MUSCOVITE DIPLOMACY AND THE 1682 MOSCOW UPRISING

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Abstract.

This work deals with Muscovite diplomacy in the context of the 1682 Strel'tsy uprising. The revolt and the related succession crisis changed the Russian political order and resulted in two half-brothers, Ivan V and Peter I, ascending to the throne, while their (half-) sister Sophia ruled the country as regent. The thesis argues that, in this novel and unusual situation, the Russian government used and adjusted diplomatic practice to control information about the events and to protect the representation of the tsars at foreign courts. Using embassies to Poland-Lithuania and Sweden as examples, it shows how the Russian court made careful choices about the diplomatic ranks of its representatives in times of crisis, how it communicated the victory over the rebels while at the same time suppressing any information about the uprising itself, and how it presented the two tsars as legitimate sovereigns.

List of abbreviation.

d. — delo

f. — fond

ob. — oborot (verso)

op. — opis'

PDS — Pamiatniki Diplomaticheskikh Snoshenii Drevnei Rossii s Derzhavami Inostrannymi

RGADA — *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov*

Table of context

Introduction.

Tsar Feodor III Alexeyevich (1661-1682) died childless at the age of 20 in 1682. He was the son of Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich (1629-1676) and Maria Miloslavskaia (1624-1669). When Maria died, Tsar Aleksey married the second time and took Natalya Naryshkina (1651-1694) as his wife. The two families, the Miloslavskiis and Naryshkins, now formed part of the royal family. When tsar Feodor died childless, the question of the succession to the Russian throne provoked a struggle between these clans. The succession crisis caused the 1682 Moscow uprising, or *strel'tsy* rebellion. The *strel'tsy*, also called musketeers, were an elite troop, created in the sixteenth century. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, other forces, the "foreign formation regiments", had become more effective and more respectful military formation, while the status of *strel'sty* decreased.[1] This, combined with financial problems, led to a bloody rebellion with many casualties.

As a result of the succession crisis and the rebellion, Russian politics changed dramatically. Proclaiming two legal tsars ruling the country at the same time was a unique compromise struck between the Miloslavskies and Naryshkins.[2] However, the new tsars, Ivan V (1666-1696) and Peter I (1672-1725), were too young to rule. The sister of Ivan (and half-sister of Peter), Sophia Alekseyevna (1657-1704), took over as regent. The rebellion was an important event in the late seventeenth century and of such significance to the members of the *strel'tsy* guards that they even established the first "civic memorial" in Moscow as a reminder of their deeds.[3] Soon, however,

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[1] Maureen Perrie, ed., *The Cambridge history of Russia*. Vol. 1. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 498

[2] Paul Bushkovitch. *Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power 1671-1725* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 125-136.

[3] Aleksandr Lavrent'ev, *Liudi i Veshchi: Pamiatniki Russkoi Istorii i Kul'tury XVI-XVIII vv., Ikh Sozdateli i Vladel'tsy* (Moscow: Russkii Izdatelskii Tsentr, 1997), 177-202.

Prince Ivan A. Khovanskii, an important figure in the rebellion and then leader of the *strel'tsy*, was executed, the order restored, and the monument demolished.

This situation was not unnoticed by foreign courts. All kinds of information and rumors about the state of Russian affairs started to circulate in Europe. These could potentially damage Russia's standing in international affairs, as such rumors posed a challenge to the legitimacy of the new Russian tsars and threatened the political order in Russia. Muscovite officials, therefore, had to re-establish the tsars' position and reinforce their legitimate succession to the throne in its representation abroad. As a consequence, the Russian foreign office (*Posol'skii prikaz*, in Russian) and other Russian officials prepared embassies to be sent abroad and ensure that the legitimacy of the Russian tsars was not pulled into question.

Diplomacy.

An important element of early modern diplomacy were status relations expressed in communications between rulers who sought precedence over others or recognition as equals. However, direct encounter in face-to-face communication between monarchs, which manifested such claims, was difficult for many reasons. Instead, diplomats, as direct representatives of their sovereign, communicated such claims in ceremonies and diplomatic protocol, while sovereign rulers remained at the center of this interaction, since the body of a ruler was a symbol of the state.[4]

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[4] Andre Krischer, "Souveränität als sozialer Status: Zur Funktion des diplomatischen Zeremoniells in der Frühen Neuzeit", in *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Jan-Paul Niederkorn, Ralf Kauz, Giorio Rota (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 4; Lucien Bély, "Souveraineté et souverains: la question du cérémonial dans les relations internationales à l'époque moderne," *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France,* (1993), 28.

The symbolical dimension of politics was crucial for early modern diplomacy, as in the relations between monarchs, rituals helped to create a political order in which they acted.[5] Power in the early modern period was embodied in numerous ceremonies which, as has been suggested, served as a sort of unwritten constitution in early modern societies.[6] As Gerd Althoff claims, in premodern societies, rituals created the state.[7] As has been demonstrated for the Russian case, such ceremonies were choreographed to show and protect the tsar's honor, not only in diplomacy but as a wider social phenomenon that bound society together.[8] Nancy Shields Kollmann has shown that "the state was closely identified with the defense of honor".[9] This sovereignty was embodied in various important details such as the use of titles in the tsars' diplomatic letters.[10] It is from this perspective that the present thesis explores important aspects of Russian diplomatic practice in the context of the 1682 uprising.

Russian tsars in the seventeenth century communicated with many European rulers. The most intensive relations were those with two neighbors: Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Russian diplomacy also followed the representations of the events in Russia in European printed media which were an important source of information for Europeans about Muscovy and returned to the tsars' court as translations in the so-called *vesti-kuranty* to inform the

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[5] Jan Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe: Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648-1725.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 23.

[6] Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor's Old clothes: Constitutional History and the Symbolic Language of the Holy Roman Empire* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 7.

[7] Gerd Althoff, *Spielregeln der Politik im Mittelalter: Kommunikation in Frieden und Fehde* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997), 199–228.

[8] Nancy S. Kollmann, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 25-28.

[9] Ibid, 4.

[10] Aleksandr Filiushkin, *Tituly russkih gosudarei*. (Moscow: Al'ians-Arkheo, 2006).

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tsar about European affairs. As a result, the Russian court was often aware of its image circulating outside Russia and could respond to it accordingly.

In the diplomatic practice of seventeenth-century Russia it was custom that, following the death of a tsar, the Russian court would first send a herald (*gonets*, in Russian, *gontsy* in the plural) to announce to foreign rulers the death of the sovereign and the beginning of the reign of the new tsar. A couple of months later, a grand embassy (*velikoe posol'stvo*) led by the representatives of the highest social rank known as *boiary* would go to the foreign court to fully represent the tsar ratify previous treaties.

Muscovite diplomats were highly differentiated by their ranks. The highest position was occupied by "grand ambassadors" (*velikie posly*, in Russian), while the heralds held the lowest diplomatic rank. They were distinguished not only by specific titles in the tsar's letters, which they submitted to foreign rulers, and by the social status of the *gonets* that lead a mission, but also by the relatively small number of their retinue and servants (from eight persons for a herald to hundreds of people travelling with a grand ambassador).[11] Leonid Iuzefovich describes the difference of these positions even in visual sources and shows the connection between diplomatic rank and the social status of the ambassador or herald.[12] The heralds were used to deliver information or to collect news, while the activities traditionally associated with diplomatic negotiation such as treaties and agreements etc., fell in the remit of ambassadors. A herald's mission, then, was only sent in preparation of a grand embassy for high-status communication that would follow shortly thereafter. This is why, after a tsar's death, a herald was dispatched to inform foreign monarchs about the death of the Russian ruler and the pending arrival of a grand ambassador to ratify treaties.

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[11] Grigorij Kotosixin, *O Rossii v carstvovanie Alekseja Mixajlovica*, ed. Anne E. Pennington (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 54-72.

[12] Leonid Iuzefovich, *Put' posla: Russkii posol'skii obychai. Obihod. Etiket. Ceremonial. Konets XV - pervaia polovina XVII vv.* (St.-Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Ivana Limbakha, 2011), 51-52.

Given the circumstances of the *strel'tsy* uprising, this tradition changed in 1682. In the uncertainty of events, sending a grand embassy bore many risks for the representation of the tsar. Therefore, a second mission, also headed by a *gonets* (not an ambassador), was sent following the first one. Only after a long time did grand embassies travel to foreign courts to announce the accession to the Russian throne of the two new tsars and ratify peace treaties. Such a gap was not a normal situation and can be explained as the result of the uprising which posed a great challenge to the Russian state and its diplomacy. Communication was possible only between sovereign and legitimate rulers, and treaties could not be ratified if this legitimacy was at stake because of domestic events and their representation abroad.

Any uprising could change the legitimacy of a ruler and therefore the communication with such a monarch could also be questioned. In 1682, foreign courts knew about the uprising, its violence and the serious threat it posed to the Russian tsar. They received this information from various sources like informers in Russia, or printed media circulating in Europe. The ambassadorial chancellery collected these newspapers and translated them for the inner circle of the tsar, and therefore knew how the rebellion was presented in Europe.

In this research I study how the Russian government tried to deal with the informational and reputational consequences of the rebellion. I explore how late seventeenth-century Russian officials responded to prevailing images abroad by giving a picture of regularity and stability in diplomatic representation.

Research Questions

The *strel'tsy* uprising changed Russian domestic politics, but it also required that the *Posol'skii prikaz* adjusted its practices to the course of events. For example, according to the overview of embassies provided by Nikolai Bantyish-Kamenskii, the first *gonets* to Poland was sent shortly

before the uprising.[13] Four months later, another herald, but not an ambassador, was sent to inform foreign courts about the future ambassadorial mission. The situation was the same in Russian-Swedish relations, except the fact that the first *gonets* to Stockholm was sent long after the revolt. This juxtaposition of missions from before and after the uprising allows me to investigate the influence of the uprising on diplomatic documents and Russian representation of its affairs abroad. I am especially interested in what were their strategies of speaking about the uprising and current state of affairs in Russia. How did the representative strategies change after the revolt?

After the uprising, the Russian ambassadorial chancellery and ambassadors had a difficult task to accomplish. First of all, they had to show that everything was 'normal' and nothing of significance had happened, that Russia was governed as usual and the revolt had changed nothing. Yet, the situation resulting from the uprising had changed dramatically. The ensuing novelties had to be hidden carefully in diplomatic correspondence and protocol, lest they threatened the status of the Russian monarch. Now diplomats had to represent two tsars instead of one and a state that was governed by a female regent and pretend that this was a normal power scenario on the Russian throne. This thesis is about how Russian officials, in an unusual situation, represented the Russian court, trying to conceal the disruption that had happened.

The two closest neighbors of Russia were Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. All three countries saw periods of lasting rivalry and long wars in the seventeenth century. That is why I have chosen to study Russian diplomatic missions to these countries. The religious differences between these countries add another perspective, allowing me to touch on confessional perspectives in Russian diplomacy, although this is not the main focus of the thesis.

The first chapter is about how the Russian government started to deal with the impact of the rebellion and how they tried to cultivate the image that everything is normal and under control.

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[13] Nikolai Bantyish-Kamenskii, *Obzor vneshnikh snoshenii Rossii (po 1800 g.)*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Tipographiia Lissnera i Roma, 1902), 153-154.

In this chapter, I show the development of early modern printed media and their impact on images of rebellions in general before focusing on the 1682 case. Muscovy was not among the printing or news-creation centers in Europe and it had its own specific way of working with such media through collecting and translating foreign newspapers. As this chapter will show, the tsars' government decided to use diplomacy in an attempt to control the information about the rebellion, which resulted in small but significant adjustments in diplomatic practice, including the sending of a second herald instead of grand ambassadors.

The second chapter explores how Muscovite officials tried to present the state of Russian affairs as stable and present the two tsars as sovereign rulers. In this chapter I deal with the diplomatic reports of the second heralds sent by Russian officials to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden. This helps to understand how the Russian government portrayed the rebellion abroad and what information it decided to share. I analyze the tsars' letters to foreign rulers in order to understand how the ambassadorial chancellery used specific linguistic constructions and theological references to reinforce the legitimacy of the two tsars and support the image of political stability. The reports also show the role of tsarevna Sophia in political ceremonies and decision-making. Therefore, the role of a female regent in these contexts will be another focus of this chapter.

Literature Review.
In this section, I will present the main research literature that is crucial for my work. The first important topic is printed media, which appeared in the early modern period and informed different audiences about the uprisings that happened in the seventeenth century. The other includes new research on early modern diplomacy. Then I will discuss, briefly, new works on the role of women in early modern Russia.

The "cultural turn" in historiography brought a number of changes to the study of rebellions and moved various approaches closer to anthropology.[14] The new principal goal of scholars is to understand how images of various rebellions were used in communication between different countries. Some of the historians focus their work on Russian seventeenth-century uprisings. Among those are the famous Stenka Razin rebellion (1670-1671), the first *strel'tsy* uprising (1682), and the second *strel'tsy* uprising (1698), with much attention paid to Johann Georg Korb's travel accounts.[15] All these works deal with European media, printing production, and their influence on politics. Some also discuss diplomatic responses to negative images resulting from rebellions. The 1682 uprising has also received some attention in these contexts.[16] In my work, I place a stronger focus on diplomatic practice and try to find out not only what information Russian officials collected, and how they did so by using diplomats, but how they dealt with the consequences in direct diplomatic interaction.

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[14] Malte Griesse, ed., *From Mutual Observation to Propaganda War: Premodern Revolts in their Transnational Representation* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2014).

[15] Gleb Kazakov and Ingrid Maier, "Inostrannye istochniki o kazni Stepana Razina. Novye dokumenty iz stokgol'mskogo arhiva," *Slověne = Словѣне. International Journal of Slavic Studies*, 2 (2017), 210-243; Stepan Shamin, "Kuranty kak istoricheskii istochnik po istorii Moskovskogo vosstaniia 1682 goda: ot regentstva tsaritsy Natal'i Kirillovny k regentstvu tsarevny Soph'i Alekseevny," *Moskoviia: Ezhegodnik nauchnyh rabot* (2015), 8-27; Malte Griesse, "Der diplomatische Skandal um Johann Georg Korbs Tagebuch der kaiserlichen Gesandtschaftsreise nach Moskau (1698-99): Ursachen und Folgen", in *Politische Kommunikation zwischen Imperien: der diplomatische Aktionsraum Südost und Osteuropas*, ed. Gunda Barth-Scalmani, Harriet Rudolph, Christian Steppan (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2013), 88-124; Idem. "State-Arcanum and European Public Spheres: Paradigm Shifts in Muscovite Policy towards Foreign Representations of Russian Revolts", in *From Mutual Observation to Propaganda War*, ed. Griesse, 205-269; Nancy Kollmann "Pictures at an Execution: Johann Georg Korb's 'Execution of the Strel'tsy'", in *Dubitando: Studies in History and Culture in Honor of Donald Ostrowski*, ed. Brian J. Boewck, Russel E. Martin and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 2012), 399-497.

[16] Gleb Kazakov, "Poezdka pod'iachego Nikity Alekseeva v Shvetsiiu i Daniyu v 1682 g." *Rossijskaya istoriya*, vol. 3. (2018), 121-133.

Russian early modern diplomatic practice is a broad field with rich source materials. Many scholars studied this topic from different perspectives. Important research was already done in the nineteenth century, focusing on the origins and continuities of Russian diplomatic practice (for example, Byzantine or Mongolian).[17] Later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, several works about various topics appeared, but they were mainly focused on the history and functioning of the *Posolskii prikaz* in the early modern period.[18] Its functioning continued to be studied throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.[19]

In the 1970s, new serious attempts were made to address ceremonial issues as a part diplomatic practice and not merely as "ridiculous side issues", as a significant part of communication between rulers with its own logic and functions.[20] This new approach was recently developed further by the new diplomatic history. Scholars understood that early modern diplomacy could have many dimensions, different from modern diplomacy (for example, not only ambassadors were diplomatic actors, but "musicians, merchants, artists, antiquarians and court entertainers". Scholars therefore "no longer view diplomacy and foreign policy as coterminous".[21]

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[17] Vladimir Savva, *Moskovskie tsari i vizantiyskie vasilevsyi: k voprosu o vliyanii Vizantii na obrazovanie idei tsarskoy vlasti moskovskih gosudarey*, (Kharkiv: Tipographiia i Litographiia Zil'berga i synov'ia, 1901); Nikolai Veselovskii *Tatarskoe vliianie na russkiy posolskii tseremonial v moskovskii period russkoy istorii* (St.-Petersburg: Tipographiia B. M. Volpha, 1911).

[18] Sergei Belokurov, *O posolskom prikaze* (Moscow: Izdetel'stvo imperatorskogo obscshestva istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete, 1906); Vladimir Savva, *O Posolskom prikaze v XVI v.* (Kharkiv: Tipographiia tovarichshestva portebitelei iuga Rossii, 1917).

[19] Robert M. Croskey, *Muscovite Diplomatic Practice in the Reign of Ivan III* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); Nikolai Rogozhin, *U gosudarevykh del bylo ukazano...* (Moscow: RAGS, 2002); Idem, *Posol'skii prikaz: kolybel' rossiiskoi diplomatii* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2003).

[20] William Roosen, "Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach", *The Journal of Modern History*. Vol. 52, No. 3 (1980), 452-476.

[21] Tracey A. Sowerby, "Early Modern Diplomatic History" *History Compass*, vol. 14, is. 9, (2016), 441-456.

Researchers in the Soviet Union also paid attention to such processes in early modern Russian diplomacy, in particular Leonid Iuzefovich in his book about diplomatic customs (*posolskii obychay*) in Muscovite Russia which provides an important description of different diplomatic rituals.[22]

In the last twenty years, a great number of works focused on ceremonial aspects of Russian diplomacy. While the re-edition of Leonid Iuzefovich's work continues the same line of argument it had supported in the first version, it provides a very useful overview of Russian diplomatic ceremonies, based on numerous archival and printed sources from the fifteenth century till the end of the seventeenth century.[23] Another significant contribution to this field was offered by Jan Hennings.[24] One of the aims of his book is to show that Russia formed part of wider early modern diplomatic culture, demonstrating how and to what extent the Russian court fitted in with ceremonial processes. This research also pays much attention to European political theories and contemporary discourses about precedence connected with diplomacy. Finally, Ol'ga Ageeva's book made an important contribution to the studies of Russian diplomacy in the eighteenth century.[25] She primarily focused on ceremonial and bureaucratic aspects of diplomatic practices in the time of Peter the Great and his successors. An important strand of these new works worth mentioning here as an example of this scholarship focuses on gift-exchange as an important part of symbolical communication between rulers, and studies how diplomatic gifts occupied a very important place in the exchange between different polities.[26] Historians of early modern diplomacy

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[22] Leonid Iuzefovich L.A. *Kak v posol'skikh obychaiakh vedetsia: Russkii posol'skii obychai kontsa XV - nachala XVII v.* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1988).

[23] Idem. *Put' posla*.

[24] Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe*.

[25] Ol'ga Ageeva, *Diplomaticheskii tseremonial imperatorskoi Rossii. XVIII vek.* (Moscow, Noviy khronograf, 2013).

[26] Some works in the field cover a broad range of objects exchanged between foreign courts, or discuss only one kind of gift (watches, for example), or address its meaning in communication. See, for example, Barry Shifman and Guy

rarely focus on the 1682 case from a strictly diplomatic perspective, although this case provides insightful materials about early modern Russian political culture and the functioning diplomacy.

Another important topic in the field has been diplomacy across confessional divides. This approach helps to understand early modern diplomacy as complex relations between different confessions. Religion was crucial in relations between states in the age of confessionalization and they also had an impact on diplomatic practices. Scholars study this topic from various perspectives such as the role of intermediaries in cross-confessional diplomacy in the Mediterranean, diplomatic networks between Protestant rulers, or Muslim-Orthodox connections.[27] Although the main focus of the present thesis is not so much on religion, I highlight the differences in communication, provoked by confessional differences between Orthodox Russia, Catholic Poland, and Protestant Sweden to show that more research needs to be done in this area regarding late seventeenth-century Russia.

Walton, ed. *Gifts to the tsars, 1500–1700: treasures of the Kremlin* (New York: Harry N Abrams Inc, 2001); Irina Zagorodnyaya, "Chasy v diplomaticheskikh podarkah" *Rodina: Rossijskij istoricheskij zhurnal*, 11 (2004), 73-78; Gerd Althoff and Mikhail Boicov, ed. *Na iazyke darov. Pravila simvolicheskoi kommunikatsii v Evrope 1000 - 1700 gg.* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2016); Hieronim Grala, "Dyplomacja z upominkami w tle (Wokół ceremoniału dyplomatycznego w stosunkach polsko-moskiewskich XVI–XVII w.)," in *Skarby Kremla. Dary Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów. Wystawa ze zbiorów Państwowego Muzeum Historyczno-Kulturalnego «Moskiewski Kreml», 7 września – 8 listopada 1998, Zamek Królewski w Warszawie. Katalog.* (Warsaw: "Arx Regia" Ośrodek Wydawniczy Zamku Królewskiego, 1998).

[27] Daniel Riches, "The Rise of Confessional Tension in Brandenburg's Relations with Sweden in the Late-Seventeenth Century," *Central European History*, 37 (2004), 568-592; Tijana Krstić and Maartje van Gelder, "Introduction: Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean," *Journal of Early Modern History*, 19 (2015), 93-105; Maria Telegina, "Ceremonial representation in cross-confessional diplomacy: the Ottoman embassy of a Christian ambassador to Moscow in 1621", CEU, MA Thesis. Budapest, 2017.

Another significant topic is the reign of tsarevna Sophia. She gained power after the rebellion and was proclaimed as regent of Russia.[28] There are few works that study this period of Russian history in detail, and some of them explore this time as part of the history of the reign of Peter I.[29] The gender aspect of Sophia's reign, and the role of women in Muscovy has also received some attention.[30] This thesis will build on these works and nuance the picture by addressing – within limits and where sources allow – the role of Sophia in diplomatic communication and decision-making, as many researchers "have for a long time ignored the role of women in diplomatic relations".[31]

Sources.

Diplomatic ceremonies were a special semiotic language used in all parts of early modern Europe. Communication in this language was highly important as it was related to issues of sovereignty and the ruler's honor. Russian diplomatic ceremonies were well-described in the special reports of ambassadors — the *stateinye spiski* which were then copied and collated in ambassadorial books (*posol'skie knigi*) together with other materials relating to the embassy. These diplomatic documents were compiled from the end of fifteenth until the beginning of the eighteenth century

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[28] Lindsey Hughes, "Sofiya Alekseyevna and the Moscow Rebellion of 1682," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 63 (1985), 518-539.

[29] Carl B. O'Brien, *Russia under two tsars, 1682-1689: The regency of Sophia Alekseevna*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952); Lindsey Hughes, *Sophia: Regent of Russia 1657-1704*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Viktor Naumov, *Tsarevna Sof'ya*, (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2015); Paul Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great*.

[30] Isolde Thyrêt, *Between God and Tsar: Religious Symbolism and the Royal Women of Muscovite Russia*. (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press).

[31] Florian Kühnel, "'Minister-like Cleverness, Understanding and Influence on Affairs': Ambassadresses in Everyday Business and Courtly Ceremonies at the Turn of the Eighteenth Century," in *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c.1410-1800,* ed. Tracey A. Sowerby and Jan Hennings, (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge), 131.

and concern Russia's relations with many countries in this period. Nikolai Rogozhin writes that nearly 760 *posol'skie knigi* survived to our time[32]. They are an appropriate and valuable source for studying Russian history and the history of European diplomacy in the early modern period. They contain different information about various subjects. Today they are held in archives in Moscow, namely in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA).

These reports give an account of the whole course of action of an embassy from Moscow and tell the story of the work of ambassadors abroad as well as of the activities of the clerks in the *Posol'skii prikaz* at home.[33] It is necessary to mention that these reports are strictly bureaucratic documents. They had little in common with the kind of early modern travel literature describing "the Other". One of their principle aims was to document how the diplomats protected the tsar's honor at a foreign court (rather than to give an "ethnographic" account of the lands the diplomats visited).[34] While these sources give little evidence about Russian diplomat's cultural perception and interpretation while on their missions, they give important insights into symbolic representation and diplomatic protocol which help to address the research question that the present thesis raises.

In 1682, there were four missions to Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. The first herald was sent to Poland in May. There is a document about his departure in RGADA.[35] It is not well-preserved, only 9 pages have been preserved.[36] In September of the same year, another *gonets* was

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[32] Nikolai Rogozhin, *K* voprosu o sohrannosti posol'skikh knig kontsa XV – nachala XVII vv. *Issledovaniya po istochnikovedeniiu SSSR dooktiabrskogo perioda.* (Moscow: IRI RAN, 1988), 22.

[33] Idem, *Posolskie knigi Rossii kontsa XV — nachala XVII vv.* (Moscow: IRI RAN, 1994), 73.

[34] Mikhail Bojcov „Die Erlebnisse der Vertreter Ivans des Schrecklichen auf dem Reichstag zu Regensburg im Jahre 1576 und ihr Nachwirken," in *Bayern und Russland in vormoderner Zeit. Annäherungen bis in die Zeit Peters des Großen*, ed. Alois Schmid (München: Beck, 2012), 227-257.

[35] RGADA. f. 79, op. 1, d. 205.

[36] Kazakov, "Poezdka pod'iachego Nikity Alekseeva", 123.

sent to Poland to inform Polish officials about ambassadors who would come to lead the negotiation.[37] These ambassadors left Moscow only in January 1683. The diplomatic diaries (*stateinyi spisok*) of all these missions are available in RGADA.[38]

The first *gonets* to Sweden was sent in June, his *stateynyi spisok* is well-preserved and available in RGADA.[39] In November, another *gonets,* Kondrat Nikitin, was sent to Sweden to inform Swedish officials about the pending arrival of ambassadors.[40] Only on June 16, 1683 did the Russian ambassadors go to Sweden where they ratified the Treaty of Cardis.[41] Their reports are also available in RGADA.[42]

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[37] RGADA. f. 79, op. 1, d. 206.

[38] RGADA. F. 79, op. 1, d. 208.

[39] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110.

[40] RGADA. f. 96, op. 1, d. 111.

[41] Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Obzor*, vol. 4, 200.

[42] RGADA. f. 96, op. 1, d. 112.

Chapter 1. The First Attempt to Deal with the Rebellion: First Heralds' Mission.

In April 1698, a Habsburg embassy entered Moscow. Shortly after its arrival, the ambassadors witnessed the second *strel'tsy* uprising. It was very brutish, and after its failure, the executions were bloody. All these events were described by the secretary of the embassy, Johann Georg Korb (1672-1741) in his diary. In 1700, this description was published in Vienna, but, in 1702, Habsburg officials started to confiscate the book and the copies that circulated. In Korb's *Diarium itineris in Moscoviam*, Russia and its government were presented as savage and cruel people.[43]. Such descriptions were common for many early modern texts about Muscovy.[44] However, Russian officials usually tried to create a positive image of their country after all these publications. This had already been the case in the first *strel'tsy* uprising in 1682, which burst out because of disorder in the Romanov dynasty.

In this chapter, I will analyze the first uprising to show how European media presented the 1682 events. I will show that rumors and uncertainty presented a challenge to the sovereignty of the Russian tsars and how Russian officials tried to stop the spread of such news. For achieving this purpose, the government used diplomacy to disseminate information about the situation.

Early Modern Media and Diplomacy.
Here I will show how early modern media functioned, what the role of diplomacy was in the distribution of news and information and how, in turn, such information influenced diplomacy. These questions are important for my research because they help to better understand the functioning of early modern diplomacy and European news networks.

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[43] Hans-Heinrich Nolte, "Korb, Johann Georg," *Neue Deutsche Biographie*. 12 (1979), 581 f. https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118565362.html#ndbcontent. (accessed 11 June 2019).

[44] Marshall Poe, *"A People Born to Slavery": Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1476–1748* (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 2000).

In the early modern period, printed media appeared to be one of the sources for information about foreign lands and their inhabitants, but they were very different from the kind of mass-media as we know it today. In this period, media started to be more and more complex with increasingly global coverage, and in the eighteenth century, news circulated worldwide: "from China to Peru".[45]

As Andrew Pettegree says, printed newspapers first time appeared Strasbourg in 1605 (at least there is clear evidence about it), and very soon various type of genres spread all over the German lands.[46] Most of these early modern media were hand-written and were not very regular, but later this situation changed. Daniel C. Waugh and Ingrid Mayer argued that many people preferred to receive political news not from these (even printed) media, but from private correspondence.[47] Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham continue this line of argument, suggesting that transmitting news in person was sometimes more efficient than printed or hand-written newspapers.[48] Early modern media existed in various forms and contained different information about many topics and themes: from descriptions of the weather to religious disputes.[49]

Early modern diplomacy played an important part in the creation and distribution of information. Ambassadors received news from the places where they resided and sent back information to their court about the country they lived in. They formed a "nexus in webs of

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[45] Paul Goring, "A Network of Networks: Spreading the News in an Expanding World of Information." in *Traveling Chronicles: News and Newspapers from the Early Modern Period to the Eighteenth Century.* ed. Siv Gøril Brandtzæg, Paul Goring and Christine Watson (London: Brill, 2018), 4.

[46] Andrew Pettegree, *The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know About Itself* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2014), 182-184.

[47] Daniel Waugh and Ingrid Maier, "Muscovy and the European Information Revolution: Creating the Mechanisms for Obtaining Foreign News," in *Information and Empire: Mechanisms of Communication in Russia, 1600-1850*, ed. Simon Franklin and Katherine Bowers (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2017), 80.

[48] Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham, "News Networks in Early Modern Europe," in *News Networks in Early Modern Europe* ed. Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 2.

[49] Waugh and Maier, "Muscovy and the European Information Revolution", 79.

communication"[50] and helped to create a pan-European network of news. Tracey Sowerby in an article about news and diplomacy in the Elizabethan period mentioned how news was useful for diplomacy and how ambassadors influenced the spread of news.[51] It is useful to recount her main points, as, using English materials, they show how early modern diplomacy and news worked.

The correspondence from London to English diplomats at foreign courts was regular including not only instructions but also news and even rumors. Sometimes, for many reasons, it was problematic to deliver this correspondence. For example, the English ambassador to France received letters from London faster than his colleagues in Constantinople or Lisbon: "it was not unusual for ambassadors to go for one or two months without any news from the Queen or her Privy Council".[52] The news from the capital was important for a diplomat to conduct a formal audience or other communication with a foreign monarch, so their absence had a negative impact on the functioning of the ambassador at foreign country. Sowerby also emphasizes the role of merchants in providing diplomats with various information about their homeland and the wider world.[53] Merchants also participated in the news exchange because it was beneficial business ("a special post from Paris to London and back cost at least £20 in 1566").[54]

Within Russia there was no production or circulation of the kind of printed media discussed above. But the Russian court also used tradespeople for the exchange of information. In the seventeenth century, Dutch merchants in Riga collected European newspapers and then sent these so-called *vesti kuranty* to Russia every two weeks.[55] This service was very beneficial for

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[50] Raymond and Moxham, "News Networks", 9.

[51] Tracey A. Sowerby, "Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks and the Spread of News," in *News Networks*, 305-327.

[52] Ibid, 305.

[53] Ibid, 309.

[54] Ibid, 305.

[55] Stepan Shamin, *Kuranty XVII stoletiya: Evropejskaya pressa v Rossii i vozniknovenie russkoj periodicheskoj pechati*, (Moscow: Al'ians-Arkheo, 2011), 4.

merchants, as the Russian government generously paid for it.[56] An important function of merchants was to send news to the capital and inform the government about European affairs. Ambassadors also transmitted news. For example, the information about the start of the Great Turkish War (1683-1699) arrived in France in diplomatic letters and only after it became news in the French media.[57] Diplomats served as important providers of intelligence about foreign countries, and they also had to evaluate the quality of the information and let the government know about it.[58] Russian diplomats also were used to collect information about foreign events. This activity was an important part of the heralds' missions that I will discuss in the present chapter.

As Tracey Sowerby has shown, to gain information, diplomats often used locals to collect news for them.[59] This relationship between diplomatic representatives and local populations is also possible to trace in the Russian sources. For example, the herald Nikita Alekseev had a conversation with one of the merchants from Narva, who visited him to share the latest news and rumors about Swedish king Charles XI (1655-1697) and the situation in Stockholm. The informant said that there could be a plot against the king, as many nobles were disappointed by the king's policy and they might try to kill the ruler.[60] Information also traveled in the opposite direction. A famous example is the *pod'iachii* (one of the clerks from the *Posol'skii prikaz*) Grigory Kotoshikhin (c. 1630 – 1667). During his work in the *Posol'skii prikaz* he sold information to the

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[56] Vesti-Kuranty. 1656 g., 1660—1662 gg., 1664—1670 gg.: Russkie teksty. Ch. 1. Ed. A. M. Moldovana, Ingrid Maier. M, 2009. P. 11.

[57] Stéphane Haffemayer, "Public and Secret Networks of News: The Declaration of War of the Turks against the Empire in 1683," in *News Networks*, 809.

[58] Sowerby, "Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks", 310.

[59] Ibid, 311.

[60] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, ll. 4-4ob.

Imperial ambassadors and later escaped to Poland and then to Sweden, where he wrote an account of Russia, providing important intelligence about the Russian court and government.[61]

To sum up, "news was essential to the conduct of early modern diplomacy", as information and foreign policy were closely interrelated.[62] This also explains why news was so important for the Russian government during the crisis of the 1682 *strel'tsy* uprising: the spread of rumors and other types of information posed a challenge to the integrity of the Russian sovereign, especially in the representation of the uprising at foreign courts, both visual and textual.

European News in Russia.

Before the Russian government could deal with the consequences of the rebellion and responded to the image that the circulation of news created outside Russia, they had to collect information about the representation of the events in European newspapers. They main source were the Russian translations of European publications, the so-called *vesti-kuranty*. It is necessary to focus on these, as they were an important basis for the Russian government to trace the image of the *strel'tsy* rebellion in Europe and understand the ensuing consequences for the legitimacy of the Russian sovereign. What is more, the *kuranty* were a source of information about the rebellion as such, even for Russian officials, and the texts of the newspapers shaped the ways in which the Russian court would present itself in diplomatic interaction.

The situation with information about global affairs in Russia bears some, if little, resemblance to the situation in Europe: the differences seem to be more striking than the discernible similarities. As mentioned in the previous section, the first printed newspaper appeared in 1605, and soon many news centers appeared, that is, cosmopolitan cities where it was

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[61] Maier, "Grigorij Kotošichin – inte bara "svensk spion", utan även rysklärarkollega? Nytt ljus på en gammal kändis," *Slovo. Journal of Slavic Languages, Literatures and Cultures*, 55 (2014), 118–138

[62] Sowerby, "Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks", 306

convenient to collect news and to print newspapers. On the map and the diagram that Haffemayer published, it is possible to see that there were no such centers in Russia.[63]

Nevertheless, this representation does not suggest that news about world affairs were completely absent in Russia. The Russian government always collected news from foreign lands. Since the end of the fifteenth century, they kept this information in special archives, organized in the *Posol'skii prikaz*.[64] However, as Ingrid Maier and Daniel Waugh show, in that period many other ideas of the transfer of information – for example, the establishment of permanent diplomatic residents or the creation of postal services such as Habsburg Imperial Post – had no impact on Russia.[65] Muscovy had a special organization, the *Yamskoi prikaz* which was created in the mid-sixteenth century to deliver state documentation and official documents rather than offering services through the regular post with established routes of communication.[66] This was an important difference between Russia and the rest of Europe "where private initiatives and the commercialization of news and information networks formed an important part of the communications revolution".[67]

During the early modern period, the *Posol'skii prikaz* was the main Russian center for collecting and processing information. The *prikaz* received news from Russian ambassadors and bought newspapers in Riga. Daniel Waugh presented two different views on the quality of this information and the ability of the *prikaz* to receive valuable and appropriate information on time.[68]

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[63] Haffemayer, "Public and Secret Networks of News", 806.

[64] Dmitrii Liseitsev, Nikolai Rogozhin, Iurii Eskin, eds. *Prikazy Moskovskogo gosudarstva XVI-XVII vv. Slovar'-spravochnik.* (Moscow, St. Petersburg: IRI RAN, 2015), 133.

[65] Waugh and Maier, "Muscovy and the European Information Revolution", 78.

[66] Liseitsev, Rogozhin, Eskin, eds., *Prikazy Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, 238-242.

[67] Waugh and Maier, "Muscovy and the European Information Revolution", 79.

[68] Waugh, "What the Posol'skii prikaz Really Knew: Intelligencers, Secret Agents and Their Reports", in *Travelling Chronicles*, 140-141.

The first one references Knud Rasmussen's idea that the Russian government really knew nothing about current European affairs as all their information was outdated.[69] Another position was presented by Mikhail Alpatov who based his research on the *stateinye spiski* and claimed that the Russian government had all necessary information about foreign news.[70] It is difficult to strike the right balance between these two positions. Daniel Waugh, for example, speaks of "a considerable unevenness in news acquisitions and its use in Muscovy".[71] Nevertheless, it is safe to say that by the end of the seventeenth century, the Russian ambassadorial chancellery had many ways to gain information about foreign events.

One of the main problems in the usage of this information was determining its quality. The sources of information played a crucial role. The clerks in the *prikaz* tried to separate information from rumors. Daniel Waugh writes: "The terms they used to describe information suggest as much: *slukhi* is commonly used to specify unverified rumor; '*nam podlinno vedomo*' ('we know for certain') generally introduces information deemed to have come from a reliable source".[72] It does not mean that the rumors were not a base for decision-making and something irrelevant. They still were an important and influential source of information for policy.[73]

Daniel Waugh argues that in the case of collecting information there was not much difference between permanent resident and ambassadors, who arrived only for one mission. He based this observation on Russian-Crimean relations (the first Russian resident was sent to the Crimean court) and the failure of any attempts to create a normal secret postal connection between

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[69] Knud Rasmussen, "On the Information Level of the Muscovite Posol'skij prikaz in the Sixteenth Century", *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 24 (1978), 88–99.

[70] Mikhail Alpatov, "Chto znal Posol'skii prikaz o Zapadnoi Evrope vo vtoroi polovine xvii v.?." in *Istoriia i istoriki. Istoriografiia vseobshchei istorii. Sbornik statei*, (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 89–129.

[71] Waugh, "What the Posol'skii prikaz Really Knew", 141.

[72] Ibid, 142.

[73] Waugh and Maier "Muscovy and the European Information Revolution", 80.

an ambassador and the central government.[74] On the other hand, Tracey Sowerby asserts that long-lasting representatives formed a network of contracts and it helped them to gain more news from the country where they stayed.[75]

The lack of printed newspapers led to a phenomenon when ambassadors during their voyage to the foreign court collected news, and newspapers, and inserted them into their mission reports: "From the end of the sixteenth century, the *stateinye spiski* sometimes include appendices with a translation of foreign news reports".[76] The use of diplomats to collect news from different parts of the world was a common practice in Europe, including Russia. But there were different problems with collecting news when exclusively done by ambassadors. These challenges had to do with the ad hoc nature of Russian embassies which meant that news arrived irregularly.[77] The *vesti-kuranty* presented a possible solution to the problem.

If in Europe the creation of newspapers often emerged as a private initiative, the translation of foreign newspapers in Russia were organized by the government and for government needs. Soon after the newspapers spread in Europe, Russian officials decided to order their translation into Russian. Printed newspapers were delivered or retold by Russian ambassadors, but also by foreign ambassadors residing at the Russian court as well as different merchants.[78] Only in the middle of the seventeenth century, during the Russo-Polish (1654–1667) and Russo-Swedish (1656–1658) wars, Russian officials started to receive foreign newspapers in a more regular manner to collect new information.[79] This was crucial during the time of war and explains the appearance of the *vesti-kuranty*. Nearly at the same time in the middle of the seventeenth century,

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[74] Waugh, "What the Posol'skii prikaz Really Knew", 143-145.

[75] Sowerby, "Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks", 315-316.

[76] Waugh and Maier, "Muscovy and the European Information Revolution", 81.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Shamin, Kuranty XVII stoletiia, 74-80.

[79] Ibid, 82.

they received their name, borrowed from some newspapers' titles.[80] There is not much information about the translation techniques, it is even difficult to call it a translation in modern sense, but I will use this term as many scholars have done.[81]

The regular transfer of foreign newspapers to Moscow was organized only from 1665 by a merchant, Jan von Sweden. In Moscow they were translated into Russian by clerks, working for government. The *kuranty* were designed to inform the tsar and *Boiarskaia duma* about European political life and changes in international relations.[82] As in Europe, it was a private commercial enterprise, but it was organized for the government and with the usage of state resources. Russian officials paid 500 rubles in cash and 500 rubles in furs per year, a considerably large amount of money.[83] For comparison, it is interesting to mention that in 1682, Russian diplomatic gifts to the Polish king and queen (all gifts were sable fur) were estimated about 1000 rubles.[84]

The *kuranty* were not the only one source of information for the Russian government. Diplomats also collected information and news about European countries, not least, presumably, to probe and verify the information received through the *kuranty*. In brief, the Russian government received information about foreign affairs from different sources, including diplomatic reports and European newspapers, translated as the *kuranty*. All this information helped Russian officials to make political decisions, to learn about the image of the Russian society and government abroad, and to influence this image. In the time before permanent residents in main European capitals, there is not much information on how the government tried to impact on this image.[85] However,

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[80] Shamin, "Slovo "kuranty" v russkom iazyke XVII–XVIII v.," *Russkii iazyk v nauchnom osveshchenii,* 1. 13, (2007), 119–152.

[81] Waugh and Maier, "Muscovy and the European Information Revolution", 83.

[82] Shamin, *Kuranty XVII stoletiya*, 6.

[83] Ibid, 84.

[84] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 208, l. 4ob.

[85] Shamin, *Kuranty XVII stoletiya*, 176.

there are some pieces of information about how the Russian government tried to avoid any mentioning of the rebellion and form a positive image to counter any negative perception resulting from the *strel'tsy* uprising.

Foreign Information about Uprisings.

In this section, I will show what impact rebellions could have on policy and diplomacy and how European governments tried to deal with such uprisings. Russia is a case in point, as in the seventeenth century, the Russian court changed the norms of speaking about rebellions, trying to conceal the events and the challenges they created for the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Russian ruler.

Until the nineteenth century international relations consisted of personal-social relations between sovereign monarchs rather than states. [86] For example, in various contexts, rulers addressed each other as "brothers" to recognize one another as sovereigns.[87] This means that the legitimacy of a king was a crucial question for all political communications in the early modern period. Consequently, upheavals were among the greatest challenges for monarchs in that they might be seen abroad as questioning the legitimacy of a ruler. Moreover, because of the media development in the early modern period, information about revolts and other disorders were soon available for European readers and could seriously disrupt the image of a state and the sovereign dignity of its rulers.

As Malte Griesse demonstrates, in a case of a rebellion, European rulers tried to "rapidly launch their hegemonic interpretation of these challenges wherein they focused on punishment and the spectacle of suffering". [88] It seemed highly effective to show that the existing order was

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[86] Krischer, "Souveränität als sozialer Status", 11.

[87] Iuzefovich, *Put' Posla*, 14-22.

[88] Griesse, "Introduction: Representing Revolts across Boundaries in Pre-Modern Times," in *From Mutual Observation to Propaganda War*, 16.

restored, and the rebellious forces were destroyed and executed. There is no need to speak about and describe various executions that took place in the early modern period, their meaning and so on. In what follows, I briefly turn to Russian history in dealing with revolts in this manner.

A good example is the Stenka Razin rebellion that burst out in 1670. It was a serious challenge for the Russian government, as it questioned its ability to control the state and provoked grave problems for Russian foreign policy, first of all, in international trade.[89] It was also was an "interesting" event, as lots of European newspapers printed information about the rebellion, many pamphlets appeared in France, in Holland, in the Holy Roman Empire, and in England.[90] The Russian government tried to show that the situation was under control while the news about the rebellion had not yet reached the printing centers. However, there were some counteractions of authors who were subjects of potential Russian enemies and who "tended to present the Russian state as weakened by the rebellion and to exaggerate Razin's successes up to the very day of his execution".[91]

Russian officials often used foreigners who served to inform their governments about the punishment and reestablishing of the political order following the execution of the rebels. European governments used their compatriots in Russia (as usual, they were merchants) to receive information about situation in Muscovy and paid for this news. One such informers was the Swedish merchant Christoff Koch who collected information and sent it to the governor of Narva every week.[92] He might have seen Razin's execution. In any case, the Russian government showed him and some other foreigners an image, created in Russian art traditions in the *Posolskiy prikaz*

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[89] Maier, "How Was Western Europe Informed about Muscovy? The Razin Rebellion in Focus", in *Information and Empire*", 114.

[90] Ibid, 117.

[91] Ibid, 120.

[92] Kazakov and Maier, "Inostrannye istochniki o kazni Stepana Razina. Novye dokumenty iz stokgol'mskogo arhiva," *Slověne = Словѣне. International Journal of Slavic Studies*, 2 (2017), 219-220.

or the tsar's office to prove that Stenka Razin had been executed.[93] Ingrid Maier and Gleb Kazakov suggest that this picture was created in many copies and later started to be a source for European images of this execution.[94] The Russian image of the execution is brutal. It shows how Razin was delivered to Moscow in chains, how he was guarded. There are also images of his quartered body with separated legs, arm, and head.[95] It is a real "spectacle of suffering" and would seem logical that Russian officials always depicted the execution of the leaders of rebellions in the same manner every time when there was a revolt. However, this was not always so.

Since the very beginning of the uprising, many European newspapers wrote about it. As Ingrid Maier says, this revolt was "an exceptional media sensation".[96] Even when there was no news about it, in newspapers there were sentences such as: "About Razin there is no news, beyond that, he is neither dead nor captured".[97] Martin Welke counted that there were 180 items of mentioning Razin in the German-language press. In every third or fourth newspaper there was information about the uprising.[98] This explains why the Russian government created an image of Razin's execution and tried to show it to many foreigners. They could not ignore the rebellion and show that everything is normal because of a great press interested in the topic. In many cases the "Russian government rather tended to silence revolts and would have them narrated only with considerably hindsight, often decades after they had happened".[99]

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[93] Ibid, 224.

[94] Ibid, 210-243. The images and their prototype are presented in their article.

[95] Ibid, 223.

[96] Maier, "How Was Western Europe Informed about Muscovy?", 113.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid, 115.

[99] Griesse, "Introduction", 16.

As every early modern government, Russian officials tried to monopolize the representation of the uprisings.[100] This is obvious, for example, from a diplomatic scandal that resulted from the publication of Korb's diary at the end of the seventeenth century. Malte Griesse examines this event calling it "proactive foreign-media policy".[101] He claims that the Russian government tried to "obliterate and put very event of revolt under taboo", suggesting that this policy continued in the eighteenth century.[102] In the following section, I show that this had also been common practice in the case of the 1682 rebellion.

First Attempts to Deal With the 1682 Rebellion

In this section, I will show how the information about the 1682 rebellion spread across Europe and appeared in printed media, and what impact it had on Russian government actions. Then I will focus on diplomatic approaches to deal with rumors about the uprising and problems that led to the second heralds' mission.

Fortunately for the Russian government, the 1682 rebellion was not so popular in European media as was the Razin uprising. For example, in 1682 there were only five mentioning of the rebellion in the *kuranty*.[103] Even during the rebellion the practice of reading *kuranty* to the tsar (presumably, neither of the two tsars participated in the readings at that time) and *Boiarskaya duma* continued, and most of the *kuranty* have survived. Stephan Shamin claims that there should be 28 texts of *kuranty* from that time, but only 21 of them are available.[104] The missing texts could be destroyed or even never created, as during the summer months the tsars went on the annual trip (*pohod*) to monasteries and some of the clerks went with them or did not know where to send the

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[100] Ibid, 17.

[101] Griesse, "State-Arcanum and European Public Spheres", 208

[102] Ibid, 267.

[103] Shamin, *Kuranty XVII stoletiia*, 176.

[104] Ibid, 119.

translated texts.[105] The loss of documents was a common thing during all these relocations and chaos, caused by the tsars' voyage. The continued preparation of the *kuranty* and their usage can be explained by the interests in an appropriate self-representation in foreign media. As I argued in the previous section of this chapter, it was important for the Russian government to have a clear sense of how it was perceived outside Russia in order to know how to respond to the circulation of images that questioned its stability and legitimacy.

In contrast to the previous Razin rebellion, the relative lack of information about the 1682 uprising in the media was beneficial for the government in that it did not have to try to make a positive Russian image in the newspaper: they only had to show to other courts that these two tsars are legitimate and sovereign rulers. The best way to do this was diplomacy.

The mission to Poland (and at the same time to the Holy Roman Emperor – this was common diplomatic practice) was sent at the end of May 1682. It was led by a clerk of the *Posol'skii prikaz*, Nikifor Veniukov.[106] There is not much information about this herald, but he had diplomatic experience after a mission to Bukhara in 1669, and later in 1685 he was sent to China.[107] Unfortunately, his report from the mission to Poland did not survived. There are only letters from the tsars to the king and back. Probably the most interesting part of the document are the marks in the text. It is not a draft because the handwriting of the scribe is very official and beautiful. He did not write it in a hurry. Such handwriting can be seen on the letters, finished, decorated and ready to be delivered to foreign courts. The marks look more like comments to the text, that explain for what mission the text was created and what was wrong in original.

Many difficulties came with the name of the tsar. In all other letters, the two tsars were named in Russian "Ioann Alekseevich Petr Alekseevich"[108] but in this letter the first tsar was

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[105] Ibid, 121

[106] Bantyish-Kamenskii N. N. *Obzor*. V. 3. P. 153.

[107] Stepan Veselovskii, *D'iaki i pod'iachie XV-XVII vv.*, (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), 90.

[108] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, l. 2.

named as "Ivan" two times.[109] The first time the clerks from *Posolskii prikaz* corrected this mistake and made a note on the field about incorrect usage of tsar's name: "in the original was written Ivanu".[110] The second time they did not correct "Ivan" to "Ioann" but say that "in the original, it was written like that".[111]

The change of names was hardly an attempt to humiliate Tsar Ivan (even if it were meant as an insult, this would not have extended to Tsar Peter). Presumably, Polish officials used his name because it was more common for them. There are not many studies about names in the Romanov dynasty, but there is some research about the Rurik dynasty who ruled Russia before the Romanovs. The representatives of this family had "public" and "private" names. In the early modern period such "public" names were commonly baptismal names.[112] It seems that the Polish officials used the same name, but not its baptismal form but the secular one. While this may explain the cause of the dispute that went on, the problem for the Russian diplomats was also simply that the name change was a breach of protocol because it departed from original scribal practice.

Another remark in the Russian translation of the Polish letters is also very interesting, and it is connected with the tsar's title. A section about the arrival of a herald with information about the death of Tsar Fedor Alekseevich reads as follows: "He was sent with information about the departure from this world and the good memory of our brother, great sovereign, tsar, and grand prince Fedor Alekseevich".[113] The Russian clerks added a note here claiming that "in 1676 [when

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[109] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 205, l. 4, 5ob.

[110] "V podlinoi napisano Ivanu". Ibid, l. 4.

[111] "V podlinoi napisano tak". Ibid. l. 5ob.

[112] Anna Litvina and Fedor Uspenskii, *Vybor imeni u russkikh knyazei v X — XVI vv.: Dinasticheskaia istoriia skvoz' prizmu antroponimiki*, (Moscow: Indrik, 2006), 214.

[113] "Prislan s vedomost'iu tak o otshestvii s sego sveta dostoinye pamiati brata nashego velikogo gosudaria tsaria i velikogo kniazia Fedora Alekseevicha". RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 205. l. 4ob. For a discussion of the term "gosudar'" and its various translations including as "sovereign", see Isabel de Madariaga "Autocracy and Sovereignty," in *Politics*

tsar Aleksey Mickhailovich died — K. M.], in a letter from the Polish king, the name and the full title were written as in the treaties instead of blessed memory of the great sovereign, and in another place in the same letter the name of the great sovereign was written as in this current Polish letter".[114]

Russian diplomacy always had conflicts about late tsars mentioning in foreign ruler's letters but only one episode is well-studied. In the 1646s, Russian and Swedish officials started to argue about the usage of the phrase "blessed memory" to speak about Russian and Swedish rulers who had passed away.[115] Aleksander Tolstikov claims that this formula had religious meanings in seventeenth-century Russia and could be used only for an Orthodox tsar. The Swedish government decided to use this formula to reestablish equality between the Swedish king and the tsar in relations with Russia. These debates lasted for many years (till 1650) and ceased only after new more actual title problems appeared. The conflict started between two allied countries, participating in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) on one side.[116] It seems that it was possible that in this kind of situation the Russian court could start an open diplomatic conflict about the late tsar's title. However, during the *Strel'tsy* uprising which challenged the government's ability to control the state, the only way Russian diplomacy could respond to such a potential humiliation was to highlight it in a document for internal use within the *Posolskiy prikaz*.

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and Culture in Eighteenth-Century Russia, ed. Isabel de Madariaga (London, New York: Routledge. 1998), 40-56, esp. p. 54-56.

[114] "Vo RPD godu v gramote pol'skogo korolia pisano vmeste blazhennye pamiati velikogo gosudarya imianovanie i titlo polnoe po dogovoram, a v drugom meste v toi zhe gramote napisano velikogo gosudaria imianovanie protiv togo kak napisano v nyneshnei pol'skoi gramote". Ibid.

[115] Aleksandr Tolstikov, "Chest' pokojnogo monarha kak predmet diplomaticheskogo spora: epizod iz istorii rossiisko-shvedskikh otnoshenii XVII v." *Studia Humanitatis Borealis*, № 1 (2013), 4-18.

[116] Boris Porshnev, *Tridtsatiletniaia voina i vstuplenie v nee Shvetsii i Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976).

An embassy to Sweden left Moscow in the beginning of June. Their mission was to inform the Swedish and Danish courts about the death of tsar Fedor and the coronation of tsars Ivan and Peter, and collect valuable data about world politics and the opinions about the Moscow rebellion. The documents relating to a Russian embassy to Sweden are better preserved, and the diplomatic report is available in the archive. As herald Nikita Alekseev was sent to Sweden and Denmark I will use only the first "Swedish" part of his *stateyniy spisok*. Gleb Kazakov also used this report, but he is primarily interested in how Russian ambassadors collected information and what kind of information it was.[117] Kazakov shows that in the first variants of the instruction to the heralds there is the only mention of Tsar Peter. These instructions were published, and there are many phrases such as "great sovereign, tsar, and grand prince Peter Alekseevich ordered to send".[118] However, in the diplomatic report, created after the mission, there appear two tsars. The document states that the *gonets* Nikita Alekseev kissed their hand ("was at [their] hand"[119]) on the 8th of June for his departure to Sweden. Their departure is dated about one month after the rebellion which started at the beginning of May, so that it is safe to say that the Russian government had enough time to prepare the mission in the face of the events that had beset the Russian capital.

As I said in the previous section, in Narva, on the 11th of July Nikita Alekseev had a conversation with a local merchant who told him about a possible noblemen conspiracy against the Swedish king.[120] Kazakov suggests that Nikita Alekseev could still be under huge influence of the Moscow rebellion and the text of the report is also under this influence.[121] This supports Stepan Shamin's argument about how the foreign news and Moscow affairs influenced each other in the

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[117] Kazakov, "Poezdka pod'iachego Nikity Alekseeva", 121-133.

[118] Ukazal velikii gosudar', tsar' i velikii kniaz' Petr Alekseevich, vsea Velikiia i Malyia i Belyia Rossii samoderzhec poslat'. PDS, v. 6, col. 1.

[119] "Byl u ruki". RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, l. 2.

[120] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, ll. 4-4ob.

[121] Kazakov, "Poezdka pod'iachego Nikity Alekseeva", 124.

minds of Russian officials. To give another example, it is worth alluding to an episode, when, in 1676, *boiarin* Artamon Sergeyevich Matveev (1625–1682), the then-head of the *Posolskii prikaz*, read a passage from *the kuranty* to both the tsar and the *Boiarskaya Duma* about the exile of the Danish grand chancellor. In the text, there were many accusations against the chancellor and, interestingly, tsar Fedor soon started to blame Matveev of the same crimes. Soon after this, he was exiled.[122]

It is difficult to assess the reliability of Nikita Alekseev's information. Perhaps he just wanted to provide his government with information about revolts in general to show that the Russian tsars were not the only rulers facing such challenges. Such astuteness in providing highly relevant information demonstrated his ability as a diplomat, and he could expect praise and benefits in return for his service. Alekseev was indeed an experienced diplomat (later he would not only deliver assignments but also participated in negotiations, and he knew what the Russian government wanted to read in the report.[123]

In the very beginning of Autumn (3 September) Nikita Alekseev arrived in Stockholm by boat.[124] There he paid much attention to the visual impression of his entrance to the city and the visit to the king. He described the royal carriage, which was provided to meet him in the city harbor, and reception of the ceremonial master, called Christian Flever in the Russian sources.[125]

A few days later, Nikita Alekseev went to the king. He described the procession and noted that he sat on the right side of the ceremonial master which he also occupied on the way from the harbor to the house (in Russian diplomatic tradition a place, where ambassadors stand in foreign country was called *podvorie*). When the carriage arrived at the court, Alekseev saw nearly 50 people with guns, who were guards sent in his honor. Nikita dismounted from the carriage at the

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[122] Shamin, *Kuranty XVII stoletiya*, 112-113.

[123] Veselovskii, *D'iaki i pod'iachie*, 18.

[124] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, l. 7ob.

[125] Ibid.

porch, in Russia this was see as very honorable.[126] He also counted another 20 members of the guard, all equipped with guns.[127]

During the audience, king stood up and took off his hat to ask about tsars' health.[128] This was a reciprocal honor the king granted the Russian tsar although it was not common practice at the Swedish court. For example, when Aleksey Mikhailovich died, and a herald arrived to inform about the king about the new tsar, Swedish king Charles XI (the same king) did not ask about tsar's health. Herald Semen Protopopov pointed this ceremonial mistake and stated that the Emperor, French and Spanish kings, and other Christian rulers usually ask about tsar's health.[129]

After describing other parts of the audience Nikita Alekseev gave a list of persons, who were at the audience: the king's uncle, dukes, treasurer, and the chancellor.[130] After it, he described his way back to the carriage, and he started the description by mentioning the guard consisted of six persons with partisans (a kind of a pole weapon).[131] The mentioning and description of various weapons played an important role in the missions. For example, in the report about the grand embassy to Poland, led by Ivan Chaadaev (d. 1696) in 1683 for peace treaty ratification, the description of the guards with different weapons and guns occupied a significant place.[132] After

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[126] Iuzefovich, *Put' Posla*, 135.

[127] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, ll. 9ob-10.

[128] Ibid. l. 12.

[129] "I Semen govoril, chtob korolevskoe velichestvo prezh izvolil sprosit' sam pro zdorov'e velikogo gosudaria ego tsarskogo velichestva kak i vse velikie gosudari o INAUDIBLE tsesarskoe velichestvo Rimskoi i korolevskoe velichestvo Gishpanskoi i korolevskoe velichestvo Frantsuzhskii i inye gosudari khristianskie pro ego velikogo gosudaria ego tsarskogo velichestva o zdorov'e sprashivaiut sami pri ego tsarskogo velichestva poslannikah". RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, ll. 8ob-9.

[130] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, ll. 14ob-15.

[131] Ibid. l. 15.

[132] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 208, ll. 31ob. 34ob.

the audience, there was a feast in the herald's house. The first drink was raised in honor of the Russian tsars.[133]

The second audience before leaving Stockholm was also magnificent and accented the importance of the diplomat (who was just a herald) for the Swedish king. The monarch gave his letter on a textile known as azure taffeta.[134] Alekseev described the royal room as well-decorated in different colors and the king himself was in colorful clothes.[135]

These descriptions of court decorations were also common for diplomatic reports. In Chaadaev's embassy diary, there are many descriptions of the hall, where the audience took place or even of the royal boat, used to cross the Vistula: "A boat was painted with gold and color, in the middle of it was a room covered with red cloth. In that room there was a bench, covered by a carpet where the grand ambassadors sat".[136] This interest in decoration could be explained as a transfer of the symbols of power. As I mentioned, the authors of the reports were not interested in the description of the Other, but they were interested in seeing the other courts and their differences from Moscow royal residence. The description of Polish *insignia* was important as they were used to prove that the communication was equal between powerful, and reach sovereign rulers on one hand, and it also gave an opportunity for a kind of transfer of the symbolical means to represent royal power.

Gleb Kazakov pays much attention to a conversation between Nikita Alekseev and French ambassador François Bazin, marquis de Baudeville. This talk happened between two audiences. This conversation was possible because French diplomacy looked for contacts with Russia in order

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[133] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110. l. 15-15ob.

[134] Ibid. l. 17ob.

[135] "A korolevskoe velichestvo sam kak byl Nikita na priezde i na otpuske v tsvetnom plat'e i obitie bylo v polate na stene tsvetnoe zh". Ibid. l. 19.

[136] "A strug pisan zolotom i kraskami i posredi evo uchinen cherdachek pokryt chervchatym suknom, a v cherdachke na skam'e poslan byl kover na kotorom sideli velikie i polnomochnye posly". RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 208, l. 30.

to forge an alliance against Sweden, since the Swedish court tried to make an alliance with French enemies. In this delicate diplomatic situation, the French court had an interest in Russia and François Bazin was well-informed about the situation and even about the rebellion. He asked Nikita Alekseev about it, but Russian herald answered that in Moscow "everything is good and silent".[137] It is obvious that Russia diplomats tried not to mention the rebellion at all, and, if this problem was raised during negotiation, they tried to show very peaceful image of Muscovy, where there was no rebellion. Russian officials decided to silence any mutiny in the country in any communication with foreign dignitaries.

Gleb Kazakov says that in a common situation most Russian heralds chose the same conduct strategy. They denied any mutiny in Moscow even if European newspapers presented the situation totally differently and reported about the death of one tsar (in this case it was Ivan). As Kazakov shows, in the Austrian *Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv* there is information about negotiations with the Russian herald Nikifor Veniukov who was sent to Poland and the Holy Roman Empire (his *stateyniy spisok* did not survive). He had a talk with Jan Probst, the emperor's secretary. The conversation was about envy and discord between the two brothers who ruled Russia (Ivan and Peter). Veniukov denied it and proclaimed love and trust between the two tsars. He did not completely concealed the information about the rebellion but emphasized the just punishment of the corrupted elite, this punishment now helped these two brothers to rule in peace and harmony.[138] Russian diplomacy chose this strategy which, in the aftermath of the 1682 rebellion, led to an adjustment of diplomatic traditions in that the Russian court now sent two low-ranking missions headed by *gontsy* instead of only one followed by another customary grand embassy led by full ambassadors. This will be the focus of the following chapter.

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[137] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110. ll. 39ob-40.

[138] Kazakov, "Poezdka pod'iachego Nikity Alekseeva", 128-129.

Conclusions.

The emergence of newspapers had an important impact on political life in Europe. Russia also participated in news circulation, mostly through buying foreign newspapers or sending ambassadors to collect information about European affairs and about the image of Russia in foreign countries. This image was disrupted by the 1682 uprising and the Russian government decided to use diplomats to share information suggesting that everything was normal and stable.

Even if Russian diplomats tried to present the situation in the capital as normal and usual, the rumors about the real situation with lots of bloody and sometimes fictional details persisted. There was information about disagreements between the tsars (more precisely, between their mothers' families). This could question the sovereignty of Russian tsars, by implication, present significant diplomatic problems for Russia. The only way to respond to this situation was not only to end the rebellion but also to continue to show that politics and government in Russia had not been disrupted and all continued to function as normal.

Chapter 2. The Second Heralds' Missions

The collections of the Moscow Kremlin Museums include many treasures, *insignia* of power used, for example, during the tsars' coronations or funerals. Among them are several thrones, created for special occasions. One of them is a golden throne featuring two seats.[139] This throne was unusual in that it was created for two tsars, the half-brothers Ivan and Peter. This seat of power consists of two separate parts which are united by double-headed eagles and a golden baldachin across the top. This baroque construction replaced the single throne for the period when the two tsars ruled together with their sister Sophia Alekseevna as regent (1682-1689).[140] The throne, as an ultimate sign of sovereignty, served an important function, symbolizing the united political body of the two tsars following the Moscow uprising of 1682. This chapter focuses on how Muscovite diplomacy managed to represent the Russian court in the aftermath of rebellion as it faced the unusual situation that sovereignty was occupied by two monarchs while the country was governed by a female regent.

In what follows, I will show how the Russian foreign office started to deal with the crises caused by the *Strel'tsy* uprising (1682). The main aim of Russian diplomacy was to present the tsars as sovereign rulers and to protect their honor as an expression of their sovereignty. The *gontsy* dispatched to Sweden and Poland were used to find out about the position of foreign courts and the possibility of whether they questioned the legitimacy of the Russian tsars because of the rebellion. Contrary to established tradition, the Russian court sent a second embassy headed by heralds rather than dispatching a grand embassy (*velikoe posol'stvo*) led by high-ranking ambassadors. The task of the second herald was to inform foreign rulers about the end of the uprising and the execution of its leaders. During the mission, the heralds had to avoid any

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[139] Dvoinoi tron. *Muzei moskovskogo kremlia.* https://armoury-chamber.kreml.ru/exposure/view/vitrina-48-dvoynoy-tron-konets-xvii-veka/. (Accessed 11 June 2019)

[140] Sophia was Ivan V's sister and Peter I's half-sister.

mentioning of the rebellion as such and portray the Russian government as one following a normal course of affairs. The main aim of Russian diplomacy in 1682-1683, then, was to downplay the uprising and to present the recent transfer of power as a matter of course. This very uncommon situation led to the concealment of any break with previous practices. Importantly, the Russian court attempted two present the two rulers on the throne as one body by using special symbols, language, and titles.

The Second Heralds and the Sources about their Missions

The second heralds' missions took place only in Autumn 1682 after the first heralds had returned to Moscow. In September, *gonets* Semen Diadkin was sent to Poland,[141] and in November *gonets* Kondrat Nikitin was sent to Sweden.[142] As mentioned in the introduction, the situation with two *gontsy* mission was not typical for Russian diplomatic practice, but it was a forced measure, caused by the uprising. The main aim of these second heralds' missions was to show the restoration of the political order and present the Russian rulers as legitimate and sovereign monarchs.

These lower-ranking diplomats were tasked to start new communication with the Polish and Swedish courts, and to make sure that no one questioned the authority of Russian rulers in the context of the recent rebellion. The crucial point is that it would have been impossible for fully accredited 'grand ambassadors' (*velikie posly*) to do this: both their diplomatic rank and social status at home presented a great risk to the Russian court if they would have been exposed to serious challenges of the tsar's legitimacy which they represented. The social status of ambassadors (*posly*) in Russian society was of the highest order, as only *boiars* and princes (*kniazy*) could serve as ambassadors, while common nobles and clerks could be employed as (*gontsy*).[143] By implication, because ambassadors would have represented the tsars' sovereignty

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[141] Bantyish-Kamenskii N. N. *Obzor*. V. 3, 153-154.

[142] Ibid. V. 4, 199.

[143] Iuzefovic, *Put' Posla*, 53-54.

more directly, it would have caused a serious threat to tsars' honor if Swedish or Polish officials decided to impugn the legitimacy of Russian rulers based on their knowledge of the events in Moscow. *Gontsy*, on the other hand, because of their lower status, did not risk suffer the consequences of such humiliation to the same degree as *posly*.

In premodern Europe the question of the status of the ruler was important in terms of the sovereignty and independence of a state: "sovereignty was a matter of constant recognition of his or her status in the social order".[144] This also meant that status could be questioned by other rulers during, for example, diplomatic communication which could be dangerous for the standing of the Russian court in the political order. That is why the usage of low-ranking representatives, who also symbolize their ruler,[145] but to a lesser degree than grand ambassadors, was more reasonable and less dangerous. Presumably, any potential humiliation of the tsars' honor could be explained as an insult of a herald because of his low status rather than a direct affront against the Russian court.

It is necessary to mention that the documents from the Polish mission are a diplomatic report (*stateiniy spisok*), which is a kind of diary documenting the diplomatic mission, while the documents from the voyage to Sweden are internal bureaucratic documents, more focused on the preparation of the mission. There is no information where and how the "Polish" diary was written, but it is rather small, only 51 folios (*listy*). It is not certain how the *stateinye spiski* were created, presumably, in Moscow upon the embassy's return, based on the notes and paperwork that the embassy produced. The Swedish document consists of 441 folios. It was created in the *Posolskii prikaz* during the preparation of the embassy and contains much information about previous missions which served as precedents in preparing the new mission. Early modern diplomacy was mostly based on tradition and previous experience which is why such documents were vital for

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144 Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe*, 18.

145 Ibid, 96.

diplomac practice. Both sets of documents are useful for my research and show different aspects of political representation.

Semen Diadkin was appointed as herald to Poland. It was his first diplomatic mission according to Stepan Veselovskii who argues that Diadkin served as an undersecretary (*pod'iachii*) at the *prikaz* of Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1680 and later in Velikii Novgorod.[146] This *prikaz* was created to govern the former lands of Lithuania, and later it was subordinate to the *Posol'skii prikaz*.[147] Given his background in Muscovite bureaucracy, Diadkin looks like a person who was well-prepared for the mission. Veselovskii does not provide much information about Kondrat Nikitin who was send to Sweden. He just says that Nikitin worked as *pod'iachii* in the *Posol'skii prikaz* from 1683 till 1690.[148] This choice of the heralds raises questions about their experience and ability to serve as skilled diplomats in a dangerous situation. Possibly, the government decided that they only had to deliver the message and the main negotiation and symbolical action would take place when the grand ambassadors mission arrived later.

Communicating the Execution of the Rebels.
In this part I will show the importance of the rebellion leaders' execution for Muscovy political culture and self-representation. I will also analyze how the Russian government tried to present the execution to foreign courts without any mentioning of the rebellion as such.

The mission to Poland (September 1682) was the first one and the herald left Moscow when there was not yet any certainty as to the outcome of the rebellion. The Swedish mission occurred later after the rebellion had ended, and there was no need to use the *gonets* as a source of information for foreign courts about the defeat of the uprising. It is not certain from my sources, but it looks as though the Russian government had a plan to capture its leaders of the uprising,

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[146] Veselovskii, *Diaki i podiachie*, 166.

[147] Liseitsev, Rogozhin, Eskin, eds., *Prikazy Moskovskogo Gosudarstva*, 94.

[148] Veselovskii, *Diaki i podiachie*, 369.

who were members of Khovanskii family and to execute them, but the *gonets* to Poland received the news about execution only on the 20ᵗʰ of October in the city of Novgorodok (now Navahrudak, Belarus).

The Lithuanian *pristav* (a special person, who accompanied the diplomats) received and shared it with Semen Diadkin information about the execution of *boiar* and prince Ivan Andreyevich Khovanskii (d. 1682) and his son Andrey (d. 1682). The latter were Sophia's main allies and the leaders of the rebellion. Later they were accused of attempts of another coup to overthrow the Romanov dynasty to make Khovanskies a new ruling house of Russia. This situation is somehow common with the Time of Troubles when the Romanovs were accused on an attempt to poison tsar Boris Godunov (c. 1551-1605). They were exiled from Moscow to various monasteries in the North of Russia.[149] The destiny of Khovanskies was much severe.

The first information about them, received by the *pristav* was that these people were executed in the village Mariina roshcha, to the North of Moscow.[150] Nancy Kollmann argues that executions in early modern Russia were not full of ceremonies as other political events. Russian sources, speaking about executions, are not very verbose and descriptive.[151] This statement is challenged by the representations of the dismemberment of Stepan Razin which occurred as part of a well-prepared ritual.[152] But in this case, the execution was not a typical event. It was not public, and it was done very quickly, as the *strel'tsy* could rebel and try to save their leaders. That is why they were executed not in Moscow but in a village far from the city. Another problem here was with the status of the executed. Ivan Andreyevich was a *boiarin*, and, as Robert Crummey

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[149] Lavrent'ev, *Liudi i Veshchi*, 7-36.

[150] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, ll. 12-12ob.

[151] Nancy S. Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia*, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 289-302.

[152] Lavrent'ev and Maier, "Chetvertovanie kak publichnaia ceremoniia i penal'naia praktika v pravlenie tsaria Alekseia Mihajlovicha: pis'mennye i izobrazitel'nye istochniki," *Ocherki feodal'noj Rossii*, 20 (2017), 216-271.

says, there were only five *boiars* executed in the seventeenth century.[153] This execution, then, was an outstanding and extraordinary event for Russian politics. All these government actions show how uncertain they were about the situation.

Russian officials tried not to draw much attention to these events, neither in Russia, nor in its foreign policy. But they had to inform the heralds about the events in Moscow. After the execution, the *strel'tsy* started a fight in the city against merchants and other people. There were rumors that nearly 4000 people were killed.[154] After it, the *strel'tsy* with guns and artillery barricaded themselves somewhere in the Kremlin for three days[155]. Later they started to look for the patriarch's protection and negotiation of their surrender.[156]

The defeat of the uprising had a great impact on the Russian court, including diplomacy. The execution of the leaders was an important event, signifying the government's victory over the rebellion and the restoration of its legitimacy and the tsars' sovereignty over the country. The fact that now no one in Russia had the power to question the tsars made Russian diplomacy more sustainable and it also strengthened the tsars' legitimacy in international relations. This is one of the reasons why in the *posol'skaia kniga* the execution of the Khovanskies was mentioned twice.

The second time was soon after the *gonets* entered Lviv. At that moment Polish king John III Sobieski (1629-1696) resided in that city. It was not easy to find out where exactly the king was at that moment, however. In Grodno, the diplomats had to stop for a while, as the Lithuanian hetman Jan Kazimierz Sapieha the Younger (1637–1720) did not know where the king at that very

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[153] Robert O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and servitors: the boyar elite in Russia, 1613-1689*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 225.

[154] "Strel'tsy s ynymi vsiakih chinov sluzhebnymi i torgovymi lyudmi mezh sebia uchinili boi i na tom boiu butto pobito s oboih storon bolshi chetyrekh tysyach chelovek". RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, ll. 12ob.

[155] Ibid. ll. 12ob-13.

[156] Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia*, 366.

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moment was and had to use the post service to confirm the location of the ruler.[157] The source does not give any information as to why John III was on the Ukrainian territories at that moment. Russian historian Kirill Kochegarov argues that Polish elites wanted to exploit the uprising and the inability of the Russian government to take back some of the lands, lost during the Russo-Polish War (1654–1667)[158]. Presumably, this was the reason why King John arrived in Lviv. This shows that the symbolism of a ruler's presence bore the risk of resulting in real war. It also signifies the importance of the diplomatic mission of the *gontsy* who were tasked to communicate the restoration of the political order and to inform European rulers that the situation of the tsars was under control.

Against this backdrop the embassy's entrance into Lviv had to be well-organized. Polish nobles met Semen Diadkin at a half kilometer before the city.[159] They gave to the Russian herald one of the king's horses and rode to Lviv on the left side of the *gonets*.[160] In the city, many nobles on horses met this procession and became a part of it, following the diplomat to the *dvor* (a building, where ambassadors with their retinue lived during the mission).[161]

Soon after the solemn entry, the *pristav* provided more information about the Khovanskies to the *gonets*. The information was about Ivan Andreyevich and it was really scary. The prince and his children wanted to become the ruler of the Moscow lands[162]. He also was guilty of many other crimes "that no man's brain can accommodate, and no words can describe".[163] The Romanovs'

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[157] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, ll. 13ob-14ob.

[158] Kirill Kochegarov, *Rech' Pospolitaya i Rossiya v 1680–1686 godah: Zaklyuchenie dogovora o Vechnom mire*, (Moscow: Indrik, 2008), 101-148.

[159] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, l. 17.

[160] Ibid. ll. 18-18ob.

[161] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, l. 18ob.

[162] "V Moskovskom gosudarstve vladetelem". RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, l. 19ob.

[163] "Chevo ne tokmo cheloveku uchinit', no i v razum cheloveku ne vmestitsia, i napisat' togo ni kotorymi slovami nevozmozhno". Ibid.

enemy was presented as a real devil, who wanted something very evil which will destroy common political order. The problem is that there is no 'real' information about Ivan Andreyevich Khovanskii's crimes. The information available demonized the *boiarin* but is silent as to the nature of these crimes, except his wish to become a ruler. Interestingly, in the sources the prince, as an 'evil force', is portrayed as wanting to become '*v gosudarstve vladetelem*' (the state possessor), not a tsar, which is connected with the tsar's title which I will focus on later in this chapter.

As mentioned above, the Khovanskiis had previously been the main allies of Sophia and the leaders of the rebellion. The Russian government, led by Sophia, did not want any mentioning of the uprising and presumably tried to replace the memory of the rebellion and the Khovanskiis' role in it by painting a picture of many other disgusting crimes. It helped Russian officials to defame a rival without mentioning the rebellion which could question the sovereignty of the rulers.

The Representation of two Tsars on one Throne
In this section I will explore the problem of representing two tsars, which confronted the *Posolskii prikaz* with difficulties. The Russian government used all means for achieving this aim, including the tsar's letter to foreign rulers and linguistic constructs, used to merge two tsars into one political body.

The *gontsy* took many things on their voyage. Arguably the most important ones were the tsar's letters, known as *gramoty* in Russian. They were crucial for the mission, as they approved the authority of the diplomats and gave to the foreign court the main information about the mission and the political information the tsar wished to communicate to a foreign court. Another function was not practical, but symbolical. The letters were understood to be the words of the tsar, his direct speech in a dialog with other rulers. It is possible to claim that these letters were a specifically semiotic system and its every element has its own symbolical meaning, even in its visually decorative part. Marija Jansson showed this in her study of English seventeenth century

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decorations of letters sent to the Russian court. She argues that these decorations were different for different political or economic purposes.[164]

This also can be demonstrated by studying the texts of the letters and its visual embellishment. Another source of evidence is the work by Grigory Kotoshikhin.[165] Kotoshikhin's book is arguably the most famous description of seventeenth-century Muscovy, composed not by a foreign diplomat or merchant, but by a former *pod'iachii* (a clerk from the *Posolskiy prikaz*), during his exile in Sweden. The book gives an account of the Russian court and government. In this work, Kotoshikhin showed how the state functioned, including the use of letters in diplomacy.

Kotoshikhin provided, amongst others, information about the titles of different rulers used in the correspondence with foreign powers: from Siberian princes, Holy Roman Emperors, Safavid shahs or Ottoman sultans. He also describes different sizes of the paper for the letters, as these indicated the different status of various rulers. Kotoshikhin also mentioned different golden limnings in the shape of herbal representations in the margins of the letters, also corresponding to distinctions of prestige.[166] Such decorations were created by unique goldmasters, who were employed to create Orthodox icons, but also to write the first part of the tsar's title with golden inks.[167]

The title of rulers was an important part of the letters: it signified the tsar's power, legitimacy, and its origins. It consists of different parts such as *invocatio* and *intitulatio*. Each of

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[164] Marija Jansson, *Art and Diplomacy: Seventeenth-Century English Decorated Royal Letters to Russia and the Far East*, (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 235.

[165] Igor Smirnov, "Kotoshihin Grigorii Karpov," in *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi. Vypusk 3. XVII v. CHast' 2. I-O*, ed. Dmitrii Likhachev (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 186-190.

[166] Kotosixin, *O Rossii v carstvovanie Alekseja Mixajlovica*, 49-54.

[167] Zinaida Kalyshevich, "Khudozhestvennaia masterskaia Posol'skogo prikaza v XVII v. i rol' zolotopistsev v ee sozdanii i deiatel'nosti," *Russkoe gosudarstvo v XVII veke. Sbornik statej*, ed. Nikolai Ustyugov (1961), 392 – 412.

these parts had special symbolical meaning. For example, the *invocatio* usually presented the tsar's power as given by the Holy Trinity.

The mentioning of the Holy Trinity in the very beginning was commonplace in nearly all the letters. Only Muslim rulers were an exception of this tradition.[168] Christian rulers, on the other hand always read about the tsar's power as given by the Holy Trinity. For example, every letter, created during the reign of tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich, sent to the Swedish kings (including Charles XI, who was king from 1660 till nearly the end of the seventeenth century, and received Kondrat Nikitin mission). These letters are now available in the Swedish Royal archive.[169] They start with the phrase "God, glorifying in Trinity". Scholars believe, that these phrases, that have liturgical and Biblical parallels, were used to emphasize the Orthodox nature of the tsar's power.[170] At the time of Ivan the Terrible (1530-1584) the *invocatio* was even used to show Trinity and St. Mary as protectors of Russian realm.[171]

The situation was the same in 1682 but with some important differences when comparing the Swedish and Polish cases. In the letter to Charles XI, sent in 1682, it is possible to find the same formula used in previous letters to Swedish kings. This formula says that tsars Ivan and Peter are rulers by the grace of God, glorifying in Trinity.[172] In the letters to Polish king John III Sobieski the *invocatio* was much longer, invoking the eternal grace of God, united in the three shining hypostases, who gave all good and light, created all mankind and gave peace.[173] Some of these

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[168] Filiushkin A.I. *Tituly russkih gosudarei*, 99.

[169] Muscovitica 618: Tsarernas originalbrev № 26–39, 1659–1666.

[170] Filiushkin A.I. *Tituly russkih gosudarei*, 99.

[171] Konstantin Erusalimskii, "Trinitarnoe bogoslovie v diplomaticheskih poslaniiah Ivana Groznogo. Berkovskie chteniia," *Kniznaia kultura v kontekste mezdunarodnikh kontaktov*, (2019), 141.

[172] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 111, l. 26.

[173] "Boga v trekh prisnosiiatel'nyh ipostasiakh edinosushchnago, prebeznachal'nogo, blag vsekh vinovango svetodavtsa, Im zhe vsia bysha chelovecheskomu rodu, mir daruiushchago milostiiu". RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 205, l. 2.

parts of the *invocatio* are similar to the Slavonic text of Credo and could be seen as a paraphrase of it. More research is required to unpack the meaning of these different formulas, which I cannot do here given the scope of the thesis.

These differences in the *invocatio* forms an interesting part of cross-confessional diplomacy and show the different ways in which Orthodox Russia communicated its sovereign dignity in relations with the Catholic Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth and Protestant Sweden. Confessional differences remained an important issue in seventeenth-century diplomacy, not only in Russia. For example, Daniel Riches shows how an internal struggle against Huguenots in France impacted on the French king's relations with Sweden and even led to a Swedish-Brandenburg Protestant alliance.[174] It is useful, therefore, to study the *invocatio* from a confessional perspective as an "alignment of political and religious spheres", as the confessional difference in the early modern period strongly influenced "the intermediaries' legal status and strategies of mediation and self-fashioning".[175]

Another significant part of the letters was *intitulatio*, where all the tsar's titles and lands were listed. Every word here could be a reason for disputes between governments. For example, the title tsar was not commonly accepted by all European rulers, especially not by Polish-Lithuanian kings.[176]

In 1682, Ivan and Peter were titled as "sovereigns, tsars and grand princes" as usual, albeit in the plural.[177] The problem was with their names. Since the very first letter, these two tsars were mentioned as "Ioann Alekseevich Petr Alekseevich". According to the rules of modern Russian grammar there had to be the conjunction "and" (Russian "*i*") separating their names.[178] The

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[174] Riches, "The Rise of Confessional Tension", 568-592.

[175] Krstić and van Gelder, "Introduction", 100.

[176] Filiushkin, *Tituly russkih gosudarei*, 124-151.

[177] "Gosudari, tsari i velikie kniazi". RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, l. 2.

[178] Ibid.

absence of the conjunction is crucial for understanding the situation. In this case the problem of language and the usage of words is important as "language is always a sensitive indicator of cultural changes"[179] and also of political changes.

The situation of two tsars on one throne was highly unusual and called for changes in their joint representation. Two tsars in power could potentially be seen as a symbol of some malfunctioning in the political order. There had to be only one tsar, any competitor had to be an impostor, the presence of which created great anxieties going back to the Time of Troubles at the turn to the seventeenth century. As Boris Uspenskiy writes, in Russia, the appearance of impostors related to the religious sphere. This was connected to the idea of a good and true tsar, given by God, and the possible threat that he could be replaced by a bad one by some mysterious evil forces. This shows how much the legitimacy was connected with God and how easily the sovereignty of a ruler could be questioned if he demonstrated wrong behavior and did not do what his subjects believed he had to do.[180]

One possible reading of the two-tsar-scenario was that Russian officials wanted to avoid any mentioning of one tsar being an impostor. Therefore, the joint apearance of the two tsars in diplomatic correspondence had to represent them as one political body. They also had to show their equality. These circumstances could be as possible reasons for not using any conjunction between Ivan's and Peter's names. An "i" ("and") between the two names could be construed as a separation between two rulers, while political reasons required that the two rulers be represented as one persona, in one body of the tsar. Linguist Andrei Zalizniak claimed that in Old Russian language (in medieval period) connections between the same grammatical elements of the sentence were possible without a conjunction, even if in modern Russian a conjunction would be necessary. He suggests that the usage of "i" was not as neutral as it is now, and, according to Zalizniak, it was

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[179] Peter Burke, *Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.

[180] Boris Uspenskii, *Izbrannie trudy. T.1. Semiotika istorii. Semiotika kul'tury* (Moscow: Nauka, 1994), 75-109

possible to omit the conjunction when the parts of the sentence were of equal significance. Zalizniak continued this thought with an example of family members, named without conjunction when they formed "a natural monolith".[181] The only problem with this linguistic evidence for early modern diplomatic letters is that this data was collected and relevant for the medieval period (eleventh to thirteenth centuries) and not for early modern Russian. With this caution in mind, it is possible to allude to these linguistic constructions to better understand the representation of Ivan and Peter as a unified body, not least because the absence of conjunctions between the tsars' two names are strikingly similar to the examples given by Zalizniak.

The two-tsar scenario is reminiscent of the *corpus mysticum*, as analyzed by Ernst Kantorowicz to describe the political body of the Church as incarnated in the person of the Pope.[182] Later it was used by medieval states to create and show their own eternal political corporative bodies. Scholars claim that in seventeenth-century Russia, the state was not separated from its ruler as it was in Europe.[183] In a situation of two tsars on one throne, the officials used all the means, even grammatical, to show that there was only one person at the top, even if in reality it was two different men.

Another attempt to show different persons as one body can be seen in the list of diplomats. Traditionally, a Muscovite embassy was headed by three ambassadors. The list of the diplomats in the very beginning of grand ambassadors' report also presented the ambassadors without any conjunction but with commas.[184] This aspect should be studied more carefully, as in the same

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[181] Andei Zaliznyak, *Drevnenovgorodskii dialekt* (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 190.

[182] Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), 207-231.

[183] Oleg Kharkhordin, *Osnovnye poniatiia rossiiskoi politiki* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2011), 21-30.

[184] "Blizhnemu okolnichemu i namestniku Muromskomu Ivanu Ivanovichiu Chaadaevu, dumnomu dvorianinu i namestniku Bolhovskomu Lukianu Timofeevichu Golosovu, d'iaku Petru Ivanovu". RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 208, l. 2.

situation in the same report from Sweden the list of ambassadors was presented with conjunction "da" (also common with English "and"). [185] Andrei Zalizniak showed that "da" had more counterpositional meaning than other variations of conjunction.[186]

In brief, these representations show how Russian diplomatic practice responded to a situation in which upheaval threatened the legitimacy of the monarch, and how it adjusted – however small the changes might seem – representational elements in diplomatic contacts to 'normalize' the situation.

Sophia, the Regent

In this section I examine the role of tsarevna Sophia in Russian foreign policy and her first steps in the field of political representation. Even if the government was led successfully by a woman, there are only small hints on her real role in political processes.

Florian Kühnel claims that "early modern diplomacy clearly depended to a large extent on the participation of women".[187] He means first of all the women participation in diplomatic affairs as ambassadors' wives, not their participation in diplomacy as rulers, but Kühnel discernment also holds true for the role of Regent Sophia in Russian diplomacy and political representation. Isolde Thyrêt argues that women were usually seen as spiritual helpers for their husbands and intercessors for the state, tsar and his subject.[188] Sophia is usually presented in a different way, as a transitional figure with cultural and political creativity, who combined policy with Western ideas.[189]

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[185] "Blizhnemu okolnichemu i namestniku Cheboksarskomu Ivanu Afonas'evichyu, da stolniku i namestniku Borovskomu Petru Ivanovichyu Pronchishchevym, da d'yaku Vasil'yu Ivanovichyu Bochininu". RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 112, l. 1.

[186] Zaliznyak, *Drevnenovgorodskii dialekt*, 192.

[187] Kühnel, "'Minister-like Cleverness, Understanding and Influence on Affairs'", 131.

[188] Thyrêt, *Between God and Tsar*, 7, 12.

[189] Ibid, 139.

Isolde Thyrêt has a different idea about Sophia's rule and believes her reign was "sanctioned by socioreligious conventions surrounding royal wives and daughters, which were flexible enough to accommodate new, even secular, notions of sovereignty in Russia".[190] While it is hard to disagree with this conclusion, Sophia's role as regent, governing a state at the top of which stood two separate but united sovereigns, was hardly reflected in diplomatic correspondence. Only in 1686, did Sophia add her name in the official royal title.[191] But there are some details in the diplomatic sources that are useful to show Sophia's role in politics, decision-making, and in the symbolical sphere. Unfortunately, the documents of the *Posol'skii Prikaz* are sometimes scarce and they did not give much direct information about it. There are only some faint traces of tsarevna Sophia and her representation.

In the summer of 1682, the two young tsars went to the famous Russian monastery Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius. This was the usual royal visit to Russian holy places. The Lavra also was an ideal place to hide from Moscow as it was not only a monastery but a strong fortress that prevented a siege in the Time of Troubles. It was a place where tsars and their court could safely create a plan how to execute Khovanskii and to rule the country.

The *Posolskii prikaz* organized the delivery of the *vesti-kuranty* to the monastery and it is possible to assume that the monastery became an important place in Russian diplomatic process. For example, the second heralds' missions were designed at the Lavra, as the documents of the embassy to Sweden show. The documentation suggests that Sophia is also mentioned in these sources. There is no name in the document, but the sister of a tsar is mentioned as *gosudarinya*. Presumably, this was Sophia. She was not only a background actor, but a full participant in the decision-making process: "On October 25, … tsars Ioann Alekseevich Petr Alekseevich […] and their sister pious (*blagovernaia*) *gosudaryna tsarevna* […] gave order to release a grant for a grand

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[190] Ibid, 141.

[191] Shamin, *Kuranty*, 124.

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embassy to Sweden".[192] Presumably, it is Sophia, who is mentioned as "pious *gosudaryn'a tsarevna*". This could be the first evidence of her governing, since until the rebellion there was no mention of Sophia at all.[193] The absence of her name here is possibly an echo of the tradition of not mentioning of royal women in official documents.

Another significant episode is also connected with Sweden and the mission of Nikita Alekseev, studied in the previous chapter. After the last audience at Charles XI's court, the herald went to a townhouse (*podvorie*) in Stockholm. There he had a feast, given by king, with participation of some Swedish officials. During such feasts there were special toasts to rulers. In the Russian tradition, the first drink was always for the tsar raised to his health (or at least it had to be so according to the text of diplomatic reports).[194] In 1682, the first toast was also to the tsars, the second one was for the Swedish king. But, uncommonly, there was a third one. This was for the "*gosudaryn' tsarits*".[195] "*Tsaritsa*" is the term to describe women of the royal house (usually the tsar's wife or mother).[196] It seems that it is possible to find Sophia under this formula, as she was also named "tsarevna", which is very close to "tsaritsa". This was an attempt at endowing Sophia with status by accommodating her name in a diplomatic ceremony. During previous[197] and further[198] missions all drinks were only for men, without any mentioning of any female relatives of the tsars. This mention raised the status of Sophia, as she was mentioned as the second person

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[192] "Oktiabria v 25 den' velikie gosudari tsari i velikie kniazi Ioann Alekseevich Petr Alekseevich vsea Velikaia i Malaia i Belaia Rosii samoderzhtsy, i sestra ikh blagovernaia gosudaryna tsarevna slushav sei vypiski v svoem gosudarskom pohode v Troitskom Sergieve monastyre ukazali dat' svoevo velikih gosudarey zhalovaniia dlia sveiskogo posol'stva velikim poslom". RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 111, l. 15.

[193] Hughes, *Sofiya Alekseyevna and the Moscow Rebellion*, 518.

[194] Leonid Iuzefovic, *Put' posla*, 226.

[195] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, l. 15ob.

[196] Thyrêt, *Between God and Tsar*, 142.

[197] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 102, ll. 11ob-12.

[198] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 111, l. 13.

after the two tsars in an official ceremony. Giving due honor to a regent in a ceremony contradicted the policy of concealing changes in politics, which is the reason why there were no further toasts for Sophia, at least in Russian official diplomatic sources.

Ottoman threat.

Geographically early modern Russia always could participate in an alliance with its neighbors against other nearby countries (if they had not made an alliance against Muscovy). This led to a complicated system of alliances and rivalries between Russia, Crimea, Poland, Sweden and other countries of the region. Some of these relations are well-studied such as the relations between Poland and Crimea, but the others still need more research.[199] While these relations are not within the scope of this thesis, it is worth touching on the role of the wars against the Ottoman empire. One reason why the rebellion in Moscow was less likely to result in a serious challenge against the sovereignty of the tsars in the perception of foreign rulers (despite the information about the rebellion that circulated in Europe) was that Muscovy was a potential ally for the powers who were at war with the Ottoman Empire.

When Semen Diadkin mission reached Lviv to visit Polish king John, he had a conversation with the *pristav*. This talk was about the Ottoman empire and the Treaty of Bakhchisarai (1681) that ended the war between Russia and the Ottoman empire and its vassal, the Crimean khanate. The *pristav* tried to convey to the herald that the Ottomans are deceitful, and this peace treaty would not last long.[200] He knew this from the Polish prisoners who had been released by the sultan and had already arrived at the court of the Polish king.[201] Diadkin had no authority to participate in negotiations, but on the way back to Moscow he had a conversation with a Polish nobleman

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[199] Dariusz Kolodzeiczik, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th century: a study of Peace TreatiesFollowed by Annotated Documents)*, (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

[200] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 206, l. 20ob.

[201] Ibid. l. 21.

(*szlachtich*) who predicted war to start next Spring.[202] Presumably, this could be read as an invitation to participate in the war against the Ottomans, at least from the point of view of what followed. When the grand ambassadors arrived in Warsaw in 1683 to ratify peace treaties, they also had to negotiate an alliance against the Ottoman empire, even if they enjoyed no authority to make any agreements about it.[203] At the same time, the Polish Seim ratified an alliance between the Polish king and Emperor Leopold I (1640-1705) against the Ottoman Empire. Russian ambassadors were informed about it in the beginning of the negotiation.[204]

All this important for my research. It shows what were the priorities of Poland and Sweden after the Moscow uprising. They knew about it but were too busy with Ottoman affairs. They decided that the fight against the Ottoman Empire (the Battle for Vienna would happen in 1683, a year after the rebellion in Moscow) was more important than exploiting the weakness of Muscovy because of the mutiny.

Conclusions.

The rebellion and the spread of information about it in European printed media posed many questions for the Russian government. They even had to send one more heralds' mission after the first heralds' return. This was done to avoid any threats to the tsars' sovereignty. The potential questioning of the grand ambassadors' legitimacy in connection with the rebellion and the status of the tsars would have resulted in a more serious insult because of their higher status and a more direct representation of the Russian monarch.

The heralds were also sent to understand what European rulers knew about the uprising and the situation in Russia. They had to present to foreign courts the kind of information that the Russian government deemed fit for diplomatic representation, avoiding any impression of serious

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[202] Ibid. l. 44ob.

[203] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 208, l. 61ob.

[204] Ibid. l. 61.

disruption or a challenge to the ruler's legitimacy, be it the two tsars on the throne, their (half-) sister as regent or the rebellion itself. As such they had to clarify the news about *boiar* Khovanskii's execution, but without any mentioning of Khovanskii's role in the uprising or even without any words about the mutiny in Moscow whatsoever.

The heralds, as any diplomat, had to represent their rulers at foreign courts. In this representation, letters played an important role. It is interesting to note that the *Posol'skii prikaz* changed the *invocatio* (a part showing the divine origin of the royal power) in the letter to Poland and made it larger and more significant with more Biblical parallels than usual. The tsar's title also had some changes as now the letters represented not only one tsar but two. Both names were put into the letter, but the scribers did not use any conjunction for their names in any of the letters, which suggests that the ambassadorial chancellery aimed at portraying the two tsars as one political body and avoid the impression of any serious challenge to the throne: they demonstrated that the two tsars appeared as one "monolithic" political body.

Ceremonies were a significant part in early modern royal representations. In this case, the ceremonies show that even Regent Sophia appeared in the ritual. The evidence is scarce, but it is possible to see that in 1682 Sophia aimed at gaining some public ceremonial status, expressed at least in the toasts at the feast after the royal audience.

Conclusion.

Grand ambassadors, or *velikie posly* in Russian, represented the highest level in the Russian diplomatic ranking system. They were sent to foreign powers to represent their ruler and to make agreements in his name. They also ratified peace treaties and confirmed these treaties after a monarch's death. For example, at the beginning of the *posol'skaia kniga* of the *velikii posol* Ivan Chaadaev's mission to Poland (dispatched after the first two *gontsy*), the following entry can be found: "when by God's will a great ruler moves from this world to eternal blessing, then the great ruler, his heir, should inform other rulers through his ambassadors for the sake of observing the peace treaty. He also should declare his will for friendship and confirm with other rulers, who have the same intentions, the peace treaty by their royal letters".[205]

In the 1682 case, the grand ambassadors departed from Moscow only a year after Tsar Fedor's death in May 1682. Grand ambassador Ivan Chaadaev went to Poland on the 21 of January.[206] Grand ambassador Ivan Pronchishchev (d. 1687) mission went to Sweden only on the 16th of June[207]. Instead two consecutive missions led by lower-ranking heralds were sent to both Poland-Lithuania and Sweden shortly after the tsar had passed away, which presented a clear break with previous practice in Muscovy because of the circumstances of the rebellion. One possible explanation for this lies in the diplomatic ranking system. In early modern diplomacy, the face-to-face practices that determined the status of ambassadors was crucial, as diplomatic ranks and distinctions did not simply follow a legally fixed pattern but were the result of direct encounters

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[205] "Budet izvoleniem Bozhim priluchittsa kotoromu velikomu gosudariu s sego sveta na vechnoe blazhenstvo pereselittsa, togda po nem nasledstvuiushchemu velikomu gosudariu dlia neporushimogo poderzhaniia togo peremirnogo dogovoru drugovo gosudaria chrez svoikh poslov obvestit'. I o sklonnosti svoei k druzhbe obiavit, chto potomu drugoi gosudar' vzaimno imeet uchinit' i tot peremirnoi dogovor podtverzhennymi svomi gosudarskimi gramotami v obshche oboi velikie gosudari podverditi dolzhny budut". RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 208, ll. 2ob-3.

[206] Bantyish-Kamenskii, *Obzor*. V. 3, 153.

[207] Ibid. V. 4, 200.

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and mutual recognition.[208] The ranks of diplomats were connected with the sovereignty of a ruler, as high-ranking ambassadors represented the majesty of their masters through various visual and ritual attributes. Not all rulers could send first-rank ambassadors, however. In theory, only monarchs who were recognized as equal and sovereign enjoyed this right.[209] The questioning of a ruler's ability to send ambassadors could signify significant problems for his or her status and position in the political order, it could signify that a ruler did not have enough honor to be recognized as a sovereign and equal player in diplomacy. To avoid this risk at a time when the Russian court faced a successions crisis and a rebellion which put the tsar's legitimacy at stake, and when it knew that information about these events circulated in Europe, Russian officials decided to send one more herald instead of an ambassador, since the lower rank of the *gonets* also meant less exposure to such status questions.

This breach of Muscovite diplomatic custom was caused by the uncertainty about the representation of the new Russian rulers, Ivan V and Peter I. The two tsars on one throne was an uncommon situation; moreover, at the very beginning of their reign, a bloody rebellion burst out. Revolts challenged the sovereignty of the tsars and questioned whether the tsars were still legitimate and able to wield authority over all Russian territories. This was a great danger for their honor, and, by implication, their sovereignty. This challenge demanded a special language in the correspondence with foreign rulers.[210]

Moreover, the increased circulation of printed media in the seventeenth century changed the ways in which information spread. The news about the rebellion in Russia reached many parts of Europe. The Russian government tried to influence this process and to maintain an appropriate

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[208] Krischer, "Das Gesandtschaftswesen und das vormoderne Völkerrecht," in *Rechtsformen internationaler Politik: Theorie, Norm und Praxis vom 12. bis 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Michael Jucker, Martin Kintzinger and Rainer Christoph Schwinges (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2011), 197-239.

[209] Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe*, 90-108.

[210] Griesse, "State-Arcanum and European Public Spheres", 205-269.

image of the state by diplomatic means, since Muscovy was not a center of news-production which made it difficult to influence the dissemination of information through printed media. In early modern Europe, printed newspapers were not the only way of collecting and spreading information. Private communication and letters were often believed to be a more reliable source of information for many people. That is why the method of using diplomats and different kinds of actors such as merchants to collect and to spread news and information was still in great demand. The Russian government, after the 1682 rebellion, also decided to use diplomats (heralds, more precisely) to show that everything was stable in Russia and that the rebellion had had no impact on political affairs in Russia or on the status of the tsar.

The Russian government decided not to communicate much about their victory over the uprising or show how they dealt with the rebels. They just decided not to speak about the uprising at all. The diplomats had to present Muscovy as a peaceful place, where everything went in a harmonious manner, without any revolt. This silence about the rebellion had an impact on diplomatic information and communication. For example, the news about the execution of the Khovanskiis, the leaders of the rebellion, was presented as an execution of horrible criminals rather than leaders of a rebellion. They were described as persons who wanted to commit cruel crimes, but not as instigators of an uprising. Russian diplomacy informed everyone about their execution (like it did after the execution of another rebellious leader, Stenka Razin in 1671), but it did not give the real reason for their execution. At that time there were many rumors about the uprising and Muscovite affairs, so Russian officials had to show how they dealt with the mutiny successfully while suppressing information about the events of the rebellion themselves.

Another problem was the representation of two tsars. This situation was very unique, and Russian diplomacy had to find necessary forms to represent two tsars instead of one. The double-seated throne was one expression of this new situation. Royal letters to foreign rulers was another important way to communicate and reinforce the legitimacy of the two tsars. These letters were presented in direct speech of the rulers. They were highly official bureaucratic and repetitive

documents, created to represent the tsar and his legitimacy as a ruler whose power derived from the grace of God. The first part of the letters was the *invocatio*, in which the ideas of the tsar's power was expressed. It also showed the divine origin of the power and presented Trinity and Saint Mary.[211] The *invocatio* to Poland and Sweden showed important differences which can be explained by confessional reasons and will require more research beyond the scope of this thesis.

An important point in the letters is the tsars' names and the way how they were presented. The absence of a conjunction between their names is a very significant point. The conjunction was omitted to show two tsars as more united, as two different persons, who have the same equal status, and this status was more important for the legitimacy of their joint rule, than signifying the two tsars as separate persons: this was an attempt to present the tsars as one political body. As a point of interest, it is worth mentioning that the list of ambassadors also had the same structure without a conjunction. Possibly, in this case, Russian officials also wanted to present the three heads of a grand embassy as one body representing the tsar's political body. There is limited linguistic research about conjunctions in Old Russian language that would endorse my point. However, the relevant work by the late Andrei Zalizniak, which is based on large linguistic data, support my argument about the one symbolical body of two tsars.[212] More research has to be done to develop this argument. The tsars' names also could be a reason for symbolical, diplomatic struggle, when Polish officials in their letters called tsar "Ioann" just "Ivan".[213] This incident shows the importance of diplomatic form and the Russian court's strict avoidance of any precedent in the usage of protocol according to established tradition.

The new two tsars were too young and weak to rule independently. Their sister, Tsarenva Sophia was appointed as regent and ruled the country for the next seven years (till 1689). Usually Sophia was presented as an imperious woman and Russian diplomatic sources provide enough

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[211] Erusalimskii, "Trinitarnoe bogoslovie", 127-142.

[212] Zaliznyak, *Drevnenovgorodskii dialekt*, 190.

[213] RGADA, f. 79, op. 1, d. 205, l. 4, 5ob.

data to see some points of her political representation and participation in governing the state. For example, Sophia was mentioned as one of decision-makers when *pod'iachii* Kondrat Nikitin's mission to Sweden was prepared.[214] A more significant episode occurred during a previous "Swedish" mission, led by Nikita Alekseev. After the royal audience, herald Alekseev went to his house in Stockholm with Swedish officials to have a feast. There the third toast was for royal women (the first two were for the two tsars and a king).[215] Sophia's name was not mentioned directly but the tsars were unmarried at that moment and Sophia is the only woman that could be mentioned in this situation. This means that her high status was recorded in the diplomatic reports.

Russian diplomacy, then, had to deal with very uncommon scenarios, and they tried to present their position as following the normal course of affairs as though nothing had happened. After such a bloody rebellion and the emergence of a new structure of the political order with two tsars and a female regent who governed the state, the emphasis on regularity and routine was key to stability and status recognition. After all, the grand ambassadors reached foreign capitals, ratified the treaties and established diplomatic communication between the new tsars and the kings of Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. The Ottoman threat helped Russia to deal with the recognition of the tsar's status at foreign courts in that Muscovy was a potential ally in the war against the Ottomans. All these embassies are also an interesting example of how Russians practiced diplomacy in times of crisis, but their study demand more comparison with previous diplomatic missions to understand the shifts in diplomatic norms.

This work is about how the tsars' government tried to act in a crisis and how they used diplomacy to deal with it. It also shows which means Russian officials used and what possibilities existed to project the tsar's power and legitimacy. In a situation when the Russian position was

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[214] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 111, l. 15.

[215] RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, d. 110, l. 15ob.

weak, diplomats had to present the situation as stable and conceal important developments and events if they posed a threat to the tsar's honor, and by implication, his sovereign status.

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