WHO ARE THE "OTHERS"? OPTING OUT OF DOMINANT ETHNIC CATEGORIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

By

Jani Korhonen

Submitted to
Central European University
Nationalism Studies Program

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Mária Kovács

Budapest, Hungary

2019

ABSTRACT

This thesis is dealing with the reasons, why some people in Bosnia and Herzegovina opt out from the dominant ethnic categories: the three constitutive peoples Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, as well as the recognized national minorities, dealing also with the consequences of such declarations. The thesis approaches the topic through the analytical concept of national indifference and qualitative methodology. The main findings of the thesis are based on interview data collected by the author. The thesis claims, that such declarations are a result of civic identification and resistance of nationalism, while the consequences are social marginalization of the people opting out from the dominant ethnic categories.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

DNZ = Demokratska narodna zajednica (Democratic National Union)
ECtHR = European Court of Human Rights
FBiH = Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
HDZ = Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)
RS = Republika Srpska
SDA = Stranka demokratske akcije (Party of Democratic Action)
SDP = Socijaldemokratska partija (Social Democrat Party)
SFRY = Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNSD = Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats)
UNDP = United Nations Development Programme

1. INTRODUCTION

The body of literature on ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina is extremely wide. It is very often a textbook example for a divided society. According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, created as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement ending the Bosnian war in 1995, there are three constituent peoples in the country: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, all speaking completely mutually intelligible variants of the same language. The country is divided into two entities, the mostly Serb-populated Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), with mostly Bosniaks and Croats as its inhabitants. According to the 2013 census, there were 50.1 per cent of Bosniaks, 15.4 per cent of Croats, and 30.8 per cent of Serbs.[1] Still, according to the census, 3.7 per cent of the population does not belong to the constituent peoples. The people not belonging to any of the constituent peoples are usually aggregated to a motley (quasi-)category of "Others" (Bosnian: *Ostali*)[2]. Some of them belong to the recognized 17 national minorities (or more recent immigrant minorities), while some of them refuse to declare belonging to any of the constituent peoples and rather choose a civic or regional category or refuse declaration completely. This thesis will concentrate on the latter set of people, whom I will in my thesis call "individuals who have chosen opt-out categories".[3] When I use the term Others, it refers also to the people belonging to national minorities. Therefore, the thesis concentrating on opt-out minorities, is that the national minorities do not fit in the framework of national indifference, which is the main theoretical paradigm of my thesis. I also believe, that the motivation of declaring oneself to a national minority is very different from

[1] "Statistika.Ba," n.d., www.statistika.ba.
[2] I use the term "Others" instead of the Bosnian one *Ostali*, but it should not be confused with the term "other" used in scholarly literature, noting something, that is intrinsically different from the in-group.
[3] I use the term "opt-out categories" following Florian Bieber's application of the verb "opt out" in this context in his article *The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses* (2010). Another way to describe these categories would have been calling them "non-national categories", but this, however, does not put the emphasis on the process of choosing a category, and it suggests, that these declarations are always non-national.

declaring oneself belonging in an opt-out category. Yet, these two sets of people face in many ways similar societal issues, mainly because of the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This thesis will contribute to the discussion by presenting the case of Bosnian citizens, who do not want to categorize themselves to dominant categories[4]. I will set the research question of the thesis into the framework created by Tara Zahra on national indifference. The framework of national indifference is usually produced in research in the field of history, but I will use the concept in contemporary contexts. The Others of Bosnia have been a topic of several researches. Many of the scholarly papers on Others concentrate on the legal perspective, but on the other hand, there are also more ethnographical ones on people, who resist categorizations. My thesis will provide an ethnographical account on people, who are set in the catch-all category of Others and give voice to the ordinary people trying to avoid or fighting categorizations in their everyday life.

My main approach on the topic will be through the notion of "national indifference", coined by historian Tara Zahra. I will treat the opt-out categories as an example of national indifference, and my thesis will also contribute into the scholarly literature on national indifference by testing it in contemporary settings. Besides this, my thesis is greatly inspired by scholars questioning the traditional approach on identities and emphasizing the malleability of the phenomenon.

While also going through the basic issues of the phenomenon of Others – statistical data, public discourse, legal aspect and the issue of discrimination – my main analysis is based on the fieldwork I carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in March-April 2019 in Sarajevo, the capital of the country, and Velika Kladuša, a town in northwest Bosnia, on the Croatian border. Both places can be seen below on MAP 1. I selected these places for the fieldwork, because they have the largest proportions of opt-out categories. Both of them are situated in the entity of the FBiH and are predominantly

[4] Under "dominant categories", we have to treat the three constituent peoples, but also the 17 recognized national minorities can be counted in, as these categories are granted official status by the law.

populated by Muslims, when it comes to the religion. This might create a bias to my research, which should be noted.

MAP 1: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Red pin stands for Velika Kladuša, and blue pin for Sarajevo.[5]



A substantial part of my research and the theory I use is concentrated around the census, although the census is not the only defining factor of being a member of Others. Yet, I consider it as the main arena for declaring identities, which effects also declarations in other contexts after the census. Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted its first census as an independent country in 2013 and the three most politicized questions were the ones on ethnic identification, religion, and mother tongue. In my thesis, I will deal much less with the two latter census questions, although they are also important, and all the three questions are intertwined to some extent.

[5] The map is created by the Google My Maps site (https://www.google.com/mymaps/).

1.1 Research questions

The focus of my research is mainly in the reasons, that lead to some people choosing to declare themselves into opt-out categories and the consequences of these declarations. The motivation for choosing an ethnic category in a census or similar categorizing situation is an under-researched topic in the literature.

Thus, the research questions of my thesis are the following:

1) *What are the reasons and motivations of opting out of the dominant ethnic categories?*
2) *How do people opting out of the dominant ethnic categories see the consequences of their choice?*

In this thesis, I will argue, that the reasons for opting out of the dominant ethnic categories are usually related to a civic sentiment or a resistance to nationalism and nationalistic labels, both of which can also be set in a historical continuum. The main consequence of these declarations is the marginalization of people opting out of the dominant ethnic categories. These arguments will be reached by performing content analysis on the interview data, that I collected. In the following section, I will explain the structure of the thesis and the way the answers for the research questions will be approached.

1.2 Structure of the thesis

The following three chapters will contextualize the interview data both to the scholarly context and to the country-specific context, and besides this give the reader the required understanding of the methodology. In Chapter 2, I will present a literature review and position my research in the scholarship. Besides this I will provide definitions on the terminology. Chapter 3 will provide the context on ethnic categorization and Others in Bosnia, both from historical and contemporary perspectives. I will deal here with the 2013 census and survey data on the Others and discuss their legal situation and representation in politics. In Chapter 4, I will present the methodology for both the

collection of the material and the analysis of it. Also, I will provide a description of the fieldwork I carried out. In Chapter 5, I move on to the analysis of my interview material, trying to find the answers on my research questions based on the sample. Along my analysis, I will compare my results to earlier research, continuing a dialogue with the literature. In the final section, Chapter 6, I will collate the results, set them into the theoretical framework, and discuss the implications of the results to the understanding of the topic.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I will provide an overview on the theory in the form of a literature review, with the aim of positioning my research to the scholarly context and familiarizing the reader with the most salient theoretical terms used in this thesis. This chapter is divided topically into four sections: section 2.1 reviewing the literature on topics of identity, ethnicity and social categorization2.1, section 2.2 dealing with the census, section 2.3 concentrating on the theoretical concept of national indifference, and in the end, section 2.4 about scholarly literature on ethnic categories in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The categorizations of the sections are overlapping, and the borders between the topics covered should not be considered clear-cut. Moreover, it should be noted, that the literature review is by no means exhaustive, and I will use examples from other scholarly papers in my background chapter and analysis.

2.1 Identity, ethnicity and social categorization

"Identity" as a term as it is currently understood in social sciences emerged only in the second half of the 20th century. The Cambridge Dictionary defines identity as something "who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others"[6]. This suggests, that there are some inherent characteristics, which define the individual or a group in relation with other individuals or groups. Yet, in the past decades, the scholarly approach has started taking a constructivist approach on the concept of "identity". One of the leading scholars in the field of identity, Thomas Hylland Eriksen writes aptly the following about the notion of "ethnicity": "We ought to be critical enough to abandon the concept of ethnicity the moment it becomes a straitjacket rather than a tool for generating

[6] "Identity," in *Cambridge Dictionary*, accessed March 4, 2019, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/identity.

new understanding"[7]. If we follow Brubaker and Cooper's argument, the same can be said about the notion of identity.

In their important article *Beyond Identity,* Brubaker and Cooper argue for not using the term "identity" as a category of analysis, while acknowledging, that "identity" is sometimes used as a category of practice. [8] They suggest, that processual terms, such as "identification" and "self-identification", that lack the reifying connotations of the word identity, should be rather used. They emphasize the contextual character of both self-identification and identification by others. They write: "The extent to which official categorizations shape self-understandings, the extent to which the population-categories constituted by states or political entrepreneurs approximate real 'groups' – these are open questions that can only be addressed empirically"[9]. In their view, talking about "identity" blurs external categorization and self-understanding.

Henri Tajfel writes, that "social categorization can [...] be considered as a system of orientation which helps to create and define the individual's place in society"[10]. There are many historical examples on how ethnic categorizations imposed from the above have created political communities and self-identifications, as well as shaped social realities. Stergar and Scheer write about the Habsburg classification efforts, among them the language categories in the census, were in a key role to establish the national categories, that are even today relevant. [11] Yet, schools played also an important role in this, as censuses did not take place more often than in every ten years. According to Stergar and Scheer, the 1880 census in Austria-Hungary divided the whole population into nations, that "did not simply misrepresent social reality, above all they shaped it" [12].

[7] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 2013),
[8] Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 1–47
[9] Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 27.
[10] Henri Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (London: Academic Press, 1978), 255.
[11] Rok Stergar and Tamara Scheer, "Ethnic Boxes: The Unintended Consequences of Habsburg Bureaucratic Classification," *Nationalities Papers* 46, no. 4 (July 2018): 575–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2018.1448374.
[12] Stergar and Scheer.

In their article *Everyday Nationhood,* Fox and Miller-Idriss write about the importance of nationally marked institutions and ticking boxes of nationality for administrational and statistical purposes: "By literally (or figuratively) ticking boxes, people 'choose' ethnonationality, momentarily invoking it and making it materially salient. Categories of belonging that may have had little symbolic significance can nevertheless become materially consequential when linked to the politics of redistribution.".[13] They also consider such national choices as unreflective and unselfconscious. Moreover, they see, that there is a two-way connection between nationhood and people's choices: they both shape each other.[14]

Brubaker et al. discuss extensively the everyday practices of categorizing and employing categories in the Romanian city of Cluj-Napoca, which has a Hungarian minority population[15]. They show, what kind of cues are used for perceiving identities. They concentrate on cues such as language, names and displaying ethnicity[16]. In Bosnia, ethnicity is rarely displayed through the usage of linguistic varieties. Names, on the other hand are used as cues for perceiving a person's ethnicity in Bosnia[17]. According to Donia and Fine, children from interethnic marriages were often given foreign or generic names.[18]

Thus, setting individuals into ethnic identity categories is a two-way process. On the other hand, there is the perception of the individual, but on the other hand the perceptions of the surroundings of the individual. Brubaker et al. talk about policing category membership among minority Hungarians in the city of Cluj in Romania. They claim, that the status of "Hungarian" is more policed, than the status of "Romanian" and that it is policed through "the monitoring of language knowledge, language

[13] Jon E. Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, "Everyday Nationhood," *Ethnicities* 8, no. 4 (December 2008): 543, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796808088925.
[14] Ibid., 544–45.
[15] Rogers Brubaker, ed., *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, (Princeton, NJ: Univ. Press, 2008).
[16] Brubaker, 217–24.
[17] Oane Visser and Marte Bakker, "Multicultural Vanguard? Sarajevo's Interethnic Young Adults between Ethnic Categorisation and International Spaces," *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, no. 3 (March 15, 2016): 460–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2015.1136595.
[18] Robert J. Donia, John V. A. Fine, and John C. Hamer, *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, Paperback ed (New York: Columbia Univ. Pr, 1994), quoted in Visser and Bakker, "Multicultural Vanguard?"

practices, school choice, and mixed marriages". [19] Yet, I contend, that it is possible to police an ethnic status also the other way around – by claiming the intrinsic and permanent character of ethnicity. Richard Jenkins writes about the relationship between external and internal categorizations, and emphasizes the interdependency of external categorizations and self-categorizations or internal categorizations, and considers external categorizations even more important in some contexts, since they validate internal self-categorizations, and they can be seen more legitimate, than internal ones.[20] He also brings up the possibility to resist categorizations, but sees, that even such resistance of categorizations is actually *internalized*, but "as a focus of denial"[21]. What this means, is that the denial of categorizations is produced paradoxically through alternative categorizations, manifesting resistance.

As this brief account on current debates on ethnicity and identities shows, that the debate is far from finished. Ethnicity works in different ways in different settings, and my research topic provides an example of a possibly untypical case of ethnic identity. Now, I will proceed to a discussion on a site for declarations of identity, namely the census.

2.2 Census

As the example above on the shaping of nations through institutions in Austria-Hungary shows us, the census is not a mere statistical activity of the state. There is a growing body of literature on the connection between censuses and identities. Michael Foucault's influence on the literature on censuses and production of statistics and statistical categories is apparent.[22] Florian Bieber considers

[19] Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, 229.
[20] Richard Jenkins, "Categorization: Identity, Social Process and Epistemology," *Current Sociology* 48, no. 3 (2000): 7–25.
[21] Jenkins, 21.
[22] See Fran Markowitz, "Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 01 (January 2007), and David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, eds., "Censuses, Identity Formation, and the Struggle for Political Power," in *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Census*, New Perspectives on Anthropological and Social Demography (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

the study of censuses as a "fruitful site of research", because "they are an instance where categories are imposed, negotiated, accepted, and rejected" [23]. He claims also, that censuses are understudied in divided societies.[24]

Kertzel and Arel have edited one of the main works on ethnicity in censuses, *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*[25], and written the introductory chapter of the volume[26]. The chapter provides a concise history of ethnic categorizations in censuses and scholarly trends in research on the topic. Kertzer and Arel claim, that census debates are about "the recognition of 'truer' realities over fallacious ones".[27] Yet, they state, that while census categories are often defined based on political decisions, there have also been bottom-up efforts to influence census categories. They mention campaigning by organizations and ethnic parties to affect the questions being asked, how the answers are categorized. They also discuss campaigning before censuses aimed at the population to be counted. In my opinion, it is not at all clear, whether these are bottom-up processes, since such ethnic entrepreneurs can be assumed to represent the elite[28]. In general, the issue of individual choices for the questions regarding national identification in censuses is an under-researched topic. Accounts on choices in censuses are sporadic in literature dealing with issues related to ethnicity. Kertzer and Arel rightfully state, that such campaigning "makes censuses far closer to a political campaign, than to a technical exercise in the counting".[29] Horowitz has famously stated, that in divided societies "the election is a census, and the census is an election". [30]

[23] Florian Bieber, "The Construction of National Identity and Its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses," *Social Science Quarterly*, 2015.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Kertzer, D. and Arel, D. (2002). Census, identity formation, and political power. In: D. Kertzer and D. Arel, *Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[26] Kertzer and Arel, "Censuses, Identity Formation, and the Struggle for Political Power."
[27] Ibid., 27
[28] Cf. Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
[29] Kertzer and Arel, "Censuses, Identity Formation, and the Struggle for Political Power," 28.
[30] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict: With a New Preface*, 2. ed., Nachdr. (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 2008), 196.

Competition at censuses also has to do with what are the political implications of the census – simply, what is at stake. For example, Brubaker reports, how in the 2002 Romanian census in Cluj-Napoca the census was a site of ethnopolitical struggles, as Hungarian-speaking population needed to reach 20 per cent of the total population of the city, in order for minority-language provisions to be implemented.[31] Hungarian minority party DAHR even tried to organize a "registration" of Hungarians in order to check the census results.[32] Similarly, refusal to count can maintain the status quo. An example on this is the annulation of the planned 2011 Macedonian census.[33] This was done, because of disagreements between ethnic Macedonian and Albanian parties and organizations on the counting of citizens in the diaspora. In North Macedonia, there is also a 20 per cent threshold in each municipality for a set of linguistic rights.[34] Also, in Belgium the language conflict was frozen by deleting the language question from the census and freezing the linguistic boundaries of 1947.[35] Similar tendencies were seen also in Bosnia, where the census was carried out only after extensive pressure by the EU.[36]

As we have seen in this sub-section, censuses are the most visible sites for ethnic categorization, and in divided societies, this creates competition, especially if there are clear implications for the census. The competition might even create tensions before censuses. Census campaigning is aimed at the more undecided population, who might be indifferent to the aims of the ethnic entrepreneurs, which is something, that will come up also in my interviews. This takes us thus into the concept of national indifference.

[31] Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, 152–53.
[32] Brubaker, 154–55.
[33] Sinisa Jakov Marusic, "Macedonia Scraps 'Failed' Census," *Balkan Insight*, October 13, 2011.
[34] Marusic.
[35] Dominique Arel, "Language Categories in Censuses: Backward-Orforward-Looking," in *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Census*, ed. David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, New Perspectives on Anthropological and Social Demography (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 105–6.
[36] Anna-Lena Hoh, "'When Counting Counts' – Europeanisation of Census-Taking in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 13, no. 1 (2017): 986.

2.3 National indifference

As this discussion has shown us, notions of "identity" and "ethnicity" are highly problematic, and administrative categorizations do not necessarily correspond with categories of social reality with more fuzzy boundaries. This takes us to the concept of national indifference, coined in 2010 by Tara Zahra in her seminal article *National Indifference as a Category of Analysis*[37]. Zahra talks about, how one part of population – especially in border areas – have been rejecting rising nationalism, but the problem has been, that the non-nationalists do not usually form a community of any kind. She talks about "imagined noncommunities", creating an analogue with Benedict Anderson's famous notion of "imagined communities"[38].

Zahra acknowledges, that there are challenges of researching such "noncommunities", as they are usually unorganized[39]. She also compares her approach to the "everyday ethnicity" approach of Fox and Miller-Idriss, but Zahra points out, that their approach is creating too clear-cut boundaries between a public sphere perceived as a political one, and a private sphere of "everyday life" perceived as apolitical.[40] Feest has ever since criticized Zahra's approach of not providing any methodological tools to investigate the phenomenon, and thus using it as a methodological starting point.[41] Gábor Egry, on the other hand, claims, that the concept of everyday ethnicity provides a better methodological framework for the research of the phenomenon. In his opinion, everyday ethnicity "can restore agency to individuals" and does not merely concentrate on people's reactions to activists' politicized claims.[42]

[37] Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," *Slavic Review* 69, no. 1 (2010): 93–119.
[38] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1983).
[39] Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," 106.
[40] Zahra, 97–98.
[41] David Feest, "Spaces of 'National Indifference' in Biographical Research on Citizens of the Baltic Republics 1918–1940," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 48, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 55–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2016.1269438.
[42] Gábor Egry, "Beyond Politics: National Indifference as Everyday Ethnicity," in *Ignoring the Nation's Call: National Indifference and the History of Nationalism in Modern Europe*, ed. Maarten Van Ginderachter and Jon E. Fox, Routledge Studies in Modern European History 64 (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2018), 158.

Zahra mentions examples on the nationalists' fears towards the nationally indifferent groups, mentioning the example of 1930 Czechoslovak census, where the idea of permitting declaration of "without nationality" or "unknown nationality" was rejected due to nationalists' warnings of the census not being able to create a good overview on the national structure and blurring the ethnic boundaries. In Bosnia, there have been similar tendencies, which I will discuss later more thoroughly. Let it just be said here, that in multiethnic and divided states, where division of resources might be at stake, nationalists have more reasons to mobilize the nationally indifferent, as the discussion on census shows.

Zahra aims with her article to historicize the approach of Brubaker and Cooper on indifference towards nationalism[43], and the notion of national indifference has indeed been applied mostly to research in historical studies.[44] However, Oane Visser and Marte Bakker have applied the notion also to the contemporary Bosnian context in their article about the strategies of interethnic young adults to deal with the ethnic categorization.[45] I believe, that the concept and its framework can be applied well in contemporary contexts.

Rogers Brubaker has dealt with similar issues in his fresh book *Trans*.[46] Here he creates a framework for analysis of the rejection of racial and ethnic categories. He makes the comparison to the current trends of rejecting traditional gender categories. While the context analyzed in the book is mostly the Northern American one, the theoretical framework will be useful for my thesis. He defines three forms of "trans": the *trans of migration* (changing one's ethnicity), the *trans of between* (belonging

[43] Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," 97–98.
[44] See Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Rok Stergar, "National Indifference in the Heyday of Nationalist Mobilization? Ljubljana Military Veterans and the Language of Command," *Austrian History Yearbook* 43 (April 2012): 45–58.
[45] Visser and Bakker, "Multicultural Vanguard?"
[46] Rogers Brubaker, *Trans: Gender and Race in an Age of Unsettled Identities* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

to several ethnicities or being "between" them), and the *trans of beyond* (going beyond existing ethnic categorization). [47]

In her fascinating account on Tutejsi ("people from here"), Morgane Labbé describes the phenomenon of people who declared themselves as Tutejsi in Polish interwar censuses.[48] The Tutejsi were concentrated mostly in the eastern borderlands of Poland, and they were considered to be in a transitory phase on the way to becoming a nationality. Labbé also raises the question important for my thesis: "[T]o what extent can the population census be considered a source on 'nationally indifferent' populations?".[49] She emphasizes the role of the census takers' reading of the individuals' responses, but sees, that in any case fragments of people's "voices" remain. Yet, even though Zahra's approach is on investigating the phenomena "from below", also in the emergent field of national indifference, we can notice a lack of individual accounts. One exception to this is Feest's interesting article *Spaces of "national indifference" in biographical research on citizens of the Baltic republics 1918–1940.* [50] In this way, a gap can be recognized in literature in such individual accounts.

National indifference is a prominent analytical concept, but as we have seen, it has also its shortcomings. It is not necessarily either that ground-breaking; similar analytic concepts have been applied even earlier. One of them is the concept of anti-nationalism, applied by Stef Jansen to the post-Yugoslav context. In his work, he researches anti-nationalism as a discursive practice expressing identity constructions in relation with and as a response to the dominant Serbian and Croatian nationalist discourses, while also acknowledging the importance of anti-nationalism in identity building of his informants.[51] While national indifference is a way of historicizing Brubaker and Cooper's ideas of going beyond ethnicity, I claim, that the concept offers an interesting set of ideas

[47] Ibid., 72.
[48] Egry, "Beyond Politics: National Indifference as Everyday Ethnicity."
[49] Egry, 170.
[50] Feest, "Spaces of 'National Indifference' in Biographical Research on Citizens of the Baltic Republics 1918–1940."
[51] Stef Jansen, "Anti-Nationalism: Post-Yugoslav Resistance and Narratives of Self and Society" (PhD Thesis, University of Hull, 2000), 17.

on the very process of showing ambiguity towards national projects, and even politicizing and mobilizing this sentiment.

2.4 Ethnicity and ethnic categorization in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the sections above, I have discussed the literature regarding identity, census and national indifference. In this section, I will concentrate on the literature dealing with ethnicity and ethnic categorization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is a multitude of scholarly texts written on this topic. Many of them show, how the ethnic categories have been fluid in Bosnia in the past centuries and censuses have been indeed an important arena for creating and reifying ethnic categories. Yet, there is no literature concentrating on individuals' motivations for choosing a census category in Bosnia. Markowitz has conducted interviews with Sarajevans on the 2002 census carried out in the entity of FBiH.[52] She brings up some cases, where the enumerators refused to count people to the opt-out category of Others, but rather put them to one of the ethnic categories.[53] Markowitz's research concentrates only on Sarajevo, as does Visser and Bakker's research on rejecting ethnonational identities, which might create sample bias. Some anthropological work dealing with identifications and briefly also with censuses has being carried out also in other parts in Bosnia.[54]

There are a few articles regarding the campaigning before the 2013 census. Armakolas and Maksimović have shown in their article, how wartime memories and trauma of the Srebrenica genocide were used in the census campaign[55]. Ethnic entrepreneurs used the genocide as a metaphor

[52] Markowitz, "Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo."
[53] Markowitz, 58.
[54] Cf. Paula M. Pickering, *Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Azra Hromadžić, *Citizens of an Empty Nation: Youth and State-Making in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina*, The Ethnography of Political Violence (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village*, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995).
[55] Ioannis Armakolas and Maja Maksimovic, "Memory and the Uses of Wartime Past in Contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case of the Bosniak Campaign for the October 2013 Population Census," *Episimi Kai Koinonia: Epitheorisi Politikis kai Ithikis Theorias* 32 (July 20, 2015): 59, https://doi.org/10.12681/sas.564.

while talking about a "self-genocide", that Bosniaks would commit, if they were not to choose the right category, and the campaign aimed especially at those individuals, who were thinking about declaring themselves by opting out of the dominant categories.[56] Bieber argues, that in the ex-Yugoslav censuses, "the number of citizens that will opt out of prevailing identity categories depends on (a) the degree of interethnic polarization and (b) the availability of alternative identities that constitute possible choice".[57] Thus, in Bieber's opinion, the polarization creates more clear-cut groups.[58] However, Bieber does not consider the role of ethnic entrepreneurs in opting out in the same way as Armakolas and Maksimović.

Norwegian anthropologist Tone Bringa discusses interethnic relations and the concept of ethnicity in a Central Bosnian village, where she has carried out extensive fieldwork[59]. She argues, that the Bosnian Muslims' identity is more contested, than the one of Serbs and Croats, because Muslims have understood their identity in a different way. She also emphasizes the importance of the religion as a decisive factor for ethnic identification. Yet, ethnic self-categorization of Bosnian Muslims depends on the person, and some of her informants tell, that they have chosen several various categories in the censuses they have taken part in their lives. Pickering, on the other hand, points out the frustration and confusion caused by the removal of the Yugoslav category. [60] She claims, that "ordinary people quietly contest the official categories and identities that are promoted by the nationalizing state and minority activists". [61] Bosnian anthropologist Azra Hromadžić has written about the trans-ethnic notion *narod* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a discursive category rather, than an observable, bounded category of analysis. [62] Yet, she argues, that using the notion is a political act mirroring in-betweenness. The category of *narod* is often contrasted by her interviewees with the

[56] Armakolas and Maksimovic.
[57] Bieber, "The Construction of National Identity and Its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses," 3.
[58] Bieber, 27.
[59] Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way*.
[60] Pickering, *Peacebuilding in the Balkans*, 65–67.
[61] Ibid., 70.
[62] Hromadžić, *Citizens of an Empty Nation*.

politicians, who are seen in a very negative light. Besides being a trans-ethnic notion, *narod* was also an administrative category in Socialist Yugoslavia, approximately (although not exactly) corresponding to the English word *nation*[63]. Contrasting with Hromadžić, Sorabji has argued, that the Bosnian war altered local understandings of *narod* and simplified the identifications to mean only ethnic identification.[64] Markowitz, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of the notion *Bosanac*, which she considers to be used quite often in everyday situations.[65] Thus, even though polarization can be indeed considered high in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such trans-ethnic categories stay strong at least in the level of everyday discourse.

The discussion above hence shows us the importance of the census and ethnic entrepreneurs in the (ex-)Yugoslav context in creating and reifying ethnic categorizations. However, according to the literature this is resisted silently at the level of discourse by people, who do not engage into nationalism. I will discuss this phenomenon more in the following chapter, which functions as a contextualizing chapter on ethnic politics and groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[63] Sorabji has criticized the usage of the English term nation as a synonym for the Bosnian word *narod*, because in everyday speech *narod* means 'people' in general. Cornelia Sorabji, "A Very Modern War: Terror and Territory in Bosnia-Hercegovina.," in *War: A Cruel Necessity? The Bases of Institutionalized Violence.*, ed. R. A. Hinde and H. E. Watson (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), 87–88.
[64] Sorabji, "A Very Modern War: Terror and Territory in Bosnia-Hercegovina."
[65] Markowitz, "Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo," 69.

3. CONTEXT

This chapter will provide contextualization for the analysis, concentrating on ethnic categorizations in Bosnia, with a special focus on ambiguous self-identifications in censuses. In the first section of this chapter, I will deal with the historical context between 1878 and 1995, and after this, in section 3.2, deal with ethnic politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly from the point of view of Others. It provides also the legal context related to Others. This section also deals with the 2013 census, concentrating on the results of it, as well as the campaigning and political discourse around it. In the last section (3.3), I will characterize Sarajevo and Velika Kladuša, the places, where I conducted fieldwork. In this section, I will use scholarly literature and census results to provide the reader with the basic information on these places.

3.1 Ethnic categories in Bosnia in 19th and 20th centuries

In this section, I will provide an overview on how ethnic categories have been treated in Bosnia from late 19th century until 1995, when the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, which ended the Bosnian War, and granted independence to Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will show also demographic data.

In 1878, Bosnia was occupied by the Habsburg Empire and taken over from the Ottoman Empire, of which it had been a subject for centuries. In order to counter competing nationalisms, the Austro-Hungarians promoted the idea of *bošnjaštvo* (Bosnianism)[66] – which considered all inhabitants of Bosnia as one nation regardless of their religion.[67] The Hungarian administrator of Bosnia, Benjamin von Kállay tried to isolate Bosnian Muslims from the Ottoman Empire and the ongoing nationalist

[66] Even though the word *bošnjaštvo* is derived from the word *bošnjak* ('Bosniak'), in 19th century, the word was referring to all residents of Bosnia.
[67] Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 64.

trends, but Bosnia could not avoid being affected by the idea of Yugoslavism.[68] Thus, an idea of unitary Bosnian nation was challenged by more broader developments, which is something, that we can see in Bosnia also in later times.

In Bosnia, there is a significant overlap of religion and ethnicity. Religion forms an integral part cultural identity of a person, rather than merely works as a system of faith and beliefs.[69] In everyday discussions, it is possible to hear people referring to other persons by mentioning their religion. Religion has played an important part in forming all nations in the Balkan region, but especially the Serb and Croat nations.[70] The importance of the religion in forming identities in the region has its origins in the *millet* system applied by the Ottoman Empire, where political identities were based on religion.[71] In late 19th century, the ethnonym Serb was promoted among the Orhodox population of the country.[72] The Catholics, on the other hand, became Croats, while Muslims stayed in a state of in-betweenness.

During the interwar period, Bosnia was a part of Yugoslavia, and it was divided to several administrative units. In 1943, the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was founded, and Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina became one of its constitutive member republics. SFRY was built on the doctrine of Brotherhood and Unity, which was based on the right to self-determination and the equality of nations.[73] An important part of the Yugoslav national policies was the division of peoples to *narods* (approximate English equivalent is 'nation') – constituent peoples of Yugoslavia: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and from 1971 onwards Muslims – , and *narodnosti* (approximate English translation would be "nationality") – national

[68] Friedman, 69–70.
[69] Tone Bringa, "Nationality Categories, National Identification and Identity Formation in 'Multinational' Bosnia," *Anthropology of Eastern Europe Review* 11, no. 1&2 (1993): 81.
[70] Miroljub Jevtić, "Uloga Religije u Identitetu Južnoslovenskih Nacija," *Godišnjak FPN*, no. 02 (2008): 172.
[71] Gerlachlus Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 28.
[72] Paul Morland, *Demographic Engineering: Population Strategies in Ethnic Conflict*, International Population Studies (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 44.
[73] Esad Zgodić, *Titova Nacionalna Politika: Temeljni Pojmovi, Načela i Vrijednosti* (Sarajevo: Kantonalni odbor SDP BiH, 2000), 161.

minorities, most notably the Albanians and the Hungarians. Until 1963, Bosnian Muslims were not considered either a *narodnost* nor a *narod*, and were first granted the status of *narodnost*, and after that, in 1971, that of a *narod*.[74] Below we can see the demographic developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the census data.

TABLE 1: Share of population (in per cent) by nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in censuses between 1953 and 1991.[75]

Year	*1953*	*1961*	*1971*	*1981*	*1991*
Serbs	44.4	42.9	37.2	32.0	31.2
Croats	23.0	21.7	20.6	18.4	17.4
Yugoslavs	31.3[76]	8.4	1.2	8.4	5.5
Muslims	--	25.7[77]	39.6	39.5	43.5
Others	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.6	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 1 shows, how the census declarations have been changing during the whole period of Socialist Yugoslavia. From 1971 onwards, the Muslim category becomes a popular one, and the majority of the population declared themselves as Muslims. The anational category of Yugoslavs is a popular one before the 1971 census, suggesting, that many Muslims declared themselves to this category, however, the category becomes a popular one again in 1981.

Tone Bringa makes the claim based on her anthropological material, that the census categorizations of her Bosnian Muslim friends depended on person, and that the Yugoslav category was a popular one.[78] Yet, declaring oneself to a Yugoslav category was chiefly related to mixed parentage, and besides this to urbanism, and membership in the communist party.[79] Mixed marriages were indeed quite common in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in urban surroundings, and this is probably one

[74] Cornelia Sorabji, "Muslim Identity and Islamic Faith in Sarajevo" (PhD Thesis, King's College, 1989), 14.
[75] "Statistika.Ba,"., www.statistika.ba.
[76] In the 1953 census, there was no category for Muslims especially, which led to many Muslims declaring themselves as "Yugoslavs undetermined" (*Jugoslaven neopredjeljen*), which explains the exceptionally high number of Yugoslavs.
[77] In the 1961 census, this was under the category "Muslims in ethnical sense" (*Muslimani u etničkom smislu*)
[78] Bringa, "Nationality Categories, National Identification and Identity Formation in 'Multinational' Bosnia," 86.
[79] Duško Sekulić, Garth Massey, and Randy Hodson, "Who Were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia," *American Sociological Review* 59, no. 1 (1994): 83–97.

reason why the number of Yugoslavs was so high in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the censuses 1971, 1981 and 1991. In the Yugoslav category, we can see the same anational patterns as in declarations to Others, although we have to note, that even in Yugoslav times, there were still Others, who had not declared themselves as Yugoslavs. In his book on anti-nationalism, Stef Jansen points out through anecdotes from his informants, how ethnicity and ethnic differences played minimal role in the lives of Yugoslav citizens.[80]

In 1993, when the destructive 1992-95 Bosnian war had started, the notion Bosniak (Bosnian: *Bošnjak*) took over the previous ethnic category Muslims. The notion Bosniak had not been in widespread use after the 19th century, when it was used for all residents of Bosnia.[81] In 1993, it was reinstated to denote only Bosnian Muslims by Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals, who argued for the autochthony of Bosniaks.[82] The notion was also a way of secularizing the Muslim identity and creating a connection with Bosnian soil rather than religion, thereby forming a national identity.[83] The Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 already talks exclusively about Bosniaks, In the literature, there are many examples on resistance towards the Bosniak national project.[84]

The term Bosniak was already proposed for denoting Bosnian Muslims 1970, but it was rejected by Yugoslav Communists partly with the argumentation, that Muslims in the Sandžak area, situated in the border region of Serbia and Montenegro, are also a part of the Muslim nation, thus Muslim nation is not only limited to Bosnia.[85] Dejan Jović sees this as an interesting case of party elites deciding, who belong to a nation in question.[86]

[80] Jansen, "Anti-Nationalism: Post-Yugoslav Resistance and Narratives of Self and Society," 94–97.
[81] Fran Markowitz, *Sarajevo: A Bosnian Kaleidoscope*, Interpretations of Culture in the New Millennium (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 63.
[82] Markowitz, "Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo," 51–52.
[83] Šaćir Filandra, *Bošnjaci nakon socijalizma: o bošnjačom identitetu u postjugoslavenskom dobu* (Sarajevo: BZK Preporod, 2012), 196. Quoted in Dejan Jović, "Identitet Bošnjaka/Muslimana," *Politička Misao*, no. 4 (2013): 145.
[84] See Hromadžić, *Citizens of an Empty Nation*, 118; Markowitz, "Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo," 57–63.
[85] Jović, "Identitet Bošnjaka/Muslimana," 137.
[86] Ibid.

Nationality categories in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus have been not been stable in its near history and mixed marriages were common especially in the Communist times. Sead Fetahagić has shown, that the nationalities, that are considered sovereign by the constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been constantly changing in the past decades.[87] In this light, the importance of a catch-all category Others both in statistics and on the level of discourse is not surprising. According to Fetahagić, the Others as a legal category we understand it today, emerged only in 1994 as part of the Bosniak-Croat Washington Agreement. After 1995, the category Others has received new kind of importance by the new constitution, as will be seen in the following section.

3.2 Status of ethnic groups in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina

In this section, I will deal with the national policies of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, concentrating on the issue and position of Others. First, I will provide an overview of the legal position of Others, after which I will deal with intertwining of the category with political issues. After this, I will deal with the 2013 census results and other statistics on Others.

3.2.1 Laws and ethnicity

In this section, I will discuss, how Bosnian law treats the constituent peoples and Others. Besides this, I will deal with the legal aspect of the Others and show, what kind of legal discrimination Others are facing. The data here is based on legal documents and literature on the topic.

The 1995 constitution is a largely consociational legal text, that puts emphasis on belonging to the three constituent peoples. The constitution has indeed been criticized for being too ethnocentric and giving too many concessions to the Serb party.[88] It has to be noted, that the 1995 constitution, created

[87] Sead Fetahagić, "Povijesni (Dis)Kontinuitet Konstitutivnosti Naroda BiH i Zahtvjevi (Post)Moderni Državnosti," *STATUS Magazin Za Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja*, 2011.
[88] Christopher Bennett, *Bosnia's Paralysed Peace* (London: Hurst & Company, 2016), 80.

as a result of Dayton Peace Agreement, was written in a short period of time by international lawyers, and its main aim was to create peace into Bosnia and Herzegovina in a way, that was acceptable for all the parties in the war.[89]

The preamble of the constitution ends with the following sentence:

> Bosnia[k]s, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows. [90]

Even though in the preamble of the constitution mentions also Others as determining groups of people and mentions the ambiguous category of "citizens", the rest of the constitution excludes the Others from the right for running for the membership in the tripartite presidency and House of Peoples, reserving this right only to Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled in the Sejdić-Finci verdict, that this violates the European Convention of Human Rights, but the decision has not yet been implemented. I will now present briefly the Sejdić-Finci verdict.

In 2006, two Bosnian citizens, Dervo Sejdić, a Roma, and Jakob Finci, a Jew, complied to the ECtHR about their ineligibility for running for the membership of the presidency and besides this also running for the membership in the House of Peoples, one of the chambers of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Article V of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina states the following about the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

> "The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska."[91]

[89] Bennett, 85.
[90] "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (1995).
[91] Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article V.

In 2009, the Court ruled in favor of the applicants, and later on the implementation of the verdict was set to be a condition for the EU accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[92] The reforms of the electoral system (and wider constitutional reforms) have not been carried out, even though it has been on the agenda of many governments so far. It is interesting to read the only fully dissenting opinion of a judge at ECtHR, stated by judge Bonello. He argues, that the constitution created as a part of the Dayton Peace Agreement was written to stop the war, and it is dangerous to alter the Peace Agreement to destabilize the status quo. The danger of giving seeds to new conflicts remains one of the reasons not to make changes to the election law. After the Sejdić-Finci ruling, there have been several similar cases. One of them is the case of Azra Zornić, who claimed to lack any ethnic affiliation whatsoever, but – as Sejdić and Finci – could not run for the Presidency or House of Peoples.[93] The ECtHR considered the case identical with the Sejdić and Finci case and ruled in favor of Zornić.[94]

There are also other cases of institutionalized discrimination towards the Others. One of them is the lack of the possibility of vetoing decisions based on "vital national interest", which is provided to the constituent peoples. The Sejdić-Finci verdict is being implemented slowly on the cantonal level. The Sarajevo Canton was the first one to make Others equal with the constituent peoples. The amendments on the Cantonal Constitution allow members of the cantonal assembly to create their own caucus by nationality and gives the possibility for the prime minister of the canton to be elected also from the members of the cantonal assembly, who have declared themselves as Others.[95] The current prime minister of Sarajevo canton is also an "Other": Edin Forto from the non-national liberal party "Our Party" (Bosnian: *Naša stranka*). Besides Sarajevo Canton, also Tuzla Canton provides the possibility to create a caucus for Others.

[92] Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 27996/06, 34836/06 (European Court of Human Rights December 22, 2009).
[93] Case of Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 3681/06 (July 15, 2014).
[94] Case of Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[95] "Od Sada Će Manjine Moći Formirati Klub „ostalih"," *Source*, February 25, 2015, http://ftp.source.ba/clanak/BiH/304767/Od-sada-ce-manjine-moci-formirati-klub-ostalih%E2%80%9C.

The law provides rights to all the 17 recognized minorities regarding education, culture, society, and language and they are presented through national councils.[96] Others, who declare themselves to opt-out categories, are not provided this right. The law also grants quotas for Others in many instances. In the Houses of Peoples in the entities, Others have a quota, and at the state level there has to be one Other in the government.[97] Besides this, judges of the constituent court has to be an Other, one government member of entities has to be an Other.[98] Proportional representation is still based on the 1991 census, and will be so until the Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons is fully implemented.[99] The ethnicity is defined in all cases by self-identification, which makes the system vulnerable to misuse of ethnicity. As we have seen, the laws discriminate on Other at some points, but as a 2017 report by European Stability Inititative points out, many countries do not take other ethnic groups into account in any way, using examples from Cyprus, South Tyrol and Belgium.[100]

The Others are partly a product of the highly consociational constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the question can be posed: are the Others also a product of historical continuity? What it comes to the national minorities, the answer is clearly positive. But for the people opting-out from all national categories, it gets more complicated, because opt-out categories consist of very different kinds of people, however, this can be seen as a continuity of fluid and ambiguous self-identifications. As I will later on show, the number of Others varies in various surveys and in the census. This is hardly surprising, since as scholarship has shown us, ethnicity is often situational.[101] It is less researched, how situational the indifference towards ethnicity is. One of the most significant problems

[96] "Nacionalne Manjine u BiH" (OSCE), accessed May 24, 2019, https://www.osce.org/bs/bih/110232?download=true.
[97] Bennett, *Bosnia's Paralysed Peace*, 123, 129.
[98] Bennett, 130.
[99] Bennett, 130.
[100] "Wine, Dog Food and Bosnian Clichés: False Ideas and Why They Matter" (Berlin, Vienna, Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative, November 5, 2017), 9, https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20Wine%20Dog%20food%20and%20Bosnia%20Cliches%20-%205%20Nov%202017.pdf.
[101] Jonathan Y. Okamura, "Situational Ethnicity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4, no. 4 (October 1981): 452–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1981.9993351.

of the Others are, that they do not constitute a group – this is also mentioned by Zahra in her article about national indifference.

3.2.2 Politics and ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In this sub-section, I will provide context on how the political parties are framing issues related to ethnicity in Bosnia. The whole political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the Dayton Peace Accords and the constitution, that it created. The international community is much present, and the implementation of the peace accords is monitored by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, who has a right to influence Bosnian politics directly.[102]

The political parties in Bosnia are usually divided into "ethnic" or "nationalist" parties representing the interests of one of the constituent peoples, and more civic ones, each with their own perception of the ethnic policies.[103] The main ethnic parties are the Bosniak SDA (*Stranka demokratske akcije*, Party of Democratic Action), Croat HDZ (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, Croatian Democratic Union) and SNSD (*Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata*, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats), which are currently the ruling parties.[104] The more civic options are provided by SDP (*Socijaldemokratska partija*, Social Democrat Party), Our Party (*Naša stranka*) and Democratic Front (*Demokratska fronta*). These three civic parties have currently 10 seats out of 42 in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[105]

The current Croat member of the tripartite presidency, Željko Komšić, needs to be noted in this thesis, because of his relevance to the topic. Komšić, representing Democratic Front (*Demokratska Fronta*),

[102] Jakub Šedo, "The Party System of Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Party Politics in the Western Balkans*, ed. Věra Stojarová and Peter Emerson (London: Routledge, 2010), 86.
[103] Heleen Touquet, "Multi-Ethnic Parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Naša Stranka and the Paradoxes of Postethnic Politics: Multi-Ethnic Parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11, no. 3 (December 2011): 451–67, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2011.01134.x.
[104] Touquet, 456.
[105] Central Election Commission Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Opći Izbori 2018. Godine - Potvrđeni Rezultati," October 28, 2018, https://www.izbori.ba/rezultati_izbora?resId=25&langId=4#/2/0/0/0/0/0.

has mixed parentage, but declares himself as a Croat, however receiving most of his votes from predominantly Bosniak-populated areas.[106] Komšić has been talking much about the importance of Bosnian and Herzegovinian identity, and according to some media outlets, he declared himself as a *Bosanac* (Bosnian) in the 2013 census.[107] This is thus an interesting case to compare with the Sejdić-Finci and Zornić cases, which were dealt in the previous section. As ethnicity is based on self-declaration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even a *Bosanac* can be elected as a member of presidency, but only by declaring belonging to one of the constituent peoples.

3.2.3 The 2013 Bosnian census

The situations, where Bosnian citizens need to declare their ethnicity are multi-faceted. Declarations of ethnicity are asked upon when getting married[108], applying for a university scholarship or jobs, when a birth certificate is given[109], running for politics, and – of course – during the census, just to mention a few. In this section, I will briefly deal with the 2013 census by dealing with the legal aspect of the census, the public discourse around it, and I will summarize the results and their reception.

The 2013 census was the first one carried out after the independence of the country. The previous census was thus in 1991, right before the beginning of the break-up wars of Yugoslavia. As mentioned in section 2.4, in 2002 a census was executed in the entity of FBiH. The 2013 census took place under

[106] "Komšić Po Ocu Hrvat, Po Majci Srbin a Biraju Ga Bošnjaci," *Politika*, October 8, 2018, http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/412722/Komsic-po-ocu-Hrvat-po-majci-Srbin-a-biraju-ga-Bosnjaci; Vera Soldo, "Komšić: Predsjednik Bez 'Hrvatske Licence'?," *Deutsche Welle*, October 27, 2018, https://www.dw.com/bs/kom%C5%A1i%C4%87-predsjednik-bez-hrvatske-licence/a-46060766.

[107] "Komšić: Vjerujem u Identitet Bosanac i Hercegovac, u Njega Mogu Stati Bošnjak, Hrvat i Srbin," *Klix.Ba*, accessed May 26, 2019, https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/komsic-vjerujem-u-identitet-bosanac-i-hercegovac-u-njega-mogu-stati-bosnjak-hrvat-i-srbin/180118114; "HMS [Saznaje]: Željko Komšić Na Popisu Stanovništva 2013. Izjasnio Se Kao Bosanac!?," *Hrvatski Medijski Servis*, February 12, 2018, https://hms.ba/hms-saznaje-zeljko-komsic-na-popisu-stanovnistva-2013-izjasnio-se-kao-bosanac/.

[108] Markowitz, "Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo."

[109] Elvira Jukić, "Bosnian Baby Beats Ethnically-Divided System," *Balkan Insight*, February 16, 2015, https://balkaninsight.com/2015/02/16/bosnian-baby-beats-ethnically-divided-system/.

pressure from European Union, after a long debate on, how the census should be carried out.[110] According to Perry, the Serb parties were most interested in carrying out the census to "reflecting the interest among RS parties in demonstrating and consolidating the demographic status quo that reflects the expected Serb majority in that territory", while Croat HDZ and Bosniak SDA parties have been less eager in organizing the census.[111]

Let us have an overview the census results concentrating on Others. In the 2013 census, 3.7 per cent of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not belong any of the constituent peoples. The proportion of Others declined significantly from the previous census conducted in 1991, when the share of Others was 7.9 per cent.[112] In 1991, the Others were comprised mainly of Yugoslavs, which in the 2013 census was an almost non-existent category (2,570 declarations).[113] The most popular declarations for ethnicity/national affiliation in the census are seen in TABLE 2.

TABLE *2: Ethnicity/national affiliation in the 2013 census – the most numerous categories[114] (opt-out categories bolded):*

Ukupno (Total)	*3,531,159*	*100.00 %*
Bošnjak/Bošnjakinja (Bosniak)	1,769,592	50.11 %
Srbin/Srpkinja (Serb)	1,086,733	30.78 %
Hrvat/Hrvatica (Croat)	544,780	15.43 %
Ostali (Others) out of which:	130,054	3.68 %
Bosanac/Bosanka (Bosnian)	**37,110**	**1.05 %**
Ne izjašnjava se (Does not declare)	**27,055**	**0.77 %**
Rom/Romkinja (Roma)	12,583	0.36 %
Musliman/Muslimanka (Muslim)	**12,121**	**0.34 %**
Bosanac i Hercegovac/Bosanka i Hercegovka (Bosnian and Herzegovinian)	**11,406**	**0.32 %**
Nepoznato (Unknown)	**6,460**	**0.18 %**

[110] Valery Perry, "The 2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Basic Review," DPC Policy Note New Series (Sarajevo: Democratization Policy Council (DPC), October 2013), 5; Hoh, "'When Counting Counts' – Europeanisation of Census-Taking in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," 986.
[111] Perry, "The 2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Basic Review," 5.
[112] "Statistika.Ba."
[113] "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti - Detaljna Klasifikacija" (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017), http://www.popis.gov.ba/popis2013/doc/Knjiga2/BOS/K2_T1_B.xlsx.
[114] "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti - Detaljna Klasifikacija." The Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina presents the results in male and female form of the ethnic category. I decided to leave the declarations like this to the thesis and provide a translation on the categories in parentheses.

Albanac/Albanka (Albanian)	2,659	0.08 %
Jugosloven/Jugoslovenka (Yugoslav)	**2,570**	**0.07 %**
Ukrajinac/Ukrajinka (Ukrainian)	2,331	0.07 %
Crnogorac/Crnogorka (Montenegrin)	1,883	0.05 %
Turčin/Turkinja (Turk)	1,108	0.03 %

TABLE 2 shows us, that most of the declarations aggregated to Others are not declarations of belonging to a national minority, but rather to a more civic category, such as *Bosanci*[115], or the complete refusal to declare any kind of national belonging. Altogether, there are 24,584 (0.70 % of the total population) people belonging to the recognized national minorities according to the 2013 census.[116] This means, that there are approximately 3 per cent of Others not belonging to national minorities according to the census – although not all of them are opt-out categories; there are several other ethnic declarations, that do not however count as recognized national minorities, such as American (119 declarations). The declaration 'Muslim' is a relic from the designation of Muslim nationality in SFR Yugoslavia. The category designed for Bosnian Muslims changed its name to Bosniaks, but the census results suggest, that this change has not been approved by all Bosnian Muslims.

The census probably shows only a slight share of people, who would be interested in declaring themselves anationally. According to the results of a test-census organized before the actual census in some areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 per cent of respondents declared themselves as Bosnians and Herzegovinians, which already threatened the power-share system, created by the Dayton constitution.[117] Yet, the number of Others could have even been higher without active campaigning and pressuring to choose one of the constituent categories.

[115] *Bosanci* is the plural form of *Bosanac/Bosanka*, meaning 'Bosnian' in Bosnian language. *Bosanac* is the masculine, and *Bosanka* the feminine version of the ethnonym. In order to avoid confusions, I will apply the notion *Bosanac/Bosanka* in this thesis.

[116] I have aggregated the data based on the census results in "Stanovništvo prema etničkoj/nacionalnoj pripadnosti – detaljna klasifikacija".

[117] Florian Bieber, "Šta Može Značiti 35% Bosanaca i Hercegovaca," *Radio Sarajevo*, November 5, 2012, https://www.radiosarajevo.ba/metromahala/ja-mislim/sta-moze-znaciti-35-bosanaca-i-hercegovaca/93866.

I would also like to draw a comparison to two surveys, that are dealing with Others: one carried out by Ipsos Strategic Marketing in 2011 and presented in Dević's book chapter on nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina[118], and another one by a survey conducted by Majstorović and Turjačanin[119]. Both surveys are especially interesting, because they have included a fourth group besides the constitutive peoples. In the IPSOS survey, this was the non-national category of Bosnians (*Bosanci*; declared by 9 per cent of the respondents)[120], while Majstorović and Turjačanin have included a "B&H" category (declared by 8 per cent of the respondents) and provided the possibility for other self-declarations (done by 3 per cent of the respondents). Thus, the survey results give a larger number for the Others, than the census. Meanwhile, we have to note, that the surveys are conducted with a significantly smaller sample and the latter survey is, concentrating on the youth, but it is also possible, that there is a smaller threshold for opt-out replies in a survey, than in the census.

Altogether, there are 508 categories declared in the census, out of which 180 are declared by only one person each.[121] Some of the categories are humorous and almost carnevalesque, such as Eskimo (54 declarations), Jedi (76), and Alien (55), and among the smaller ones we can even find a Liberal Hippie and 6 people declaring to be Homo Sapiens.[122] Yet, even these humoristic declarations have the aim of undermining or mocking the census. Bieber argues, that such declarations are a "tool for individual contestation is to opt for identity categories that mock the established groups". [123]

Earlier I discussed the Others in a historical continuity. A similar question relevant when dealing with censuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina is, to what extent is the aggregated category Others related to Yugoslavism? Proportions of Others are high in somewhat same areas as in 1991 for the Yugoslavs.

[118] Ana Dević, "Jaws of the Nation and Weak Embraces of the State: The Lines of Division, Indifference and Loyalty in Bosnia-Herzegovina," in *Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in South Eastern Europe*, ed. Pål Kolstø, Southeast European Studies (London New York: Routledge, 2016), 51–86.
[119] Danijela Majstorović and Vladimir Turjacanin, *Youth Ethnic and National Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Social Science Approaches*, 2013, http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1571872.
[120] Dević, "Jaws of the Nation and Weak Embraces of the State: The Lines of Division, Indifference and Loyalty in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 54.
[121] "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti - Detaljna Klasifikacija."
[122] "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti - Detaljna Klasifikacija."
[123] Bieber, "The Construction of National Identity and Its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses," 19.

Declaring oneself to a Yugoslav category was mainly related to mixed family background, and to some extent also to urban residence and membership in the communist party.[124] Sorabji suggests, that the Yugoslav did not exist as a national category in everyday speech in Bosnia.[125] Bakker and Visser's research suggests, that this is the case often also for Others in contemporary Bosnia, where ethnic belonging and categorization is very common in everyday contexts too.[126] As I mentioned in the literature review, the discouragement of the usage of Yugoslav category created difficulties in choosing an alternative discursive category for in-betweenness. As the 2013 census result show, new opt-out categories have effectively replaced the Yugoslav category in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there is not a single strong opt-out category in the way, as the Yugoslav category was in SFRY. Let us now move on to look at, how Others have declared themselves regarding religion.

TABLE 3: Responses of religion among Others in the 2013 census[127]

Muslims	51,149	39.3 %
Does not declare	23,123	17.8 %
Atheists	14,008	10.8 %
Orthodox	10,134	7.8 %
Catholics	6,992	5.4 %
Agnostics	5,365	4.1 %
other	19,283	14.8 %

TABLE 3 tells us many interesting things. Firstly, it has to be noted, that the share of people refusing to declare any religion is extremely high. Secondly, we can see, that atheists, agnostics have also a large share among Others. On the level of the whole country, the share of atheists is 0.8 per cent and agnostics is only 0.3 per cent.[128] In Serbia, a similar prevalence of atheism and agnosticism among

[124] Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson, "Who Were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia."
[125] Sorabji, "Muslim Identity and Islamic Faith in Sarajevo."
[126] Visser and Bakker, "Multicultural Vanguard?"
[127] I have aggregated the data based on "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti, Vjeroispovesti i Spolu" (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017), http://www.popis.gov.ba/popis2013/doc/Knjiga2/BOS/K2_T3_B.xlsx.
[128] "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti, Vjeroispovesti i Spolu."

people declaring themselves as Yugoslavs is recorded.[129] Thirdly, we can see, that there are significantly more Muslims among Others, than Orthodox and Catholics, which suggests us, that declaring oneself to Others is more common among people with Muslim background. Majstorović and Turjačanin's survey provides us similar results: people declaring the B&H category have a significant number of those, who are not religious: 35.7 per cent. Besides this, 46.5 per cent declare themselves as Muslims, 8.3 as Catholics, 5.1 as Orthodox, and 4.5 declare Other religious identity. After this, let us briefly deal with the responses of Others on the question on mother tongue.

TABLE 4: Responses of mother tongue among Others in the 2013 census[130]

Bosnian	79,651	61.2 %
Serbian	12,597	9.7 %
Croat	2,660	2.0 %
Serbo-Croat	8,948	6.9 %
Bosnian-Serbian-Croat	1,055	0.8 %
other	25,143	19.3 %

TABLE 4, shows us, that among Others, the Bosnian language category is more popular, than on the national level, where 52.8 per cent of the population declared their mother tongue to be Bosnian.[131] Serbian and Croat languages are significantly less popular declarations among others. As an interesting phenomenon we can see, how the old name of the language, Serbo-Croat, is declared by almost 7 per cent of Others.

Before and during the 2013 census, the question regarding ethnicity was highly politicized. There were campaigning for choosing the "right" categories. As I mentioned in the literature review, Horowitz has written, that in divided societies elections and censuses tend to remind each other, and

[129] Vladimir Đurić and Republički zavod za statistiku (Serbia), eds., *Etnokonfesionalni i Jezićki Mozaik Srbije*, Popis Stanovništva, Domaćinstava i Stanova 2011. u Republici Srbiji (Beograd: Republički zavod za statistiku, 2014), 194.
[130] I have aggregated the data based on "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti i Maternjem Jeziku, Po Spolu" (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017), http://www.popis.gov.ba/popis2013/doc/Knjiga2/BOS/K2_T4_B.xlsx.
[131] "Statistika.Ba."

both need to be "won".[132] Laurence Cooley has written about the census campaigns in Bosnia, interviewing participants in the civic and the Bosniak campaigns.[133] The campaigning seems to have been the most intense among Bosniak ethnic entrepreneurs. One reason for this was, that Bosniak identity had not been "tested" in a census before 2013, as in the earlier censuses Bosniaks have fallen under the category "Muslims". Besides this, the civic option was also perceived as a threat. Cooley elaborates on this based on her interviews with participants in the Bosniak census campaign:

> A key concern for campaigners was that their target population should not act in such a way to split the group between 'Bosniaks' and 'Muslims', given that many older citizens would have memories of the old, Yugoslav census categories. […] The threat was not only that some Bosniaks might identity as Muslim in response to the ethnic/national affiliation question but also that they might opt to describe themselves simply as 'Bosnian'.This 'danger' was perceived to stem partly from Bosniaks' status as the largest of the three constituent peoples and also from the actions of the civic campaign, which were thought to be more likely to influence Bosniaks than Serbs or Croats.[134]

During the months preceding the census, there were heated debates about the notions of "Bosniak" and *Bosanac*. In one debate university professor of political science, Senadin Lavić was claiming, that activists for the civic option are trying to ethnicize the notion *Bosanac,* which he emphasizes to refer to all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[135] In another interview, professor Ugo Vlaisavljević says that the census can bring unwanted phenomena, as people not declaring as "what they actually are".[136]

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) wrote in its paper on the census the following: "The key threat remains the impact of the results on the proportionality guarantees embedded in the

[132] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 196.
[133] Laurence Cooley, "To Be a Bosniak or to Be a Citizen? Bosnia and Herzegovina's 2013 Census as an Election: Bosnia and Herzegovina's 2013 Census as an Election," *Nations and Nationalism*, February 18, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12500.
[134] Cooley, 8.
[135] *Senadin Lavić & Hidajet Čehić Bošnjak Ili Bosanac) FaceTV (10 11 2012)*, vol. YouTube, 2012, https://youtu.be/TIV7mkRHFVs.
[136] *Šta Morate Znati o Popisu Stanovništva - Dnevnik TV1 20.10.2012*, vol. TV1, 2012, http://www.vkportal.ba/popis-stanovnistva-bosnjak-srbin-hrvat-ili-ostali-video/.

Dayton Accords and subsequent agreements, and the associated domestic political reaction".[137] The results were published finally three years after the census, out of pressure from the European Union. The reactions after the publication of the census results were indeed such. Republika Srpska did not accept the results, due to disagreements regarding methodology and the counting of citizens living in diaspora.[138]

During the months preceding the 2013 census, a civic census campaign Be a Citizen (*Budi građanin(ka)*) was created. First, the campaign was aimed on creating more open questions for the three most politicized questions: ethnicity, language and religion. Later on, the activists tried to encourage people not to feel pressured to reply with the category they are expected to.[139]

In this section, I have shown the Others are in a discriminatory situation in the contemporary political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and being part of the Others is usually discouraged in the system. Declaring oneself into a non-national category is not completely unknown in other countries in the region either. Yet, in Bosnia we have a special case of institutionalization of the lack of a dominant identity, even though this institutionalization is working often in a discriminatory way.

3.3 Characterization of Sarajevo and Velika Kladuša

In this section, I will briefly contextualize the two places, where I conducted fieldwork – Sarajevo and Velika Kladuša – by providing information on demography and recent history.

Sarajevo has a long history with a multicultural character. Between 1943 and 1992, it was the capital of Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and after that became the capital of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Communist Yugoslavia, Sarajevo could be considered

[137] "BiH Census: Proposed Way Forward" (United Nations Development Progreamme (UNDP) and European Commission (EC), July 2005). As cited in Perry, "The 2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Basic Review," 5.
[138] "Rezultati Popisa: U BiH Živi 3.531.159 Stanovnika," *Al Jazeera Balkans*, June 29, 2016, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/bih-danas-rezultati-popisa-iz-2013-godine.
[139] Cooley, "To Be a Bosniak or to Be a Citizen?," 13.

"the most Yugoslav" city, or mini-Yugoslavia, both demographically and culturally.[140] It was heavily destroyed during the siege of the city in 1992-95, when Serb forces isolated the city and snipers were killing people on daily basis. With the Dayton Agreement, the city was split and a relatively small part, nowadays called Eastern Sarajevo, was cut out of the city. It is predominantly Serbian and *de jure* the capital of Republika Srpska, while *de facto* the capital is Banja Luka.

TABLE 5*: Population of Sarajevo by ethnicity/national affiliation according to the 2013 census*[141]

Bosniaks	222,417	80.7 %
Croats	13,604	4.9 %
Serbs	10,422	3.8 %
Others out of which:	29,041	10.5 %
Bosanci	10,961	4.0 %
undeclared	6,160	2.2 %
Bosnians and Herzegovinians	5,231	1.9 %
Total	**275,484**	**100.00 %**

TABLE 5 shows, how Sarajevo is predominantly Bosniak, but there are more Others, than the other constitutive nations Croats and Serbs. In the 1991 census, Muslims constituted 49.2 per cent of the city's population, and there were significantly more Croats (5.5 per cent) and Serbs (29.8 per cent), than in contemporary times.[142] Yugoslavs and Others constituted 14.3 per cent of the city's population, which shows, how non-national identification was popular even before the 1992-95 war.[143] Sarajevo had the largest proportion of Yugoslavs of all republic capitals in Yugoslavia.[144]

[140] Zlatko Jovanović, "'All Yugoslavia Is Dancing Rock "n" Roll'": Yugoslavness and the Sense of Community in the 1980s Yu-Rock." (PhD Thesis, Københavns universitet, Det Humanistiske Fakultetet, 2014).
[141] I have combined the results of the four urban municipalities of Sarajevo – thus not containing Eastern Sarajevo – based on "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti - Detaljna Klasifikacija"; "Statistika.Ba."
[142] *Nacionalni Sastav Stanovništva*, Statistički Bilten 234 (Sarajevo: Državni zabod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, 1993). Cited in Markowitz, *Sarajevo*, 83.
[143] Ibid.
[144] John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, 2. ed., transf. to dig. print. 2003 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), 337.

TABLE *6: Population of Velika Kladuša by ethnicity/national affiliation according to the 2013 census* [145]

Bosniaks	32,651	80.6 %
Croats	636	1.6 %
Serbs	145	0.4 %
Others out of which:	7,076	17.5%
Bosanci	4,781	11.8%
Muslims	1,366	3.4 %
Undeclared	598	1.5 %
Total	**40,508**	**100.0 %**

TABLE 4 shows us, how Others form more than a sixth of the town's population. Most people belonging to the Others have declared themselves as *Bosanci*, although here we can see also Muslims among the 3 most popular opt-out categories. It is also interesting, that in the 1991 census, only 3 per cent declared themselves as Others.[146] Thus, we can see the emergence of Others as a new phenomenon in Velika Kladuša, which is contrary to countrywide developments.

Velika Kladuša has a special history within contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the fact, that an intra-Muslim conflict took place there as part of the 1992-95 war. In 1993, Fikret "Babo" Abdić, a member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and former leader of economic powerhouse Agrokomerc company set up his locally celebrated para-state Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, which was sided by both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats.[147] The Abdić-led Autonomous Province came down in 1995 and Abdić was eventually sentenced to twenty years – out of which he served ten – in prison in Croatia.[148] After this he returned to Velika Kladuša to become the mayor of the town in the local elections.[149] He is still holding the position, and has founded two

[145] "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti - Detaljna Klasifikacija"; "Statistika.Ba."
[146] "Statistika.Ba."
[147] Christia Fontini, "Following the Money: Muslim versus Muslim in Bosnia's Civil War," *Comparative Politics* 40, no. 4 (July 2008): 467–68.
[148] Alfredo Sasso, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Return of Fikret Abdić," *OBC Transeuropa*, November 8, 2016, https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Bosnia-Herzegovina/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-the-return-of-Fikret-Abdic-174832.
[149] Sasso.

parties: first DNZ, and after this the Labor Party (*Laburistička stranka*) which are representing his political views even on the national level.

The question can be asked: what led people in Velika Kladuša to support Abdić's statelet? Jović refers to the conflict as a fragmentation of Bosnian Muslims, which took place as a part of the break-up of Yugoslavia, but which, on the other hand had also existed among Bosnian Muslims[150]. Velika Kladuša is situated in the very north-western corner of the country in the predominantly Muslim Cazinska Krajina region, more than a 6-hour ride from Sarajevo through very sparsely populated territories. Thus, it can be presumed, that the region has a somewhat distinct identity from the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslim regions. Yet, Fontini suggests, that the reason behind the conflict were rather economic incentives promised by Abdić, which "coupled with an affinity for the patron providing them, overcame ethnic affinity", claiming furthermore, that the Muslims of Velika Kladuša had similar traditions as Bosnian Muslims in general, meaning that there were no differences in the identity.[151]

[150] Jović, "Identitet Bošnjaka/Muslimana," 136.
[151] Fontini, "Following the Money: Muslim versus Muslim in Bosnia's Civil War," 469–72.

4 INTERVIEW DATA AND METHODOLOGY

As I have mentioned, the aim of my research is to deal with the motivations and perceived consequences of people who declared themselves into opt-out categories. For understanding the issue, and reaching answers for my research question, I apply the methodology of qualitative ethnographical research. One reason for this is, that the answers to my research questions can be reached best through semi-structured interviews, which encourage the informants in sharing narratives on the issues discussed. Secondly,qualitative methodology has the value of supplementing the qualitative data, upon which I have presented an overview in the chapters above. In the following two sections I will go through the methodology of data collection (4.1) and for analyzing the data (4.2).

4.1 Data collection

I collected the material for my thesis in March-April 2019 by conducting 16 interviews in Sarajevo and Velika Kladuša. Two of them were expert interviews, while all the other interviews were conducted with "ordinary people".[152] The expert interviews were carried out with politician Vibor Handžić from Our Party who is officially declared as an Other MP in The House of Peoples of FBiH and Parliament of Sarajevo[153], and with NGO coordinator Goran Bubalo. Moreover, I was in touch by e-mail to journalist Amir Purić, who is from Velika Kladuša. In Sarajevo, I found some of my informants through my contacts and some of them through a post in Facebook group *Odliv Mozgova* (Brain drain), where I told, that I was looking for people declaring themselves to "Others" to have a discussion over a cup of coffee. The group states its mission to be "[h]elping Balkan youth in

[152] While acknowledging the problems with the notion "ordinary people, in this thesis, I use it to contrast with the experts, with whom I had a different approach in interviews. One of them was a borderline case, as the person was also a lawyer and talked to me also about the legal situation of the Others.

[153] "Skupština Kantona Sarajevo - Vibor Handžić," 2019, http://skupstina.ks.gov.ba/vibor-handzic; "Parlament Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine - Dom Naroda - Klubovi," 2019, https://parlamentfbih.gov.ba/v2/bs/stranica.php?idstranica=2.

intellectual & educational migrations"[154]. In other words, the members of this Facebook group are internationally orientated, educated young people by default, which frames my research to a certain demographic cohort, however, there are reasons to presume, that this cohort is somewhat representative of people choosing opt-out categories, as Others are concentrated in urban surroundings.[155]

In Velika Kladuša, I found one of my informants through a contact, while others I found by asking around. In this sample, some of the informants told me they had not declared belonging to any of the opt-out categories, but due to time restrictions, I was not able to conduct more extensive fieldwork. These interviews gave me an insight on more mainstream perceptions on the phenomenon I am dealing with. After returning from my fieldwork, I carried out one more interview over Skype with a person from Velika Kladuša, who is not living there at the moment.

Twelve of my informants had declared themselves to opt-out categories. Most of my "ordinary people" interviewees were under 35 years old, but in Velika Kladuša I talked with some elder persons too. All except one of my informants declaring opt out categories were either currently university students or persons who had attended university earlier. This can be considered a sampling bias, but it is also possible, that it reflects the education level of people declaring opt-out categories in general. The gender distribution of my informants declaring opt out categories is assumed to be 7 males and 5 females. All the other informants, both the experts and people who had not declared themselves into opt-out categories, were all males. Out of my 10 informants in Sarajevo, 5 had moved to the city from another dwelling, which also can be assumed to affect my results.

The interviews were semi-structured, and there was a great variation in which topics were more extensively covered. While I initially tried to reveal as little as possible about my research focus, the fact, that I was looking for people who had declared themselves as Others, led the discussion very

[154] "Odliv Mozgova - About," Facebook, n.d., https://www.facebook.com/groups/odlivmozgova/about/.
[155] "Statistika.Ba."

quickly to Others. Sometimes I was puzzled on, what I can ask from the informants, and some of them did not want to respond to all the questions due to the sensitiveness of the topic. For example, I did not ask all informants about how their family has declared themselves, All interviews were conducted in Bosnian. The length of the interviews varied from 20 minutes to 2.5 hours and almost all interviews took place in cafés – a very common place for Bosnians to spend time – one took place in a NGO space, one at the office of the informant and two of them took place on a public square. I recorded all except for one interview, where the person did not want to be recorded. When presenting interview excerpts in the following chapter, I will use pseudonyms, that is fictional names, to protect the anonymity of the respondents. The pseudonyms are created by not changing the "national character" of the name, thus Muslim names are replaced by Muslim names, and neutral names are replaced by neutral ones. Besides the pseudonym, I will provide also the assumed gender (M=male, F=female), the profession of the informants and the place, where the interview was conducted.

4.2 Methodology for analysis

In interpreting the interview data, I will apply inductive content analysis, following Marshall and Rossman's model[156]. They divide the analyzing process into five steps:

1) Organizing the data
2) Generating categories, themes, and patterns
3) Testing the emergent hypotheses
4) Searching for alternative explanations from the data
5) Writing the report

First I came up with categories based on topic relevant for the research questions from the material and then I organized the material to these categories. This process can also be called coding, with

[156] Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research*, 6. print (Newbury Park, Calif: Sage, 1990), 114.

inductive reasoning.[157] After this, I tried to recognize patterns and common narratives on each topic. After this, I compared the recognized patterns and narratives within each category in order to find a common line in the narratives. Following this, I reorganized the material once again following this, and searched for counterarguments in the material, following the idea of Marshall and Rossman's step 4.

For as high validity of the results as possible, I also compare it to earlier research, and try to apply a critical approach on my data. While due to time limitations, it is not possible for me to apply triangulation of analyzing various data or using various methods, I believe, that earlier research and usage of survey and census data will help in reaching higher validity for the research. Of course, due to the small sample, my research is not exhaustive, but it provides a glimpse on the narratives of my informants motivations and experiences related to the belonging in the category Others.

[157] Yan Zhang and Barbara M. Wildermuth, "Qualitative Analysis of Content," *Analysis* 1, no. 2 (2005): 2.

5 ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW MATERIAL

In chapter 3, I have already given an overview of the topic of Others in the light of literature and statistics. So far, I have shown, that the Others is not a new phenomenon in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather a continuation of fluid ethnicity categorizations, however the constitution is also contributing to the birth of this category. In this chapter, I will move on to analyzing the interview material I collected, following the methodology presented in chapter 4. I will compare the interview material both to the theory presented and earlier research on the topic. I have divided the chapter into sections topically, each divided further into sub-sections. The first section of this chapter (5.1) deals with the declarations of my informants and the site of declaration, while the two following ones are organized following my research questions. The second section (5.2) thus deals with the reasons for choosing opt-out categories and the third section (5.3) with the consequences for such declarations. The fourth section (5.4) deals with the specificities of Velika Kladuša, and the fifth section (5.5) concludes the analysis shortly before moving over to the main concluding chapter 6. In this chapter, I will provide interview excerpts to demonstrate my findings, when relevant. I want to emphasize once more, that the names used here are only pseudonyms, unless I am referring to an expert interview.

5.1 Declaring ethnicity

Before going to analyze the reasons for and consequences of declaring oneself to ethnic categories, I will first deal with the declarations themselves. I start with dealing with the sites of declarations, then with the ways my informants have declared themselves, and in the end with their relation to external categorizations in form of what I call assumptions and impositions.

5.1.1 Declarations

My thesis has so far dealt with the census into a large extent. The earlier literature emphasizes the importance of ethnic categorization in censuses in reifying self-identificaiton. As I will show, based on my interviews, it appears, that the census seems to have importance in shaping (non-)ethnic self-categorizations in the minds of people. Yet, while being an important one, the census is not the only site of declaration. Many of my interviewees had had to declare themselves for various administrational situations, for example when enrolling a university, or applying for a job or a scholarship. According to my informants, ethnicity is not often declared explicitly in everyday situations. In such situations, but also in more official settings, ethnicity is often assumed based on proxies or other cues, such as names or party membership. I will discuss imposing and assuming identities more in depth after dealing with the ways my informants declared themselves.

All my informants seemed to remember clearly the census and the process, that lead them to choose their category belonging to Others on the question on national/ethnic affiliation, but when it came to the other questions considered important, religion and nationality, they seemed to be less important to them, and my informants did not bring up their responses for these questions spontaneously, although they remembered, what they had declared.

Let us now deal with various ways my informants have declared themselves without yet going to the reasons of declaring these categories. I have provided this information in TABLE 7: The self-declarations of ethnicity among informants opting out from national categories which shows the various self-declarations of my informants.

TABLE 7: The self-declarations of ethnicity among informants opting out from national categories

Bosnian and Herzegovinian (Bosanac i Hercegovac / Bosanka i Hercegovka)	7
Bosnian (Bosanac/Bosanka)	3
Others (Ostali)	1
Citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Građan/Građanka Bosne I Hercegovine)	1
Total	**12**

As TABLE 7: The self-declarations of ethnicity among informants opting out from national categories shows, all except one of my informants declared themselves in relation with the Bosnian state, which I will call from here forward as civic categories[158]. In the census, the category *Bosanac* was the most popular one of the opt-out categories, but the category Bosnian and Herzegovinian was significantly a less popular one. Yet, the table should be taken by a grain of salt. During some interviews, informants seemed to say different – although very similar – declarations for themselves. When referring to the census, this is understandable, as the census had taken place already more than five years before I carried out my fieldwork. Some informants also mentioned different kind of identifications and feelings of belonging in a later phrase. One informant also told he now declares himself as a Bosnian and Herzgovinian, in contrast with the census, when he was a minor, and his parents declared him as a Bosniak instead of him. Thus, belonging to Others was more important, than the specific declaration chosen for some of the informants, and they used "Others" as a discursive category, however stating, that they do not like this name for the category.

I usually did not start speaking about the census, but rather talked about declarations, which led the informants usually themselves starting to talk about the census. This suggests, that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the census is a primary arena for declarations of ethnicity. The 2013 census appears to have been important in creating identity categories and cementing them, as I will show in sub-section 5.3.2. The perceived disappearance[159] of the Yugoslav category created a vacuum taken over by multiple alternative declarations, as there is no single strong non-national category. This also seems to have contributed to the informants pondering them more, and making the census more of a

[158] In this thesis, I will not take part in the debate on civic and ethnic nationalism (see Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004), 132–46.), but I will use the notion "civic" to note belonging on the state-level belonging as opposed to the "ethnic" belonging to the constituent peoples. Yet, it has to be noted, that the boundaries between civic and ethnic belongings are ambiguous even in the Bosnian case, as I will show in sub-section 5.2.1, when discussing Bosniak integralist nationalism.

[159] I refer to it as "perceived", because one can still declare him/herself into the Yugoslav category, but this is discouraged, and was not common in the 2013 census.

situation, where politicized statements were given. I will discuss this in the following section more in detail.

It has to be also noted, that the 2013 census was for all of my informants in Sarajevo the first census, they had participated in as adults, as it was the first census in 22 years taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also the enormous media reactions and census campaigning are likely to have contributed to the perceived importance of the census. One informant characterized it as a "once in a lifetime situation".

My informants considered applications for public sector jobs as situations, where they knew, that they would need to declare themselves and considered it difficult to get such jobs, when not being a member of the constituent peoples. Membership in one of the national parties was considered as a proxy for ethnicity, when applying for jobs in the public sector. As Larisa Kurtović points out in her article, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a tendency of party patronage and distribution of public sector jobs reifying the ethnic divisions, especially on the local level.[160] In Bosnia and Herzegovina, party membership is considered very important in being employed in the public sector.[161] My informants emphasized, that this is the case with the membership in the governing nationalistic parties.

One informant also mentioned, how he once had to pretend to be a Bosniak in order to receive a scholarship he was applying for. Visser and Bakker share an interesting account on applying for jobs based on ethnic belonging, where one of their informants tell, that since his parents are of different nationalities, he can apply as a member of those both national categories.[162] I asked my informants, whether it is possible to declare another national category, than the one they consider belonging to in

[160] Larisa Kurtović, "What Is a Nationalist? Some Thoughts on the Question from Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 29, no. 2 (2011): 245.
[161] Dženana Karabegović, "Stranačka Knjižica Vrednija Od Diplome," *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, n.d., https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bosna-i-hercegovina-politicari-zvanicnici-bosnjak-srbin-hrvat/29101656.html.
[162] Visser and Bakker, "Multicultural Vanguard?," 474.

a job interview, and all of them believed, that it is possible. Still, many of them claimed, that they would not want to declare themselves into one of the constituent peoples only to receive a job. Two informants, however, told me, they might do it in the future. This discussion on fluidity of categories takes us to the following topic, assumptions and impositions.

5.1.2 Assumptions and impositions

As I mentioned already in my literature review, Brubaker et al. have written about assuming ethnic categories in the multi-ethnic town of Cluj[163]. When it comes to opt-out self-identifications, we arrive to an interesting question: Can such self-identifications be recognized from outside? Above, I have already shown some examples of religion and party membership working as a proxy for assuming ethnicity. However, the religion or possible party membership of an individual are not usually found out, when meeting a stranger, unless they are performed in some way. Visser and Bakker claim, that in Sarajevo it is not possible to determine another person's national belonging quickly based on appearance and speech, but instead names are used as cues for ethnic belonging.[164] They also mention, how in mixed marriages children were often given neutral names. The names are also tied with religion, many of Bosniaks' names are of Turkish or Arabic origin, while Serbs and Croats are often using either names with religious connotations or names with Slavic origin.

One informant mentioned, how it is common for people living in Bosnia have an instinct on trying to come up with the ethnicity of the other person based on not only names, but also way of speech and manners. She also considered such assuming as a very negative phenomenon. The categorization and imposing of categories is part of everyday life, as the account of another informant shows:

[163] Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, 217–23.
[164] Visser and Bakker, "Multicultural Vanguard?," 475.

> Constantly I feel bullying from constitutive nations. My whole life Bosniaks try to tell me I'm a Bosniak and ask why I don't fast, why I don't do some other things… Everybody tries to put you somewhere. […] I think it is difficult to live in a climate, where everybody thinks similarly. The majority thinks there's three constitutive peoples and that's how [they] feel. But what if I don't feel that way?
>
> Ivana (F), language teacher, Sarajevo

The excerpt shows, how a certain behavior is expected from people, that are considered Bosniaks, in this example being the tradition of fasting during Ramadan. The imposing of categories is also very much related to policing, as mentioned in my literature review. Membership in categories is policed based on some cues and opting out from ethnic categories is often frowned upon. Many informants said, that they do not discuss ethnic categorizations with friends, and believed, that most of their surroundings look at them as Bosniaks. These are examples of assumptions and impositions in everyday settings.

Yet, imposing happens also in more formal contexts. As mentioned above, often declarations take place in administrative settings. Sometimes it is not possible to declare an opt-out identification or to refuse declaration in situations dealing with administration of some sort. The following account is a good example on this:

> When I enrolled to university, I was also counted as a Bosniak. I told them, that I am not a Bosniak. They asked me 'what are you then'. I said 'I'm a Bosnian and Herzegovinian' and the guy working there said that 'I don't have that option, I have Bosniak, Serbian, Croatian or Other'. But there was a problem putting me to Others, because at uni you can't be Others; then you are a foreign student. And then we went through the whole process and they had to put me in the end into Bosniaks, because that was the only way for me to be a student from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
>
> Aida (F), student, Sarajevo

Aida's story can be set to Fox and Miller-Idriss' theory on institutionalizing ethnic categories, which was discussed in the literature review Here, the ethnic categories – following the words of Fox and Miller-Idriss – become "materially salient"[165] in an everyday setting. Besides this, I heard several

[165] Fox and Miller-Idriss, "Everyday Nationhood," 543.

accounts also on census-takers imposing ethnic categories . In the following excerpt the informant talks about the census interview. We can see the enumerator first assuming Bosniak national belonging based on the name of the informant, and after this imposes categories:

> It was very uncomfortable and biased, because the people who asked us were a bit older than me and they are writing my first and last name and ask, what are you? I say I'm a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The guy says, you can't say that, you are a Bosniak. I tell him to write what I say, you've come to our house to have communication. [The census-taker says] your name belongs to the cluster Bosniak.
>
> Mirza (F), NGO employee, Sarajevo

This was far from being the only account of this kind on the census taking process and these narratives suggest, that the census-takers were actively and intentionally trying to impose categories. For example, Haris described, how her mother was told, that she will be fined if she declares herself as ethnically undefined, and she ended up declaring herself as a Bosniak.

The civic campaign Be a Citizen, launched the civic monitoring project *PopisMonitor* (Census Monitor). As part of the project, an online platform with the same name was created, where citizens could report about census irregularities. 850 reports on irregularities were recorded, more than two fifths of them consisting of attempts to influence declaration of ethnicity.[166] According to a survey carried out by *Zašto ne* before the publication of the census results, only 15 per cent of the respondents believed the census results would "reflect the real situation".[167] According to several accounts by my informants, many people fear losing their job, if they declare themselves differently. Cooley has had similar accounts in her article.[168] Although the results are secret, there have been issues with data protection. It is hard to say, how realistic these fears were, but the presence of them show, what kind of pressure many citizens are feeling to declare themselves belonging into one of the constituent

[166] "Report on the Civic Monitoring of the Census in BiH 2013 – Popismonitor.Ba" (Sarajevo: UG "Zašto ne," March 2014), 22, https://zastone.ba/app/uploads/2014/03/Report-on-the-Civic-Monitoring-of-the-Census-in-BiH-2013-%E2%80%93-Popismonitor.ba_.pdf.
[167] "Report on the Civic Monitoring of the Census in BiH 2013 – Popismonitor.Ba," 37.
[168] Cooley, "To Be a Bosniak or to Be a Citizen?," 16.

peoples. This is also suggested by the survey results that I presented in section 3.2.3, which show a greater proportion of Others, than the census.

Many of my informants considered imposing of categories as a bothering phenomenon of overtly ethnic categorization and some informants stated, that they are feeling, that constituent peoples do not take into account Others and do not believe declaring oneself as a *Bosanac*, for example, is a legit response. Similar experiences can be found in the scholarly literature. In her article about the 2002 census carried out in FBiH, Markowitz has an example on a case, where a census enumerator asked a person declaring herself as *Bosanka*, what "she *really* is", since this was not considered an adequate response.[169] Thus, we can see, that such assumption and impositions are taking place in both everyday and official settings. In sub-section 5.3.1, I will provide an example on, how official, ethnically imposing discourse affects also everyday settings. Now, let us move on to the declarations on religion and mother tongue.

5.1.3 Religion and language

As we have seen in chapter 3, religion and ethnicity are highly connected with each other in Bosnia and Herzegovina and according to the census, a large share of Others have declared themselves as atheists and agnostics. Therefore, it is not surprising, that most of my informants declared themselves as atheists, agnostics, or chose not to declare religion in the census. On this question, I cannot provide any exact numbers, as the question on religion did not come up with all informants. Many, on the other hand, mentioned having family background in one of the religious groups, and one informant even declared himself as a Muslim, adding that he, however, indeed consumes beer. In section 5.2.1, I will show, how religious connotations of the Bosniak ethnic category discourage some people from declaring themselves as Bosniaks.

[169] Markowitz, "Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo," 59.

The issue on language was not discussed very deeply in my interviews, and I will not deal with it very profoundly in this thesis. Let it be said, that most informants considered their language to be Bosnian, and they had declared it as Bosnian or, in some cases, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian (*bosansko-hrvatsko-srpski*). This is again in line with the cross-tabulated census results for Others, presented in TABLE 4: Responses of mother tongue among Others in the 2013 census. All of the informants, that I discussed the local language's relation to other codified variants of Central South Slavic, they acknowledged, that they all constitute the same language with different kinds of names. Many considered the current politicized discourse on separate languages humorous. Ivana, a language teacher from Sarajvo, however, told that in her opinion, Bosniaks should not use the name Bosnian (*bosanski*) for the language, but they should use the name Bosniak (*bošnjački*), stating, that "you should not pretend to be a *Bosanac* if you're a Bosniak". Serb and Croat linguists are often referring to the language as Bosniak.[170]

However, language can be also seen as a proxy for ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, albeit not as an important one as religion. An example on this can be seen, as scholar Vanessa Pupavac has argued, in the way, that language and human rights discourse is used as an argument for separated school system for ethnic groups and is in fact applied to reify the ethnic divisions.[171]

5.2 Reasons

In this section, I will move on to deal with the first research question: "What are the reasons and motivations of opting out of the dominant ethnic categories?". As mentioned in the literature review, the motivations for choosing a specific identity category is understudied. Based on the responses, I have divided the analysis of the answers into two sub-sections. The first one (5.2.1), deals with civic

[170] Robert D. Greenberg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and Its Disintegration*, 1st publ. in paperback (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), 142.
[171] Vanessa Pupavac, "Discriminating Language Rights and Politics in the Post-Yugoslav States," *Patterns of Prejudice* 40, no. 2 (May 2006): 112–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220600634261.

identification, while the second sub-section (5.2.2**Virhe. Viitteen lähdettä ei löytynyt.**) deals with anti-nationalism. The two terms are largely intertwined, but I want to treat them separately, as based on my material, anti-nationalism is more of a reaction to the current ethnocentric politics and ethnic divisions in Bosnia, than the manifestations of civic identity are.

5.2.1 Civic identification

As we could see from TABLE 7: The self-declarations of ethnicity among informants opting out from national categories, eleven out of twelve self-declarations of my informants were related to the Bosnian state. In his article dealing with Bosniak and civic census campaigns, Cooley shows, how many people choosing to declare themselves as Bosnian was an instrument for expressing the need to create a less ethnocentric constitution.[172] Cooley also notes, that civic orientation coincides with Bosniak integralist nationalism, since in a unitary Bosnian state the Bosniaks would be in the most privileged position.[173] Good examples on this is an informants in Velika Kladuša, who declared himselves as a Bosniak and considered, that every resident in Bosnia should be treated as a Bosniak, regardless of their religion.

Among my informants, some had purely civic orientation, while some were more opposing towards nation-states in general, which can be seen in the following sub-section on anti-nationalism. In the following excerpt, the informant declares Bosnian civic identity, while also talking about an identification with Yugoslavia, which in his narrative has changed into an identification with Bosnia and Herzegovina:

> **N:** [In the census I declared myself] as a Bosnian and Herzegovinian, as an Other.
>
> **JK**: Did you know it already before the census, or was there a dilemma in deciding it?

[172] Cooley, "To Be a Bosniak or to Be a Citizen?," 14.
[173] Cooley, 14–15.

> **N:** No, no dilemma whatsoever, because I love this country. Actually, if you look at it logically, I stayed as a Yugoslav. I was born in Yugoslavia. As nothing is left of it, I'm really happy to say I'm Bosnian and Herzegovinian.
>
> Nebojša (M), economist, Sarajevo

Similarly, sport project coordinator Nina sees the Bosnian and Herzegovinian category as a natural choice for her, when asked if she would declare herself again in the same way as she did in the 2013 census:

> I would declare myself in the same way, as a Bosnian and Herzegovinian. Because I feel that way, I live in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I have a passport, which says Bosnia and Herzegovina. My ID says the same. I'm a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. How should I feel if not a Bosnian and Herzegovinian?
>
> Nina (F), sport project coordinator, Sarajevo

Many informants also considered, that everybody should become *Bosanci* or Bosnians and Herzegovinians, since this would be a solution to the problem of ethnic divisions in the country. On the other hand, civic identification and ethnic identification do not have to be exclude each other, as many informants point out. A few informants consider, that the civic belonging should be primary, and ethnic identification secondary, thus not overlapping each other. As the census and most other sites of declaration provide only one possible category to be chosen, many people have to decide, which one to prioritize: the civic or the ethnic belonging.

As the aim of this research is to – by qualitative methods – to find out answers on the reasons for and consequences of choosing opt-out categories, and not to measure the strength of civic identification, but I cannot provide any data on the strength of the feeling. Still, among the interviews no-one explicitly pronounced any anti-civic opinions. Rather many saw the problems of the country being rather due to the ethnocentric political system. According to Dević, however, loyalty towards the state is the lowest in Bosnia and Herzegovina of all the post-Yugoslav states.[174]

[174] Dević, "Jaws of the Nation and Weak Embraces of the State: The Lines of Division, Indifference and Loyalty in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 53.

Yet, declarations to civic categories do not necessarily mean a primarily civic identification. Some of my informants told me, they rather consider ethnicity as a private matter, and mention a Bosnian identity category if asked. A *Bosanac* or Bosnian and Herzegovinian identity category can be seen as the easiest way of declare oneself anationally, and the historical model of Yugoslav identity category might have contributed also to the relative popularity of the civic categories. Also in Bosnia, we see a special case, as there is no officially recognized category for affiliation to the country as a whole, which might increase its popularity as a category for those, who resist ethnic declarations. Let us now move to motivations for declaring opt out categories, that are arising from anti-nationalism.

5.2.2 Anti-nationalism

As mentioned in the literature review, Stef Jansen researches anti-nationalism predominantly as a discursive practice contributing also to constructing personal identities of his informants. Keeping this in mind, in this sub-section, I will deal with those motivations for declarations, that are criticism on the ethnocentric tendencies in the country or are protesting on nationalistic or ethno-confessional associations.

Many informants expressed explicitly, that they want to resist the current political system and nationalism with their self-declarations. Many stated, that they do not want to take part in the ethnic divisions, that are commonplace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the following excerpt on an interview with Haris shows, declaring oneself as an Other can be seen as a way of protest.

> I think, that it is mostly important for people for their personal feeling. It is not that important for the society or for the country. It's more like some revolt, inability. We don't know, what will we do, but we can declare ourselves as Jedis. It won't change much, though.
>
> Haris (M), IT expert, Sarajevo

Haris also states, that it would be important, if a critical mass of Others would be gathered, that could change things. As Cooley points out, this was an aim of some activists in the civic campaign preceding

the 2013 census.[175] Politician Vibor Handžić, was however more skeptical about, whether a critical mass in the census could have changed something.

Resisting nationalism is not only manifested in resisting general divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the literature suggests, also the Bosniak project has not been accepted by all the people it is aimed on.[176] A significant number of my informants, who have Muslim background, have a certain resistance or aversion towards the notion Bosniak. The following two interview samples show, how Bosniakness is perceived to be tied to being a Muslim, which causes the informants to take distance to the ethnonym.

> Dad and I declared ourselves as Bosnians and Herzegovinians, while Mom and brother declared themselves as Bosniaks. We decided that with dad, because we don't feel… what bothers us is, that national declarations are associated with religion. We're not religious, neither have we ever been, and most likely won't ever be, I presume. We didn't want it to be associated, if we say we're Bosniaks, then we are immediately associated with Islam. Not that we have anything against it, but it's symbolic for us.
>
> Aida (F), student, Sarajevo

> I would traditionally be supposed to be a Bosniak, since I come from such a family. But I have resistance towards the construct, where faith has to be connected to citizenship […] I declared myself as Bosnian and Herzegovinian, that is Citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Others is the only natural for me, because I'm not a Croat, I'm not a Serb, Bosniak – there's a repulsive note to it. Because it's very much tainted by religion, Allah, Muslims... […] I *am* religious, but it's my private thing.
>
> Mirza, NGO employee, Sarajevo

In the two quotes I presented above, the informants consider the association of Bosniakness to Islam a problem, even though Mirza states to be a believer. It would be interesting to know, would people with predominantly Serb and Croat heritage make a similar claim on their respective nationality categories. Mirza's statement, that she is "supposed" to be a Bosniak due to her religious background, once again shows, how religion and ethnicity are intertwined in Bosnia. This also shows, how taking

[175] Cooley, "To Be a Bosniak or to Be a Citizen?," 14.
[176] See Hromadžić, *Citizens of an Empty Nation*, 118; Markowitz, "Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo," 57–63.

a certain distance to religiousness is related to declaring opt-out categories. Atheist family background seems also to correlate with declaring opt out categories, as well as family background with Yugoslav declarations in earlier censuses. This, again, sets the phenomenon of opting out of dominant ethnic categories to a historical continuum.

5.3 Consequences

In this section, I will deal with the consequences of declaring opt-out categories. This section is thus finding answers for the second research question "how do people opting out of the dominant ethnic categories see the consequences of their choice?". Here, the word "consequence" has to be understood broadly, since I deal also with the way people declaring opt-out categories consider the phenomenon Others. I will start by dealing with the experiences of being marginalized and discriminated upon, an issue, that has already been partly dealt with in the sub-section on assumptions and impositions.

5.3.1 Discrimination and marginalization

As the Sejdić-Finci and Zornić cases showed us, the Constitution discriminates Others. Above I have presented some accounts on discrimination of Others during the 2013 census. Besides these cases, there are also reports on discrimination in more everyday contexts, some of which we could already see in sub-section 5.1.2 dealing with assumptions and impositions. Other important consequence, that I already briefly discussed, is the exclusion of Others public sector jobs.

In my interview with politician Vibor Handžić, he considered the discrimination towards Others to have mostly psychological effects on the population, because in his opinion, they can have long-lasting consequences. Also, many of my informants talked about not being recognized by the constitution. Boris, who had grown up outside Sarajevo and moved there only later, told that his father encouraged him to declare himself as a Bosniak, because in this way, he would be protected by the

constitution. Another informant, on the other hand, states, that he is a minority in his country, and contrasts the – in his words – difficult situation of minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Germany, where he had grown up. He also states, that "you have a feeling that nobody recognizes you in your own country". The Sejdić-Finci case was generally known among my informants, and they considered it a significant injustice.

Besides the psychological effects, there are the more concrete ones, such as applying for public sector jobs, as I already have mentioned above. In the following interview excerpt, however, the organization committing the discriminatory act is actually an international one.

> Only once have I had a problem. One international organization was looking for young women, who are activists and they were supposed to send us abroad. To educate us and for us to be a small political school for women from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then I go to the interview and in the end of the interview, they ask me, what are you. I say, that I'm an Other and then I don't get that fellowship. After this they tell me, that all the women they chose were from the cluster Bosniak-Croat-Serb. I would have never thought!
>
> Mirza (F), NGO employee, Sarajevo

Nebojša, on the other hand believes, that he does not have possibilities of striving a political career as an Other. Even though there are several examples of politicians belonging to Others, again the psychological effect of the marginalization might be cause for this. Even the term "Others" is despised by many informants, who see marginalization and exclusion already in this term. Nebojša considers, that he is a Bosnian and Herzegovinian, but gets called an Other by people, who according to him, want to score political points by this.

However, discrimination is rarely verbal and explicit, but rather indirect. My informants told, that in their social circles, nationality issues are usually not discussed. During the 2013 census, on the other hand, declarations of nationality became an important topic of discussion. Several of my informants had received negative feedback on their declaration choices from their surroundings. Three of them told, they had been called traitors for choosing to declare themselves as Others. In all these cases,

they were expected to declare themselves as Bosniaks. The following excerpt describes one such situation:

> Before the census I had a talk with a friend, and she blamed me, that I'm a traitor, that I'm not normal and by declaring myself as a *Bosanac*, I risk the future of Bosniaks and because of people like me, Bosniaks will be erased from the country and so. Because the idea is, that if there's not a lot of us – if it's seen in the census, that there's not so many of us, then Serbians and Croats can do with us, what they want.
>
> Sead (M), graphic designer, Sarajevo

This phenomenon of calling people declaring themselves into opt-out categories traitors is an example of narratives identified by Armakolas and Maksimović, where Bosniak ethnic entrepreneurs are using narratives wartime past as trying to create the feeling of being obligated to declare themselves as Bosniaks.[177] In this case, however, such narratives are applied by "everyday people" in contrast with activists and can be even seen as policing of ethnic belonging, as I suggested in sub-section 5.1.2. It is also an example of ethnically imposing discourse affecting everyday situations.

My informants also considered, that there is no real political representation for them. On the other hand, especially in Sarajevo canton, the non-national parties are relatively strong. According to the program of Our Party, the constitution should be changed. Besides this, the party aims for the abolishment of the tripartite presidency, and rather having one president with rotation of constitutional nations and Others.[178] Most of the people I talked with considered, that instead of having a fourth member of the presidency representing Others, there should rather be one president representing the whole country.In the interview with politician Vibor Handžić, he emphasized the importance of fixing the discriminatory situation of Others. He thinks, that also Others should have the political instrument of vital national interest, but it would be hard to be formed, as the Others are constituted from so many different groups.

[177] Armakolas and Maksimovic, "Memory and the Uses of Wartime Past in Contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina."
[178] "Bolji Ustav," Naša stranka, 2018, http://nasastranka.ba/bs/bolji-ustav/.

This sub-section has shown, how Others are discriminated in many ways, also in everyday settings. The feelings of marginalization seem to be strong among the informants, which is interesting in a system, where ethnicity is based on self-declaration. Thus, the informants would be able to change their declaration on ethnicity, but out of the reasons presented in section 5.2, they do not wish to do so. Let us move on to the following sub-section, which will deal with the informants perceptions on, who the Others are.

5.3.2 Being an Other

This sub-section consists of my informants' views on how they see they perceive the values associated with Others. Many informants described people declaring themselves to Others as being the ones, who "think with their own head"[179], following a Bosnian proverb. Besides this, they consider Others as those, who are not "tricked" by nationalism. Ivana, for example, even considers this in a way a precondition for being a *Bosanac:*

> Dad considers himself a *Bosanac*, but he's actually a Bosniak. He's not aware of it, he has a lot of emotional tension. I think, that he would say he's nationally a *Bosanac*, and ethnically a Bosniak. He thinks, that's how it is, but it really isn't. […] He feels himself as a Bosniak and all the time talks about those Serbs there, those Croats there… You cannot be a *Bosanac* and talk like that. I mean, that's impossible.
>
> Ivana (F), language teacher, Sarajevo

This, again, is in a way imposing ethnic categories, this time, however, coming from a person declaring herself to an opt-out category. In any case, the civic and anti-national values are associated with Others. While my informants also generally acknowledge, that the composition of Others is very heterogenic, and they do not necessarily want to be associated with all groups aggregated to Others,

[179] In Bosnian the proverb is "*misliti svojom glavom*".

people belonging to Others seem to have some level of cohesion at least in such urban settings, as Sarajevo. For example, Haris claims, that most of his friends are Others.

The low number of Others in the 2013 census is seen as a disappointing fact. As mentioned in sub-section 5.2.2, many thought – or hoped – that a critical mass would have been reached in the census, which would have changed something, if not even leading to a constitutional reform. Almost all of my informants said, that they would declare themselves in the same way now, as they did in 2013. However, for some of them, the self-declaration in the 2013 census was the product of a thinking process, which seems to be cemented by the census. It is notable, how in many anthropological accounts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the informants at least claim to remember, how they have declared themselves at each census. Thus, this thesis also confirms the salient role of censuses in shaping self-identifications.

As many of my informants pointed out, Sarajevo is a special case within Bosnia, a more tolerant, multicultural city, which was often contrasted with the countryside perceived as a more conservative space. Let us now move to research the specificities of the results in Velika Kladuša

5.4 Velika Kladuša

Due to the somewhat different character of results and context in Velika Kladuša compared to Sarajevo, I want to devote a separate section for the interviews carried out Velika Kladuša. Here, I will concentrate on the results, that differ from the ones in Sarajevo, that I have already presented above. After all, as I have mentioned, Velika Kladuša has a special history within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also the interviews show, that Velika Kladuša is a slightly different case. First of all, it is important to note, that Velika Kladuša has a very small number of people belonging to other constituent peoples, than the Bosniaks.

In Velika Kladuša, I was able to talk with two persons who declared themselves to opt-out categories. One of them was declared in the census as Bosniak, because at the time of the census he was a minor, but now he would declare himself as a Bosnian and Herzegovinian. While the motivations of my informants for choosing an opt-out category was similar to the ones in Sarajevo, they told me the main reason for the great number of Others in Velika Kladuša is due to the intra-Muslim conflict and the influence of the Labor Party in the town. Also an informant, who declared himself as a Bosniak, considered this to be the main reason, mentioning, that this declaration is done "out of spite". The enumerator I interviewed told me the same. Amir Purić, journalist from Velika Kladuša, with whom I was in contact with over instant messaging, told me, that the reason for this is, that people who fought in the war against the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina see the idea of Bosniakness to be in connection with the war-time president Alija Izetbegović and his party SDA, and wanted to resist this. Therefore, this shows us, that even as religion is highly intertwined with ethnicity in Bosnia, in all cases the two do not equate each other.

Due to time restrictions, I was not able to find anyone, for whom the abovementioned had been the main motivation to choose an opt-out category. I contacted also the Labor Party, but they did not provide a response on my question. When looking for informants, I had a brief unofficial discussion with a person I tried to convince to have a longer interview with me. During this discussion, I asked about the notions Bosniak and *Bosanac*, and he told me the notion *Bosanac* was more used before the war, but now *Bošnjak* was the most common one. During this discussion, he invited more people for a short survey; all five persons – among them three teenagers – who took part in this impromptu survey said they are rather *Bosanac* than Bosniak. These ethnonyms, however, did not seem to play an important part in the lives of these people I talked with. According to Almir, an artist from Velika Kladuša, people in Velika Kladuša do not consider these categories at all salient, with the exception of the 2013 census, when the questions of ethnic belonging became important.

As I conducted in Velika Kladuša interviews with people declaring themselves as Bosniaks, it also provided also a possibility to see their insights on the issue. They represented somewhat the idea of Bosniak integralist ideas on the country. The informant, who had worked as a census enumerator, told me, that all Bosnians should be called Bosniaks, as this is the historic name, and that Bosniakness should be treated in the same way as Albanianness, which is not tied to religion. Another informant stated similarly, that it is not possible to be a Serb or a Croat in Bosnia, but these people should be called – in contrast with the previous example – as *Bosanci* with Orthodox or Catholic religion.

Thus, Velika Kladuša shows to be a fascinating example of opting out from the dominant categories and an exception in the declaration patterns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, many questions remain open in the Velika Kladuša case. Are most people opting out only at the census or do they self-identify differently in other settings, too? Do people from Velika Kladuša have a stronger civic identification, than Bosnian citizens in average? Or are the declarations of non-ethnic or civic identity actually a proxy for a regional identity? A more thorough research on self-identifications in Velika Kladuša would be needed to find out the answers to these questions.

5.5 Conclusion of analysis

In this analysis chapter, I have analyzed my research material looking for answers for the reasons behind declaring opt-out categories, and the consequences of such declarations. These questions are complicated, and it is difficult to explain them exhaustively. Yet, I have shown, that such declarations are the product of reasons intertwined with civic identification and anti-nationalism. Something I have dealt with in lesser extent, is the family background, which can also be considered as an explaining factor. Consequences, similarly, are versatile, but the most predominant one is the marginalization, that people choosing opt-out categories are facing. The declarations can be set into a historical context, where we can see, that ethnic identity categories have been constantly in flux in

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Censuses have been in an important role not only measuring, but rather, forming those identifications. The ethnic identifications are also affected by the nationalizing state, which is also seen on the everyday level. Moreover, Velika Kladuša can be seen as a specific case with the recent intra-Muslim conflict leading many people to declare themselves to opt-out categories, mainly as *Bosanci*.

Now, I will set my findings to the theoretical framework presented in the literature review. First of all, we can see, how national indifference becomes salient in a nationalizing setting. When comparing to the period of SFRY, we can see, that national belonging was not considered salient and, thus, national indifference was not that salient either. The narratives told by my informants show, that it is important for them to opt out from dominant ethnic categories. Yet, we might have to reconsider, whether national *indifference* is the right term to depict this phenomenon. I claim, that "indifference" is however a correct word to describe the relation of my informants towards the relatively new notion of Bosniak, but otherwise anti-nationalism or anationality would be a more depicting one.

Returning to Brubaker's theory on forms of "trans" of ethnicity, we can see, that the analysis above shows in most cases the *trans of beyond*, declaring oneself beyond existing ethnic categories. In some cases, however, we can identify *trans of between*, being in between two categories, where a categorization of *beyond* is applied as a proxy for the betweenness. In practice, this means situations, where family background is ethnically mixed. Interestingly, such both of *trans* seem to be manifested through the same categories, albeit in the census, there were some declarations displaying this in-betweenness, such as Serb Croat (*Srbin Hrvat / Srpkinja Hrvatica*), declared by 62 people[180]. What has to be noted in the Bosnian context, when comparing to many other cases of *trans of beyond* or national indifference is, that in Bosnia these are not a reaction to only one majority nationalism, but rather to three dominant nationalisms.

[180] "Stanovništvo Prema Etničkoj/Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti - Detaljna Klasifikacija."

Ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina is officially based on self-declaration, while unofficially ethnic labels are assumed and imposed. Yet, even if my informants could declare themselves to a category of one of the constituent peoples, which are often even imposed on them, they decide not to choose such a category for instrumental purposes. Thus, declaring oneself into opt-out categories is an important question of principles – some scholars would even call this a salient part of personal identity – for my informants.

Let us now move on to the conclusion chapter, which will collate the results and provide the implications of this thesis into our understanding of the phenomenon and scholarly literature dealing with Bosnia and similar phenomena in other settings.

6 CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have shown the multi-faceted reasons and motivations for declaring opt-out categories, and the consequences of such declarations. These declarations are the product of reasons intertwined with civic identification and anti-nationalism, and the most notable consequences of them are the marginalization and discrimination people declaring opt-out categories are facing. The reasons and motivations for such declarations can be set on a historical continuum of fluid and ambiguous identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they are also reactions to nationalism and nationalistic divisions in the country.

The importance of self-categorizations in the census in shaping further self-categorizations should not be underestimated. The 2013 census was specifically important, since it was the first one taking place in a post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a highly divided society, especially in contrast with SFRY. This dividedness led the census to be a site for competition and it reminded an election in many ways.

I would like to draw briefly the analogy of protest voting and opting out of dominant census categories. The parallel is most functioning, if we look at choosing the carnivalesque categories, such as Jedi and invalid votes, both abandoning completely the expected categorizations, but in the census these are at least counted. However, the treatment of Others by the Bosnian society reminds sometimes the way invalid votes are treated in an elction.

Many questions for further research arise from this thesis. Firstly, this thesis was limited mostly to people with Muslim family background and their declarations were partly reactions to the creation of Bosniak identity. Therefore, it would be interesting to make comparisons with people declaring opt-out categories in Republika Srpska or the predominantly Croat parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, most of the informants were young people, and the same research could be conducted with

elder people, who also have already taken part in many censuses and have had to declare themselves regarding ethnicity in many instances. Thirdly, a comparison with people declaring themselves to the recognized national minorities would also be of interest. Fourthly, as this thesis has shown, the 2013 census made the questions of ethnicity suddenly salient even in such everyday settings, where this was not necessarily the case. Thus, one possibility for further research would be following interactions of people during the following census taking part in Bosnia and Herzegovina most likely in early 2020s. Besides this, there are many open questions related to Velika Kladuša, which I presented in section 5.4.

This thesis presents a case study on how censuses shape people's self-understandings. It presents a view "from below" on this phenomenon, which is an understudied scholarly field. In the literature review, I mentioned Jenkins's claim on how people resisting official categorizations, in fact categorize themselves. This can be seen in the declarations of my informants, who have found themselves alternative categories as a response to the insistence on categorization of the state.

The implications of this thesis to the scholarship of national indifference are multiple. First of all, "indifference" might not be the proper adjective to describe resistance towards dominant categorizations. Rather, the term anti-nationalism, which is also applied in this thesis, suits better to describe the situation. This thesis did provide, however, many examples on phenomena, that Zahra also brings up in her article. One was that of nationalists' perceptions of Others as a threat, which was most strikingly manifested during the 2013 census and affected the discourses in everyday situations. Thus, we can see, how national indifference in its politicized form is clearly distinct from everyday ethnicity, at least in divided societies, as Bosnia and Herzegovina. More research on national indifference should be carried out to better understand, how specific the Bosnian case is, for example due to the historical continuity of ambiguous ethnic identifications. This thesis has also shown, that the analytical concept of national indifference can also be applied in contemporary settings. The methodological shortcomings of the concept, discussed in the literature review, are not necessarily

too significant obstacles for scholars in societies like Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the category Other is institutionalized in a way and a more visible category, than in many other societies.

So, what are the perspectives of Others in Bosnia and Herzegovina? The implementation of the Sejdić-Finci verdict has been on the table for years, but the ethnic parties leading the country are maintaining the status quo, which is understandable 24 years after the end of a destructive war. Yet, citizens who do not want to declare themselves into the dominant categories, are meanwhile marginalized from the society. As an informant in Velika Kladuša told me, the international community has imposed the constitution on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is the responsibility of the international community to solve this. This, however, is possible only with the cooperation of Bosnian political elites.

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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF TYPICAL QUESTIONS IN AN INTERVIEW

Tell me about yourself

How do you declare yourself?

What are the Others?

Is there often situations, that you have to declare yourself?

Is there imposing of other categories?

Was it difficult to decide, how you will declare yourself?

How have your parents declared themselves?

Who is a *Bosanac* (Bosnian)?

How do you call the language spoken here?

How did you declare yourself, what it comes to religion?

Did you notice the campaign before the census?

Was there something, that irritated you in the campaign?

Was there any talk about the census and self-declaration in your surroundings, among friends or family?

Do you have some commentaries for the census results?

Do you know other people, who have chosen to declare themselves outside the constituent peoples?

Is there some difficulties or problems in declaring oneself as Others?

Do you think, that the Others should have more representation in politics?

How will you declare yourself in the following census?

Should the question of national identity be asked at all?

Why is the topic of Others important?

Is there still something you would like to add on the topic or what I should ask?