I Would Never Have a Third Kid:
Pronatal Awareness, Resistance, and Strategic Compliance in Hungary and the United States

By

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Gender Studies

In partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Arts in Gender Studies

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Budapest, Hungary
2019

Abstract

As right-wing, nationalist parties gain popularity across the globe, governments have increasingly tied family welfare policies to reversing population decline and preventing further immigration. Although scholars have long studied the impact of family policy incentives on demographic outcomes, little attention has been paid to individuals' actual awareness of these policies or to the role of men and women as active agents in resisting state benefits. Through 26 qualitative interviews with prospective parents, this study compares individuals' responses to pronatalism in Hungary, a country with an established family policy infrastructure, and the United States, a country with a history of limited government family welfare. In Hungary, individuals were widely knowledgeable about how they could benefit from having larger families, but constructed instinctual narratives about parenthood or considered migration to resist the government's conspicuous pronatalism. In the United States, female respondents had much greater policy knowledge and anxiety about parenthood than male respondents. To cope with their anxiety, American female respondents relied on individualized strategies and redefined their expectations for equal partnership. American male respondents prematurely resorted to traditional gendered divisions of labor. While all other respondents maintained that their fertility intentions could not be altered, American female respondents expressed shifting financial preferences for children, a strategy that may allow these women to reclaim agency in the face of limited support. Altogether, this research reveals that policymakers can no longer ignore subjects' active role in determining the relative success of different fertility incentives. Family policies that discount this role are unlikely to achieve their intended aims.

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of biographical reference.

I further declare that the following word counts for this thesis are accurate.

Body of thesis (all chapter excluding notes, references, appendices, etc.): 18,620
Entire manuscript: 23,228

Signed _____
Erica Mildner

Acknowledgements

This thesis is the product of immense professional and personal support. I would like to thank my supervisor, Éva Fodor, for her constant guidance and feedback throughout the research and writing process. I am especially grateful for her expertise and patience in explaining the intricacies of Hungarian family policy to a perplexed American. I would also like to thank my second reader, Hadley Renkin, for pushing me to engage with the theoretical underpinnings of this research and for going above and beyond to provide detailed comments. Sincere appreciation is especially due to Zsófia Veér and Dorottya Fekete for their help with Hungarian translations and context. To all of my respondents, who took time out of their busy lives to speak with me, thank you for entrusting me with your innermost thoughts and feelings.

Lastly, thank you to all of my friends and family for their emotional support and listening to me speak endlessly about family policy. To my father, Mark Mildner, thank you for your useful comments. Growing up, I remember asking why you decided to have three children, if we were each so expensive and difficult. You answered, "Maybe our lives are richer because we had you." As the youngest of three, thank you for making that cost-benefit calculation in my favor.

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Introduction

In February of 2019, Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, garnered international reproach after announcing a series of new family policy incentives. The benefits, which included tax exemptions for mothers with four children and funding for large families to purchase homes and automobiles, were met with consternation by European leaders.[1] The Swedish Minister for Social Affairs remarked that the policies "reek[] of the 1930s," while the European Human Rights Commissioner charged that the plan "instrumental[izes] women" (Schaart, 2019, Henry, 2019). An economics professor in Germany further alleged that Orbán's policies are "strikingly similar" to the marriage loans introduced by the Third Reich (Hausner, 2019).

Thousands of miles away, a seismic shift in United States' family policy provoked another firestorm, this time among right-wing conservatives. At the February 2019 Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), Rick Santorum, a former U.S. Senator and presidential candidate, ruffled attendees with his endorsement of paid family leave (Kelly, 2019).[2] Eschewing decades of opposition to government social welfare, Santorum claimed that the time had come for conservatives to change course. While Santorum's reversal perturbed CPAC audiences, his speech came on the heels of U.S. President Trump's official support for paid family leave, another move that the media acknowledged was a "striking departure from GOP orthodoxy" and predicted to stir an "ideological civil war" among Republicans (Sullivan & Costa, 2018, Salam, 2016).

Less than one month after Orbán's announcement and Santorum's speech, government officials from Hungary and the United States united in a conference entitled "Making Families

[1] See Figure 1 for program details.
[2] See Figure 2 for announcement poster.

Great Again."[3] On the surface, the alignment of these two countries appears baffling. Hungary has a history of active family policy interventions under state socialism and one of the longest paid maternity leaves in the OECD (OECD PF2.1., 2017). The United States, by contrast, is known for its privatized, laissez-faire approach to welfare, and is one of the last remaining nations in the world without a single day of guaranteed paid family leave (Salam, 2019).

Despite historic differences in generosity and mode of support, both governments have increasingly tied family welfare policies to reversing population decline and preventing further immigration. Referring to the decline in the Hungarian birthrate and disavowing immigration as "surrender," Orbán emphasized: "Success depends precisely on the reliability and tenacity of our family policies" (Orbán, 2017, 2019). Similarly, Ivanka Trump, the U.S. President's daughter and advisor, called for paid family leave because "everyone shares the concern for our country's plummeting fertility rates," while Santorum explicitly urged that the "Trump coalition" will need higher birthrates or else businesses will "push[] for immigration" (Trump, 2018, Santorum, 2019).

The radical dependence on family policy in Hungary and the historic shift in right-wing support for government family policy in the United States reveals how each government trusts that these incentives will alter individuals' fertility decisions. Underlying this trust is the assumption that individuals will act as rational, "value-free" actors, and refrain from illogical, emotional deliberation (Durnová, 2015, citing Weber, 1926). Although scholars have long studied the impact of family policies on demographic outcomes, little attention has been paid to individuals' actual awareness of these programs, or how individuals react when their personal fertility desires conflict with the state's financial incentives. Through a series of qualitative interviews with prospective parents in Hungary and the United States, I will challenge the assumption that family policy

[3] See Figure 3 for event poster. This event was organized and hosted by the Hungarian Embassy in Washington D.C. and riffs on U.S. President Trump's 2016 campaign slogan "Make America Great Again."

functions in a unidirectional fashion by studying how individuals enact agentic responses against state policy to preserve their ideal family structures.

In Hungary, where the government rewards parents for having three or more children, I find that respondents are extensively aware of these benefits, yet they rely on instinctual fertility narratives to resist government inducements to have three or more children. For a smaller subset of respondents primarily concerned with gendered divisions of labor in Hungary, I find that individuals will also consider migration to preserve their idealized vision of parenthood. I then interrogate how these resistance strategies could be shaped by respondents' class-status, the historic stigmatization of the Roma community, and respondents' identification with "Western" progressivism.

In the United States, where the government has largely abdicated family policy responsibility to private employers, I find that respondents' resistance strategies were mediated by men's lack of policy awareness and women's individualized, neoliberal[4] expectations of parenthood. I conclude that despite American male respondents' professed desire for equal parenthood, their lack of policy knowledge has both structural and intrapersonal origins. Finding reiterations of prevailing neoliberal feminist ideology, I also suggest that American female respondents' individualized approach to parenting acts as a psychological coping strategy to comply with their limited anticipated external support.

Lastly, applying Repo's (2018)'s critique of Becker (1964)'s fertility policy model, I argue that Hungarian respondents strategically apply instinctual conceptions of parenthood to resist the

[4] The term neoliberal has been used to refer to a complex multitude of economic, political, and social phenomena. Neoliberalism is commonly characterized by economic deregulation and privatization, state withdrawal from public welfare, and the production of individualized, autonomous, subjects (Rose, 1992, Bockman, 2013). Neoliberal feminism, as Rottenberg (2014) and Fraser (2009) describe, is the Western cultural absorption of neoliberal principles into mainstream feminism, enacting an individuated feminist subject who views gender inequality as a personal problem rather than a structural shortcoming.

instrumental logic underlying the cost-benefit fertility approach. Contrarily, I find that American female respondents articulate shifting preferences for children based on financial costs. Using Donath's (2017) defense of Becker's (1964) model, I contend that these respondents embrace financial instrumentality to briefly reclaim their agency and resist pressure to bear larger families without assistance. I conclude by suggesting that even in restricted, pronatalist contexts, individuals retain their agency and disrupt the presumed unidirectional relationship between fertility policy incentives and societal outcomes. Respondents' pronatal dissension in turn alters their preferences for children, an outcome that governments do not foresee.

Background: Family Policy in Hungary and the United States

In this section, I outline the history of family policies in Hungary and the United States. For Hungary, I primarily focus on policy developments under state socialism from 1949 to 1989. I then discuss policy provisions post-1989 until the present. While the United States does not have a rich history of family policy programs, I explain how the enactment of a maternalist and racist welfare state beginning in the Progressive Era shaped the minimal policy infrastructure that exists today. I then discuss current efforts to establish new family policies at the state and federal levels.

Family Policy History in Hungary

From Equal to Acceptable: Family Policy Under State Socialism

Family policy support under state socialism shifted by prevailing economic, ideological, and demographic concerns.[5] Under early state socialism, the government faced a labor shortage and attempted to position socialist women in opposition to Western capitalism. Accordingly, women were expected to commit to the paid labor market and motherhood. Emphasizing the importance of parenthood, the government instituted a tax on childless couples for failing to contribute to the collective society. Meanwhile, workplaces made temporary accommodations for maternity leave and provided women with greater flexibility because of their additional household responsibilities (Fodor, 2003, Haney, 2002). Other than these brief differentiations, women were expected to work in the same fashion as men. The 1949 Hungarian Constitution made this explicit by pronouncing that women would be entitled to "the *same* work under the same working conditions as men," and government legislation decreed that women should be able to "fill any job" (Fodor, 2003, p. 114, emphasis in original). To enforce these principles, the state subsidized

[5] One exception to this statement was the continuous eligibility expansion for family allowances, or monthly payments for childcare (Haney, 2002).

local nurseries and public canteens to enable women to work while raising a family. However, these formal equality principles did not significantly decrease women's occupational segregation in the labor market, the gendered wage gap, or the unequal domestic division of labor at home (Zimmerman, 2010).

The Hungarian government's emphasis on women's temporary difference in pursuit of workplace equality ended in the late 1960s. After post-war industrial production stagnated, party leaders became increasingly concerned about an oversupply of unskilled female labor and the rapidly declining birthrate. While the government first tried to regulate the birthrate through sharp abortion restrictions from 1953 to 1956 ("The Ratkó era"), these measures were widely unpopular and left state nurseries overburdened, leading to prompt relaxation and repeal (Sandor, 1999, Sawyer, 2010). Changing tactic from direct intervention during the Ratkó era, party leaders began to emphasize women's special role as mothers and call attention to their gender differences in the labor market. For the first time, the state passed protective legislation to exclude women from work deemed too physically demanding or potentially damaging to their reproductive capacities. Simultaneously, psychological research on child development increasingly prescribed that women needed to spend more time on childcare. In 1967, the government instituted a universal paid childcare allowance called GYES, the nation's first maternity leave policy apart from short-term post-natal leave, allowing women[6] to take three years of paid leave after childbirth. This leave guaranteed women's reemployment but gradually reinforced the idea that childrearing should be women's priority instead of work, as in early socialism. The government codified women's new

[6] Men were excluded from taking GYES until 1985 and were not entitled to take GYED until after their child's first birthday. Even after their formal inclusion, few fathers took parental leave. Men are separately entitled to five paid days of paternity-specific leave. (Fodor, Glass, Kawachi & Popescu, 2002, Gábos, 2018).

role by amending the Constitution in 1972 to guarantee women's rights to *acceptable*, rather than equal, workplace conditions (Fodor, 2003, Haney, 2002, Melegh, 2006, Zimmerman, 2010).

Anxieties about potential labor surpluses, demographic declines, and the developmental necessity for mothers to be with their children continued throughout the mid-1980s. In response, the government began to target its pronatalist efforts towards highly educated women in the workforce by instituting GYED, a two-year wage-related parental leave benefit paid at 70% of the parent's former wage (Gábos, 2018). Turning away from universal entitlement, the government also began efforts to identify impoverished mothers who were termed to be "truly needy" under the growing capitalist influence of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Haney, 2002). As a result of this targeting, mothers who were not in highly-paid formal employment, or were not considered to be living in poverty, were slowly excluded from the social category of those in "need." This differentiating discourse was also extended to reduce government support for Roma mothers, who were judged by economists and geneticists to have lower "quality" children, and should therefore be discouraged from having more than three children (Melegh, 2006).

After the collapse of the socialist regime in 1989, the newly elected democratic government instituted widespread austerity reforms further restricting family policy eligibility. In 1995, the Bokros package abolished GYED and restricted access to GYES via means-testing. The societal backlash against these restrictions was swift, and by 1998, the first Orbán government made GYES once again universal. Although the conservative coalition restored universal GYES and reintroduced GYED, the real value of both allowances declined substantially due to rising inflation. At the same time, targeting efforts continued with income thresholds for child tax credits, privileging better-off families. Family policies also adopted the late socialist discourse about "quality" and "deserving" children by tying eligibility to school attendance (Melegh, 2016).

Hungarian welfare scholars including Szikra (2014) have argued that the emphasis on GYED, which supports recipients in highly-paid, formal positions, and the income requirements for child tax credits have both contributed to a "two-track," polarized family welfare system, benefitting wealthier Hungarians while increasing poverty among lower classes (Spéder & Kamarás, 2008, Aasave et al., 2006, Melegh, 2016).

Since 2000, alternating left-wing and conservative governments have taken different approaches to family policy by targeting poor or upper-class families, excluding or including Hungary's Roma population, and limiting or universalizing benefit eligibility (Inglot, Szikra & Rat, 2012, Sharle & Szikra, 2015). For example, the government cut GYES funding from three years to two in 2009 and then reinstated GYES for a full three years in 2010 without indexing the rate to inflation. Demographers have characterized this "zigzagging" oscillation in political support for family policy as creating a climate of uncertainty and unpredictability for individuals considering starting a family in Hungary (Spéder & Kamaras, 2008, p. 650, Aassve et al., 2006, Hollos, 2009).

Recent Changes in Hungarian Family Policy

Since the consolidation of power between Fidesz and the Christian Democratic bloc under Viktor Orbán's cabinet in April 2010, the Hungarian government has continued to target its family policies towards higher income citizens. These policies further target families with at least three children and families with working mothers, while increasingly disenfranchising Hungary's Roma population. The government first implemented this agenda by altering its tax credit and housing loan programs. Families with three or more children now receive substantially larger tax credits than families with one or two children, effects which are amplified by the national flat 15 percent

income tax rate (Inglot et al., 2012, National Tax and Customs Administration, 2017). This preference for larger families is reinforced in the government's 2015 CSOK program, or 10 million-forint (~31,000 Euros) loan guarantee to purchase new homes for families who intend to have at least three children (BBJ, 2016).[7] These loans apply to a small number of newly constructed, pricier homes, again benefitting wealthier Hungarians with existing purchasing power (BBJ, 2016).

Second, to raise the birthrate while preserving mothers' labor force participation under a labor shortage, the Fidesz government spearheaded GYED Extra in 2014. Under this scheme, if women return to their jobs after their child's first birthday, they can continue to collect GYED without any restrictions on their working hours (Makay, 2015). Moreover, if women have a second child while receiving GYED, the new policy allows women to receive both childcare benefits at the same time (Makay, 2015). GYED Extra then encourages working women to have more children during their leave and to return to work after one year. The conservative government's renewed focus on women's reconciliation between work and family responsibilities also comes in the context of European demographic studies indicating that birth rates increase when women are labor market participants (See e.g. Bloom et al., 2009). These reconciliation efforts are thus a reflection of the government's economic and demographic concerns rather than its ideological support for mothers in the Hungarian paid labor market.

The third crucial policy trend is the intensified welfare exclusion of Hungary's Roma population. While these exclusionary discourses were active under state socialism, the government has ratcheted up its anti-natalist rhetoric towards the Roma people and established indirect barriers to pronatalist benefits. In 2019, Orbán called for the government to support those who wanted to

[7] Recipients do not have to pay back the government loan if they have three children. CSOK recipients with under three children receive low-interest, subsidized loans (Melegh, 2016).

live "for their children, not off their children," a statement that was repeated by Zoltán Balog, the Commissioner for Roma Affairs, who also berated "irresponsible" fertility decisions by Roma people (Orbán, 2019, Balog, 2019).[8] Institutionally, the privileging of tax benefits over government cash transfers emphasizes formal taxable earnings, which excludes a large proportion of the Roma community (Inglot et al., 2012). This exclusion is also present in GYED Extra, which again incentivizes reproduction among women in the paid labor market and excludes Roma women who engage in informal employment or agricultural work (Zimmerman, 2010). Szikra (2018) terms this redux of racial targeting in Hungary as "selective pronatalism," or crafting policies to empower certain races to reproduce while excluding others.

During the 2019 State of the Nation Address, Orbán proposed radical changes to Hungarian family policy as part of a seven-point Family Protection Action Plan. These changes include exempting women from lifetime income tax after four or more births, gifting families with at least three children 2.5 million forints (~7,800 Euros) towards new automobiles, expanding GYES eligibility to grandparents, and investing in nationwide crèche care (Orbán, "State of the Union" 2019)[9]. These programs attempt to balance conservative beliefs with labor market requirements. Following the traditional family model, loan and tax benefits apply solely to mothers, and these mothers must be under age 40 and married for the first time (About Hungary, 2019). At the same time, parental leave expansion to grandparents and state investment in crèche care facilitates mothers' reintroduction to work, meeting the high demand for labor and applying European demographic models for population stability.

[8] Zoltán Balog interview translated and contextualized from Hungarian to English by Zsófia Veér.
[9] See Figure 1 for a summary of program details.

Family Policy History in the United States

Helpless Mothers to Welfare Queens

The United States is commonly classified as a liberal welfare state, characterized by means-tested, modest welfare programs, which often include work requirements. (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In absence of universal policy provisions, U.S. social reformers in the early 20th century relied on stereotypes about women's inferiority and natalist responsibilities to qualify for state assistance and regulation (Sapiro, 1990, Jenson, 1990, Skocpol, 1995). Emphasizing women's biological dependence to uphold social programs, including mothers' pensions and minimum hour laws, reformers rejected an equality-centered approach in favor of a maternalist welfare state (Skocpol, 1995).[10] These maternalist protections envisioned a white, female subject to preserve the Anglo-Saxon morality of the home from the threat of less "morally fit" immigrants from Southeast Europe and Asia (Mink, 1990). In exchange for accepting their domestic role and contributing to the racial welfare of American society, white women were then able to receive state compensation for motherhood. Mink (1990) concludes that this arrangement led to a distinctly American variety of social welfare that was "drawn by race and mediated by gender" (p. 99).

Despite the acceptance of maternalist protections in regulatory policy, direct aid for mothers remained severely restricted and stigmatized, especially Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AIDC)[11], established in 1935 (HHS, 2009). AIDC state social workers heavily surveilled

[10] It is important to note here that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an attempt to limit maximum working hours in Lochner v. New York (1905), three years before the Court upheld Muller v. Oregon (1908), which permitted the regulation of women's working hours, based on their need for special state protection. In these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively established that women's rights in the labor market could only be regulated by their differential status. The legal reliance on women's vulnerability in the workplace formally ended in 1935 with the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which regulated maximum working hours for all employees (Sapiro, 1990, Jenson, 1990). However, echoes of state protectionism persist today in cases over whether woman who are pregnant or may become pregnant can be prohibited from employment that could threaten their fertility (See e.g. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (1991), EEOC v. RTG Furniture Co. (2016)).

[11] This program was originally called Aid to Dependent Children or ADC.

their predominantly African American female clients while wealthier white women were depicted as "worthy widows" living off of their husbands' social security payments (Sapiro, 1990, Skocpol, 1995). Until 1968, state officials could make unannounced visits to their clients' homes to verify that there was not another "man in the house" who could provide secondary income (Amott, 1990). In this way, whiteness was linked with morality and independence from the state, in contrast to blackness and state dependency (McMahon, 2018, quoting Levenstein, 2009).

To deter future state reliance and calm racialized fears about higher birthrates among women of color, hospitals involuntarily sterilized thousands of Black, Latin American, and Native American women throughout the 20th century (Showden, 2011). The racial stigmatization of family welfare programs achieved national notoriety when then-Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan railed against "welfare queens," or presumed women of color de-frauding the state, as a central message in his election campaign (New York Times, 1976). Seven years after Reagan's tenure, Congress replaced AIDC with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), which decentralized welfare distribution to the states, imposed lifetime limits on welfare assistance, and introduced minimum work requirements (HHS, 2009).[12] State programs often required recipients to utilize long-acting birth control and penalized women for having more children while on welfare (Showden, 2011). After years of stigmatization, decentralization, and privatization, Mettler (2011) claims that even Americans who stand to benefit from welfare expansion have forsaken these government programs.

[12] Although Congress was controlled by a Republican majority, President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, signed these welfare reforms into law, following a campaign promise to "end welfare as we know it" (Semuels, 2016).

The United States interrupted its pattern of means-tested family welfare policies on two occasions: to create maternal health clinics after World War I and to construct childcare facilities during World War II. In 1921, Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner Act, which enacted federal clinics to provide mothers and new infants with medical care (Skocpol, 1992). This Act was repealed eight years later under suspicion that it would lead to socialized medicine and government "interference" in family life (Sapiro, 1990, Moehling & Thomasson, 2012). Despite these concerns, the U.S. government enacted a universal childcare program a decade later, during World War II, when a wave of mothers entered the workforce en masse to maintain wartime production levels while their husbands were fighting abroad.[13] Using the Lanham Act, the government built 3,000 childcare centers across the United States, serving 130,000 children (Riley, 1994, Cohen, 2015). After World War II ended, the federal government withdrew funding for the centers (Riley, 1994). Currently, there is no universal access to maternal healthcare or childcare in the U.S. and Americans must rely on costly, private solutions. A few states have implemented universal pre-kindergarten programs which typically begin when a child turns age four (New America, 2016). Childcare spending also qualifies for a modest $3,000 tax credit and childcare costs average around one-fifth of a median family's income (IRS, 2018, New America, 2016).

[13] While World War II marked a watershed moment for married women in the U.S. labor force, many minority women, especially from lower classes, were already employed prior to World War II (National Archives, 2016).

State by State: Recent and Proposed Family Policy Changes in the United States

Besides minor tax credits[14] for children, the Family and Medical Leave Act (1993) (FMLA) stands as the only federal U.S. family policy guarantee. This law provides employees with three months of unpaid leave to care for a new child or sick family member. Unpaid FMLA leave is not a universal provision. Qualifying employees must have at least one year of previous full-time work experience at a company with 50 or more employees (Collins, 2016, Georgetown University Law Center, 2010). Private employers and states may supplement FMLA leave by providing payment for any portion of the three-month duration or longer. However, as of March 2018, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found that only 17% of civilian workers had access to any paid family leave (BLS, 2018). Hispanic workers in particular have substantially lower rates of paid-leave access compared to White and non-Hispanic workers (BLS, 2019). While FMLA leave is gender-neutral, research indicates that most fathers take one week or less of parental leave, and often use vacation days to take leave because they do not realize that they qualify for FMLA (Gerstel & Armenia, 2009, Pragg & Knoester, 2017, Kaufman et al., 2010). On top of these leave regulations, individuals are not guaranteed paid sick days or health insurance (Collins, 2016). In international comparisons, the United States provides some of the least generous social provisions for new parents, even among comparable liberal welfare states such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia (Raub, 2018). Remarking that the individualized discourse around family life is a unique characteristic of U.S. culture, Daly and Rake (2003) conclude that the entire concept of family policy is "foreign" to the United States (p. 150).

While there are no federal provisions for paid family leave in the United States, four states have introduced paid leave programs including California, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode

[14] These federal tax credits currently stand at $2,000 per child (IRS, 2019).

Island, which each offer four to six weeks of guaranteed paid family leave (Donovan, 2019). Massachusetts, Washington State, and the District of Columbia, are in the process of implementing paid leave laws (Donovan, 2019). [15] At the federal level, bipartisan support for paid family leave is building (Salam, 2019). In 2018, President Trump proposed implementing a paid leave program by enabling parents to withdraw funds from their social security savings if they agree to defer retirement (Kaufman & Gatenio Gabel, 2018). Relying on personal savings, this plan does not provide government funding for parental leave and penalizes parents by forcing them to retire later than workers without children or wealthier workers who can afford to take leave without withdrawing from their social security funds.

[15] All state-level paid leave policies currently in operation are funded by employee payroll taxes. The upcoming DC paid leave program will be funded by employers and the programs in Massachusetts and Washington State will be jointly funded by employees and employers (Donovan, 2019).

Literature Review

Introduction

This research engages with four existing strands of literature: biopolitics and family policy, pronatalism and agency, the gendered mental load, and country-specific research on fertility in Hungary and the United States. I will begin with a theoretical discussion of the biopolitical basis for family policy, and how feminist scholars are divided in their perception of these programs as emancipatory or coercive. My analysis of these perspectives engages with Repo's (2016, 2018)'s Foucauldian critiques of fertility policy and Donath's (2017) emotional logic counternarrative. Next, I use Showden's (2011) analysis of pronatalism to explain how Hungary and the United States can both be considered pronatalist, despite their extreme differences in financial support for families. Using historical examples of pronatal resistance and Mahmood's (2001) conception of agency, I contend that respondents in this study can enact agentic resistance and compliance. I then review how respondents' strategies may be influenced by unequal gendered divisions of labor in family life documented by di Leonardo (1987), Hoschild (1989), and Offer (2014). In this discussion, I review two opposing theories for the origin of this inequality—Gerson (2010) and Pedulla & Thébaud's (2015) structural explanation and McMahon's (1999), Coltrane & Adams (2008), and Lockman (2019)'s theory of men's self-interested resistance. Finally, I provide a brief overview of existing family policy and fertility literature in the specific contexts of Hungary and the United States.

Family Policy and Biopolitics

Previous studies of family policy and fertility outcomes have evaluated the potential of different types of incentives to encourage men, and especially women, to have particular numbers

of children. Applying statistical regression models, these analyses trace fertility outcomes after the introduction of different family benefits, including child allowances, subsidized childcare, and paid leaves (Bjorkland, 2006, Olivetti & Petrolongo, 2017, Bassford & Fisher, 2016, Ságí & Lentner, 2018, Farré & González, 2018). A subset of these studies argues that these policies will only create higher fertility if they encourage dual partner participation or facilitate women's labor force participation (McDonald, 2000, Oláh, 2003, Cooke, 2004, Duvander & Andersson, 2008, Bloom et al., 2009). Policy initiatives from either of these perspectives are depicted as unsuccessful or containing policy gaps if they fail to facilitate a desired manner of fertility (Craig & Siminski, 2010, Olivetti & Petrolongo, 2017, Ságí & Lentner, 2018, Doepke & Kindermann, 2018, Farré & González, 2018). Alternatively, Rijken & Knijn (2009) conclude that individuals do not engage in a conscious decision-making process whatsoever in their decision to have a child, while Hoem (2008) argues that a "family-friendly culture" is a necessary foundation for family policy to impact fertility (p. 256, See also Mills et al., 2011). Whether fertility decisions are treated as a result of policy incentives, unconscious choices, or a byproduct of a supportive culture, each approach relies on how external factors influence individuals' (though principally women's) childbearing decisions.[16] Neither methodology considers individuals' agency in responding to or resisting state incentives that encourage particular modes of fertility. This research will challenge individuals' presumed passivity in the fertility process.

In an analysis of family policy initiatives, Repo (2018) finds the dominant influence of U.S. Chicago School economist Gary Becker (1964). In Becker's (1964) human capital approach to fertility, he assumes that all individuals are economically rational with a stable desire for children, like any other consumer good, and engage in "utility maximizing" behavior to optimize

[16] Collins (2016) terms this lack of lived experience as the "black box of work-family policy" in the anticipated linear relationship between family policy structures and outcomes (p. 7).

psychic and financial benefits from children (Repo 2018, p. 241). As Repo (2018) argues, the widespread adoption of human capital theory into fertility policy frames reproduction "in economically instrumental terms as a computational outcome of parental utility optimization of children-as-goods…rather than, for instance, simply human instinct" (p. 241). Using this consumerist framework is inappropriate, according to Repo (2018), because it imagines that children are "readily available" and ignores that children are not "easily disposable" (p. 241). Criticizing the economic logic around the European Commission's use of reconciliation policies,[17] Repo (2016) argues that member states use family policies to manipulate women's cost-benefit calculus for children and maximize their economic and reproductive contributions. This hidden agenda, Repo (2016) claims using a Foucauldian analysis,[18] is how family policies are transformed into a biopolitical tool of neoliberal governmentality, enabling governments to regulate the previously unassailable private sphere.

Repo's (2016) argument, that reconciliation policies are a means of controlling women to maximize their outputs for the state, stands in contrast to decades of feminist scholarship that has viewed family policy as a conduit for women to alleviate their historic dual burden of paid work and child care (Sainsbury, 1999, Mandel and Semyonov, 2005, McDonald, 2000). From this viewpoint, active state intervention to provide generous family policies is a signpost of equality, demonstrating that the state recognizes the value of women's unpaid care work (Hochschild, 1989, Orloff, 1996).

[17] Reconciliation policies aim at facilitating women's balance between work and family obligations and encompass "a wide range of issues, such as work–life balance, child care, parental leave, working arrangements, and financial benefits for working parents" (Repo, 2016, p. 310)

[18] See Lemke's (2001) analysis of Foucault's (1979) lecture at the Collège de France on neoliberal governmentality. Foucault suggested that neoliberalism applied economic analysis to previously social spheres (including family and reproduction) to dissolve the boundary between these two fields and justify government intervention (p. 197).

Although family welfare policy can be viewed from either of these approaches, both assume that individuals reflexively consider these policies and are either subject to manipulation or closer to emancipation through their enactment. Research has yet to consider individuals' awareness of family policy when evaluating their fertility decisions or what kinds of reasoning individuals use in choosing to accept or reject these benefits during their decision-making process.

While Repo (2018) problematizes the proliferation of Becker's (1964) fertility approach, Donath (2017) finds that mothers' application of cost-benefit logic can be a source of both agency and resistance. Using qualitative interviews with mothers who expressed regret that they had children, Donath (2017) claims that regret allows these women to make an after-the-fact, rational calculation about the costs to motherhood, and conclude that they made the wrong decision. Applying this cold, "hyperrational" logic to childbearing decisions, these mothers violate the societal view that women have an innate desire for motherhood that is unaffected by external conditions (Donath, 2017, p. 212). In this way, expressing motherhood regret, or women asserting that they made the wrong cost-benefit calculation, is a way to resist the assumption that all women find motherhood to be a worthwhile and gratifying experience. The expectation that women should not use cost-benefit calculations in thinking about children, or refrain from applying "emotional logic," Donath (2017) asserts, obscures women's role as human subjects "who think, feel, examine, imagine, value, and decide" (p. 212, 215). Through this interpretation, Becker (1964)'s fertility model can enable women to reestablish their humanity, or as Donath (2017) explains, "…emotional logic is part of being a subject—of being a human and alive" (p. 215).

Recent qualitative research among women who decided not to have children in Sweden indicates that women tend to use both intuitive and Becker-ian (1964) narratives to resist financial and social incentives encouraging parenthood. In one study, Peterson & Engwall (2013) found that

Swedish women framed their decision against childbearing as a biological urge, which the authors suggest is an "embodied resistance" to pay deference to the essentialist motherhood myth while deviating from this norm (p. 387). However, in another study, Peterson (2014) found that women focused on the "benefits of the childfree life" and relied on narratives of long-term, methodical desires against parenthood to portray themselves as "rational decision-makers" (p. 4, 6). The variety of strategies employed, in the same national welfare context, suggests that individuals choose diverse strategies to counter state fertility inducements.

While Donath (2017)'s study examined cases of women who are already mothers, and Peterson & Engwall (2013) and Peterson (2014)'s studies interviewed women who decided not to have children, research has not been extended to men and women planning on having children in the near future. By interviewing these individuals, a group theoretically targeted by government policymakers, I will investigate what types of strategies men and women use to negotiate their fertility desires when they conflict with state incentives. This research will contribute to existing literature by comparing two opposite welfare contexts: Hungary, where middle-class individuals are heavily rewarded for having three or more children, and the United States, where individuals do not receive significant financial support for having any number of children. The strategies revealed in this research will then further elucidate how family policies shape prospective parents' resistance plans and how the policy context itself influences perceptions of children and desires for parenthood.

Agency, Pronatalism and Resistance

To interrogate men and women's agency in resisting state incentivized forms of fertility, we must briefly review prevailing discussions about the pitfalls of locating agency in pronatalist societies and how to distinguish between respondents' resistance and strategic compliance. In the classical sense, Hungary's family policies are recognized as pronatalist because the state provides significant financial incentives for three or more births. Beyond this economic definition, feminist scholars such as Showden (2011) argue that pronatalism can also be constituted culturally, ideologically, psychologically, and politically.[19] As Meyers (2001) identifies with the term matrigyno-idolatry and Michie and Cahn (1997) dub the "reproductive master narrative," women are acculturated from childhood to believe that motherhood is a natural and necessary step in their development (Showden, 2011, p. 95-7). Because of this powerful hegemonic narrative, scholars claim that the United States, despite its lack of formal welfare infrastructure, effectively functions as a pronatalist society (Blake, 1972, Senderowitz, 1974, Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). With this broader understanding of pronatalism in place, I will refer to both Hungary and the United States as pronatalist societies in this research.

After acknowledging the widespread economic or societal pressure to reproduce, it becomes challenging to ascribe agency or the capacity for resistance to any individual's decision to have a child. To navigate this bind, Showden (2011) employs Foucault's theory of governmentality to claim that deviation from the state's narrow fertility norms enables women to relocate their agency and find resistance against the master fertility narrative. Using the case of the East German "birth strike," or spike in women's voluntary sterilizations after reunification,

[19] Showden (2011) defines cultural pronatalism as normalizing motherhood as a part of women's identity, ideological pronatalism as framing childbearing as women's responsibility to the state, psychological pronatalism as linking childbearing to rationality and maturity, and political pronatalism as the state's regulation of fertility (p. 95).

Dölling, Hahn, and Scholz (2000) found that certain women framed their decision as resistance against post socialist abortion restrictions and lower quality job opportunities in spite of societal pressure to reproduce. While these women engaged in resistance by rejecting motherhood, agency and resistance can be expressed through any subversion of the state's reproductive conventions, not only when individuals refrain from parenthood altogether. For example, under fascist rule, the Italian government attempted to raise birth rates using steep taxes for unmarried individuals and exempting families from taxes with at least seven children (Ipsen, 1996, Farris, 2017). Ipsen (1996) concludes that the failure of these policies showcases the "resistance of the Italian family" to produce the state's "desired progeny" (p. 255). Whether through deliberate sterilization or the refusal to produce the state's ideal family structure, there is repeated precedent that individuals have engaged in resistance against pronatalist pressures. As Meyers (2001) argues, feminists must recognize that "oppression impedes autonomy," without extracting the autonomy that individuals have "managed to wrest from a patriarchal, racist, heterosexist, class-stratified world" (p. 739). It is possible to recognize the ubiquity of pronatalism without erasing individuals' capacity to override these influences. Using this framework, I argue that men and women's strategies to maintain their fertility desires when in conflict with the state properly qualify as forms of agentic resistance.

Although I have thus far presented agency and resistance as linked, partnered concepts, feminist theory has scrutinized this relationship and questioned whether agency can exist without overt defiance of hegemonic norms. In mapping the nexus between agency and resistance, Butler (1990) claims that subjects are formed by their failure to replicate socially mandated gender roles. Before this subversion, Butler (1990) argues that, "There is no self…who maintains 'integrity' prior to its entrance into this conflicted cultural field" (p. 145). Instead, it is "the subject who would

resist such norms," who asserts agency (Mahmood, 2001, quoting Butler, 1993). This view, as Mahmood (2001) problematizes, frames resistance as the "paradigmatic instance of agency" (p. 211). And, if resistance is the model for agency, actions of conformity and continuity are then viewed as passive, non-agentic docility (Mahmood, 2001). Mahmood (2001) upends this assumption and instead finds agency in her respondents' effortful conformity to piety.[20] In this interpretation, subjects can express agency through purposeful compliance rather than solely through countercultural resistance. By recognizing alternative manifestations of agency in this research, it will be possible to identify when respondents demonstrate agency without planning to directly challenge the state's pronatalist regime. This conceptualization will prevent the ascription of binary characterizations to respondents as either having agency and resisting state fertility incentives, or lacking selfhood altogether by complying with maternal "master narratives."

The Gendered Family Load: Structural Shortcomings or Men's Self-Interest?

Awareness and potential responsiveness to family policy can differ by gender roles that have historically treated women as bearing primary responsibility for the family. As di Leonardo (1987) first identified with the term "kin work," women take on additional unpaid work in organizing family gatherings and maintaining familial ties for both partners (p. 442-3). In addition to performing these "kin" tasks, Hochschild (1989) and Offer (2014) have documented how women take on unequal mental labor, or responsibility for planning and facilitating family life.

[20] Mahmood (2001) specifically claims that the practice of sabr, or patience, among pious Islamic women in Egypt "marks not a reluctance to act; rather it is integral to a constructive project, a site of considerable investment, struggle, and achievement" (p. 222). Mahmood's (2001) interpretation of agency then hinges on subjects' active commitment, whether mental or physical, towards a particular aim, regardless of whether it challenges, or even supports, an oppressive status quo. ,

This concept is colloquially referred to as the mental load (Clit, 2017).[21] Research suggests that women's primary responsibility for the mental load among dual earner couples results in more psychological distress compared to men (Offer 2014, Ciciolla & Luthar, 2019). In Hungary, Kruse (2017) found that men's support for involved fatherhood has declined, indicating that women may feel more pressure to understand family policies than men. However, in the United States, researchers claim that gender roles are converging and that men feel more pressure to be involved in family matters (Parker & Wang, 2013). As a result, American male respondents could demonstrate more comparable family policy knowledge.

Although millennial support for splitting work and family responsibilities equally has increased in the United States, Gerson (2010) and Pedulla & Thébaud (2015) find that without supportive family policies, men, more so than women, tend to resort to traditional gender expectations. In an experiment stimulating hypothetical supportive and unsupportive family welfare contexts, young, unmarried men and women ideally preferred to equally share work and family responsibilities with their partners. But, when supportive policies were not theoretically available, men tended to use the primary breadwinner role as a fallback plan while women's preferences shifted by educational attainment (Pedulla & Thébaud, 2015). In qualitative interviews with young Americans, Gerson (2010) similarly found that women and men preferred egalitarian relationships, but expected that realistically, this would not be obtainable. While women tended to use self-reliant strategies, men enacted "modified traditionalism" in which they planned to be the family's primary breadwinner while maintaining their partner's "right" to work (Gerson, 2010, p. 159, 177). These studies indicate that despite gender-neutral preferences for egalitarian parenthood, women and men will likely have different strategies to address the lack of family

[21] The mental load is often conflated with Hoschild's (1983) concept of emotional labor, which refers instead to the management of feelings required by certain occupations.

support in the United States. In Hungary especially, many family policies are overtly targeted at women's fertility, including women's lifetime income tax exemption after four births. Hungarian male respondents may then formulate different ideas about their proper roles at work and at home in response to these policies. While workplace FMLA leave is gender-neutral in the United States, employers often target parental leave accommodations towards women, whereas men are encouraged to rely on informal solutions (Kaufmann et al., 2010, Reid, 2015). As men do not receive the same financial advantages or opportunities for workplace flexibility as women, these findings predict that Hungarian and American male respondents may plan to revert to traditional roles, despite a preference for equality.

Contrary to Gerson (2010) and Pedulla & Thébaud's (2015) analysis, McMahon (1999), Coltrane & Adams (2008), and Lockman (2019) argue that gendered divisions of labor persist because men recognize that it is within their self-interest to resist domestic responsibilities. Alluding to fathers' low paternity leave take-up in Sweden, a country where both parents receive generous amounts of paid parental leave, McMahon (1999) challenges the narrative that labor market factors prevent men from becoming equal partners and further argues that focusing on structural inequalities diverts critical attention from men's capacity to change their behavior. These claims are substantiated even in Gerson's (2010) structural analysis when she theorizes that men's default to a primary breadwinner role "preserves [men's] personal discretion about how—and how much—to participate at home" (p. 178). Recognizing male respondents' missed opportunities for involvement in family planning is then crucial to consider how inequalities arise from both societal structure and men's potentially spurious commitment to household gender equity.

Family Policy and Fertility in Hungary

Previous research findings, both qualitative and quantitative, have come to divergent conclusions about individuals' responsiveness to family policy in Hungary. Some researchers found that Hungarians respond to disadvantageous policy changes by engaging in strategic postponement of parenthood (Aassve et al., 2006, Hollos, 2009, Sági & Lentner 2018). Meanwhile, a comparative study between Sweden and Hungary argues that gender equality concerns, such as fathers' uptake of paternity leave or division of childcare at home had the greatest impact on fertility decisions (Oláh, 2003, Baizan et al. 2016). Hollos (2009) however maintains that Hungarian couples do not consider gender equity as a precondition for starting a family. The role of gender equity in Hungarian family planning then remains an open question.

In addition to the strategy of postponement or the relative importance of gender equity, studies have documented different ways that Hungarians react to policy uncertainty and the "zigzag" of family support post socialism. Hollos' (2009) research found that individuals postponing parenthood idealized supportive family policies from state socialism and clung to stability in their jobs and families. Almost a decade later, Sági & Lentner (2018) found that at least one-third of their respondents in tertiary education do not plan to settle down in Hungary. This finding reveals that the strategy of fertility postponement or employment stability needs to be reevaluated as more Hungarians plan to migrate around their peak childbearing years.

Family Policy and Fertility in the United States

Although the United States does not have a formal network of federal family policies, quantitative research has found that women's access to unpaid FMLA leave increased fertility outcomes for first and second births (Cannonier, 2014). As more states adopt paid family leave

guarantees, studies from New York and California have concluded that state-wide paid family leave also increases fertility outcomes and future fertility intentions for both men and women (Thunell, 2018, Hwang, 2019). Baughman & Dickert-Conlin (2007) contrarily found that increases in earned income tax credits (EITC) had no effect other than slightly lowering fertility among white Americans. This limited research tentatively bolsters Mettler's (2011) conclusion, that direct, visible welfare policies such as parental leave may have a stronger impact on fertility than submerged tax credits.

In contrast to Hollos & Yando's (2006) study in Hungary, socioeconomic status did not explain differences in intended family size in the United States. As Sweeney & Raley (2014)'s quantitative analysis revealed, variances in family size were not eliminated after controlling for class factors and were less salient than racial differences. However, completed family sizes were similar for white, black, and native-born Hispanic women in the United States, following decades of convergence (Sweeney & Raley, 2014). Nearly all of the U.S. research on family leave availability and fertility intentions relies on quantitative analysis. As a result, there is little information concerning how much individuals know about federal and state policies when considering whether to have children, how they consider these benefits with other factors, and whether individuals from diverse socioeconomic and racial backgrounds consider the policies in different ways. In sum, available data does not capture the mechanisms by which individuals process the introduction of family benefits and how identity status mediates this relationship.

Conclusion

Altogether, this study will speak to existing research on biopolitics and family policy, pronatalism and agency, gendered division of labor, and fertility. Through conducting qualitative

interviews with individuals in Hungary and the United States, this research will disrupt the assumed unidirectional relationship between policy and fertility outcomes that has dominated family policy analyses. By removing this assumption and allowing individuals to articulate their agency in the fertility process, we can study how respondents actually consider these policies and whether they are viewed as helpful or manipulative. As the majority of previous literature relies on female respondents, interviews with both men and women who plan to start a family in this study will allow for analysis of a potential gendered mental load in family planning.

Methods, Positionality, and Limitations

I conducted 26 semi-structured qualitative interviews, 11 in Budapest, Hungary, and 15 in New York, New York, from February to May 2019. Participants were recruited via snowball sampling. I made initial contacts through word of mouth and posts to Facebook groups for Central European University students and Cornell University alumni asking to speak with anyone who is thinking about having children sometime within the near future. The Hungarian sample ranged from 21 to 34 years old. Five participants identified as male and six identified as female. Two participants identified as members of the Roma community. The American sample ranged from ages 23 to 35. Seven participants identified as male and eight identified as female. Five belonged to a racial or ethnic minority group in the United States. The median respondent age in both samples was 26 years old. Further information on respondents' demographic and employment characteristics is available in the appendix.

To preserve confidentiality, all names have been changed and job titles are described at the general industry-level. I recorded participant interviews with consent and subsequently transcribed and coded recordings. During interviews, I took notes to supplement the recording and remember key statements. I stored interview data on a password protected drive and informed all respondents of their ability to remove any portion of the interview from transcription. While all Hungarian interviews were conducted in person, I conducted five interviews in the United States using Facetime and Skype. In each location, I held one two-person interview with an engaged couple. These interviews allowed me to compare real-time affective responses to each partner's perceptions of available resources and anticipated divisions of labor. Following Naples (2005) feminist methodology, I attempted to disrupt the traditional hierarchical interview space by engaging in a two-way dialogue about my own positionality with respondents and providing

resources and information about family policies in Hungary and the United States to interested participants after the interview. I asked each respondent about their plans to start a family in the future, their knowledge of family policy in their country and other countries (and in the case of the United States, other states), their career plans, and their ideal division of childcare responsibilities with a partner.

As a monolingual American researcher in Hungary, I had to restrict my sample to English-speaking Hungarians. The English language requirement and my use of snowball sampling in Budapest skewed the sample towards middle- and upper-class urban Hungarians. Similarly, my use of snowball sampling and limited two-week research period in the United States restricted most of my interviews to middle- and upper-class urban Americans. Research has previously found that socioeconomic status has critical bearing on the number of children women desire in Hungary while results in the United States are mixed (Hollos & Yando, 2006, Sweeney & Raley, 2014). However, as Collins (2016) points out quoting Stone (2007), if those with the most social and financial capital, or societal "best-case scenario" are struggling, this can act as a "canary" in a coal mine that something is "seriously amiss" (p. 29). Since Hungary's family policies target middle- and upper-class individuals by tying substantial benefits to formal employment experience and tertiary educational attainment, speaking with the policies' intended recipients is crucial to study whether the government measures are having their intended effect. In the United States, access to family policy benefits is also linked to class status but varies widely by employer. As a consequence, results among middle- and upper-class Americans may exhibit more variation than in the Hungarian sample.

Since I relied on snowball sampling in this study, I often had a friend or acquaintance in common with my respondents. These connections were more prominent in the U.S. sample

because of my American upbringing. My proxy relationship with respondents could have influenced the candidness of their responses (i.e. male respondents presenting as more committed to social norms of equal parenting), despite promised confidentially. While the influence of these relationships should be considered, I found that respondents were open and forthcoming during the interviews, without expressing verbal or nonverbal cues of discomfort. To build rapport and trust, I adhered to Reid's (2015) technique of saving "potentially threatening" questions concerning gendered divisions of labor for the latter part of the interview (p. 5). Although the interviews were designed to last approximately 45 minutes, many continued for well over an hour due to respondents' interest and openness in discussing these topics.

One respondent in my American sample self-identified as queer. All other respondents in Hungary and the United States did not self-identify as queer, gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and spoke about their desires for opposite-gender partnerships. When studying family policy, it is crucial to avoid the tendency towards "compulsory heterosexuality" in assuming that heterosexual, dual-partner relationships are the societal standard (Rich, 1980). Research has found that non-heterosexual couples apply less normative approaches to gendered divisions of labor (Goldberg, 2012, Perlesz et al., 2010, Geist & Ruppanner, 2018). While this study does not contain enough queer representation to add to these conclusions, further research must examine how queer individuals and couples resist family policies that privilege traditional gender roles and ascribe family benefits towards heterosexual, married couples. This analysis is essential in Hungary, where gay and lesbian couples do not have access to legal marriage rights and are then formally excluded from pronatalist benefits (About-Hungary, 2019).

Chapter 1

Family Policy Knowledge in Hungary and the United States

Introduction

When attempting to influence fertility patterns, policymakers first assume that all eligible individuals will have knowledge about new policy incentives, and that this knowledge will result in economically rational behavioral changes. In this chapter, I test this baseline assumption by asking respondents about the benefits that they expect to receive from the government and their employers if they have children. Overall, both male and female Hungarian respondents displayed more knowledge than Americans, and female American respondents had more knowledge than American male respondents. American female respondents then used their knowledge to communicate greater levels of emotional and physical stress. After outlining these findings, I argue that the difference in policy awareness between Hungary and the United States is due to the linkage of family policy with broader political discourses in Hungary, which appears to contradict Spéder & Kamaras' (2008) conclusion that shifting welfare provisions have created a climate of uncertainty for young Hungarians. To explain the gendered gap in policy awareness in the United States, I find support for both Gerson (2010) and Pedulla & Thébaud's (2015) structural fallback theory as well as McMahon's (1999) male resistance theory, signaling that both explanations contribute to men's default to traditional gender roles absent employer and government support.

"It's Really On Right Now": Family Policy Knowledge Among Hungarians

Interviews in Hungary revealed that almost every respondent understood that government benefits increased after two children. Except for one respondent who did not grow up in Hungary, each person cited precise aspects of Hungarian family policy, including amounts for tax credits,

loans, and housing funds, and how these amounts would increase with more children. While not everyone mentioned GYES and GYED by name, respondents knew that parents are entitled to a small amount of universal income from the government and that additional funding is tied to previous employment. While, Gergő, 30, who works in television production and plans to have two children, labeled himself as unfamiliar with Hungarian family policy, he exhibits a foundational understanding of the state's incentives:

> It's really on right now…I'm not really friendly with it, like to be honest…like if you have two kids you can get some credit from the government and pay it slowly back…I think there is something like you don't get this help if you only have one, but from two you have more and from three you have even more.

Although Gergő claims he is not versed in the details of Hungarian family policy, he articulates a clear understanding that his financial benefits will increase if he has more children, consistent with the base assumption of policy designers hoping that this knowledge will increase the birthrate among middle-class Hungarians. Regardless of age, male and female respondents expressed similar fundamental knowledge of the financial benefits to larger families embedded in government policy.

> Dominik, 21, an engineering student:
>
> The CSOK program…if you have three or more children you can apply to get 10 million Hungarian forints or maybe more, you can spend it on buying a house I think…I think you have to repay but for a long time there's very good rates but it's a convenient option for families instead of taking the loans from a bank.
>
> Aron, 28, a graduate student in economics:
>
> You can get a limited amount of money, I think two million if you have two children and if you have three you can have almost ten million forint and they can provide you a loan with really good circumstances.
>
> István, 32, and Zoe, 28, an engaged couple who plan to have three children:
>
> Zoe: I think we get a discount on car buying, housing, and student loan.
> István: They give me a baby-[expecting] loan, 10-million-forint discount to buy a house…

While the level of knowledge varied, Hungarian respondents across the age and gender spectrum voiced awareness of the principal that they would receive greater financial rewards for having more children. At least for middle-class Hungarians, this result counters Spéder & Kamaras' (2008) assumption that the "zigzagging" oscillation in support for family allowances after socialism has resulted in a climate of uncertainty (Spéder & Kamaras, 2008, p. 650, Aassve et al., 2006, Hollos, 2009). Surprisingly, there were no significant knowledge differences between Hungarians who planned to have a child in the next two to three years versus those who were planning in the next five to ten. Even to an outside American researcher, respondents situated these policies as common knowledge and often claimed that I "must have seen something about it" during my time in Hungary. In this way, Hungarian respondents described their knowledge of family policy in a similar vein to being well-informed with current events and keeping up with national politics.

When asked how they knew about these program details, Hungarian respondents commonly linked their awareness to the widespread political discourse on the low birthrate and the government's efforts to prevent immigration. These connections are understandable in the context of the high visibility government campaigns to promote family policy as a counter to immigration. In 2018, Orbán publicized this agenda by declaring the "Year of the Family" and announced the seven-point "Family Protection Action Plan" during his 2019 State of the Nation Speech (Kovács, 2018, Orbán, 2019). In the midst of interviews with Hungarian respondents, the government began a publicity campaign to advertise new family policy benefits on highway billboards and metro stops across Budapest, where all of the respondents lived (See Figures 4 and 5). These billboards received further media attention after they featured a man from the viral "unfaithful boyfriend" stock photoshoot and were used to hastily cover-up anti-European Union

messaging before a visit from the leader of the European People's Party (EPP) (BBC, 2019, See Figure 6). In two interviews, respondents specifically mentioned government billboards as the source of their awareness, including an advertisement announcing that grandparents now qualify for GYES and another encouraging Hungarian women to have at least three children. Although respondents heard about these policies in the news and from media campaigns, at least half said they had done additional research to find out more details about the new benefits. This further research reveals how respondents were significantly engaged with family policy discourse in Hungary irrespective of age and gender.

"That's a Good Question.": American Men and Gendered Family Policy Awareness

In contrast to Hungary, where male and female respondents had roughly equal family policy knowledge, American males had consistently less knowledge and anxiety about having children than their female counterparts. In interviews with American males, after asking about employer and government resources for new parents, interviewees commonly responded with "I haven't look into it yet," "I haven't thought about it," or most frequently, "That's a good question." The gendered knowledge gap in the U.S. showcased how American men ideally desire equal partnerships but have not considered how to enact these arrangements given unequal resources. Greg, 26, who works at a law firm and plans to have either one or three children in the next five years did not know his current policies but felt that he should:

> I haven't explored it at all, so to be quite honest, I don't know what the maternity or paternity leave is. It's better than most…but I'm speculating because I don't know…
> Q: …Do you know anything about your partner's leave?
> I actually don't know, but there's a lot of women at her job…I don't know I would probably say it's pretty good…sorry I wish I knew.

Michael, 26, a software engineer who plans to start his own business before having three children:

> I'm pretty sure there is paternity leave…I have to look [it] up…should I do it now?
> …Q: Do you know what benefits you would get from the government for a paid leave, state or federal, if you do decide to start your own business?
> I have no idea, yeah, I'm not sure. That's a good question though!

Joseph, 29, a teacher who plans to have three children:

> Q: So there's no paternity leave?
> I don't think so, I'm not really sure though…
> Q: Do you know how much time [your partner] has to take off at her job?
> Um, I'm not sure.
> Q: In general, do you worry about the financial costs of raising three kids in the New York area?
> Uh not yet but I'm sure I will.

Out of seven male American respondents, only two were able to cite specific details about their available family policy resources. While these men did not have basic knowledge of the benefits available to them if they have children, a few apologized for their lack of knowledge and offered to review their company policies during the interview. By acknowledging that they "should" know their policies and claiming regret that they were unaware, respondents could have been expressing self-consciousness that their knowledge gap violates their identification as "liberal" and "progressive" men. However, Michael later admitted that he is generally uniformed and plans to stay that way:

> I'm not proud of it but I'm really detached from what's going in the world, I pay very little attention to all of it. Sometimes I have trouble motivating myself to do it...I'm pretty blissfully unaware.

Michael's representation of his unawareness as "blissful" supports McMahon's (1999), Coltrane & Adams (2004) and Lockman's (2019) claims—that beyond structural impediments, some men enact self-interested resistances against taking on additional family responsibilities (p. 205). Rather than embarrassment or hiding their contravention of liberal norms, male respondents' nonchalant repetition of "That's a good question" could also constitute their continuing disregard for family policy matters. Further, Michael does not address his privilege in remaining removed from policy concerns while his female partner will likely be left with the dominant share of responsibility to understand these policies.

Even when Caleb, 26, an accountant, had precise knowledge about his company's leave policy, because it had been the subject of an office-wide e-mail the prior week, he confessed that it was not something he seriously considered in his employment decisions. When asked if he was worried after learning that his workplace provides only five days of paid leave for new fathers, Caleb, who plans to have three children, said:

> Um, it's definitely like a head-scratcher. My old job gave six weeks for paternity leave, which when I left I wasn't really thinking about.

By using the value-neutral term "headscratcher," Caleb declines to define his limited paternity benefit as lacking or troubling, even though he would prefer to take a longer leave. He recognizes that his current policy is substantially shorter than his last company's policy, which he regards as puzzling. Still, he refuses to characterize his situation as unfair or consider paternity benefits as a factor in future employment decisions. Caleb's neutral reaction towards his meager leave policy could reflect his denial that family policy issues are part of his masculine "sphere" of concern, as Coltrane & Adams (2008) theorized.

While American male respondents did not express significant affective responses to their lack of family policy knowledge or limited policy coverage, their renunciation of these responsibilities could also indicate their fallback response to traditional gender roles absent state support in line with Gerson (2010) and Pedulla & Thébaud's (2015) findings. This fallback pattern is reflected in the fact that all American male respondents professed a desire for equal parenting, but did not consider how to achieve this equal split when faced with the reality of unequal paid leave provisions. Greg, 26, who did not have information about his leave policies, also did not have a plan for putting his vision of egalitarian parenting into practice.

> I guess one thing that the wife I keep talking about is that we want to be equal participants with the child, meaning that I don't want one of us to work more than the other necessarily or one of us to always be the one taking care of things…

> Q: So…if your partner takes four to six months and your firm gives you a few weeks of paid leave, how are you going to try to balance that out if that is the situation?
> Yea, um, that's a good question. I don't know. We would have to just deal with it…I haven't really considered that (chuckles).

Greg brought up the topic of equal parenting without prompting, after I asked whether there were any additional factors that were important to him about his desire for children. After outlining his wish to share childcare responsibilities equally, he is unable to develop a counter strategy to a probable future scenario. The fact that Greg has not thought about how he would handle this situation reveals that his lack of policy knowledge may result from his pre-parenthood abnegation of family responsibilities to his wife even though he desires an equal partnership. His creation of a fallback plan that will likely rely on his partner supports both Gerson (2010) and Pedulla & Thébaud (2015)'s analysis of work-family preferences under structural constraints and McMahon (1999), Coltrane & Adams (2008), and Lockman's (2019) theory of men's self-interested resistance.

"It Makes Me Ill to Think About": American Women and Family Policy Knowledge

American female respondents by contrast, although not uniformly knowledgeable about employer and government family policies, knew substantially more information about resources for new parents. Their awareness of their minimal support structures caused respondents significant emotional distress. After outlining the lack of government resources for childcare before she can enroll her future child in New York State's universal pre-school program, and how she does not expect to receive assistance from her future job or her husband's workplace, Elizabeth, 27, a graduate student, shared:

> Everyone I know has said you have to get on day-care lists before the kid is born…it makes me ill to think about it. I'm essentially going to be making money to cover my kid's day care…it gives me an existential crisis. I want to keep working and I enjoy using my brain, totally not that stay at

> home moms don't…I know that I would go crazy though…but at some point I have to make enough to justify that expense otherwise I might as well just stay home.

Although Elizabeth is only one year older than Greg, Caleb, and Michael, she has already looked into potential options for state and employer-funded childcare. After finding that these resources are insufficient, she describes her mental and physical anxiety when considering how to manage the lack of public resources with her looming desire for parenthood. After transitioning from engineering to the nonprofit sector, Elizabeth knows that her higher-paid partner will continue to outpace her salary. She then fears that if childcare costs are too high, it would only make sense for her, as the secondary earner, to exit the workforce. The realities of her plans for children laid bare, she experiences an affective and bodily conflict between her desires for formal employment and parenthood. Leela, 24, a sales and advertising manager who plans to start her own business, similarly described her awareness of her current generous benefits and how she worries about having children without her employer's generous policies:

> We have four to six months of maternity leave which is pretty unheard of in the United States… men's leave is four months…you get money for day care…maybe $3-4,000 a year you can claim…and then you actually get baby cash for having a baby—two grand…when I say all the benefits people are like why do you want to leave [employer]?
>
> ...
>
> Financial risk isn't something I'm very easily able to take on because I don't make that much money…I think it's really sad that [the government] doesn't provide anything of that nature, like we don't even have paid family leave or paid sick leave, as a part of our laws, so I think it disadvantages particularly women…

Leela has not only looked into specific details of her employer's family policy, but she has contextualized this policy with national standards and is aware of the financial risk she will be taking if she leaves her company and decides to change employers before she has children. Although the prospect of this risk is not enough to persuade her to remain at her current job, she is nonetheless aware of the challenges she will confront in having children with no government

safety net. Without being asked directly about their concerns, each American female respondent used her family policy knowledge to voice financial anxieties around having children.

Clarissa, 25, a hedge fund employee:

> Even as we're having this conversation, I'm thinking about all these things we're saying…like right now I'm so financially insecure, like I still have my undergraduate loans and New York is so expensive…five years isn't that far from now and like would I still have my student debt when I'm trying to have kids? Like that would suck! (nervous laughter). Like I want to be married which would cost money…I'd like to own where I live…the dope vacations I want to take…kind of all those various financial goals before kids. And I read recently a statistic that a child will cost you a million dollars.

Ana, 23, an English teacher:

> You have to be ready to put down thousands of dollars, apart from tuition, which is crazy…You're doubling the financial, I don't want to say the burden, but the cost, with each child …I need time for financial recovery.

Clarissa and Ana's distress about their lack of support for having children is clear. Clarissa interrupts her description of ideal leave policies to list her financial fears about motherhood. Ana admits that her desire for children will eventually be a "burden" for her, a term she quickly replaces with "cost." Her correction and discomfort with terming her future children as "burdens" advances Donath's (2017) theory that women are socialized to speak about motherhood in positive, emotional rhetoric. Despite these social correctives, the overall climate of anxiety and uncertainty was palpable in interviews with American female respondents. As Hoshchild (1989) found thirty years ago, women continued to speak about feeling overwhelmed much more than male respondents and revealed a deep understanding of the challenges ahead.

Conclusion

Analysis of family policy knowledge between Hungary and the United States reveals two unique findings. Male and female Hungarian respondents displayed equal knowledgeable about family benefits, even though many of these policies are targeted towards women. In the United

States, male respondents knew little about their available family policies and did not seem overly concerned when they knew that their employers would not provide their desired leave structures. Despite stated preferences for equal partnerships, these men anticipated that they would take on the primary breadwinner role and did not communicate anxiety about family policy inequities. Female American respondents, who had more knowledge about government and employer benefits, displayed higher levels of distress.

Though interviews did not uncover substantial gender differences in Hungarian family policy knowledge, this finding does not indicate that Hungarian male respondents are necessarily more active in family planning or hold more egalitarian family beliefs. In fact, in an ideal scenario, most American male respondents desired to take longer, more equitable parental leaves than their Hungarian counterparts, who mostly accepted that their female partners would take longer leaves. In the absence of direct government messaging and frequent political conversations around these benefits, it is likely that a gender gap in family policy knowledge would also exist in Hungary. At the same time, it must be pointed out that in New York, where most of the American respondents lived, the government actively promoted new family policy benefits on subway advertisements during the interview period (see Figures 7 and 8 for examples). This result reveals that the overt political discourse around family leave in Hungary could have been more salient for respondent awareness than media advertisements alone. On the other hand, the American male respondents could have felt that it was not their responsibility to pay attention to these signs, following McMahon's (19909) resistance theory, or they could have believed that the advertisements were targeted towards women (Reid, 2015).[22]

[22] Note however that the advertisements in New York feature fathers with children and LGBT couples (See Figure 7).

The difference in affective responses between American male and female respondents and prospective fathers' striking knowledge gap provides evidence for the gendered mental load in the planning stages of parenthood, years before a couple has children (di Leonardo, 1987, Clit, 2017). This result reinforces Bodin's (2018) study in which Swedish men took joint responsibility for the decision to start a family, but did not actively prepare for pregnancy or engage in research on fertility. These findings together extend Offer (2014)'s conclusion, that mothers in dual-earner households bear much greater emotional stress than fathers, to the time period years before heterosexual couples start having children. Put simply, the unequal gendered mental load of parenting begins years before conception.

Chapter 2

Family Policy Resistance and Compliance in Hungary and the United States

Introduction

While family policy knowledge varied between Hungary and the United States, and shifted by gender in the U.S., all respondents created strategies to resolve the tension between their personal desires and the state's fertility incentives. In this chapter, I argue that the prevalence of inherent fertility descriptions in Hungary enables respondents to resist government interference into the private sphere. For respondents primarily concerned with equal gendered division of labor, I find that these individuals are more likely to consider migration from Hungary than respondents who are less concerned with gender roles. Re-examining Hollos & Yando's (2006) study as well as Zimmerman (2010) and Melegh's (2006) historical analyses, I consider how class dynamics, racially targeted pronatalism, and Western self-positioning could have shaped respondents' resistance strategies.

Next, I describe how American female respondents, in contrast to male respondents, prematurely adjusted their expectations of equal partnership, an outcome that acts as strategic compliance rather than resistance. Finally, I consider how each of these strategies impacted respondents' emotional and financial conceptions of children. I find that while Hungarian respondents and American male respondents refused to consider their fertility desires in financial terms, bolstering Repo's (2018) critique, American female respondents articulated shifting fertility preferences based on expected monetary resources in line with Donath's (2017) motherhood cost-benefit framework. Possible explanations for these outcomes are subsequently discussed.

"It's Not Like That": Intuitive Parenthood Narratives as Resistance

Although almost all Hungarian respondents knew that they could financially benefit from having three or more children, they deliberately framed their desire to have children by emphasizing the private and personal nature of fertility. This framing verbally and mentally separates respondents' financial concerns from their fertility plans, in direct opposition to state incentives. As Dorina, 23, Dominik, 21, and Lilien, 24, who all plan to have two children, each explained:

> …the kind of benefits that I would get, let's say the policies of the Hungarian government, are targeted at middle class families and I would belong to that…I couldn't imagine thinking about having kids in financial terms to that respect. I have one or two kids great, but what if we have one or two more, darling, then we could gain so much from the state? Like, no! (emphatic)

> …of course you have to think about kids in financial terms as well but I think for me, I want it to be more an emotional decision rather than a financial one. So I wouldn't have a third kid just because I would have some financial help from the government. I would rather have two children whom I decide to have because I want to have them. Give them all I can.

> I would never have a third kid whatever they offer just because I get that kind of support…of course [the money] can help…but the decision of having a child should come from within…not like from external, like oh we get an extra car!

These respondents all recognize that as a middle-class Hungarians, they stand to benefit from Hungarian family policies. Nevertheless, they carefully divorce their fertility desires from the economic realm. By classifying their desires as emotional rather than financial, they create a barrier to contest the possibility that this personal desire can be breached by state policy. These statements do not ignore the relevancy of finances for family planning, yet respondents deftly demarcate their desire for children outside of the governmental sphere. By portraying parenthood desires as instinctual, these individuals directly challenge the underlying premise in Becker's (1964) fertility theory, that individuals plan for children in utility maximizing terms, like other consumer goods (Repo, 2018)

Even in a case where István, 32, and Zoe, 28, planned to have three children and recognized that their personal fertility desires would allow them to benefit from government policy, Zoe made sure to reiterate this divide:

> Q: What do you think about these programs, do you like them?
> Zoe: I think the family planning is not really in connection with these circumstances and political sphere. If these discounts will be able to reach, we plan the same, three children. These family plannings do not change.

Even without asking whether Zoe considers these policies when she thinks about having children, she is insistent to point out that these policies are irrelevant to her desire for three children. Zoe and István instead outline how they both came from large families, enjoyed having siblings, and have each always planned to have three children. Zoe's insistence on delineating her personal plan for children from the government's incentives implies that she does not want to be perceived as a passive adopter of Hungary's fertility policy. Though she expects to take advantage of the benefits and has no plans to subvert the policy regime, Zoe's active construction of a fertility counternarrative supports Mahmood's (2001) theory of subject agency without direct resistance.

The fact that Zoe's chosen counternarrative also maintains the distance between her fertility plans and the state could however be viewed as a direct resistance to governmentality. Jettisoning the barrier between the economic and the social, Orbán emphasized: "How many children we decide to have is one of the most personal decisions that we make, and although it is a personal decision it is also one of the most important for our community" (Orbán, State of the Nation, 2017). Despite Orbán's efforts to link the economic and social realms, all respondents maintained a sharp division. Tellingly, Dominik, 21, later couches his desire for two children as an overt opposition to the government's pressure to increase the birthrate:

> …the government often emphasizes that one of our responsibilities as young people is to have enough children to grow Hungary as a country which I don't agree with…[decreasing population] will become a problem in financial terms but my responsibility in solving this issue isn't having three or more kids.

Dominik's ideological separation of his own goals from the state's reveals his ability to clearly locate his agency and decision-making power regardless of state policy (Showden, 2011). Countering Becker's (1964) assumption, Dominik and other respondents' preferences are not altered by expected financial outputs (Repo, 2018). Instead, interviewees resist that their fertility desires can be swayed by a cost-benefit calculus and express a defiant interest in smaller families or maintain the independent origins of their fertility plans.

The sharp demarcation communicated in each interview should be interpreted with a few caveats. First, as Hollos & Yando (2006) discovered, middle and upper-class women often choose to have two children in favor of achieving social norms of intensive mothering and raising "quality" children. As such, the dominant desire for two children by both men and women in this sample could partly reflect class expectations. These class expectations could in turn be shaped by socialist-era discourses that criticized Roma families for having more than three children and failing to provide them with "'average levels of care'" (Melegh, 2006, p. 86). Second, respondents' insistence that they would not take money from the government to have more children could be another way to separate themselves from pejorative welfare stereotypes about Hungary's Roma population "living off their children" (Szikra, 2019, Orbán 2019). As Gergő, 30, shared:

> No, it's not like, let's do some more and get some **money** (laughs)! Just to make one more baby to get more money is not really my thing…I think it shouldn't be about the money.

Gergő's pronouncement that having another child "just to get money" is not his "thing" could be viewed as a thinly veiled disassociation of himself from what he perceives as the behavior of the Roma population. Despite the fact that government benefits are targeted at middle and upper-class Hungarians, and exclude much of the Roma population, respondents maintained the general attitude that they did not want to be viewed as making childbearing decisions to receive economic incentives. The failure of these policies to encourage higher fertility might then be attributed to the

stigmatized clichés about receiving government childcare funds as well as resisting state efforts to manipulate the private sphere.

Lastly, respondents' staunch opposition to pronatal incentives could be part of larger efforts to situate themselves within liberal, Western, and urban intellectual population discourses (Melegh, 2006). Melegh (2016) interprets Orbán's turn towards "demographic nationalism" as a method to counter "the internal Orientalism of the EU" in which "'East Europeans' should be passive and dependent objects of Western policy making" (p. 104). In this context, disapproval of Hungary's pronatalism is respondents' way of signaling that they identify with the "developed West" and support liberal notions of reproductive rights (Melegh, 2006). This explanation is particularly relevant since nearly every Hungarian respondent described pronatalist programs with skepticism and frequently criticized the efficacy of one or more components of the Family Protection Action Plan. As a consequence, these ideological separations could also function as an endorsement of "Western" fertility principles and a tactic to oppose the government's nationalist opposition to liberal population discourses (Melegh, 2016).

"I Don't Want to Give Birth in Hungary": Migration as Resistance to Family Policy

While all interviewees were adamant that they would not change their fertility plans, respondents differed on whether they would consider migration as a resistance strategy to unfavorable family policy. Interviewees generally considered migration in response to broader institutional concerns in Hungary including health care, education, wages, politics, and even cultural pessimism. Although seven out of eleven interviewees discussed potentially migrating before starting a family, only two linked their desire for migration as a strategy to contest the gendered implications of Hungarian family policy.

Mira, 26, a graduate student who wants to have two children:

> I don't want to give birth here in Hungary…I was thinking about moving to Nordic countries because they have very nice policies for families, I mean they are supportive. I don't think everything is nice there and perfect but in terms of family policies and supporting women, it's very important…

Balázs, 23, a language tutor who wants to have two children and plans to leave Hungary for graduate school:

> I would love to stay at home with my children, and that's not really incentivized [in Hungarian society]…I think [paternity leave] is much much shorter than for women…I would do 50/50 with my wife depending on what she'll say…so I would [take leave] around a year, that would be ideal... Scandinavian countries are on that path, I'm not sure which.
> Q: Do you think that Hungary could ever get there?
> Well that's the million-dollar question, right? I think I'll wait it out abroad and come back [to Hungary] if it happens.

When considering future migration plans, both Mira and Balázs highlight countries with family policies that would better support their desired equal division between work and childcare responsibilities with their partner. The mention of Nordic countries, rather than other locations where they could potentially earn higher wages and receive quality health care (i.e. Germany or Austria) reflects how Mira and Balázs place considerable emphasis on equal gendered division of labor above other factors. These respondents' choice of migration to counter gender equity concerns rather than strategic postponement or planning for smaller families reveals a new resistance strategy in Hungary furthering Oláh (2003), Aassve et al., (2006), Hollos, (2009), and Ságí & Lentner (2018)'s research. Outside of the migration discussion, both expressed their recurrent concerns about gender relations in Hungary. Mira, 26 recalled how her father did not help her mother with childcare or housekeeping and how she would like an equal partner. She emphasized:

> The housework, we have to share it because I experience myself, if I have to take care of the housework and study, it's very difficult because my father is very patriarchal and doesn't help my mother…I would like really a partner…next to me. It's different you know, whether you have a partner or a husband…I worked a lot and I think I bring a lot to the table so I don't want to be treated like a piece of shit.

Balázs, 23, similarly critiqued gender relations in Hungary and how it bothered him that he could face ridicule for taking a long paternity leave.

> …it's a psychological or cultural attitude. Men in Hungary are not expected to stay home with their children and are expected to work even when they have children. So as far as I know, it's not like you can say maybe I'll do part time for this period…maybe you can do that legally but you're pressured into not doing that, that's something I hear quite often…it may just be a paranoia of mine but from what I can see, it seems realistic.

In line with Offer (2014) and Ciciolla & Luthar's (2019) research, Mira and Balázs anticipate that they will face an unequal gendered division of labor as parents if they remain in Hungary. For Mira, she fears that she will replicate the unequal gender dynamics from her childhood. Balázs worries that his employer will not support his intention to take a year of leave, which he acknowledges would be a concern for his future partner and his own aspiration for involved fatherhood. Positioning migration as a way to subvert these structural and cultural roadblocks, these respondents find a new way to preserve their desires for parenthood without complying with state incentivized gender roles. The strategy to have children abroad then acts as a double form of resistance by rejecting the government's concerted efforts to produce more "Hungarian" children.

On the other hand, interviewees who were less concerned about gendered division of labor, or ranked gender equity lower on their list of priorities, were less likely to consider migration as a viable strategy. When asked if he planned to take parental leave after he has children Aron, 28, who plans to have two to three children and did not plan to migrate, answered,

> You mean like not to work *at all*? I didn't think about this actually because in our family like it is obvious that the women should take [leave] because the women can feed the children…the first few years the mother is much more important than the father for a little child.

This exchange between Zoe, 28 and her fiancé István, 32, who also plan to raise their family in Hungary, followed the same pattern on the topic of parental leave:

István: I think about the woman staying with the kids…if I want, I can stay with the kids [with GYES].
Zoe: You can, yes...if you want! (laughs jokingly). It can change maybe when the children are bigger.

Gergő, 30, who plans to have two children and will likely remain in Hungary:

Q: Have you thought how much time you would want to take off if you have a kid?
Phew! Okay, strange, I never think about that! But I don't know, we talk with the girl.

Aron and Gergő's incredulous reactions to the possibility of taking parental leave as men and Zoe's humor at the suggestion that her male partner would take GYES reveal that these respondents have more traditional gendered attitudes about roles for new mothers and fathers. István and Gergő each mentioned in their interviews that they knew they could legally take paid parental leave in Hungary, yet that they planned to have their female partners take the leave. It follows that these individuals would then be less likely to contemplate migration in response to family policy. These four respondents also had the least amount of knowledge about family policies outside of Hungary. This outcome suggests that individuals with more concern about gendered division of labor then seek out information about international policies to strategize for their future outside of Hungary.

"It's on Me": American Women's Strategic Individualization

While respondents in Hungary demarcated their desires for parenthood from the financial sphere, and a few planned to leave Hungary to counter state gender roles, American women tended to cope with the minimal welfare structure by placing responsibility on themselves. In almost every interview, American respondents shared "horror" stories about stressed-out new parents in their workplaces who they did not want to become. Jacob, 25, shared his experience working in a law firm and hearing a new mother cry in her office when she came back to work. Caleb, 26, spoke about a dad at his accounting firm who wore contacts to work until he was forced to switch to glasses because his eyes were so red from lack of sleep. Clarissa, 25, who works at a hedge fund,

talked about how parents complain that they do not see their children for days in a row or are forced to log back online to catch up on work after they put their children to bed. While these stories were articulated as cautionary tales, female respondents developed strategies that focused on their personal responsibility for family planning while male respondents did not formulate plans whatsoever. Natalie, 26, who wants two or three kids, discussed how women at her job stockpile overtime, and instead of getting paid out, use the extra hours to take a longer paid maternity leave than the guaranteed six weeks. When asked if her partner, who works in finance, would be able to take any time off, Natalie said:

> I guess it would be nice if I could have a husband take off during that time period…realistically I don't see [him] taking any time off…I think he would take off like two weeks to help me out…I feel like it should be an even amount of time…that would be ideal but that would never happen.

When asked how she felt about the fact that her partner might not take an equal share of leave, Natalie continued:

> This is what I want so this is what I'll do to have kids…realistically, we're just not at a place in society where men will like take on that role so it's like if I want to have kids I'm going to have to figure out how to make it work…the onus is going to be on me. Not to say the other person wouldn't be there to help me along the way. It'll still be a partnership to figure out what does make sense....But I'm going to be the one making sure we are making these decisions…the final responsibility would be on me...when it comes down to it, I want to have kids.

To rationalize the fact that her partner will likely not take an equal amount of leave when they have a child together, Natalie redefines the term partnership within the confines of what she views as realistic. While Natalie stated that she wanted a fifty-fifty time split for parental leave, she uses the term partnership to denote making childcare arrangements as a couple, not that these arrangements themselves or the decision-making process will follow an even split. This compromise follows Hochschild's (1989) finding that women become "*benignly* accommodating" and convince themselves to accept new definitions of fairness when confronted by unequal household divisions of labor (emphasis in original). Natalie also continually personalizes her desire

for parenthood in this exchange by labeling having children as what she wants for herself, rather than discussing the benefits that her partner would gain from children, or any responsibility that her government or employer should bear. After recognizing the gender inequalities in planning for children, Ariana, 26, a physiotherapy student who plans to have two children, made a similar internal shift:

> I could choose to be angry about it but there are so many layers that I'd have to peel back…I think sometimes my initial reaction is, why don't you know this? Um, but then I kind of reset myself and say okay I can either be angry at him for not knowing something, which helps no one, or I can be like this is why I know this, this is why you should know this…God bless him, he's very responsive to that… I feel like I've been obligated to know more about this because the child comes out of me.

Like Natalie, Ariana is careful not to fault her partner for his lack of knowledge and expresses gratitude for his responsiveness to her requests. As Lockman (2019) discovered, this appreciation for partner participation, rather than equal contribution, preemptively lowers the bar in setting expectations for childcare responsibilities. Ariana also does not question the missing support from the government or her employer. She alternatively decides to change her internal outlook from anger to compassion to coach her husband about how he can help contribute to planning for children. By claiming that her anger would "help no one," and tying her experience to her personal "mindset," Ariana again puts the obligation on herself to cope with this societal inequality while her husband's actions evade responsibility. Her conclusion is that she needs to start pushing herself and her husband towards collecting more knowledge about family policies and ends with an essentialist statement about her biological family responsibility. Even from the perspective of a respondent not in a relationship, Leela, 24, communicated equivalent individualist expectations for family planning:

> I want to be able to completely support my children, like I don't expect the government to provide things. I don't expect my parents to provide things so I want to make sure I'm able to responsibly raise up my own children without depending on other sources.

Equating the ability to responsibly raise children with independence from government or family support, Leela situates herself as the sole duty bearer for her children regardless of her relationship status. This reasoning follows U.S. ideology of conflating independence from the government with moral responsibility (Mink, 1990). However, in none of these interviews do American women request that their partners switch jobs to take an equal amount of leave, while at least half of the eight American women considered changing their own jobs if they were provided with insufficient leave. Even when American women did expect their partners to alter their work schedules, they imagined a less equitable division of labor compared to women in Hungary. I asked Leela, who expressed the strongest commitment to equal partnership among American respondents, what she would do if her partner does not have substantial paid paternity leave:

> I think it would have to be a discussion…equal partnership is very important so I think it would be like, what would we do to make this better? I'm not saying he would have to necessarily leave, but like…maybe you don't have leave policies but I need you to come home by five PM everyday… they have to be willing to make changes…so that all the work doesn't fall to me as a mother.

Contrast Leela's response in the United States with Lilien, also 24, who is from Hungary, and was presented with the same hypothetical situation:

> I mean in that sense of course you have to deal with it, it's not like I can do much about it but after work maybe I would ask the dad to be there with the kid and then I could have in some ways time for myself.

Like American female respondents, Lilien expects that the realities of paternity leave policies in Hungary might make her desire for equal partnership difficult to achieve. Yet, unlike Leela, she does not request only that her partner be home at a reasonable time so that they can share responsibilities. Alternatively, she suggests that her partner would have sole responsibility for childcare after work so that she can have free time to account for the extra childcare hours she contributes during her maternity leave. While Leela's suggestion would provide her with help from her partner and does require her partner to make some lifestyle changes, Lilien's solution to be

"off-duty" after work allows her to more fully reclaim her idea of equal partnership. While Lilien and Leela both absolve their partners from personal blame, discarding McMahon's (1999) theory of men's resistance, Lilien at least suggests that her partner should rebalance hours of childcare work created by unsupportive family leave policies. Even if men's inaction is treated as a structural rather than purposeful condition, Lilien recognizes that her fallback position should entail more than occasional sharing (Gerson, 2010).

This difference between female Hungarian and American respondents' strategies reinforces Collins' (2016) comparative study of working mothers in Europe and the United States, in which American mothers blamed themselves for their difficulties reconciling work and family instead of looking to the government or their partners like their European counterparts. In a series of interviews with young mothers in Australia, another liberal welfare state, Baker (2009) found that mothers minimized the gendered inequalities they faced and reframed their difficulties as resilience. Following these neoliberal tenets, American women's framing of children as their individual choice and subsequent personal responsibility places the burden for family planning on women's shoulders without criticizing the structural failures in government policy or why their partners do not feel the same distress.

To cope with the expected future onslaught of unequal childcare expectations, women also used language shrouded in intentionality. In Elizabeth's, 27, interview, she used the terms "intentional" and "super purposeful" four or five times in describing her strategy to maintain her social life after children and avoid "falling off the earth." Clarissa, 25, declared that she needed to be "more intentional" about her timeline for children in general, and not remain childless before she turns 40 years old. The predominance of language concerning intentionality in these interviews once again reveals how American female respondents internalize and personalize their experience

of parenthood rather than critiquing systematic failures in the government, their employers, or their partners. This individualistic attitude is deeply embedded in American popular culture. In Rottenberg's (2014) analysis of Sheryl Sandberg's (2013) popular manifesto "Lean In," she documents how Sandberg calls for women to "change themselves" and confront "internal obstacles," creating affective pressures for self-monitoring and self-reliance, furthering the aims of neoliberal governmentality (p. 421, 424). Collins (2016), found that distraught American working mothers adopted this rhetoric by underscoring their internal fixes such as time management strategies and revised definitions of career and personal success. Although the American women in this study do not yet have children, their redefinition of ideal partnership from a fifty-fifty, even split, to one in which they anticipate taking primary responsibility for family matters, acts as an early psychological tactic to "change themselves," or prepare for motherhood in an environment where they expect to receive negligible aid. While these techniques do not challenge prevailing norms and more likely qualify as strategic compliance, they enable women to present themselves as "purposeful agents" rather than victims of unfair circumstances (Baker, 2009, p. 286-7). These women can then claim agency without confronting inequitable welfare structures (Mahmood, 2001, Hochschild, 1989). Thus, while American female respondents' focus on intentionality and individualism may seem counterintuitive in a context where they desperately need external support, these women reap temporary psychological benefits by creating illusory control.

"It Depends": American Female Respondent's Fluctuating Preferences for Children

Although almost all female American respondents planned to cope with minimal family support through individualized strategies, some women used financial logic to talk about their

desires for children as a way to directly resist the paucity of assistance. Ana, 23, Ariana, 26, and Ruby, 27, each highlighted how their desire for two children could be shifted to three if financial concerns were abated:

> Ana, 23:
>
> Having a sibling is so priceless. Two children is cheap enough and then if I'm really fortunate maybe three.
>
> Ariana, 26:
>
> I think we would probably do two…I think part of it is definitely financial...It all kind of depends on what the future holds for us. Two would be comfortable, three would be less so. But if it were in the cards I would definitely consider having a third.
>
> Ruby, 27, whose fiancé would like three children:
>
> My answer is going to be two…more than that is a lot to handle…An extra human to worry about, financially…I'm not totally against three. Right now that seems like a lot to me…"

Unlike interviews with Hungarian respondents, American female respondents have fluctuating preferences for the number of children they would have based on their level of financial support. When comparing two versus three children, these women focus less on the emotional commitments of parenting and place more emphasis on the material, financial resources that would be available in making their decision. Notably, Ana still labels her desire for two children as "priceless," again separating her desire for two children from a matter of economics but leaving the third to depend on finances. Ariana and Ruby create the same preference structure by leaving a third child as an abstract possibility based on economic resources. Countering Repo (2018)'s critique of Becker's (1964) human capital theory, in which Repo (2018) posits that women do not view children in economically rational, instrumental terms, these women consider their plans for a third child as rational, financial judgments. As Donath (2017) describes in the case of women who admit that they regret motherhood, allowing women to apply utilitarian, cost versus benefit calculations to childbearing decisions enables women to "destroy the illusion that the 'private

sphere' of the family and motherhood are bereft of such calculations balancing profits and losses" and helps us view these women as human subjects (p. 212-213). In other words, women's application of Becker's (1964) logic can acknowledge that the financial, rational sphere of parenthood is not reserved exclusively for men, and that motherhood is often not a simple instinctual desire for women.

By contravening the cultural narratives about natural motherhood, the strategic employment of this financial logic also enables women to enact brief agentic resistances in the fertility process, where they must manage their personal desires with little to no assistance. Ariana's responses particularly illuminate her subtle transition from strategic compliance to possible resistance. While she articulated intrapersonal fixes to cope with insufficient support, her refusal to have a third child unless she receives more assistance, which could come from the state, her job, or her husband, craftily creates a small window for Ariana to resist pronatalist pressures to have more than two children. Ruby also enacts this resistance when she tells her fiancé, who is only entitled to five days of paternity leave and wants three children, that she is not "totally against three" but is leaning towards two children because of financial constraints. In these interactions, American female respondents briefly shed their strategic compliance with neoliberal feminist norms and enact micro resistances by refusing to have more children without requisite assistance.[23] At the same time, these shifting preferences could reflect ingrained, neoliberal ideology to have children "responsibly," or without relying on external aid, rather than purposeful collateral against their minimal support structures. It thus remains unclear whether these preferences signify resistance or strategic compliance.

[23] For a related discussion of grassroots, or meso-level resistances, see Pande's (2012) account of female migrant domestic workers in Lebanon.

American female respondents' willingness to marshal financial bases for fertility desires could also be tied to their greater awareness about family policy. Female respondents recognized how financial assistance could dramatically change their quality of life. In turn, their inclination to couch their desire for children in financial terms may act as a strategy to mentally prepare themselves if the larger family they desire is not feasible and their individual efforts to scrape together leave time or become more "intentional" are not sufficient. Ana's description of whether she will be "really fortunate" to afford three children, and Ariana's characterization of whether it will be "in the cards" for her to have a third child, reveal how these women desire more children but view having more than two as a financial privilege that must be privately borne.

"I'm Pretty Set on the Number": American Male Respondents' Inflexible Fertility Desires

American male respondents, in contrast to American female respondents, were less likely to change their desired number of children with improved hypothetical finances and family policies.

Kevin, 26, who would like two children:

> No, because there's some stuff you can't change, like the fact that you'll be losing so much sleep when you have to take care of a baby and there's only so much sleep that I want to be losing out on (laughs)."

Joseph, 29, a teacher who would like three children:

> I'm pretty set on the number…cause I wouldn't want to have more than three because I want to eventually have some free time.

In these exchanges, Kevin and Joseph contemplate whether supportive family policies or financial incentives could influence their desires for children and deny that their preferences can be altered. Rather than focusing on the monetary costs of raising children, they underscore the time costs that would dissuade them from having a larger family, but maintain a separation between their financial

status and their desire for a particular number of children. This reasoning is also distinct from Hungarian respondents, who described their desire for children in emotional, inborn terms to rebut financial incentives. Although American male respondents maintain that finances will not be a decisive factor, they instead focus on how children would affect their available personal time. The reliance on time costs reveals that these men are applying Becker's (1964) cost-benefit framework to the number of children that they want, but that they place a higher premium on time than money compared to American female respondents. This difference in cost inputs in the cost-benefit analysis for children could reflect the fact that men are horizontally and vertically segregated into higher paid positions, making finances less of an overall concern for these middle and upper-class men (Barbulescu & Bidwell, 2013). As Michael, 26, a software engineer described:

> It's just also like my elasticity for income and stuff too like, I feel fairly comfortable financially and that incentive [tax breaks] doesn't entice me that much but it probably varies a lot.

The fact that Michael and most other male respondents feel "comfortable" financially and plan to remain in highly-paid positions possibly explains why financial factors are not as influential in shifting preferences for children as they are with American female respondents. Since these men also have little information about their parental leave options or know that they have only a small time to take leave, they might prioritize time costs with each child, since leave time is the area in which they have the least anticipated support. High-paid jobs in the United States also provide higher returns to long working hours, another reason that American male respondents may consider further reduction of their already limited free time as a larger factor than financial losses (Goldin, 2014, Cain Miller, 2019). Contextualizing these respondents' refusal to alter their fertility preferences, in an inflexible, devotion-based work culture, we can see how these men negotiate their fertility plans with their demanding career expectations (Reid, 2015). These attempts however should not be classified as agentic compliance or resistance. As Showden (2011) recognizes, "One

mark of agency is the ability to articulate reasons for the choices one has made, with some sense of the available options" (p. 99). Since male respondents are predominantly unaware of available family support from their employers and the government, it is unfitting, without further evidence of effortful deliberation, to claim that their intransigent fertility desires are an act of resistance against their workplaces or the state (Mahmood, 2001).

Conclusion

Although Hungarian respondents and American female respondents were knowledgeable about available family policies, respondents articulated diverse resistance strategies when their fertility desires conflicted with state incentives. In Hungary, respondents each maintained the private nature of the fertility sphere to reject government incentives. Respondents characterized fertility plans as fixed, instinctive, and emotional decisions that could not be changed, underscoring Repo's (2016, 2018) critique of neoliberal fertility policy. For respondents primarily concerned with equal gendered divisions of labor, relative to other factors, Hungarian respondents considered migration as a strategy to reconcile their fertility desires with their ideological commitments to equal parenthood.

In contrast to Hungarian respondents, American female respondents personalized their responsibility for parenthood and redefined their standards for equal partnership in response to limited state and private intervention. Recognizing that they would not receive substantial external support, these respondents articulated their desires for children as shifting preferences based on their financial status, violating pronatalist norms about natural motherhood to reclaim their agency, consistent with Donath's (2017) theory of emotional childbearing logic. American male respondents, like Hungarian respondents, were unwavering about the number of children they

would have, but emphasized time costs as the main reason for their intransigency rather than instinctive desires. I theorize that the prioritization of time costs over finances reflects these men's occupational segregation into highly-paid jobs and their lack of awareness about family policy.

The variability in Hungarian and American resistance strategies reveal that prospective parents, in addition to childless individuals, employ a range of resistant and compliant responses to pronatalism (Peterson & Engwall, 2013, Peterson, 2014). These results further demonstrate how individuals then adapt these strategies to address national policy circumstances and anticipated levels of support. These context-driven responses in turn shape individuals' conceptions of parenthood and desires for children. Taken together, these findings then challenge the positivist policy assumption that family welfare policy will unidirectionally alter fertility. Instead, these outcomes establish how individuals' responsive agency can undermine government demographic agendas and how individuals play an active part in policy deployment.

Conclusion

As governments position family policy as an alternative to immigration, this study has interrogated how individuals negotiate their personal fertility desires with conflicting state incentives. I found that individuals in Hungary and the United States engaged in agentic resistance and compliance to reconcile their ideal family structures with perverse benefits or minimal state support. While strategies in Hungary were shaped by the prevailing political discourse and, in some cases, individuals' prioritization of equal parenthood, responses in the United States were mediated by the gendered gap in family policy awareness altogether. Absent external support, American female respondents developed rhetorically protective, individualized compliance strategies and described more fluid preferences for their ideal number of children than Hungarian respondents and American male respondents. Accounting for these results, I find support for Repo's (2018) critique of Becker's (1964) cost-benefit approach to family planning and Donath's (2017) feminist rehabilitation of economically rational childbearing decisions. Respondents strategically invoked both of these models to counter constraints created by each welfare context.

In the case of gendered division of labor, American male respondents' anticipated fallback to traditional breadwinner roles, despite preferences for equal parenthood, reveals support for Gerson (2010) and Pedulla & Thébaud's (2015) structural account. Concurrently, American male respondents' blasé tone and failure to engage in future planning provides evidence for McMahon (1999), Coltrane & Adams (2008), and Lockman (2019)'s theory of men's self-interested resistance. Masculinity norms against expressing overt emotional reactions could have tempered these responses. Nevertheless, the evidence for structural and intrapersonal explanations signals that both contribute to the persistence of the mental load and unequal gendered division of labor among heterosexual couples. As Reid (2015) and Albuja et al. (2019) have documented,

purposeful targeting of available benefits towards prospective fathers may persuade men to take more ownership of their role in family planning.

As respondents acknowledged, they felt that much of their decision-making capacity was related to their class status. Further research must engage with individuals from lower economic classes and non-urban locations to test whether respondents engage in different responses or are able to demonstrate agency in fertility choices with more pressing financial concerns. Coltrane & Adams' (2004) study of paternal involvement in low-income, Mexican-American households is a promising example of this direction.

In this study, American female respondents, the group with the least external support, developed strategies to preserve their parenthood plans. However, many of their techniques provided only superficial support and did not alleviate their mental and physical anxieties. Additional research could engage with a longitudinal approach and evaluate how respondents apply these strategies when they actually have children or how male respondents create real-time strategies when they actively confront the dilemma between idealized egalitarian parenthood and insufficient assistance. A quantitative analysis would be equally important to evaluate whether these rhetorical strategies have any collective impact on the national birthrate. Lastly, respondents in Hungary and the United States habitually mentioned plans to depend on grandparents as secondary help absent state support. The ramifications of this strategy on respondents' division of labor in dual-earner families should be examined.

More broadly, the results of this study reveal that individuals do respond rationally to family policy incentives, but not in the unidirectional mode that governments assume. By invoking strategic, contextual responses that adapt to prevailing ideologies in each location, we can finally detect how individuals play an active role in these policies' success or failure. Recognizing this

role, governments and demographers alike would do well to consider future recipients' preferences rather than instituting a top-down approach that could be met with resistance.

It is true that family policies in Hungary and the United States are in many respects counter opposites, which was bolstered by respondents' dissimilar resistance strategies in this study. Historically this has been true as well. Hungary has a history of fluctuating yet relatively generous state support for family policy while the United States has maintained a noninterventionist approach, notwithstanding limited cases of racially stigmatized aid. But, as right-wing governments in both countries look to reduce immigration and increase birthrates, Hungary and the United States are finding common ground in their turn towards family policy. While the Hungarian Embassy's "Making Families Great Again" conference with Trump administration officials was billed as a discussion on modern marriage and family, messages veered towards the role of the family as a vehicle for racial and ethnic purification. In his conference speech called "Your Family Can Save Our Civilization," Sebastian Gorka (2019), a former assistant to President Trump, pronounced:

> Some cultures are better than others. Period. If that isn't true, just go and live in Somalia…Look at what it is to be a woman in the Middle East; what it is to be a non-Muslim in the Middle East… We are here because we know the core building block of the Judeo-Christian society is the family. It is the family that provides us the direct connection to the eternal truths upon which our civilization is built. A civilization that proudly counts both America and Hungary as its members.

By including Hungary in this order of superior, Judeo-Christian nations, Gorka's racist and nativist remarks defend Hungary's claim to White, Western, Christian culture. Orbán himself attempted to reaffirm this tie, most recently when he proclaimed to a reporter, "I am the most Christian, and thus the most European, of Europeans. Europe's DNA is me. I am its guardian." (Lévy, 2019). The reincarnation of these anti-immigrant, nativist tropes is certainty bleak. Yet, even under the present return of these eugenic fears, the power of individuals' collective resistance to oppose governmentality, and the historic failure of political systems to control population changes are

sources of promise. As Carl Ipsen (1996) noted of Italy's family policy under fascism, "The Italian Fascist regime proved unable to manipulate demographic phenomena to the degree and in the direction desired, a warning perhaps to those who presume to make similar attempts in other political contexts" (p. 255).

Appendix

Respondent Characteristics[24]

Hungary Respondent Characteristics				
Name	Age	Occupation	Roma Identity Status	Gender
Dominik	21	Student		Male
Rebeka	23	Physiotherapy Graduate Student		Female
Dorina	23	Graduate Student		Female
Balázs	23	Language Tutor		Male
Lilien	24	Human Resources Recruiter		Female
Mira	26	Graduate Student	Roma	Female
Zoe	28	Museum Employee		Female
Aron	28	Graduate Student	Roma	Male
Gergő	30	Television Producer		Male
István	32	Museum Employee		Male
Anja	34	Graduate Student		Female

Median age: 26

Roma proportion: 18%

[24] All names have been changed to preserve confidentiality.

United States Respondent Characteristics					
Name	Age	Occupation	Race/ Ethnic Origin	Gender	State
Ana	23	Teacher	Korean American	Female	New York
Leela	24	Sales & Advertising Manager	Indian American	Female	Texas
Robert	24	Sales & Advertising Manager	African American	Male	Texas
Clarissa	25	Hedge fund consultant	Caucasian	Female	New York
Jacob	25	Unemployed	Caucasian	Male	New York
Natalie	26	New York City Government Analyst	Caucasian	Female	New York
Caleb	26	Accountant	Caucasian	Male	New York
Michael	26	Software Engineer	Caucasian	Male	New York
Kevin	26	Software Engineer	Chinese American	Male	New York
Ariana	26	Physiotherapy Student	Caucasian	Female	New York
Greg	26	Legal Marketing Specialist	Hispanic American	Male	New York
Elizabeth	27	Non-profit Management Graduate Student	Caucasian	Female	New York
Ruby	27	Speech Language Pathologist	Caucasian	Female	New York
Joseph	29	Teacher	Caucasian	Male	New York
Brittany	35	Self-employed online saleswoman	Caucasian	Female	Illinois

Median age: 26

Total non-Caucasian proportion: 33%



Figure 1 Seven-Point 2019 Family Protection Action Plan (Ministry of Human Capacities)

Figure 2 CPAC Advertisement for Rick Santorum's 2019 Speech in Support of Paid Family Leave (Photo from Twitter, @AP4Liberty)



Figure 3 Event Poster for "Making Families Great Again" Event (Photo from Evenbrite.com)

Figure 4 Metro Advertisement Promoting Family Benefits in Hungary

Figure 5 Another Advertisement Detailing the Family Protection Action Plan

Figure 6 Top Image: The Hungarian Government's Promotion of its New Family Benefits, Bottom Image: The Viral "unfaithful boyfriend" Star Contemplating Migration to London (Photo from Twitter @Asz)

Figure 7 Subway Advertisements for Paid Family Leave in New York State (Photos from Twitter @BrianEsserEsq and Community Service Society)



Figure 8 Subway Advertisement for Universal pre-Kindergarten in New York City

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