

Privileged and Discriminated Citizens of Slovakian Ethnic Democracy

By

Barnabás Felicián Tóth

Submitted to Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
in Political Science.

Supervisor: Zoltán Miklósi

Budapest, Hungary

(2019)

Abstract

The Hungarian minority of Slovakia seems to suffer from a structural ethnic injustice, whereby members of the minority community become disadvantaged solely as a result of their belonging in the minority. Are the structural relations between the Hungarian and Slovak citizens of Slovakia truly unjust? Does the Slovakian democracy enjoy democratic legitimacy even beside the presumed ethnic injustice? The thesis examines these research questions for the case of Slovakia between the years of 1998 and 2019. First, the thesis claims that ethnic democracy might be a proper concept to describe Slovakia's ethnopolitical regime. Second, it analyses the normative worth of ethnic democracy within the tradition of liberal political philosophy and concludes that ethnic democracy treats its citizens inherently unjustly and it has a weakened democratic legitimacy. Third, it demonstrates that the Slovakian case shows a considerable fit with the concept of ethnic democracy. To aid the classification of the case the thesis statistically analyses the Slovakian state's resource allocation and finds that Hungarian citizens receive significantly less compared to majority citizens. The thesis concludes that Slovakia is an ethnic democracy and thus should undertake institutional reforms to change its regime to one which resolves ethnic injustice and restores the democratic legitimacy of the Slovakian state.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Introducing Ethnic Democracy.....	5
Smootha's Concept of Ethnic Democracy and its Critiques	5
A Working Definition of Ethnic Democracy	9
Chapter 2: Justness and Legitimacy of Ethnic Democracy	13
Test 1: State Neutrality.....	13
Test 2: Compensation of Inherent Disadvantages	16
Test 3: Absence of Permanent Minorities	21
Putting Ethnic Democracy to the Three Tests.....	25
Normatively Superior Alternatives of Ethnic Democracy	28
Chapter 3: The Slovakian Ethnic Democracy Between 1998-2019.....	30
Democrateness of the Slovak Republic's political system	31
The Multinational Society of Slovakia.....	32
Absence of Elite Consensus	34
The perceived threat of Hungarians	35
Ethnic ascendancy within Slovakia.....	37
Chapter 4: Statistical Examination of Disproportionality	41
The Statistical Analysis Contribution	41
Research Design of the Empirical Examination of the Hypothesis	42
Data Preparation Methods and Their Shortcomings	46
Potential Directions of the Biases	50
Statistical analysis and the obtained results	51
Conclusion.....	58
References	61

List of Figures

Figure 1.: The number and percentage of Hungarians in Slovakia.....	33
Figure 2.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2007-2013 EU budget cycle (I.).	52
Figure 3.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2007-2013 EU budget cycle (II.).	52
Figure 4.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2014-2020 EU budget cycle (I.).	53
Figure 5.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2014-2020 EU budget cycle (II.).	53
Figure 6.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2002-2012 Slovakian state transfers (I.).	53
Figure 7.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2002-2012 Slovakian state transfers. (II.).	53
Figure 8.: Distribution of the portions of Hungarians at Slovakian municipalities (I.).	54
Figure 9.: Distribution of the portions of Hungarians at Slovakian municipalities (II.).	54
Figure 10.: Scatter plot of the Hungarian inhabitants and the per capita funds 2007-2013 EU budget cycle.	54
Figure 11.: Scatter plot of the Hungarian inhabitants and the per capita funds 2014-2020 EU budget cyle.....	54

List of Tables

Table 1.: Major Hungarian minority parties' election results	34
Table 2.: Total number, successfully localized number and share of 2007-2013 contracted funds.	49
Table 3.: Total number, successfully localized number and share of 2007-2020 contracted funds.	49
Table 4.: Average per capita funds received by Hungarian and non-Hungarian and citizens of Slovakia.	55
Table 5.: The share of Hungarians in municipalities which did not receive any funding.	56

Introduction

A century has passed since the Slovakian Hungarian minority came into existence. After a troubled century of subordination and inequality the last three decades brought with them the promise of fundamental changes. Contrary to the exaggerated hopes, these changes remained painfully partial. Although both the democratization after 1989 and Slovakia's integration into the European Union in 2004 lead to significant improvements in the situation of minority Hungarians, they could still not achieve their full recognition and equality of within Slovakia. Disappointment followed and currently it seems that resignation takes over within the Hungarian minority. Slovakian Hungarians seem to unconsciously accept that as Hungarians they can only be second class citizens of Slovakia. In today's absence of loud Slovak anti-Hungarian exclusionary nationalism, the situation of minority Hungarians falls into disinterest. Even though ethnic inequality might be one of the most widespread type of social inequality it seems to receive only scarce and peripheral attention. Citizens belonging to ethnic or national minorities are often disadvantaged by their own society and their own state. Andreas Wimmer has correctly observed that "the main promises of modernity – political participation, equal treatment before the law, and protection from the arbitrariness of state power, dignity for the weak and poor, and social justice and security – were fully realized only for those who came to be regarded as true members of the nation" (2004, p. 14). Despite being quite widespread and unjustly harmful in its effects, interest in the problem of ethnic inequality seems to be quite limited. This is especially true for the type of ethnic inequalities which affect national minorities and other autochthonous ethnic communities. Among these communities socially marginalized ethnic minorities receive probably the most attention. Yet, some of these minorities might suffer from serious inequalities even if their socio-economic circumstances are not gravely different compared to majority members. Social science research could have a deceiving role in erasing

ethnic inequality as their works have the authority and credibility to cut through the indifference of majority members and thematise the situation of national and autochthonous minorities.

The structural relations between ethnic communities within a state are embodied by the state's ethnopolitical regime. Ethnopolitical regimes embody the "structure of modern state power among ethnic groups in a single state in relation to the maintenance of ethnic identities" (Pettai, 2015, 6. lecture, 4. slide) and set the rules of political and social actions and interactions. The central features of the ethnopolitical regimes reflect not only the power relations between the ethnic communities but also explains relative the treatment what citizens belonging to different ethnicities or nationalities receive from the state. Therefore, through the examination of a case's ethnopolitical regimes a good can be learned about ethnic justice of that case's society.

The purpose of this thesis is to take on this academic mission by examining the case of the Post-Mečiar democratic Slovakia. More specifically it examines the situation of the Hungarian minority within Slovakia in the time period of 1998 and 2019. Its research question asks whether the Slovakian ethnopolitical regime, that is the structural relations of Hungarians and Slovaks within Slovakia, is unjust and democratically illegitimate. As distinct parts of the analysis the thesis also answers the following questions. Is the ideal type of ethnic democracy just and democratically legitimate? Can the Slovakian ethnopolitical regime be classified as an ethnic democracy? Does the Slovakian state allocate its resources disproportionally between its Slovak and Hungarian citizens?

The method of examination is the following. The thesis first introduces the regime type of ethnic democracy developed by the Israeli scholar, Sammy Smooha (1997, 2002a; 2002b; 2005a; 2005b; 2009) and provides a working definition of the theoretical concept. Second it normatively analyses the justness and legitimacy of the ideal type of ethnic democracy within the tradition of liberal political philosophy. It argues first that ethnic democracy is unjust because the way it treats its citizens and second that ethnic democracy's legitimacy is weakened

as it violates the public equality of its citizens. Third it examines the case of Slovakia to see whether it fits the definition of ethnic democracy. The thesis demonstrates a neat fit with only one point, the existence of the preferential treatment of the majority remaining somewhat uncertain. To overcome this uncertainty, the thesis statistically examines the resource allocation of the Slovakian state between 2002 and 2019 and finds that a significant disproportionality exists in the distribution of state resources between Hungarian and other citizens. Therefore, the thesis demonstrates a clear fit of the political regime of Slovakia with the definition of ethnic democracy and in consequence it proves that Slovakia's regime is unjust towards its Hungarian citizens and it has a weakened democratic legitimacy. In conclusion the thesis recommends specific directions for the institutional reform of Slovakia's political regime to overcome ethnic injustice within Slovakia and to strengthen the legitimacy of Slovakian democracy.

The analysis of the Slovakian case is built up in this way to avoid being bogged down in less relevant details of the examined case. The theoretical concept of ethnic democracy guides the analysis in selecting the relevant features of the structural interethnic relations of Slovaks and Hungarians with which the analysis can work with. The normative analysis is carried out on the ideal type of ethnic democracy as this helps to focus the inquiry on the relevant features of the examined regime, while the particularities of reality does not derail the analysis. The success of this method hinges on whether the empirical analysis of the Slovakian case can credibly show that there is a sufficiently strong fit between the ideal type of ethnic democracy and the ethnopolitical regime of Slovakia.

The primary motivation of the thesis is to provide an empirical description and a normative assessment of the ethnopolitical regime of Slovakia. With this exercise the thesis contributes in three ways to social science academic literature. First, the thesis contributes to the academic discussion on the normative merits and vices of the ideal type of ethnic democracy by analysing this regime type within the tradition of liberal egalitarianism. Second, with the evaluation of

the Slovakian case's fit with the concept of ethnic democracy it expands the literature which seeks to determine which country cases can be classified as ethnic democracies. Thirdly, it contributes to the literature on the Slovakian state's resource allocation by empirically examining the widely shared, yet never statistically proven claim of ethnically disproportional resource distribution.

The structure of the thesis will be the following. The first chapter introduces the concept of ethnic democracy and presents a working definition. The second chapter normatively evaluates ethnic democracy by raising three tests and contrasting the ideal type of ethnic democracy with these tests. The third chapter shows the fit of Slovakia with the regime type of ethnic democracy. The fourth chapter fills the missing link by its statistical analysis of the resource allocation of Slovakia. The conclusion brings recommendations for institutional reform.

Chapter 1: Introducing Ethnic Democracy

The asymmetrical relations of the Slovak and Hungarian communities of Slovakia cannot be fully grasped without a theoretical framework which structures the complex social and political reality of the case and thereby highlights its normatively relevant aspects. On the following pages this chapter introduces such a theoretical framework: the concept of ethnic democracy. The chapter first describes the original concept of ethnic democracy as developed by Sammy Smooha, and then it reviews the criticisms what Smooha's concept received. In the second step the chapter offers a working definition of ethnic democracy, somewhat reframed for the purpose of the thesis and embedded in a crude and partial typology of democratic regimes types relevant in the context of multinational societies.

Smooha's Concept of Ethnic Democracy and its Critiques

What is ethnic democracy? It is a political regime of divided societies which “combines ethnic majority rule with democratic rights for all” (Smooha 2002a, p. 497). Even though Smooha's description of the concept was by no means identical in all of his reviewed writings on ethnic democracy (Smooha 1997, 2002a; 2002b; 2005a; 2005b; 2009), this idea of an ethnocultural majority nation's permanent domination within a democratic context remained central. As Smooha rightly points it out there is a conflict within the pillars of ethnic democracy, or in his words “the founding rule of this regime is an inherent contradiction between two principles – civil and political rights for all and structural subordination of the minority to majority” (2005a, p. 22). Importantly, Smooha (2003a) by stressing that the state equally grants democratic political and liberal civil rights through citizenship to all of its permanent residents, he distinguishes ethnic democracy from ethnocracies like the South African apartheid. On the other hand, his definition also clearly states that ethnic democracy deviates significantly from the ideal type of democracy due to the privilegization of the majority (Smooha, 2002a).

What Smootha conceptualized in the form of ethnic democracy is the antithesis of Lijphart's (1990) consociational democracy. It is stable rule of the majority within a democratic political system over a plural society. These cases in Lijphart's view might not even be considered a democracy. He writes that "in plural societies, therefore, majority rule spells dictatorship and civil strife, rather than democracy" (Lijphart 1984, p. 23). Nonetheless, Smootha (2002a) would argue that ethnic democracy fulfils the minimal procedural definition of democracy and thus should be accepted in the family of democracies as a distinct subtype.

What are the distinctive features of ethnic democracy? Smootha (2005b, p. 254) groups the main features into three larger sets: (1) ethnic ascendancy, (2) perceived threat and (3) diminished democracy. Ethnic ascendancy denotes that there is "a crucial distinction between members and non-members of the ethnic nation" (Smootha 2002a, p. 477). The majority ethnic nation treats the state's territory as their exclusive homeland and appropriates the state as their own nation-state. The state is put in the service of the interests of the ethnic majority nation and its members. In the words of Smootha "the ethnic nation, not the citizenry, shapes the symbols, laws and policies of the state for the benefit of the majority" (2002, p. 478).

Under perceived threat Smootha refers to the majority members' fear from the potential anti-regime and anti-majority nation activities of the minority members (2002a, p. 478). As Smootha observed on the case of Israel, it is only of secondary importance whether it is a real existential threat or it is only a widely perceived one among the majority members. What is crucial is that the perception of threat stabilises the majority's support for ethnic democracy.

Ethnic democracy's political regime meets the minimal procedural definition of democracy. This according to Smootha entails that the political regime "is characterized by free elections, universal suffrage, change of governments and respect of civil rights" (2005a, p. 8). Yet ethnic democracy is a "diminished type of democracy" (Smootha 2005a, p. 20) as it does not meet the criteria of equality due to the structural privilegization of the majority and the discrimination of

the minority. Ethnic democracy falls short of the ideal type of democracy because the “state privileges the majority and strives to advance its interests rather than to serve all its citizens equally” (Smootha 2002a, p. 478). In consequence, “the minority cannot fully identify itself with the state, cannot be completely equal to the majority and cannot confer full legitimacy on the state” (Smootha 2002a, p. 478).

To prepare the ground for the normative analysis it’s worth to introduce Smootha’s take on the normative justifications of ethnic democracy. In his article Smootha (2002a, p. 483) identifies four ways in which ethnic democracy might be justified. He denotes the first two as the practical ones. The first claims that ethnic democracy is superior to ethnic violence and non-democratic forms of conflict management. The second argues that it is indispensable to ensure the security of the majority until the existential threat of the minority have not been disposed. Smootha categorises the second two as the ideological ones. The third potential way of justification builds one feature of ethnic democracy, namely that it does not violate the minority rights outlined in the main international documents on minority protection, because ethnic democracy provides both “individual civil, political and social rights as well as collective linguistic and national rights to minorities” (Smootha 2002a, p. 483). Finally, Smootha proposes that in some sense ethnic democracy might be even superior to liberal democracy. Ethnic democracy in his view shows the unique virtue that it does not claim false ethnic neutrality, while it also tends to equip the minority with necessary institutional tools to ensure its cultural reproduction.

Smootha’s concept received significant scholarly attention and has been applied to a number of cases. Smootha (1997a) developed his concept on the example of Israel. A debate erupted between scholars having an interest in Israeli politics about whether Smootha’s concept is the right one to describe the Israeli regime (see Dowty 1999, Danel 2009). Smootha also applied his concept to the case of Northern Ireland (1997b, 2001) and argued that interwar Poland and Malaysia might also fit his definition (2005a). Smith (1996) and Pettai (1998) used the concept

in relation with the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, van Duin and Polácková (2002) in their analysis about Slovakia wrote that it is likely that Slovakia will develop into an ethnic democracy. Later a wider research project was conducted on Central and Eastern European cases in which different scholars have analysed the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo with the theoretical concept of ethnic democracy (see Smootha and Järve eds. 2005).

It was not only the application of the concept of ethnic democracy which spark the interest of scholars, but also the scientific value of the concept. Within a lively debate Smootha's concept received a healthy amount of criticism. Critical works might be differentiated into two categories. One argues that ethnic democracy does not meet the requirements of democracy (see Yiftachel 1998, 2000 and Ghanem et. al. 1998). The second which concentrates on the analytical value of the concept for comparative studies (Danel 2009). The first category is less challenging to handle. The definition of democracy on which Yiftachel and his co-authors (1998, 2000 and Ghanem et. al. 1998) rely is so demanding that it would exclude not only the archetype of ethnic democracy, Israel, but also several much less controversial cases which we generally identify as democracies. On the other hand, Danel's (2009) challenge is much harder to handle. Danel (2009) in his article argued first that Israel is not so different from North-American and Western European democracies and second that the concept of ethnic democracy cannot be hold to be an ideal type as Israel is the only case which meets its definition.

Although in some sense Danel's (2009) arguments are self-contradictory, nonetheless I think he accurately recognized the main shortcoming of Smootha's ethnic democracy concept. The definition of ethnic democracy even after Smootha's (see 2005a, 2005b) efforts to distil it remained too Israel specific to be able to travel to other empirical cases. This was demonstrated most sharply by Smootha's assessment on the existence of ethnic democracies within post-communist Eastern Europe. Concluding the above mentioned considerably wide research

project he wrote that no viable ethnic democracy could emerge within the region (Smootha 2005b). As most of Smootha's earlier examples of which cases could be considered to be ethnic democracies came from this region, this was a serious blow to the concept. It is unsurprising then that Smootha's (2009) reaction to Danel's (2009) could not convincingly rebut the critical arguments of Danel.

Should we therefore outright reject the concept of ethnic democracy? Such haste might not be justified. There are strong reasons to believe that Smootha observed a unique type of democracy. If the concept would be cleansed from its Israel specificities it could most probably fit several empirical cases. Such a reconceptualization is however not the purpose of this thesis. The concept even in its current form has analytical value as it fits at least one more case, than Israel, the case of Slovakia. This fit will be demonstrated in the third chapter. However, before that, this chapter offers a working definition of ethnic democracy and the next chapter concludes a normative assessment of the moral desirability of this regime type.

A Working Definition of Ethnic Democracy

My working definition of ethnic democracy, developed for the subsequent normative analysis on the base of the above discussed works of Smootha and his critiques is the following: ethnic democracy is a regime type which characterized by a (1) democratic political regime, (2) a multinational societies characterized by (3) elite dissensus and (4) ethnonational ascendancy. This working definition situate the type of ethnic democracy within the family of contextually relevant political regime types.

First of all, it is not authoritarian, but a democratic regime. Ethnic democracy meets the minimal procedural definition of c and Levitsky (1997, p. 434), which definition requires “fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and association”. Thus,

ethnic democracy in the terminology of Collier and Levitsky (1997) is not a diminished subtype of democracy, because it meets all of the minimal defining criteria of democracy. It is important to stress that the fit of ethnic democracy with the minimal definition also implies that it respects core individual democratic and liberal rights.

Second, ethnic democracy is one among those democratic regime types which can be found in multinational societies. A multinational society in the understanding of Kymlicka is one which incorporates more than one nations, where a nation is understood to be “a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture” (1995, p. 11). The set of multinational societies is in itself quite diverse. In the followings the analysis will work with a narrowed understanding of multinational society in where beside a demographically clearly dominant majority nation there is at least one significant national minority. A national minority is significant if it has a sufficient population share to ensure the minority’s political representation.

As Kymlicka (1995) rightly observes national minorities form a more or less complete parallel society with their own separate institutional networks. Depending on the specific case such institutional networks can be made up of a minority tongue educational intuitions, cultural and religious organisations and alike. Importantly national minorities in the understanding which the thesis will follow are politically mobilized socio-cultural categories (Brubaker 1996), which form their own political cleavage fulfilling all the three dimensions of Bartolini and Mair’s (1990, p. 212-220) definition of political cleavages. As members of national minorities vote almost exclusively for parties of the minority, these cleavages tend to be extremely stable. The national minority’s and the majority nation’s cleavages together form a segmented party system (Sartori 1990), where the segments might resemble on their own mini party systems.

Third, ethnic democracy is differentiated from two of its contextually relevant alternatives, namely democracies with partial power-sharing and consociational democracy (Lijphart 1990).

Consociational democracy is characterized by elite consensus and complete institutional power-sharing in the forms of grand coalition, ethnic autonomy, veto rights and proportionality in the distribution of state resources (Lijphart 1990, p. 494-495). Regimes of partial power-sharing tend to have at least a moderate level of elite consensus and more importantly some, but not all of the above listed forms of power-sharing. The most common form is probably ethnic autonomy in the form territorial or personal/cultural autonomy.

Ethnic democracy is different. Within ethnic democracy there is an inherent conflict between the majority and minority elites. Elites of the majority partly due to conviction, partly to self-interest, by and large prefer the continuity of ethnic democracy. Elites of the minority tend to strive to change the regime to one where the minority enjoys more equality and where the minority elites can control more resources. Besides the dissensus of elites, ethnic democracy is also distinguished by its complete lack of any of the forms of power-sharing. None of the four above introduced power-sharing forms are present in the case of ethnic democracies.

Finally, ethnic democracy is further differentiated by ethnic ascendancy. Ethnic ascendancy is understood to be the self-interested and exclusivist domination of the majority nation over the members of the national minority, whereby the former uses the state to advance its interest. This feature differentiates cases of democratic multinational societies from ethnic democracy where there is no elite consensus or any form of power-sharing, but the minority relative to the majority is not disadvantaged, at least not in non-cultural matters by its own state. Ethnic democracy in this regard has the special characteristic that it disadvantages its minority citizens not only on the grounds of cultural matters (e.g. mother tongue state services), but also on non-cultural matters. An example could be for the latter when the state grants less funds per pupil for minority schools, than it does for majority schools, or when it concentrates all of its projects of infrastructure development in non-minority inhabited areas.

This working definition differs from the definition of Smootha (2002a, 2005a) in some important respects. It clarifies that ethnic democracy is not a diminished subtype of democracy, not at least according to the widely referred understanding of Collier and Levitsky (1997). It makes explicit that ethnic democracy is a regime type of multinational societies. Moreover, the working definition strengthens the distinction between power-sharing regimes and the type of ethnic democracy by highlighting the lack of elite consensus and the connected absence of any forms of power-sharing. Through this it also simplifies the understanding of ethnic ascendancy by narrowing it down to the domination of the majority nation over the state's institution and consequently over the national minority. Finally, it drops perceived threat from the defining features of ethnic democracy. Smootha's (2002a) that perceived threat is effectively essential to the emergence and stability of ethnic democracy seems only partially convincing. Certainly in some cases it can contribute to the regime's emergence and stability. However, it seems fully plausible that ethnic democracy could emerge without any significant sense of threat. The majority can create and upkeep ethnic democracy aside from fear because of (1) plain self-interest, (2) unawareness of the and indifference to the situation of the minority, (3) prejudicial convictions despising the minority and idealizing the majority.

At the end of this section it is important to emphasize again that my above elaborated definition of ethnic democracy is only a working definition which is tailored to the needs of the subsequent normative analysis. To some extent it distilled and specified the original concept of Smootha, while remaining largely substantially faithful. This faithfulness could be shown by the working definition's continuing fit with Smootha's primary case of Israel. Undeniably, this definition ended up being a bit Slovakia specific. In this case however, it is not vice, but a virtue, because this definition is introduced not for comparative studies but to support the analysis of the Slovakian case by highlighting the relevant features of the Slovakian ethnopolitical regime.

Chapter 2: Justness and Legitimacy of Ethnic Democracy

The first chapter has introduced the concept of ethnic democracy. However, it did not assess the normative desirability of ethnic democracy, which is necessary for the subsequent analysis of the Slovakian ethnopolitical regime. This chapter therefore provides a normative evaluation of the desirability of ethnic democracy within the tradition of liberal political philosophy. The evaluation seeks to answer the following three questions. Is ethnic democracy just? Does ethnic democracy have democratic legitimacy? Compared to the contextually relevant alternatives, concerning both justness and legitimacy, is ethnic democracy normatively superior or inferior? The chapter assesses the worth of ethnic democracy along three tests. Each test is derived from foundational liberal principles. The first test asks whether the state remains neutral relative to the different conceptions of the good life held by its citizens. The second test asks whether the state compensates inherent disadvantages of its citizens. The third test asks whether a permanent minority is present or absent in the state's democratic assembly. The chapter first elaborates these tests and then confronts the ideal type of ethnic democracy with the three tests. Towards the end of the chapter the normative evaluation reaches the conclusion that ethnic democracy fails all the three tests. It is a regime type which treats its citizens unjustly and which has a weakened democratic legitimacy. As normatively superior alternatives are available, states whose regime type conforms to the definition of ethnic democracy should implement structural institutional reforms to change their regime type.

Test 1: State Neutrality

This section elaborates the first test which concerns the neutrality of states. The argumentation departs from the belief that individuals have equal moral worth. This is a liberal position. Kymlicka citing Rawls writes that in liberalism "individuals are viewed as the ultimate units of moral worth, as having moral standing as ends in themselves" (1980 in 1989, p. 140). He also states that within the tradition of liberal egalitarianism "every individual has an equal moral

status, and hence it is to be treated as an equal by the government, with equal concern and respect” (Kymlicka 1989, p. 140). In Christiano’s (2008) argumentation equal moral worth or status derived from the idea that all persons are authorities in the realm of value, is also a central premise. For Christiano (2008) it implies the principle that each individual has an equal right to advance her interest. The defence of this foundational premise of equal moral worth would far exceed the possibilities of the thesis, therefore it will be assumed without further justification that individuals have equal moral worth.

The normative prescription of state neutrality flows from the premise of equal moral worth. Dworkin (1985, p. 191-192) argues that, as individuals have equal moral worth and varying beliefs about what constitutes good life, liberalism advises the state against selecting one’s conception of the good life as the right one and advancing that among the citizenry. In other words, liberals demand that the state should be neutral relative to the citizens’ different conceptions of the good life. As Dworkin (1985, p. 191) has rightly observes, if the state would decide to act contrary and would start to prefer one conception of the good life when it makes its decisions, it would indicate that it values that conception of the good life more than it values other conceptions. This would violate the principle of treating citizens as equals. It would indicate that in the state’s views those who hold conceptions different from the one held by the state, have inferior beliefs. Such a differentiation in the valuing of the different conceptions would imply that the state failed to respect the equal moral worth of citizens. Therefore, the state should remain neutral relative to the different conceptions of the good life.

At first it might not be self-evident what the prescription of state neutrality entails beside the universal point in the special context of multinational societies. Some might think that neutrality entails that the state treats its citizens in the same way, by providing them with perfectly equivalent services. After all, at first it may seem logical that neutrality is best achieved if the state provides the exact same thing to its citizens irrespective of the citizens’ different

characteristics and needs. However, after some consideration probably most of us would reach the conclusion that such an understanding of neutrality would seriously miss the point of the above elaborated principle.

Within multinational societies citizens have culture specific needs. Citizens of multinational societies by definition grow up in and socialize into different cultures. Imagine that person X and Y are both citizens of the same multinational society. Person X grew up in the majority nation's cultural context. His parents at home speak the majority's language, in his hometown people speak the majority's language, in all his schools the language of instruction is the majority's language. Person Y grew up in the national minority's cultural context. Her parents raise her in the national minority's language, which is also the mother tongue of most of the inhabitants of her hometown. She attends minority schools where she studies all subject in her mother tongue, the minority's language. Assume that X and Y need the same basic type of state services. Yet X primarily needs them in the majority's language, while Y primarily needs them in the minority's language. Therefore, person X and Y have different culture specific needs.

The state remains neutral in this context if it serves equally the different culture specific needs of its citizens. Continuing with the hypothetical example, if the state provides a basic service in X's mother tongue, in the majority's language, it should also provide that service in Y's mother tongue, in the minority's language. If the state would only provide services in the majority's language this would show that the state values more those conceptions of the good life which are imagined within the majority nation's culture. This would indicate that the state believes that lives lived in the context of the minority culture have a somewhat inferior value. Such a belief would disrespect the equal moral worth of citizens. Therefore, citizens are treated as equals in the context of a multinational societies if the state is sensitive to their culture specific interests in the provision of state services and thus remains neutral.

A word of caution is necessary. It is undoubtable that this obligation of the state does not entail that in every type of state service the state has to accommodate uniformly the culture specific needs of the majority and the minority. In the case of some very special state services the culture sensitive provision of the service would entail disproportionally high burdens on the state and consequently on the whole society. Examples for such highly special state services could be ballet education or university programmes say in urban design or ancient Greek philosophy. It's not only the content, but also the location of state services where the provision of some services can be disproportional. Assume that almost all members of the national minority live in on well-defined region of the state. In this case it seems in line with state's obligation of neutrality that the it does not provide full bilingual services in the whole territory of the state, only within the region where minority members are concentrated.

Test 2: Compensation of Inherent Disadvantages

The second test on a liberal egalitarian ground requires that the state should compensate those disadvantages of its citizens which arise due to their circumstances and not as a result of their choices. This section first explains the inherent disadvantages what minority members have to face just because they belong to a national minority. Second it introduces the liberal egalitarian argument for the compensation of inherent disadvantages. Third it concludes that the liberal egalitarian principles require that minority members' disadvantages be compensated.

Citizens belonging to a national minority face inherent disadvantages in the private sphere. Minority members are disadvantaged because in their pursuit of personal well-being they have to face a choice set which is worse in terms of costs compared to the choice set of majority members. What is the difference between their choice sets? Being a minority member entails that minority members have to choose on a scale how much they want to remain within the minority cultural sphere or want to integrate into the majority cultural sphere. Both directions have their costs. If a minority member chooses to remain within its own cultural sphere this will

narrow down the possibilities that she has. On the other hand, if she wants to take advantage of the wider possibilities within the majority cultural sphere she will have to bear the costs of learning the language and culture of the majority. Either way she decides she cannot escape the inherent disadvantage of being member of a national minority. Since majority members do not face the same dilemma, minority members are disadvantaged relative to majority members.

One of course could put forward the argument that members of the majority face the very same dilemma that minority members face. Majority members also have to make the choice whether to pursue their well-being within the majority cultural sphere and thereby accept that their possibilities are constrained to what that sphere can offer. Or alternatively they can choose to learn the minority language and culture with all of its costs to be able to access the possibilities of the minority cultural sphere. What this argument contains is I think right, yet it fails because it does not take into account the difference between the possibilities that the minority and the majority cultural spheres can offer. Due to market laws the minority cultural sphere, which by definition includes numerically less people, in the baseline cases has less possibilities to offer than what the majority cultural sphere can offer.

Why does the minority cultural sphere offer less possibilities than the majority cultural sphere? It is a crucial question because it concerns the core disadvantage of being a minority member. A hypothetical case can be illustrative. Imagine that there is a society which is inhabited by members of two national categories. Members of the two categories have considerably different cultures and they have different mother tongues. In the total population members of one national category far outweigh the members of the other category by a portion of 4:1. This means that the majority nation forms 80% of the society, besides the 20% share of the national minority. Irrespective of their different cultures, the distributions of talents within the majority nation and the national minority are perfect equivalents. This means that from each type of talents there are proportionately less within the national minority. If there are 80 extremely talented opera

singers within the majority nation, there will be 20 just as extremely talented opera singers within the national minority. To further simplify the case, imagine that there is no state in this society and accordingly no state employment, regulations or policies. One of the remaining value allocation mechanism, market allocation, will thus be extremely important.

The market values efficiency and effectiveness. Operating in two languages makes processes more complicated and raises costs. One explanatory example here might be the operation of the institutions of the European Union. Where multiple languages are in use either people have to learn all the languages which are used, which demands time and effort and thus increases costs or the human and technological infrastructure of on the spot translation has to be provided with all of its complications and costs. Companies seek to minimize per unit costs. Therefore, they will try to avoid the complexities and costs of operating in multiple languages. In the case of a large company, at different sites at the lower hierarchical levels different languages might be used. However, at medium and high levels most probably in almost every case one language will be fixed as the primary tool of communication. If the distributions of talents and personal interests are equivalent within the majority and the minority, then there will be numerically more majority members in every profession. For companies this means that the majority cultural sphere offers a wider pool of potential employees to choose from. All things being equal to minimize labour costs and to gain space for future domestic expansion for companies it will be a rational decision to operate in the majority's language. Thus, companies will by and large operate in the majority's language. Of course this does not mean that this will be true of every company and true for every companies at all hierarchical levels and sites. It merely means that the situation will be such that the language of the majority will be disproportionately more used, at least at the higher hierarchical levels, at the more prestigious jobs.

Other arguments relying on the insights of economies of scale could be also brought forward. One example could be that as the majority has higher numbers, applicants from the majority

can support self-financing majority language higher education in such niche areas where the potential minority applicants have insufficient numbers to support a minority language higher education programme. It is not only education where the economies of scale idea is relevant, but also the cultural sphere. The minority might not have enough members who have a more niche cultural interest to be able to finance such minority language cultural activities. It could be for example that among the majority and the minority there is an equal share of admirers of the opera. Yet whereas there are enough majority member opera admirers to make a majority tongue opera affordable, the total number of minority member opera admirers would not be sufficient for the affordability of a minority tongue opera. The effects of these economies of scale limitations in different fields such education, cultural activities and others, are far reaching. They imply that the minority's culture cannot incorporate all the areas which the majority's culture can. This means that the minority's culture will be poorer both in its cultural forms and in its vocabulary.

This hypothetical inquiry was hopefully sufficient to demonstrate that minority members compared to majority members all things being equal have less possibilities within their own cultural sphere. As the example showed this is true even when within the society there is no ethnic hatred or prejudice, when there are no adverse state actions. The circle is closed if we add that learning a language and getting familiar with a culture has its own costs. Taken together these implies that minority members due to their unique situation of being a minority member have a worst choice set in terms of costs compared to what majority members have. Minority members inherently have a more limited choice set of lives to pursue than majority members if they want to remain in their own culture. They either accept this or take the costs of learning the majority language and culture. In every case an average national minority member will start off from a disadvantaged position relative to an averaged member of the majority nation due to her membership in the minority.

Now, that it was demonstrated that minority members suffer from an inherent disadvantage, the discussion can turn the question of why inherent disadvantages has to be compensated by the state. Dworkin (1985, p. 205-207) believes that liberals should care for equality. He argues that liberals are ought to demand the compensation of inherent disadvantages which prevent people from achieving the share of resources which they would otherwise achieve in the absence of these disadvantages. He grounds his position in the principle that the government has to treat its citizens as equals in ways which can be accepted by the citizens without forcing them to give up their sense of their equal moral worth. On the basis of this principle Dworkin argues that “market allocations must be corrected in order to bring some people closer to the share of resources they would have had but for these various differences of initial advantage, luck, and inherent capacity” (1985, p. 207). In other words, according to this position justice requires that persons be compensated for those differences between them and others which are the results of their circumstances and not of the choices they have made.

Kymlicka (1989) following the same line of thought distinguishes differences between persons’ owned resources into two types, which types have different normative implications. According to him individuals might have less resources compared to others as a result of (1) their personal choices or (2) due to their initial circumstances or lesser personal capabilities. Those differences which arise between persons’ resources due to factors outside of their influence, are “as Rawls famously put it, arbitrary from the moral point of view” (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 186). These inequalities are not due to the decisions of the adversely affected person. She is not responsible for them and thus she does not deserve to bear their disadvantageous effects. As “no one chooses to be born into a disadvantaged social group or with natural disabilities” liberals in the understanding of Kymlicka (1989, p. 186) hold the view that “no one should have to pay for the costs imposed by those disadvantageous circumstances” (Kymlicka 1989, p. 186). Thus Kymlicka (1989) and Dworkin (1985) argues for the compensation of inherent disadvantages.

After both the minority members inherent disadvantage and the necessity of compensation premises have been elaborated, the conclusion can be drawn. If we accept the liberal egalitarian principle that the state should compensate the inherent and thus undeserved disadvantages of individuals and if we accept that minority members are inherently disadvantaged then we are ought to see that minority members have to be compensated by the state. This argumentation resembles the one of Kymlicka (1989), however it has important differences. While it also focuses on the disadvantage what minority members have due to their different culture, it does not seek to prove that the protection of ethnic communities' culture is necessary for people's well-being. That argument has been largely refuted (see Waldron 1992). Thus this section only argued that minorities inherent disadvantages have to be compensated.

Test 3: Absence of Permanent Minorities

The first test of state neutrality and the second test of compensation of inherent disadvantages both focus on how the state treats its citizens. Their core question is whether the state treats its citizens justly, whether the acts and policies of the state are just. The third test is different. It focuses on the democratic legitimacy of the political regime. In the subsequent paragraphs this section introduces Christiano's argument in favour of the intrinsic justness of democracy, his take on the limits of democratic authority and his account of the problem of permanent minorities (see Christiano 2008). His work does not require any adoption to the context of multinational societies, because it was also developed partly for cases of multinational societies partly for other type of cases. Nonetheless, the section adds to Christiano's discussion by going into more details at a crucial point which was not elaborated by the author.

In his book Christiano (2008) provides a sophisticated justification of the intrinsic justness of democracy. A complete reconstruction of his argumentation is not possible within the limits of the thesis. Nonetheless, because his argumentation is indispensable for the ensuing argument to

work the following paragraph provides a crude and unavoidably incomplete summary of his arguments. For the original argumentation see the chapters of 1-4 and 7 in Christiano (2008).

Christiano (2008) departs from the premise of persons' equal moral worth. All members of a political society have an equal right to advance their interests. Each member has an interest to make the common world which she inhabits with other members of the political society as homelike for herself as possible. Because without feeling at home in the common world people cannot realize their well-being. As the common world is so crucial for the well-being of every member of the political society, we can claim that each of its member has an equal stake in it. Due to the "disagreement, diversity, fallibility, and cognitive bias" (Christiano 2008, p. 47) of humans, people are generally speaking incapable to rightly assess the interest of other people. This implies that each person should be able to speak for herself and thus have an equal say in the decisions of the political society. Equal say is provided per definition only within one type of political regime which is democracy. Furthermore, Christiano (2008) argues that basic liberal rights such as the freedom of association are grounded in the same foundational principle of public equality which grounds the justness and authority of democracy. To summarize the holistic argument of Christiano's (2008), we can say that persons' equal moral worth requires that a political society should make its decisions within liberal democratic institutions.

Christiano (2008) derives the limits of democratic authority from the same principle of public equality on which he grounds his argumentation in favour of the intrinsic value of democracy. Christiano (2008 p. 265-272) finds that the democratic assembly does not have the authority to violate the democratic and liberal rights of its citizens as those rights stand on the exact same principle of public equality on which the assembly's authority lies. Therefore, his observation is that if a democratic assembly would pass such acts case it would lose its authority in that case, but for that case only. The democratic assembly's authority is also weakened if the

assembly is ruled by a permanent majority in a such a way that it creates a permanent minority which rarely if ever gets its preferences satisfied (see Christiano 2008, p. 288-300).

According to Christiano (2008, p. 290) the problem of persistent minority may appear in deeply divided societies where the society is divided into highly salient social groups along religious, ethnic, ideological or linguistic lines and where one group has a sufficient share in the total population to have perpetual majority in the democratic assembly. According to Christiano in the case of persistent minorities the core problem is that:

the minority rarely gets its way on any of the properties of the common world it shares with the majority. It suffers from a kind of global alienation from the political process. Its members live in a world they do not really understand or recognize and which is not suited to their conception of social life. (2008, p. 291)

It is important however, that the problem of persistent minorities according to Christiano (2008, p. 290-291) differs analytically from the problem of majority tyranny. In the cases of persistent minorities, the majority “may act in good faith” (Christiano 2008, p. 291). This means that the majority following its conceptions of what is just and unjust may believe that it treats the minority justly even in a case of a permanent minority. Christiano (2008, p. 292-293) when evaluating this problem of permanent minorities takes the position that the existence of a permanent minority implies that public equality of the citizens is violated. This is an outcome related challenge to his procedure centred justification of the intrinsic justness of democracy. He suggests that if the democratic assembly does not want to weaken its authority by violating the foundational principle of public equality it should ensure that minority members have their preferences satisfied in a number of cases which is above a certain minimum threshold. To ensure that such a threshold is passed different institutional forms of power-sharing between the majority and the minority might be justified (Christiano 2008, p. 299).

It seems that Christiano (2008) provides a precise description of the disadvantage that national minority members might face in the public sphere. Even if minority members have an equal say

in a procedurally perfectly democratic system they are inherently disadvantaged. Contrary to the members of the majority, members of the minority cannot form the common world along their conception of the good without the consent of non-members of their community. This is a public constrain in the advancement of the interests of the minority members which constrain is not shared by majority members. Thus it is demonstrated that minority members have double disadvantage, one in the private and another in the public sphere.

One special form of this inherent public disadvantage of minority members within democratic political systems demands some further attention. Some policy issues in the fields of cultural or education policy are culture specific. There are many such issues. One example might be the curriculum of history classes. Assume that the majority and the minority communities have significantly different histories. Minority schools teach the history of the minority community, whereas majority schools teach the history of the majority. Who decides what to teach in these history classes? Let us assume for the sake of the example that the decision is made by a democratic assembly where no form of power-sharing is in place. Such a situation implies that there is an inequality between minority and majority members. The representatives of the majority can decide among themselves within the country's democratic assembly what to teach in the history classes of the majority schools. In the special circumstances when there is a wide disagreement in the majority nation on what to teach, the minority representatives can have an influence over what history is taught in majority schools. If, however, the representatives of the minority aim to shape what is taught in the minority schools, they can only do so if a sufficient part of the majority representatives support them. The institutional structure of regular parliamentary democracy within unitary states grants the majority self-government rights within the culture specific areas. Citizens belonging to the national minority however does not have such self-government rights in culture specific areas. This is an important inequality which is part of the wider problem of permanent minorities.

To conclude this section, the third test asks whether a permanent minority is present within the democratic assembly. If such a permanent minority exists, then it implies that the public equality of minority members is hurt and consequently the legitimacy of the democratic assembly is weakened. Therefore, the state's institutional structure should be changed in a way which ensures that minority members can satisfy their preferences at least in a minimum amount of cases. Although it might not be sufficient in itself, this also entails that to honour the public equality of minority citizens the institutional possibilities of self-government in the culture specific policy issues should be created for minority members.

Putting Ethnic Democracy to the Three Tests

Since the three tests with which the justness and legitimacy of ethnic democracy can be assessed have been elaborated in the previous sections, now the chapter can turn to the normative evaluation of the moral worth of ethnic democracy. Thus the section puts ethnic democracy to the three test and argues that ethnic democracy fails all the three.

Ethnic democracy fails the first test which asks whether the state is neutral. Both in Smootha's (2005b, p. 254) original definition and in the working definition developed in the first chapter one of the defining features of ethnic democracy is ethnic ascendancy. In cases of ethnic democracy both the state and its territory are treated by the members of the majority nation as their exclusive nation-state and homeland. Moreover, institutions of the state are used to serve the interest of majority members. When these applies it can be safely stated that the state is not neutral between conceptions of the good life imagined in the majority and the minority cultural sphere. The state in ethnic democracies per definition values more those conceptions of the good life which are imagined within the majority cultural sphere. This is a signal that the state believes that lives lived within the minority cultural sphere are somewhat inferior. Therefore, ethnic democracy disrespects the equal moral worth of its citizenry and treats its minority citizens unjustly.

In relation the first test it is also important to recall Smootha's (2002a, p. 483) third and fourth arguments in favour of the justification of ethnic democracy. These both rely on the observation that ethnic democracies in response to minority members' culture specific needs often grant significant state services to the minority members, such as mother tongue education or state support for minority cultural activities. The provision of such services truly seems to correlate with the presence of ethnic democracies. In what Smootha (2002a) is also right is that some of the cases of democracies within multinational societies which are not of the consociational or the partial power-sharing part, are actually less generous in the provision of such state services to minority members than some cases of ethnic democracy.

Nonetheless, a closer examination reveals to two things. One is that services to culture the culture specific needs of the minority, such as minority mother tongue educational institutions, does not seem to be a necessary or structurally central feature of ethnic democracy. Ethnic democracies can be imagined without the provision of these services to minority members. However, if it's not an inherent feature of ethnic democracy than it does not have to be taken into analysis during the normative evaluation of this regime type. The other thing which can be revealed by a closer examination is that ethnic democracy certainly does not serve equally the culture specific needs of the citizens belonging to the minority and the majority. As the states advances the interests of the majority, it by definition serves more the culture specific needs of the majority. Therefore, it might be the case the case that ethnic democracy is more just in its service of the culture specific needs of its citizens than some of those regimes which neither grant power-sharing rights, but lack ethnic ascendancy. Nevertheless, ethnic democracy can hardly be considered more just even compared to these regimes, because it treats its minority citizens worse even in non-cultural matters (e.g. distribution of resources).

Continuing with the test it can be stated that ethnic democracy fails the second test as well. Remember, this test asks whether the state compensates the inherent disadvantages of belonging

to a national minority. Ethnic democracy does not compensate, but in fact worsens the situation of minority members. Because state policies favour the interest of the majority members, the state in ethnic democracy further worsens the already disadvantaged situation of minority members. In many cases, the effects of the state's unequal treatment can actually be much more detrimental to the situation of minority members than their initial inherent disadvantage. Thus, ethnic democracy burdens the already burdened with further undeserved disadvantages.

Ethnic democracy fails the third test which asks whether a permanent minority is present or absent in the democratically elected assembly. Ethnic democracy is characterized by dissensus between the majority and minority elites. This is most visible in the unsuccessful attempts of the minority representatives to change the regime to be more accommodating and its policies to be more fair with the members of the minority. Such unsuccessful attempts characterize permanent minorities. Therefore, national minorities are permanent minorities within ethnic democracies. Their presence implies that the public equality of minority citizens is violated and in consequence the democratic legitimacy of ethnic democracy is weakened. This weakened legitimacy however does not mean that ethnic democracy would lack democratic legitimacy altogether. It only means that its moral authority over the minority members is weakened and the minority members have less obligations to obey to the democratic assembly of the state.

In relation to the third test it is also important to mark that ethnic democracy's democratic legitimacy is not threatened by such gross violations of individual democratic and liberal rights which takes place in ethnocracies like apartheid South-Africa. Ethnic democracy respects equally the democratic and liberal individual rights of this citizens. In this way it does not conflicts the public equality of its citizens. It violates public equality by up keeping a situation where the national minority remains a permanent political minority which can rarely if ever satisfy by its political preferences.

All in all, ethnic democracy fails all the three tests and thus it can be stated that it is a regime which treats its minority citizens unjustly and which has a weakened democratic legitimacy. Minority citizens just as much as majority citizens deserve to be treated as equals. The full legitimacy of the democracy has to be regained because its reduction entails serious injustice against some members of the society. Therefore, if alternative regime types exist which are feasible in the context of multinational societies, which can provide treatment as equals and where the national minority is not a permanent minority exists, then ethnic democracy should in all instance be replaced by one of those alternative regime types.

Normatively Superior Alternatives of Ethnic Democracy

Regime types which are relevant within the context of multinational societies and which are normatively superior relative to ethnic democracy do exist. In the last section we have seen that those regimes of multinational societies which do not have any form of power-sharing are also or only a bit less problematic than ethnic democracies. However, other alternatives are also available. This section puts two of these, namely consociational and partial power-sharing democracy to the same three tests to demonstrate their superiority relative to ethnic democracy.

Full-fledged consociational regimes pass the second and third tests. National minority members are compensated for their inherent disadvantages, as they receive stronger than proportional political rights. The minority is not a permanent minority because the consociational power-sharing methods, such as the veto rights, grand coalition and ethnic autonomy ensure that it can satisfy its political preference way above the minimum threshold. Nonetheless, it could be argued that consociational regimes does not fulfil the first test of state neutrality. With some foundation it can be claimed that consociational democracies grant more rights to minority members than what would be required. Thus they violate the public equality of majority members. Citizens surely does not have an equal say in the political decisions of consociational regimes, because minority members have per capita stronger influence. This might indicate that

the state prefers those conceptions of the good life which are imagined within the minority culture, thus it does not remain neutral. This is a thorny question as it hinges on the assessment of whether the compensation of the minority members should take the form of the provision of stronger than equal political rights to minority members and if yes, what is the appropriate level of disproportionality between the rights of minority and majority citizens. That said, the thesis does not seek to occupy a position in the question of the neutrality of consociational regimes it only aimed to note this problem to which consociational regimes are seemingly vulnerable.

Fortunately, partial power-sharing regimes clearly pass all the three test as they are not to be vulnerable to the problem of consociational regimes. Partial power-sharing democracies can provide a treatment of their citizens which is equally sensitive to their cultural specific needs. Through special measures and cultural/personal autonomy they can compensate the inherent disadvantages of minority members and avoid the problem of permanent minorities.

Cultural/personal autonomy is crucial to overcome the permanent minority problem. It might be argued that it leaves the minority members bit better off. If only the minority members receive cultural autonomy, it can be claimed that in a narrow sense they enjoy a better situation than members of the majority. In such a case the minority members can make decisions on their own culture specific issues without the involvement of the majority. The majority on the other hand still has to make these decisions within the country's legislative assembly where minority members might also have an influence in decisions regarding the majority's culture specific issues. However, if this would judge to be a serious problem, then it can be easily solved. A separate directly elected body can be set up just as well for the majority as for the minority and thus any claims of inequality in this direction would lose their ground. Therefore, partial power-sharing regimes can pass all the three tests and thus they stand as a normatively clearly superior and also contextually plausible alternative to ethnic democracy.

Chapter 3: The Slovakian Ethnic Democracy Between 1998-2019

The thesis up to this point has first introduced the regime type of ethnic democracy within the first chapter and second it normatively problematized the concept of ethnic democracy by demonstrating that it is an inherently unjust regime with a weakened democratic legitimacy. The current chapter builds on these grounds. Its main purpose is to examine whether the case of Slovakia following its democratization fits sufficiently or not with the concept of ethnic democracy. The chapter argues that based on the available information it can be stated that the Slovakian ethnopolitical regime fits neatly with the regime type of ethnic democracy. The chapter demonstrates this fit both for the working definition of the first chapter and also for the definition of Smootha. Therefore, it leaves no place for such concerns that the case only meets the definition brought forward by the thesis, reframed for the purposes of the study.

The chapter's structure is the following. It first shows that since 1998 Slovakia's political regime undoubtedly meets the minimal procedural definition of ethnic democracy. Second, it describes why the Slovakian society is a multinational society. Third, the chapter prove that there is an elite dissensus between the majority and the minority elites and that Slovakia has no form of institutionalized power-sharing between the minority and the majority. Fourth, it indicates relying on survey data that anti-Hungarian sentiments and some degree of perceived threat do exist among members of the Slovak majority. Fifth, it partially confirms the presence of ethnic ascendancy within the case of Slovakia. Yet it also determines that although the claim of disproportional resource allocation is held by not only Slovakian Hungarian political actors, but by also social science scholars, actually up to this point no systematic statistical analysis was conducted to support this hypothesis.

Democrateness of the Slovak Republic's political system

Slovakia is a democracy, arguably since the collapse of the Czechoslovak socialist regime in 1989 and undoubtedly since 1998, since the end of the Mečiar era. The working definition of ethnic democracy for the minimal procedural definition of democracy relied on the work of Collier and Levitsky (1997). Their minimal definition of democracy requires general suffrage, competitive elections, absence of widespread electoral fraud and the protection of civil liberties (Collier and Levitsky 1997, p. 434). The section first gives a superficial overview of the political history of post-communist Slovakia and then surveys the presence of each of the factors of the definition of Collier and Levitsky.

After the Second World War communists came to power in Czechoslovakia in 1948 just as the neighbouring states of Central Eastern Europe which fell under Soviet influence. The socialist regime lasted for four decades and finally collapsed at sudden in the Velvet Revolution in 1989. A regime change started which gradually transformed the socialist dictatorship and the planned economy into a democracy and a market economy. Disputes about the level centralization however also ensued between the Czech and Slovak elites of Czechoslovakia, which lead to the dissolution of the federal state in 1993 1st of January. Slovakia in the mid-1990s has experienced a partial political setback under the semi-autocratic and anti-Hungarian regime of Vladimír Mečiar. This period however has ended with the election of 1998 after which the Slovak and Hungarian opposition of Mečiar could form a coalition government. In the following years Slovakia returned to track of democratization and marketization achieving quick successes. Finally, in 2006 the country has joined the European Union. Because the democrateness of the Mečiar period could be to some degree questioned and also because those years constituted an extremely negative period in the treatment of the Hungarian minority (for more see Csergő 2011 and Hamberger 2008) the following analysis of the case of Slovakia will be narrowed down to the period after 1998 the collapse of the Mečiar regime.

The political regime of Slovakia after 1998 clearly meets the minimal procedural definition of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997, p. 434). Slovakia guarantees general suffrage and a range of liberal and democratic political rights. The constitution of the Slovak Republic, which entered into force in 1992, besides civil liberties such as freedom of speech (Article 26), freedom of assembly (Article 28) and freedom of association (Article 29) grants universal suffrage to its citizens (Article 30). As citizenship legislation does not exclude minorities, they enjoy equal voting rights. Screening through Amnesty International annual reports between 1998 and 2018 on Slovakia it seems that apart from Slovakian Romani minority which suffers from heavy discrimination, the rights of Slovakian citizens are respected and protected by the Slovakian state (The Online Books Page, n.d.). Elections are competitive and massive electoral fraud is absent. The OSCE deployed observers to Slovakia to the parliamentary elections first in 1998 and then in 2002, 2010, 2012, 2016 and to the presidential elections in 1999 and 2004. According to the reports (OSCE 1998, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2010, 2012, 2016) the most problematic elections were the 1998 parliamentary and the 1999 presidential ones, but even at these elections the OSCE observed only minor problems and on the whole found them sufficiently democratic. After all these it is not surprising that since Freedom House (2018) classification is available for Slovakia (1999), it always classified Slovakia as free.

The Multinational Society of Slovakia

Slovakia has a multinational society. The Hungarian minority is the only national minority. According to the Czechoslovakian census of 1989 Hungarians made up 10.8% of Slovakia's total population. Although, as depicted by Figure 1, both their total numbers and their share within Slovakia's population is in a decline, they continue to have a substantial demographic weight, with roughly 450 000 (8.5%) Slovakian citizens identifying themselves as Hungarians at the last census. Members of the Hungarian minority live rather concentrated along the Hungarian-Slovak border in three non-connected blocks. The Hungarian minority has a state

founded mother tongue school system from kindergartens up to the Hungarian Selye János University of Komárom/Komárno. Besides the minority schools it has strong local, regional and countrywide cultural and professional organisations. Importantly the Hungarian minority also has a relatively strong Hungarian media with a newspaper (Új Szó), with several online news sites and with a state funded radio. Finally, the Slovakian Calvinist Church, which has almost exclusively Hungarian with its strong institutional network also forms one of the central pillars of the Slovakian Hungarian society.




Figure 1.: The number and percentage of Hungarians in Slovakia since their inclusion into Czechoslovakia. The large decrease in 1950 is due to post Second World War deportations and “Reslovakization” programs. The decrease in 2011 is to some degree due to the different census methods. Own figure, data source: Gyurgyík, 2013.

Through the successful political mobilization of Hungarian voters by their own elites the demographic weight of the Hungarian minority has been turned into a political weight at every subsequent election since 1990. Since the first election of 1990 Hungarian minority parties have always secured representation within the Slovakian parliament and were included in coalition governments four times (see Table 1). With the notable exception of Most-Híd, these Hungarian parties have advanced a relatively strong minority nationalist agenda. Their programmes demanded territorial or personal autonomy and official bilingualism in South-Slovakia. These parties also articulated the aim of organising a parallel Hungarian society within Slovakia with its own institutions. All in all, the Hungarian minority forms complete cleavage (Bartolini and Mair 1990) on all the three levels of cleavages.

Table 1.: Major Hungarian minority parties' election results (only those are included which run on a separate Hungarian list) since the collapse of the socialist regime in 1989. Data source: volby.statistics.sk (n.d.).

*Although Most-Híd is a mixed Hungarian-Slovak party, it was included among the Hungarian parties as it was founded and to this day is dominated by Slovakian Hungarian politicians.

Year of Parliamentary Elections	Independently Running Hungarian Parties or Coalition of Parties	Vote Share	Obtained Seats out of the 150	Member of government
1990	Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM) and Coexistence (EGY)	8.66%	14	No
1992	Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM) and Coexistence (EGY)	7.42%	14	No
	Hungarian Civic Party (MPP)	2.29%	0	No
1994	Hungarian Coalition (MKDM, EGY, MPP)	10.2%	17	No
1998	Party of the Hungarian Coalition (MKP)	9.1%	15	Yes
2002	Party of the Hungarian Coalition (MKP)	11.2%	20	Yes
2006	Party of the Hungarian Coalition (MKP)	11.7%	20	No
2010	Most-Híd*	8.12%	14	Yes
	Party of the Hungarian Coalition (MKP)	4.33%	0	No
2012	Most-Híd*	6.89%	13	No
	Party of the Hungarian Community (MKP)	4.28%	0	No
2016	Most-Híd*	6.5%	11	Yes
	Party of the Hungarian Community (MKP)	4.05%	0	No

Absence of Elite Consensus

The relation of Slovak and Hungarian elites in the examined period is primarily characterized by a dissensus. In other words, there is a wide disagreement on the ideal way of organising the state's institutional structures and on the role what the Hungarian minority has in the future of Slovakia. On the one side of the conflict, the Hungarian elites seeks to gain the long term recognition of the Hungarian minority as a constitutive part of Slovakia, a more favourable territorial distribution of state resources, Slovak-Hungarian official bilingualism in South-Slovakia and some degree of minority self-government either in the form of territorial or cultural/personal autonomy (see Szarka, 2004 and Öllös, 2004). On the other side the Slovak elites either openly engage in or passively support the nation-state building project which seeks to establish a Slovak nation-state on the multinational and multi-ethnic: Slovak, Hungarian, Roma and Rusyn grounds of Slovakia. Up until the last decade on both sides there have been an unbroken often only latent in some moments manifest consensus on these minority and majority nationalist political projects (Fiala-Butora 2019). Both the Slovak and the Hungarian

parties could mobilise successfully the relevant national communities' electorate behind their projects. This situation has been partially by the appearance of the mixed Hungarian-Slovak Most-Híd party, which have although by no means on every, but on some important issues have broken the consensus on the Hungarian side. However, the Most-Híd project did not demolish the Hungarian cleavage and the party's current troubles clearly shows the limited possibilities of interethnic projects within such highly divided environments.

Two stories might illustrate the depths of the cultural and cognitive divide. When against the vote of the Hungarian minority party MKP, the Law on the Use of Minority Languages had been passed by the Slovak parliament in 1999, the Slovak politicians of one of the parties which at that time were governing together with the Hungarian MKP celebrated the passing of the law by singing Slovak nationalist songs together with representatives of the Slovak opposition (van Duin and Polácková 2000, p. 353). When in 2002 after the elections the position of the Speaker of the Slovak Parliament, according to the Slovakian traditions should had been granted to Béla Bugár as the leader of the second strongest governing party, a debate aroused whether it is appropriate if such a high position is taken by a Hungarian. That time leader of the opposition, stated that he thinks that it would be most unusual if a non-Slovak person would chair the parliament (Harris 2004, p. 8). These stories might show that the Slovakian case is not simply characterized by a self-interest based elite dissensus about the institutional structural of the Slovakian political regime, but that the case is also characterized by culture of historical conflict between the communities with its reference points and motives.

The perceived threat of Hungarians

Although the thesis has argued in the first chapter that perceived threat should not be included among the defining features of ethnic democracy, nonetheless the present section shows that the perceived threat feature is also present in the case of Slovakia to show that the case fits not only the working definition, but also the original definition of Smooha (2002a, 2005a). The

followings first shortly introduce the historical base of the perceived threat of Hungarians. Then the section reviews survey data which shows that a large portion Slovaks did perceive minority Hungarians as threat and that many had strongly negative view of Hungarians.

Until the latest years the Hungarian card was a common theme in Slovak political discourse. As van Duin and Polácková (2000 p. 348) explain, the Hungarian card is the political act of *“frightening the ethnic Slovak voters with the bogey of the Hungarian threat”*. The historical experiences of Slovaks and the established Slovak narrative on historical Slovak-Hungarian relations created a solid base for such a political discourse. The fact that the territory of nowadays Slovakia was a part of Hungary for a millennium is tend to be viewed among Slovaks as their 1000 years’ oppression by Hungarians (Mihalikova 1998, p. 160). The complex Slovak-Hungarian historical relations are largely evaluated through the more recent periods and the wrong-doings of the other side within these periods. The most important among these for Slovaks are the Magyarization efforts of the Hungarian state during the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, Hungarian irredentism after the Treaty of Trianon and the return of some territories to Hungary in 1938 as the result of the First Vienna Award (van Duin and Polácková 2000). The latter case is especially central in terms of perceived threat, as when Slovaks were shocked in 1938 for losing territories back to Hungary, local minority Hungarians were gladly greeting the arriving Hungarian troops.

Surveys conducted in post-communist Slovakia among majority member ethnic Slovaks not only provide evidence that fear of Hungarian irredentism was present, but also about wider negative, non-accommodating attitudes of Slovaks towards Hungarians. In 1993 January 60% of Slovak respondents blamed minority Hungarians with irredentism (Guy 1994). Moreover, in 1990 October 83% of those Slovaks living in ethnically homogenous and 60% of those from mixed areas agreed with the statement that Hungarians are always expanding (Guy 1994). In 1992 January among Slovaks who live in mixed areas 28%, while in homogenous areas 51%

agreed with the statement that Hungarians should emigrate from South-Slovakia (Guy 1994). According to a survey conducted by the Centre for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture (CVEK) in 2008, not much have changed one and a half decade later (Kriglerová and Kadlečíková, 2009). Their survey interviewed 955 Slovak children from 9th grade about their attitudes towards minorities. With 36.7% having a negative and only 25% positive opinion, Hungarians came out as the most disliked minority group, as even Roma people were viewed more favourably than them (Új Szó 2008). At the same survey 57.7% of the participants said that Slovakia is the country of Slovaks and it should stay like that, while 63.3% stated Hungarians should speak Slovak in public and not Hungarian (Paraméter 2008).

Ethnic ascendancy within Slovakia

The third chapter have so far presented that (1) Slovakia's political regime in the examined post-1998 period is democratic, (2) that Slovakia has a multinational society made up by a Slovak majority nation and Hungarian national minority, (3) that there is a wide dissensus between the majority and minority elites and finally that (4) among Slovaks according to survey data there was a perception of threat and that there is a significant aversion against Hungarians., Only one point, the feature of ethnic ascendancy remained undiscussed before it could be concluded that Slovakia is an ethnic democracy. In the last section the chapter continues with assessing whether ethnic ascendancy is present in the Slovakian case. The section first brings symbolic examples for the appropriation of the state and then in the second part it discusses the claim of disproportional resource allocation.

The main example of the Slovaks' symbolic appropriation of the Slovakian state is the Preamble of the Constitution of Slovakia (1992, p. 2.). The Preamble starts by speaking in the name of the Slovak nation, makes repeated references to the history of the Slovak ethnic nation and connects Slovakian statehood with Slovaks' right for national self-determination. As Kusy (1996) have argued this was done by Slovak politicians primarily to highlight the Slovakness

of the state and to stress the Slovak nation's ownership over the state. The second example of symbolic appropriation is another preamble, the preamble of the State Language Law from 1995 which states that "the Slovak language is the most important distinctive feature of the uniqueness of the Slovak nation, the most precious asset of its cultural heritage, the expression of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic" (through van Duin and Polácková, 2000, p. 347).

If we turn from symbolic to more practical issues, we might also find some facts that support the case that the appropriation of the state by the Slovaks is not only a symbolic matter, but it has far reaching consequences in policies as well. The Slovakian state's language policy clearly serves more the culture specific interest of majority members. The Slovak language enjoys strong protection as the official language of the state, while the administrative use of Hungarian is only prescribed in a limited number of areas even within Hungarian inhabited areas and in some situation it is illegal and officially punished (Fiala-Butora 2019). The administrative division of Slovakia was drawn in a way of ethnic gerrymandering, minimizing the share of Hungarians in every region and district (Hamberger 2008). The financing of Hungarian cultural institutions and events is also strongly disproportional to the detriment of Hungarian minority members. The Slovakian Hungarian culture sphere therefore primarily relies on state funds of neighbouring Hungary (see Székely 2014 and Nagy 2017). Finally, the claim of territorially disproportional resource distribution has been repeatedly made by both Slovakian Hungarian political actors and some experts and researchers. This claim deserves further attention because if it's true that Hungarians per capita receive less resources compared to Slovaks, then it would be a very strong and probably most clear indication that the Slovakian state is truly an ethnic democracy which advantages its Slovak citizens and disadvantages Hungarian citizens.

If we scan the English and Hungarian literature on the territorial resource allocation of Slovakia, or with a wider scope search for works which focus on the territorial inequalities in Slovakia we might find only a few articles. Mezei and Hardi (2003) researched the territorial inequalities

within Slovakia between regions and districts and the relation of these inequalities with the structure of Slovakia's administration. Kling (2004) provides a review of the institutional set up of Slovakia's territorial development policy with its changes and surveys the support what South-Slovakia received. Gábor Lelkes wrote about the inequalities within South-Slovakia (Lelkes 2006) and on regional development policy within South-Slovakia after EU accession (Lelkes 2008). Rajkovics (2013) summarized the factors which he believes contributed to the economic lagging behind of South-Slovakia, such as the underdeveloped infrastructure, missing skilled labour, long term unemployment and a territorial development policy which neglects the region. Finally, the MKP-SMK party and Hungarian civil, academic experts formulated a development policy plan for South-Slovakia, called the Baross Gábor Plan (Matus et. al 2017), which contains a detailed description of the relative socio-economic lagging behind of South-Slovakia and some data which suggests that South Slovakia received disproportionately less state resources both from state distributed EU funds and from Slovakian government funds.

There are several similarities within these publications. First, most seems to agree that South Slovakia both within and after the socialist Czechoslovakia has been discriminated in terms of the attention and resources it received from central policy makers. However, these articles do not provide a systematic analysis of the relative amount of resources allocated to different regions of Slovakia. Sometimes only the situation of South-Slovakia is analysed without much comparison to other Slovakian regions (Lelkes 2006; 2008). If comparison is being made it is exclusively based upon comparing raw quantities or at best per capita values of received support through tables, histograms or maps (Mezei and Hardi 2003; Kling 2004; Rajkovics 2013 and Matus et. al 2017). No statistical method whatsoever has been applied. Finally, even though that results in much cruder results, without exception the comparison is being made between regions or districts and never between municipalities. Therefore, we cannot know for certain whether disproportionality exists or not in the allocation of state.

So far the thesis has shown that ethnic democracy is an unjust regime type which has a weakened democratic legitimacy and it also demonstrated that the Slovakian case even after 1998 has a considerable fit with the concept. If the thesis could prove that the disproportional resource allocation hypothesis is well-founded, it would have a very strong case for classifying Slovakia as an ethnic democracy and in consequence establishing that Slovakia truly unjust towards the members of the Hungarian minority. Therefore, the following last chapter examines the distribution of the EU 2007-2013 and the EU 2014-2020 budget cycles' distributed funds within Slovakia and the allocation of Slovakian state transfers distributed between 2002 and 2012 to private investments to boost employment.

Chapter 4: Statistical Examination of Disproportionality

Within the fourth chapter the thesis examines the territorial resource allocation of Slovakia to establish whether the claimed disproportionality exists between the funds received by Slovak and Hungarian citizens of Slovakia. The chapter first describes the contribution that it adds to the discussion on the disproportional resource allocation claim. Second, the chapter introduces the research design of the empirical analysis. The third part describes the data preparation process. The fourth part discusses the limitations and potential biases arising as the results of the specific data preparation methods. Finally, the fifth part ends the chapter by presenting the results of the empirical analysis.

The Statistical Analysis Contribution

As it was stated in the last chapter the methods which so far have been applied to the problem of the Slovakian state's resource allocation are largely inadequate. First, because tables giving total values of received support or maps indicating the location of supports are not the right methods of summarization of the available information when the research question is whether the distribution is ethnically disproportional or not. They are well suited for finding outliers or gaining information on the relative situation of some observational unit compared to others. Nonetheless, they simply cannot tell for certain whether the examined data tells that the per capita distribution is proportional or not. Second, because ethnic gerrymandering, which has been mentioned in the previous chapter, distorts the results if the analysis is carried out on the levels of districts or regions. The boundaries of the districts and the regions were drawn in a manner to minimize the number of Hungarian majority units. Thus, the relation between the number of Hungarians at these units and the amount of resources which they receive can easily become blurred. The cases of the nationally mixed districts of Lučenec/Losonc or Trebišov/Tőketerebes can be illuminating examples here. These districts have a relatively large population and are made up of separate Hungarian and Slovak majority areas, with at most only

a small area between the two where the two nationalities live intermixed in municipalities. If the Slovak inhabited areas of this two districts receive state funds it will by definition raise the average of the whole district. However, it might easily happen that the funds what the Slovak areas of the district received actually had no effect on the life of the district's Hungarian inhabitants. The district level data therefore might blur significant within district differences of the state resource allocation. This is even more true for the regions.

The following analysis therefore will advance the literature in a major way. The utilization of statistical methods which have never been used before to examine this question, will help to assess much more precisely whether the disproportional resource allocation hypothesis is in line with the empirical realities or not. As the following analysis will be based on municipality level figures, the results will be much more precise than what district or regional level data would make possible.

Research Design of the Empirical Examination of the Hypothesis

Based on the ethnic democracy model and the above reviewed literature the hypothesis can be raised that the resource allocation of Slovakia favours its Slovak citizens and disadvantages minority Hungarian citizens. This disproportion hypothesis can be restated in an exact way as follows: Hungarian citizens of Slovakia on average received per capita less state funds relative to non-Hungarian citizens of Slovakia. Due to data availability this hypothesis will be examined for the period between 2002 and 2019. It is also important to note here, that this empirical analysis is entirely a descriptive one, which does make any statement on casual relations.

There are two variables of interest within this disproportion hypothesis. One is the amount of allocated per capita state resources, the other is the share of Hungarians at the given territorial unit. As the resource allocation here will be studied on the municipality level, the units of observation will be the 2928 municipalities of Slovakia. As it is impossible to obtain

information on all allocated per capita resources of the Slovakian state and it is also impossible to exactly determine the share of Hungarians at every municipality, the analysis have to rely on indicators for both of the two variables. The share of Hungarians for every municipality will be indicated by the number of inhabitants who identified their own nationality as Hungarian at the last Slovakian countrywide census, conducted in 2011. The amount of state resources allocated to the municipalities will be indicated by the amount of resources received by the municipality on three separate indicators divided by that number for total population of the municipality which have been given in the 2011 census. The first indicator of allocated resources is the Slovakian state's funds granted to private investment between 2002 and 2012 to boost employment (Hruška and Lehotský 2013). The second are the contracted Slovakian funds of the European Union's 2007-2013 budget cycle (see NSRR SR 2008). The third are those Slovakian funds of the EU's current budget cycle (2014-2020) which have been contracted until the 1st of January, 2019 (see Partnerská Dohoda 2015). The census 2011 datasheet have been received from the Forum Institute upon personal request, while the data for the EU and Slovak funds are available online on the provided links in the references.

It is important to recognize that census data on nationality is of course not an objective depiction of the underlying social reality, but a widely used part of the toolkit of ethnopolitics (Brubaker 2011). Probably identities are always more complex than what census data can tell us. Moreover, states will follow their ethnopolitical strategies when they set the exact rules of counting. Those rules will be chosen which out of this complexity of identities can draw the picture which resembles the most that composition of the population which the state seeks to establish. One clear issue in the case of the Slovakian census data is that at the 2011 census many Slovakian citizens chose to not report their national self-identification. Therefore, the nationality of these citizens have been counted as unknown, which category made up 7.5% of Slovakia's total population. This category might hide minority citizens of Slovakia in

disproportional numbers (see Gyurgyík 2013). Nonetheless, there is no superior alternative compared to the census data on national self-identification which could better indicate the distribution of nationalities within the population of Slovakia. What is more, even if it does not report the exact degree of minority presence at municipalities, by and large it provides a reliable indicator of the territorial distribution patterns of nationalities.

The 2011 census data on the total population of municipalities has its weaknesses as well. As the analysis uses this data for a time period of sixteen years it is necessarily introduces some biases into the analysis. However, this census data can at least be expected to be reliable in indicating at least the magnitude of the municipalities' population.

The ideal situation would be to work with data on all the resources which have been distributed since the independence of Slovakia (1993) by the Slovakian state. Such database is of course not available. However, in line with EU regulations data is available online for the funds of the European Union's two budget cycles (2007-2013 and 2014-2020) in which from their beginning Slovakia participated as a member state of the Union. Although most of the funds of the operational programmes within these two budget cycles have been provided by the European Union, actual decisions on the allocation of these funds have been made in Bratislava by central government authorities (Nagyházi 2015). For the 2007-2013 period both the contracted and the exhausted funds are available, while for the 2014-2019 only the contracted funds have been so far made public. The following analysis in both cases will work with the contracted funds, because this research project's main interest lies in the central government's resource allocation patterns and not in the actual absorption capacities of the beneficiaries. Within these funds of the two EU budget cycles both EU and Slovakian state supplied transfers are included, while private contributions have been excluded.

Within these two European Union budgets cycles, compared to the Slovakian GDP an enormous amount of funds has been distributed. During the 2007-2013 budget cycle in total 33 325 259 531 euros have been contracted, which is an equivalent of roughly the half of Slovakia's pre-crises (2008) gross domestic product (GDP) (Countryeconomy.com 2008). Between 2014 and 2019 January 1 in total 8 892 460 610 euros have been contracted, which amounts to 13.5% of Slovakia's 2008 GDP. These two aggregates of course include a significant amount of funds which only have been contracted but have not been actually paid to the beneficiary. It is also only a rough estimate because whereas the 2008 GDP have been used in 2008-euro price, it's unclear in which year's euro price the funds of the two EU budget cycles have been provided. Nonetheless, it is hardly questionable that these funds have an enormous size relative to Slovakia's whole economy. The distribution of such a large amounts of funds most probably provides a reliable indicator of the Slovakian state resource allocation patterns. Therefore, any general pattern of Slovakian state resource allocation should be discernible in the allocation of these European Union budget cycle funds.

Beside the funds of the two EU budget cycles the analysis works with one more publicly available dataset. Journalists of the leading Slovak SME newspaper in 2013 had compiled the Slovakian state's transfers which have been allocated between 2002 and 2012 to help private investments in Slovakia in order to boost employment (Hruška and Lehotský 2013). This database by Hruška and Lehotský (2013) aggregates all different type of state support, such as tax reliefs, direct transfers or property endowments. Although the 1.381 milliard euro total value of these transfers is much below the total values of the two EU budget, nonetheless it is sufficient to provide an additional indicator which can be utilized to check the robustness of the patterns of the EU funds' distribution.

The empirical analysis employs various statistical methods to assess the existence of the claimed disproportional resource allocation pattern. One possibility is that the disproportion pattern takes the form of a linear relationship, whereby a higher portion of Hungarian citizens at municipalities is correlated with a lesser amount of allocated funds. To assess whether such a relationship exists, the relation between the variables of allocated funds and the variable of the share of Hungarians have been visualized with scatterplots. Irrespective of whether a linear relationship exists there might be a significant difference in resources received by Hungarians and others. To assess this possibility, the differences between the value of funds which have been allocated at every municipality to Hungarians and what should have been allocated in case proportionality were examined with a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The average per capita funds received by Hungarians and non-Hungarians were also computed for all the three indicators of the resource allocation. Finally, to see whether the portion of Hungarians at the category of municipalities which received 0 funds is significantly different from the portion of Hungarians at municipalities which received more than 0 funds, a Chi-square test have been carried out.

Data Preparation Methods and Their Shortcomings

The most challenging task of the data preparation process was to localize the EU funds. Neither of the online available datasheets contained a variable directly indicating the exact location where the EU funds were spent. The datasheet on the funds of the 2007-2013 budget cycle has no variable on the locality of implementation, while the datasheet for the 2014-2019 period have such a variable, however it only provides the region of implementation. Therefore, the localization of these funds had to be based on other variables. Two different methods have been employed, both of which work with information provided by these datasheets about the beneficiaries of the funds. The first method can localize only those funds which have been won by a self-government of a municipality. On this subset the name of the beneficiaries is the direct equivalent of the name of the municipality or contains its name after the word of city (“mesto”)

or commune (“obec”). The second method relies on the unique identification number of the beneficiaries called IČO, which is the registry code of legal entities of Slovakia. There are several Slovakian governmental websites, which following separate searches for each IČO numbers provides the name and the seat of the legal entity whose IČO number was searched for. For both the 2007-2013 and the 2014-2019 EU budget cycle’s funds data the IČO numbers of the beneficiaries have been provided. The addresses connected with the 6764 unique IČO numbers have been gathered from one of the Slovakian governmental websites.

Both of the two localization methods have its own shortcomings. The main limitation of the municipality beneficiary method is that it can only localize those funds which have been won by municipalities themselves. Unfortunately, it cannot even localize all these funds because 207 Slovakian municipalities out of the total 2928 have a name which is the exact equivalent of the name of one or more Slovakian municipalities. In order to handle this problem, all of these municipalities have been excluded from the analysis. In a marginal number of cases the municipalities name was given mistyped and thus these cases could not be localized.

The central assumption of the municipality beneficiary localization method is that funds have been spent in the territory of the beneficiary municipality. However, this does not necessarily have to be the case. The most common case when this assumption does not hold is probably cases of joints projects between neighbouring municipalities. From the perspective of this research project such cases are not seriously problematic. The geographic distribution of Slovakian nationalities is such that they tend to live concentrated in blocks and not intermixed. Therefore, in cases where the beneficiary municipality spends the funds partly on the territory of the neighbouring municipalities, in most of the cases the national makeup of the beneficiary municipality will provide a rather good estimate of the national makeup of the also affected municipalities.

The IČO number based method also has its own assumptions and shortcomings. Here, the main assumption is that the funds were actually contracted for projects to be carried out at the same municipality where the beneficiary has its seat. This method could primarily localize EU funds received by companies and municipalities. The case of municipalities has already been discussed, however the case of companies is however somewhat different and the assumption is more problematic. A company operating in Slovakia might have more than one operational sites and it can easily happen that funds are not spent at the site which is the official seat of the beneficiary company. The possibility of this type of miss localization is probably the highest in the cases where the beneficiary has its seat in the capital city of Bratislava. To handle this issue, all the districts of Bratislava and in consequence all funds whose beneficiary is seated in Bratislava have been excluded from the analysis.

These two localization methods taken together fortunately could localize a sufficient degree of all the contracted EU funds of the two budget cycles. In the case of the funds of the 2007-2013 budget, out of the total 7550 contracted funds, 5420 (71.06%) could be localized. Funds were connected to 43.55% of those Slovakian municipalities which have a unique name. The total value of the localized funds makes up 21.3% of all the contracted funds of the 2007 -2013 period. Table 3 shows the distribution of localized funds among the operational programs.

For the 2014-2019 period out of the total 5403 contracted funds 3724 (68.92%) have been localized. Out of those 2721 Slovakian municipalities which have a unique name funds were connected to 1052 (34.15%). All together these successfully localized funds have a total value of 6 139 178 746 euros, an equivalent of 64.58% of all the funds which have been contracted within the 2014-2019 period. The total number and portion of the localized funds for each operational program in this period is provided by Table 4. Within these numbers the funds connected to districts of Bratislava are included. In both of the EU budget cycles most of the

funds which could not be localized have been mostly contracted with ministries, other government authorities, self-governments of regions, schools and religious organisations.

Table 2.: Total number, successfully localized number and share of contracted funds of the 2007-2013 EU budget cycle's eleven operational programs.

Operational program	Total number	Number of localized	Share of localized
Informatisation of Society	98	7	7%
Competitiveness and Economic Growth	1148	1039	91%
Research and Development	498	365	73%
Education	883	298	34%
Environment	667	602	90%
Bratislava Region	352	305	87%
Transportation	118	41	35%
Technical Assistance	150	1	1%
Employment and Social Inclusion	1631	1155	71%
Healthcare	73	67	92%
Regional Operational Programme	1920	1485	77%

Table 3.: Total number, successfully localized number and share of contracted funds of the 2007-2020 EU budget cycle's eleven operational program. Only funds are included which were contracted as of the 1st of January 2019.

Operational program	Total number	Number of localized	Share of localized
Integrated Regional Operational Program	1077	792	74%
Interreg V-A Slovak Republic – Czechia	70	23	33%
Interreg V-A Slovak Republic – Austria	18	3	17%
Effective Public Administration	95	21	22%
Integrated Infrastructure	108	31	29%
Environment	1356	1102	81%
Human Resources	1350	667	49%
Fisheries	14	2	14%
Technical Assistance	100	0	0%
Research and Innovation	1129	1081	96%
Rural Development	84	2	2%

Fortunately, the datasheet covering the Slovakian state's transfers which have been allocated to support private investments in the period of 2002-2012, has a variable which directly indicates the municipality where the supported investment has taken place. Therefore, none of the above discussed localization issues are relevant for this dataset.

All the three group of funds have some extreme outliers in terms of the per capita support what municipalities received. Two districts of Bratislava: Staré Mesto and Karlova Ves had extreme outlier values in both of the two EU budget cycles. These were removed together with all the other districts of Bratislava to avoid a potentially massive miss localization of funds. Thus their removal is not done to smooth the distributions of the allocated funds, but is connected to a data

quality issue. All the other outliers have been left untouched. Separately for every per capita fund outlier a search was conducted, where the Google Map satellite images were inspected whether on the territory of the municipality any major factory or industrial park can be found. It appeared that these outliers are all smaller municipalities with industrial parks or with major factories, located within the agglomeration of a larger town. Because the study is interested in the proportionality of the resource distribution, the removal of these funds would have distorted the results of the analysis. Therefore, these outliers were included in the analysis.

Potential Directions of the Biases

Before moving to the presentation of the statistical results it is important to discuss the potential biases which could have been introduced with the taken data preparation steps. Because no detailed analysis was conducted to estimate the resulting biases, the followings will be only a personal and somewhat subjective assessment on the potential directions of the distortions. The thesis by no means implies that these arguments are necessarily true, on the contrary, these are hunches which are wholly open to further debate and a more thorough examination.

The municipality beneficiary localization method might have introduced a bias in favour of Hungarians in the distributions of funds. Hungarians are less urbanised, more rural compared to the Slovakian average (see Gyurgyík et al. 2010, p. 102). At municipalities which have a small population and are not located within the agglomeration of a major town there is a high probability that the only legal person which might apply for funds is the self-government of the municipality. As the share of Hungarians within the category of these municipalities is higher than their overall portion in Slovakia's total population, it seems quite likely that the sample which only covers the funds won by municipalities will show a distorted picture, which is more favourable to Hungarians than the actual reality.

It is unclear whether the IČO localization method have introduced any major biases and if yes what is there direction. What might lead to another distortion in favour of Hungarians is that for both EU budget cycles only a low portion of the infrastructural development funds could have been localized (see Table 3 and 4! above). A high portion of these funds were contracted for example with the Ministry of Transportation whose funds could not have been localized. Yet, the infrastructural development strategy of Slovakia seems to favour the Slovak inhabited North relative to the Hungarian inhabited South, both in highway and railway developments (Gál 2016). Finally, the exclusion of Bratislava could also lead to bias. If a significant amount of the funds what was localized to the districts of Bratislava have really been spent there, then their exclusion might also distort the obtained results in favour Hungarians, because although their share of Hungarians is now only marginal in Bratislava, still in total a significant amount of Hungarians from all Hungarian citizens of Slovakia do live there. Therefore, if the districts of Bratislava would have been left in the analysis the average per capita resources what Hungarians received might have been actually higher. These considerations seem to suggest that the results of the subsequent statistical analysis will constitute a conservative estimate.

Statistical analysis and the obtained results

In the followings this section presents the steps of the statistical analysis and the results which have been obtained. First, it describes the distributions of the four variables which are being studied in the analysis. Second, it investigates whether a linear relationship exists between the portion of Hungarians at a municipality and the amount of funds which the municipality in average receives. Third, the section presents the average per capita funds what Hungarians have received and examines whether the actually received funds of Hungarians are significantly different from what they should have received under proportionality. Finally, it also examines whether the fact that a municipality received any funds or received nothing is independent from the share of Hungarians.

Figure 2-9 presents the distribution of the four variables. The histograms are paired. In every one of these pairs the first histogram demonstrates the whole distribution, while the second zooms by excluding the lower and sometimes the upper end of the distribution. These histograms nicely illustrate the fact that none of the four variables' distribution is normal, and also that all the four variables show a very high frequency of zero values. The distributions of the two EU budget cycles' funds and the Slovakian state transfers show a highly similar picture. In all the three variables the mode is the zero euro per capita fund, while most of the non-zero municipalities have values of per capita funds below 2000-3000 euros. The existence of outlier municipalities with extremely large per capita funds – above 10-20 thousand or in the case of the Slovakian state transfers even above 80 thousand euros – is similar pattern in all of the three variables as well. Finally, the distribution of the portions of Hungarians is somewhat different. The mode is again at zero, however, there is another peak between 75-80%.




Figure 2.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2007-2013 EU budget cycle in Slovakia between municipalities




Figure 3.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2007-2013 EU budget cycle in Slovakia between municipalities. Values equivalent to zero or higher than 10 000 euros have been excluded.




Figure 4 The distribution of per capita funds of the 2014-2020 EU budget cycle in Slovakia between municipalities. Only funds which have been contracted until the 1st of January 2019.




Figure 5.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2014-2020 EU budget cycle in Slovakia between municipalities. Only funds which have been contracted until the 1st of January 2019. Values equivalent to zero or higher than 8000 euros have been excluded.




Figure 6.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2002-2012 Slovakian state transfers to private investments for boosting employment.




Figure 7.: The distribution of per capita funds of the 2002-2012 Slovakian state transfers to private investments for boosting employment. Values equivalent to zero or higher than 15 000 euros have been excluded.

The non-normal distribution of the four variable already implies that they will not have a linear relation. The two scatter plots included below (see Figure 10 and 11!) visualizes nicely the total absence of such linear relations. One thing which can also be learned from these scatter plots is that the extreme outliers above 7500 euros are exclusively municipalities which have a zero percent or just a marginal share of Hungarians. The scatter plot of the portion of Hungarians and of the per capita 2002-2012 Slovakian transfers received by municipalities were not

included because due to the low number of observations it is not highly meaningful, while it shows a very similar pattern as Figure 10 and 11 of the EU budget cycles' funds.




Figure 8.: Distribution of the portions of Hungarians at Slovakian municipalities according to the 2011 census.




Figure 9.: Distribution of the portions of Hungarians at Slovakian municipalities according to the 2011 census. Values below 0.02 (2%) have been excluded.




Figure 10.: Scatter plot of the Slovakian municipalities' portion of Hungarian inhabitants as of the 2011 census and the amount of per capita funds which they received from the 2007-2013 EU budget cycle.




Figure 11.: Scatter plot of the Slovakian municipalities' portion of Hungarian inhabitants as of the 2011 census and the amount of per capita funds which they received until the 1st of January 2019, from the 2014-2020 EU budget.

One quite self-explanatory way of examining whether disproportionality exists is to calculate the average per capita funds that Hungarian citizens of Slovakia received from the different resource allocations. Such a Hungarian average can be calculated from the per capita funds of municipalities, by adding together municipality's per capita fund weighted by the number of Hungarian inhabitants of the municipality and dividing the sum with the Hungarian's total number within Slovakia.

At all the three examined resource allocations Hungarians received per capita considerably less compared to the country's per capita average. The differences are not marginal. During the 2007-2013 EU budget cycle Hungarian citizens of Slovakia received only 55% what non-Hungarian citizens received. The difference is less large in the analysed years of the second EU budget cycle, here minority Hungarians obtained the 76% of what non-Hungarians gained. Finally, the difference between the average per capita 2002-2012 Slovakian state transfers show very similar pattern, Hungarians only acquired 53% of what non-Hungarians seized. These numbers provide a clear evidence that at least on the currently examined samples of the Slovakian state's resource allocation, a considerable disproportion exists. The differences are entirely in line with the theoretical hypothesis, which stated that Hungarian citizens of Slovakia receive disproportionately less per capita funds by their state.

Table 4.: Average per capita funds received by Hungarian and non-Hungarian and citizens of Slovakia. Own data, own calculations.

	Average Hungarian	Average non-Hungarian	Countrywide average
2007-2013 EU funds	510 euro/capita	925 euro/capita	887 euro/capita
2014-2019 EU funds	368 euro/capita	483 euro/capita	472 euro/capita
2002-2012 SK funds	140 euro/capita	261 euro/capita	250 euro/capita

The per capita funds what Hungarians should have received in case of perfect proportionality had been computed for the three examined resource allocation samples for all municipalities by multiplying the number of Hungarian inhabitants with the countrywide average per capita fund of the relevant resource allocation sample. As the distributions are not normal, the difference between the actual and the predicted values have been examined with the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test which test the differences of the paired samples' medians. The results of the three tests show that the amount of funds what Hungarians have received is significantly different even on the 1% alpha level from what they should have received under full proportionality. The medians of the three actual distributions are zero, whereas the predicted distributions always had exactly the same value for their median aggregated funds as the per capita countrywide average of that specific resource allocation sample.

This have suggested that source of the differences between the per capita averages of Hungarian and non-Hungarian citizens is most probably can be found in the difference between the shares of Hungarians and non-Hungarians who live in municipalities which did not receive any funds. Table 6 shows that indeed Hungarians are heavily overrepresented in the category of those municipalities which did not receive any funding, whereas they are underrepresented in the other category which have received funding. Chi-square tests of independence were conducted for all the three samples of resource allocation which shown that the difference between the shares of Hungarians at municipalities which received zero funding and at municipalities which received more than zero funding is significantly different.

Table 5.: The share of Hungarians among those citizens who lived in municipalities which did not receive any funding and which did receive funding. Own data, own calculations.

	2007-2013 EU funds	2014-2019 EU funds	2002-2012 SK funds
Share of Hungarians on 0 fund municipalities	14%	11%	10%
Share of Hungarians on non-0 fund municipalities	8%	8%	4%

Based on these results the conclusion of the empirical analysis is that at least on the analysed datasets the resource allocation of the Slovakian state is disproportionately favours non-Hungarian citizens relative to Hungarian citizens. The difference between the average per capita funds received by Hungarian and non-Hungarian citizens are quite wide. Hungarians received between 53% and 76% of what non-Hungarians have received. The main source of the difference is most probably Hungarians' lower share at the category municipalities which received any EU or Slovakian state funds.

Of course the external validity of these results might be questioned by pointing to the fact that the analysis relied only on subsets of the resources allocated by the Slovakian state. What could be answered to such concerns is that the two EU budget cycles' have an extremely high total value compared to the Slovakian economy and the Slovakian state's usual capacity to invest. A relative high portion of these funds could be successfully localized in both of the two budget

cycles, covering a sufficiently high portion of the all contracted funds' total value of these two budget circles. Therefore, it can be reasonably expected that the successfully localized funds provide a reliable estimate of the general patterns along which these EU budget cycle funds have been distributed. What is more, according to assessment of the chapter the distortions are more likely in favour of Hungarians, therefore this current estimate seems to be a rather conservative one. Differences on the full population of allocated state resources might be even more stark. Finally, the Slovakian state's transfers for private investments showed very similar patterns to the EU budget cycle samples, while this data does not suffer from the kind of data preparation issues which are potentially distorting in the case of EU funds.

Conclusion

Before final conclusion of the broad argumentation about the justness and legitimacy of the Slovakian political regime could be stated it is important to revise the steps how the conclusion is reached and what were the contributions of each steps. This thesis set out to examine the normative worth of the ethnopolitical regime of the Post-Communist democratic Slovakia in the light of the situation and treatment of the Slovakian Hungarian minority citizens. Its core research question was whether the Slovakian ethnopolitical regime, that is the structural relations of Hungarians and Slovaks within Slovakia, is unjust and democratically legitimate.

The steps through which the answer was reached were the following. The thesis first introduced the theoretical concept of ethnic democracy and the scholarly reactions what it received, besides developing a working definition of ethnic democracy embedded in a partial and crude typology of its contextually relevant alternatives. In the second chapter the thesis normatively examined the concept of ethnic democracy within liberal political theory and argued that ethnic democracy is an unjust regime type with a weakened democratic legitimacy. The third chapter demonstrated that the Slovakian case shows a significant fit with the definition of ethnic democracy. It also observed that at the defining feature of ethnic ascendancy crucial knowledge has so far been missing from social science literature, that is whether the Slovakian state allocates its resources disproportionally among its citizens belonging to the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority. The fourth chapter statistically examined the resource distribution of the Slovakian state. The analysis was carried out on three samples. On the contracted funds of two European budget cycles (2007-2013 and 2014-2020) and on Slovakian state transfers to employment creating private investments. The statistical analysis found that on all three samples Hungarians received per capita markedly less funds. A Hungarian citizen on average received between 24 and 47 percentage point less compared to a non-Hungarian citizen.

The steps of the above analysis taken together have shown that Slovakia is an ethnic democracy whose regime is therefore unjust and suffers from a weakened democratic legitimacy. It has been identified in the third chapter that Slovakia on all the core features meets the definition of ethnic democracy. Slovakia is a democracy arguably since 1990 and undeniably since 1998. It has a multinational society with a Slovak ethnonational majority and a both politically and socially significant Hungarian national minority. Dissensus characterizes the relations of the elites of the Hungarian minority and the Slovak majority, which remains so despite the changes what was brought by the Slovak-Hungarian party, Most-Híd. What is more based on the so far published literature it can be convincingly argued that the Slovakian case also exhibits the ethnic ascendancy feature of ethnic democracy. Yet, for those remaining the sceptic, the fourth chapter has shown that in line with the expectations, Slovakia blatantly treats its Hungarian citizens worse than as it treats its non-Hungarian citizens. Therefore, it also clearly exhibits the feature of ethnic ascendancy.

As it was argued ethnic democracy is unjust because it prefers those conceptions of the good life which are lived within the majority's cultural sphere and because it does not compensate, but in fact further worsens the inherently disadvantaged situation of minority citizens. Based on the above refreshed arguments and findings, these forms of unjustness seem to fit very well to the Slovakian case. What is more, ethnic democracy's regime type has a weakened legitimacy, because of the presence of a permanent minority. The permanent minority is also present in the case of Slovakia in the form of the Hungarian minority. Therefore, we can conclude that as Slovakia treats its Hungarian citizens unjustly and has a weakened democratic legitimacy. What follows from the preceding argument is that the Slovakian regime should change to redress the situation and overcome ethnic injustice.

It is not possible here to provide a proper policy proposal how Slovakia could and should handle the normatively problematic situation. Nonetheless, the argumentation of the thesis offers some

guidelines. The normative part has argued that partial power-sharing democracy seems to be the normatively most promising contextual alternative of ethnic democracy. The most evident reform concerning the state's institutional structure thus could be to grant cultural autonomy to the Hungarian minority. This would be a significant step towards the abolition of the permanent minority status and would also mean a step towards elite consensus. What is more the Slovakian state should ensure that it services equally the culture specific interests of its citizens. The first steps in this direction could be official bilingualism within the Hungarian inhabited South Slovakia. Meaningful territorial self-government for the cultural, economic and geographic regions could also bring significant long term improvements. If the boundaries were redrawn according to the socio-cultural regions of Slovakia, it would grant the Hungarian minority significant local self-governance in at least one region and a stronger say in the regional decisions in a few other regions. Finally, significant authorities in the distribution of EU funds could be granted to the regions after their boundaries thus redrawn, thereby giving control over the distribution of at least a part of EU funds to the minority.

Finally, it is important to reflect on the limitations of the thesis. The author is evidently not a political theorist. In consequence the normative argumentation of the thesis remained somewhat loose, the premises and the conclusions were not connected strictly enough. Rather a sketch of a possibly more detailed and therefore more neat argumentation was drawn. What is more the statistical analysis had to work with a partial and certainly non-random, therefore with a biased sample. Both of these weaknesses offer tempting new ways for research. The normative argumentation should be distilled and its relevance might be opened to a wider range of cases, to cases beyond ethnic democracy. Its universal base might allow that. On the side of the case focused statistical analysis new ways to more systematically estimate the direction of the bias should be explored. Last, but not least, either manually or computationally a wider set of EU funds could be localized and thus weaken or strengthen the current research findings.

References

- Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990) *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press
- Brubaker, R. (1996) *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Brubaker, R. (2011) Nationalizing states revisited: projects and processes of nationalization in post-Soviet states. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34(11).
- Christiano, T. (2008) *The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Collier, D. and Levitsky, S. (1997) Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research. *World Politics*, 49(3), p. 430-451.
- Constitution of the Slovak Republic (1992) Available in English online: <https://www.prezident.sk/upload-files/46422.pdf> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Countryeconomy.com (2008) *Slovakia GDP – Gross Domestic Product*. [online] Available at: <https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/slovakia?year=2008> [Last accessed: 2019.05.06.]
- Csergő, Zs. (2011) Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Expansion of Democracy. In: Wolchik, S. L. and Curry, J. L. eds. (2011) *Central and East-European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Danel, A. (2009) A methodological critique of the concept of ethnic democracy. *Journal of Israeli History*, 28(1), p. 37-54.
- Dowty, A. (1999) Is Israel Democratic? Substance and Semantics in the "Ethnic Democracy" Debate. *Israel Studies*, 4(2), p. 1-15.
- Dworkin, R. (1985) *A Matter of Principle*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
- Fiala-Butora, J. (2019) *Nemzetpolitika - Magyarok határon innen és túl*. Eötvös Csoport. [video online] Available at: <https://youtu.be/1iJoLO9TEog?t=394> [Last accessed: 2018.01.06.]
- Freedom House (2019) *Freedom in the World: Slovakia*. [online] Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/slovakia> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Gál, Zs. (2016) Az elhanyagolt Dél-Szlovákia. *Felvidék.ma* [online] Available at: <https://felvidek.ma/2016/06/elhanyagolt-del-szlovakia/> [Last accessed: 2019.05.06.]
- Ghanem, A., Rouhana, N. and Yiftachel, O. (1998) Questioning "Ethnic Democracy": A Response to Sammy Smooha. *Israel Studies*, 3(2), p. 253-267.
- Guy, L. (1994) Szlovákiai közvélemény-kutatások a magyar kisebbségről. *Regio – Kisebbség, politika, társadalom*, 5(1). Available at: <http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00036/00017/pdf/16.pdf> [Last accessed: 2019.05.30.]

- Gyurgyík, L. et al. (2010) Demográfiai Folyamatok, Etno-kulturális és Társadalmi Reprodukció. In: Bitskey, B. ed. (2009) *Határon Túli Magyarság a 21. Században: Konferencia Sorozat a Sándor-palotában*. Köztársasági Elnöki Hivatal.
- Gyurgyík, L. (2013) The demographic trends of the ethnic Hungarian population of Slovakia in light of the 2011 census to the present. *Minority Studies*, 15, p. 53-66. Available online: http://epa.oszk.hu/00400/00463/00015/pdf/EPA00463_minorities_2013-15_053.pdf [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Hamberger, J. (2008) A magyar kisebbség jogi, politikai helyzete Szlovákiában 1989 novembere után. In: Bárdi, N. et al. eds. (2008) *Kisebbségi magyar közösségek a 20. században - Történeti vázlat*. Gondolat Kiadói Kör Kft.
- Harris, E. (2003) Management of the Hungarian Issue in Slovak Politics: Europeanisation and the Evolution of National Identities. *University of Leeds: POLIS Working Paper 7*, Available at: <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/wp7harris.pdf> [Last accessed: 2018.05.30.]
- Hruška, M. and Lehotský, L. (2013) 'Vláda mení pravidlá pre stimuly. Pozrite sa, kto ich za 10 rokov dostal'. *SME*. Available at: <https://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/6664445/vlada-meni-pravidla-prestimulypozrite-sa-kto-ich-za-10-rokov-dostal.html> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Kling, J. (2004) A régiófejlesztési politika és közigazgatás. In: Fazekas, J. and Huncík, P. eds. (2004) *Magyarok Szlovákiában (1989-2004): Összefoglaló jelentés, a rendszerváltás az Európai Unió csatlakozásig*. I. kötet. Somorja-Dunaszerdahely: Lilium Aurum Könyvkiadó. Available at: mek.oszk.hu/02400/02447/02447.pdf [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Kriglerová, E., G. and Kadlečíková, J. (2009) *Kultúrna rozmanitosť: a jej vnímanie žiakmi základných škôl na slovensku*. Bratislava: Nadácia otvorenej spoločnosti – Open society Foundation.
- Kymlicka (1989) *Liberalism, Community and Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Kymlicka, W. (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lelkes, G. (2006) Területi egyenlőtlenségek Dél-Szlovákiában az uniós tagság tükrében. *Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle*, 4. Available at: <http://forumszemle.eu/2006/06/28/lelkes-gabor-teruleti-egyenlotlensegek-del-szlovakian-az-unios-tagsag-tukreben/> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Lelkes, G. (2008) A szlovákiai regionális fejlesztéspolitika s annak középtávú Dél-Szlovákia határ menti vetülete az uniós támogatáspolitiká tükrében. *Tér és Társadalom*, 22(3). p. 151-182. Available at: <https://tet.rkk.hu/index.php/Tet/article/view/1190/2377> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Lijphart, A. (1984) *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*. London: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (1990) The Power-Sharing Approach. In Joseph Montville ed. (1990) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*. Lexington: Lexington Books.

- Matus, T. et. al (2017) *Baross Gábor Terv: Dél-Szlovákia/Felvidék regionális gazdaságfejlesztési terve*. Available at: <https://baross-palyazatok.eu/sites/default/files/BGT-7.pdf> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Mezei, I. and Hardi, T. (2003) A szlovák közigazgatás és területfejlesztés aszimmetriái. *Tér és Társadalom*, 17(4), p. 127-155.
- Mihalikova (1998): The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia: Conflict over Autonomy. In: Opalski, M. (1998) *Managing Diversity in Plural Societies: Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-communist Europe*. Nepean: Forum Eastern Europe.
- Nagy, E. (2017) Mi lesz a Kisebbségi Kulturális Alap igazi szerepe? Felvidék.ma. [online] 14th of July. Available at: <https://felvidek.ma/2017/07/mi-lesz-a-kisebbségi-kulturalis-alap-igazi-szerepe/> [Last accessed: 2019.05.30.]
- Nagyházi, Gy. (2015) Regional Development Trends and The Regional Development Institutions in the Visegrád Countries – Enabling or Hindering Institutional Environment. *DETUROPE - The Central European Journal of Regional Development and Tourism*, 7(2), p. 28-44.
- NSRR SR (2008) *Funds Allocation and Lists*. [online] Available at: <http://www.nsrr.sk/en/cerpanie/> [Last accessed: 2019.05.19.]
- OSCE (1998) *The Slovak Republic Parliamentary Elections 25 and 26 September 1998, Final Report*. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/slovakia/16314?download=true> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- OSCE (1999) *The Slovak Republic Presidential Elections 15 and 29 May 1999, Final Report*. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/slovakia/16336?download=true> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- OSCE (2002) *The Slovak Republic Parliamentary Elections 20 and 21 September 2002, Final Report*. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/slovakia/16298?download=true> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- OSCE (2004) *The Slovak Republic Presidential Elections 3 April 2004, Final Report*. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/slovakia/33455?download=true> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- OSCE (2010) *The Slovak Republic Parliamentary Elections 12 June 2010, OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report*. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/71246?download=true> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- OSCE (2012) *Slovakia, Early Parliamentary Elections, 10 March 2012: Needs Assessment Mission Report*. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/Slovakia/88246?download=true> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- OSCE (2016) *Slovakia, Parliamentary Elections, 5 March 2016: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report*. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/slovakia/235591?download=true> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]

- Öllös, L. (2004) A magyar pártok programjai. In: Fazekas, J. and Huncík, P. eds. (2004) *Magyarok Szlovákiában (1989-2004): Összefoglaló jelentés, a rendszerváltás az Európai Unió csatlakozásig*. I. kötet. Somorja-Dunaszerdahely: Lilium Aurum Könyvkiadó
- Paraméter (2008) Szlovák fiatalok: "Maďari za Dunaj!". *Paraméter*, [online] 22 August. Available at: <https://parameter.sk/rova/belfold/2008/08/22/szlovak-fiatalok-madari-za-dunaj> [Last accessed: 2019.05.30.]
- Partnerská Dohoda (2015) *Informácia o implementácii EŠIF*. [online] Available at: <https://www.partnerskadohoda.gov.sk/informacia-o-implementacii-esif/> [Last accessed: 2019.05.12.]
- Pettai, V. (1998) Emerging ethnic democracy in Estonia and Latvia. In: Opalski, M. ed. (1998) *Managing Diversity in Plural Societies: Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Europe*. Ottawa: Forum Eastern Europe.
- Pettai, E-C. (2015) Ethnopolitical Situations. *SORG 00.033 Nationalism and Ethnopolitics*. [power point slides] University of Tartu. unpublished.
- Rajkovich, P. (2013) *Miért maradtunk le?* [online] Available at: <http://www.kerekasztal.org/2013/07/miert-maradtunk-le/> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Smith, G. (1996) The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in Estonia and Latvia. *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 24(2), 199-216. o.
- Sartori, G. (1990) A Typology of Party Systems. In Mair, P. ed. (1990) *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Smootha S. and Järve, P. (2005) *The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*. Budapest: Open Society Institute.
- Smootha, S. (1997a) Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype. *Israel Studies*, 2(2), p. 198-241.
- Smootha, S. (1997b) The Viability of Ethnic Democracy as a Mode of Conflict-Management: Comparing Israel and Northern Ireland. In: Endelman, T. M. ed. (1997) *Comparing Jewish Societies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Smootha, S. (2001) The Tenability of Partition as a Mode of Conflict-Regulation: Comparing Ireland with Palestine – Land of Israel. In: McGarry, J. ed. (2001) *Northern Ireland and the Divided World: Post Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smootha, S. (2002a) The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. *Nations and Nationalism*, 8(4), p. 475-503.
- Smootha, S. (2002b) Types of democracy and modes of conflict management in ethnically divided societies. *Nations and Nationalism*, 8(4), p. 423-431.
- Smootha, S. (2005a) The model of ethnic democracy. In: Smootha, S. and Järve, P. eds. (2005) *The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*. Budapest: Open Society Institute, p. 559.

- Smootha, S. (2005b) The Non-Emergence of a Viable Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe. In: Smootha, S. and Järve, P. eds. (2005) *The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*. Budapest: Open Society Institute, p. 241- 257.
- Smootha, S. (2009) The model of ethnic democracy: Response to Danel. *Journal of Israeli History*, 28(1), p. 55-62.
- Szarka, L. (2004) Kisebbségi többpártrendszer és közösségépítés: A szlovákiai magyar politikai pártok működése 1989-1998. In: Fazekas, J. and Huncík, P. eds. (2004) *Magyarok Szlovákiában (1989-2004): Összefoglaló jelentés, a rendszerváltás az Európai Unió csatlakozásig*. I. kötet. Somorja-Dunaszerdahely: Lilium Aurum Könyvkiadó
- Székely, I., G (2014) *Dynamics of Party Politics, Electoral Competition and Cooperation within the Hungarian Minorities of Romania, Serbia and Slovakia*. [PhD Thesis] Central European University
- The Online Books Page (n.d.) *Amnesty International Annual Report*. [online] Available at: <https://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=aireport> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- Új Szó (2008) Gyűlölet. *Új Szó*, [online] 26 September. Available at: <https://ujsoz.com/vasarnap/gyulolet> [Last accessed: 2019.02.23.]
- van Duin, P. and Polácková, Z. (2000) Democratic Renewal and the Hungarian Minority Question in Slovakia: From populism to ethnic democracy? *European Societies*, 2(3), p. 335-360.
- volby.statistics.sk (n.d.) *Elections and Referenda*. [online data source] Available at: <http://volby.statistics.sk/index-en.html> [Last accessed: 2019.05.30.]
- Waldron, J. (1992) Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative. In: Kymlicka, W. (1995) *The Rights of Minority Cultures*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Wimmer, A. (2004) Dominant Ethnicity and Dominant Nationhood. In Kaufmann, E., P., ed. (2004) *Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 40-58.
- Yiftachel, O. (1998) Democracy or Ethnocracy?: Territory and Settler Politics in Israel/Palestine. *Middle East Report*, 207., p. 8-13.
- Yiftachel, O. (2000) “Ethnocracy” and Its Discontents: Minorities, Protests, and the Israeli Polity. *Critical Inquiry*, 26(4), p. 725-756.