

# **BUILDING BRIDGES INSTEAD OF FENCES – AN EMPIRICAL ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE ACADEMIC HIATUS IN SECURITIZATION**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This research revolves around the apparent dichotomy between the two dominant schools of securitization, the so-called Copenhagen and Paris schools. The use of different logics – the logic of exception and the logic of routine respectively – that underpin their argumentation has put the two versions at odds within the literature, flagging them as mutually exclusive. However, the logics themselves are in no way contradictory to each other. In fact, as this research will argue as well, there is room not only for coexistence, but even simultaneous application. Taking inspiration from Philippe Bourbeau, this research will showcase the dynamics of the two logics through the case study of the securitization of migration in Hungary, as well as make inferences about the cyclicity of securitization processes. The empirical study will emphasize the nature of securitization within Hungary as well as the supporting logics to demonstrate that simultaneous application is not only a possibility but yields a more detailed and consistent analysis. In this way, this research will highlight that the long-standing dichotomy in the literature should be rethought, and analysis encompassing both logics encouraged.

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## INTRODUCTION

The notion of security has experienced some turbulent times ever since the end of the Cold War. With the emergence of constructivism and critical security studies, it has been redefined, or it was completely deconstructed to allow for an entire reconceptualization to happen. The strand of critical security studies literature this research will engage with is the branch of securitization. In a simplified form, the process of securitization is essentially ‘creating’ security – identifying and then reifying a security threat with attention to context. As opposed to the more traditional understandings of for example realism, advocates of securitization claim that there are no ‘real’ or quantifiable threats out there of any nature – a threat becomes a threat as an actor in the securitization process reframes it as a threat. This self-referential definition, if successful, can then allow the actor to introduce emergency measures, granting him a larger amount of power than before.

However, significant debates have emerged concerning how exactly this process is conducted. Two main strands of securitization, the so-called Copenhagen and Paris schools argue that this process happens based on different logics – the logic of exception and the logic of routine, respectively. The logic of exception, as laid out in the seminal piece of the Copenhagen variant, argues that securitization happens during speech acts and in spectacular displays of threat.<sup>1</sup> To achieve this, it employs the theory of the speech act, and emphasizes the emergence of security rhetoric. Its focus on exceptionality explains how extraordinary circumstances both necessitate and justify emergency measures. The logic of routine claims securitization happens in an almost invisible manner, through legislation, institutions, and bureaucracy. In their understanding, security professionals work without a pressing security threat, and with their mundane actions, create and perpetuate security threats. Notable

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<sup>1</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998)

proponents of this approach include Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans.<sup>2</sup> This differentiation brings with it several analytical differences, as well as their proprietary caveats. These two logics are seen as mutually exclusive. Such a thing happens even though no advocate of the two schools claim primacy over their logic or their work. This resulted in a stalemate within securitization literature, with an academic hiatus emerging, as there were no attempts in bringing the two logics and schools closer. However, there is no reason for such an apparent dichotomy to exist – using one logic need not bar the other from entering the analysis. A similar contention has already been noted in the literature of critical security studies by Philippe Bourbeau. He also recognizes the dichotomy, and that both logics can have gaps in their analysis as they lack the tools to describe and explain all events of a securitization process – a gap that the introduction of the other logic into the analysis might easily bridge. To prove his hypothesis, Bourbeau uses a case study, and through the analysis of language as well as institutions, presents an account of the French case of securitizing migrants.<sup>3</sup> He also toys with the idea of a partial synthesis, but finally decides against it. Instead, he aims to find common ground between the two logics and base his argumentation on that.

To sufficiently distinguish the two logics from each other, this research will provide an extensive literature review. The implication that these logics can only be applied on an either-or basis will be questioned and their complementarities highlighted to show that simultaneous application is not only a possibility but is also beneficial after realizing that none of the logics alone can account for all aspects of securitization. After introducing both logics in detail, this research will set up the analytical framework it will use throughout the research. An immense help to this process is the pre-existing contribution of Philippe Bourbeau within the

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<sup>2</sup> Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” *Alternatives* 27, Special Issue, (2002): 63-92; Jef Huysmans, “What’s in an act? On security speech acts and little security nothings,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no.4-5, (2011): 371-383

<sup>3</sup> Philippe Bourbeau, “Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,” *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 43, no.1, (2014): 187-206

securitization literature. His article being both a source and inspiration for this research, this chapter cannot go past him without introducing his ideas – and noting where the contentions of this research differ from that of Bourbeau's. Following this, the nature of sources – both primary and secondary – shall be detailed, as this will be important in understanding how these affect the entirety of the securitization process – the analysis of which starts in the next chapter. Just like the Bourbeau piece, this research will also use a case study.

It will analyze the developments of the securitization process within Hungary. The case study of Hungary is a good example for several reasons. Firstly, due to overwhelming government rhetoric, as well as the length of the securitization process allow for a multitude of measures and sources to be available on the topic, aiding analysis. Furthermore, since language plays an important role in securitization, the proficiency in the language of the author allows for deeper insights. The process of analysis will start with 2015-2016, identifying the logics and actors as well as highlighting how the two logics can operate in a complementary way. This will be done by considering each individual securitization move and categorizing it into one of the logics of securitization based on its effects and tools it uses. It will also test the hypothesis of temporality with regards to the two logics, namely that one logic must precede the other temporally in order for the process to be understood. This will mainly be done by the analysis of the rhetoric the government uses, supported by the analysis of Hungarian legislation.

By the end of this research the benefits as well as the potential drawbacks of the simultaneous application of the logic of exception and the logic of routine will be highlighted. The claim that using both logics to analyze the same securitization process will be substantiated through the empirics drawn from Hungary from the 2015-2016 period. Important conclusions concerning temporality can also be drawn – however, in a slightly different form than the hypothesis presupposed in the beginning of the research. Nonetheless, these findings only further cement the main point this research has: that the simultaneous application of both logics

during the analysis of the same securitization process is an entirely real possibility – and a very beneficial tool to correct for the analytical caveats either logic has on its own. This kind of application can also explain why securitization processes can be drawn out, how they can be perpetuated. The seemingly disjointed securitization attempts that is encompassed by only one logic become immediately clearer and more approachable should both logics be used in analysis. The discussions on the dichotomy seem futile from the standpoint of this research, and it would rather advocate for simultaneous application – resulting in both more detail as well as more consistent securitization analysis.



## CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW

### *1.1: Securitization Writ Large*

Before engaging with the two prominent schools of securitization, this section will briefly summarize the novelties and basic working mechanisms of the process. Situated within the critical constructivist literature, advocates of securitization regardless of its subvariant argue that there are no real, objective security threats ‘out there’, rather they are ‘manufactured’. This means that the connection to the traditional, military-political understanding of security is severed, and that securitization is an extremely contingent process, depending on many factors, such as political environment, cultural heritage and historical background. It follows that any issue that the securitizing actor can present in a believable manner to an audience can become a security issue, and that a security issue for one is not necessarily a security issue for another actor. This security issue is framed in terms of an existential threat, one that has the capacity to destroy the ‘referent object’ – an item to be defended at all costs – determined by the securitizing actors themselves. The argument of securitization claims that these threats are selected from issue areas that are either completely non-politicized or are in the sphere of normal politicization, and then – via various methods, depending on the school of securitization – are elevated to the status of ‘security issue’. In case of the more prominent Copenhagen School of securitization, this method is the ‘speech act’, a special linguistic tool which self-referentially creates the security threat out of an ordinary issue. The speech act is a central element within this school, and it creates the critical junctures the school understands as its main vehicle for the process of securitization. This school emphasizes exceptionality and critical ruptures. Meanwhile, another school, which emerged later and is referred to as the ‘Paris School’ sees securitization in the form of changes within miniscule, everyday details of life. Rather than focusing on critical junctures, it focuses on routine, and institutions as well as the technological background creating a conducive environment to securitization. Nonetheless, both work with

issues that are to be dealt with in an emergency security framework. This ‘emergency’ moniker, if accepted by the audience of the securitization process will in turn grant the securitizing actor the power to introduce extraordinary measures to handle the current (manufactured) security situation. The speed, intensity and success of securitization greatly depends on the actors involved in the process, as their activity – or the lack thereof – can impede or hasten securitization. In the following, both schools mentioned will be detailed, and the actors as well as their working mechanisms explored to understand their differences. The literature of securitization provides a toolkit for researchers, certain ideal types and methodologies, with whose help researchers have a better chance at understanding processes related to security and emergencies in the post-modern political context of critical constructivism.

In summary, securitization is a process that works to provide emergency powers to an actor, who called upon reframing an issue or issue area to become an existential threat by treating it as such. This self-referential practice and the weight of emergency will provide the actor with an increased repertoire of powers.

### ***1.2: The Copenhagen School of Securitization***

The seminal piece of securitization literature is the product of Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver.<sup>4</sup> Their work is the main piece for outlining what has become known as the Copenhagen School of securitization. The Copenhagen School (CS) uses the logic of exception as its main idea – and the implications of this will be prominent at several points within the literature. The CS will understand elevating ordinary issues to exceptional importance as an attempt to gain the ability to introduce emergency measures to tackle it. The ways in which this can be done, along with actors and the underlying logic of the process will

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<sup>4</sup> Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*

be elaborated upon in this chapter. The following literature review will build heavily upon the book of Buzan et al.<sup>5</sup>

The scholars in Copenhagen created a new way to analyze and understand security – a method through which the shift from ‘traditional’ hard security analysis was reflected. One of the main arguments of securitization is that objective security threats do not exist, instead they are the result of intersubjective understandings. From intersubjectivity, it also follows that they can be manufactured – an implication present throughout the entirety of securitization literature, regardless of variant.<sup>6</sup> Intersubjectivity, as well as agency will become a more detailed and debated issue with the temporal evolution of the Copenhagen School, and is most notably expanded upon by Thierry Balzacq.<sup>7</sup> Intersubjectivity will remain the connecting thread when identifying the security threats across different sectors in which they can emerge. These sectors, as per Buzan are as follows: the military, the political, the economic, the societal, and the environmental sector.<sup>8</sup> All of these will have different security implications, and different issues will be threatening for each of them. Nonetheless, to conclude a successful securitization process, a referent object and an existential threat jeopardizing stability and security must be defined in each sector.

The scholars argue that in the context of international relations, security is ultimately about survival. This understanding stems from a traditional, military-political understanding of security. Since it is connected to survival, it threatens the very existence of the polity; the exceptional importance of security triggers the logic of exception, as “the special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.”<sup>9</sup> Within

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<sup>5</sup> Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1-45

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, 21

<sup>7</sup> Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no.2 (2005): 171-201

<sup>8</sup> Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 8

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, 21

securitization theory, the survival of the ‘referent object’ is paramount. The referent object – an item or concept to be defended at all costs – can be several things, ranging from the state itself to the ever more commonly articulated ‘society’. The loss of the referent object is unthinkable – if it is destroyed, there will be no point for any other political processes or deliberations – thus invoking urgency. This is how emergency measures are justified.

But how should one understand ‘existential threat’ and ‘emergency measures’? In line with the original idea of securitization, existential threat “can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question.”<sup>10</sup> Since there is no universal threat, what might be threatening for one state or one particular sector might not be concerning for other actors. Existential threats in the CS understanding of securitization are contingent with regards to sector, time, referent objects, and levels of analysis as well. The logic of exception allowing for the introduction of emergency measures can only be invoked in case there are existential threats identified in connection with a referent object that is valuable and relatable enough to invoke popular support. Referent objects can crudely be categorized within Buzan’s sectoral theory, incorporated into the securitization literature. With regards to sectors, these referent objects also vary. In general, the referent object of the military sector will be the state.<sup>11</sup> This is the result of traditional military-political understandings influencing the development of securitization theory. In the political sector, defining the referent object becomes more difficult. According to the Copenhagen School, they are “traditionally defined in terms of the constituting principle – sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology – of the state.”<sup>12</sup> This categorization allows for the inclusion of not only state regimes, but increasingly supranational constellations within the international system. Situations threatening the existence of a long-standing norm or system of institutions – e.g. the nuclear taboo, or the principle of non-

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<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, 22

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, 22

intervention – can be categorized and framed as an existential threat within this sector.<sup>13</sup> As for the economic sector, identifying the existential threats and referent objects is more complex. Economically speaking, the referent objects might be understood as firms. However, while their demise is undesirable for themselves, one would be hard-pressed to justify securitizing a firm in the market economy characteristic to Western democracies, where firms are not expected to stay afloat indefinitely. This might shift the attention to national economies as referent objects, but even the performance of said economy cannot be necessarily securitized unless it falls below a level where it has the capacity to continuously ensure the survival of the population. Nonetheless, much like in case of the political sector, supranational trading and economic regimes can be viewed as referent objects for the economic sector – if a certain amount of overlap is allowed with other sectors while framing issues.<sup>14</sup> The environmental sector is the most difficult to deal with in search for a clearly definable referent object and threat. With awareness continuously being raised about different environmental issues, the sector has virtually unlimited referent objects depending on the level of analysis. Likewise, the number and nature of threats is very diverse and context-sensitive. While there exist some easily securitizable existential threats, such as the survival of humankind considering continuous and rapid environmental deterioration, or the survival of a species – between these two endpoints exists a large amount of issue areas with neither clearly definable referent objects nor threats, making their securitization difficult. Even more confusingly, the environmental sector is largely intertwined with all other sectors, making its boundaries blurry at best and indiscernible at worst.<sup>15</sup> For the purposes of this following research, mainly the categories of political and societal sectors will be considered. While it is highly likely that no issue will fit exactly into

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<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, 23

one category, for securitization to begin in earnest, both the referent object(s) and the threat(s) must be clearly defined.

By securitization theory, Buzan et al. change how security is conceptualized – it is not the Cold War understanding of ‘being adequately safe from a threat’. Instead, “Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”<sup>16</sup> According to the theory, any issue that can be located within a political sphere can be moved out of complete non-politicization, through politicization to a “more extreme version of politicization” – meaning the issue becomes securitized.<sup>17</sup> According to Buzan et al., ‘securitized’ stage refers to an issue being “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”<sup>18</sup> Where certain issues fall on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized to securitized is usually up for state discretion – with potential influence arriving from supra- or international constellations the state is located in.<sup>19</sup> Buzan et al. argue that the presentation of issues is paramount within securitization theory – by convincing an audience that an issue should receive more attention than any other, security becomes a “self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.”<sup>20</sup> During this process, the intersubjective establishment of an issue happens – and the actor initiating the process can face multiple results depending on several factors.<sup>21</sup>

The actor aiming to securitize by declaring something existentially threatened is usually referred to as securitizing actor, while its addressee is referred to as the audience. This audience

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<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, 24

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, 24

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, 25

is most commonly the constituency of the polity in which the actor operates. The securitizing actor's credibility depends greatly on their position and (perceived) expertise on the topic at hand.<sup>22</sup> In the original formulation the role of the audience was a more passive function, only having the agency to accept or refuse a securitizing move, but later developments of the Copenhagen School allowed the audience to gain more agency.<sup>23</sup> Others influencing, but not directly engaging with the process of securitization are referred to as functional actors. These actors can modify and influence discourses concerning security.<sup>24</sup> Functional actors include stakeholders, scientific communities, and the media – especially in case of securitizing migration.<sup>25</sup> Their action or inaction can greatly impact the speed and success of a securitization process. Once an issue becomes securitized, it is framed as an existential threat that can destroy the referent object. However, it is important that we draw a distinction between securitization and a securitizing move. A securitizing move is usually a constructed discourse with the attempt to move an issue out of the realm of the (non-)politicized, and into the realm of securitized. By itself however, the move will not achieve securitization – the audience who is the addressee must accept the securitizing move.<sup>26</sup> (While the agency and role of the audience is not thoroughly explored within the original conceptualization of the Copenhagen School, this area becomes one of the most heavily criticized in later research, see e.g. Balzacq.<sup>27</sup>) Even if the securitization process does not result in substantial policy change, it can be deemed successful. As Buzan et al. put it, “Securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking the rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.”<sup>28</sup> In other words, even if the securitizing

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<sup>22</sup> Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” 178

<sup>23</sup> Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, Jan Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases,” *International Relations* 30, no.4 (2016), 500

<sup>24</sup> Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” 178

<sup>25</sup> Philippe Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration* (London: Routledge, 2011), 78-96

<sup>26</sup> Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 25

<sup>27</sup> Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” 171-201

<sup>28</sup> Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 25

move and its acceptance, resulting in securitization does not achieve meaningful policy change, the fact that it creates an environment in which there would be no legal, popular or other obstacles to the introduction of emergency measures signifies its success. In short, for securitization to be considered successful, the acceptance of the audience is always a necessary condition, while introducing emergency measures is a possibility, but not a must.

The question arises: how does securitization work to lift an issue above normal politics and securitize it? The answer of the Copenhagen School is that language has the capacity to achieve this effect. A sign of emergent security discourses is their labeling of previously non-politicized issues as security issues.<sup>29</sup> This effect is achieved by employing the theory of the speech act. According to Buzan et al., “it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).”<sup>30</sup> They argue that the author of the speech act “has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means to break the normal political rules of the game.”<sup>31</sup> In this scenario, language is not only descriptive, but also becomes performative. The focus on the speech act also allows scholars to identify the commencement of a securitization process. The introduction of a new and consistently different rhetoric which frames a previously (non-)politicized issue in security terms can serve as a starting point to the securitization process. Given the centrality of this concept in this original conceptualization in enacting securitization, an elaboration on this sociological concept is required. I will proceed to summarize Jef Huysmans’ evaluation of the speech act here, as it is more applicable than Austin’s original conceptualization. His research adds certain qualifications to the speech act particularly relevant to security situations.<sup>32</sup> The author argues that not only is the utterance important in the establishment of a security

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<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*, 26

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, p24

<sup>32</sup> Jef Huysmans, “What’s in an act? On security speech acts and little security nothings,” 371-383



discourse, but also the circulation of security speech. As per Huysmans, these speech acts ‘rupture’ the normal procedures, and have the ability to identify and tag existential threats that cannot be dealt with under normal circumstances, thus – in line with the conceptualization of the Copenhagen School – necessitate the introduction of extraordinary measures.<sup>33</sup> Granted, the acceptance of the speech act, and thus the success of securitization is contingent upon the audience, let us assume they are successful at this stage. Said measures will then purportedly guarantee the safety of the referent object. In this sense, we can see the notion of ‘security as a process’ come to life – from identification through communication to acceptance, it has resulted in redefining something as a threat. It is here where Thierry Balzacq would interject with the refinement of the Copenhagen School of securitization. As before, he highlights how the reification of the speech act as the centerpiece of the securitization process works to overshadow other necessary conditions of securitization by making the whole process entirely top-down, ‘formal’.<sup>34</sup> The argument about non-discursive securitization elements is an important one, playing a significant role in this research as well.<sup>35</sup> Other factors include the increased agency of the audience, and the larger awareness of the intersubjective context that must be established. It is in this environment that one might gain a fuller picture of the Copenhagen version of securitization, and it is one to which this research will also allude.

In other words, the logic of exception is the logic that allows the securitizing actor to (potentially) break the rules of normal/constitutional politics and introduce new measures.<sup>36</sup> The focus on the extraordinary shines through the Copenhagen School argumentation and provides a good view of how the logic of exception works in practice. It follows from the exceptional nature of the existential threat that only exceptional measures can control it. An

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<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*, 372-373

<sup>34</sup> Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” 172

<sup>35</sup> Balzacq, Léonard, Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ revisited, theory and cases,” 497, 517

<sup>36</sup> Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 24

actor utilizing the logic of exception can ‘create’ a security threat for its audience through this exceptionality. The contingency on audience is especially significant as an intersubjective understanding must be reached about the exceptional importance and danger of said established threat. There is a perceivable shift from the once narrow ‘original’ conceptualization of the CS placing a great emphasis on speech acts thanks to authors such as Balzacq. The increased role and agency of the audience will play a more prominent role in this research as well. Once this conceptualization is complete, based on the logic of exception, the announcement and/or introduction of emergency measures is inherent to the process. It is important to note however that even criticisms that attack or aim to refine the Copenhagen School of securitization still agree with the main building blocks of the process. This means that while Balzacq et al. seeks to refine the role of the audience, as well as highlight the importance of intersubjectivity and contingency, the core logic of the process remains intact. The logic of exception, and the focus on exceptionality and critical junctures remain unscathed by most critiques. While refinements are added to it, the CS is still very much a top-down, elite (i.e. securitizing actor) controlled process even with the expanded understanding of audience. Even more importantly, the focus on the speech act also remains, and is only reinforced by other, non-discursive elements. But these still work with the logic of exceptionality, and they still highlight critical junctures where ‘normal politics’ ceases to function, and a way of thinking in which averting catastrophe through emergency measures is adopted. Thus, it would be safe to conclude that all iterations and refinements of the Copenhagen School leave the notions of critical moments and exceptionality intact and in high regard when conceptualizing security. In this light, security becomes “a process designed to combat existential threats via exceptional measures.”<sup>37</sup> In the end, “security is whatever significant actors may regard as such.”<sup>38</sup> As such, the Copenhagen School securitization process is one that removes an issue from the realm of the (non-

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<sup>37</sup> Philippe Bourbeau, “Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,” 187

<sup>38</sup> Stefano Guzzini, “Securitization as a causal mechanism,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no.4-5, (2011): 330

)politicized with the help of the speech act and/or other, context-dependent elements, emphasizing the extraordinary nature of said issue, and establishes an intersubjective understanding of threat with an audience. This, in turn allows for the introduction of emergency measures. Going forward, this logic of exception will be contrasted with a more diffused idea, whose start and ending points cannot be so easily identified – but can result in securitization as well, only through the employment of a different methodology.

### ***1.3: The Paris School of Securitization***

In stark contrast with the Copenhagen School securitization lies the security conceptualization of the Paris School of securitization (PS). Instead of the (over)emphasis on exceptionality, it emphasizes repetition and institutionalization. The PS is built on the logic of routine that “views securitization as a collection of routinized and patterned practices, typically carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals, in which technology comes to hold a prominent place.”<sup>39</sup>

This logic of routine works in a way that it inscribes meaning through an iterative process rather than a rupture in normal politics and the introduction of a new, consistently security-framed rhetoric like in the case of the Copenhagen School. Bourbeau, in agreement with another notable scholar of the Paris School, Didier Bigo, argues that “security is largely defined by mundane bureaucratic decisions and practices that create a sense of insecurity and unease.”<sup>40</sup> Since the logic of exception is so fixated on critical junctures and ruptures with regards to the redefinition of security, it is largely unable to account for continuity. This is where the logic of routine employed by the Paris School is more appropriate in the identification. However, while the PS offers an insight into the reproduction and perpetuation

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<sup>39</sup> Bourbeau, “Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,” 188

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*, 190

of unease and insecurity, it is in turn unable to point towards exceptionalities and sudden changes within the system.<sup>41</sup>

Identification may prove challenging within the Paris School should one look for the securitizing actors with the help of the framework. A more traditional understanding of the Paris School would only consider security professionals as potential securitizing actors. However, this research, in agreement with Bourbeau – who at this stage distances himself from Bigo despite agreeing on the bureaucratic element – would expand the arena of possible actors, to include not only said professionals, but all those who “can speak with authority” during the securitization process.<sup>42</sup> Within the logic of routine, securitizing actors often work in highly institutionalized environments, sometimes unaware of the effect they have with regards to (re)framing security discourses. In the PS, these actors are usually security professionals or bureaucrats. The focus on these actors allows the Paris version of securitization to identify and analyze patterns that perpetuate security discourses. This process is often placed within a highly technical environment.<sup>43</sup>

Technology within the Paris School enjoys special attention. In an attempt to understand the prevailing practices of routinized (in)securitization, Didier Bigo analyzes the mechanisms of the European Union (EU) border controls – land and sea alike.<sup>44</sup> As he puts it, “For understanding practices of (in)securitization, actual work routines and the specific professional ‘dispositions’ are therefore more important than any discourses actors may use to justify their activities.”<sup>45</sup> However, the use of technology and “techniques of protection does not always

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<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*, 190

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, 192

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, 188, 190

<sup>44</sup> Didier Bigo, “The (in)securitization practices of EU border control: Military/Navy – border guards/police – database analysts,” *Security Dialogue* 45, no.3, (2014): 209-225

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*, 209

reduce insecurity or increase confidence in the political.”<sup>46</sup> As opposed to the logic of exception, which focuses on rhetorical ‘high points’ (speech acts) and cannot explain the mundane working mechanisms of discourses, this logic of routine has the capacity to capture this aspect. For Bigo, this is where securitization happens, rather than in heightened points of rhetoric.<sup>47</sup> Technology is woven through the entirety of this process for the EU border control, from fingerprint scans to the use of satellites and body-scanners.<sup>48</sup> However, with the proliferation of surveillance technologies, the management of unease and (in)securitization becomes easier, and potentially more automated. The processes become so embedded and routinized, the active or even the passive acceptance of the audience is not important anymore – and thus the securitization understanding of the Paris School has the potential to work even without an identifiable audience.<sup>49</sup> This claim further substantiates the routinized nature of the Paris version of securitization. Securitization in this school of thought is akin to a way of governance rather than the exceptional process of the Copenhagen School.<sup>50</sup> It does not analyze the intentions behind the exertion of power, rather the environment in which said power gains the ability to be exploited to begin with.<sup>51</sup> As Didier Bigo puts it, the processes of securitization are all related to “a field of security constituted by groups and institutions that authorize themselves and that are authorized to state what security is.”<sup>52</sup>

In the process of defining what security is, some actors might not even be entirely aware that they are producing or perpetuating a securitizing discourse with fellow security

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<sup>46</sup> C.A.S.E. Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” *Security Dialogue* 37, no.4, (2006): 457

<sup>47</sup> Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” 75

<sup>48</sup> Bigo, “The (in)securitization practices of EU border control: Military/Navy – border guards/police – database analysts,” 209

<sup>49</sup> Thierry Balzacq, “The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, no. 1, (2008): 75

<sup>50</sup> C.A.S.E. Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” 457

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Didier Bigo, “When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe,” in *International Relations Theory and The Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*. ed. M. Kelstrup and M. Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), 171-204

professionals.<sup>53</sup> The C.A.S.E. collective labels this as ‘habitus’ – but the term is ubiquitous in the Paris School literature. This ‘Bourdieu-esque’ understanding of habitus is what structures the field of security professionals – their ways of operation might not seem to contribute to the process of securitization on their own, but when the entirety of the professional security field becomes conjoined – in no small part thanks to technology –, multiple institutions carrying out their day-to-day tasks will produce and perpetuate securitization discourses.<sup>54</sup> To sum up, the Paris School understanding of securitization places special emphasis on identifying and understanding the everyday practices of security professionals and bureaucrats that reframe and subsequently perpetuate the security discourse on a day-to-day basis. This is in contrast with the Copenhagen understanding where security is reframed at critical junctures with the help of speech acts.

#### ***1.4: Interactions of the Logic of Exception and the Logic of Routine***

However, even with these differences apparent, at no stage do either of the two schools of thought claim that their logic is superior to that of the other, or that their logic should enjoy prevalence in any way. And still, there is an apparent dichotomy within the critical constructivist literature concerning the employment of these two logics. However, after conducting this literature review and uncovering the core logic behind both processes, it would seem that there is indeed no real contradiction between the two logics. Similar, but slightly different concerns have been voiced within the critical constructivist literature by Philippe Bourbeau, who also suggests to ‘move forward together’.<sup>55</sup> In his paper, Bourbeau posits that the securitization literature has treated the two logics in accordance with an apparently false dichotomy, an either-or application procedure. However, just like this research, he also arrives to the initial hypothesis that this dichotomy – much like the emergency threats within

<sup>53</sup> C.A.S.E. Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” 458

<sup>54</sup> Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” 65, 73

<sup>55</sup> Bourbeau, “Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,” 187-206

securitization itself – is constructed, and there is no real indication within the literature of either the Copenhagen or Paris Schools that they should be exclusive. In his words, he “caution[s] scholars against overdrawing distinctions between the two logics, for it is not clear that they are mutually exclusive.”<sup>56</sup> Instead, he turns towards identifying and describing the building elements of securitization present in both schools in an attempt to bolster both versions of securitization by highlighting mutual elements in them.<sup>57</sup> And thirdly, his main idea, referenced in his work’s title as well is articulated: “Finally, I contend that moving forward together will help scholars to study the coexistence of development and change, critical junctures and recurrence, and transformation and reproduction.”<sup>58</sup> However, there are some important distinctions to note between his work and this current research. Bourbeau makes no effort to synthesize the two logics by describing their similarities and differences. He claims his argument is based on uncovering similarities to shift attention away from a focus on purported differences – all he has to say about the synthesis is that it is not his aim to correct the flaws, or propose a comprehensive theory of securitization.<sup>59</sup> In this research however, these very same similarities and differences will be used as grounds for argumentation to highlight complementarity and offer a new approach when dealing with security analysis through the framework of securitization. While not strictly speaking a synthesis, the proposed simultaneous application aims to minimize the amount of ground left uncovered by the theories and create a more nuanced understanding of any given securitization process.

This clearer understanding is possible as the two logics that are core to the two schools are fundamentally different in terms of what they are able to explain and take into account when using them in an analysis. Exceptionality in Copenhagen and routine in Paris – the two instances

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<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, p188

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*

are complementary, and thus this dichotomy begs the question: why not employ both logics? While one logic will always be ill-equipped to encompass and account for every aspect of an empirical case, the use of both can cancel out problems arising from focusing solely on one aspect – exceptionality or routine. While Bourbeau does not voice the contention in the form of this kind of mild synthesis, he too reaches the stage where he tests his main hypothesis with a case study. The author chooses to analyze the attitudes towards migration in France. He recognizes how “employing one logic to the exclusion of the other leads to a partial and potentially deceptive account of the securitization process.”<sup>60</sup>

As it currently stands, the academia is divided between the two logics, and perceive them as mutually exclusive – thus only applying their select method on an either/or basis. The issue this raises is that neither understanding of the securitization process can encapsulate all aspects of securitization. The differing logics bring with them different applications. The logic of exception is great at identifying and describing critical events, speech acts and actors, and account for the sudden change of the status quo. However, it is unable to properly explain continuity, as the “model is ill equipped to deal with the idea that mechanisms of security are proliferating and generating a constant sense of insecurity, fear and danger.”<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, the application of the logic of routine can account for continuity and routinized practices, but sees critical junctures as also part of a routinized process – defeating the purpose of labeling altogether.

There really is nothing to be gained within the academia by maintaining this arguably false dichotomy between these two logics of securitization. The logics are not automatically incompatible with each other. In fact, in this paper it will be analyzed whether it would be more beneficial to apply both logics on the same empirical case to gain more insight into both the

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<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, 205

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*, 191



emergence of exceptional rhetoric and politics, as well as its reproduction. The contention of this research is that these logics are seemingly easily reconcilable, and yet there seems to be no attempt at doing so, as their differences are the grounds for mutual exclusivity rather than grounds for extensive research combining both. There appears to be an academic hiatus within the literature in this respect – scholarly debate has been so caught up in deciding on the appropriate logic that it has not even considered simultaneous application. This research will argue that not only it is beneficial with regards to empirical analysis (by gaining more detail and shedding light on shifts from exceptionality into continuity/routines) but will also hypothesize the two logics are merely temporal evolutions of one another. To abolish or at least damage and reevaluate this long-standing dichotomy that has cemented itself into the securitization literature, a suitable case study will be selected. To substantiate these claims, this paper will use the empirical example of the securitization of migration in Hungary. In the following, the research will introduce the case study and will attempt to bridge the perceived theoretical gap and reevaluate the existing dichotomy between the two different logics by applying them on the same empirical case, demonstrating their beneficial effects – and potentially proving they are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

To sum up, it is clear that the contention with the long-standing and apparently false dichotomy is not only this research's own. Other scholarly literature has started the exploration of possible simultaneous use. Both informed and inspired by this literature and the foray into moving forward together, this current research will analyze its own case study. Just like in the case of France, there is good reason to believe that the empirical example of Hungary and the securitization of migration will be fertile ground for this quasi-synthesis of the two schools of thought. The synthesis would be a new way of approaching securitization analysis. It would keep both logics intact but would argue the analysis should shift from the application of one to the other when it encounters an event inexplicable by one logic. This kind of synthesis could

provide the added benefit of uncovering any events that are not covered by either logic – potentially indicating the end of the explanatory capabilities of both logics. On the surface, it seems like a good example to reevaluate and potentially abolish the dichotomy persisting in securitization. However, this current research will not only highlight the areas where it gains more from employing both schools, but also argue for their complementarity as well as their potential temporal sequence. The two schools of thought being essentially temporal evolutions of each other would not only contribute to deconstructing the mutually exclusive barrier between them but could also potentially make them easier to approach to use in analysis, as it would show that there has to be certain turning points which trigger securitization processes best understood by the Paris School and vice versa. Should these points be sufficiently identified, their inclusion in a revised securitization ideal type could only benefit securitization literature and research. In the following chapter, the analytical framework to achieve these goals with this research will be introduced.

## **CHAPTER II: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

### ***2.1: Establishing the Framework of the Research***

In the previous chapter, the existing dichotomy and the differences between the two schools of thought have been highlighted. This chapter will turn towards establishing an appropriate analytical framework to identify and analyze both the Copenhagen and Paris schools. When selecting appropriate sources and certain methodologies, this research also leans on the previously laid out research of Philippe Bourbeau. The case study of this research will be Hungarian migration and the reactions to it. The suitability of the case is supported on multiple sides. For one, the length of the ongoing securitization process provides many sources through which the logic of exception (i.e. rhetorical shifts, ‘speech acts’) and the logic of routine (i.e. routinization, perpetuation and reproduction of insecurity) shines through. The importance and penetration of the issue within the state has reached very high levels – allowing this research to draw from a pool of various sources ranging from scholarly to governmental. Length is also beneficial as the research will also attempt to investigate potential temporal connections between the two logics. What is more, since language plays a very important role in securitization, having the ability to capture all shades and nuances of the Hungarian language is paramount – and this also proved to be an important aspect during the choice of the case study. Finally, the fact that Hungary had not connected migration and security before the start of the 2015 migration crisis gives an opportunity to accurately identify a starting point to the securitization process with the help of the logic of exception – as well as at least vaguely gauge the success of said securitization process.

### ***2.2: Existing Academic Background***

As it has been mentioned before in the previous chapter, the work of Philippe Bourbeau will serve as an important source for this research. In the following, its own analytical framework will be introduced which will both serve as a guidance for the reader, and as an

opportunity to demonstrate where the contentions of Bourbeau and this research diverge. Bourbeau, before beginning his analysis of the French case he has chosen, notes that both schools, when taken on their own, suffer from partial incompleteness, as there are certain aspects they are unable to account for.<sup>62</sup> He argues that “...the logic of exception perceives the securitization process as binary (either there are high points or there is no securitization), while the logic of routine understands it as flat (perceived high points are merely patterned practices)...”.<sup>63</sup> In order to conduct his research, his methodology instead focuses on the common grounds, aspects of securitization present in both schools. He finds two pillars: performance and path dependence.<sup>64</sup> He argues that securitization, regardless of variant, is “first and foremost about a performance”.<sup>65</sup> Emphasizing an intersubjective understanding of security can be understood as performance, and this allows the researcher to group both logics as performative, establishing a common ground. His concept of path dependence theorizes that the logic of exception solely focuses on critical junctures, which initiate a change in framing and potentially policies, while the logic of routine, with patterns and institutionalizations “locks in” securitization. As he puts it, “By searching for elements of both exceptionalist security discourses and routinised security practices across time and across cases, scholars will get a clearer, more comprehensive sense of the securitisation process.”<sup>66</sup> Thus, he opens the two logics to complement rather than contradict each other.<sup>67</sup>

After establishing his analytical common ground, Bourbeau explains how he will analyze the securitization of migration in France. He looks for changes in the security practices in relation to migrant detention, as well as – in line with the performative nature of securitization

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<sup>62</sup> Bourbeau, “Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,” 190

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, 192

<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*, 193-194

<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*, 188

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*, 196

<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, 195

– the security performances of political/media agents.<sup>68</sup> The author looks for the security speech acts of the French securitizing actors within the framework of the logic of exception. As such, he searches for the security-speech statements of high-ranking officials. At the same time, he looks at the evolution of the detention centers from multiple angles: their potential location, the treatment within, as well as the increasing number of occupants. He finds that “As the next pages will show, both securitisation logics have come into play in the development of a French national stance on immigration, which supports the contention that the two logics can coexist.”<sup>69</sup> Interpreting this, he sees the two logics interact with each other at several stages of the securitization process and suggests the application or at least the consideration of both logics when analyzing securitization to gain a clearer picture of a securitization process. However, when hypothesizing the relationship between the two logics, Bourbeau also argues that a temporal hypothesis would suggest the primacy of one logic over the other.<sup>70</sup> This research would disagree with this, as it treats both logics as equally important for a successful securitization process – but on the surface, it does seem like one of the logics could precede the other. Nonetheless, this does not mean that one logic is ‘better’ than the other, or that it has more explanatory value – it only means that in a logical sequence, one predates the other. While this research welcomes Bourbeau’s intention of not further distancing the two logics and perpetuating the dichotomy by claiming the supremacy of one, it would also add that temporal precedence does not necessarily equals the dominance of either logic.

However, there is an important distinction Bourbeau himself makes with regards to the logic of exception and the logic of routine. While he acknowledges the contribution of Didier Bigo to the Paris variant of securitization, he also criticizes him for wrongly placing all the emphasis on security professionals. Bourbeau argues that “Thus, restricting the scope of

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<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*, 196-197

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<sup>70</sup> *ibid.*, 195

securitising agents to security professionals limits more than it reveals in the context of contemporary security studies.”<sup>71</sup> This means that not only he distances himself from the routinization understanding of Bigo, he also makes a case for the inclusion of other securitizing actors when dealing with routinization, because the securitization process involves a lot more actors than simply security professionals.<sup>72</sup> The current research would concur with these views of Bourbeau. Just as the case study of Bourbeau, the scope of the Hungarian case will also be broadened to include actors outside the traditional understanding of the logic of routine. This will help with identifying potential institutional securitizations even if it was not the result of the operation of security professionals.

As one can see, questioning the long-standing dichotomy of the two logics was also the aim of Bourbeau. However, other than highlighting the issue and pointing towards a common analytical ground, Bourbeau does not wish to synthesize the two logics, nor does he intend to theorize their temporal relations. Throughout this research however, the potential of a temporal evolution will be more thoroughly analyzed, as not only would that make thinking about the process of securitization that much simpler, it would also make the framework more approachable and easier to use.

In order to achieve this, the current research will also turn towards a case study – that of Hungary. A securitization process was initiated surrounding the issue of migrants in the state at the beginning of 2015. Even though traces and elements of this securitization process have been replaced or transformed with time and (inter)national developments, it did not cease completely. The case of Hungary is interesting should one consider their meager amount of experiences with refugees previously, as well as their relatively undesirable nature as a destination. This means that it was not until 2015 that security and migration were seriously connected with each

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<sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, 192

<sup>72</sup> *ibid.*

other in the state. These aspects are important should one consider how heavily the securitizing rhetoric hit the country, and how the lack of previous experiences gave room for an entirely new and centrally distributed understanding of the process of immigration. Further complicating the case in Hungary are domestic political dynamics, explored within the next chapter. Nonetheless, similarly to Bourbeau, to assess the impact of securitization as well as the actors and referent objects pertaining to the process, both primary and secondary sources in Hungarian and English will be used.

### ***2.3: Use of Sources During the Research***

Primary sources will incorporate government communication, keeping in mind for example Balzacq's addition to securitization when talking about credibility and posture with regards to the success of securitization. Also included in this category are institutional legislation changes, decrees, amendments to existing laws, and non-discursive securitization elements. Secondary sources will include the reports of the media, scholarly opinion pieces on the developments as well as polling data where available. Within these sources, the logic which would best explain the securitizing move will also be highlighted. While the audience can be expected to remain relatively the same, actors may change, or – especially in case of the Paris School – be difficult to identify. The referent object of the process will also be pinpointed. In connection with migration, the concept of the referent object will usually still be the state – only approached across multiple of the sectors outlined in the beginning of the literature review. Securitizing actors might try to grab hold of the issue from the side of economics, or from the side of potential terrorism within the state – indicating a shift towards the political sphere. This individual analysis will then be supported by polling data and existing scholarly literature wherever available.

There will be multiple uses for both primary and secondary sources. First and foremost, sources will be surveyed for vocabulary and/or rhetoric consistent with exceptionality –

pointing towards a potential linkage with the Copenhagen School notion of exceptional moments. Such vocabulary is not only the utterance of the word ‘security’, but rather the use of words signifying how dangerous a securitizing actor selected threat is, as well as delineating a referent object. A good example of such security speech might be plucked from Bourbeau’s analysis of France, where declarations by the president of France such as “we have decided to declare war” and arguments such as measures are required so that France can “[keep] its civilisation”.<sup>73</sup> These lines and the security discourse they create are the main vehicles for securitization as seen through the lens of the logic of exception. The logic of routine will be showcased through subtler and less disruptive changes in reframing an issue in security terms. Gradualness and an extended array of potential securitizing actors other than security professionals will be included, in line with Bourbeau’s stance with regards to Bigo and the Paris School. To find the everyday workings of routines and institutionalizations, small changes in legislation and institutions will be highlighted that either entrench certain obstacles into the path of migration or create new ones. These obstacles may manifest in the form of red tape, or in the form of an extension to extrajudicial powers for the authorities – changes that are not immediately visible but are effective in perpetuating the atmosphere of emergency and existential threat. The shifts in legal thinking towards a stricter or more lenient procedure can provide a good example of how the logic of routine works in practice. For Hungary, one must also take into consideration non-discursive securitization elements. These, depending on their impact might prove difficult to categorize to only one logic. Some elements might bear the characteristics of both – an apparent critical juncture that will pave the way for routinized practices, or a legal background change which will allow the securitizing actor to suffer less repercussions when articulating speech acts and creating the critical juncture.

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<sup>73</sup> Bourbeau, “Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,” 203



All in all, this broad analytical framework will be utilized to analyze Hungary and its attitude and actions towards migration in the post-2015 period. There are some assumptions this research takes that Bourbeau does not have in his own research, such as attempting to establish a ‘timeline’ of the different logics and pointing towards a new framework for analysis by emphasizing the complementarities. In the following, the case of Hungary will be introduced in detail, and the events of 2015-2016 analyzed to start the deconstruction of the dichotomy.

## CHAPTER III: THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN HUNGARY

### 3.1: *Earlier Ties and Connections*

As it has been outlined before, the securitization of migration in Hungary is an interesting case study, first and foremost stemming from the historical and cultural heritage of the state. Situated within Central Europe, the state of Hungary had no serious interactions with migration before the events of 2015, aside from accepting refugees following the Bosnian Wars in the region and dealing with Kosovar migrants following deals between Serbia and Kosovo.<sup>74</sup> However, the current wave of migration did not fit the expectations of Hungarians based on earlier interactions, and as such, the population was open to new interpretations concerning migrants.<sup>75</sup> The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that Hungary has no significant immigrant population, therefore “no real picture of immigrants, and has no own and direct experience with them”.<sup>76</sup> This meant that a governmental reframing met no serious resistance, as there was no basis for comparison. The state also has no ‘historical obligations’ like several Western-European states to accept refugees from former colonies, as it had none.<sup>77</sup> However, similar allusions to moral obligations crop up in the discourse of Hungarian leaders from time to time. Hungary has been portrayed by both the pro-government domestic and the international media as the ‘last bastion of Christendom’ – a metaphor used to amplify the importance of both border protection and Christianity.<sup>78</sup> Thus, goes the argument, it is a moral obligation of

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<sup>74</sup> János Gyurok, “Jugoszláviai menekültek Magyarországon,” (Refugees from Yugoslavia in Hungary) *Regio – Kissebség, politika, társadalom* 5, no.4, (1994); MTI, “Fotó: Tömegével érkeznek a koszovóiak a Homokhátságra,” (Kosovars arrive to Homokhátság en masse) *HVG*, February 07, 2015, [https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150207\\_Foto\\_Tomegevel\\_erkeznek\\_a\\_koszovoiak\\_a\\_Ho](https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150207_Foto_Tomegevel_erkeznek_a_koszovoiak_a_Ho), accessed: 05.22.2019; MTI, “330 koszovói ellen indítottak eljárást a bevándorlásügyiek,” (The immigration authorities have launched proceedings against 330 Kosovars) *HVG*, February 03, 2015, [https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150203\\_330\\_koszovoi\\_ellen\\_inditottak\\_eljarast\\_a](https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150203_330_koszovoi_ellen_inditottak_eljarast_a), accessed: 05.22.2019

<sup>75</sup> Attila Juhász, Csaba Molnár, Edit Zgut, “Menekültügy és migráció Magyarországon,” (The issue of refugees and migration in Hungary) *Political Capital*, 2017, [https://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/HUNGARY\\_BOOK\\_HU\\_BOOK\\_ONLINE.pdf](https://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/HUNGARY_BOOK_HU_BOOK_ONLINE.pdf) 14, accessed: 05.22.2019

<sup>76</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> András Szalai, Gabriella Göbl, “Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary,” (Working Paper) *CEU Center for EU Enlargement Studies*, (2015): 14

<sup>78</sup> Norbert Pap, Péter Reményi, “Re-bordering of the Hungarian South: Geopolitics of the Hungarian border fence,” *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 66, no.3 (2017): 248-249; Daniel Boffey, “Orbán claims Hungary is

Hungary to keep protecting the southern borders and keep Europe ‘safe and Christian’. The metaphor itself is grounded in history, when the Hungarian armies repelled Turkish forces along the southern border, barring them from entering Central Europe. Invoking such similarities leads to reframing the migrants at the borders as an invading force – and thus creating a climate which was conducive to the process of securitization within Hungary.

Nonetheless, even though they do not have a direct historical connection to migration, the states within the Central European region also echo policies and politics from the Western European region. This is especially true as at the initial stages of the refugee crisis, the Hungarian far-right party Jobbik was closing the gap in popularity with Fidesz. Their differences were between 4 and 9%, depending on polling authority.<sup>79</sup> This means that their rhetoric which was also centered around anti-immigration policies gained more attention and supporters within the state. As Bernáth et al. notes, the views of the far-right Jobbik party and Fidesz concerning immigration were often similar.<sup>80</sup> It is in this political climate that Fidesz has started its campaign on migration, essentially reframing the refugee crisis in Hungary. While an inquiry into the reasons behind the initiation of the securitization process is both immensely difficult and out of scope for this project, it is important to note that the process started amid lackluster popularity reports and growing political pressure for Fidesz. Some media outlets at the time also highlighted potential issue areas which were pressing in the country, putting pressure on the government. These included but were not limited to moving large amounts of capital in an undocumented matter, demonstrations by nurses, and radical changes in the media

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the last bastion against ‘Islamisation’ of Europe,” *The Guardian*, February 18, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/18/orban-claims-hungary-is-last-bastion-against-islamisation-of-europe>, accessed: 05.21.2019

<sup>79</sup> Levente Kisistók, “Pártpreferenciák 2015 áprilisában – Egybevágó eredmények,” *közvéleménykutatók.hu*, May 18, 2015, <https://kozvelemenykutatok.hu/partpreferenciak-2015-aprilisaban-egybevago-eredmenyek/>, accessed: 05.20.2019

<sup>80</sup> Gábor Bernáth, Vera Messing, “Bedarálva – A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tőle független megszólalás terepei,” (Ground up – The governmental campaign about refugees and the possibility to speak up independently) *Médiakutató* 16, no.4, (2015): 10

of Hungary.<sup>81</sup> Nonetheless, no inference here shall be made about the ‘real’ reasons behind initiating the securitization process – this research is more concerned with the methodology and the deployment of the two prominent logics of securitization.

To see the logics in action, the research will turn towards analyzing the political moves that were taken within the state, with special regards to the logic of securitization they utilize. What is more, the referent object as well as the securitizing actor and the nature of the securitizing move will also be highlighted. The descriptions will follow a timeline of the refugee crisis in Hungary, beginning in 2015 and ending with relatively recent developments in 2019. The succession of events, while might give an idea about the potential truth the ‘temporal evolution’ hypothesis has, are strictly linear and not a direct answer to the hypothesis.

### ***3.2: Securitization Processes in Hungary from 2015***

#### **3.2.1: The Initial Stages of Securitization**

The securitization of migration in Hungary started with a strong rhetoric against economic migration. This rhetoric presented the influx of people into the country as a threat to Hungarian workplaces, jobs, and its economy. The construction of this frame began in early 2015, when Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary gave a statement concerning economic migration: “Economic migration is a bad thing in Europe, it should not be seen as something with any use, for it only brings trouble and danger for the European people, therefore migration must be stopped, this is the Hungarian stance.”<sup>82</sup> Already this early in the process, the words ‘trouble’ and ‘danger’ were connected to migration – even though this was only in connection with economic migration. The weight and intensity of the words invoke a slight sense of

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<sup>81</sup> hvg.hu, “Miről tereli el a figyelmet a menekültek ellen uszító kampány?,” (From what does the campaign against refugees shift attention away?) *HVG*, July 01, 2015,

[https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150701\\_Fidesz\\_nepszerutlen\\_botranyok\\_kampany\\_men](https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150701_Fidesz_nepszerutlen_botranyok_kampany_men), accessed: 05.19.2019

<sup>82</sup> Index, “Orbán: Gazdasági bevándorlóknak nem adunk menedéket,” (Orbán: We do not give asylum to economic migrants) *Index*, January 11, 2015, [https://index.hu/belfold/2015/01/11/orban\\_gazdasagi\\_bevandorloknak\\_nem\\_adunk\\_menedeket/](https://index.hu/belfold/2015/01/11/orban_gazdasagi_bevandorloknak_nem_adunk_menedeket/), accessed: 05.19.2019

emergency. Clearly, the securitizing actor in this case is Orbán himself, and the referent object is the state approached through the economic sector. These remarks were complemented by others which aimed to make sure that Hungary does not become a target for immigration, as well as “keeping Hungary Hungarian.”<sup>83</sup> During press conferences, media appearances and other public events, the reframing of the migrant continued. An apparent conflation of the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’ was being carried out in the rhetoric, which masked differences between the two groups.<sup>84</sup> As noted by Bernáth et al. as well, another qualifier, aimed at instigating negative reactions was added to migrant: ‘megélhetési’, which has the connotation that the migrant with this moniker is arriving with the sole intent of pursuing a better life, not safer conditions. (‘Megélhetési’ has no direct English equivalent, and thus the research will continue to use it in Hungarian and with the meaning outlined above.)<sup>85</sup> In February 2015, Orbán argued that Hungary’s doors must be “bolted shut”, as there is no need for even a single ‘megélhetési’ migrant. The leader of the faction in the Parliament, Lajos Kósa, also calls for legislative changes granting the power to complete the ‘door-bolting’ – not only alluding to the exceptional measures in line with the Copenhagen School, but also foreshadowing later institutional and legislative changes cementing anti-immigration sentiment in the state.<sup>86</sup> The ruling party organized a debate day in the Hungarian National Parliament titled ‘Hungary does not need

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<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> Viktória Serdült, Lajos Micskei, “Így keveri Orbán Viktor a bevándorlókat a menekültekkel,” (This is how Orbán mixes up refugees with migrants) *Origo*, May 21, 2015, <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20150520-orban-viktor-bevandorlas-europai-unio-menekult-illegalis-bevandorlo.html>, accessed: 05.19.2019; Tamás Vince Ádány, “Nemzetközi jogi szempontok a migrációs válság értelmezéséhez,” (International law aspects to interpret the migration crisis) *Iustum Aequum Salutare* 12, no. 2, (2016): 237-249; United Nations, “Refugees and Migrants: Definitions,” *United Nations*, no date, <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions>, accessed: 05.24.2019

<sup>85</sup> András Szalai, Gabriella Göbl, “Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary,” (Working Paper) 19; Gábor Bernáth, Vera Messing, “Bedarálva – A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tőle független megszólalás terepei,” 8; hvg.hu, “Orbán: “Mire Magyarországra érkezik, már mind megélhetési bevándorló,” (Orbán: by the time they arrive to Hungary, they are all megélhetési migrants) *HVG*, June 05, 2015, [https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150605\\_Orban\\_penteki\\_interju](https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150605_Orban_penteki_interju), accessed: 05.24.2019

<sup>86</sup> Index, “Orbán: Be kell reteszelni Magyarország ajtaját,” (Orbán: Hungary’s door must be bolted shut) *Index*, February 05, 2015, <https://index.hu/belfold/2015/02/05/orban-be-kell-reteszelni-magyarorszag-ajtajat/>, accessed: 05.23.2019

‘megélhetési’ migrants’.<sup>87</sup> In these instances, the securitizing actors switch from one person to the entirety of the governing party. The functional actors, such as the media which has particular importance in case of securitizing migration, had a hard time countering the unfolding government rhetoric.<sup>88</sup> According to the researchers at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, especially in the initial stages of the securitization discourse, expert opinions or counterframes could not emerge due to the prevalence of the strongly pushed and overarching government discourse. They also note the conflation of ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’, and the use of ‘economic’ or ‘megélhetési’ as a moniker frequently.<sup>89</sup>

As we can see, in the initial stages of re-framing migration as a threat, the main referent object was the state, approached through economy. To apply Buzan’s sectoral theorem, this characterization means a threat by which the economy will be damaged sufficiently to endanger the provision of basic needs to the populace – all on account of ‘economic’ or ‘megélhetési’ migrants. This rhetoric worked to elevate a previously non-security issue into the sphere of securitization. In this discourse, immigration was portrayed as something out of the ordinary for the European, but especially the Hungarian people. It was a phenomenon with extreme disruptive capabilities that endangered Hungarians’ livelihoods by grabbing their jobs. The logic of exception was set in motion by portraying the entirety of this issue as something extraordinary that requires special attention and immediate care – otherwise the state would suffer greatly from the consequences. The success of this initial stage is hard to gauge. One aspect pointing towards success could be found when analyzing the Fidesz faction leader’s call for legislative change – and the lack of a huge and widespread backlash. This – according to the original conceptualization of the Copenhagen School – already points towards a successful

<sup>87</sup> Rita Pálfi, “Magyarországnak nincs szüksége megélhetési bevándorlókra,” (Hungary does not need megélhetési migrants) *24.hu*, February 03, 2015, <https://24.hu/belfold/2015/02/03/magyarorszagnak-nincs-szuksege-megelhetesi-bevandorlokra/>, accessed: 05.24.2019

<sup>88</sup> Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*, 78-96

<sup>89</sup> Gábor Bernáth, Vera Messing, “Bedarálva – A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tőle független megszólalás terepei,” 12-14

securitization attempt. Nonetheless, it is important to observe – as noted by the researchers of the Academy of Sciences – that any counterframes or narratives deviating from that of the government had a hard time entering the discussion.<sup>90</sup> Therefore, the lack of backlash and coverage can also be these voices being drowned out by government rhetoric. Still, the success of the process could also be indirectly measured by the following events – ramping up rhetoric, constructing a fence, making changes in legislation, etc. Nonetheless, this research would not consider indirect correlations as a proof of success of securitization through the economic sector. While it is hard to discern, the subsequent events shaking up sectors point towards the fact that a new rhetoric was required – and the old one was abandoned.

### **3.2.2: The Escalation of the Rhetoric and the National Consultation**

The second stage of securitizing migration in Hungary, starting around mid-2015, employed a harsh rhetorical campaign that was very visual, supplemented by a form of ‘opinion-polling’. At the same time, the signs of the first of several legislative changes are also visible. The rhetorical aspect of the securitization attempt was still describable by the logic of exception, as it places immigration in yet another, but similarly ‘danger-fraught’ light. The new campaign was largely based on advertisements on billboards. Three main slogans were utilized on these billboards. As a continuation of the economic framing of the migrant, one of them read “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take the jobs of Hungarians!”.<sup>91</sup> This was clearly in line with earlier framings – but new sectors through which the referent (the state) was threatened were introduced as well. Following the same “If you come to Hungary...” structure, the other two read: “... you must respect our culture!” and “...you must respect our laws!”.<sup>92</sup> With the

<sup>90</sup> Gábor Bernáth, Vera Messing, “Bedarálva – A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tőle független megszólalás terepei,” 12-14

<sup>91</sup> Tamás Német, “Megvan a kormány menekültellenes kampányának két újabb szlogenje,” (Here is the two new slogans for the government’s anti-refugee campaign) *Index*, June 04, 2019, [https://index.hu/belfold/2015/06/04/megvan\\_a\\_kormany\\_menekultellenes\\_kampanyanak\\_ket\\_ujabb\\_szlogenje/](https://index.hu/belfold/2015/06/04/megvan_a_kormany_menekultellenes_kampanyanak_ket_ujabb_szlogenje/), accessed: 05.19.2019

<sup>92</sup> *ibid.*

introduction of these new billboards, the government slightly shifted their rhetoric from solely an economic perspective to one that encompasses cultural and legislative aspects. To apply the sectoral theory of Buzan, these threats would most likely fit into the political sector, one threatening with the collapse of a long-standing system of institutions that comprises laws of Hungary, as well as the set of norms and beliefs that compose the culture of Hungary. These billboards, and the change they brought with themselves however were only the beginning of a shift in sectors – but before engaging with the further evolution of them, the research will turn towards the introduction of the ‘National Consultation’<sup>93</sup>, a quasi-polling tool designed by the government. The aim of the Consultation was gauging the opinion of the population on questions connected to migration – but it also served as an *ex post facto* justification of the harsh anti-immigration rhetoric, and as a future justification for impending legal changes.

The title of the 2015 National Consultation already mentioned immigration and terror in the same sentence, suggesting a close relationship of the two terms.<sup>94</sup> The preface of the Consultation, which was distributed with every copy, refers to migration as a “new type of threat that we (Hungarians) must stop”. It talks about the Paris terror attacks in a tone that is aimed at invoking emotion by using phrases such as “cold-blooded and merciless” and “shocking brutality”. What is more, the questions of the Consultation were highly suggestive, and were not phrased in a manner that would have allowed for objective deliberation.<sup>95</sup> To bring a few examples, question one reads: “There are several opinions available about intensifying terrorism. How important do you think the proliferation of terrorism (the French carnage, the

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<sup>93</sup> The institution of the National Consultation was introduced in 2010. It is a government polling tool, but its nature is entirely political, and thus the questions themselves does not have to live up to scientific standards.

<sup>94</sup> András Szalai, Gabriella Göbl, “Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary,” (Working Paper), p15; The Hungarian Government, “Nemzeti Konzultáció a bevándorlásról és a terrorizmusról,” (National Consultation on immigration and terrorism) 2015, [https://www.kormany.hu/download/7/e2/50000/nemzeti\\_konzultacio\\_bevandorlas\\_2015.pdf](https://www.kormany.hu/download/7/e2/50000/nemzeti_konzultacio_bevandorlas_2015.pdf), accessed: 05.28.2019

<sup>95</sup> The Hungarian Government, “Nemzeti Konzultáció a bevándorlásról és a terrorizmusról,” 2015



alarming deeds of ISIS) is from your own aspect?”.<sup>96</sup> The beginning of the question relies on a pre-established notion of increasing terror, and the rest of the question employs a vocabulary that invokes the feeling of emergency – ‘carnage’ as opposed to ‘fatal incident’ or ‘shooting’, and ‘alarming’ as an adjective. These invocations are in line with the logic of exception – they do not directly reference security, but their meaning and connotations are able to create a connection to security issues. The government aims to curb the proliferation of terrorism, and for this asks for the legitimization of the population – but the questions are framed in a way that it is highly illogical to give a negative answer to them. As for the legislative changes, questions 7 and 8 directly ask for the opinion of the people about the introduction of stricter laws when it comes to immigration. Question 7 “Would you support the Hungarian government to introduce stricter immigration regulations as opposed to Brussel’s lenient policies?” could be seen as a potential attempt to legitimize one-sided action by Hungary concerning immigration. Closely connected, question 8 asks “Would you support the Hungarian government to introduce stricter regulations, which could serve as a basis for the detention of migrants crossing the Hungarian border illegally?”. These and similar suggestive questions formed the backbone of the consultation.

Words and phrases already used in the rhetoric established earlier, such as ‘megélhetési’ migrant and migrants taking jobs were also iterated and built into the question in this Consultation (questions 3 and 10). Such repetitive actions however cannot sufficiently be explained by only the logic of exception – though parts of the Consultation, including the title, introduces new connections between migration and terrorism, and use emergency vocabulary – the reiteration of established government tropes is more in line with the broadened understanding of routinization processes, the one shared by both Bourbeau and this research. This, in turn, brings this aspect of the consultation closer to the securitization concept of a

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<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*

refined Paris School understanding when it comes to securitizing actors. This securitizing campaign that had been going on for almost six months started to show signs of routinization. The government rhetoric permeated the media and the public opinion, the confusion about migrants and refugees was still a very acute problem, and now the opinion poll aimed to normalize the connection between migration and terrorism – all while preparing the population for further legislative changes cementing the anti-immigration stance even more. This aspect of securitization simply cannot be explained by the logic of exception anymore, as it works in exactly the opposite way – tiny, everyday minutia are being reinvented and reframed to create an environment that is conducive for further securitizations. Therefore at this stage the research cannot safely conclude that the employment of the logic of routine is merely a necessary temporal evolution to the logic of exception – because what follows next will once again employ both logics to achieve its effects.

### 3.2.3: The Construction of the Border Fence

Potentially the most spectacular and infamous step in the securitization process in Hungary was the construction of a border fence on the Serbian-Hungarian section of the border in the southern parts of the country. The construction was ordered on the 17<sup>th</sup> of June, in the form of a governmental decree. The fence is 175kms in length, and 4 meters in height, and its official name is “temporary fence with the aim of border protection”.<sup>97</sup> The reason for the construction was an “extraordinary immigration pressure” as outlined by the decree.<sup>98</sup> This move was wildly publicized and reiterated by the securitizing actor, the Hungarian government, and was presented as a step to protect not only Hungary, but to alleviate pressure on Germany as well.<sup>99</sup> At a press conference, the Prime Minister also added that “the borders of Hungary

<sup>97</sup> The Hungarian Government, “1401/2015 (VI.17) Kormányhatározat a rendkívüli bevándorlási nyomás kezelése érdekében szükséges egyes intézkedésekről,” (1401/2015 (VI.17) Government decree about the measures necessary to deal with exceptional immigration pressure) June 17, 2015

<sup>98</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> MTI, “Orbán Viktor: Magyarország deli határai egész Európát védeni fogják a jövőben is,” (Orbán Viktor: Hungary’s southern borders will protect the entirety of Europe in the future as well) *Magyar Idők*, July 05, 2018,

will remain protected in the future as well.”<sup>100</sup> During the very same conference, he also described the construction as an attempt to regain control over the state.

Concerning the fence, there are several aspects to be analyzed and identified in order to be put into the category of the two preeminent securitization logics. First and foremost, the construction of the fence constitutes a non-discursive securitization element in itself. The fence, while surrounded by verbality and described verbally and in speeches, is not a speech act, yet it still invokes a feeling of insecurity. Its construction is a self-referential practice with regards to framing security – the construction of an instrument of protection implies the existence of a threat. Building a fence to stop the “extraordinary immigration pressure” is a very spectacular and easily recognizable step of securitizing the issue. While the argument could be made that the installation of the fence is a sign of an entirely successful reframing of the migrant and thus successful securitization, polls from 2015 show a large number of the population being reluctant to support the fence. The Publicus Institute, a polling body in Hungary found in a representative research that only 34% of the population supported the fence actively, while 56% would rather choose not to construct it.<sup>101</sup> Based on this, the current research will make the argument that while on the surface the fence is an extraordinary measure introduced, it is not a straightforward indicator for the success of securitization as it was mostly rejected by the population. Nonetheless, it being a non-discursive securitization element with a large impact that further designates the migrant as a threat to Hungary, it also can be placed into the framework of the logic of exception. It conveys the message that the border protection instruments are required – the threat being the migrant, and the referent object still being the state, but now seen through

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<https://www.magyaridok.hu/kulfold/orban-viktor-magyarorszag-deli-hatarai-egesz-europat-vedeni-fogjak-a-jovoben-is-3266156/>, accessed: 05.21.2019

<sup>100</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Publicus Institute, “A többség nem építene kerítést,” (The majority would not build a fence) *Publicus Institute Blog*, July 11, 2015, [http://publicus.hu/blog/a\\_tobbseg\\_nem\\_epitene\\_keritest/?utm\\_source=mandiner&utm\\_medium=link&utm\\_campaign=mandiner\\_201507](http://publicus.hu/blog/a_tobbseg_nem_epitene_keritest/?utm_source=mandiner&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=mandiner_201507), accessed: 05.21.2019

the lens of territorial integrity. Thus, the fence being a blatant securitizing attempt once again changes the sector through which securitization is conducted. This can be inferred from the statement of the Prime Minister, who argues that the fence was a tool to “regain control over the territory of the state.”<sup>102</sup> The emphasis thus shifted from keeping immigrants out solely because of economic reasons to now include a territorial dimension as well. This research will argue that this continuous shifting of sectors and approaching the threat of migration from different angles was necessary as the original, economic framing of the migrant has largely failed, gradually fading from government rhetoric to give way for new understandings, such as ones in connection with terror. Thus, while the fence seems to be an extraordinary measure on the surface, the product of a successful securitization process, this research will argue that it is instead the starting point of yet another cycle of exceptionality.

Nonetheless, the fence also has an effect in the long run. It can be seen as an instrument that institutionalizes the border protection narrative. It is the embodiment of insecurity in the sense that its mere existence radiates the need for a dialogue on security and potentially securitization. The construction of the fence therefore cements the discourse of protection against immigration within Hungary, and creates an environment in which security and protection are more important than ever – otherwise why would there be a fence? This leads to a tautological and self-referential reframing of immigration and consequently the creation of a securitized environment by simply existing. Not uttering any speech acts leading to critical junctures but still having an everyday effect on the lives of Hungarians, the fence can also be understood as a policy instrument in line with the logic of routine as put forward by Bourbeau – one that encompasses not only the work of security professionals, but all kinds of other

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<sup>102</sup> MTI, “Orbán Viktor: Magyarország deli határai egész Európát védeni fogják a jövőben is”

routinizations as well. It institutionalizes a constant need for protection even without consciously thinking about it.

In this environment, talking about temporality becomes highly counterproductive. The fence represents both the logic of exception and routine, and it serves as a tool to open up further discussions about protecting territorial integrity and further extraordinary measures. The fence, being a very spectacular non-discursive securitization element in line with the logic of exception, and an instrument that routinizes discussions about security is in a very peculiar place within this research. Without the application of both logics, some of its effects could not be deciphered or understood – but simply by its nature of being an out of the ordinary securitization tool to invoke feeling of insecurity, as well as “locking in” a feeling of insecurity, it defies temporal categorization. While Bourbeau’s analysis would stop at this point, this research would highlight the compatibility and complementarity of the two logics, that yielded this detailed understanding of the fence – either logic alone would have masked some of its effects.

After this securitizing move, the research will now move towards a clearer development of the securitization process. Following the announcement and the construction of the border fence, in September 2015, a new law has been approved by the Hungarian parliament.<sup>103</sup> This law contains heavy modifications to pre-existing legislation. §16 of this law adds an entirely new subsection into the pre-existing 2007 LXXX law about asylum rights. The subsection, that is titled 80/A-E details what are the prerequisites for declaring an “emergency situation caused by mass immigration”.<sup>104</sup> In accordance with this amended law, declaring said emergency grants the government certain extra rights as long as the state of the emergency is ongoing. For

<sup>103</sup> The Hungarian Government, “2015. évi CXL törvény egyes törvényeknek a tömeges bevándorlás kezelésével összefüggő módosításáról,” (Law 2015 CXL about modifying certain laws in connection with the management of immigration en masse), September 15, 2015

<sup>104</sup> The Hungarian Government, “2015. évi CXL törvény egyes törvényeknek a tömeges bevándorlás kezelésével összefüggő módosításáról,” §16

example, subsection 80/D §1 gives the government the right to expedite the construction of centers concerned with the placement and detention of third-country persons by being exempt from certain official and public administration procedures.<sup>105</sup> Subsection 80/E gives the right to the government to not apply public procurement laws when purchasing equipment that is in connection with the detention of third-country persons, or is in connection with border protection, as this equipment is classified as “purchases in connection with the country’s basic security”.<sup>106</sup> What is more, subsection 80/G states that while carrying out the tasks in connection with the emergency situation caused by mass immigration, the minister for national defense can authorize the Hungarian Army to assist.<sup>107</sup> All these incremental changes that are not widely publicized contribute to granting the government extraordinary powers in the case of an emergency caused by mass immigration. The government is also the bearer of the right to declare and end a situation of emergency.<sup>108</sup> The emergency situation was announced in Hungary in March 2016.<sup>109</sup> Since then, it has been extended multiple times, to the extent that the state of Hungary is currently still in a state of emergency caused by mass immigration.<sup>110</sup> This means that the prerogatives that the government enjoys are continuously available for them since 2016, and also that the state of emergency has been de facto but not de jure routinized. Furthermore, marking the fact that the fence is here to stay, the very same law also adds an

<sup>105</sup> The Hungarian Government, “2007. évi LXXX. törvény a menedékjogról,” (Law 2007 LXXX about the right to asylum) January 01, 2019, 80/D

<sup>106</sup> *ibid.* 80/E

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.* 80/G

<sup>108</sup> *ibid.* §93 (1)

<sup>109</sup> Szabolcs Dull, Barbara Thüringer, “Az egész országra migrációs válsághelyzetet hirdet a kormány,” (Migration state of emergency is declared for the entirety of the country by the government) *Index*, March 09, 2016, [https://index.hu/belfold/2016/03/09/az\\_egesz\\_oroszagra\\_migracios\\_valshhelyzetet\\_hirdet\\_a\\_kormany/](https://index.hu/belfold/2016/03/09/az_egesz_oroszagra_migracios_valshhelyzetet_hirdet_a_kormany/), accessed: 05.21.2019; 24.hu, “Az egész országra kihirdették a “migrációs válsághelyzetet,” ([The Government] declares “migration state of emergency” for the whole country) 24.hu, March 09, 2016, <https://24.hu/belfold/2016/03/09/az-egesz-orszagra-kihirdettek-a-migracios-valsaghelyzetet/>, accessed: 05.21.2019

<sup>110</sup> Márton Kárpáti, “Meghosszabbítja a kormány a válsághelyzetet,” (The government extends the emergency) *Index*, September 03, 2018, [https://index.hu/belfold/2018/09/03/bevandorlas\\_valshhelyzet/](https://index.hu/belfold/2018/09/03/bevandorlas_valshhelyzet/), accessed: 05.21.2019; Marianna Biró, “Már megint meghosszabbítják a bevándorlási válsághelyzetet,” (The immigration state of emergency is extended yet again) *Index*, February 22, 2019, [https://index.hu/belfold/2019/02/22/mar\\_megint\\_meghosszabbitjak\\_a\\_bevandorlasi\\_valshhelyzetet/](https://index.hu/belfold/2019/02/22/mar_megint_meghosszabbitjak_a_bevandorlasi_valshhelyzetet/), accessed: 05.19.2019

entire new subsection to the pre-existing law about the criminal procedure. A new chapter is added in Law 1998 XIX that is concerned with “Procedures for criminal acts committed in connection with the border fence”.<sup>111</sup> This law criminalizes interference with the border protection fence and details the laws to be applied in connection with violations. Once more, this legislative change is a reaction to earlier securitizing moves that were in line with the logic of exception, and it is also a precursor for further changes. At the same time, it helps making sure the securitization is also enshrined in a legal framework.

The passing of this law not only is a prime example of the slightly modified routinization process that distances itself from only looking at security professionals, it is also cementing the importance of border protection measures – here, that is the temporary border protection fence. Without any fanfare, declaration or a clearly identifiable speech act, this law has worked to cement into the Hungarian body of legislation measures against immigration. This highlights the importance of Bourbeau’s argument: actors other than security professionals can also impact and perpetuate securitization processes. The laws also provided certain rights to the government to declare an emergency situation – which, in turn, grants them emergency measures. While the exact securitization actor is not identifiable as responsibility is shared among parliamentary representatives, the process is still in line with governmental rhetoric and discourse concerning migration. And, in line with the original conceptualization of the Paris School, the securitizing actors themselves are not even necessarily aware of the securitized environment they are creating – for them, amending, debating and finally voting on legislation is part of their everyday tasks. Furthermore, the audience of the entire process is sometimes unclear – since the news and effects of the legislation changes reach a relatively small number of people, the securitizing actors in this situation require no clear-cut audience. As for the sectoral

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<sup>111</sup> The Hungarian Government, “1998. évi XIX törvény a büntetőeljárásról,” (Law 1998 XIX about criminal prosecution) July 01, 2018, XXVI/A – later replaced in its entirety by Law 2017 XC, but that law also contains this segment

implications, the laws mostly belong to the political sector with a pronounced aim to protect and preserve territorial integrity. Stemming from this, the referent object is the state itself, and this law ensures that certain new rights are granted to protect it should there be a case of emergency caused by mass immigration. All these further strengthen the claim of this research that this legislative process was an example of a routinization, a securitization through everyday means and tiny steps – subscribing to the logic of routine. In the future, changes in laws and newer decrees with similar results and with a similar logic behind them will occur – even modifying the Fundamental Law of Hungary.<sup>112</sup>

### 3.2.4: The Changes in the Fundamental Law and the National Referendum

In this shifting legislative environment, the Hungarian government continued to securitize and fight against immigration, European Union directives and as it became known in Hungary, the settlement quotas. The State of the Union speech of the prime minister in 2016 also included remarks concerning the situation. According to Viktor Orbán, “2015 ended the time when the security of Europe could be taken for granted.”<sup>113</sup> It also took a jab at the proposed quotas, dismissing them as “unlucky, unfair, illogical and illegal.”<sup>114</sup> The Hungarian government has announced a referendum on accepting these quotas later in 2016.<sup>115</sup> To support this referendum, the government has unveiled another poster and advertisement campaign within the state. Just like before, the posters and their messages were reliant on conveying shocking information to the public. The wording of these posters conveyed that the threat of immigration would seem imminent as well as highly disruptive for everyone in Hungary and

<sup>112</sup> In the Hungarian legal hierarchy, the Fundamental Law is the highest-ranking legal source, replacing the Constitution of Hungary in 2012.

<sup>113</sup> Viktor Orbán, “Orbán Viktor éwertékelő beszéde,” (Viktor Orbán’s yearly speech) *Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda*, February 28, 2016, <https://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/orban-viktor-evertekelo-beszede>, accessed: 19.05.2019

<sup>114</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Marton Dunai, Krisztina Than, “Hungary to hold referendum on mandatory EU migrant quotas on October 2,” *Reuters*, July 05, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-referendum-idUSKCN0ZL0QW>, accessed: 05.23.2019



the international community. The new campaign, while the securitizing actor stayed the same, modified slightly the nature of the threat, ushering in yet another sector through which the state was threatened.

First and foremost, the new campaign directly connects terrorism and migration. Thus, it creates a link between homeland security and the influx of immigration. The two most striking posters read as follows: “Did you know? Since the beginning of the migration crisis, more than 300 people have died in a terror attack in Europe.”, and “Did you know? The Paris attack was perpetrated by immigrants.”.<sup>116</sup> Firstly, the qualifier ‘crisis’ is added to immigration – already aiming to invoke a sense of insecurity and urgency in connection with the word. Secondly, migration and terrorism are linked directly. The number of victims is showcased to show the extraordinary amount of lives lost. Framing the attacks in this light obviously highlights their exceptional nature. The second poster works to further cement the connection between immigration and terrorism. This campaign worked to bolster the pre-existing government rhetoric of anti-immigration, while also reframing the migrant itself from the economic migrant that poses a threat to Hungarian jobs to the migrant who also poses a threat to domestic security. The use of ‘Europe’ as the place of danger and threat not only highlights that Hungary suffered no attacks of terrorism, but also that the government is alluding that the referent object in some cases can be Europe as well.

This second campaign culminated in a referendum about the settlement quotas that the European Union wished to impose upon states. On the surface, this referendum could also serve as an *ex post facto* justification for earlier rhetoric, just like the case with the Consultation issued in 2015. However, the turnout of the referendum did not reach the required fifty percent of the

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<sup>116</sup> Richi Tóth, “Itt vannak a kormány új plakátjai a menekültellenes népszavazáshoz,” (Here are the government’s new posters for the anti-refugee referendum), *24.hu*, July 20, 2016, <https://24.hu/kozelet/2016/07/20/itt-vannak-a-kormany-uj-plakatjai-a-menekultellenes-nepszavazashoz/>, accessed: 05.22.2019

population, and as such, it was invalid.<sup>117</sup> But since 98.36% of the valid votes cast by the 41.32% of the eligible voters were saying no to the quotas, the government still saw the referendum as a victory.<sup>118</sup> As such, Viktor Orbán himself proposed an amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, twisting the results in a way that government communication would highlight the fact that more than 98% of the people voted no, and obscured the fact that the referendum was invalid because of the lower than required turnout.<sup>119</sup> The amendment to the Fundamental Law however passed only two years later. This meant that it now included a passage that forbids the settlement of “foreign population”, as well as a passage that states “A non-Hungarian national shall not be entitled to asylum if he or she arrived in the territory of Hungary through any country where he or she was not persecuted or directly threatened with persecution.”<sup>120</sup> This essentially meant, Hungary being a landlocked country, that asylum rights were entirely at the discretion of the Hungarian government.

This final sequence of events in 2016 on the surface looks like a very convincing argument for the temporality of the logic of exception and the logic of routine. Exceptional language and a strong rhetoric pave the way for a seemingly *ex post facto* justification in the form of a national referendum – following which, despite its invalidity, certain rules and measures are enshrined in legislation, “locking in” the securitization process. However, it is interesting to highlight the apparent cyclicity of the securitization process in Hungary. It is indeed apparently true that a routinizing securitization follows a logic of exception-based

<sup>117</sup> Nemzeti Választási Iroda, “Népszavazás 2016. október 2.,” (Referendum 02.10.2016) *Nemzeti Választási Iroda*, October 11, 2016, <https://www.valasztas.hu/20>, accessed: 05.28.2019

<sup>118</sup> *ibid*; MG, HJ, Tamás Szémán, “Hol akadt el a fideszes gőzhenger?,” (Where did the Fidesz steamroller get stuck?) *Index*, October 03, 2016, [https://index.hu/belfold/2016/10/03/kvotareferendum\\_nem\\_eredmeny\\_terkep/](https://index.hu/belfold/2016/10/03/kvotareferendum_nem_eredmeny_terkep/), accessed: 05.28.2019

<sup>119</sup> RA, “Itt az alaptörvény módosítása: Magyarországnak senki ne diktáljon,” (Here is the amendment to the Fundamental Law: Nobody dictates for Hungary) *Index*, October 10, 2016, [https://index.hu/belfold/2016/10/10/orban\\_benyujtotta\\_az\\_alaptorveny\\_modositasat](https://index.hu/belfold/2016/10/10/orban_benyujtotta_az_alaptorveny_modositasat), accessed: 05.28.2019; Ildikó D. Kovács, “Megszavazták az alaptörvény hetedik módosítását,” (The seventh amendment has been approved), *24.hu*, June 20, 2018, <https://24.hu/kozelet/2018/06/20/alaptorveny-hetedik-modositas/>, accessed: 05.28.2019

<sup>120</sup> The Fundamental Law of Hungary, XIV (1)-(4)

securitization – but the entire process of securitization does not end with the routinization. Instead, it lays the groundwork for future securitizations – either exceptional or routine variants of it. This means that it creates a conducive environment in which further securitizing moves will be met by less backlash or institutional/bureaucratic obstacles. While not entirely in line with the original temporal hypothesis of the research, in a slightly adjusted form, the case study of securitization in Hungary can serve as a great example of how temporality could be understood within securitization theory.

### 3.2.5: The Legacy of 2015 and 2016 – The Remnants of Earlier Securitizations

While the most serious securitization processes were happening during the years 2015 and 2016, them going through multiple evolutions, the threat of immigration was slowly ramped down in rhetoric, and instead, international and governmental organizations, as well as individuals were attacked by the Hungarian government for their support towards aiding migrants. The Hungarian government openly attacked both the United Nations and the European Union, calling them the supporters of migration – and terrorism.<sup>121</sup> The sources of threats therefore shifted from the migrants themselves to the supranational organizations of which Hungary is also a member of, but remnants of the anti-immigration rhetoric can still be discovered even in more recent government communication. To showcase this, the final part of this chapter will take a look at the vocabulary of the 2018 and 2019 State of the Union speeches of Viktor Orbán.

In the 2018 speech, the referent objects shift once more as the prime minister argues that “Most immigrants will arrive from the Islam world. If everything goes on as it does now (...) ”

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<sup>121</sup> Fidesz, “Az ENSZ bátorítja a terrorizmust és ösztönzi a migrációt,” (The UN encourages terrorism and motivates migration) *Fidesz.hu*, April 30, 2019, <https://fidesz.hu/hirek/az-ensz-batoritja-a-terrorizmust-es-osztonzi-a-migraciott>, accessed: 05.28.2019; Fidesz, “Nem a migráció szervezésével kell foglalkozni, hanem a visszatelepítéssel,” (It is not the organization of migration that has to be managed, but relocation) *Fidesz.hu*, April 23, 2019, <https://fidesz.hu/hirek/nem-a-migracio-szervezesével-kell-foglalkozni-hanem-a-visszatelepítéssel>, accessed: 05.21.2019

our culture, our identity, and our nations, as we know them today, will cease to exist.”<sup>122</sup> Aside from the immediate depiction of danger, the referent object itself becomes identity, culture and nation. The prime minister also uses several war metaphors when talking about the states fighting immigration, calling them “hinterland”, as well as talking about the “fall of the West”. These metaphors about war continue in 2019 as well, when Orbán calls immigration a “surrender”, an acknowledgement that “we are incapable of sustaining ourselves biologically.”<sup>123</sup> He argues that in mixed nations, “historical continuity ends” – once again alluding to the referent objects of culture and nation.

These remarks are only snippets of the continuous battle waged against migration in the state. They were used without the intention of being entirely thorough to showcase the evolution as well as the perpetuation of anti-immigration stances within the government. It is also important to note that this stance is now intertwined with a family protection program within Hungary, a domestic and very contextual issue – highlighting the complex and highly contingent nature of the process of securitization while once again reminding researchers and readers how immensely difficult it is to discern the ‘real’ motives behind securitization.

Nonetheless, while debating real intentions behind securitization might prove unfruitful, the above research showed that the partial synthesis of the two logics is a useful tool in order to understand how the understanding of security can shift, and how emergency measures, the purported ‘end product’ of securitization can come into play through the interaction of processes of exception and routinization. By using a refined version of the Paris School, that allows for the inclusion of not only security professionals but other securitizing actors as well,

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<sup>122</sup> Viktor Orbán, “Orbán Viktor évertékelő beszéde,” (Viktor Orbán’s yearly speech) *Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda*, February 18, 2018, <http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor-evvertekelo-beszede-2/>, accessed: 05.19.2019

<sup>123</sup> Viktor Orbán, “Orbán Viktor évertékelő beszéde,” (Viktor Orbán’s yearly speech) *Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda*, February 10, 2019, <http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor-evvertekelo-beszede-3/>, accessed: 05.19.2019

this chapter was able to produce a more detailed account of the processes within Hungary during the 2015-2016 period. If this research used only one logic, that would have led to large jumps and apparently incoherent securitization attempts and behavior on the part of the government. But applying both revealed how the exceptional reframing was later cemented into legislation, and how this legislation in turn allowed for new exceptionalities to be immediately understood and lowered the institutional pushback and bureaucratic obstacles when re-framing them as an emergency issue. In short, the deployment of both logics throughout the process of the case study yielded a much more comprehensive and detailed account of how the securitization processes occurred, and how the interplay of the logics was required to not only name and elevate an issue out of the realm of normal politics – but also to ‘lock in’ securitization processes in every day dealings of the state and bureaucracies.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY**

This research set out to provide a new viewpoint of securitization within the critical constructivist academia by dislodging research from its current academical stalemate fought on the battlefields of differing securitization logics. The two dominant schools – the so-called Copenhagen and Paris schools – of securitization offer two proprietary logics, called the logic of exception, which focuses on securitizational high points and exceptional events and framing, and the logic of routine, which sees securitization as the result of every day, institutionalized changes creating a new political environment in which security is reframed. For many, this constitutes an unreconcilable difference. This unfortunate categorization is present in the literature even though there is no indication in either of the two schools of thought that the logic they employ should enjoy primacy, or it is in any way better suited to explain the entirety of a securitization process. This either-or mindset masks the several advantages the combination of the two logics can bring to an analysis. Both logics have their own shortcomings – for example, focusing on exceptional events makes routinized or institutionalized processes incomputable,

and vice versa – but closer inspection of available logic of exception and logic of routine literature reveals that instead of a mutually exclusive nature, these logics can complement each other. This in turn can result in a much more nuanced and detailed analysis, revealing details and minutia that would be obscured should only one of the logics be used during research.

It is here where this current research enters the discussion within the academia about the differing logics with its own contribution in the form of a case study. The analysis of the case of Hungary and its securitization campaign against immigration in 2015 and 2016 serves as an intriguing example of reframing security in a country that had no significant previous interactions with migration. It also serves as a testing ground for the hypotheses this research has: namely that there is an apparent temporality in how the two logics of securitization follow each other in any given case, and that certain turning points are identifiable in each case where this logic will shift from one to the other. What is more, by applying the two main logics in securitization literature simultaneously, this research also attempted to prove how a much more detailed and nuanced analysis can be gained as opposed to a research process that only utilizes one of the logics.

Based on the analysis conducted on the 2015-2016 period, it turned out that the use of both logics is not only highly beneficial in uncovering details and the background of securitization processes, it is also an indispensable tool to show the logical progression of securitization. Without simultaneous application, apparent gaps and hiatuses would have emerged in the analysis because of either of the logics not being able to account for the events completely on its own. Therefore, it is safe to claim that to provide a full-fledged analysis that takes into consideration as many aspects of a securitization process as possible, the simultaneous application of both logics is preferable. This finding works towards proving that not only is the apparent dichotomy a constructed one in the academia, its perpetuation can lead to loss of information and thus skew both research and results. Bringing the two schools of

thought closer together and bridging them can provide a more detailed and easily followable account of securitization processes. This is especially true if one considers the widened understanding of Bourbeau about the logic of routine. This approach, shared by this research, allows more actors to enter the analysis, bridging even better the seemingly disjointed instances of securitization. The synthesis, leaving intact the two proprietary logics of securitization while allowing both to enter the research based on their complementarities therefore works, but did not flag any issues that could not be captured by the two logics. While this research was not exhaustive, this bodes well for the proliferation of simultaneous application – as it seemingly manages to encompass most if not all issues, especially with the refinements of Bourbeau on routinization processes.

Conducting this research with the simultaneous application of the two logics also provided results in connection with the temporal hypothesis. In its original form, namely that routinization follows the logic of exception, it is only partially true. While there is a certain identifiable cyclicity within the securitization process, identifying the starting logic only depends on where one enters the analysis. In the Hungarian case study, the start of the process is fairly clear-cut, and is more in line with the logic of exception – nonetheless, other case studies might not provide such easily identifiable starting points. Thus, recognizing that the two logics require each other in order to work effectively and reach their full securitization potential is the most important takeaway. Throughout this research, routinizing processes seemingly always followed exceptional reframings – however, the routinization also served as a basis for future exceptional articulations. Thus, while there is a temporal sequence between the two logics, they are often prerequisites of each other, and trying to argue that one logic precedes the other would become immensely difficult. Since routinization often does not finish securitization – as evidenced by this case study as well – talking about temporality of the process becomes futile. Especially if an example such as the case of the border fence is revisited – it being both

a new securitizing measure and the routinization of earlier securitization attempts. Rather, just like before, simply considering both logics can reveal a lot more about the effects of a securitization process. Instead of focusing on temporality, which reaches only to the extent of an observable cyclicity, it would be more beneficial to emphasize and focus on the interplay between the two logics, and to demonstrate and highlight how they create conducive environments in which the cyclicity of the logics can be repeated, or even perpetuated indefinitely. In short, while the temporality of the logics on the surface seems logical and even desirable for ease of analysis, focus on it can become futile – it is better to underline the interactions of routine and exceptions to gain the large amount of detail the simultaneous application of both schools can yield. By extension, it follows that it becomes rather futile to focus on remarkable turning points in securitization – they can only pinpoint the locations in time where the cyclicity returns. While it is possible to know when one logic or the other kicks in, the identification of the exact event, speech, piece of legislation, etc. that allows for said other logic to enter the securitization process again remains masked.

Another thing that also remains masked regardless of the benefit of the added detail is the real intentions of the securitizing actors. Securitization, due to its capacity to essentially ‘create’ new issues, is able of shift domestic attention away from problems. It is immensely difficult to decide if the securitization process is a diversionary tactic for domestic audiences, or a securitizing actor seeking a larger pool of power and the application of emergency measures – or both. The nature of securitization makes it extremely sensitive to context: it is contingent on history, culture, institutional and national memory, etc. For this reason, it is prudent for research engaging with the securitization literature and/or case studies to familiarize both the analyst and the reader with the wider cultural background of the target state. Closely connected to culture, and because it is also the most important aspect of the Copenhagen School of securitization, language should also be paid considerable attention throughout the process. The



nuances and details of the language can mean great differences when interpreting speech acts or legislation – common tools for the logic of exception and routine respectively.

All in all, this thesis would therefore advocate for the simultaneous use of both logics when examining a securitization process. Not only can this move the securitization literature away from its analytical stalemate, it is highly beneficial as it can yield a more detailed analysis. Thus, emphasis from the mutual exclusivity should be shifted to highlighting the compatibility and complementarity of the two logics – and how simultaneous application can potentially dissolve a persistent academic dichotomy between the two logics to yield consistent and nuanced securitization analysis.

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