Speechwriting *als Beruf*: The Transformation of Practices of Soviet Speechwriters from the Brezhnev Era to the Early Perestroika Period

By

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to offer a new perspective within the field of Soviet Subjectivity through the concept of the *kollektiv* proposed by Oleg Kharkhordin and applied to the case study of Soviet Secretary General's speechwriters from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. Namely, I examine the transformations in speechwriting practices of the *kollektiv* in the 1970s and 1980s. The *kollektiv* underwent a process of routinization in the early Brezhnev era, establishing a system of collective writing intended merely to transmit Party directives. This routine, which the contemporaries had described as numbing and uninspiring, had completely changed under Gorbachev. Practically, the routine of the speechwriting had become the continuous process of the creation of new ideas under the supervision of the Secretary General in the mid-1980s. Retrospectively identifying with the "sixties generation," the speechwriters felt that they were finally allowed to fully express their creative potentials and reform the system from within. Having resulted in the creation of the "New Political Thinking," this case study does not only show us how these two different approaches to speechwriting reflect the totalitarian and the revisionist perceptions of Soviet Subjectivity; it also shows how the changing self-image of the Soviet state had developed and was transmitted into the international arena.

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I am immensely grateful to my peers at the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Research Group for making me think more broadly about the area of Soviet studies, and for always having the time and interest to hear about my progress. My friends and colleagues from the Higher School of Economics, Masha Zimina, Rita Pavlova, and Sasha Korobeinikov, have been with me through both my BA and MA programs, shaping me as a researcher and as a human being. I am grateful to them for sharing the hard-working and lazy moments of the past six years with me. I can only hope that I have been as helpful to them as they have been to me.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for being there for me. My grandma, for never doubting me and encouraging me to open myself to new experiences. My mom, for supporting my move to a foreign country and teaching me how to face and overcome problems. And my husband, for being there from the inception of my thesis until its completion, and performing all of the reproductive labor so that I could focus on my career.

List of Abbreviations

CEH – Common European Home

Comecon – Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CWPSC Department – The Department of the CPSU Central Committee for Relations with the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries

EEC – European Economic Community

Gruzinform – Georgian Information Agency

ID – International Department

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MGIMO – Moscow State Institute of International Relations

TASS – Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union

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Introduction

On the 17th of September 1987, the agreement between the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, and the US Secretary of State, George Shultz, on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was reached. The night before the official announcement of the upcoming treaty, an American soldier from a communications group was wounded in the arm in Berlin.[1] Fearing failure of negotiations and a possible diplomatic scandal, the Minister and his speechwriters urgently prepared the apologies, which were read next morning, on the 18th of September, during Shevardnadze's extraordinary press conference in the "golden room" of the Soviet embassy in Washington D.C.[2] Later that day, the speechwriter of the Soviet Minister would write in his diary that "this shot could kill the "double zero" agreement," but concluding the thought with the following passage: "E.A.[3] did what Gromyko could never do. Any obstacles from the Americans would make him [Gromyko] stop negotiations: "If so, then we leave." E.A. avoided all obstacles and achieved agreement."[4] That was the main difference between the operating method of Gromyko and Shevardnadze "teams," signifying the "New Political Thinking" in international relations of Mikhail Gorbachev. This example not just indicates the differences coming into being with the new Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also the transformation in the speechwriting practices as such, broadly showing its relevance to the field of the Soviet Subjectivity approaches.

[1] HIA, 2000C91-5-4, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 17th of September 1987.
[2] HIA, 2000C91-5-4, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 18th of September 1987.
[3] E. A. stands for Eduard Ambrosiyevich (Shevardnadze) in Stepanov-Mamaladze diaries.
[4] HIA, 2000C91-5-4, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 18th of September 1987.

My thesis will look at the new trends in the practices of speechwriting during the Perestroika period.[5] Based on the memoirs and diaries of Gorbachev's speechwriters and Shevardnadze's speechwriter, I will trace the institutional and practical routinization[6] of the speechwriting practices. The specificity of the sources at my disposal narrows the focus of the research to speechwriting on topics of international relations. The thesis will be devoted to the structure of the process of speechwriting: from the demand to the final delivery of the speech. The idea is to understand if the new rhetoric of the Soviet foreign policy was compatible with the old practices of speechwriting, or if it led to the creation of new practices and ways of delivering the message in the realm of foreign policy. As Soviet speechwriting was both the tool and the consequence of the evolution of the state's foreign policy rhetoric, this case study will provide a possibility for a better understanding of the Soviet diplomacy in the mid-1980s.

As a thesis statement, I claim that during the Perestroika period the practices of speechwriting for the Secretary General transformed from the collective speechwriting under Brezhnev to the very closed circle of assistants, who were serving both as advisers and speechwriters, producing texts together with Gorbachev. Moreover, those who had become the speechwriters on topics of international relations were not restrained from formulating new ideas in collaboration with the Secretary General. During the mid-1980s, Gorbachev not only narrowed down the list of speechwriters for the international relations parts of the speeches, but also was actively participating in the process of their creation. That made the speeches become less of a dictate of the authoritative word of the Party and more an authorized and personalized claims by Gorbachev.

[5] By Perestroika I mean the timeframe from 1985 until 1988. As I do not want to engage in the discussion on the revolutions of 1989, since this could have taken a separate research and is not relevant for my central thesis.

[6] I believe that Max Weber's terminology is applicable here. Over the course of time, a new bureaucratic group has been routinized in the apparatus through the transformation of the originally creative work into monotonous and tedious work by introducing strict standardization and strict fixation of functions. Max Weber, *Politics As a Vocation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965).

The rationale behind conducting a research on the Gorbachev speechwriters relies on the simple fact that the ego documents I am using illustrate the practical application of the Soviet Subjectivity methodology on the particular case of Soviet speechwriting.[7] Within the Soviet Subjectivity field, the issue of the Soviet subject is usually presented in the black and white tones, either seeing a person as a static screw inside the personality-killing machine of the Soviet system or as the synthesis between cultural, political, and economic rationales coming together in a single human. To be more specific, born in the time of the Cold War rhetoric, one view would see the Soviet project as directly and indirectly erasing the sense of "self" within the Soviet citizens, seeking the annihilation of the "personality" as such. The other would argue that the Soviet system does not exclusively suppress, but also encourages the emergence of the new identities, speaking not only of the Soviet citizens' subjugation to the system, but their practices of adaptation and constant constructing of their "self" in the dialogue with the changing politics of the state, cultural references and different pasts. These theoretical claims are seemingly opposed to one another; however, my case will present more complex relationships between the theories than just an either / or question.

The case of the transformation of the speechwriting practices bridges these two views on the Soviet Subjectivity through the concept of the *kollektiv*, proposed by Oleg Kharhordin.[8] The emphasis of Kharhordin's concept of the *kollektiv* is concentrated around its censoring and

[7] Yet another rationale is that the sources I am using, even though analyzed for different purposes, have never been looked at with such a perspective. Scholars examined these ego documents to establish Gorbachev's inner circle or to describe the process of putting to an end the arm race, however, there is no monograph interested in the practical application of speechwriting under Gorbachev. See for example: William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017); Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War: 1985-1991* (Public Affairs, 2015). There is only one non-academic book, written by journalist Andrei Kolesnikov, engaging in the topic of diversity of the speechwriting practices from Stalin to Putin. However, the book narrative is built on the authors personal experiences working as a speechwriter (without specifying for whom) and interviews. Despite the fact that the book appeared to be helpful in identifying some speechwriters (especially for Brezhnev era) I cannot consider it to be an overarching account on the topic of Gorbachev speechwriters and the alterations in the practices during the Perestroika period. See: Andrei Kolesnikov, *Spichraitery: Chronika Professii, Sochinyavshei i Izmenjavshei Mir [Speechwriters: Chronicle of the Profession, Formulating and Changing the World.]*. (Moscow: AST: HRANITEL, 2004).

[8] Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices*, Studies on the History of Society and Culture (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999).

controlling character, which, the author claims, at one point became more efficient in monitoring Soviet citizenry than the secret police. Despite the fact that Kharhordin's analysis is ending in the 1960s, the case of the speechwriters' *kollektiv* under Brezhnev showed the same tendency. The ego documents of this period show that the speechwriting duties described are concordant with the former view on the Soviet Subjectivity. The transformation which had occurred with Gorbachev in power switched the main goal of the *kollektiv* from the self-censorship to the production of ideas. The speechwriters' duties of the second part of the 1980s were depicted in the ego documents as indicators of the latter view on the Soviet Subjectivity, which argued for the existence of a constructed "self," capable of adaptation and invoking (or transforming) new identities, such as the ethos of the "sixties generation."

The approach of the Soviet Subjectivity is not narrowed with the analysis of the "self" within the Soviet context; however, it most often seeks the broader explanation of the ways the centralized state used tools of governance and representation. The specificity of the scrutinization of the speechwriting *kollektiv*'s transformation in Soviet foreign policy allowed me to tackle the broader topic of the ways how the Soviet state had broadcasted its vision of itself. The ways the practice of the speechwriting is organized, among many other things, constructed the state's self-image in the international arena. That is why, by claiming in this thesis that the speechwriting for the Secretary General altered from the collective formulation of the same ideas to the narrow circle of the advisers formulating new ideas, I illustrate the process through which the transformation of the self-perception of the state had occurred during the Perestroika period.

Thus, my thesis is an attempt to turn the study of Soviet Subjectivity on its head, by combining both of the dominant approaches and moving the focus away from the collective and structural impact on the self of particular Soviet citizens. Instead, I propose to look not

only at how these individuals changed their own self-perception, but how this process fundamentally shaped the altering self-image of the state itself. While this may not answer the question, so controversial in historiography, of whether the cause of changes in the late 1980s was structural or individual (namely, Gorbachev's appointment), it can nevertheless offer a new perspective on the period and provoke a debate on what it actually meant to be Soviet.

The focus of the research will be oriented on the actors who articulated a "New Political Thinking"[9] within the confines of socialist ideology: both the assistants and the consultants who were involved in writing the speeches for the General Secretary or the Foreign Minister during the Perestroika period. Through their ego documents (diaries and memoirs) I seek to examine the speechwriting process. I will focus on the prosopography and duties of speechwriters in the Soviet apparatus, the scope of their ideas, and possible influence on the new Soviet foreign policy trajectory. Furthermore, the thesis will elaborate the departmental affiliation of speechwriters and their respective practices before and during Perestroika. As the thesis seeks to trace the departmental alterations together with the practices of speechwriting that occurred during the second half of 1980s, it is crucial to analyze these topics in the earlier periods. That is why I will begin to describe the practices of the speechwriters and the actors' affiliation in the Soviet apparatus from Brezhnev's time, by using the memoirs of the consultants of that period. The research questions for the analysis are the following: Who was in charge of speechwriting for Gorbachev and Shevardnadze and why them? What was the prosopography of the assistants involved in writing speeches? How and why did speechwriting change with Gorbachev in power? What was the process of

[9] To avoid both the teleological interpretation of the Soviet collapse and a personality-centered narrative, the changes in Soviet foreign policy of the mid-1980s should be analyzed by applying the rationalities of the time, which were based on the concept of "New Political Thinking" that reshaped Soviet international relations policy in the Perestroika period. Even though the interpretation of the ideological and cultural roots of the "New Political Thinking" goes beyond the scope of my analysis, I think that the evaluation of changes in the speechwriting practices will shed some new light on the topic, or in the very least open new avenues for research.

writing General Secretary's or the Foreign Minister's speeches before and during the second part of the 1980s?

Historiographical Overview

Even though, in this thesis, the phenomenon of Perestroika will be used as a period from 1985 to 1991, distinguished by a fundamental change in the political, social, and cultural realities, the period is often considered to be inseparable from its "final stage" - the end of the existence of the USSR and Soviet Bloc. Some theories of why the Soviet Union "suddenly" collapsed are relevant to this research. In the third volume of "The Cambridge History of Russia,"[10] Archie Brown systematically describes the "failures" of each policy direction: political structure, economy, international relations, ideology and national struggle in the empire.[11] Each of these "failures" is also described in detail in the narrative book by David Lane.[12] He claims that Gorbachev's new policy failed to reform previous deficiencies of the Soviet regime. Partly, this book shares the ideas developed by the totalitarian school of the Soviet studies, whose scholars examined the "Soviet experiment" as a system that was doomed to collapse. Just like the previously mentioned authors, Martin Malia and Stephen Kotkin retrospectively stressed the failures of the system, which predestined its end.[13] Even though outside the totalitarian school as such, Alexey Yurchak is not an exception to this cohort of researchers.[14] By claiming that transformations of the mid-1980s in the Soviet system and ideology did not fit into the frame of the Soviet ideological authoritative paradigm, he states that it influenced the weakening of the authority of the

[10] Archie Brown, "The Gorbachev Era," in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 3, The Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 2006), 316–51.
[11] Brown, 331–32.
[12] David Lane S., *Soviet Society under Perestroika* (New York: Routledge, 1996).
[13] See for example, Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York, 1996); Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000* (Oxford University Press, 2008).
[14] Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton University Press, 2005).

Communist Party and, with the complex of other factors, led to ultimate dissolution of the USSR. In the international relations historiography, a significant book about the Soviet perspective on the end of the Cold War fits within the confines of the previously mentioned cohort. Focusing on the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union from the Stalin period to the early 1990s, Vladislav Zubok[15] claims that it was doomed to immediate adjustment due to increasingly cooling relations between the USA and the USSR, the continuation of the arms race, and the fall of international authority caused by the war in Afghanistan.[16] He perceives the Soviet state as a "failed Empire", because even though it had imperial ambitions, the long-term shortage of the political and economic resources had predisposed its changes and end.[17]

Although these researches' descriptive overviews of the Perestroika transformations are used to introduce the context, this thesis does not intend to share the teleological view on the Soviet collapse and will not make any attempts to read the "collapse" in Perestroika. Quite the opposite, I agree with views that Ronald Suny expresses in his works.[18] He claims that the entire Soviet system was not static, that it had changed throughout its history and most importantly, it did not present a project that was opposed to modernity and thus doomed to decay. Instead of being an imperfect system that existed only in the struggle with capitalism as an economic system and "democratic/liberal" nation-state as a state system of the

[15] Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, New Cold War History Series (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

[16] For more detailed research on the Afghan war influence on the Soviet international image and observing the issue of the Afghanistan war as a reason for the Soviet Union collapse see: Timothy Nunan, *Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan*, Global and International History (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, eds., *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 2002); Reuveny R. and Prakash A., "The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union," *Review of International Studies*, 1999. Generally speaking all of the enlisted authors see a decline of authority and effectiveness of the Red Army and its inability to serve the needs of the Empire as a prerequisite to the decrease of the authority of the whole of the Soviet state, so it lost the status of superpower.

[17] Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 455–506.

[18] Ronald Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States* (Oxford University Press, 2011); Valerie A. Kivelson and Ronald Grigor Suny, *Russia's Empires* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

"modern country," the socialist ideology was an "alternative modernity," the author argues. Illustrating a view opposite to the totalitarian school on the state of the Soviet collapse is the monograph by Sergei Plokhy. He sees the end of the Soviet Union as not predefined before the last six months of its existence.[19] Moreover, the author argues that only the referendum of the 1st of December 1991, held in the Ukrainian SSR, determined that Gorbachev's idea to create a Union of Sovereign States (*Soyuz Suverennykh Gosudarstv*) of the Soviet republics would be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, these books are taken into consideration in the thesis either because they provide a substantial context or methodological approach for the research.

Avoiding the person-centred narrative in my research, I cannot ignore some valuable accounts written in this manner. Scholars such as the already mentioned Robert Service, Archie Brown, and William Taubman focus on the figure of Gorbachev, who made it possible to change the external policy course that had remained stable until the mid-1986s. Service analyses the issue of demilitarisation policy articulated among the Soviet and American leaders – Gorbachev and Reagan. However, if his monograph answers the questions of "what kind of new strategies appeared between the two superpowers in the case of military regulations" and "how they were implemented worldwide," it does not reflect on the question "why these strategies occurred."[20] In addition to Service, both Brown and Taubman consider Gorbachev a socialist believer who tried to create the "Common European Home" without NATO and the Warsaw Pact, without any nuclear weapons and struggles between different ideologies, as each state would respect the sovereignty of the

[19] Sergei Plokhy, *The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).
[20] Service, *The End of the Cold War: 1985-1991*.

other.[21] Outlining the main events and actors of the world arena during the late 1980s, these studies provide the core for the research chapter on Gorbachev speechwriting.

Moreover, the scope of the historiography on the topic of the end of the Cold War includes some case studies significant for my research. Paying special attention to the concept and the politics of the "Common European Home," Marie Sarotte displays the opportunities and solutions of 1989, concentrating her narrative around the reunification of the Germanies.[22] The author widely depicts the struggle to create the new political structures in Europe by analysing the political elites' voices of the GDR, FRG, USSR, USA, Great Britain, France and Poland. She explains that there were several scenarios of the union of European countries, and that the European Union, as we know it today, was a product of clashes of that time.

My research also touches upon the methodology of the Soviet Subjectivity, which I will elaborate on in greater detail in the first chapter, focused exclusively on that particular field of research. Nevertheless, it is still significant to stress the core monograph here. Agreeing with Brown and Taubman in the last chapter of *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia*,[23] Vladislav Zubok also states that an attitude towards liberalization of the Soviet regime brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev was a consequence of the leader's belonging to the "sixties generation," which referred to the Soviet intelligentsia's reformist orientation that followed the death of Stalin. I intend to elaborate on Zubok's terminology and its application to the sources in the first chapter of the research, together with the methodological introduction on Soviet Subjectivity.

[21] Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford University Press, 1997); Taubman, *Gorbachev*.
[22] Marie Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (Princeton University Press, 2009).
[23] Vladislav Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia* (Harvard University Press, 2009).

Sources

The research will be based on a variety of sources, which I intend to use to trace the institutional and practical alterations in the speechwriting practices before and during Perestroika. The core of the thesis will draw upon ego documents, such as memoirs and diaries of assistants and speechwriters, mainly from the period of Gorbachev's rule. Aside from them, I will engage with certain memoirs of the Brezhnev-era actors. The prosopography of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze's closest speechwriters shall be elaborated further, as their ego documents serve as primary sources for the research.

Anatoly Chernyaev got the position as international affairs' advisor of the Secretary General in 1986, being one of Mikhail Gorbachev's main speechwriters and supporters of the Perestroika reforms in the Soviet apparatus. Five years after the death of Stalin, Chernyaev became the correspondent in the Prague editorial office of the journal "Problemy mira i sotsializma [Problems of Peace and Socialism]," where he worked until the very beginning of the 1960s. Before joining the "Gorbachev team," for almost twenty-five years he was working in the International Department (ID) CC CPSU, occupying a variety of positions, as an assistant department Head, consultant and even Head of the group of consultants.[24] Chernyaev left a very detailed diary starting from 1972 until 1991, covering most of the stages of his career described above. These diaries were published online[25] as a part of the project of the National Security Archive, where the originals are now. These

[24] The consultants' groups and their duties are crucially related to the routinization of the speechwriters' profession and the institutional affiliation of their *kollektiv*. For more on the Soviet phenomenon of *kollektiv* see: Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices*, Studies on the History of Society and Culture (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999).

[25] National Security Archive, Anatoly Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh, 1972-1991. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 12.05.2019)

diaries together with the book of Chernyaev's memoirs[26] became the vital sources for the research.

Just like Chernyaev, **Georgy Shahnazarov** was one of the best-known Gorbachev speechwriters. Shahnazarov's memoir dedicates a significant portion to the Department of the CPSU Central Committee for Relations with the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries (CWPSC),[27] as he was the First Deputy Head of the Department. From 1960 he was working in the journal "Problemy mira i sotsializma." He became the consultant at the CWPSC Department in 1964 at the invitation of Iurii Andropov, and served in this Department for more than twenty years. Moreover, as Shahnazarov mentions in his memoir, from the beginning of Brezhnev's rule, the CWPSC Department's consultants, together with Andropov, were involved in writing speeches, reports, and articles for Brezhnev, especially on the topics of international relations.[28]

Very briefly, from 1986 to 1988 **Vadim Medvedev** was a Head of the CWPSC Department which was created by Andropov in 1957 and was one of the "recruiting institutes" for the speechwriters of the General Secretaries. That episode in his career was described in detail in his memoirs.[29] Moreover, dealing with the close circle of Gorbachev's assistants, I could not avoid the Head of the Propaganda Department and the "architect of Perestroika," **Alexander Yakovlev**. Even though Yakovlev was not a speechwriter himself, and most probably had his own speechwriters, the account in his memoir[30] is of interest for the research, as he was involved in the process of formulating the ideological line of

[26] Anatoly Chernyaev, *Shest' Let s Gorbachevym: Po Dnevnikovym Zapisyam [Six Years with Gorbachev: Based on Diaries]* (Moscow: Progress: Kul′tura, 1993).
[27] This department plays even more significant role in the routinization process of the consultants' groups. On this department creation history and purpose I will elaborate in the subchapter "Collective Speechwriting Under Brezhnev and the "Routinization" of the Profession."
[28] Georgii Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]* (Moscow Vagrius, 2001), 217.
[29] Vadim Medvedev, *V Komande Gorbacheva Vzglyad Iznutri [In Gorbachev's Team, the View from Inside]* (Moscow: Bylina, 1994).
[30] Aleksandr Yakovlev, *Sumerki [Dusk]* (Moscow: Materik, 2003).

Perestroika. Hence, accounts of both Yakovlev and Medvedev also became significant sources for my research.

Among the main sources of this research are the diaries of **Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze**.[31] He was a speechwriter and personal assistant of Eduard Shevardnadze. While working as a speechwriter in the ministry, Stepanov-Mamaladze managed to compose detailed diaries describing everything that happened to him and the Minister from 1985 to 1991. The main topics of meetings, notes, and contents from negotiations of the Minister with foreign diplomats are all the subject of his diaries. Diaries contain extracts from newspapers and magazines during Perestroika and quotes from contemporaries who spoke about the Minister or the Soviet foreign policy in general. Moreover, the author pays much attention to the description of life in other countries. The diaries also feature a multitude of personal conversations between Shevardnadze and Stepanov-Mamaladze.

To trace the changes in the speechwriters' duties trough the evolution of the Soviet state, memoirs of the Brezhnev-era figures are of particular interest. At this point, the prosopography of the actors is needed to emphasize their departmental belonging, which also legitimizes the foreign policy focus I am taking. Firstly, I intend to analyze the memoirs of the main representatives of Brezhnev's speechwriters' cohort. One of them, **Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov**,[32] wrote a memoir,[33] through which it is possible to trace the particularities of the speechwriters' duties through the decades of Khrushchev and Brezhnev reign. From 1947, Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov was occupying the position of an adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nineteen years later, he became an assistant and Foreign Affairs adviser of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He remained in

[31] Even though I myself was not working in the Hoover Institution Archives, I was involved in the project of transcribing and commenting on the photocopies of the diaries for the period from 1985 to 1991.
[32] The second part of Alexandrov-Agentov's surname appeared during his service as Brezhnev's adviser and later on started to be used as his writing pseudonym.
[33] Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontay Do Gorbacheva [From Kollontai to Gorbachev]*, ed. I. Ogorodnikova (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994).

this post until 1986, being replaced by Anatoly Chernyaev. Another one was **Alexander Bovin**, who, after being the consultant in the "Kommunist" journal, was summoned to the Department of the CPSU Central Committee for Relations with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries (CWPSC Department or "Department of Socialist Countries") in 1964. Bovin was one of the most well-known Brezhnev's speechwriters until 1972. Then he was a political commentator for "Izvestia" and a host of the weekly television program "International Panorama" until the very dissolution of the Soviet Union.[34] Finally, the memoir of the first Head of the consultants group for the CWPSC Department, **Fedor Burlatsky**, is of interest for the research.[35] From 1971 almost until the end of Perestroika, he was the Head of the Department of Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CPSU (at the International Lenin School) and was still from time to time invited to participate in the collective speechwriting for Brezhnev.

Aside from assistants' and speechwriters' diaries and memoirs, I will deal with the sources of the **Gorbachev Foundation Archive** regarding the departmental structure in which the General Secretary's or the Foreign Minister's assistants and speechwriters worked before and during the Perestroika period. I intend to analyze their personal papers, drafts of speeches, notes and inner correspondence between them and Gorbachev on the foreign policy issues in the Gorbachev Foundation Archives in Moscow.

Identifying the Genre: Memoirs and Diaries

The memoiristic genre lies in between literature and history, appearing simultaneously as a document and a verbal work of art. Defining the genre, cultural historian, Beth Holmgren,

[34] Aleksandr Bovin, *XX Vek Kak Zhizn': Vospominaniia* (Moscow: Zakharov, 2003), 50.
[35] Fedor Burlatskiy, *Vozhdi i Sovetniki: O Khrushchove, Andropove i Ne Tol'ko o Nikh [Leaders and Advisers: About Khrushchev, Andropov, and Not Only about Them]* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990).

writes: "In the memoir the author narrates real events and contacts he or she has experienced or witnessed, usually foregrounding a subjective perspective and evaluation."[36] In their discrepancy with both autobiography and biography,[37] memoirs are the product of the author's reflexive narrative about the past. At the same time, alike autobiography, it is rightfully considered an untrustworthy historical source, since the author could intentionally falsify some factual information or unintentionally distort it.[38] In memoirs, some historical figures could be either canonized or demonized according to the views and preferences of the author. Cementing together individual expression and reliable record, a memoir could either legitimize the author's point of view on the history or present her or his role in important events of the past in an exaggerated manner. Nevertheless, as Holmgren writes: "the memoir necessarily presumes to record its subject's different public performances on "real" stages: among family and intimates; in various social and political milieus; in the "real" space and time of history."[39] Talking from the position of cultural history, Barbara Walker pointed out that the particular value of these sources does not lie on the "correct" depiction of the past, but rather on particularities of the author's worldview.[40]

There is a degree to which the author's worldview appeared to be a reprocessed experience, as memoirs exclude any possibility for the relatively "immediate" reflection of the past intrinsic to diaries. This positions memoirs as a very particular type of historical source which is essentially limited in temporal dimensions. For instance, a diaristic form opens the

[36] Beth Holmgren, ed., *The Russian Memoir: History and Literature* (Northwestern University Press, 2007), xi.
[37] In the introduction of the Holmgren book, she distinguished the memoirs genre from autobiographies and biographies. Autobiography puts to foreground "the autobiographical subject and his or her play of subjective imagination," which is inherent in all documentary genres, but especially manifested in the autobiographies. The biography genre, on the other hand, introduces ether a first- or a third-person omniscience, "may play the detached analyst or the involved interlocutor—in short, may approximate the first-person performance of the memoirist". However, as memoirs constitute a particularly fluid genre, variating from text to text, it could be impossible to discern it from already enlisted genres. See: Holmgren, xiii–xiv.
[38] Usually written long after the historical events described, it excludes any possibility for the relatively "immediate" reflection of the past, which is intrinsic to diaries. See: Barbara Walker, "On Reading Soviet Memoirs: A History of the 'Contemporaries' Genre as an Institution of Russian Intelligentsia Culture from the 1790s to the 1970s," *Russian Review* 59, no. 3 (July 2000): 327–352.
[39] Holmgren, *The Russian Memoir*, xv.
[40] Walker, "On Reading Soviet Memoirs," 329.

possibility for an author to articulate all three tenses: by describing and reflecting on the past, relatively immediately reporting on the present conditions, and speculating about the possible futures.[41] Concentrating on the reflected past, memoiristic genre lacks the "immediate" historical present and imagined future. Indeed, the eagerness of the memoirist to create a narrative about the "real" past, does not exclusively come to claimed importance of the historical events themselves, but, simultaneously, the relevance of this past for the moment of writing the memoir. Therefore, the reason for creating an ego document in each particular case becomes crucially important for performing the analysis.

To grasp a sense behind the memoiristic creation, one should pay significant attention to the fluctuating political censorship towards memoirs, which was varying throughout the Soviet history, transforming the reasons for creating a memoiristic narrative and the genre itself.[42] Without going into the details of the genre evolution, I will concentrate on the Perestroika period and post-Soviet memoir writing instead, since Aleksandrov-Agentov's, Chernyaev's, Medvedev's, Shahnazarov's, and Yakovlev's memoirs used for the analysis were published at that time. The de-Stalinization of the late 1950s and early 1960s not only brought about the rise of the unofficial memoir production, *Samizdat*,[43] but also the official one by

[41] The specificity of the approach based on trichotomy of past, present and future, for analyzing ego documents will be discussed further in the chapter.

[42] For the shortened history of the Russian-Soviet memoiristic genre see: Holmgren, *The Russian Memoir*, xv–xxv; Marina Balina, "The Tale of Bygone Years: Reconstructing the Past in the Contemporary Russian Memoir," in *The Russian Memoir: History and Literature*, ed. Beth Holmgren (Northwestern University Press, 2007), 186–210.

[43] During and after World War II in Eastern and Central European socialist countries, the phenomena appeared as a denotation of the variety of practices as an author's publication of his or her own work, distributed in typewritten or printed copies transferred among readers by hand, to avoid the governmental censorship. Also *Samizdat* was not only a tool of the intelligentsia or the dissidents because it went far beyond the binary opposition of dissent circles versus state or even "real" information versus "false" one. Inasmuch as unofficial texts were not automatically invested with authority, they were not the mediators of trustworthy information but more of mere opinion sometimes supplemented with the mainstream narratives of the Cold War media propaganda. On the notion of *Samizdat* see Harold Gordon Skilling, *Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe* (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1989); Peter Steiner, "Introduction: On Samizdat, Tamizdat, Magnitizdat, and Other Strange Words That Are Difficult to Pronounce," *Poetics Today* 29, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 613–28; A. Komaromi, "Samizdat as Extra-Gutenberg Phenomenon," *Poetics Today* 29, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 629–67.

allowing and even soliciting "true" documentation of the Stalinist experience.[44] The same tendency of the full restoration of "real" history was shaping the Perestroika memoirs. The researcher of Soviet literature, Marina Balina, writes:

> Once again, triggered by the changing political atmosphere, memoirs had to submit to the pressure of a changed version of absolute time, and factual material was again placed at the core of the narrative. The reminiscences of this period attracted the reader with sensational facts that were grouped together to uncover "false" history. In this way the memoirs of glasnost merged within the genre the discourse practices of both the dissident memoir and the memoir of the Thaw, fostering an approach to history akin to a "draft" full of blots, a "draft that needs to be corrected again and again."[45]

Continuing this thought Balina claims, that for the late Soviet intelligentsia[46] the phenomenon of Glasnost' undermined the previously existing memoiristic model juxtaposing the official narrative of history and the authors' opinion. The author of the article sees this model in both the Thaw and Perestroika periods, ending only with the collapse of the Soviet Union, when "constant attempts to tell the truth about the past of the country or an individual have produced so many versions of this past that society in general felt deprived of its own history."[47] Even though I would agree with Balina's identification of the late- and post-Soviet memoiristic models, her analysis does not include any memoirs of political actors, who tend to identify with the politics they were making even after the collapse of the state. Similarly, without being a political figure per se, speechwriters were associating their work with the political figure and the policy proclaimed by him. Thus, being involved in the speechwriting for the Secretary General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, each speechwriter largely associated his "self" with the official policy of Perestroika in the memoirs. Simultaneously facing the actuality of the state dissolution, not without

[44] Holmgren, *The Russian Memoir*, xxiv.
[45] Balina, "The Tale of Bygone Years: Reconstructing the Past in the Contemporary Russian Memoir," 193.
[46] Her analysis is based on the members of cultural intelligentsia such as fiction and screenwriters, she does not include the notion of "enlightened apparatchiki" in her analysis.
[47] Balina, "The Tale of Bygone Years: Reconstructing the Past in the Contemporary Russian Memoir," 196.

critical remarks, memoiristic narrative served as justification of the chosen political path of Perestroika and to a degree as a confession of its failure.

Even though the author's worldview represented in the memoirs could be synthetically constructed by the means of later multiple reflections and by the rationale of the mid-1990s and early 2000s, it is still exposed in the memoirs through dominant topics related to the author's participation in Soviet culture, acting within specific professional groups and social strata, and engaging in political work. Thus, the memoiristic genre inquiry, according to Barbara Walker, should be focused on the behavior of the social circles (*kruzhki*) which constitute the sense of belonging to the author of the ego document.[48] Because my vision of the methodological approach for examining memoirs does not differ from Walker's, first, I would like to stress the specificities of the diaristic genre, examine its intersection with the memoiristic one, and later return to the discussion on the memoirs, combining them with diaries in the section discussing the issue of subjectivity. Even though the example of the memoiristic genre will be often evoked further in this subchapter, I would like to observe the notion of this ego document type in the light of its distinction from diaries.

The specificity of diaries as sources for the historical research was the subject of the whole section of *The Russian Review* from October 2004, including the article by Irina Paperno "What can be done with diaries?"[49] To perform the analysis of the diaristic source, Paperno claims, one should be aware of its polyhedral nature, as this kind of document can juxtapose the variety of genres, which at the same time can shed light on sets of ideas of the author, representing the broader historical period.[50] A great deal of my analysis will be driven by

[48] Walker, "On Reading Soviet Memoirs," 330.
[49] Irina Paperno, "What Can Be Done with Diaries?," *Russian Review*, 2004., 561-573.
[50] Paperno poses the rhetorical question if the diary is a complete source or a literary compilation? Having this question in mind, one can justifiably argue for a diary not being a "credible" historical source, as it does not claim to reflect neither unmediated historical facts nor experiences. I do recognize this issue, however, and yet I tend to trust Iliya Gerasimov's statement. Gerasimov's narrative is built around the diary of Ekaterina

the writer her- or himself through the individual positioning in the time of writing, and the author's rationale for creating the document. Introducing the concept of "the private self," Paperno is tracing it to the owner's special relations of secrecy and intimacy to their diary.[51] Indeed, the source almost never has an addressee, but it is firmly committed to the first-person narrative, as in the case of both Chernyaev and Mamaladze diaries. Thus, recognizing the purpose of the creation of the ego document is crucial for understanding its contents. A routine practice of a diary keeping either as a historical record or as a disciplinary exercise for creating a "new self," or both, could constitute the rationale for the author. In both cases of Mamaladze and Chernyaev diaries, the main semantic function for creating the text lies in the factographic cornerstone. That is, the reason for keeping such a detailed track of the meetings, negotiations and even gossips within the apparatus in the diaries[52] was the practical application of the same information in future speeches.

At the same time, it could be argued that both of the diarists are "privatizing the history"[53] of the political changes of the time. Fascinated by Perestroika's reforms, Stepanov-Mamaladze, who had never occupied a government post at the Union level,[54] emphasized throughout the diaries his involvement in the "epochal events"[55] such as the signing of the

Sakharova as an example of transformations of a normative intellectual of the twentieth century. Gerasimov presents the diaristic narrative as a specific illustration of the compound ideological paradigms replacing each other with the advent of Soviet power. Ilya Gerasimov, "Udovletvoriaia idealu budushchego": dnevniki Ekateriny Sakharovoi kak poiski budushchego v proshlom (1905−1919) ["'Serving the Ideal Future:' Ekaterina Sakharova's Diaries as a Quest for the Future in the Past (1905–1919)"], *Ab Imperio* 16, no. 1 (2015): 213−246.

[51] Paperno, "What Can Be Done with Diaries?," 567.

[52] As it was already mentioned in the Introduction, during Perestroika (from the 30th of August 1985 to the 19th of October 1990) the speechwriter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze, created around 2870 pages of the diary equivalent of approximately 740 Word pages (12 TimesNewRoman, single-space), and Anatoly Chernyaev, one of Gorbachev's speechwriters, for the period of six years (1985-1990) has created 413 pages of diaries transcribed into PDF format (12 TimesNewRoman, 1,5-space).

[53] This is a terminology used by Ilia Gerasimov, describing the urge with which the author of the diary, Ekaterina Sakharova, sought to embed her "self" into the rapidly changing historical moment. Gerasimov, "Udovletvoriaia idealu budushchego," 213-214.

[54] As it was emphasized in the introduction, before occupying the post of Shevardnadze's assistant, from 1978 Stapanov-Mamaladze was the head of the Georgian Information Agency (Gruzinform).

[55] From the very beginning of the diaristic accounts for 1985 he emphasizes his allure for the Perestroika and strong interest to alter the Soviet international relations. See: HIA, 2000C91-5-1, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 30th of August 1985.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the recommencement of diplomatic relations with China, the reunification of Germanies and other events. The "self" has also been problematized in both Stepanov-Mamaladze's and Chernyaev's diaries. Mamaladze's recognition of the Perestroika as a time of change shapes the other semantic reason for keeping the diaries, which served as a platform for self-disciplining passages claiming to achieve his own ideal of the Perestroika-type speechwriter. At the same time, Chernyaev's diaries are containing significantly less self-disciplining passages than Stepanov's, probably because his work as a higher class apparatchik did not start in 1985, but much earlier.[56]

The theoretical engagement of this research with the ego documents requires the introduction of the terminology. By formulating a simple question: "does every diary work the same?" Jochen Hellbeck[57] traces the concept of temporality, as a marker of an individual's relation to history, through the concept of subjectivity. Through adding the temporal dimension in the already problematized "sense of self," Hellbeck emphasizes that the temporality of the current historical moment is semantic for the author of the ego document. The sequence of numbers signifying the flow of weeks, months and seasons provided by the diary "invites the diarist to deal with the past as he/she interacts with the present."[58] In contrast with the memoirs of different speechwriters discussed above, diaries introduce another temporal dimension to the source narrative – the present tense. The author of the diary is able not only to keep track of the day-to-day alterations but to capture the current moment, time, or epoch. By "subjectivity," he means the sum of mechanisms

[56] Already in 1961 he worked in the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, serving at the variety of positions as assistant department head, consultant and even head of the group of consultants, before 1986, when he became Gorbachev's assistant.
[57] Hellbeck, "The Diary between Literature and History," 622.
[58] Paperno, 568.

through which the "self" is problematized in the ego document.[59] My choice to apply this concept for the research is motivated by the fact that all the ego documents at my disposal, indeed, problematize the author's "self" on the level of temporality by relating it to history. And if in the memoirs this tendency is driven by the genre itself, diaristic examples uncover a more specific and historicized methodological approach to Soviet Subjectivity. The evolution of this conception and its relation to the ego documents of the Perestroika speechwriters are the topics shaping the fabric of the following chapter.

Outline

The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces the reader to the methodology of the research, which has also signified the rationale for performing the analysis itself. More specifically, in the chapter I demonstrate the approaches of the Soviet Subjectivity and narrow them down to the construction of the "self" related to the speechwriters' group. By introducing the concept of *kollektiv*, proposed by Oleg Kharkhordin, the chapter bridges the seemingly polar understandings of the "self" within the Soviet Subjectivity field. One particular characteristic of the speechwriters' *kollektiv* is also introduced in the first chapter, marking the speechwriters' self-positioning in the ego documents. This characteristic is the imagined community of the "sixties generation."

The second chapter engages in the discussion of the speechwriters' departmental affiliation and their practices under Brezhnev, connecting the historical narrative with one of the visions on the Soviet Subjectivity approach. Affiliated as consultants of the ID and the CWPSC Department, the speechwriters' duties were routinized within the Soviet apparatus during the mid-1960s. The chapter is discussing not exclusively the routine of speechwriting under Brezhnev, but also paying special attention to the ways the practices of *kollektiv*

[59] Hellbeck, "The Diary between Literature and History," 623.

shaped the subjectivity of the speechwriters in the relation to the imagined community of the "sixties generation." Furthermore, the chapter touches upon the speechwriters' involvement in shaping Brezhnev's Détente of the 1970s.

The third chapter is dedicated to speechwriting under Gorbachev. The overarching scope of the chapter introduces the reader to the departmental alterations which occurred in the mid-1980s and the ways they changed the balance of power on the Soviet foreign policy decision-making. Together with the reorganization of the International and the CWPSC Departments, the chapter stresses the changes in both the speechwriters' *kollektiv* and its duties, which had occurred with the new Secretary General in power. The story is not limited to the description of the speechwriting routine of Gorbachev's assistants, but includes the speechwriting alterations of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze. Reflected in the ego documents is the speechwriters' self-identification with the "accomplished sixties generation's" desires, demonstrating its relation to Hellbeck's approach to the Soviet Subjectivity, which is stressed in the conclusion of the third chapter.

In the conclusion, I summarize the main outcomes of each chapter, offering the bigger picture of the process of creation and transformation of the speechwriters' routines through almost twenty-five years, from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. The case of the *kollektiv* transformation illustrates how easily the two approaches to Soviet Subjectivity could be linked. Furthermore, in the concluding remarks, I seek to engage in the broader discussion of the practical application of the Soviet Subjectivity approach itself.

Chapter 1: History of Soviet Speechwriting through Ego Documents

What "ego documents" have in common is not the formal parameter of individual authorship, but the fact that they produce testimony about the self (and how it acquires a particular meaning in a given historical context)...

(Jochen Hellbeck)[60]

In this chapter I intend to demonstrate the specificity of the Soviet Subjectivity approach. The aim of the chapter is not to present the overarching scheme for the analysis of the whole matrix of the constructed "self" in the ego documents. Instead, the aim is to give a specific angle for such analysis, narrowing it down to the examination of the constructed "self" only in relation to the speechwriting profession. Through the concept of *kollektiv,* proposed by Oleg Kharkhordin, this chapter will discuss the linkage between seemingly polar theories within the Soviet Subjectivity field, illustrating how the practices of the speechwriters' collective suppressed or encouraged different manifestations of the "self."

Moreover, the description of the particular characteristic of the speechwriters' *kollektiv*, has signified their self-positioning in ego documents. This characteristic, namely the sense of belonging to the imagined community of the "sixties generation," will also appear in the chapter narrative. Having been characterized as a part of even broader and even more loosely defined "group" of the Soviet intelligentsia, the ideal type of this "generation" shared the belief in socialism and desired to alter the state system to the better. Thus, by identifying the particularities of the ego documents analysis, by engaging in the scrutiny of the Soviet Subjectivity viewpoints through the concept of the *kollektiv,* and by stating the views of this "generation" and tracing the speechwriters' self-identification with the group, I

[60] Jochen Hellbeck, "The Diary between Literature and History: A Historian's Critical Response," *Russian Review* 63, no. 4 (October 2004): 623.

will establish a framework which enables me to understand the evolution of the speechwriters' profession in chapters two and three.

Using Soviet Subjectivity to Analyze the "Kollektiv"[61]

Even though my research is devoted to tracing the bridge between the theories of Soviet Subjectivity of late socialism, it is valuable to scrutinize the existing paradigms of the Soviet Subjectivity field, which are mostly focusing on the early Soviet and Stalinist period. As I explained earlier, by observing the Soviet Subjectivity research approach on the example of my case of the Soviet speechwriting practices, it is possible to bridge the "totalitarian" and "revisionist" views on the Soviet subject, shaping the rationale behind engaging in such an analysis in the first place. Furthermore, a focus on subjectivity has a capability to reveal more overarching information on social types and different historical phenomena (in this case particular professional category).[62]

Examining different paradigms of the Soviet Subjectivity studies, Choi Chatterjee and Karen Petrone arguing that the "Soviet" part in Soviet Subjectivity emerged together with the "totalitarian" model of Soviet individuality described by mostly non-Soviet scholars.[63] The methodological approach of Soviet Subjectivity had appeared in juxtaposition with the liberal subject and was embedded in the "totalitarian" approach to the study of the "Soviet project." This model implied that state terror leads individuals to complete subordination to the regime. Pioneering work on totalitarianisms by Hannah Arendt[64] stated that in these conditions, citizens of the Soviet Union are either portrayed as hiding their "sense of self" or living a life in which self-understanding is completely destroyed. Observing the Soviet state as a system which was predestined to failure, "totalitarian" scholars believe that the

[61] Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia*.
[62] Choi Chatterjee and Karen Petrone, "Models of Selfhood and Subjectivity: The Soviet Case in Historical Perspective," *Slavic Review* 67, no. 04 (2008): 967–86.
[63] Chatterjee and Petrone, 970–71.
[64] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 1st ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004).

ideology of the Soviet Union played a constitutive role in the totalitarian regime.[65] That means that any reforms and changes were structurally unable to take place in this society, because they could not have met with support within the immutable system.

Criticizing this model, the revisionists claim that the individual has a flexible attitude to the system: the person's understanding of self can vary depending on subjective interests. Introducing the concept of "useful self," revisionist scholars, such as Sheila Fitzpatrick, focus primarily on the daily practices of individuals, through which "different categories of their identity and identification" could be revealed.[66] Even though she consciously distanced herself from the newer scholarship of Soviet Subjectivity,[67] preferring to engage with broader categories of identification," *Everyday Stalinism*[68] shows how "usable selves" were constructed by Soviet citizens as surviving practices during Stalinism. At the same time for the scholars who identify as revisionists, and Fitzpatrick herself, the idea that an individual has a pre-existent system of self-understanding (either for or against the current regime) remained indisputable.[69]

To summarize the first overarching view presented by these authors it could be seen that the system and the self are presented in hostile relationships, where one is always trying to overcome another. These views negate the role of state as a creator of new subjectivities and social roles. By introducing or erasing some of these roles, the system did not exclusively suppress the personality, making it either fight or survive the system, but created new

[65] See for example, Alex Inkeles, Raymond Augustine Bauer, and David Gleicher, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society*, First Edition (Harvard University Press, 1959); Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, or, more naively, Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, 1992).
[66] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Tear off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Princeton, [N.J.]: Princeton University Press, 2005).
[67] Fitzpatrick, 8–9.
[68] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
[69] Hoffmann David, "Power, Discourse, and Subjectivity in Soviet History," *Ab Imperio 3*, 2002.

possibilities for the citizen's self-identification. Furthermore, the contested presumption that the subjectivity of the person is a preexistent static category could be seen within this claim.

These ideas were first challenged in the mid-1990s by Stephen Kotkin's book *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization*.[70] The book is devoted to analyzing the ways of understanding the process of work and labor that prevailed at that time and how this influenced the Soviet workers' self-perception. Still arguing with the totalitarian school, he shares the view of the revisionist cohort of researchers, who reject any possibility for a pre-existent coherent system of self-understanding of the newborn Soviet citizen. On the contrary, for revisionist historians, state discourse and subjectivization practices construct the subjectivity of a particular individual. In their narrative, the Soviet state appears not only in the role of a repressive structure but also in the role of the demiurge, creating a new form of persons' self-determination within the system. This implied a certain process of building a particular kind of citizens by creating the fields of activity for these citizens. In a way, Kotkin's book gives the definition of Soviet Subjectivity without calling it such.[71] For the individuals, the Soviet regime was not only a static system with which people could either resist the government at the micro level for the sake of their interests or support it for climbing up the career ladder. Through the discourses and practices of the inter-war Stalinist state, the new identities like Udarnik, Stakhanovite, Komsomol member, and others had emerged, transforming former peasants into Soviets.[72]

[70] Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

[71] Even though his later books, such as already mentioned *Armageddon Averted* would not share the ideas of scholars of Soviet subjectivity paradigm, his research on Magnitogorsk presents a new understanding of the "Soviet self" cardinally different from totalitarian and revisionist ones should be included in the discussion on Soviet subjectivity. See: Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck, "Rethinking the Stalinist Subject: Stephen Kotkin's 'Magnetic Mountain' and the State of Soviet Historical Studies," *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1996, 456–463.

[72] Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, 21-23. Even though for Kotkin the transformation of peasants into workers was not an overnight process, some critical views point out that for him the Bolshevik culture has not changed through the first decades of the existence of the Soviet state. For him, the revolutionary culture of the 1920s

If Kotkin's focus is oriented on the examples of peasantry and workers' subjectivity, the cases of the educated class of the Soviet cultural elites would demand a more specific examination. The already mentioned section of *The Russian Review* from October 2004 also includes a detailed literary analysis of Iurii Olesha's diaries by Boris Wolfson.[73] By focusing on Olesha's attempts of self-shaping as a Soviet citizen and as an *homme de lettre*, Wolfson distinguishes two intertwined semantic objectives for the Soviet writer and poet to develop a habit for diary keeping. On the one hand, Olesha's diary served as a cathartic platform to overcome the writer's apparent crisis restraining him from creating a new work of fiction. On the other, the duty of diary-keeping appeared to be a laboratory for constructing a "new Soviet man." Engaging in the literary research of Olesha's attempts to construct a vital identity in the Soviet context through the diary, Wolfson describes how "Olesha's vocation (calling) as a writer defined and deformed his self-writing project."[74] My decision to evoke this specific example here is the respective relation to which Stepanov-Mamaladze and Chernyaev address the same rationales behind the diary-keeping routine. If Wolfson understands the diaristic routine of Olesha as a writer's project, neither Chernyaev nor Mamaladze ever perceived themselves as mere writers of fiction. Thus, unlike Wolfson, I would like to take a broader perspective and look at the diaries of the speechwriters through the prism of the historicist approach, suggested by Jochen Hellbeck.[75]

If we once again return to the opening quote of the chapter, it will become clear that for Hellbeck, subjectivity is the ability of individuals to think and act within the framework of a

remains the same during the Stalinist decade of 1930s, which arguably presents an oversimplification. See Krylova A, "Soviet Modernity: Stephen Kotkin and the Bolshevik Predicament," *Contemporary European History 2/*2014, 167–192.

[73] Boris Wolfson, "Escape from Literature: Constructing the Soviet Self in Yuri Olesha's Diary of the 1930s," *Russian Review* 63, no. 4 (October 2004): 609–620.

[74] Wolfson, "Escape from Literature: Constructing the Soviet Self in Yuri Olesha's Diary of the 1930s," 613.

[75] Jochen Hellbeck, "The Diary between Literature and History: A Historian's Critical Response," 621–629.

holistic understanding of oneself, the "sense of self."[76] In other words, subjectivity implies the desire to understand oneself as a subject of one's own life (as opposed to perceiving oneself as, say, an object of higher will).[77] In his work *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin*,[78] he switches the focus away from the destructive state practices, which construct the "Soviet self" through violent actions and repressions.[79] Instead of repressions, he talks about the resourceful actors, who, through their diaries, purposively transformed their self into the "integrated selfhood in which the personal would be raised to the level of the social."[80] In this light, Hellbeck presents another picture of the same diary of Iurii Olesha, painted in the colors of the historicist approach. By switching the respective focus from the writer-self on an individual's practices of self-historicization, the author of the article portrays the diaristic project as a tool for the conceptualization of the "self" in the historical era and, as I discussed earlier, in the contemporary collective.

Putting on the table the polar idea of the state being just a suppressive machine for killing personality, the second view on the Soviet Subjectivity gives the perception of the Soviet system as the environment for evoking new identities. Either for workers or for the intelligentsia, the state created the multiplicity of new possibilities for self-identification.

[76] Hellbeck Jochen, "Working, Struggling, Becoming: Stalin-Era Autobiographical Texts," *Russian Review 60*, July 2001, 340–359. See also Halfin Igal, "Looking into the Oppositionists' Souls: Inquisition Communist Style," *Russian Review 60*, July 2001, 316—339.
[77] Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck, "Interview," Translation by M. Mogilner, *Ab Imperio* 3/2002, 219.
[78] Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin*, 1. Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009).
[79] This approach was strongly criticized by Aleksandr Etkind, who argues that "Replacing Soviet terms such as "remaking" (*peredelka*), "reforging" (*perekovka*), or "remolding" (*pereplavka*), which are quite horrible in their application to humanity, with a universal idea of "subjectivity," Halfin and Hellbeck make the regime look better than it made itself. For a contemporary reader with a liberal heritage, the noun "subjectivity" sounds quite nice—certainly nicer than the adjective "Soviet." Institutions of Soviet power—concentration camps, personnel departments, or psychiatric hospitals—used a number of rhetorical devices to justify what they did." However, in seeking an ostensibly "non-ideological" interpretation of the Soviet Union, he juxtaposes it to another ideological creation, which presupposes the existence of a "human nature," a term he never reflects on, but presumes to be in harmony with a "liberal subjectivity" and actively opposed to Soviet attempts at creating a "New Man." See: Aleksandr Etkind, "Soviet Subjectivity: Torture for the Sake of Salvation?," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 6, no. 1 (2005): 171–186.
[80] Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind*, 93–94.

This allows me to underline the next view on the Soviet subject presented above as a resourceful actor, who thoughtfully transforms him- or herself.

In the light of both of these views, I would like to evoke the article "The Diaristic Form and Subjectivity under Khrushchev"[81] by Anatoly Pinsky, which gives the following definition of the term "Soviet Subjectivity:" "By subjectivity is meant an individual, historically created in dialogue with more or less dominant political, social and cultural institutions and phenomena."[82] Pinsky's article emphasizes the cultural, social and political background as a part of the person's constructed "sense of self." This is where the diaristic and memoiristic types of the ego documents both gain a similar analytical framework. In the same manner as Pinsky comments on the semantic subjectivity of the diaristic project, Walker also states that the memoir genre "can be understood only in terms of its place in the social, cultural, and economic history of Russian [Soviet] intellectual life."[83] Thus, the problematization of the author's "self" in the ego document can be deducible from the microcosm of social circles a person pertains to, and in this research it comes down to the category of *kollektiv*.

Analyzing the specificity of creation of the Soviet subject, political scientist and sociologist, Oleg Kharkhordin is arguing that the diverse practices of the collective played the major role in the construction of the "self."[84] He claims that after Stalin's death the dichotomy of law and terror was switched to the dichotomy of law and social pressure under Khrushchev, with the mutual surveillance and admonition of *kollektivy*.[85] By using Iurii Levada's report, Kharkhordin draws an interesting conclusion about the changes of 1985: the fundamental "transparency" of a Soviet citizen led to the general softening of the surveillance and

[81] Anatoly Pinsky, "The Diaristic Form and Subjectivity under Khrushchev," *Slavic Review* 4/2014, 805-827.
[82] Pinsky, "The Diaristic Form and Subjectivity under Khrushchev," 805.
[83] Walker, "On Reading Soviet Memoirs," 330.
[84] Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia*.
[85] In the chapter 7 of the book, he was mostly speaking about a group of employees at a workplace or a group of people at one particular labor camp. Kharkhordin, 279–328.

admonition practices, which were used only in the cases of conscious defiance. Through their accounts of private confession or public relations within the *kollektiv*, traced from personal diaries and memoirs of speechwriters, I intend to examine the compatibility of Kharkhordin's claims with the situation of the *kollektiv* I am researching.

The specificity of the *kollektiv* of Soviet diplomatic speechwriters enables me to also understand the self-perception of the late Soviet state in the international arena. The practices of the speechwriters' *kollektiv* became a piece of the puzzle of the Soviet Union's reinvented self-image. This lays bare the complex interconnection between the members of the apparatus who created the Perestroika and the highest echelons of decision-making in the Soviet state. Therefore, I turn the existing ideas of Soviet Subjectivity on their heads: discussing the presentation of "the self" in the ego documents of the speechwriters led me to the broader picture of the changing presentation of the state's self-image from Brezhnev to Gorbachev.

Usable Past of "Zhivago's Children"

If one is to look through the memoirs and diaries of the speechwriters for Brezhnev, Andropov, and Gorbachev, it is impossible to avoid the fact that in their thoughts and choices these people were constantly referencing the "*pokolenie shestidesyatnikov"* (sixties generation). Some researchers claim that the Gorbachev team's "New Political Thinking" had found its roots in this generation. Here, it is essential to point out a descriptive book by Vladimir Shlapentokh, which reflects on the transformation of the Soviet people's life in the post-Stalin period.[86] He believes that the ideology had fundamentally changed after the

[86] Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

death of Stalin and that the coming generation, the so-called "sixties generation,"[87] had sought to theoretically reconsider the Soviet apparatus and "liberalize" the state itself. I do not perceive that statement literally, distinguishing between visions of a democratic socialism and the liberal view of the state. The latter was not of interest to those in the Soviet Union who were inspired by the communist ideal, but unimpressed by the reality of the society built by Stalin. By opening the debate with Shlapentokh's book, I seek to elaborate on the notion of the "sixties generation," which, being neither a "generation" in the common sense of the term, nor a coherent group of any sorts, still served as a semantic ground for the self-positioning of Gorbachev's speechwriters.[88]

This "generation" could also be called "Zhivago's children," as Vladislav Zubok identified them in his eponymous work.[89] He writes that the death of Pasternak, who belonged to the old intelligentsia, coincided with the birth of a new spiritual and civil community, a new type of an intellectual class. This community, whose social background was far from Pasternak's, was nevertheless distinguished by the same desire for intellectual and artistic emancipation. In this matter, the "sixties generation" considered themselves descendants of the great Russian cultural and even moral tradition embodied in Pasternak, his social circle, and mostly in Pasternak's character, Yuri Zhivago. Thus, according to Zubok, these "Zhivago's children" were the spiritual offsprings of Pasternak's intelligentsia.[90] However, Sheila Fitzpatrick rightly notes that perhaps the term "Zhivago's children" in itself is not the best name for the "sixties generation." It is hard to imagine that a group of optimistic socialists oriented toward reform, proud of their country and considering themselves

[87] As my research is not concerned about the Thaw period as a specific analytic category I will not engage in the description of the debates around this term. Instead, I will dedicate the following subchapter to elaboration of the term "sixties generation," which appears to be an essential concept for the inquiry.
[88] However, I intend to show how this, to evoke an overused term, imagined community was actually used by the speechwriters only in chapters two and three accordingly.
[89] Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia*.
[90] Zubok, *Zhivago's Children,* 20.

children of the Revolution, had much in common with Pasternak and Zhivago, who were neither socialists, nor optimists, nor Soviet patriots. Even though Fitzpatrick criticizes the term, she admits that there is still a pattern which makes two types of intellectuals alike, which is their admiration and identification with the high culture.[91] In this thesis, the definition of the group will be borrowed from Zubok and the term "sixties generation" will be used interchangeably with "Zhivago's children."

Zubok's descriptions of "Zhivago's children" have already evoked the picture of the "Soviet intelligentsia." The book by Benjamin Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev*,[92] puts *intelligentsia* in a neutral framework of "a status group in the Weberian sense."[93] To signify why intelligentsia is a matter of a status in opposition to class, Tromly emphasizes intelligentsia's particular habitus (in sociological terms), manifested in "ethical consciousness, concern for transcendent ideas, and distaste for banal and selfish ("petty-bourgeois") concerns,"[94] as well as for the absence of accumulation of wealth and power in Soviet society by intelligentsia's "culturedness."[95] Thus, it is important to emphasize, that when we are talking about the contemporaries of the 1950s-1960s, i. e. people who actually were a part of the "generation," it is all about "a relatively narrow part of society: intellectual elites [and students of Moscow and Leningrad universities][96] who had long been confident in their mission to civilize society and felt particularly duty-bound to assign themselves this role in

[91] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultivating Their Dachas," *London Review of Books*, September 10, 2009.
[92] Benjamin Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139381239.
[93] Tromly, 9.
[94] This matter is also notable as a semantic reason behind the diaristic routine and memoir creation. My assumption is that the desire to keep the diary or write a memoir is a part of the habitus coming with the status of an intelligent.
[95] Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia*, 10–11.
[96] Zubok shares this idea with Tromly by also underlining the fact that whose people who would identify with the "sixties generation" during 1960s were most definitely a part of the student community (*studenchestvo*) of 1960s. See: Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia*, 25.

the wake of the Stalin period."[97] Tromly describes "Zhivago's children" as the "liberal intelligentsia," a group defined by a civic, moral, or political agenda in implicit or explicit opposition to the authoritarian state."[98]

Even though I agree with the statement that intelligentsia should be analyzed as a status group, neither during the 1960s nor during Perestroika could "Zhivago's children" have been reduced to being merely a "liberal intelligentsia." Zubok himself writes that "Zhivago's children" were not positioning themselves in opposition to the system. Instead, these Soviet citizens had high expectations of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization in the 1950s and invested their hopes in the concept of "socialism with a human face" in 1960s. Moreover, they were optimists who were confident in their future within the socialist path of their country and believed in the possibility of reforming the system without rejecting socialism as such. For Zubok, this "group" is, in some respects, composed of believers in the socialist system, at least of the form of socialism they were familiar with on the example of their own state.[99] That is why Zubok specifically lists not only famous dissidents, but "television engineers" (*teleinzhenery*), workers in the military-industrial complex, musicians, poets, artists, critics, journalists, writers, and scientists, as well as "enlightened bureaucrats" (*prosveshyonnye apparatchiki*) and war veterans[100] as a part of this imagined community.[101] I would like to draw special attention to the penultimate group.

The fact that "enlightened bureaucrats" are present in Zubok's list of the "sixties generation" is noteworthy for Sheila Fitzpatrick. She writes: "Zubok's practice is at odds with the Russian intelligentsia's long tradition of categorically excluding 'bureaucrats' - that is,

[97] Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia*, 187–216.
[98] Tromly, 12.
[99] Zubok, *Zhivago's Children,* 20-22.
[100] For Zubok this community included war-worn young veterans born in the 1920s and post-war young people born in the 1930-1940s. Because part of them were enthusiastic about building (or rebuilding) the country and "socialism" after the war, the author assumes that some of them could be included in the "Zhivago's children" community, but he does not generalize. Zubok, *Zhivago's Children*, 33.
[101] Zubok, *Zhivago's Children,* 437.

anyone holding an official state or Party office - from its ranks. But as scholarship on the postwar period develops, it is becoming increasingly clear that bureaucrats were no less likely than poets to be reform-minded (and a lot more likely to get their reforms implemented.)"[102] As "enlightened bureaucrats" were an inseparable part of the imagined community of "Zhivago's children," so were the speechwriters, who were a part of this stratum. The second chapter will describe how the idea of belonging to this imagined community was manifesting itself through the particular practices of the speechwriting *kollektiv*. Furthermore, I will show how the practices of the *kollektiv* shaped the subjectivity of the speechwriters and what view on the Soviet Subjectivity approach they represent.

Applying this definition for the analysis of the ego documents at my disposal, I would argue that each of these dimensions, among other things, is manifesting itself in the relation to the professional *kollektiv* of a given individual. Furthermore, it works vice versa: through a person's self-positioning (self-reflecting) among different pasts and contemporary political and cultural contexts, certain patterns of the Perestroika actors' circle of speechwriters could be revealed. Moreover, together with the evolution of the profession presented in my thesis, the two overarching ideas on subjectivity complement one another, showing that none of them could be solely applied to the case I am researching.

Conclusions

Just recently, the publishing house of the European University at Saint Petersburg has published the book titled *Posle Stalina: pozdnesovetskaja sub'ektivnost' (1953-1985): sbornik statei [After Stalin: Late Soviet Subjectivity (1953–1985)]*[103] which is dedicated to putting together overarching understandings of the Soviet Subjectivity. In the introduction,

[102] Fitzpatrick, "Cultivating Their Dachas."
[103] Anatoly Pinsky, ed., *Posle Stalina: pozdnesovetskaja sub'ektivnost' (1953-1985): sbornik statei [After Stalin: Late Soviet Subjectivity (1953–1985)]* (Sankt-Peterburg: Idzatel′stvo Evropejskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2018).

Anatoly Pinsky argues for the view which is problematizing the coherence of the concept of the "self." He quotes Foucault's understanding of subjectivity, which implies "a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized."[104] I share this significantly broadened understanding of the subjectivity itself, within which there are two ways to see the Soviet subjectivity: one would focus on the absence of the possibilities for the "self" realization, and another would analyze the opportunities for the "self" realization within the particular time in Soviet history, both of which I had described in the first subchapter. One view presents the understanding of the Soviet citizen as a static screw inside the personality-killing machine of the Soviet Union, another, the post-revisionist conception, sees the Soviet subjectivity as a creative process of the construction and realization of the "self," in the particular time of the Soviet history.

By turning to these models of Soviet subjectivity, I focus the analysis of the subjectivity and temporality manifested in the ego documents at my disposal to their particular relation to the speechwriter's profession during Perestroika. Through the matrix of the mechanisms which stimulate personal reflections about the "self" and time, bringing about the daily routine of diary keeping, I observe the diaries and memoirs by paying special attention to what the authors have to say about their profession. Therefore, the process of becoming and performing as a higher-rank speechwriter is scrutinized through the prism of temporality and subjectivity evoked in the sources. Thus, I have presented these views because, while seemingly showing exclusion of one another, my case of analyzing practices of the speechwriting *kollektiv* bridges them together. The evolution of this *kollektiv* and the routinization of this profession will be traced in the further chapters to show the synthesis between these views, ultimately confirming Foucault's more comprehensive view on subjectivity. That is how the case of writing the history of a professional *kollektiv* will

[104] Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1982): 790. Quoted in Pinsky, 26–27.

uncover the linkage between differing approaches to Soviet Subjectivity, ultimately showing the fundamental shift in the Soviet state's self-image at the end of the 1980s.

Chapter 2: Soviet Speechwriting before Gorbachev

Following the ideas on the speechwriting *kollektiv*, this chapter seeks to introduce the reader to the speechwriters' departmental affiliation and their practices before the Perestroika period. It will be done for the sake of linking the process of creating speeches with an already described paradigm within the Soviet Subjectivity approach, focusing on the repressive character of the Soviet state.

To achieve this objective, I will start with looking at the particular case of the speechwriters' *kollektiv* practices to illustrate how the set of views of the "sixties generation" was clashing with the restrictive demands of the General Secretary. In particular, I intend to show the transition from the "spontaneous" speechwriting for Khrushchev to the routinized, collective practices which had appeared in the Brezhnev era. In an attempt to trace these speechwriters' departmental affiliation, I will describe the duties of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the Department of the CPSU Central Committee for Relations with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries. Thus, this chapter would describe how the idea of belonging to the imagined community of the "sixties generation" was manifesting itself through the particular practices of the speechwriting *kollektiv*. Furthermore, I will look at how practices of *kollektiv* shaped the subjectivity of the speechwriters and what view on the Soviet Subjectivity approach they represent.

First and foremost, it is important to emphasize that the professional group analyzed in this research was not named "speechwriters" until 1975. Before the Brezhnev period, the leadership team, which was mainly involved in writing speeches and public texts, was called "a consultancy group" (*consul'tativnaya gruppa*) or a group of assistants. The year 1975 is

significant in this matter, precisely because of the earliest mentioning of the concept of "speechwriter" as a professional group in the ego documents of the research. To be more precise, the diaries of Anatoly Chernyaev mention the term explicitly in 1975.[105] It is interesting to note that some of the speechwriters from Brezhnev's time on were calling themselves in a Russian manner, *rechepisets,* but this term is mainly appearing in the memoirs published after the end of the USSR.[106] Even though in Khrushchev's time all the speechwriters were affiliated as assistants, for the sake of avoiding confusion, in this research the analyzed group will be interchangeably called both speechwriters and assistants, according to their duties, not according to official definitions.

Soviet "Speechwriters" and their Duties after the Death of Stalin

One could assume that the "liberalization," which followed Khurschev's "Secret Speech," had made the "enlightened bureaucrats" involved in the speechwriting process, as they were hoping to inspire change and become active reformists themselves. However, there are too few testimonies from the personalities who served as Khrushchev's speechwriters to prove this argument. On the contrary, as Susanne Schattenberg points out in one of her articles discussing Brezhnev's scenario of power: "he chose his scenario, above all, to distance himself from the terror under Stalin and the reform fury under Khrushchev, both of which destroyed many careers and lives."[107] As changes with Khrushchev were constant, he was almost impossible to work with. Some of Brezhnev's future speechwriters such as Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov[108] or Leonid Zamyatin[109] have left only an episodic description of

[105] National Security Archive, Anatoly Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh, 1975 god. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 28.10.2018)

[106] See for example, Georgij Shahnazarov *S vozhdyami i bez nih [With and without leaders]*. Moscow Vagrius, 2001.

[107] Susanne Schattenberg, "Trust, Care, and Familiarity in the Politburo: Brezhnev's Scenario of Power," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 16, 4/2015: 835–858.

[108] From 1947, Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov was occupying the position of an adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nineteen years later, he became an assistant and Foreign Affairs' adviser of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He remained in this post until 1986. The second part of his

working under Khrushchev. According to an interview with Zamyatin, who in 1961 was the Deputy Head of the Department of the Americas at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Khrushchev participated in the writing of texts by dictating the main points of the speech and sometimes listening to the final version. Other times, he would just ignore the text prepared for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or any other prepared public text and just give an improvised speech.[110] Therefore, even if a speechwriter had shared the desire for de-Stalinization of the Soviet system, Khrushchev made it clear that he is the main and only source of changes in the state.

Even if Khrushchev would decide to read the speech before the event, his method of working with texts was sometimes "spontaneous." For example, Alexandrov-Agentov, who at that time was an adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Gromyko, recalls a case connected to the situation of West Berlin in 1958. Khrushchev began to dictate his new decision to the stenographer, without listening until the end the speech previously prepared by the MFA and read by Gromyko in his report. Khrushchev outlined his proposal "to declare West Berlin a free, demilitarized city, make it independent from both the FRG and the GDR."[111] After that, the General Secretary suggested to his Foreign Minister to "throw

surname appeared during his serving as a Brezhnev's adviser and later on started to be used as his writing pseudonym.

[109] Leonid Zamyatin occupied various positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he started to work at the age of 24. After the death of Stalin, he became the First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UN based in New York. In a short period of three years from 1957 to 1960, he was relocated to Vienna to take a chair of Permanent Representative of the USSR in the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under Brezhnev, for almost a decade (1962-1970), he was the Head of the Press Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before he finally became the Head of TASS for another eight years (1970-1978). The biographical report was taken from the webpage of the research project "Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoj partii i Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1898-1991" http://www.knowbysight.info/ZZZ/02675.asp (Access Date: 04.11.2018).

[110] Nataliya Gevorkyan, "Intervyu s Leonidom Zamyatinym "Kak ehto delalos v SSSR: Genseki ne lyubili chitat i pisat" [An interview with Leonid Zamyatin "How it was done in the USSR: General secretaries did not like to read and write,"]" *Zhurnal "Kommersant Vlast'"* 6/24.02.1998, 13. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/14123 (Access Date: 04.11.2018).

[111] Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontay do Gorbacheva [From Kollontai to Gorbachev]*, edited by I. Ogorodnikova (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994.), 50.

his paper in the trash can as it does not deserve any better".[112] This example portrays both of Khrushchev's characteristics which made it difficult for speechwriters to work with him. The first is his unpredictability and the second is his habit for mockery. Quoting the report of the Presidium of the CC CPSU of October 1964, Schattenberg writes: "the Party charged that Khrushchev "no longer even adhered to the basic rules of polite behavior and swore so foully that it would cause, as the saying goes, not only your ears to redden [*ushi vianut*], but also the basest fishwife to blush [*chugunnye tumby krasneiut*.]""[113] This line of behavior, according to Schattenberg, was another nail in the coffin of Khrushchev's career as a General Secretary.

Even though it was not the most self-rewarding activity to write speeches for Khrushchev, he had a so-called "press group," which was dedicated to writing, editing and preparing for publication most speeches and reports of the General Secretary.[114] In an interview to the *Kommersant Vlast'* journal, Leonid Zamyatin reported that "this group of eight people worked continuously, although all of its members had posts and responsibilities outside the group."[115] This spontaneously formed group was headed by Leonid Ilyichev,[116] the Secretary of the Central Committee and the Head of the Ideology Department. The group usually included the editor-in-chief of Pravda, the chairman of the State Radio and Television (*Gosteleradio*), and two assistants of Khrushchev. Zamyatin notes that one of

[112] Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontay do Gorbacheva*, 50.
[113] "Doklad prezidiuma TsK KPSS na Oktiabr'skom plenume TsK KPSS," in *Nikita Khrushchev 1964: Stenogrammy plenuma TsK KPSS I drugie dokumenty*, ed. A. N. Artizov et al. (Moscow: Materik, 2007), 183. Quoted in Schattenberg, "Trust, Care, and Familiarity in the Politburo," 843.
[114] Gevorkyan, "Intervyu s Leonidom Zamyatinym" 6/24.02.1998, 13.
[115] Ibid.
[116] After the death of Stalin, Leonid Ilyichev served as the Head of the Press Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs for five years, and at the same time was in charge of the editorial board of the journal *International Affairs*. From 1961 to 1965 he occupied the position of the Chairman of the Ideological Commission and became famous for being the main ideologist of the Khrushchev anti-religious campaign. Almost right after Khrushchev's removal from the seat of General Secretary, for twenty-four long years (1965–1989) Ilyichev was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. See the digital library of the Soviet history research project "Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoj partii i Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1898-1991." http://www.knowbysight.info/III/02868.asp (Access Date: 04.11.2018).

these two assistants was "particularly influential in formulating Khrushchev's speeches - his cultural and ideological advisor, Vladimir Lebedev.[117] He was an intelligent, hard-working and very closed man."[118] A key figure was, of course, Aleksei Adzhubey,[119] Khrushchev's son-in-law. Zamyatin himself joined the group of speechwriters after 1962, when he already became the Head of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These were more or less all the members of the "working group." However, some special parts of speeches, such as the diplomacy-oriented sections, were written by the MFA team. This team had Gromyko as its undisputed leader and, according to different sources, occasionally included Valentin Falin[120] and Lev Mendelevich,[121] the members of the Central Apparatus of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[122] Despite the fact that the MFA had a separate team for preparing specialized diplomatic excerpts of speeches, it is fairly clear that almost all of the so-called "working group" members were either trained within the institution of the MFA or had experience working there.

[117] Vladimir Lebedev was a journalist and for a year (1953-1954) was the Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. From 1954 and until the end of Khrushchev career as a General secretary Lebedev was a Khrushchev's assistant and adviser for culture and ideology, was also a theater specialist. See Alexander Yakovlev digital archive: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/almanah-dict-bio/1003728/10 (Access Date: 04.11.2018).
According to Khrushchev's daughter, Rada Adzhubey, in Khrushchev's apparatus Lebedev played the restraining role of a "rational liberal." See: Yadviga Yuferova, "Rada Adzhubey: Otec Krym otdaval na moih glazah [Rada Adzhubey: Father gave Crimea before my eyes,]" *Rossijskaya gazeta*, 3607/19.10.2004. https://rg.ru/2004/10/19/adzhubej-dz.html (Access Date: 04.11.2018).

[118] Gevorkyan, "Intervyu s Leonidom Zamyatinym" 6/24.02.1998, 14.

[119] Thanks to the patronage of his father-in-law, Adzhubey's career was successful: in 1950 he came to work at "Komsomolskaya Pravda" and in nine years reached the position of Chief Editor. Later Adzhubey was appointed as a Chief Editor of the newspaper "Izvestia."

[120] Until 1958, Valentin Falin was working in the Information Committee at the MFA of the USSR and later on joined the Foreign Ministry as an adviser and Deputy Department Head. Until 1964, he was a leader of Gromyko's group of advisers. From 1966 to 1968 he was the Head of the 2nd European (British) Department of the MFA but later was transferred to the Soviet Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany, where he spent 7 years.

[121] A year before the death of Stalin Lev Mendelevich became a member of the Central Apparatus of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 7 years. From 1965 he was promoted to the Head of the MFA's Latin America Department. Two years, from 1968 to 1970, Mendelevich was serving as a Deputy of the Soviet Permanent Representative to the UN. Later on, most part of his career he was Ambassador-at-large of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing with various diplomatic missions. See Russian Jewish Encyclopedia online: https://www.rujen.ru/index.php (Access Date: 04.11.2018).

[122] Gevorkyan, "Intervyu s Leonidom Zamyatinym" 6/24.02.1998, 14.

The usual time to write a thematic part of the speech varied from three-four days to three months.[123] However, the preparation of speeches of special importance, such as, for example, the main speech by the Secretary General at the Congress of the CPSU, could start almost a year prior.[124] The work of the speechwriters themselves was the so-called "brainstorming" at the state dachas in the nearby Moscow villages such as Volynskoe, Gorki, Zavidovo or Ogarevo. The "working group" was writing the texts using the General Secretary's notes, the excerpts on diplomatic relations from specialists of the MFA,[125] and the notes from the KGB. After the first draft was compiled it was read out loud to the General Secretary. His comments were immediately written down by stenographers and later given back to the "working group" for editing the text of the speech. This cycle could repeat one more time before the text would be circulated among Politburo members for their notes. Then the final text would return to Khrushchev for him to decide which notes from the Politburo members should be included into the text and which should not. However, as Zamyatin says, Khrushchev was almost never engaged in the editing process and generally was not paying much attention to the Politburo comments on the text.[126] Ideally, after the process of editing began, the final proofreading of the speech was supposed to take place together with the General Secretary, but with Khrushchev, this was rarely the case.[127]

The analysis shows that these "enlightened bureaucrats" who were involved in the speechwriting process were subjected to the "spontaneous" needs of the General Secretary and were left without any institutional affiliation. Furthermore, until this moment, the

[123] See: Aleksandr Bovin, *XX Vek Kak Zhizn': Vospominaniia*, 99.
[124] See: Vadim Medvedev, *V komande Gorbacheva vzglyad iznutri*, 20-21.
[125] Some sources mention that for the MFA parts of the speech, yellow-colored paper was used to signify the status and priority of the message. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontaj do Gorbacheva*. 23.
[126] See the online source: "Delitsya svoimi vospominaniyami Leonid Mitrofanovich ZAMYATIN byvshij rukovoditel mezhdunarodnogo otdela CK KPSS" https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1018517/11/Pikov-_Ya_nachinayu_voynu.html (Access Date: 04.11.2018).
[127] Andrey V. Kolesnikov, *Spichraitery: Chronika Professii, Sochinjavshej i Izmenjavshej Mir* [*Speechwriters: Chronicle of the Profession, Which Created and Altered the World*] (Moscow: AST: HRANITEL, 2007). See also: Gevorkyan, "Intervyu s Leonidom Zamyatinym" 6/24.02.1998, 13.

analyzed sources do not provide enough personal information about these groups' relation to the imagined community of the "sixties generation." However, if the roots of these connections were not clearly seen during the Khrushchev era, they will become clearer in the following subchapter, in which I will provide the description of how these informally gathered people brought about the routinization of the professional *kollektiv* of speechwriters.

Collective Speechwriting under Brezhnev and the "Routinization"[128] of the Profession

- Is it possible to wrap an elephant in a newspaper?
- Yes, if it contains the speech of Brezhnev.
Joke from the 1960s[129]

In the Russian-language version of the monograph *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* by Alexei Yurchak, the author writes that, with Gorbachev in power, the ideological transformations had started altogether changing the "discursive structure" in the USSR, dooming its end.[130] The author claims that during the late Soviet system[131] the "authoritative word," by being constantly reproduced in its official texts, rituals and other acts, was increasingly getting detached from the "reality" and creating the "performative shift." The author calls the gap between the ways the system was formulating itself and its original meaning the "performance shift." Due to the authoritative discourse becoming "numbed" throughout late socialism, the form of statements began to

[128] As I have mentioned in the introduction, Max Weber's terminology seems to be applicable here. Over the course of time, a new bureaucratic group has been routinized in the apparatus through the transformation of the originally creative work into monotonous and tedious work by introducing strict standardization and strict fixation of functions. Max Weber, *Politics As a Vocation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965).
[129] Kolesnikov, *Spichraitery*, 35.
[130] For this chapter I will mostly use the Russian version of the book, which is much more detailed than the original one. Alexei Yurchak, *Eto Bylo Navsegda Poka Ne Konchilos. Poslednee Sovetskoe Pokolenie [Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More]* (Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2014), 572.
[131] The author also calls this period "Late Socialism" meaning the timeframe from the mid-1950s to Perestroika. See: Alexei Yurchak, "Soviet Hegemony of Form: Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 03 (July 2003): 480–510.

prevail over their meaning. Over time, "authoritative" statements of the highest echelons of power became more and more separated from the "reality," that is, they did not describe the present situation, but simply reproduced the form.

This view could already remind the reader of the paradigm of the suppressive role of the state within the confines of the Soviet Subjectivity approach, which was illustrated earlier. Together with the theory of "numbed" authoritative discourse by Yurchak, this subchapter will reveal how the process of creating speeches corresponds with the first overarching view on the Soviet Subjectivity approach, appealing to the suppressive character of the Soviet state. It will be done on the case of the tendencies which occurred in the speechwriting for the General Secretary during the 1964 – 1982 period. Based on the memoirs and diaries of Brezhnev's speechwriters, I will trace the institutional and practical routinization of the speechwriting practices. The specificity of the sources at my disposal narrows the focus of the research to the speechwriting on topics of international relations. Thus, to examine the speechwriting process, the subchapter seeks to look at the departmental affiliation of speechwriters and their respective practices under Brezhnev.

In her article, Susanne Schattenberg[132] writes about Brezhnev's scenarios of power by analogy with Richard Wortman's analysis of the Russian Monarchy.[133] Schattenberg describes how Brezhnev was legitimizing his position of Secretary General by introducing care for the people and trust as his scenario of power. This self-positioning was his constant demonstration, through rituals and protocols, that he is, in fact, just a first among equals in the collective leadership, and, thus, on his behalf, he would never go against the collective will.[134] A part of Brezhnev's long-lasting image was the collective speechwriting practice.

[132] Schattenberg, "Trust, Care, and Familiarity in the Politburo."
[133] Richard Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, Studies of the Harriman Institute (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995).
[134] Schattenberg, "Trust, Care, and Familiarity in the Politburo," 839.

Building up on Schattenberg's article, I intend to not only describe the procedure of collective speechwriting, but also elaborate on the increasing role of the International Department and the "Department of Socialist Countries" of the CPSU Central Committee, while paying significant attention to the speechwriting on international relations.

The collective speechwriting process was meticulously described by Alexander Bovin, who states in his memoirs that there were four approximate groups of specialists participating in the speechwriting for Secretary General. The first one "headed" ideology in all possible directions: culture, art, science, education. Bovin writes: "They knew what "good" is and what "bad" is. And they were responsible for ensuring that subversive opinions were not expressed. They determined what was necessary to read and what was forbidden. What was not prohibited to say, and what was better not to."[135] The second group was supervised by leaders of the national economy, and each ministry had in the office its "curators." Usually these people were experienced specialists who knew the field. The third group is described by Bovin as the executive power holders.[136] They were representatives from the Administrative Department, through which the Party oversaw the activities of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the situation in the armed forces, the work of the court and prosecutors. The last, but not least, was the group which consisted of the members of two "brotherly" departments: The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the Department of the CPSU Central Committee for Relations with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries.[137] I will pay significant attention to these two departments, as they were the providers of the international relations parts of the General Secretary's speeches.

[135] Aleksandr Bovin, *XX Vek Kak Zhizn′: Vospominaniia*, 72.
[136] Aleksandr Bovin, 71.
[137] Kolesnikov, *Spichraitery: Chronika Professii, Sochinjavshej i Izmenjavshej Mir*, 36–59.

Created on the basis of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee started operating during the culmination of the Second World War, in the summer of 1943. In coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this Department was shaping the international policy of the USSR. Through it, the CPSU led the communist movements throughout the world. The ID could be called the Department for the preparation of the world socialist revolution.[138] Two years after the death of Stalin, Vladimir Ponomarev became the Head of the Department, and remained in the post until the rise of Perestroika reforms in 1986. In 1956, right after the Hungarian "ellenforradalom," (counterrevolution) the Department of the CPSU Central Committee for Relations with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries was created as the "Second International Department," and was headed by Iurii Andropov. The sphere of legislation of the CWPSC Department was limited to the relations with the communist/socialist parties of the countries of the "Socialist Camp," including both the Warsaw Pact states and the Non-Aligned Movement countries. Since the communist parties of the socialist countries were ruling parties, the relations between foreign socialist parties and the CWPSC Department should be perceived at the level of foreign policy. Accordingly, the department of the Central Committee was even more closely cooperating with the Foreign Ministry, with the embassies in and of the socialist countries, tracking the situation in each country, participating in the design and implementation of foreign policy actions by basically imposing or promoting the Soviet experience during the other countries' socialist construction.

Describing the staff of these departments, Bovin says:

[138] Read more on the ID's international actions and strategies of persuasion: Jan S. Adams, "Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee," *Slavic Review* 48, no. 04 (1989): 614–30, https://doi.org/10.2307/2499786.

> People who worked in the "brotherly" *(bratskih)* departments had contacts around the world, they knew languages, often went abroad. The effectiveness of their work implied knowledge of the actual, rather than the propagated, picture of events, the ability to argue, a certain flexibility in the discussions. Therefore, in the "brotherly" departments more educated people were working, often skeptical of the dogmatism of the Soviet ideology. There were exceptions, but in general, in our corridors people breathed more freely than others... This was known to all, and many did not like it, but there was nothing to be done about this after the 20th CPSU Congress.[139]

Further in the memoirs, Bovin writes that the consultants' groups appeared to be an even more exceptional group of specialists in the departments, who at the same time performed the speechwriting duties for the Secretary General. Embarking on a detailed description of these consultants' groups, it is significant to mention that, aside from regular speeches and reports for the Politburo, another duty of the consultants from both of the mentioned departments was the writing of memoirs for the Secretary General. There is a variety of accounts of who exactly was ghostwriting Brezhnev's Memoirs: nine books (six published during Brezhnev's life, the rest posthumously) and also the tenth book titled "Vospominania [Memories]" which was a shortened compilation of all previous books. The author of the most famous book of Brezhnev's memoirs, *Tselina,* was Aleksandr Murzin,[140] who, unlike almost all other speechwriters, was never affiliated to the ID or CWPSC Department, or any other state department. Aside from Murzin, I managed to identify Anatoliy Agranovskiy,[141] Vitaliy Ignatenko,[142] Leonid Zamyatin,[143] and Vadim Zagladin[144] among the ghostwriters of Brezhnev's memoirs.[145]

[139] Aleksandr Bovin, *XX Vek Kak Zhizn': Vospominaniia*, 72.

[140] Unlike almost all other speechwriters, Aleksandr Murzin was never affiliated in the ID or RCWPSC, or any other state department. After the graduation from the Faculty of Journalism at the Ural State University in 1953, he was working as a special correspondent in newspapers "Komsomolskaya Pravda" and "Pravda" from the very beginning of the 1960s until 1989.

[141] In 1958, he graduated from the Higher Literary Courses at the Literary Institute of Maxim Gorky and already in 1961 became a special correspondent for the newspaper "Izvestia." In the 1970s, Agranovsky was called "journalist number one," over the course of his life, he published more than 20 books, including the second part of the Brezhnev memoirs' trilogy "Vozrozhdeniye."

[142] Like Aleksandr Murzin, in the early 1960s Vitaliy Ignatenko was a correspondent in "Komsomolskaya Pravda." However, his career went beyond an exclusively journalist path. During three years (1975-1978) he had served as a Deputy Director General of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). After that, at the invitation of Boris Ponomarev, he got a position of the Deputy Head in the ID. During Perestroika, Ignatenko became the chief editor of the "Novoe Vremya" magazine.

[143] Leonid Zamyatin occupied various positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he started to work at the age of 24. After the death of Stalin, he became the First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the USSR

On the basis of the CWPSC Department, the Subdivision of Information (*podotdel informatsii*) was created in 1964,[146] consisting of different consultants whose primary role was speechwriting. Later on, aside from the Subdivision of Information, the consultants of different sectors of the Department also had a duty of performing speechwriting together with an analysis of information about the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries, and wrote reports. In the first half of Brezhnev's rule, the heads of the consultants' groups in the Subdivision of Information were such people as Alexander Bovin, Fedor Burlatsky,[147] and Georgy Arbatov.[148] That was the first consultant's group, with which I would argue the institutionalization of the speechwriting profession started, inasmuch as in the same fashion consultants were performing the speechwriting duties at the International Department. At the approximately same time as the Subdivision of Information (*podotdel informatsii*) was created in the CWPSC Department, in the International

to the UN based in New York. In a short period of three years from 1957 to 1960, he was relocated to Vienna to take a chair of Permanent Representative of the USSR in the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under Brezhnev, for almost a decade (1962-1970), he was the Head of the Press Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before he finally became the Head of TASS for another eight years (1970-1978). The biographical report was taken from the webpage of the research project "Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoj partii i Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1898-1991" http://www.knowbysight.info/ZZZ/02675.asp (Access Date: 04.11.2018).

[144] Just like Shahnazarov, Vadim Zagladin was working in the journal "Problemy mira i sotsializma [Problems of Peace and Socialism]," and just like Chernyaev in its Prague editorial office, in the beginning of the 1960s. From July 1964, he also worked in the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Working at the Department for roughly fourteen years, he served as a consultant, Deputy Head, First Deputy Head before being invited by Gorbachev to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1988.

[145] Including people mentioned above, Murzin also wrote about Chernenko being responsible for the memoir-writing group. See Murzin's interview "Kak pisalis memuary. Ispoved suflyora. [How to write a memoir. Prompter's Confession]" on the website dedicated to memory of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev. See: http://leonidbrezhnev.ucoz.ru/publ/stati_zametki_intervju/kak_pisalis_memuary/2-1-0-25 (Accessed 07.04.2019)

[146] This is an approximate date taken from the memoir of Alexander Bovin. See: Aleksandr Bovin, *XX Vek Kak Zhizn′: Vospominaniia*.

[147] Finishing his postgraduate studies in law at the USSR Academy of Sciences, he became the academic secretary of the editorial and publishing council for social sciences of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and an employee of the international department of the journal "Kommunist." In 1960, he also became a consultant for the CWPSC Department, holding the post for just five years. From 1971 almost until the end of Perestroika, he was the Head of the Department of Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CPSU (at the International Lenin School).

[148] Arbatov was the first Head of the consultants group from 1964 to 1967, in between being the Head of the sector of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences and serving as the Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which he was a founder of. Through decades until the collapse of the USSR the Institute was the largest scientific center, carrying out comprehensive research on the political, military, economic and social problems of the United States and Canada.

Department Vladimir Ponomarev also created the consultants' group which affiliated such prominent speechwriters as the already mentioned Vadim Zagladin, Karen Brutents,[149] and, most importantly for the later period, Anatoly Chernyaev.

Even though Shahnazarov describes top relationships in the CWPSC Department as a struggle behind the scenes between "two Kostyas," Rusakov[150] and Katushev,[151] it did not lead to factionalism among consultants, but preserved the general atmosphere of free thinking already described by Bovin.[152] Alexander Murzin would even say this about consultants: "Some speechwriters called themselves "legal dissidents."[153] Unlike ordinary dissidents, they did not go on demonstrations with posters, which made no sense. But they could at least, by centimeters, make changes in the country."[154] That is the description of consultants Shahnazarov gives in the memoirs:

> Consultants, recruited mainly from the scientific and journalistic circles, differed in thinking more freely, a tendency not to take anything at face value, as they say, "dare to have their own judgment." Working in the apparatus, fully complying with the necessary discipline, they were not apparatchiks in the widespread sense of the word, i.e. obedient servants who do not dare to question the reasonability of the orders of the leadership, rejecting any seditious thought, if suddenly it comes to their mind.[155]

[149] During almost a decade in the 1960s (from 1961 to 1969), Karen Brutents was the Head of the Department of the "National Liberation Movement" of the Prague editorial board of the journal "Problemy mira i sotsializma." At the same time from 1961 he worked in the International Department, there he occupied the position of the first Deputy Head until 1972.

[150] Until 1964, when his career became intertwined with the CWPSC Department, Rusakov was the Deputy Minister of Fisheries of the USSR and even was the Minister of Fisheries for couple of years. In the Department he served as a Deputy Head, First Deputy Head and as Head from 1968 to 1972, before becoming an assistant of Brezhnev for another five years. He replaced Bovin who, pretty suddenly lost the place of Brezhnev's favored speechwriter. After that, in 1977, Rusakov got back to being a Head of the CWPSC Department again until his death in 1986.

[151] Already in 1968, Katushev had become secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and in 1972 he was the Head of the CWPSC Department. He kept the post until 1977, when he became the Permanent Representative of the USSR in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). The really fascinating curve of the career rollercoaster of Katushev happened after Andropov became the Secretary General in 1982. That year Katushev was "exiled" as an ambassador to Cuba. Only Perestroika returned him back to Moscow to the place of the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.

[152] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 118.

[153] See the online source: "Interview with Alexander Murzin," *Orthodox Newspaper of the North of Russia "VERA" - "ESKOM,"* n.d., URL: http://www.rusvera.mrezha.ru/488/9.htm. (Accessed 11.04.2019)

[154] See: "Interview with Alexander Murzin."

[155] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 133.

In this light, I claim that the rationale behind hiring people predominantly from journalistic or social scientistific backgrounds was that they were both experts in their fields and the Soviet equivalent of *homme de lettres.* As Alexandrov-Agentov writes, groups of consultants were not only tolerated by Leonid Ilyich, but were necessary for him, at least because at the beginning of his rule he was "completely disoriented" in the foreign policy field. Therefore, he needed knowledgeable, and most importantly, faithful people by his side. Moreover, Brezhnev sought gifted writers to distinguish his ostensibly sophisticated appearance from Khrushchev's "peasant dialect."[156]

Furthermore, the image, described by Shahnazarov, cannot fail to awaken associations with "Zhivago's children" presented by Vladislav Zubok,[157] or how these people were usually called during the 1970s, *shestidesyatniki*. Zubok called "Zhivago's children" the distinct, usually university-educated part of the Soviet *intelligentsia*,[158] which was not positioning themselves in the opposition to the system. Instead, these Soviet citizens put their hopes in the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 and were propagating "socialism with the human face" in the 1960s. For Zubok, this "group" is, in some respects, composed of believers in the socialist system, at least of the form of socialism they were familiar with, the example being their own state.[159] That is why Zubok specifically lists not only famous dissidents, but, most importantly, "enlightened bureaucrats" (*prosveshyonnye apparatchiki*) as a part of this imagined community.[160] Indeed, Alexandov-Agentov,[161] Bovin,[162] Burlatsky,[163]

[156] Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai Do Gorbacheva [From Kollontai to Gorbachev]*, 93–94.
[157] Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia*.
[158] I share this vision of *intelligentsia* presented in the book by Benjamin Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev*, which puts *intelligentsia* in a neutral framework of "a status group in the Weberian sense." To signify why intelligentsia is a matter of a status in opposition to class, Tromly emphasizes intelligentsia's particular habitus (in sociological terms), manifested in "ethical consciousness, concern for transcendent ideas, and distaste for banal and selfish ("petty-bourgeois") concerns," as well as, the absence of accumulation of wealth and power in Soviet society by intelligentsia's "culturedness." See: Benjamin Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 9–11.
[159] Zubok, *Zhivago's Children,* 20-22.
[160] *Zhivago's Children,* 437.
[161] Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontay Do Gorbacheva [From Kollontai to Gorbachev], 76.

Shahnazarov[164] – they all called themselves and their colleagues consultants *shestidesyatniki* to underline their special set of beliefs and hopes.

There was a debate in Russian-language historiography about whether the Second World War veterans could be considered precursors to the "sixties generation" or its antagonists. Back in 1999, Boris Grushin, a Soviet and Russian sociologist and philosopher, wrote about the 1950s:

> It was a brilliant time of victories, defeats, a real struggle... It was then that something very influential was happening, the erosion of society began, little by little, the tongues were unleashed. Front-line soldiers, people who saw Europe, returned. The Iron Curtain was broken through by the war.[165]

Another sociologist, Boris Firsov, also partially shares this opinion about front-line soldiers in the book *Raznomyslie v SSSR 1940-1960-e gody. Istoriya, teoriya, praktika [Dissent in the USSR. 1940-1960. History, theory, practice]*, where he introduced the concept of "Soviet generations."[166] This is an ideal type of generational stratification of the Soviet citizens, mostly intelligentsia, which states that there were at least two such cohorts throughout the history of the Soviet state. Interestingly, for Firsov "the first Soviet generation" was neither those people who supported the Bolsheviks in the years of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War, nor those who were imbued with communist ideas or learned communist rhetoric to build a career in the newborn state during the late 1920s and 1930s. The author includes in this group exclusively those children who were born under the Soviet regime and later fought fascism in the Great Patriotic War. People of this generation were simultaneously true Stalinists and those who, having marched through Europe as

[162] Aleksandr Bovin, XX Vek Kak Zhizn´: Vospominaniia, 72.
[163] Burlatskiy, *Vozhdi i Sovetniki: O Khrushchove, Andropove i Ne Tol'ko o Nikh [Leaders and Advisers: About Khrushchev, Andropov, and Not Only about Them]*, 47.
[164] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 77.
[165] Boris Grushin, "Gorkij vkus nevostrebovannosti [Bitter taste of unclaimedness,]" *Demoscope Weekly*, 301–302/2007. http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0301/nauka04.php (Access Date: 04.10.2018).
[166] See: Boris Firsov. *Raznomyslie v SSSR 1940-1960-e gody. Istoriya, teoriya, praktika [Dissent in the USSR. 1940-1960. History, theory, practice]* (St. Petersburg: European University Press in St. Petersburg; European House, 2008), 202-204.

liberators, understood the necessity of reforming the Soviet state system. These war veterans returned home and focused on rebuilding a war-torn country. However, the "next Soviet generation" inherited their desire for reforms. Firsov sees this "second generation" as being unchallenged by war and repressions and thus, it was precisely this generation that was later called the "sixties generation." These people, the author claims, became the critical drive, which, firstly, revised Stalinism and then the socialist ideology itself, eventually abolishing communism in the USSR. Thus, for Firsov, the Soviet war veterans, on the one hand, were devoted to Stalin as a leader of the army and a winner of the war, and, on the other hand, these people "saw Europe," which made them a generation that desired a reformation of the USSR.[167]

However, Nikolai Mitrokhin, a sociologist and a historian, criticized the idea of "Decembrist front-line soldiers," arguing that neither Grushin nor Firsov had provided sufficient evidence of "front-line stories about Europe which somehow corrupted the Soviet system."[168] The argument of Mitrokhin is the opposite:

> On the contrary, it was the "front-line soldiers" who formed the backbone of the lower and middle nomenclature, which from the *ZhEKs* to the Central Committee apparatus up to Gorbachev's time firmly suppressed all the "sixties" impulses, [this group of former soldiers] was the support, if not the main personnel reservoir, of the "Stalinists" and was indomitable in its desire to increase its own privileges.[169]

This debate would not appear in this subchapter if it were not for the matter going way beyond just a question of whether the war veterans belonged to the "sixties generation" or not. This debate is actually directly connected to the speechwriting duties. As Mitrokhin further states in the article, the speechwriters and generally open-minded apparatchiks were in a difficult situation: groups of advisers and consultants in international affairs, all with higher education received in the post-war period, had practically no chance of promotion for

[167] Boris Firsov. *Raznomyslie v SSSR 1940-1960-e gody*, 224.
[168] Nikolai Mitrokhin. "Zametki o sovetskoj sociologii (po prochtenii knigi Borisa Firsova) [Notes on Soviet Sociology (after reading the book by Boris Firsov,)]" *"NLO"*, 98/2009. http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2009/98/mi13-pr.html (Access Date: 28.10.2018).
[169] Ibid.

the higher ranks during Brezhnev's era. Journalists, political scientists, historians and experts in international relations composed the body of those responsible for speechwriting who have worked abroad, imbued with the ideas of the XX Party Congress, and who were writing other people's speeches and reports for decades.[170] Expanding on this claim of Mitrokhin, we can recall Murzin's description of speechwriters, responsible for the foreign policy speeches as "legal dissidents," who were capable, little by little, of inserting some changes in the speeches of the Secretary General. However, if one gets closer into the process of speechwriting, Murzin's description could appear as a large-scale overestimation.

While the group of consultants of the "brotherly" Departments was "brainstorming" diplomatic parts of speeches for days (or even weeks) somewhere on state dachas such as the ones in Gorki, Volynskoe, Ogarevo villages, other groups, mentioned by Bovin, were preparing their parts at the same dacha. Using the excerpts on diplomatic relations from specialists of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),[171] and the notes from the KGB, "brotherly" Departments' consultants were creating their part of the text.[172] This part, as all the others, was later on reviewed by the group which "headed" ideology, and sometimes even by the former Head of the ID, Mikhail Suslov. Subsequently, when the first draft was compiled, the reviewing process had started again, but with the Secretary General. That was the least efficient part of the speech creation, as Brezhnev rarely listened to the speech drafts. In the same manner as Khrushchev,[173] Brezhnev was almost never engaged in the editing process, as he preferred hunting, while the "working group" was creating the text.[174]

[170] Nikolay Mitrokhin, "Elita 'Zakrytogo Obshchestva': MGIMO, Mezhdunarodnyye Otdely Apparata TSK KPSS i Prosopografiya Ikh Sotrudnikov [Elite of a 'Closed Society': MGIMO, International Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Prosopography of Their Employees]," *Ab Imperio*, 2013, 174–75.
[171] Some sources mention that for the MFA parts of the speech, yellow-colored paper was used to signify the status and priority of the message. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontaj do Gorbacheva*. 23.
[172] Aleksandr Bovin, *XX Vek Kak Zhizn': Vospominaniia*, 75.
[173] See the online source: "Delitsya svoimi vospominaniyami Leonid Mitrofanovich ZAMYATIN byvshij rukovoditel mezhdunarodnogo otdela CK KPSS" https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1018517/11/Pikov-_Ya_nachinayu_voynu.html (Access Date: 04.11.2018).
[174] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 177.

However, if the speech was read out loud to the Secretary General, and if he had any comments, they were fixed and the editing process of the speech would start anew. The last stage of the editing process was compiled with the Politburo members' comments, which were then either agreed on or dismissed by the speechwriters. Thus, three stages of the proofreading of the speech show that, despite the fact that the reform-minded consultants were working in these speechwriting groups, they were not given any freedom of expression of views which would not be agreed upon in the Party. The only place where they had a greater possibility of maneuver was the international policy line known as Brezhnev's Détente.

Brezhnev's "Desire for Peace"

In January 1965, the MFA and the CWPSC Department appealed to the Politburo with the claim about the need for the immediate improvement in relationships with the USA, since the Cuban Missile Crisis and the escalation of the Vietnam War, the relationships between two superpowers were on the edge of a world war. Politburo declined the claim, and Alexander Shelepin,[175] Politburo member, scolded the heads of these entities, Andrei Gromyko and Iurii Andropov, for the absence of "class approach" and "class flair."[176] As the new face in the Soviet international relations, Shelepin understood the aim of the Soviet foreign policy resting on the warming up of the relationships with other socialist and communist countries, first of all China, after vagaries of Nikita Khrushchev. His understanding was not different from the other Politburo members, such as Mikhail Suslov, Sergey Trapeznikov,[177] and Alexei Kosygin, among others. Thus, in the second part of the

[175] In the period from 1964 to 1967, Shelepin was one of the main rivals of Brezhnev, who, with Brezhnev in power, had started to lose the positions. His demotion started from 1965, when he lost the position of the Deputy Head of government and of the Chairman of the Party-State Control Committee. And three years after, Shelepin was demoted to the position of Ambassador to Denmark.

[176] Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 195.

[177] Already from 1956 Sergey Trapeznikov became Leonid Brezhnev's assistant. During the first five years of the 1960s Trapeznikov was the Vice-Rector of the Higher Party School at the Central Committee of the CPSU on scientific work. After that for almost twenty years, from 1965 to 1983, he was the Head of the Department

1960s, the international relations line was targeted on the support of the United Arab Republic (already dissolved into separate Syria and Egypt) after the Six-Day War and increased financial and military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam after the direct US military intervention in the Vietnamese conflict.

However, the line of Soviet foreign policy before Gorbachev did not take such a straightforward direction, but at one point presented the curve of the Brezhnev's Détente. The historian, Vladislav Zubok, writes in the monograph *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, that in spite of his political "centrism" and an absence of foresight in the international politics,[178] Brezhnev did have a desire for the peace, which according to Zubok, he would preach in almost every meeting at the governmental dachas with other Politburo members and sometimes even with the leaders of Western capitalist countries.[179] Despite the views of the strong cohort of "conservatives"[180] in the Central Committee, who would even exclude the "peaceful coexistence" passages from the part on the international relations in the Brezhnev's fist report to the Central Committee, some of the Secretaries, such as Gromyko, Ponomarev, and Andropov found some merit in Brezhmev's aspiration for peace. For them, the dialogue on the issue of the arms race control could only be initiated by the "strong country," from a position of force. After the "success" of putting down the Prague Spring and the very real possibility to finally solve the West Berlin issue, the Politburo members who saw the rationale in starting the Détente secured their view even more.

of Science and Educational Institutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Since 1983 Trapeznikov was sent to retirement.

[178] As it was already mentioned in the memoirs of Alexandrov-Agentov, Brezhnev did not have any experience in the field of international relations, and that is why he had a need to get an assistant-advisor in the field, whom Alexandrov-Agentov eventually became in 1964. See: Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai Do Gorbacheva [From Kollontai to Gorbachev]*, 93–94.

[179] Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 199.

[180] In the context of various memoirs, the term "conservatives" in the Central Committee staff would usually refer to the people sharing the hard line politics towards the capitalist countries, excluding any kind of cooperation with the "ideological enemies."

With both silent and pronounced agreement of the Heads of the "brotherly" Departments and the MFA, speechwriters, the "enlightened bureaucrats," did inspire Brezhnev to take the path of the Détente through personal conversations in "*gosdacha*s" (governmental dachas), such as Volynskoe, Gorki or Ogarevo. Of course, I am not talking about a full agreement between Brezhnev and "enlightened bureaucrats," since at that time Brezhnev was a very talented maneuverer within the apparatus and was able to balance the interests by clashing the "extremes" against each other. By fully introducing the collective scenario of power mentioned by Susanne Schattenberg, he would carefully choose the path of how and to what degree to realize his desire for peace. He was achieving it by introducing a somewhat special speechwriting and report-writing practices relating to cases of West Berlin or arms control negotiations with Nixon. Bovin reports on this:

> The following practice was established. At first, Brezhnev sent a draft to a narrow circle of people whose opinion interested him.[181] Together with him, we went through the comments, took something out, and kept other things. And only after that the official sending followed: to all members and candidate members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee.[182]

Eventually, they were shaping most of the Brezhnev's negotiations with Willy Brandt about the issue of West Berlin and with Richard Nixon, preparing the speech after signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-I).[183]

Indeed, since 1964, the very first year of Brezhnev's position as the General Secretary, official speeches were impregnated with intentions to demilitarize the world, stop the arms race, and grant European security through Détente.[184] This foreign policy line was pursued

[181] It usually meant close assistants such as Aleksandrov-Agentov. See: Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontay Do Gorbacheva [From Kollontai to Gorbachev], 134.
[182] Aleksandr Bovin, XX Vek Kak Zhizn´: Vospominaniia, 109.
[183] Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 205. Interestingly, Helsinki Accords were of marginal concern of the "brotherly" Departments consultants, being fully under supervision of MFA. See: Aleksandr Bovin, XX Vek Kak Zhizn´: Vospominaniia, 121-168.
[184] The rhetoric of the "peaceful coexistence" for capitalist and communist systems appeared 8 years earlier in the Khrushchev's speech, which was later published as a brochure. Nikita Khruschev, *O mirnom sosuschestvovanii* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1959), 8.

by the Soviet Union throughout the entire period of the second half of the 1960s.[185] However, in this case, despite the fact that general disarmament and security occupied a special place in speeches, no political action of any kind had been taken to curtail the arms race immediately after Brezhnev became the Secretary General. During the second half of the 1960s, Brezhnev's desire for peace resulted in negotiations only closer to the beginning of the 1970s. During the 1970s, the situation had drastically changed. The proclamations of a disarmament strategy were evolving into real negotiations as the limitation program for the strategic arms had been launched.[186] Disarmament and nuclear abandonment become the major topic of the 3rd of July 1974 Soviet negotiations with the United States of America[187] and become a part of Brezhnev's 25th CPSU Congress speech in 1976.[188] These intentions were not only talked through but implemented in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I of 1972 and SALT II of 1979. Sometimes, both Brezhnev and the Minister of the Soviet Foreign Affairs, Andrey Gromyko, would even proclaim an intention to completely abandon both strategic and nuclear weapons: "We call on the UN and its member-states to continue

[185] See, for example, "Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda. Doklad na torzhestvennom sobranii v Kremlevskom Dvorce sezdov posvyaschennom 20-letiyu pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne, 8 maya 1965 goda;" "Vystuplenie v Kremle na prieme v chest vypusknikov voennykh akademiy, 3 iyulya 1965 goda;" "Otchetnyy doklad Centralnogo Komiteta KPSS XXIII sezdu Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 29 marta 1966 goda;" "Rech na mitinge sovetsko-polskoy druzhby v Kremlevskom Dvorce sezdov, 15 oktyabrya 1966 goda;" "Rech pered izbiratelyami, 10 marta 1967 goda;" in Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 1, 1964-1967. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970). See also "Pyatdesyat let velikikh pobed socializma Doklad i zaklyuchitelnaya rech na sovmestnom torzhestvennom zasedanii Centralnogo Komiteta KPSS Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR v Kremlevskom Dvorce sezdov, 3-4 noyabrya 1967 goda;" "Rech na mitinge sovetsko-vengerskoy druzhby v Kremlevskom Dvorce sezdov, 3 iyulya 1968 goda;" "Rech na pervomayskikh torzhestvakh na Krasnoy ploschadi v Moskve 1 maya 1969 goda," "Rech na torzhestvennom zasedanii v Khar'kove, 14 aprelya 1970 goda" in Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 2, 1967-1970. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970).

[186] This switch had found its place in several speeches. See for example: "Rech na obede vo dvorce Bolshoy Trianon v Versale, 25 oktyabrya 1971 goda," "Vystuplenie po francuzskomu televideniyu, 29 oktyabrya 1971 goda," "Rech na VI sezde Polskoy obedinennoy rabochey partii v Varshave, 7 dekabrya 1971 goda" in Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 3, 1970-1972. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972).

[187] Leonid Brezhnev, "Rech na obede v chest' sovetskikh rukovoditeley v posolstve Soedinennykh SHtatov Ameriki v SSSR 2 iyulya 1974 goda," in *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 5, 1974-1976. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976).

[188] Leonid Brezhnev, "Otchet Centralnogo Komiteta KPSS i ocherednye zadachi partii v oblasti vnutrenney i vneshney politiki. Doklad XXV sezdu KPSS. 24 fevralya 1976 goda" *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 5, 1974-1976. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976).

and intensify efforts to reduce step by step and then completely eliminate the possibility of the [nuclear] threat from people's lives."[189]

Brezhnev's personal interest in the Détente was inspiring and motivating the "enlightened bureaucrats," but did not prevent the deterioration of his health, thus withdrawing Brezhnev from the active position of the peacemaker. Less than a year after the Helsinki Accords, he underwent a clinical death. This was the time when official speeches, in fact, were not primarily real political projects for transforming international relations, but instead became a repetitive series of ideological slogans, so irritating for the speech-writing "enlightened bureaucrats." If speechwriters were not interested in the creation of the repetitive speeches, the diplomatic function of these kinds of speeches seemed to be targeted to make sure the Soviet position on the "peace preservation," intention to fight "imperialism," and other issues of the international affairs remained unchanged. That is why, even though the ideas of the disarmament were proclaimed by the Soviet government and the ratification of SALT agreements took place, the implementation of these treaties remained within the borders of the military alliances of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The intention to decrease the number of strategic or nuclear arms never meant to limit the usage of these weapons within the territories of the European socialist countries. The foreign policy rhetoric of the Brezhnev period considered Détente and disarmament initiatives only within the framework of preserving a sufficient stock of weapons to "protect the peace and security of peoples, defend revolutionary gains from the encroachments of the imperialists."[190] Thus, peace

[189] Andrey Gromyko, "Rech na generalnoy Assamblee OON, 1977," *Pravda* no. 271 (28 September 1977): 4.
[190] "47-ya godovschina Velikoy Oktyabrskoy socialisticheskoy revolyucii Doklad na torzhestvennom zasedanii v Kremlevskom Dvorce sezdov, 6 noyabrya 1964 goda," in Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 1, 1964-1967. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970). It is interesting to note that Andropov's period also perpetrated the topic of "defending socialist gains from imperialism." See, for example: "Shestdesyat let SSSR: Doklad na sovmestnom torzhestvennom zasedanii Centralnogo Komiteta KPSS Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR v Kremlevskom Dvorce sezdov, 21 dekabrya 1982," "Leninizm neischerpaemyy istochnik revolyucionnoy energii i tvorchestva mass: Doklad na torzhestvennom zasedanii v Moskve posvyaschennom 112-y godovschine so dnya rozhdeniya Lenina, 22 aprelya 1982" in Yurii Andropov, *Izbrannye rechi i stati* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), 14, 198-199.

initiatives aimed at disarmament and universal security were in place but, in Brezhnev's words: "the Communists never approached this issue from the standpoint of toothless pacifism."[191] As I have mentioned, this Central Committee's political line was shared by some of the Secretaries, such as Gromyko, Ponomarev and Andropov, who believed that the arms race control talks could be initiated "from a position of force" and by keeping up the "fight against imperialism." That is why, already in one of the Secretary General's early speeches, he also said: "We have understood well and understand now that as long as there is a threat of imperialist intervention, while imperialism threatens the world with new military adventures, the forces of progress must have the necessary military power to restrain aggression and militarism."[192] Therefore, neither "Operation Danube"[193] nor the modernization of the operational tactical complexes, which started from the second half of the 1970s on the territory of the Warsaw Pact states, were implemented in the logic of the demilitarization negotiations. That, together with other circumstances on the international arena, Zubok claims, changed the flow of Détente, and let the Soviet imperial overreach to take over, eventually resulting in the "limited Contingent of the Soviet Troops" crossing the Afghan border on the Christmas Eve of 1979.[194]

The same goes for the concept of "peaceful coexistence of two systems," which was also touched upon in each of the indicated speeches. For Soviet leaders before Gorbachev, "peaceful coexistence" for European countries meant, first of all, a clear border of these systems, recognized by all the states on the European continent.[195] From the very start of Brezhnev's term, negotiations were launched for securing and recognizing the borders after the Second World War. In 1970, these negotiations led to the signing of the Moscow and

[191] Leonid Brezhnev, "Rech na torzhestvennom zasedanii v Kharkove, 14 aprelya 1970 goda" in *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 2, 1967-1970. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970).
[192] Ibid.
[193] Official name for Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
[194] Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 227-265.
[195] Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 192–226.

Warsaw treaties, which "create[d] all the necessary prerequisites for the further progress – for creating a pan-European meeting, aiming to build the fundament for the European security system."[196] The crown of success in these negotiations was the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975. The Helsinki Declaration covered the issues of the sovereignty of states' borders and non-intervention, and also called for respect for human rights and peoples' self-determination among the international community. For leaders of the Western European states, it was paradoxical that in Brezhnev's Helsinki speech on the 31st of June 1975, he would one more time underline the issue of the non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries which had signed the Final Accords.[197] It seemed paradoxical because less than a year later the Soviet Union engaged in the politics of strengthening its European strategic direction, which was then developed under Andropov, with the deployment of the operational tactical complexes OTR-22 and OTR-23 "Oka" on the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Thus, the concept of peaceful coexistence was not intended to overcome the reality of already existing military alliances. Nevertheless, these politics signified the Soviet perception of the European space under Brezhnev and briefly under Andropov and Chernenko. Europe was a dual agent, existing simultaneously as a united entity of states which did not have disputed boundaries and were not willing to resolve the conflicts (even ideological ones) through war anymore; and as a dichotomous sphere of influence of two different military alliances. The USSR would play the constitutive role for both of these Europes by governing the Warsaw Pact as the core of the empire would govern its periphery, and claiming nuclear abandonment for the whole "European civilization."[198]

[196] Leonid Brezhnev, "Uchastnikam Assamblei obschestvennykh sil za bezopasnost i sotrudnichestvo v Evrope, 2 iyunya 1972" in *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 4, 1972-1974. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974).
[197] Leonid Brezhnev, "Vo imya mira, bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva. Vystuplenie vo dvorce "Finlyandiya" v Helsinki na Soveschanii po bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestvu v Evrope, 31 iyulya 1975" in *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 5, 1974-1976. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976).
[198] Brezhnev, "Vo imya mira, bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva..."

With the devaluation of Brezhnev's active position of the peacemaker together with ID's leading role in the developing of the Soviet foreign policy strategy, speechwriters also lost a somewhat special attitude of the Secretary General on the issues of international relations. Even though within their departments consultants did not hesitate to discuss pressing problems and critically rethink the dogmas of the system, they were not required to invent anything while making speeches. As the leadership of the Central Committee and its departments did not change for more than a decade, there was no reason for these speechwriters to propose any changes or new ideas. Their task was to make the already well-established sets of views sound "scientific/sophisticated" (*nauchno*) and not new. From this point I can claim that, in the Brezhnev era, the consultants were writing exactly the kind of texts that Alexey Yurchak wrote about. According to many testimonies,[199] for example, of Gennady Gerasimov,[200] the Brezhnev era was characterized by senselessness and boredom, as "the same phrases and even paragraphs were wandering from one speech to another."[201] Shahnazarov writes that this was how creative postgraduate students with freshly written dissertations or journalists turned into "talmudists" over time, and their consultation duty turned into "*kunstkamera.*"[202] Anatoly Chernyaev often writes in his diaries about the senselessness and the *zaboltannost'* (over repeated) of the speeches of the Secretary General (even before the period of his illness), about the accumulation of words behind which nothing had stood:

> People are tired, they are tired of this meaningless speechwriting. Additionally, laziness and irresponsibility are generated by the fact that the official reputations in the apparatus are not created "by deeds," but by the whims of B.N.,[203] who

[199] See for example the online source: "Interview with Alexander Murzin," *Orthodox Newspaper of the North of Russia "VERA" - "ESKOM,"* n.d., URL: http://www.rusvera.mrezha.ru/488/9.htm. (Accessed 11.04.2019)
[200] After graduation from the International Law Faculty of the MGIMO, for three years (1964-1967) he worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Since 1978, he hosted one of the leading TV shows "Mezhdunarodnaya panorama." In 1983-1986, he was the chief editor of the newspaper "Moscow News." During Perestroika, Gerasimov became a spokesman for Mikhail Gorbachev and press secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze.
[201] Quote from Kolesnikov, *Spichraitery*, 59.
[202] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 95.
[203] In the diary "B.N." stands for Boris Nikolaievich Ponomarev.

> consciously encourages anonymity [of and in the speech], so that General Secretary's speeches look like "an assignment of the Party." [204]

Even Alexander Yakovlev, who until 1973 worked in the Central Committee apparatus and claimed to repeatedly participate in the reports and speechwriting for the Secretary General,[205] writes in his memoirs that unified party language became a "social drug," and a "mental illness system."[206]

I did not intend to sound naïve in these concluding remarks by reducing all the speechwriters' expectations from their work to exclusively systemic reform. I recognize the pragmatic part of the speechwriters' position. They would be provided with immediate accommodation in Moscow for their whole family (usually it implied a nuclear family, but there are cases in which old parents of the speechwriter got accommodation too). Furthermore, this was coupled together with a good salary (starting from 300 rubles, compared to an average of 150 rubles in the country), an ability to use "*stolovoi lechebnogo pitaniya"* (Medical Nutrition Dining Room), and the services of the Fourth Main Directorate under the Ministry of Health. This means they were able to order groceries, which were in deficit in the country, use both the governmental dachas and sanatoria for their vacation, and get the treatment in the best medical centers and hospitals of the state. On top of that, the employees of the ID and the CWPSC Department had the possibility to travel abroad, not exclusively to the Warsaw Pact countries. Recognizing the privileges this profession opened for the speechwriters as a significant motivation for joining and showing high proficiency in the profession, however, does not completely change my view of the *kollektiv*. Their desire to get rid of Stalin-era institutions and hierarchies eventually inspired Brezhnev to begin negotiations on arms control and shaped the Détente policy of the USSR.

[204] Anatoly Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh ehpoh, 1978, 4. The same claims could be seen throughout both previous and later years: Anatoly Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh ehpoh, 1974, 45-46; 1977, 20-21, 48; 1980, 38-39, 44.
[205] Yakovlev, *Sumerki [Dusk]*, 317.
[206] Yakovlev, 462.

The testimonies of the consultants-speechwriters for Brezhnev show that their duties were not a creation of new political realities but a reproduction of standardized and formalized texts, which, exactly as Yurchak points out, were replicated from one context to another and proclaimed an endless number of times. This monotonic repetition of "the same phrases and even paragraphs," which were "wandering from one speech to another," built up the sense of a "monolithic authoritative word." In the conclusion of the Russian edition of Yurchak's book, he states that the "performative shift" occurred only during the Perestroika period. Gorbachev breached the circle of constant self-legitimization of the Soviet "authoritative discourse" by appearing as an external commentator of this "discourse," by undermining its circular logic and also by doing all of it "in the language different from the language of the Party."[207] With doing so, Gorbachev intended to renew the system and even return it on the truly Leninist path (including a hegemony of the Communist Party). However, things turned up in quite the opposite way: Gorbachev's innovation disrupted the discursive monolith of the Soviet system and, at the end, delegitimized one-party rule itself.

Conclusions

As "enlightened bureaucrats" are an inseparable part of the imagined community of "Zhivago's children," I suggest the ethos of the "sixties generation" to be a pronounced trait of the speechwriters' *kollektiv*. Distinguished by the desire for the reformation of the system after Stalin, they never wanted to abandon socialism itself. Having these ideas, the *kollektiv* of speechwriters was formed within the consultants' groups in the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the Department of the CPSU Central Committee for Relations with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries after Khrushchev's forced retirement. Before that, during Khrushchev's rule, it is not possible to speak about speechwriters as a *kollektiv* and their profession as a structured routinized

[207] Yurchak, *Eto Bylo Navsegda Poka Ne Konchilos. Poslednee Sovetskoe Pokolenie [Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More]*, 574.

enterprise. After 1964, the "spontaneous" speechwriting for Khrushchev transformed to the routinized, collective practices. Within ID and the CWPSC Department, the groups of speechwriters, most of whom had the set of values referring to the "sixties generation," got their first institutional experience.

The institutional affiliation at the same time made the clash between the self-perception and the ideas of this group with the Soviet system unavoidable. On the institutional level the Détente coincided with the shift in the balance of power between the ID and the MFA in jurisdiction over the Soviet foreign policy. Marie-Pierre Rey writes that from the second part of the 1970s the ID started to gradually loose its dominating position in the formulation of the Soviet foreign policy line, yielding to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[208] Brezhnev's desire for peace implemented in politics led to a transformation of the MFA into a powerful bureaucratic machine by "encouraging a marked increase in the staffing level of the Foreign Ministry — if the USSR maintained diplomatic outposts in 66 countries in 1959 and 95 in 1965, it was present in 108 countries in December 1970," states Rey.[209]

Additionally, the clash between the self-perception and the ideas of the speechwriters' *kollektiv* was not exclusively manifesting itself in the obvious ways of censoring and multiple stages of speeches' proofreading, but in the demand for the speech itself. If Khrushchev was claimed by speechwriters to be too "spontaneous" in the speechwriting and capable of unannounced last-minute changes, under Brezhnev, speechwriting became the routinized and even ritualized process, in which there was no need for "new minds" or the "mindful process itself." There was a need for "*pishushie per'ya*" (writing quills), which are

[208] Marie-Pierre Rey, "Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department," in *Russian Bureaucracy and the State*, ed. Don K. Rowney and Eugene Huskey (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 189–211.
[209] Rey, "Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department," 197.

able to write the standardized and depersonalized speeches, speaking on behalf of the whole Party and the whole Soviet Union.

The scrutinization of the ego documents for the Brezhnev's period signifies how, on the one hand, after Khrushchev's "Secret Speech," the system created the opportunities for the self-identification on the example of the "sixties generation," while, on the other hand, during Brezhnev it restrained the speechwriters in the numbing loop of writing the same speeches without the possibility for promotion or introducing original ideas into speeches. This example shows the obvious disconnection between the subjectivities of these people, with their abilities for idea realization, fitting the first overarching view on the Soviet Subjectivity, underlying the suppressive character of the Soviet state. The following chapter will elaborate on the transformation of the departmental structure and staff together with both the *kollektiv* and practices of the speechwriting under Gorbachev.

Chapter 3: Speechwriting during Perestroika

This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the alterations which occurred in the speechwriting practices in the middle of the 1980s. The chapter begins with the description of the departmental alterations of the MFA, the ID and the CWPSC Department, which established the leading role of the General Secretary, and secured both his desire and vision of the reformation of the Soviet system. The change within the system also meant the transformation of the Soviet international agenda. The restructuration of the institutions led to the creation of the new speechwriting team, consisting of Gorbachev's associates. The routine of the speechwriting job got intensive and required from the speechwriters not just to reformulate old ideas, but create new ones. The ego documents of the speechwriters describe the new duties in terms of the revival of the system, evoking the image of, and self-identifying with, the "sixties generation's" desires, which could "finally" be accomplished. The participation in the process of the creation of the "New Political Thinking," reflected in the ego documents, which had started the process of "the failure of the empire," as Zubok describes it, signified the alteration of the *kollektiv.* The transformation of this *kollektiv* synchronized with Hellbeck's view on Soviet Subjectivity.

The death of Leonid Brezhnev and the appointment of Iurii Andropov as a Secretary General raised hopes of the consultants of the ID and CWPSC Department, since "enlightened bureaucrats" predicted the reformist potential in the creator and former Head of one of their departments. The same day Andropov got his new position, Anatoly Chernyaev wrote in his diary:

> And now about the main thing - about Andropov. It is very good that he will become General Secretary. However, he has very poor health, he has little time to leave a mark on history. And there will be no time for warming up, being too careful, getting used to

> the position, and it is dangerous - this "process" swallows and relaxes you, the more you let it, the harder it is to break it. And it is necessary to break up with so much.[210]

After leaving this note in the diary, he continues with a fifteen-step program for the new leader, which closely resembles the upcoming ideas of Gorbachev's Perestroika, with withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, Removing SS-20 from Europe, and letting the Warsaw Pact countries to follow their own path, without the dictate of Moscow. The desire for changes was met to a very limited degree: Andropov did start the campaign against corruption in the Party apparatus. At the same time, the international affairs of the Soviet Union had suffered from renewed Cold War tensions. In the early 1980s, it was caused by the change of the foreign policy course of Washington, with the arrival of the new president and his administration in the White House. This factor was combined with the already mentioned Andropov's commitment to engage in any arms control talks or any negotiations intending to lessen the tension between the USA and USSR from a position of strength.

Andropov was more involved in the speechwriting process than Brezhnev was in his best conditions.[211] That is why Chernyaev kept expressing the hopes for Andropov's reforms and even scolded the Secretary General for being too slow with this process. "The raise of morale" during 1983 inspired the author of the diary to express genuine concerns about the fate of the country, regardless of how the "change for the better" will affect his own career, working in the ID under Boris Ponomarev, who was not open to any changes.[212] Following these sentiments, Andropov's death and the appointment of Konstantin Chernenko as a Secretary General seemed to have killed the growing hope of the "enlightened bureaucrats" for the structural reformation of the state. However, Chernenko did not turn from

[210] NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, the 11th of November, 1982, 50-51. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 01.05.2019)

[211] NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, from the 30th of January to the 29th of December, 1983, 1-37. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 08.05.2019)

[212] Chernyaev indeed, stresses that idea several times in different years in his diary. See: NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, the 29th of December, 1983, 38. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 08.05.2019)

Andropov's course, nor did he change anything in the speechwriting practices, keeping the "enlightened bureaucrats" for the formulation of the speeches, which were filled with similar ideas.

Interestingly, the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as a Secretary General in 1985 only intensified Chernyaev's feeling that any significant alterations in the Party will cause his demotion, as he is one of the apparatchiks closest to Ponomarev. On the 29th of June 1985, before being appointed as Gorbachev's assistant, he wrote:

> Curiously: I do "passionately" wait for changes, I urge Gorbachev in my heart — quicker, bolder. But after all to me personally they [changes] promise nothing good! The trampling and removal of Ponomarev will mean, most likely, retirement for me. Nevertheless, I sincerely want these changes, and people who start grumbling about Gorbachev's mettle, and even confidentially looking for an ally in me, fill me with disgust.[213]

The most paradoxical thing about his fear was the fact that Chernyaev was simultaneously right and wrong. Gorbachev's changes indeed meant the restructuration of the ID and other institutions, together with the alterations in their staff bodies. The following subchapter will uncover the departmental alterations which happened with Gorbachev in power.

Departmental Alterations from 1985

Some researchers claimed that the change in the Soviet foreign policy line started with the change of purpose, and Heads of the institutions played a paramount role in the development of the Soviet foreign policy: ID and its "brotherly" CWPSC Department together with the MFA.[214] The changes began with the replacement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the 1st of July 1985, after the Plenum of the CPSU, Chernyaev wrote in his diary the story of

[213] NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, 29th of June, 1985, 50-51. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 08.05.2019)
[214] Adams, "Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy"; Marie-Pierre Rey, "Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department," in *Russian Bureaucracy and the State*, ed. Don K. Rowney and Eugene Huskey (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 189–211.

Ponomarev's participation at a Politburo meeting which resulted in Shevardnadze's formal election as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR:

> Gorbachev unexpectedly named Shevardnadze for Minister of Foreign Affairs, commenting it as follows: "We have grown great diplomats worthy of being ministers, for example, Kornienko,[215] Chervonenko,[216] Dobrynin..." At that moment, Gromyko interrupted him and proposed Vorontsov's[217] candidacy. But the General Secretary threw him a sidelong glance and did not react. "But this area of work," he continued, "should be concentrated in the hands of the Party and therefore we must nominate a comrade from the Party leadership to this post." Ponomarev also added, about Vorontsov: "MS,[218] they say, "did not notice" his name, because giving the Foreign Ministry to Vorontsov, who is almost a relative of Gromyko, would mean to leave everything as it was."
>
> I consider all this to be very indicative, it means the end of the Gromyko's monopoly and of the power of the Foreign Ministry apparatus over foreign policy.[219]

Chernyaev was catching the thoughts of Gorbachev before becoming his assistant. Already during Andropov's time, there were ideas of returning the prerogative for developing and formulating the Soviet foreign policy back to ID, making the MFA only an executive institution.[220] Shevardnadze was the appropriate candidate for the post, since he was perceived by Gorbachev as reliable and eager for changes, and able to mettle the Ministry. Both Zubok and Mark Kramer point out that the lack of any experience in the field of international relations was compensated by Shevardnadze with the ability to learn fast, which was proven during the Geneva Conference already in November 1985.[221] Furthermore, the appointment of Shevardnadze broke up the power structure of Gromyko.

[215] From 1964 Georgy Korniyenko headed the US Department at the MoFA and was one of the developers of the fundamental legal framework between the USSR and the USA, preparing documents for almost all the American-Soviet summits and negotiations of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. He became the first Deputy Minister in 1977 for almost a decade, before being appointed in the ID.

[216] From 1973 for almost a decade Stepan Chervonenko was an Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of USSR in France. After that, from 1982 was Head of the Cadres Abroad Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

[217] Starting from the mid-1970s Uilii Vorontsov was an assistant of Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. After that from 1978 to 1983 was a Soviet Ambassador to India and then, to France until the promotion of 1986.

[218] MS stands for Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the Chernyaev diaries.

[219] NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, 29th of June, 1985, 51. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 01.05.2019)

[220] See: NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, the 11th of November, 1982, 50-51. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 01.05.2019)

[221] Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 280; Mark Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," *Soviet Studies* 42, no. 3 (July 1990): 429–46.

Because of being an outsider to the MFA, Shevardnadze could not serve as a power boost for any of the already existing "patrimonies" of Gromyko.[222]

The vocabulary of the mediaeval Russian political system is present here because this bright allusion was used not only by Kramer. It is a reference to the language of the source. In the diaries of Stepanov-Mamaladze, the author underlines the atmosphere of the MFA both he and Minister had encountered since the beginning of their work:

> People have been marking time for years, losing the taste for creative work. Ignorance of the specificity of each international relations case (issue). Inability to work with documents, to think over a piece of paper, to write. Too few "breadwinners", too many dependents, slow growth of youth, weak and empty people become mentors, etc. <...>
>
> Plus, the stinking smell of feudal subservience and corruption, which has been going on to this holy of holies of our state: traveling abroad for bribes; bribing of those who take and give orders from the personnel department, wasting money from so-called representation funds, etc.[223]

The referencing to the MFA staff as a "patrimony" of the previous Minister would be recognized by the author of the diary several times within the diary's narrative, also transferring this image to all the levels of the Soviet system, both internal and external. The episode of the natural disaster of the Spitak earthquake, which happened in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic on the 7th of December 1988, would evoke these comparisons with greater force.[224] These comparisons were supported by the author with the neglectfulness with which the catastrophe was handled by mid-level bureaucrats. The higher echelons of power, namely Gorbachev, cancelled the Havana and London trips and flew back to Moscow to organize with Shevardnadze the recovery after the disaster with a great deal of international help. The help was not rejected, but welcomed now, and the Minister proposed to appoint someone to oversee the division of this international help. However, the local levels did not respond that zealously as the General Secretary and the Minister. Regarding

[222] Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," 433.
[223] HIA, 2000C91-5-1, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 17th of November 1985.
[224] HIA, 2000C91-5-6, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 7th of December 1988.

the chaos with the foreign supplies, he writes: "The earthquake revealed the complete failure of managers, the lack of civil defense, alert units, the crime of builders who constructed the buildings from sand, the shortage of medicines, blood plasma, equipment..."[225] Stepanov-Mamaladze would explain these failures in terms of "fiefdoms" of corrupted and irresponsible *apparatchiki* created by Brezhnev.

The change of the Head of the MFA gave a start to other significant transformations within the Ministry such as the removal of nine Deputy Foreign Ministers, during the summer of 1986.[226] Furthermore, Rey writes that "the leading Détente diplomats" got promotions to the rank of first Deputy Ministers, namely Anatolii Kovalev,[227] and, ironically, Uilii Vorontsov. Archie Brown also adds that some other diplomats, prominent for having good relations with Western European countries and the USA, such as Anatolii Adamishin[228] and Alexander Bessmertnykh[229] got their promotion to Deputy Ministers.[230] In February 1986, with the officially proclaimed "New Political Thinking" in the international relations of the USSR, simple rearrangement of cadres was not enough. That is why the MFA got involved in the structural reorganization on the departmental level, with the emergence of new departments within the ministry, among which were those for disarmament, the Non-Aligned Movement, international economic relations and humanitarian issues.[231] The

[225] HIA, 2000C91-5-6, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 15th of December 1988.
[226] Rey, "Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department," 201.
[227] From the very beginning of the Brezhnev's era Anatolii Kovalev was appointed as the Head of the First European Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, responsible for the Western European portfolio and the Helsinki process. From 1971 became the Deputy Minister for 15 years until the promotion of 1986.
[228] Under Brezhnev Anatolii Adamishin was the Head of the Office of General International Problems of the USSR Foreign Ministry from 1971 until 1978. After that for eight years he served as the Head of the First European Department and a member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR before becoming the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
[229] From the early 1970s Alexander Bessmertnykh was working in the USSR Embassy in the United States, serving as First Secretary, Counselor, and Minister Counselor. In 1983 for three years became the Head of the US Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, and a member of the board of the USSR Foreign Ministry, before being promoted in 1986.
[230] Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 217.
[231] Rey, "Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department," 201.

summary of the reorganization of the MFA is provided in figures in the article by Kramer, showing that 85% of the MFA got under the personnel turnover from 1985 until 1991.[232] That resulted not only in the complete end of Gromyko's monopoly over the Soviet foreign relations, but also in the implementation of "The New Political Thinking."

Analyzing the diaries of Stepanov-Mamaladze, it can be noted that the team of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs was indeed mostly constituted of new people. The diaries show that, for some trips abroad, the team of the Minister of the Foreign Affairs included the Minister's assistant and the Head of the General Secretariat, Albert Chernyshev,[233] new Deputy Minister, Vadim Loginov,[234] Eduard Pesov,[235] the already mentioned Anatolii Kovalev and Genady Gerasimov, another Minister's speechwriter, Sergey Tarasenko,[236] Valery Nesterushkin,[237] and translators Viktor Sukhodrev,[238] and Pavel Palazhchenko.[239] All of them, with the exception of the photographer, were long-time employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had received a degree in the field of international politics, primarily at MGIMO. Their university affiliation is especially noteworthy in the context of Mitrokhin's article, which highlights the ethos of the post-Stalinist cohort of diplomats and

[232] Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," 434.
[233] Graduated from MGIMO. At the age of 46, Chernyshev became the assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1982. But he did not escape the rotation and in 1987 became the ambassador to Turkey.
[234] Loginov started to work in the MFA in his 40s in 1967 and occupied various positions within MFA. In 1984 was the head of the 5th European Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry until being promoted to the Deputy Minister in 1985.
[235] From 1968 to 1992 Pesov was a photographer for the *Fotokhronika* TASS (TASS photo chronicle).
[236] Tarasenko Sergey Petrovich, is also referred to as SPT, Sergey or Tarasenko in the diaries of Stepanov-Mamaladze. He was an assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, worked as a speechwriter together with Stepanov-Mamaladze from 1985 to 1990. Tarasenko was a specialist in the Soviet-US relations.
[237] Graduated from MGIMO in 1971. In his 30s, Nesterushkin had already occupied various positions in the central office of the MFA.
[238] Sukhodrev was a translator of Soviet leaders including Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. After 1983 he became a Deputy Head of the US and Canadian Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and after 1985 also worked as a translator of Mikhail Gorbachev.
[239] Palazhchenko was also a translator, he worked with both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. From 1980 to 1990 worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, first in the translation department, then in the USA and Canada department. Participated in all Soviet-American summits from 1985 to 1991.

international affairs' specialists from MGIMO.[240] The author claims that young people born in the families of Soviet employees, educated in Stalin's secondary schools, mainly from the central districts of Moscow, constituted a fairly homogeneous group, a "closed society." The author states that the "closed society" bonded together by the university also had no hopes for promotion, due to the influence of their superiors, who belonged to the older generation of Stalin-era *apparatchiki*. At the same time, MGIMO graduates, author claims, were less ideologically motivated than the "sixties generation." They considered Gorbachev's urge for reforms reasonable, at least in terms of a pure advantage for themselves, such as the possibility of promotion due to the rotation of cadres. I cannot fully share this view, since Mitrokhin writes this article considering the occupations some of the graduates from MGIMO gained after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, I would agree that these people had shared the desires of the "sixties generation" for change, however, their motives for this lie beyond the scope of my analysis.

Before the Perestroika period, the ID had formal precedence over MFA in the development of the Soviet foreign policy line. However, the Head of the MFA did ascertain its actual dominance not only through the network of the representatives and expertise, but also through Gromyko's personal influential role within the decision-making body of the Politburo.[241] Gorbachev had challenged the hegemony of the MFA powers, turning the balance of power towards the ID. From the very beginning of his rule, Gorbachev would always write assignments on the international affairs issues, addressing them not solely to Gromyko, but including Boris Ponomarev for the sake of "reminding the MFA that they are

[240] Mitrokhin, "Elita 'Zakrytogo Obshchestva': MGIMO, Mezhdunarodnyye Otdely Apparata TSK KPSS i Prosopografiya Ikh Sotrudnikov [Elite of a 'Closed Society': MGIMO, International Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Prosopography of Their Employees]," 175–86.
[241] Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," 432.

not the only ones in charge," writes Chernyaev on the 30th of March 1985.[242] Next year, the "conservative" persona of Ponomarev was forced to retire, with Anatoly Dobrynin appointed as the Head of the ID. This is where Chernyaev had been both right and wrong: the removal of Ponomarev, which was meant to be the rehabilitation of the ID, did not result in early retirement for the author of the diaries, but quite the opposite.

For the new Secretary General, the foreign policy field presented a high priority with the ambition to reach success as soon as possible. That is why the appointment of Dobrynin, a skilled and experienced expert in the Soviet-US relations, who prioritized this specialization in the ID, should have brought the Department to a new life. On the one hand, by assigning Georgy Korniyenko, who had been heading the US Department within the MFA from the early Brezhnev era, to serve as Dobrynin's assistant, the ID shortly balanced the power of the MFA. Being knowledgeable in how to constrain and direct the MFA through the supervision of the ID, Korniyenko, together with the Head of the Cadres Abroad department, Stepan Chervonenko, assisted Dobrynin's efforts in replacing the staff of the MFA, especially ambassadors.[243]

On the other hand, the ID did not become the proper balance and the supplementing foreign policy institution for the MFA. Already in mid-1986, Anatoly Chernyaev wrote a note to Gorbachev as a follow up of his conversation with Dobrynin, Yakovlev and Shevardnadze, summarizing that the overall alteration in the relationships between the MFA and the International Department did not occur. Even though "the mutual understanding was improved" and "synchronization in action is present," it was reached only through personal contacts between Shevardnadze and Dobrynin. However, on the institutional level,

[242] NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, the 30th of March, 1985, 27. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 01.05.2019)
[243] Rey, "Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department," 202; Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," 435.

Chernyaev wrote, there is no proper entanglement and cooperation to be seen. Neither is the MFA encouraging this cooperation, directly addressing everything to the Central Committee and avoiding the ID, nor do the ID deputies understand the responsibility of providing the MFA with their expertise on various cases of foreign policy.[244] Following this idea from Chernyaev's report to Gorbachev during the summer of 1986, scholars claim that two institutions never reached organizational cooperation.[245]

Another challenge which could both become an opportunity and a disadvantage was the enlargement of the ID's responsibilities after 1986. Aside from the previous routine of keeping up with the propaganda machine of the capitalist countries, the issues of national security policy and arms control got under its jurisdiction. Gorbachev's idea was to create a think tank on foreign policy out of the International Department. They would have dealt with policies he considered crucial, starting from demilitarization. That is why introducing the branches for arms control within the ID and the MFA was done by Gorbachev: to restrict the monopoly of the General Staff on the decision-making process in the sphere of Soviet national security.

The former point had a precedent aside from the restructuration issue: the illegal landing of the West German amateur pilot, Mathias Rust, in the center of Moscow, close to the Red Square. Since the aviator had not been noticed by the Soviet Air Defense Forces, the incident led to the dismissal of the main General Staff of the Soviet Union, such as the Minister of Defense, Sergei Sokolov, and the Soviet Air Defense Forces Head, Alexander Koldunov, together with hundreds of officers.[246] Thus, those who constituted the main opposition to Gorbachev's reforms were now removed from their positions, giving more

[244] GFA, 2-1-1, Report of Anatoly Chernyaev, "K razgovoru Shevadnadze-Yakovlev-Dobrynin+Chernyaev," 11th of June 1986.
[245] See for example: Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 220; Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 300;
[246] Service, *The End of the Cold War: 1985-1991*, 211–12.

influence in the decision-making process on the national security issues to the Secretary General, the ID and the MFA.

However, the new jurisdictions did not lead to the immediate readjustment of the whole department. This was coupled with the inability of Dobrynin himself to adapt to the new position of the Head of the ID, as he remained "an ambassador for America," working mainly as an advisor to the Secretary General on American affairs.[247] Furthermore, after most of the cadres were overturned and Shevardnadze exhausted the time needed to settle into his new role, which had happened in early 1987, the ID was gradually losing its power. The inability of the ID to adjust to the new realities dictated by Gorbachev produced more reforms of the department in 1988. After both Dobrynin and Korniyenko were relieved of their duties in the ID, while remaining advisors of the Secretary General on the Soviet-US affairs, in 1988, the International Department took over the responsibilities of the Cadres Abroad Department and the CWPSC Department, both of which had ceased to exist.

The CWPSC Department also did not escape the reformation. Konstantin Rusakov, who was the Head of the Department for a total of fourteen years, first from 1968 to 1972 and then from 1977 to 1986, was replaced by Vadim Medvedev. Medvedev, who before 1986 was the Head of the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU, was characterized by Shahnazarov as a thoughtful economist, whose task was to reorient the CWPSC Department on the elaboration of the trade connections with the friendly socialist states.[248] Moreover, giving the Department for Relations with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries to one of his allies, Gorbachev made sure to take under his personal control one of the most important spheres of Soviet foreign policy.

[247] Rey, "Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department," 206–7.
[248] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 294-296.

Overall, the politics of Gorbachev targeted at the staff and organizational transformation of the ID, CWPSC Department and the MFA ultimately resulted in the incontestable dominance of the Secretary General's figure in the foreign policy decision-making. After having prepared the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) during Shevardnadze's visit to the United States of America in September 1987,[249] the Minister of Foreign Affairs once again became the right-hand man to the General Secretary, by making sure to give the leading voice to Gorbachev as the main Soviet foreign policy actor. That will be described in detail in the subchapter titled "Formulating the "New Thinking," where I am talking more about the authoritative position of the Secretary General in the Soviet foreign policy field, underlined by various scholars.[250] His new line was secured by the abolition of the dominance of Gromyko's supporters in the MFA, and of the General Staff on the questions of national security and arms control. Both were accomplished through reorganizations in the ID, the CWPSC Department and MFA. At the same time, just like Brezhnev, Gorbachev had a personal vision on the new foreign policy of the USSR, the formulation of which required the renewed *kollektiv* of the speechwriters and an introduction of new methods of work.

Alterations in Practices of Speechwriting for Gorbachev

Together with the ID, the CWPSC Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the main speechwriting *kollektiv* and its practices had also been altered from 1985. First and foremost was the fact that the *kollektiv* had shrunk in size significantly. The renewal of the speechwriting practices under Gorbachev started from the reappointment of the main assistants' body. The International Department did not only get the new Head but also lost one of its prominent experts in the field of Soviet diplomacy, Anatoly Chenyaev, who had

[249] See more on the negotiations: HIA, 2000C91-5-4, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, 15-18 of September 1987.
[250] Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 220; Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 275–87; Service, *The End of the Cold War: 1985-1991*, 78–85.

become the General Secretary's assistant on foreign affairs, replacing Alexandov-Agentov. Furthermore, at the same time Vadim Medvedev became the Head of the CWPSC Department, Georgy Shahnazarov got involved in the speechwriting process for the Secretary General. In the memoirs, speechwriters report that most often speeches were created by Valery Boldin,[251] who has been Gorbachev's assistant since 1981, Anatoly Lukyanov,[252] the new Head of the General Department of the CPSU, Alexander Yakovlev, who became the Head of Propaganda during the summer of 1985, and his Deputy, Nail Bikkenin,[253] together with Vadim Medvedev, Anatoly Chenyaev and Georgy Shahnazarov. The last three were usually responsible for the parts of the speeches on international relations.

The routine behind creating the speech was also different. During the Brezhnev era, meetings of consultation groups often took place without a General Secretary, and if he was there, these "*sideniya*," as Shahnazarov characterized it, in Volynskoe or Zavidovo, were ritualistic.[254] Now the effective work of thought, and not just the compilation of easy-to-read phrases, has become an integral part of the speechwriters' work. Vadim Medvedev brightly characterized the changes in the speechwriting practices which had occurred under Gorbachev in his memoirs. He writes:

[251] From 1969, Valery Boldin became an economic columnist for "Pravda," then became a member of the editorial board of the newspaper. Already from 1981 he started to work with Gorbachev as an assistant Secretary and then General Secretary. From 1987 until the end of the USSR was the Head of the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Interestingly, Boldin is considered by Shahnazarov as one of the least productive members of the speechwriters' team and, in general, not the best choice of cadres made by Gorbachev, since in his own department he was mostly just creating the illusion of work, and not alleviate the burden of the bureaucratization of the Soviet apparatus but facilitate it. See: Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 369-370.

[252] In the beginning of the 1980s Anatoly Lukyanov started his job in the General Department of the CPSU, first as a First Deputy Head, then Deputy Head and finally, as the Head of the department. After leaving the post in 1987 was shortly appointed as the Secretary of the CPSU.

[253] For twenty-one years, from 1966 to 1987, Nail Bikkenin was working in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, first as a consultant, then as a Deputy Head. Since 1987 he became a chief editor of the journal "Communist."

[254] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 161-163.

> Then [under Brezhnev] the work on the text was given self-sufficient value, and in fact the main problem was to find some smart openings, new verbal formulas, like: "Five-Year Efficiency and Quality," "The economy should be economical," etc. Such work lasted for many long months. It began almost a year before the Congress. As for the role of the speaker himself - the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it was limited to the choice of the proposed wording, the replacement of individual words, etc.
>
> Now everything was different. The main initiative in the work came from Gorbachev himself. The task of the people who would help him [with speechwriting] was to adequately outline the sum of theoretical, political and ideological ideas, to give them the form of political outlines and tasks, but such a form, which would not limit political actions to some kind of limited framework, but would open the way for social and political creativity. It was primarily not a literary, but a creative, searching process.[255]

To summarize, the speechwriting group has now become the think-tank. The demand for the speech now required not fancy formulations and figures of speech, but brainstorming. That is why the routine beginning of the process was the meeting of all or the majority of the aforementioned assistants and Heads of the departments, for a general exchange of views on issues and development of approaches and concepts.[256] After that, the transcript or even the dictation of the concept itself was made, together with the provisional structure of the speech. On the next stage, the same people were responsible for their respective parts of the speech, which they had to create within their departments and, for some parts, such as the one for international relations, in cooperation with the MFA and the KGB.

After that, following the previous Secretary General's tradition, all of the speechwriters went to one of the governmental dachas for creating the compilation of the speech out of the already written separate parts. Medvedev writes that it was the most intense period of speechwriting in his lifetime, since Gorbachev was present almost every time for a rehearsal of the rough draft of the newly-made speech or report.[257] With Gorbachev, the continuous corrections and reinventions of the text had begun. Moreover, as a rule, these rehearsals were conducted not once or twice, but a variety of times, resulting in a completely new text

[255] See: Vadim Medvedev, *V komande Gorbacheva vzglyad iznutri [In Gorbachev's Team, the View from Inside]*, 20-21.
[256] Kolesnikov, *Spichraitery: Chronika Professii, Sochinyavshei i Izmenjavshei Mir [Speechwriters: Chronicle of the Profession, Formulating and Changing the World.]*, 124.
[257] Medvedev, *V Komande Gorbacheva Vzglyad Iznutri [In Gorbachev's Team, the View from Inside]*, 21–22.

being born. Only after the tiring process of the multiple rewritings of the speeches within the narrow group of advisors and a couple of stenographers, the text was sent to the Politburo members for the commentaries. After all of the comments had been submitted and the speechwriters went through them with the Secretary General, they were either discarding or accepting some of them. Thus, the work in Volynskoe, Zavidovo or any other governmental dacha, was not reminiscent of the special sanatoriums with exotic lunches and dinners and hunting with the Secretary General, as was the case under Brezhnev, but a strenuous brainstorm, frequently demanding speechwriters to work for ten or even twelve hours per day.[258] Such a dynamic work required the enormous creative capacities of the speechwriters, who did not monotonically juggle with "the same phrases and even paragraphs" from one speech to another, but were creating new political realities.

However, there was an exception to this collective enterprise of the speechwriting for the Secretary General. Just like Alexandrov-Agentov before 1986, there were some special duties delegated only to Anatoly Chernyaev as he became Gorbachev's international affairs assistant. Basically, Chernyaev was the at-hand "*pishushee pero*" (writing quill) of the Secretary General. He was the first one to be assigned to write any urgent speech, report, a statement for the press etc. However, the urgent writing of speeches during negotiations and the General Secretary's trips abroad will be discussed later in the chapter. Here I will only mention that, aside from being always at hand for the Secretary General, he also was the one being in closest contact with Gorbachev, discussing and formulating his ideas in textual form. In 1987 in his diaries, Chernyaev writes that he mastered the "Gorbachev style" of the speeches and keynotes for negotiations and can prepare it relatively fast from the reports of other assistants, the MFA and the ID.[259] Sometimes, his role of the speechwriter would also

[258] Medvedev, 23.
[259] NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, the 5th of July 1987, 16. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 01.05.2019)

transfer to the last stages of the formulation of a very significant speech, such as the one for the Congress of the Politburo of the CPSU at the beginning of July 1987. This speech was prepared by the already mentioned close assistants, with the involvement of various specialists and together with Gorbachev several times, but before being spoken, the speech was proofread by Chernyaev and Gorbachev alone.[260] Furthermore, Chernyaev alone wrote Gorbachev's book titled *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlya nashei strany i dlya vsego mira [Perestroika and new thinking for our country and for the whole world]*,[261] and even though, this book was dictated anew several times by Gorbachev[262] and, in general, underwent a number of corrections, it was not done by the *kollektiv* of authors-speechwriters.

The other drastic change presented by Gorbachev compared to Brezhnev had to follow – the speech delivery itself.[263] Many participants in "Gorbachev's team" report, that in spite of the extremely intense work performed during the brainstorming and writing of the speech, the Secretary General would not always follow the prepared speech, and time and again would step away from the text. Alexander Yakovlev, one of the main "architects" of Perestroika, confirms this with the following statement:

> Mikhail Sergeevich is the first post-Stalinist leader who could write, know how to dictate, make corrections, look for the most accurate expressions, and most importantly, was able to think alternatively, to even give up his own texts without regret. The so-called "obligatory" formulas from the communist heritage were treated without the ritual respect that prevailed in the practice of writing speeches for all, without exception, previous "leaders." They all spoke other people's words. Gorbachev spoke his own.[264]

[260] Ibid.
[261] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie Dlya Nashei Strany i Dlya Vsego Mira [Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World]* (Moskva: Izdat. Polit. Literatury, 1988).
[262] Chernyaev, *Shest' Let s Gorbachevym: Po Dnevnikovym Zapisyam [Six Years with Gorbachev: Based on Diaries]*, 169.
[263] I will not engage in the discussion of Gorbachev usage of media tools since this is beyond the scope of my thesis. For a detailed analysis of Glasnost' in the Eastern European Media see: Marsha Siefert, ed., *Mass Culture and Perestroika in the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); David L. Paletz, Karol Jakubowicz, and Pavao Novosel, eds., *Glasnost and after: Media and Change in Central and Eastern Europe*, The Hampton Press Communication Series (Cresskill, N.J: Hampton Press, 1995).
[264] Yakovlev, *Sumerki [Dusk]*, 465.

Indeed, even before becoming the new Secretary General's assistant and advisor, Anatoly Chernyaev wrote in his diary that it was fairly obvious that Gorbachev was speaking without a paper, in his own words, and "not in the official language, mastered out among nomenclature workers."[265] The tendency to speak without a paper could spread even on the texts which had been prepared in such a meticulous manner as was described above. In a different but yet similar manner, the stepping away of the prepared text could remind of Khrushchev's manner of speech delivery.

Despite the generally democratic relationships with the assistants and advisors during speech creation, Gorbachev had a clear tendency to always keep professional distance from his team and reserve for himself the leading role in the speechwriting process. Even though literally every sentence in the future speech would be brainstormed, the Secretary General would always both oversee the process and have the last word in it. Kolesnikov proposes that was the reason why Alexandrov-Agentov, who was doubtlessly a skilled and experienced specialist in international affairs, was unable to work with the General Secretary. The main motive for Agentov to leave the post of an advisor allegedly was Gorbachev's "chronic" inability to listen.[266]

A similar point was expressed in the Medvedev memoirs, but not in such harsh terms. This is how he describes the routine gathering of the speechwriters in Zavidovo, one of many:

> We were gathered in the mansion, where the General Secretary was staying, in a small, cozy hunting room. Scrupulous correcting of the entire text was done section by section, page by page, line by line. In the course of the writing, we had an absolutely frank and open dialogue. Naturally, each of us acted as critics in those sections of the work on which he did not take part in writing, and, on the contrary, tried to argue the propositions that were agreed upon at the previous stage. <...>

[265] NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, the epilog of the 1985, 78. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 01.05.2019)
[266] Kolesnikov, *Spichraitery: Chronika Professii, Sochinyavshei i Izmenjavshei Mir [Speechwriters: Chronicle of the Profession, Formulating and Changing the World.]*, 128.

> Mikhail Sergeyevich was very tolerant and even interested in our disputes. If we continued to insist on our own vision, he delicately and not without humor reminded us who is the speaker here. As a result, he usually offered his own semantic solution and its formulation, which was immediately written down.[267]

Thus, even though the work within the small team of advisors, responsible for the speechwriting was usually conducted in the open, trustful atmosphere, it did not undermine the dominant position of the Secretary General in the speechwriting process. The seemingly democratic environment did not mean that the figure of Gorbachev was less authoritarian in the decision-making concerning his speeches. Shahnazarov also stresses a similar episode in his memoirs. While giving a speech during the meeting with a foreign diplomat or leader, Gorbachev often would slide from the given text to improvisation, which made the subsequent publication of the speech in the press significantly harder. However, the occasional improvisation and increased intensity and speed of work under the texts were not the only changes which the speechwriting practices underwent.

All in all, the possibility of the influence on actual politics evoked the authors' ego-documents retrospective self-identification with the "sixties generation" or, if we follow Zubok's terminology, "Zhivago's children." The people involved in the process of speechwriting for the Secretary General were reporting the rise of hope and feeling of actual accomplishments, since they were given the possibility to transform the system without abolishing socialism.[268] Arising set of ideas, retrospectively attributed to the "*shestidesyatniki*" was not bounded by the borders of the USSR, but had specific ways to navigate the Soviet foreign affairs. The following subchapter will discuss the alterations which had occurred specifically in the field of the international relations speechwriting both for the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary General, including the routine of the

[267] Medvedev, *V Komande Gorbacheva Vzglyad Iznutri [In Gorbachev's Team, the View from Inside]*, 27.
[268] See for example: Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 292, 435.

speechwriting for the Soviet diplomacy, meaning the speechwriting during General Secretary's trips abroad and the speechwriting for the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Formulating the "New Thinking": Practice of Speechwriting for Soviet International Relations

The tempo of work had accelerated drastically not only in the cases of the preparation of domestic speeches, but also those for the General Secretary's trips abroad. Astonishingly, such meticulous work on the texts of the speeches described above did not stop on the ground, but continued in the air. Shahnazarov reports that even a thoroughly prepared text would be most probably corrected on the plane one more time. In his memoirs, Shahnazarov stresses how different this practice was from Brezhnev's: after the text was already approved by Brezhnev, he would "no longer think about it," and him calling Aleksandrov-Agentov for making any corrections was a rare case.[269] Moreover, Brezhnev in general preferred to stay in the separate compartment of the plane, where no assistants were allowed. With Gorbachev in power, it was a casual procedure to "go through" the text one more time in the air, which usually resulted in dictating the speech anew. Usually it was Chernyaev's or Shahnazarov's job to look through the final version of the "plane speech" for the repetitions and coherence. Upon arrival at the foreign country, stenographers, sometimes urgently mobilized from the local Soviet embassy, almost until the morning were typing and printing the new version of the text on large sheets, so that the General Secretary could read it easily.[270] However, as it was already mentioned, Gorbachev did not always follow the prepared speech anyway, creating many difficulties for his translators.[271]

[269] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 298.
[270] Shahnazarov, 299.
[271] Kolesnikov, *Spichraitery: Chronika Professii, Sochinyavshei i Izmenjavshei Mir [Speechwriters: Chronicle of the Profession, Formulating and Changing the World.]*, 131.

At the same time, the situation of the process of negotiations from time to time had demanded a swift reaction, which cannot possibly go in hand with the meticulous work on the texts of the speeches. These kinds of situations signified the spaces of freedom for the speechwriters, in most of the cases individual speechwriters. For example, such a situation happened during Gorbachev's negotiations with Rajiv Gandhi in Moscow from the 2nd to the 4th of July 1987. During the afternoon of the 3rd of July, an hour and a half before the official lunch of Gandhi and Gorbachev, for which the speeches were not planned, the Secretary General had called on Chernyaev to write a speech anyway.[272] Chernyaev wrote the speech in half an hour, and since the speech was found to be quite good, it was published without any corrections.[273] However, in these urgent situations, Chernyaev was the only one to be mobilized in most of the cases. Even though other speechwriters did work long hours, it was mostly a collective routine, not an individual one.

Shahnazarov continues to describe in the memoir some other distinctive features of the speechwriting in Gorbachev's time. He writes about the practice of the so-called "recap" happening during the trips abroad. Usually at the last evening of the foreign visit Gorbachev would gather all the participants of the trip – from the speechwriters-advisers to the translators - for the "last supper" to discuss the outcomes of the meeting on both the international reputation of the USSR and the influence it produced within the Soviet state. Sometimes, as Chernyaev writes in his memoirs, this kind of recaps could occur during the trip itself, when Gorbachev could even brainstorm with his assistants and speechwriters "where it would be reasonable to negotiate further."[274] If this kind of dinner did not occur on

[272] NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, the 5th of July, 1987, 18. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 12.05.2019)
[273] Ibid.
[274] Chernyaev, *Shest' Let s Gorbachevym*, 114–15.

the ground of the foreign state, it would in the air, as it happened after Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia on the 18th of March 1988.[275]

Another interesting feature of Gorbachev's routine of speechwriting was the presence of his wife, Raisa Gorbacheva. She was present during most of the brainstorm sessions on the Soviet dachas' and during all the Secretary General's trips abroad.[276] Shahnazarov writes that the presence of Raisa Gorbacheva "established a hard line of decency, which usually intersects in a purely male society" because of her "innate sense of self-dignity." [277] According to Shahnazarov, she had a sense of political hierarchy: she never interrupted, but always with an underlined attention listened to Gorbachev, making it clear that she perceives him not as all the other assistants, but as a Soviet leader first and foremost.

However, let us return back to the reorganized Soviet MFA and the features of the speechwriting for Eduard Shevardnadze. The appointment of the speechwriter Stepanov-Mamaladze was somewhat similar to the appointment of his boss. Never having been trained in the field of international relations, Stepanov was not chosen to the position as a regular MFA employee would be. The rationale behind his appointment was to a degree similar to the consultants before. As a prominent journalist,[278] before becoming the speechwriter he was the Head of *Gruzinform*,[279] Mamaladze proved to master the ability to

[275] Vadim Medvedev, *Raspad: kak on nazreval v "mirovoj sisteme socializma" [DECAY: As it was started within the "world socialist system"]* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), chap. 3 "On the eve of the Yugoslav tragedy". See also: Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 300.
[276] See for example: NSA, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi iskhod Dnevnik dvuh epoh*, the 5th of July, 1987, 18. Published online, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/rus/Chernyaev.html (Access Date: 12.05.2019)
[277] Shahnazarov, *S Vozhdyami i Bez Nih [With and without Leaders]*, 300.
[278] Stepanov-Mamaladze graduated from the Law Faculty of the Moscow State University in 1958, and started to work as a journalist in Georgia. He worked in various newspapers such as "Vecherniy Tbilisi", "Zarya Vostoka", "Molodezh' Gruzii." From the beginning of the 1960s he moved to Moscow and worked at "Komsomolskaya Pravda" as a correspondent for the Georgian SSR. From 1972 to 1978 Stepanov served as the Head of the department of literature and art, and a member of the editorial board of "Komsomolskaya Pravda." In June 1978 Stapanov-Mamaladze was appointed head of the Georgian Information Agency (Gruzinform). The information is
[279] Georgian Information Agency (Gruzinform) was part of the unified information system of the Soviet Union. It was simultaneously under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR and the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). The agency was engaged in the dissemination of whole Union

shape the ideas into the written word and edit texts, which determined his candidacy for the position. Stepanov-Mamaladze did not fit into the framework of typical diplomats of the MFA, not only because of being a journalist throughout his life and not having a foreign region specialization, but also because of an absence of knowledge of any foreign languages, in contrast to another one of Shevardnadze's speechwriters, Sergey Tarasenko, who spoke English. The program of the Law faculty of Moscow State University during the 1950s did not include any classes of foreign languages.[280] When starting work at the Foreign Ministry, Stepanov also proved to not know any English or German, as evidenced by some diary notes he made, for example: incorrect spelling of foreign words, the spelling of phrases phonetically or spelling of foreign words in Cyrillic.[281]

Yet another thing connecting Stepanov-Mamaladze to the consultants' group of the ID and the CWPSC Department was a shared idea of belonging to the "sixties generation." In the diaries, he identifies himself with the "suppressed generation of the sixties", which got the opportunity for "realization" only in the second half of the 1980s:

> In the West, Gorbachev is called a man from the generation of "angry young people" of the 1960s. I also belong to this generation, although I began to "get angry" only at the end of the seventies, when more by premonition than by mind I understood that the country is in decay. And I am far from being indifferent about what they say and think about this country in the world, how they see it, how its children live, how they will receive it from us. I have a very short part of active life left, but all that remains I am ready to devote to the tasks which the "Gorbachev team" has proposed.[282]

Retrospectively integrating into the past the generation of "Zhivago's children," Stepanov justifies and positions himself within the present, identifying with "Gorbachev's team," for which one of the fundamental features would be the criticism of the "stagnant" Brezhnev era. He also considers himself to be a member of an imagined community of the Soviet

and foreign news from TASS within the Georgian republic, and also gathered "hard news" about the Georgian SSR for republican media.

[280] See the history of Moscow State University on the official website. URL: http://www.law.msu.ru/structure/kaf/konst-mun-pr/history (Accessed: 28. 02.2019).

[281] See for example: HIA, 2000C91-5-3, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 26th of November 1986, where he misspelled "First Lady" with "First ladi."

[282] HIA, 2000C91-5-2, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 27th of February 1986.

intelligentsia,[283] for whom, in their fifties and sixties, Perestroika became the last life chance to "defend the ideas" of *shestidesyatniki.* Thus, on the one hand, having a new Minister, and new MFA staff, and on the other, the new speechwriter, sharing (or claiming to share) the ethos of the "sixties generation," was required for the new practices of speechwriting to get into place.

The same accelerated tempos of work were a common practice among Minister's speechwriters. Sometimes, especially at the beginning of his career as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shevardnadze made the speechwriters work all night long. This kind of situation happened on the 27th of February 1986, when at 8 pm Shevardnadze went through his tomorrow's speech for the 27th Congress of the CPSU *once again*, and rejected it entirely, making the speechwriters continue correcting it long after midnight.[284] These episodes would repeat even during the Minister's trips abroad. For example, during their visit to the UN General Assembly Session from 23rd to 27th of September 1986,[285] or during Shevardnadze's visit to Mexico from the 2nd to the 5th of October 1986.[286] Nevertheless, the Minister himself was not an exception for such an intensive tempo of work. Usually if he would assign the speechwriters to rewrite the speech or the press statement, Shevardnadze would find time either early in the morning or late at night, or just like Gorbachev, in the plane, to brainstorm and re-dictate the text of the speech. At the same time, the practice of so-called "recaps" of the negotiations, meetings and trips was also a feature of the speechwriting routine for the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, but it did not occur each time, as opposed to the Secretary General's habit.

[283] It is also supported by the fact that he was in contact with various representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia community, such as famous film directors, Marlen Khutsiev, Tengiz Abuladze, Rezo Chkheidze; a poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko; writers: Andrey Bitov, Fazil Iskander, Irakli Abashidze; many journalists, including the Deputy Chief correspondent of Izvestia, Igor Golembiovsky, and a Chief editor of the newspaper "Pravda," Viktor Afanasyev.
[284] HIA, 2000C91-5-2, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 27th of February 1986.
[285] HIA, 2000C91-5-3, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 26th of September 1986.
[286] HIA, 2000C91-5-3, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 3rd and 4th of October 1986.

There are no doubts that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs was subordinated to Gorbachev's leading role in international politics. Sometimes, this recognition of the leading role of the General Secretary and the separation of roles would go "too far," when Shevardnadze would make Mamaladze introduce the open praise of the new leader of the Soviet Union in his speech. For example, this happened in the same speech on the 27th Congress of the CPSU, given on the 28th of February 1986.[287] In this kind of situation, soon after the speech, Shevardnadze would most probably receive the call from Gorbachev with the demand to stop engaging in the "old mossy practices," as it, indeed happened in the evening of the 28th of February.[288]

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs seemed to finish the correction of this mistake closer to the middle of 1987, when he found a balanced way to underline the dominating role of the Secretary General in the Soviet foreign relations, leaving the secondary position for the MFA. The bright example of the recognition of this division of roles by Shevardnadze is given by Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze in his diaries on the 3rd of September 1987 in the dialogue with Shevardnadze:

> Unexpected night call from E.A.[289]
>
> - I was thinking: we will be present in the press for too long. Shouldn't M.S. give an interview about international security?
>
> I did not immediately understand. Tarasenko - he got it instantly.
>
> - He should not and does not want to come to the fore. This is the place of the General Secretary. And acting gradually would give the space for *someone* for a free-kick ... For making the right decision.[290]

This dialogue happened right before Shevardnadze's triumphal trip to the USA, where he had negotiations with George Shultz and Ronald Reagan, building up the foundation for the

[287] HIA, 2000C91-5-2, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 27th of February 1986.
[288] This kind of phone calls was witnessed by Stepanov-Mamaladze. See: HIA, 2000C91-5-2, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 28th of February 1986.
[289] E. A. stands for Eduard Ambrosiyevich (Shevardnadze) in Stepanov-Mamaladze diaries.
[290] HIA, 2000C91-5-4, Stepanov-Mamaladze Diaries, the 3rd of September 1987.

INF Treaty. Thus, Gorbachev's zeal to stop the inveterate glorification of the Secretary General which dated back to the pre-Perestroika time would relatively succeed. However, this declarative rejection of a personality cult would not supersede the reality in which Gorbachev gained indisputable dominance as the Soviet foreign affairs decision-maker and actor.

Stepping aside from the practices, I want to turn to same examples of the contents of speeches representing the new ideas which had appeared with Gorbachev's line of foreign policy. The concept of "New Political Thinking" was based on an understanding of the Helsinki Accords. At the beginning of Gorbachev's term, the Soviet foreign policy line would not question the reality of the existing opposition of military alliances. However, it would encourage the cooperation with the USA and Western European countries on the basis of friendly relations: "with the Helsinki spirit," as it was described by Gorbachev in several early speeches.[291] According to Gorbachev, this friendly cooperation was necessary if the international community wants to deal with the global problems of the issues of ecology, environment and planet pollution, the spread of AIDS, terrorism and other problems.[292] In 1987 this rhetoric, together with the intentions for a full nuclear disarmament of the European continent, would take shape in the concept of the "Common European Home." Even though this concept was used for the first time in October 1985,[293] I argue that it took shape and began to be propagated only two years after.

In the monograph, Alexei Yurchak stresses that during the Perestroika there was an appeal to the "true Lenin" and a call to "cleanse" the Party's doctrine from the "rust" of

[291] See for example: Mikhail Gorbachev, "Rech na vstreche Gorbacheva s parlamentariyami Francii v Parizhe, 3 oktyabrya 1985" in *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'I*, Vol. 2. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 485-488.
[292] Mikhail Gorbachev, ""Glavnoe teper' - prakticheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroyki." Rech na torzhestvennom sobranii posvyaschennom vrucheniyu Murmansku ordena Lenina i medali Zolotaya Zvezda, 1 oktyabrya 1987 goda," in *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 5. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), 300-310.
[293] Mikhail Gorbachev, "Vystuplenie v Vrashave na priyome v chest uchastnikov vstrechi vysshih partiynyh i gosudarstvennyh deyateley stran-uchastnic Varshavskogo Dogovora, 26 aprelya 1985 goda" in *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 2. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 176-179.

"totalitarianism."[294] Much like everything else in the Soviet rhetoric, the Gorbachev line in international politics of the USSR should have been justified by referring to Lenin. Indeed, in quite a few speeches of the second half of the 1980s, focused on the themes of "sincerity" and "humanity" in international relations, Gorbachev appeals to the "real" or "correctly interpreted" Lenin.[295] However, the "real Lenin" had lost the class struggle on the way. "With the Helsinki spirit" to build the relationships of trust with the European countries, the Soviet leader would switch the framing of the Soviet foreign policy line from the class struggle to the "peaceful competition of systems."[296] From 1987 the Soviet leadership was moving away from the Brezhnev and Andropov principles: "not to appease the aggressors, but to expose and thwart their plans, repulse their dangerous actions, strengthen the ranks of the anti-imperialist forces."[297] The antiimperialist line was less and less mentioned in the speeches when the topic of the threat of the Strategic Defense Initiative lost its relevance, after the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of the 8th of December 1987.

The disappearance of the class struggle and the imperialist threat moved Gorbachev's "new thinking" away from understanding the European countries only in terms of the military alliance's division. For the Soviet leader, the "Helsinki spirit" in the international relations obtained a broader sense. The "Common European Home" was considered to be an interstate relationship built on mutual respect for other states' sovereignty. Proclaimed by the Helsinki Final Act, the articles on the "sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty" and "refraining from the threat or use of force" were the core principles of

[294] Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever,* 577.
[295] See for example: Gorbachev, ""Glavnoe teper' - prakticheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroyki…"
[296] This idea is best expressed in a speech of the 9th of April 1987: Mikhail Gorbachev, "Rech na obede dannom generalnym sekretarem CK KPCH prezidentom CHSSR Gustavom Gusakom v chest generalnogo sekretarya CK KPSS M. S. Gorbacheva," in *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 4. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 455-468; it also occurs later, in the later years of Gorbachev leadership. See, for example: "Vystuplenie v georgievskom zale Kremlya na vstreche s sovetskimi amerikanskimi i finskimi shkolnikami, 11 maya 1988 goda," in *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 6. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), 216-217.
[297] "Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda Doklad na torzhestvennom sobranii v Kremlevskom Dvorce sezdov posvyaschennom 20-letiyu pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne, 8 maya 1965 goda" in Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i.* Vol. 1, 1964-1967. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), 146.

the "Common European Home." If before Gorbachev came to power, Europe was the place of a division of the zones of influence between the Soviet and American blocs, during Perestroika, disarmament and all-European security began to play a decisive role in the foreign policy of the USSR.[298] With that, the Soviet leader proposed for both the USA and the USSR the end of the "policy of imposition"[299] and "superpower mentality," instead of claiming for each country the right to independently determine their own path.[300] It would no longer be assumed that certain states, especially Eastern European ones, are to be "fiefdoms" of superpowers.[301] The sovereignty of the states would also spread on the economic relations between countries, putting it on the shoulders of each particular state to negotiate the terms of trade with its partner-state.[302]

The universal threat of the nuclear weapons and other global problems were not exclusive points for building the concept of the "Common European Home." The understanding of Europe was also put into the civilizational frame. In the speeches, Mikhail Gorbachev describes the European space as an entity united by a common history and culture.[303] Gorbachev proposed European cultural identity as the main force to unite the European civilization. It is interesting that, by applying the civilizational frame to Europe, he would give it qualities articulated during the Enlightenment, such as the European supreme culture

[298] See for example: "Generalnomu sekretaryu OON X Peresu de Kuelyaru, 11 yanvarya 1987 goda;" "Za bezyadernyy mir, za gumanizm mezhdunarodnyh otnosheniy. Rech na vstreche v Kremle s uchastnikami mezhdunarodnogo foruma "Za bezyadernyy mir za vyzhivanie chelovechestva", 16 fevralya 1987 goda" in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 4. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 376-392.
[299] Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 28.
[300] Mikhail Gorbachev, "O hode realizacii resheniy XXVII Sezda KPSS i zadachah po uglubleniyu perestroyki. Doklad na XIX Vsesoyuznoy konferencii KPSS, 28 iyunya 1988 goda" in *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 6. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), 348.
[301] See: "Rech na vstreche s rukovoditelyami i delegatami skupschiny SFRYU, 16 marta 1988 goda;" "Otvety na voprosy gazety Vashington Post i zhurnala Nyusuik, 18 maya 1988 goda;" "Moschnyy faktor mirovoy politiki Vystuplenie i zaklyuchitelnoe slovo na vstreche v Sverdlovskom zale Kremlya s predstavitelyami mezhdunarodnoy obschestvennosti, 2 iyunya 1988 goda" in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 6. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990).
[302] Ibid.
[303] See for example: Mikhail Gorbachev, "Rech na sovmestnoy s Fransua Mitteranom press-konferencii v Eliseyskom dvorce, 4 oktyabrya 1985 goda" in *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 1. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), ; Mikhail Gorbachev, "Rech na obede v Kremle v chest Fransua Mitterana, 7 iyulya 1986 goda," in *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 2. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 470-487.

and the high development which make for peaceful and civilized international dialogue.[304] Moreover, he would not frame this identity in terms of a "clash of civilizations," like it was done by Samuel Huntington on the example of the religious and cultural divisions in 1997.[305] On the contrary, this civilizational frame created an inclusive supranational vision of Europe without opposing it to any particular Other (aside from "global problems/threats"). According to Gorbachev, even the Soviet Union was always a part of this civilization; he uses different forms of the phrase "we, the Europeans... (understand/see/know and so on)" in quite a few speeches.[306] In the book *Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashey Strany i Dlya Vsego Mira [Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World]*, the Secretary General writes: "Someone in the West is trying to "exclude" the Soviet Union from Europe. Now and then, as if inadvertently, there is an equation of the concept of "Europe" and "Western Europe." But such tricks cannot change anything in the existing geographical and historical realities. Europe is our common home."[307] Thus, the Soviet inclusive vision of the European civilization proposed the unification of Europe around history, culture, global problems and the desire to solve these problems in a "civilized manner": without wars and threats of nuclear or any other destruction, but on the basis of friendly dialogue.

All in all, during the last couple of years of the 1980s, the Soviet vision of the European states would abandon the military alliance-based understanding of international relations. The fight against imperialist-capitalist forces and class struggle slowly disappeared from the

[304] Mikhail Gorbachev, "Rech na obede dannom generalnym sekretarem CK KPCH prezidentom CHSSR Gustavom Gusakom v chest generalnogo sekretarya CK KPSS M. S. Gorbacheva, 9 aprelya 1987 goda," in *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 4. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 455-468.
[305] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2003).
[306] "Rech na obede dannom generalnym sekretarem CK KPCH prezidentom CHSSR Gustavom Gusakom v chest generalnogo sekretarya CK KPSS M. S. Gorbacheva, 9 aprelya 1987 goda," "Rech Gorbacheva na mitinge v Prage, 10 aprelya 1987 goda," in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stati*. Vol. 4. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987).
[307] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashey Strany i Dlya Vsego Mira [Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World,]* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 178.

Soviet foreign policy rhetoric. Furthermore, after the 1989 historical events, the concept of the "Common European Home" would move even further away from "the Brezhnev doctrine," proposing to fully get rid of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and to create the European nuclear-free zone.[308] Instead of these alliances, the proposal was to create a new supranational structure, in which not only the USSR would have been an indisputable part, but also the USA and Canada, as long as their intentions would be oriented on peacekeeping in Europe.[309] This was a Copernican turn in the self-perception of the Soviet empire within the diplomatic arena.

Conclusions

In this chapter I talked about the first departmental alterations of the institutions serving the Soviet diplomatic decision-making. Even though the influence of the KGB and the Ministry of Defense (aside from the episode with Mathias Rust) were just touched upon but not covered in detail in the chapter,[310] the descriptions of the MFA, the ID and the CWPSC Department were able to uncover the new trajectory for the international policy of the USSR under Gorbachev. The departmental alterations were made in order to abolish the dominance of Brezhnev's and Gromyko's legacy in the MFA, the ID and the CWPSC Department, surrounding the Secretary General with his associates and ridding himself of the rivals. Setting up the foundation for the changes, the newly-born "Gorbachev's team" adopted new practices of speechwriting.

On the one hand, restructuration of the speechwriting process allowed for it to evolve from a mere ritual to the "mindful process" of creation. The Secretary General showed to the narrow circle of his speechwriters that their duties are now being taken seriously with no more numbing reshuffling of the same speeches or juggling of the same phrases. Instead, the

[308] Gorbachev, *Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie,* 179.
[309] Gorbachev, 180.
[310] Since this kind of analysis would go beyond the scope of my research.

speech preparation became the truly thoughtful and meticulous task for speechwriters-assistants together with the Secretary General himself. On the other hand, the significantly more mindful routine of the speechwriting did not undermine the leading position of the Secretary General in the process. That overall led to speechwriting becoming the resourceful process aimed not just at shaping, but at generating new ideas. The demand for the speech, which now was shaped by the intensified tempo of political changes in the country and the "New Political Thinking" agenda of the Soviet international affairs, changed together with the process of their creation. This political program ultimately arose thanks to the input of "enlightened bureaucrats" and thanks to their complex relationship to the state.

The bureaucrats' special characteristic, which both Brezhnev's and Gorbachev's speechwriters are referencing, is the "sixties generation" mindset. The belonging to the part of this generation, and the ability to quickly analyze the information and write, was the reason that the consultancy groups for speechwriters were created in the first place. By reading the "generation" retrospectively, and, I would argue, by describing themselves as a part of this "generation" in the ego documents, the *kollektiv* of speechwriters emphasized their belonging to the narrow circle of the reformist Secretary General. However, the transformation of this *kollektiv* had occurred together with its practices.

During Brezhnev's time, described as the engagement in the mindless numbing routine, the speechwriting duty tended to remind more of the first overarching type of Soviet Subjectivity. If Kharhordin is underlying the self-regulation of the body of the *kollektiv* reached through mutual surveillance and censoring, which was a common practice within the speechwriting group under Brezhnev, the main goal of Gorbachev's speechwriting *kollektiv* had changed to the production of ideas. Indeed, only with Gorbachev they managed to realize their potential and become not just formulators of pre-set ideas, but think tanks for creating the ideas orchestrated by the Secretary General. The self-censoring *kollektiv* had

transformed into a creative one. That is why, in the mid-1980s, in the ego documents, the new speechwriters' duties are reflected on in a way that points to the second overarching type of Soviet Subjectivity, which was oriented on the resourceful part of the self and the ability to invoke identities, such as the ethos of the "sixties generation," which appeared in the sources and with their engagement in new practices of work.

Thus, the alterations of the departmental structures and the rotation of their cadres and Heads, together with the changes of speechwriting practices, signified Gorbachev's establishment of the new type of international self-representation of the Soviet Union. The restructuration of the departments and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had, therefore, changed not only the self-image of individual speechwriters, but also of the entire state. The brief case study of the "Common European Home" shows that the USSR was re-oriented from the class struggle approach in foreign affairs to becoming a vanguard of a planned peaceful, cooperation-based world order.

Conclusion

The story of the transformations of the speechwriting for the Secretary General underlines the shift in the perception of the "self" reflected in the speechwriters' ego documents. That is why the narrative of the thesis needed to start with the discussion on the specificities of the genre of the memoirs and diaries used in the research. If the memoiristic genre serves as a justification of the Perestroika or as a testimony of the collapse of the empire, the diaristic one is not based on describing moments retrospectively to the same degree as memoirs. At the same time, by establishing the analytical frame for both kinds of ego documents, I showed that there are two markers addressed in the sources. They are temporality and subjectivity. The temporality category seemed to differ in the sense of the diaries' opportunity to capture relatively "immediate moments" in greater detail than memoirs. The subjectivity marker, however, needed a broader explanation.

The self-positioning in the text of any given ego document led me to touch upon the broader methodological frame, which was the Soviet Subjectivity approach. The idea that the Soviet subject is intrinsically different from "liberal" subjectivity[311] was born in the time of the Cold War and continued to exist throughout the decades until the beginning of the current millennium. The argument was built up on the idea that the Soviet project was suppressing the "self" in the Soviet citizens, using direct and indirect ways of doing so, and, finally, getting rid of the "personality" as such, making the citizens function like a static screw. Not surprisingly, such a blunt description created a whole variety of responses which could be bound together by the desire to uncover the "real" Soviet identity-building mechanisms, becoming known as the field of Soviet Subjectivity. The opposition to the so-called "totalitarian" vision became the one which sees in the Soviet citizen not exclusively an oppressed "self," but a resourceful actor, who not only adapts to the system but exists in the

[311] The term is used in: Etkind, "Soviet Subjectivity," 177.

complex dialogue between the state system, the "self," cultural layers, and different pasts coming together in a single person.

Two of these ideas came into place in the case of the transformation of the speechwriting practices. Going beyond the "self" in the scrutinizing of the ego documents, two of the overarching views on subjectivity are seen through the concept of the *kollektiv,* proposed by Oleg Kharhordin. Underlying the censoring and controlling character of the Soviet *kollektiv*, Kharhordin writes that, starting from the Khrushchev era, the secret police's duty of monitoring the citizenry through the decades of the late Soviet period was gradually becoming the matter of the *kollektiv*.[312] Even though Kharhordin's narrative does not go beyond the 1960s, the evolution of the speechwriters' *kollektiv* and the routinization of this profession showed the same tendency. Paradoxically, the transformation of the speechwriters' *kollektiv* shows the linkage between two seemingly exclusionary understandings of Soviet Subjectivity. The relationship between the speechwriters and the state was mutually constructive, going beyond the simple dichotomies of repressed or adaptable individuals.

Getting into more details with the case studies of my analysis, I started the story from the description of the Brezhnev-era speechwriting. The General Secretary's rule was characterized by the idea of the collective leadership, which Brezhnev had implemented not only in the higher echelons of power, but with the speechwriters as well. I assume that the routinization of the profession of the speechwriters had started in the mid-1960s. This is not to say that before the second part of the 1960s there were no speechwriters, but, in case of the speechwriting on international affairs issues, that there had been some special departments within the existing institutions, whose employees were responsible for writing speeches.

[312] Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia*, 279–328.

With this process of routinization, the speechwriting had been shaped by the several established steps and, most importantly, the *kollektiv* of the speechwriters developed a particular trait. This trait had been identified by the authors of the ego documents as their belonging to the "sixties generation," or at least referring to themselves as the holders of this generation's ethos. Framing it within the concept of Vladislav Zubok, "Zhivago's children,"[313] this self-identification pattern implied a whole set of ideas, such as actors belonging to the imagined community of the Soviet intelligentsia and their belief in "socialism with a human face." This identification marker determined the perception of the duties of speechwriters, who at that moment in their majority were consultants of the CPSU Central Committee International Department and the Department for Relations with the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries. Even though such people as Bovin, Burlatsky, Shahnazarov, Chernyaev, and others had enjoyed the privileges of working in the Soviet apparatus in Moscow, they wrote in the ego documents that, as "enlightened bureaucrats," they were expecting that such a close position to power will give them an opportunity to influence the politics and push changes in the country similar to the ones after the XX Congress of the CPSU.

However, their overall desires for change were not able to happen just yet. Even with the short moment of their participation in Brezhnev's Détente, in general they were stuck in the routine of "numbing speechwriting" of similar texts over and over again without any possibility for promotion or reform. During Brezhnev, they were not expected to produce any kind of new ideas, but to translate the existing ones into the official language, making the speeches sound like the Party directives. That is why, each time they were stressing in their diaries and memoirs that these "dull and numbing" duties were suppressing their self-identification as *shestidesyatniki*.

[313] Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia*.

With Gorbachev in power, the situation changed radically. He started to alter the foreign policy line of the USSR by first reorganizing the aforementioned departments and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with their staff. Throughout the first two years of being the Secretary General, he made sure to abolish the dominance of Brezhnev's and Gromyko's legacy in the MFA, the ID and the CWPSC Department. Since the soil for the sprouts of Perestroika had been sown, the new speechwriting practices did not have to wait long to be introduced. A significantly narrowed down circle of speechwriters switched from performing mainly as formulators of the preexisting ideas to creating these ideas together with the Secretary General. The ritualized process of speechwriting was transformed into the scrupulous and thoughtful creation of the new ideas, led by Gorbachev.

Still being closely tied to the idea of belonging to the "sixties generation," with Gorbachev at the helm, the speechwriters started to underline their ability and desire to invest their intellectual capital into Perestroika, abandoning their previous emphasis on the self-regulation of the speechwriters' *kollektiv*, established by the mutual surveillance and self-censorship. Instead, they claim that only with the new Secretary General the desires of the "sixties generation" could be accomplished. Furthermore, new conditions of their work allowed them to connect their lives to the imagined heroic past of the "sixties generation." This speechwriters' tendency to read this "generation" retrospectively and self-identify with it made me conclude that, in their ego documents, the post-revisionist overarching type of Soviet Subjectivity has been established. Together with the evolution of the *kollektiv*'s purpose being the production of ideas, the diaries and memoirs draw the picture of the speechwriters' resourceful "self," which did not stand in the submissive position to the state system, but was capable of invoking new identities and creating new political realities.

The case of the transformation of the speechwriting *kollektiv* goes beyond any polar view on Soviet Subjectivity. The case of alteration of Brezhnev's and Gorbachev's speechwriting shows that, in the ego documents, the authors could depict both the suppressive and creative character of the state, meaning that the subjectivity was not a preexisting category, but an ever-changing system constructed in the dialogue with the power discourses in the field of possibilities created by the political system of the state. Referring to accomplished and unaccomplished possibilities of the speechwriters' *kollektiv* under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, the ego documents ultimately speak in favor of a more broad view on subjectivity. I believe that my case has shown that the Soviet Subjectivity approach should concentrate less on the questions if the Soviet context had provided its citizens' with the opportunities for "self-realization" or not; rather, it should examine to what degree the perception of the possibilities or their absence depicted in the ego documents was corresponding to the particular moment of the Soviet history and for what reasons.

The answer to this question lies in the development of the Soviet foreign policy agenda itself. It signified a switch in the self-image of the state through the alternation of the demands for the speechwriters. They were now being shaped by the urge to implement the ideas of the "New Political Thinking" into the Soviet foreign policy agenda, making the Soviet Union broadcast the self-image of a benevolent world power, and distancing itself from the idea of an imperial state guarding its sphere of influence, which had been transmitted before Gorbachev. Thus, the changes of the institutional structures, which signified the evolution of the speechwriting *kollektiv*, may not provide an answer to the question about the origins of reforms in the late 1980s, but they can switch the focus of the Soviet Subjectivity from the self-image of its citizenry to the state's self-image, transmitted into the international arena.

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