elites. The question is to what extent can elites manipulate claims adopted by group members and how much are the elites limited by the group. First, elites are bounded by the virtue of the fact that they have to make group-based claims. In a contrary case, the constituency might vote differently if identity is not primed or identity-related payoffs are not satisfied. Second, group identity will also have constraining effect on the political elite (Dickson and Scheve 2006; Morin 2014) in the form of personal stakes in the group.

Another fuzzy relationship is between norms, meanings and political attitudes: which one drives which (Huddy 2013)? Does political affiliation influence what claims are supported? Ethnic and national identities usually do not overlap completely with a single politicized identity (Freedman 2000, Junn and Masuoka 2008, Phalet and Baysu 2010), as these are more of a vessel, containing other identities. It seems logical to assume that contestation can also be present only because there are other politicized identities.

4. Methodology, Measurement and Case Selection

The empirical research design makes use the variation of the socio-economic characteristics within the group and a consequent discourse analysis.

The central dependent variable of the thesis is the change in claims, operationalised in two ways. First, the strength of demands depends on the extent of the powers that the minority groups want to acquire from the host state (Jenne 2007, 40). These demands or claims are to acquire rights, concessions and specific policies from the majority. Based on the recipient of the claim, these benefits can be enjoyed by an individual in virtue of their citizenship and human rights, as a unique member of the group, or, by the group as such. Claims that would be enjoyed collectively, as a community, are seen as more intense because it implies the explicit recognition of the community as such by the central state (Kymlicka, 1995). This is a crucial difference in many countries in which the majority society attempts to sustain the veil of an ethnically homogenous state (e.g. Central and Eastern European countries). By this measure, extremity increases from temporary affirmative action, to language and cultural rights, claims for autonomy and finally, to irredentism. Yet, there might be claims among which one is more extreme in its challenge to the central state but lacks the communal aspect. In such cases, the claim demanding community recognition would be considered as more intense (for the full listing of claims see Appendix 3.)

Second, I construct a typology of claims: 1) linguistic claims, 2) symbolic claims, 3) economic claims, 4) claims of power devolution (including territorial claims). This categorization is close to that of intensity but allows us to focus on whether select discourses have preferences towards certain claim types or not. For instance, as was earlier discussed, a less groupist discourse might not only prefer claims of lesser intensity, but would disregard symbolic claims of the group as well.

4.1 Methodology and Research Design

As the thesis is limited in its scope, only spatial and social variation within a national minority group are analysed. The expectation is that the territorial variation of the group characteristic affects the way subjects motivate their choice of appropriate claims. The methods of the thesis are exploratory and qualitative in nature. Interaction is key in understanding how social identities are constructed, how discourses are acted out, and how members negotiate their interests and settle on group demands. Therefore focus groups are used, as they allow for interaction between group members (Kitzinger 1995). However, focus groups have the disadvantage of increasing group identification to higher levels than in normal circumstances, because of the very theme and questions raised during the conversation, and also because participants will all be co-members. This way, conformity is a very possible threat to the study, which might prevent the surfacing of distinct opinions. Other limitations include: dominant voices, normative discourses dampening others and moderator influence (Smithson 2000). These limitations were tackled by the introduction of individual surveys at the beginning of each focus group, to detect any of the above-mentioned effects.

One focus group was conducted in every chosen settlement. Prior to the focus group, participants filled out a short survey measuring their identification and attitude towards the group (see Appendix 1.). The focus group participants were gathered with a maximum variation sampling – where possible – (Onwuegbuzie and Collins, 2007), as the aim is to include a wide variety of views. On the other hand, group heterogeneity has a negative effect on participants' willingness to express their views (Sim 1998 from Onwuegbuzie et al. 2009). I assumed the role of moderator, which consists of facilitating the discussion, asking questions and encouraging participation and, in the light of the above, attempt to maintain equal participation.

The discourse analysis focuses on different narratives in the discussion, mapping links between identity characteristics, discourses and claims. Several questions were posed in the

focus group, aimed to uncover how identity might be constructed differently, how certain group claims are explained and seen by participants (for questions and prompts see Appendix 2.). The focus groups combined also serve as a tool to map out the recurring discursive patterns, how participants position themselves (Bamberg 2010, Depperman 2015) and whether these are connected to widely shared claims.

In sum, the focus group proceeds in the following order: individual surveys (see Appendix 1.) measure the degree of group identification, norms and values, the degree and nature of intergroup contact and require participants to choose one from three different types of claims to be able to detect group pressure; the first set of question during the discussion explores the meanings of identity; followed by a discussion on claims and claim-making and how participants legitimize them, lastly, a group exercise of ranking claims measures contestation and claim adoption.

The number of focus group participants varies between 9-10. The discussion revolved around the meaning of Hungarian identity: when it becomes salient in everyday situations, how it is conceptualized vis-à-vis the majority and how participants legitimize minority group claims. The final task of the participants was to discuss and rank different minority claims.

Participant selection was done through snowball sampling. Participants that were not born in the respective town of analysis all lived there for at least 8 years. Females were overrepresented among participants. The discussions lasted for an hour and a half on average and were carried out in Hungarian.[6]

In Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, participants were between the age of 18-35, with one exception, all of their parents were of ethnic Hungarian origin. Being Transylvanian, urban and Christian were other identities that were reported besides being Hungarian. In Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely Participant's age varied between 18-65, slightly skewed towards the

[6] These were recorded, to which all participants agreed to.

younger generation, all of them were ethnically Hungarian. Lastly, in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda participants' age and sex were fairly well distributed.

4.2 Case Selection and Description

The group analysed are Hungarians in the Romanian region of Transylvania. Transylvania has historically been a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional region. Ethnic Romanians are the absolute majority. Other minorities' numbers have been decreasing steadily. According to the 2011 census, 1.2 million Hungarians are living in Romania, representing around 6.1% of the country's population. Most of them concentrated in Transylvania, which is 18.91% of the region's population (National Institute of Statistics in Romania). Several reasons motivate the choice of focusing on this group: 1) it is one of the largest minority groups in Europe and the largest one in Romania, 2) the group is spread out on a large territory, 3) there is considerable variation in group characteristics, 4) the group has long been politically active, 5) the focus group moderator is member of the group, which enables him to perceive cultural cues and context. I begin with a short general overview of the current territorial segmentation of Hungarians and history of Transylvania (for a detailed overview see Köpeczi et al. 1994), followed by the characteristics and short history of the selected towns.

Four Hungarian-inhabited regions can be distinguished. Székely Land is the largest and most compact ethnic block of Hungarians with almost half a million inhabitants, yielding a strong regional identity. Partium, close to the Hungarian border, is an ethnically mixed region, Hungarians make up 28% of this region on average. Central Transylvania comprises the major towns of Cluj/Kolozsvár and the numerically largest Hungarian town, Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely, with a bit less than 50% of Hungarians. The rest of Hungarians communities live dispersed among large Romanian majorities (Kiss 2018, 395).

Historical and Institutional Background

Ethnic conflicts in Transylvania are often framed in historic terms. It is folk knowledge for its inhabitants that the region has been caught up between geopolitical borders for all of its history. It has been a part of the easternmost roman province of Dacia, the eastern region of the Hungarian Kingdom and Christianity, the periphery between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires as an independent principality and then as a Habsburg province, and it was caught up between the awakening nations of Hungarians and Romanians (Brubaker et al. 2006, 56–88). As a result of historical heritages, both Romanian and Hungarians, although the latter more so, have developed strong regional identities. This was further underpinned by the fact that Transylvania was and is a comparably wealthier and more developed region, than the rest of Romania.

With modernity, an era of nationalizing states began, with short alteration of Hungarian and Romanian nationalizing efforts between 1867-1944, ending with Transylvania becoming part of the Romanian nation state. These regime changes were accompanied by mutually committed atrocities and either voluntary or involuntary population displacements (Jeszenszky 2013). Turning to the particular situation of the Hungarian minority, after the Second World War, discrimination of ethnic Hungarians became apparent, further exacerbated by Ceausescu installing a local, nationalist version of Stalinism (Boia 2015; Bárdi 2017).

After the regime change of 1989, international pressure on Romania to recognise minority rights was massive, but a hasty package of minority policies did not meaningfully solve the situation (Kettley, 2003). The 1991 Constitution was drafted in an atmosphere of interethnic animosity, without the participation of ethnic minorities, famously stipulating that „Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible nation-state", frequently speaking in ethnic term throughout the constitution[7] (Fábián 2007). On the other hand, in a

[7] Such an example is Art. 4.1.: "The State is founded upon the unity of the Romanian people". Later, the 2003 amendment added: "The State is founded upon the unity of the Romanian people *and the solidarity of its citizens."*

contradictory manner, it also ensures guarantees for minorities the right to preserve, develop and express ethnic, religious and cultural identities (Art. 6 of the 1991 Constitution). The greatest leap forward in minority rights was the European Union (EU) membership application (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007), marked by hallmark developments in 2003, when linguistic rights gained constitutional powers[8]. As scholars characterize, the Romanian constitution has a tolerant stance towards minorities, but excludes the possibility of positive discrimination (Fábián 2007, 234).

Currently, compared to its East-Central European neighbours, Romania has more inclusive minority policies, that, however, still lag behind minority regimes in Western Europe and seriously struggles with the implementation of these rights. (Toró 2016; Horváth, n.d.). These policies were largely a result of the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE), Council of Europe and EU membership conditionality on Romania (Kelley 2004). Notwithstanding their positive effect, many of these rights, especially concerning bilingual signs in areas where Hungarians constitute a local minority and the right to use Hungarian language in public institutions are not properly implemented, or are even violated (Horváth 2013; Toró 2016). Other rights include: state-funded Hungarian language education, usage of Hungarian in public institutions and, overall an official policy approach of non-communitarian accommodation, instead of integration (e.g. Leg. Nr. 215/2001).

This Romanian model of ethnic relations has been termed as a model of unequal accommodation (Kiss et al. 2018), which sits in-between an integrationist regime and one that grants constitutional privileges for accommodation. The dominant ethnic party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), participates in coalition governments and solicits deals (to sustain the Hungarian institutional network) and the actual implementation (often on

[8] "In the territorial-administrative units where citizens belonging to a national minority have a significant weight, provision shall be made for the oral and written use of that national minority's language in relations with the local public administration authorities and the deconcentrated public services" (Art. 120(2)).

a case by case basis) of rights through bargaining. Crucially, as Kiss et al. argue, the Romanian minority regime is embedded in political patronage and informality. This is true for DAHR as well (Kiss and Székely 2016), having the ultimate say in allocating funds to the cultural institutions and Hungarian controlled settlements. Instead of institutional guarantees and an ethnic power-sharing arrangement, "the bargaining power of the minority elites depend on the political constellations of the day and are often of ad hoc nature" (Kiss et al. 2018, 14), making it highly dependent on personal, elite-level relationships. Others called this arrangement the Romanian elite's "control through co-optation" (Medianu 2002).[9]

The national minority identity and culture are still lively. The elite-declared dream of a separate minority society has not been fully realized. In some areas, Hungarians constitute a pillar on their own, with extensive social institutions. Change in self-identification is rare, the only assimilatory decrease of cultural reproduction are ethnically mixed marriages. The rate of interethnic marriages hover at around 15% (Horváth 2014, 123). As such, assimilation has had a secondary role compared to more indirect processes as low birth rates and massive emigration of Hungarians (Kiss 2018).

The religious composition of the region follows closely the ethnic divisions, Hungarians are Roman Catholic, Calvinists and Unitarian, while Romanians are Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. This cleavage, until aggressive homogenization policies in the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, was reinforced by a social cleavage as well (Brubaker et al. 2006, 86; Horváth 2014, 121). Today, most Hungarians live outside of the economically more prosperous corridor of Transylvania (Kiss 2015). This status reversal still creates tangible feelings of resentment (Petersen 2002) in the Hungarian community.

Arguably, settlements with high shares of the minority do not assimilate as quickly. However, ethnic proportions do not only influence the rate of assimilation, as the differences

[9] With the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Agency and the disruption of personalistic relationships and bargains, this model now seems to change.

between the marked-unmarked group (e.g. which group is social mainstream and how secure the unmarked group's position is) affect group characteristics forming entitativity and the availability of other non-ethnic identities. Thus, the main indicator of choosing specific places to conclude focus groups in, is the ethnic proportions of the settlement. Other variations are also to be considered, such as the local living standards, historical legacies, the local political landscape, the administrative hierarchy etc. Thus, to obtain a high variety, the following places are selected: Miercurea-Ciuc/Csíkszereda, Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely, Cluj/Kolozsvár.

Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár is the regional capital and the social and intellectual centre of Hungarians. It has experienced a striking change of its ethnic composition. Formerly a multi-ethnic city, today only less than 15 percent of the population remained Hungarians, from 81.6 percent of Hungarians in 1910 (Brubaker et al. 2006, 2011 census). Thus, not only generally but locally, a full status reversal took place during the last century between the two groups. The regime change gave way to nationalist rhetoric, emblematized by the ultra-nationalist Funar mayor between 1994-2004. Today, the city defines itself in a multicultural identity, accompanied by an open, urban local identity. Still, there are occasionally minority-related tensions, especially connected to the local government's resistance towards bilingual inscriptions.

Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely is the municipality of Mureș/Maros county and has been the capital of the ephemeral Hungarian Autonomous Region from 1952 to 1968. In present days, the demographics have tipped to a small absolute Romanian majority. The town itself is an ethnic frontier, a buffer zone between the central-eastern Hungarian part of the county and the western Romanian part. After the regime change, Hungarians wanted to unmix and restitute historic Hungarian schools. This issue culminated in the only violent interethnic conflict after the regime change in March of 1990. Although not violently, but the spirit of ethnic conflict still carries over into today's Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely, manifesting a tacit ethnic

confrontation. The other exemplary case is the continuing issue of Hungarian language education and bilingual street signs and inscriptions. The Civic Engagement Movement, a local NGO's shadow report has documented some of these issues (CEMO Shadow Report, 2016).

Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda is a small town in the Székely region, 81% of its population is Hungarian. It is economically backward, compared to the rest of Transylvania. Using Hungarian language has no barriers in local or regional public institutions and other requirements concerning bilingualism are largely fulfilled as well (Horváth et al. 2010). Romanian living in the town are generally fulfilling their duties in the police forces, the army, as firefighters or in other centrally controlled government institutions.

Group boundaries are strong in all three localities. Given that Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda is within the ethnic enclave, the unmarked group here, opposite to the other two cases, are the Hungarians. In their daily lives, strangers initiate discussion in Hungarian, whereas in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, and increasingly in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely, people engage with each other in Romanian first. Intergroup contact is high both in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, and Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely and low in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda. However, in all of these places, though in varying size, ethnic Hungarians are able to encapsulate themselves into a small Hungarian-world, with minimal interaction with Romanians. Furthermore, given that Hungarians are a majority in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda, there is more space for in-group pluralism and fragmentation. This was so far confirmed on the political, elite level (Kiss 2019, 142). Moreover, beginning from the 1990s, ethnic elites have maintained – albeit after 2004 only in a programmatic from – the claim for constitutional accommodation and autonomy (Kiss et al. 2018, 96–100).

In sum, Hungarians in Transylvania can be defined as a national minority, self-conscious of its ethnocultural distinctiveness. Their identity is not slurring with the majority one, and the community aims to sustain its distinctiveness.

5. Analysis and Results

In the following, I present results by the elements of group cohesion, followed by an analysis of group discourses. These are then connected to the results of the claim-making exercise.

5.1 Groups and Entitativity

Group Identification

The survey gauged the extent of group identification with a three-dimensional measure used in social psychology (Cameron 2004). The results showed that on average, participants identify with the Hungarian ethnic group at a 3.2 level on a 1-4 scale. Group identification is almost equally strong in the case of participants from Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda and Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely, and weaker in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár. Participants interacted with the outgroup on similar frequencies (3-3.56 on a 1-4 scale). As expected, participants from Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda reported the smallest level of interaction, followed by Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár and Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely. Responses on the nature of this interaction (everyday chores i.e. interaction with strangers, workplace, private life i.e. relative, friends) differed by settlements. In this perspective, Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely fares the best, almost all participants did share working and private ties with the outgroup. Multiple form of interactions were present in Cluj-Napoca as well, although to a lesser degree, while in Miercurea Ciuc, interactions with Romanians typically were restricted to the workplace and everyday chores (such as shopping, interacting with the civil service of centralized institutions etc.). Lastly, as reported by Veres, Hungarians, on average, are neutral towards Romanians, evaluating them 2,52 on a 1-5 scale of sympathetic to hostile (Veres 2007; Veres 2014). Thus, relations to the outgroup are most probably context dependent.

Group Boundaries

The first question asked about situations and personal experiences when being ethnically Hungarians has gained importance. Here, participants mentioned mostly experiences of interacting with an external group (Romanians and foreigners). Living in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, participants were all advanced speakers of Romanian, yet, the barrier of language and reactions native interlocutors were mentioned. Some said ethnicity becomes salient when handling official matters and others only experience being Hungarian abroad.

> *Participant (P.).6: I only feel Hungarian when abroad. It is there, when you have to say where you are from, who are you? Then I say, I am Hungarian*
>
> *M.: And when you speak with Romanians, is this more self-explanatory?*
>
> *P.6: I am more in favour of integration (homogeneity), so* [in these case] *there's nothing like that.*[10]

However, there also were a few concentrating on the community's internal life, such as cultural events, sport matches and marches (such as during national holidays). As compared to cases when ethnic identity was evoked as a result of external impulses, in these cases, living the group identity had more positive connotations. When asked about how they see differences between Romanians and Hungarians, participants tended to say that there is no drastic difference.

> *Participant (P.) 7: There are differences, but in my opinion, there are differences between every nation.*
>
> *P.4: I can only support this.*
>
> *P.6: I don't think there are* [differences]. *I have been working in a Romanian environment for a year* […] *besides the fact that we have a different religion and we celebrate eastern at a different time I don't see much difference.*
>
> […]
>
> *P.8: I think there is difference, although I support this liberal think that you said. But there is a difference in how we socialized. We, Transylvanian Hungarians socialized in a minority context, as members of a minority and they socialized as members of the majority community.* […] *Besides this, we*

[10] All following quotes are translated from the original Hungarian excerpt of the discussions.

> *practically have the same problems, everything is the same, except that we speak another language.*

This indicates that group boundaries are not strong and distance between the two group is not seen as significant. Often, language and culture were seen as a barrier for desirable intergroup contact. When discussing Hungarian identity, participants saw their minority identity as a possibility to have a wider perspective, given that they knew Romanian culture as well.

In stark contrast, participants in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda characterized distance between groups as great, even despite personal positive experiences. One participant explained these differences by being part of two different cultural words, the Central-European, western Christianity and a byzantine Orthodox world.

> *P9.: There's not only difference in language and culture. Also in temperament.* […] *We are different from Romanians and Roma people, this is a genetic thing. You cannot deny it, disown it. Not even with good manners.*
>
> *P.4: It flows within us.*

Group distance, conceived in this way, together with high identification prevents to recognize internal differences, heterogeneities of the other group. Here, stereotyping is a good indicator of distance between the group. Such examples were present during discussions: P.4: *"I can see it from far, when somebody is approaching me, no one has to tell me that he is a Romanian"*, or, another participant said P.7: "*The ravine is big* [referring to differences]".

In Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely group boundaries were similarly strong, although not characterized as drastically as in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda. Instead, participants casually discussed all sorts of perceived differences (such as Hungarians being friendlier, reserved, open, refined in taste and putting greater stress on the community, while Romanians being more upfront, more focused on appearances and ambitious). Hence, participants differentiated between the groups and did so without considering whether these are genuine, universal characteristics of the group.

Thus, if we were to place opinions on a continuum, participants in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár can be placed on the lower end in terms of group distance, while participants in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda take place on the exact opposite side.

Interaction

Naturally, interaction was reported to raise the salience of the group identity in each case. Asking about situations when ethnicity gained importance, all group discussed paradigmatic cases of interacting with Romanians, the primary external group: handling official matters and speaking the Romanian language. Group events, in line with expectations, were also mentioned to enhance the experience of groupness (e.g. religious and sport events). Aside from these general remarks, however, there also were differences.

When asking about the particular experiences of being a Hungarian in the city, the responses of participants in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár were in large part positive, even when discussing interaction with Romanians. Participants noted that *"Hungarians can get around Kolozsvár quite nicely".* Some have highlighted that *"there is a strong bloc of Hungarians"*, a bubble that even if unintentionally, moves in the same circles. P.9 voiced his disagreement about *"this stupid parallel Hungarian world in Kolozsvár is in no contact with the Romanians"*. Another participant (P.1) said that he feels as Hungarian but also as Romanian, even though he lived in a mostly Hungarian environment. The Romanian belonging gained importance especially when considering political decisions. Another participant agreed with him:

> *P.4: I think that this political example is very good. As long as decisions affect us, as Transylvanian Hungarians, we also think, voluntarily or involuntarily, as Romanians. Recently there have been protests, there, Romanians and Hungarians protested together, regardless of this bubble difference.*

This is in line with what was seen regarding the perception of apprehension of boundaries between the two groups. As participants were not perceiving strong group boundaries, interaction is also not phrased in negative terms. Furthermore, during the discussion, participants were keen on focusing at the individual level and emphasize that

regardless of ethnicity, their experiences are the same with both community members. Thus, the lack of strong group boundaries and comparatively low identification prevented creating interpretations and generalization based on contact when a participant was, for example, insulted.

Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda again, showed a distinctively different and opposite picture at certain points. When asked about interaction, a participant noted only after studying Cluj, did he realize that he had almost no personal contact with Romanians. On top of mentioning cases of interaction and moments of enhanced group unity (such as hockey and football games), many participants were using offensive language in their answers:

> *P.2: …when we talk with our brothers, this always comes up. Always, somewhere, Romanians have this general consciousness, be it sport or not, that they have to be better than Hungarians. You can feel this in public life as well, stop because I'm Romanian. It's largely the same as back in the romans, they invaded us, so they are the invaders.*
>
> *P.4: Yes.*

Some, in reaction, disagreed and suggested a friendlier stance towards Romanians, but did so as to set an example for the majority group. This fragmentation in the group will be addressed later.

When compared to Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda, interaction was much more discussed in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely and was reported to raise ethnicity in higher frequency than in the previous case. A few participants expressed that they have socialized with Romanians as well and do not encounter issues. When discussing Hungarian-Romanian differences and relations, participants noted that individuals are not responsible for conflicts:

> *P.10: As I see it, we get along pretty with Romanians, here, in Transylvania.*
> *P.9: You should rather say, here in Marosvásárhely.*
> *P.7: In Marosvásárhely.*
> *[…]*
> *p.4.: It is the media making a fuss about it.*
> *P.8: Yes.*

[…]

P.4: This is why Hungarians and Romanians wrangle. Otherwise, there'd be no problem. Me as well, I was playing around with Romanians, my best girlfriend was Romanian. I learned Romanian from her, she learned Hungarian from me.

However, they also noted that this is true only for the local situation. Interaction with Romanians obtained both positive and negative signs, that were connected to the difference between long-time urban dwellers and the newly incoming Romanians, especially from outside Transylvania.

Alternative Identities

As it was theorized, alternative identities to which the group member can falter to, would weaken the intensity of claims. The regional identity of 'Transylvanian', being non-ethnic, cross-cutting would be such a candidate. Despite the occasional appeals to this identity, which indeed comprised Romanians, did not figure significantly in the discussions in general. Most of the mentions, however occured in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár and Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely. Based on the level of group identification and how boundaries were perceived, this is not contradicting the observations. As group boundaries are weaker than in Miercura Ciuc/Csíkszereda, this cross-national, regional identity can be more viable.

Conclusion

In sum, it was concluded that the level of group cohesion is the highest in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda, while the lowest is in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár. As it was illustrated personal accounts were frequently taken over by grand narratives and as the citation above illustrates, group boundaries and distance were seen as almost insuperable in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda. In contrast, for participants in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, group identity and contact with the Romanians were not problematized: *"It's normal, that I'm a Hungarian, if one has been born a Hungarian, one has to die as one".* Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely was observed to take the middle ground, even though it was similar to Miercurea-Ciuc. Participants took part in

stereotyping, identified with the group but, disparately, had high interaction with positive experiences.

Interaction, identification and boundaries are, as expected, reinforcing each other. On the other hand, participant identified to a high extent with their group both in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda and Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely and had different evaluations regarding group boundaries and interaction. Thus, the last two factors can vary independently from identification. Put simply, identifying strongly with a group does not preclude perceiving heterogeneity in the out-group or genuine intergroup interaction. In the case of Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, relatively low group identification moderated the effect of negative contact and, participants did not tend to universalize these experiences to the entirety of the out-group.

While these results are not representative for the population, it is useful in mapping the composition and attitudes of the focus groups to see how these affect claim adoption.

5.2 Identity Construction, Discourse and Contestation

The analysis of identity, its content and the discourse follow the elements discussed in the theoretical part. It will center on relational comparisons, constitutive norms and the cognitive models (Abdelal et al. 2009) that may be found and consistently used in the focus group discussions.

All groups have, even after repeated attempts, failed to mention and agree on common norms and values of the group. Similarly, relevant parts of the individual survey had been left empty, or common elements of the national identity were mentioned (e.g. tradition, language, community and sticking together). Therefore, the lack of data makes inferences on the effect of norms and values on claim-making impossible.

The relational comparisons of the three groups are very different. Part of those in Miercurea Ciuc often hinted at Hungarians being superior in some sense. To cite a moderate opinion: *P.3: "That Romanian, if it does not relate to us so to say in a nice way, then we have*

to show how one ought to be. To show that we are Hungarian. Some say that God shows us examples of what not to be". As discussed in the theoretical chapters, in-group favouritism is a general characteristic of all groups. However, when compared to the two other focus group, it becomes clear that most participants in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda are more radical. In Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely, for example, the discussions recognized skills and characteristic of the out-group, while in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár these comparisons ended up in highlighting more commonalities.

Themes of togetherness and sustenance of the Hungarian community were significant in all group discussions, however, there were considerable differences in group-identity construction as well.

When discussing Hungarian identity, participants in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, saw their minority as a possibility to have a wider perspective, given that they knew Romanian culture as well. The two unifying elements of the Hungarian community were mentioned regularly: language and religion. However, a participant noted that the community itself is fragmented into different religious denominations. After that, language was seen as the least common denominator, instead of a common historical heritage, rituals or culture.

In the case of Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely, asking about Hungarian identity prompted responses with a language and culture-centred perspective. This reconfirms the high group identification of participants. Moreover, the basic experience of being a minority was mentioned: P.5: *"I think the separation from Hungary itself, has grounded a feeling of Hungarianness, that is there in everybody, who's Hungarians* […] *it is simply wanting to subsist".* Identity construction also included distancing from the Romanian majority, inhabitants of the kin-state and, from the Szekler region. In contrast, discussion about how is being Hungarian in the town was more negative. The majority of the participants noted that

Hungarians are discriminated, have additional burdens and disadvantages compared to Romanians in several areas: P.8: *"If you are Hungarian, you have to perform twice as good".*

With this characterization of group identity perception, let us turn to discourses. It was striking, that participants in Cluj-Napoca employed a discourse that emphasized the common, everyday problems that both ethnic groups share. Furthermore, they minimalized the differences between the groups. As a result, the group discussion had an individualist perspective, instead of engaging in groupist thinking. Their discourse also avoided generalizations most of the time and regarded the commonly shared human side of the groups as more important. As presented, Hungarians of the city could easily put to use a discourse based on resentment and previous, quite recent grievances. Rather, participants mainly saw Hungarian identity as language based, instead of evoking a common historical heritage or group-based grievances. Thus, relation comparisons reveal a discourse highlighting that groups are heterogenous and not generalizable, in which conflict is much more due to select individuals. Therefore, the groups manifested a discourse that can be called cosmopolitan. This, of course, is concomitantly present with the increased in-group favouritism of a minority community:

> *P.6: In terms of cultural life, I prefer more to go to the the Hungarian theatre. I don't know why, I wanted to go to the Romanian theatre for long, but it is so homelike [the Hungarian theatre], that I couldn't go. I would go there, but the other one is still more homelike and comfortable.*
>
> *P.7: I go to the Romanian theatre as well. However, it is entirely different, when they laugh at a joke I don't see it as funny. In the Hungarian theatre, I smile when everybody else does.*

In contrast, Miercurea Ciuc participants have another kind of discourse. This can be termed primordialist and groupist discourse. The majority of the participants characterized Hungarian identity in historic terms, as something given, rigid and unchanging. Discussions proceeded in grand narratives and focused on the victimization of the Hungarian community

vis-à-vis other nationalities. This manifested itself in various forms, for instance in a narrative, in which the majority nation deliberately sabotages the Hungarian community:

> *P.7: Every kin-state, in which a Hungarian minority ended up, developed similar strategies, similar methods to liquidate, remove and throttle the annexed Hungarian nation. They did not wish to live together with Hungarians, but wanted the territory.*

While it does not reflect the entirety of the group, this discourse could be possibly summarized by the following utterance: *P.2: "In former times, people were taught to be Hungarian first, after that you can be human in the meantime".* Furthermore, the participants enacting this discourse, also saw Hungarians as more exceptional, therefore deserving the rights they push for. In sum, the discourse is prototypically primordial, participants employed a more groupist cognitive framework. On the other hand, participants who previously debated the strength of group boundaries contested this discourse:

> P.1*: "When we think big about the nation, Hungarians, Romanians, then these confrontations are coming up, because we have prejudices and the Romanian has too. Many of these things is the manipulation of the media, politics and the world. But if we break it down, it depends on how open we are* [towards the other]*".*

How can be this – the strongest case of contestation in all focus group – explained, given that in general, group entitativity was the highest in this group? For one, levels of identification, interaction, boundary perception were fairly similar within the group. This would indicate that discourses vary, at least somewhat, independently from group entitativity. Secondly, intragroup policing can be lower, as the minority group has a comfortable local majority.

Claim legitimation was also following these discourses and characteristics. For instance, in Târgu Mureș, when asked about how they legitimize minority claims, reference to these grievances were missing and arguments mainly concentrated on external legitimacy:

> *P.6: If he/she flies the Szekler flag, it's a normal thing, it shouldn't bother anybody. It doesn't bother me if I see the Romanian flag.*

> *P.1: It would be good for Romanians as well. […] Romania could be presented as not a simple country. There's more here, richer, from the point of view that everything is bilingual, or even trilingual.'*

This approach is explainable by the comparatively high interaction with the out-group. In comparison, those in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda simply referred to the existence of the group, its sustenance: *P.3: "We can dream in Hungarian, and when we think we can think in Hungarian"*. On the other hand, the minority, those who disagreed with the primordial discourse, also phrased claim legitimation in a way that might appeal to the majority nation as well.

Summary

Groupist thinking and a primordial approach were prominent in the Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda group, while the Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár group enacted a more individualist discourse. Thus, it is expected that the latter will favour claims of lower intensity and also, claims which are not based on the recognition of the minority group as such. Participants in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely have given their Hungarian identity much more cultural content and being a minority also figured more prominently in their discussions. While the cosmopolitan discourse was also present throughout the discussion, the group did not antagonize the out-group and acknowledge differences in the majority group as well. Thus, the discussion was more of an amalgam of the previously identified discourses.

Table 2. Summary of different groups on group cohesion and discourse

Settlement	Group identification	Intergroup interaction	Group boundaries	Other identities	Discourse
Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda	High	Low	Strong	Székely and Christian	Groupist and Primordial
Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár	Moderate	High	Weak	Transylvanian	Individualist and Cosmopolitan
Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely	High	High	Moderate	-	Mixed and Culturalist

5.3 Group Claims

At the second half of the discussion, the groups had to discuss and order multiple claims together (see Appendix 3. for list of claims). The exact order of the claim might be highly stochastic; however, as there were at least 2 claims from each type, ordering of claim types should be less so. Also, within certain types, a measure of intensification can be established. For example, regarding power-sharing claims, one can go from an inclusion of the minority in the governing bodies, to decentralization, to autonomy and secession.

I claim that group cohesion should determine the claim intensity the groups adopt. Moreover, the second hypothesis assumes that discourses on national identity influences which claims the group adopts and with what intensity it does so.

All groups ranked 'Education in the minority language' first, regardless of their internal differences. As studying in the minority language is the most essential right for the sustenance of any linguistic and ethnic minority community, this corresponds to what we expect. It also shows, that there are claims that are not affected by local level variation of characteristics. Consequently, these are not subjected to a rational evaluation of the group's leverage power. Rather, all focus groups identified this claim as a basic, common necessity for their group, which is, as argued in the theoretical chapters, motivated by the national minority identity. Secession was put in the last places in all three groups, indicating an upper ceiling for the possible intensification of claims (see Appendix 4-5-6, for the full ordering of the claims). The 'No need for minority rights' tag was also placed in the last places everywhere, likewise setting a minimum of claims across all groups, motivated by the need to sustain the national minority identity. These two claims were non-acceptable, community-wide boundaries of claim-making. Secession was put in the last places in all three groups, indicating an upper ceiling for the possible intensification of claims. The rejection of secessionism, however, cannot be similarly explained by the specificity of the national minority identity, as the best way to secure their

identity would be complete secession, the contrary of the results of the focus groups. Thus, this is a clear limitation by the effect of the currently observable levels group entitativity, as the claim lies outside of the "field of imaginable possibilities" that the group may want to realize (Cruz 2001).

Lastly, groups recognized the typology of claims. They frequently placed symbolic claims near each other, or grouped them, while deliberating, participants were often comparing and contrasting claims not only across types, but within as well (e.g.: mother tongue education vs. the usage of the language, economic subsidies vs. support for cultural institutions, decentralization vs. autonomy vs. secession). The fact that groups recognize claim types is important, as I also look at how certain discourses and conception of identities is related.

The Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár focus group (for the ranking of the claims see Appendix 5.), after little thinking and no debate, placed territorial claims i.e. ethnic autonomy and secession in the last place. How can be this choice explained? For one, group entitativity (H1) was the lowest here and the focus group's discourse (H2) also motivates this. Similarly, decentralization was also placed in the back. Claims about symbolic representation were also in the bottom half of the hierarchy, indicating that these issues, connected to the recognition of ethnic identity, are not as salient as claims that have a forthright impact, such as the financing of cultural institutions, right to use mother tongue in public institutions and Hungarian representation in the government, all of which have passed symbolic claims in importance.

Looking at participants' initial, individual claim choice in their survey (aside from one participant, all chose linguistic rights), it can be inferred that the discussion and other participants did not repress diverging opinion or change participants' views fundamentally. Thus, the expectation and hypothesis that discourses influence both the claim intensity and claim type seem plausible in this case, yet, some limitations also were in the result.

The claim for institutionally assured ethnic representation in the government was placed second on the group's list, which cannot aptly be explained by the discourse of the group. It calls for a power-sharing mechanism from the majority on an ethnic basis, therefore it is a claim with high intensity. However, if compared to claims for ethnic autonomy, it might be seen as a moderate choice, conforming to the discourse, place and group characteristics. An additional argument would be that following the cosmopolitan discourse, the participants would rather take part in the Romanian political process and, than create their own version of it, in form of a political autonomy.

Participants in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely, where both group boundaries and identification were stronger and the discourse more groupist than in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, ranked the claim for decentralization second, and initially, autonomy in the third place (for the ranking see Appendix 4.). Decentralization of the highly centralized government is not ethnic-based and might be advantageous for Romanians as well, it is a solution that can work for both groups. When comparing the two, the following discussion ensued:

> *P.8: Autonomy would be good for everyone.*
>
> *P.10: Not for everyone.*
>
> *P.9: Maybe decentralization would be good for everyone, autonomy not necessarily.*

Choosing decentralization (less geared towards the minority) conforms to the group's culturalist discourse, the focus on legitimizing their claims for the out-group. On the other hand, the prioritization of decentralization might only be instrumental talk, a decoy for autonomy. Still, the attention to the out-group is notable. Furthermore, choosing these high intensity claims also fits the expectation in the light of high group identification and the emerged discourse.

When discussing between symbolic rights i.e. the usage of national symbols and the financing of minority cultural institutions, the group favoured the latter[11], similarly to the group in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár.

> *P.4: If you support culture, you have the symbol included. If you have symbols, where do they come from? From culture.*
>
> *P.10: But you can have a theatre to no avail, if you cannot fly the flag.*
>
> *P.1: But many Hungarians gather in the theatre, it has a community building effect.*
>
> *P.9: It is more important, to be able to go the theatre, than flying the flag.*
>
> *P.8: Yes, yes.*

The choice of the group to rank these right higher, corresponds to the culturalist discourse within the group, in comparison to a more cosmopolitan, linguistic-focused discourse. Aside from this, the other claim and claim-types seem to vary independently from each other. For example, symbolic claims were not placed together, even though they have similar claim intensity and topic. As mirrored by some debates during the discussion, participants chose differing claims in the surveys. A plurality, 4 people chose linguistic rights, 3 chose symbolic rights and 2 chose autonomy. The difference in views were generally present during the debate as well, but those who supported autonomy did not speak up strongly when discussing the claims in the group. Overall, based on the final ranking of claims, the plurality for more intense claims managed to convince the others, but with a compromise (autonomy was placed down, while decentralisation stayed third on the list).

As expected, the group in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda was the most radical in its claims (for the ranking, see Appendix 6.). Three to four participants did not agree with the ordering of the claims and adopted an altogether different list. Accordingly, five participants chose autonomy and four participants linguistic rights as their first claim in the individual surveys. However, the fact that a plurality of opinions was present here, may be indicative of the fact

[11] I must note that despite that the group seemed to choose financial support for cultural institutions, they did not move the claim u p. I assume they forgot to do so as I, the moderator ended the discussion on this part.

that in ethnic enclaves, where the majority's pressure is not as strong, the group can afford to have a divergence of opinions. An alternative explanation is that some, who are tightly connected to the life of the enclave are in disagreement with those, who had more intergroup experiences. Thus, the group did not succeed to come to a definitive listing of claims:

> *P.2: This is the top, decentralization and autonomy.*
>
> *[…]*
>
> *P.8: I would say it is a good thing, if it was possible, but in these circumstances…*
>
> *P.2: How do you now what are the present circumstances? If you don't believe in it, as a young man, we can wait for it in vain then.*
>
> *P.4: This is the problem.*
>
> *[…]*
>
> *P.1: I believe in autonomy, but for now, Transylvania would not be capable to* [achieve it], *without external help.*
>
> *[…]*
>
> *P.9: This would be the basis of it* [referring to education], *and then would come language use.*
>
> *P.2: These two* [referring to decentralization and autonomy] *would bring with itself the others, because you will make the laws.*
>
> *P.1: These are* [referring to decentralization and autonomy] *fond illusions, in my opinion.*

However, in the face of these disagreements, both lists placed symbolic claim up on the list, just after linguistic rights. Compared to the others, the Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda group identified highly with their group, interacted less with Romanians, manifested a group identity with strong boundaries and more distant from Romanians and a similarly primordial discourse, this confirms the expectations. Those that manifest a primordialist-exceptionalist discourse do, indeed focus more on symbolic issues and claims as a means to get recognition for their group identity. Only after the symbolic claims, come claims for economic subsidies and state-financed cultural institutions, unlike in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely. These results are further reinforced by participant's claim choice before the discussion: 5 chose territorial autonomy, while 4 chose linguistic rights.

Following the claim ranking exercise, one last topic was introduced to the groups. When asking about the aspects and consideration did participants take into view, most mentioned that their ranking followed personal preferences and reported that feasibility or other considerations were not prominent.

5.4 Summary

The national minority group was observed to generally be as the theoretical chapters outlined. Comparisons with and reflection on the out-group were frequent, the group had overall strong boundaries and the preoccupation with the sustenance of the community was apparent.

It was found that groups do adopt non-negotiable claims. These are connected not so much to the internal variation of the minority identity, but to the very preservation of their national minority identity. Moreover, they also all excluded secession from the claims. Whether this truly presents an upper ceiling for minority claims, however, is not provable here.

In each case, claims were discussed as a tool to strengthen and sustain the minority identity. It was found that once this need is satisfied, participants enacting a cosmopolitan and more individualist discourse do not support claims with higher intensity and they consistently rank them lower, even if it is one that was not yet obtained and is kept in the discourse by political entrepreneurs. For example, contrary to the social situation described and ethnic entrepreneurs' previous campaign for ethnic autonomy, participants in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely chose lower intensity claims than expected. Moreover, it is important to notice how much internal variation is taking place within the Hungarian community or even within the groups, most notably the one in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda. This result would caution future claim-making theories to extrapolate singular claims to the entirety of a national minority community.

Of the four elements influencing group entitativity, group identification and group boundaries proved to be the most critical. For one part, it ultimately defined not only the extent

of how important a group is for individuals, but as a consequence, how intergroup interaction was interpreted. Groups and individuals identifying less with the group, experienced these contacts more on the interpersonal and not on the intergroup level. As a result, group boundaries were not experienced as significant either. Whereas interaction and boundaries, moderated by identification, were meaningful in explaining claim making, the relative lack of alternative identities made hard to gauge the importance of other, alternative horizontal identities. In conclusion the first hypothesis i.e., the effect of group entitativity on claim-making, is capable to explain– from an internal perspective – the intensification of claims. These measures may be later used to construct more exact surveys.

Both the survey and the discussion frequently prompted dialogue on constitutive norms of the group. However, the groups remarkably defied voicing common norms, aside from equivocal linguistic and cultural ones, which are basically empty signifiers and can be filled with a plethora of meaning.

Group discourses on national identity revealed a relationship with both the typology and the intensity of the claims that were supported. The primordialist, exceptionalist thinking engages in more groupist discourse, and as a result, focuses more on strengthening the group's identity. As a result, it places more importance on symbolic claims and generally results in claims of higher intensity. It did not appeal to the understanding of the majority group and was more unapologetic than its counterpart cosmopolitan discourse. The cosmopolitan discourse had placed more importance on linguistic, and to a lesser degree cultural claims, while it placed claims of higher intensity at the end of the ranking. Participants in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, were also focusing on instrumentality in a categorically non-ethnic sense. Such a case is the discussion of the common economic situation, explained by the rarity of a groupist perspective during the discussion. Therefore, whether groups think in interpersonal or intergroup terms seems to predict well the intensification of claims.

The second hypothesis i.e. the effect of group norms and discourses on claims, was partially confirmed, as groups' discourse were in line with most of the claims they chose. Crucially, the concrete effects of entitativity and discourse could not be separated and individually tested. Discrepancies between the individual surveys and group-adopted claims may be attributed to discourse, but can also be due to intervening variables such as peer pressure, a matter of personal assertiveness etc. Whether elements of group entitativity influence group discourse or these vary independently from each other, should be tested in future studies. Similarly, claim intensity was likely connected to the social and demographic indexes of each town, but this could not be tested, as the findings of the focus group have low external validity and representativeness.

Let us turn back to the presented bargaining theory in the first chapter. I argued that the theory puts uneven focus on ethnic entrepeneurs' claim-making. As it was confirmed, there is a discrepancy between entrepeneurs' and group members claim choice. While a rational choice perspective may be suitable for describing elite-level claim-making, this cannot be always applied to group-members' claim-making (on the flipside, it also illustrates that there remains much space for bargaining on the elite level). In the case of Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda claim-making was primarily grounded in ensuring the subjectively most necessary cultural, linguistic and symbolic needs.[12] When deliberating between claims and accounting for claim-choice later on, groups did not take into account the leverage power of the majority, especially in the case of minimum, non-negotiable claims. Consequently, claims were illustrated to vary based on factors that could not be aptly integrated by a rational choice perspective.

Furthermore, there was some evidence for how a claim could be sustained for longer period even if the groups' leverage power would not account for such. Participants that adopted

[12] This is in line with the literature establishing that Ethnic voting as well, is not instrumental, rational but expressive and affirmative of an identity Horowitz (2000, 326-30):

a primordialist, groupist discourse saw autonomy as the best possible way to guarantee the group identity's sustainment, thus, this claim could not be negotiated and bargained in their case. This even resulted adopting two different claim rankings in the group.

While claim-choice was not fully predicted, taking into account the results of the focus group, the initial theory seems to be plausible. There are claims of utmost importance for the group. Crucially, the focus groups showed that what is necessary was mostly agreed by the all the groups, regardless of variation. These, as motivated by the national minority's group identity, are a least common denominator for the group. Thus, national minority groups, unlike what current theories of bargaining theory may suggest sometimes, are not capable of endlessly and easily modifying their claims. They are able to do so to a certain extent, as the fulfilment of certain claims are bounded by the very nature of the group identity they aim to protect. This of course, does not imply the exclusion of factors seen as external from the viewpoint of collective identity (such as group size, economic status etc.), even more so, as the analysis also uncovered limitations of both the discourse and group entitativity.

Conclusion

The thesis aimed to look at the less studied side of minority claim-making, to be able to better understand and explore the internal features and processes of how a national minority group gets to adopt claims. The starting point was the rational choice perspective of current theories of claim-making, that takes group identity and group characteristics as static, missing its changes and effects. Without invalidating the most crucial findings of bargaining theory, the aim was to refine and complement these with theorizing new variables. In this fashion, the thesis argued that claim-making theories, most notably bargaining theory, misses an important aspect of claim-making, i.e. the role of the collective minority identity. It proposed that group entitativity and group discourse, surmised under the label of group identity bounds and affects perceptions on what claims the group should adopt.

In sum, the theoretical part explains national minority claim-making from an internal, experiential, phenomenological perspective. Doing this, social identity theory and other literature from social and political psychology was used to characterize and describe national minorities. Then, it was argued that based on these characteristics, national minorities are a specific kind of group, which shows in their claim-making as well. Moreover, the constructed nature of the national minority identity became evident by the various approaches the discussion took about group identity. Granted, the empirical investigation did not succeed in clearly establishing distinct causal relationships but provided a deeper understanding of the internal life of the national minority community with regards to claim-making. The thesis demonstrated that it is not only group identification that governs claim-making in the group, but also, the way members construct and constitute what their respective national minority group means. Even if group identification was high, people engaged in different ways to think about their groups and these discourses resulted both in choosing claims of different intensity and type. In sum, the bargaining process was not invalidated, but augmented with the caveat that group identity and

discourse introduce minimums and also govern certain claim choices, that, as a result, appear to be stiffer and less negotiable. However, this may be stated with the caveat that focus groups are not representative for the whole society of Transylvanian Hungarians. Moreover, assessing the role of group entitativity was only tested qualitatively, thus to be taken with reservations.

The thesis opened up a horizon of new questions. It made possible to analyse the relationship between the internal features of national minority claim-making discussed here and the external features discussed by the well-established bargaining theory. Moreover, future research can now also investigate in more detail the differences and connection between elite-level claim making practices and the presented group-level claim-making process. Along the same lines, a question that has arisen is how far political entrepreneurs' claim-making is constrained and bounded by group discourse and conversely, how far elites are able to influence these claims on the group-level should also require more careful analysis.

The investigation completed here exposed a new aspect about the aims of national minority groups, growing our understanding of these groups. The characterization of national minority groups may serve as possible arguments in the theoretical debate between the communitarian and individualist approaches on minority rights. Moreover, a better comprehension of national minority claim-making could prove useful during reconciliation, after an ethnic conflict and findings can also serve with advice on preventing the eruption of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, even in peaceful times, the better understanding of the aims of national minority communities can help in more adequate policy formulation and the accommodation of these groups.

Appendices

1. Survey for the participants of the focus groups

1) Are you:

a) male

b) female

2) What is your age?

a) 18-25

b) 26-35

c) 36-45

d) 46-55

e) 56-65

3) What is the highest level of education you completed?

a) High School

b) Bachelors

c) Masters

d) Post-graduate

4) Parents' nationality: _____ and _____.

5) Are you working/studying? If yes, what is your profession/study area?

6) How true are the following statements in your case (with a 5-pont scale):

	Totally agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Totally disagree	Don't know
I often think of myself as Hungarian.					
I consider myself a typical Hungarian					
I'm proud that I'm Hungarian					

If someone said something bad about Hungarian people I feel as if they said something bad about me					

7) Name at least 3 core features of Hungarians in Transylvania:

8) Name at least 3 norms of the Hungarian community:

9) Do you interact with individuals of other ethnicities in your life?

a) never

b) rarely

c) often

d) daily

9.2) If yes, where (you might circle more than one):

a) workplace
b) private life (friends, relatives etc.)
c) everyday activities (paying bills, shopping etc.)

10) Do you have any other identity besides being Hungarians (e.g. local, regional, professional, ethnic, social role etc.)?

11) Please choose one claim that you think your group can rightfully ask for:

a) language and cultural rights (e.g. right to learn in Hungarian from day-care until university)

b) right to use national symbols where applicable (schools, local institutions etc.)

c) autonomy

d) secession

2. Questions during the focus group discussion

How important is your national group in your everyday life?

What are some situation when you think of yourself as a Hungarian?

People have all kinds of identities: do you consider to have another important identity?

How different is your group to Romanians?

How do you view Romanians?

How would you define Hungarians (in Transylvania)?

What is it like to be Hungarian in your settlement?

What are the central norms and values of Hungarians?

Why should Hungarians receive minority rights? How do you argue for this?

Would other groups (e.g. the Roma) deserve these rights?

Why do you think Hungarians should have X right?

On what basis did you rank these claims?

Is there anything else you feel was left out of the discussion?

3. List of claims by intensity and types

Intensity	**Claim**	**Claim type**
	No need for minority rights	-
	Education in mother tongue	Linguistic
	Right to use mother tongue in public institutions	Linguistic
	State financed cultural institutions	Economic
	Right to use national symbols in local institutions	Symbolic
	Recognition of Hungarian national days	Symbolic
	Economic subsidies for the minority group	Economic
	Permanent Hungarian representation in the government	Power devolution
	Decentralization	Power devolution/territorial
	Autonomy	Power devolution/territorial
	Secession	Power devolution/territorial

4. Ordering of claims in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely (from top to bottom)

- Right for education in mother tongue

- Decentralization
- (Autonomy) – discussed and agreed to be placed down on the list
- Right to use mother tongue in public institutions and Recognition of Hungarian national days
- Right to use national symbols in local institutions
- State-financed cultural institutions
- Permanent Hungarian representation in the government
- Economic subsidies for the minority group
- No need for minority rights
- Secession

5. Ordering of claims in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár (from top to bottom)

- Right for education in mother tongue
- Permanent Hungarian representation in the government
- Right to use mother tongue in public institutions
- State-financed minority cultural institutions
- Right to use national symbols in local institutions and Recognition of Hungarian national days
- Economic subsidies for the minority group
- Decentralization
- Secession and Autonomy
- No need for minority rights

6. Ordering of claims in Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda (from top to bottom)

Version A

- Right for education in mother tongue
- Right to use mother tongue in public institutions

- Right to use national symbols in local institutions and Economic subsidies for the minority group
- State-financed minority cultural institutions and Recognition of Hungarian national days and Permanent Hungarian representation in the government
- No need for minority rights
- Decentralization and Autonomy
- Secession

Version B

- Decentralization
- Autonomy
- Education in mother tongue and Right to use mother tongue in public institutions
- Right to use national symbols in local institutions
- Recognition of Hungarian national days
- State-financed cultural institutions and Permanent Hungarian representation in the government
- Economic subsidies for the minority group
- No need for minority rights
- Secession

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