

**From Havana to Belgrade: The Changing Fate
of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Yugoslav Press
1979 - 1989**

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Abstract

The focus of the thesis is on the Yugoslav media's changing perception of the country's foreign affairs. I will specifically explore the media representation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) from 1979 to 1989 – analyzing the press coverage of the NAM summits in Havana (1979) and Belgrade (1989). In that way, I will describe the perception of non-aligned politics in Yugoslavia that changed in the media over the span of ten years.

The thesis consists of two thematic parts. In the first part, I establish the theoretical basis for discussing the status of the media in Yugoslavia, explaining its legal and political framework. Additionally, I explain how the media were guided and constrained in their representation of Yugoslav international relations, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement. Part two presents my research on the two NAM summits – the 6th summit in Havana in 1979, and the 9th summit in Belgrade in 1989. Here I show my findings regarding the press coverage of the summits in the daily newspapers *Večernji list*, *Vjesnik*, and *Borba*. The aim is to understand how the press portrayed the two summits, within the context of the transformation of the Yugoslav media during these ten years. By comparing the three newspapers, representing the Croatian and Serbian republics, I also aim to show how these representations reflect the momentous changes in Yugoslavia in both domestic and international terms.

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Introduction

The date is September 4th, 1979, the scene is Havana, Cuba and the 6th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement is in progress. Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito is giving a speech that will save the Movement from divisions, a Movement that once aimed to save the world from the uncertainty of the two-bloc rivalry. Or so the Yugoslav newspapers were writing. *Borba*'s edition from September 6th, with the headline 'Tito's words – our pride', reports people's reactions to the speech from all over Yugoslavia. As one citizen from Zagreb states: "... Tito has shown the way to the future. Simple, temperate in form. Tito's speech is revolutionary at its core."¹




Figure 1 "Firmly opposed to a world divided into blocs: Congress palace during Tito's speech" (Havana Summit; *Borba*, September 6th, 1979)

In 1979, the crisis in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was deepening due to the improving relations between Cuba and the Eastern Bloc, including the Soviet Union, and the Yugoslav backlash to Cuba's politics was considerable. Tito was elderly at this point, the only

¹ "Jednaki principi za sve" (Equal principles for all) *Borba*. September 6th, 1979.

statesman still alive of those who had founded the Movement,² which gave his role, and the role and responsibility of Yugoslavia, an air of special significance.³ Every media channel was set with the task of uplifting Tito's efforts and those of his delegation in order to stifle Cuba's 'deviation' from the Movement, and to ensure re-endorsement of Yugoslav politics in the NAM. This was important for the country's integrity, not just its foreign policy and its position in the world. However, by 1989, during the 9th NAM summit in Belgrade, the interest for the Movement in Yugoslavia had decreased, Yugoslav politicians and media being more critical to the Movement.

In my thesis, I will present the reasons behind the decline of the support for the non-aligned ideology in Yugoslavia during this ten-year period and over four NAM summits through the lens of the media, more specifically, the newspapers. The media in Yugoslavia was never exactly the mouthpiece of the state. Despite being under constant supervision, the Yugoslav press can in fact bear witness to evolving perspectives even in politics, and it is informative for comprehending the changing tides of the 1980s. The analysis of the media can help us understand the question of rising nationalism and the failing economy in Yugoslavia, specifically the way it affected the importance of international relations, and thus, the reporting on the NAM.

Like many elements of Yugoslavia's socialist society, the media was responding to the ever-changing Yugoslav domestic political attitudes *vis-à-vis* the superpowers. These dynamics of change entailed interesting and diverse ways of media development over Yugoslavia's 45-year life span. The media evolved from being fully controlled by the state, immediately after World War II and the establishment of socialist Yugoslavia in 1945, to being mostly independent in the 1980s. This evolution of Yugoslav media has not received a

² John R. Lampe. "Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy in Balkan Perspective: Tracking between the Superpowers and Non-Alignment." *East Central Europe* 40 (2013): 97–113. p. 107.

³ Tito was 87 during the summit, and he died 8 months later (May 4th, 1980).

lot of academic attention thus far. The most notable and extensive work is a 1977 book by Gertrude Joch Robinson,⁴ an account of media structure from 1945 to 1975. Robinson divided the structure of Yugoslav media into four periods – Administrative Media (1945-1950), Transition Media (1951-1961), Decentralized Media (1963-1970), and at that time the Uncertain Present (1971-1975)⁵ – and provided reasons for this periodization. Other sources on Yugoslavia media and specifically on the newspapers that were printed only in Croatia, can be found in the extensive historical overview by Božidar Novak from 2005.⁶ This publication should be considered carefully, as it is largely subjective, but still highly useful for gathering a large body of information. Helpful information about Yugoslav media can also be found in primary sources from this period, usually of a descriptive nature, but also with theoretical and ideological underpinnings.⁷ Mihailo Bjelica and Zdravko Leković's, or Živorad Stoković's publications from the 1970s and the 1980s are examples of such work.⁸

My thesis will focus on the activities of Zagreb-based newspapers *Večernji list* and *Vjesnik*, distributed and read in Croatia, and the Belgrade-based newspapers *Borba*, oriented towards the federal disposition. The thesis' specific orientation comes into play when we consider the effects of the national questions and the Croatian Spring in 1971 (i.e. the social crisis instigated by national appeals, also referred to as 'the Croatian crisis'⁹) on Croatian media. The event compelled the authorities to limit the freedom of the media, which resulted

⁴ Gertrude Joch Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media. The Politics of Mass Communication in Yugoslavia*. Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1977.

⁵ Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*. p. 15.

⁶ Božidar Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. (Croatian Journalism in the 20th Century) Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2005.

⁷ Marko Zubak. *The Yugoslav Youth Press (1968-1980) Student Movements, Youth Subcultures and Alternative Communist Media*. Zagreb: Srednja Europa, Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2018. pp. 21, 22.

⁸ Mihailo Bjelica and Zdravko Leković. *Communication policies in Yugoslavia*. Paris: UNESCO, 1976;

Mihailo Bjelica. *Štampa i društvo: istraživanje istorije novinarstva* (The Press and the Society: Historical Research of Journalism). Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1983;

Mihailo Bjelica. *Velike bitke za slobodu štampe*. (The Great Struggles for the Freedom of the Press). Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985;

Živorad K. Stoković. *Štampa naroda i narodnosti u SFRJ 1945.–1973*. (The press of the people of SFRY 1945–1973) Belgrade: Jugoslovenski institut za novinarstvo, 1975.

⁹ In Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*.

in a distinct set of circumstances. *Borba* serves as a comparative tool to more clearly understand the position of *Večernji list* and *Vjesnik*. With regard to these domestic problems, I purposefully research the media coverage on international politics, as it is an area heavily influenced by inter-Yugoslav fluctuations. The coverage of international politics can serve to better understand domestic matters as well. These developments will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

The first newspaper, *Večernji list*, reached the greatest number of people: in 1980 it printed 300,000 copies a year, being the second best-selling paper in Yugoslavia (after the Belgrade-based *Politika*). In 1983, it printed 324,000 copies, and in 1986, 370,000 copies a year, after which the numbers started to decline. It finished its distribution as a Yugoslav medium with 304,000 copies in 1988.¹⁰ *Vjesnik* was not as popular, but it is useful in this study as it was more politically focused than *Večernji list*. It covered NAM summits more extensively and with longer articles. In 1972, *Vjesnik* printed 100,000 copies; it was constantly declining until 1983 and 1984, when it bounced back to 100,000 copies. In 1988, *Vjesnik* printed 85,000 copies but sold only 68,000.¹¹ It is important to note that both dailies were part of the *Vjesnik* publishing house. Newspapers *Vjesnik*, since 1953, were published under the name ‘*Vjesnik of Socialist Alliance of Working People of Croatia*’. *Večernji list* was founded in 1959 by the merging of *Narodni list* and *Večernji vjesnik*.¹²

Finally, *Borba* was a publication of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia from 1964 onward. It was printed both in Cyrillic and Latin script, in Belgrade and Zagreb, transcending republic and cultural boundaries. It was the most highly reputed newspaper, considered to be intended for communist officials. Its symbolic importance adds to its relevance for my research here. However, by 1988, *Borba* ended its Latin script edition

¹⁰ Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. pp. 851, 852.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 850.

¹² Stoković. *Štampa naroda i narodnosti u SFRJ 1945.–1973*. p. 44.

in Zagreb,¹³ later publishing both in Latin and Cyrillic script in the same Belgrade issue.¹⁴ The selection of newspapers will investigate any potential disparity between them, especially between *Večernji list* and *Vjesnik* in contrast to *Borba*, considering the latter being a primarily Belgrade-based newspaper. This will additionally contribute to the understanding of media in this research.

Another important factor in news coverage was Yugoslavia's news agency, the main source of information for all media houses, the Telegraphic Agency of New Yugoslavia (*Telegrafska agencija nove Jugoslavije*) – Tanjug. Founded in 1943, Tanjug was the only Yugoslav news agency, and by the 1970s, it enjoyed worldwide prestige. Tanjug was still under considerable influence of party officials,¹⁵ and it is thus appropriate for studying the state-media relationship. Tanjug started as a domestic news agency, and later became an international agency, mostly with the help of its connections in the countries of the NAM and its foreign correspondents in those countries. Tanjug supplied Yugoslav newspapers with a broad range of daily goings-on, but most importantly with international news. During the 1960s, the newspapers gained a certain degree of independence that entailed gathering information on their own, and as Robinson shows, the number of their foreign correspondents was constantly increasing.¹⁶ The period from 1979 to 1989 saw competition between republic media houses (like the newspapers analyzed in this thesis) and Tanjug; thus, I chose to deal with all the news suppliers – Tanjug and the newspapers' correspondents – to present differences in numbers of reports and their content, and to find ways to explain these differences.

¹³ Mark Thompson. *Forging War: The media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Luton: University of Luton Press. c1999. pp. 28, 29.

¹⁴ This was the case with the issues published during the summit in September 1989. In my research, I use issues printed in Zagreb for the Havana summit, and issues printed in Belgrade for the Belgrade summit.

¹⁵ Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*. p. 119.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 86, 88.

My thematic focus is the Non-Aligned Movement because of Yugoslavia's major role in the NAM, from its infancy in the 1950s and the first conference in Belgrade in 1961, until the 1980s. Tito's 'third way' characterized the manner in which Yugoslavia established itself in international relations. In the mid-1950s, with the impossibility of reconciliation with the USSR and in refusing to turn towards US capitalism, Yugoslavia had to find new partners. The countries with similar political views – India, Egypt and Indonesia – extended their hand to Yugoslavia in an attempt to reposition themselves on the world map. It was on this basis that Yugoslavia started developing its foreign policy.¹⁷ Exploring the NAM is thus the best way to analyze Yugoslav foreign policy from 1979 to 1989. To engage with the question of Yugoslav international relations and Yugoslavia's political *status quo* during this time interval, I turn to the extensive work on Yugoslavia in the NAM. From a number of publications about Yugoslavia's position in the NAM and in international relations more broadly during the Cold War, the most important contribution comes from Tvrtko Jakovina, who published numerous articles and a book in 2011 on the issue of Yugoslavia's 'third way'.¹⁸ His overview of Yugoslav international policy in the Non-Aligned Movement will be the groundwork for my interpretation of international relations and their influence on domestic politics and media activities.

The period between 1979 and 1989 is most notable for research on the nationalist question and the analysis of the reasons why Yugoslavia fell apart. I will turn my attention to the Yugoslav international relations of this ten-year period. The thesis will analyze two NAM summits, the 6th summit in Havana, Cuba in 1979, and the 9th summit in Belgrade, in 1989 through the lens of the press. Ten years apart, these summits are located in very different

¹⁷ Tvrtko Jakovina. *Treća strana Hladnog rata*. (The Third Side of the Cold War) Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2011. p. 32.

¹⁸ Tvrtko Jakovina. *Treća strana Hladnog rata*. Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2011.

historical contexts, in terms of world politics, the social and political situation in Yugoslavia, and the workings of the media.

During the Havana summit in 1979, a high tension enveloped the event. Fidel Castro opted for a new kind of ‘third way’, one that was characterized by a more comfortable relationship with the USSR. This tendency marked 1979 as a moment of crisis in the Movement. This historic episode challenged NAM principles – the principles Yugoslavia proudly proclaimed. After Tito died in 1980, Yugoslavia went down the path of international and domestic transformation, and the changes during these ten years were considerable. In 1980, the country lost the presence of leadership it had under Tito, and the state now had to attend to the surfacing demands of different republics.

The 1989 Belgrade summit illustrates Yugoslavia's international position as well as domestic attitudes towards the NAM. At that time, Yugoslavia was awaiting the reform of its political and economic system. Discussions on the future of the League of Communists were prominent, and growing national interests came to be aligned with specific political options.¹⁹ The NAM itself had problems with future direction, its members faced with rising economic challenges over the 1980s. Much like Yugoslavia, the Movement lacked strong leadership after 1980.

In the thesis, I argue that the news reporting on international relations changed between 1979 and 1989. Yugoslav media was being supervised by the League of Communists throughout Yugoslavia's existence, but it was also its own ‘creature’, evolving in response to the challenges of specific periods. If we bring together Yugoslavia's international position and domestic politics, but also factor in the varying importance of these two aspects of governance, we will be able to compare how international news reporting changed in the ten-year period. This analysis fills an existing gap in the research on communist media and Cold

¹⁹ Chip Gagnon. “Yugoslavia in 1989 and after.” *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 38, no. 1 (2010): 23–39. p. 23.

War history and brings attention to foreign policy matters at the height of Yugoslav inter-republican struggles.

The first chapter contains the legal and political context for the operation of Yugoslav media – the legislative context and the special issues related to reporting on diplomatic matters. In this chapter I will also address the role of Tanjug, Yugoslavia's international news agency, and the methodology I will use to analyze the press. Chapters 2 and 3 analyze the newspaper coverage of the Havana and Belgrade summits. In conclusion I will assess implications of the analysis for explaining the range of approaches – in different newspapers and during the two summits – for understanding the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in the representation of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy.

1 Yugoslav media in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s

In this chapter, I am going to elaborate on the status of the media in Yugoslav society during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It is important to understand the sociopolitical base that grounded media activities – its legal background, and the shifting political context – in order to later understand how the media came to report on international relations. During the 1960s, the media in Yugoslavia was at its liberal peak (specifically, 1963–1970). At the beginning of this period, a new Constitution was in place, together with a new, more liberal approach to politics, economy, and the media. Yugoslavia was becoming decentralized, as was the media.

The most elaborate law up until 1960 was the Law on the Press and other Information Media. According to the law, censorship of the press was prohibited,²⁰ yet, it is noted that “...freedoms shall not be used by anyone to overthrow the foundations of the socialist democratic order [...] to endanger the peace, international cooperation on terms of equality [...].”²¹ Like the Law, the 1963 Constitution guaranteed freedom of the press and the media.²² More regulations came from the Congress of the Journalist Federation. The Code of Yugoslav Journalism, passed in the aftermath of the 6th Congress of the Journalist Federation in 1965, stated that the journalist in Yugoslavia was a

“socio-political worker [...] [who] participate[s] in building and developing a socialist society [...] They take part in the development of socialist consciousness and in the formation of a socialist public opinion [...] When determining their point of view, journalists start from the fundamental and generally accepted socialist principles and norms.”²³

²⁰ Službeni list FNRJ 16,45 (9. studenog 1960), 814-826. In Ivana Hebrang Grgić. “Zakoni o tisku u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do danas.” (Publishing legislation in Croatia from 1945 to the present) *Vjesnik bibliotekara Hrvatske* 43, no. 3 (2000): 117-134. p. 124.

²¹ Constitution SFRY 1963, p. 25. In F. Kempers. “Freedom of Information and Criticism in Yugoslavia: 2. Press Freedom and its Limitations.” *International Communication Gazette* 13 (1967): 317–336. p. 331.

²² Constitution SFRY 1974. Wikizvor. Access: May 15th, 2019.

[https://hr.wikisource.org/wiki/Ustav_Socijalisti%C4%8Dke_Federativne_Republike_Jugoslavije_\(1974.\)](https://hr.wikisource.org/wiki/Ustav_Socijalisti%C4%8Dke_Federativne_Republike_Jugoslavije_(1974.))

²³ Code of Yugoslav Journalism, *Novinarstvo*, 1965/2, p. 204. In Kempers. “Freedom of Information and Criticism in Yugoslavia.” p. 330.

These documents indicate that the journalist in Yugoslavia was the employee of the state, tasked with the objective of helping to construct a socialist society. Writing in ways that would not contribute to society or could disrupt its society-building mission was not permitted.²⁴ The media represented the channel for the implementation of this socialist ideology, as in many other socialist countries.

In 1971, after the Croatian Spring, the media once again faced increased inspection. These changes in Yugoslavia had been brewing for several years, with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and with nationalistic ideas in Europe gaining in popularity.²⁵ After the events in Prague, Yugoslavia formed the so-called General People's Defense and the Social Self-protection²⁶ of SFRY, pre-emptive doctrines against possible attacks, including ideological ones. New committees were formed in media houses that would take care of toxic ideological infiltrations.²⁷ The year 1971 changed the media setting, in that newspapers took greater chances if they strayed from state guidelines. One example of such risks was taken by the Croatian weekly newspaper, *Hrvatski tjednik — Novina za kulturna i društvena pitanja* (Croatian weekly – newspaper for cultural and social matters), part of *Matica hrvatska*, a Croatian publishing organization, the purpose of which was to promote Croatian and Slavic cultural identity. The first issue of the weekly was published on April 16th, 1971. This issue contains a prologue, which declared a need for integrating the Croatian nation, its statehood, and the feeling of national affiliation. The claim of the prologue was that these aims could be fulfilled by means of strengthening the Croatian economy and spirituality.²⁸ The first issue

²⁴ To learn more about the limiting factors of Yugoslav and Croatian media see: Josip Mihaljević. "Liberalizacija i razvoj medija u komunističkoj Hrvatskoj 1960-ih i na početku 1970-ih." (Liberalization and the development of media in communist Croatia during the 1960s and 1970s) *Društvena istraživanja: časopis za opća društvena pitanja* 24, no. 2 (2015): 239–258.

²⁵ Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*. pp. 15, 54, 55.

²⁶ Originally, *općenarodna obrana* (ONO) and *društvena samozaštita* (DSZ).

²⁷ Božidar Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2005. p. 853.

²⁸ "Proslov." (Prologue) *Hrvatski tjednik*, April 16th, 1971. p. 1. In Meri Kunčić. "O nekim aspektima utjecaja političkih zbivanja na rad Matice hrvatske u vrijeme Hrvatskog proljeća." (On some aspects of political influence on the activities of Matica hrvatska during the Croatian Spring) *Kolo* 4, Winter, 2005. Access: May

was printed in 15,000 copies, and the last, 33rd, in an astonishing 148,000 copies! After the famous 21st session of the Presidium of the League of Communists in Karađorđevo (Serbia; November 30th–December 1st, 1971), *Matica hrvatska* and *Hrvatski tjednik* were shut down.²⁹

The legislation in the 1970s was a continuation of the earlier period but was also marked by added restraints. The 1973 Law on Preventing Abuse of the Freedom of the Press and Other Media Channels, relying on the Law from 1960, reinforced the prohibition of content and introduced stricter penalties.³⁰ The new strategies used in the 1970s were meant to tighten supervision over media policies and statements, increase control over the management of personnel selection, and bring republican laws closer in line with the federal ones. The information regarding politics was under surveillance and reflected the viewpoints within the League of Communists.³¹ Another document of importance for the media operations was the Resolution of the Federal Council on the Achieving of Social Protection in the Self-Management System in 1973 – primarily to counter techno-managerial, bureaucratic and liberal resistance that was thought to endanger self-management and socialist development. Article 10 of the Resolution states that it is now, more than ever, necessary to resist anti-socialist activities. The media was thus supposed to manage their activities whilst in permanent contact with state services, and also warn against and oppose such anti-socialist tendencies.³² The new Constitution of 1974 reaffirms the freedom of the media and guarantees freedom of public expression.³³ However, the Constitution condemned

16th, 2019. <http://www.matica.hr/kolo/298/o-nekim-aspektima-utjecaja-politickih-zbivanja-na-rad-matice-hrvatske-u-vrijeme-hrvatskog-proljeca-20305/>

²⁹ Aleksandar Stipčević. “Tiskari kao cenzori u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1990.” (Printers acting as censors in Croatia 1945-1990) *Vjesnik bibliotekara Hrvatske* 48, no. 3/4 (2005): 1 – 15. pp. 8, 9. and

Stipe Botica. “Počeci Matice hrvatske.” (The beginnings of Matica hrvatska) *Vijenac* 577, April 14th, 2016. Access: May 17th, 2019. <http://www.matica.hr/vijenac/577/poceci-matice-hrvatske-25542/>

³⁰ Službeni list SFRJ (The official SFRY bulletin), 29, 22 (19. travnja 1973), 745–747. In Hebrang Grgić. “Zakoni o tisku u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do danas.” p. 125.

³¹ Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*. pp. 59, 64.

³² Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. pp. 780, 781.

³³ SFRY Constitution 1974. Wikizvor. Access: May 15th, 2019. [https://hr.wikisource.org/wiki/Ustav_Socijalisti%C4%8Dke_Federativne_Republike_Jugoslavije_\(1974.\)](https://hr.wikisource.org/wiki/Ustav_Socijalisti%C4%8Dke_Federativne_Republike_Jugoslavije_(1974.))

anything that can endanger the “independence of the country, peace or international co-operation on terms of equality,”³⁴ and because of this, restrictions were imposed on “[...] the freedom to use printed matter and other media of information and communication that is directed against the foundations of the socialist democratic order [...]”.³⁵ The activities considered threatening were not detailed in the Constitution. However, the 1974 Constitution ensured the republics with a high level of autonomy, which gave rise to the half-confederative structure of Yugoslavia.³⁶ The press was consequently divided along republican lines, each republic creating its own media subsystems.³⁷ One of the deciding guidelines for the media law regulations was the 10th Congress of the League of Communists held in May 1974. The Congress also made decisions about the activities of party officials with regard to information exchange, stating that “the League of Communists needs to be the deciding ideologically-political factor in the information system [...]”.³⁸ It further supplements the Constitution in determining the obligations of the journalist to combat any anti-socialist resistance.³⁹

During the 1970s the media were one of the social agencies upon which the League of Communists indirectly extended its ideological guidance.⁴⁰ As the UNESCO study on Yugoslav communications from 1974 shows, the League of Communists influenced staff selection and program content and promoted the doctrine and method of self-management.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Tvrtko Jakovina. “Sloboda u raspadu. Nesvrstana, samoupravna; nestabilna i slaba SFRJ: od smrti Tita do uspona Miloševića.” (A Freedom Crumbling. Nonaligned, Selfmanaged; Unstable and Weak SFRY: from Tito’s Death to Milošević’s Uprising), In *Osamdesete! Slatka dekadencija postmoderne* (Eighties! Sweet decadence of postmodernism), edited by Branko Kostelnik and Feđa Vukić, 13–33. Zagreb: Hrvatsko društvo likovnih umjetnika and Društvo za istraživanje popularne culture, 2015. p. 22.

³⁷ Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*. pp. 39–42.

³⁸ X. Congress, Kultura (Culture), 1975. In Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. p. 783.

³⁹ Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. p. 783.

⁴⁰ Robinson exhibits the letter of the executive bureau of the Presidium of the League of Communists from September 29th, 1972, in which the League proposes a more homogenous stance in the media editorial boards that “meetings are held of all communists in the press, radio and television and of all responsible political and social bodies to discuss and undertake energetic measures to put an end to destructive writing, to remove from leading positions all those who do not accept the political course of the League of Communists, to make impossible writings which are contrary to the League of Communists and factional activity through the press.” Tito, Kardelj, and Dolanc. *Ideological and Political Offensive*, p.103. In Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*. p. 60.

However, the study states that, in the 1970s, there was no top-down channeling of information *per se*, since this would not be compatible with the declared openness of the League's operations.⁴¹ This kind of openness, I believe, was never the issue in Yugoslavia. However, there existed a state-imposed hierarchy, a pecking order in the journalistic practice, the top of which was the League of Communists. The second tier to pose guidelines, compliant with those coming from the top, were the founders⁴² of newspapers. They determined a paper's basic program conception, drew up the staff policy, set up the editorial board and arranged the appointment of the director and editor-in-chief via public tender.⁴³ Thus, a fully democratic journalistic practice never materialized, at least not in areas packed with sensitive issues for the state. Included among these issues were those of foreign affairs, particularly relations with the USSR and the NAM. Yugoslavia, as other communist states, paid attention to public opinion in order to participate in its formation and evolution. This was a common conception of society-wide ideological molding,⁴⁴ which the media had to incorporate into its operations. It is with these ideological bases in mind that we should observe press reports on the NAM summit in Havana in 1979.

In the 1980s, the legal framework was very similar to that of the previous decade. In 1982, the Law on Public Information was passed in the Croatian parliament. The law guaranteed media freedoms, but again raised expectations about supporting self-management and prohibited the media from using its freedom to destroy the state and violate morality.⁴⁵ Thus, the early 1980s represent a continuation of the state's restrictive attitude towards the

⁴¹ Bjelica and Leković. *Communication policies in Yugoslavia*. p. 47.

⁴² The founders of the *Vjesnik* publishing house were the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Croatia, and of *Borba* the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia.

⁴³ Bjelica and Leković. *Communication policies in Yugoslavia*. p. 47.

⁴⁴ Ghita Ionescu. *The politics of the European Communist States*. New York, Washington: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967. pp. 169-180.

⁴⁵ Narodne novine 38(144), 11 (16. ožujka 1982), 182–191. In Hebrang Grgić. "Zakoni o tisku u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do danas." p. 126.

media. Still, many events in domestic politics and in the world – the absence of Tito, the growing economic crisis, the conflicts within the League of Communists, and the pro-national outbursts – all took their toll on media activities described in the following paragraphs.

In 1980, *Vjesnik* published Tanjug's report about the need for a society-serving journalist, pointing out that the reporting of many still failed to fit that description. It is thus necessary for journalists, the report states, to attend more counselling sessions and decrease their monopoly on the exchange of public information.⁴⁶ In 1983, *Vjesnik* was still very much obedient to state policies, stating that "there is no political crisis in our system – this is only a slight weakness in its operations..."⁴⁷ However, small-scale changes in media operations started to appear in 1984. The Constitutional Court in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina ruled the 'moral and political eligibility of an individual' qualification to be unconstitutional.⁴⁸ Also, in 1986, Dušan Čkrebić, the president of the Central Committee of Serbia, invited the media to take out the 'moral and political eligibility' requirement from their job calls.⁴⁹ Even though this happened only in Vojvodina, it indicated a change in the political structures.

The problem was still prominent in the mid-1980s, according to Mihailo Bjelica's 1985 publication. It was not strange for the newspapers to act as political bulletins, he wrote, since the editor or the director were not journalists, but 'politically eligible' individuals appointed by the state. This practice lies at the root of self-censorship.⁵⁰ In 1986, at the 13th Congress of the League of Communists, the media was still invited to support Yugoslav ideological strivings.⁵¹ Even at the 1989 Assembly meeting of the *Vjesnik* publishing house and the

⁴⁶ Tanjug. "Od plusa do minusa." (From positive to negative) *Vjesnik*. August 14th, 1980. In Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. p. 888

⁴⁷ *Vjesnik*. January 14th, 1983. In Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. p. 894.

⁴⁸ Moral and political eligibility were oftentimes a precondition for employment.

⁴⁹ This rule explains why non-journalists held the positions of editors in media houses. Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. pp. 897, 898, 922.

⁵⁰ Bjelica. *Velike bitke za slobodu štampe*. p. 169.

⁵¹ Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. p. 920.

Presidency of the Conference of the League of Communists of *Vjesnik*, it was demanded that *Vjesnik* publications promote Yugoslav unity. It was also stated that *Vjesnik* should not contribute to the cleavages in the Yugoslav media space.⁵² In spite of all the appeals to the media to respect the Yugoslav regulations imposed by laws and to take note from the League's directives, Božidar Novak argues that the media underwent gradual liberation during the 1980s, which is apparent given the greater openness in writing about the political and economic crises. For this, Novak offers the example of *Večernji list*'s writing, as well as that of *Danas* and *NIN*.⁵³ I will demonstrate the same phenomenon using the example of reporting on the Belgrade summit in 1989, showcasing the stark contrast with the reporting on the Havana summit ten years earlier.

1.1 Informing on diplomatic issues – keeping the media in check

Reporting on diplomatic issues in Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s is often overshadowed by the highly profiled national problems. In accordance with this fact, Robinson claims censorship in Yugoslavia was usually practiced in response to domestic, and not international news. The former had the potential to cause more damage to Yugoslav socialist society than most international problems. As Robinson writes, the more dangerous diplomatic circumstances could be reduced to the extremely delicate Soviet negotiations and the occasional instances of the fundamental ideological principles being challenged.⁵⁴ However, I claim that the news reporting on the international relations, specifically the NAM, had to adapt to some ideological stipulations. Josip Grbelja includes the NAM on the list of

⁵² *Mali Vjesnik*. April 7th, 1989; “Skupština NIŠPRO *Vjesnik*.” *Večernji list* April 6th, 1989. Ibid. p. 934.

⁵³ Ibid. pp. 924, 925.

⁵⁴ Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*, pp. 62, 64.

taboo topics in journalism, although only in 10th place.⁵⁵ Tvrtko Jakovina argues that non-alignment was one of the more important ideological building blocks of the Yugoslav state, calling the Movement ‘Tito’s child’.⁵⁶ This seems even more plausible when one looks into the newspapers’ reports during the 6th summit in Havana, where the importance of non-alignment is most prominent.

The order and balance inside the Movement were nearly disturbed in 1979. Yugoslavia had to take a stand to defend one of its main principles – non-alignment – and the legitimacy the state gained for being a member of the Movement. Reporting on the 6th NAM summit in Havana in 1979 supports this hypothesis, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 2. This is somewhat expected, I would argue, as the diplomatic problems with the USSR were a disruptive factor in Yugoslav politics since the 1940s, resulting in one of the first major diplomacy breakdowns, the Tito-Stalin Split, in 1948. Yugoslav state ideology was then adjusted to the new international situation of Yugoslavia, dragging the media along.⁵⁷ A similar turn of events (but not as momentous) happened in 1979 when Cuban tendencies nearly undermined the whole idea of the Movement. More examples of Yugoslavia fighting against other ‘leftist’ influences include Indonesian tendencies to get close to Chinese politics in 1964, and the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966. Yugoslavia was heavily criticized during this Conference, due to its alleged attitude about the US–Vietnam war, in which it was said to be favoring the Americans. Cuba later published a theoretical book about Yugoslavia faking its socialism, and in fact helping Americans in Vietnam.⁵⁸

The 9th summit in Belgrade was the swan song of the NAM and the last big foreign policy move for Yugoslavia. This was a tumultuous time for Yugoslavia: the state system

⁵⁵ Josip Grbelja. *Cenzura u hrvatskom novinarstvu: 1945.–1990.* (Censorship in Croatian Journalism: 1945–1990) Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić Okel d.o.o., 1998. p. 196.

⁵⁶ Tvrtko Jakovina. *Trenuci katarze. Prijelomni događaji XX. stoljeća.* (Moments of Catharsis. Breaking Events in the 20th Century) Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2013. pp. 311-313.

⁵⁷ Zubak. *The Yugoslav Youth Press.* p. 27.

⁵⁸ Jakovina. *Trenuci katarze.* pp. 321, 322.

started to fall apart, Tito was criticized, the League was divided, the republics were in conflict, and the main tenets of the ideology – socialism and non-alignment – were threatened. Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Budimir Lončar, hoped that the meeting would help various groups in Yugoslavia to seek out non-aggressive solutions that would deliver Yugoslavia from crisis and re-establish its global importance. Also, the summit was a chance for the state to re-kindle the positive forces in the country, tone down the talk of crisis, and re-construct the meaning of Yugoslav identity.⁵⁹ But the NAM was overlooked by domestic actors;⁶⁰ Croatia and Slovenia in particular were openly critical of it and objected to its economic dimensions.⁶¹ The press assumed a different role compared to that in 1979, when the objective was to reproduce state ideology, and highlight the importance of the NAM for the world and the Yugoslav public. Struck by internal crisis and losing a sense of purpose in the face of the Cold War ending, the NAM was becoming less appreciated in Yugoslavia, which was reflected in press reports.

Again, the legitimacy that the NAM gave Yugoslavia was extremely important for the country and represented a constitutive part of Yugoslav identity. In my research, I argue that Yugoslavia set specific objectives for NAM-related reporting – to establish and retain its ‘non-aligned’ status – in the world and among the Yugoslav republics. This claim is supported in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Daya Kishan Thussu’s book on international news exchanges. They write about the usual objectives in media exchanges between countries internationally, for example: promoting greater equality, justice, and pluralism.⁶² Other goals in media exchanges were directed towards the creation of regional or group *identity*: international,

⁵⁹ Jakovina. *Treća strana Hladnog rata*. p. 625.

⁶⁰ Ibid. pp. 622, 624.

⁶¹ See more: Robin Alison Remington. “Foreign Policy.” In *Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism*. Edited by Dennison Rusinow. Washington, DC: Wilson Press Center, 1988. and Gabriel Partos. “Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Summit.” BBC Caris Talk no. 79/86, July 28th, 1986.

⁶² Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Daya Kishan Thussu. *Contra-Flow in Global News. International and Regional News Exchange Mechanisms*. London: John Libbey and Company Ltd, 1992. p. 33.

cultural, or political. One example of a political identity, the authors say, can be a specifically ‘Non-Aligned Movement identity’. They say that establishing an identity is directly achievable by means of promoting a country’s ideology and by supplying certain kinds of information.⁶³ This identity-building is applicable to domestic needs, as much as to the international situation written about by Boyd-Barrett and Thussu. As Jakovina claims, forming the NAM identity with which all of the Yugoslav republics could identify was one of the main Yugoslav objectives. This goal was prominent in the years leading up to Tito’s death, but slowly started to decline in the following decade.

1.2 The importance of Tanjug

To understand Yugoslavia and its international news reporting, the role of Tanjug in the NAM needs to be elaborated. As the key news supplier to Yugoslav newspapers, I claim that Tanjug played a considerable role in constructing the narrative about the non-aligned identity of Yugoslavia. Robinson sees Tanjug in a different light. She writes about Tanjug losing its popularity during the period of liberalized media, since media houses had more correspondents working abroad. Tanjug was unable to steer Yugoslav media as before, especially in the domain of international reporting, Robinson argues. Media houses in Yugoslavia were able to collaborate with other news agencies and media houses from all over the world, and in that way bypass Tanjug as a news source. In addition, Tanjug was mostly covering political news, while media houses in Yugoslavia showed more interest in cultural and social topics since these attracted a wider audience in the liberalization period.⁶⁴ I would

⁶³ Ibid. p. 33.

⁶⁴ Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*. pp. 86, 88.

suggest a different approach to Tanjug's popularity and importance in Yugoslavia, at least as far as the end of the 1970s and the Havana summit are concerned.

At exactly the mid-point of the 1970s, media development in the non-aligned countries was undergoing a distinctly positive trend due to New World Information and Communications Order.⁶⁵ The NAM found itself in limbo. With the SALT-I agreement and the *détente* politics setting in, the East and the West were no longer on the edge of nuclear war as they were a bit over a decade ago, with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, or the Soviet bomb testing during the first NAM summit in Belgrade in 1961. Consequently, the NAM lost its political function as a medium for establishing equilibrium with its third-way politics.⁶⁶ Politics were now weighing less heavily on the NAM, so the members turned to establishing economic partnerships, and, more importantly for my purposes, cooperation between media agencies.⁶⁷ During the 4th NAM summit in Algiers in 1973, a proposition was made for establishing a media network across the NAM. In the final declaration, under the chapter 'Action programme for economic co-operation', one section proposed an exchange of ideas and information.⁶⁸ At the 5th NAM summit in Colombo in 1976, the News Agency Pool was voted into existence and started its operation.⁶⁹ The News Agency Pool's (NAP) most active member was Tanjug. Before it was established, the Tanjug Pool was, in fact, the forerunner of the NAP. In the NAP, Tanjug worked as the main collector of news reports from NAM

⁶⁵ Regina Mulay. *Mass media, international relations, and non-alignment*. New Delhi, 1987. p. 34.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 199.

⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 198.

⁶⁸ The cultural cooperation between the developing countries was among the plans as well.

Final Document of Fourth NAM Presidential Summit. *Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Disarmament Database*. Access: May 20th, 2019.

http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/5th_Summit_FD_Sri_Lanka_Declaration_1976_Whole.pdf, pp. 88, 89, 199.

⁶⁹ Final Document of Fifth NAM Presidential Summit. *Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Disarmament Database*. Access: May 20th, 2019.

http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/5th_Summit_FD_Sri_Lanka_Declaration_1976_Whole.pdf, pp. 134, 135.

member countries.⁷⁰ Also, Yugoslavia was the greatest contributor to the NAP, with 17 percent of stories contributed to the Pool (Egypt was second with 12 percent contribution), as Edward Pinch reported in 1978. Tanjug became a prominent player among the world's news agencies and the NAM even before, but especially after, the establishment of the NAP. Its coordinating role as a well-resourced state news agency changed the hegemonic perspective on the Third World, which was the predominant opinion among the First world news agencies. By 1978 Tanjug became the fourth news agency in the world in terms of the number of countries serviced, after Reuters, Agence France-Presse, and Associated Press.⁷¹ The worldwide influence of Tanjug in the 1970s can thus be easily recognized.

I would argue that this fact also demonstrates the high importance of Tanjug for Yugoslav leadership and for state identity building. This argument is supported by Richard Shafer in his study from 1997 on the impact of Tanjug on domestic media. He argues that the press had a leading "role in promoting the official foreign policy of non-alignment." He adds that one of the ways this was managed was by turning Tanjug's interest towards the Third World countries.⁷² However, it is important to note that Tanjug was not an extended hand of the state in the standard sense. Rather, as part of Yugoslavia's media network, it was required to abide by legislative documents I have presented at the beginning of this chapter. Tanjug was also financially supported by the state. In an interview conducted by Richard Shafer, Žarko Modrić, a Tanjug bureau chief in Zagreb in 1989, stated that in 1987, 45 percent of Tanjug's budget was provided by the state, and 38.5 percent came from the sale of Tanjug's bulletins⁷³ (like *Svet nesvrstanih* [The world of non-aligned], *Servis za regionalnu štampu i*

⁷⁰ Edward T. Pinch. "The Flow of News: An Assessment of the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool." *Journal of Communication* 28, no. 4 (1978) p. 166.

⁷¹ Mulay. *Mass media, international relations, and non-alignment*. pp. 24, 25.

⁷² This does not mean Yugoslavia was interested in Third World news more than in the news from 'developed world'. Quite the opposite, Yugoslavia was always more focused on the news from Europe.

In Richard Shafer. "The Press and the Preservation of Yugoslavia Before 1990: Tanjug's Leadership of the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool." *The Global Network*, no. 8 (1997): 53–66. pp. 54, 61.

⁷³ Ibid. p. 63.

radio [Service for regional press and radio], *Svet i mi* [The world and us]). On top of all this evidence regarding Tanjug's connections with state authority, the idea of an active international agency would not be possible for Tanjug without the interference of political leadership.

Furthermore, Robinson writes about the possibility of Tanjug having an influence on media houses, but only because the media channels used a great number of Tanjug's reports.⁷⁴ I will take this into consideration when presenting my research. The numbers themselves can be useful in a comparative approach to the press coverage of the two NAM summits. There was a difference to how the Tanjug reports on the Havana and Belgrade summits were used in different newspapers in terms of quantity and content, and I speculate on the reasons in the following pages.

1.3 Methodology

The focus of my research is Yugoslavia and its foreign affairs seen through the lens of domestic media channels – specifically the press. I will explore the relevance of Yugoslavia's foreign affairs through the press representation of the Non-Aligned Movement summits as one of the indicators for understanding the transformation of Yugoslav politics and society between 1979 and 1989. The two summits – Havana in 1979, and Belgrade in 1989 – stand for symbolic points of Yugoslav history, Havana being the last summit Tito attended, and Belgrade being the last summit Yugoslavia 'attended'. In order to investigate the press' reporting on NAM summits, one needs to focus on understanding the media operations, built upon the domestic politics and Yugoslav foreign policy.

⁷⁴ Robinson. *Tito's Maverick Media*. p. 89.

The methodology in my thesis is comprised of quantitative and qualitative analyses of three daily newspapers – Zagreb-based *Večernji list* and *Vjesnik*, and Belgrade-based *Borba*.⁷⁵ The material consists of newspapers published during and one day after the summit for Havana, and for Belgrade, one day before the summit. Given the brevity of the latter event, I added the day before the summit to the analysis in order to have a full picture of how the press in Belgrade anticipated the summit. The sample encompasses 39 issues and 461 articles. For analysis I chose those articles that appeared on the front pages, and in the section dedicated specially to the summit. The rationale for this specific design is based on practicality and representativeness. For the Havana summit, the dates are: September 3rd–10th, 1979; for the Belgrade summit the dates are: September 3rd– 8th, 1989. The few articles about the summit not found in one of the sections are omitted for reasons of practicality, constraints of space, and secondary importance when compared to the ‘summit section’ articles.

For each newspaper, I provide in-depth analysis of at least three articles per newspaper, totaling 18 articles. In the analysis, I have focused on the newspaper treatment of the basic principles of non-alignment, as well as the difficulties the Movement faced in September of 1979 and 1989. Although the articles are not exclusively about these topics, they were the most prominent in all three newspapers.

This methodology will allow me to analyze **(1)** the discourse formed by the particular newspapers, and **(2)** the discourse formed by all the newspapers with regard to the two relevant years, 1979 and 1989. The last step in the research is to compare the 1979 and the 1989 press coverage and explain the differences between them, by highlighting the political and social forces that characterized the activities of the media and the NAM summits in 1979 and 1989. This last step is crucial for the thesis, and will allow me to attend to the following matters: **(a)** the differences in coverage between the summits in terms of article number and

⁷⁵ For 1989, I analyze the Belgrade issues of *Borba*, since the Zagreb office was shut down in 1988.

their size, which will show the differences in interest for the particular summits; **(b)** the differences between Tanjug reports published in the newspapers for the Havana summit and the Belgrade summit (considering the degrees of state control over Tanjug, and the effects on content); **(c)** comparison of content, which will demonstrate the differences in the approaches (of both Tanjug and newspaper journalists) to the Havana and the Belgrade summit.

It is necessary to acknowledge some limitations of my methodology. The length of the articles is not clear from the results presented, given that the paragraph measure I have chosen is not precise, and there is no way of knowing why each newspaper chose to print a specific number of Tanjug journalists' articles. However, the basic measurements do yield a complex picture of the media representation of international relations in this crucial period of Yugoslav history.

2 Press coverage of the Havana summit 1979

The Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Havana, the Republic of Cuba, from September 3rd to September 9th, 1979. There were 92 full members of the Movement taking part in the summit. 19 countries, organizations and national liberation movements, had the status of observer, and 18 the status of guest.⁷⁶ The Chairman of the summit was Fidel Castro, President of Council of State and the Council of Ministers, of Republic of Cuba.⁷⁷ The summit hosted 160 Yugoslav delegates and state security personnel, together with 67 journalists.⁷⁸ With Tito, the prominent Yugoslav delegates were Josip Vrhovec, Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Budimir Lončar, Vrhovec's assistant at the time, but later a central figure at the Belgrade summit in 1989, where he acted as Secretary of Foreign Affairs himself.

The Havana summit started with Cuba insisting on the NAM's cooperation with one of the blocs to be included in the final document of the summit. The summit, however, ended quite differently, with the final document as a summary of the NAM's basic principles, at repeated request of Cuba's opposition within NAM. Yugoslavia proposed the greatest number of amendments to the first version of the final document and was celebrating Tito's success in safeguarding non-alignment. However, it was clear that the Movement did not eliminate its divisions, and that these would resurface in the future.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Additionally, Belize was granted special status as a non-member state, and the right to speak.

⁷⁷ The Final Document for the Sixth NAM Presidential Summit. *Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Disarmament Database*. Access: June 10th, 2019.

http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6th_Summit_FD_Havana_Declaration_1979_Whole.pdf, p. 6.

⁷⁸ Tvrtko Jakovina. *Trenuci katarze. Prijelomni događaji XX. stoljeća*. Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2013. p. 324.

⁷⁹ Tvrtko Jakovina. *Treća strana Hladnog rata*. Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2011. pp. 240, 242.

2.1 *Večernji list*

Table 2-1 is a representation of *Večernji list*'s summit coverage during a five-day cycle, producing 38 articles and 339 paragraphs, the least of all the newspapers analyzed. This was anticipated, since *Večernji list* was not as politically focused as the other two newspapers. I have acquired and analyzed five issues: 3rd (Monday), 4th (Tuesday), 7th (Friday), 8th and 9th (weekend issue), and 10th of September 1979.⁸⁰

During this period, the special section in the newspapers, dedicated to the summit events, contained reports by Tanjug and *Večernji*'s correspondent, Maroje Mihovilović. As shown in Table 2-1, *Večernji*'s Mihovilović and Tanjug authored nearly the same number of articles and paragraphs. Leading up to 1979, Mihovilović, a prizewinning journalist,⁸¹ was an active employee in the *Vjesnik* publishing house, where he started to work in 1964, mostly for weekly magazines such as *Vjesnik u srijedu*, *Studentski list* and *NIN*. From 1974, he was employed as a reporter on international politics in *Večernji list*, the same post from which he reported on the Havana summit in 1979, and on the 7th NAM summit in New Delhi in 1983. He reported from many Asian countries (India, China, etc.), but also from Europe, Latin America and the US. Notably, in 1985, he entered Kampuchea with four other journalists, from where he sent reports and interviews, transmitted by a number of leading news agencies.⁸² Interestingly Tanjug's and Mihovilović's reports approach to the topic in similar ways, utilizing matching concepts and ideas, like democratization, unity, anti-bloc politics, threats to the Movement, defending the basic principles of the Movement, and the role of president Tito. Examples of such concepts are presented in the table below.

⁸⁰ The library (Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica Zagreb) did not have the newspaper published on September 5th and 6th. Still, I believe the lack of those issues should not deeply affect the results of the research.

⁸¹ Prizewinner of *Vjesnik*'s 'Zvonimir Kristl' prize (1976) and winner of the Medal of the merit for the people with silver star (1980). In ed. Mirko Peršen. *Vjesnikov leksikon 1940-1990* (*Vjesnik lexicon 1940-1990*) Zagreb: Novinska, izdavačka, štamparska i prodajna organizacija 'Vjesnik', 1990. p. 287.

⁸² Ibid. p. 287.

There is a total of 14 photographs in all *Večernji list* issues. The photographs in *Večernji list*, the main source of which is Telefoto Tanjug, are not numerous, or given much attention. They are small, except for the photographs on the front page; these photographs are at the center and dominate the page in all the issues presented. As evidenced in Table 2-1, *Večernji list* did not place reports on the front page like other newspapers, but only a photograph and a headline. Mostly statesmen are photographed: Fidel Castro (6 photographs) and Tito with his fellow statesmen (3). Other photographs show Tanjug colleagues at work (2), and the conference room shot from a wide angle (3).

Table 2-1 *Večernji list* 1979

	Front page	Reports from Tanjug	Newspaper's reporter Maroje Mihovilović	Articles with the dateline: Havana
9/3 1979	"Today: summit" No photograph	1 article; 4 paragraphs; Dateline: New York	7 articles; 38 paragraphs; 2 photographs (Telefoto Tanjug); Dateline: Havana (3)	
9/4 '79	"The biggest summit of the non-aligned" Photograph of the summit Presidency during the opening of the summit (unattributed)	7 articles; 50 paragraphs; 3 photographs ⁸³ ; Dateline: Havana (6)	/	3 articles 14 paragraphs
9/7 '79	"The confirmation of the principles" Photograph of the conference room from the air during a debate (unattributed)	/	6 articles; 80 paragraphs; 4 photographs (unattributed); Dateline: Havana (2)	
9/8,9 '79	"Unanimously for basic principles" Photograph of Tito and Yasser Arafat in embrace (unattributed)	2 articles; 65 paragraphs; 1 photograph; Dateline: Havana (1)	1 article; 9 paragraphs	2 articles 12 paragraphs
9/10 '79	"The biggest recognition goes to Tito" Photograph of conference room during a special recognition of Tito's work (telephoto Tanjug)	6 articles 45 paragraphs Dateline: Havana (4)	2 articles 17 paragraphs Dateline: Havana (2)	1 article 5 paragraphs
		Number of articles: 16 Number of paragraphs: 164	Number of articles: 16 Number of paragraphs: 144	Number of articles: 6 Number of paragraphs: 31 ⁸⁴

In the introductory article to the 'summit section' of the weekend issue (September 8th/9th), titled "Unanimously for independence," Mihovilović writes about the problems that certain (unspecified) statesmen provoked with their undemocratic behavior during the summit.⁸⁵ Because many other statesmen were opposed to the provocations, Mihovilović

⁸³ Since all the photographs linked to Tanjug reports are unattributed, it is likely that their source is Telefoto Tanjug. I assume this for Tanjug articles in both *Vjesnik* and *Borba*.

⁸⁴ In this table, and all the following ones, I listed the number of articles; number of paragraphs; photographs and their author; the dateline. If there were no photographs or dateline in the article, I have omitted the information completely.

⁸⁵ The reference for this article (and all other newspaper articles) will appear at the end of the segment in which I am describing the article.

judged in the article that “there is no possibility of the NAM losing its way in respecting its basic principles.” He writes that the member states supported further democratization, the anti-bloc nature of the Movement, and that only a small number of delegates expressed different opinions, which is “standard for a movement that is not monolithic.” Mihovilović writes that during the speeches, the majority reminisced on the “visions of the Movement founders.” The author then lists a number of spokespeople that were supportive of the basic principles (such as the president of Pakistan, the Indian foreign affairs minister, etc.), and presented the new version of the political declaration. The political declaration had to be amended due to numerous complaints. The new version was comprised of ideas that followed up on the declarations of earlier summits, making “some fundamental principles [...] more emphasized than ever before.” Mihovilović writes about the attempts of some media channels (without bringing up their name) to show the summit in a somewhat strange light, quoting speeches out of context in order to form news reports. The author also writes about the undemocratic acts, such as the hosting of the ministerial conference, which was marked by an imposition of opinions “that the Movement does not want.” Mihovilović accuses some delegates of purposefully delivering speeches that were too long, so to give their viewpoints an air of dominance and intellectual sophistication. The author finishes on a positive note, stating that the majority of statesmen did not adopt an attitude like the aforementioned minority, and that they confirmed their anti-bloc allegiances. This was crucial for the protection of democracy, which was the source of NAM strength, Mihovilović stated.⁸⁶

On September 10th, in the article titled “Stronger in spite of the challenges,” Mihovilović writes about the successful end of the summit, accomplished with the help of the unity of attitudes about the basic anti-bloc principles of the Movement. This was accomplished, the author writes, because of the challenges posed by those who questioned

⁸⁶ Maroje Mihovilović. “Jednoglasno za nezavisnost.” (Unanimously for independence) *Večernji list*. September 8th and 9th, 1979.

the Movement's foundations. Mihovilović writes about the summit's declaration in its final form, and its preamble, which was named by some the 'non-aligned charter'. The first draft was proposed by Cuba, after which fifty nations demanded its amendment. Tito's role is especially emphasized in the article, and the author states that his words were deemed by others to be worthy of remembrance. He does not mention the source of the judgment but does write about a great number of statesmen being very kind to Tito and proclaiming him the father of non-alignment and the backbone of the Movement. On the other hand, the author points to the downsides of the summit, which were embedded in the way the organization was managed by the host, and the way the Cuban and American media were reporting on it. In the end, he concluded, in spite of all the troubles of the 1979 Havana summit, the Movement came out strong.⁸⁷

Tanjug reports in *Večernji list* are mostly information on the course of the debates and personal meetings of statesmen; commentaries in the articles are not that common. Tanjug frequently reported on the reactions of other statesmen and media channels to Tito and his speech.⁸⁸ One article depicted the conditions in which the journalists were working during the summit and reflected on Western practices of journalism. Tanjug criticized Western-style reporting, stating that the editors of many Western journals had shaped the news of the summit to form the narrative of competition between Yugoslavia and Cuba within the Movement. The report claims that Western journalists relished in the experience of the Cuban-Yugoslav rivalry.⁸⁹ *Večernji list* denied that there was any real conflict to begin with.

⁸⁷ Maroje Mihovilović. "Jači unatoč izazovima." (Stronger in spite of the challenges) *Večernji list*. September 10th, 1979.

⁸⁸ "Tito is the harbinger of peace." Ahmed Sékou Touré about Tito. Tanjug. *Večernji list*. September 10th, 1979.

⁸⁹ Tanjug. "Havanske sličice i dojmovi." (Pictures and impressions from Havana) *Večernji list*. September 4th, 1979.

2.2 *Vjesnik*

In its issues from September 3rd–10th, *Vjesnik* broadly covered the events at the Havana summit, having published 41 articles based on Tanjug reports, and 18 authored by two of their own journalists: a total of 59 articles and 947 paragraphs (additionally 8 articles unattributed with 165 paragraphs, totaling 67 articles and 1,112 paragraphs) in eight issues, more than *Večernji list*, but fewer than *Borba* (see Table 2-2). Tanjug authored more than twice as many articles compared to *Vjesnik*'s reporters, and three times the number of paragraphs. *Vjesnik*'s most prominent news reporter for summit matters was Zoran Bošnjak, a prizewinning⁹⁰ journalist who worked in the *Vjesnik* publishing house from 1974. He wrote for *Vjesnik u srijedu*'s domestic and international politics sections, transferring in 1975 to *Vjesnik* newspapers as a foreign policy journalist and the editor of the news program. From 1979 to 1980, he was the editor of the foreign policy section of *Vjesnik*, and then correspondent from the US and the UN. In 1987, he became the chief editor of *Start* magazine, after which he came back to his former post in *Vjesnik*.⁹¹ One article on the summit was written by prizewinning journalist Željko Brihta. Brihta joined the *Vjesnik* publishing house in 1950 and worked almost exclusively for *Vjesnik* for the rest of his active journalist years. He worked on both the domestic and international politics sections and later became editor of the latter. He was also a correspondent from Bonn, a secretary of the League of Communists for *Vjesnik* and a president of the workers council of the *Vjesnik* publishing house.⁹² Like in *Večernji list*, the differences in approaches of Tanjug and the *Vjesnik*'s correspondents were not

⁹⁰ 'Seven LCYY Secretaries' prize (1974), and *Vjesnik*'s 'Zvonimir Kristl' prize (1977). Perščen. *Vjesnikov leksikon 1940-1990*. p. 49.

⁹¹ Ibid. pp. 48, 49.

⁹² Prizes: Croatian Journalists' Association prize (1954), 'Otokar Keršovani' prize (1986), Medal of the merit for the people with silver star (1977), Golden plaque of *Vjesnik* (1988). Ibid. p. 53.

considerable, consisting of reports on the courses of events, and the reporters' reflections. I will explicate this in more detail in the content analysis section below the table.

There were 35 photographs in *Vjesnik*'s summit section in eight of the issues covered. Similarly to *Večernji list*, the photographs were mostly showing the statesmen during the conference or engaging in private conversations. Most photographs, 16 in total, show Tito and the Yugoslav delegation in the conference room. A total of 12 photographs similarly show various statesmen from all over the world. Other photographs are wide-angle shots of the conference room and of the front of the Congress palace. The photographs are mostly highlighting the importance of Tito and the Yugoslav delegation; one such photograph is accompanied with a quote by Tito: "Our efforts to democratize international relations calls for further democratization inside the NAM"⁹³ (see Figure 2).⁹³



Figure 2 *Vjesnik* - September 5th, 1979

⁹³ September 5th, 1979. *Vjesnik*.

Table 2-2 *Vjesnik* 1979

	Reports from Tanjug	Newspaper's reporters	Other
9/3 1979⁹⁴	7 articles 51 paragraphs 1 photograph (Telefoto Tanjug) Dateline: Havana (3)	Zoran Bošnjak: 1 article 11 paragraphs	Has only the dateline: Havana (one article; 3 paragraphs) 2 photographs (Telefoto AP)
9/4 '79	2 articles 6 paragraphs Dateline: Havana (all)	Zoran Bošnjak 1 article 19 paragraphs	1 article attributed to Zoran Bošnjak and Tanjug 62 paragraphs; 4 photographs (Telefoto Tanjug); Dateline: Havana 1 article unattributed and without dateline: 4 paragraphs
9/5 '79	5 articles 101 paragraphs 4 photographs (Telefoto Tanjug /3/ and Telefoto AP /1/) Dateline: Havana (all)	Zoran Bošnjak 1 article 7 paragraphs	Unattributed and without deadline: 1 article; 62 paragraphs; 1 photograph (unattributed) Unattributed and without dateline: 1 article; 8 paragraphs
9/6 '79		Zoran Bošnjak 7 articles; 134 paragraphs; 6 photographs (Telefoto Tanjug /4/, Telefoto UPI /2/); Dateline: Havana (all)	Has only the dateline: 2 articles 21 paragraphs
9/7 '79	7 articles 186 paragraphs 6 photographs (Telefoto Tanjug /4/, Telefoto UPI /2/) Dateline: Havana (6), Ljubljana (1)	Gojko Marinković 1 article; 6 paragraphs Zoran Bošnjak 1 article; 15 paragraphs	
9/8 '79	7 articles; 146 paragraphs; 4 photographs (Telefoto Tanjug /3/, Telefoto AP /1/); Dateline: Havana (6), Ljubljana (1)	Mirko Galić 1 article 8 paragraphs	Has only the dateline: 1 article; 5 paragraphs; 1 photograph (Telefoto Tanjug); Dateline: Havana
9/9 '79	10 articles 145 paragraphs 4 photographs (Telefoto Tanjug 4) Dateline: Havana (all)	Zoran Bošnjak 2 articles; 31 paragraphs; Dateline: Havana (1) Željko Brihta 1 article; 12 paragraphs	
9/10 '79	3 articles 30 paragraphs Dateline: Havana (all)	2 articles; 39 paragraphs 2 photographs (Telefoto Tanjug /1/, Telefoto UPI /1/); Dateline: Havana (1)	
	Articles = 41 Paragraphs = 665	Articles = 18 Paragraphs = 282	Articles = 8 Paragraphs = 165

On the front page of the September 3rd issue is the Tanjug report, titled “The meeting of the statesmen of the non-aligned world starts.” The article describes the complicated

⁹⁴ The front page of *Vjesnik* consists of articles, so the front page section is omitted here and included in other sections. This is the case in *Borba* as well.

international situation and the position in which the NAM found itself in 1979. Because of this, the report states, it was important that the Movement insisted on unity and “continues to comply with the principles negotiated during the 1st summit in Belgrade in 1961.” Next, the report states that the economic cooperation between the members was imperative as there was a need to equalize the positions of Third World countries with those of the developed world. “A fight for equal economic relations will bring an economic component to the NAM countries’ independence, being also an important factor of cohesion at these times, as once was the fight for independence.” The article comments on the willingness of the members to work on their unity (*jedinstvo*) and suggests that an active consciousness regarding the threat coming from the two blocs had prevailed among the member states. In other words, not one member wanted to be left to the mercy of being isolated in the Movement, the report states. It also suggests what would have happened to world politics had it not been for the Movement – “the world would be terrifyingly divided between two antagonisms watching each other through electronic crosshairs of their rockets.” In spite of this, it was important for the Movement that every country be its own self-determining subject in international relations. The report goes on to announce the talks of Democratic Kampuchea, stating that the country was the target of foreign intervention, an issue that needed tackling. Otherwise, all other countries would be in danger if there was no explicit condemnation of military intervention. The question of Egypt and negotiations with Israel were also considered to be of high importance during the summit. The report finishes with information regarding the ministerial meeting of the NAM states. As the ministers adopted the draft of the summit agenda, Morocco demanded that the question of Western Sahara be left out. After the debate on the matter, 44 countries, including Yugoslavia, rejected the proposal, concluding it was a relevant part of decolonization discussions. Thus, the Western Sahara question was left on the agenda. The

final matter in the ministerial conference was that of Democratic Kampuchea and its participation at the summit.⁹⁵

This article sets the tone for *Vjesnik*'s writing on the summit's topics. The journalists who were writing the reports on the summit had similar approaches to the problems Yugoslavia faced in Havana. For example, in the article from September 9th, titled "The important is here to stay, and everything else will perish," Željko Brihta writes about the differences in the community of the non-aligned countries and their ideas of mutual acceptance. He starts by stressing that the summit ought to be analyzed only once it was over. Some predictions about the summit ending in conflict were not realized, the author states – "the Movement is alive and well." Some have perceived the summit as a sports contest, he writes, but it was obvious that the summit had been played only towards the victory of diversity, highly valued in the NAM. Brihta writes that the NAM not only resolved the differences that had surfaced during the summit, but also laid the foundation for future teamwork. He condemns the reports of Eastern newspapers for dividing the NAM into the 'developed' and the 'underdeveloped', and the Western media for dividing it into 'radicals' and 'moderates'. The only important thing in Havana was whether "one country's politics were following the NAM principles of unity and universality or not." Also, he conveys the words of Stane Dolanc, high official of the League of Communists, about Cuba's "strange behavior," but points out Cuba's failure in influencing other members, and the successful end of the summit, despite the differences instigated by Cuba and Fidel Castro. He mentions the problem of pressure on the Movement coming from the two blocs, and states that cooperation with the blocs is, however, necessary – "but the interests of the bloc politics and those of the non-aligned can never be reconciled." Bloc politics always impose limited views on the world, he writes, referring to the words of the foreign affairs minister of the Federal Republic

⁹⁵ Tanjug. "Počinje sastanak državnika nesvrstanog svijeta." (The meeting of the statesmen of the non-aligned world starts) *Vjesnik*. September 3rd, 1979.

of Germany: “some NAM members getting closer to the socialist bloc should not be countered by allowing an increased influence from the West, as that would mean inheriting bloc contradictions into NAM politics.” Brihta then comes back to the media coverage of the Movement, stating that many had hoped the summit would finish successfully. The author concludes by writing that history would repeat itself and reiterates the statement from *The Economist* in 1973, after the summit in Algiers – “that this was the last ever summit of the non-aligned.”⁹⁶

In the article “Source, path and success” by Zoran Bošnjak from the September 10th issue, the justification of non-aligned politics is prominent. Bošnjak writes about the confirmation of non-aligned ideals, the attractiveness of the Movement for many new states, and its struggle for a world based on new values and international relations. He also discusses the successful end of the conference and restates validations the Movement received for its principles, aims and directions of non-aligned politics, as well as its unity, even more bolstered in Havana. All the non-aligned principles can be found in the final document of the Havana summit, the author states, which is “the greatest achievement of the conference.” The path towards this document was difficult, the article continues. This was because of a great number of members, many of them active, and most of them opposed to the instances of ‘undemocratic’ behavior, tried to impose their attitudes on others. “Tito, the founder of the NAM, was an important factor in determining the basic course of the debate,” Bošnjak writes. He emphasized the need for the democratization and for “more concrete and comprehensive action by the Movement” as a proper way to strengthen free and fair communication.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Željko Brihta. “Bitno ostaje, ostalo prolazi.” (The important is here to stay, and everything else will perish) *Vjesnik*. September 9th, 1979.

⁹⁷ Zoran Bošnjak. “Izvor, put i uspjeh.” (Source, path and success) *Vjesnik*. September 10th, 1979.

2.3 *Borba*

The *Borba* issues from September 3rd to 10th all gave a detailed coverage of the event, consisting of 127 articles and 1,326 paragraphs in eight issues. It surpassed *Večernji list* and *Vjesnik* by 89 and 60 articles, respectively. In *Borba*, there were approximately twice as many Tanjug reports than those of the newspaper's correspondents. As it can be seen in Table 2-3, Tanjug reports approximately twice as many articles and paragraphs as *Borba*'s journalists. As with the previous newspapers, the approaches of Tanjug's and journalists' articles were very similar to each other, consisting of reports on the course of events at the summit, as well as reporters' commentaries on the events. I will explicate this further below. Compared to other newspapers, more journalists were writing about the summit. Most of the articles were written by Bogdan Dečermić and Slobodan Pavlović, totaling ten articles, and Vlado Teslić, who contributed with five articles. Slobodan Dečermić joined *Borba* in 1950, leaving to work in *Novosti*, but coming back in 1964 to work for its international politics section. He was *Borba*'s correspondent in the US and the UN from 1977 to 1981. From 1985 to 1987, he was president of the Journalists' Association of Serbia.⁹⁸ He is a prizewinning journalist awarded with a Medal of the merit for the people with silver star and the 'Svetozar Marković' prize (1971). Slobodan Pavlović started working in journalism in the late 1950s in *Sport*, and then *Borba*. In the late 1960s, he left for his first job as foreign correspondent in London. Later, he was stationed in Mexico reporting for *Borba*. In the late 1980s, he left for Washington, as Yugoslavia's first correspondent there. Pavlović was a member of the Journalists' Association of Serbia.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ He is a prize winning journalist presented with a Medal of the merit for the people with silver star and 'Svetozar Marković' prize (1971). "In Memoriam." *Večernje Novosti*. July 5th, 2006. Access: June 6th, 2019. <http://www.mc.rs/bogdan-decemic.6.html?eventId=27805>

⁹⁹ "Preminuo novinar Slobodan Pavlović." (Journalist Slobodan Pavlović passes away) *Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije*. March 4th, 2013. Access: June 6th, 2019. <http://nuns.rs/info/news/18724/preminuo-novinar-slobodan-pavlovic.html>

There were 39 photographs exhibited in *Borba*. The depiction of Tito in various roles was the most prominent, totaling 20 photographs. On these photographs, Tito is seen in company with other statesmen, with the Yugoslav delegation, or alone. Other photographs consist of statesmen in conversations, behind the podium, or sitting during a debate (10 photographs). The photographs of the conference room and journalists monitoring the debate are also represented (6 photographs). The most interesting photographs in *Borba*, which sets the newspaper apart from the other two, are the depictions of Yugoslav people in Zagreb and Belgrade watching Tito's speech on television sets at their workplaces or in TV shops (3 photographs).¹⁰⁰

Information on Vlado Teslić was unavailable.

¹⁰⁰ September 4th and 6th, 1979. *Borba*.

Table 2-3 Borba 1979

	Reports from Tanjug	Newspaper's reporters	Other (unattributed articles or without dateline)
9/3 1979	10 articles 48 paragraphs 2 photographs Dateline: Havana (8), Algiers (1), Nairobi, Tokyo, Mexico, Bangkok, Hanoi (all in one article)	Bogdan Dečermić and Slobodan Pavlović ¹⁰¹ 2 articles; 23 paragraphs; 1 photograph (not attributed); Dateline: Havana (all) Vlado Teslić 1 article; 25 paragraphs; 1 photograph (unattributed) D. Vukobratović 1 article; 5 paragraphs; Dateline: Rome	
9/4 '79	12 articles 82 paragraphs 5 photographs Dateline: Havana (9), Belgrade (1); none (2)	Bogdan Dečermić and Slobodan Pavlović 3 articles; 29 paragraphs; 1 photograph (unattributed); Dateline: Havana (all) Rade Brajović 1 article; 5 paragraphs; Dateline: New Delhi	
9/5 '79	6 articles 78 paragraphs 4 photographs Dateline: Havana (5), Belgrade (1)	Vlado Teslić 1 article 10 paragraphs	Has only a dateline: 76 paragraphs 2 photographs Dateline: Havana 1 article unattributed and without dateline 14 paragraphs 1 photograph
9/6 '79	9 articles 111 paragraphs 3 photographs Dateline: Havana (6), Lima (1), Belgrade (1), Bucharest (1)	Bogdan Dečermić and Slobodan Pavlović 1 article; 12 paragraphs; Dateline: Havana Vlado Teslić 1 article; 11 paragraphs Rade Brajović 1 article; 5 paragraphs 1 photograph (unattributed); Dateline: New Delhi Dragan Vukobratović 1 article; 10 paragraphs; Dateline: Rome I. Martinović 1 article; 5 paragraphs; Dateline: Warsaw A. Đukanović 1 article; 6 paragraphs; Dateline: Paris Đ. Bogojević 1 article; 11 paragraphs The same report: O. Despotović, S. Hodžić, M.D., M. Tobov, F. Nikočević, S. Festić 6 articles; 30 paragraphs; Datelines: Titograd, Pristina, Belgrade, Sarajevo, Ljubljana Lazar Čarnić 1 article; 11 paragraphs; Dateline: Athens D. Lukić 1 article; 3 paragraphs; Dateline: Cairo	1 article unattributed and without dateline: 1 article 5 paragraphs Dateline: Zagreb 1 article 4 paragraphs Skoplje 4 paragraphs Novi Sad 4 paragraphs
9/7 '79	12 articles 157 paragraphs 4 photographs	Slobodan Pavlović and Bogdan Dečermić 1 article; 7 paragraphs Rade Brajović 1 article; 4 paragraphs; Dateline: New Delhi A. Đukanović	Unattributed and without dateline: 1 article 6 paragraphs

¹⁰¹ The names are listed in order they are in the newspapers. This applies to all the other listed reporters' names.

	Dateline: Havana (10), Belgrade (1), Madrid (1)	1 article; 5 paragraphs; Dateline: Paris I. Martinović 1 article; 3 paragraphs; Dateline: Warsaw M. Milivojević 1 article; 5 paragraphs R. Ličina 1 article; 5 paragraphs	
9/8 '79	8 articles 131 paragraphs 5 photographs Dateline: Havana (7), Belgrade (2)	Bogdan Dečermić and Slobodan Pavlović 2 articles; 13 paragraphs; 1 photograph (unattributed); Dateline: Havana (all) Rade Brajović 1 article; 5 paragraphs; Dateline: New Delhi I. Martinović 1 article; 4 paragraphs; Dateline: Warsaw Duška Petković 1 article; 9 paragraphs	Unattributed and without dateline: 1 article 1 paragraph
9/9 '79	9 articles 126 paragraphs 4 photographs Dateline: Havana (9), Belgrade (1)	Bogdan Dečermić Slobodan Pavlović 1 article; 10 paragraphs; Dateline: Havana Vlado Teslić 1 article; 9 paragraphs Đ. Bogojević 1 article; 6 paragraphs A. Đukanović 1 article; 8 paragraphs; Dateline: Paris R. Ličina 1 article; 6 paragraphs	
9/10 '79	9 articles 75 paragraphs 2 photographs Dateline: Havana (all)	Vlado Teslić 1 article; 4 paragraphs D. Vukobratović 1 article; 8 paragraphs; Dateline: Rome Đ. Bogojević 1 article; 4 paragraphs	One article dateline Havana, unattributed: 9 paragraphs Two articles without the dateline and unattributed: 79 paragraphs; 2 photographs (unattributed)
	Articles = 75 Paragraphs = 808	Articles = 43 Paragraphs = 316	Articles = 9 Paragraphs = 202

The report from Bogdan Dečermić and Slobodan Pavlović, from the September 6th issue of *Borba*, titled “A message for all the world,” informs about Tito’s speech from September 4th. It logs the number of journalists from around the world present at the summit, reaching 1100 individuals. The report states that Tito’s speech was highly anticipated and, as can be seen in Figure 3, conveys the opinions of a number of journalists that the Tanjug staff was in contact with. The article writes about most of them sharing in the opinion that “Tito and his speech significantly contributed to the conference and to the program of non-aligned

politics, meaningful for the present and the future.” The report also includes comments from some of the Cuban journalists, who claimed that Tito and Castro spoke about the same thing, but in a different way. The authors write of journalists who were disappointed that there was no clash between Tito and Castro: “That is their personal problem, and the problem of the politics they support and follow” the article states, but also notes “many other journalists interpreted Tito’s speech in an objective way [...]”. In the end, the article cited the reflections of five different media persons about Tito and his speech.¹⁰²



Figure 3 Borba - September 6th, 1979

People from all over Yugoslavia watched Tito’s speech. Each article on this page is a report from one of Yugoslav cities: Zagreb, Titograd, Pristina, Skopje, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Beograd, Novi Sad.

¹⁰² The Statesmen (India), Il Paese Sera (Italy), U.S. News & World Report (USA), Radio-Lusaka (Zambia). Bogdan Dečermić and Slobodan Pavlović. “Poruka za cijeli svijet.” (A message for all the world) *Borba*. September 6th, 1979.

In another article, by Vlado Teslić, titled “Identification,” printed on the front page of the September 9th issue, the author writes about the summit being the battlefield of the NAM’s “fight for a better world,” which in itself is the confirmation of the basic principles of non-alignment. “Some dissonant, but expected approaches, only boasted confidence in the reaffirmation of the Movement.” Teslić writes about Yugoslavia being content because “our main expectations and optimism were satisfied.” He writes about the role of Tito at the summit, and his and Yugoslavia’s contribution to the affirmation of non-aligned politics. “As we have seen, many accorded with Tito’s words, in that way showing unity of thought...” At the end, the author emphasizes the great number of members contributing to the most progressive strivings of humanity, in one place, during a single summit, “the likes of which have never been seen before.”¹⁰³

In the article from a Tanjug report, titled “Openness and democracy,” printed on the front page of the September 9th issue, the emphasis was placed on the plurality and acceptance of different perspectives among the Movement members. The article informs about the way the summit is conducted. “Plenary meetings are public” and available for everyone, non-aligned and aligned journalists. Even though some meetings were closed for the public, the media was informed on the discussions afterwards. Also, owing to this kind of democratic approach, all of the delegates were given their time and spotlight to voice their opinions. Thus, the report states that no “objective and benevolent” person would have intentionally incited conflicts in such an environment. It was exactly these differences in Havana that reinforced the fortitude of the Movement, its program and its spirit, the report concludes.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Vlado Teslić. “Identifikacija.” (Identification) *Borba*. September 10th, 1979.

¹⁰⁴ Tanjug. “Otvorenost i demokratičnost.” (Openness and democracy) *Borba*. September 9th, 1979.

2.4 Havana summit coverage - analysis

Večernji list published the least on the proceedings of the summit, 38 articles and 339 paragraphs (statistics can be seen in Table 2-4), which was expected given its more popular and less politically focused character. However, this newspaper did use extensive information from Tanjug and employed an expert journalist to work on the matters of the summit. Aside from standard reporting on events during the summit, there is reiteration of certain words in the reports: ‘democratization’ within the Movement, upon which the struggle against impositions from the minority in the Movement (Cuba and its supporters) is grounded, strength in ‘unity’, the ‘basic principles’ the Movement has to return to, and ‘anti-bloc politics. There is a tendency of condemnation of unethical journalistic work, and criticisms of “nonobjective” reporting (mainly from the US and Cuba). Tito is mentioned frequently and prominently. This is not surprising in itself but becomes more interesting towards the end of the summit, because of the praise that Tito received by the newspaper for being the ‘Movement’s savior’.

Vjesnik, which as a morning daily focused more on political goings-on, contributed with 67 articles and 1,112 paragraphs. *Vjesnik* articles emphasized the need for revived unity within the Movement, which was a constant in many reports, noted as a response to threats to the Movement from the two blocs, and to “strange Cuban behavior.” As in *Večernji list*, the articles invite the appreciation of the basic principles forged in Belgrade in 1961. The need for cohesive factors is often stressed, economic matters being one possible consideration. Many articles report on the confirmation of non-aligned ideals and politics, and the validation of Movement principles expressed by its members. The condemnation of Eastern and Western media coverage is also a common motif in the newspapers. There is a special review of Tito’s speech and reports of reactions to it from around the world. An emphasis is placed on the new

strengthened unity within the Movement that is the result of the difficulties the community has faced in Havana. The future work on democratization, which is viewed as the next step for the proper exchange of perspectives and fellowship is another highlighted notion.

Borba supplied 127 articles, and 1,326 paragraphs, having more correspondents and more Tanjug reports than *Večernji list* or *Vjesnik*. In *Borba*, the same emphases are placed on the basic principles and the importance of the first NAM summit in Belgrade. Moreover, the articles point out the great number of members that are joined in and committed to improving world politics, by means of fostering the plurality of thought and differences in perspectives. Tito's role at the summit is also mentioned multiple times, and disappointment is frequently expressed about the reporting of other media channels, especially Cuban ones. The end of the summit was successful, *Borba's* reports conclude, and the expectations of Yugoslavia, of reinvigorating the Movement, were fulfilled.

Tanjug is dominant in its coverage on the issues of the Havana summit, having the greatest number of articles and paragraphs – 132 articles and 1,637 paragraphs, compared to the journalists' articles, 77 of them, and 742 paragraphs.¹⁰⁵

Table 2-4 Havana summit coverage

<i>Večernji list</i>	<i>Vjesnik</i>	<i>Borba</i>
Articles= 38 Paragraphs = 339	Articles = 67 Paragraphs = 1,112	Articles = 127 Paragraphs = 1,326
Articles = 232		
Paragraphs = 2,777		

¹⁰⁵ Without the 'Other' section.

The three newspapers endorsed a unified position in summit reporting, since there were close similarities in the approaches they take – including the reports written by Tanjug, and those written by individual journalists. At this point, I would like to remind the reader of the media position in 1979, which I have described in Chapter 1. The press was to be a tool which forged the socialist society – as written in the legislation prior to 1979. It was expected from the newspapers to support and idealize the Yugoslav cause in Havana. The still ongoing importance of Tanjug, the number of articles presented to the audiences, and the high-profile journalists covering the summit can be interpreted as the effort of Yugoslavia to promote the importance of the summit and the ideas it stood for. There were several notable matters all newspaper emphasized in their writing:

---Emphasis on the 1st summit in Belgrade and the foundation of non-aligned principles, and an appeal that these principles be highly regarded and respected.

---Stressing the role of Tito, his personality and, above all, his speech, with which he presumably ‘salvaged’ the Movement at the end of the summit.

---The condemnation of Western (American) and Eastern, as well as Cuban journalists.

---Emphasis on the successful close of the summit, with assessments that the Movement is stronger and more unified than ever before; the need for future democratization of the Movement, so that its cohesion never again comes into question.

Aside from the expectations the state imposed on the media, the data from the research closely reflects the political turbulences within the Movement. As I mentioned, Yugoslavia reportedly placed high value on non-alignment principles and strived for their preservation. For Yugoslavia, non-alignment was laid at the foundations of the country’s identity building, apart from its other symbols – Tito, socialism, ‘brotherhood and unity’, revolution, the Party

and self-management.¹⁰⁶ Secondary sources analyzing the press coverage from other countries help to contextualize the way in which the Yugoslav press framed its NAM politics. It was not just the Yugoslav newspapers that condemned other agencies and media channels reports. Cuban media responded to Tanjug's writing on the summit as well, stating that they have found the reports offensive. *Prensa Latina*, the Cuban news agency, accused Tanjug of overemphasizing the blunders of the hosts at the summit, while stating that the supporters of Cuban ideas were given prime time in the debate. Taking this route, *Prensa Latina* argued that by engaging in this kind of reporting, Tanjug was playing up to US journalists by forming common attitudes with them towards the summit.¹⁰⁷ The American account of the events in Havana is also noteworthy. Writing about the American and Indian reports on the Havana summit, Regina Mulay concludes the American papers reiterated its anti-summit 'feelings', emphasizing the cleavages that were present during the summit, especially those between Yugoslavia and Cuba.¹⁰⁸ As Dennis Small writes prior to the summit in August 1979, from the moment Havana was announced as the next conference site, the US and the UK tried to undermine the efforts of the NAM to organize the summit in peace, stressing the problem of Cuba as an example of "Soviet expansionism."¹⁰⁹ Even though the article comes from a highly politicized American journal, it offers a glimpse into the 1979 powerplay, and serves as a starting point for explaining that the Yugoslav response to the Havana summit was affected by the circumstances of international politics. David Small writes that Yugoslavia took part in the media attacks on Cuba. Tvrtko Jakovina also writes about the similarities between American and Yugoslav views on the solution to the problem of the Cuba-USSR fraternization, and this is the reason for possible speculations on the Yugoslav and American

¹⁰⁶ Jakovina, *Trenuci katarze*. p. 311.

¹⁰⁷ Miodrag Žiko Abramović, ed. *Tanjug: pola veka 1943.-1993*. (Tanjug: half a century 1943-1993). Beograd: Novinska agencija Tanjug, 1993. pp. 127, 128.

¹⁰⁸ Regina Mulay. *Mass media, international relations, and non-alignment*. New Delhi, 1987. pp. 313, 314.

¹⁰⁹ David Small. "The Non-Aligned meet in Havana. The challenge of guaranteeing Third World development." *Executive Intelligence Review* 6, no. 33 (1979): 27–29. p. 27.

collaboration.¹¹⁰ However, it is clear from the material presented here, that the Yugoslav newspapers were accusing the US and its media as well. It was in the interest of Yugoslavia that the NAM continued with its work unscathed.

Yugoslavia was thus concerned with the intentions of both the US and Cuba, while the even greater threat of the USSR was lurking in the background. To be sure, Cuba had supporters in the NAM: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Benin, Madagascar, Palestine Liberation Organization, Guinea, Mali, Jamaica, and sometimes Algeria, Guyana, Syria, Tanzania, and Iraq.¹¹¹ One example bears witness to media alignment with state policies with regard to the countries supporting Cuba. One Tanjug article in *Večernji list* reported on the Vietnamese foreign affairs minister, Nguyễn Cơ Thạch, with the title “Contradiction,” referring to the minister’s statement during one of the press conferences. The minister commented on the notion of the NAM adopting anti-bloc politics, stating that the same does not imply that the countries of the NAM should not enter one of the blocs, but that they are fighting imperialist and colonialist tendencies.¹¹²

The news reporting during the Havana summit was diverse, and depending on the country of origin, the Cuban, American and Yugoslav news agencies and media houses adapted to their state leanings and tendencies. Yugoslavia was no exception. Yugoslav journalists, as I argue, could have been under explicit instructions to support the Yugoslav cause in global politics and in the NAM. This can be understood more clearly when one realizes that all the earlier instances of Yugoslavia having to fight against the state positions that were too far to the left, and that I have described briefly in Chapter 1. In the end, with regard to the Havana summit, Tvrtko Jakovina states that the general mood in 1979 was the

¹¹⁰ Tvrtko Jakovina. “Sloboda u raspadu. Nesvrstana, samoupravna; nestabilna i slaba SFRJ: od smrti Tita do uspona Miloševića.” In *Osamdesete! Slatka dekadencija postmoderne*. Edited by Branko Kostelnik and Feđa Vukić, 13–33. Zagreb: Hrvatsko društvo likovnih umjetnika and Društvo za istraživanje popularne culture, 2015. p. 14.

¹¹¹ Jakovina. *Trenuci katarze*. p. 324.

¹¹² Tanjug. “Kontradikcija.” (Contradiction) *Večernji list*, September 4th, 1979.

same as in 1948, the only difference being the USSR acting indirectly through Cuba.¹¹³ Jakovina believes Yugoslavia was the most devoted member state of the NAM. It was ready to keep the Movement's working temperature high, and the only state interested in conserving the ideas of its founders.¹¹⁴ My analysis gives rise to a clearer picture of the interdependence of international relations and the media's activities.

¹¹³ Jakovina. *Trenuci katarze*. p. 324.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 320.

3 Press coverage of the Belgrade summit 1989

The Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries met at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, from September 4th to September 7th, 1989. It was preceded by a Preparatory Meeting of Senior Officials, held on August 31st, 1989, and a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held on September 1st and 2nd, 1989. There were 98 Movement members participating, and 44 countries and organizations were guests at the summit. The Chairman of the 9th Conference was Janez Drnovšek, the President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Budimir Lončar, Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia was in charge of the ministerial meeting.¹¹⁵

The final document, the Belgrade declaration, was novel in form for the NAM. It was shorter than the earlier final documents, and more precise in its conclusions. For the first time, a final document contained matters of human rights and environmental protection. After the Belgrade summit, the Movement took a new turn and redefined itself as a constructive factor in world's affairs. After the summit, the NAM tried to shake off its reputation of contrarianism against the West.¹¹⁶ For Yugoslavia, this summit was critically important for several reasons. Before the summit, the Presidency of the SFRY had reservations about hosting the summit, in fear of backlash across the country. Budimir Lončar considered it imperative for Yugoslavia to host the summit even before any decision was made – exactly because of this fear. He understood the gravity of domestic problems and believed that investing into foreign policy would alleviate troubles at home.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Final Document of the Fourth NAM Presidential Summit. *Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Disarmament Database*. Access: May 20th, 2019. http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/m, pp. 144, 147.

¹¹⁶ Budimir Lončar in talks with Tvrtko Jakovina, February 26th, 2006. In Tvrtko Jakovina. *Treća strana Hladnog rata*. Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011. p. 627.

¹¹⁷ Tvrtko Jakovina. "Sloboda u raspadu. Nesvrstana, samoupravna; nestabilna i slaba SFRJ: od smrti Tita do uspona Miloševića." In *Osamdesete! Slatka dekadencija postmoderne*. Edited by Branko Kostelnik and Feđa Vukić, 13–33. Zagreb: Hrvatsko društvo likovnih umjetnika and Društvo za istraživanje popularne culture, 2015. p. 28.

3.1 *Večernji list*

Table 3-1 details *Večernji list*'s coverage of the 1989 Belgrade summit. The contrast with the 1979 Havana summit coverage is suggested by the total number of articles and paragraphs published. The paper produced altogether 63 articles and 272 paragraphs during the six days (September 3rd–8th). In 1979, there were 38 articles published in five days, but those consisted of 339 paragraphs. The ratio of Tanjug and *Večernji lists*'s journalist articles changed, now strongly favoring *Večernji*'s articles – 45 (223 paragraphs), while Tanjug numbered 18 articles (49 paragraphs).¹¹⁸ The number of journalists working on the summit coverage increased – the articles in the summit section were jointly signed by four journalists: Zoran Vodopija, Slobodan Brkić, Zlatko Herljević, and Božo Ožbolt.

Zoran Vodopija joined *Večernji list* in 1979 and soon became editor of the foreign policy section of the paper. He was a correspondent in South America, Spain, Austria, Hungary, Italy, etc.¹¹⁹ Zlatko Herljević was a prizewinning journalist and the president of the Workers' Council of the *Vjesnik* publishing house from 1986 to 1988. He joined *Večernji list* in 1983, and from 1985 started writing for the foreign policy section of the papers. He was an expert on South East Asia and the Far East, as well as the oil market and OPEC. He was a correspondent in India in 1987 during the military intervention into Sri Lanka.¹²⁰ Božo Ožbolt, started working in *Večernji list* in 1971, where he advanced from associate, to deputy and then to editor of the foreign policy section. Ožbolt was also a correspondent from Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Egypt, and Algeria.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ In 1979: Tanjug – 16 articles and 164 paragraphs; *Večernji's* journalist Maroje Mihovilović – 16 articles and 144 paragraphs.

¹¹⁹ Ed. Mirko Peršen. *Vjesnikov leksikon 1940-1990* (*Vjesnik lexicon 1940-1990*) Zagreb: Novinska, izdavačka, štamparska i prodajna organizacija 'Vjesnik', 1990. p. 535.

¹²⁰ Winner of *Vjesnik's* 'Zvonimir Kristl' prize in 1986. Ibid. p. 154.

¹²¹ Awarded with a Working Order with silver wreath in 1987. Ibid. p. 331. Information on Slobodan Brkić was unavailable.

The previous chapter briefly discussed the approaches of Tanjug and the newspapers' journalists to the subject matter of the Havana summit. I will not be able to do the same for the Belgrade summit. Tanjug reports on the Havana summit often detailed the course of events and quoted the statements made by heads of states. This was also the case in 1989, but no opinions of any kind were voiced by Tanjug reporters. Also, Tanjug reports often filled the 'fun facts' section of the newspaper. There was no specific approach that can be induced from the articles. The journalists' articles also refrained from expressing opinions, and mostly reported on particular speeches, summit debates, and events. However, *Večernji list* emphasized the main problems raised during the summit, discussing the position of the Movement in the world, and the change that the Movement anticipated.

The photographs in *Večernji list* were significantly more diverse and numerous than ten years earlier. There were 27 photographs in total. The main supplier was the award winning photographer and photo reporter Marija Koković, and not Tanjug. Koković worked for the *Vjesnik* info center in Belgrade from 1968 onward.¹²² The photograph on the front page is, together with the headline, the only information on the summit there, just as it was ten years earlier – *Večernji list* did not place reports on the front page like other newspapers in this research. This time, the news about the summit was not at the center of the page like in 1979, but at the top of the page, with very little room for the headline or the photograph, the latter of which is omitted in some issues. Of the Yugoslav politicians, the photographs depict mostly Janez Drnovšek, Budimir Lončar, and Ante Marković, the president of the Federal Executive Council (7). There are fewer photographs of foreign statesmen than in the 1979 coverage – only 6. The politicians in photographs are depicted in certain activities: Rajiv Gandhi is shown at Tito's grave, and with restaurant workers at the Sava Center where the

¹²² Prizes for photography in Belgrade in 1965 and 1966, and third place at the 'YU press' exhibition of the Yugoslavia Journalist Association in 1970. Awarded with the Working Medal in 1986. Ibid. p. 213.

summit was held. Other than that, the photographs depict the summit's more 'curious' details – camels in the garden of Gaddafi's residence (brought because "Gaddafi likes to drink camel's milk in the morning"), one lost-and-found summit pass of a Serbian politician, a female employee of the Iranian news agency IRNA, dressed by the "strict standards of the Islamic revolution." Other photographs in this category depict the 'duty free' shop at the Sava Center, two people sleeping after a long day at work (one of them the Tanjug director), and the Gala concert that some of the statesmen visited.

Table 3-1 Večernji list 1989

	Front page	Reports from Tanjug	Newspaper's reporters
9/3 '89	"The statesmen can begin" 1 photograph of Indonesia and Nigeria politicians (Matija Koković)	6 articles 11 paragraphs 1 photograph (unattributed) Dateline: Belgrade (3)	Zoran Vodopija, Slobodan Brkić, Zlatko Herljević 3 articles 16 paragraphs 2 photographs (Matija Koković)
9/4 '89	"Summit today" 1 photograph of Belgrade airport while welcoming the guests (Matija Koković)	2 articles 6 paragraphs Dateline: Belgrade (1), Jakarta (1)	Božo Ožbolt, Zoran Vodopija, Zlatko Herljević 8 articles; 24 paragraphs 3 photographs (Matija Koković) Dateline: Belgrade (3)
9/5 '89	"Time for changes" 1 photograph of Janez Drnovšek at podium during his introductory speech (Matija Koković)	6 articles 19 paragraphs Dateline: Belgrade (4), Teheran (1)	Zoran Vodopija, Zlatko Herljević, Slobodan Brkić, Božo Ožbolt 5 articles; 41 paragraphs 4 photographs (Matija Koković)
9/6 '89	"Choosing dialogue" No photograph	2 articles 5 paragraphs Dateline: Belgrade, Vienna	Zlatko Herljević, Slobodan Brkić, Božo Ožbolt, Zoran Vodopija 7 articles; 53 paragraphs 3 photographs (Matija Koković) Dateline: Belgrade (2)
9/7 '89	"Debt, development, ecology" No photographs	1 article 6 paragraphs Dateline: Belgrade	Slobodan Brkić, Božo Ožbolt, Zoran Vodopija, Zlatko Herljević 9 articles; 42 paragraphs 3 photographs (Matija Koković) Dateline: Belgrade (1)
9/8 '89	"On the doorstep of new beginnings" 1 photograph of Božidar Lončar	1 article 2 paragraphs	Božo Ožbolt, Zoran Vodopija, Zlatko Herljević, Slobodan Brkić 13 articles; 47 paragraphs 7 photographs (Matija Koković) Dateline: Belgrade (2)
		Articles = 18 Paragraphs = 49	Articles = 45 Paragraphs = 223

In the article from the September 3rd issue, titled “A Turn in Attitudes” (not attributed to any of the four authors in particular), the author writes about the need for modernizing the methods and operations of the Movement, a motion which was partly instigated by the Yugoslav delegation. The main question raised by the delegations was whether the Movement should be changed only in form, or “take a huge leap forward, away from the smugness that existed during the time of the great leaders.” The ministerial committee had discussed (prior to the summit) the central problem of the Movement’s position in the world, suggesting a change in outlook regarding the superpowers. This was the first time that the improvement of US and USSR relations was officially acknowledged. However, the author continues, some countries from “the anti-imperialist club are dissatisfied with that formulation – stating that this is too optimistic of an outlook, not considering much the questions of colonialism.” The articles also reported on the changes in the summit’s work methods – “future documents produced during the summit should be shorter and more concise, compared to the lengthy and dense declarations of the past.” This step was already taken during this summit, as the final declaration had slightly over 3,000 words. The author goes on to describe other novelties: one was additional time for informal meetings, that would “allow politicians to resolve some of the issues in private, and not yell across the conference room.” The speeches were to be shorter too, reaching only 20 minutes per spokesperson. However, the author writes about a major shift within the Movement – “turning away from the ideological understanding of international relations towards the attitude that the Movement is part of the world, in which dialogue about political and economic issues is of common interests and includes the aligned and the non-aligned.” The article judges that a political will for change and a more modernized movement existed, but there were some who opposed it.¹²³

¹²³ “Zaokret u glavama.” (A Turn in Attitudes) *Večernji list*. September 3rd, 1989.

In the September 5th issue of *Večernji list*, Tanjug reports wrote about the summit being televised in 18 different countries from South America to Asia. There were more than 900 media personnel from 87 countries in Belgrade. The number was expected to reach “1000 foreign correspondents, which will amount to more than 3000 journalists with the inclusion of the locals.” The media personnel that could not enter the conference room watched the debate on over 100 television sets. The photo reporters were dissatisfied the most, but the organizers promised everyone would get in at one point.¹²⁴

In the September 7th issue, in the article “Let’s be real” (again not attributed), the author writes about the unseemly behavior of certain politicians, making attempts to provoke a confrontation. One case was that of Muammar Gaddafi. His demeanor and ideas granted him the status of a charismatic persona, writes the author, which was especially noticeable after his speech, when he took a long walk through the conference room to greet and embrace the other statesmen. Some of his ideas “strangely found support, expressed with hugs and kisses.” One was, the author explains, a radical solution to the Palestinian question, which ran contrary to what the Palestinians were fighting for all along. However, the author ends, there is no doubt that the “new realism is prevailing,” one that will defeat directions such as Gaddafi’s. It was expected that the Movement’s future consensus will be more realistic than before, the author concludes.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Tanjug. “Najteže - fotoreporterima.” (Photo reporters had it the hardest) *Večernji list*. September 5th, 1989.

¹²⁵ “Budimo realni.” (Let’s be real) *Večernji list*. September 7th, 1989.

3.2 *Vjesnik*

Table 3-2 shows that *Vjesnik*'s coverage of the Belgrade summit was extensive, with 57 articles and 485 paragraphs in six issues (September 3rd–8th), more than *Večernji list* and less than *Borba*. However, compared to the 1979 Havana summit, *Vjesnik* reduced both its article and paragraph count, when 67 articles (including the 'Other' table section) and 1,112 paragraphs were published. In the 1989 issues, the differences between the writing of Tanjug and *Vjesnik*'s journalists cannot be assessed, as Tanjug is signed together with *Vjesnik*'s journalists at the bottom of the summit section (i.e. authors are mostly not attributed to single articles). There is only one case where Tanjug is specifically attributed to an article, and only several where individual journalists are. Three journalists for *Vjesnik* were covering the Belgrade summit: Hido Biščević, Ljubomir Čučić, and Dragan Milivojević. Hido Biščević wrote for *Vjesnik*'s foreign policy section. He wrote mostly about Asia, international relations, and the socialist countries.¹²⁶ Ljubomir Čučić, a prizewinning journalist, joined *Vjesnik* in 1979, and from 1987 wrote for the foreign policy section of the newspaper. He was a correspondent from the US, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, France, the UK, FR Germany, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and the European Economic Community. Dragan Milivojević joined *Vjesnik* shortly prior to the Belgrade summit, in 1988.¹²⁷

The photographs in *Vjesnik* were much less diverse than those of *Večernji list*. A total of 21 photographs mostly depicted member states representatives – 11 photographs show the Yugoslav delegation, of which Janez Drnovšek the most by far, followed by Branimir Lončar and Ante Marković, alone or in the company of fellow statesmen; 10 photographs show foreign delegates during a debate or in private talks. Similarly, as in 1979, *Vjesnik*

¹²⁶ Peršen. *Vjesnikov leksikon 1940-1990*. p. 39.

¹²⁷ 'Zvonimir Krist' prize in 1983; 'Seven LCYY Secretaries' prize for journalism in 1985. Ibid. pp. 79, 292.

demonstrates its serious approach to coverage of the summit, compared to *Večernji list*'s 'less formal' photography.

Table 3-2 *Vjesnik* 1989

	Reports from Tanjug	Newspaper's reporters	Tanjug and newspaper's reporters
9/3 '89			Hido Bišćević, Ljubomir Čučić, Dragan Milivojević and Tanjug 5 articles; 26 paragraphs; 1 photograph; Dateline: Belgrade (2)
9/4 '89		Hido Bišćević 1 article; 3 paragraphs	Hido Bišćević, Ljubomir Čučić, Dragan Milivojević and Tanjug 7 articles; 22 paragraphs; 1 photograph; Dateline: Belgrade (5), Frankfurt (1)
9/5 '89	1 article 22 paragraphs 1 photograph Dateline: Belgrade	Dragan Milivojević 1 article; 3 paragraphs; Dateline: Belgrade Ljubomir Čučić 1 article; 5 paragraphs	Hido Bišćević, Ljubomir Čučić, Dragan Milivojević and Tanjug 7 articles; 80 paragraphs; 3 photographs; Dateline: Belgrade (4)
9/6 '89		Hido Bišćević 1 article; 3 paragraphs Ljubomir Čučić 1 article; 5 paragraphs	Hido Bišćević, Ljubomir Čučić, Dragan Milivojević and Tanjug 8 articles; 81 paragraphs; 4 photographs; Dateline: Belgrade (7)
9/7 '89		Ljubomir Čučić 1 article; 7 paragraphs	Hido Bišćević, Ljubomir Čučić, Dragan Milivojević and Tanjug 8 articles; 112 paragraphs; 2 photographs; Dateline: Belgrade (5)
9/8 '89		Hido Bišćević 1 article 2 paragraphs	Hido Bišćević, Ljubomir Čučić, Dragan Milivojević and Tanjug 14 articles; 114 paragraphs; 10 photographs; Dateline: Belgrade (9)
	Articles = 1 Paragraphs = 22	Articles = 7 Paragraphs = 28	Articles = 49 Paragraphs = 435

In the September 3rd issue of *Vjesnik*, Ljubomir Čučić writes about the difficulties that Yugoslav companies, and thus, the Yugoslav economy, experienced due to enormous debts owed to Yugoslavia by Third World countries. In the article titled "Giving up on lingering hopes," Čučić writes: "Guided by the principle of developing countries' mutual help, for many decades, Yugoslavia has focused a great deal of its international trade on these countries." This was often not driven by Yugoslav economic motives but represented a way

for Yugoslavia to contribute to the economic cooperation among the non-aligned. The result was 3 billion in debt¹²⁸ owed to Yugoslavia by these countries, he concludes. The growing dependency of the South, including Yugoslavia, on the North, has bubbled from 80 billion dollars at the mid-point of the 1970s to 1300 billion dollars in debt at the end of the 1980s. By virtue of this, Čučić continues, many have turned away from the South-South economic relations, and towards developing a market with the North. But most of all, the changes in the world economy, and especially in domestic politics of the non-aligned countries and Yugoslavia, were instigators of these problems. During the 1980s, Yugoslavia and other countries were aware of not profiting from mutual economic partnership within the NAM, economically or politically. Hence, the author concludes, this summit was a chance to define the new economic relations of the non-aligned. Yugoslavia's orientation towards the South has clearly resulted in isolation from technological and financial progress.¹²⁹

The article by Hido Bišćević from September 6th, titled "A useful optimism," deals with the problem of the Yugoslav crisis, and the great responsibility of the country at the summit. This responsibility was acknowledged by Janez Drnovšek in his opening speech highlighting the main problem of Yugoslavia at the summit: its incapability of respecting the same principles it had promoted as a part of the NAM in its domestic relations, and its failure to utilize its international dealings to peacefully transform its socioeconomic system. Bišćević argues that this 'responsibility' reflects not only on Yugoslav foreign policy, but on the fate of the country as well. The author explains that overcoming the confrontations with the superpowers, and establishing dialogue and cooperation, represents for Yugoslavia needed modernization of the political model of self-management and non-alignment devised in the

¹²⁸ Čučić omits currency here, but he probably means dollars, as this is the currency that debt is measured in later in the article.

¹²⁹ Ljubomir Čučić. "Prizemljenje neostvarenih nada." (Giving up on lingering hopes) *Vjesnik*. September 3rd, 1989.

1950s and the 1960s. How is it possible, Bišćević asks, “to spearhead the reform in the Movement, at a time when Yugoslavia’s own reform results only in conflicts and violent divisions?” Bišćević explicates an example of this problem – in its future dealings in the Movement, Yugoslavia will have to promote the Palestinian cause and organize a peace conference on Middle-Eastern issues. How would Yugoslavia benefit from the Movement, when some of the conflicts and divisions from the Middle East would later be mirrored in domestic politics, most specifically in the problem of Kosovo? Bišćević then goes on about the principle of ‘useful optimism’ in politics, according to which, if one argues something will happen, it is only a matter of time before it does. This is applicable to arguments (such as that of Budimir Lončar) that the international activity will bear positive results in Yugoslav domestic politics. This “may” indeed happen, says Bišćević. However, Yugoslavia’s most important responsibility at that moment was “its internal drama, now laid bare to the entire world.”¹³⁰

The article from the September 7th issue, “It moves at last” (not attributed to anyone specifically) reports on the economic committee and its work during the summit. The documents of the committee were almost completed, says the author, and points out the convergence of “now harmonized opinions” in the committee. It is obvious, the author writes, that the attitudes became more mature at the summit than they had been before. Stubbornness gave way to cooperation. The common denominator of all the summit documents was one underlying aim – “CALL FOR DIALOGUE with the superpowers.” However, the article continues, a number of countries still insisted that there was a “lack of fairness in the world economy,” a wording that also found its way into the documents. Nevertheless, all Movement

¹³⁰ Hido Bišćević. “Korisni optimizam.” (A useful optimism) *Vjesnik*. September 6th, 1989.

members agreed that the poorest countries' debts were to be written off, and that the developed countries should aid them in the process of political and economic restructuring.¹³¹

3.3 *Borba*

The *Borba* coverage of the Belgrade summit from September 3rd to 8th was extensive and thorough, and in terms of quantity, 109 articles and 1,152 paragraphs published was not a significant decline from their coverage of the Havana summit (127 articles and 1,326 paragraphs). Unlike *Večernji list* and *Vjesnik*, the publication rate of which was greatly diminished, *Borba* still invested a great deal of effort into the coverage of the NAM. Table 3-3 *Borba 1989* shows that during the four days of the summit, from September 5th to 8th, the articles were signed by six newspaper journalists, Dušica Petković, Gordana Tomljenović, Mirko Klarin, Nenad Briski, Vladimir Matović, Radomir Ličia, Slobodan Pavlović (who wrote for *Borba* at the Havana summit in 1979), together with Tanjug under the summit section, just as in *Vjesnik*. Correspondingly, it will not be possible to determine the differences in reports authored by Tanjug, and those by *Vjesnik*'s journalists. *Borba*'s journalist Vladimir Matović worked at *Televizija Beograd* (Television Belgrade), and with various journals, including *Student*, *Omladina* (Youth) *Duga* (Rainbow) and *Gledišta* (Perspectives) before becoming a desk editor at *Borba*. Later, Matović was an advisor to the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Dobrica Ćosić.¹³² Zoran Mandžuka started his career at *Borba* in 1969 and soon became one of the leading media authorities on international politics. He was educated into Slobodan Glumac's 'old school' of journalistic practice, which, apart from high-

¹³¹ "Ipak je krenulo." (It moves at last), *Vjesnik*. September 7th, 1989.

¹³² "Preminuo Vladimir Matović." (Vladimir Matović passes away) *Udruženje novinara Srbije*. January 10th, 2018. Access: June 7th, <http://uns.org.rs/sr/desk/UNS-news/54284/preminuo-vladimir-matovic.html>

level professionalism, fostered companionship and optimism among journalists. He had the reputation of an amiable and entertaining interlocutor.¹³³ Radomir Ličina always took *Borba* to be a medium in the service of the people, and maintained this view following the breakdown of Yugoslavia.¹³⁴

There were 68 photographs in *Borba*'s issues during the summit, most of all the newspapers analyzed in the thesis. However, these were not diverse in their depictions, mostly showing delegates in the conference room or in private conversations. There were 10 photographs of the members of the Yugoslav delegation, alone or in company. There were 18 photographs of foreign delegates carrying out different activities – giving a speech or holding a press conference. Alongside the standard photographs of the conference room and journalists at work, other photographs show some specific episodes of the summit – there were photographs of Gaddafi's camels, from the Sava center's restaurant or shop, of the conflict between the Yugoslav and Gaddafi's security services, and 10 photographs of sleeping delegates and journalists at the Sava Center. There were also 10 photographs of female delegates at the summit, and the paper made special note of their rise in numbers, stating that "the NAM is in the hands of men – but women started to assert themselves at the Belgrade summit."¹³⁵

¹³³ R.D. "Preminuo novinar Zoran Mandžuka." (Journalist Zoran Mandžuka passes away) *Danas*. November 25th, 2008. Access: June 7th, 2019. <https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/preminuo-novinar-zoran-mandzuka/>

¹³⁴ DanasOnline. "Kritički prema svakoj vlasti." (Critically against every government) *Danas*. June 7th, 2007. Access: June 7th, 2019. <https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/kriticki-prema-svakoj-vlasti/>

There was no information about other journalists from *Borba*.

¹³⁵ *Borba*, September 8th, 1989.

Table 3-3 *Borba* 1989

	Reports from Tanjug	Newspaper's reporters (and Tanjug)	Other
Sep 2/3 1989	1 article 2 paragraphs Dateline: Belgrade	Slobodan Pavlović 1 article; 7 paragraphs Nenad Briski 2 articles; 19 paragraphs Marko Klarić 1 article; 12 paragraphs 1 photograph (unattributed) G. T. 1 article; 7 paragraphs 2 photographs (Predrag Mitić) D. Petković 1 article; 23 paragraphs; 1 photograph (Ivan Doroški); Dateline: Belgrade	2 articles unattributed and without dateline 56 paragraphs; 1 photograph (unattributed)
9/4 '89 ¹³⁶	4 articles; 61 paragraphs 2 photographs Dateline: Belgrade (3)	Marko Klarić 1 article; 16 paragraphs; 1 photograph (unattributed) G. T. 1 article 8 paragraphs 2 photographs	1 article with Dateline: Moscow: 3 paragraphs 2 articles unattributed and without dateline 6 paragraphs Radio Deutsche Welle 1 article; 9 paragraphs; Dateline: Köln Hindustan Times 1 article; 3 paragraphs; Dateline: Belgrade Reuters 2 articles; 13 paragraphs; 1 illustration (R. Luri); Dateline: Belgrade and Nicosia Radio Prague 1 article; 4 paragraphs; Dateline: Prague TASS 1 article; 3 paragraphs; Dateline: Belgrade AFP 1 article; 5 paragraphs; Dateline: Belgrade Il Piccolo 1 article; 3 paragraphs; Dateline: Trieste AP 1 article; 4 paragraphs; Dateline: Belgrade
9/5 '89	14 articles; 144 paragraphs; 6 photographs; 2 illustrations (unattributed); Dateline: Belgrade (14)	<i>Under the section it is stated:</i> <u>Reporters:</u> Dušica Petković, Gordana Tomljenović, Mirko Klarin, Nenad Briski, Vladimir Matović, Slobodan Pavlović, Tanjug <u>Photo reporters:</u> Ivan Doroški, Predrag Mitić, Branko Pantelić 13 articles; 122 paragraphs; 6 photographs;	

¹³⁶ One page from the newspaper is missing.

		Dateline: Belgrade (8), Teheran (1)	
9/6 '89		<u>Reporters:</u> Dušica Petković, Gordana Tomljenović, Mirko Klarin, Nenad Briski, Vladimir Matović, Radomir Ličina, Zoran Mandžuka, Slobodan Pavlović, Tanjug <u>Photo reporters:</u> Ivan Doroški, Predrag Mitić, Branko Pantelić 17 articles; 219 paragraphs; 12 photographs; 2 illustrations (unattributed); Dateline: Belgrade (8), Colombo (1)	
9/7 '89		<u>Reporters:</u> Dušica Petković, Gordana Tomljenović, Mirko Klarin, Nenad Briski, Vladimir Matović, Radomir Ličina, Zoran Mandžuka, Slobodan Pavlović, Tanjug <u>Photo reporters:</u> Ivan Doroški, Predrag Mitić, Branko Pantelić 19 articles; 199 paragraphs; 15 photographs; 2 illustrations (R. Luri)	
9/8 '89	1 article; 2 paragraphs; Dateline: United Nations	<u>Reporters:</u> Dušica Petković, Gordana Tomljenović, Mirko Klarin, Nenad Briski, Vladimir Matović, Radomir Ličina, Zoran Mandžuka, Slobodan Pavlović, Tanjug <u>Photo reporters:</u> Ivan Doroški, Predrag Mitić, Branko Pantelić 17 articles; 197 paragraphs; 19 photographs; Dateline: Belgrade (12) T. Milinović 1 article; 5 paragraphs; Dateline: Moscow	
	Articles = 20 Paragraphs = 209	Articles = 75 Paragraphs = 834	Articles = 14 Paragraphs = 109

The September 5th article titled “Realism” discusses the success of Janez Drnovšek in delivering an excellent opening speech – “he already shows that the ‘realism in the Movement’ is not just a phrase.” Compared to long opening speeches from the past, Drnovšek was brief and touched upon the most important topics, mostly those related to the economy. “We were offered data and facts, concrete initiatives and practical propositions with regard to how the non-aligned should help themselves,” compared to the speeches of earlier summits that were preoccupied with ideology, the revolution and the fight against ‘-isms’. The author (not specified) turns to the speech of Rodrigo Borja, who said that the financial problems of the South were not just financial, but political, the economy being the basis for democratic

institutions. Robert Mugabe also talked about the economy, including statistics on the debt of the non-aligned countries; he expressed hope that the Belgrade summit would be a catalyst of the South-North dialogue to bring the Third World on the path of development. The author concludes by praising the “new spirit of realism” and with the hope that the same will not “disperse in complacency and self-initiatives, that for so long troubled the Movement.”¹³⁷

The article from the September 6th issue, titled “Words,” discusses the words commonly spoken during the summit. Interestingly, the author of the text (not specified) left a message for the future analysts of the summit, stating: “to someone who will do research on the Belgrade summit, the words and semantics used in Belgrade will be but a single part of the in-depth analysis of the changes that the Movement underwent during this summit.” The author writes about the “lack of the traditional NAM commitment to the lofty terms of petty politics.” The rhetoric about “basic principles” was replaced with economic jargon on the “stabilization of the raw material market.” The author points out that the language of media headlines follows in this vein: “For financial disarmament” and “Stop the economic slavery.” These terms meant that the strategies of the Movement finally turned to the relevant topics, and because of that the summit should be called “the summit of modernization.”¹³⁸

In the article titled “Identity crisis” from the September 7th issue, the author (not specified) discusses the problems the Movement is facing – the identity crisis, which was, however, “present in the Movement since its beginnings in 1961.” The crisis existed because of the *détente* politics of superpowers, and especially due to conflicts and wars between some of the Movement’s members. In spite of that, the Yugoslav delegation denied the existence of the crisis, the author states. There is hardly evidence of crisis, given the attention the media gave to “Gaddafi’s farce in Belgrade”; the articles states that “the camels are the stars of the

¹³⁷ “Realizam.” (Realism), *Borba*. September 5th, 1989.

¹³⁸ “Riječi.” (Words) *Borba*. September 6th, 1989.

show.” Further, the author writes, as Drnovšek has announced the new directions of the Movement towards the real problems, the author interprets this as straying from “anti-imperialist talk and phrases about the new international order” that have for so long been at the center of the Movement’s objectives – “that was part of NAM’s empty, utopian and egalitarian spirit.” The major problems – the conflicts between the Movement’s members (the wars in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, the Iran–Iraq War) – were largely avoided within the NAM. Quoting the Parisian journal *Libération*, the article states that everyone in Belgrade acted as if there was no problem in sight, and “that the biggest issue is where to put Gaddafi’s camels.” Another issue, the author states, was the possible ‘yugoslavization’ of the Movement. Here, the problem was the possible mirroring of the Yugoslav’s system of rotating the Presidents of the Federation (President of the Presidency – Janez Drnovšek was first in line, his mandate ending in May 1990) on the Movement, “with all of its well-known negative consequences.” Janez Drnovšek was aware of that possibility, and the author quotes him: “We cannot ask others for peace [...], when in our own relations we do the opposite.” Yugoslavia was the ideal host for the summit – the article continues, “the North-South problems, ideological conflicts of the East and the West, religious antagonisms, the lack of unifying federal principles.” Yugoslavia was running away from the reality of its problems, but there would come a time when these issues would need to be solved, the author concludes.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ “Kriza identiteta.” (Identity crisis) *Borba*, September 7th, 1989.

3.4 Belgrade summit coverage - analysis

Večernji list gave the summit the least space in its issues (63 articles and 272 paragraphs). More articles were published than in *Vjesnik*, but fewest paragraphs – only half of the number in *Vjesnik*, and almost four times less than *Borba*, as it can be seen in Table 3-4 below. In this way, *Večernji list* aimed at more diverse content, compared to *Vjesnik* and *Borba*'s more political orientation. *Večernji list*'s correspondents were not very opinionated about the events in Belgrade, nor do they discuss political and economic matters. Traces of a discussion are provided in examples down below from September 3rd and 7th. Hence, it is more difficult to speculate on the positions of the journalists or that of *Večernji list*, than it was the case in 1979. However, I can argue that the interest for the summit decreased. The same can be seen in the treatment of the front page of *Večernji list*, with more space and attention given to the 1979 front page (Figure 4). The possible reasons for this will be provided in the pages below.




Figure 4 *Večernji list*'s front page from the day after the summit in 1979 (left) and 1989 (right) - space given to summit matters

Vjesnik invested more of its volume to report on the summit than *Večernji list*, and less than *Borba* (57 articles and 485 paragraphs). It is more open and thorough compared to the other two newspapers. As presented in the articles in 3.2, the journalists wrote openly about the concrete issues of the NAM, and especially emphasized Yugoslavia's troubles within it. Those concern the economic instability of Yugoslavia that the Movement contributed to; the impossibility of Yugoslavia to extract something good from the Movement and for the country; and the issues inside the Movement, especially with members not wanting to reconcile with the "superpowers."¹⁴⁰

Borba once again presented the audience with the highest number of articles and the most detailed coverage of the summit (109 articles and 1,152 paragraphs). The articles give witness to the way *Borba* tackled the emerging changes and troubles of the NAM – its identity crisis and the need for a fresh start, and Yugoslavia's loss of prominence within the Movement. The 'changes' in 1989, in Yugoslavia and in the NAM, were long expected and visible. The journalists wrote about the major transformations of the NAM with a level of grandeur, stating that one day people would look back at the words spoken at the 9th NAM summit, and would think of them as prophetic in understanding the course of history.

Table 3-4 Belgrade summit coverage

<i>Večernji list</i>	<i>Vjesnik</i>	<i>Borba</i>
Articles = 63 Paragraphs = 272	Articles = 57 Paragraphs = 485	Articles = 109 Paragraphs = 1,152
Articles = 229		
Paragraphs = 1,909		

¹⁴⁰ The term 'superpower' replaced 'bloc', which was used in newspapers back in 1979.

In the coverage of the Belgrade summit, all three newspapers produced a total of 229 articles and 1,909 paragraphs. The numbers gathered from each individual newspaper show that *Borba* paid most attention to the event. The differences between the writing of the newspapers' own journalists and Tanjug cannot be analyzed properly since it was not clear in *Vjesnik* and *Borba* who was responsible for authoring which article. Only *Večernji list* made authorship explicit, having Tanjug articles decreased in number and content, and reducing them to reports on courses of events without any opinions being discernible.

The expected differences between particular newspapers were not discernible either, but the similarity in approaches suggests a common ground shared by these newspapers in NAM matters and the Yugoslav position in it. Tanjug's role in 1989 is also not clear from these materials; it is still used as a report supply, but its contribution to *Večernji list* shows that their production numbers shrank. This however, does not necessarily entail that Tanjug lost its influence. As during the Havana summit, Tanjug still seemed to have played a large part in covering the summit. According to Boža Rafajlović, Tanjug's journalist, Tanjug demonstrated high professionalism at the Belgrade summit, and was recognized by the International Press Institute based in Brussels, the report of which rendered Tanjug to be free of any censorship imposed by the government, testified by the speed with which Tanjug released reports for Yugoslavia and for the world.¹⁴¹

The common approach of the newspapers in matters relating to the Belgrade summit and non-aligned politics was in this way similar to the coverage of the Havana summit, in that they shared the view about Yugoslavia's position in the NAM. But in 1989, the media casted doubt on, instead of promoting Yugoslav politics in the NAM. All newspapers highlighted the problems that the summit and the NAM were facing, questioned non-aligned politics, or

¹⁴¹ Boža Rafajlović. "Od Beograda - do Beograda." (From Belgrade - to Belgrade), In *Tanjug: pola veka 1943.-1993*. Edited by Miodrag Žiko Abramović, 129-131. Beograd: Novinska agencija Tanjug, 1993. p. 131. The author did not specify the year of the recognition from the International Press Institute.

expressed a hint of skepticism about Yugoslavia's ability to lead the summit. All newspapers focused on several crucial points during the 9th summit in Belgrade:

---Turning away from non-aligned ideology towards the 'reality' of the Movement.

---Persistence of some countries in condemning the First World for Third World problems.

---Yugoslavia's domestic political and economic crisis should not be overlooked.

---The issue of Yugoslavia presiding the Movement, while not being able to solve its own problems.

---Probability that Yugoslavia will not utilize its NAM presiding for its own benefit – addressing the situation at home.

---Economic crisis in the Third World countries and the debt some countries owe to Yugoslavia.

As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the media in the 1980s started opening up in the way they tackled Yugoslavia's domestic issues, which was not a matter for open debate before the 1980s.¹⁴² Until 1989, newspapers in Croatia, and as we learn, Belgrade's *Borba* as well, abandoned the notion of being the 'socialist society building tools' and endorsed the idea of the media open to questioning politics and the economy in Yugoslavia – *at least* in the realm of non-aligned politics. This runs counter to the belief of some politicians, such as those in the League of Communists of Croatia, who, according to Božidar Novak, still expected cultural and media actors to fight "antisocialist forces," which still deeply affected big media houses like *Vjesnik* in 1988.¹⁴³ One of the reasons this may be, Tvrtko Jakovina hypothesizes,

¹⁴² Božidar Novak. *Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću*. Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2005., pp. 924, 925.

¹⁴³ Ibid. pp. 926, 928.

is because of the anxieties caused by the 1971 crisis, which steered the Croatian communists towards ideological obedience. It should be noted that this was also a way to counter ‘detitoization’ activities in Serbia in the mid- and late 1980s.¹⁴⁴ This brings us back to the question of the influence of the 1971 crisis on Croatian newspapers. It seems that it was expected of the press to submit to ideological guidance in the late 1980s. However, as the material presented suggests, the same was not expected for the 1989 NAM summit coverage. It is possible, however, that the ideological rules had to be abided by in some other, more controversial matters. Hence, it is likely that the NAM was no longer in the realm of protected ideological values in Croatia in the late 1980s, as can be concluded from looking at the newspaper coverage.

Questioning one of the most important Yugoslav ideological principles indicates that non-aligned politics lost their media sponsorship. However, as I will show further below, the change in attitude towards non-alignment was not visible only in the newspapers. The press has been responding to the change of political climate in Yugoslavia, mainly to the conflicts between different political structures with regard to Yugoslavia’s role in the NAM, but also to the political and economic crisis the NAM itself was undergoing in 1989.

The 1980s saw NAM’s transition from being an important factor in the context of the US-USSR conflict during the first mandate of the Reagan presidency in the first half of the decade,¹⁴⁵ to being struck by an ‘identity crisis’ in the late 1980s. With Mikhail Gorbachev coming to power in 1985, the *détente* politics kicked in, and the NAM finally shook off the long existing fear of the USSR meddling into its business. The NAM’s 8th conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, was the first where the fear of USSR entanglement into the Movement

¹⁴⁴ Jakovina. “Sloboda u raspadu.” pp. 25, 26.

¹⁴⁵ Robin Alison Remington. “Foreign Policy.” In *Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism*. Edited by Dennison Rusinow. Washington, DC: Wilson Press Center, 1988. p. 159.

was reduced.¹⁴⁶ With regard to Yugoslavia's status in international relations, and the NAM, Tvrtko Jakovina argues that Yugoslavia was disinterested in non-aligned politics as early as the beginning of the 1980s, stating that previous Yugoslav insistence on fostering international relations had passed, due to the crisis experienced within.¹⁴⁷ This was primarily seen in political, and not so in economic sphere, as Yugoslavia still profited from the economic exchanges with the Movement's members.¹⁴⁸

In spite of this, some politicians, primarily the new minister of foreign affairs (in 1987) Budimir Lončar, known as Mr. Non-aligned, strived to make Yugoslavia an important factor in international relations once again, in order to help the country solve its own problems by bringing the NAM "back home."¹⁴⁹ He was an optimist about this matter during the summit as well. In his interview for *Vjesnik*, Lončar stated how he is very impressed that with all its troubles, Yugoslav people supporting the summit, and in a sense 'rooting' for Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁰ Prior to Lončar's efforts in organizing the summit in Belgrade, Robin Alison Remington wrote about the reservations of Croatia and Slovenia towards the NAM, specifically expecting Yugoslavia to seek out a higher level of advantage before continuing with its non-aligned politics. Ljubljana and Zagreb were particularly irritated about Yugoslavia's proclamations about non-aligned activity in Europe, given that its predominant orientation was still towards the Third World during 1986.¹⁵¹ For instance, Velimir Srića, Croatia's minister of science and technology (1986-1990), stated in 1989 that there was no use staying non-aligned, and that

¹⁴⁶ Jakovina. *Treća strana Hladnog rata*. p. 617.

¹⁴⁷ Jakovina. "Sloboda u raspadu." pp. 18, 19.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 16.

¹⁴⁹ Jakovina. *Treća strana Hladnog rata*. pp. 621, 622.

¹⁵⁰ "Summit za Jugoslaviju." (Summit for Yugoslavia) *Vjesnik*. September 8th, 1989.

¹⁵¹ Remington. "Foreign Policy." pp. 163, 164.

Yugoslavia had to become a member of the European Economic Community.¹⁵² These political tendencies additionally deflated the value of non-alignment.

Richard Shafer notes that media presented the same attitude as soon as the danger from the USSR started to diminish in 1985, and the NAM's position in the world became less pragmatic.¹⁵³ Part of the public considered Yugoslav membership in the NAM obsolete, and the reason why the country lagging behind Europe and the developed world; Yugoslavia's build-up of its international importance brought the country to its knees.¹⁵⁴

The same problems are found in newspaper coverage. The issue of debt owed by Third World countries, the issue of the NAM losing its identity, and possibly its role in world politics, combined with Yugoslavia failing to assume its role in the Movement – have all been extensively written about in newspaper coverage. This was a result of greater independence for the media in covering the NAM. The coverage mirrored the position of Yugoslavia towards its role in the Movement, and the level of importance the Movement possessed in Yugoslavia. These considerations culminated in the Yugoslav abandonment of non-aligned principals that were advocated for so long.

¹⁵² Richard Shafer. "The Press and the Preservation of Yugoslavia Before 1990: Tanjug's Leadership of the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool." *The Global Network*, no. 8 (1997): 53–66. p. 60.

¹⁵³ Ibid. p. 55.

¹⁵⁴ Jakovina. *Treća strana Hladnog rata*. p. 625.

Conclusion

The aim of the thesis was to examine how the Non-Aligned Movement was portrayed in the Yugoslav, and specifically in the Croatian and Serbian press. The purpose of the examination was to understand more clearly the changes in Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policy in the last decade of the country's existence. Although there are other scientific ways to illuminate this period of social and political flux, my research into the media outlets, newspapers in particular, can serve as an indicator of how the power of the social, political and economic forces influenced the flow of information. The NAM, one of the leading determinants in Yugoslav politics, both internationally and domestically, was itself an indicator of political and economic change. The material presented in the tables in Chapters 2 and 3 showcase the difference between reporting on the Havana summit in 1979, and on the Belgrade summit in 1989, and can help us understand Yugoslavia in these focal points in time.

Reporting on the Havana summit in 1979 characterizes the media's function at that time, to produce the news in accordance with the state's ideological preferences, in this case – the ideology of non-alignment. The newspapers presented in the research were the afternoon daily *Večernji list*, which covered the least news about the summit; the morning daily *Vjesnik*, which was more focused on the politics, and thus covered the summit more extensively; and the daily *Borba*, the most productive of the newspapers. The differences between Zagreb-based dailies, and *Borba*, primarily based in Belgrade, are not apparent, except in their production rates. The newspapers in Yugoslavia in 1979 do not differ significantly from each other in covering the NAM matters. All had a similar take on summits, uplifting the non-aligned cause of Yugoslavia. We also learned that Tanjug was dominant in 1979 reporting, producing more reports in newspapers than the newspaper's journalists themselves. Given the importance of Tanjug for the League of Communists and its representative capacity for

Yugoslavia in the non-aligned world, which was fostered through its management in the 1970s, we get a clearer picture of the media's role in promoting non-aligned ideals in its summit reporting. Not to mention that the media had strict laws to abide by – these demanded that the media be the tool of socialist society building. Thus, the press at the time was primarily tasked with promoting the main Yugoslav ideals. The presence of Tito is also significant in newspapers supporting the ideals of non-alignment, as he was always the binding force in Yugoslavia – until his death in May 1980, after which the fate of Yugoslavia started to turn. The 6th summit in Havana also gave the newspapers special reason to uplift non-aligned politics and Yugoslavia's pivotal role in it. Cuba's attempts to bring NAM closer to the USSR made Yugoslavia vigilant to preventing the Movement from losing cohesion and purpose. The USSR had been the major concern of Yugoslav foreign policy since the 1940s. This is why the newspapers intensified the rhetoric of the importance of non-aligned politics for Yugoslavia – if the Movement had not been defended from the USSR's advances, Yugoslavia would have lost its international position, and thus be under threat of isolation, with no 'third way' to lead.

Reporting on the Belgrade summit in 1989 is, however, indicative of the slow demise of non-aligned politics in Yugoslavia. The press reporting once again showed a unified approach to the matters of the summit. In this case, the newspapers were more open to questioning non-aligned politics, a major turn compared to 1979. The newspapers *Večernji list* again covered the least, and *Borba* the most. The overall number of articles and paragraphs written about the summit diminished, but only in *Večernji list* and *Vjesnik*. This may imply diminished interest in the summit compared to Havana. In 1989, the expectation for the newspapers to publicize non-aligned ideology was non-existent, which allowed the newspapers to focus on the problems surrounding the NAM. Unfortunately, the role of Tanjug in the 1989 newspapers cannot be properly assessed, as Tanjug articles are not specifically

signed. They are attributed only in *Večernji list*, which shows a great decline of Tanjug articles compared to 1979; more reports were now being produced by the newspaper's journalists. Still, the information is not itself sufficient to bear any conclusion about the importance of Tanjug for domestic media. Tanjug's production rate compared to the Yugoslav newspapers might have mostly been the simple consequence of journalists being able to attend the Belgrade summit more easily than going to Havana. The reason newspapers were openly critical in reporting on the Belgrade summit lies in a complex ten-year-long chain of events in Yugoslavia and in the NAM. Yugoslavia and the NAM lost their strong leadership with the loss of Tito, as well as part of their ideological charge. Yugoslavia's economy was becoming increasingly unstable through the 1980s. The political forces were divided, and different fractions sought out a variety of solutions for the future of Yugoslavia, many of them fatal for the integrity of the country. The problems were thus piling up, as the politics of non-alignment slowly faded away. 1985 saw a shift in global political affairs, and with the slow reconciliation of the USSR and the US, the NAM was hit by an 'identity crisis', now without the fear of USSR intrusion and with new 'realist' objectives for solving the economic crisis through an open dialogue with the North. The NAM's *raison d'être* was defined by the pitfalls of a world divided; once these were gone, so was the essence of the Movement. Eventually, in 1989, the Cold War divide expired. The idea of non-alignment in Yugoslavia specifically has been present in the media and in political language for several decades.¹⁵⁵ In hindsight, because of Yugoslavia's own problems within the NAM, some believed that Yugoslavia's membership was an important cause for its underdevelopment.

However, the last summit Yugoslavia attended and organized was not unsuccessful. Still, Yugoslavia was unable to utilize the success, or the new direction the Movement proclaimed. This was a clear sign that the hopes of foreign politics galvanizing domestic politics,¹⁵⁶ as

¹⁵⁵ Tvrtko Jakovina. *Trenuci katarze. Prijelomni događaji XX. stoljeća*. Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2013. p. 329.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 330.

Budimir Lončar had planned, were misplaced. The case was the exact opposite – the domestic issues of Yugoslavia were shaping its activities in foreign politics, and particularly the NAM. The way this happened is demonstrated in the press: the shift occurred from non-alignment ideology towards skepticism about the purpose of NAM politics. By fully comprehending the fluctuations in media sentiments, we can now more clearly understand the processes of political and economic developments in Yugoslavia.

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