

Not by TASS Alone: Reporting Khrushchev's Trip to America, 1959

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of History

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary

2019

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Abstract

In this thesis, I argue that the Soviet international propaganda system experienced a significant change in its structure, performance, and personnel in the late 1950s. Using the archival materials from the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, and Open Society Archive, I investigate the reasons behind this shift. More importantly, I look at the role of the network of journalists and diplomats who were in Khrushchev's close circle and had access to means of changing the propaganda system. Studying the role of these individuals, my research sheds new light on the agency of Soviet officials, their methods of cooperation and coordination of the extensive web of organizations involved in propaganda activities abroad. This study is exemplified by Khrushchev's trip in 1959, which became a turning point for propagandists.

Acknowledgments

This thesis would not have been possible without the help of many people. I am forever thankful to my best friend, Yana Kitaeva, for always being there, for support and fun that we have had. I would also like to express my endless gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Marsha Siefert, for her patience, encouragement, and endless enthusiasm. I cannot thank Prof. Siefert enough for believing in me when even I did not believe in myself. Furthermore, I am grateful to Professor István Rév for his valuable comments which directed my work. I also have to thank Professor Thomas Rooney for bearing with me and my Slavic grammar. Csaba Szilágyi was a big help for my research, giving me access to materials which made my understanding of the work much clearer.

Of course, this thesis would not have happened if I did not get financial support from CEU. I would like to thank the CEU History Department for a valuable experience that I've gained while studying here, for my deeper understanding of history, and for an always friendly atmosphere.

List of Used Abbreviations:

Agitprop – Department of Propaganda and Agitation

GARF – The State Archive of the Russian Federation

GKKS – The State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

Glavlit – The General Directorate for the Protection of Secrets of the State

RGANI – The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History

SIB – Soviet Information Bureau

SSOD – Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

TASS – Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union

VOKS – The State Committee for Overseas Cultural Ties

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Introduction

"Assistants of our Party" Khrushchev called journalists at a reception in the Kremlin, dedicated to the First all-Union Congress of Soviet Journalists. His explanation was then picked up and disseminated by the Party ideologists. "Why the assistants? Because you really always have the Party at hand. As soon as any decision is made, it is necessary to explain and implement, we appeal to you, and you as the correct transmission belt, take the decision of the Party and carry it into the midst of our people".¹ This special mission of journalists was fixed in expressions and slogans like:

You, journalists, occupy a place of honor in that great matter, which is under the leadership of the Party committing our people – builder of communism... long live the workers of the pen – journalists who, not sparing their strength, work for the benefit of the people, for the benefit of the construction of communism!²

The 1950s and early 1960s were the times of change within the news agencies and journalism in general in the Soviet Union. The question of a generational gap arises from the understanding of the contrast of Stalinist era and the Thaw. While the so-called ‘propaganda state’ under Stalin is seen as a machine under a full control of Glavlit,³ Khrushchev’s era was marked by a liberalization of many spheres of life, including journalism. Soviet openness to the interactions with the capitalist countries was embodied in exchanges and international summits. The authorities also hoped to extend the influence in the post-World War II Europe and in the former colonies.⁴ The heads of the news organizations were in the forefront of this transformation, as the openness required a change to the propaganda system.

¹ *Pravda*, 18 Nov, 1959.

² Ibid.

³ Peter Kenez, *The Birth of Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

⁴ Vladimir Pechatnov, "Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945-1947, *Cold War History*, №1, January 2001, 1-27; Dzhabangir G. Nadzhafov, "The Beginging of the Cold War between East and West: The Aggravation of Ideological Confrontation", *Cold War History*, Vol. 4, №. 2, January 2004, 140-174.

This research is dedicated to the understanding of Soviet propaganda⁵ abroad during the Thaw period focusing on the practices of planning and dividing the functions between the main Soviet news agencies of the time toward Nikita Khrushchev's trip to the United States in September 1959. TASS and Sovinformburo are the center of attention of this research as the largest and most prominent Soviet agencies for providing the information for other countries.⁶ Both were dependent on the state and received the directives from the Soviet officials. At the same time, their constant struggle for distributing and circulation of information faster than other news organizations and agencies is the point of comparison. Faster acquisition and then printing of information meant effectiveness of their mechanism and provided a monopoly on the Soviet point of view in the news.⁷

The title can be explained by historiographical tradition of portraying Soviet propaganda abroad. On one hand, in Cold War historiography, TASS was seen as the all-mighty news agency which was responsible for the most part of Soviet propaganda in the world. On the other hand, this was not true, as TASS was an executor of high-ranking officials' decisions, which were made in different institutions. I see the Soviet propaganda as a complex structure, which involved multiple ministries, committees, organizations, news agencies, and newspapers. The basis for this system was mostly in the interconnectedness on the personal level. The heads and top-rank officials from multiple institutions formally did not belong to the same system.⁸ However, they took part in the Soviet delegations during the trips abroad in the Thaw period, coordinated the press coverage of international events, corresponded about the re-organization of their contemporary propaganda system. This "human" dimension

⁵ The editors were directly calling the information 'propaganda' and had a rather positive connotation for it. This being said, they understood how this word was perceived in the capitalist countries and tried to avoid it there.

⁶ GARF, f. P9587, op. 1, d. 3, 'Dokumenty ob uchrezhdenii Aгенstva pechati Novosti, osnovnye polozheniya ob organizatsii', 1960-1961, ll. 5-15.

⁷ Nikolai Pal'gunov, *Osnovy informatsii v gazete: TASS i ego rol'*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1955, 5.

⁸ GARF, f. P9587, op. 1, d. 1, Protokoly # 1 - # 18 zasedaniy i postanovleniya Pravleniya APN.

brings into light the very core of the problems of the propaganda system during the Thaw period,⁹ explaining the tardiness of the news network, ineffectiveness of the attempts to transform it and so on.

The research has several limitations. First, since I will pay attention to the system's development in preparation for Khrushchev's trip and its consequences, I will limit the timeframe from 1953 until 1959.¹⁰ Second, I will concentrate only on the departments of the agencies which were preoccupied with propaganda in America. Third, although a large amount of research focuses on other propaganda media at the time (Soviet radio, particular newspapers and so on), I wanted to focus specifically on the under-researched news agencies and their operations as the key players on the international news arena.

Importance of News

One cannot start speaking about the news agencies without mentioning the very core of their existence – news. This day-to-day concept, when internationally disseminated, is widely debated in multiple contexts, bringing into question globalization and power relations,¹¹ capitalism and media imperialism,¹² totalitarianism and Sovietization.¹³ According to Denis McQuail, news is the prevalent form of current information about public events transmitted by media of all kinds.¹⁴ While there are many types and formats due to the cultural differences,

⁹ This sort of approach was used effectively in the following works: Dina Fainberg,, "Portrait of a Journalist as a Cold War Expert: Harrison Salisbury", *Journalism History*, Fall 2015, Vol. 41, Issue 3, 153-164. Mary-Catherine French, *Reporting Socialism: Soviet Journalism and the Journalists' Union, 1955–1966*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2014. Simon Huxtable, "Making News Soviet: Rethinking Journalistic Professionalism after Stalin, 1953–1970", *Contemporary European History*, 27(1), 59-84, etc.

¹⁰ Moreover, the group involved in the propaganda activities changed in 1960.

¹¹ Colin Sparks, *Globalization, Development and the Mass Media*, London: Sage Publications, 2007, John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

¹² Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney, *The Global Media – the New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism*, London: Continuum, 2004.

¹³ Gail Kligman, "Spreading the Word – Propaganda," in *The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 116-147, Marietta Stankova, "The Media and the Onset of the Cold War in Bulgaria 1944-1947," in Olaf Mertelsmann, ed., *Central and Eastern European Media under Dictatorial Rule and in the Early Cold War*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2011, 87-112.

¹⁴ Denis Mcquail, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, Cambridge: SAGE, 2009.

the quality of the news is usually appreciated if it is up-to-date, relevant, and reliable.¹⁵ Moreover, one can understand the significance of the news when it is being released by the amount of space or time dedicated to the report on the event in the media.

However, the scholar tradition mirrored Anglo-American current values and reflected it onto the Soviet propaganda system, which did not meet the Western ideal of news. The communication system of a country was a reflection of a moral superiority or inferiority.¹⁶ Since the press model was built by Anglo-American scholarship, good news was the American news. “Capitalist” tradition saw ideal news as objective, up-to-date, entertaining, free.¹⁷ However, since Marxism-Leninism propagates a class consciousness and does not see a possibility of information being objective, the journalists could not pursue the objective truth.¹⁸ It is questionable whether Marx would have approved the Soviet press model.¹⁹ However, the need to describe the Soviet press equaling Marxist press meant that it’s in fact a contrast of American and Soviet model, not Marxist and capitalist.²⁰

In the 1950s, instead of the word ‘news’, the Soviet preferred the word *informatsia* [information]. *Novosti* [news] was associated with the Western concept and, in the Soviet journalist’s eyes, implied its sensationalism, distortion of truth, and scandalousness. The Soviet information had to be truthful and objective but did not have to resemble

...a simple photograph, but to disseminate information that [on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory] gives an analysis of events, helps the reader to understand the essence of the phenomena and processes described and covered by this information.²¹

¹⁵ Mark Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*, New York: Pegasus, 1970.

¹⁶ Thomas Wolfe, *Governing Socialist Journalism. The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005, 11.

¹⁷ For example, Mark Hopkins explicitly compares the Soviet and American propaganda systems, finding the parallels in both. Acknowledging the differences, he sees the flaws in both systems and admits to the imperfection in news values of the USSR and the USA. Mark Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*, New York: Pegasus, 1970.

¹⁸ Vladimir Lenin. *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy. Moscow: Zveno Publishers, 1909, 28.

¹⁹ John C. Nerone, ed., *Last Rights: Revisited, Four Theories of the Press*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995, 147.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 127.

²¹ Nikolai Palgunov, *Osnovy informatsii v gazete: TASS i ego rol*. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1955, 1.

Going into details on differences between the news, during the 1950-1970ss, many researchers started to pay attention to the ways in which the Soviet Union created the news. Censorship, state-dependence, power relations were the center of attention of those works.²² They were written without the access to the information on the inner workings of the news system. Moreover, they had the Western values of news in mind. Later, the 1990s were marked by the end of the Cold War, which led to the deeper interest in the effects of the only surviving 'side' – capitalism. Consequently, the attention switched to the post-Soviet press of the newly-independent states of the region.

In this way, the Soviet press was studied from the positions of Cold War propaganda, journalism as a profession, press coverage of certain events, image-construction in the Soviet newspapers and so on.²³ Many of those pieces of research tended to overlook an important aspect of the interpersonal ties within the propaganda system due to the Cold War perspective that news production was a "machine", homogeneous and being state-dependent.²⁴ This issue also brings into the question the core of the totalitarian paradigm, with the help of which the Soviet news system was seen during the Cold War era.²⁵

More recent Cold War scholarship focuses on the state experts and intermediaries and their effects on the state policies. It pays much more attention to the networks of journalists and their agenda as the Cold War experts,²⁶ censors,²⁷ reformists of the press,²⁸ fighters with

²² For example, Fred Seaton Siebert, Theodore Peterson, Wilbur Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956; Antony Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*, London: Pall Mall, 1964, Theodore E. Kruglak, *The Two Faces of TASS*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.

²³ This issue is seen both in the new and old works on the topic. As in: Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*, New York : Pegasus, 1970. Yuri Smertin, "Word and Work of the NPA: Soviet Propaganda in Africa during the Cold War", *Astra Salvensis*. 2018, Issue 11, 257-288.

²⁴ For example, Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

²⁵ Antony Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*, London: Pall Mall, 1964.

²⁶ Dina Fainberg, "A Portrait of a Journalist as a Cold War Expert", *Journalism History*, Vol. 41, issue 3, 2015, 153-164.

²⁷ Samantha Sherry, "Better Something Than Nothing: The Editors and Translators of Inostrannaia Literatura as Censorial Agents", *Slavonic and East European Review*, №91 (4), 2013, 731- 758.

²⁸ Simon Huxtable, "Making News Soviet: Rethinking *Journalistic Professionalism after Stalin, 1953–1970*", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 27, issue 1, 2018, 59- 84.

Sovietization.²⁹ Additionally, an extensive strand of scholarship focuses on the professionalism of the Soviet journalists.³⁰ Mary-Catherine French explored the creation of the Union of Journalism and the shift in implications of being a journalist in Cold War.³¹ Without totalitarian paradigm in mind, journalists were the state-actors, however, they found the ways to communicate their issues to the officials or became officials themselves. Studying their network can be alternative or complimentary to the Cold War sides of the conflict, as they brought up the debates on pragmatism above the Party's hard line. I would argue that Soviet journalistic organizations were not faceless offices directly connected to the state but rather a network of individuals who pushed for the change in the system and tried to coordinate their actions to achieve better results.

The journalists took part in the process of governmental communication with the foreign public. They attempted to bring understanding of the Soviet ideals, institutions, and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.³² This kind of journalism can be considered a type of diplomacy as it was carried out in front of the world public in contrast to 'closed-door diplomacy'.³³ This new way of handling diplomatic representation has been called 'media diplomacy'.³⁴ It was pursued in forms of interviews, television broadcasts, press conferences, and media events dedicated to the visits of heads of the states and so on. I will exemplify this concept by analyzing Khrushchev's trip.

Think Globally, Act Locally: Examining New Agencies

²⁹ Vladimir Pechatnov, "Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945-47", *Cold War History*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2001, 1-27.

³⁰ For example, Thomas F. Remington, "Politics and Professionalism in Soviet Journalism", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1985, 489-503.

³¹ Mary-Catherine French, *Reporting Socialism: Soviet Journalism and the Journalists' Union, 1955-1966*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2014.

³² Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, 3.

³³ Eytan Gilboa, "Mass Communication and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework", *Communication Theory*, 10(3), 2000.

³⁴ Ibid, "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 12, issue 2, 2001.

Soviet news agencies were not news agencies in a Western sense. While capitalist news agencies tended to have own reporting sections, i.e. news room,³⁵ the Soviets collected and selected information in other ways. As one of the notes of Nikolai Palgunov, the head of TASS, on the work of news agencies says,

Aside from the supply with articles, commentaries, newspapers, the foreign media should get more information on the Soviet Union. It is a difficult task. We cannot be like other foreign news agencies. It is impossible because of the political factor. Our information will be specific and will touch upon important events. It will not be like a river but will be more precise and include more interesting and illustrative notes.³⁶

On that account, the Soviet news agencies did not just select and disseminate news. They were involved in different activities through the Soviet embassies, spread bulletins, books, brochures, took part in the organization of the exhibitions on the USSR abroad, were involved in the network of intelligence service, collected information for the Soviet government about the image of the USSR abroad.

Another special feature of the Soviet news agency was the character of dissemination of information. The Western news agency did not generally publish the news itself, as it mostly supplied information, ‘hard news’, to the subscribers. The shared cost of these transmissions was recognized as more effective and financially sustainable, hence, the spread of the biggest news agencies and the dependence on them from the local actors.³⁷ Even the news outlets with own extensive network of international correspondents couldn’t afford having all-regions-inclusive gathering of information.³⁸ In contrast, the Soviet news agency had their

³⁵ News rooms select and edit the incoming information under the great deal of pressure of time. The main responsibility of the news room is the preparation of so-called ‘hard news’ – information that can be used with little to no modification by other news media. However, it is very much worth the debate whether the ‘hard news’ exist in the first place, due not only to the more obvious reasons of not being able to make any report unopinionated but simply because the selection and re-editing of each news piece.

³⁶ Nikolai Pal’gunov, *Osnovy informatsii v gazete: TASS i ego rol’*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1955, 3.

³⁷ It is important to note that the biggest news outlets, newspapers and magazines, could have international news networks of their own, although much smaller than those established by news agencies. In the Soviet case, *Pravda*, *Izvestiia*, and *Trud* had their own networks of international correspondents.

³⁸ Safiya Usman, Baba Zanna Isa, Fati Usman Inuwa, Hajja Maimuna Sale, “News Agencies as Agents Of Globalization”, *Journal Of Humanities And Social Science*, Volume 21, Issue 6, Ver. 7 (June. 2016), 7-12.

own newspapers as a way of dissemination of information. They had those outlets in countries of both blocs and in non-alignment countries. They also did not rely on the profitability of network, as the outreach was important.

One of the most striking things, however, was the presence of two major news agencies in the USSR at the same time: TASS and Sovinformburo. TASS achieved its superior status (consequently, attention of the Western observers) not by the quality of its reports but by the association with the Party. It was the official spokesman of the government, as it was the source for following the Soviet policy: it published all main speeches by the Soviet officials, statutes, decrees. Separation of the activities between news agencies was potentially seen as a possibility for TASS to increase the speed of transmission of information. There was a project, according to which TASS would disseminate the official documents of the Soviet government, while Sovinformburo was supposed to supply the mass media abroad with the short commentary on those speeches and materials.³⁹ Nevertheless, the project was not realized, and news agencies continued their co-existence.

However, this extensive network costed a lot, hence, the question of dependency comes into place. Who paid for the news? Usually, government was involved in different forms: sponsorships, surveillance, directives. It also controlled news networks, mostly by having the personal or political ties, as well as funding the news agencies. What is important is that this feature is seen as being limited only to the news agencies within 'totalitarian' regimes, as Xinhua in China, TASS in the USSR, ČTK in Czechoslovakia, etc.⁴⁰ Mostly, the news agencies in the communist countries were described by having close ties to Ministry of Information or to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴¹ However, the news network was much

³⁹ GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 642, Predstavleniya, dokladnye zapiski, spravki po voprosam deyatel'nosti TASS (v CK KPSS).

⁴⁰ Antony Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*, London: Pall Mall, 1964.

⁴¹ *The Globalization of News*, edited by Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen, London: Sage Publications, 1998.

more complicated than that, involving dozens of organizations, actors, and forms of cooperation.

The Network within the News Network

The links between the organizations and people can be identified in multiple ways: signatures under the documents, correspondence, mentions of the names in the documents. Moreover, these officials usually formed a core of Soviet delegations visiting different countries. For example, Yuri Zhukov, the head of the State Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, visited Britain six times between 1945 and 1963. He attended the Stockholm session the World Peace Council in 1954 and the Vienna meeting of its Politburo in 1955. He covered the Berlin and Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1955. In that year, he also accompanied Bulganin and Khrushchev their much-publicized tour of India and Burma. In 1959, he accompanied Khrushchev on his tour of the United States.

The additional factor of understanding of a high status of a person within this information hierarchy was the TASS's *vestnik* of information – unfiltered versions of news from the West for the top-rank officials.⁴² These people had an access to the information, which no one also in the country could read due to the inaccessibility of the foreign press, jamming of Western broadcasts and so on. Hence, they were the only ones who needed the full picture to decide on the ways of leading propaganda and counter-propaganda abroad.

The awareness of the human factor provides the researcher with shedding the light on interpersonal connections which played a huge role in the Khrushchev's era. After Stalin's death, the interconnectedness between the propaganda institutions increased mainly due to the personal factors. International news workers challenged Soviet habits of working with information. Many of the most serious critics of these habits were the Soviet journalists who

⁴² GARF, f. 4459, op. 39, d. 28, Sluzhebnyi vestnik informatsii TASS.

were *mezhdunarodniki*, columnists who specialized in foreign affairs. The most obvious proof to it is the time when Khrushchev was denounced as the Soviet Premier, as well as many of the heads of established during his rule committees and organizations because of association with his group.⁴³

Sources

The research was conducted based on the materials from several Archives. The State Archive of the Russian Federation contains several funds on the Soviet news agencies: Sovinformburo,⁴⁴ TASS,⁴⁵ and Novosti Press Agency,⁴⁶ as well as material on the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.⁴⁷ The documents in the Archive contain minutes of meetings, official correspondence with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and different ministries, estimated expenses, plans of publications, official notes on their work and principles, printability reports. The scope of these documents makes it feasible to look inside their everyday routine, statistics, strategy, mistakes, level of competition between them, technical supply. The fund of the Union of Journalists also came in handy and helped me with a better understanding of the personal entanglements of the high-rank journalists.⁴⁸

⁴³ Even the most prominent press officials like Adzhubei and Zhukov, although not being fully erased from the map, did not hold any high positions after the second half of the 1960s. As in: Adzhubei, Alexei, 1968-1993; HU OSA 300-85-13:4/6; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Soviet Red Archives: USSR Biographical Files; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest; Zhukov, Georgij (Jurij) Aleksandrovich, 1955-1981; HU OSA 300-80-7:136/1097; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Soviet Red Archives: USSR Biographical Files; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

⁴⁴ GARF, f. P8581– ‘Sovetskoe informatsionnoe byuro (Sovinformbyuro) pri Gosudarstvennom komitete po kulturnym svyazyam s zarubezhnymi stranami pri Sovete ministrov SSSR’, 1941-1961.

⁴⁵ GARF, f. P4459– ‘Telegrafnoe agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza pri Sovete ministrov SSSR (TASS)’, 1925-1990.

⁴⁶ GARF, f. P9587– ‘Agentstvo pechati “Novosti” ’, 1961-1991.

⁴⁷ GARF, f. P9518– ‘Komitet po kul'turnym svyazyam s zarubezhnymi stranami pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR’, 1957- 1957.

⁴⁸ GARF, f.10124– ‘Soyuz zhurnalistov SSSR’ 1956-1992.

The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History provided my research with the sources on the activities of Department of Propaganda and Agitation.⁴⁹ The correspondence and statutes within these materials unveiled the technical side of propaganda, as they mostly discussed visa issues, lack of the paper, budget cuts and so on. Most importantly, the combination of the materials from the State Archive of the Russian Federation and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History made it possible to see the exact distribution of duties within the propaganda system and principles of its work.

Open Society Archive's materials were used, as they were inherited by the Archive from Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, making available the 'Western' gaze on the Soviet propaganda activities, showcasing the work of their monitoring units on the trips, institutional changes within the USSR, collection of biographical files and so on.⁵⁰

In chapter 1, I will look at the reasons for change in the propaganda structure, as well as the transformation and creation of new institutions in this field. Second chapter focuses on the personal aspect of the system and pays attention to the interconnectedness of news professionals. Third chapter will exemplify the preparations and conclusions for media events by the Soviet journalists with a focus on the American exhibition in Moscow in July 1959, and Khrushchev's trip to the United States in September 1959.

To sum up, I believe that the Soviet news agencies are an under-researched topic, as they were looked at from the position of totalitarian paradigm. It made them sound fully dependent on the state, homogenous, and faceless. Additionally, it was mostly TASS which was looked at,⁵¹

⁴⁹ RGANI, f. 5– 'Apparat TSK KPSS', 1949–1991.

⁵⁰ Of course, I do see the problem of making comparisons to the imagined 'Western' journalistic practices, somewhat of an ideal Weberian type of capitalist news. Despite this, I still think it is still relevant to my research, as both sides believed in this distinction and developed their media systems keeping in mind those specificities, sometimes borrowing techniques 'from the other side' of the Iron Curtain and sometimes constructing their own missions in contrast to the other kind of journalistic practices.

⁵¹ As in: Anthony Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*, New York: Praeger, 1964; Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*, New York : Pegasus, 1970; Theodore E. Kruglak, *The Two Faces of TASS*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.

while Sovinformburo was only described as a war-time propaganda organization.⁵² What I want to bring into the light is the network of interpersonal connections between the participants of the Soviet propaganda system during the Thaw. This approach will bring a better understanding of the process of transformation of news agencies and journalist profession in general during this time.

Chapter 1

Institutional Changes

In this chapter, I will investigate the Soviet propaganda system from 1945 until 1959. In order to understand where the journalists worked, I have to re-construct the propaganda apparatus. My analysis will show the overlapping functions of Soviet organizations and committees, as well as a complicated subordination system. I will show why the re-configuration of these institutions happened in the post-war USSR and why it was unsuccessful. After that, I will explain what changed in the 1950s and why it was possible to achieve better results at this time. I will conclude this chapter by delineating the functions of multiple organizations, so in the next chapter I will be able to understand the intersection of journalists' duties.

1.1 The Soviet Post-War Press

By May of 1945, the Soviet press was structured as a military press, carefully designed for the wartime conditions. The end of the war caused the need not only to reorganize the press system, but also to re-direct its efforts towards the problems of economic construction. The country faced a difficult task of restoration and further development of the national economy. However, it is not only about the reorganization of the press. The post-war years led to

⁵² As in: Elizabeth Waters, *Heroism in the Frame: Gender, Nationality and Propaganda in Tashkent and Moscow, 1924-1945*, New York: Palgrave, 2018.

significant changes in all parts of the media system. The propaganda institutions had overlapping duties, were slow, and did not correspond to the needs of a peaceful time.

These issues were meant to be resolved by a special organization – Department of Propaganda and Agitation. From 1945 to 1953, problems of international propaganda were dealt with within the framework of the Department's various sectors, such as the sectors of Radio Broadcasting, Publishing Houses, Magazines, Literature and Science.⁵³ As Vladimir Pechatnov showed in his article, multiple commissions were organized in the late 1940s in order to identify the problems of Soviet international propaganda.⁵⁴ These commissions, headed by a chairman of Agitprop Georgii Aleksandrov, concluded that despite the overall centralization of the propaganda system, it caused, in fact, a competitive atmosphere between the Soviet organizations.⁵⁵ The supervision was separate, too – the organizations were subordinate to CC departments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other institutions. After these conclusions of these commissions were drawn, no real effect was achieved. Examined organizations like VOKS, Sovinformburo and others continued to perform the way they did before.⁵⁶ One of the commissions went as far as to deem the work of SIB unsatisfactory and its personnel – insufficient.⁵⁷ Another commission concluded that a close supervision of Agitprop over journalists and their background is necessary⁵⁸.

Only by the mid-1950s, the country had formed a system of training journalists for the press, radio, and later for television. On the basis of the departments of journalism of philological faculties of Moscow, Leningrad and other universities, faculties of journalism were established.⁵⁹ Training of journalists was also carried out in the system of higher party

⁵³ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 13.

⁵⁴ Vladimir Pechatnov, "Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945-1947", *Cold War History*, №1, January 2001, 1-27.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 7.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 22.

⁵⁷ GARF, f. 8581, op. 2, d. 231, Otchet o rabote s kadrami Sovinformburo.

⁵⁸ RGANI, f. 5, op. 15, d. 34.

⁵⁹ Nikolaj Pal'gunov, *Osnovy informacii v gazete: TASS i ego rol'*, Moscow, 1955, 4.

education, in regional and inter-republican party schools. The so-called class approach and party journalism remained the main requirements for the press and journalists. Moreover, party membership of journalists was interpreted literally. Most of them had to be party members, to follow the party discipline, carry out the party line. In their work, all publications should be based on the party's guidance materials on the leadership of the press, radio and television. Journalists were seen as “the vanguard party”.⁶⁰ Special status was given to correspondents of the central newspapers like *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Trud* [Labor], *Sovetskaya Rossiya* [Soviet Russia] and others.

1.2 News Agencies

In the system of the Soviet foreign propaganda, a special role belonged to the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). It provided operational information messages at the all-Union and international level. TASS had a correspondent network within the country and abroad. It formed an information system of the country, which included the following units: Union Information, Foreign Information, Socialist Countries, information for Abroad, Photo Information, the Main Communication Department.⁶¹ The main Editorial Board of Information Abroad (RIDZ) selected information about the USSR for foreign subscribers. In the post-war years, the re-organization of TASS has been intensively carried out. The agency's internal network was developing. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic republics restored and expanded the Republican branches of TASS, the local party and Soviet organs created the republican news agencies – RATAU, BelTA, etc. In the apparatus of TASS, regional main offices were organized. However, there was still a strict centralization of the activities of the Republican and local branches of TASS.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 2.

⁶¹ RGANI, f.5, op. 76, d. 216, l. 52.

The changes in the world demanded the expansion of the TASS foreign information service. By the mid-1950s, the agency's correspondent offices were opened in many countries of Eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. The increasing flow of foreign information required its selection, systematization, differentiated distribution. The solution of these problems was taken over by the regional offices created in the structure of the foreign information service of TASS by groups of countries or continents.

However, the role of TASS also changed due to the creation of other institutions, too. The head of the news agency admitted to its limited influence by the 1950s, saying that, "TASS was established as the exclusive apparatus of the Soviet information. It should be said, however, that this monopoly is now to a certain extent limited by the fact that new information devices have emerged and are operating in connection with the needs of the country: the radio information Department under the Ministry of culture, the Soviet information Bureau."⁶²

With the end of the war, another Soviet news agency – Sovinformburo (SIB) – lost its main function – propaganda amidst the battles and the territories which were newly-lost or conquered.⁶³ Hence, in its operation during peaceful time, it performed functions which were doubling the TASS's duties. Sovinformburo was occupied by dissemination of official materials and government statements, as well as writing materials for the newspapers abroad. It was especially noticeable in some regions: two organizations sent out the same materials to India, Libya, Iran, GDR and so on. At the same time, TASS and SIB had different equipment: for example, SIB had a teletype connection with Budapest, and TASS did not. Nikolai Palgunov proposed to combine the agencies so that the work was carried out from a single center; it would be possible to make the SIB Department at the "newly-created Office of

⁶² Nikolaj Pal'gunov, *Zametki ob informacii*, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1967, 27.

⁶³ In connection with the need for a more rapid dissemination of information about events at the front, on June 24, 1941 the Soviet information Bureau was created.

Foreign Information of TASS" but Sovinformburo needed to be performing under its name. The proposal was rejected because the authorities were hoping for re-purposing SIB after some time.⁶⁴ Hence, the agencies continued to perform simultaneously.

1.3 Monitoring and Measuring Change

The simultaneous work, necessitated a way to assess the performance of news agencies. Both agencies established departments for tracking down their printability – the amount of articles in which newspapers cited or referred to information provided by Sovinformburo or TASS. The TASS Department for monitoring of *pechataemost'* [printability] of the Soviet materials was established in 1948.⁶⁵ Printability was tracked down by the correspondence with journalists staying abroad, by contacting TASS correspondents who would send the informational summaries of printability of Soviet information, and, more importantly, how this information was used in the press. Reviewing information of foreign agencies received by TASS was also an important way of seeing if the Soviet information was printed. The employees of the Department, freelance assistants, editors, and translators of InoTASS,⁶⁶ RIDZ,⁶⁷ and Radio Editorial⁶⁸ were occupied by this function. RIDZ transmitted the overview of the newspapers later than Moscow Radio and it affects the printability.⁶⁹

In the case of Sovinformburo, its functions were mostly limited to monitoring the press within the Eastern Bloc and issuing of Soviet bulletins, including the bulletins of TASS. They suggested, however, to disseminate information in a different form, as bulletins were immediately seen as propaganda. They also insisted on the new contracts with other news

⁶⁴ RGANI, f.5, op. 76, d. 210, CK KPSS ot glavy TASS.

⁶⁵ GARF, f. P4459, op. 11, d. 1290, Operativnye prikazy po Telegrafnomu Agentstvu Sovetskogo Soyuza (TASS) s № 1 po № 32.

⁶⁶ International department, occupied mostly by the collection of information.

⁶⁷ Редакция информации для заграницы – editorial for information abroad.

⁶⁸ Occupied with transmission for and with radio.

⁶⁹ It also created problems, since there was no close contact between two departments of TASS – Union Information and Foreign Information, hence, the propagandists from the domestic market did not know what kind of information should be collected to be further sent to the international propaganda offices.

agencies to increase the index of printed materials.⁷⁰ For example, for a number of countries, the printability was not clear (Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Iran, Netherlands, Latin America) or was poorly studied (Australia, Egypt, China, etc.)⁷¹ due to the lack of Soviet newspapers in these languages or the lack of specialists who knew these languages.

The news agencies also lacked insight on the specifics of each foreign editorial. Every newspaper and magazine had its own focus on particular topics, hence, the race to the increase printability rate did not mean the quantitative improvement of the situation but also stepping up the quality. The information had to be unique, and the thematic overview of the Soviet pre-planned publications had to be of a better variety. For being published in the capitalist press, the goal was to make the Soviet information more concise, with specification of geographic locations and explanations of terms which might be unknown to the reader. Palgunov wrote on about this problem in his book, “If it is a new machine – what’s so new about it? If it’s a sport event – what was not only the result but also the characteristics of a particular match or game?”⁷²

Orientation towards the political direction of the newspaper also was a key factor of being published.⁷³ Hence, news agencies were not only to suggest their news to the most progressive or socialist-oriented editors but also to write more neutrally to be included on the pages of more politically balanced newspapers. At the same time, the fluctuation could be caused by the instability within particular country, changing status within the governments and so on. The speediness of information also needed to be increased. For example, there was no night shift at the offices of the news agencies, and a lot of information from distant regions, due to the time difference, could not be received and printed in time if the event happened in the

⁷⁰ GARF, f. P4459, op. 39, d. 25, Predlozheniya po uluchsheniyu rasprostraneniya informacii TASS; polozhenie s rasprostraneniem informacii TASS za granicej.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Nikolaj Pal’gunov, *Osnovy informacii v gazete: TASS i ego rol’*, Moscow, 1955, 15.

⁷³ TASS information was obtained not by newspapers, but by local news agencies, which often translated and distributed information themselves. SIB targeted specific newspapers instead.

evening or at night. The high officials did not introduce the night shift but just suggested to immediately submit the information in the evening, so the material might be finished earlier in the morning. Sovinformburo did now work on Sundays, so all the information from Saturday just stayed in the office until Monday.

The speed of transmission also could be changed by the very type of information.⁷⁴ If it were short messages without any commentary remarks, editing would take much less time, hence, this measure was recommended to the news agencies at the time. The content of the news was also criticized by Palgunov, the head of the TASS at the time, for ‘the lack of international coverage, ‘screaming’ tone of the articles, the lack of fact-checking and proofreading, not avoiding the mockery of the heads of the foreign states’.⁷⁵ More importantly, the document with the critique was also related to the other instances of Propaganda, as it was signed by Andrei Vyshinskiy,⁷⁶ Mikhail Suslov,⁷⁷ and Vladimir Vinogradov.⁷⁸ He goes on by saying that both TASS and Sovinformburo are suffering from the inexpressive language, not taking into account the specificity of the regions, and multiple repetitions. Photo-materials were a huge disadvantage of the Soviet news agencies due to the poor quality. While 2 million pictures were made in 1949, only one-tenth of this amount was sent abroad.⁷⁹ The quality got worse not only because of the outdated equipment of photo-correspondents but also because of the poor quality of ink and paper.⁸⁰

The need for an analytical center for the study of Soviet-American relations with the subsequent adoption of practical recommendations was evident to the Party. Americans just

⁷⁴ TASS information was reported to the subscribers mainly by the teletype, telephoto, wired communication lines and radio, and was sent by mail in ballots. Within the USSR, the TASS teletype network covered more than 200 cities. The total length of its lines – 140 thousand km, and the duration of the agency's transmissions abroad in six languages – Russian, English, Spanish, Arabic, French and German – amounted to hundreds of hours a day but still was not enough.

⁷⁵ GARF, f. P4459, op. 38, d. 433, Predstavleniya, dokladnye zapiski, spravki po voprosam deyatel'nosti TASS.

⁷⁶ The Minister of foreign Affairs of the USSR.

⁷⁷ At that time, Suslov was a head of Foreign Policy department of the CPSU Central Committee.

⁷⁸ Deputy head of the Department of trade with Western countries of the Ministry of foreign trade of the USSR.

⁷⁹ GARF, f. P4459, op. 38, d. 433, Predstavleniya, dokladnye zapiski, spravki po voprosam deyatel'nosti TASS.

⁸⁰ Ibid, f. P8581, op. 1, d. 32, o tekhnicheskoy-material'noy baze Sovinformbyuro.

created the new US news Agency – USIA – in 1953 and the Soviets felt threatened by it.⁸¹ Organizational and personnel metamorphoses of the divisions of Agitprop demonstrated the desire of management to intensify analytical work related not only to the reception but also to the processing of information, the flow of which was truly enormous.

Overall, the press system developed by 1953 did not meet the requirements of a peaceful time. There was an urgent need for the restructuring of the press, its further development. In the USSR, foreign policy propaganda-wise was carried out on the basis of the functioning of a number of interacting structures involved in the collection, systematization, and analysis of information for the organization of propaganda activities abroad, and to counter hostile propaganda on the Soviet society from the outside. However, the measures undertaken and data-collection of its real effectiveness have shown, that news steps need to be undergone in order to make Soviet propaganda truly work.

1.4 Catch up and Overdo: Propaganda in the Late 1950s

«Any political news takes hold of public opinion in the version that it first learned about.»⁸²

Nikolai Palgunov

In 1957, the Central Committee of the CPSU indicated serious organizational and substantive problems of the Soviet cultural and information policy abroad, which necessitated the structural reform of the system of public authorities: a) the discrepancy between the scope and level of Soviet propaganda to foreign countries and the tasks of the Soviet state; b) the lack of proper initiative of the relevant ministries, departments and public organizations; c) the passive, defensive nature of propaganda to foreign countries; d) the random nature of activity and lack of initiative in the implementation of cultural relations with foreign

⁸¹ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 86, ll. 89-102.

⁸² Nikolaj Pal'gunov, *Zametki ob informacii*, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1967, 27.

countries; e) bureaucratic attitude to the initiatives of organizations and individuals from the countries of people's democracy in the organization of cultural relations; e) the fragmentation, unsystematic actions of state institutions, agencies and public organizations, the lack of thought-out plans; g) the lack of control over the implementation of agreements on cultural cooperation; h) the poor condition of the material and technical base of organizations engaged in propaganda on foreign countries.⁸³

These problems were meant to be solved by a newly established organization – the State Committee of Cultural Relations with Foreign countries under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (later in the text – GKKS). This organization was established in March of 1957 in order to improve Soviet propaganda to foreign countries because "our propaganda was not up to par".⁸⁴ Throughout its existence, the State Committee of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was directly subordinate to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU.⁸⁵ The decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the organization of foreign policy propaganda and cultural relations with foreign countries became a key focus of the Committee. This, in particular, is evidenced by the discussion at the meetings of the Committee on the implementation of the relevant decisions of the CPSU Central Committee, decisions of the Plenums of the CPSU, etc.

To eliminate certain shortcomings of Soviet performance, GKKS was supposed to provide measures mainly of an organizational nature – the concretization of plans, implementation of planning based on the proposals of grass-roots organizations, to work more closely with the implementing organizations and regulatory agencies in the preparation of exchanges, etc. In turn, the substantive recommendations of the GKKS to address the shortcomings of Soviet

⁸³ GARF, f. 9518, op. 1, d. 2, Postanovleniya Soveta Ministrov SSSR, otnosyashchiesya k deyatel'nosti Komiteta.

⁸⁴ Ibid, d. 1, Ukazy Prezidiuma Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR, otnosyashchiesya k deyatel'nosti Komiteta po kul'turnym svyazyam s zarubezhnymi stranami pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

international activities were, as a rule, of the most general nature. They included references to the need to increase the "propaganda load" of the activities carried out, the need to prepare activities taking into account the specifics of each country, the mention that cultural materials should "promote the success of the Soviet people in the Communist construction", etc.⁸⁶

The general purpose of the GKKS's work was designated as "leadership and coordination of the activities of [Soviet] organizations in the field of cultural relations with foreign countries".⁸⁷ In the field of information, the main tasks of the Committee were: a) management of radio broadcasting abroad, publication and distribution of printed materials abroad; b) supply of foreign periodicals with materials about life in the Soviet Union and its foreign policy; c) development of methods for improving propaganda on foreign countries, the study of foreign propaganda, and analysis of the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda on foreign countries; d) coordination of plans of ministries, departments and organizations in the field of Soviet propaganda on foreign countries, the preparation of relevant proposals for the Central Committee of the CPSU. In the field of cultural relations with foreign countries, among the tasks of GKKS were the development of measures (plans) for the development of relevant international agreements, coordination of the work of Soviet institutions and organizations, as well as monitoring the implementation of tasks assigned to Soviet institutions and organizations.⁸⁸ The key functions of the GKKS were to plan and guide the work of Soviet state and public organizations in the field of cultural and information interaction with foreign countries. In this regard, GKKS was conceived by the Party leadership of the country as a single center of operational management of the efforts of the Soviet Union in the field of media diplomacy, understood in a broad sense – as a set of propaganda measures aimed at forming public opinion abroad .

⁸⁶ Ibid, d. 4, Prikazy po komitetu №№ 1 - 237 za 1957 g.

⁸⁷ Ibid, d. 2, Postanovleniya Soveta Ministrov SSSR, odnosyashchiesya k deyatel'nosti Komiteta.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

In addition, the Central Committee of the CPSU approved draft plans of cultural cooperation prepared by GKKS and approved the already signed international agreements.⁸⁹ Another aspect of the interaction of the Committee with the top-Party leadership was the preparation of inquiries for the departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the state of affairs in the field of foreign policy propaganda and cultural cooperation with foreign countries. The focus of the inquiries of the Committee were the international Department (International Relations Department of the Communist parties of the capitalist countries) and the Department of Agitation and Propaganda (Ideological Department).

Moreover, GKKS among other state and public structures engaged in the propaganda accompaniment of the key events organized by the Central Committee of the Communist party, for example, Party conferences and anniversaries of the October Revolution.⁹⁰ Finally, the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee was also authorized to regulate key internal issues of the Committee's activities. In particular, in the duties of the CPSU Central Committee was the appointment or the dismissal of the leadership of the Committee, the legal status of the members of the Committee on business trips abroad in the Soviet delegations, authorizing the conduct of talks about the plans for cultural cooperation with foreign countries and other similar questions.

Most of the functions associated with direct participation in the implementation of cultural relations with foreign countries, GKKS performed in cooperation with the USSR Foreign Ministry. In particular, GKKS was responsible for the distribution through the Soviet embassies abroad of various information and propaganda materials, for the organization at the Soviet embassies of films for free viewing of Soviet films, for the organization of work

⁸⁹ Ibid, d. 4, Prikazy po komitetu №№ 1 - 237 za 1957 g.

⁹⁰ Ibid, op. 1a, d. 15, Perepiska s Ministerstvom kul'tury SSSR o kul'turnom sotrudnichestve s zarubezhnymi stranami.

with foreign correspondents accredited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.⁹¹ In addition, it should be borne in mind that all the main activities on cultural and information cooperation with foreign countries (conversations with representatives of foreign public and business circles, coordination of cultural cooperation plans with official representatives of foreign countries, the organization of certain cultural exchanges, etc.) were carried out with the participation of employees of Soviet embassies abroad, performing key mediation functions. In addition, all the basic information about foreign contractors in the field of cultural cooperation, as well as coverage of cultural and information activities of the USSR in foreign media, also accumulated mainly in Soviet embassies.⁹² The need for constant operational contact with the Soviet embassies was keenly felt by the leadership and staff of the GKKS.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR, mainly regulated the material and technical aspects of the State Committee for cultural relations with foreign countries. Most of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in relation to the activities of the Committee was associated with the issuance of permits for the expenditure of GKKS funds for the performance of representative functions (receptions of delegations, dinners, etc.), as well as with the material and technical support of "decisions of instance" adopted in relation to the activities of GKKS.

In most of the cases, the functions of the GKKS were limited to planning and monitoring the implementation of plans for cultural cooperation with foreign countries through individual ministries, departments and institutions – the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Professional Education, the Ministry of Health, the Union of Writers, the Academy of Sciences, etc.

⁹¹ Ibid, d. 6, Dokladnye zapiski, informacii, spravki, napravlennye v CK KPSS o kul'turnom sotrudnichestve s zarubezhnymi stranami

⁹² Ibid, d. 8, Perechen' voprosov, obsuzhdaemyh na zasedaniyah Komiteta za 1957-1967 gg.

Thus, it can be seen that GKKS was a structure of double subordination in the system of Soviet authorities. The substantive aspects of the activities of the GKKS, as well as key issues of its internal organization, were controlled directly by the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. In turn, the Council of Ministers of the USSR in relation to the GKKS mainly played the role of a source of logistics activities with the right to demand financial statements. However, the creation of a new Party organ did not mean that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation was forgotten. From 1953 to 1962, international propaganda, as in the previous period, was also supervised by different sub-departments and sectors of the Department of propaganda and agitation of the CPSU Central Committee. The main functions of the Ideological Apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee on foreign policy propaganda were as follows: information and propaganda work with foreign tourists; control over the departure of Soviet citizens abroad; censorship and control over the import of foreign press (newspapers, magazines, books); spreading the Soviet agitation and propaganda materials abroad; resistance to hostile broadcasting; implementation of the Soviet broadcasting abroad; propaganda within international institutions; study of methods and techniques of the ideological policy of the countries of the West and the United States for the organization of counter-propaganda.

An important activity of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee concerned cooperation with the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Reference materials, reports, and memos in the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the State and Measures of Improving Soviet International Propaganda" are an important source for understanding the scope and content of the activities of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the dissemination of the Soviet periodicals abroad.

A separate activity of the sub-Department of International Propaganda was the leadership over the Unions of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. SSODs were created in 1958 and served as effective channels of propaganda work of the ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee.⁹³ The tasks of the SSOD were determined primarily by the need for extensive information work with the foreign public, including foreigners—graduates of Soviet educational institutions, in order to form Pro-Soviet sentiments in foreign countries. They were used not only to disseminate the necessary information about the Soviet Union counter-propaganda in relation to the flow of information from the United States, but also as centers for the study of practical activities of foreign countries, methodical associations to assist in the study of the Russian language and Soviet culture abroad. The main forms of propaganda activities of SSOD were reports on topical issues on Soviet lifestyle, the display of works by Soviet artists, popular science and documentary films, the exchange of delegations and individual cultural figures, the acquisition and direction of tourist groups in the USSR. Each year, only the Republican society held about 25,000 events dedicated to foreign countries, their history, science, art, anniversaries and memorable dates, as well as solidarity with the peoples of Indochina, the Middle East, Africa, Chile.

Of course, the creation of friendship societies required certain financial efforts on the part of the USSR, which is confirmed by the documents. Thus, in October of 1956, financial assistance was provided to the society "France–USSR". It was stated that "the amount of 114 thousand rubles in foreign currency is needed to cover the debts of the company".⁹⁴ On August 31, 1961, the Society of Soviet-American relations was created in Moscow, which was an important step for the organization of Soviet propaganda in the United States.

⁹³ The organization itself was created in 1958 but, in fact, it just replaced VOKS and took over the administration of many pre-existing unions of friendship.

⁹⁴ GARF, f. P9576, op. 1, d. 6, Protokol № 3 zasedaniya Prezidiuma Soveta SSOD.

Structural changes did not contribute to a radical improvement in international propaganda, but rather caused for some time the disorganization in management, which was associated with a change in the functional tasks of the newly formed sectors. It should be noted that the sub-Department of International Propaganda was of significant importance, associated with the problems of affecting public perception of the image of the USSR. It was, in fact, the coordinating organization of the information policy of the USSR – the direction of social and political life of the country, which began to acquire an increasing enormous role in geopolitical development in the postwar period.

In addition, the concentration of the entire foreign policy of the USSR propaganda in one structure that would not duplicate the others and coordinate the work of other agencies was clearly lacking. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation was seen as coordinating center, until May 12, 1965, when a decree of the Presidium of the CC CPSU ideological Department was abolished following the creation of independent departments of the Central Committee of the Communist party.

It seems that this was due not only to material and technical difficulties, limited financial resources, but also to the massiveness, weak flexibility of the Party structure, which was directly engaged in solving issues of foreign policy propaganda. In this regard, the system created by the ideological apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, were much inferior to the similar bodies of the United States.

In sum, I have uncovered three layers of the system.

- 1) Chief Propaganda Organizations: Department of Propaganda and Agitation (Agitprop), The State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (GKKS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These three divisions were responsible for most of the planning (in case of GKKS, also execution) of the Soviet propaganda abroad. They held the meetings discussing the ways of improving the effectiveness of soft

power measures taken,⁹⁵ agreed on the limitations of budget and so on. Many documents of the organizations, officially unrelated to the mentioned above institutions, were, however, signed by the chiefs of these departments: Leonid Ilyichev (Agitprop)⁹⁶ and Yuri Zhukov (GKKS).⁹⁷

- 2) Executive organizations: TASS, Sovinformburo, APN, *Mezhdunarodnaia kniga* [International Book], SSOD, VOKS. These organizations are the first-hand executors of the propaganda plans, responsible for the dissemination of news about the Soviet Union, printed materials, organizations of exhibitions abroad, signing of all kinds of exchange agreements and so on. The main figures here are the heads of TASS – Nikolai Palgunov (until 1960) and later Dmitrii Goryunov (since 1960),⁹⁸ who were trying to coordinate the work of other organizations in the group but still were subordinate to GKKS and Agitprop.
- 3) Individual newspapers with their own “foreign correspondent offices”: *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Trud*, *USSR*. These newspapers were especially influential during the Thaw era.⁹⁹ For that reason, they were heavily monitored by the ‘Western observers’¹⁰⁰ and served as the reporters of the deeds of the Party not only on the domestic market but

⁹⁵ More on the soft power in the USSR in: Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961*, New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997.

⁹⁶ Il'ichjov, Leonid Fjodorovich, 1952-1990; HU OSA 300-80-7:148/1194; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Soviet Red Archives: USSR Biographical Files; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

⁹⁷ Zhukov, Georgij (Juriij) Aleksandrovich, 1955-1981; HU OSA 300-80-7:136/1097; Ibid.

⁹⁸ Neither have separate files at Open Society Archives. Moreover, their names are rarely mentioned in the reports of Radio Free Europe's and Radio Liberty's monitoring units.

⁹⁹ This notion is especially true for *Izvestia*, because the editor-in-chief, Adzhubei, was married to Khrushchev's daughter, had a lot of power, and significantly raised the printability of the newspaper.

¹⁰⁰ Of course, I do see the problem of making comparisons to the imagined ‘Western’ journalistic practices, somewhat of an ideal Weberian type of capitalist news. Despite this, I still think it is still relevant to my research, as both sides believed in this distinction and developed their media systems keeping in mind those specificities, sometimes borrowing techniques ‘from the other side’ of the Iron Curtain and sometimes constructing their own missions in contrast to the other kind of journalistic practices.

also abroad. Influential figures in this category are Aleksei Adzhubei, editor-in-chief of *Izvestia*,¹⁰¹ and Pavel Satyukov, editor-in-chief of *Pravda*.¹⁰²

1.5 Control of News Agencies

TASS closely followed the operation of GKKS, making the notes on the its work and effects on news agency's performance. Palgunov insisted on the exclusion of the point on the control of TASS, saying that there was not need in the supervision of TASS by GKKS, as it is a job for Agitprop.¹⁰³ Moreover, he claimed that the separation of the control on domestic information and international information would hurt TASS performance. TASS working both for international and domestic market, could not see itself being divided into several spheres of control, it would be fake and unrealistic and would affect negatively the already existing routine.¹⁰⁴

Next, Agitprop did not engage itself in propaganda operations of TASS but functioned as a planner, guide, supervisor and policeman over all appropriate government agencies. With responsibility for propaganda policies and decisions and for disseminating Party policy throughout the USSR, Agitprop had the task of determining how TASS reports should be edited to make them ideologically correct.

Glavlit (Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing) is another agency which shared the control over TASS and Sovinformburo. As the main government censorship agency with the right of 'political, ideological, military and economic control' over all

¹⁰¹ Adzhubei, Alexei, 1968-1993; HU OSA 300-85-13:4/6; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Soviet Red Archives: USSR Biographical Files; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

¹⁰² Satjukov, Pavel Alekseevich, 1955 – 1971; HU OSA 300-80-7:285/2166; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Soviet Red Archives: USSR Biographical Files; *ibid*.

¹⁰³ RGANI, f..5, op. 15, d. 72, Tovarishchu V.P. Tereshkinu. CK CPSS. 14 dekabrya 1959. Za podpis'yu Nikolaya Pal'gunova.

¹⁰⁴ Moreover, he illustrates his point by stating that GKKS so far not only has not helped TASS, but on the opposite, slowed down its operations in Indonesia and other regions, being an obstacle for unknown reasons.

published material, as well as the right to prohibit publication, Glavlit is authorized to station its representatives at all places of publication; the law makes specific reference to ‘telegraphic agencies’. It is not known to me, whether TASS availed itself of this right or of its right to appoint responsible editors of publications to act as its agents. At the very least, TASS materials were subject to Glavlit pre-publication censorship to prevent disclosure to military secrets.¹⁰⁵

Yet, there was another controlling institution. Judicially TASS was a state-owned enterprise attached directly to the Council of Ministers, and Sovinformburo was subordinate to GKKS. However, both were connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First, the status of TASS as an official arm of the Soviet government provided the employees of TASS with diplomatic immunity when they get into trouble abroad. Second, TASS, Sovinformburo, and Soviet embassies operated in close contact. TASS personnel and Soviet diplomats were often billeted in the same building, while TASS offices are usually located on mission premises or adjacent to them. In many instances, TASS and Sovinformburo made use of available diplomatic facilities such as the pouch and telecommunications.¹⁰⁶ As a rule, TASS correspondents carry Soviet ‘service’ passports and, on occasion, diplomatic passports.

Concluding Remarks

Many measures were taken to improve the propaganda system in the Soviet Union in the post-war era and after Stalin’s death. Already-existing structures were changed, and new ones were established. However, the efficiency of these steps was still questionable. The existing system of subordination was preserved, and many instances needed to approve the smallest changes

¹⁰⁵ News gathered abroad by TASS was also subject to censorship control by the Ministry, presumably in its Press Office, before publication.

¹⁰⁶ Abroad, TASS shared news collection with a limited number of correspondents representing major Moscow-based newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia, Trud, Komsomolskaya Pravda), and news dissemination with several Sovinformburo offices as well as reports sent abroad by foreign correspondents stationed in the Soviet Union. They all needed diplomatic channels for increased access to information and communication channels.

to the organizations. Thus, not only the structural transformation but the changes in personnel had to occur to develop the news network on the international level. This network was more flexible and could adjust to different conditions easier.

Chapter 2

Media Professionals

In this chapter, I will argue that the real change in the propaganda system was introduced circa 1955 - 1957, when the struggle for power within the Communist Party had settled down and new high-ranking officials were introduced, including into the sphere of media. This change was due to the personal factor. The new people started to re-think the basics of the propaganda system through institutionalizing journalistic practices (for example, the establishment of the Union of Journalists in 1956). The heads of the news organizations were at the core of the transformation.

Many journalists occupied the same positions and were still the representatives of the previous generations in their field, so the question of a generational gap naturally arises from understanding the contrast of the Stalinist era with Khrushchev's rule. In accordance with the peaceful co-existence policy, Soviet cultural diplomacy began to play a new role in the foreign policy of the USSR as a means of international influence. Important occasions like the Geneva summit with the participation of the Soviet delegations abroad can be considered as important markers of this political turn,¹⁰⁷ and high-ranking visits were seen as acts of strategic cultural diplomacy. Hence, these new officials were at the center of this transformation.

2.1 Old Staff in News Agencies

¹⁰⁷ The so-called spirit of Geneva occurred after the Geneva summit in 1955, when many countries allegedly understood that the compromises between two systems are possible.

Despite the institutional alterations, according to the multiple internal reports, real change in the system was slow and very ineffective.¹⁰⁸ TASS and Sovinformburo, being international news agencies, both had some specific problems in terms of personnel. Old cadres of Soviet agencies' staff both in Moscow and abroad had an extensive diplomatic experience. TASS's wartime director, Konstantin Umansky, had just previously served as Ambassador to the US. His successor, Palgunov, had been head of the Foreign Ministry's Press Office, and one of his assistants later became an Ambassador to China.¹⁰⁹ Fyodor Orekhov, an assistant to Palgunov in TASS, was made Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Mikhail Yakovlev, Sovinformburo head in the late 1940s, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR and Zhukov's Assistant at GKKS. Moreover, many people working in the UN Secretariat under the Soviet quota were originally listed as TASS correspondents. This interchangeability suggests that a news agency job was regarded as an important assignment in the foreign field, providing useful training for a diplomatic career, and vice-versa, working as an international correspondent could open a new career opportunity at embassies.¹¹⁰

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a pro-active role in all steps of propaganda production. Diplomats and ambassadors sent reference materials and suggestions to GKKS and Agitprop about their methods of work, who later worked on guidelines for the Soviet news agencies. The ambassadors were seen as the experts on these countries and were supposed to notify Soviet authorities of changes in the political climate, shifts in public opinion, the image of the USSR abroad and so on. Many so-called printing units were established within the Soviet embassies, and TASS employees were formally regarded as the diplomatic workers who had

¹⁰⁸ GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 894, Postanovlenija i rasporyzhenija Soveta Ministrov SSSR po voprosam dejatel'nosti TASS.

¹⁰⁹ I did not manage to find any background information on the head of Sovinformburo Anatoly Poryvaev or his assistants.

¹¹⁰ TASS had many foreign nationals employed in their offices abroad and they were expected to be members of the Communist Parties of their respective countries, although not always open members, and to be well-qualified journalists. In the United States, for example, Americans employed by TASS have, since 1941, been required technically to resign from the Party. Foreign national employees were not expected to know Russian.

nothing to do with propaganda.¹¹¹ This strategy was somewhat effective, as many materials were spread by the embassies in the form of Soviet bulletins – short updates on the main points of Soviet policy– and were not considered as pure propaganda but something more neutral.¹¹²

However, a diplomatic background was not sufficient for writing good journalism. Constant complaints on the contents of Soviet news suggested that the problems regarded style of writing, printing techniques, new understanding of media.

2.2 Turning Point

Admittedly, there were many preconditions for the changes in news network of the USSR, but it likely started with the note of Boris Polevoi, a prominent Soviet writer and journalist,¹¹³ who traveled with 6 other journalists to the United States in 1955. The delegation included Aleksei Adzhubei (*Komsomolskaya Pravda* at the time), Anatolii Sofronov (correspondent of *Ogonyok*), Boris Izakov (*Pravda*), Viktor Poltoratskii (*Izvestia*), Valentin Berezhkov (*Novoe Vremya*), Nikolai Gribachev (*Sovetskii Soyuz*).

According to Adzhubei's book, it was the first journalistic delegation to the US since 1945.¹¹⁴

He recollected that,

The trip was important. We were instructed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. We sat at a long table in his office and listened to a lecture on international problems, bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States. Then we asked Molotov to answer questions. They were, of course, more than naive. To drink or not to drink "Pepsi" and "Coca-Cola", to accept or not invitations of Americans to visit their families, what to fear, what not to fear? The advice sounded quite specific. Behave freely, naturally.<...> Don't drink Coca-Cola, it is the embodiment of American imperialism and expansion. This is how the question should be understood.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ This way, when the political situation towards the USSR was hostile in one of the countries, many Soviet journalists had to leave the region but the embassy stayed and continued spreading the materials, just on a smaller scale.

¹¹² GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 801, Predstavleniya, dokladnye zapiski po voprosam dejatel'nosti TASS.

¹¹³ Boris Polevoi was a wartime correspondent, took part in delegations to China, the US, etc., and wrote "American Diaries"

¹¹⁴ Aleksej Adzhubej, *Te desyat' let*, Moskva: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1989, 119.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

The group was representing the Soviet Union and its ideals as a whole. Moreover, the Americans who sent invitations represented major industrial businessmen, millionaires, and various civic organizations – all of them wanted to interact with officials the other side of the Iron Curtain.¹¹⁶

The trip took more than a month, with visits to many major American cities and organizations. As a part of a traditional Soviet propaganda strategy, the group gave public lectures or held conferences. However, this experience was not enlightening just for Americans. In fact, it was a moment of realization for the Soviet journalists, too, about how outdated their perception of the USA was.¹¹⁷

Polevoi, as the head of the delegation, had to write a report on the conclusions they drew from this trip.¹¹⁸ Polevoi also heavily criticized the TASS departments in the USA for the lack of properly educated staff and their poor linguistic background. He also stressed the material conditions of the workers, their low salaries, and inadequate social skills.¹¹⁹ While TASS defended its position and nothing was changed, the report had consequences in other forms. Following Polevoi's note, the Soviet embassies and news agencies were encouraged to be in active correspondence in response to capitalist editorials.¹²⁰ A Decree of the Central Committee also stated the need for the interaction with journalists from other countries.¹²¹ They had to represent the journalists of the USSR as a professional movement which was ready to be very pro-active in the international scene. Additionally, new requirements were set for the profession. The adaptation to the new realm of international news agencies also meant a change in the very language of talking about the news. The realization of a need for

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 122.

¹¹⁷ Rosa Magnussdottir, "Mission Impossible: Selling Soviet Socialism to Americans, 1955–1958," in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, eds., New York: Berghahn Books, 2010, 54–68.

¹¹⁸ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 734, ll. 130– 147.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 139– 147.

¹²⁰ Ibid, d. 748, ll. 109– 112.

¹²¹ Ibid, d. 671, ll. 45–48.

journalists, not diplomats, was reflected in the change in training of new personnel for news agencies.

2.3 New Requirements of Journalistic Education

By 1955, journalistic education was given in 12 universities of the Soviet Union, from which 1500- 2000 students were graduated annually. However, during the war, these figures had been much lower, which affected the personnel crisis in the fifties.¹²² By that time, the problem of raising the educational, professional and cultural level of editorial staff, newspaper and radio correspondents became more and more evident. In general, media covered many aspects of life in some of the most important areas of the country superficially, and rarely raised issues of economic, scientific, and cultural development. To improve the skills of their own correspondents in the editorial offices of the central newspapers,¹²³ TASS, radio, and television, a special training program and permanent courses were begun, with seminars and internships held regularly.¹²⁴

TASS itself had responsibility for training the cadres of 'nomenclature workers' for the entire system of news agencies and also for assisting the republic agencies in training of their correspondents.¹²⁵ The system placed great stress on attracting competent writers and

¹²² Nikolai Pal'gunov, *Tridcat' let: vospominaniya zhurnalista i diplomata*, Moskva: izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1964, 273.

¹²³ Specialists in other categories were trained separately. In order to improve the training of radio and television journalists and meet the increasing needs in this category of creative workers, the Department of Radio and Television within the Faculty of Journalism at Moscow State University was established in 1959. In subsequent years, the same faculty began to carry out recruitment to the Department of International Journalism, introduced specialization in Photojournalism.

¹²⁴ Correspondents for the sectors abroad had to be appointed from the TASS members first and then from other Soviet press. As interns, they had to be introduced to the specifics through attending press-conferences, make them know the countries they are writing about, etc. They were planned to the foreign countries more. They also had to drive a car, know how to use a typewriter, etc. Plus, an important part of the work of the international news agencies were translators. They had to be graduates from the linguistic universities. The staff of TASS and SIB was ordered to have more interns, who would be introduced to the basics of work in 10 sessions with the editor. Those included the use of reference materials, editing texts, translation, etc.

¹²⁵ As in most lines of government work, news agencies' employees were pressured early in their careers to join the Party.

ideologists into journalism and encouraged each level of the press to give on-the-job training. TASS and Sovinformburo were expected to do their share in this process.

The success of a news agency was determined by the level of skill of the journalists working for it. A journalist working in the field of international information needed to be properly trained. He needed to know the new history of international relations, economic geography, international law, and philology to be able to apply Marxist-Leninist theory to international events, as well as to know two or three foreign languages and have a university degree.¹²⁶ However, this skillset was not enough. Journalists in the editorial office of a newspaper or news agency were taught to use modern means of information transmission, and to use various newspaper genres.¹²⁷ Foreign TASS correspondents were required to have an ability to summarize information. It could help the reader to understand the events, to look more deeply into the phenomena witnessed by the correspondent.

Correspondents were also trained in new ways of obtaining information. A bad correspondent was only satisfied with reading the local newspapers. However, a qualified journalist would not see the press as the only source of information. Understanding newspapers published in capitalist countries was not an easy task. Palgunov wrote, "Capitalist newspapers with their sensational headlines, pictures, illustrations can capture the attention and consciousness of the reader"¹²⁸; the journalist had to know who was sponsoring this newspaper, must know its expenses, and to which party the newspapers belonged.

To obtain this information, correspondents had to be sent abroad. For that purpose, news agencies' and newspapers' correspondents were nominated by a 5-man sub-committee

¹²⁶ Nikolai Pal'gunov, *Tridcat' let: vospominaniya zhurnalista i diplomata*, Moskva: izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1964, 272.

¹²⁷ In the mid-1950s, the systematic development of the Soviet theory of journalism began. Scientists and practitioners took different positions, conduct discussions about the genre structure of journalism in general. At the end of the 1950s, there were still few books and brochures in the USSR that facilitated the exchange of journalistic experience in different genres, not to mention fundamental works on the theory and practice of periodicals of the Soviet period. For example, Bogdanov and Vyazemsky, *Informaciya v gazete*, Moscow, 1955.

¹²⁸ Nikolai Pal'gunov, *Osnovy informatsii v gazete: TASS i ego rol'*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1955, 3.

attached to the Party Presidium, which, in fact, had to approve the appointment of any Soviet citizen abroad. The committee was headed by a Presidium member, with other members representing the Foreign Ministry, Foreign Trade Ministry and Ministry of State Security. Because of this appointment procedure, TASS correspondents sent abroad appear have been chosen chiefly on the basis of political reliability, with the journalistic qualifications being quite secondary. The Foreign Ministry was also required to approve the position, formally at least, for TASS correspondents assigned abroad.

The correspondent abroad had to be able to draw information from „life itself“. ¹²⁹ For that, the ideal correspondent was an educated person who knew the language and the history of the country that he is sent to, and who had a sufficient command of the language for reading not only books and newspapers, but also for understanding speeches.

It should be noted that parliamentary speech was especially difficult to understand, not only because it is an example of high public speaking, but also because of the need to be able to read between the lines. The correspondent had to be present at all official acts organized by the leadership of the state to which representatives of the press were invited. ¹³⁰ The correspondent should also be present at the most important meetings of the municipal councils, especially when the issues on the agenda of these meetings went beyond the scope of current events. ¹³¹ The correspondent was obliged to read regularly published collections of laws and government orders. ¹³²

¹²⁹ Ibid, 42.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 43.

¹³¹ After these events, according to the official guidelines for the TASS employees, they were supposed to send information not later than 30 minutes after the event. The reports were meant to be sent in two versions: the short one and an expanded one. The short one should be sent immediately, and the long one should be sent later if there is a need in that.

¹³² Usually, in a number of Western countries, the authorities created a special regime for foreign correspondents and provide them with certain privileges regarding the presence and attendance of various public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, supply correspondents with special documents that allow them to enter through police barriers.

For these reasons, new guidelines for training journalistic cadres were introduced through the system of state education and through internships at TASS and SIB, which targeted the specialists with a skillset needed for news agencies. They were no longer just bureaucrats but also journalists first. The change was rather slow in the lower echelons of the professional journalists but was noticeable by the people who were the heads of the news organizations.

2.4 Generation of News Officials

The late 1950s were marked by many newcomers to the propaganda system. New high-ranking officials headed news agencies,¹³³ heads of new organizations,¹³⁴ or were quickly promoted; for example, Leonid Ilyichev became a head of Agitprop in 1958,¹³⁵ and Aleksei Adzhubei became the editor-in-chief of *Izvestia* in 1959.¹³⁶ All of them had a special feature: unlike people from a previous generation they had a background in journalism. Yuri Zhukov was a foreign correspondent of *Pravda* for many years,¹³⁷ Adzhubei worked at *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, and Ilyichev was an editor at *Pravda*.

This experience allowed them to be involved not only in the diplomatic part of being an international journalist or propagandist but also pay attention to new ways of persuasion. Additionally, they were concerned with the pragmatic sides of being a journalist – comfort of a working place, salaries, etc. As Adzhubei put it in his book,

By this time I had visited the United States of America twice, seen how the work of journalists was organized in the local newspapers. I tried to use their experience. Instead of the tiny rooms for the reporters, we made a few common rooms where every single person was on sight stocked with new equipment. We encouraged those who used a typewriter, even

¹³³ Anatoly Poryvaev was named a head at SIB in 1957.

¹³⁴ Yuri Zhukov became a head at GKKS from the very beginning, in 1957.

¹³⁵ Il'ichjov, Leonid Fjodorovich, 1952-1990; HU OSA 300-80-7:148/1194; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Soviet Red Archives: USSR Biographical Files; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

¹³⁶ Adzhubei, Alexei, 1968-1993; HU OSA 300-85-13:4/6; Biographical Files, *ibid*.

¹³⁷ Zhukov, Georgij (Jurij) Aleksandrovich, 1955-1981; HU OSA 300-80-7:136/1097; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Western Press Archives: Biographical Files [Abel - Yeltsin], *ibid*.

introduced courses in typewriting. According to the fashion of those years, we painted the walls in different colors to make the work merrier.¹³⁸

They were more open to change, flexible, and more aware of what journalists needed to increase their productivity. This factor was also encouraged by their trips to foreign countries, from where they borrowed their ideas. As editor Adzhubei transformed *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* and *Izvestia* due to his trips to the USA and visits to American newspaper offices. This experience led him to change not only the working conditions, but the very principles of work, methods of reporting, journalistic values.¹³⁹

While Zhukov was not among the newcomers, as his career in journalism had started much earlier, he quickly became a Party functionary. Moreover, during the Stalin era, he did not hesitate to write to top-rank officials like Zhdanov and bring up problems of propaganda.¹⁴⁰ Zhukov worked as a *Pravda* correspondent in France and the US and knew all too well what was lacking for foreign correspondents and, at the same time, what benefits the correspondent offices abroad could bring to the news networks. After this experience, he insisted on less outright propagandist ways and persuaded the state officials to implement more specialized and nuanced plans for each region.¹⁴¹

2.5 Network of Propagandists

At the same time, not all old cadres were dismissed. Pavel Satjukov, the editor-in-chief of *Pravda*;¹⁴² Mikhail Kharlamov, head of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry;¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Aleksej Adzhubej, *Te desyat' let*, Moskva: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1989, 8.

¹³⁹ Simon Huxtable, "Making News Soviet: Rethinking Journalistic Professionalism after Stalin, 1953–1970", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 27, Issue 1, 2018, 69.

¹⁴⁰ Vladimir Pechatnov, "Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, *Cold War History*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2001, 7.

¹⁴¹ RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 370. Zhukov's memorandum about bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and Western Europe and the United States.

¹⁴² Satjukov, Pavel Alekseevich, 1955 – 1971; HU OSA 300-80-7:285/2166; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Soviet Red Archives: USSR Biographical Files; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

¹⁴³ Kharlamov, Mikhail A., 1959 - 1964; HU OSA 300-80-7:102/5, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Western Press Archives: Biographical Files [Abel - Yeltsin], *ibid*.

Mikhail Suslov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet¹⁴⁴

– represented a group of chief ideologists of a previous generation. They still held high positions and, moreover, actively took part both in planning of propaganda activities.

The planning activities were carried out both by the newcomers and old cadres. I came across multiple mentions of the so-called *press-group* of Khrushchev. This group was his closest political circle, responsible for speeches, coverage of events, ideology, and assisting him in other fields of political life. Using multiple accounts, I reconstructed different combinations of these people belonged to it:

Fig. 1. Press Group Members

Name	Number of Mentions	Account
Adzhubei	6	Vladimir Yermenko, Boris Pankin, Leonid Zamyatin, Boris Pyadyshev, Sergei Khrushchev, Aleksei Adzhubei
Ilyichev	4	Leonid Zamyatin, Sergei Khrushchev, Aleksei Adzhubei, Shepilov
Kharlamov	4	Vladimir Yermenko, Boris Pankin, Boris Pyadyshev, Sergei Khrushchev
Lebedev	4	Boris Pankin, Boris Pyadyshev, Sergei Khrushchev, Shepilov
Satyukov	4	Vladimir Yermenko, Boris Pankin, Boris Pyadyshev, Shepilov
Goryunov	2	Boris Pyadyshev, Sergei Khrushchev
Polyakov	2	Vladimir Yermenko, Aleksei Adzhubei
Shevchenko	2	Sergei Khrushchev, Shepilov
Shuiskii	2	Sergei Khrushchev, Shepilov
Aleksandrov	1	Boris Pyadyshev

¹⁴⁴ Suslov Mikhail, 1968 – 1993; HU OSA 300-85-13: 301/21, Biographical Files, *ibid*.

Andropov	1	Aleksei Adzhubei
Kirillin	1	Aleksei Adzhubei
Ponomarev	1	Aleksei Adzhubei
Suslov	1	Aleksei Adzhubei
Trojanovskii	1	Sergei Khrushchev
Zamyatin	1	Leonid Zamyatin
Zhukov	1	Aleksei Adzhubei

It can be seen that Aleksei Adzhubei, Leonid Ilyichev, Mikhail Kharlamov, Vladimir Lebedev, and Pavel Satukov were most likely the members of the group, as they were mentioned in multiple accounts.¹⁴⁵ These multiple accounts also gave conflicting accounts of the person who took the leadership role in the group – Adzhubei was named as a relative of Khrushchev, Satukov as an old-standing journalist, Ilyichev as a propaganda chief. Adzhubei also mentioned the group who performed the last, ideological, check: Suslov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Ilyichev.¹⁴⁶ Their duty was proofreading the texts for the correct interpretations of Marxism-Leninism.

By all accounts, the press group was a mixture of old and new cadres. These people also usually accompanied Khrushchev in his trips abroad or were representatives of the Soviet government. This gave them a unique perspective on Soviet propaganda, combining experienced Party workers and newcomers who could bring more ideas and be more flexible.

¹⁴⁵ Accounts used: Aleksej Adzhubej, *Te desyat' let*, Moskva: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1989; Dmitry Shepilov. Cited from Vladimir Shevelev, N.S. Khrushchev, <https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=221345&p=54> (accessed: 25.05.2019); Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, 710; Boris Pyadyshev, <http://www.pseudology.org/MID/KhrushchevAmerica1960.htm> (accessed: 25.05.2019); Leonid Zamyatin, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/14123> (accessed: 25.05.2019); Boris Pankin, *Preslovutaya epoha v lichah i maskah, sobytiyah i kazusah*, Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017; Vladimir Yermenko, *Vblizi Sil'nykh mira sego*. <https://libcat.ru/knigi/starinnaya-literatura/217134-neizvestno-eryomenko-vblizi-silnyh-mira-sego.html> (accessed: 31.05.2019).

¹⁴⁶ Aleksej Adzhubej, *Te desyat' let*, Moskva: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1989, 311.

Plus, Khrushchev had two assistants, who were part of the group, – Vladimir Lebedev¹⁴⁷ and Grigorii Shuiskii.¹⁴⁸ Lebedev was named as an assistant for ideology,¹⁴⁹ while Shuiskii was named later by Sergei Khrushchev as the first assistant.¹⁵⁰

Aside from the press-group, publications in the Soviet press about the international meetings were prepared by many different people. In the first stages, they were prepared by the translators (Viktor Sukhodrev or Oleg Troyanovsky)¹⁵¹ accompanying Khrushchev during the trip, later by the press group; employees of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR also took part in the preparation of press conferences. It is clear that the final texts were carefully edited and verified at different levels.¹⁵²

It should be noted that this group was not homogenous. They had quite different career paths: while some had a long list of experiences and posts on the governmental jobs, some of them began their journalistic career only during Khrushchev's time. For example, Satyukov has been in the Party apparatus since 1942, Kharlamov has worked at the radio since 1932, Mikhail Suslov has at the top of the Party since 1931. Under Khrushchev, Alexei Adzhubei became the editor-in-chief of *Izvestia* in 1959 in the age of 35, Viktor Sukhodrev, the translator, got his post in 1956 at the age of 24.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ Lebedev was an ambassador to Poland, Finland, etc.

¹⁴⁸ It seems that Khrushchev knew him since work in Ukraine.

¹⁴⁹ Vladimir Yeremenko, *Vblizi Sil'nykh mira sego*. <https://libcat.ru/knigi/starinnaya-literatura/217134-neizvestno-eryomenko-vblizi-silnyh-mira-sego.html> (accessed: 31.05.2019).

¹⁵⁰ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, 299.

¹⁵¹ Oleg Troyanovsky was a translator-diplomat who worked in the Secretariat of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Trojanovskij (Sbornyj), 1968 – 1993; HU OSA 300-85-13:311/3; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Soviet Red Archives; USSR Biographical Files; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

¹⁵² Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, 710.

¹⁵³ Sukhodrev began his career in 1956. He was a personal translator of Nikita Khrushchev, then Leonid Brezhnev. He also worked with Mikoyan, Kosygin, Gromyko. This translator had a unique experience: he lived in England during the war, and then studied at the Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow, so he knew English as his first language and could easily switch accents. Sukhodrev, Viktor M., 1959 – 1979; HU OSA 300-120-7:216/6 Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Western Press Archives; Biographical Files [Abel - Yeltsin] ; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

Interestingly, none of the heads of TASS and SIB can be found among these people. They did not take part in delegations and did not participate in the process of speechwriting. Unlike those assistants who were always ‘on the spot’ and quite mobile, these officials stayed in Moscow. The same went for the head of SSOD, Nina Popova; head of VOKS, Andrei Denisov; and head of *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*, Afanasii Zmeul.

Yuri Zhukov and Nikolai Palgunov are the most unusual cases in this network. Both of them worked in the field of media for a long time (from the 1920s and 1930s); both took the most prominent positions in the propaganda sphere. However, I discovered that they were nowhere to be found described as the assistants of Khrushchev, despite that fact, they were active in the journalistic field. They both directed not only their respective organizations but also played a major role in the Union of Journalists. In fact, both were networking with the help of the Union, directing Soviet journalists at the time.

2. 6 Union Of Journalists as a Point of Convergence

The Union of Journalists was started in 1956. For 3 years, *Orgburo* [Organizational Bureau] debated its status, functions, mission, and membership politics, before the Union was officially established in 1959. The Orgburo is one of key elements of my research, as, in fact, it became a point of convergence for the most prominent high-ranking journalists. Palgunov, Zhukov, Adzhubei, Satyukov, Kharlamov were all on the board of Orgburo of the Union.

Such unions in Soviet history were meant to provide an institutional grounds to the professional groups of writers, artists, etc. These unions took into account different sides of being a professional in a creative sphere – they provided assistance for their copyright problems, overcoming economic obstacles, subsidized different activities like traveling,

etc.¹⁵⁴ However, since the profession was a basis for the creation of unions, they required the professional mastery of their members.

During the earliest sessions of the Orgburo meetings, the members discussed the form of the organization and the membership: is it just journalists or other literary workers like editors, teletypists, etc.¹⁵⁵ The question of media was also raised: would it be just newspapers and magazines or also radio, publishing houses, etc.? In the end, by analogy with other unions, it was professionalism which was the common ground for the group, hence, all media involving journalistic practices counted.¹⁵⁶

In the meetings, these unions held discussions about the values within the profession, its limits, and directions. Many talks were dedicated to the expansion of professionalism, borrowing the experience from professionals in different countries. Hence, the Union's of Journalists' foundation was perfectly aligned with the cultural diplomacy of the USSR at the time. Both the USSR and the Union felt the need to send specialists abroad, to learn from colleagues, and to represent the country in a new light.

In the logic of Soviet bureaucracy, a separate institution had to represent the USSR, not individual actors.¹⁵⁷ Orgburo was meant to be a front organization in the field of media diplomacy. At the same time, it had to be presented as a non-state initiative coming from the journalists themselves. During the meetings, they discussed the ways of hiding the incoming

¹⁵⁴ John Garrard and Carol Garrard, *Inside the Soviet Writers' Union*. London: Tauris, 1990.

¹⁵⁵ Naturally, it was also discussed in a context of what background of journalists they were seeking for. The journalists at the time had very different backgrounds: while some were shaped by being a war correspondent, some were affected by the trips to foreign countries and comprehension of foreign journalistic practices. Matthew Lenoe. *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, 146–148.

¹⁵⁶ GARF, f. 10124, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 22–23, Protokoly №№ 1–37 zasedanij Orgbyuro.

¹⁵⁷ Even before the official creation of the Union with zero official members, Orgburo was essentially discussing its international policy, in particular, the upcoming summit of journalists in Helsinki. GARF, f. 10124, op. 1, d. 1, 20-21.

budget from the government and other way of tracking down this affiliation, which was important for Western observers.¹⁵⁸

Most founding Orgburo members had careers of *zhurnalist mezhdunarodnik* [international journalist] – journalists whose writing was oriented towards international coverage. As previously mentioned, Zhukov worked as a foreign correspondent of *Pravda*, Palgunov was a head of TASS, and Kraminov, another prominent figure, was an editor of a magazine *Za Rubezhom* [Abroad].¹⁵⁹ Other members were mostly deputies at GKKS, SIB, and TASS. This clearly shows the prioritization of the foreign policy goals over the regulation of profession on the domestic front.¹⁶⁰

This way, in the absence of a centralized point of state control, propaganda chiefs could coordinate their activities more effectively. The Union discussed ways of increasing the effectiveness of propaganda on the pages of its magazine *Sovetskaya Pechat* [Soviet Press]¹⁶¹ and during the meetings. The Orgburo appointed the journalists they wanted to send abroad. These agreements were made because of the closeness of the contacts in the higher journalistic circles. For example, if people were needed for an international coverage, Orgburo chose people they knew personally. If they decided that smaller newspapers also needed representation, they would ask someone to find appropriate candidates.¹⁶²

Another important issue taken up by the Union was the shortage of the journalists who spoke languages other than Russian. As Sukhodrev mentioned it in an interview,

¹⁵⁸ For example, they did have a membership fee but realistically it would never cover the expenses for running such organization, so they had to address the state.

¹⁵⁹ Earlier, he was also a correspondent of TASS and *Pravda*.

¹⁶⁰ Mary-Catherine French, *Reporting Socialism: Soviet Journalism and the Journalists' Union, 1955–1966*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2014, 43-44.

¹⁶¹ Adzhubei was not only as editor-in-chief of *Izvestia* but also an editor of “*Sovetskaya Pechat*”, the organ of the Union of Journalists, where he played a very pro-active role.

¹⁶² GARF, f. 10124, op. 1, d. 2, Perepiska s ministerstvami i vedomstvami SSSR, zarubezhnymi zhurnalistskimi organizatsiyami po ustanovleniyu i uprocheniyu kontaktov s zhurnalistami zarubezhnyh stran.

At that time, there were very few people in our country who knew foreign languages perfectly, very few people have been abroad. It is today anyone can go to study where he wants. But back then we were unique.¹⁶³

Despite TASS and SIB having linguistic training, courses and additional motivators to learn languages like the rather significant pay raise (10-30%),¹⁶⁴ many journalists still lacked the ability to make contacts with foreign colleagues simply due the language barrier.

The membership principles of Orgburo encouraged to include more *mezhdunarodniki* and serve as a platform of networking for the Soviet journalists. During the discussions, it was brought to the Orgburo's attention that competitiveness was a key element of the sustainability of the Union. Learning about the capitalist press, its methods of work, specifics of professional training, etc., would increase the chances of the USSR to be seen as an equal on the international arena.¹⁶⁵ Summing up the objectives of the Union, its key member held speeches during the opening session in 1956. Yet again, Zhukov, Ilyichev, and Satyukov emphasized the role of the journalists in the Cold War and the course of peaceful co-existence. The success of the journalists was no longer measured by Soviet standards – it had to be an international outreach that proved the Union's success.¹⁶⁶

It is clear that the coordination between the propaganda chiefs was crucial. However, the propaganda system, with its principle of double subordination, was quite chaotic, and not all of the needed people were part of the so-called press group. Thus, they met through the newly created channel of the Union of Journalists and were involved in a process of self-regulation. Here, they had a chance to network and to discuss the pragmatic issues of the Soviet journalism.

¹⁶³ Kto perevodil sovetskikh liderov, <https://www.gq.ru/entertainment/kto-perevodil-sovetskikh-liderov> (accessed: 19.04.2019).

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, f. P4459, op. 39, d. 71, Kopii dokumentov ob organizacii i deyatelnosti telegrafnykh agentstv SSSR.

¹⁶⁵ RGANI, f.5, op. 16, d. 748.

¹⁶⁶ GARF, f. P4459, op. 39, d. 23, Dogovory i soglasheniya mezhdru TASS i inostrannymi agentstvami po voprosu ob obmene informaciej.

There were many other places where some of them could meet (for example Satyukov was also a Deputy Chairman of the SSOD of Soviet-Chinese friendship) or some of them worked at *Pravda* or other newspapers at the same time. Many reports to the Central Committee on ways of improving propaganda were signed by Zhukov and Poryvaev or Zhukov and Ilyichev. However, taking into account the chaos in the system of the Soviet propaganda, the Union served as a ‘universal’ meeting point for chief journalists of *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, TASS, SIB, *Trud*, *Komsomol’skaya Pravda*, etc. with the chief propagandists like Yuri Zhukov, who took a very pro-active role in the Union, and Leonid Ilyichev, who was a frequent guest at the meetings.

Concluding remarks

1955 was a catalytic year for a change of the Soviet propaganda apparatus. On the one hand, the 1955 Geneva summit demonstrated that the country was advocating the course of peaceful co-existence. On the other hand, the very same year, the Soviet journalists' visit to the United States demonstrated the need to meet new requirements. The ‘workers of the pen’ became a real target of the Soviet government. Many newcomers were introduced to the upper echelons of the Party, and they were quickly promoted. As representatives of a new generation of propaganda officials, they introduced new methods of journalistic practices.

They pursued their goals of system’s transformation through the change in educational system, stricter control over personnel, and, most importantly, the creation of the Union of Journalists. I see the Union of Journalists not only as an organization for Cold War purposes of media diplomacy,¹⁶⁷ but I also argue that it was a place of consolidation and communication between the top-ranking journalists themselves. While most of them were a part of the so-called ‘press group’, some of the most prominent heads of organization and committees were

¹⁶⁷ Mary-Catherine French, *Reporting Socialism: Soviet Journalism and the Journalists’ Union, 1955–1966*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2014.

excluded. With the platform like the Union of Journalists, they had a direct access to each other and could discuss the needed measures for co-operation among their organizations.

Chapter 3

Coordinating International Coverage

In this chapter, I will analyze the foreign activities of the Soviet journalists in maintaining Soviet publications, delegations, and coverage of exhibitions of the USSR abroad. All of these channels or methods of work were used during Khrushchev's trip to the US in 1959. Furthermore, these campaigns were coordinated by the propaganda chiefs, about whom I wrote in the previous chapter. I will also introduce some new figures, who were the new appointees at positions in the US or in the newspapers oriented towards the international coverage.

While the journalists themselves claimed that they were not that influential (most of them did not even sign their articles),¹⁶⁸ I cannot fully share this opinion. Scholarship on Cold War experts sees the groups of actors, artists, musicians as non-state actors who have influence in the interpretation of Cold War relations.¹⁶⁹ Clearly, the Soviet journalists did not have a full control of their agency and both Soviet commentators as well as outside observers saw them more as officials, not creative workers. Soviet journalists were in fact still state experts and represented the state's interests to a large degree. They took part in international trips and covered the events from the Soviet perspective. Media was not only the instrumental way of narrating the state's vision; sometimes, in the absence of direct communication, media were

¹⁶⁸ They even had an inside joke that all the journalists go to die to TASS because their names never appeared on any of their reports. GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 798, Postanovlenija i rasporejzhenija Soveta Ministrov SSSR po voprosam dejatel'nosti TASS.

¹⁶⁹ Iacob, Bogdan C., Corina Doboş, Raluca Grosescu, Viviana Iacob, and Vlad Paşca. "State Socialist Experts in Transnational Perspective. East European Circulation of Knowledge during the Cold War (1950s–1980s): Introduction to the Thematic Issue", *East Central Europe* 45, (2018):145-159.

used to send the messages to the rivals or to “test the waters” of how particular regulations might be perceived by other states. The press became the eyes and ears of diplomacy.

3.1 Soviet Specialists Abroad

“We started seeing the world up close. It's needed to be done. When the world exhibition opened in Brussels in 1958, Khrushchev offered to send large groups of workers of various professions and organizers of production to study the experience. They called it: "We are going to the Brussels seminar." And soon it was decided that "Intourist" should not only receive foreigners, but also organize mass trips of Soviet people abroad.”¹⁷⁰

Aleksei Adzhubei

The actions of the Soviet citizens abroad were seen as a state act. Their activities needed to be strictly regulated to avoid diplomatic conflicts. One of the main aspects of agreements made between states for exchange visits was the principle of reciprocity. This means that each side of the exchange agreement could take the equivalent steps and measures while the relationships lasted. The reciprocity principle became especially important with the signing of the Lacy-Zarubin accord in 1958. This document was an official agreement on ‘exchanges in cultural, technical and education fields’, which was supposed to be potentially stimulating economic and cultural cooperation between two countries.¹⁷¹ For example, in the US- USSR cultural exchange agreement, the number of tourists visiting each country was supposed to be the same (in fact, the USSR did not follow this rule and sent less people than the US did).¹⁷² The principle of representation of the USSR could be the sole reason of picking the delegate as the means of propaganda or counter-propaganda. The USSR would have wanted a woman to be a part of the Soviet delegation for her ability to talk about the women’s issues in the country.¹⁷³ A person could be chosen because of gender, religious beliefs, or nationality. As

¹⁷⁰ Aleksei Adzhubei, *Te desyat' let*, Moskva: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1989, 125.

¹⁷¹ Andrei Kozovoi, “A Foot in the Door: The Lacy–Zarubin Agreement and Soviet-American Film Diplomacy during the Khrushchev Era, 1953–1963”, *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 2016, Vol. 36(1), 21-39.

¹⁷² GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 724, Dnevnik rukovodjashhih rabotnikov.

¹⁷³ Ibid, f. 10124, op. 1, d. 10, Protokoly №№ 38–63 zasedanij Orgbyuro.

various minorities were believed to be suppressed in the USSR in the eyes of the West, bringing the representatives of those groups meant that the Soviet Union acknowledged these groups and was ready to debunk these myths.

This being said, the candidate selection might be altered weeks and days before the trips.¹⁷⁴

It could happen because of a candidate's non-party status, complications with the visas, inability to speak the local language or just a newly found more suitable candidate for the delegation. Moreover, those responsible for receiving the delegation might protest the participation of some members of delegations.¹⁷⁵ Hence, every member of the delegation had to be approved not only by the sending side also but by the side who was hosting the delegates. Many committees had not only to approve the candidate for going abroad but also to check his loyalty to Soviet values. When submitting an application for a delegate to be sent abroad, an organization had to send the full name, date of birth, nationality, information on Party membership, previous countries of visits if any.¹⁷⁶ Sometimes they also had to include the references or recommendations from other organizations, certifying that the person was indeed reliable and was not known for anti-Soviet activities.

However, the justification for journalists' trips was different. Unlike other Soviet citizens, they had to have additional reasons to go abroad. Their news coverage had to be justified, as they had to connect it to an important (from the Soviet point of view) international event like Youth Festival or any other event which was not seen as 'sensationalist'. Rather, the events

¹⁷⁴ For example, Mikkonen talked about the Soviet radio specialists who were meant to go on exchange in 1959 and were excluded from the group in the last minute. Simo Mikkonen, "Stealing the Monopoly of Knowledge?: Soviet Reactions to U.S. Cold War Broadcasting", *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, Vol. 11, Number 4, Fall 2010, 778.

¹⁷⁵ The United States did not want to invite the writer Fadeev to the 1949 conference in New York because of his previous anti-American speeches, or the UK wanted to rule out the head of KGB from visiting the country in 1956.¹⁷⁵ Natalia Kapitonova, "Visit of Soviet Leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nicholas Bulganin to Britain in April 1956", *Cold War History*, Vol. 14, 2014, 127-152.

¹⁷⁶ The author briefly touches upon issuing visas in: Nigel Gould-Davies "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic history* 27, no. 2 (2003): 196.

themselves had to be considered useful for the Soviet audience, hence, they were not to be entertaining first but more educational and appropriate for coverage.¹⁷⁷

The same procedure applied to the people who were meant to work abroad for longer periods of time. When choosing people to go abroad, their skillset and background were taken into account, as well as the necessity of going abroad. It had to be a valuable specialist or an intern, who would have to write a full report on their activities abroad upon their arrival back to the USSR.

This complicated system for journalism was in place for a reason. Having a journalist or a publishing office abroad from your own organization meant not only the increased speed of receiving and transmitting information but, more importantly, independence from the Western news agencies and the information they supplied.¹⁷⁸ However, these specialists had to be especially discrete, not involved in ‘Anti-Soviet activities’,¹⁷⁹ and not become an informant or a defector to the West.

News media with a *korset*’ [correspondent network] outside of the USSR used the foreign experience to their advantage. The open competition with the West meant borrowing the experience from the rivals.¹⁸⁰ Yuri Zhukov’s experience as a foreign correspondent most likely affected the way GKKS was operating. Under his supervision, Soviet international activities were executed in less outright propagandist ways, as he was trying to persuade the state officials to implement more subtle and nuanced plans for each region.¹⁸¹ For this reason,

¹⁷⁷ RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 35, l. 65, Pros’ba ob otpavke korrespondenta Pravdy na Vsemirny festival’ molodezhi.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, l. 3.

¹⁷⁹ This wording usually meant behavior not appropriate for the Soviet citizen, as getting drunk in the public, any illegal activities, etc.

¹⁸⁰ News agencies were more and more prone to not only hiring the people among the local population due to their fluency in languages but also because of their full awareness of the situation within the country or region where they lived in.

¹⁸¹ RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 370. Zhukov’s memorandum about bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and Western Europe and the United States.

the Soviet news media sent their employees abroad as part of delegations, where they could gain some deeper knowledge of the country, obtain better linguistic skills, etc.

This orientation towards the local conditions also meant having a network within the region. Personal ties were especially important in the journalistic sphere. Many sources of international information were only open to those who were in a close contact. Palgunov explicitly insisted on his employees making friends with foreign journalists who could become the unofficial informants for Soviet newsmakers.¹⁸² It seems that there were lists of people who officials especially wanted to become friends of the Soviet state. For example, the GKKS issued the lists of the most prominent people from the countries in which they were interested. It could be musicians, sportsmen, politicians, etc.¹⁸³ Zhukov, for instance, was a brilliant example of a cultural diplomat,¹⁸⁴ who had daily meetings with foreign correspondents, politicians, writers and so on.¹⁸⁵ In his working diaries, Zhukov wrote down discussions with representatives of other countries about propaganda, upcoming events organized by the USSR abroad, work of correspondents in different regions and so on.¹⁸⁶

At the same time, journalists had to be careful in their connections and consult with their chiefs or ambassadors. Not only was direct involvement abroad seen as diplomatic. Addressing some issues or congratulating certain personalities or organizations on the pages of the most influential Soviet news media was also seen as an act of media diplomacy. These newspapers were the spokesmen of the USSR, although they were not even meant for the readers abroad. For example, *Pravda*, the most prominent newspaper in the USSR, regularly consulted with Agitprop and the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign

¹⁸² Ibid, 45.

¹⁸³ It seems that those lists worked as guidelines to whom the Soviet journalists had to pay more attention or whom they were wanted to cooperate with.

¹⁸⁴ For example, Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960.

¹⁸⁵ As in GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 724, Dnevnik rukovodjashhikh rabotnikov.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, d. 725, Dnevnik rukovodjashhikh rabotnikov.

Countries publishing the greetings to the so-called countries of people's democracy's organizations, even on the seemingly smallest occasions like the anniversary of other country's newspaper.¹⁸⁷

3.2 Printing Capabilities of Organizations Abroad

With the established network of the Soviet journalists abroad, the activities of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda involved the dissemination of the Soviet periodicals, movies, etc. Under the supervision of Agitprop, Soviet international organizations coordinated their publishing activities.¹⁸⁸

For international publishing, the principle of reciprocity also affected the activities of the Soviet reporters. The restrictions put on one side in the sphere of journalism mirrored restrictions on the other side. If the Soviet journalists were not allowed to attend one of the public hearings in the American Senate, those American journalists in the USSR would be more restricted in their attendance of public meetings.¹⁸⁹ Airtime would also count as one of the main targets of both countries. If an American official was given time on Soviet radio or television, the Soviets would demand the broadcast with the participation of the representatives of the USSR; this principle was extensively used during the Khrushchev's trip.

However, the way around it for Soviet propaganda was publishing in newspapers and magazines of international organizations. For example, in the late nineteen-fifties, with the encouragement of Ilyichev, more than 100 reports on achievements of Soviet science, culture and education were published by UNESCO, including "Equality of Races and Nations in the

¹⁸⁷ RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 32, l. 23, TSK KPSS: "Redaktsiya gazety Pravda prosit razresheniya napravit' privetstviye redaktsii gazety Kol-Gaan".

¹⁸⁸ For example, SSOD published the newspaper "Moscow News", with a circulation of 600 thousand copies, and the monthly magazine *Culture and Life*, which circulation was 90 thousand copies, published in English, French, Arabic, and Spanish.

¹⁸⁹ As in Dina Fainberg, "Portrait of a Journalist as a Cold War Expert: Harrison Salisbury," *Journalism History*, Fall 2015, Vol. 41, Issue 3, 153-164.

USSR", "Polytechnic Education in the USSR", "Social Consequences of Automation and Mechanization in the USSR".¹⁹⁰ Through Agitprop, Ilyichev invited Soviet scientists and experts to write on the issues which could serve as the proof of Soviet superiority. At the same time, Soviet materials were often prepared without taking into account the specifics of international publications, and were not used to the full extent of the possibility of publishing about the actual achievements of Soviet science.¹⁹¹

Membership in another international organization – UN – also had some benefits for the Soviets. The Soviet ambassador to UN, Nikolai Burev, regularly supplied Agitprop or GKKS with Anti-Soviet materials spread in the United States, as well as documenting rumors and scandals surrounding the USSR in diplomatic circles.¹⁹²

Nevertheless, if the publication was targeting a particular country, the principle of reciprocity was still in place. In the case of the United States, the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to publish the magazine 'USSR' (publishing house "Pravda") in English (July 1956) in exchange for distribution in the USSR of the magazine "America".¹⁹³ Nikolai Gribachev, who was on the journalists' trip to the USA in 1955, became an editor of the 'USSR' magazine.¹⁹⁴ It was important for both countries to have the same number of printed issues but also the same circulation, which was also a basis for further conflict.¹⁹⁵ The USSR claimed that the US intentionally hid new issues, so that the Soviet magazine would not have a chance to be disseminated by official means.¹⁹⁶ However, within the USSR, a warning was sent to the Party

¹⁹⁰ RGANI, f. 5, op. 55, d. 115, l. 86.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 85.

¹⁹² GARF, f. P9518, op. 1, d.348, Perepiska s Posol'stvom SSSR v Soedinennyh Shtatah Ameriki, ministerstvami i drugimi central'nymi uchrezhdeniyami i organizatsiyami SSSR o kul'turnyh svyazyah SSSR i Soedinennyh Shtatov Ameriki.

¹⁹³ In fairness, it should be said that the magazine *America* began to be issued in April 1945 and sent to the USSR. The Catalogue of Loud Advertising: About the Magazine "America", *Culture and Life*, 1947, № 22, 4.

¹⁹⁴ Gribachev was known as a poet and a war correspondent. He spoke multiple languages.

¹⁹⁵ I also found that there 7 Soviet magazines disseminated on the US territory: 1) *USSR*, 2) *Novoe Vremya* [New Time], 3) *International Life*, 4) *Soviet Woman*, 5) *Moscow News*, 6) *Kultura i zhizn'* [Culture and Life], 7) *Soviet Literature*. They were all under control of SIB and GKKS. However, I did not find any information (circulation, plans, etc.) on most of them.

¹⁹⁶ The *USSR* was published with a circulation of 62 thousand copies per month (it cost the USSR 500 thousand dollars to produce).

committees entitled "On the Distribution in the USSR of the Magazine "America"" (1956). It said, "A certain portion of the magazine "America" will fall into the hands of inexperienced, politically unstable readers; around the materials published in it and selected tendentially, may begin unwanted conversations".¹⁹⁷ The Central Committee of the CPSU warned the Union republics, regional committees, and city committees to limit the distribution of the magazine "America" and to refute the published materials skillfully, thoughtfully, "entrusting the case to politically verified workers."¹⁹⁸ "Carelessness in this regard was unacceptable, as it could be used by the American side for anti-Soviet propaganda and to limit the distribution of the Soviet magazine "USSR" in the United States,"¹⁹⁹ the document warned.

Despite all of these concerns, it was worth having a newspaper in the US. Allowing the magazine "America" to be printed paved the way for the magazine "USSR". The magazine published materials which were targeted specifically against the "weak points" of the United States at the time. It included articles on racial question in the USSR, the woman question, education, medicine, etc. Later on, this magazine came in especially handy. It was extensively used during Khrushchev's trip and Nikolai Gribachev was invited to be a part of the Soviet delegation.

3.3 TASS Offices

TASS had two offices in the United States: in Washington and in New York. The New York office was also used for the countries of Latin America, because of geographical proximity and the UN's location. TASS offices in the US were directly connected by phone with the White House, the Congress, and the State Department.²⁰⁰ TASS also had its own phone booth in the press halls and close to the places where the Presidents held press-conferences. TASS's

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 5.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ GARF, f. P4459, op. 38, d. 908, Perepiska o deyatel'nosti korpunktov TASS v N'yu-Jorke.

department is the US was the biggest and most technologically advanced. The New York office had a 24-hour teletype connection with Moscow and could transmit information both in Cyrillic and Latin. This arrangement saved a lot of time and made it almost effortless to get the information first to the Russian teletypists and then to Moscow.

However, they did not perform well, and Palgunov was dissatisfied with both offices abroad and with the American section of TASS in Moscow.²⁰¹ In a meeting with Morev (the head of the American Section), Palgunov expressed his frustration with the work of the department. Morev admitted to the “weakening of journalists in New York”. The department was mostly preoccupied with translations and not so much with the general overview of the American press. The employees suggested skipping multiple checks of the information and not always cutting the information into short bits, as the meaning suffered from these cuts. Expansion of the offices was also desirable, as it would have been easier to replace the missing staff. In fact, the offices were very short on the personnel, and even the illness of one worker could paralyze the work of the others.²⁰²

The core of the personnel of this department was made up of both American and Soviet employees. The Americans were overwhelmingly busy with translations and collection of information, so the Soviets were needed to write more of the original information. The installment of equipment with Cyrillic alphabet significantly increased the speed of information and the coverage of the events happening in New York, Washington and elsewhere. It was especially noticeable after the employment of the family members of TASS correspondents as Russian teletypists. Two of them in Washington and two in New York helped to preserve the 24-hour-service. However, the problem of personnel was raised many times during this meeting, and the employees suggested not only sending young

²⁰¹ Ibid, d. 878, Perepiska s rukovodyashchimi partijnymi i sovetskimi organami i korpunktami TASS za granicej po voprosam rasprostraneniya sovetskoj informacii za rubezhom.

²⁰² Ibid, d. 834, Perepiska o deyatel'nosti otdeleniya TASS v N'yu-Jorke, i korpunkta v Vashingtone.

correspondents or interns but also experienced reporters who would actually stay and work there. Palgunov was also willing to increase the number of employees, especially in Washington, so they could use the maximum the sources of information available to them from the Pentagon, the American government, and so on. In 1959, Mikhail Sagatelyan was appointed as the new head of the TASS offices in the United States, so he started to reform the offices in response to Palgunov's complaints.²⁰³ Subsequently, he also took part in Khrushchev's trip.

3.4 Sovinformburo's Input

Sovinformburo was not a traditional news agency in the Western understanding. Its main occupation was dissemination of propaganda materials like brochures, bulletins, books, and articles written at the requests of foreign publishers. These requests were for articles on the processes ongoing in the Eastern Bloc countries that had already taken place in the USSR (like collectivization).

The GKKS was responsible for the planning of preparations of these materials. Thematic plans included titles of the articles or books but rarely names of the authors. While it was most likely written by the expert in the requested sphere, the author was a secondary factor in the planning. However, the requests were not always fulfilled. Due to the narrow background of the journalists or experts, the lack of time, and the shortage of finances, the SIB was not capable of meeting the inquiries from the foreign mass media.

Aside from the information printed in the newspapers which requested materials, Sovinformburo had multiple newspapers under their control – "The Moscow News" in English and "Les Nouvelles de Moscou" in French. The English version was published in 56,000 copies, the French one 20,000. However, only 14,700 units were sent abroad, as

²⁰³ Sagatelyan graduated from the State Institute of International Relations and an international journalist. He worked at *Izvestia*, then at the weekly *Novoe Vremya*.

Zhukov admitted, 'they were not popular among foreigners'.²⁰⁴ GKKS also planned the content of those magazines.²⁰⁵ After two years of their existence, Zhukov decided to make the newspapers 'more Western' in order to compete with the mass media of the capitalist countries. During this review, it was decided that the newspapers had to become more entertaining, use fewer clichés and more original materials. These reforms might have also happened due to the fact that not only were they repeating SIB's reports verbatim but they were also delivered abroad with huge delays of 4-5 days, despite being sent by the airmail. The newspapers were meant to be distributed through the embassies to other representatives of foreign governors, so the number of copies sent to the US was only 200 per week.²⁰⁶ The Soviet propaganda system had to perform the miracles of cooperation, as the task of advertising of the newspapers was directed to *Mezhdunarodnaya kniga*, and the editions themselves were from then on published by the publishing house of *Izvestia*.

Other occasions used by SIB were exhibitions and state visits. In both cases, the requests for the biographies and additional information on the themes of the exhibitions were accepted. The focus of the requests that were satisfied was on the region-specific problems. Even if the exhibition was about the achievements of the Soviet science, the brochures on Soviet lifestyle, education, etc. were disseminated. They were usually given out for free at the entrance of the exhibitions. However, reports concluded that some capitalist countries' citizens refused to take those materials as open propaganda (which the visitors assumed from the mere fact that the leaflets and books were given out for free). Yuri Zhukov came up with the idea of selling those materials, and the distribution of the brochures improved.²⁰⁷

3.5 The Soviet-American Exhibitions in 1959

²⁰⁴ RGANI, f.5, op. 16, d. 145, ll. 32-34.

²⁰⁵ They were renewed in 1956.

²⁰⁶ However, the reporter for the newspaper – Javad Sharif – also took part in Khrushchev's delegation.

²⁰⁷ GARF, f. 9518, op. 1, d. 4, Prikazy po komitetu №№ 1 - 237 za 1957 g.

We cannot demand taking down those texts because we have an exchange agreement, as they don't have any anti-Soviet statements. What we have to do is to debunk those in the press after the opening ceremony.²⁰⁸

Yuri Zhukov

Some researchers argue that state visits of Frol Kozlov and Anastas Mikoyan to the United States were testing waters for the Khrushchev's much desired trip.²⁰⁹ I would argue, however, that it was actually the exchange of two exhibitions in Moscow and New York which were a testing ground for the Soviet capabilities in propaganda and counter propaganda. While visits by Kozlov and Mikoyan did not get much press coverage in the USSR, the exhibitions were a central theme for both American and Soviet media. For Khrushchev and his entourage, it was important to demonstrate the success of the USSR overseas. The concerned authorities believed that the success of the exhibition in New York might create the right atmosphere of the impending visit of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party to the United States.

The Lacy-Zarubin accord on cultural cooperation seemed to be one of the most important victories of Soviet diplomacy in 1958. Implementation of the program involved the exchange of various programs, including the mutual national exhibitions in 1959: on June 29, 1959, the "Exhibition of Achievements of Soviet Science, Technology and Culture" was opened in New York. In July of the same year, in Moscow's Sokolniki Park, a counter "American National Exhibition" was opened.²¹⁰ The decision to hold the American exhibition was made in 1958. The organizers of the exhibition in Sokolniki were the USIA, the US Department of Trade, the GKKS and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²¹¹ From the decision taken at the highest level until the day of its opening, it took only seven months.

²⁰⁸ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 120.

²⁰⁹ For example, Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945 – 1961*, New York: Macmillan, 1997, 211.

²¹⁰ Ibid, 204.

²¹¹ Ibid.

Both the American and Soviet sides did not just exhibit and present their achievements. The Cold War, being a global confrontation, actualized the thinking in binary oppositions, primarily the opposition of capitalism-communism (socialism). This confrontation was embodied in the way of organizing exhibitions: if the US actively attracted private firms and funds, the USSR invested state capital. The exhibits presented by the American and Soviet sides testified not only to the achievements (in the case of the USSR, not only actual, but also potential) of the participants in culture, science and technology, but also reflected the key values of capitalist and socialist societies.

From the Soviet side, the planning was the responsibility of GKKS. Zhukov was mostly planning the activities which turned out to be successful at the international exhibition held in 1958 in Brussels.²¹² Back then, the USSR delegation was awarded numerous Grand Prix, against which the US section seemed much less interesting. The Soviet side decided to emphasize the peaceful beginning in all of its technologies. Thus, the model of the nuclear power plant, the model of the nuclear icebreaker, the model of the rocket stage in full size, the models of three satellites and the first satellite launched into space were exhibited. In total, the Soviet Union exhibited about 10,000 different objects (from cars and food to musical instruments and works of art), according to the organizers, testifying to the great success of the USSR on the way to building socialism.

Ilyichev, Satyukov, and Zhukov were closely following the American preparations for the exhibition in Moscow. Since the Soviet side was aware of the American plans through the Soviet diplomats in the US, they tried to respond appropriately and include topics which were going to be highlighted in Moscow. The American side presented an ideal culture of consumption, so the Soviet propaganda had to focus on the living conditions and access to healthcare and education. The Ministry of Foreign Trade was ordered to take into account the

²¹² Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, February 13, 1959.

economy and peculiarities of the US when choosing exhibits.²¹³ The Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of the Navy were responsible for the timely delivery of exhibits.²¹⁴ The Councils of Ministers of the Soviet republics were responsible for providing exhibitions with the necessary catalogues in foreign languages. The Ministry of Culture was responsible for showing Soviet films during exhibitions.²¹⁵ Different ministries had to send the experts in the fields of Soviet science and technology, so around 400 Soviet citizens staffed the New York exhibition, including 20 interpreters to assist the experts who could not speak English.²¹⁶ The Soviets also used their common strategy and invited the Soviet Army Song and Dance Ensemble. Frol Kozlov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, opened the exhibition. Among those who visited the Soviet exhibition were U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon.

The means of Soviet newspapers and news agencies were extensively used. For the exhibition, photonegatives belonging to TASS, Sovinformburo, SSOD, "Pravda", "Izvestia", "Ogoniok", "Soviet Woman", and "Soviet Union" were used.²¹⁷ TASS had to organize special photo shoots for the thematic plans of the exhibition in New York.²¹⁸ TASS was also obliged to supply the newspapers and radio, as well as republican news agencies, with the guidelines on what, when and how they should publish about the exhibition.²¹⁹

The exhibition gained some publicity, as it was covered by "Izvestia", "Soviet Culture", Sovinformburo, "Moscow News", "Foreign Commerce Weekly", "Soviet Russia", and the "New York Times". "Pravda" published multiple lengthy articles on the Soviet exhibition in New York.²²⁰ Those texts underlined the unprecedented success of the exhibition. Satyukov

²¹³ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 150.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid, d. 152.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 876, Predstavleniya, dokladnye zapiski po voprosam deyatel'nosti TASS.

²²⁰ For example, there were two publications on June 29 and July 2.

insisted on providing many quotes from American citizens praising the exhibition and wrote that the newspaper received hundreds of positive letters from the American citizens.

A week after the opening ceremony, GKKS held a press-conference concerning the upcoming Soviet exhibition in New York.²²¹ Aleksei Manzhulo, General Director of the exhibition in New York, and Georgii Bolshakov, Deputy editor-in-chief of the “Soviet Union” and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, answered questions. Bolshakov defined the exhibition’s role as ‘familiarizing the American people with the Soviet Union’s achievements in peaceful construction and with the Soviet people’s life’.²²² The following day Mikhail Nesterov, President of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce, said that “the aim of the exhibition is to demonstrate the achievement of the Soviet people in development of science, technology and culture, as well as the rise in living standards”.²²³

After the exhibition, a film *Eto videl New York* [New York Saw It] was commissioned by Agiprop.²²⁴ In this film, there were numerous comments of officials about the exhibits: footage with the Minister of Agriculture, sitting behind the wheel of the Soviet combine; a remark that Eisenhower's wife liked the Soviet fur coats, and the President himself intending to buy a Soviet car "Moskvich".

To sum up, the Soviet Union used the means of multiple ministries, committees, newspapers, etc. to perform the propaganda activities at the New York exhibition. It was a testing ground for their capability of producing propaganda on a foreign territory, their quick responses to the capitalist press, and their coordination of all the internationally oriented Soviet organizations and media.

3.6 American Exhibition in Moscow

²²¹ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 145.

²²² *ibid*

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ *Ibid*, d. 167.

At the same time, the national exhibition of the USSR in New York and the US exhibition in Moscow were meant to be held on absolutely equal terms, and the Soviet exposition was opened two weeks earlier. It gave the Soviets some space for maneuvering. Agreement on the absence of the censorship, however, forced Zhukov and Ilyichev to be more inventive. The propaganda chiefs did not want the Soviet citizens to buy any American goods or to attend the exhibition. Many souvenirs were planned to be given out for free: plastic cups, Coca-Cola, etc.²²⁵ The problem with the sale of goods was solved relatively simply — by a sharp reduction in the number of sales during the Soviet exhibition in New York. Moreover, the restriction of access to the exhibition of Soviet visitors was resolved by a decision to distribute (mainly through enterprises and public organizations) many fewer tickets than planned, and to explain to the Americans that the exhibition did not create the expected interest.

The Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in the USA Mikhail Smirnovsky reported on the projects, plans for the ‘America’ magazine, etc.²²⁶ In his report, he provided many details on the future exhibition. First, it was prepared by USIA. The agency planned an extensive advertisement on the billboards in multiple Soviet cities, ads in the newspaper *Vechernyia Moskva* [Evening Moscow], broadcasting ads on radio and television. The Soviet documents record that the Americans also found an excuse not to show the films in advance, as the construction of the pavilion took a while, and the screening was not possible without all the necessary equipment being installed, so the Soviets had to ask for the scenarios of the films.²²⁷ Visual propaganda played a huge role, showcasing color television and films. The Americans were going to use the network to broadcast discussions between the Soviet visitors and American guides. The Soviet side realized that it was needed for Americans because Vice President Richard Nixon, who was going to run for President in 1960, needed notable success.

²²⁵ Ibid, d. 117, l. 5.

²²⁶ Ibid, 14.

²²⁷ Ibid, 33.

The representatives of GKKS began to negotiate with the adviser of Embassy of the USA Brady responsible for carrying out an exhibition in Moscow.²²⁸ The head of the GKKS reported to the Central Committee that he asked Brady about the messages in the American press on the televised discussions:

Somewhat embarrassed, Brady replied that such press reports are 'a strong exaggeration', meaning to show on TV only the speech of Vice-President Nixon. No other speeches and especially discussions at the exhibition, according to him, were planned. In this regard, I once again stressed that we consider it absolutely unacceptable to hold any discussions at the exhibition, let alone on television. Brady agreed that it would be inappropriate.²²⁹

A focus of the exhibition was on the books, newspapers, and magazines. Two hundred publishing houses in America were planning to send 8000 books. Aside from that, 500 publishing houses were to display their magazines.²³⁰ After the report by Smirnovsky, the Soviet propagandists took a very hands-on approach to the American exhibition. They asked to check the literature and films which was going to be displayed with an excuse of checking them for mistakes. For example, in a discussion with one of the organizers of exhibition in Moscow, Zhukov pointed out a grammar mistake on the cover of an American book. During the check, the Soviet curators noticed anti-Communist literature.²³¹ Two days prior to the opening of the exhibition, July 23, 1959, Zhukov called the US Ambassador Thompson, who was handed a note with a full list of anti-Soviet literature. Thompson's position was hopeless — the Soviet exhibition in New York was working hard, and the American one in Moscow could be canceled, taking advantage of this occasion. Zhukov reported:

Handing the note, I expressed indignation that, despite the warning made earlier to the Americans, the American side included a large amount of anti-Soviet literature on July 22. I cited the example of Fisher's book,²³² containing gross, slanderous attacks against the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikita Khrushchev and other leaders of the Soviet government; collection of "Articles on Foreign Policy of Russia", containing

²²⁸ Ibid, 37.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid, 35.

²³¹ Ibid, 38.

²³² Zhukov identified it as "Snova v Rossii" [Again in Russia] but I did not manage to find it.

articles by Trotsky and other political opponents of the Soviet system, and a number of other books.²³³

Another point of friction was the denial of propaganda presence at the exhibitions from both sides. The Soviets learnt that the Americans were going to give out 5 brochures; however, Americans quickly pointed out that those had an explanatory nature and were strictly connected to the topics of exhibition.²³⁴ The next Soviet concern was about the desire to display the American press. As both sides agreed, the exhibition had to stay out of polemics; however, the press was, admittedly, a very political subject.

In June 1959, the Central Committee approved a decree ‘On the Activities in Connection with the Forthcoming Opening of the Soviet Exhibition in New York and the American Exhibition in Moscow’ prepared by Zhukov and Ilyichev. The special guidelines were issues for the local newspaper editors from all over the USSR to carry out explanatory work among the population, to emphasize the need for a critical attitude to the exhibits at the exhibitions and the publications on this matter.²³⁵

The government tried to provide the Moscow citizens with many alternatives for spending free time of, which required multiple measures. The Ministry of Culture of the USSR had to organize many concerts and tours of famous artists and groups from the countries of the people's democracies.²³⁶ The Ministry of the RSFSR was obliged to create a fair of goods, which were in a great demand. Up until July 15, the Soviets organized another exhibition “To You, Soviet Man”, in the very same park ‘Sokolniki’.²³⁷ The Ministry of Culture also had to organize the performance of Soviet ballet on ice, free screenings of Soviet films on the central squares of Moscow, a new circus, etc.²³⁸

²³³ Ibid, 39.

²³⁴ Ibid, 42.

²³⁵ Ibid, d. 118, l. 20.

²³⁶ Ibid, 22.

²³⁷ Ibid, 24.

²³⁸ Ibid.

As for the press coverage, Ilyichev and Zhukov passed down the guidelines on the coverage of the events.²³⁹ They addressed TASS, radio, central and Moscow newspapers, television. No special attention should be devoted to any exhibits. All the data displayed at the exhibition should have been softly compared to the data obtained through other sources about the real situation in the US.²⁴⁰ The Central Committee required the Central Statistical Office and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations to provide the necessary data on the 'truthful' situation of living conditions of American workers.

All the material about the arrival of Nixon had to be published only after the guidelines had been issued by TASS. The official report on the opening ceremony was also provided by TASS. The articles about the exhibition had to be published in different newspapers at different times, but had to be approved by Agitprop. Each newspaper, according to its target audience, was supposed to focus on the way Americans presented their lifestyle. For example, the newspaper 'Trud' highlighted the problems with security, employment, etc., 'Komsomolskaya Pravda' ontroubled American youth, 'Literaturnaya Gazeta' on the decline in American culture, and so on.

These actions did not go unnoticed by the Americans. TASS' *Vestnik* included a lot of American press coverage on the perception of the exhibition in Moscow.²⁴¹ According to the document, *The New York Times* put on the front page a message from Moscow titled "The Soviets are Trying to Disrespect the American Exhibition and Nixon's Visit," which reads:

The propaganda apparatus of the Communist party today intensified its attempts to overshadow the first days of the American national exhibition and Nixon's visit. New tactics in the Soviet press and prohibition of censorship of a number of photographs showing Soviet workers, who greeted Nixon that most clearly reflect the efforts of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee <...> the actions of censorship are

²³⁹ Ibid, d. 119, 12.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, 14.

²⁴¹ GARF, f. P4459, op. 38, d. 938, Sluzhebnyj vestnik inostrannoj informacii TASS "OZP" (osoboe zakrytoe pis'mo) №№ 640 - 740.

contrary to the assurances given to Nixon's official representatives before his visit to Moscow.²⁴²

This way, the Soviets now had to produce counterpropaganda for the exhibition itself and for the articles in the American press. For example, Zhukov suggested taking photo-copies of the American stands sending those the newspapers for the editors to make counter-propaganda statements.²⁴³ The journalists also had a conference on the way to cover the exhibition, to coordinate what had to be praised and what had to be debunked.²⁴⁴ The order of the publishing of reviews of the visitors also had to be coordinated, as Americans could ask for them. Propagandists also trained some people to argue with the American guides, and this material was later used in the reports on the exhibitions to show the "genuine" reactions of the visitors.²⁴⁵ Organizations sent people (from Komsomol or Party) to write in the visitors feedback book.²⁴⁶

At the same time, the mutual exchange of national exhibitions in summer of 1959 was supposed to develop mutual understanding between the peoples of the US and USSR. TASS and other media had to highlight the importance of this form of cultural exchange for the sake of further cooperation and peaceful co-existence.

Concluding Remarks

The Soviet propaganda chiefs had multiple channels of executing propaganda activities abroad. By the means of TASS, SIB, 'Soviet Union', *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, etc., the propaganda chiefs managed to coordinate the overall direction of the press coverage and counterpropaganda. An example of these coordination activities is the exchange of exhibition between the US and the USSR in 1959. The exhibitions served as a testing ground for the

²⁴² Ibid. The agreement between the US and the USSR stipulated that neither party would censor any exhibits that would be shown by the other party. Each party agreed that it would not sell more of its goods than the other party.

²⁴³ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 116, l. 38.

²⁴⁴ Ibid, 51.

²⁴⁵ Ibid, 54.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

propaganda on a larger scale on the territory of a foreign country. Many of the technologies used during these events were later applied to the Khrushchev's trip to the United States later that year.

Chapter 4

Khrushchev's Trip

There is an extensive body of scholarly studies on the trip. One tradition writes about the trip as a short-lived success or being insignificant whatsoever. For example, Vladislav Zubok briefly touches upon the visit, mentioning that although the trip was promising, no immediate policy breakthroughs were made.²⁴⁷ William Taubman, infamous Khrushchev's biographer, also did not see any substantial long-term effect as a result of the trip.²⁴⁸

On the other hand, there are scholars who treat the event not from the position of estimating its success but rather by the policies involved in its execution. For example, Harry Hanak saw the event as a way of establishing a personal contact with Eisenhower.²⁴⁹ Nikita Khrushchev's son, Sergei Khrushchev, contributed to the scholarship on the trip, describing it as a „resurrection of the spirit of Geneva“.²⁵⁰ Gary Tocchet's research had a focus on the diplomatic part of the trip and public opinion on it.²⁵¹ Aaron Max Berkowitz also studied the reaction of public but in a form of a protest.²⁵² Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko saw the trip as an impactful event for the Soviet perception of itself, as it showed a gap between the development of two countries, which Khrushchev could witness himself.²⁵³

²⁴⁷ Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

²⁴⁸ William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.

²⁴⁹ Harry Hanak, *Soviet Foreign Policy since the Death of Stalin*, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.

²⁵⁰ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

²⁵¹ Gary Tocchet, "September Thaw - Khrushchev's Visit to America, 1959," Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1995.

²⁵² Aaron Max Berkowitz, "Mr. Khrushchev Goes to Washington: Domestic Opposition to Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 Visit to America", Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 2010.

²⁵³ Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.

For my research, I will study Khrushchev' trip as a media event. The head of the country is often seen as the main representative of the state. Hence, the visits of the heads of the states included multiple newsworthy activities, where the leader of the delegation would become familiar with the ceremonies and activities considered to be embodying the foreign culture and would be very ceremonial in their form. By design, these events create the illusion of two cultures meeting and attempting to understand each other, so it would frame the communicative space for both the foreign and domestic public.

I would claim that the media event represents a specific genre for journalists, as television, radio and printed media came to adopt specific tools and ways of covering media events. Using Dayan and Katz concept, I will see media events as having specific features that are suitable for the 1950s and 1960s, hence, for my research.²⁵⁴ First, media events are distinct because they interrupt the daily routine of broadcasters (for this matter, viewers and listeners, too). Second, they often gain a very wide media coverage or monopolize it. Third, they are usually reported or broadcasted live. Additionally, they are pre-planned and usually have a ceremonial aspect.. Finally, these events were also relatively predictable, discrete, and existed within a limited time.²⁵⁵

The concept of a media event is an analytical tool, as even events which were claimed to be global do not have an outreach to many places, due to the differing access to information in many regions of the world. Media events create the illusion of 'being there' despite the remote location through different means: TV and radio broadcasts, printed materials and so on. Media events are usually created with possible economic benefits and wide media exposure in mind.

²⁵⁴ The features of a media event described here are taken from Daniel Dayan, James E. Katz, *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

²⁵⁵ The concept was originally described in 1980 and has been criticized from many standpoints but I think those exceptions covered by other researchers are not related to my topic. For example, authors are criticized for not seeing catastrophes and natural disasters as media events. Other group of researchers pointed out the overly ritual perspective of the approach. Fiske criticized them for neo-Durkheimian perspective and focus in shared values, making unable the analysis of conflicting and diverse visions of media events.

By these means, a much wider audience is aware of the event and they have an illusion of being present.

Using the concept of a media event, my research will take into account media coverage generated before, during, and after the Khrushchev's visit, for several reasons. News can be subordinated to the logic of media event, reporting on the most spectacular and noticeable occurrences within the framing of the media event..²⁵⁶

4.1 Soviet Officials Visit the USA

While the Khrushchev's trip had a very important symbolic meaning, I cannot argue that the propaganda mechanism was re-built solely for the purposes of the American visit. However, the transformed system was tested during the two exhibitions in summer of 1959 and by the earlier trips of Frol Kozlov²⁵⁷ and Anastas Mikoyan.²⁵⁸ 1959 was a year of Soviet official visits to the United States. In January, Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet Minister of Trade, visited the US on an 'unofficial trip'.²⁵⁹ Later, Frol Kozlov, the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, went to America to open the Soviet exhibition in New York.²⁶⁰ Both of them traveled across the country, met with many prominent figures, and spent a lot of time in press-conferences and interviews. Although neither of them received much press coverage on the pages of the Soviet newspapers, they did create a trend for how to represent the Soviet high-ranking official. For example, Mikoyan's visit did not reach the front pages of *Pravda* but filled multiple inside columns. The overall message of the Soviet press treatment of the

²⁵⁶ William Pawlett, "Media Events' Reconsidered: From Ritual Theory to Simulation and Performativity", *Journal for Cultural Research*, Volume 22, 2018, 1-15.

²⁵⁷ Frol Kozlov visited America for a short informal trip, as well as to introduce the Soviet exhibition in New York.

²⁵⁸ Mikoyan made many important trips to Yugoslavia, USA, Asia and Cuba.

²⁵⁹ In September of 1954, Mikoyan accompanied Khrushchev to China and the Soviet Far East, and became one of his closest associates.

²⁶⁰ Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961*, New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997, 211.

visit was that the American public was ready for relaxing international tension, expanding trade, and ending the Cold War.

Among the Soviet elite, Mikoyan was considered a 'Western expert', as he has visited many capitalist countries and already had toured the US in 1936.²⁶¹ His previous 'private' trip was made in 1956 to Yugoslavia to secretly negotiate with Tito. In 1956 he paid two further visits to Peking and accompanied Chinese delegations coming to Moscow. Indeed, many of these 'private' trips were connected to crises of Soviet foreign policy. One of the most notorious visits was also in 1956, when he was a chief negotiator with Hungarian communists during the Hungarian uprising. He also met with Eisenhower and discussed the possibility of student exchanges between the US and the USSR.²⁶²

Mikoyan was relatively popular during his American trip, making TV-appearances and attending the press-conferences. However, it seems that Frol Kozlov became a star for the American press. He seems to have been instructed by someone on how to interact with the US media:

Frol Kozlov is in the US for only one week, but observers already came to conclusion, that he is not different from any American political figure, searching for popularity among the masses. He begins to behave as a candidate two days before the election <...> American photographers hardly ever had a better friend. At their request, the first Deputy Prime Minister is ready to do literally everything you need to give a photo on the front page of tomorrow's newspaper.²⁶³

Kozlov's speech at the opening ceremony of the New York exhibition was broadcast over radio and TV, which caused a problem, as it then required a reciprocal broadcast for the American exhibit opening in Moscow.

According to US documents, the American believed that it was in the best interest of the US to have a friendly reception of Kozlov. First, he came to the US to open the Soviet exhibition

²⁶¹ Aleksej Adzhubej, *Te desyat' let*, Moskva: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1989, 255.

²⁶² Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961*, New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997, 196.

²⁶³ GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 790, Sluzhebnyj vestnik inostrannoj informacii TASS "OZP" (osoboe zakrytoe pis'mo) №№ 609 - 662.

in New York which was 2 weeks prior to the American exhibition in Moscow, thus, the better the reception for him, the better the reception for Nixon. Second, they regarded Frol Kozlov as an heir of Khrushchev and thought they might be dealing with him as a Soviet leader in a few years, so wanted to make a personal connection.²⁶⁴

Unlike Mikoyan, who did not bring many people with him,²⁶⁵ Kozlov was accompanied by the academic Andrei Tupolev, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Republic Yadgar Nasriddinova, chief of the American division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Aleksandr Soldatov, and chairman of the State Planning Commission of the RSFSR Vladimir Novikov.²⁶⁶

In the end of the trip, the US State Department filed a report, in which it stated that:

Kozlov's visit to the United States June 28–July 13 took place without unpleasant incidents and seemed helpful in opening more meaningful discussion on contentious issues between the two countries.²⁶⁷

This lack of incidents and overall effective way of communication led to the American's considering an invitation for Khrushchev to visit the country.²⁶⁸

4.2 Preparations for Khrushchev's Trip

The visit of Nikita Khrushchev to the United States in September of 1959 became a significant event in the world history. A leader of the Soviet Union visited the major "capitalist" state for the first time, setting a precedent in the system of relations between the two countries. However, it was also unprecedented from the scale of its journalistic coverage. As Adzhubei noted in his memoirs, "there were about five thousands of my colleagues "tailing"

²⁶⁴ Editorial Note № 78 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p1/d78> (accessed: 05.06.2019)

²⁶⁵ Mikoyan was accompanied by Oleg Troyanovsky, Washington-educated official interpreter and diplomat.

²⁶⁶ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 101.

²⁶⁷ Editorial Note № 78 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p1/d78> (accessed: 05.06.2019).

²⁶⁸ Ibid, Editorial Note №85, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p1/d85> (accessed: 05.06.2019).

Khrushchev—a record number at the time.²⁶⁹ Competition with Western colleagues and the desire to create a cohesive image of Khrushchev forced the propaganda mechanism to speed up already ongoing changes in the system, resulting in a new format for Nikita Khrushchev's official representations. Innovations in international politics,²⁷⁰ supplemented by changes in the ways of representing the political leader, had a significant impact on Soviet propaganda practices.

However, my sources claim that Khrushchev's trip was rather unexpected, and the real preparations started only in summer 1959.²⁷¹ Since the program of the American visit was quite busy, and there was very little time for its preparation, different teams worked hard to come up with the propaganda plans.²⁷² Many of the ideas were already used for other international exhibitions, trips and so on. A large group of party workers, government officials and scientists worked hard on the necessary documents. They were produced numerous brochures and materials on various aspects of Soviet life, prepared by more than 30 responsible agencies and organizations (on Soviet democracy, science, youth, freedom of conscience, cultural relations with foreign countries, etc.).²⁷³ Special attention was paid to materials related to foreign policy issues and to the history of Soviet-American relations. At the same time, letters and telegrams received in connection with the trip to the United States were planned to be published in the Soviet press on the eve of the delegation's departure to

²⁶⁹ GARF, f. 9518, op. 38, d. 939, Sluzhebnyj vestnik inostrannoï informacii TASS "OZP" (osoboe zakrytoe pis'mo) №№ 741 - 815.

²⁷⁰ By these changes I mean the new discourse of peaceful co-existence.

²⁷¹ This document was the earliest-dated evidence (June 19, 1959) of the actual preparations; however, it was much more centered around the Kozlov's trip and only suggested possibility of Khrushchev's trip in the future: GARF, f. 9518, op. 1, d. 349, Perepiska s Posol'stvom SSSR v Soedinennyh Shtatah Ameriki, ministerstvami i drugimi central'nymi uchrezhdenijami i organizacijami SSSR o kul'turnyh svjazzah SSSR i Soedinennyh Shtatov Ameriki.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid, d. 348, Perepiska s Posol'stvom SSSR v Soedinennyh Shtatah Ameriki, ministerstvami i drugimi central'nymi uchrezhdenijami i organizacijami SSSR o kul'turnyh svjazzah SSSR i Soedinennyh Shtatov Ameriki.

Washington.²⁷⁴ The letters expressing the desire for a peaceful coexistence were considered and circulated in the Soviet press by those newspapers and news agencies whose leaders took part in the trip.

Propaganda chiefs paid special attention to formatting a positive image of Khrushchev for the West. It was for this "western" direction that a full-scale project began to be implemented, which can be called "Khrushchev for the world". This project was a series of promotions and was the result of the activities of the Soviet services such as the Agitprop, GKKS, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, all of which had significant press mechanisms for propaganda abroad. All channels and mass media – press, radio and television - worked for the project.

Right before the trip, the TASS statute was changed. The last statute on TASS had been accepted in 1935 and certainly needed a revision. New tasks were officially introduced to TASS by the CPSU Central Committee resolution of June 24, 1958, "On the Measures of Improving the performance of TASS". Palgunov's deputy, Vishnevsky, introduced a new point to the TASS statute on August 26, 1959: TASS had to be engaged in "propaganda of success in the economic and cultural construction of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, transferred abroad as their own, and gleaned from the Soviet press materials, rebuffing the attacks on the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp, exposing slander and misinformation apologists bourgeois ideology, using also the judgments and statements of our political opponents, directly or indirectly evidence of the success of the foreign policy of the USSR."²⁷⁵

During the high-ranking state visits, SIB's main occupation was writing and sending out the biographies of high-ranking officials. During the trip of Frol Kozlov, Anastas Mikoyan, and

²⁷⁴ They were later published in multiple Soviet newspapers, spread by Sovinformburo, and published in a book "Face to Face with America".

²⁷⁵ GARF, f. 4459, op. 11, d. 1143, Operativnye prikazy po Telegrafnomu Agentstvu Sovetskogo Soyuza (TASS) s № 1 po № 57.

especially Nikita Khrushchev, SIB received hundreds of requests for biographical reference materials. Even the biographies of Soviet leaders were used as propaganda for the life path of an exemplary Soviet citizen. The creators of the personal biography of Khrushchev in successfully dealt with its task. His official biography, broadcast to the Western audiences, was built in accordance with the ideal Soviet image. The emphasis was on his democratic ("from the people") origin, his "miner's" past, and military merits. In addition to personal data broadcasted to the West, there was a set of the Soviet leader's individual qualities : democracy in communication, energy, good physical health. Having to overcome the Soviet tradition, the new biographers gave the appearance of Khrushchev "for the world" significant features for foreign audiences, for example, the presence of a family who traveled with him.

Preparations had to be done on multiple levels. First, many plans for the trip had to go through the Soviet ambassador to the United States – Mikhail Menshikov. For several weeks, he tried to negotiate on the schedule, cities, and activities of the General Secretary of the USSR.²⁷⁶

Meanwhile, Poryvaev, Zhukov, and Ilyichev had to come up with the propaganda plans. On August 11, 1959, Poryvaev introduced a plan of propaganda measures in relation to the upcoming trip of Khrushchev to the United States.²⁷⁷ This plan included thematic plans of the publications, responsible departments, kinds of publications, possible authors. For example, Sovinformburo suggested a special edition of the magazine 'Soviet Union' dedicated to the Khrushchev's trip, a press-release from the embassy with a short biography of Nikita Khrushchev, a selection of his previous statements. Also suggested were pieces on Leninist peaceful foreign policy, on Soviet-American relations, on the struggle of the USSR for disarmament, on the international trade of the USSR and economic possibilities of cooperation with the US, on the domestic policy of the USSR.²⁷⁸ There was also historical reference

²⁷⁶ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 106.

²⁷⁷ Ibid, d. 108, plan propagandiskth meropriyatij, 11 Aug. 1959, l. 34.

²⁷⁸ Ibid, l. 36.

material on the exchange of visits of state and public figures between the USSR and US. Aside from these press releases, there was a plan of to publish materials on the 7-year plan, the cultural exchanges between two countries and so on. Those were supposed to be written by the experts in the area – doctors of science, deputy ministers, heads of committees.

An additional piece of the plan was the preparation of materials for the American press: a short biography of Khrushchev, excerpts from his previous statements, articles on peaceful co-existence during the Cold War. Yet again, those were written mostly not by journalists but by the president of Academy of Sciences, the head of Inturist and so on. Additionally, booklets and brochures were printed in Moscow to be distributed across the United States.²⁷⁹ Those included a biography of Khrushchev, short reference materials on the USSR, materials on the ongoing reform of education, space program, 7-year plan. Those were written by the representatives of Gosplan, Ministers of Finances, etc.

Another stage of preparations included photo-materials. They had to illustrate Khrushchev's biography, and, more interestingly, the experience of the USSR co-operating with the capitalist countries, so many materials were taken or written in the TASS and SIB sub-sections of the United Kingdom or Western Europe.²⁸⁰ For example, this section had to prepare the materials on the cooperation of the USSR, the UK and the US during World War II, articles on the end of the 'Cold War', and on the elimination of military bases. Multiple articles were written in the sectors of Latin America or India: most of them were of a very generic character on the idea of peaceful co-existence. Special materials had to be prepared which would target specific regions of Western Europe, Asia and Latin America but those were not specified.²⁸¹

²⁷⁹ Ibid, l. 39.

²⁸⁰ Ibid, d. 110.

²⁸¹ Ibid, d. 108, ll. 34-40.

A separate plan was created for the *Soviet Union* which was already distributed in the US. These plans were pre-occupied with particular topics (the production of mass goods, Soviet school, mass housing, Nixon's trip to the USSR, space, Soviet literature and theater, etc.). The instructions described in detail how much space each piece should occupy, emphasizing the role of illustrations in most of them.²⁸² The plans were approved on August 22, 1959, by the Ministry of Foreign affairs.²⁸³

Mamedov, the editor-in-chief of *Soviet Union*, also asked to increase the circulation of the magazine during Khrushchev's trip, from the regular 52,000 to 75,000 copies to satisfy the demand of the readers. However, the embassy of the USSR and the Sovinformburo office had to decline the offer, as they foresaw that the Americans would ask for the mutual increase of the circulation of *America* before Nixon's visit to Moscow and it could not be done.²⁸⁴

However, there was a maneuver which allowed the Soviets to increase the presence of their press during that time. The American publisher the International Arts and Sciences Press started publishing a magazine called *Soviet Highlights*.²⁸⁵ It shed light on the economic development of the USSR, education, literature, medicine, etc. More importantly, it was not officially involved with the Soviet government and was established by an American citizen. It was printed of 25,000 copies and it was planned to re-print Soviet newspaper material from *Kommunist* [Communist], *Voprosy Filosofii* [Questions of Philosophy] and other Soviet publications.

According to data from the Sovinformburo representative in the USA, Diakonov, this publication gained some traction among the American public and American libraries and organizations subscribed to the magazine.²⁸⁶ The editors also addressed Sovinformburo for

²⁸² Ibid, l. 41.

²⁸³ Ibid, l. 42.

²⁸⁴ Ibid, l. 43.

²⁸⁵ Ibid, d. 109.

²⁸⁶ Ibid, d. 108, ll. 45-46.

help translating the articles. The magazine asked for the financial aid from the Soviet government (3000 dollars for improving publishing conditions and 500 dollars for subscriptions). Zhukov decided to fully support the initiative as it introduced new opportunities during the Khrushchev's trip. As it was published by the Americans, the question of reciprocity did not have to be taken into account. At the same time, the control over the magazine was, in fact, in Sovinformburo's hands.²⁸⁷ The dissemination of the magazine was also guaranteed, as, according to American laws, embassies could spread the printed materials if they were produced by Americans. The Soviet embassy in the US also fully supported the idea. Hence, the plan was approved on September 9, 1959, by Agitprop and the International Department.²⁸⁸

4.3 Coordination on the Spot

Among the Soviet officials who seem to be setting the theme for coverage and "interpretations" of various events, are Khrushchev's son-in-law and editor of *Izvestia*, Alexei Adzhubei; Russia's propaganda chief Leonid I. Ilyichev and Georgi A. Zhukov, chief of Russia's east-west cultural exchange section of Soviet Foreign ministry.

*Excerpt from RFE special Gettysburg, PA, Sept. 26*²⁸⁹

Khrushchev needed assistants who would help him with making the decision on the spot. From multiple sources, I managed to partially identify the members of delegation. Unfortunately, I only know around 40 member of the delegation, whilst it has to be approximately 100 members:

The party will include members of the Premier's family, important government officials, a large contingent from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and a group of at least thirty-nine journalists, photographers and broadcasters.²⁹⁰

I sub-divided the delegates into several sections by their role during the trip.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, d. 109.

²⁸⁸ Ibid, d. 108, ll. 47-48.

²⁸⁹ "Excerpt from RFE special Gettysburg, PA, Sept. 26," HU OSA 300-80-7:356/2628; Хрущёв, Никита Сергеевич: поездки: [США]: USA 1959; Old Code Subject Files; Soviet Red Archives; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

²⁹⁰ William J. Jorden, Russian Party Will Number 100, *New York Times*, 3 September 1959.

Fig. 2. *Delegation to the United States*

№	Name	Position	Group
1	Nikita Khrushchev	General Secretary of the USSR	Khrushchev and his assistants
2	Vladimir Lebedev	Khrushchev's assistant	
3	Andrei Shevchenko	Khrushchev's assistant	
4	Grigorii Shuiskii	Khrushchev's assistant	
5	Leonid Ilyichev	Chairman of Agitprop	Chief propagandists
6	Yuri Zhukov	Chairman of GKKS	
7	Vyacheslav Elyutin	Minister of Higher Education	Representatives of Soviet ministries
8	Vasilii Emelyanov	Head of the Main Department for the Use of Atomic Energy at the Council of Ministers of the USSR	
9	Aleksandr Markov	Head of the 4th Department of the Ministry of Health	
10	Vladimir Vinogradov	Head of the Department of Trade with Western Countries of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR	
11	Andrei Gromyko	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Representatives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11	Aleksandr Soldatov	Member of the Collegium of the USSR of Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
12	Oleg Grinevskii	Third Secretary at the Department of International Organizations of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR	
13	Mikhail Kharlamov	Head of the Press Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
14	Mikhail Menshikov	Soviet Ambassador to the US	
15	Anatolii Kovalev	Assistant of Minister of foreign Affairs of the USSR, head of the group of advisers to the Minister	
16	Vasilii Grubyakov	Senior assistant to the Minister of foreign Affairs of the USSR	
17	Yuri Volski	Counselor, Soviet Embassy	
18	Fedor Molochkov	Head of Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
19	Nikolai Lunkov	Deputy chairman of the 3rd European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
20	Arkadii Sobolev	Soviet Permanent Delegate to the UN	Editors-in-chief
21	Aleksei Adzhubei	Editor-in-chief of <i>Izvestia</i>	
22	Pavel Satyukov	Editor-in-chief of <i>Pravda</i>	
23	Nikolai Gribachev	Editor-in-chief of <i>USSR</i>	
24	Natalia Sergeeva	Editor-in-chief of <i>Novoe Vremya</i>	
25	Vladimir Orlov	Editor-in-chief of <i>Soviet Culture</i>	
26	Mikhail Sagatelyan	Head of the TASS news agency's United States Bureau	Local Soviet journalists
27	Evgenii Litoshko	Correspondent of <i>Pravda</i> in New York	
28	Anatolii Garanin	Photo-correspondent of <i>USSR</i>	

29	Vikentii Matveev	Adzhubei's protégé, correspondent of <i>Izvestia</i>	Other Soviet journalists
30	Dmitrii Goryunov	Deputy editor-in-chief of <i>Pravda</i>	
31	Javad Sharif	Correspondent of <i>Moscow News</i>	
32	Oleg Troyanovskii	Interpreter	Interpreters
33	Viktor Sukhodrev	Interpreter	
34	Mikhail Sholokhov	Writer	No group
35	Aleksandr Feklistov	Head of the American Section within KGB	
36	Nikolai Tikhonov	Chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk Economic Council	
37	Tupolev	Son of an aircraft designer Tupolev	
38	G. T. Gordon	Unknown	
39	Oleg Vadeev		

It is worth mentioning that I excluded family members of the Soviet delegates, which was another innovative thing about this trip: Mikoyan, being considered an expert in Western countries, suggested bringing families on the trip.²⁹¹ Khrushchev, Adzhubei, and Gromyko brought their wives and children to the United States.

As it can be seen from the table, the biggest groups of the delegation were the representatives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives of Soviet press – editors-in-chief, correspondents, employees of a local office of Pravda and TASS, etc. These people consulted with Khrushchev during the trip on the matters of speeches, diplomatic behavior, and press coverage.

Many American newspapers reported not only on the trip itself but also paid attention to those who covered the trip – the Soviet journalists.²⁹² According to the RFE report,²⁹³ the Soviet approach seemed much easier for the Americans, who were semi-jealous of the simplicity within the group of the Soviet journalists. They were admired for their unwillingness to rush,

²⁹¹ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, 307.

²⁹² RFE special Gettysburg, PA, Sept. 26,” HU OSA 300-80-7:356/2628; Хрущёв, Никита Сергеевич: поездки: [СИИА]: USA 1959; Old Code Subject Files; Soviet Red Archives; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

²⁹³ Ibid.

for taking pictures from the same angle, for everything being decided for them. This ‘no-brainer’ for them was a sign of putting much less stress on the journalists. They especially dreamt of the absence of miscommunication with the bosses because the Soviet superiors were all ‘in the field’ and there was no telex or telephone involved. It was an ideal situation where your only job was to listen to the boss standing right next to you and write what was dictated for you. As the *New York Times* recalled, the head of the American department of TASS simply came up to his group and said not to cover a couple of speeches which would only happen in a couple of hours, as “TASS has already sent it”. The author of the article poked fun at the reaction of the group, saying,

None of the Soviet newsmen protested; none complained that they have had already filed the story. They all said “charasho” and seemed very pleased about it.²⁹⁴

It should be noted that foreign journalists who met with Nikita Khrushchev often performed a special diplomatic mission, speaking as informal ambassadors of their country. Khrushchev was well aware of this:

...Sometimes journalists perform tasks of their governments and introduce an idea for which their governments are allegedly not responsible, but weigh how this idea is accepted by the other side.²⁹⁵

Communication with representatives of the press was based on the scheme "answers to questions"; in other words, Khrushchev answered questions of the correspondents.²⁹⁶ Judging by the style of these "answers", it was not the author's words but editorial materials that were prepared on the recommendations of the Soviet press group. Several topics were usually the occasion for conversations and press conferences of Khrushchev, mainly subjects of international politics, the relationship of the Soviet Union with other countries and the attitude of the USSR towards a particular event. The relevance, speed, thematic focus or conditionality

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Hrushcheva, *Voprosy istorii*, № 4, 1995, 78-93.

²⁹⁶ For example, Otveti tovarishcha N. S. Hrushcheva na voprosy redakcii gazety «Pravda» o sobytiyah vo Francii, *Pravda*, September 22, 1958.

of international relations with the country represented by the journalist were mandatory for these materials. However, foreign journalists were interested in what was happening in the Soviet Union, and the personality of Khrushchev. Therefore, at press conferences, he was asked much broader questions – about censorship in the Soviet press and policy towards Western journalists whose assessment differs from the official Soviet ideology, the financial situation of Soviet citizens, reforms in the national economy, the past of the leader of the state, etc. Khrushchev called representatives of the bourgeois, capitalist press "otkrytye bandity pera" [explicit bandits with a pen] and accused them of lying. However, Viktor Sukhodrev, who worked as Khrushchev's translator for many years, noted that he always saw a great importance of the media in foreign countries. During his trips abroad, he often met with journalists and liked to talk with them. "There were tons of people who wanted to take an interview with Khrushchev, among them were the most popular newspaper and TV-companies."²⁹⁷

During the trip abroad, the leader of the Soviet state met with journalists in various professional clubs and associations, which was a common way of communication abroad. An example is the meeting held at the Economic Club in New York on September 17, 1959.²⁹⁸ Although the host party consisted of representatives of leading trading firms, questions were asked about the activities of the Soviet media. In particular, there was a question: "Why do our programs for the Soviet Union not reach the audience?"²⁹⁹ Further, the representative of the tobacco company asked the question about the distribution in the Soviet Union of all sorts of bourgeois publications, radio programs "Voice of America" and similar radio stations.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ Viktor Sukhodrev, *YAzyk moj – drug moj*, Moscow: Valent, 1999, 31.

²⁹⁸ Aleksei Adzhubei, Nikolai Gribachev, Yuri Zhukov, Leonid Ilyichev, Mikhail Kharlamov, Vladimir Lebedev, Evgenii Litoshko, Vikentii Matreyev, Vladimir Orlov, Pavel Satyukov, Oleg Troyanovsky, Aleksandr Shevchenko, and Georgii Shuisky, *Face to Face with America*, Moscow: Politizdat, 1960.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid, 55.

There were multiple ups and downs for the Soviet press group during the trip. The delegates had to deal with the potential scandals at the National Press Club in New York, avoid mentioning street protests on multiple occasions, etc. Yet, there were situations with a potential of showing Khrushchev in the best light, when he attracted an enormous amount of press in Iowa or gifted the model of Sputnik to Eisenhower.

Khrushchev's speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959, was shown as a great success of the Soviet government.³⁰¹ He made a lot of key points which were repeated throughout the trip. However, this particular speech had an important symbolic meaning, as the platform of the UN is addressing the international arena and calls for the cooperation with between multiple countries. UN is known as an entity for resolution of international issues; in a way, it is the embodiment of co-existence of countries with different systems and beliefs. This speech was supposed to enhance the prospects of mutual understanding, and Khrushchev used his own trip as an example of cooperation and attempts of having a dialogue. He raised the questions of damaging effects of the Cold War, resolution of the Berlin Crisis, admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, and a change in discriminatory international trade policies.³⁰² However, Khrushchev failed to mention the Soviet troops in Eastern Germany and many other issues concerning the West. While those were picked up by the American reporters, the Soviet press portrayed the speech as an absolute triumph of a Soviet leader and socialism in general.³⁰³

A visit to Los Angeles can an example of disaster for the Soviet journalists: a protest took place upon Khrushchev's arrival.³⁰⁴ Later, he visited the Twentieth-Century Fox studio and

³⁰¹ Ibid, 63.

³⁰² Ibid, 65.

³⁰³ The authors described the results as follows, "Behind every word of Khrushchev is a powerful Soviet state, the united socialist camp, a peace-loving humanity, striving to live without the "Cold War", without an arms race, without constant anxiety for peace, for its future." Ibid, 67.

³⁰⁴ Aaron Max Berkowitz, *Mr. Khrushchev Goes to Washington: Domestic Opposition to Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 Visit to America*, Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 2010, 34.

witnessed Can-Can, and it was apparent that he did not like what he saw.³⁰⁵ During his stay at Los Angeles, he also did not get to go on the scheduled Disneyland visit because of the security concerns.³⁰⁶ Later, the mayor of Los Angeles gave a rather hostile speech and made Khrushchev furious to the extent that he threatened to get on the plane and fly back to the USSR.³⁰⁷ However, the conflict was resolved by Andrey Gromyko, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs,³⁰⁸ and the negotiations continued.

For example, Yuri Zhukov used the meetings with Americans and talked to the USIA director George Allen. Together they discussed the possibilities of not jamming the American radio broadcasts on the Soviet territory and a wider circulation of magazines *America* and *USSR*.³⁰⁹ During the first few days of the trip, the Soviets indeed stopped jamming the "Voice of America" because Khrushchev's speeches were being broadcast. In return, the radio toned down the anti-Soviet propaganda.³¹⁰

Naturally, many measures were taken by the Soviet news agencies. Specifically for the trip, Sovinformburo re-printed Khrushchev's article 'On Peaceful Co-existence' (originally published in the American magazine *Foreign Affairs*)³¹¹ in a booklet in multiple foreign countries and in Soviet newspapers. One hundred thousand copies of Khrushchev's biography were disseminated as well as brochures with his statements 'For Peaceful Co-existence and Cooperation'. Sovinformburo also closely followed and co-operated with the magazine *Soviet Highlights* and supplied it with needed materials.³¹²

³⁰⁵ Ibid, 35.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, 36.

³⁰⁷ Ibid, 37.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Memorandum of Conversation №18, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, part 2, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/d18> (accessed 25.05.2019).

³¹⁰ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 108.

³¹¹ Ibid, ll. 49-58.

³¹² Ibid.

In TASS *vestnik* of September 19 the article from the correspondent of Associated Press was translated. This reporter was stationed in Moscow and saw what was going on in the Soviet press. His article stated that while the trip came to its second half, the Soviet press portrayed a happy picture of an absolute triumph.³¹³ Contrary opinions were not expressed and were not available to the majority in Moscow, although during the first 36 hours of Khrushchev's trip to America, the USSR did not jam VOA programs.³¹⁴

This picture was created by the leaders of Soviet propaganda, many of whom were together with Khrushchev in America. All of them sent materials to their organizations and newspapers. Many Columns in *Novoe Vremya*, *USSR*, *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Trud*, etc. were dedicated to the trip. Soviet newspapers covered in detail the meetings of Nikita Khrushchev with representatives of the Western media, but almost never called them „interviews,“ but rather *besedy* [talks] or "answers". The term "interview" in those years was seen as a bourgeois concept in a Soviet newspaper and magazine practice, except in reprints from foreign media. . Secondly, the genre of the interview involved the active participation of the journalist in the dialogue with the subject of the interview (the journalist interviews, the journalist thinks and asks questions, talks). I think that journalism in "the Thaw" did not use this approach to communicate with the first person of the Soviet state – it was Khrushchev who talked to journalists, not vice versa. In these materials, the surnames of the Soviet journalists were never specified, thereby the author's beginning was excluded. However, during Khrushchev's "conversations" with foreign correspondents, their names and status were necessarily indicated in the subtitle of the material.

As I have mentioned before, some of the questions asked to Khrushchev were problematic for the Soviet press. However, Satyukov and others found a way around it and started underlying

³¹³ GARF, f. 4459, op. 38, d. 940, Sluzhebnyj vestnik inostrannoj informacii TASS "OZP" (osoboe zakrytoe pis'mo) №№ 816 - 897.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

the ‘dignity’ of Khrushchev, his patience, and his willingness to avoid scandals despite provocations.³¹⁵ By the end of the trip, all the major Soviet newspapers drew a positive conclusion. They thanked the American people for hospitality, and admired the dialogue between the Soviet and American nations. *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and *Komsomolskaya Pravda* all admitted the welcoming atmosphere of the tour.

4.4 Making it a Triumph

Meanwhile, there were no agreements achieved on any controversial issues. The discussion of trade and economic relations between the two countries ended in vain. The Soviet delegation was unable to move forward on the issue of abolishing the US Congress sanctions on trade with the USSR. In turn, Khrushchev refused to link the issue of normalization of Soviet-American trade with the settlement of payments on lend-lease (the amount that Moscow was ready to pay did not suit Washington). Negotiations on the problems of US-China relations, China's representation in the UN and the situation around Taiwan were also unsuccessful. The attempts of the Soviet leader to defend the position of Beijing met with a very tough reaction of the American partners in the negotiations. A compromise on the German question was never found.

However, the propaganda was far from over after the end of the trip even despite its diplomatic failures. The active propaganda work began for an explanation of the outcome of his US visit. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU from October 12, 1959 "About the Mass-Explanatory Work in Connection with the Results of the Visit of Nikita Khrushchev in the United States of America" was approved.³¹⁶

As a result of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, a number of books were published containing descriptions of his trip, speeches, conversations, remarks, and photo illustrations:

³¹⁵ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 112.

³¹⁶ Ibid, d. 114.

"To Live in Peace and Friendship" (author – Nikita Khrushchev, Moscow, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1959) and "Face to Face with America" Moscow, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1960).³¹⁷

The latter is a very interesting example, as, in fact, all prominent journalists and propagandists were listed as authors - Adzhubei, Gribachev, Zhukov, Ilyichev, Lebedev, Litoshko, Matveev, Orlov, Satyukov, Troyanovsky, Shevchenko, and Shuiskii. The book stated:

The visit of Nikita Khrushchev to the United States was not an isolated act. It was a victorious result of the political line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government, illuminated by the light of the great ideas of the work of the Soviet people. This is the highest achievement at this stage, crowning the bulk of our success.³¹⁸

A large portion of the book was dedicated to the image of Khrushchev. For example, the authors represented the Soviet leader as follows: from the very beginning of the trip he was "energetic, mobile". He won the crowd with his "Khrushchev smile", which was "wide, open, contagious." He is sociable, easily likable by people. Americans are "fascinated by the Shine of his eyes – kind, attentive, intelligent." All his answers to opponents were "fast, successful, hit the mark." These answers "clarify the face, make the room tremble, cause a thunder of applause." The authors constantly reinforced the idea of how triumphant the trip was and underlined the thought that the trip was a success among 'ordinary' Americans despite the attempts of the police to stop them from meeting the Soviet leader. This way, with the focus on 'ordinary Americans', the diplomatic failures were less noticeable. In 1960, the book won the Lenin Prize.

Traditionally, a film on the trip was commissioned.³¹⁹ Already in October, it was screened in color. The cameras were rarely off the Premier in the one-hour chronicle of his journey. There were no close-up scenes of the apartment houses, no schools, no hospitals. The visit to the

³¹⁷ The book was published in Russian and in English.

³¹⁸ Aleksei Adzhubei, Nikolai Gribachev, Yuri Zhukov, Leonid Ilyichev, Mikhail Kharlamov, Vladimir Lebedev, Evgenii Litoshko, Vikentii Matreyev, Vladimir Orlov, Pavel Satyukov, Oleg Troyanovsky, Aleksandr Shevchenko, and Georgii Shuisky, *Face to Face with America*, Moscow: Politizdat, 1960, 164.

³¹⁹ RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 113.

supermarket and cafeteria were also omitted. The documentary adhered strictly to the Soviet version of Khrushchev's experiences in America. For example, policemen were shown to illustrate how they needed to keep the crowds away from Khrushchev. The ordinary Americans were said to come from distant places just to meet Khrushchev. As the machine factory was shown in California, the narrator notes that there were still no space vehicles in America which could reach the moon. Cine-propaganda was meant to be sent to the embassies and missions of the USSR in foreign countries, which included the color film about the trip, as well as a recorded speech on American television. By the order of Zhukov, they were sent to 59 countries.³²⁰

4.5 Conclusions Drawn by Propagandists

Zhukov and Poryvaev drew multiple conclusions after the trip. They filed a ten-page report on what has to be done to increase the effectiveness of the Soviet international propaganda.³²¹ First, they pointed out that Sovinformburo was the main news organization occupied with a printed form of propaganda for foreign countries, as it produces 26 illustrated magazines and newspapers (961.500copies), 35 bulletins (140,000 copies), collections of official documents, and these figures do not include around 100,000 articles and 300,000 sent to foreign newspapers. SIB also issued special editions of Soviet newspapers abroad with Khrushchev's speeches at the UN, on American television, and during the meeting of workers in Moscow (September, 27). Those were printed in a form of brochures (1,800,000 copies). The illustrated book with the speeches was issued in 10 countries (250,000 copies), 100,000 of them – in the United States.

However, the scale of work of Sovinformburo still did not correspond to the current needs of Soviet propaganda. In Zhukov's report, not enough was done to reflect 'in a bright,

³²⁰ Ibid, d. 114.

³²¹ Ibid, d. 117.

comprehensible way the fundamental problems of building communism in the USSR, the worldview of the Soviet people, the advantages of the Soviet social and state systems.’³²² They were characterized as suffering from lengthy unconvincing explanations, full of clichés. Counter-propaganda was also not as effective as it should have been. Sovinformburo did not issue deep enough articles which would have shown more clearly the misconceptions about the USSR in the articles of the Western press. The poligraphic base was also seen as a huge disadvantage of the Soviet press. The Soviets constantly experienced the lack of paper, printing ink, etc. Illustrated newspapers did not meet the high visual requirements were quite dull and unexciting. Even if a newspaper needed more units printed because of the Party Congress, it needed to go through a long process of reporting its need to Agitprop and Ministry of Finances.³²³ Yet again, the inability of reaction time was questioned, as well as not taking into account the political situation in a particular country.

These downsides were explained by multiple reasons.³²⁴ The employees of Sovinformburo were not motivated enough to increase the quality of their work. Due to the lack of control by the sectors and editors, new employees were not educated or knowledgeable about the topics they were covering. The structure of Sovinformburo was seen as outdated. Many of the newspapers they were issuing did not have editorial boards or editors. Articles and illustrations for those were picked by the employees who were foreigners, not the ones sent from Moscow. Hence, the magazines were not made in Moscow, so the most ideologically important parts could be misinterpreted by foreigners without a close Soviet supervision. Zhukov also reported on the fact that Sovinformburo was supervised by GKKS.³²⁵ For him, SIB had become quite distant from the Central Committee. In this sense, SIB was in a worse

³²² Ibid.

³²³ For example, *Pravda* wanted to issue more units for the announcement of a 7-year-plan but needed to wait for approval from different instances. RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 95.

³²⁴ Ibid, op. 16, d. 104, ll. 30-32.

³²⁵ Ibid, ll. 38-40.

position than all central newspapers and magazines, as the heads of Sovinformburo sectors no longer received enough direct guidelines from the Central Committee. They received all the important information later than the central newspapers, although they needed, in fact, to get it quicker to spare time on translation and transmission. There was no unified structure of the Sovinformburo offices overseas. Some worked on the basis of embassies as diplomats, some as librarians, attaché, secretaries of the diplomats. SIB wanted to change this situation and unify its employees' status.

Zhukov and Poryvaev summed up by saying that in the near future they needed to improve the quality of the magazines published abroad, increase the circulation of booklets, brochures, albums, improve the supply with photo-materials.³²⁶ The demand for the articles on the development of Soviet science and technology has be to satisfied, so Sovinformburo planned on opening a department of propaganda for those issues. These goals could be achieved by every newspaper and magazine's layout being prepared in Moscow. At the same time, regional newspapers had to have own editorial board which would be responsible for the content. They would be approved by the Central Committee.

Yet again, the interests and requests of the foreign newspapers had to be taken into account. Sovinformburo planned on having a group of 7-8 highly-qualified journalists whose area of specialization was international relations. Sovinformburo still had a head of the organization, not a general secretary, like TASS, so they wanted to re-name the position.³²⁷ Offices abroad should have been unified, preferably becoming press-departments of the embassies. They needed to be headed by diplomatic workers not lower than of the 1st rank of the secretary of embassy. It would have created the conditions of strengthening ties with the foreign press organizations.

³²⁶ Ibid, ll. 51-53.

³²⁷ Ibid, l. 54.

Sovinformburo also insisted on the strict division between their functions and those of TASS. Sovinformburo transmitted the official documents of the Soviet government and doubled this function with TASS, spending the state money. Instead, Poryvaev wanted to focus more on the propaganda articles and commentary on those official documents.³²⁸ Interestingly, Sovinformburo representatives complained that they were not invited to the state meetings and so on, hence, they could not operatively report on those events.

The quality of translations also left much to be desired.³²⁹ Sovinformburo wanted to hire foreigners to do this job, as well as to send interns from Moscow to foreign countries. The material and technical basis was also not very effective, as Sovinformburo still was not using telex.

Next, GKKS introduced its plan of propaganda activities after the trip on October 19, 1959.³³⁰ It included multiple publications like a) an illustrated compilation ‘Nikita Khrushchev in the USA’ (16-18 printed sheets, 193,000 copies), 40,000 of them were for the United States. The rest was printed in Arabic, Italian, Swedish, Hindi, Bengali, Indonesian and Japanese. b) An illustrated brochure “For Complete Disarmament” with the Khrushchev’s speech at the UN (789,000 copies). It was printed in 28 countries and in 24 languages. c) An illustrated brochure “Peoples Have to Live like Good Neighbors” with the full speech of Khrushchev on American television (557,000 copies for the same countries, same languages. D) An illustrated brochure “Nikita Khrushchev: Our Time Can and Has to be the Time of Peace and Progress” (557,000 copies,, same countries and languages.)³³¹

Some materials were written by the delegates who took part in the trip (for example, Nikolai Gribachev wrote a brochure ‘The Mission of Peace’, 100,000 copies).³³² Every newspaper

³²⁸ Ibid, l. 55.

³²⁹ Ibid, l. 67.

³³⁰ Ibid, ll. 230-233.

³³¹ Ibid, ll. 235-242.

³³² Ibid, l. 232.

and magazine under the supervision of Sovinformburo had a special edition on Khrushchev's trip to the US with 32 articles on peaceful co-existence. Twenty-one articles were written for foreign newspapers. The Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages planned 9 books in 6 languages to be published in 1959-1960 concerning the trip. "Les Nouvelles de Moscou" and "Moscow News" had a special plan for their publications with the variety of topics sub-divided into sections: science, culture, international relations, etc.³³³

Concluding Remarks

Overall, Khrushchev's trip was very remarkable propaganda-wise. The major Soviet propagandists managed to coordinate the press coverage of a huge media event. They all were 'on the spot' close to Khrushchev to direct the press coverage and assist him with strategies and speeches. All the propaganda channels were used with different types of media and several ways of advertising the Soviet Union abroad. It used multiple techniques of propaganda that had been tested during the Soviet-American exhibitions and during the state visits of Mikoyan and Frol Kozlov.

While it was a failure from a diplomatic standpoint, it became a moment of realization of a need for further transformation of the Soviet propaganda system. TASS was changed for the needs of the trip prior to it and SIB's activities were analyzed and reported on later. This event was planned as a truly globally-important phenomenon, as propaganda of Khrushchev's triumph was held in multiple languages and spread in multiple countries.

Conclusion

Despite the realization of a need to change the Soviet propaganda system in the post-war context, the real transformation occurred only in the late 1950s. Multiple factors led to it: during the Thaw era, new officials responsible for propaganda had a journalistic background,

³³³ Ibid, l. 231.

not a diplomatic one. These newcomers quickly became a part of the network around Khrushchev, obtaining access to the means of changing the way news agencies and other internationally-oriented Soviet organizations were working. Yuri Zhukov, Leonid Ilyichev, Aleksei Adzhubei, Mikhail Kharlamov, and Pavel Satyukov became the new faces in the Soviet propaganda. They developed new guidelines for the education and practice of journalists, as well as supervised the major channels through which the propaganda was executed: TASS, Sovinformburo, *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For more effective coordination, propagandists used the Union of Journalists as a platform for discussions on the current issues, diplomatic objectives, etc.

These changes could be clearly seen on the example of Khrushchev's trip to the United States in 1959. All the newly-established or transformed propaganda organizations were coordinated by the propaganda chiefs in order to perform at their best. The main propagandists at the time were all a part of the delegation, helping the Soviet General Secretary 'on the spot'. Most importantly, the media coverage of Khrushchev's trip could not be clear if not to highlight the principles of Soviet international coverage overall. Main state and press officials were part of the delegation and represented their committees and departments. They made notes, dictated the ways to cover the events, what to leave out and so on. In the end, the Soviet journalists turned this event into a triumph. Khrushchev's tour was turned into a global media event, as the Soviets disseminated the materials on the trip long after its finish all-around the world. In fact, the trip became a testing ground for the current propaganda system.

The Soviet propaganda system in the late 1950s tried to learn from its successes and mistakes. With each new global media event like international exhibition, they tested what was popular and interesting to the public and used it further on other occasions. It also became more open to learning from the West and accepting its methods of work. The Soviet news agencies were especially important to change: they had to perform the fastest to be published. Faster transmission meant the publication of the Soviet stance on the events. Soviet news agencies, however, were not news agencies in the Western sense. They did not correspond to the Anglo-American values of news and performed other activities rather than the transmission of the so-called hard news. Their responsibilities included the dissemination of propaganda materials, control over several newspapers, etc.

After the trip, the need for further alterations became obvious, especially in the case of Sovinformburo. The issues of speediness, quality of translations, and originality of articles were raised. The system stayed ineffective due to the overlapping responsibilities of propaganda organizations and double subordination. In the forthcoming years, the group around Khrushchev slightly changed, and so did the propaganda. Sovinformburo was transformed into a 'Novosti' Press Agency, the new head of TASS, Dmitrii Goryunov, was introduced and became a part of the so-called press-group,

After the dismissal of Khrushchev, these people were still closely associated with a previous head of the state, so many of those from his circle were also removed from their positions and started to occupy less prominent posts. In 1964, Satyukov became an editor of a newspaper *Agitator*, Adzhubei – Head of the Department of the magazine *USSR*, Lebedev – junior editor at Politizdat, Shevchenko – senior researcher at one of the universities in Moscow.

With my research, I have also demonstrated the ways through which the Soviet international coverage was coordinated. It was a crucial element of media diplomacy, as, on the other hand, according to the ideological beliefs, the press had a class consciousness. Since there was just one class, the opinions in the Soviet press had to be unified. On the other hand, the Soviets realized that their press is being monitored by the West, so they used it as a platform for 'testing the ground' and took into account the opinion of the other side. They were informally restricted by this monitoring, by the principle of reciprocity, etc.

Another implication for my research is understanding of a thin line between the international journalists and diplomats, as they often worked 'hand-in-hand'. Although the situation slightly changes in the 1950s with the transformation of the educational system, there was still a very strong diplomatic element to the work of *mezhdunarodnik*, as the reporter's actions abroad and coverage of international events were seen as a position of the Soviet state.

In sum, my research showed a network of journalists responsible for the change in propaganda in the late 1950s, which was exemplified by the trip of Khrushchev to the United States. Highlighting the actors behind this transformation also gave them an agency, as a large body

of the Cold War historiography depicts the journalists as the state employees who are simply following the Party's guidelines.

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