

**Cultural Policy Approaches and Industrial Art Sponsorship:
The Case of Dunaújváros And Linz, 1960s–80s**

By
Annamária Nagy

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Supervisor: Professor Emese Kürti

Second Reader: Professor Marsha Siefert

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Abstract

This thesis examines post-war Hungarian and Austrian cultural policy approaches and the progress of state and private funding from the 1960s to the 1980s. It analyzes the attitude of industrial establishments towards local cultural and artistic initiatives, furthermore, the background of political, social and economic approaches that determined the cultural scene at both side of the Iron Curtain. Danubian steel factories, the VÖEST Alpine in Linz and the ISD Dunaferri Danube Ironworks in Dunaújváros, served as the basis of my comparison together with the steel sculpture parks they helped to establish during the 1970s. The long-term consequences of their supportive practice are also emphasized.

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1. Introduction

After the Second World War, Hungarian cultural policy closely followed the totalitarian Soviet practice, in which the state monopolized the scientific and cultural fields, and strictly regulated the fundamental nature of cultural consumption.¹ This practice led to the establishment of the so-called banned-tolerated-promoted² system, which allowed little or no latitude for those individual actions that did not follow the rules defined by the state, hence no critical official opposition could exist. Those who publicly communicated any critique of the system often renounced their secure working and living conditions in the process. Meanwhile, the news coming from the other side of the Iron Curtain suggested that there are more opportunities given in “the West” for a more liberal scientific and cultural life. Hence the media was also controlled by the state, the lack of sufficient authentic information made it hard to avoid idealizing life on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

This thesis compares Hungarian and Austrian post-war cultural policy approaches and the evolution of state and private funding. It addresses institutional relations between factories and artists and the formative role of these supportive industrial establishments on culture and art. Furthermore, it analyzes the background of political and social issues which dictated the cultural processes from the 1960s to the 1980s in each country, and looks at the long-term effects of the factories’ patronizing activities. For the basis of my comparison, I choose to analyze artistic sponsorships from two steel factories, the VÖEST Alpine³ in Linz, Austria and

¹ Inkei, Péter, Vaspál, Veronika: *Hungary*. Council of Europe/ERICarts (2007): Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe. 8th edition. (Hungary, Council of Europe/ERICarts, 2007) 2

² The so-called “Three T’s” (tiltott=banned, tűrt=tolerated, támogatott=promoted) system operated in Hungary from the late 1950s based on the Soviet practice, although in a milder form. It was incidental and most of the time depended on the favor of the people in power. The method is connected to the communist politician, György Aczél.

³ Voestalpine is an international capital goods group based in Linz. One of its principal components is the steel-based factory in Linz, the VÖEST (Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen und Stahlwerke – United Austrian Iron and Steelworks, hereafter VÖEST Alpine).

the ISD Dunaferr Danube Ironworks⁴ in Dunaújváros, Hungary. These institutions both supplied artistic initiatives not only with financial support, but also with a material and technological background. As such, the outcome of these projects, open-air sculpture collections at the riverside of the Danube in both cities, could not have been made without their contribution. Moreover, Linz and Dunaújváros have been sister cities since 1992.⁵ Prior to that, the two factories did not have direct contacts with each other despite the fact that the DUNAFERR adopted a technological innovation invented by the VÖEST Alpine.

1.1. Historical Background

I find the comparison of Hungary and Austria interesting, because both countries mutually affected each other politically, culturally and economically for centuries. However, the emergence of the Iron Curtain abruptly drove a wedge between them, dividing these geographically Central European states into Eastern and Western ones based on their political ideology. Nevertheless, Hungary never became a typical Eastern European state, and being neutral Austria was not considered to be a typical Western European country either, although from the Hungarian point of view it was the door to the West.⁶ The overall objective of the project is to understand what kinds of parallel policies existed in Hungary and Austria and whether they had the chance to influence each other. I also would like to point out the different nature of these countries in both the East and the West when it comes to political, cultural, artistic and economic tendencies.

⁴ The factory was called “Dunai Vasmű” (Danube Ironworks, hereafter DUNAFERR) from 1950 to 1984, when it took the name Dunaferr, and eventually became ISD Dunaferr Danube Ironworks Ltd. in 2007.

⁵ Csaba D. Kiss, “A Linzi Kapcsolat (The Relations with Linz),” *A Hírlap*, April 3, 1992, 3.

⁶ The lack of a consensus on the definition of “Eastern” and “Western” could cause confusion. See more Ihar Babkou, “A Modern/Posztkolonális a Kelet-Európai Határvidéken (Modern/Post-Colonial at the Eastern-European Bordeland),” *Szépirodalmi Figyelő*, no. 4 (2004): 27–41.

For the practical analysis, I chose to examine the Hungarian case through the example of the International Steel Sculptor Workshop and Sculpture Park in Dunaújváros, which has been supported by DUNAFERR since 1975. The Workshop was established in 1974 as a continuation of the art colony movements of the 1960s.⁷ It was one of the first initiatives in Hungary that took advantage of the country's large-scale industrial background, using materials that suited the profile of the given industry. For the Austrian case I will analyze the "forum metall," which was supported by the VÖEST Alpine in Linz in 1977. The ironworks of Linz served as a patron of an open-air sculpture collection in the Donaupark, presenting prestigious, internationally-acknowledged artworks from the 1960s and 1970s, with the aim of highlighting the several ways to utilize iron and steel by connecting heavy industry and art. It was one of the most important steps in developing Linz, the City of Steel, into the City of Culture.⁸ The metallurgical industry of the Linz region was reshaped after the Second World War and VÖEST Alpine became a leading industrial institution of Austria and even Europe, later on. DUNAFERR was established in 1950, thus both factories underwent significant development during the same period; moreover, both of them were state properties during the Cold War: VÖEST Alpine was privatized at the beginning of the 1990s, and DUNAFERR followed suit in 2004.

⁷ The workshop was founded in 1974, operating on a biennial basis from 1975 to 1989, then three more occasions were held in 1993, 1996 and 2000. After seventeen years it was revived in 2017 and it will be held in 2019 as well.

⁸ "Forum Metall," *LENTOS Kuntmuseum Linz* (blog), accessed June 9, 2019, <https://www.lentos.at/html/en/3580.aspx>.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

Substantial works have been carried out on the general questions concerning both the political and the cultural aspects of the Cold War period. These works typically cover cultural policy approaches and the methods of patronizing art as well.⁹ However, regarding Hungary, in many cases the focus is either on state policies or on the resisting individuals and groups. The state-funded institutions in between, such as factories and marginal community centers, are often overlooked and lumped together with general state policies, although many of them fought against the oppression with their own tools. The following two recently published collection of studies serves as the basis of my analysis: (1) *Art in Hungary 1956-1980. Doublespeak and Beyond*.¹⁰ covers not only the central tendencies but also the peripheries and grey zones of culture and art, contextualizing the Hungarian scene in relation to other socialist and capitalist countries' practices; (2) *1971 – Parallel Nonsynchronism*¹¹ is the catalogue of Kiscelli Museum's recent exhibition, which focused on those parallel tendencies which occurred between supported, prohibited and banned artists. Moreover, in my opinion this collection of studies provides a more thorough and unbiased introspection than the Hungarian National Gallery's 1960s exhibition catalogue¹² from 2017. While comparing the

⁹ Kurt Tweraser, "The Marshall Plan and the Reconstruction of the Austrian Steel Industry 1945-1953: The Bureaucratic Politics of Trusteeship, Nationalization, and Planning as Reflected in the Rise of the United Iron and Steel Works in Linz," in *The Marshall Plan in Austria*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Dieter Stiefel, vol. 8, Contemporary Austrian Studies (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 290–322; Hans Knoll and Júlia Jolsvai, eds., *A második nyilvánosság: XX. századi magyar művészet, Művészeti világ sorozat* (Budapest: Enciklopédia Kiadó, 2002); M. János Rainer, "A 'Hatvanas Évek' Magyarországon. (Politika)Történeti Közelítések. (The Sixties in Hungary—Some Historical and Political Approaches)," in *"Hatvanas Évek" Magyarországon. (Muddling through in the Long 1960s: Ideas and Everyday Life in High Politics and the Lower Classes of Communist Hungary)*, ed. M. János Rainer (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2004), 11–30; Balázs Apór, *The Handbook of COURAGE Cultural Opposition and Its Heritage in Eastern Europe* (Budapest: Institute of History, Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2018), <https://doi.org/10.24389/handbook>.

¹⁰ Edit Sasvári, Hedvig Turai, and Sándor Hornyik, eds., *Art in Hungary 1956-1980: Doublespeak and Beyond* (New York, NY: Thames & Hudson, 2018).

¹¹ Dóra Hegyi et al., eds., *1971 – Párhuzamos különidők (1971 – Parallel Nonsynchronism)*, A Fővárosi képtár katalógusai 161 (Budapest: BTM Kiscelli Múzeum – Fővárosi Képtár, 2019).

¹² Kinga Bódi et al., *Within Frames: Art of the Sixties in Hungary (1958-1968)* (Budaörs: Magyar Nemzeti Galéria / Szépművészeti Múzeum, 2017).

Cold War cultural policy approaches of two countries that were on different sides of the Iron Curtain I found it difficult to avoid generalizing and non-adequate terms, hence in this regard I relied on Ihar Babkou's study on modern and post-colonial Eastern European borderlands.¹³ Although factories were usually funded and operated by the state—as in the cases of VÖEST and DUNAFERR—they were not unequivocally political bodies like government ministries, but they also played significant role in shaping social relations and public matters. A closer look at their approach could help to fill the gap regarding the intermediate political actors of the Cold War. Although my research will cover the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, I would like to briefly refer to the continuation of artistic initiations in Linz and Dunaújváros and consider the long-term effects of their patronizing activities.

1.3. Methodology

To have a clear view for appropriate comparison, I consider it crucial to use diverse sources, in addition to the secondary literature (academic publications, workshop and exhibition catalogues, and so forth). For primary sources I intend to use contemporary press materials, cultural policy reports and interviews. The archives of DUNAFERR are accessible, and many kinds of related documents are preserved, although the collection is incomplete due to a lack of proper maintenance.¹⁴ Regarding the “forum metall,” the LENTOS Kunstmuseum Linz is in charge of the collection and the sculpture park, while the city archives of Linz have also preserved some official sources.

In order to make the comparison, it is first necessary to analyze both cases independently, keeping in mind the same primary questions: What were the main

¹³ Babkou, “A Modern/Posztkoloniális a Kelet-Európai Határvidéken (Modern/Post-Colonial at the Eastern-European Bordeland).”

¹⁴ Although all the documents (contracts, photos, film footages, publications, press materials, artworks, etc.) are situated in the same place, the factory does not have employees who take care of the archives, thus the documents are not organized in any way.

characteristics of the country's cultural policy approaches during the 1960s–80s? What kind of art sponsorship did the country have? How did these approaches and methods work in practice, particularly in the case of the chosen factory? To be able to answer these central questions, several additional sub-questions need to be addressed as well, organized in thematical groups. The first group is focused on institutional politics: What kind of institutions existed to support cultural needs on the national level? What kind of firms or factories could afford to finance art and culture, and with what kind of sources (material, financial)? Did the state, as the owner of most institutions, encourage these collaborations? What are the origins of these kinds of industrial support in each country? In cases of state-funding, who decided upon the sponsorship, the state or the given institution itself?

The second group of sub-questions concerns the nature of art sponsorship: What types of art and artists did the factories patronize and why? When and on what terms did private funding become acceptable? Did these sponsorship actions have any significant effect on art history (by extension, were there any solo or group exhibitions organized? Was it a frequently-discussed topic in the contemporary media?) Did these actions indicate further development?

The final group of sub-questions is focused on the method of comparison: What are the main similarities and differences between the Hungarian and Austrian practices? Did they influence each other and if so, how? Was the Austrian approach as “free” and developed as it appeared from Hungary? Moreover, based on the comparison, I expect to obtain answers to the following questions regarding contemporary matters: What are the long-term effects of these patronizing activities? Have the factories continued their sponsorship after the fall of the Communist regime?

By answering the above listed questions, I expect to find multilevel analogies between the two cases, as the outcome of the case studies—namely the International Steel Sculptor Workshop and Sculpture Park and the forum metall—are similar, thus I assume that the institutional background of these cases must have similarities as well, moreover they must rely on similar sources of inspiration given the stylistic characteristics of the artworks.

Following this introductory section, I intend to structure my thesis into two main chapters: the cultural and industrial developments on both sides of the Iron Curtain and patronizing and sponsorship activity of industrial developments. The second chapter will contain the comparison of the Hungarian and Austrian cultural policy approaches followed by the development of steel industry and the significance of the Danube in the steel industry. The third chapter will cover the analysis of industrial establishments' general sponsorship activity and the profiles of the DUNAFERR and the VÖEST, moreover the comparison of the two sculpture parks. Besides the general comparison, I intend to compare the long-term consequences of the factories' supporting behavior to cultural life in their immediate surroundings. In the conclusion I will briefly look at the contemporary situation of the factories as well.

2. Cultural and Industrial Development on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain

The aim of this chapter is to examine and compare the cultural and industrial positions of Hungary and Austria after the Second World War. Regardless of the different political structures of these countries, both intended to leave behind the enormous losses of the war and provide suitable living conditions for their inhabitants. Although Hungary was not part of the Soviet Union, it was an important satellite state with a political apparatus closely modeled on the Soviet one: cultural policy was no exception to this emulation. In the case of Austria, the political and social restoration of the country after the Nazi occupation was also a crucial task in which culture played a significant role. After all, both countries' intentions were similar, but as the Iron Curtain emerged between them and they found themselves on opposite sides, any possible co-operation—which might have seemed logical considering their close relations in the past—became implausible. In this chapter I will focus on the cultural and industrial aspects of the post-war politics because of their social and economic significance for a country's welfare. Regarding cultural policy approaches, I will discuss the governmental and institutional practice of each country from the states' perspective. For the industrial comparison, as I indicated in the introduction, I will examine two metallurgical cities on the Danube—Linz and Dunaújváros—and their factories, as both VÖEST Alpine and DUNAFERR became involved in the economic restoration process after the Second World War.

2.1. Post-war Cultural Policy Approaches

In 1985, Canadian economists Harry H. Chartrand and Claire McCaughey distinguished four alternative models for post-war public support of culture and the arts.¹⁵ According to their study, the state can play the role of Facilitator, Patron, Architect, or Engineer (see Table 1.). In each case, the government acts as a leader, but its political and financial dominance over the arts differs greatly. The Facilitator follows the policy of diversity, supporting many kinds of creative initiations regardless of artistic style or genre. Funding for these projects comes from tax expenditures and private donations. The Patron focuses on artistic excellence and funds art with the help of arm's-length art councils.¹⁶ By doing so, the government retains the right to decide upon the extent of any funding, but does not control its beneficiaries. The Architect considers the arts as part of the country's social welfare, thus usually a Ministry or a Department of Culture oversees funding. Moreover, artists' unions and art organizations ensure the financial status of their members. Although in this case the preferences of the art-consuming community are as important as artistic excellence or professional standards, financial support does not depend on popular success and might cause creative stagnation. The last type, the Engineer, has the highest level of control over the cultural scene, since in this case, the state supports art only if it is useful for political and educational purposes. Party members decide upon funding, and artistic freedom or creativity play no role in this concept. The state owns every cultural organization: hence official artists' unions, approved by the government, are the main sources of financial

¹⁵ Harry Hillman Chartrand and Claire McCaughey, "The Arm's Length Principle and the Arts: International Perspective - Past, Present and Future," in *Who Is to Pay for the Arts?: The International Search for Models of Support*, ed. Milton C. Jr. Cummings and J. Mark Davidson Schuster, ACA Arts Research Seminar Series (New York, N.Y: ACA Books, 1989), https://www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/ArmsLengthArts_paper.pdf.

¹⁶ "Arm's length" is a principle of public policy in which the government implicitly separates the judiciary, executive and legislative powers. See more in Hillman Chartrand and McCaughey, 1.

security. Whereas it is difficult to maintain these repressive conditions without any resistance in the long run, there is a possibility that suppressed artists might create underground communities or a counterculture.¹⁷

The authors state that the above-mentioned models are elaborated concepts, but also generalized ideal types, and, in most cases, states apply features from more than one category. Nonetheless, they introduce a model country for each category: the USA as the Facilitator, the United Kingdom as the Patron, France as the Architect, and the Soviet Union as the Engineer. This categorization shows the assumed power structure of the Cold War as three types matched with Western countries and the Soviet Union represented the whole Eastern Bloc, although not all Socialist countries followed the same cultural policies and the level of artistic freedom also differed between them. However, despite the fact that neither Austria nor Hungary are mentioned in the study, I find this categorization applicable for my research, because matching the characteristics of these ideal types with the countries' own practice makes the similarities and differences more visible while also helping to frame the comparison. In the following sub-sections I will discuss the development of the Hungarian and the Austrian states' cultural policy approaches. In the case of Hungary, I will analyze its transition from the strict Engineer model to a practice which applies features from the Architect and the Patron models as well. Regarding Austria, I will examine its attempts to transform the Architect model into a Patron-Facilitator hybrid during the 1960s–1980s.

¹⁷ Hillman Chartrand and McCaughey, 2–3.

1. *Table Models for Supporting the Arts, Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989*

Models for Supporting the Arts							
ROLE	MODEL COUNTRY	POLICY OBJECTIVE	FUNDING	POLICY DYNAMIC	ARTISTIC STANDARDS	STATUS OF THE ARTIST	STRENGTHS & WEAKNESS
Facilitator	USA	diversity	tax expenditures	random	random	box office appeal & taste; financial condition of private patrons	S: diversity of founding sources W: excellence not necessarily supported; valuation of private donations; question benefits; calculation of tax cost
Patron	United Kingdom	excellence	arm's length arts councils	evolutionary	professional	box office appeal; taste & financial condition of private patrons; grants	S: support of excellence W: elitism
Architect	France	social welfare	ministry of culture	revolutionary	community	membership in artists' union; direct public funding	S: relief from box office dependence; the affluence gap W: creative stagnation
Engineer	Soviet Union	political education	ownership of artistic means of production	revisionary	political	membership in official artists' union, Party approval	S: focus creative energy to attain official political goals W: subservience; underground; counterintuitive outcomes

2.1.1. Hungary

As Chartrand and McCaughey indicated in their study, the Engineer type of public support is the most rigorous of all. The Engineer's main policy objective is political education; accordingly, the state retains the ownership of all artistic means of production. The policy dynamic is revisionary, the artistic standards are political, and the financial and social status of the artists is secured through membership in the official artists' unions and the Party's approval. I argue that the Hungarian public support system used this methodology from the end of the 1950s until the middle of the 1970s, an era often referred to as "the long sixties."¹⁸ This period was followed by a gradual, but slow and unbalanced thaw up until the regime changed in 1989. Nevertheless, the cultural policy approaches and doctrines from these years, as well as the development of the institutional structure, are inseparable from the suppression of the 1956 revolution and the subsequent retaliation.

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, hereafter MSZMP), led by János Kádár, governed the country from November 1956 until the regime change of 1989. After the revolution, regaining and strengthening the power of the communist regime were the most important tasks for Kádár and his administration. They urged cultural reform as well, for two reasons: firstly because, according to them, the country's inadequate cultural approach (namely, the Western/capitalist/imperialist cultural impressions) was one of the most crucial causes of the revolution; and secondly, due to the delicate relationship with the Soviet Union, the government was in need of support from the Hungarian people, and culture and art were considered the main tools of political education.¹⁹ Some topics, such as the ("counter")revolution, the Jewish question, and any criticism of the

¹⁸ See more about "the long sixties" Rainer, "A 'Hatvanas Évek' Magyarországon. (Politika)Történeti Közelítések. (The Sixties in Hungary—Some Historical and Political Approaches)." *Acta Historiae Artium*, special issue on 'The Long Sixties' ed. Edit András and Hedvig Turai (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2015) Vol. 56. 1.

¹⁹ Melinda Kalmár, *Ennivaló és hozomány: a kora kádárizmus ideológiája (Edibles and Dowry: The Ideology of the Early Kádár Era)*, Lassuló idő (Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1998), 20–25.

political state apparatus or the Soviet invasion, became taboo, greatly limiting creative freedom. By the 1960s the communist leadership found itself in a contradictory position. On the one hand, the MSZMP struggled to meet the expectations of the Soviet leadership; on the other hand, they also made some efforts to please the Western powers in the hope of social and economic development. The Kádár regime was not able to resolve this paradox, though it successfully maintained the practice of doublespeak for almost thirty years.²⁰

In the Kádár regime, György Aczél was the most significant figure of the era's cultural policy-making. He had a key role in enacting the so-called "Three T's" directive in 1958, which determined cultural life in the country until the end of the 1970s.²¹ This regulation differentiated three levels of state censorship, categorizing artists and other cultural actors (writers, musicians, and so forth) as promoted, tolerated, or banned. From the promoted artists the Party expected to create artworks which fitted into the socialist framework both aesthetically and ideologically, and in exchange they enjoyed social and financial benefits. Banned artists were not only publicly stigmatized because of their opposition, they were also deprived of the chance to forge a professional artistic career. Tolerated actors were in a somewhat better position: however, they had very limited opportunities to exhibit their art and they could not rely on any financial support either.²² Even though these categories were not controlled by any law, the Party's regulation of 1958 was the basis of the cultural policy approach for decades, since it covered a broad framework which allowed Party members to

²⁰ Edit Sasvári, "Autonomy and Doublespeak: Art in Hungary in the 1960s and 1970s," in *Art in Hungary 1956-1980: Doublespeak and Beyond*, ed. Edit Sasvári, Hedvig Turai, and Sándor Hornyik (New York, NY: Thames & Hudson, 2018), 10–11.

²¹ "Az MSZMP Művelődéspolitikájának Irányelvei 1958. Július 25. (Guidelines of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party. 25 June 1958)," in *A Magyar Kultúrpolitika Története: 1920 - 1990 (History of the Hungarian Cultural Policy: 1920-1990)*, by M. Róbert Drabancz and Mihály Fónai (Budapest: Csokonai Kiadó, 2005), 160–71.

²² László Beke, "Magyar művészet a hatvanas években (Hungarian Art in the 1960s)," in *"Hatvanas évek" Magyarországon. (Muddling through in the Long 1960s: Ideas and Everyday Life in High Politics and the Lower Classes of Communist Hungary)*, ed. M. János Rainer (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2004), 450–51; Sasvári, "Autonomy and Doublespeak," 13–14.

make individual, often biased and ad hoc decisions.²³ Aczél actively participated in this process, to the extent that his input became unavoidable regarding every cultural policy decision and cultural event.²⁴

It can be concluded from the above-mentioned cultural policy approaches that several elements of the 1958 declaration match with the Engineer model. The Kádár regime's policy objective (political education), its policy dynamic (revisionary), as well as its artistic standards (political) cover almost all the Engineer state's characteristics, and the remaining two categories, the status of the artists and the funding structure, also follow this pattern. The managing and funding structures of visual and applied arts were settled simultaneously with the ideological pursuits of the MSZMP's post-revolution politics by the middle of the 1960s and worked until 1989. The newly developed, centralized institutional network was responsible for every aspect of the cultural life: exhibitions' authorization, artists' residencies, and fellowships, just to mention a few. The managing structure had four cornerstones. While the employees of the Ministry of Culture (Művelődésügyi Minisztérium) legislated directives and regulations, the Art Fund of the Hungarian People's Republic (Magyar Népköztársaság Művészeti Alapja, hereafter Art Fund) would then oversee such issues as artists' livelihood or the practical creation of their artworks from the second part of the 1960s. The Association of Hungarian Artists (Magyar Képző- és Iparművészek Szövetsége, hereafter Association) was a Soviet-style union, originally founded in 1949, which provided ideological guidance for professional artists, and the Supervisory Body of Arts and Crafts (Magyar Képző- és

²³ Sándor Révész, *Aczél És Korunk (Aczél and Our Time)* (Budapest: Sík, 1997), 81–82.

²⁴ In the case of the opening of the Csontváry exhibition in 1963 in Székesfehérvár, Aczél told Ö. Gábor Pogány, the then-director of the Hungarian National Gallery, not to open the exhibition because he did not consider the event representative enough, even though the invitations were already sent, and the exhibition was permitted by the authorities. See Emőke Gréczi, "Tűrt-Tiltott Művészet Egyóránra Pesttől - Kovalovszky Márta És Kovács Péter a Székesfehérvári Múzeum Legendás Kiállításairól (Banned-Tolerated Art in an Hour from Pest - Márta Kovalovszky and Péter Kovács about the Legendary Exhibitions of the Museum in Székesfehérvár)," *MúzeumCafé*, August 2012, <http://muzeumcafe.hu/hu/turt-tiltott-muveszet-egyoranyira-pesttol/>. See more on marginal places Júlia Perczel, "The Art Sphere as a Grey Zone: Techniques of Power and the Context of Artistic Practices," in *Art in Hungary 1956-1980: Doublespeak and Beyond*, ed. Edit Sasvári, Hedvig Turai, and Sándor Hornyik (New York, NY: Thames & Hudson, 2018), 58–75.

Iparművészeti Lektorátus, hereafter Supervisory Body) was a sovereign institution of censorship, in addition to the Art Fund's revisionary department from 1963.²⁵ In other words, to become a professional artist the first step was to join to the Young Artist Studio (hereafter Studio), which served as the youth section of the Art Fund. Official artists gathered at the Association upon receiving their diploma, which implied their membership of the Art Fund as well (with the representatives of other cultural genres). The Art Fund covered their living costs and provided studios, workshops and different types of social aid, as well as dealing with the yearly sales of the artworks. The Supervisory Body belonged to the Art Fund, although it made decisions about applications, beneficiaries, and most importantly exhibitions independently, according to the principle of the Three T's. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Aczél himself played a significant role in everyday artistic life: he regularly visited openings and sometimes ordered the shutdown of exhibitions on the spot if they did not meet with his personal expectations. The Party centralized cultural life and intended to keep its official locations in the capital.²⁶ Accordingly, the main exhibiting place was the Kunsthalle (Műcsarnok), and some smaller, so-called "Exhibiting Institutes" operated in parallel: the Ernst Museum, the Helikon Gallery, the exhibition hall at Dorottya Street, as well as the Fényes Adolf Hall.²⁷

Chartrand and McCaughey's description also indicates that the rigidity of the model might generate some kind of organized resistance or counterculture, as would ultimately occur in Hungary. Even though tolerated and banned artists could not enjoy any benefits of the state's institutional background, they had some opportunities to bypass the system as studio exhibitions were allowed without a permit if they were not advertised and did not last longer

²⁵ Perczel, "The Art Sphere as a Grey Zone," 61.

²⁶ However, Pécs was in a peculiar situation as Aczél's hometown.

²⁷ László Beke, "Tiltani, Tűzni, Támogatni. A Hetvenes Évek Avantgárdja (Ban, Tolerate, Promote. The Avant-Gard of the Seventies)," in *A Második Nyilvánosság: XX. Századi Magyar Művészet (The Second Publicity: Art in Hungary in the 20th Century)*, ed. Hans Knoll and Júlia Jolsvai (Budapest: Enciklopédia Kiadó, 2002), 230–33.

than one day. Many members of the Hungarian neo-avant-garde art scene took advantage in this way, such as György Galántai who organized exhibitions in a chapel in Balatonboglár at the beginning of the 1970s. As the official exhibiting locations were not available for most artists, exhibitions moved to alternative spaces: marginal cultural centers, the entrance halls of state firms, and private apartments. Museums and cultural institutions outside of Budapest were in a unique situation. On the one hand, the authorization process was similar for them as well; on the other hand, due to their distance from the capital, the Supervisory Body did not treat them as strictly as those in Budapest.²⁸ This partial freedom of choice played an important role in the symposium movement which usually focused on local industrial techniques, as was the case in Dunaújváros (iron and steel), Bonyhád (enamel), or Villány (stone).²⁹

Although it may appear that the post-war Hungarian cultural policy approaches completely match with the Engineer model (along with the Soviet practice), the system was multilayered, as the need of the Party's doublespeak already suggested. The thaw began early in the 1960s: the progress was slow and complex, caused by many economic, political, and diplomatic factors, and the incidents of the 1950s cannot be separated from this process either. Due to the tense industrialization and forced labor, supply disruption occurred all over the country, generating serious tension by the middle of the 1950s, and the 1956 revolution intensified this already ambiguous situation. Nevertheless, the emerging social and economic crisis urged the Party to take consistent actions simultaneously in the field of domestic and foreign politics.³⁰ Regarding the latter, the overall aim of the post-1956 foreign politics of Hungary was the justification of the violent governmental reactions. Therefore, diplomatic

²⁸ See more of these parallel tendencies in Hegyi et al., *1971 – Párhuzamos különidők (1971 – Parallel Nonsynchronism)*.

²⁹ See more of the symposium movement's history in the third chapter.

³⁰ T. Iván Berend, *A szocialista gazdaság fejlődése Magyarországon, 1945-1968 (The Development of the Socialist Economy in Hungary, 1945-1968)* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1976), 123–24.

reform was a priority, particularly because the country's membership of the United Nations was suspended as a result of the revolution's suppression. For this reason, the MSZMP chose a policy of "wait and see" until, in July 1958, the Party officially distanced itself from Stalinism while maintaining a pro-Soviet attitude.³¹

In this political climate, Kádár's government decided to renew the country's interwar cultural network. The traditions of cultural relations between Hungary and other European states goes back to the 1920s, when Kuno Klebelsberg, then Minister of Religion and Education, created a series of Hungarian Institutes (Collegium Hungaricum) to help young Hungarian humanists, scientists, and artists to travel and study abroad with the financial support of the state.³² The first ones opened in Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and Rome, although by the end of the 1950s, the Parisian and the Roman were the only Hungarian cultural institutes functioning on the other side of the Iron Curtain, and both of them were led by Hungarian émigrés.³³ In 1959 the Party appointed new directors to regain the leadership of these diplomatic bodies, and to connect them back to the international state diplomacy.³⁴ Khrushchev's visit to Paris in 1960 was another turning point for Hungarian diplomacy and cultural policy practice, since it gave more room for maneuver in the future.³⁵ Furthermore, the state encouraged émigré artists to return to Hungary, for two core reasons: firstly, to earn social support from the Hungarian people; and secondly, the Party intended to use the

³¹ Anikó Macher, "Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1957-1963. Echoes of Western Cultural Activity in a Communist Country," in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, Explorations in Culture and International History Series, v. 6 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 79, 82.

³² Collegium Hungaricum opened in Vienna and Berlin in 1924, and in Paris and Rome in 1927. Nowadays, Hungary has 23 Hungarian Institutions in 21 countries, outside of Europe as well, from New York to Delhi and Cairo, to name a few. See more: <http://www.balassiintezet.hu/en/international-relations/international-directorate/> last reviewed: 18th April 2019.

³³ The Viennese Hungarian Institute reopened in 1963, which I will discuss in length towards the end of this chapter.

³⁴ Macher, "Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1957-1963. Echoes of Western Cultural Activity in a Communist Country," 81.

³⁵ Macher, 95.

homecoming artists' foreign appreciation and influence to cleanse Hungary's international image.³⁶

While the thaw continued, and the government showed an open-minded image to the West, Hungarian cultural workers and artists continued to face severe control and censorship. However, the reform of the cultural scene's financial services had also become inevitable by the middle of the 1960s, and it became part of the leadership's new economic mechanism starting from 1968. The aim of this policy was to retain central control, while the cultural sector was maintained by localized and restricted capitalist approaches. The leadership hoped that this goal would be achievable by decentralizing part of the cultural field, thus they continued to champion ideologically important works while creating a (supervised) marketplace to satisfy some consumer demands. The newly founded or merged cultural firms (publishers, motion picture distributors, and so forth) bore the responsibility to cover their costs from the profit made on their products.³⁷ While fine arts were not part of this marketing reform as much as literature or cinematics, the thaw was noticeable in this field as well. From the middle of the 1960s more and more artists had opportunities to travel abroad and familiarize themselves with the Western art scene, but it rarely meant that they could exhibit artworks inspired by these new experiences.³⁸ However, in 1967 the Party gave unendorsed artists permission to organize self-financed shows, although it applied only to marginal places

³⁶ Sasvári, Edit, "Fából Vaskarika. Marxista Önmegvalósítás Helyett Kapitalista Import - Nemzeti Alapon. (Squaring the Circle. Capitalist Import on a National Basis Instead of Marxist Self-Realization)," in *Amerigo Tot: Párhuzamos Konstrukciók (Amerigo Tot: Parallel Constructions)*, ed. Emese Kürti and József Mélyi (Budapest: Ludwig Múzeum, 2009), 23. See more in Lóránt Bódi, "Domesticated Modernism: The Role of Western Émigré Artists in the Cultural Politics of the Kádár Era," in *Art in Hungary 1956-1980: Doublespeak and Beyond*, ed. Edit Sasvári, Hedvig Turai, and Sándor Hornyik (New York, NY: Thames & Hudson, 2018), 179–89.

³⁷ Melinda Kalmár, "Az Optimalizálás Kísérlete. Reformmodell a Kultúrában 1963-73 (An Attempt at Optimization: The Reform Model in Culture, 1965–1973)," in *"Hatvanas Évek" Magyarországon. (Muddling through in the Long 1960s: Ideas and Everyday Life in High Politics and the Lower Classes of Communist Hungary)*, ed. M. János Rainer (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2004), 167, 176.

³⁸ Perczel, "The Art Sphere as a Grey Zone," 69–70.

and the Ministry of Culture remained in charge of the authorization process.³⁹ Another turning point happened at the end of the 1970s when the Educational Institute (Népművelési Intézet) took the place of the Supervisory Body regarding the authorization of exhibitions. Getting permission for a show was still incidental, as Party members feared the consequences of the ever-changing informal guidelines, but the network of alternative spaces provided enough room to continue the unofficial artistic discourse.⁴⁰

By the beginning of the 1970s, the degree of the thaw together with the 1968 events in European politics caused such social and economic changes that the Soviet Union intervened, and Kádár received severe censure from Brezhnev. Hence, the Party reconsidered its reform model and attempted to take back some of its social and cultural concessions, but a return to previous ways was no longer possible.⁴¹ The thaw slowed down for a while but nonetheless continued, and from the middle of the decade the debates rose amongst the artists in tandem with increasing criticism of the regime. The government tried to keep tensions under control, but by the mid-1980s most of the artists were openly hostile to the regime and socialism as such was in a general social crisis. The division between official and non-official artists dissolved by this time either. The cultural scene opened, contemporary art, theatre and film became available such as foreign press material and publications. Moreover, the erstwhile executive of the regime's cultural policy, György Aczél, had lost his political power. In the second half of the 1980s the Party was not able to consistently control the

³⁹ Maja Fowkes and Reuben Fowkes, "Liberty Controlled: Institutional Settings of the East European Neo-Avant-Garde," in *Art in Hungary 1956-1980: Doublespeak and Beyond*, ed. Edit Sasvári, Hedvig Turai, and Sándor Hornyik (New York, NY: Thames & Hudson, 2018), 80.

⁴⁰ Beke, "Tiltani, Tűzni, Támogatni. A Hetvenes Évek Avantgárdja (Ban, Tolerate, Promote. The Avant-Gard of the Seventies)," 231. See more in Perczel, "The Art Sphere as a Grey Zone"; Hegyi et al., *1971 – Párhuzamos különidők (1971 – Parallel Nonsynchronism)*, 208–44.

⁴¹ Rainer, "A 'Hatvanas Évek' Magyarországon. (Politika)Történeti Közelítések. (The Sixties in Hungary—Some Historical and Political Approaches)," 23–26.

transformation cultural scene and by 1987–88 the cultural field became inseparable from the political progression.⁴²

When analyzing the cultural policy tendencies in Hungary between the 1960s and the 1980s, a continuous fluctuation in the power structure is noticeable. The period from 1956 to 1962–63 completely matches with the Engineer model: the Party used culture and the arts for political purposes and funded them accordingly. Due to the fundamental rigidity of the system, its maintenance was an unreal attempt on the part of the Party. The lack of consistent, long-term political thought eventually caused economic, cultural, and social crisis, and the country's leadership found itself in a difficult situation: how to keep control and make concessions at the same time. The attempts to solve this contradiction rather intensified the thaw instead of eliminating the tension; by the middle of the 1960s the Engineer model was no longer sustainable, and some aspects of the Architect type appeared. Political education was still the most important cultural policy objective, but the economic struggle required a shift of focus to social welfare. Funding became partially decentralized, the practice of self-managed events emerged and unofficial artistic standards gained more attention. The attempt to reform the vertical cultural policy system into a parallel structure required self-sufficiency from certain sectors (such as book publishing). The popularity of cultural products and artists plays an important role in the Patron model, although in the case of the Hungarian method this practice was limited and did not imply unconditional artistic freedom. All in all, as the political climate of the country was changing from the 1960s, so did its approach to cultural policy until it became a hybrid model based on the characteristics of the Engineer, the Architect, and the Patron models.

⁴² Lóránd Hegyi, “Új Helyzetben Új Identitás. A Nyolcvanas Évek Magyar Művészete (New Situation, New Identit. Hungarian Art in the 1980s),” in *A Második Nyilvánosság: XX. Századi Magyar Művészet (The Second Publicity: Art in Hungary in the 20th Century)*, ed. Hans Knoll and Júlia Jolsvai (Budapest: Enciklopédia Kiadó, 2002), 271–73.

2.1.2. Austria

If one compares the post-war cultural policy approaches of Hungary and Austria based on the features of the Chartrand-McCaughey ideal types, a complex picture emerges. While the former aimed to narrow down the territories of cultural life and created the communist vision of modernity, the latter stood for cultural diversity and transparency and had its own vision of creating national identity with the help of culture and the arts. According to the Chartrand-McCaughey study, Austria mostly adhered to the Architect model with a hint of the Engineer's ideology, until a turning point at the beginning of the 1970s when some elements of the Patron and the Facilitator models appeared in cultural policy. In the subsequent paragraphs I will discuss this transition and analyze how this process differed from or resembled the Hungarian method.

Even though the pace of the development in Austrian cultural policy approaches differed from the Hungarian practice, both responded to international political events and internal social tensions. In the Austrian case, the most important national task after the Second World War was to find its place between East and West as a sovereign, neutral country. This process accelerated in 1955, when the Allied occupation by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain ended and the coalition of the conservative, Christian democratic Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, hereafter ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Socialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, hereafter SPÖ) began to reestablish a new, independent, and neutral Austria.⁴³ Accordingly, the first ÖVP-SPÖ coalition (1945–1966) was determined to create a new national identity with the following preconditions: firstly, Austria cannot be impeached for its participation in the

⁴³ Andrew E. Harrod, "Hidden Hand and Cross-Purposes: Austria and the Irreconcilable Conflict between Neutrality and Market Laws," *Austrian History Yearbook*, 43 (2012): 165–88.

Second World War, since the country merely followed the orders of the oppressive Nazi regime.⁴⁴ Secondly, the cultural heritage of the state is based on its thousand-year-old history and traditions, surrounded by countless natural beauties; and thirdly, as a neutral country, Austria would not participate in any of the Cold War conflicts. Due to the lack of all-encompassing social and political processing of Austria's role in the Nazi regime, the adaptation of these tasks was contradictory. On the one hand, the government gave former national socialists opportunities to reintegrate into society without any accusations in the name of collective victimhood, while the real victims were overlooked and devalued.⁴⁵ The cultural restoration complied with this practice as the state intended to continue its nation-branding in the manner of the Habsburg traditions, suggesting that the Anschluss did not have any impact on Austrian culture. Consequently, the previously prestigious genres of music and theatre were at the top of the artistic hierarchy, but contemporary representatives were either ignored or sanctioned, not to mention the actors of fine arts, literature, and other fields.⁴⁶

During this period, from 1955 until the end of the 1960s, the ÖVP-SPÖ coalition mostly applied the Architect-type cultural policy, although some of their attempts varied from it. According to this model, culture and art are necessary elements of social welfare. The bureaucrats of a Ministry or Department of Culture decide upon funding according to community standards rather than artistic professionalism, which can lead to creative stagnation. Moreover, the financial status of the artists is guaranteed by their membership in official artists' unions, and the box office or private funding are not determining factors.⁴⁷ The

⁴⁴ In this regard both Hungary and Austria chose to leave their engagement in the Second World War unsaid, but with different approaches. While Hungary followed the leftist, „anti-facist” rethoric, then Austria followed the retrograde rightist path.

⁴⁵ Margarete Lamb-Faffelberger, “Beyond ‘The Sound of Music’: The Quest for Cultural Identity in Modern Austria,” *The German Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2003): 290–91, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3252083>.

⁴⁶ Andrea Ellmeier, “Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity Report: Austria,” Council of Europe: Transversal Study on the Theme of Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity (Vienna: Österreichische Kulturdocumentation, Internationales Archiv für Kulturanalysen, February 2000), 19, <http://www.kulturdokumentation.org/eversion/download/Austrian-Report.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Chartrand and McCaughey indicated that this model is the closest to the European monarchies' practice between the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, and following the First World War, most of the social

fact that party leaders explicitly denoted traditional cultural genres as cornerstones of the new Austrian identity suggests that the policy dynamic was revisionary (Engineer) rather than revolutionary (Architect). Furthermore, party politics dictated the performance of non-governmental interest groups as well, leading to a particular form of interlocking associations, parties and interest groups that determined the cultural sphere.⁴⁸ The ideology of this practice is similar to the Hungarian in this period, and it can be concluded that both governments used culture and the arts, amongst other tools, to legitimize their early post-war politics: Austria to cover the lack of accusations against its Nazi collaborators, and Hungary to prove the justness of the 1956 revolution's suppression. However, a significant difference appears between the two states' attitude to émigré artists and intellectuals. As I previously discussed, inviting émigrés home was a key element of Hungarian cultural diplomacy in the 1960s. In contrast, Austria did not treat its émigrés as allies, but rather considered them as mementos of the War and their crimes.⁴⁹ One possible reason behind this decision might be the government's fear of public discussion concerning the relationship between culture and politics, which was taboo up until the 1980s.⁵⁰ The narrowed governmental view of cultural policy stood against particularly the young and critical artists forcing them to create informal, underground groups,

democratic Western European countries applied it. See more in Hillman Chartrand and McCaughey, "The Arm's Length Principle and the Arts," 3.

⁴⁸ Ellmeier, "Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity Report: Austria," 20.

⁴⁹ Michael Wimmer, "Cultural Policy in Austria as a Permanent Challenge," *The European Journal of Cultural Policy* 3, no. 1 (October 1, 1996): 42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10286639609358033>; Ellmeier, "Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity Report: Austria," 19.

⁵⁰ One of the very few public figures who stood up for émigré artists was Viktor Matejka (1901–1993), member of the Communist Party of Austria (Kommunistische Partei Österreichs, KPÖ) and of the city council, responsible for cultural affairs between 1945–1949. He fought for the return of Oskar Kokoschka and Arnold Schoenberg, among others, and consistently collected press and magazine clippings from the 1920s, moreover he was often called the "conscience of the nation". His early archival materials were destroyed by the Nazis in 1938; however, he continued his collecting habit even in the Dachau concentration camp. Matejka donated his post-war archive to MUMOK (Museum moderner Kunst Stiftung Ludwig Wien) in 1979 with the wish that the institute would continue the collection. Today the Viktor Matejka Art Archive is part of the Museum's collection and it. See more "Matejka, Viktor," *Weblexikon der Wiener Sozialdemokratie* (blog), accessed June 5, 2019, <http://www.dasrotewien.at/seite/matejka-viktor>; Susanne Neuburger and Marie-Therese Hochwartner, "We Trailblazers: Pioneers of Postwar Modernism (Wall Text)," 2016, <https://www.mumok.at/sites/default/files/cms/wirwegbereiter-wandtexte-e.pdf>; Franz Richard Reiter, ed., *Wer war Viktor Matejka?*, Dokumente, Berichte, Analysen 7 (Wien: Ephelant-Verl, 1994).

a typical effect of the Engineer type's suppressive politics which indicates the complexity of the post-war Austrian cultural policy approaches. Another noteworthy irregularity from the Architect model appeared in the field of funding. Although artists were rarely supported through private funding in the initial post-war period, an unusual alliance was forged between an open-minded clergyman and radical avant-garde artists,⁵¹ and literary and architectural avant-gardes were also supported by some regional politicians in Styria. These collaborations not only implied avant-garde artists' participation in the change of government at the turn of the 1960s–70s—which was partially indicated by the Europe-wide revolutionary atmosphere around 1968⁵²—but also indicated the metamorphosis of the cultural policy system. Considering the development between 1955 and 1970 it can be concluded that at the beginning of the Second Republic, the government had a democratic, though conservative, approach that fundamentally relied on the more liberal Architect type but strengthened its political intentions by applying some features of the rigorous Engineer model. By the end of the first coalition in 1966, some elements of the Patron model appeared—especially in the field of funding, as discussed above—and this transformation into a more transparent structure continued during the 1970s.

The turning point in cultural policy came when the SPÖ took over the government from the ÖVP at the beginning of the 1970s, under the leadership of Bruno Kreisky. This period also marks the end of the reconstructions after the Second World War and the social democratic reforms brought new approaches to many fields, including cultural policy. The most important improvement was the broadened concept of culture that raised contemporary

⁵¹ Monsignor Otto Mauer (1907–1973) founded Galerie nächst St. Stephan in 1954 and acted as a counterpoint of the Catholic Church antimodernist attitude. His gallery supported artists like Arnulf Reiner, Maria Lassnig and Kiki Kogelnik, among others. See more in Neuburger and Hochwartner, “We Trailblazers: Pioneers of Postwar Modernism (Wall Text)”; Robert Fleck, *Avantgarde in Wien: Die Geschichte der Galerie nächst St. Stephan, 1954-1982* (Wien: Löcker Verl, 1982).

⁵² Michael Wimmer, *Reflections on a Special Case: What Makes Cultural Policy Truly Austrian?*, vol. 35, 2006, 271, <https://doi.org/10.3200/JAML.35.4.265-276>; Ellmeier, “Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity Report: Austria,” 20.

art and popular genres to the level of traditional high culture (theatre, music, and so on) and gave room for diversity not only in theory but also in practice through reform of the cultural funding system.⁵³ In order to initiate a discussion between those who distributed art and those who produced the distributed products, a reform of the institutional structure was necessary. Since at the beginning of the Second Republic bureaucrats were in charge of cultural decisions, poor decisions were often made due to a lack of professional cultural knowledge. Thus, the democratization of the decision-making process brought new forms of collaboration and intermediaries were set up. Advisory bodies, juries, and commissions, all of them experts in their artistic fields, supported the work of the federal minister who was the head of the funding's distribution. At the same time the role of the private sector also grew, seeing it financially support not only contemporary initiations but also traditional institutions.⁵⁴

The broadened funding intentions went hand in hand with the extension of the cultural budget, which caused difficulties to the government. It was one thing that the state intended to make culture widely accessible to all classes, but finding the financial background for this prior to the upcoming economic crisis was another. Therefore, the Federal Ministry of Education and Arts decided to decentralize cultural governance and share expenses between the central Federal Ministry of Finance and the provincial institutions. By doing so, not only did the financial burden decreased, so did the tension between the provinces and the capital.⁵⁵ Furthermore, at the end of the 1970s the first debates on privatization in the cultural field also emerged. However, to encourage firms and enterprises to pay their share towards covering cultural expenses, the state allowed them to integrate part of these sums into their professional expenses, thus attaining tax-deductible status. By this time, the most popular forms of

⁵³ Wimmer, *Reflections on a Special Case: What Makes Cultural Policy Truly Austrian?*, 35:271. See more on the politics of Bruno Kreisky in B. Vivekanandan, *Global Visions of Olof Palme, Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 117–87, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33711-1>.

⁵⁴ Ellmeier, "Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity Report: Austria," 20–21.

⁵⁵ Harald Gardos and Manfred Wagner, *Some Aspects of Cultural Policies in Austria*, Studies and Documents on Cultural Policies (Paris: Unesco, 1981), 64–65, <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000043730>.

corporate sponsorship were purchasing artworks, sponsoring artistic events and financing cultural institutions.⁵⁶

Not long after Kreisky became the chancellor of the country, the government initiated an open discussion about cultural funding and the needs of the Austrian society. For this reason, from 1971 on, the Federal Ministry of Education and Arts annually published and distributed Art Reports (Kunstbericht) in which they made their cultural expenditures publicly accessible. On the one hand, these reports aimed to raise awareness of those politicians who were responsible for the annual budget. On the other hand, it ensured transparency by revealing the purposes and the beneficiaries of the funding in detail; moreover, citizens were encouraged to express their opinion and comment on the report. Many of them took the opportunity to share their valuable knowledge and personal experiences of a certain cultural field, which was important especially regarding the regional peculiarities. In order to enhance the efficiency of the decision-making process, in 1975 the Institute for Empirical Social Research carried out a survey focusing on the attitudes towards culture among the Austrian population. The questionnaire covered many fields (reading, adult education, music, fine arts, and so forth); besides cultural interests, everyday cultural behavior was also estimated. The catalog based on the survey was published in 1975, and it served as a reference point for the decision-making process until the end of the 1980s.⁵⁷

Various additional attempts were made to involve culture in everyday life. For example, from the middle of the 1970s a cultural management training program became available as a specialization at the University of Music and Performing Arts. The overall aim of launching this course was to train cultural mediators who not only knew how to address

⁵⁶ Wimmer, "Cultural Policy in Austria as a Permanent Challenge," 46–47; Gardos and Wagner, *Some Aspects of Cultural Policies in Austria*, 71.

⁵⁷ Gardos and Wagner, *Some Aspects of Cultural Policies in Austria*, 21–22, 53–55; Wimmer, "Cultural Policy in Austria as a Permanent Challenge," 46; Ellmeier, "Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity Report: Austria," 21.

people, but also were familiar with cultural financing. The Austrian Cultural Service (Österreichischer Kultur-Service) was established for similar reasons, to mediate and animate cultural activities all over the country.⁵⁸ The reform of the adult education program also proved to be successful, especially after the decentralization, because regional governments were able to arrange such activities according to the preferences of locals. The open studio program (Wiener Volksbildungswerk) was also initiated at the end of the 1970s as a further form of artistic animation.⁵⁹ Bruno Kriesky was in power from 1970 to 1983 and during this period Austrian cultural policy became more transparent, giving more space (and funding) to contemporary endeavors. By this time the Architect type of cultural policy-making lost its dominance, and features from the Patron (arm's-length governance, private patrons, grants, and so on) and the Facilitator (diverse funding sources, valuation of private donations, tax-deduction) models were equally significant. The changing political atmosphere of Europe in the 1980s had an impact on Austrian politics as well. While in the 1970s consumption determined the cultural field, the 1980s and 1990s were led by the quest for new investments and financial approaches; this was also the era when privatization became a key issue (and remained one up until the 2000s). The marketization of culture together with the privatization efforts engendered a situation very similar to that at the beginning of the 1960s: traditional institutions and cultural genres again received more financial and moral support as representatives of the national identity.⁶⁰ However, contemporary art did not fall back to the same position it held at the beginning of the 1960s, mostly due to the newly introduced Federal Arts Promotion Act in 1988, which emphasized its policy importance.⁶¹

Based on the analyses above, it can be stated that the Hungarian and Austrian governments had fundamentally different cultural policy approaches. Although at some point

⁵⁸ Gardos and Wagner, *Some Aspects of Cultural Policies in Austria*, 62–65.

⁵⁹ Gardos and Wagner, 45–47.

⁶⁰ Wimmer, *Reflections on a Special Case: What Makes Cultural Policy Truly Austrian?*, 35:272.

⁶¹ Ellmeier, “Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity Report: Austria,” 21.

they had similar purposes, such as strengthening national identity after the Second World War and legitimizing the states' actions with the help of culture, the overall outcome of the two practices did not harmonize with each other. While the Hungarian method showed a slow but continuous thaw from the beginning of the 1960s until 1972, when Brezhnev's criticism produced a temporary setback, for Austria the reformatory period came with Bruno Kreisky in 1970 and lasted until 1983, when the emerging privatization reversed it somewhat. Although in both instances the states attempted to open to the public, there was a significant difference between their intentions. In Hungary the thaw was caused by social and political pressure, and Kádár's government made concessions to prevent the (further) spread of countercultural movements. By contrast, the Austrian government itself was proactive in initiating most of the social and cultural changes and involved people in the decision-making process by asking their direct feedback. In order to achieve both states' main purpose—namely to make culture accessible for everyone, regardless of their class—Hungary chose to centralize the cultural field, whereas Austria did the opposite. This latter difference is even more interesting considering the fact that both countries had to contend with the cultural (and economic) dominance of their capital cities and intended to decrease it with the help of political and cultural realignment. To conclude the comparison, it can be stated that the Hungarian and Austrian cultural policy approaches were closest to each other at the beginning of the 1960s, when culture was utilized as a political tool. As the states began to recover from the social, economic, and cultural losses of the Second World War, their approaches diverged year by year. Although they reconverged at the end of the 1980s, when the changing political system had an impact on the emerging Europe-wide cultural industry, the marketization of culture took place differently in both countries from 1989 onwards.

2.2. Steel Industry along the Danube

During the early years following the Second World War, it was of utmost importance that Europe-wide industrial establishments, especially iron and steel plants, begin to work as soon as possible to accelerate the restoration process. The increased demand for these products stimulated a production boost which also had a pressing effect on technological development. Essentially two conditions determined the geographical location of steel and iron production: the location of raw materials and the costs of their transportation. As technologies advanced hastily it became possible to diverge from natural sources; thus, by the 1960s, the international geography of iron and steel production transformed. The previously dominating centers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—lost some of their influence as new regions like Japan, China, Brazil, and Australia became important actors. In those countries where the economy was strong enough, iron and steel plants worked not only for the nation's recovery, but for commercial purposes as well.⁶² For this reason, in most of the steel-producing countries the states strengthened their involvement either by nationalizing the plants or by cooperating more closely with the private sector.⁶³

The production boom lasted until 1973 and was followed by a recession provoked by the price rises of crude oil. During the post-war decades production could barely keep up with demand and caused high prices; in the 1970s, however, due to the massive overproduction, steel and iron production companies had to compete by lowering their prices as much as was financially acceptable. The European Community, successor of the European Coal and Steel Community (hereafter ECSC), which was founded in 1951 by France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands, even introduced a quota system to regulate the market, but it proved to be unsuccessful in solving this global economic problem until the

⁶² The automobile industry was one of the top beneficiaries of the market competition.

⁶³ Ray Hudson and David Sadler, *The International Steel Industry. Restructuring, State Policies and Localities* (London; New York: Routledge, 1989), 3–8.

end of the 1980s. Neither Austria nor Hungary were members of the ECSC or played a significant role in the industrial market in the initial post-war years.⁶⁴ However, from the beginning of the 1950s both countries paid special attention to the steel and iron industry, although for different reasons. While the Austrian light and heavy industry were controlled by the Allied powers, for whom profit was of paramount importance as part of realizing the Marshall Plan, Hungary had just begun to accomplish the first five-year plan which prescribed intense industrialization in accordance with socialist guidelines.⁶⁵

Even though the political, social, industrial, and economic profiles of Hungary and Austria greatly differed from each other, there has been one phenomenon that held them together throughout: the Danube. The importance of the river in the European trade and economy network was already recognized in 1856, when Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey initiated the European Commission of the Danube with the aim of making the river and its coasts more easily navigable.⁶⁶ Due to the complex political climate of Europe until the end of the Second World War, the committee was reorganized in 1948 under the name of the Danube Commission, but this time only the riparian states were allowed to join, with the exceptions of West Germany and Austria.⁶⁷ Although, until the death of Stalin, the Commission's margins were determined by the Soviet Union, after 1953 multilateral technological collaborations began to expand. The central tasks were the

⁶⁴ Hudson and Sadler, 29–39.

⁶⁵ Tweraser, "The Marshall Plan and the Reconstruction of the Austrian Steel Industry 1945-1953: The Bureaucratic Politics of Trusteeship, Nationalization, and Planning as Reflected in the Rise of the United Iron and Steel Works in Linz," 290; Ildikó Laki, "A Short History of Hungarian Industrial Towns from the 1950s Until the Regime Change," *Belvedere Meridionale* 28, no. 2 (2016): 114, <https://doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.8>.

⁶⁶ Henry Trotter, "Danube," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, ed. Hugh Chisholm (Cambridge University Press), 821–22, accessed June 8, 2019, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Danube#cite_note-1.

⁶⁷ Both Austria and West Germany received observer status in 1957. Eventually, Austria became a member in 1959, but West Germany's request was refused several times (1966, 1967) until the Federal Republic of Germany got accepted in 1999. See more: Charles András, "Transport on the Danube," January 29, 1955, 23–24, HU OSA 300-1-2-54942, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: General Records: Information Items; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest, <http://catalog.osaarchivum.org/catalog/osa:37868c0f-6124-4ccf-9243-a382fddc7881>; John C. Campbell, "Diplomacy on the Danube," *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 2 (1949): 315–27, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20030183>.

development of the Danubian navigation, the exploitation of the river's hydro-power potential, and most importantly, the establishment of a Europe-wide waterway system. The relevance of the project is illustrated by the fact that until 1967 transit more than doubled, a growth caused mostly by the transport needs of the riverside industries, of which the two most significant were the state-owned VÖEST Iron and Steel Works in Linz and the Danube Ironworks in Dunaújváros. Yet while the former gained a prominent position in the Austrian East-West relations and in the Danubian network, the latter had primarily bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.⁶⁸ In the following paragraphs I will discuss the Hungarian and Austrian steel industries focusing on the plants in Dunaújváros and Linz and compare their industrial approaches.

2.2.1. DUNAFERR

Prior to the First World War, Hungary was an agrarian country whose economic levels lagged behind those of Western Europe. Although, with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the heavy and light industries both had the chance to close the gap with the West on rather favorable terms, the development was moderate and irregular, and furthermore, its degree differed between the industrial branches.⁶⁹ From the 1930s and 1940s on, industrialization was an essential tool for gaining economic and political independence, yet Hungary still entered the Second World War as an industrially underdeveloped country. During the first few post-war decades, the focus was on heavy industry, more specifically on mining and steel production. Accordingly, in 1950 the Communist leadership started the first five-year plan, which aimed to transform the predominantly agricultural Hungarian state into

⁶⁸ András, "Transport on the Danube," 24–25.

⁶⁹ T. Iván Berend and György Ránki, "Magyarország Ipari Színvonalá Az Európai Összehasonlítás Tükrében a Második Világháború Előtt (Hungarian Industrial Standards Compared to the European Level before the Second World War)," *Közgazdasági Szemle* 8, no. 1 (January 1961): 59–66.

a country of iron and steel.⁷⁰ Industrial decentralization was also of paramount importance after the war, since Budapest and its neighboring counties dominated this field, and politicians considered this process as key to the elimination of regional inequalities. Hence, in 1949 the Spatial Planning Institute (Területrendezési Intézet, hereafter TERINT) worked together with the National Design Agency (Országos Tervhivatal) and designated three main regions for industrial development: the North-East and South-West mining territories, and the North-South axes of the Danube and the Tisza. The former regions were rich in raw materials but lacked any serviceable water resources, thus the two greatest Hungarian rivers had to redress the balance. In accordance with the TERINT's proposals the constructions of new steel, smelting furnaces and aluminum plants began country-wide in 1950, with a special emphasis on the Danube Ironworks and the new town, Dunaújváros. However regularly TERINT called the government's attention to the probable financial hardships of the forced industrialization, the Party kept neglecting warnings by referring to the intensifying Cold War situation. Eventually, the lack of a precise economic implementation plan and the Party's willingness to sanction irrational investments meant that by 1953 the industrialization process was exhausted and reorganization became inevitable. Furthermore, due to the illogical development policy, the country-wide advancement was asymmetrical, thus certain regions expanded dynamically (Dunántúl, Western Hungary), while others went downhill or fell into a smaller economic crisis (Alföld). Moreover, the geographically unbalanced industrialization forced hundreds of thousands of workers to relocate or commute across the country, further weakening the backward areas.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Ildikó Laki, "A Short History of Hungarian Industrial Towns from the 1950s Until the Regime Change," *Belvedere Meridionale* 28, no. 2 (2016): 111, 114, <https://doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.8>.

⁷¹ Pál Germuska, "A Szocialista Városok Létrehozása (Creating Socialist Cities)," *Századvég*, no. 24 (2002): 50–62.

One might think that in the above analyzed political and economic climate the installation of the new Danubian steel-producing establishment was free of major difficulties and challenges, since the government paid special attention to it, but this was hardly the case. The idea of a new metallurgical plant already emerged around 1938, when the Ministry of Industry selected two possible locations: the Ajka-Bodajk region north of Lake Balaton, and a Southern-Danubian area between Dunaföldvár and Kalocsa. When Hungary entered the Second World War in 1941 the rapid realization of this plant was of utmost importance; however, the intense pig iron⁷² shortage forced the ministry to consider alternative solutions. One of them was attaching the new factory to the existing works in Győr, because military industry was already under development there. The building began in 1944 but as the war intensified, relocation became unavoidable and a Southern-Danubian city, Mohács, was chosen as the new location of the factory. Even though the relocation plans were made in 1944, the construction started only in 1949, when the Party accepted the aforementioned first five-year plan. Nevertheless, the need for another relocation emerged quickly after the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, since Mohács lies only ten kilometers from the former Yugoslavian border. For this geopolitical reason, in 1949 the Party definitively marked the ultimate site of the new factory and the joint residential district next to the village of Dunapentele, seventy kilometers south of Budapest.⁷³ Construction of the metallurgical plant finally began in the fall of 1950. Its first name was Danube Ironworks (Dunai Vasmű), then the town was named after Stalin (Sztálinváros), thus it was changed to Stalin Ironworks (Sztálin Vasmű). By doing this, the Party intended to urge the Soviet Union to involve the new factory in its Eastern European

⁷² According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, pig iron is “the direct product of the blast furnace and is refined to produce steel, wrought iron, or ingot iron.” “Pig Iron,” in *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, accessed June 9, 2019, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pig%20iron>.

⁷³ Sándor Horváth, *Stalinism Reloaded: Everyday Life in Stalin-City, Hungary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), 16–17.

industrial strategy.⁷⁴ During the 1956 Revolution it was renamed Danube Ironworks again and eventually the town followed suit, becoming Dunaújváros in 1961.⁷⁵ The name of the Ironworks was changed once again in 1983 to DUNAFERR Danube Ironworks.⁷⁶

The number of problematic issues regarding the factory did not decrease with its opening. While the foundry, the blacksmiths' workshop and the mechanical workshop began production in November 1951, other plants of the factory were still under construction, and the residential district was a work in progress as well.⁷⁷ Thus, both living and working conditions were far from ideal. The proximity of the river was crucial not only for transportation, but also because water is the most important auxiliary material for metallurgy: the daily water consumption of this one site was equivalent to that of a medium-sized city.⁷⁸ Both local and national press regularly reported about the factory, although most of the time these reports were exaggerated and deliberately obscured even the obvious complications. In fact, many of the problems arose from human failures: unattended facilities, wasted raw materials, and poorly-utilized machines, amongst others.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the production level of the ironworks was high in the early years, despite the fact that at the end of the first five-year plan it had yet to generate a profit.⁸⁰ However, by its thirtieth anniversary in 1981 the

⁷⁴ András Ferkai, "Építészet a második világháború után (Architecture after WWII)," in *Magyarország építészetének története (The History of Hungarian Architecture)* (Budapest: Vince, 1998), 320.

⁷⁵ "Sztálinváros Új Neve - Dunaújváros (The New Name of Sztálinváros - Dunaújváros)," *Népszabadság*, November 25, 1961, 10.

⁷⁶ "A Vállalat Története (The History of the Dunaferr)," accessed June 9, 2019, <http://www.dunaferr.hu/hu/rolunk/cegbemutato/vallalat-tortenete>.

⁷⁷ "Büszkeségünk: Sztálinváros És a Sztálin Vasmű. Mi Épült Egy Év Alatt Sztálinvárosban? (What Has Been Built in 1951 in Sztálinváros?)," *Szabad Nép*, January 10, 1952, 9.

⁷⁸ "Annyi Vizet Fogyaszt Majd a Sztálin Vasmű, Amennyi Egy Többmillió Város Teljes Háztartási Vízszükséglete (A Report on the Factory's Water Requirements)," *Szabad Nép*, January 10, 1952, 9.

⁷⁹ "Ne Pazarolják a Nép Vagyonát a Sztálin Vasműben! (Do Not Waste the Wealth of the People in the Stalin Ironworks!)," *Népszava*, April 17, 1954, 2.

⁸⁰ "Kohász Nagygyűlés a Vasműben (Metallurgical Assembly in the Ironworks)," *Dunapentelei Hírlap*, March 22, 1957, 3; "Szükség Volt-e a Dunai Vasműre? (Was the Danube Ironworks Necessary?)," *Sztálinvárosi Hírlap*, May 17, 1957, 3.

factory's pig iron production had increased fourfold and the government's enormous financial investment already paid off multiple times over.⁸¹

The factory is a poster child of the post-war Hungarian industrialization approaches. As Party representatives emphasized many times throughout the 1950s–1970s, the ironworks and the new residential district were the best platforms for the faithful socialist life. Accordingly, the social and cultural service provider institutes (cinema, theatre, city library, and so on) were also amongst the first buildings to be opened in the town at the beginning of the 1950s. The peculiar position was undeniable, hence the money spent on the continuous development of the city—only partially covered by the Ironworks—meant that other, industrially less significant regions lost sponsorship and development opportunities.⁸² The fact that it was one of the most prestigious political projects during the 1950s and 1960s attracted many people to the town, which not only influenced the pace of the work but also had an effect on the general atmosphere and on social welfare.

2.2.2. VÖEST Alpine

Austria, alike Hungary, as part of the Monarchy was a predominantly agricultural country at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although its industrial state of development was a little higher than that of the other nations of the Monarchy, it was far from the dominant English, German and French level of advancement.⁸³ Due to the lack of a well-functioning capital market, the banking system became involved in the industrial sector to such an extent that by 1914 it gained significant influence over almost all industrial branches. This power

⁸¹ “Tények, Adatok a Vasmű Történetéből (Facts and Data from the History of the Ironworks),” *Dunaújvárosi Hírlap*, August 25, 1981, 6.

⁸² Márta Matussné Lendvai, *Új város születik: Dunaújváros (A New Town was Born: Dunaújváros)* (Dunaújváros: Intercisa Múzeum, 2001), 9–11.

⁸³ T. Iván Berend and György Ránki, “Magyarország Iparának XX. Század Eleji Színvonala Az Európai Összehasonlítás Tükrében (Hungarian Industrial Standards Compared to the European Level at the Beginning of the 20th Century),” *Közgazdasági Szemle* 7, no. 8–9 (August 1960): 1026–27.

structure did not change until the Anschluss, although foreign capital appeared in the Austrian market. However, the economy stagnated in the interwar period and industrial performance was not able to reach the pre-war level.⁸⁴ During the National Socialist regime (1938–45) many industrial companies were initiated or merged with others. Heavy industrial establishments were absorbed by the Reichswerke in order to serve German political needs, and the companies in the Linz region were amongst the most important ones.⁸⁵

The recovering economy during the early post-war years was determined by two aspects: the intense nationalization program and the Marshall Plan. The former was led by the fear that the Allied powers might take over the German properties in Austria, thus the government initiated two Nationalization Laws, of which the first (1946) secured the nationalization of the largest iron and steel producers in Upper Austria and Styria.⁸⁶ Austria's relatively fast economic, social, and industrial recovery could not occur were it not for the Marshall Plan, namely the European Recovery Program, initiated by the foreign minister of the United States from 1948 to 1953.⁸⁷ The industrial sector received the majority of the overall national financial sponsorship, hence despite the troubled interwar period, after the Second World War the industrial sector greatly contributed to the rapid economic recovery. The cooperation between the social-democratic (SPÖ) and conservative (ÖDP) parties greatly contributed to the swift industrial development since it created an amenable political and economic atmosphere. By the 1970s Austrian factories were amongst the top steel and iron

⁸⁴ Peter Eigner, "Ausztria Gazdasági Teljesítménye a 20. Században. Megjegyzések a Bankrendszer És Az Ipar Szerepéről És Egymásra Gyakorolt Hatásukról (Austria's Economic Performance in the 20th Century. Some Remarks on the Role and Influence of Banks and Industry)," ed. Ágnes Deák, *AETAS Történettudományi Folyóirat* 20, no. 1–2 (2005): 116–20.

⁸⁵ Reichswerke Hermann Göring was the Nazi Germany's industrial conglomerate, established in 1937. See more R. J. Overy, *War and Economy in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 108, 145.

⁸⁶ The Austrian government nationalized seventy-one corporations, three banks, and eighty-five percent of the electricity sector. See more in Eigner, "Ausztria Gazdasági Teljesítménye a 20. Században. Megjegyzések a Bankrendszer És Az Ipar Szerepéről És Egymásra Gyakorolt Hatásukról (Austria's Economic Performance in the 20th Century. Some Remarks on the Role and Influence of Banks and Industry)," 122.

⁸⁷ Tweraser, "The Marshall Plan and the Reconstruction of the Austrian Steel Industry 1945-1953: The Bureaucratic Politics of Trusteeship, Nationalization, and Planning as Reflected in the Rise of the United Iron and Steel Works in Linz," 290–93.

production companies of the Western European region. Much like the cultural sector, privatization also extended to industry during the 1980s. It was partially caused by the second oil crisis and the accompanying decline, in addition to a lack of innovation and technological modernization. By the 1980s the public sector was in financial and structural crisis and privatization became inevitable for some companies.⁸⁸

The ironworks known today as the VÖEST Alpine in Linz was built as part of Hitler's plan to establish a new mid-European industrial and cultural center in the Linz region. For this reason, the Reichswerke absorbed the Alpine Montan Company (Alpine Montangesellschaft) in Styria, and together with the newly established ironworks they became the Reichswerke A.G. Alpine Montan Betriebe "Hermann Göring" in 1938.⁸⁹ The construction began in the same year with the help of many civil foreign laborers. From 1940, forced laborers and prisoners of war arrived and one year later, male inmates came from the Mauthausen-Gusen concentration camp which was opened on the factory's territory to provide laborers not only for this ironworks, but also other Upper Austrian plants.⁹⁰ After the German defeat the Reichswerke fell apart. Linz was occupied by the United States and the plant was renamed as United Austrian Iron and Steel Works (Vereinigte österreichische Eisen- und Stahlwerke A.G., from which comes the name VÖEST), separately from the Alpine Montan, though both were considered as German exile property. The future of the factory was highly debated amongst the United States and different groups within the Austrian government between 1945 and 1950, even though it was nationalized by the aforementioned first Nationalization Law in 1946. The debate questioned the *raison d'être* of the VÖEST as it

⁸⁸ Eigner, "Ausztria Gazdasági Teljesítménye a 20. Században. Megjegyzések a Bankrendszer És Az Ipar Szerepéről És Egymásra Gyakorolt Hatásukról (Austria's Economic Performance in the 20th Century. Some Remarks on the Role and Influence of Banks and Industry)," 122–25.

⁸⁹ Overy, *War and Economy in the Third Reich*, 108.

⁹⁰ Leonard Woldan, "1938-1945. The Linz Site of Reichswerke 'Hermann Göring,' Berlin, Germany," *Voestalpine* (blog), accessed June 9, 2019, <http://www.voestalpine.com/group/en/group/history/1938-1945.html>.

became a competitor of the traditional Donawitz-based Styrian Alpine Montan. Lobbying was intense on both sides and many factors needed to be taken into consideration in order to serve the overall Austrian iron and steel branch.⁹¹ Eventually, the invention of the Linz-Donawitz oxygenblast method (hereafter LD process) started a new chapter in steel-making technology in 1949, which would completely reshape the industry worldwide in the following decades. The LD process superseded the Siemens-Martin method, reducing the furnace time from ten to twelve hours to thirty-five minutes. The new procedure was the main reason for Austria's rapid growth in the Western European steel production market during the 1950s; furthermore, it reduced production costs by twenty to thirty percent.⁹²

In 1968 the VÖEST transformed into a conglomerate as it merged with the Alpine Montan and established an extended international network across eighty-seven countries. The government also launched a three-year-long special investment program from 1965 to further modernize the production process.⁹³ Not long after the merger, the oil crises of the 1970s reached VÖEST which decided to move towards industrial plant engineering and finished goods to avoid possible decline. By doing so, the conglomerate managed to survive without sustaining significant losses.⁹⁴ However lucrative and internationally-acknowledged VÖEST became following the decades of the Second World War, the oil crises and the failure of several foreign projects led to its bankruptcy in 1985.⁹⁵ During the second half of the 1980s the company underwent a thorough reorganization and decentralization, until 1995 when it

⁹¹ Tweraser, "The Marshall Plan and the Reconstruction of the Austrian Steel Industry 1945-1953: The Bureaucratic Politics of Trusteeship, Nationalization, and Planning as Reflected in the Rise of the United Iron and Steel Works in Linz," 293–98.

⁹² Michaela C. Schober, "The Story of the Linz-Donawitz Process. A Development Which Has Changed the World" (voestalpine AG, January 2013), 10–20.

⁹³ Leonard Woldan, "1963-1973. VÖEST up to the Merger with Österreichisch-Alpine Montangesellschaft," *Voestalpine* (blog), accessed June 9, 2019, <https://www.voestalpine.com/group/en/group/history/1963-1973.html>.

⁹⁴ Leonard Woldan, "1974-1985. VOEST-ALPINE AG up to the Restructuring of ÖIAG," *Voestalpine* (blog), accessed June 9, 2019, <http://www.voestalpine.com/group/en/group/history/1974-1985.html>.

⁹⁵ Hudson and Sadler, *The International Steel Industry*, 41.

was privatized. The VÖEST Alpine was one of the very first industrial companies to be nationalized in 1946, and it was again amongst the first factories which proceeded to the private sector.⁹⁶

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century the diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations of Austria and Hungary were influenced by many factors. Initially the Iron Curtain put a wedge between them, which was deepened when the different political apparatuses strengthened their power. Not long after Austria regained its independence in 1955 the two countries took the first steps to repair their relationship, but the 1956 revolution in Budapest caused the contacts to deteriorate. The next breakthrough came in 1959 when the Hungarian state initiated a general improvement of relations, together with the advancement of economic contacts and cultural collaborations. The immediate effects of these approaches were an increased number of visiting opportunities for factory workers, bilateral trade union representations, and sporting connections. Nevertheless, because of occasional incidents at the border public arguments arose in the media of both countries, repeating the same charges against the other country.⁹⁷ The thaw came at the beginning of the 1960s and by 1964 the nature of the contacts transformed again: university professors, artists, writers, and musicians travelled to Austria to observe and exchange ideas and Austrian intellectuals came to Hungary for the same reasons.⁹⁸ With regard to cultural relations, the reopening of the Hungarian Institute in Vienna (Collegium Hungaricum Wien) in 1963 was of utmost importance. The

⁹⁶ Leonard Woldan, “1993-1995. VÖEST-ALPINE STAHL AG up to the Onset of Privatization,” *Voestalpine* (blog), accessed June 9, 2019, <https://www.voestalpine.com/group/en/group/history/1993-1995.html>.

⁹⁷ András, “Transport on the Danube,” 54. See more in Róbert Fiziker, “Hét Szűk Eszendő(?): Az Oroszlán Ugrani Készül. Fejezetek Az Osztrák-Magyar Kulturális Kapcsolatok Történetéből (1963-1970) (Seven Lean Years(?): The Lion Prepares for a Jump. Chapters in the History of Austro-Hungarian Cultural Relations (1963-1970),” *Történelmi Szemle* 53, no. 3 (2011): 425-65.

⁹⁸ In case of Hungary, these opportunities were given mostly, but not exclusively to supported artists and professionals, see for instance Dóra Maurer and Tibor Gáyor.

tasks of the institute broadened: besides being a scientific center, it also served as a cultural hub and supported visiting Hungarian intellectuals in every possible way. Moreover, exhibitions, film screenings, concerts, and theatrical performances were all amongst the wide range of cultural events the institute organized, not only in their central building but all over Vienna.⁹⁹

Bruno Kreisky, then Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid a symbolic visit to Budapest in 1964 in the hope of defusing the tension between the two countries. A key question in this discussion was the possible collaboration between the nationalized industries, but the realization of this suggestion was eventually postponed. Even though both states had to abandon some of their expectations, the reconciliation attempts indicated a slow, but ongoing process.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, based on the above analyzed factory profiles and state intentions, the collaboration of the two Danubian factories would have been unambiguous were it not for the Iron Curtain and the economic contrast on a governmental level. The case of the converter building illustrates well the lack of industrial-technological collaborations. The turn of the 1970–1980s was spent modernizing the furnace process in the Danube Ironworks, but the contemporary primary sources do not mention the LD process when discussing the new method, even though the procedure itself was identical;¹⁰¹ instead they emphasize the Soviet contribution.¹⁰² The construction of the converter steelworks was a very well-documented project from 1975 until its opening in 1981, yet the name of the LD process

⁹⁹ “A Collegium Hungaricum És a Bécsi Magyar Történeti Intézet Története (History of the Collegium Hungaricum and the Hungarian Institute in Vienna),” *Balassi Intézet* (blog), accessed June 9, 2019, <http://www.becs.balassiintezet.hu/hu/2011-11-08-23-07-02/>.

¹⁰⁰ András, “Transport on the Danube,” 56–60.

¹⁰¹ Csaba D. Kiss, “Az Országban Elsőként: Konverteres Acélmű Épül a Dunai Vasműben. Beszélgetés Répási Gellérttel, a Vasmű Vezérigazgató-Helyettesével (First in the Country: Converter Steelwork Is about to Be Built in the Danube Ironworks. Conversation with the Deputy General Manager of the Ironworks, Gellért Répási),” *Dunaújvárosi Hírlap*, June 13, 1975, 5.

¹⁰² “Egymillió Tonna Acél Bölcsőjénél. (One Million Tons of Steel),” *Fejér Megyei Hírlap*, September 2, 1977, <http://ht.jakd.hu/index.php?p=view&id=19927>.

was used only once as a photo caption.¹⁰³ However, contemporary secondary sources consider the usage of the Linz method evident: these include publications from the factory itself.¹⁰⁴ The two ironworks strengthened their relations only after the regime changed, when in 1991 the VÖEST Alpine became an associate partner of the DUNAFERR's cold rolling mill and the two cities became sister cities a year later.¹⁰⁵ The businesses' co-operation ended in 2004 upon the privatization of the DUNAFERR.

To conclude the political, cultural, and industrial relations of Hungary and Austria, Dunaújváros and Linz, it can be stated that despite the differing state apparatus, cultural policy, and industrial approaches, the two factories have a lot in common, beginning with the fact that both were constructed for ideological reasons. Considering that DUNAFERR began to use the LD process in 1981 after it was tested in the Soviet Union, direct contact could have happened earlier as the LD process had already begun to spread worldwide during the 1960s. All in all, parallel approaches regularly appeared in both cases after the Second World War. In the following chapter I will discuss one of these, perhaps the most spectacular one: the steel sculpture parks which were made with the sponsorship of the factories.

¹⁰³ “Épül Az Üst-Javító Csarnok (The Cauldron-Repair Hall Is under Construction),” *Dunaújvárosi Hírlap*, October 21, 1977, 2.

¹⁰⁴ “A Vállalat Története (The History of the Dunaferr).”

¹⁰⁵ Mátyás Stossek, “A Hideghengermű Jövője (The Future of the Cold-Rolling-Mill),” *Dunaferr*, June 11, 1991.

3. Patronizing and Sponsorship Activity of Industrial Establishments

This chapter will deal with the post-war corporate sponsorship approaches of Hungary and Austria, more specifically with the steel sculpture workshops and sculpture parks in Linz and Dunaújváros. In order to contextualize these projects, it is important to briefly summarize the state policies and cultural policy approaches regarding national sponsorship. The majority of the industrial establishments were nationalized in both countries not long after the war. In Austria, the practice of state acquisitions was reformed during the 1970s, as part of a structural reorganization of the cultural funding sector during the Kreisky era. Prior to these reforms, the Federal Ministry of Education and Arts was solely responsible for the so-called “support acquisitions.” In each year it spent a given amount of money by purchasing artworks ad hoc in all nine federal provinces without a thorough long-term plan. After the reorganization, the relevant provincial institutions had the chance to decide in collaboration with federal ministry officials.¹⁰⁶ One of the main advantages of the cultural field’s decentralization was that local artistic initiatives had a greater chance to gain funding, which increased cultural diversity all over the country. Moreover, as I already indicated in the previous chapter, the Austrian state encouraged companies to support culture and the arts by giving them tax discounts, which the companies readily took advantage of. This situation was favorable for every sector: companies’ financial contributions decreased the pressure on the federal budget, while artists and other cultural actors had more opportunities to realize their projects.

In following its communist ideology, the Hungarian state applied a peculiar approach to its artistic acquisition. On the one hand, somewhat like the capitalist purchase system, the Art Gallery Company (Képcsarnok Vállalat) operated a “state art trade” (also known as the

¹⁰⁶ Gardos and Wagner, *Some Aspects of Cultural Policies in Austria*, 54.

“Képcsarnok purchase”), in which artworks were collected from artists every two weeks and distributed amongst the people country-wide. Naturally, only those artworks which suited the Party’s artistic requirements were purchased. Through this practice the state induced artificial supply and demand and acted as an intermediary while enjoying the financial benefits. On the other hand, the acquisitions of the Art Fund, the “two-million-purchases,” were placed in museum collections and state institutions.¹⁰⁷ Concerning industrial funding, the Party instructed construction companies to spend 0.002% of their overall expenses on new artworks which could later decorate the new buildings and their surroundings; the selection had to be approved by the Supervisory Body. Both methods were introduced in the first half of the 1960s and lasted until the 1970s.¹⁰⁸ The third form, the so-called “socialist employment contract” resembled the more classical sponsor-artists relationship. From the end of the 1960s the largest state companies and corporations employed artists without any particular obligation to hand in original artwork. At the beginning of the 1980s the process was reviewed, and regulations were initiated. Throughout these years the DUNAFERR employed many artists, and it was a great opportunity for the new generation as well.¹⁰⁹

Workshops were another form of industrial funding. They were usually organized together with a symposium to complete the practical work with professional discussions and creative thinking. What was significantly different in this case was the structure of these projects, as they were organized from below to fill the void caused by the state’s extensive

¹⁰⁷ Perczel, “The Art Sphere as a Grey Zone,” 61. See more of the “two-million-purchases” in Adrienn Kácsor, “„Kétmillió” Vásárlások: Képzőművészet És Politika a Kádár-Korszakban (‘Two-Million-Purchases.’ Fine Arts and Politics in the Kádár Era),” *Médiakutató* 10, no. 4 (2009), https://mediakutato.hu/cikk/2009_03_osz/08_kepzomuveszet_politika_kadar.

¹⁰⁸ Csaba Gál, “A Vörös Fonál Mentén Az 1960-as És 70-Es Évek Textilművészetében. (Along the Red Thread in the 1960s and 1970s Textile Art.),” in *1971 – Párhuzamos Különidők (1971 – Parallel Nonsynchronism)*, ed. Dóra Hegyi et al., A Fővárosi Képtár Katalógusai 161 (Budapest: BTM Kiscelli Múzeum – Fővárosi Képtár, 2019), 93.

¹⁰⁹ Viktória Vass, “Festészet És Grafika Dunaújvárosban Az Ötvenes Évektől a Kilencvenes Évekig Végéig (Painting and Graphic Arts in Dunaújváros from the 1950s to the End of the 1990s),” in *Acélcset. Művészet Az Ország Közepén. (Steel Brush. Art in the Middle of the Country)*, ed. Tamás Fehérvári (Dunaújváros: Modern Művészetért Közalapítvány, 2006), 42.

control. Another aspect of this movement was the need for technological development in some artistic genres. The most common forms of the workshops were the following: (1) temporary works based on technical and technological conditions; (2) continuous activities based on technical and technological conditions; (3) team work without a technical or technological background; (4) collective teamwork organized with a given purpose; (5) theoretical discussion (symposium). The Hungarian symposium and workshop movement began in the 1960s and it was inspired by various foreign projects, from Poland through Slovakia to Austria.¹¹⁰ Due to the centralized aspect of the cultural scene these projects worked on the periphery, although not completely under the radar: the Supervisory Body was aware of their actions. Among them were the textile workshop in Velem, Western Hungary, stone sculpture in Villány, graphic art in Makó, wood in Nagyatád, steel and iron in Győr and Dunaújváros, and so on.¹¹¹

In Austria, workshops and symposia were similarly structured, but because of the decentralized cultural scene they lacked the strong marginal posture of their Hungarian counterparts. The international sculpture symposia movement was initiated by an Austrian artist, Karl Prantl, in Sankt Margarethen im Burgenland, near to the Hungarian border in 1959, when eleven artists from eight countries spent three months together working in a quarry. Although this symposium did not require a grandiose industrial mechanical background, it spread the idea of working and thinking together in an atmosphere resembling today's artist-in-residence programs all over the world.¹¹² There is one particular workshop which was a source of inspiration for workshops in both Linz and Dunaújváros: the Biennale of Spatial Forms in Elbląg, North Poland which operated from 1965 to 1973 and drew attention to the

¹¹⁰ Hedvig Dvorszky, ed., *Nemzetközi Szimpozionok Magyarországon 1967-87 (International Symposia in Hungary 1967-87)* (Baranya Megyei Tanács V.B. Művelődési Osztály, 1987), 12–13.

¹¹¹ Beke, "Tiltani, Tűrni, Támogatni. A Hetvenes Évek Avantgárdja (Ban, Tolerate, Promote. The Avant-Gard of the Seventies)," 235, 384.

¹¹² "Karl Prantl Und St. Margarethen," *Symposion Europäischer Bildhauer* (blog), accessed June 9, 2019, <http://www.karlprantl.at/geschichte/rueckblick.html>.

numerous ways industry could contribute to art.¹¹³ In the following section I will deliberate the history of the workshops in Linz and Dunaújváros and put them in the previously analyzed political and cultural context.

3.1. International Steel Sculptor Workshop and Sculpture Park in Dunaújváros

The case of the Dunaújváros workshop is especially complex since it was organized in the poster child of socialist towns in Hungary, yet was a fundamentally modernist initiative growing into a defining phenomenon of the town's cultural life. While it was a place to escape from the strictly-controlled Budapest art scene, the Linz workshop was guided by curiosity and experimental intentions, in which the factory and the local government assisted. Nevertheless, it cannot be claimed that the local authorities in Dunaújváros did not support art and culture, even though they did so for different reasons.

The social life of the town was very active from the beginning. Firstly, the importance of public places was emphasized in the early stages of architectural planning, thus many squares and parks were designed to make people's lives more comfortable. Secondly, since certain provider institutes—library, culture house, evening school, and so on—were not ready, the aforementioned public spaces served as the centers of social life. In order to make Dunaújváros outstanding amongst the socialist cities, it was necessary to create a vibrant cultural life and art scene which could be used for educational and propaganda purposes. Moreover, as a newly established town Dunaújváros completely lacked any kind of cultural aspects in the beginning, but as life normalized after the first few months of forced labor,

¹¹³ "1st Biennale of Spatial Forms Elbląg, 1965 (1-50/278)," *Eustachy Kossakowski Archive* (blog), accessed June 9, 2019, <https://artmuseum.pl/en/archiwum/archiwum-eustachego-kossakowskiego/18?read=all>; Waldemar Baraniewski, "The Biennale of Spatial Forms in Elbląg—Between Form and Structure," accessed June 9, 2016, https://www.academia.edu/35795361/THE_BIENNALE_OF_SPATIAL_FORMS_IN_ELBL%C4%84G_BE_TWEEN_FORM_AND_STRUCTURE.

people looked for leisure-time opportunities.¹¹⁴ To this end, the leadership announced an open call in which they invited professional artists to settle in the town in exchange for a monthly stipend, art studio, and a fully furnished, newly-built apartment. They were supposed to create artworks which suited the socialist ideology and could be placed somewhere public in the town.¹¹⁵ However, settled artists usually took teaching jobs as well, and many of them founded their own arts clubs, either for children or for adults, which were popular town-wide.¹¹⁶ Although the Party expected their artists to follow the official cultural and artistic guidelines, as Dunaújváros was far enough from Budapest they were not supervised so closely. The costs of this “permanent artist-in-residence program” were split between the local government and the Danube Ironworks.¹¹⁷

The idea of the workshop came from Ferenc Friedrich, a material engineer who worked in the factory while being a self-taught sculptor; István Birkás, a settled artist who was also a master of the new generation of artists in the town; and László Erdész and Ernesztin Reszler, two local cultural workers. As I mentioned above, the Biennale of Spatial Forms in Elbląg served as the main source of inspiration, although an aluminum workshop in Székesfehérvár from 1973 also caught the organizers’ attention.¹¹⁸ The workshop ran for the first time in 1974 with the participation of four artists; some monumental sculptures and a few small plastics were made as well in the small-scale foundry of the local polytechnic college. A year later the organizers managed to move the program into the factory and they welcomed ten artists, among whom was György Galántai, the organizer of the aforementioned

¹¹⁴ Horváth, *Stalinism Reloaded*, 15–18.

¹¹⁵ Settled artists particularly liked this task: *many of their works were placed in the town and have been enjoyed by multiple generations.*

¹¹⁶ Vass, “Festészet És Grafika Dunaújvárosban Az Ötvenes Évektől a Kilencvenes Évekig Végéig (Painting and Graphic Arts in Dunaújváros from the 1950s to the End of the 1990s),” 38–39.

¹¹⁷ Vass, 42–43.

¹¹⁸ Annamária Nagy, ed., *Ötvözet. XIII. Dunaújvárosi Acélszobrász Alkotótelep. (XIII. International Steel Sculptor Workshop in Dunaújváros)* (Dunaújváros: Dunaírárt Dunaújváros Alapítvány, 2018), 35.

Balatonboglár Chapel Studio exhibitions, banned artists at that time.¹¹⁹ From 1975 to 1989 the workshop functioned on a biennial basis,¹²⁰ following a pattern which remained largely unchanged throughout the years. During the first two years the organizers and the Young Artists Studio together sent out the open call and served as a jury. From 1979 the Association replaced the Studio. The four-to-six-week-long workshops were usually held in late spring or early summer, with artists receiving meals, accommodation, and a daily stipend. Regarding the work within the factory, group of workers known as “brigades” helped the artists to create the sculptures. In many cases they bonded quickly, and factory workers were very proud of the artworks as well.¹²¹ Until 1983 it was exclusively a national project, but later on foreign artists could also participate. After the fall of the communist regime three more workshops were held in 1993, 1996, and 2000. Financial problems occurred already at the beginning of the 1990s, even so that the cultural department of the factory together with the archives were closed at the beginning of the 2000s. Eventually the newly-elected leading party decided to cut the funding of the workshop; the ironworks would follow, citing the ambiguous situation of the forthcoming privatization in 2002.¹²²

The exhibitions closing the residency programs were the highlight of the workshops. They were installed in the predecessor to the Institute of Contemporary Art – Dunaújváros, the Uitz-hall. The monumental sculptures were erected in front of the building, in the middle of the town. Although the workshops achieved great success in the national cultural scene, some artworks were misunderstood, and the general attitude of local people was rather

¹¹⁹ He was one of two artists who participated five times in the workshops, and three of his monumental sculptures are erected at the riverside.

¹²⁰ In 1991 operations ceased for the first time of the workshop's history. András Miklós Klein, ed., *Nemzetközi acélszobrász alkotótelep és szimpózium Dunaújváros: 1974-1993 (International Steel Sculptor Workshop and Symposium, Dunaújváros: 1974-1993)* (Dunaújváros, 1996), 24.

¹²¹ The „Előre brigád” liked Galántai so much that they applied to change their name to „Galántai György brigád.” See Galántai's report on <http://www.galantai.hu/dokumentum/Dunaujvaros.html#A> Accessed 9 June 2019.

¹²² András Miklós Klein, *Művésztelepek, Alkotótelepi Szimpóziumok Dunaújvárosban. (Workshops and Symposia in Dunaújváros.)* (Dunaújváros: Dunafer-Art Dunaújváros Alapítvány, 2007), 6.

negative. When a new neighborhood unit was constructed, architects wished to accommodate the sculptures around the new block of houses, but the idea was immediately rejected by the residents. In the end, the sculptures were put into a coastguard storage facility for years. The fact that today they are erected along the Danube is due to a fortunate coincidence: when a French communist visited the town, sculptures were quickly installed at the riverbank and it required so much work that they were not removed.¹²³ The organizers intended to rearrange them from time to time, but this turned out to be very difficult due to their size and weight.

The relocation of the sculptures coincided with the end of the afforestation of the newly-structured riverside, which became necessary after the fall of the loess wall in 1964 and 1965.¹²⁴ Up until today the bank of the Danube in Dunaújváros is one of the largest open-air sculpture parks in Europe with its fifty-one steel sculptures. As the sculpture park and the riverside reached its final form, it grew into a popular place for leisure and sports amongst the people. Meanwhile, the inhabitants also began to see the sculptures differently until they eventually became integral parts of the town's identity. By now several generations have grown up amongst these monuments, with each having different nicknames for certain sculptures, like Toblerone, Rooster, Giraffe or Dinosaur, just to mention a few. Even though the people of the town grew to like the sculptures, their physical condition is far from ideal, due to a lack of financial support from the local government, even though the sculpture park is under national monument protection; its estimated value is approximately one and a half billion forints.¹²⁵

¹²³ Klein, *Nemzetközi acélszobrász alkotótelep és szimpozium Dunaújváros*, 21–22.

¹²⁴ The sediment the town was built on, loess is a loose material, which tends to slump under moisture and weight and therefore requires something to hold it together, such as tree roots or bushes. Surprisingly, this aspect was not emphasized during the planning and building process which eventually triggered the fall. *Up until today the coastguard closely monitors the drainage system to avoid any accidents, but occasional minor ground shaking is noticeable in the town.*

¹²⁵ See the list of every participants <http://steelsculpture.art/en/artists/>. Accessed on 9 June 2019.

3.2. forum metall in Linz

Forum metall was part of an ambitious cultural program that was organized throughout the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s in Linz. The three main events were the forum stahl, two industrial design exhibitions in 1971 and 1975, the forum metall, a steel sculpture workshop in the VÖEST Alpine and the joint exhibition in 1977, and the forum design, an industrial and artistic design exhibition in 1980. The two main organizers were Helmuth Gsöllpointer, a sculptor and industrial designer, and Peter Baum, visual artist, museum director, curator, and art critic. The main purposes of this comprehensive cultural program were to build a bridge between art and industry, to induce discussions between artists and citizens, and to find a common ground which could serve as a reference point for future collaborations. The main contributors to the project were the University of Art and Design, the VÖEST Alpine, and the Neue Galerie der Stadt Linz (hereafter Neue Galerie).¹²⁶ The three forums were related and reflected to each other: forum stahl exhibitions showed the kinds of opportunities that heavy industry could offer to industrial designers; forum metall went a step further, connecting iron and steel to visual artists who are not obliged to create something useful per se but are able to deliver a message through their artworks, especially if these were meant to be erected in a public space; and finally forum design focused on design's all-encompassing aspects and demonstrated how design shapes people's everyday life.

The preparations of forum metall began as early as in 1972. After a long development process, eventually Gsöllpointer presented his large-scale, open-air sculpture park concept to the city authorities in 1975 and received the requisite financial support a year later. Baum, by then director of the Neue Galerie, was asked to join Gsöllpointer as a co-organizer by the city council. Moreover, the federal government and the Upper Austrian provincial state also

¹²⁶ Thomas Philipp, "Stadt Im Glück (Linz. City of Luck)," in *Stadt Im Glück (City of Luck)*, ed. Thomas Philipp et al. (LIQUA - Linzer Institut für qualitative Analysen, 2009), 9–13, <https://liqua.net/stadt-im-glueck/text/chapter/forum-stahl-forum-metall-und-forum-design>.

enrolled as financial partners, although most of the funds were provided by the Bundestheater (the umbrella organization for theatrical and performing arts institutes in Austria).¹²⁷ According to the workshop's concept, twelve internationally-recognized artists were invited to create monumental steel sculptures to be erected at the Donaulände, the bank of the Danube next to the Brucknerhaus (festival and concert hall) and the Linz city center. When selecting the artists international recognition was not of utmost importance, but their determination to reflect on the role of iron and steel in the contemporary artistic discourse mattered immensely. The nature of the material was the key to connecting industry and art (aside from the factory's financial support); furthermore, the use of steel is also evident considering how deeply integrated it is into the city's identity. The sculpture park opened in September 1977, and over a thousand people gathered at the opening ceremony, with even more international attention than domestic. Press interest was also intense, as more than 330 articles were written about the project.¹²⁸

However ambitious and visionary the forum metall project was, the sculpture park was not intended to remain in situ for more than two years for the following reasons: firstly, the city council granted the prestigious riverside space only for a limited time to the organizers. Secondly, the ownership of the sculptures remained with the artists—unlike the Hungarian workshop where the erected sculptures, and occasionally some small plastics, were taken from the artists in exchange for the residency opportunity—and they had the right to exhibit or sell

¹²⁷ Peter Baum and Helmuth Gsöllpointner, *Forum Metall Linz* (Linz Hochschule für künstlerische und industrielle Gestaltung, 1977).

¹²⁸ It should be noted that many of these articles discussed the debate over the “Nike” sculpture, designed by an architectural design company and placed on a rooftop in the baroque district of the city. More than 250 letters and complaints were sent to the city authorities and protests were organized; the problem was more the where than the what, as it was close to the old city hall. Eventually, after two years of fighting the pressure on the local government was so high that it was torn down. In 2016 it was installed again, but on a different building where it found its place. See more in Ute Kreft, “Kunst im öffentlichen Raum - NIKE - Geschichte eines Kunstwerks zwischen Irritation und Akzeptanz (Art in public space - NIKE - History of a Work of Art Between Irritation and Acceptance)” (Bachelor, Katholische Privat-Universität Linz, 2017); Laurids Ortner, Es war ein Kulturkampf um Linz, interview by Roswitha Fitzinger, Ober-Österreich Nachrichten, May 14, 2016, <https://www.nachrichten.at/kultur/Es-war-ein-Kulturkampf-um-Linz;art16,2231467>.

the artworks after the second year. Out of twelve artists, three took back their sculptures and a fourth was removed by popular demand.¹²⁹ The third reason for the relatively short installation time was that the organizers hoped to induce a long-term collaboration between the factory and the cultural scene in Linz, so that a biennial workshop could be developed from this event. As the project's enormous budget was heavily criticized in the local press, forum metall became a poster child for over-supported, but publicly unappreciated artistic initiatives. One of the sources of the intense misunderstanding could be found in the national cultural policy approaches which were just about to change with Bruno Kreisky's rise to power. Moreover, given the fact that baroque architecture defines the cityscape in Linz, the abrupt appearance of modern public art was far from what the inhabitants were used to, and they were not even able to avoid them since the sculpture park was in the middle of the city. Although the organizers were satisfied with the outcome of all three projects and the feedback from the national and international professional scene was favorable, the overall aim of connecting non-artistic people to industry and encouraging them to connect with their creative selves was less successful.

Based on the analyses of the two workshops one might think that they do not have much in common. Not only the organizers' intentions, but also the funding process, the structure, and the long-term goals were different. While in Dunaújváros the founders were driven by artistic inspiration and the numerous opportunities afforded by the technological background of the factory—not to mention their self-interest to participate in the workshop—in Austria the whole project was rather a representative show that aimed to educate people about modern and contemporary art. The DUNAFERR workshop provided enough time, space, and material to the artists to develop new ideas during the construction of their sculptures, which could not have occurred in Linz, hence the different nature of the creative process.

¹²⁹ See footnote no.23.

Nevertheless, some similarities can be found too, namely the significant role of the factories, the look and style of some sculptures, the permanent installations at the Danubian riverside, as well as the enthusiasm of the organizers and the resistance of the local people. Stylistic resemblances suggest that artists might have had similar sources of inspiration, although these also could have arisen from the similar technological opportunities. Considering that, according to my primary sources, the only connection between the two projects is the Polish biennale, I argue that both projects shared stylistic inspiration. The fact that when the first workshop was organized in 1974 in Dunaújváros artists and cultural workers already had limited opportunities to travel and familiarize themselves with modern art adds another layer to the argument. Since the archival materials of the Hungarian workshop are still not completely processed and reviewed, the possibility of a direct connection between the organizers cannot be entirely excluded either.

4. Conclusion

The starting point of this research was to question whether the post-war Hungarian and Austrian cultural policies differed from each other more significantly than would be assumed from the differing state ideologies, or if there were some similarities regardless of political background. One of the main conclusions I established is that despite the fundamentally dissimilar political situation early after the Second World War—namely the communist takeover in Hungary and the occupation of the Allies in Austria—both countries went through the same phases, starting with their similar attitude towards restoration and the role of culture in this process, continuing with the re- or decentralization of the social, economic, and cultural sectors, and moving on to the thaw and its turning points; even though the timeline was different. The industrial developments also ran in parallel immediately after the war, although thanks to a breakthrough innovation (the LD process) the VÖEST began to grow rapidly. Oddly enough, despite my preliminary conclusions regarding the seemingly most similar projects, the steel sculptor workshops and sculpture parks proved to be essentially divergent beneath the surface. Not only the founders' initiation, but also the structure and even the significance of the factories are different. Thus, I conclude that in contrast to the parallel core idea—using heavy industrial machinery for artistic purposes—the similar outcome of these workshops rose from a shared aesthetic standard and neither cultural policy approaches nor the extent of artistic freedom influenced it significantly.

Following this conclusion, three possible research aspects occurred to me. Firstly, the analysis and comparison of the ways in which artists looked for stylistic contacts and created a comprehensive international artistic network. Another aspect could be the workshops' contextualization in the national and international art historical canon. As both projects received more intense (and generally positive) feedback from international professionals and institutions, it would shed light on the background of this peculiarity. The third aspect would

examine the economic and touristic effects of the sculpture parks and compare them to each other while considering the popularity of the surrounding cultural and leisure features. This topic would correspond with the long-term consequences of the workshops and the cultural wave they both initiated. In the case of Dunaújváros, the movement that the biennial workshops generated until the 2000s created the foundations of a vivid, diverse cultural life. However, as the funding of the workshop was cut, so the similar initiatives fell from support even if not from one day to the next. Few actions speak louder about the level of a nation's social welfare than the condition of prestigious, internationally-acknowledged cultural and scientific institutes (see the current situation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). In Dunaújváros, the Institute of Contemporary Art (ICA-D) funded by the local government, nearly went bankrupt at least two to three times during the last decade and the struggle for its survival has now become a permanent battle.¹³⁰ The gallery halls and the depository places of the artworks are way below international and even national standards, jeopardizing the valuable and unique collection. Meanwhile, the yearly exhibition program tries to maintain its previous high-quality level. The once prosperous town which was proud to support cultural initiations nowadays looks away and lets long-lived and respected institutions slowly bleed out, despite their popularity amongst the people of the town; the same applies to the conditions of the sculpture park.

On the contrary, after the three forums in Linz the supporters of cultural initiatives became more cautious and the rapid cultural development slowed somewhat. However, after the scandal of forum metall and forum design settled down, a new phase began in the cultural development of the Upper Austrian regional capital. Contemporary institutions, like the Ars Electronica and the LENTOS Kunstmuseum, working together with the industrial sector, helped Linz become the European Capital of Culture in 2009. The jury awarded the title to

¹³⁰ See the detailed discription of the crisis <http://help.ica-d.hu/en/index.php> Accessed 11 June 2019.

the city for four reasons: (1) Linz is a Europe-wide acknowledged media center; (2) its geographical location is favorable; (3) it is famous for its outstanding international cultural relations; and (4) the hub of cultural institutions functions very well.¹³¹ Even if the plans of the forum metall's founders did not work out as they wished, the three forum projects started something which, together with the increased international attention and the continuous support of industrial establishments (not exclusively the VÖEST Alpine), all contributed to Linz becoming a modern European city.

¹³¹ Kurilla Annamária, Orosz Éva, and Stefán Klára, "Linz09 - A kultúra és az ipar találkozása (Linz09 - The Encounter of Culture and Industry)," *Területfejlesztés és Innováció* 3, no. 3 (October 6, 2009): 10–18.

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