

# Getting a Slice from the Cake – New Parties in the Hungarian Parliament

By Benedek Jardanyi

Submitted to  
Central European University  
Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Political Science

Supervisor: Professor Robert Sata

Budapest, Hungary

## **Abstract**

The aim of this thesis is to understand how new parties can manage to get inside parliament. More precisely, the idea is to outline certain characteristics that could be decisive in deciding the faith of a 21th century new party. Based on general theories of parties, party systems and social movements the thesis argues that important factors can be put into two categories: external (factors that act as a shaping force from the outside of the party) and internal (factors that affect the future of the party from the inside). The thesis examines these factors empirically using the case of Hungary since the country went through an interesting change: a once stable system crumbled, giving life to a different party system. The thesis evaluates the general factors affecting the prospects of the new parties by looking at two successful parties that entered Hungarian parliament contributing to the parliamentary system change – LMP and Jobbik. The review of these parties also allows for a refinement of the list of potentially relevant theory-based factors since it evaluates these against empirical reality. Next, using this refined list of factors affecting the prospects of new parties, the thesis evaluates a completely newborn party – Momentum. The thesis finds that the prospects of entering parliament depend largely on ownership of an issue that can help the party generalize its policies to a wider range; the position of the party on the left-right scale for the average voter; furthermore a “building phase” that yields local organizations to get in touch with the voters; and one of the crucial aspects is the structure of the party: having a centralized, hierarchical entity with a strong leader makes a difference.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Robert Sata. Without his long-lasting patience, detailed comments and useful insights, this thesis would not exist. And not only this thesis, but in part the whole positive CEU experience is thanks to him. And here I would like to mention also the lovely ladies at the secretariat of Political Science, thank you for bearing with me. All in all I would like to thank CEU for bringing an amazing international atmosphere to my beautiful hometown.

I would also like to thank my fellow students, especially Dada, Jovana, Zsuzsi and Alberto for making these two years what it really was: an unforgettable experience, a mix of learning and having fun.

And finally I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents, because they truly believed (but mostly hoped) that their son will eventually have a Master's degree. Love you!

# Contents

<b>Abstract</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Contents</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1.1 Methodology</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>2 State of art – parties and party systems</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>2.1 Different playgrounds – external factors</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>2.2 The game itself – internal factors</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>2.3 External and internal factors benefitting new parties</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>2.4 Accessing the different factors</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>3 The game in Hungary</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>3.1 Introduction and historical background</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>3.2 Changing rules</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>4 In- and outside shaping forces for LMP and Jobbik</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>4.1 What remained from the external</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>4.2 What is new on the inside</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>4.3 Refining the factors after evaluating the historical cases</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>5 Will it gain Momentum?</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>5.1 External first</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>5.2 Anything new on the inside?</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>5.3 What is there and what is missing?</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>6 Conclusion</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>7 Bibliography</b>	<b>77</b>

# 1 Introduction

The Hungarian party system until 2010 was based on the so-called “binary party logic” (or similarly said on the “two block system”).<sup>1</sup> Until the elections of 2010, mostly the parties that made it into the Parliament were the same or the allies of those that brought the regime change in 1990. However we had a new, interesting phenomenon: in 2010, two parties of the 21th century made it into Parliament and two parties, which contributed to the regime change (SZDSZ and MDF<sup>2</sup>) fell out. In my opinion, these new parties are new in the sense that they oppose the establishment, they bring a new issue to the political agenda, they add to the existing party competition, and they also have a strong social movement history. That means they all start as a movement but then transform into parties as they bring more and more issues to their agenda. The success of the transformation seems to depend on their internal politics, how democratic or centralized are, and what leadership they have.

The research question would be the following: what characteristics are needed for a genuinely new party in order to make it in Parliament?

The overall idea is to engage with the new perspectives for representative democracy in the era of declining party membership and high electoral volatility. In evaluating the above mentioned universal query I chose Hungary because it is an interesting case, a once stable system collapses, giving birth to a new party system; I also chose Hungary because I don't have language barriers

---

<sup>1</sup> Soós Gábor; Kétblokkrendszer Magyarországon in Boda Zsolt, Köröscényi András, Van irány? Trendek a magyar politikában, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, Politikatudományi Intézet, 2012

<sup>2</sup> SZDSZ (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a Magyar Liberális Párt; Alliance of Free Democrats – Hungarian Liberal Party) was a party with voters mostly coming from Budapest, middle class and liberal intellectual groups. It ceased to exist in 2013. MDF (Magyar Demokrata Fórum; Hungarian Democratic Forum) was a center-right political party with christian-democratic and national-conservative ideology. It ceased to exist in 2011.

to deal with and I have access to a great deal of information through interviews which otherwise would be nearly impossible to conduct. The parties I am looking for are genuinely new parties<sup>3</sup>, and for these parties it is hard in the 21st century to get inside the parliament. The three parties approximately account for the 20% of the votes (as the polls show it in 02.2018.). So it is important to understand those parties' function that account for nearly one fifth of the electorate.

First, the thesis examines the general theories of how and why parties can be successful and construct a theory based on the literature. I learnt from the general theory that what matters are external factors (party system, party type, political culture, relationship of a party with civil society, new competition) and internal factors (opportunities, framing, media presence, issue ownership, resource mobilizing, structure of the party, leadership). In the next section the thesis evaluates the Hungarian context. Afterwards, the first new parties – Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom and Lehet Más a Politika<sup>4</sup> will be evaluated, because those were the two new parties that made into the Parliament in 2010 - to see which of these theoretical factors are really relevant or if there is any other important factor missing, this way I can streamline the theory. (I am looking at the attempts that were successful and not at the numerous small parties that tried but failed). Based on the review, I found that similar external factors (party system, anti-establishment party traits, media and internet presence) are relevant, and some new internal factors (movement history with social networks, generalize party's politics, position of the party

---

<sup>3</sup> Genuinely new parties are “parties that are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members.” (Sikk, Allan; How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe, *European Journal of Political Research* 44: p. 399, 2005) I would add in my cases to the definition that these parties bring new issue and new competition, and in the Hungarian case this is what could be considered as the most relevant factor.

<sup>4</sup> Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom; Movement for a Better Hungary) is a right-wing party with radical and nationalist origins founded in 2003, but since 2014 it drove closer to the center leaving behind some of the radical traits. LMP (Lehet Más a Politika, Politics Can Be Different) is a center-left, green political party founded in 2009.

on the left-right scale) were found and also some previous internal factors (issue ownership, organizational strength of a party) were confirmed.

And finally, based on the revised theory the thesis proceeds to offer a better understanding of a new-born party, Momentum Movement<sup>5</sup>. The goal is not to predict the future of Momentum, but it is simply to understand better throughout the analysis of these three genuinely new parties, what are the crucial factors for these new parties to be successful. The outcome of the thesis was the following: a movement history in a party's past is important in order to build up organizations for connecting with the voters. And generalizing the party's politics is not enough unless there is a clear position of the party on the traditional left-right scale – so voters can put them in context. However, what seemed as one of the most important factors is the structure of the party: a centralized, hierarchical entity with a strong leader could provide the best outcome.

## 1.1 Methodology

The thesis will be built upon: (1) the existing literature that we already have in the case of Jobbik and LMP, and in order to fill the literature gap and most importantly understand the processes of Momentum – which lacks a proper literature yet – I will be heavily relying on (2) interviews also. I intend to combine the existing knowledge with new information emerging from the interviews. This way I hope to synthesize information into a new theory of new parties, playing close attention to differences and similarities that these three parties might have.

---

<sup>5</sup> Later referred as Momentum

To test my theory, I will use comparative analysis (and not a single case study on Momentum), to exclude „false uniqueness” and „false universalism.”<sup>6</sup> Halperin and Heath distinguish between four types of case study, out of which I will use a combination: I will both use “descriptive contextualization” and “apply existing theory to new context”<sup>7</sup>, because even though it will be an exploratory study (for the part concerning Momentum) I will be using theories as basics. I am very aware that all these factors will mean that the study will have a relatively high internal validity for the expense of the external validity. However this will be in line with the main idea because I look at two older successful cases to devise the theory which then I apply to a new case.

As for the interview part of data collection, I do face-to-face interviews as these are the best for “open-ended questions and in-depth exploration of opinions.”<sup>8</sup> My goal, with this method is to be able to access properly the information about party structure and development and I find it useful that I can ask follow-up questions. Furthermore I use “unstructured interviews”<sup>9</sup>, meaning that the questions are open ones, this way allowing me to have a closer understanding of different mechanisms. The interviews are addressed to members of the parties. The questions are the same for all interviewed. The main idea is to get the leadership and the main figures of the parties to answer questions on party mechanism, because they are someone “who exercises disproportionately high influence on the outcome of events or policies in [my] research area”<sup>10</sup>. The key here is that I might obtain information, which otherwise would be extremely hard or impossible to gain.

---

<sup>6</sup> Rose, Richard; Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis, Political Studies, Volume 39, Issue 3 September 1991 Pages 446–462

<sup>7</sup> Halperin, Sandra; Heath, Oliver; Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills; OUP Oxford, January 2012, p. 206

<sup>8</sup> Idem p.254

<sup>9</sup> Idem p.257

<sup>10</sup> Pierce, R.; Research Methods in Politics: A Practical Guide, London: Sage Publications, 2008



## 2 State of art – parties and party systems

### 2.1 Different playgrounds – external factors

In this section I will introduce and elaborate external factors that I found important for the scope of my thesis. I will do so by starting with the bigger picture and gradually look at the more focused factors: meaning that first I will look at party systems, historical background, party types, special competition and relation with civil society; after these I shall look at political opportunity, framing and media presence.

#### **What is the system?**

As the title suggest, the scope of the thesis is to understand how new parties can get elected to the parliament. For this, I found it necessary to clarify more in-depth party systems, and to be even more precise, to understand better, how party system dynamics work in certain settings because the context of party development is the party system, and these systems can have various consequences for the parties. The reason that the thesis looks upon two party systems especially is that Hungary resembled a polarized party system that later on evolved into a predominant party system.

One of the clearest definition for party system is made by Sartori: “Parties make for a ‘system,’ then, only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition.”<sup>11</sup> Enyedi mentions that there are various ways to classify party systems. The major ones are the following: classification according the

---

<sup>11</sup> Sartori, Giovanni, *Parties And Party Systems: A Framework For Analysis*, n.p.: Colchester : ECPR Press, 2005 p.39

number and size of parties, based on the quality and strength of coalitions, and according to the interactions between parties. Further factors like fragmentation, polarization, power relations and electoral volatility are also decisive.<sup>12</sup> According to Wolinetz, a party system is where “political parties [are] competing with each other for elective office and control of government”.<sup>13</sup> He also argues that there are many different ways in classifying party systems (most commonly the distinction falls between one-party, two-party and multiparty systems), but he is in agreement with Sartori (1976), that there is need for rules to decide which parties matter and which do not. There were many attempts to find the best way to build categories for party systems, but Wolinetz finds that one of the best way – as Sartori and Mair did – is “considering polarization and internal dynamics as well as the number of parties.”<sup>14</sup>

I will consider Sartori’s fourfold typology (predominant party system, two-party system, moderate pluralism, and polarized pluralism) and examine those that are most important for the scope of this thesis. Bardi and Mair also denote that plausibly Sartori (1976) made the most relevant work in the field of party system. After accessing the work of Sartori, they claim “that party systems are best understood as multidimensional phenomena.”<sup>15</sup> They argue for a more complex arena in which party systems are to be understood: “the capacity of a given polity to maintain more than one party system, even of different types, may be related to three other important divisions within the polity itself.” These are vertical, horizontal and finally functional divisions.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Enyedi, Zsolt, *Pártok és pártrendszer*, in *A politikatudomány arcai: tanulmányok*, Akadémiai Kiadó Budapest, 1999 p.181 - 223

<sup>13</sup> Wolinetz, Steven B.; *Party Systems and Party System Types* In: *Handbook of Party Politics* Edited by: Richard S. Katz & William Crotty, SAGE, 2006, p.52

<sup>14</sup> Idem, p.55

<sup>15</sup> Bardi, Luciano; Mair, Peter; *The Parameters of Party Systems*, *Party Politics* 2008; 14; p.147

<sup>16</sup> Idem; p.155-156

Based on the above I think of party systems as different systems, where you have entities (parties) competing with each other – throughout policy making and reaching voters, etc – in order to gain maximum power, meaning to be able to govern. Now, I intend to specify the tools of measurement and categorization for different party systems. Sartori starts by explaining that it is quite difficult to even categorize party systems. He asks what should be the bases of evaluation: the number of parties maybe? He argues that this kind of measurement is considered inadequate nowadays. However, it is understandable how fragmented the political power is by looking at the number of parties. Nevertheless, more importantly, Sartori claims that counting parties is relevant, but what is vital that we know *how* to count the parties! It is vital to assess the relevance of a party: its electoral strength, its governing and coalition potential.<sup>17</sup>

Sartori speaks about “intelligent counting”. This notion is most important when we speak about predominant-party system: that is a system where a single party rules (with absolute majority) over time. One of the possibilities for a predominant-party system to rise is when the original system is fragmented; meaning that out of the numerous parties no one is able to reach absolute majority. This fragmentation could be the result of both “segmentation” and “polarization.” Sartori argues that a predominant party can establish a predominant party system when it wins three consecutive elections with absolute majority of the votes. This party system lies at the limits of competitive area.<sup>18</sup> Thus could mean that for a new party it might be more difficult to enter the game. Wolinetz mentions the effective number of parties, which is measured by dividing 1 by the sum of the squares of proportions of votes; the difference here is that with this methods, smaller parties that would have been excluded by Sartori’s way of counting are

---

<sup>17</sup> Sartori, 2005 p.105-109

<sup>18</sup> Idem p.110-111

included (but do not account for too much).<sup>19</sup> I do agree with Sartori's main view that an intelligent counting is vital in order to truly understand a party system, more precisely to understand a party's weight in a single party system thus understanding the system itself.

Anthony Downs's work, the *Economic Theory of Democracy* deals with the spatial competition theory. Downs claims that a citizen generally acts to maximize his/her self-interest and that "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies" and politicians are "motivated by the desire of power" which they can obtain if "their party is elected in office", so their "primary object is to be elected."<sup>20</sup> Kitschelt also mentions the spatial theory of party competition that draws on cleavages (more precisely the political mobilization of conflict of interest) and comes in the picture when there is an important issue that brings in the political interest of a significantly large group that lacks representation in the actual established party system. This is the moment when there is probability for a movement organizer to actually enter the race for electoral votes. One of the reasons that already established parties do not want to advocate for the salient issue that is at heart of many voters is the fear of losing part of the original voters because the new policy implementation could cause for those old voters to turn away from their party: so it is simply a calculation of trade-offs. To lose part of your electoral constituency would simply outnumber the win of the new one, this way making it irrational to put that specific salient issue on the agenda.<sup>21</sup>

A relevant party system for the scope of my thesis is Sartori's polarized pluralism party systems (when we have around five parties). One of the important features of these systems is that we can

---

<sup>19</sup> Wolinetz, 2006, p. 55

<sup>20</sup> Downs, Anthony, *Theory of Democracy*, 1957, New York, pp. 28, 30

<sup>21</sup> Kitschelt, Herbert, *Movement Parties* in Richard S Katz, William, *Handbook of Party Politics* J Crotty, SAGE, 2006

find relevant anti-system parties (what is common ground to these anti-system parties – according to Sartori – is that they question the regime’s base of support). Also, nowadays many new parties are seen as these anti-system parties. The second important feature of polarized pluralism is the existence of a so-called “bilateral opposition”. This means that parties opposing the government are mutually exclusive and we find them on the two sides of the ruling power, meaning that it is hardly feasible that these parties would join forces. Sartori even states, “in fact, the two opposing groups are closer, if anything, to the governing parties than to each other.”<sup>22</sup> Wolinetz also denotes that a possible cooperation between parties depends on great deal on how far they are from each other when it comes to important issues.<sup>23</sup> Sartori continues by saying that apart from these two, most distinctive features, we can identify further traits. Basically, there is no more bipolar interaction, but rather we can speak of a triangular one. Sartori denotes that this center position actually concerns the *position itself* and not the ideology or doctrines, because “the central area is out of competition.” What comes out of this occupation of the center – according to Sartori – is the encouragement of extremist politics, because the central space is already occupied, so forces are driven away.<sup>24</sup>

The upcoming, forth feature can be found in the name also: this is the polarization of the system, how ideologically distant parties are. Sartori argues that the fifth element of polarized pluralism is the phenomenon of centrifugal powers prevailing on the centripetal ones. According to this, there will be an inevitable loss of votes from the center towards one of the extreme ends of the system. The next element is ideology: but Sartori argues that in a pluralistic case like this, ideology is conceived as way of doing politics, more focused on the mentality sight. The seventh

---

<sup>22</sup> Sartori, 2005 p.117-118

<sup>23</sup> Wolinetz, 2006, p.53

<sup>24</sup> Sartori, 2005 p.119

feature is the notion of *irresponsible opposition*. The fact that the center (governing) party constitutes the spine of politics and the anti-system parties are generally not destined to govern, Sartori excludes the possibility of *alternative* coalitions and limits himself to the so-called *peripheral turnover*, which means that mostly the center-left or center-right has the limited access to the government. The last feature of polarized pluralism is what Sartori calls *politics of outbidding*.<sup>25</sup> When parties advocate for certain issues, and promise certain outcomes, when it might be possible that they do not even have the substantial material to fulfil these promises. This could mean that new parties go for specific issues in order to carve a place out for themselves and make the voters aware of their presence.

### **Different games, different rules**

In this section the main focus will be on the evolution of parties, so we can understand better what new parties are born to. Enyedi denotes that there are various outside forces that could shape a party system. Among the most important factors are the electoral system, the structure of the executive and the legislature, inequality in society and finally the various ideological patterns.<sup>26</sup>

Every single party system has its own way of forming parties, so the systems have direct impact on them. This can be relevant for the scope of the thesis, because these impacts can limit the choices for new parties. However, there are also different approaches to evaluate parties, which we have to discuss before moving on. Enyedi sums up by mentioning the sociological approach, in which the changes in society shape the behavior of parties; the rational choice theory, in which

---

<sup>25</sup> Sartori, 2005 p.123

<sup>26</sup> Enyedi, 1999

voter preferences are the main force; and finally the one theory that defines the previous two, which argues that parties both shape the preferences of voters and the political culture also (one of the main exponents of this theory was Sartori).<sup>27</sup>

Lipset and Rokkan argue that parties are best understood as the representatives of social conflicts.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile Duverger claims, that parties are best defined by their particular structure.<sup>29</sup> Mair argues, that “electorates in Europe in the 1980s have in general proved more stable and more predictable than they were. (...) At least up to now, the general pattern shows more rather than less stability.” And even though their overall share of votes decreased they still win the majority of popular support. So instead of rumours of electoral change we can witness electoral continuity.<sup>30</sup>

Enyedi claims that nowadays still one of the most salient topics in political science concerns parties, according to him this is due to the connection between party competition and modern democracy. For this connection the evidence lays in front of our eyes: parties are (nearly in every modern society) the indicators of democracy. However it was not always like that, Enyedi claims that for example Rousseau, looked at parties as obstacles in the way of people’s general will.<sup>31</sup> Mair – along with Duverger and Panebianco – argues, that if we want to understand parties properly, we have to access their relation and interaction with civil society. Mair imagines that each type of party has its own line of development and each of these new party types creates further development that leads to another, new party type, which again creates its own reaction to

---

<sup>27</sup> Enyedi, 1999

<sup>28</sup> Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan, 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Introduction." In: *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. by Seymour M. Lipset, and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1-64.

<sup>29</sup> Duverger, Maurice, 1964. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen & Co.

<sup>30</sup> Mair, Peter; *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*, Clarendon Press, 1997, p.86

<sup>31</sup> Enyedi, 1999

the system. This is the line of party evolution – where every party type is just a stage – that consists of continuous development.<sup>32</sup>

It is also important for us to understand better the stages of party development. Before we do that I would like to mention Duverger, who introduced the dichotomy of mass versus cadre parties. Cadre parties were so-called parties formulated by the members of parliament; meanwhile mass parties arose from the cooperation of movements and civil initiatives.<sup>33</sup> According to Mair there is a clear distinction between parties and the state when it comes to understand mass and catch-all parties. Mass parties arose from civil society, with the intention to enter the state and to modify public policy. Catch-all parties can be found midway between the state and civil society.<sup>34</sup> Kirchheimer argued that it was quick economic growth, rise of consumption oriented society, loosening of class-belonging that led to the formation of so called catch-all parties.<sup>35</sup>

The afterward tendency in history was that these kind of parties gradually became less attached to civil society and more incorporated in the state apparatus itself. The outcome was a decline in party membership and with that also the cost of party activity went up. This is why parties had to find other ways to found themselves: and the handiest option was to seek the help of the state.<sup>36</sup> This resulted in a state that supported the inside parties with funding and was able to restrict the access of the new arrivals. Parties are no longer mediating between civil society and state, but they become part of the state apparatus. What is also important to mention is that the mode of competition between parties also changed: in order for parties to survive all together, it was reasonable to share resources by forming cartels, thus augmenting the possibility for survival:

---

<sup>32</sup> Mair, 1997, p.93

<sup>33</sup> Duverger, 1964.

<sup>34</sup> Mair, 1997, p. 96-97.

<sup>35</sup> Kirchheimer, Otto 1966: "The Transformation of the Western European Party System" In: LaPalombara, J. - Weiner M., eds. Political Parties and Political Development. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

<sup>36</sup> Mair, 1997, p.105



this logically led to lower the levels of competition. “But while the cartel parties may be able to limit competition among themselves, they are of course unable to suppress political opposition more generally.” Becoming more part of the state meant, that specific problems were best advocated by interest groups and not by parties anymore.<sup>37</sup>

For this, it is understandable that the very same feature that would be guarding the cartel parties, is quite contradicting. Because by excluding the possible new parties, these cartels handed a quite powerful weapon themselves to their challengers: a theme based on which there outside parties could mobilize the masses.<sup>38</sup> And this is why – as Mair suggest – one of the most common policy ground – leaving behind ideology and party orientation – for new parties trying to enter the political ground, is the dedication to break down the established, guarded system. Mair also notes that this vocation many times is purely rhetoric, and it serves just as a catch phrase for the new parties to attract voters. However in other cases, it is actually a radical manifestation of their dissatisfaction, and this is most visible in the case of extreme-right parties. And from this we can deduct that the more cartel parties try to exclude their rivals, actually the more this gives legitimacy to the “wrath” of anti-establishment parties. And in conclusion Mair argues that parties did not lose their importance (as many authors argue) but rather the channel of competition has changed with cartel parties and their opponents, the anti-establishment parties.<sup>39</sup>

Why are we looking at all to parties? One of their most important aspects is the relevance of a party. Sartori claims that “The strength of a party is, first of all, its electoral strength”<sup>40</sup> and he continues by saying that in a multiparty system what is of further interest is the governing and

---

<sup>37</sup> Mair, 1997, p.116-7

<sup>38</sup> Ibidem

<sup>39</sup> Mair, 1997, p.118-9

<sup>40</sup> Sartori, 2005 p.107

coalition potential. He argues that a minor party could be labelled irrelevant if it is never needed for any coalition, however Sartori himself accept the limitation of this, because it is more difficult to define a party's irrelevance rather than its relevance, so he complements his argument with the blackmail potential: "A party qualifies for relevance whenever its existence" ... "alters the direction of competition"<sup>41</sup>

Kitschelt continues the thought of Sartori by claiming that movement parties could think of themselves as blackmail parties by putting pressure on the established parties to take seriously in consideration the alternative voice of a certain large, non-represented group. The relevance of these parties lays here: to be able to make salient issues that otherwise would be forgotten.<sup>42</sup> Rightist parties have a strong single-issue position, like "opposing to immigration, to European integration". We can see it form the evolution of different far right parties "the importance of combining intense single-issue appeal with broader (...) political values", because Brug also mentions that those who vote for the right-wing parties have a tendency to be neither a single-issue nor a protest voter.<sup>43</sup> When there is a need to broaden the political program or just cooperate – even in coalition for example – with other parties, extreme right parties have a tendency to experience inner conflicts that could translate later on into the reorganization of the parties internal structure. Turning back to the main argument we can see that in order to turn into a multi-issue party you need your internal resources or in other words the ability to manage internal conflict.

---

<sup>41</sup> Sartori, p.108; Sartori later on argues that the notion of blackmail party is quite similar to that of an anti-establishment party. Furthermore he claims that the blackmail potential can be translated in the political arena to the veto power.

<sup>42</sup> Kitschelt, 2006

<sup>43</sup> Van der Brug, Wouter, Fennema, Meindert and Tillie, Jean (2000) 'Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?' *European Journal of Political Research*, 37:77-102

In conclusion, Enyedi claims that the main potential in parties is that they can provide alternatives by expressing interests and values, and they structure public opinion even before the elections (by providing the electorate with their program). The fact that parties have to reach a consensus between conflicting interests and they cannot afford to provide solution to only one particular problem is what distinguishes parties from other political formation (for example movements). In addition, there are two more important factors of parties that help people become citizens: integration (unifying multiple individuals or groups into one; and giving them a shared identity) and mobilization (the act to motivate individuals or groups to undertake certain political actions).<sup>44</sup>

### **Seizing the moment**

Another key external factor for new parties is the opportunity given from the outside. Not all new movements or parties can be explained by resource mobilization theory (elaborated later on): some do not have the necessary money for example, so this theory fails to account for other establishing factors. This is when the Political Opportunity Theory comes in the picture. This theory emphasizes that it is a window of opportunity based on which a movement or party can take a certain action. One of the similarities with the Resource Mobilization theory is that – according to Goldstone – the political environment plays an important role in determination the outcome of the movement.<sup>45</sup> According to Tarrow, the road from opportunity to success is a top-

---

<sup>44</sup> Enyedi, 1999

<sup>45</sup> Goldstone JA. 1980. The weakness of organization: a new look at Gamson's The Strategy of Social Protest. *American Journal of Sociology*. 85: 1017-42, 1426-32

down interactive logic. Opportunities are there when there is a split within the elite, a political realignment within a polity, the authorities' will and skill to control dissent declines.<sup>46</sup>

Framing Theory - in my opinion - is an interesting mix of internal and external factor. It is a more recent theory that basically describes the discourse presented by the movement/party. Tarrow talks about framing when he elaborates the way movements make meanings. They use framing (along with other tools) in order to compete for public space with the government and to obstruct the government's attempt to monopolize the creation and spread of public opinion.<sup>47</sup> Once again a relevant aspect for the thesis: because it concerns how new parties compete for space in the public debates. Framing is a scheme that simplifies and condenses the "world out there". There are two different ways in its formation by the opposition parties: injustice framing, which is a publicly shared concept of grievance or enemy, and bricolage, when people merge traditional cultural templates with promotion of new contents and values.<sup>48</sup>

## **2.2 The game itself – internal factors**

In the upcoming part the thesis introduces the internal factors that were found relevant in the existing literature. Among these were resource mobilization, party/movement structure, leadership and issue ownership.

After clarifying how party system works, we know the dynamics of the system itself that can contribute to the rise of new parties. Some new parties start as movements and turn into parties later on, this is why it is important to understand, what knowledge we can withdraw from these

---

<sup>46</sup> Tarrow, S. (2011) *Power In Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>47</sup> Tarrow, 2011, Chapter 7

<sup>48</sup> Idem

literature. In revising the literature, I will be focusing on the different factors and aspects that I already introduced in the beginning and I found important in order to carry out a proper analysis. In a sense these are all internal factors that shape these new parties.

## **Social movement**

“Movements, interest groups, and parties are the main vehicles of political interest articulation and intermediation”<sup>49</sup>. The notion of movement party according to Kitschelt is the transition of a movement to a party in which they change the institutional setting of the organization and improve the infrastructure and they also create the program of the new association. People can advocate for their opinion in three different ways: (1) through democratic representation, (2) to influence financially or with information via interest groups, (3) in political movements, manifesting their ideas and interest through protest for example.<sup>50</sup>

According to Aldrich when we look at the functional criteria we have to take in consideration the amount of investment of the organizations in finding solutions to problems of collective action and problems of social choice. Both human and capital resources are needed in coordinating and organizing collective action.<sup>51</sup> And these resources are vital for success.

As we saw previously there are changes in parties and also social movements are becoming important source for parties because of the changes in the cleavage systems, in the structure of a party/movement and the rise of modern issues. So I believe that it is important to understand

---

<sup>49</sup> Tarrow, 2011 p.278

<sup>50</sup> Kitschelt, 2006

<sup>51</sup> Aldrich, John, 1995, *Why Parties?* Chicago, University of Chicago Press

what institutional path led to elections to parliament, and in general to give an overview on social movements.

In the 1970-80's new social movements arose with emancipator goals, targeting especially the dilemmas of peace and solidarity. Meanwhile on the other side we can see the rise of new radical right movements that mainly consists of right intellectual circles, publishing houses, extra-parliamentary organizations, and violent youth subcultures. With the weakening of traditional cleavages (like class, religion and family), new cleavages became more visible: mostly created by the spread of education and by the distinction between winners and losers of modernization.<sup>52</sup>

### **Resource mobilization**

According to Kriesi, during the 1970's in Europe the Green parties were closest to the new social movements, their adherents were more educated than the national average – which means that they were the winners of modernization - and here it is quite important to note that not only the goals but also the modes of doing their politics helped to mobilize people (meaning that it was participatory, issue-specific, and oriented towards public opinion), meanwhile the right managed to mobilize mostly the losers of modernization. In general, these were less educated people, who were part of the declining middle class or the unskilled working class. Based on this information, Kriesi claims that new social movements are “movements of affluence” while movements of the new right are “movements of crisis”. The former has resources at their disposal, and make claims that are in their own interest with arguing that it is for the good of everyone. Meanwhile the latter

---

<sup>52</sup> Kriesi, H. “Movements of the Left, Movements of the Right: Putting the Mobilization of Two New Types of Social Movements into Political Context.” 1997

experience, or expect to experience soon, socioeconomic decline and they articulate particularistic claims.<sup>53</sup>

Mostly when we speak about social movements, the main focus is to discover the factors that lead to the formation of different organizations. Firstly, I examine the resource mobilization theory according to Jenkins, which claims that a social movement has the basics for foundation when changes happen in the group's organization, in its available sources and opportunities. The main points are the following: actions conducted by the members of a movement are rational. The actions of a movement are influenced by the institutionalized power, especially by its influence and conflict of interest. These different interests in general are capable to generate grievances that provide an incentive for the social movement to mobilize.<sup>54</sup>

Internal organizations are key when mapping a movement or a party. A strong affirmation of Jenkins' paper is that informal and decentralized social movements are not as effective as centralized and formally structured ones. Furthermore, the (desired) success of a movement depends in a great deal on the actual political climate in which this movement is situated. Actual political climate in this case could mean (among other factors): how democratic a system is, what the relationship is between the government and the opposition and how free the press is.<sup>55</sup>

In the leadership literature, I found two different ideas when it comes to movements: (1) a charismatic leader that exercises unquestioned control, or (2) movement parties that may install a grassroots, participatory and inclusive organization among their members and activist.<sup>56</sup> One of the most important aspects of social movements is the figure of the leader. According to Morris

---

<sup>53</sup> Kriesi, 1997

<sup>54</sup> Jenkins JC. 1983. Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*. 9: 527-553

<sup>55</sup> Jenkins, 1983

<sup>56</sup> Kitschelt, 2006

and Staggenborg “they inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes.”<sup>57</sup> However the authors argue that there is still lack of a proper theoretical framework when it comes to the question of leadership in relation to social movements. They claim that it is crucial to evaluate leaders in a structural context, recognizing the roles of participants and the important and complex levels of leadership. Actually the authors argue that is important to evaluate the question of leadership, because it can help to understand better other, key issues within the frame of social movement theory. According to Gusfield a leader has dual role: one is when he operates within the movement, acting as a “mobilizer” – stimulating members – and the other is when he acts outside of the movement, functioning as an “articulator” - behaving as the highest form of connection between movement and society in general.<sup>58</sup>

Many authors still draw on Weber’s theory of “charismatic leadership”, in which he claims that an emotionally driven community appoints the leader(s) based on their loyalty to them.<sup>59</sup> One problem with Weber’s theory – according to Melucci – is that with the idea of the charismatic leader the notion of social relationship is endangered between followers and leaders.<sup>60</sup> However, Robert Michaels argues that this is not a problem, but on the contrary, members are actually willing to cede their channels of communication to their leaders and are actually grateful and happy that leaders act and speak on their behalf. The problem comes when leaders become more powerful and they actually become part of the political elite, and this way their personal interest

---

<sup>57</sup> Morris, Aldon, and Suzanne Staggenborg. "Leadership in social movements." *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (2004): 171-196. APA

<sup>58</sup> Gusfield, Joseph R. *Functional Areas of Leadership in Social Movements*. *Sociological Quarterly*, 7 (2), 137–56, 1966

<sup>59</sup> Weber, Max; *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968

<sup>60</sup> Melucci, Alberto; *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996



conflicts with their own member's interest. This can happen when members lack of competence and skills that their leaders possess.<sup>61</sup>

Kitschelt also draws on Weber's charismatic leadership when he talks about extreme right parties: "organizational stability of extreme rightist parties is predicted on the undisputed control of a party by single charismatic individual".<sup>62</sup> Different, pre-existing organizational structures lead to the formation of different kind of leaders. According to Freeman, from more traditional and formal organization (like unions and parties) "older branches" came out, meanwhile from more decentralized and loose organizations the "younger branches" emerged.<sup>63</sup> In addition, a final point in the leadership section has to be made when we talk about collective leadership, and not about a single leader. Chances of success are the highest when a leadership has both insiders and outsiders. A more successful outcome is expected if the leadership of a movement is constituted of people with different sets of skills and backgrounds.<sup>64</sup>

### **Issue ownership**

Brug and Berkhout argue that political parties are the most important actors when it comes to setting the political agenda. They found "that issue ownership is positively related to claims-making". One of the main implications of this finding is that "issue ownership matters for agenda-setting". They claim that they are able to make accurate predictions about who is going to appear in the press during political debates based on which issue is key to that precise party.

---

<sup>61</sup> Barker, Colin (2001) Robert Michels and "The Cruel Game." In Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette (eds.), *Leadership in Social Movements*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 24–43.

<sup>62</sup> Kitschelt, 2006

<sup>63</sup> Freeman, Jo (1975) *The Politics of Women's Liberation*. New York: David McKay

<sup>64</sup> Ganz, Marshall (2000) Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture: 1959–1966. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (4), 1003–62.

Moreover, they also claim that radical-right parties (which are mostly issue-owners), have difficulties in reaching the public, given the fact the mainstream media is less keen to give them space. They also found – what would seem obvious – that larger parties get bigger attention in the media, which makes certain issues (especially important for these parties) more salient. One of the most important findings of Burg and Berkout is that those parties that have strong issue-ownership have also a greater relevance in agenda-setting.<sup>65</sup>

The studies of Stefaan Walgrave et al. are mostly concerned how stable is the issue-ownership of a party. They argue: “firmly owned issues are a bit more difficult to claim for other parties, but even here we found that a leader’s media performance can to some extent pull an issue closer to the party.” They also found that in order for a party to keep an issue their very own, they need to constantly keep it on the agenda and speak of it in the media; otherwise they could risk losing it to another contender. Basically they “showed that issue ownership essentially is a dynamic process directly affected by parties’ communication in the media.” They suggest that the best strategy for a smaller party is to stick to its owned issue, because of the relatively smaller media attention it is not so feasible to appropriate and advocate for a broader set of issues, meanwhile bigger parties – thanks to the greater media exposure – are more able to draw attention on other(s) issues – that they might claim as their owns afterwards.<sup>66</sup> Issue ownership and media presence are derivation of the party system itself, which is why I listed among external factors.

---

<sup>65</sup> Brug, Wouter van der; Berkhout, Joost; The Effect of Associative Issue Ownership on Parties’ Presence in the News Media, *West European Politics*, 2015, 38:4, 869-887

<sup>66</sup> Walgrave, Stefaan, Jonas Lefevere, Michiel Nuytemans; Issue Ownership Stability and Change: How Political Parties Claim and Maintain Issues Through Media Appearances, *Political Communication*, 2009, 26:2, 153-172

### **2.3 External and internal factors benefitting new parties**

After analysing party systems and evaluating the institutional path of newly emerging parties (out of social movements) I would like to reassume what characteristics I found important for the scope of the study.

I found that the development of a party depends great deal on external factors, like the (1) party system in which it can be found. For example in a polarized pluralism party system we could witness the rise of anti-system parties and the existence of a bilateral opposition, which could further encourage extremist politics. (2) Political culture, social conflicts and voter preferences also work as an external shaping force for new parties. Also the (3) relationship of a party with civil society greatly affects the development of the party itself. The historical development of parties is also important when it comes to understand how new parties come along: different historical background (for example loosening of class belonging and rise of consumption society) leads to different (4) party type. After that parties become less attached to civil society (and loosing membership) they had to look at the state for financing them. With the state supporting the inside parties, for new parties it become more and more difficult to enter the scene. With the inside parties sharing the resources of the state by forming cartels, some problems left could be best advocated by newly formed interest groups (which have the potential to later on turn into a party). So for these new parties on the outside, “bringing down the established system” could be a catch phrase to attract voters. Meaning, the more the competition is limited, the more these parties have legitimacy while trying to break in. Also, when it comes to parties we can access the relevance of a party, by checking whether it (5) brings a new competition or it addresses its communication to a slice of the population which was not represented before.

Last but not least, it would be important to mention (6) opportunities: a sudden change in the political landscape itself can land a hand to an emerging entity, after that it will come down to this new party whether they can seize this moment. Continuing this line of thoughts, we can see that (6a) framing is also important after catching an opportunity, because framing gives a chance to compete for public space and form a distinct opinion. (6b) Political opportunity also plays an important role: in case a smaller party has a strong issue ownership, then they are in a better position to attract voters, and if this is aligned with a (7) strong media presence that also helps the party/movement to gain more votes. (8) Spatial competition is mostly based on cleavages and it is best manifested when there is a salient issue that is at the heart of a large group which lacks representation; and this is where a new party could enter the game.

Even though spatial competition is an external factor, its manifestation, (9) issue ownership is one of the main internal factors. Furthermore the politics of outbidding could also mean for a new party, that they grasp on a certain issue in order to make themselves aware in the eyes of the voters. The other question was, how a movement could (10) mobilize its resources, and how is it built up? Reviewing the literature I found that what is more desired for such a movement is to have a well-designed (11) structure, with a centralized and formal spine. When it comes to the figure of (12) leader, the literature denotes that it is both possible to have a strong leader (or leadership) or a more participatory and inclusive organization. What was then later on found, is that a charismatic leader can provide more benefits to its party (he/she can mobilize resources, attract voters etc.).

## 2.4 Accessing the different factors

In this session I will provide some preliminary tools that I found important in order to connect theory with my historical cases. One of the basic concepts to access a party's organizational strength was introduced by Cotter et al. in 1984.<sup>67</sup> They evaluated American state parties' organizations from the 1960s through the 1980s. As Hatch reassumes it: "the state parties with the strongest organizations exhibit both organizational complexity and programmatic capacity, as they are characterized by professionalism, bureaucratic development, and the capability to mobilize voters and provide essential services to party candidates."<sup>68</sup> As Hatch also emphasized, Cotter et al. found important two dimension: (1) organizational structure – under which they evaluated whether a party: has Separate Headquarters, Owns Headquarters, Hires Executive Director, Hires Salaried Chair, Employs Research Staff, Employs PR Director, Employs Comptroller; and (2) programmatic activities – under which they evaluated whether a party: Runs Mobilization Program, Commissions Public Opinion Polls, Holds Fund-Raising event, Publishes Party Newspaper, Operates Direct Mail Fund-Raising, Runs Campaign Seminars, Hires Field Staff, Recruits Full Slate of Candidates.

Based on the general tool of Hatch et al, for new parties I need to select measures that are relevant so for example instead of party newspapers I shall look into the website use and campaigns run on social media. Another one of my tools of measurement will be the simplified and combined versions of the above listed characteristics. As we can see from this list what matters (that enables a party to gain success – without considering the outside factors) is the

---

<sup>67</sup> Cotter CP, Gibson JL, Bibby JF, et al.; *Party Organizations in American Politics*, New York: Praeger. 1984

<sup>68</sup> Rebecca S. Hatch; *Party organizational strength and technological capacity The adaptation of the state-level party organizations in the United States to voter outreach and data analytics in the Internet age*. *Party Politics*, Vol 22, Issue 2. 2015

degree of professionalization of a party and the extent to which they can recruit members and attract voters. Furthermore I am interested in the composition of the leadership (polarized, professional etc), the centralization of the party and the extent of local organization, because all these factors were regarded important in the success of a party when I revised the existing literature.

### 3 The game in Hungary

#### 3.1 Introduction and historical background

After the general overview on literature I would like to move on to introducing the Hungarian case, and in order to understand it better I will give a general historical background. In Western Europe the relevance of parties diminished, because other organizations are also able to form the political life and landscape.<sup>69</sup> The case in Hungary is different, here still the ideas of Lipset apply,<sup>70</sup> parties are the main and ruling forces in articulating ideas, opinions and they are the leading organizations in the countries life.<sup>71</sup>

According to Mair, the democratization process, just like the behavior of voters and parties were also different in the post-communist countries than in the West.<sup>72</sup> We can observe a worldwide tendency in declining party membership.<sup>73</sup> One of the main reasons is that parties do not need to relay anymore so heavily on member fees.<sup>74</sup> This is especially true in Hungary, where the main income for a party is coming from the state itself. In addition, even though, parties are the most important representative force, now there are multiple possibilities for voters to participate in political life.<sup>75</sup> In the post-communist countries, the decline of membership was even more

---

<sup>69</sup> Schmitter, Philippe C; „Parties are not what they once were” in Larry Diamond – Richard Gunther (eds.): Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore–London 2001) 67–89

<sup>70</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin; „The Indispensability of Political Parties” Journal of Democracy 2000/1. 48–55.

<sup>71</sup> Körösi András, A magyar politikai rendszer – negyedszázad után, Osiris Kiadó – MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Politikatudományi Intézet, 2015 249-278

<sup>72</sup> Mair, 1997 p.175–198.

<sup>73</sup> Mair, Peter – Ingrid van Biezen: Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies 1980–2000, Party Politics 2001/1.; Ingrid van Biezen – Peter Mair – Thomas Poguntke: „Going, going, ... gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe” European Journal of Political Research 2012/1.

<sup>74</sup> Whiteley, Paul F; Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world Party Politics 2011/1.

<sup>75</sup> Körösi, 2015

visible because the negative experience of communism itself made people less keen to become members.<sup>76</sup>

It is also important to address shortly the evolution of the typical Hungarian two-block party system. The polarization that led to the opposition of the blocks evolved gradually. The decision based on the interaction between the parties left little to no space to the leaders, which then translated in solid party coalitions that become so stable that there was no trespassing between the blocks. The reason that this phenomenon lived on is that the two blocks were continuously building on the negative identity of one another. Furthermore, there were big cohesion powers within the two blocks and also incentives and punishments made stronger the ties between allies and the ban to cooperate outside of the proper block.<sup>77</sup>

The Hungarian party system was a relatively consolidated one.<sup>78</sup> It was not so open to new parties, but this changed recently with the entrance to the Parliament of Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom and Lehet Más a Politika<sup>79</sup>, and I am interested to see what were the specificities that could explain the success of these new parties. In 2010, the two-block system clearly had a shock. One of the blocks gained huge majority. On the other hand, the other block did not simply get weaker, but next to it there were two other parties from the outside. The status quo has changed: there were no more two contesting blocks in the party system.

Here it is important to mention the relative stability and consolidation of this two-block system up until the election of 2010: on one hand, the left block experienced political scandal and inner

---

<sup>76</sup> Lewis (2000) 103.; Tomás Kostelecký: Political Parties after Communism: Developments in East-Central Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2002) 152–154.; Ingrid van Biezen: Political Parties in New Democracies Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) 115

<sup>77</sup> Soós, 2012, p.37-38

<sup>78</sup> Toka, Gabor: Hungary in the Handbook of Political Change in eastern europe, ed. by Sten Berglund, Tomas Hellén and Frank Aarebrot. Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 1998, pp. 231-74

<sup>79</sup> Lehet Más a Politika will be referred as LMP and Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom will be referred as Jobbik



conflicts, which led to its erosion. On the other hand, the two-block system was capable to control the mainstream dissents, because it was mostly focused on mainstream events, covered by the mass media. Smaller groups of activist – who made use of the internet also – were out of the sight of the system. This is what could explain the two emerging subcultures (left-green, and radical-right) in shadows of the system. The basis of these two subcultures were found outside of the two-block system and it remained resistant to it.<sup>80</sup> Fricz argues that what happened after the elections of 2010, could be defined as the genesis of a predominant-party system (in the Sartorian definition).<sup>81</sup>

Hollowing and backsliding are important concepts in order to understand the situation in Hungary. Social protection selectively benefitted workers and pensioners, keeping them interested in political activity, while offering little to the Roma and youth “whose political participation was least likely anyway”.<sup>82</sup> Greskovits suggests that the left-liberal coalition, which starting in the 1990s was initially well endowed with political capital and links to civil society, lost touch with certain interests and demands of their constituency. He attributes political agency to the Hungarian right, which took advantage of the opportunity to engage large segments of the population, building a broad base of social support and credibility. Up until 2010 the governing socialists got into public scandals, the crisis of 2008 hit and the reforms of the left-liberal rulers failed. Most authors argue that the reason for the rise of the right is The Great Recession.

However, Mudde claims that this general perception is wrong, and it is based on conceptual stretching, generalizations and opportunism. “Both Orbán’s Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance

---

<sup>80</sup> Soós, 2012

<sup>81</sup> Fricz Tamás 2011. 2010-től predomináns pártrendszer Magyarországon? In Sándor Péter – Vass László (szerk.): Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2010-ről. Kormányzat, közpolitika, közélet. Budapest: DKMKA (elektronikus kiadvány).

<sup>82</sup> Greskovits, B. (2015) „The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe.” Global Policy 6

and Jobbik profited from widespread political dissatisfaction, but the causes were only partly related to the economy.”<sup>83</sup> In the election year of 2010, with the winning of Fidesz the political consensus supporting liberal democracy collapsed, the opposition got marginalized and an illiberal democracy-building has started.<sup>84</sup> Fidesz gained asymmetrical strength in civil society: the left – in its 12 year of governing – gained political capital and social networks, but the right gradually sank deeper in society acquiring grassroots influence. The left made a mistake by ignoring protest and civil actors and made politics above the society sphere, meanwhile the right appealed to “people directly through permanent mobilization”.<sup>85</sup>

### 3.2 Changing rules

It is important to mention the elections of 2010 and 2014. We can talk about the so-called critical elections in 2010 in Hungary, and not just because of the landslide victory of the Fidesz-KDNP<sup>86</sup>, but also because of phenomenon such as new parties appearance, change in the balance of power in the parliament and in general in the party system or even the fact that there was an exceptionally high electoral participation.<sup>87</sup> According to Key, an election can be called critical when the outcome of the elections is more important than usual to the voters, voter participation is relatively high, as well as conflicts that structure the election are different from earlier and

<sup>83</sup> Mudde, C. (2014) “The Far Right and the European Elections.” *Current History* (March), pp. 98-103.

<sup>84</sup> Greskovits, B. and Wittenberg, J. (2016) *Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Hungary in the 1990s and 2000s*. 3-7

<sup>85</sup> Greskovits, Wittenberg, 2016

<sup>86</sup> Fidesz: Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance): founded in 1988, a center-right christian conservative catch-all party. KDNP: Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People's Party), founded in 1943, banned and refounded in 1989 is the coalition partner of FIDESZ since 2006

<sup>87</sup> Róbert Péter – Papp Zsófia *Kritikus választás? Pártos elkötelezettség és szavazói viselkedés a 2010-es országgyűlési választáson* in Boda Zsolt, Körösnéy András, Van irány? *Trendek a magyar politikában*, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, Politikatudományi Intézet, 2012

finally, these changes will remain stable in the long run.<sup>88</sup> After this victory, Fidesz had the 2/3 majority to change the electoral system to make it more disproportionate in its favor.

The Hungarian voting method is one-dimensional in the sense that there is no space for the voters to express their secondary opinion, furthermore it makes impossible for the parties and individual candidates to cooperate, this way deepening the social cleavages and making dialogues impossible. The gerrymandering that has been made is also against representativeness.<sup>89</sup> Despite the changes in the voting system, the composition of the Parliament (for an inexperienced eye) was similar in 2014. Once again, the landslide wining of Fidesz-KDNP, the new parties (Jobbik, LMP) and the left that won seats in the shape of a coalition (MSZP-EGYÜTT-DK-PM-MLP). To analyze further the differences of the elections is beyond the scope of this study: what matters is the fact the both the LMP and the Jobbik (despite the differences in competition) made it into Parliament.

In conclusion I can say that after a general historical overview we can also see some of the external factors manifesting: in Hungary, parties are still the main guiding forces, heavily financed by the State. The two block system before 2010 originally froze the surface, and to this was added the general lack of contact with the people, and the disinterest of marginalized people and youth. Also it is important to mention how the right connected directly with everyday people. And finally with the landslide winning of 2010 the rules have also changed: different electoral system and gerrymandering have meant additional obstacles for new parties.

---

<sup>88</sup> V. O. Key, Jr. 1955. A Theory of Critical Elections. In *The Journal of Politics* 17, no. 1: 3-18.

<sup>89</sup> <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-election-briefing-no-51.pdf&site=266>,  
<http://www.meltanyossag.hu/content/files/Hungarian%20electoral%20system%20and%20procedure.pdf>

## 4 In- and outside shaping forces for LMP and Jobbik

In this section –after seeing some of the external factors manifesting in Hungary –, I will continue to elaborate and evaluate the other remaining external, and after that I will turn and look upon the internal factors, and by the end of the chapter I shall have a refined set of tools for the theory of new parties, based on the evaluation of Jobbik and LMP. Also in this section I will incorporate three interviews. Out of those three, two were conducted with Jobbik members: Dr. László György Lukács (Member of Parliament, Vice-President of the Welfare Committee, Vice-Chairman of Jobbik group in Parliament, later on referred also as Jobbik interview correspondent No.1) and Tibor Bana (Vice-President of Jobbik, Member of Parliament, Vice-President of the European Affairs Committee, later on referred also as Jobbik interview correspondent No.2). And one deep-interview was conducted with LMP member Péter Ungár (member of the party since 2013, member of leadership from 2015 until 2018, actually youngest member of Parliament, later on referred also as LMP interview correspondent).

### 4.1 What remained from the external

#### **The system that gave birth to...**

In order to understand better the Hungarian situation I would also like to elaborate the notion of “cartel party”, mentioned by Katz and Mair. Yet another external factor that worked in great deal when deciding the shape and outcome of a new party. This theory introduced in 1995 elaborates the new generation of parties which is mostly financially dependent from the State,<sup>90</sup> thus

---

<sup>90</sup> Katz, Richard S.– Mair, Peter: „Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party” Party Politics 1995/1

becoming more and more part of the State itself and less attached to society.<sup>91</sup> This theory was wildly debated and not always found its implication, but it is interesting to see whether the theory can be applied in Hungary.

Ágh found the most convincing empirical evidence for cartel parties in Hungary in strong State financing<sup>92</sup>, Körösenyi however found multiple attitudes (especially in FIDESZ), like centralized campaign, non-ideological carrier-like politics that he defined as traits of cartel party.<sup>93</sup> We can also talk about cartel party on party system level (and not only in single party level): this means that parties try to conserve the existing system, and they act in order to close down the possibilities in front of new parties. Actually since 1990, the system gave birth to only two genuinely new party which could pass the threshold and get into Parliament. Körösenyi rightfully argues that these factors are hardly visible for the public, so it is difficult to understand whether the cartelization tendency is due to thoughtful decisions or it is the outcome generated by the system.<sup>94</sup>

Körösenyi argues however that a few other traits of cartel party system – described by Katz and Mair -, like the co-working ambition between parties regardless of ideological traits and the slowing down of competition can be hardly seen in Hungary.<sup>95</sup> Instead, a massive right-left polarization was visible after 1990 with little or no trespassing between the blocks.<sup>96</sup> What was seen in Hungary after 2010, complied with the theory of Katz and Mair who argued that the

<sup>91</sup> Katz, Richard S.– Mair, Peter: „Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? A Rejoinder” Party Politics 1996/4.

<sup>92</sup> Ágh Attila: „The End of The Beginning: The Partial Consolidation of East Central European Parties and Party Systems” in Paul Pennings – Jan-Erik Lane (eds.): Comparing Party System Change (London: Routledge 1998) 206

<sup>93</sup> Körösenyi András: „Parlamentáris vagy »elnöki« kormányzás? Az Orbán-kormány összehasonlító perspektívából” Századvég 2001/20

<sup>94</sup> Körösenyi, 2015

<sup>95</sup> Idem

<sup>96</sup> Enyedi Zsolt – Kenneth Benoit: „Kritikus választás 2010. A magyar pártrendszer átrendeződése a bal-jobb dimenzióban

theoretical evolutionary line of cartel parties would inevitably be broken, because by their nature, the cartel party system will give birth to its opponents<sup>97</sup> in the shape of anti-establishment or populist parties.<sup>98</sup> As Körösiényi argues this was the case after the election of 2010 when two anti-establishment parties got into the Parliament.<sup>99</sup> Finally, Körösiényi says that the two-block system developed after 1990 ended with the tremendous majority of Fidesz. And politics become three-way in a new sense: Fidesz-KDNP which is the ruling heavy force, the left in general and finally Jobbik, which both in moral values and in world view constitutes a different block (in addition we can mention LMP as a new-arrival with its anti-establishment attitudes, but without enough structural power to make a difference yet).<sup>100</sup> And this is why I find it extremely interesting and also important to understand the mechanisms behind these two new parties

The fact that new, outsider forces could get in the Parliament only at the elections of 2010, confirm the closeness of the Hungarian party system. All the factors that are contributing to the exclusiveness of the system actually serve as incentives for the new challengers to build up competitive structure and to function with an extensive activist network.<sup>101</sup> Hajnal talks about the incompetence of the system in both countering radical initiatives and not being responsive to civil society's initiatives. He argues that this is due to the structural problems Eastern European countries that could not be labeled as typical bureaucratic flows, but are leftovers of the post-communist states.<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>97</sup> Katz, Mair, 1995

<sup>98</sup> Katz, Richard S. – Mair, Peter: „The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement” Perspectives on Politics 2009/4

<sup>99</sup> Körösiényi, 2015

<sup>100</sup> Idem

<sup>101</sup> Mikecz Dániel: Új pártok, változó mozgalmak 65-82 in Boda Zsolt, Körösiényi András, Van irány? Trendek a magyar politikában, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, Politikatudományi Intézet, 2012

<sup>102</sup> Hajnal György 2006. Bureaucratic Incapacity in Transition Democracies: A Case Study of Decision Behaviour in Hungarian Central Government Organisations. In Rosenbaum, A. – Juraj, N. (eds.): Democratic Governance in the

### ...anti-establishment parties

LMP can be seen only slightly attributed to the Hungarian ecopolitics way of thinking; basically they advocate that global problems cannot be solved along a left-right line. And Jobbik is simply and strongly denying anything that is based on the old left-right establishment. The basis of the Jobbik argument – according to which there is a legitimacy problem with the actual existing system – was provided by MIÉP<sup>103</sup> and more precisely, by its former leader István Csurka, who claimed that after the transition of democracy in 1989 the elite stayed the same, therefore the transition did not serve the Hungarian people but the elite and at the same time the foreign powers who helped the elite to stay in position, so the legitimacy of the whole system was questioned. A new wave of radicalization happened with the generational change. And this gave birth to movements that tried to provide political space to the young radicals within the frameworks of MIÉP in the beginning, but gradually they become a sort of rival to them.<sup>104</sup> This characteristic of being an anti-establishment party is a common factor in all three cases that I am looking at: the denial of the elite of the past.

Given the ideological differences between LMP and Jobbik it could be surprising to find that they have a few similar points they advocate for. However, given also the fact that they both have anti-establishment characteristics (so they both represent themselves as feasible alternatives to the existing parties), it is not surprising anymore to see that both parties underline the importance of anti-corruption. Furthermore, LMP's advocacy on this matter was even more visible compared to Jobbik's. This issue-ownership can be also seen from the study of Bíró-Nagy

---

Central and Eastern European Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century. Bratislava: NISPAcee. 151–172 itt 152-153

<sup>103</sup> MIÉP - Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja) is a nationalist political party founded in 1993

<sup>104</sup> Hajnal, 2006

and Róna: they compared (based on Petrocik)<sup>105</sup> the ratio of people that found competent a specific party in a specific issue to the ratio of people who actually voted for this party. When there are significantly more people believing that for a specific issue that party is the best actor, then we can talk about issue-ownership. This small circle of people - that both parties are interested in - do exists, and it mainly consists of younger cohorts who make regular use of internet and neither the old left-libertarians nor the FIDESZ managed to attract them.<sup>106</sup> The manifestation of these characteristic (those of the anti-establishment parties) are due to the external shaping forces of the party system, which is yet another confirmation of my built up theory.

## Media

This section concerning media is part of the opportunity structure: which depend both on external and internal factors. Meaning that it is an outside, given opportunity, but in the end it comes down to the party itself, how much they can make out of it; how they can compensate if needed – for the lack of space in mainstream media, by trying to gain platform in alternative media.

Just like in the theoretical chapters, I will address also here the relevance of media in connection with my historical cases. It is vital in general for a party to get proper access to media in order to reach voters. Róna argues that alone the question of media cannot answer the relevance of a

---

<sup>105</sup> Petrocik, J. R. (1996): Issue-Ownership in Presidential Elections with a 1980 Case Study. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40, 825-850.

<sup>106</sup> Bíró-Nagy András – Róna Dániel: „Tudatos radikalizmus. A Jobbik útja a parlamentbe, 2003–2010” in Láncki András (szerk.): *Nemzet és radikalizmus. Egy új pártcsalád felemelkedése* (Budapest: Századvég Kiadó 2011), p.32



party.<sup>107</sup> According to Róna, one of the reasons that the mainstream media reports at all about radical parties is the trend of infotainment; it coincides with the ways of popular media that radical parties simplify the facts, it is easily consumable and they almost always define clearly the enemy. Another factor that can be decisive regarding the presence of a party in the media is that in general, how well are issues owned by the parties already represented (in the case of radical right is mostly the immigration question).

Róna claims that the media has crucial role in the building phase of a party: when a party – that at a certain point was quite unknown – gains media attention thanks to the fact that it brings a new issue (that was not represented by other established parties) to light. In the case of Jobbik it was the “Roma-crime” issue. And Róna continues (following Ellinas), that in the next phase the single issue loses its importance and the crucial focus will be on the actual characteristics of the new party.<sup>108</sup> Róna argues that initially, even a negative framing could have a positive effect on a radical party: meaning that for a quasi-unknown party is important to have any kind of coverage, because this way they can become known for a vaster part of the electorate. Róna continues by saying that what is important after this stage is to build an alternative side of the stories, meaning that is important to have their own virtual or printed space where they can present their side of the stories – and this way their electorate can resist to the stories presented by the mainstream media.

Róna argues that the actual political climate favored Jobbik, because the party’s strong issue (the Roma-crime) got big attention in the mainstream media, and even though in general this media did not favor Jobbik, it could not portray “negatively” (for the party) the tragedies that happened

---

<sup>107</sup> Róna Dániel, *Jobbik-jelenség*, Corvinus University, PhD dissertation, 2014 p. 93

<sup>108</sup> *Idem* p.94-95

(for example the lynching of a teacher by Roma people). And even though they painted the rest of the party's action badly, Jobbik voters had an alternative (online) source to inform themselves according to the parties own statements.<sup>109</sup> One of the main decisive factors in the rising popularity of Jobbik was the attitude of the left-libertarians towards the radical party: Róna argues that actually the hate-speech and condemning of Jobbik actions by liberal politicians provided Jobbik with an unimaginable media attention, but more importantly it “showed” to the people who were the ones fed up with the liberals, who is the enemy of the left, which party they can vote for if they want a change.<sup>110</sup>

Lukács reaffirmed the previous findings when he said that it was always tough for the party to properly represent itself both in the printed and online media. Compared to the size of the party the media presence was minimal. The media tried to keep the Jobbik in the far-right box. And all the sympathizers and activist were labeled as far-righters.<sup>111</sup>

Major change occurred around 2014, mainly in the leftist media and especially after the infamous G-day when Lajos Simicsak<sup>112</sup> broke up with Fidesz. There was a more positive picture about Jobbik in the media after these events; however the window started to close again in 2018. Jobbik, by itself could not build a country-wide media outlet. On the online platform they run the N1 television and the Alfahír website. In the mainstream media (which is owned mostly by Fidesz-allies) they have little to no space, but when they are represented, it is mostly with a negative framing. From 2009 until around 2014, Jobbik was mainly in the news for being too radical and unacceptable; and from 2014 mostly scandals were portrayed, and news about

---

<sup>109</sup> Róna, 2014, p. 104

<sup>110</sup> Idem p.105

<sup>111</sup> Jobbik interview correspondent No.1

<sup>112</sup> millionaire, mediaoutlet owner and former friend of Viktor Orbán

Jobbik leaning towards the left. There is little to no possibility for alternatives: print media and television (which are the best way to connect with people) need tremendous financing (and usually it is always with a negative balance), so without huge private or governmental investment it is nearly impossible for Jobbik to develop these platforms. Especially in the rural areas, county newspapers are impossible to be managed as a positive enterprise with return, so only with the help of private or state founding can be kept alive. Jobbik does not have any of these options which leaves them with no alternative.<sup>113</sup>

On the modern, online platform, apart from Facebook there is no other possibility to connect with people. Instagram is more for the fun and people are not seeking political content there. But still the print media and firstly the television is the most important platform in general, and it will still be in the near future. That is why Fidesz tries to monopolize these channels. And even though Jobbik makes local newspapers, and various local organizations produce and distribute these newspapers in a general two-month basis, it is still below the desired level.<sup>114</sup>

A lot of attention was given – when evaluating media – to the radical-right. There are two main reasons for this: first, simply there is more empirical evidence in this context that concerns Jobbik and second, LMP did not have its own online or printed media outlet; this was said by the actual co-leader of the party, András Schiffer in 2016.<sup>115</sup> Also my correspondent said: “no school like the old-school”, the best way to reach voters is by printed media. It is planned for the party to invest in these kinds of media.<sup>116</sup> In my opinion this is one of the main reasons for the lower scoring of LMP in the elections. The fact that they do not have their own pages or media to

---

<sup>113</sup> Jobbik interview correspondent No.1

<sup>114</sup> Idem

<sup>115</sup> <https://mno.hu/belfold/nem-ker-a-szekertabor-logikabol-az-lmp-kozeli-portal-1331410>

<sup>116</sup> LMP interview correspondent No.1.

advocate for their policies makes it less feasible for them to be successful in elections. And this takes us to the final part of this section: What is the alternative source when you do not have access to mainstream media: the internet.

## **Internet**

One of the pro's (which from certain point of view could be a con also) of internet is that you cannot control it or impose censorship. And this is why – especially for the radical parties which are so in contrast with the mainstream media – it provides an unstoppable flow of information which at the same time means an alternative source for the voters in respect to the mainstream media. What is important here – especially for Jobbik – that there were already radical-right webpages (even some disconnected from Jobbik) that regrouped this subculture (which mostly consisted of younger cohorts). In addition, later on Jobbik could rely on these and build up their own pages as well. The most important for them is the “kuruc.info” (even though the party officially does not recognize the ties with the online portal). This page is extreme-right (neo-fascist) ideology themed site, but according to Róna many voters found that there are some information that could be found only in this page, making it a feasible alternative to the mainstream media.<sup>117</sup>

Once again the online presence of LMP is not so visible vis-à-vis the Jobbik's relevance among internet users. So this – along with the lower presence in mainstream media – could explain the worse performance of the green party. Also my LMP correspondent reaffirmed that the online

---

<sup>117</sup> Róna, 2014 p.107-109

media presence is extremely weak. My correspondent disposed of the money during the 2018 electoral campaign but they did not allocate it well.

## **4.2 What is new on the inside**

### **The social movement past of Jobbik and LMP**

Tarrow's main argument throughout his book "Power in Movements", is the following: movements emerge in response to changes in political opportunities and constraints.<sup>118</sup> The importance of this theory is relevant for this study because in all the two movements there were opportunities, linked sometimes to single-issue cases, which helped the organizations to gain more support:<sup>119</sup> The Roma-question for the Jobbik and environmental protection for LMP. Róna cannot emphasize enough the importance of this issue in the case of Jobbik: In Hungarian society a vast amount of people had tremendous prejudices against Roma but there was no party in the consolidated Hungarian system that had touched upon even once on this issue, this made the Jobbik the exclusive owner of this particular claim.<sup>120</sup> Along the Roma-issue there was yet another theme that gained importance: the anti-leftist sentiment, this meant a negative attitude towards the leftist government that ruled from 2002-2010. During this eight year period mostly Fidesz (which was in opposition that time) advocated against the leftist government, and they become gradually stronger with this rhetoric. However Jobbik also reaffirmed strongly this anti-leftist sentiment, thus they too gained more attention. The end of this cooperation was when Jobbik left behind political correctness and touched upon the Roma-issue and the public order-

---

<sup>118</sup>Tarrow, 2011

<sup>119</sup>Goldstone, 1980

<sup>120</sup> Róna, 2014, p.81

issue. Fidesz was however preparing to govern so they kept in line the political correctness in order to preserve centrist voters.<sup>121</sup> In the beginning - according to Róna – the issue-ownership of the Roma-question of Jobbik was facilitated by: (1) the radicalization of Fidesz that laid down the ground for radical right, and (2) the “terrible” governance of the previous left-libertarian coalition (as it was labeled by the vast majority of the population).<sup>122</sup>

As we saw, a strong issue is important for a party in order to mobilize people. However my correspondent from LMP, did not mention any specific, good theme along which they could mobilize people. Even after I mentioned green ecology, he did not grasp on the theme. So I was keen to understand what could explain the support of LMP. Ungár mentioned anti-Paks<sup>123</sup> initiatives and the “home care” program (for example your mom is sick and you have to stay home to take care of her, so you are out of the working market, and you get only 50000 HUF). These are general social issues that my correspondent mentioned. Deducting from this we can see that mostly social issues resonated to people. (Ungár used the example of forums in small villages after a village party: they paid attention to these social issues the most). Another topic that my correspondent mentioned was that there are big discussions inside the party also: whether they should do politics along moral themes, meaning that the most important things are to advocate against the undemocratic ways of the state and Fidesz (for example how the rule of law is distorted and because of this antidemocratic measure how important would be to form a coalition with other opposition parties), or maybe they should leave behind moralization and deal with everyday problems. Even when I mentioned the anti-corruption theme (and that Róna found

---

<sup>121</sup> Jobbik interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>122</sup> Róna, 2014

<sup>123</sup> In Paks, Hungary there is a nuclear power plant. In 2014 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed cooperation agreement for the expansion of the actual powerplant.

the LMP as the most credible party to advocate for anti-corruption) my correspondent did not seem to be keen to admit that it was effectively a salient topic.<sup>124</sup>

Radical right movements experienced change both in the logic of organization and in collective action: the protest that Hungary experienced in 2006 – erupted after the leaked speech of the actual Hungarian Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány – was a series of violent riots never seen before. These protest in the autumn of 2006 did not simply bring structural change, they helped to consolidate extreme right movements by binding together the participants and reinforcing the social network between them. We can basically say that radical right movements became true movements after these riots: the multiple connections of different networks and a common identity developed throughout the riots. And modern technology made it even easier to recruit new members.<sup>125</sup> So the extreme right cannot be identified with only one political group, but it is a loose connection of different cultural, sociological and political phenomena.<sup>126</sup> This makes it clear for us that next to the Jobbik, on the far right scale there were multiple other movements, but none of them actually posed a threat to the movement party status of Jobbik.<sup>127</sup> Jobbik emerged victorious from all others. What matters is that they managed to control an issue and have the popular support.

In the second part of 2000', the alternative activism decreased on one hand, on the other hand the right was more mobilized and street actions were happening more often. We could witness quality changes on the alternative site – just like on the right side – that led to the formation and access to the Parliament of the LMP, however these structural changes were different compared

---

<sup>124</sup> LMP interview correspondent

<sup>125</sup> Mikecz, 2012

<sup>126</sup> Goldstone, 1980

<sup>127</sup> Mikecz, 2012

to the radical-right. This means that green movements were not unknown in Hungary. And actually LMP itself before turning to a party could count on numerous activist groups, that helped by the simple fact that there was already an “alternative” network that could be used. Mostly the support of these kinds of groups came from the upper/ middle-upper classes, and many time even foreign intellectuals (like Noam Chomsky) were present at the events organized by the alternatives<sup>128</sup>

### **The evolution to a movement party and beyond**

As I mentioned before, after the elections of 2010, Jobbik and LMP, two new parties were present in the Hungarian Parliament. Even though the voters slightly experienced before the presence of both a radical right party (MIÉP) and some green candidates inside other left parties, the two newcomers brought respectively a green force (LMP) and a radical right force (Jobbik) that was not seen before in the Hungarian Parliament.<sup>129</sup> Considering Jobbik, the movement aspect is undeniable, but also if we look at some of the members of the LMP we can found some former movement activist.

In 1999 a social movement called Right-wing Youth Community (Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség) was formed by some university students. Their primary object was to never again let the communist come back and rule. Originally they even helped to get votes for other right-wing parties. The idea to form a party only emerged after the unsuccessful outcome of the elections of 2002, where they found Fidesz (their actual ally) in opposition and the youth organizations was dissatisfied with the soft politics conducted by Fidesz in opposition. The so-called civil circles

---

<sup>128</sup> Mikecz, 2012

<sup>129</sup> Idem



network – developed by Fidesz – was an appealing idea to the Youth Community also. And even Gábor Vona, former president of Jobbik was attending the circle for a year formed by Viktor Orbán.<sup>130</sup>

When Jobbik became a party in 2003, they thought that in order to narrow down the gap between voters and politicians, the national civil sphere has to be strengthened. So the regular and personal contact with voters is vital. In 2002 there were still a lot of street activities and demonstration organized by Jobbik and in 2003 they conducted a nation-wide rally where they visited around 100 cities (this can already be seen as an initiative to build up the organizational network of the party). In the upcoming years, Jobbik was still weak to run alone in the elections, and did not have enough attention either from the media (which later on was also provided by the outraged leftist media block). Gábor Vona, in 2007, announced the formation of the Hungarian Guard. The main idea with this organization was to help solving people's everyday problem, especially one problem – that Jobbik was advocating for so fiercely – the so-called “Roma-crime”. The outcome was amazing: all the outrage because of the Guard and all the misery about the legal issues around it gained a media-attention never seen before.<sup>131</sup>

Even though there are some similarities looking at the movement-styled past when transforming to a party the patterns were quite different. The question is: a movement party could stay as it is or it will inevitable turn into an established party? Parties or (movements) that were always concentrated on single issues may find difficulties or even internal chaos of their organization when they need to articulate positions that are completely outside of their previous political

---

<sup>130</sup> Bíró-Nagy, Róna, 2011 p. 2-5

<sup>131</sup> Ibidem

sphere. Jobbik was transformed from a movement to a party - following the western European far right parties' trend - primarily to overcome the lack of movement mobility.<sup>132</sup>

LMP, before turning into a party had a long history of civil activism and social movement, so actually they could rely on the already existing social networks and channels that they built up (for example the cycling protest, protest against the Iraqi war etc.). One of the main movement on which the LMP draw later on was the Védegylet, founded in 2000 (an eco-organization founded for both the safeguarding of our planet and the upcoming generation). One of the most known actions of the civil organization along with a few others – was the Zengő-konfliktus, where activists stopped workers from cutting trees in order to build a NATO radio locator. The LMP was something new and analysts often criticized them for having too few to say on general matters, the truth was that this kind of ecopolitics - skeptic towards globalization - existed before but was not connected and present in any of the main Hungarian political blocks.<sup>133</sup>

Ecological movements become competitive parties under three conditions: when the original movement was strongly mobilized, there were no other party representing the core issue of the ecological party and there was a “history of center-left governments and corporatist interest intermediation.” Political decision-making in ecology parties “tends to be more participatory and less predictable than in other parties because of the substantial internal diversity of political opinions and factionalism”.<sup>134</sup> In Hungary there is a possibility for alternative movements to oversee the political process, but for an effective contribution there is need for an established party – due to the closeness of the party system,<sup>135</sup> and also because of the trends that I

---

<sup>132</sup> Mikecz, 2012 p.73

<sup>133</sup> Mikecz, 2012

<sup>134</sup> Kitschelt, 2006

<sup>135</sup> Mikecz, 2012

mentioned previously, namely that still here in Western Europe parties are the main representative forces.

In order to understand development better let us imagine a linearly developing entity, where in phase one you need a single good issue to mobilize people. In phase two you already need internal resources to be able to attach other issues. Then if you succeed in being multi-issue you could meet the conditions to grow from a movement into a party. After that, if you are societally embedded you have the possibility to succeed. This is why it is important to generalize the politics of a movement party<sup>136</sup> so voters can position it on the left-right scale, thus making it easier for – especially not so informed voters – to have a clue about the possible policies of the party. This is because rational voters are more attracted by predictable parties rather than by unpredictable ones.<sup>137</sup> LMP and Jobbik are clear on the left-right scale.

### **Centralization of a party**

Some authors (like Decker<sup>138</sup>) argue that usually a radical party has a strong charismatic leader with a weak party structure. However Pedahzur and Brichta claim that a strong leadership does not exclude a successful party structure. In contrary the coexistence of these two factors make a party's survival permanent in the party system.<sup>139</sup> All in all we can see that Hungarian parties followed different trends in their strategic changes (and sometimes these trends did comply with

---

<sup>136</sup> My correspondent from Jobbik (No.1.) reaffirmed this statement when he claimed that during the transformation to a populist party, they had to take up issues like healthcare in order to enlarge their voter basis.

<sup>137</sup> Mikecz, 2012

<sup>138</sup> Decker, Frank: Der neue Rechtspopulismus. Leske + Budrich, Opladen. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-663-09621-4, 2004

<sup>139</sup> Pedahzur, Ami – Brichta, Avraham (2002): The institutionalization of extreme rightwing charismatic parties: a paradox? Party Politics 8 (1), 31-49. DOI: 10.1177/1354068802008001002

the party families expectations). Overall we can say that centralization is one of the crucial aspects in Hungary for a party.

When we want to evaluate the 2009 and 2010 electoral success of Jobbik we can see that the party went through a well-designed structural change. The outcome was a centralized party with a narrow, but powerful and competent leadership.<sup>140</sup> It is possible that the presidency took up too many operative tasks. The length of a presidency meeting sometimes was 7-8 hours which left a mark. Some of the task took up by the presidency could have been outsourced or solved by lower levels in the party. The overweight of the presidency and the fact that decisions were not made through a clearly defined party structure were all remains of the movement past. (For example sometimes the presidency had to deal with county problems, which could not be solved in the very same county). These difficulties have been mostly overcome by the introduction of the constituency. The president of the constituency was able to deal with the problems, so afterwards the presidency of the party did not have to carry the burden in dealing with those local problems. There was no omnipotent president of the party, the vice-presidents various times contradicted the decision of the president.<sup>141</sup>

In 2009 there were still looser connections between different task force inside Jobbik, mainly connected through the county president of Jobbik. This county president was the fire-bearer, going around in his county to form various local organization. This was the “reproduction” phase. After 2009 – there were more or less formed organizations – the central intelligence of the party tried to grasp a stronger hold and direct the initiatives of the counties and local organizations. All this still happened through the county president but in more formal way.

---

<sup>140</sup> Bíró-Nagy, Róna, 2011, 247–250

<sup>141</sup> Jobbik interview correspondent No.1.

Gradually these loose connections and informal channels transformed into a more professional organization. This transformation ended approximately in 2012. (Friendly cooking afternoon transformed to general meetings). So this professionalization eroded the movement aspect of the party. Before that the movement traits were also visible from the fact that everybody aggregated their own resources. Before 2009 it was not the headquarter of the party who sent money but for example if they travelled to a rally they put their own gas money. The county presidential system, with the county board functioned approximately until 2015 when they changed to articulated, more diverse force filed with the introduction of the constituency, which was already adjusted to the general parliamentary elections.<sup>142</sup>

Looking at the LMP we can identify the typical traits of a green party: great degree of decentralization and to a certain extent, participatory democracy.<sup>143</sup> We can find confirmation of this aspect by looking at the Statute of the Party, in which they declare that they aimed to structure the party as less hierarchical as possible, enabling this way a broader possibility for participation.<sup>144</sup> My correspondent argued that the party has a formal structure. Originally in the party, they believed in collective leadership (all members had the right to vote). Basically the formal structure of the party made it impossible to guide it, (there is no decision that can be made through this formal structure, no time to make this decisions) this is why it was led informally, and this generated various problems. There is an informal power structure of every party, because the person (or people) who possess the control over resources is the one who actually has the control over the party.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>142</sup> Jobbik interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>143</sup> Körösenyi, 2015

<sup>144</sup> <http://lehetmas.hu/rolunk/szervezet/>

<sup>145</sup> LMP interview correspondent No.1.

In parties like the LMP, the biggest resource is coming from the fraction, (the fraction is the biggest distributor of resources), so those who give the majority of the fraction are able to effectively lead the party. Ungár claims that an ideal structure would be like in Jobbik: a strong leader complemented with a relatively strong leadership, and a party director with a strong power of dissolution. My correspondent does not believe in collective leadership and in participatory democracy. His argument is that in the committee and in the countrywide collective meeting of the members, the least knowledgeable and talented politician has the same right as the leader of the party. This has changed a bit with the introduction of a co-leader, but informally the party was functioning also before (“from the telephone book of Schiffer”) but still, every party has this unofficial, informal, effective leading (that cannot be seen from the outside).<sup>146</sup>

The leadership did not actually exist (only theoretically) during the camping of 2018, they did not make effective decision during that period. Ungár was the one who disposed over 100 million Hungarian forints (which is the budget that comes from the state during election), and he claims that he was exclusively making decisions about this money, not because he did not let anyone to have a word in it, but because everybody was pushing away this burden. There were in general big discussions inside the party (Sallai-Hadnagy affair for ex), but mostly about whether they should join the other opposition parties in a coalition against Fidesz or not.<sup>147</sup>

Furthermore I wanted to mention what my correspondent said about getting inside the party, because it sheds light on the difficulties of a decentralized party, and on its ineffectiveness: “It is harder to get in this party than to get in the French Foreign Legion.” First you can be a helper in one of the regions for a month. Then you can apply to become a member, with another month of

---

<sup>146</sup> LMP interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>147</sup> Idem

trial, during which every member of the party has the right to put a veto to your membership. At the end the leadership has the right to decide whether you are worthy enough to join the party. The reason why it is so hard to get a membership is because once in, you have loads of rights. It would be better to have more members with fewer rights. And also a member cannot be kicked out; the leadership, with a 2/3 majority can suspend a member, but cannot kick out (also remains of participatory democracy). A way to kick out a member is quite long. First comes the ethical committee (90 days), after that you can appeal (another 60 days), and after that there is a final leadership decision. This is the theoretical way, but mostly they put so much pressure on the member that he or she chooses to leave.<sup>148</sup>

So why is the party still managed this way? The task for those who are ruling the party informally is always easier if the party is unmanageable formally, because if you have in your pocket the whole party, even if you get in minority the invisible majority is on your side. Also, in theory, the leadership should meet up to solve the problems, but nowadays they try to solve it in a sloppy way, by telephoning around. And even these telephones are restricted, not necessarily to the 9-people leadership, but to the “major stakeholders.” And this is why my correspondent concluded that social movement background “was important, we grow over, we should stop (behaving like one).” It was useful; they built on it. But now it should be a professional pragmatic party. Without the movement there would be no party today, but it is time to let it go.<sup>149</sup>

---

<sup>148</sup> Idem

<sup>149</sup> LMP interview correspondent No.1.

## Local organizations

Other important aspect of party structure is how wildly they can build up local organization to achieve nation-wide coverage and influence.<sup>150</sup> What here concerns me is the incredible difference between the two “new arrivals” after the 2010 elections, namely the numerical difference between Jobbik and LMP in terms of party membership and organization: Jobbik had 15 times more members and 25 times more local organization than LMP. Even though these great differences, Jobbik obtained only twice as much votes as the LMP.<sup>151</sup> So we can clearly see the differences in structural organizations, and even though Tavits argued – when analyzing four post-communist countries – that membership, local organizations and professional staff are indispensable for long-term party building,<sup>152</sup> the reality in Hungary – with the dissolution of SZDSZ and MDF, which were both well-structured under the conditions previously mentioned – is not always this simple. So even if there are numerical differences, we can see that new parties need to have societal support.

On the fact that professional stuff is important, both my LMP and Jobbik correspondent agreed. The LMP correspondent claimed that now there are not only fierce ecologists in the party. The more diverse the constituency the better it is. You have to aim to have a more diverse community inside the party. There were way more intellectuals back the time, and it is a good thing that this changed. “Originally they thought that making politics is about getting a few intellectuals together and next to a good bottle of wine they can discuss the thoughts of Habermas.” But the more the party resembles the people, the better it is. This – just like the phenomenon of people

---

<sup>150</sup> Körösenyi, 2015

<sup>151</sup> Körösenyi, 2015

<sup>152</sup> Tavits, Margit; *Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013) 67., 196.



with diverse background - developed organically. And the Jobbik correspondent said that it is ideal for a party – just like for a multinational company – to have people with various backgrounds. This, in the Jobbik was an organic development. Everyone added his or her own values to the party. Mostly people already in the party recommended other people with different expertise, who had the potential to join Jobbik.<sup>153</sup>

Jobbik – after cutting ties with the other radical party, MIÉP – realized that the key to a strong, independent political conduct is to reinforce the structure of the party, more precisely to be able to give their own candidate in every single district, and to have enough volunteers everywhere to promote the party. And the outcome was quite exceptional: from 2007 (with 70 operating local organizations) to 2010 the number of organization increased by an order of magnitude.<sup>154</sup> The activities at the local organizations were high due to a certain degree of decentralization at this level: the membership fees of the local organizations were not pumped into to central party organization, but rather it stayed at the local level and it was possible to reinvest it. What was also important (and partly it could explain the successful European Parliament elections of 2009) is that Jobbik promoted and organized a great number of public forums for the locals, and also these were heavily promoted by their local activist, this way usually the speaker was awaited by vast crowds.<sup>155</sup>

Lukács said that on a 10-point scale the coverage of the local organizations would be 6. By coverage we mean how well the party can connect to people all over the country, and how helpful and present are these organizations. The Fidesz's score would be around 7-8, meanwhile that of the LMP for example would be around 2-3. In the smallest of the villages (1000-1200

---

<sup>153</sup> LMP and Jobbik interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>154</sup> Róna, 2014

<sup>155</sup> Idem

people) there are no effective organizations but more like a few sympathizers who help the party there. In small villages where job-possibility are scarce and it is harder to make a living many people are not so keen to be part of a professional local organization of Jobbik but rather they prefer to help as sympathizers, in an informal way. There was only minimal change in these organizations between 2010 and 2018. In 2006 connections were still extremely loose, there were no proper organizations, but those that were there in 2006 are still mostly in the party nowadays also.<sup>156</sup>

On the other hand the LMP had difficulties building up these local organizations. When there was an initiative to enlarge one of the local organizations, the local leader did everything in his power to scare away the new arrivals. He or she feared that with the new arrivals his/her position is threatened and might get less chance and money as before. So it was because of inner conflicts. To strengthen local organization, they should make it easier to enroll new members. Money distribution should be regulated and tied to conditions. Distribution of money should be redesigned: a small party like this cannot afford to give money equally everywhere in the country: 8 regions should be chosen and let the rest go. The original movement (Vedegylet) was mostly present in the capital. Now the LMP is present in every city with county rights. In places that by size are between a city with county rights and a city of 10000 people LMP has a low presence, but the case is better in western Hungary. In cities with less than 10000 people there is no LMP presence at all.<sup>157</sup>

---

<sup>156</sup> Jobbik interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>157</sup> LMP interview correspondent No.1

### 4.3 Refining the factors after evaluating the historical cases

After evaluating both the literature and our historical cases we can set out the refined and definitive tools of measurement, before moving on to Momentum. First, let us take a look at the external factors. The upcoming factor may be obvious but I wish to state it anyway: in general for these kind of new parties to emerge, we have to have a system that generates them, or better said a certain type of system or parties, which in this case is the (1) cartel party, that inevitably generates its enemies (as (1a) anti-establishment parties), due to the fact that in a cartel party system the competition is narrowed down and there is little to now possibility for established parties to gain influence, this way making it the only feasible option to found an anti-establishment party. Revising the historical cases we can say that a (2) media presence is extremely important for a new party, but what I would add now that (2a) internet is also a key factor. I discussed previously that in the initial phase even a negative framing could boost the attention towards a party. And – as I elaborated previously - any kind of representation could be relevant, regardless if it is a bad or a good advertisement for the party. However, later on a strong media presence is required, and if not there must be an alternative source of information, – most commonly – in the shape of internet, and online sources. There is a clear distinction also in this level between my two historical cases. On one hand we can see the presence of Jobbik in the mainstream media and also an extremely strong existence in the online platform. Meanwhile, on the other hand we have the LMP that lacks presence both in the mainstream media and on the internet. To these we can add the other external factors derived from previously: the exclusiveness of the systems that serves as an incentive for parties to build up their networks, the previously existed strong two block system, and the apathy of voters.

After looking upon the external factors I shall introduce the refined internal ones. What seemed extremely important is the (3) ownership of an issue. An issue that is best advocated for by one party and they are able to preserve this exclusiveness. It seems that it is also important for these parties to have a (4) movement history, because we can see that it helped them to lay down their (4a) grassroots organizations, and made it more feasible for them to get in touch with the electorate thanks to their already existing (4b) social networks. We saw how important is in the initial phase to have a good single-issue, however it is also vital on the later stages to be able to (5a) generalize the party's politics, meaning to have a view on more general matters, and just topics closest to the original single issue; it also seems to be relevant to (5b) position the party along the left-right scale. And even though, both LMP and Jobbik are in denial with the existing system and generally advocate that conducting politics along the left-right scale is an old vision, they still have a clear position in this scale which could help voters to decide when casting their votes. It is also a key factor to analyze a party's (6) organizational strength. This incorporates how high is the (6a) centralization of the party, the composition of the (6b) leadership – or even the figure of the leader itself –, (6c) degree of professionalization and to see how extent is its (6d) local organization. As we saw it from our cases, what seemed to be important is to have a highly professional staff, but when it comes to the centralization/decentralization of the party, we have contrary evidences in our two historical cases. However, looking at the electoral outcomes we could deduct that a more hierarchical and centralized structure leaves better chances for winning. As for the local organizations, after accessing the numbers of LMP and Jobbik we can say that it is vital for a party to have an extensive network of organizations throughout the country in order to reach their electorate.

## 5 Will it gain Momentum?

In this chapter I will see how Momentum performs on the previously listed factors and I will compare the findings with those of LMP and Jobbik. The external factors (like the party system type and the party type) can be considered constant, because even though the balance of the two block system changed over time, and Momentum is a younger party compared to the two historical cases; the general apathy and the anti-establishment aspect remained (just like at LMP and Jobbik). However the media aspect obviously is different compared to the other two parties, so I will analyze that also.

In this chapter the basis of information will be two interviews. The first was conducted with János Mécs (one of the founding members of Momentum, belonged to the leadership until the end of NOlimpia Campaign in 2017, since then he still contributes to ad hoc policy making tasks related to the party, also leader of the law workgroup of the party; later on referred as Momentum interview correspondent No.1.). The second interviewee was Tamás Soproni (in March 2016 Momentum Movement was formed in which he became one of the five-membered leadership and in March 2017 the party was formed where he also become member of that five-membered leadership until the end of the general Hungarian elections of April 2018; later on referred as Momentum interview correspondent No.2).

### 5.1 External first

As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, I will evaluate the external factors that varied in respect of the two historical cases: namely (2) media and (2a) internet.

Mécs argued that in villages especially, the only option to reach people is the TV and the printed media, were they cannot stand their ground. There are fantasies about producing printed media, but these are not feasible option in the upcoming next two years. The representation of the party is quite hectic on the internet also- he continues: for example there is a journalist (Szabolcs Dull) on the Index (one of the most popular news website, mainly visited by the left-libertarian and centrist public) that did not like Momentum from the very start. But other pages like 24.hu and HVG are all favorable towards Momentum. And the clearly leftist website and people (Mérce, élet és Irodalom, Tamàs Gàspàr Miklòs) could not put the Momentum in context and because of this, their judgment towards the party is also mixed. There is however, a Momentum vlog which gets to people, but these people are still mostly intellectuals/big city citizens, so only a small constituency of voters.<sup>158</sup> I think from this we can understand that, both the online and especially the printed media presence are quite weak for Momentum. This is another flaw for the new party. A flaw, that to a certain degree they share with the two historical cases (Jobbik and LMP). The printed media (especially in the countryside is owned by people who are close to Fidesz. And even though Momentum is gaining spirit on the online platform, still only a restricted circle is interested in those messages. The general apathy of the youth and the politically active no-internet generation makes Momentum's initiative in targeting the voting constituency blurry.

Soproni mentioned another interesting theme: the question of the youth. This party being a new-generation party, aims to speak to the youth itself: but it turned out that it is extremely difficult to penetrate the interest of the youth. It does not matter that Momentum is in general a youth oriented party; still, those in their early twenties are hardly interested in political content. However my correspondent argues that one of the best ways is to get out and reach people

---

<sup>158</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

personally, and here they mean, by collective signatures for a cause (NOlimpia for example). However, also this has a limited potential (it was visible that the next collection of signatures (against the Civic law) did not go as well as the NOlimpia. But still the main idea is to speak and discuss with people, however this is a slow and money consuming project.<sup>159</sup>

## **5.2 Anything new on the inside?**

### **The NOlimpia campaign**

One of the first problems to solve was to get known by the people, to draw media attention. This is this self-indulgent process, that the moment they take you seriously, you actually become serious. The NOlimpia campaign helped to solve all this.<sup>160</sup> We can already see here to factors from my previous analysis. First, media attention was needed in order to make the party salient, this was made plausible with a strong (3) single-issue ownership via the NOlimpia campaign. The reason why this functioned perfectly as a (temporary) single-issue was that many people (opposing Fidesz) found outrageous the irresponsible spending of the government (among many other spending, it was always a great deal of money that was spent on stadium building and other sport founding). During this – Budapest based – NOlimpia Campaign many people felt that another irresponsible spending – this time aiming to host the 2024 Olympics in Budapest – would be unjust, taking the fact that the same amount of money could go to raise the level of healthcare and education. So Momentum, with this campaign, helped to amplify the voice of the dissatisfied. And they actually managed to collect more than 266,000 signatures. These signatures would have served to put the question of the Olympia to a referendum. But eventually

---

<sup>159</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.2.

<sup>160</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

the government backed down from the candidacy after seeing the overwhelming will of the Budapest people not to host the Olympics.

### **What social movement past?**

János Mécs, along with Dániel Csala and András Fekete-Győr (President of Momentum) had the idea to form a party: they immediately had in mind a proper party from day zero. Even though they also knew that they will do it in a movement style: organized from below. There were initial conflicts (with those groups for example who organized the demonstration against the Internet tax), because that fraction wanted to change society and get into representative politics only after, meanwhile my correspondent and co wanted a party from the begging.<sup>161</sup> And here we have a conflict that could immediately define one of my factors: (4) movement history. Without a longer history of social activism, it could be hard to lay down country-wide organizations and get in touch with locals. This means that neither (4a) grassroots organizations nor (4b) social network were available to Momentum from a movement history, because there was no such thing.

### **The good old left-right scale**

The initial problems were the so-called pre-party problems: there was no financing (the members co-founded the programs in the beginning, and this was visible during the first programs). Another problem was: what is the Momentum? They thought that is neither a social-democrat, nor a right-catholic party. Everyone was just fed up with the actual political climate. The

---

<sup>161</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.



problem was how do define Momentum. In the beginning they had an online platform called Lumio on which they posted weekly questions like what do you think about death-sentence, abortion etc. and they discussed these in order to see the polarization of the party. The (5b) left-right scale works for the voters: and the voters might put Momentum on the left, because they measure its distance from the Fidesz, which makes it immediately a leftist party for them.<sup>162</sup>

However, if we look purely ideologically on the left-right scale the Momentum is in the center (“Nation, Solidarity, Performance”). There are conservative narratives (like more accentual voting rights to those living abroad), there are solidarity elements from the left, and there are also market centric initiatives. It was never a goal to put Momentum in an exact position on this traditional scale, because the problem with Fidesz was never ideological. It is not like they are too conservative, but the problem is that, what the Fidesz does is antidemocratic. Momentum has both rightist-religious and left-libertarian members, and the bridge between these members was the fact that all of them condemned the politics of Fidesz. It was important not to slice up the Momentum. There was and still is some argument: some claim that they should say out loud that Momentum is a social-democrat party, but in that case they would have lost immediately the rightist members of the new party, and nobody wanted that. The situation in Hungary requires that these distinctions should not be made. (Ex: if a house is burning you shouldn’t argue what color the baby room will be after, but you concentrate on putting out the fire, and after that you can discuss about the rest). To overcome this problem Momentum used a dichotomy: those who are trying to put out the fire and those who are not. And it does not matter who you are, just come and help to put out the fire.<sup>163</sup>

---

<sup>162</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>163</sup> Idem

With the NOLimpia success the polls showed them at 5%, whit a possibility of 10% until the elections. This led to a catch-all party communication trying to aim at the average voter, with this, they lost some of their leftist intellectual constituency. In order to attract voters you have to define “us” and “them”, but without experience and political talent, this did not happened in the beginning. And also the NOLimpia was the main issue along they could mobilize people. However it was a temporary issue, during that campaign Momentum was every day in the news, they managed to attract lots of new members. But eventually after that, the media and the people also started to give attention just like to any other party. And slowly this initial force was lost a bit.<sup>164</sup>

Soproni said that in November 2016 there were two strategies: stick to the wannabe centrist ideology, or say out loud (or at least between the members say out) that this is effectively a left-libertarian party with some conviction from the conservative side. In the end none of these initiatives went through. In March 2017 finally the centrist initiative was the main guideline. My correspondent believes that if they would have pressed and undertake this true, left-libertarian identity in front of the public, the Momentum would have gained access to the Parliament at the elections of April 2018. After they changed the constituency of the leadership (hence my correspondent was not part of it anymore), he wished for the community that in the future they would bravely and openly stand for what they are. He argued that it would have been vital already in the beginning to carve out the position. Even if that would have been for example a right-conservative guideline, he would have said goodbye to the Momentum but at least there would have been a clearly defined ideology that could have brought the party the success they needed. He also said that in January 2017 they set down and wanted to figure out the values of

---

<sup>164</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

the party: finally solidarity, positive nation image and good performance principle were the most important. Even the different policy groups (social working, economic etc. groups) were divided organically along left-right ideology. This was visible in their program, because every writing member underlined those values that were dearest to them.<sup>165</sup>

We can see that a problem quickly arose. Where is the Momentum (5b) on the left-right scale? How can an average voter decide the clear positioning, based on which he or she intends to vote. Momentum (even if it is pseudo-clear that it is a libertarian party) tries to catch voters from every corner. This is a trade-off: because by positioning clearly yourself, you might end up losing some of your constituency that does not agree with your position. However on the other hand, you can reach new – previously indecisive voters. This could sound gambling, until we take in account the two –previously analyzed – historical cases: Jobbik and LMP From these evidences we can deduct that in Hungary, a new party needs a clear positioning on the left-right scale in order to attract voters. Meaning that one of Momentum's weaknesses is the missing positioning on the traditional left-right scale.

### **Organizational strength**

There is the delegated congress, which is the main power body, which gets together every few month and it has the power to also change the leadership of the party (which nearly happened: two members form the leadership resigned, but there was already a censure motion form the congress). It is mostly consisted from old Momentum members who make politics along principles, and it is basically a watchdog. The leadership leads politically the party (strategic

---

<sup>165</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.2.

decision). And there is the operative leadership: a multilevel organization, and the local organizations connected to all these (with not much success). In the beginning it was only the leadership and the mass below and now it is more hierarchical structure with different task forces. Still my correspondent argues that despite the hierarchical structure intraparty democracy remained in the sense that people from completely different levels can reach and discuss among each other.<sup>166</sup> So we can see a structural change, a kind of (6a) centralization and mostly hierarchicalization, meaning that Momentum followed the trend of the historical cases: going towards a more centralized structure. The only question that remained was whether the level of centralization was sufficient to run the party properly.

The leadership<sup>167</sup> made decisions (before the decisions there were obviously conflicts, but after the decision every member of the leadership stood up for the outcome): and the congress was the organ that debated and accounted the leadership. And also the president was a regular member of the leadership, not with outstanding powers. After mid 2015 the relationship in the leadership got worse and by the beginning of 2017 the tension was extremely high. By that, the decision-making process was in chaos. The leadership consists of 5 members, so decisions were made by simple majority. And often 4 members were against the leader. The fact that the congress could hold accountable the leadership was a democratic trait; however politics were made effectively by the leadership, which had always a weekly meeting, and when this weekly decision-making was not working anymore because of the inside conflicts, the party remained without a “head”. There was a problem: when part of the leadership campaigned at the congress against the other members of the leadership. The moment there is no unified leadership against the congress, they just ruin each other without a proper way of communication, and this makes also impossible for

---

<sup>166</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>167</sup> My No. 1. correspondent belonged to the leadership until March 2015

the two bodies to do their jobs. So is vital for the leadership to cooperate and not to have a leader who wants to solve everything single handed.<sup>168</sup> From this we can clearly see that Momentum has a low performance on the (6) organizational strength factor. Especially on the (6b) leadership and (6a) the centralization of the party factor. Without a unified leadership, or a single leader figure, decision-making seems to be more than problematic. Conflicts within the leadership and the possibility to hold accountable other leadership members in front of the congress slowed down the bureaucracy in the party.

My other correspondent said that the leader did not have any special and extra power. And even though this could sometimes slow down the decision-making process it was important to them to keep a democratically functioning leadership. And even though they wanted to keep the balance, the media during the NOlimpia campaign picked up the leader (András Fekete-Győr) as the main exponent of the movement. This slowly backfired inside the party also, and the leader felt that he has more informal power compared to the rest of the leadership, this overthrow the balance in the leadership. However my correspondent agreed that in a completely democratic way is impossible to run a party because decision-making would take too long. He thinks that certain tasks should be outsourced to a member of the leadership who gets full power in that matter and has to refer from time to time to the leadership.<sup>169</sup> Once again, we can see that (6) organizational strength, especially the (6b) leadership does not function effectively. So as we saw - from previous theory and the two historical cases also – the fact that there is an aspiration to guide a party following democratic principles in leadership, is going to be one of the reasons for the ineffective and slow conduct of the party. The leadership encountered many problems not just facing other bodies of the party, but especially on its inside. When holding so dear the democratic traits, they sacrificed

---

<sup>168</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>169</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.2.

efficiency, and even worse after that there was an informal out powering by the leader. So the question arose: would it not be better to have a strong, legitimate leader figure (combine which brings forward the party, and also a better run platform to solve inner problems?

When evaluating the (6c) degree of professionalization of the party, my correspondent said the followings: the original constituency of the Momentum was formed by mostly law and economic students. Later on, organically, people with other backgrounds joined the association. And these people were also able to obtain leading position. For example the committee of health was led by a doctor. And after the NOlimpia campaign even more diverse people (not necessarily with university background) also joined the movement. And now in the leadership there is a mathematics and history professor also. And the IT section for example was completely managed by IT background people. Everybody added his or her own value and knowledge.<sup>170</sup> However, despite having people from various backgrounds another face of professionalism was lacking: most of the members lacked any leading skills, so mid-high level leaders were not able to manage their section.<sup>171</sup> We can see here that even if the (6c) professionalization - in the sense of having people in the party with various backgrounds - of the party was relatively high; in general leading skills were not so common. So rather than lacking professional skills, the main problem was not having enough prepared man or woman who could lead the different committees, outsource tasks and more in general, make people work together.

In the congress, many times the conflicts and debates unfolded in Facebook. And there was no such problem like in the leadership, that a personal conflict could stop the motion of the entire entity. For the leadership, until March 2017 there were teambuilding events which helped a lot to

---

<sup>170</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>171</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.2.

solve inner conflicts. When these teambuilding events ceased to exist, the leadership tried to solve everything during the regular meetings. This was nearly impossible, because you have to decide – in a short time – about various issues, and next to that it is hard to find time for general and personal issue-solving. So when there was no platform to solve issues, these began to flow on informal channels and sometimes even behind backs, which created even more tension.<sup>172</sup> Also my other correspondent claimed that it was a problem that this young generation easily argued on internet (Facebook) that led to uncontrolled, non-personnel arguing that was hard to channel and discuss properly. The main problem was that the very same people, who were in leader status in some sections, were also part of the general assembly. Recently they changed this and now it is not possible for these leaders to be also member of the general assembly: the biggest problem was that employees could too easily criticize the work of their leaders, this way removing them from their position, and this was dangerous because it could make inefficient and work progress. This, eventually also led to enormous conflicts.<sup>173</sup> Here we can see another factor that could determine the (6) organizational strength of a party: how they manage inner conflicts. It is clear that, especially in the leadership but also in other bodies conflicts were not easily resolved: this once again resulted in slower processes inside a party, which had a negative impact in the party in its whole.

### **Local organizations**

It is impossible to build local organization without being known nationally, so they were able to start building these organizations after the NOLimpia campaign. The original idea was to have the

---

<sup>172</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>173</sup> Idem

so-called *cselekves korei*, as local organizations: these would help the local community to solve everyday minor problems.<sup>174</sup> Actually these initiatives resembled a lot to those local circles that originally Fidesz and after that Jobbik started to build up nationwide.

Momentum's organizations had autonomy in these decisions. The problem arose for example with the local candidates during elections. When there were big discussions on the opposition in general about withdrawing one-another candidate, in order to help other opposition candidates. This is where the clash happened: because meanwhile they enjoyed autonomy in solving local problems, during elections decision came from the central organization. There is not enough local organization to reach everyone in the country; it is still in the developing phase. Not even the smaller cities have a good local organization. One of the differences between the beginning and the present is the territorial distribution. In the beginning there were more members in foreign countries than in the countryside (basically it was a Budapest based organization). Now they have local organizations around the country (still not at the desired level, but better than in the beginning).<sup>175</sup> Outside Budapest the biggest local organizations had a maximum of 15-20 members. There are around 100 local organizations out of which half of them are operating effectively. But in many places there are not enough people to run the local organizations. The lack of clear communication – from the headquarter towards the local organizations – made the work difficult for these bodies. The only local organization before turning into a party was at Szeged. Actually there was a debate in 2016 whether they should run already in 2018 on the national elections, or a year later at the European elections. Finally they decided to already run on the national elections: they set guidelines and what should be accomplished by then. Looking

---

<sup>174</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.1.

<sup>175</sup> Idem



back, without the NOlimpia campaign, this would have been impossible.<sup>176</sup> Once again we can witness a classic flaw of a new party: a network of local organization not extent enough. The party development phase happened so fast that there was not enough time to build up a country-wide local organization system. And it is clear that a strong presence in Budapest is not enough, without a proper, nationwide local organization you cannot get in touch with the voting constituency, so you fail to connect with the possible future voters.

### **5.3 What is there and what is missing?**

I can say that the different factors evaluated had different scores compared to the two other parties I look upon. The (3) ownership of an issue was strong in the beginning thanks to the NOlimpia campaign, but this gradually lost its relevance as the campaign ceased to exist. The (4) movement history was practically unnoticeable of the party: it was so short that there was no time to build up local organizations and prepare for a party building, even so that was never the aim of Momentum. They were able to (5a) generalize easily the politics of the party: once again the basic idea to form a party went along with the installation of different policy groups who worked on different policy matters. Now, one of the biggest flaws of the party was that they could not and did not want to (5b) position the party on the left-right scale. More precisely the idea was to picture Momentum as a centrist party, which many argued that is not. This reluctance towards both the members and voters to define the party led to the uncomfortable position of not knowing what exactly Momentum is.

---

<sup>176</sup> Momentum interview correspondent No.2.

When looking at the (6) organizational strength we can see other flaws: the (6c) degree of professionalization – even though there are members with various background – is debatable for the soil fact that there is a lack of leadership skills already on the mid-levels; the (6b) the leadership – wanting to function democratically – experiences difficulties in carrying out their task, and by informal force taking they experienced inner conflicts also. The (6a) party went through a certain hierarchicalization rather centralization and still lot of work needs to be done in order to enlarge the (6d) local organization networks. The (1) anti-establishment trait is also visible by condemning the previous generation way of doing politics. And finally the (2) media and (2a) internet presence could be labeled as weak even though there was a peak in the mainstream media during the NOlimpia campaign and what is interesting that even though Momentum should be the most appealing towards the youth there is not an extreme visibility in this area.

## 6 Conclusion

In my thesis I tried to understand how new parties can come along and gain access to the Parliament. I found that the best way to do so is to examine external and internal factors that can be beneficial for new parties. In the first section I looked at the existing literature to see what was done before and how people tried to understand parties. After examining the literature I found that the context (external factor) plays an important role. The political culture, civil society and history shape the system in which a party can be found, and also the reaction that the party emits in response to these factors is important (like how can it seize the opportunity that the system gives and what is its relation with the media). Apart the external factors I found in the literature, the internal factors like ability to mobilize resources, how well structured the entity is, how vast its network organization is and what is the leadership like, also matter.

In the next section I wanted to evaluate the Hungarian context so I tested my theory and refined it. After evaluating the Hungarian system and my two historical cases (Jobbik and LMP) I found that as external factor it is vital that in Hungary we had for over 20 years a strong two block system, which tried to keep out new contesters (that ironically served as a strong incentive to break in), the general disinterest of the people towards politics, and to this we have to add that many rules have changed after 2010: the electoral change has upset the balance of the two block, the right gained more weight, while the left was sliced up.

Further external factors were important, like the cartel party type of system, which generated its own enemies in the outlook of anti-establishment parties. Still the relation of the party with the mainstream media and the internet were important. As for internal factors what was still important in the Hungarian context is the ownership of an issue and to have a movement history

where it can lay down the basis of a party (like grassroots organizations and social networks). It is vital for a party to have a general saying on political matters and not just stick the original single issue. After that the organization strength of the party plays also a big role in its fate: the degree of professionalization, the composition of the leadership, the centralization of the party and the extent of its local organizations.

After having this refined theory, in the last section I wanted to see how Momentum would perform along these factors. For Jobbik and LMP I had – apart from the interview data – secondary data also, but in the case of Momentum I was relying exclusively on my correspondents (taking the fact that it is still a relatively new party). The external factors remained mostly constant, because even though the balance of the two block system got upset, the general apathy and the anti-establishment aspect remained (just like at LMP and Jobbik). But when I looked at the internal factors I found that the issue ownership although it was strong it was different compared to the case of Jobbik, because it gradually lost from its importance. Also the movement history was basically null, which made it impossible to lay down its grassroots organizations and networks.

They were however able to generalize the party politics easily thanks to the different policy groups. One of the main flaws was, on the other hand that they were not able to position the party along the left-right scale. This made it hard for voters to put Momentum in context and it made hard for the members to give a strong identity to the party, a cohesion force that would stick them together. And when it came to the organization strength I found other problems: even though there were people from various backgrounds, there was still a general lack of leading skills, the leadership did not have a clear and official leader figure, which resulted sometimes in slow decision-making process and unofficial directives. And even though the party structure

evolved into a more hierarchical entity, the centralization of the party was not so strong. And finally, despite being a party aiming at the young generation they could grasp so much through the internet and also the initial peak appearance in the mainstream media (thanks to the NOlimpia campaign) gradually sank to the average (or even below level) of an opposition party.

Finally, after evaluating and reevaluating my theory I can say that what really matters for a new party who wants to gain attention and access to the parliament is permanent and conscious building; the construction of a structure and of an identity. Because a strong ownership is not enough if you cannot keep the topic salient and you also have to generalize later own your sayings, and not just stick to that one issue. You need time and construction from below (preferably in a movement phase) in order to build up your local organizations and reach most of the population in every corner of your country; get your message to the everyday people. When it comes to the degree of professionalization, what matters the most is to have a centralized, hierarchical party, with strong leader, that is backed by a well-designed leadership. And not just have people with various background, but to have people with leading skills, how can give and obey orders, but maybe what matters the most –just as I mentioned before – to have a local organization network built up country-wide. When connecting with people – apart from the local organizations – the media and the internet also play a crucial place. For a new party is hard to gain access to the mainstream media, especially in a cartel party system. In order to do so you have to have a salient topic that keeps resonating to people, and for the internet – taking the fact that there are no restrictions – you have to have a population that is engaged with the 21th century technology and is also interested in politics.

## 7 Bibliography

- Ágh Attila: „The End of The Beginning: The Partial Consolidation of East Central European Parties and Party Systems” in Paul Pennings – Jan-Erik Lane (eds.): Comparing Party System Change (London: Routledge 1998) 206
- Aldrich, John, Why Parties? Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995
- Bardi, Luciano; Mair, Peter; The Parameters of Party Systems, Party Politics 2008; 14, 2, 147-166
- Barker, Colin; Robert Michels and “The Cruel Game.” In Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette (eds.), Leadership in Social Movements. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, 24–43.
- Batory Agnes, Election Briefing No.51 Europe and the Hungarian Parliamentary elections of April 2010, EPERN <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-election-briefing-no-51.pdf&site=266>, [accessed on 01/12/2018]
- Bíró-Nagy András – Róna Dániel: „Tudatos radikalizmus. A Jobbik útja a parlamentbe, 2003–2010” in Láncki András (szerk.): Nemzet és radikalizmus. Egy új pártcsalád felemelkedése (Budapest: Századvég Kiadó 2011)
- Bolleyer N. - E. Bytcek; Origins of party formation and new party success in advanced democracies. European Journal of Political Research 52: 2013, 773–796
- Brug, Wouter van der; Berkhout, Joost (2015) The Effect of Associative Issue Ownership on Parties’ Presence in the News Media, West European Politics, 38:4, 869-887
- Cotter CP, Gibson JL, Bibby JF, et al.; Party Organizations in American Politics, New York: Praeger. 1984
- Decker, Frank: Der neue Rechtspopulismus. Leske + Budrich, Opladen. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-663-09621-4, 2004
- Downs, Anthony, Theory of Democracy, 1957, New York, pp. 28, 30
- Duverger, Maurice, 1964. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen & Co.
- Enyedi, Zsolt, Pártok és pártrendszerek, in A politikatudomány arcai: tanulmányok, Akadémiai Kiadó Budapest, 1999 p.181 – 223
- Enyedi Zsolt – Kenneth Benoit: „Kritikus választás 2010. A magyar pártrendszer átrendeződése a bal-jobb dimenzióban, 2011

- Evans, Geoffrey – Norris, Pippa (eds.): *Critical Elections. British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective*. London: SAGE, 1999.
- Freeman, Jo; *The Politics of Women's Liberation*. New York: David McKay, 1975
- Fricz Tamás. 2010-től predomináns pártrendszer Magyarországon? In Sándor Péter – Vass László (szerk.): *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2010-ről*. Kormányzat, közpolitika, közélet. Budapest: DKMKA (elektronikus kiadvány) 2011
- Ganz, Marshall; *Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture: 1959–1966*. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (4), 2000, 1003–62.
- Goldstone JA.; *The weakness of organization: a new look at Gamson's The Strategy of Social Protest*. *American Journal of Sociology*. 85: 1017-42, 1980, 1426-32
- Greskovits, B.; *The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe*, *Global Policy* 6, 2015
- Greskovits, B. and Wittenberg, J.; *Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Hungary in the 1990s and 2000s*. 2016, 3-7
- Gusfield, Joseph R; *Functional Areas of Leadership in Social Movements*. *Sociological Quarterly*, 7 (2), 1966, 137–56.
- Hajnal György 2006. *Bureaucratic Incapacity in Transition Democracies: A Case Study of Decision Behaviour in Hungarian Central Government Organisations*. In Rosenbaum, A. – Juraj, N. (eds.): *Democratic Governance in the Central and Eastern European Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century*. Bratislava: NISPAcee. 151–172
- Halperin, Sandra; Heath, Oliver; *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills*; OUP Oxford, January 2012
- Jenkins JC. 1983. *Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements*. *Annual Review of Sociology*. 9: 527-553
- Katz, Richard S. Mair, Peter; *Changing Models Of Party Organization And Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party, Party Politics*; Vol. 1 Issue 1, p5-28, 1995
- Katz, Richard S. Mair, Peter: „Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? A Rejoinder” *Party Politics* 1996/4.
- Katz, Richard S. – Mair, Peter: „The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement” *Perspectives on Politics* 2009/4
- Key, V. O., Jr.; *A Theory of Critical Elections*. In *The Journal of Politics* 17, no. 1: 3-18, 1955

- Kirchheimer, Otto: "The Transformation of the Western European Party System" In: LaPalombara, J. - Weiner M., eds. *Political Parties and Political Development*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1966
- Kitschelt, Herbert, *Movement Parties* in Richard S Katz, William, *Handbook of Party Politics* J Crotty, SAGE, 2006
- Körösényi András: „Parlamentáris vagy »elnöki« kormányzás? Az Orbán-kormány összehasonlító perspektívából” *Századvég* 2001/20
- Körösényi András, *A magyar politikai rendszer – negyedszázad után*, Osiris Kiadó – MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Politikatudományi Intézet, 2015 249-278
- Kriesi, H. “Movements of the Left, Movements of the Right: Putting the Mobilization of Two New Types of Social Movements into Political Context.” 1997
- Lakner Dávid, *Nem kér a szekértábor-logikából az LMP-közeli portál*, *Magyar Nemzet*, 2016 <https://mno.hu/belfold/nem-ker-a-szekertabor-logikabol-az-lmp-kozeli-portal-1331410>, [accessed on 01/12/2018]
- Lewis, Tomás Kostelecký; *Political Parties after Communism: Developments in East-Central Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2002) 152–154.;
- Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan; "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Introduction." In: *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. by Seymour M. Lipset, and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1967, 1-64.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin; „The Indispensability of Political Parties” *Journal of Democracy* 2000/1. 48–55.
- LMP – Organizational Structure, <http://lehetmas.hu/rolunk/szervezet/> [accessed on 01/12/2018]
- Mair, Peter; *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*, Clarendon Press, 1997
- Mair, Peter – Ingrid van Biezen: *Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies 1980–2000*, *Party Politics* 2001/1.; Ingrid van Biezen – Peter Mair – Thomas Poguntke: „Going, going, ... gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe” *European Journal of Political Research* 2012/1.
- Melucci, Alberto; *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996
- Mikecz Dániel: Új pártok, változó mozgalmak 65-82 in Boda Zsolt, Körösényi András, Van irány? *Trendek a magyar politikában*, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, Politikatudományi Intézet, 2012



- Morris, Aldon, and Suzanne Staggenborg; Leadership in social movements, The Blackwell companion to social movements (2004): 171-196. APA.
- Mudde, C.; The Far Right and the European Elections, Current History (March), 2014, pp. 98-103.
- Nagy Attila Tibor, Hungarian electoral system and procedure, Centre for Fair Political Analysis <http://www.meltanyossag.hu/content/files/Hungarian%20electoral%20system%20and%20procedure.pdf>, [accessed on 01/12/2018]
- Pedahzur, Ami – Brichta, Avraham; The institutionalization of extreme rightwing charismatic parties: a paradox? Party Politics 8 (1), 2002 31-49. DOI: 10.1177/1354068802008001002
- Petrocik, J. R.; Issue-Ownership in Presidential Elections with a 1980 Case Study. American Journal of Political Science, 40, 1996, 825-850.
- Pierce, R.; Research Methods in Politics: A Practical Guide, London: Sage Publications, 2008
- Rebecca S. Hatch; Party organizational strength and technological capacity The adaptation of the state-level party organizations in the United States to voter outreach and data analytics in the Internet age. Party Politics, Vol 22, Issue 2. 2015
- Róbert Péter - Papp Zsófia: Kritikus választás? Pártos elkötelezettség és szavazói viselkedés a 2010-es országgyűlési választáson In Boda Zsolt - Körösi András (ed.): Van-e irány? Trendek a magyar politikában. MTA TK PTI - Új Mandátum, 2012, 41-64.
- Róna Dániel, Jobbik-jelenség, Corvinus University, PhD dissertation, 2014
- Rose, Richard; Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis, Political Studies, Volume 39, Issue 3 September 1991 Pages 446–462
- Sartori, Giovanni, Parties And Party Systems: A Framework For Analysis, n.p.: Colchester : ECPR Press, 2005
- Schmitter, Philippe C; „Parties are not what they once were” in Larry Diamond – Richard Gunther (eds.): Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore–London 2001) 67–89
- Sikk, Allan: How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe, European Journal of Political Research 44: 391–412, 2005
- Soós Gábor; Kétflokkrendszer Magyarországon in Boda Zsolt, Körösi András, Van irány? Trendek a magyar politikában, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, Politikatudományi Intézet, 2012

- Tarrow, S. (2011) *Power In Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Tavits, Margit; *Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013) 67., 196.
- Toka, Gabor: *Hungary in the Handbook of Political Change in eastern europe*, ed. by Sten Berglund, Tomas Hellén and Frank Aarebrot. Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 1998, pp. 231-74
- van Biezen, Ingrid: *Political Parties in New Democracies Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2003)
- Van der Brug, Wouter, Fennema, Meindert and Tillie, Jean (2000) 'Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?' *European Journal of Political Research*, 37:77-102
- Walgrave, Stefaan, Jonas Lefevere, Michiel Nuytemans; *Issue Ownership Stability and Change: How Political Parties Claim and Maintain Issues Through Media Appearances*, *Political Communication*, 2009, 26:2, 153-172
- Weber, Max; *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1968
- Whiteley, Paul F; *Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world* *Party Politics* 2011/1.
- Wolinetz, Steven B.; *Party Systems and Party System Types* In: *Handbook of Party Politics* Edited by: Richard S. Katz & William Crotty, SAGE, 2006

## **List of interviews**

### **Jobbik**

Dr. László György Lukács - Member of Parliament, Vice-President of the Welfare Committee, Vice-Chairman of Jobbik group in Parliament. Interviewed on 23/05/2018, Budapest, Hungary.

Tibor Bana - Vice-President of Jobbik, Member of Parliament, Vice-President of the European Affairs Committee. Interviewed on 15/05/2018, Budapest, Hungary.

### **LMP**

Péter Ungár - member of the party since 2013, member of leadership from 2015 until 2018, in 2018 youngest member of Parliament. Interviewed on 07/05/2018, Budapest, Hungary.

### **Momentum**

János Mécs - one of the founding members of Momentum, belonged to the leadership until the end of NOlimpia Campaign in 2017, since then he still contributes to ad hoc policy making tasks related to the party, also leader of the law workgroup of the party. Interviewed on 06/06/2018, Budapest, Hungary.

Tamás Soproni - in March 2016 Momentum Movement was formed in which he became one of the five-membered leadership and in March 2017 the party was formed where he also became member of that five-membered leadership until the end of the general Hungarian elections of April 2018. Interviewed on 11/05/2018, Budapest, Hungary.