The Business of Religion and Politics: The Inevitable Oppression of the Ahmadis in Pakistani Regimes

By

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Political Science

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Robert Sata

Budapest, Hungary 2020

Abstract

How do different regimes manage majority-minority relations in non-secular systems, and does regime type have an effect on the treatment of religious minorities? The literature has demonstrated that majority-minority religious conflicts occur as a consequence of an instrumentalized difference, rather than an innate attribute to religion. Religious instrumentalization for political means is exacerbated in weak political frameworks. Through the lens of the political economy of religion, the thesis argues that minority accommodation varies based on regime type and strength. It looks at the Pakistani case and the treatment of the Ahmadi community by both military and civilian regimes. It tests whether the strength and type of regime impact the role of religion in society and the political instrumentalization of religion. To ascertain how Pakistani regimes ranging from 1947-2020 differ and resemble in their minority accommodation, the empirical section employs the historical process tracing (PT) method, paired with interview data from 27 Ahmadis from all over Pakistan. The findings show that regime strength plays a more important role than its type in determining the politicization of religion. Religion's instrumental use for political purposes plays an integral role in excluding religious minorities.

Acknowledgements:

Being able to write in itself is a privilege not many have. In a world where words are so easily thrown or detached from reality, the writers of today must exercise the privilege of being able to read and critically think in a manner that mindfully reflects the truth–embedded with a sense of empathy. The process of writing has given me endless nights tugging between self-doubt and courage. Yet writing is nothing more than self-discovery, knowing your roots, and an awareness of the possibilities that the future holds.

Behind any piece of writing lie several lessons; people that keep one sane, sleepless nights, and so on. I would first thank my father. For if you had not met my mother, I would have missed out on the opportunity to have a mother who has worked tirelessly to ensure I never felt your absence – you did well. To my mother; thank you for being a courageous woman who in many ways defies the norms of the society we come from. I am amazed by your perseverance every day. As said by many before me and will be stated by many after I am gone, surely without my mother, I am nothing. I am eternally grateful for all the women, who generations before me, struggled to ensure women of all backgrounds occupy socio-political space while being unapologetically vocal. If it weren't for your tireless efforts, I, like many disadvantaged women, would be a prisoner of what society has determined for us. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Robert Sata. I have bothered you beyond limits for the past two years. I will be forever grateful for your precious guidance and patience with me and my work.

Thank you to my partner, Hamza, for having faith in me in moments where I gave up. You have stood by me like a rock through this thesis and otherwise. Thank you for keeping me grounded and giving me the confidence to keep moving – there are not many like you where we come from. A special thanks to Mr. L.Rehman, who vouched for me, which made peeking into the lives of so many people, and so many stories possible. The twisted, yet strong women I met in Budapest; Jitske Grift, Natalia Kovyliaeva, Kinga Korányi and Gaia Liotta. Thank you for teaching me that there is no problem big enough that a bunch of drinks by the Danube cannot fix. To my chosen family in the US, your friendship made pushing through quarantine blues and writer's blocs a whole lot better. A special thanks to the Lankan queen Mehr, for choosing English as her passion and becoming my best friend. Most importantly, thank you to all the Pakistani artists I have listened to during this time; your words have made me feel indescribable

emotions, reassuring me that being human in an emotionally paralyzed society is possible before, during, and after my lifetime.

Through this process I have learnt about my homeland, the beauty it holds and the demons that plague it. My country is a conglomeration of extreme dilemmas. Growing up in this dilemma of poor and rich, empathy and the dismissal of it, dishonesty and honesty, piety and corruption, fundamentalism and secularism, and the business of religion somewhere in between, is what showed me how beautiful and how miserable life can be depending on how your cards play out. Pakistan, I owe you an apology for the people that misuse your potential. I owe you for teaching me the value of true freedom, which no other 'free' country in the world ever could. Thank you for making me who I am and giving me my identity.

To the countless list of those who live in my country under constant fear and injustice. You are the true heroes that need to be commemorated. Many in Pakistan have been denied livelihood, recognition, respect, acceptance, opportunity, and ultimately their lives, because they believed in something different. To those people of Pakistan who demand and work towards a more tolerant and equal homeland, your job is thankless but your resilience amidst the whirlpool of intolerance and injustice is astounding. And to the human without whom this research would have never come to being, Bader M. You may not remember telling a twelve-year-old how for simply saying an Islamic greeting you could be jailed, or your life could be in danger, but without you I would have never realized what an unexplainable reality it is to be an Ahmadi in Pakistan. I can never thank you enough for teaching me how to remain curious, humorous, and empathetic while understanding the layered injustices that occur in the country we both call home.

I would like to end this with a verse written by prominent Sufi thinker, Baba Bulleh Shah (1680 - 1757):

پڑھ پڑھ عالم فاضل ہویوں، کدی اپنے آپ نوں پڑھیای نہیں
جا جا وڑدا مندر مسیتی، کدے من اپنے وچ وڑیا نہیں
ایویں روز شیطان نال لڑدا ایں، کدے نفس اپنے نال لڑیا نہیں
بلھے شاہ! آسمانی اڈیاں پھڑدا ایں، جیڑہا گھر بیٹھا اونہوں پھڑیا نہیں۔

You read and read and call yourself a scholar, but you never studied about yourself,
You keep visiting temples and mosques, but you never entered inside yourself.
Every day you fight against Satan, but you never fought against your own ego,
Bulleh Shah! You grasp for the flight of heaven, yet you never grasped what is within your own house.

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1. Violence & Power of Religion:

The small community of Ahmadiyya originated in the Indo-Pak region of South Asia and was formalized as a Muslim group in 1889.[1] The Ahmadi community is distinguishable by its belief that the promised Messiah has arrived, a belief majority Muslims do not accept. Despite many parallels with mainstream Muslim groups, Ahmadi Muslims have historically been persecuted due to their perception and classification as heretics[2] under both military and democratizing governments in Pakistan.

Why are communities with similar belief systems, ethnicities, nationalities, and languages outlawed and ostracized from society? Why are the differences between groups from the same religious school-of-thought amplified to incite violence against one another? Moreover, how do different regimes managing these often-sensitive relations approach the issue of religious majority-minority conflict? This thesis will examine *how religious majority and minority relations are managed in a non-secular state system.*

Investigating the religious aspect of minority persecution in politics is important because of its highly sensitive role in identity politics. Religion occupies a deeply personal aspect of identity politics which can be problematic when imposed on a collective by another collective.[3] When states instrumentalize a particular truth attached to a religion in society, they inherently create sharp divisions between/within belief systems to justify persecutory acts. Religious states aspiring to democratize can create political power networks based on religious identification due to the significance of religion in social and political relations. This increases the likelihood of

[1] Al-Islam, "Muslim Community."
[2] Paracha, "1974 Ouster."
[3] Friedland, Roger. "Religious Nationalism," 126.

human rights abuses against religious minorities, negating any expected or actual democratic development. Although this thesis focuses on the instrumentalization of religious identity by religious states, the instrumentalization of religion for political means is also observed in non-religiously affiliated states (e.g. the abortion or euthanasia debate).

Studies have shown that 86% of all nations in the world have laws restricting religious practice, while 75% of states in the world carry out actions and policies that openly discriminate against minority religions.[4] Scholars and policymakers alike favour states to liberalize into full democracy for its beneficial political characteristics, especially for marginalized minorities. This thesis tries to understand whether democratization generates an environment that fosters the alleviation of persecution of minorities at the hand of both society and state. A 2018 Freedom House Report shows approximately 30% of recognized countries in the world considered partly free continue to support discriminatory policies in some form.[5] Both 'free' and 'partly free' countries engage in religious discrimination making the issue of democratization and the commitment to its values more complicated. Despite a secular political system, cases like India showcase that a shift towards nationalism can successfully exclude minorities. The Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) National Registration of Citizenship (NRC) overtly targets the Muslim-minority population of India.[6] A 'free' democratic nation stripped 15% of 1.3 billion people of their citizenship,[7] exhibiting a dangerous pattern of religious exclusion many thought to have defeated by establishing a secular-democratic framework after independence.

Religious states can be considered different from non-religious ones. When the state mixes its policies with religion it can create, formalize, and crystallize conflict along ethnoreligious

4 Finke, and Martin. "Ensuring Liberties," 687.
5 Freedom House, "World 2018."
6 Karat, "Communal Game-Plan"
7 Kuchay, "Anti-Muslim."

divisions making coexistence unattainable. Religious states granting hegemony to a specific religion may make religion in society omnipresent, however, this special role of religion in the political market can create competition between religious brands, whose interaction in the market is not static over time. Religious states taking an exclusionary stance on all groups not belonging to the majority should according to rational choice, lose interest in minorities once successfully excluded. Yet, we often see continuing persecution after successful exclusion by both society and state, so the question is what is the rationale behind such action? This thesis proposes to examine *how the journey of regime liberalization in transitioning religious democracies can lead to harsher treatment of minorities and a reduction in their religious freedom.* More specifically, I expect that the strength and nature of the government/regime (civil/military) determines the level of state religious-instrumentalization (role of religion) which directly impacts minority marginalization (H1).

To test these questions, the thesis employs mixed methods; historical process tracing (PT) and in-depth qualitative interviews. This type of process tracing aims to analyse causal-mechanism patterns in historical events over time. The analysis, paired with the support of interviews, allows for understanding why certain actions were pursued by various political actors, how the targeted group views these actions over time, and whether the regimes have fallen prey to path-dependence of action.

I employ the case of Pakistan for my research because it harbours communal division according to the religious majority-minority division since colonial times, making religion's role in society a special one. Pakistan was founded through religious mobilization instead of ethnic or national mobilization, which resulted in a religious state. The thesis focuses on the small Ahmadi group and explores why an insignificant sub-brand of Islam becomes the centre of religious and

political debate. Pakistan's history is split into two; half under military reign, and the other half trying to reform towards an effective Western-valued, representative democracy. Pakistan's unstable political history makes it an ideal example to employ the political economy of religion and observe how minorities have benefitted from the turbulent transition towards democracy. Civilian regimes are taken as being democratic, whereas military rule is an authoritarian system which by default cannot be considered democratic or democratizing even if it exhibits such characteristics. However, it is crucial to highlight that this thesis does not discuss democratization. Rather, it studies the consequences of religious relations existing between state and religious actors in countries that are often plagued by military rule and attempting to move towards democracy.

Chapter two of this research discusses religious majority-minority religious relations while defining key concepts and addressing the operationalization of terms such as religion, minorities, violence, and regime types. It synthesizes and evaluates the contributions from previous work on religious violence. The thesis adopts the theory of political economy of religion for an understudied comparison of regime types and their tactics of managing religious majority-minority relations. The theoretical lens governing this research then produces two indicators of evaluation. The 'indicators of strength' measure the strength/weakness of the regime and corroborate the impact this has on the instrumentalization of religion through the 'indicators of marginalization.' This section concludes by giving details and justifications for the methodology used.

Chapter three of the thesis begins by dividing Pakistani history into key periods (1947-1973, 1974-2007, 2007-2020) that represent three critical junctures of modern history. It underscores regime variations in minority accommodation, and how well regimes of the time manage the non-static role of religion in the political market of religion. Regimes and treatment of minorities in each section are analysed and guided by the indicators of the political economy of

religion. Excerpts from the interview data are also inserted within each time frame to support the findings of the historical process tracing.

Chapter four serves as a conclusion section discussing the lessons of the empirical findings, and its implications for Pakistan and the wider world. Moreover, it also presents the limitations of this thesis, what other factors can be added to strengthen the findings, and what policy recommendations can make the transition towards democracy and minority accommodation smoother. The discussion concludes by proposing solutions for countries plagued with violent religious majority-minority relations such as India and Myanmar.

1.1 Background, Selection, and Justification

The political genealogy of Pakistan provides a useful case because it is a transitioning or deficient democracy.[8] It is considered by many as a failed, or failing state, with high levels of military intervention derailing its attempts to become a democracy.[9] According to a 2010 estimate, of Pakistan's population of 207 million, 96.4% are Muslims (Sunni 85-90%, Shia 10-15%), and 3.6% are religious minorities (including Christians and Hindus), with 11 registered languages spoken in the country.[10] Religious ideologies tend to be fragmented and are far from monolithic even within one sect of Islam.[11] Situated within the category of 'others' in religious minorities, less than 0.2% of the population are the Ahmadiyya.[12] However, this insignificantly small sub-brand of Islam is the only group that has group-specific laws restricting its religious freedom.[13]

[8] Raina, "Case of Pakistan." 209-210.
[9] Khan, "Decline of the State in Pakistan," 219-220
[10] Central Intelligence Agency, "South Asia."
[11] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 50-51.
[12] Ashraf, "Understanding Blasphemy," 61.
[13] Shahid, "Accept Ahmadis as Muslims"

Once a part of Hindustan, Pakistan has sheltered diverse religious, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic compositions.[14] It is home to one of the Early Civilizations, the Indus Valley Civilization which existed 5,000 years ago.[15] In its successive years, the region was subjected to several imperial rules, by local and foreign dynasties such as Mongols, Arabs, Greeks, Maurya Empire, Persian Mughals, and the British India Company.[16] The pluralistic nature of communities is mentioned to show that there has been a long history of multiple identities existing in the region thus there is no country in South Asia glued together under one common culture, race, religion, or ethnicity such as Germany or Japan.[17]

Many historians have documented the absence of communalism and conflict while speaking of historical co-existence between different faiths such as Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, and Muslims.[18] However, the British colonial invasion of the region played upon the dormant divides in society by politicizing them through their policy of divide and rule to consolidate their control of the region.[19] British politicization/communalization of religion gave religion a distinctive role in the sub-continent allowing for the internalization/instrumentalization of religious tensions in terms of local contests for power.[20] Under colonial rule, state apparatus such as the electorate were stratified by religion. Like one of dozens, the British implemented Morley-Minto reforms so politicians could only seek votes from their co-religionists, widening the gulf between Hindus and Muslims crystalizing religious communalism with sharp in/out-group loyalties.[21]

[14] Ollapally, Deepa M. "Violent Conflict," 24.
[15] Central Intelligence Agency, "Introduction-South Asia."
[16] Central Intelligence Agency, "Introduction-South Asia"
[17] Ollapally, "Violent Conflict," 25.
[18] Ollapally, 25-27.
[19] Ollapally, 37.
[20] Talbot, "Religion and Violence." 158.
[21] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land 12.

Understood to be a new religion by its opponents, the Ahmadiyya group formalized themselves as a reformist movement within Islam, led by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908).[22] M.G. Ahmad is considered a spiritual leader and in 1889 announced himself as the promised messiah, leading to the formal creation of the Ahmadiyya community in British Punjab.[23] Ahmadiyya faith believes that M.G. Ahmad is the 'Mahdi' whose advent was foretold by Prophet Muhammad, whose purpose was to restore and reform the fanatical beliefs of Islam back to its true teachings.[24] Mainstream Islam often confuses the establishment of the Ahmadiyya Khilafat with the Ahmadiyya community's disbelief in the Seal of Prophethood or *Khatam-I Nabuwwat* (considered an essential aspect of being a Muslim).[25]

In contrast to these claims, every year in an annual gathering in the U.K., members of the community take an annual pledge declaring "I solemnly pledge that I believe Muhammad is God's Prophet and the Seal of the Prophets."[26] Nevertheless, many *ulemas* (religious scholars) globally and in Pakistan have issued *fatwas* (religious decrees) condemning M.G. Ahmad and his followers, by publicly declaring Ahmadis all over the world, and especially in Pakistan, of being *Kafirs* (infidels) who are *Wajib-ul-Qatal* (deserve/worth being killed).[27] Statistics on offenses related to religion (posing to be Muslim, outraging religious sentiments, defiling religious scripture and so on,) also known as the blasphemy law, show that during 1986-2014, out of the total number of blasphemy cases recorded, 50.41% of accused are of mainstream Muslim faith (over 90% of the population) and 34.89% are Ahmadi faith (0.2% of the population).[28] The Pakistani state mandates

[22] Rashid, "10 Fabrications."
[23] Qasmi, "Introduction." 2.
[24] Islam Ahmadiyya "Ahmadiyya Muslim Community."
[25] Rashid, "10 Fabrications."
[26] Rashid, "10 Fabrications."
[27] Qasmi, "Introduction." 2.
[28] Ashraf, "Understanding Blasphemy," 68.

signed declarations when leaving for Hajj calling all Ahmadis apostates, liars, and infidels.[29] Every Pakistani citizen applying for a passport or a national ID card must sign a mandatory oath that "I consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad an impostor prophet…and his followers…to be non-Muslims."[30]

I justify my focus on the Ahmadiyya Muslims in Pakistan because they are ethnically, linguistically, and historically similar to the majority group. They belong to a branch within Islam which makes them even less alien than a minority group from a different theological thought. This allows for controlling the effects of any possible alternative options such as perceived animosities due to pre-independence colonial-invasion. The negative discourse attached to the Ahmadiyya is constructed where the differences between groups are politicized as 'enemy' or 'heretical' rather than naturally occurring,[31] which further justifies this research; Ahmadiyya's self-identify as Muslims, yet the state and mainstream Muslims consider them as non-Muslims.

After independence in 1947, Lawyer Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a Liberal-Muslim, commonly known as the founder of Pakistan, did not want to bundle distinctly exclusive cultural identities such as the Hazara, Baloch, Sindhi, Saraiki, Kashmiri, Punjabi, Pashtun, excluding refugees from India into a theological state–rather wanted it to be the world's first secular Muslim-majority democracy.[32] However, Pakistan abandoned these ideals, and today is known as a Public Relations disaster; plagued by serious economic problems, persistent sectarian issues, deep-rooted corruption, vicious military intervention in civilian rule, and alleged state collaborations with notorious international terror groups (such as Al Qaeda).[33] Since its inception, its politics has been unstable. With the Pakistani military playing a huge role when it comes to economics, politics, and

[29] Rashid, "10 Fabrications."
[30] Hanif, "Pakistan's Ahmadi Community."
[31] Rahman, "Indonesia and Pakistan" 409.
[32] Nasir, "Jinnah's Ideals."
[33] Central Intelligence Agency, "Introduction-South Asia"

security, military take-over occurred approximately four times, since as early as 1958.[34] The upcoming chapter section dives into the concepts and framework needed to better understand religious conflict.

[34]BBC News, "Pakistan Profile."

2. Theories & Methods

2.1 Conceptual Clarifications:

Identity is a canvas where different beliefs and values bundle together to create a sense of the self, which provides security, and comfort to the individual when faced with complex circumstances. The beliefs and values comprising one's identity can be derived from cultural or religious domains. These domains serve to provide the tools for identity formation and solidification. Religious domains complement identity formation as they provide "a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices",[35] through which an individual can develop their way of life, sense of morality, and personhood.

A religious group is seen as "a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common religious creed, beliefs, doctrines, practices, and beliefs."[36] Globally the arrangement of various identity groups–cultural or religious–often demarcate identities as majority and minority groups, directly impacting the lives of individuals–and the collective. According to Special Rapporteur of the UN for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti, a minority is "a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members –being nationals of the State–possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population…"[37] The asymmetrical position of majority-minority group interactions can be hazardous for the freedoms of the non-dominant minority religious groups. Thus, special attention is required to ensure the autonomous exercise of religion is free from "any limitation on one's ability to practice religion as an individual or a group."[38]

[35] Merriam Webster, "RELIGION."
[36] US Legal Inc. "Group Law."
[37] OHCHR. "International Law."
[38] Fox, "Religious Discrimination?" 12.

As this thesis focuses on the various degrees of accommodation for religious minorities' freedom, the definition of religious discrimination is inherently connected to the idea of that freedom, or the lack of it. Discrimination on the basis of religion stems from both the absence of action and the presence of repressive policies targeting specific minority groups due to their beliefs. Religious discriminations are "restrictions on the religious practices, clergy, or institutions of minority religions that are not placed on the majority religion."[39] This encompasses a variety of marginalization tactics adopted by states that can form policies and practices such as the inability to profess religion, declaration of a state religion, inability to get access to universal rights due to faith (housing, education, job opportunities), specific laws restricting religious activities, voting rights, declarations degrading member(s) of faith, social out-casting, and inability to worship freely.

Studies have shown that the rise in religious discrimination is not specific to any geographical location, culture, religion, or religious minority.[40] States with little to no religion-state association engage in disadvantaging minority groups, but when the religion-state connection is taken for granted, minority accommodation becomes even more precarious. Authors argue that the state-religion nexus becomes problematic once it "claims monopoly over a state territory, impedes the free exercise of religion, and undermines equal rights or equal access of all citizens."[41]

Democracy can be a complex concept to define as it encompasses different areas of political life and manifests itself differently in each system. It is understood as a system where the people as a whole rule and competitive elections for all levels of government are held but "democracy should not even be 'rule of the majority' if that means that minorities' interests are

[39] Fox, "Religious Discrimination?" 29.
[40] Fox, "Conclusions" 190.
[41] Fox, "Religious Discrimination?" 19.

ignored completely."[42] Democracy is where a set of key principles, institutions, and procedures allow for a majority rule whilst ensuring the protection of minority rights are constitutionally guaranteed and effectively ensured through the enforcement of rule of law. The principle of political equality ensures that "equal opportunities for marginalized groups…are an inherent element of democracy and democratic theory." [43] Therefore, democracies may engage in discriminatory policies however, the crystalized commitment to rights of all citizens (including minorities) is protected, and avenues of accountability facilitate minority protection.

Military regimes are a type of authoritarian government where there is "a system of managing by the military. Government can be defined as the administration of the state by legitimate power-holding group, the instrument of society that centralizes political and legal authority. Military regimes are authoritarian…though their degree varies…"[44] Some military regimes may have complete authoritarian control over all state-institutions whereas some exhibit less authoritarian characteristics as they enjoy public support and don't feel the need to be completely repressive, thus may let some state institutions to be run somewhat independent of the army control (e.g. elections, coalitions, judiciary).

While fully independent civilian regimes are democratic in nature, transitioning democracies can be considered as a hybrid on the spectrum. I create my own definition of regime change in which a transition of political institutions and laws in a country occur that are politically governed by a different set of rules, affecting the nature of the system and its subjects as a whole. Then, transitioning democracies can be understood as the

[42] Council of Europe, "Democracy."
[43] Plog, "Global Democracy," 64.
[44] Perlmutter. "Military Regimes," 96–97.

> "interval between one political regime and another…Transitions are delimited…by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and…the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative."[45]

I recognize weak regimes-in-transition by their poor enforcement, development, or effectiveness of key democratic institutions such as free media, state patronage, and little or no effective standard for the rule of law and its implementation. This also extends to the presence of rampant corruption and a serious lack of transparency in state institutions. I suggest that weak states suffering from low state-capacity are likely unable to provide basic services such as health and education, raising the political/social status of alternative actors/sources that can provide what the state lacks. Most importantly, the absence of an independent, free, and effective judicial system impedes the civilian regimes' ability to implement the rule of law. The underdevelopment or disintegration of these frameworks can endanger the rule of law and restrict the respect for the subjects of the state, leading to states potentially disregarding the limits put on them.[46] Poor consolidation of democratic institutions and the lingering presence of authoritarian elements make such regimes particularly hostile for minority freedoms and interests. The next section tries to understand the application of these concepts in various theoretical frames.

[45] Mainwaring, "Comparative Issues," 2
[46] Gurses and T. David, "Civil War," 143–45.

2.2 Is Religious Conflict Belief-Driven?

Scholarly interest in the prevalence of religious conflict is flooded with categorizing dominant beliefs, emotions, and doctrinal differences as the primary reason for conflicts turning violent. Many conclude that religious beliefs invoke a devotion and rigidity that is intrinsically prone to becoming a source of and/or leads to an inflammation of conflict. Strong devotion to belief, especially between incompatible value systems resorts to claiming the 'other' as an evil that must be eradicated because it is infiltration and destruction of society/culture.[47] Other scholars within the belief-based narrative support the role of divine beliefs in being intrinsically prone to creating violence. Indisputably, this is observed in the concept of Salvation and its role in condoning violence by emphasizing the need for sacrifices–justifying the rationale of violence towards others.[48] Rightfully so, religion has the potential to "sanitize violence" due to the authoritative nature of religious scriptures.[49]

Beliefs are highly subjective, and differences of beliefs may explain the propensity of 'clashes' between communities, nevertheless, they do not explain why states support certain belief systems over another. Beliefs alone can explain theological states and non-state group violence, but they are unable to explain conflict at the state level, such as, why states align with the clergy, and/or persecute its own subjects. Deviating from belief-based explanations, others suggest that beliefs alone are not responsible for religious conflict, rather it is the scarcity of resources under which society operates intensifies conflict for resource-allocation between groups.[50] They rightfully argue that such scarcity can manifest through ownership of space, which brings with it

47 Frankfurter, "Construction of Evil." 2.
48 Avalos, "Religion in Violence." 11.
49 Avalos, 13.
50 Avalos, 2.

political and economic benefits for a group (e.g., Jerusalem).[51] The issue of scarcity and allocation of resources can heighten group differences but, it cannot explain why almost identical groups resort to violent confrontations.

Some use Rene Girard's mimetic theory to combine the previous two schools-of-thought; resources and beliefs by stating that humans "imitate others and desire objects they cannot share or enjoy… they easily turn against one another."[52] When groups are searching for validation and hegemony for their ideological belief, they do not want to share power and in turn engage in violent behaviour when competing for resource and belief superiority. In a state of conflict, the persecutors understand the expelled as both a source of absolute good and absolute bad.[53] In congruence with the belief-driven logic, the absolute evil provides a 'good' opportunity for the sacrifice that is required to restore peace, while being a 'bad threat' to society that needs to be eradicated.[54] Such explanations do provide a convincing lens for explaining violent conflict under frameworks of political economy.

Yet, the political economy of religion is incomplete without taking into account how religious rivalries are politicized by the state. The legitimizing role the state plays in supporting the narrative of one group being an absolute evil over the other is crucial. Moreover, if it is only about economic survival, then once groups have gained economic hegemony, theoretically they would if not stop, at least reduce their engagement in violence. Beliefs themselves can become a lucrative resource that facilitates resource acquisition when adopted by a certain group, especially under weak-state conditions. I argue that state-endorsed ostracization of a certain community and its beliefs is not driven purely by dedication to scriptures. It also extends to policies of

[51] Avalos, "Religion in Violence." 7.
[52] Palaver, "Mimetic Theories," 2.
[53] Palaver, 4.
[54] Palaver, 4.

marginalization internalized by the state as they provide some political gain. In the political economy of religion, clerics engaging in violence or oppression seek state/political-economic bounties turning beliefs, economic resources, and claims of sacred spaces into avenues of violence.

On the other hand, some scholars understand religious violence to be a consequence of competition for resources (conflict) through grievances that might arise or linger unresolved.[55] Groups denied their religious freedom engage in acts of violence against others to reshuffle the status quo in their favour. Such perspectives are valuable as they hold weaker states as more susceptible to violent acts because they harbour underdeveloped/decaying institutions that are "unable to stop various social groups from engaging in violence in pursuit of their own ends."[56] This explanation highlights how the risk of punishment is much lower than the gain from engaging in discriminatory and violent behaviour in weak-state frameworks.[57] Weak state institutions do have an effect on the increased likelihood of religious violence irrespective of the presence of religious grievances, therefore grievances and opportunities together provide a holistic picture.[58]

Reflecting upon this, the consequences of weak state institutions and opportunities for violence are undoubted. However, this theory does not explain why groups with status quo develop deep grievances enabling them to (and continue to) engage in violent, persecutory behaviour. What has not been considered is the type and level of state interference in group conflicts. These theories, although valuable, do not consider the role of the state that some argue is a subject of competition. Little work has been done analysing whether groups compete for hegemony or act on their quest to retain and strengthen the rule of the majority at the expense of the opposing group–creating a

55 Muchlinski, "Grievances and Opportunities," 685.
56 Muchlinski, 685.
57 Muchlinski, 689.
58 Muchlinski, 703.

kind of political economy of religion.[59] The upcoming section tries to have a clearer understanding of religious conflict, addresses the need to incorporate the type of system, durability of institutions within that system, and why states are willing to engage in competitive religious violence.

[59] Finke, Martin, and Fox, "Explaining Discrimination," 391

2.3 State Legitimacy: Costly for Few, Lucrative for Many

Internalization of religion into a value system enables it to become an integral part of our identity. For its followers, religious ideology occupies an elevated status in identity composition because of its devotional transcendence. Religious ideologies reinforce existing beliefs about the world and the people within it, justifying the creation of new beliefs, and claims to affirm religious piety. Unlike countries where the separation of state and religion is present, religious states give religion a special position in society by bringing it into the foreground of socio-political operations, politicizing different groups through religious affiliation. By declaring a hegemon, the fluctuating use of religion by various actors can be a powerful political influencer, creating conditions for a political market where different brands or sub-brands of religion compete against one another. Thus, taking an instrumentalist approach of classifying identities as a malleable entity that is manipulated primarily by political actors in pursuit of power.[60] This market structure creates competition within/between groups for the guardianship of the true word of God, which can be used to gain power with a brand-specific religious ideology.

States are an authoritative entity that possesses and manages a collection of resources subject to competition. As the state is an actor that holds authority over its subjects and resources, this extends to managing majority-minority relations within its territory. Religious groups in the political market compete with each other to attain state endorsement, creating a political economy of religion where ideological and economic resources of the state are sought out for. During times of majority-minority friction, the state and its capabilities can serve to provide a hegemonizing effect to a given group. However, for states, the instrumentalization/mobilization of religion is a

[60] Talbot, "Themes and Theories." 156.

lucrative political strategy because it can provide mass support and state legitimacy,[61] hence entering and becoming a key player in the political market/economy of religion.

A more formalized theory of political economy of religion comes from Jonathan Fox, Finke Roger, and Robert. R Martin who finds that religious minorities face discrimination from the state and those who support state religion due to the unwanted threat the minority brings to the dominant group's sustenance of power.[62] In religious states, minority persecution is perpetuated because when a "government is linked to 'one true faith,' the favoured religion tends to consider other religions as competition and a threat to its position in the state."[63] As states withhold a collection of resources, which are subject to different political and social actors ([non]incumbent politicians, parties, clergy, military), religious groups seek to obtain state resources for their own political benefit/survival/relevance because state endowments allow for market monopoly allowing the group to market themselves better. When religion is a primary aspect of identity, and the devotion to religion is predominant, the dominant group's political relevance is generated by persistently demonizing the minority group to overcome religious competition by discrediting minority claims and securing more of the market share.

In-group differences pose a greater competition than out-groups as minorities belonging to the same religious tradition pose a greater or equal threat to the hegemonic religion.[64] If doctrine A encompasses the majority of the market audience, different sub-categories within doctrine A have a higher capability to capture the market, versus non-majoritarian doctrine B which claims less competition due to a smaller share of the market audience. The majority group seeking to win or sustain their market dominance can use their majority status to exclude different brands of

61 Finke, Martin, and Fox, "Explaining Discrimination" 391.
62 Finke, Martin, and Fox, 391.
63 Fox, "Causes and Consequences," 37.
64 Finke, Martin, and Fox. "Explaining Discrimination," 411.

religion or sub-brands of the same religion to dominate the political market and the state. This consistently formalizes the 'heretical group' as an ontological threat in the historical continuum. With sharp (invented or not) majority-minority differences, the state (forced or not) supports majority religion for its own political survival/legitimacy by co-opting religious actors that target minority groups as a political strategy to cement the "mechanics of maintaining a religious monopoly."[65] Even when the dominant group is hegemonic, it continues framing the minority group as an ontological threat. This is a political tactic to keep its audience engaged by (re)asserting itself, ensuring that the actions bringing state legitimacy do not fizzle, and their salience is maintained in society (especially as a moral compass).

Dominant groups generate a religious threat of the minority for means of religious hegemony, but the formation of such a dynamic becomes a political opportunity for the (particularly weak) state to legitimize its own rule and gain public support ensuring political power. I take this a step further to suggest that the competition for resources (tangible and symbolic) not only provides resource prosperity but also a way to ensure ideological hegemony, for the state and clergy. This ultimately is the driving force for the clergy to seek out the state and its capacities, while states extend co-optation when religion can easily be used as a tool of legitimization. Recognizing the mutual political benefit in becoming allies solidifies the political economy of religion, giving birth to state-instrumentalization of religion.

Once a state-religion political partnership is initiated, the state in pursuit of appeasing its political partner benefits from stratifying society according to the religious majority's lines of preference. In return for the dominant majority group's religious support, the state facilitates its religious partners' political goals in state-operations such as; laws of the land, judicial procedures,

[65] Fox, "Causes and Consequences," 36..

civil liberties, political freedoms, and voting rights. This is manifested through state actions that determine desirable and undesirable religions whilst creating a space for systemic and institutional inequality–negating the position of minorities. If the system operates on the purity and protection of a certain religious doctrine, religious minorities can be pushed out as impure or unfit to be equals in society.

Religion-state co-optation is evident through formal and informal linkages. Dominant religious institutions demand to tighten the state-religion nexus by politically manoeuvring formal legislation in favour of the dominant religion through religious propaganda and mass-mobilized sit-ins.[66] If the state is weak, these pressures make states to pass laws that can infringe upon its citizens' freedoms. These laws could range from being directed against a certain group, or group members' agency to run for public office, limiting the freedom to disclose and practice their religion without fear, to special taxes imposed on a group, and so on.

Through the proposed theory of the political economy of religion, one can observe how contrasting political regimes contribute to the non-static use of religion, creating or enhancing conflict with the minority. In any regime of the religious state, I suggest that the political aspirations of religious organizations remain unchanged (want to be attached to the state), nevertheless, what differs is the religious aspirations of the political system. For weaker regimes (less solidified ideological footing, weak institutions or capacity), religion provides a lucrative avenue that allows for legitimacy and survival of the regime, essentially becoming the social glue that assists in reinforcing the state's authority.

Dominant religious groups can become lucrative partners for the state due to their ability to mobilize religion for political means; bringing the state mass support and thus legitimacy. When

[66] Finke, and Martin. "Ensuring Liberties," 690.

dealing with a religious population, a state-supported religion can be an effective and easy method to minimize political and civil unrest, ensuring state political survival while lowering the cost of ruling.[67] Different actors albeit are individual, but their political ambitions operate under a collective structure of a regime (different party electoral alliances, religious groups synchronizing into governmental structures). Hence, the management of majority-minority relations and the adjudication of those seeking to gain state resources can occur differently depending on the character of the state, making the presence of religion unfixed. However, it is important to note that in religious states there is always a hegemonic religion, and thus the expectation of some degree of religious persecution being omnipresent in society is an unfortunate standard.

To legitimize and offset destabilizing effects of democratization, some transitory states often rely on creating a close relationship with alternative power centres in society such as economic elites or even religion to overcome the instability arising from the systemic changes taking place.[68] Dominant religious groups seeking political authority understand the weakness of the state as a way inside the political sphere to pursue their own political aims. By appeasing the dominant group, the state creates a state-sponsored hierarchy and desirability of belief systems. For weak transitory states, it is rational to (re)produce alliances with the dominant religion to serve as a tool for its own political survival.[69] Unable to provide security for its citizens due to poor institutional development, weak transitory states, unfit to provide basic services to its citizens such as sanitation, suffer from a lack of legitimacy which can in fact promote religious discrimination to ensure their authority and control remains intact.[70] Weak states use the common ideology of religion as it brings ease of operation and limits the market of religious brand/sub-brand

[67] Fox, "Causes and Consequences," 36.
[68] Lorch, "Weak States." 42.
[69] Finke, and Martin. "Ensuring Liberties," 690.
[70] Rotberg, "Collapsed States," 4–5.

competitors for its ally, essentially protecting or preferring one over the other. Weaker states can range from states that have poor state capacity/infrastructure, lack of/weak institutions, poor rule of law conditions, corruption, and poor popular support (indicators detailed methodology). Nevertheless, I expect stronger regimes to be more capable to balance political actors effectively, thus not needing religion (to the same degree) for their survival. In such cases, despite the aspirations of the religious majority, the state is able to form its legitimacy elsewhere. Stronger regimes have a greater state capacity to challenge competing groups. This mechanism legitimizes their control over their populations, diminishing (to various degrees) their reliance on religion and curbing the competition for state resources.

Alongside the strength of regimes, the type of regime contributes to the political economy of religion. Weaker civilian regimes working towards democratic principles are constrained by the ballot box, thus grievances of the masses must be resolved through non-violent measures such as bargaining.[71] This democratic peace proposition keeps the state in check and restricts its willingness to use repression due to the fear of the ballot box.[72] Therefore, I suggest state leadership submits because the fear of electoral repercussions can form negotiations/bargaining of power between political and religious actors in order to share political space. This increases the propensity of state-religion alliances that will continue due to the legitimacy gained by 1) the state that uses religion as a means of social glue and 2) the dominant group that gains political space/relevance/authority through state sponsorship.

As "clerical edicts are powerful forces promoting increased state restrictions on religious freedoms",[73] giving the dominant clerics the ability to disseminate their message to millions of

[71] Gurses, and T. David, "Civil War," 142.
[72] Gurses, and T. David, 142.
[73] Finke, and Martin. "Ensuring Liberties," 701.

people, allowing them to pressure the state through the masses if need be, and participate in stopping or pushing for discriminatory legislation. I expect that when weak civilian regimes (not liberal) are religious states, they willingly or unwillingly have to share political space with religious clerics reinforcing religious engagement on every platform; electoral, procedural, ministerial, political mass-mobilization, policy, and decision-making due to the openness of the system and fear of the ballot. In a weaker civilian environment, the majority benefits in form of legal privileges, perception of doctrinal superiority, ideological hegemony, and material resources that are not limited to but commonly including state funding.[74] As a result, I expect that the democratic setting within a weak state pushes the state to co-opt religion and ensure its own survival by maintaining the majority brand/sub-brand of religion as its source of binding society together.

On the other hand, stronger authoritarian regimes, even if they carry out an electoral ballot, strictly enforce state hegemony through means of force and coercion, and are able to eliminate any opposition before the emergence of challenges to the regime.[75] Military regimes' grip over executive decision-making structures enables them to hold more authority (violence, resources, and ideologies) over state-apparatus due to no checks and balances when dealing with conflict.[76] Therefore, I expect that their ability to monitor and control political infrastructure and state narratives allows for neutralizing threats to a considerable degree.[77] I suggest that stronger authoritarian regimes have centralized power thus they have little or no interest in power-sharing arrangements. I argue this gives them the choice to only co-opt dominant religion to their preferred level (if they wish). Therefore, the expected state-religion co-optation would be lower in stronger

[74] Finke, Martin, and Fox, "Explaining Discrimination," 391.
[75] Driessen, "Muslim World." 375.
[76] Gurses, and T. David, "Civil War," 143.
[77] Gurses, and T. David, 143.

military regimes due to greater state control through means of force. An important caveat is when stronger/weaker military regimes do co-opt religious actors as seen in countries like Myanmar or Egypt, the state-religion alliance can produce more violent and intense state repression of minorities due to the same lack of checks and balances and high state control (ideological, force, and economic).

The framework of the political economy of religion deviates from simplistic belief-driven theories of religious conflict and incorporates the strength and type of regime's effect on the dynamics of group conflict. Its rational approach to state actions offers promising political explanations for countries behaviour when faced with opportunities of religious power-sharing. I propose that a consequence of the fear of the ballot box is a greater likelihood of bargaining, which leads to higher levels of cooperation/co-optation of religion, and as a result higher persecution of religious minorities. Whereas, in times of greater state repression, challengers of the state can be eliminated, reducing chances of religious co-optation. Yet, these regime types are not absolute in their characteristics. Civilian and military regimes in absolutist terms are present on both extremes of the spectrum, but in political reality, regimes are fluid between these two extremes. Similarly, even though the role of religion in a religious state is given, it is always changing. As the variation within each regime type and the role of religion is taken into consideration, the thesis hypothesizes that;

H1: The strength and nature of the government/regime (civil/military) determines the level of state religious-instrumentalization impacting minority marginalization. More specifically, based on the political economy of religion I expect the following outcomes:

TABLE 1

	REGIME TYPE	
REGIME STRENGTH	Weaker Civilian => Higher Instrumentalization of Religion => Closer State-Religion Link=> Greater Minority Persecution	Weaker Military => Higher Instrumentalization of Religion => Closer State-Religion Link=> Greater Minority Persecution
	Stronger Civilian => Lower Instrumentalization of Religion => Looser State-Religion Link=> Lower Minority Persecution	Stronger Military => Lower Instrumentalization of Religion => Looser State-Religion Link=> Lower Minority Persecution

2.4 Methodology

For this thesis, Pakistani history is divided into three parts based on key points in history such as the formalization of a religious state (1947-1973), the solidification of state religious-exclusion and Islamization (1974-2007), and the move towards the first era of democratic continuity (2007-2018). The thesis employs a historical process tracing (PT) method to study how these periods differ/resemble. PT can prove useful as it allows for the historical patterns in events to unfold using an analytic perspective to systematize the qualitative causal-process observations. PT focuses on two independent variables; the type of regime (civilian/military) and the strength of the regime (IV) and whether this impacts the state-religion nexus and shifts the level of minority persecution (DV). The research is guided by the 'indicators of strength' that help to measure the strength/weakness of any type of regime.

(1) State capacity

(a) Presence of institutions, institutional capacity for enforcing state-actions (i.e. riot control), development of institutions.

(b) Presence and application of the rule of law, including the state's ability to punish perpetrators of violence

(c) Presence of institutional mismanagement of resources such as corruption

(d) Provision of public good and services (infrastructural capacity)

(2) Popular support of the regime

(a) For military regimes, support can be both within public institutions, and the public itself, whereas for civilians it is based on public support for the government, especially in relation to other actors like the clergy.

In tandem with the indicators of regime strength and type, the thesis formulates 'indicators of marginalization' to determine the state-religion nexus, and as a result the level of minority persecution. The following 'indicators of marginalization' serve as the criterion by which minority persecution will be examined;

(1) Preferential inclusion of hegemonic groups.

(a) declaration of a non-secular state, state appointment, or state funding for specific groups.

(b) Recognition of minority group(s) according to self-identification

(c) Representation of minority groups in state-institutions or policymaking.

(2) Discriminatory laws passed against/regarding the minority group(s) without representation/with an asymmetrical representation of minority groups.

(3) Violence against a minority group in action or in speech

(a) Hate speech, incitement of hatred

(b) Active riots and/or acts of physical harm to the minority community or property.

The process tracing also includes interview excerpts to each period, I felt this can provide an insider knowledge for showing whether the minorities' lived experience corroborates to the patterns observed in the analysis. The in-depth qualitative interviews include the 27 Ahmadis and their views (identities kept anonymous for participant safety). Although the sample is not representative in any sense, the interviews provide an insider look of minority group studied. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling in 4 major metropolitan cities in Pakistan (Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore, Rabwah). There are 16 males and 11 females, age is 38-75 years, while the social class ranges from lower-middle to upper-class. Participants hold a very high level of education with the minimum being a college-degree, along with high international exposure

(travelled/lived abroad more than five times, for over 2 years). Many were in high-positions within the community at a regional, municipal, or national level, including few who were community-appointed contacts for the government to get information about the treatment/incidents relating to Ahmadis. This is an extremely relevant part of the sample as these individuals have a high level of understanding of the position of the state and their experiences within the changing regimes, instead of a common person, who may not be able to distinguish between the intricate differences in persecution between different times of discrimination.

3. Accommodation Through Religious Regimes

The following sections of this chapter outline the creation of the state of Pakistan and how weak state-institutions in each regime change manage the colonial legacy of the special role of religion. It maps shifting political arrangements, and the evolving use of religion by politicians, military rulers, and clerics. The first subsection; 1947-'73, focuses only on West Pakistan, and how the creation of a secular vs religious conflict by the Sunni sub-brand brings religion at the centre stage of political operations and examines whether military rule continued the trend of its civilian predecessors. It sketches the foundations of the political market and how subsequent calls for religious exclusion are managed.

The second subsection; 1974-2007, speaks of five regimes, three civilian and two military, and their management of religion and its clerical proponents. It reinforces how the state's failure to overcome its weakness (institutional, or hybridity) makes its shortcomings chronic, thus solidifying the systemic presence of a religious-political market in different forms such as electoral alliances, or militarization. It differentiates each period for state relations with the Sunni clergy and showcases how this affects minority accommodation.

The third subsection; 2007-'20, takes a look at whether the three consecutive civilian regimes in contemporary times, understood as a vaguely consolidated commitment to democratization,[78] fare better than those preceding them. It evaluates how democratization in a chronically weak religious state manages the solidified hegemony of Islam, and how the political economy of religion is still paramount for explaining minority discrimination.

[78] BBC News "Pakistan Profile,"

3.1 Dreams of Secularism (1947-1973)

Religion plays a special role in paving the way to democracy in Pakistan. Under colonial rule, communities were classified by religious identity, stratifying political culture by religious belief, thus Islamists and Hindus, were well-entrenched in society and able to develop political roots/support through religious ideology. Years of the British Raj structured divergent ethnic and religious communities into violent systems of communalism. As populations were identified by religious belonging, this meant political mobilization was done according to religion giving religious actors immense political clout. This unique religious cleavage of vast political-religious mobilization was at the centre of the creation of Pakistan. However, the leader of the Pakistan Movement, and the first Governor-General of Pakistan *Quaid-e-Azam* (Great Leader) Muhammad Ali Jinnah voiced his commitment to a secular parliamentary democracy declaring that "Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission."[79] During Jinnah's rule as Governor General, himself a Shia, nominated several non-Muslims such as Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan (Ahmadi)[80] and Law Minister Jogendar Nath Mandal (Hindu),[81] reflecting the religious tolerance he envisioned Pakistan to have. This section explores the construction and replacement of this original liberal democratic narrative with the language of religious exclusion in the following 25 years.

The British institutionalized riot system produced Islamic Deobandi groups such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) lead by Syed Abdul Ala Maududi, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Majlis-e-Ahrar (Ahrar), who all vehemently opposed a 'Muslim homeland' being based on a worldly rather than religious government.[82] Such Islamists were highly embedded in the South Asian region due

[79] Hoodbhoy, "Islamic State."
[80] Rashid, "Intolerance in South Asia."
[81] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 22-27.
[82] Talbot, "Religion and Violence," 156.

to the fierce political mobilization that occurred on the bases of religion in British India. Knowing their street power, Islamists like Maudaudi saw Pakistan as an opportunity to "reconstruct the new state on a truly Islamic basis."[83]

As independence was achieved following the larger Hindu-Muslim conflict, the threat of a Hindu majority lessened. Now that Pakistan was to be a secular state, the clergy foresaw its demise if secularism was pursued. Religious tolerance of the state to non-majoritarian groups became something that needed to be opposed, creating a religion vs secularism divide. Ahmadi involvement in state-affairs at an executive level boasted the state's religious tolerance towards all kinds of religious groups but simultaneously made Sunni clerics uneasy about losing their own market of supporters to secularism. Both groups belonged to the market of Islam but the Ahmadiyya embodied the secular state therefore, targeting them was an easy way to remain relevant in a country they opposed in the first place.

After the formal declaration of a secular ideology, civilian leaders inexperienced with state-governance were confronted by daunting issues such as strong demands for ethnic self-autonomy, millions of incoming refugees, controversy over the role of religion, and practically no real economic/political infrastructure to navigate any of this.[84] As the British central state apparatus was focused on the Indian side, Pakistan had no real state structures.[85] In 25 years of civilian rule, seven Prime Ministers led the country, out of which only two enjoyed above-average levels of popular support.[86] Thus, the newly founded state is considered weak due to its poor social embeddedness, its inadequate network of established institutions, and lacks a social contract binding its diverse groups.

[83] Talbot, "Religion and Violence," 157.
[84] Bennett Jones, "Democracy" 224-5.
[85] Mukherjee, "Basic Democracy," 271.
[86] Bennett Jones, 225.

By 1949, Sunni clerics stirred up religious sentiments against secularism by demanding a greater role of religion in public life, claiming Pakistan to be the "Land of the Pure", capturing their quest to 'purify' Pakistan according to the Sunni brand of Islam.[87] State leaders/ministers weary of majoritarian backlash, invited clerics such as Maududi who imagined Pakistan as "a laboratory for applying Islamic ideals" that needed protection from infidel infiltration,[88] to join the state apparatus such as Constituent Assembly (CA) (preliminary Parliament). In as early as 1949, state leaders scraped the vision of religious pluralism when the CA passed the Objectives Resolution (OR), declaring the nucleus of the Pakistani state to be an Islamic Republic under the sovereignty of God.[89] Maududi's active membership in the state apparatus (Constituent Assembly) gave the Sunni clergy influence/access to key state-building machinery (Parliament, Constitution-making). This allowed them to propose for implementing *Sharia* (Islamic) law, of which some were later absorbed into the1956 constitution ensuring the head of state must be a Muslim male, claiming those astray from the 'right ideology' cannot be entrusted with the machinery of the state.[90] Weakness of state infrastructure and embeddedness meant the state could not fight against religion exclusivism and supported the clergy to secure their support. For the market of religion, this marked the first attempt at ensuring that out-group brand competitors like Christians and Hindus were excluded from holding equal status as a citizen.

As the history of the region had shown religion as a salient identity-marker, it made religious appeals more potent for politics than a fragmented ethnic or nationalist sentiment. The foundations of OR translate into our preferential treatment indicator where a state religion is declared, clerics are appointed into sensitive state-building matters, and the hegemonic status of

87 Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 7.
88 Ispahani, 28.
89 Talbot, "Themes and Theories," 148.
90 Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 38.

Islam is announced. By making religion the epicentre of state ideology, the state was able to unify vastly diverse groups and draw from the well-established religious networks of the majority. The religious clergy accepted this as their political opportunity to strengthen their Islamic brand of religion and enjoy the political power that comes with state alliance. When interviewed participants were asked why they feel religion has historically played a central role in politics one stated that:

> We are not a homogenous nation; the only rallying point is religion. Why do we have priesthood? This all started from the OR… a rallying point that cuts all other identities was Islam. Religion appealed to the common man so they (clergy) manipulated the appeal so people can unite, and then the government took the easy way out by using it.[91]

However, because Islam is so diverse, the exclusion of non-Muslims through the OR did not bring any greater market share to the dominant Sunni sub-brand in particular. Now that the non-Muslim minority was excluded, a large share of the market of political Islam confronted a power struggle of different sub-brands of Islam "invoking religion to enhance its standing and credibility."[92] In fear of losing market hegemony, Sunni clerics began to frame the smallest sub-brand of Islam, the Ahmadis, as infidels. As Ahmadis were a numerically small sub-brand with influential positions in the state apparatus, religious competition between sub-brands of Islam made them a token of the secular and religious divide. Religious-political groups like the Ahrar distributed pamphlets against Ahmadis in government, calling for their expulsion, and framing Ahmadi faith as the equivalent of disloyalty to the state,[93] ensuring success for the anti-Ahmadiyya stand.

[91] MN, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, June 7th, 2019.
[92] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 42.
[93] Khan, "Role of Persecution" 254.

By 1952, Sunni Islamic parties under the banner of *Majlis-i-Tahafuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwat* (Organization for the Preservation of 'the Finality of Prophethood') made their first publicly organized demand to legally qualify Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority by disseminating mass-propaganda, unseen for any other group, claiming that Ahmadiyya *kafirs'* (infidels) employment/role in the Pakistani government threatens the purity of the state.[94] Maududi like many other Sunni clerics wishing to expand their political involvement beyond their role in the CA played upon the anti-Ahmadi narrative by calling "a civil war between the government and the public."[95] This led to the first large-scale domestic crisis the civilian government confronted.

Underestimating the strength of mullah street power cultivated during the pre-partition era, the government ignored their demands leading to the 1953 riots.[96] Sunnis revolted in various cities in tens of thousands destroying government buildings, looting, forcing Ahmadis to renounce their faith, and even lynching them,[97] fitting the indicator of violent mass-mobilization. With riots bordering anarchy, and the government/police unable to tame them, Chief Minister of Punjab proved civilian ineffectiveness and undermined civilian authority by declaring Martial Law to control the politically influential street-power of the Sunni clerics.[98] The protests of 1953 highlight the civilians' failure to manage group relations effectively and further weakened its own civilian authority by calling upon the military. This showcased the military as efficient and capable as it was able to control the violence within a matter of days,[99] something civilian apparatus could not.

In response to the 1953 Ahmadi Riots where 2,000 Ahmadis were killed, the civilian government ordered a judicial inquiry investigating the anti-Ahmadi pogrom.[100] The rigorously

94 Khan, "Role of Persecution" 255-58.
95 Khan, 262.
96 Khan, 261.
97 Khan, 261.
98 Khan, 262.
99 Bennett Jones, "Democracy" 227.
100 Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 46.

done Munir-Kiyani Report warned the government how hazardous mixing religion and the business of the state can be, the effects of which originate from the symbolic yet detrimental use of religion in the OR. For the mullahs the state cannot be Islamic, tolerant, and pluralistic; much of the report shows clerics from all sub-brands of Islam, big or small, claiming each other's interpretation of Islam to be un-Islamic.[101] Clerical unity was only displayed when in opposition to non-Muslims, especially the Ahmadi, and the necessity of an Islamic state that only they seemed fit to rule.[102] However, the weak state did not have enough public support, resources, or willingness to act on these recommendations, which shows how state-weakness fails to curb religious power.

The 1953 riots reflected two actions, first; although Islamist demands were not granted, they realized their power of religious mobilization could consequently challenge government authority hence, the state could not ignore them if it wanted to function. Second; the civilian state realizes it is unable to control Islamists' instigations for political space thus, for self-survival, the state gives in to political demands, creating a political market of religious competition with Sunni Islam at the top of the order.

As clerics are considered religiously enlightened intellectuals, an overwhelmingly large majority began believing Ahmadis were indeed infidels using their political influence in governmental positions to pursue nefarious acts.[103] Mass conversion of mindsets by the clergy and Maududi's fiercely unapologetic stance over his actions proved how important religion was to people, fuelling Sunni political aspirations. Absolving and accommodating Sunni clerics to maintain order, the Prime Minister invited Maududi to contribute towards the constitution of Pakistan in 1956[104] giving JI the political opportunity to transform a religious movement into a

[101] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 49.
[102] Ispahani, 49.
[103] Ispahani, 48.
[104] Khan, "Role of Persecution" 263.

political party contesting elections, facilitating the political economy of religion. In its first civilian constitution of 1956, the regime pronounced Pakistan an Islamic Republic.[105] The constitution adopted the OR as its preamble, incorporating many of Maududi's Islamic directives barring non-Muslims from ever becoming head of state, and Article 198 stating that "No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah…"[106] This fulfills the indicator of preferential treatment because even though the state did not declare Ahmadis non-Islamic, it stripped other religious minorities of an equal opportunity by entrenching a hegemonic position to the majority religion and securing the dismissal of a secular future.

In the first 10 years of the modern state of Pakistan the state-religion nexus formed–non--Muslims excluded– and demands for categorizing sub-brands of Islam outside of Islam began. The civilian regime failed at every level of minority accommodation as shown by the preferential inclusion of minority group (state religion, appointment), presence of violent riots and hate speech, laws impinging on the freedom/equality of minorities, and lack of punishment/accountability for perpetrators of violence against minorities. As hypothesized, weaker civilian states unable to manage its diverse ethnic population due to its weak social embeddedness, and almost no infrastructure/resource to exercise control debilitated its chances of effectively curbing the instrumentalization of religion. This brought the state-religion alliance closer, resulting in higher minority marginalization (H1).

Two years later, Pakistan's first coup d'état led by General Ayub Khan was overwhelmingly welcomed by the public because the military was seen as more capable to manage political instabilities than civilian rule could.[107] Disputes amongst politicians and civilian

[105] Ahmad, "National Parliaments," 4–5.
[106] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 56.
[107] Mukherjee, "Basic Democracy" 270-1.

dependence on the military to ensure order gave the traditionally powerful military an even stronger image as an institution that is efficient, organized, and capable.[108] This gave the new military regime a stronger position in the eyes of the public, compared to its civilian counterparts, as the guardian of the state.

Khan propagated for modernized reform, especially for a state distanced from Islamic parties.[109] The state claimed that it was imperative to limit the role of the *ulema* (religious scholars) because they were "more interested in regaining their position of strength and influence that they had lost…"[110] rather than creating a modern/moderate Islamic state. Although Khan operated with high centralized state control of institutions, the regime set out to contort religious influences in the political market. In 1959, using his strong control over state resources and judiciary, Khan passed an ordinance bringing control/management of properties for religious purposes under the military government to repress and modernize religious scholars, making 'worldly education' mandatory for ulema enlisted by the state.[111] His regime curbed religion step-by-step by passing a Family Laws Ordinance in 1961 in "an attempt to exclude the ulema and disenfranchise them from what they regarded as their exclusive privileged domain."[112] Dismissing Islamic law guidelines, the Ordinance established the principle of arbitration in inheritance cases and granted gender equality, made registration of marriage/divorce compulsory, and secured rights for women such as the initiation of divorce.[113] State control through means of repression is also reflected when Khan's government went as far as banning Maududi's party JI in 1964 due to their engagement with hate

[108] Mukherjee, "Basic Democracy" 271-2.
[109] Talbot, "Themes and Theories." 149.
[110] Qasmi, "God's Kingdom," 1226–27.
[111] Qasmi, 1227–28.
[112] Qasmi, 1233.
[113] Qasmi, 1231-2.

speech,[114] claiming they were responsible for inciting violence against fellow citizens and disrupting socio-political order.

Such actions show that Khan had re-established control over religion through the centralized state control dictatorships offer. Although the state did not get rid of the political market completely, popular support and strong state control improved the regime's ability to balance the state-religion relationship. Although the Sunni schools were not shut down, the state extracted its legitimacy from the army and its strong, positive perception rather than relying on religion. The military's strong grip over executive decision-making made it better able to monitor and control religious competition in the political economy of religion to their preferred level. Thus, the state's ability to punish those responsible for inciting violence as an indicator was also achieved. These actions show a regulation (to a degree) of the previously determined 'elevated' position of the religious majority by the state. Many interview participants recalled how such high state control impacted them, a participant stated: "At Ayub Khan's time, none of that (state marginalization) existed…it was reprimanded, restricted, and taken down…if things ever went to court, they (state-institutions) would listen to us…"[115]

Although the state maintained its conformity to the status quo of Islam, it was curtailed and balanced to some degree under military rule due to centralized control of force, ideology, and resources. In 1962, this balance was evident when the symbolic hegemony of Islam was taken down by Khan's strong authoritarian leadership, giving Pakistan its short-lived secular name "Republic of Pakistan" in the second constitution.[116] By doing so, Khan defied the preferential treatment indicator by carrying out actions restricting dominant religions' monopoly over the

[114] Qasmi, 1244.
[115] TJ, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, June 23th, 2019.
[116] Talbot, "Themes and Theories." 149.

political economy of religion. The regime's crackdown on clerical influence in the public sphere led to decreased state instrumentalization of religion, which also decreased the degree of minority marginalization.

Despite calls for removing Ahmadis from governmental positions a few years ago, the regime was able to appoint Ahmadis in key executive state positions (financial and security) highlighting the inclusion of minorities in state affairs.[117] Like any other citizen, Ahmadis were able to achieve high-ranking positions in the armed forces,[118] signalling that all members of society were given an opportunity that was not determined by faith. Furthermore, by passing 'secular' laws concerning inheritance (traditionally dealt with in Islamic manner) the state was able to effectively pushback on competing religious (sub)brands' public encroachment, contorting their political influence to a degree that suited the state.

Interviews showcase that many Ahmadis felt the constrain of Sunni Islam by the strong state benefitting them. When participants were asked to recall under which regime they felt most safe in their lifetime, an overwhelmingly high number of people responded along the lines of: "In 1968 we could breathe easy…Why? Because the rule of law under his rule meant a lot, they had control and didn't succumb to any pressure…that's the last I remember feeling somewhat 'free' and 'safe' in Pakistan."[119] In another interview, a participant claimed: "I would say during the government of Ayub Khan…he didn't allow Mullahs the freedom that they had after him and definitely not the kind they do now."[120]

However, as Khan's popularity took a hit, he gave leadership to General Yahya in 1969, who being disinterested in holding power announced that all political parties were allowed to

[117] Rashid, "Permeation of Religious Intolerance,"
[118] Chaudhry, "Pakistan's Finest."
[119] LTF, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, July 5th, 2019.
[120] ZK, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, August 19th, 2019.

partake in the upcoming election.[121] Yahya called for the 1970 elections to be held under joint electorates despite the persistence of Islamist parties calling for a separate electorate for Muslims and non-Muslims.[122] The separate electorate system diluted the non-Muslim vote electing only one non-Muslim from all of West Pakistan; however, under joint electorates, most of the non-Muslim vote went to the secular party at the time. By ignoring the demands of the clergy, the regime showed they were strong enough to carry out their state affairs, with minimal disruption, negating the preferential treatment of the hegemonic group. During this time, the lingering unacceptance of Bengali ethnic identity by the state nucleus, and the distance of the East wing from the West was evident. In the 1970 elections, West Pakistani leaders refused an East Pakistani government, resulting in a civil war (genocide) that led to the creation of Bangladesh, and the political leadership of runner-up Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the West that became what we now know today as Pakistan.[123]

In terms of the religious state, the strong popular support of the military, its ability to carry out actions cracking down on the Sunni clergy like passing 'non-Islamic' laws, maintaining joint electorates, and acts accommodating minority groups like the Ahmadi appointment to executive levels show that the regime was strong enough to curb religious grip on power. As shown, even though strong military regimes did not cease the religion-state alliance, public support (strength) and centralized state control (type) enabled it to lower the political instrumentalization of religion and forge distance between state-religion alliance, thus lowering minority marginalization. This proves the expectation that the strength and nature of the regime determine the degree of state-religious instrumentalization, in consequence, impacting minority accommodation even if the

[121] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 69.
[122] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 71.
[123] Ispahani, 73.

regime is not democratic (H1). This section has presented how the state and the religious majority for their own survival replaced the liberal democratic narrative with the language of religious exclusion making religion a key player in the political sphere.

3.2 Democracy, Coups, & Islamization (1973-2007)

The secular Pakistan People's Party's (PPP) came into power in a highly volatile period. Suppression of Bangla ethnic identity severely impacted state stability due to the loss of two-thirds of the territory,[124] but the state-silencing of ethnic nationalism continued after Bangladesh's independence. The state dealt with calls for ethnic representation by Baloch provincial leaders by adopting a policy of repressing Baloch voices and dismissing provincial leaders who challenged the state.[125] Such dismissals led to large scale Baloch mobilization that the government could not control, thus, to restore peace it undercut its civilian authority by mobilizing 80,000 military men to repress Baloch collective action due to police incompetence.[126] Calling the military to stabilize 'guerrilla' Baloch mobilization raised the perceived competence and prestige of the military once again, illustrating the seriously weak authority of the civilian state.[127] Moreover, keeping aside the resources spent on fighting two wars ('65 and '71), economic deterioration was carried forward by the PPP's engagement in corrupt state ventures by building clientelist relations rather than elected ones, further decaying democratic institutional development categorizing the regime as weakened.[128] This section illustrates how the state augmented conditions of political economy, making the competition between sub-brands of Islam a central theme in the political market.

PPP's leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a political opportunist, and personally a man of no deep religious faith was conscious of appearing too secular, thus, marketed the populist ideology of *roti, kapra, makkan* (food, clothing, shelter) as "Islamic socialism."[129] The onset of this new ideology was in direct competition with religion in the political market. This ideological shift in the state

[124] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 77.
[125] Jaffrelot, "Impossible Democracy," 238-9
[126] Jaffrelot, 238-9.
[127] Jaffrelot, 237
[128] Jaffrelot, 238
[129]Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 81.

leadership immediately after military repression of the clergy signalled Islamists a continued loss in political relevance. Thus, the search for an opportunity to tighten the religion-state alliance began by questioning the state's religiosity. Consciously aware of the state's weak capacity to sustain any ethnic or religious ideological confrontation, the 1973 constitution reinstated Pakistan as an Islamic Republic promising conformity of all existing laws with the "Injunctions of Islam laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah."[130] This shows that although Islamist pressure was in its early stages, the government was eager to neutralize the possibility of political instability before its outburst. Hence, despite popular support, weaker civilian states with low institutional capacity to manage (expected) majoritarian confrontation relied on alternative power structures to strengthen themselves further ensuring an ease of operation through religion's strong ideological bind.

In accordance with the indicator of state hegemonic status, steps to appease the Islamists channelled direct government funding to Sunni religious schools, expressing the advantageous position of the majority.[131] Nevertheless, an Islamic constitution or state funding neither eradicated the competition of Islamic socialism nor its control over state apparatus, hence for the clerics, the threat to religion's grip on power remained. To overcome this, the clergy reinserted the Ahmadi issue. In 1974, exclusionary demands recirculated when Sunni medical students engaged in violent clashes against fellow Ahmadi students in Rabwah taking 27 Ahmadi lives.[132] Soon other Islamist political parties joined the campaign and once again, the Ahmadi community became their religious scapegoat.

[130] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 82.
[131] Ispahani, 82.
[132] Ispahani, 84.

Moreover, the sharp decline in popular support, and the electoral alliance of all parties (Islamists and non-Islamist) against Bhutto made the state weary of its incapability to withstand intense violent protests (much like the Baloch protests) by challenging such demands. The absence of political strength to contain Sunni agitation led to Bhutto protecting his political grip by taking the Ahmadi controversy to a parliamentary debate.[133] Islamist parties in Parliament lobbied for the 2nd amendment and got overwhelming support with almost no minority representation; the state adopted it into the 1974 constitution, pronouncing Ahmadis non-Muslim due to their alleged "disbelief in the finality of Prophet Muhammad," and referring to them by pejoratives attached to them akin to the Protestant Christians describing Catholics as "Papists" in the law.[134] Such targeted religious group ostracization was unprecedented in Pakistan, neither the Hindus, nor the Christians were ever the subject to such state-led group-specific religious exclusion.

As Sunnis are the majority, by demanding to push out the Ahmadi sub-brand of Islam and narrowing what it meant to be a Muslim, religious groups were able to 1) perpetuate their authority over Islam by marketing their version of Islam 2) exclude a competing Islamic sub-brand from the political market due to its active involvement in state affairs since independence 3) pressurize the state by inciting religious sentiments challenging the new ideology of Islamic socialism. Interviews revealed that the power of the clergy is vast, and its demonization of a minority group reinforced its ideological position in society:

> The mosque is a place of business, a shop… remember they don't have anything else to attract people…get donations. They instigate people saying look these Ahmadis are tarnishing the honour and valour of the prophet. People support…they think it's the truth. The donations and support [public and state] makes the mullah a hero…enables him to get a four-wheeler, and AC home but if he didn't have this [Ahmadi's as a rallying point], his value is nothing. This is

[133] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 85.
[134] Ispahani, 85-6.

> an economic earning… it becomes political too. They had no formed political parties… gaining fame by abusing us they are a political force now. It is an economic, political, and social gain by abusing us because it is a convenient way to rally people and become a political force…In a way, we are providing them food on their tables.[135]

The instrumentalization of religion and the market (re)dominance of the Sunni brand of Islam directly wrecked Ahmadis' freedom to follow their religion. The discriminatory laws implemented by the government demanded all applicants for passports and ID cards to declare their belief in the finality of Prophet Muhammad, and that M.G. Ahmad and his followers are imposters, [136] completing the indicator of marginalization where state-marginalization policies are enacted against a minority. To get official documents, Ahmadis would have to renounce their leader and register as Muslims or submit to the forced status of a non-Muslim.[137]

The successful exclusion of Ahmadis from Islam solidified that narrowing what it meant to be a Muslim was a successful political strategy to tighten the state-religion alliance and assert the Sunni hegemony as the 'true' guardian of the word of God. Religious exclusion through democratic channels occurred because 1) Bhutto's political opportunism to retain (reaffirm and secure) his position as leader of the state or possible re-election meant the majoritarian Islamists demands could not be ignored. 2) Religious parties had translated their street power into public power, their seats in Parliament gave Sunnis access to state machinery to lobby for shrinking the boundaries of what a Muslim is. In the political economy of religion, the exclusion of the Ahmadi sub-brand became an avenue for the Sunni brand to reassert its grip over the state. By excluding a market competitor through state support, the Sunni clergy emerged as the monopolizing force in

[135] SF, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, July 18th, 2019.
[136] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 87.
[137] Rashid, "Imran Khan."

the market, as the withholder of the 'true' Islam. Weak civilian regimes unable to assert their authority against political challengers often concede to demands rather than adjudicating them. State's operating in the political economy of religion bargain/negotiate with their potential challengers to retain their own political grip, as seen in the case of Ahmadi religious exclusion. Interview participants also highlight the immense popularity/power of religion in politics that the state uses. A participant claimed that: "Bhutto declared us non-Muslim just to gain popularity…have the masses on their side…Bhutto took a purely political decision to get his numbers up. He was feeling he was losing popularity… there was a lot of discrimination…"[138]

The 1974 violent riots against Ahmadi's complete the indicator where acts of physical harm take place against the minority community. Moreover, other indicators like the lack of minority representation in parliament, acceptance of discriminatory laws, and dismissal of groups' self-identification point to the state disregard of its own citizens while ensuring Sunni hegemonic group status. This fulfils the expectation that weaker civilian regimes rely on alternate power mechanisms such as higher instrumentalization of religion to keep power, bringing the state-religion alliance closer and cementing the marginalization of the minority (H1).

Despite a series of attempts to neutralize and co-opt Islamic mobilization, Bhutto's rule became increasingly unpopular. Bhutto's parochializing politics and economic reforms doused in corruption and mismanagement depleted the economic health of the country, leading to harsh public resentment towards the incompetent civilian rule.[139] Such public disdain led to a military intervention by General Zia-ul-Haq who openly conjoined religion and state power, claiming to be guided by the "spirit of the people's struggle for Nizam-e-Mustafa" (System of the Prophet).[140]

[138] AJ, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, June 16th, 2019.
[139] Zaidi et al., "War Making" 385.
[140] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 91.

There is considerable evidence proving that the military facilitated the Islamist parties to violently protest, instrumentalizing religion to give the military opportunity to bring back 'order.'[141]

Even though military regimes typically start out strong, in a short span of time state weakness is evident–the army and the public disbelieved in Zia's ability to effectively contain the lingering internal issues of Pakistan.[142] Internal threats within the army led to a series of coups, and the arrest of 40 army officials.[143] Failed coups signalled a lack of support by the army, fearing that if the economy deteriorated more, Zia would not be able to sustain public backlash, potentially tarnishing the political prestige the army enjoyed.[144] The fears expressed by the army were not far-fetched. Poor governance was evident when Zia's cabinet was chosen based on trust rather than function.[145] He also repealed the country's anti-corruption laws and introduced development funds for Members of National and Provincial Assembly (MNA/MPA), writing off large sums of bank loans for his supporters.[146] This made the army more eager to dismantle Zia's rule as overwhelming evidence of corruption seriously threatened the army/state's capacity/resources to defend the country's internal and external threats.[147] This shows that Zia's leadership may have started strong, however the lack of support from within the army, and the poor economic performance lead to decreased public support making the regime weaker than it portrayed.

The leading reason for often overestimating Zia's leadership lies with the regime's involvement in the Afghan War, which brought over $7 billion dollars in giving it the ability sustain its rule despite crippling systemic corruption.[148] Zia's involvement in the Afghan War is in

141 Ispahani, 94.
142 Central Intelligence Agency, "Zia's Pakistan," 1.
143 Noman, "Era and Legacy," 35.
144 Central Intelligence Agency, "Zia's Pakistan," 2.
145 Central Intelligence Agency, 3.
146 FP Politics, "Unfortunate Events"
147 Central Intelligence Agency, "Zia's Pakistan," 3.
148 Weisman, "The World"

a way a catch-22. While the Afghan War brought US financial and political support legitimizing Zia's rule, however, it also allowed for the formation of Islamic militia groups, increasingly securitizing/weaponizing areas predisposed to ethnic tension such as Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan with drugs and arms making their threat to the state even larger.[149] This becomes relevant to the political economy of religion as it added elements of terrorism into the political fabric, this allowed armed religious-groups to use terrorism and fear to navigate the political scene.

To overcome the rise of external and internal threats to the weak regime, Zia employed tactics of political survival that aimed to tighten state authority in domestic and international endeavours. In essence, this regime has been an outlier in the patterns of co-optation in the history of Pakistan. It can be argued that the repressive and highly authoritarian nature of Zia's rule comes from its poor public/military support, which paired with its alliance with the US against the Soviet invasion brought religion to the forefront. Under Zia's rule, Sunni Islam enjoyed the benefits of political patronage as its importance for the regime served internal and external interests. Sunni political groups through their vast public support brought Zia the popular mass-support he desperately needed to strengthen his rule by assisting the regime in setting up *Madrassas* (religious schools) all over Pakistan to prepare and train Mujahideen for their fight in Afghanistan.[150] The forceful imposition of Islam while banning all political parties or elections was Zia's sole, and most powerful, source of legitimacy. Zia's political insecurity led to a mass-marketing campaign for Islamic values allowing him to equate challenging the state to challenging Islam. Interviews also show that many in the community understood the tactical use of religion in Zia's rule:

> Zia did it to make sure his power remains as strong as it can for as long as it can…religion is the best way to control the uneducated religious masses…the

[149] Weisman, "The World"
[150] Behuria, "Pakistan at War," 532.

> mullahs' grassroots control along with state sponsorship brought social and political control into Zia's hands…in a way we [Ahmadis] became reinforcement tools for his domestic friendship with the mullahs…[151]

Unprecedented synthesis of religion and state, with prominent augmentation of the Sunni brand of religion, established a hierarchical framework within the political economy of religion. Zia's strict Islamization of Sunni Islam impacted the political economy of religion by creating conditions that fragmented sub-brands of Islam highlighting their differences. A new intra-group rivalry between Shia and Sunni Islam came to the forefront, which the regime was unable to neutralize. In 1980, under Islamization, *Zakat* (mandatory charity) of 2.5% was made compulsory to which Shiites objected, as such a law did not corroborate to their religious belief.[152] In retaliation, Shiites in numbers of tens of thousands occupied the capital in protest, unable to contain the protests, the state exempted the Shia sub-brand of religion from alms tax.[153] The Shia protests reflect how the state, weak and unable to confront backlash from a strongly organized and numerically larger (than Ahmadis) minority group allowed for the fragmentation and multiplication of religion. This religious divisiveness of Islamic sub-groups crystalized the in-group competition for hegemony even further as religious identification/competition was based on sub-group affiliation rather than the overarching group of Islam.

Zia institutionalized Islamic education under the guise of religious duty/piety as a political tactic,[154] allowed government-sanctioned madrassahs proliferate, and brought stoning and lashing to the legal framework acting on the first indicator of preferential inclusion by making the dominance of the chosen religion even more extreme.[155] The destabilizing effects of proliferating

[151] RY, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, August 5th, 2019.
[152] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 103.
[153] Ispahani, 103.
[154] Jamal, "Zia-Ul-Haq."
[155] Kennedy, "Legal Reform," 70.

religious sub-group political competition in the religion-market deteriorated the Ahmadi position, as the Ahmadi issue was the only one that united different sub-brands of Islam together. It was also the only group that was subject to another round of group-specific discriminatory state-laws.

In a conference addressing orthodox Sunni clerics in 1985, Zia stated his desire to "ensure that the cancer of Qadianism is exterminated."[156] A series of state-sponsored barbaric laws in 1984 punished Ahmadis for up to three years for pretending to be a Muslim, using Islamic nomenclature, or calling their place of worship a mosque.[157] Ahmadis were put on a separate list from both Muslims and non-Muslims, thus to vote as 'Muslims' they would have to sign declarations claiming M.G. Ahmad as an imposter, leaving the entire community disenfranchised in protest.[158] The same Presidential Ordinance barred Ahmadi's from being able to perform the call to prayer, proselytize, or distribute any pamphlets.[159] Despite the specific hardships Ahmadis in specific went through during Zia's time, when asked to compare life under military vs civilian rule, many shared a similar sentiment:

> It is really complicated when you put it like that…circumstances are different in each era… the worst was during Zia but when you put it between military and civilian rule, interestingly the few times life was a tad bit better was during the other two military governments (Khan &Musharraf)…never realized that.[160]

In a nutshell, Zia's ordinance silenced the Ahmadiyya and made it almost impossible for them to live a life of dignity and freedom. By the end of Zia's rule, the regime had fulfilled every indicator of marginalization, the state regressed all modern developments by giving Sunni Islam

156 Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 124.
157 Ispahani, 120-1.
158 Ispahani, 103.
159 Ispahani, 119-24.
160 KH, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, August 8th, 2019.

an unprecedented high status in society. It passed group-specific discriminatory laws and engaged in hate speech. The weakness of the military rule made state co-optation of religious groups a politically lucrative strategy, moreover, because of its highly authoritarian military framework such co-optation went unchallenged and the state could not manage an unforeseen increase in the instrumentalization of religion, leading to the extreme strengthening of state-patronage towards Islam, which directly impacted the freedoms of Ahmadis (H1).

After General Zia died in a sudden plane crash in August 1988, the November elections peddled towards democratic civilian frameworks resulting in the electoral win of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter, the first woman to lead a Muslim-majority country, [161] Benazir Bhutto (also known as BB). The next 11-year period of civilian rule was filled with the persistent change of leadership between BB (1988-1990 and 1993-1996),[162] and pragmatic businessman turned politician, Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993, 1997-1999). [163] In the post-Zia period the role of the army shifted, giving it an unprecedented level of involvement in civilian affairs. Laws passed by dictators to centralize power directly resulted in weakening the political culture. Zia's 8th Amendment allowed for the dismissal of incumbent governments, which was used to dismiss BB and Sharif's governments twice; within 11 years elections were held 4 times with practically no democratic reform taking place in either tenure.[164]

Such rapid shifts in control majorily influenced the credibility and functioning of democratic structures as the masses began losing faith and interest in the ballot box further increasing civilian-state fragility.[165] Civilian leaders gave large shares of national resources to the

161 Sterling, "One Female."
162 Sterling, "One Female."
163 CNN, "Nawaz Sharif"
164 Memon, "Military Intervention" 499.
165 Memon, 487.

army to avoid being overthrown, and core state issues of foreign policy and national security were kept under the military's domain.[166] Such unforeseen hybridity severely undermined civilian power and its ability to develop a political culture independent of military intrusion. The subservience of civilians to the military, high levels of corruption, and staggeringly high levels of foreign debt under both BB and Sharif pushed the masses to further lose trust in civilian rule, thus made a mockery of democracy.[167]

Under Zia's rule, the evolution of the political economy of religion into sub-brand competitors exacerbated internal group political divisions. To overcome the challenges of civilian incompetency and public distrust, Both BB and Sharif tapped into the religious market via electoral associations with different types of Sunni hegemonic groups, allowing for even more electoral and political influence.[168] BB strategized to increase her chances of winning by partnering with sectarian Sunni groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) that aimed to exterminate the Shia Muslim population and propagated Ahmadis as *Wajib-ul-Qatal* (worth/deserving of murder).[169] This showed that the state's uncontrolled involvement in the politicization of the religious market created conditions for further narrowing what it meant to be a Muslim. Sunnis aiming to preserve and expand their hegemony over the market first excluded non-Islamic groups like Christians and Hindus, then moved to smaller Islamic subgroups like Ahmadis, and then to numerically larger sub-groups like the Shias. Participants also shed light on the power arrangements present in the political market of religion reaffirming the political use of religion:

> After Zia it was clear that mullah exported Islam was the only way the country could run… they had no chance outside of Islam…The mullahs want their own

[166] Memon, 500
[167] Memon, "Military Intervention" 499
[168] Ullah, "Extremism Works." 134.
[169] Nasr, "Sectarian Militancy." 105.

> vote so does the government… the government works with them making sure that mullah politics gives them voters…[170]

Another one recalled that:

> Obviously the government sponsors them, these Mullahs want to get power…that's what pays their bills…they (state) go to Madrassas to get political votes…the state sponsors the madrassas because it wants their voter bank…everyone wants power and things get bad (for Ahmadis) because religion is the easiest way to get it.[171]

By tapping into the religious market, the mainstream parties not only ensured their own political power but also added an electoral dimension of religious instrumentalization in the political economy of religion. This was evident when BB gave SSP members ministerial positions in the provincial cabinet despite a lack of qualification, in the hope to win over Sharif and his Sunni allies.[172] In 1992, many Sunni Islamist parties wanting to identify their political audience to better compete in the newly stratified political religion-market demanded the state to require citizens to declare their religion on their National Identity Cards forcing sub-groups of Islam and 'imposter Muslims' (Ahmadis) to become easily identifiable.[173] Fearful such an action would dilute the secular PPP voter-base, the government shelved the idea.[174]

BB attempted to alter Pakistan's harsh laws of offenses related to religion, also known as blasphemy laws, by adding a clause where false accusation of blasphemy can lead to 10 years in prison, however the strong mobilization by Islamists gave the leadership no choice but to submit to Islamist pressure and scrape the blasphemy proposal.[175] BB supported, and Sharif upheld the

170 FL, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, August 1st, 2019.
171 MN, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, July 31st, 2019.
172 Nasr, "Sectarian Militancy." 104.
173 World Watch Monitor. "Pakistan Court."
174 World Watch Monitor. "Pakistan Court"
175 Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 149.

Federal Shariat Court's recommendation of the death penalty for blasphemy (an Islamic court ensuring laws comply with Sharia), even though the justice system argued for life imprisonment.[176] This speaks to the discriminatory law indicator of marginalization as statistics on blasphemy laws show that blasphemy laws disproportionately target the Ahmadi population while letting false accusers face no punishment. [177]

The return of civilian rule brought different strains of Sunni parties to the forefront. Whilst JUI and SSP Sunni parties were primarily supported BB, the JI Sunnis joined Sharif in opposition forming a coalition that gave Sharif the popular support needed to come into power.[178] Sharif's coalition with JI gave him his second tenure, in a rare civilian attempt to curb the religious influence of Sunnis in the political market, he started cracking down on the active sectarian forces fostered by all brands of Islamists at a local level, including his own Sunni supporters. He negated the indicator of preferential treatment by shutting down madrassahs, arresting Islamist cabinet members in key government positions with registered murder accusation cases, and arrested 1500 sectarian 'activists' under a new anti-terrorism law.[179] Islamist groups were angered, and in 1998, Sunni Islamists attempted to assassinate Sharif.[180] Immediately after, Sharif's narrative reversed towards religious favouritism to safeguard his life and political future. He fulfilled the indicator of state preferential treatment sustaining the hegemonic group by announcing large sums of economic assistance to religious schools.[181]

This highlights that using electoral alliances to form governments in the political economy of religion has evolved to a point where tapping into the Sunni voter bank was an easy way for

176 Ispahani, 143.
177 Julius, "Blasphemy Laws," 99
178 Ullah, "Democratic Parties," 64.
179 Nasr, "Sectarian Militancy," 105.
180 Nasr, 100.
181 Nasr, 100.

mainstream parties to gain power. Furthermore, a cleric, Sharif's Islamist-coalition partner, and member of the Provincial Assembly in his home region of Punjab, lobbied for the official name change from Rabwah to Chenab Nagar against the wishes of 95% of the Ahmadi residents, claiming it sinful to let Ahmadis live in a city with an Islamic name.[182] By using state apparatus to further exclude minorities successfully, the hegemonic group's unrestricted political influence in the political market, and the state's inaction against such laws only brought higher discrimination against groups they believed 'deserved' to be excluded. These acts speak to the indicator of discriminatory laws against Ahmadis in an attempt to further ostracize the minority group exhibit the vast Sunni dominance over political affairs. It can be argued that civilian frailty led to electoral coalitions with religious parties creating high levels of religious instrumentalization, bringing the state-religion alliance closer and making conditions favourable for increasing minority marginalization (H1).

The chronic weakness of civilian endeavours and plummeting economic conditions led to the fourth military takeover by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999.[183] Musharraf's coup was validated through a Supreme Court's decision deeming conditions 'necessary for intervention'.[184] His regime like many military regimes began strong, as the army and judiciary backed his coup. Musharraf was able to hold general elections in 2002 through a rigged constitutional referendum that gave him another five years in government,[185] but his popularity plummeted as his promise to give up power was never realized. Nevertheless, the true strengths of Musharraf's regime can be retraced in his efforts against armed extremism in the country, especially his alliance with the US

[182] United States Department of State, "Pakistan." 656.
[183] Dugger, "Coup in Pakistan."
[184] Bearak, "Upholds Coup"
[185] International Crisis Group, "Stability in Pakistan," 5

part of the War on Terror, which provided legitimacy to the actions of the regime.[186] Promulgating Musharraf's rule, the alliance brought an estimated US$ 3 billion dollars in forms of debt-relief and postponement of interest-payments massively upscaling poor economic conditions brought by the previous civilian era.[187] Musharraf's regime compensated for a lack of popular support through US external legitimacy. State strength enabled Musharraf to emphasize on how 'exploitation of religion' was evident in all layers of society, and the abandonment of true Islam by the clergy made the fight against extremism central.[188]

The political economy of religion suggests that stronger regimes, and especially military regimes with centralized control, are able to choose to which degree religion is co-opted into political affairs. Even if the regime secedes to the market dominance of the majoritarian group, it is able to achieve some degree of minority accommodation due to its firmly consolidated authority and force. In this way, Musharraf successfully he negated the indicators of hate speech and violence by banning political/religious militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the SSP, holding groups who openly engage in hate speech or physical violence/terrorism accountable.[189] He was able to reform *madrassas* by making registration compulsory and enforced the mandatory inclusion of science, and English in their curriculum.[190] Musharraf's top civilian aide, considered by many as his closest advisor, Tariq Aziz, was a declared Ahmadi, holding top governmental position after decades.[191] After decades of persecution, all minorities were invited to a meeting by Musharraf to discuss the abolishment of the separate electorate system to bring minorities back into mainstream politics.[192] In 2002, Musharraf scrapped the mandatory declaration of religion

186 Bennett Jones, "Musharraf's Challenge" 3.
187 Bennett Jones, "Musharraf's Challenge" 3.
188 Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 166.
189 Ispahani, 173.
190 Bennett Jones, "Musharraf's Challenge" 33.
191 Masood, "Aides to Musharraf."
192 Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 166.

making citizenship the distinguishing factor when voting, thus allowing Muslims and non-Muslims to vote on the same electoral list.[193] Interviews show that for many 'undeclared' Ahmadis this was the first time they voted after 1973;

> Musharraf's regime made me and many of my community members comparatively safer…but I wasn't safe enough to openly declare my religion. Some good things did happen…making religion not a requirement in voting… me and many of my friends or our children had never voted…this time we did.[194]

However, due to harsh disapproval from leading Sunni Islamists, Musharraf in fear of public religious outburst, withheld 'declared' Ahmadis' effective representation.[195] Their voter disenfranchisement was retained by a special separate electoral list barring them from voting as Muslims, only allowing them to vote for one of the two reserved seats at the national level.[196] Many of these actions speak to the indicator of marginalization and the special electoral list also completed the preferential treatment indicator as it inhibited minority political representation/participation at the most basic level.

In a favourable step towards minority accommodation in 2004, Musharraf removed the religious identification column from passports.[197] This relegated the discriminatory law indicator as it was a big win for Ahmadis, like many other minority groups, as it protected them from serious discrimination. For Ahmadis, it was especially significant as it rightfully allowed them to escape signing declarations denouncing their faith. Musharraf also wished to tighten the blasphemy law

193 Farooq, "Won't Vote."
194 AO, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, July 18th, 2019.
195 US Department of State, "International Religious Freedom 2002," 636.
196 Farooq, "Won't Vote."
197 Ahmad, "Pervez Musharraf."

by proposing that the accused should be charged by a judge rather than a police officer as this would reduce false allegations against minority groups targeted by this law.[198]

Nevertheless, as blasphemy was a core element of clerical politics, and a matter of strong public passion, both measures were short-lived because the Sunni community protested these claims as an attack on Muslim identity.[199] This shows that in a political setting where religion is deeply embedded in the historical formation of public life, even strong military regimes are restricted to accommodate minorities within a certain limit to ensure stability. Many participants expressed that: "During Musharraf's rule there was a little, very small comfort that ended when he left. He gave us something we never had after 1973, even if it was for a little while."[200] Despite the reversal of such proposals, many participants felt Musharraf's rule to be the most accommodating in the past 30 years.

> Musharraf tried to revoke this law of putting religion in the passport…the hue and cry from the mullahs they have so much mass power and support…he had to succumb…he being the dictator, he was army and even he couldn't do it, shows you mullah power.[201]

All of the above shows that the military is better able to manage the political interests of religious groups than its civilian counterparts due to less reliance on electoral support. As the military rule was able to get legitimacy from other avenues such as the army or external alliances, it was able to contain the political economy of religion. It made efforts to circumscribe, to some degree, the dominance of Sunni Islam even if these attempts were reverted later due to regime-weakening. This shows that regime strength can restrict to some degree the political hegemony of

198 Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 170.
199 Ahmad, "Pervez Musharraf."
200 KM, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, July 21st, 2019.
201 DH, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, , 2019.

the dominant group being (re)produced in the market over time. Additionally, military regimes are able to lower the instrumentalization of religion due to their authoritarian characteristics weakening the state-religion nexus, thus reducing minority marginalization in some respects (H1). This section has shown that states play an important role in facilitating conditions of political economy, making the competition between sub-brands of Islam a central theme in the political market for their own political benefit.

3.3 Democracy Again (2007-2020)

In 2007, Musharraf suspended the constitution in hopes to extend his tenure but due to popular protests like the Lawyers' Movement, the military was forced to give up control to civilians.[202] This democratic transition made Asif Ali Zardari, BB's husband, the first-ever democratic President to complete his five-year term peacefully after taking office in September 2008.[203] This section shows that the solidification of the political economy of religion becomes evident when the system reopens and religion dominates the electoral and political sphere.

Although the transition was much awaited by the masses, the regime's weakness was once again evident. Under Zardari's civilian rule, the issue of blasphemy resurfaced due to the, then alleged, blasphemy charges against a Christian woman called Aasia Bibi. Many within the federal government who raised their voice in support for blasphemy law reforms had no support from the government itself because of its fragile grip over power.[204] A proponent of reforming blasphemy laws, the Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer was murdered in broad daylight by his own bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri.[205] In celebration of Taseer's murder, 500 clerics, various political parties, and educated lawyers declared Taseer's death a victory for Islam and the country; even today, the judge who delivered the death penalty to Qadri is in hiding due to multiple death threats.[206] The only Christian federal minister in power and support of the reform of the blasphemy law was also murdered by the Taliban.[207] This shows that state decentralization reintroduced the lack of state control over violence, hindering state-ability to ensure protection against extremist

202 Gall and Perlez, "Defeat to Musharraf."
203 Ispahani, "The Zardari Legacy."
204 Walsh, "Pakistan Minister"
205 Rashid, "Failed Commitment 30.
206 Rashid, 30.
207 Rashid, 30.

forces. In fear of protests or killings, Zardari's Law Minister expressed the state had no intention of altering blasphemy laws that disproportionately target minorities.[208]

The return of civilian rule highlighted two things, 1) armed Islamic radicalism brought an element of terror into the political economy of religion as a tactic to pressurize weaker transitory states into pushing the state-religion nexus closer; 2) a civilian state that was historically unable to deal with unarmed unrest, would fare even weaker when faced with armed political pressure. In the interview statements, it is evident that the community accepts the state's unaccountability as inevitable. One participant summarized the general sentiment of participants stating that: "religion is a game for political parties…to keep operational, religion is used by all those trying to develop access to power… no other tool works"[209]

Despite the Sunni status-quo, decentralization of the media brought anti-Ahmadi sentiments to the forefront. Other religious minorities were not subject to the clergy-generated incitement of hate and violence. Prominent and self-proclaimed religious scholar and future political candidate, Dr. Amir Liaquat Hussain, along with others urged Muslims to "not be afraid to kill Ahmadis."[210] Within 24 hours of this instigation, the district president of the Ahmadiyya community in Sindh was shot eleven times; and the regime refrained from reprimanding the killers, TV channels, nor did they attempt to shut down the TV show.[211] The Ahmadiyya community also endured twin bomb blasts in 2010 which took the lives of 94 Ahmadis but the perpetrators were never brought to justice.[212] Such actions highlight that in the first civilian regime, indicators of active incitement of hatred and acts of physical violence alongside a lack of state-accountability

[208] Rashid, "Failed Commitment," 29.
[209] WS, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, June 30th, 2019.
[210] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land," 177.
[211] Ispahani, 177.
[212] Hashim, "Absence of Justice."

to punish perpetrators of violence were fulfilled. With poor state-capabilities to deal with clerical encroachment in public life, the state-maintained focus on remaining in power by overlooking Sunni crimes against minorities rather than cementing the writ of the state for better democratic development. Therefore, the weakness it exhibited against Sunni clerics allowed for the instrumentalization of religion leading to further violence against minorities (H1).

The first peaceful transition of leadership brought Nawaz Sharif back to power in 2013,[213] but the weakness of the regime was quickly realized. The government met high levels of public backlash with thousands of protestors claiming his win was rigged, keeping domestic and international investment seriously low, thus plummeting the economy, and further weakening public support.[214] Moreover, Sharif's involvement in the Panama Papers brought his undeclared fortune to the forefront making the masses question his, and his regime's credibility.[215] The system was dominated by religious politics, and this weakness was even more evident when in 2017 the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) suggested reforms to the *Khatm-i-Naboowat* (Finality of the Prophet) clause, proposing to replace "I solemnly swear" with "I believe" when a candidate declares their belief in the finality of the Prophet Muhammad.[216] After three weeks of violent protests by hardline Islamists who believed the state softening its stance on the Ahmadi issue, the oath was added unchanged.[217] To soften the blow, the Speaker National Assembly stated that these changes were made due to a 'clerical error.'[218] Such actions are a clear indicator of the seriously weak capacity of the state to function without Islamist support. Interviews also reflect a similar sentiment concerning state backtracking;

213 Boone, "Sharif's Government."
214 Boone, "Sharif's Government."
215 Waraich, "Corruption Conundrum"
216 Khattak, Inamullah, and Guramani. "Elections Act 2017."
217 Wolf, "A Multi-Dimensional Perspective," 11.
218 Khattak, Inamullah, and Guramani. "Elections Act 2017."

> Religious elements have become a weakness of the governments, especially in democracy…religious elements were given so much freedom that it is difficult to take back force from them even if the governments wants to…any time the government tries to restrain them they use their power to push the government back deeper.[219]

State weakness was also evident on the minority accommodation front. In 2014 there was a mob attack against Ahmadis in Gujranwala where the police watched, and some even joined the 1000 attackers who burned several houses to the ground, where many were lynched, the youngest being 3 years old.[220] In 2016, Sharif took a symbolic step of renaming the National Centre of Physics after Dr. Abdus Salam, the first Muslim Nobel laureate, whose contributions have been rejected by the state due to his Ahmadi identity.[221] Simultaneous to the clergy's expression of disapproval via attacks on the Ahmadi community,[222] Sharif's own son-in-law and party's ex-Member of National Assembly (MNA) Capt. Safdar appealed to JI clerics with MNA status to take down the name of an apostate, and the government obliged.[223] He glorified Taseer's murderer, and claimed that Ahmadis should not be allowed to enter the government or military because they are "a threat to this country, its constitution and its ideology." [224] In 2016, once again an approximately 1000-3000 strong mob attacked an Ahmadi mosque, displacing and killing hundreds, however, the police afraid to protect heretics and get attacked by the mob watched as bystanders.[225]

This shows that once the political economy of religion becomes an untamed condition, weak states are perpetuating the upholding of the Sunni status quo as the costs of curbing religious

219 MB, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, August 2nd, 2019.
220 Gillani, "Blasphemy Rampage."
221 Shahid, "Accept Ahmadis as Muslims"
222 Shahid, "Accept Ahmadis as Muslims"
223 Saleemi, "Safdar's Resolution,"
224 Shams, "Pakistan against its Ahmadi."
225 Mehmood, "Bigotry against Ahmadis."

instrumentalization n rise. Since minorities have been successfully excluded, the instrumentalization of religion serves to bolster clerical political ambitions. Sharif's regime fulfilled the indicator of marginalization as it was unable to hold perpetrators accountable for carrying out deadly physical and verbal acts of violence against Ahmadis on several occasions, at a social and political level. Thus, the weakness of the regime, especially in front of the clergy was evident. The regime for its own survival opts to refrain from curbing religious instrumentalization, leading to greater minority marginalization (H1).

The 2018 elections brought a new party *Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf* (PTI) (Pakistan Party of Justice) led by Imran Khan called into power by a coalition win.[226] Khan's biggest failure so far can be seen on the economic front. Besides changing financial ministers several times in his barely two years in power, the state borrowed an additional $16 billion and the rupee lost 35% of its value in one year, sinking his popularity amongst the masses immensely.[227] Moreover, the government's orders of crackdowns on opposition, and media blackout on protestors protesting the government's violations of human rights/rule of law reflects a serious weakening of democratic values.[228] However, the state's weakness is undoubtedly evident through *Tehreek-e-Labbaik's* (TLP) leader Khadim Rizvi, and his violent protests against the Supreme Court's (SC) historic decision of acquitting Aasia Bibi in 2018, a Christian woman accused of blasphemy in 2010.[229] In response to her acquittal, violent Sunni mass-protests in the capital paralyzed the government by openly calling for the murder of the judges, and ministers.[230] On the basis of Sunni demands, the government banned Aasia Bibi from leaving the country until the SC reviewed its decision.[231] Rizvi was

226 Gettleman, "Next Prime Minister"
227 Siddiqui, "U-Turns"
228 Siddiqui, "U-Turns"
229 Masood, "Court Acquits"
230 Ahmad and Masood, "Pakistan Makes Concessions."
231 Ahmad and Masood, "Pakistan Makes Concessions."

eventually charged and jailed under counts of terrorism and sedition, however, months later a Lahore High Court granted him bail and released him to avoid reigniting protests.[232] Nevertheless, this highlights how chronically ineffective state accountability is, especially when dealing with the hegemonic groups' clerical personalities.

To strengthen his plunging popularity, Khan carried on Ahmadi voter disenfranchisement and declared that the nation's blasphemy laws safeguarded Islam, and its devotees' emotions.[233] Khan is said to have donated large sums to US-terror list cleric, also known as 'father of Taliban,' Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman Khalil to join hands with PTI and initiate government Islamic schools.[234] These actions speak to the preferential treatment indicator as the state is elevating the majority group by reinforcing their hegemonic position. Other than colliding with extremists, Princeton economist, Atif R. Mian was axed from the Economic Advisory Council by Khan in 2018 due to clerical disapproval of an Ahmadi holding a position of state-decision-making.[235] In May 2018, an Ahmadi mosque was attacked by a mob of 600 people while police authorities once again, watched the desecration of the Mosque where Mirza Ghulam Ahmad once lived.[236]

Months later, clerics incited anti-Ahmadi sentiments by rallying an armed mob of 400 towards a mosque in Faisalabad, burning the mosque, nearby homes, and killing five Ahmadis.[237] Furthermore, on January 2020 the District Bar Association in Multan made it mandatory for candidates wishing to hold a position in an executive council to declare their faith by signing a declaration in their belief in the finality of the Prophet.[238] Such mandatory declarations present another example of subjugation of minorities, and the inaction of the government against a law

232 Hashim, "Far-Right Activists"
233 Rashid, "Imran Khan."
234 Rashid, "Imran Khan."
235 Stacey, Kiran, and Bokhari. "Ahmadi Adviser."
236 CSW, "Ahmadi Mosque,"
237 CSW, "Ahmadi Mosque,"
238 DAWN "Declaration before Vote,"

that forbids non-Muslims, especially Ahmadis, from participating in Bar Council elections. Interviews statements show that state functioning is hampered when mullahs perceive something against 'Islam':

> The government doesn't have a choice but to continue using this narrative cause they never built any other way to keep power…now they listen to and please clerics… when most of your people think hating us is Islam, even if democracy works perfectly here it still won't do anything for me… there has to be a good dictator in this country so this can change.[239]

When the political market has developed only through religion, the avoidance of religion is unlikely, making transitions even more susceptible to religious instrumentation. The regime seeking to ensure its own control over power completes the indicator of state-preferential treatment as it dismisses the minority group from representation in federal judicial, and economic institutions. It also fulfils other indicators by failing to acknowledge or reprimand police officers' inaction or perpetrator's acts of violence against the minority community, and property. These acts of marginalization signal how in the political economy of religion when the dominant group immerses itself in mainstream politics the gains from capitalizing on religion rise even further. Regimes that are fragile with weakened state-capacities do not have to political will or capital to curb religion's grip over power. Thus, instrumentalizing religion becomes harder to resist, pushing the state-religion nexus closer, making minority marginalization unavoidable (H1). This section has shown that state weakness plays an important role in setting up conditions for the political economy of religion. By perpetuating such activity, weaker states may continue to reproduce state-religion alliances due to a lack of development in alternative power sources, thus restricting the potential for minority accommodation.

[239] IA, interview with Syeda Mahnoor Amjad, June 7th, 2019.

4. What Now?

This thesis set out to understand the dynamics of political economy of religion and how its presence in each regime (type and strength) is non-static, thus impacting the level of minority accommodation. As shown above, the three periods of history (1947-1971), (1972-2007) (2007-2020) show that in the early years of Pakistan (1947-1971), the liberal democratic narrative was replaced with one of religious exclusion. As the poorly embedded civilian state was too weak to resist the politicization of religion, a decline in minority accommodation was observed. The onset of military rule in the 60s was widely supported, and because of high state control, it was better organized to curb religious instrumentalization, in turn diminishing the level of minority marginalization.

From 1972-2007, the conditions of political economy were augmented by the return to civilian rule in the 70s. It brought poorly developed civilian institutions back into power, showcasing that state weakness augments the state-religion alliances and has the potential to formalize them into state policy, systematizing minority socio-political ostracization. Moreover, the weak military regime of the 80's shows makes Islam the central theme in the political market, showing that high levels of state control under weak systems can further exacerbate minority marginalization. The reintroduction of civilian leadership in the 90s exemplified that little to no real democratic development kept civilian leadership in a state of chronic weakness, which generated an environment for greater religious instrumentalization, and lower minority accommodation. The last military rule began out strong, exhibiting a strong control over its population, and amplified minority accommodation, however as the military leadership weakened towards its end, the regime fails to pass or maintain its efforts of curbing religion's grip over power.

In the most recent times (2007-2020), the solidification and reproduction of the political economy of religion becomes evident through the dominance of religion in the electoral and political arena. The three civilian leaderships from 2007 onwards show that as the transition towards democracy is being maintained, the lack of democratic development (judicial, or political), alongside persistent military inference in civilian governance have further debilitated state capacities. The reproduction of state weakness, and the perpetration of the political economy of religion has greatly diminished the possibility of minority accommodation greatly.

When states are unable to exert their authority due to lack of support –popular or institutional– the fragility of the state is harshly realized because dominant groups seeking political power play on such state weaknesses. The empirics have detailed how state weakness and regime type plays an integral role in developing the frame of political economy of religion. These actions highlight why an alliance between state and religion can be problematic, especially in newly democratizing regimes. Weak states transitioning into democracy with an alliance to a particular religion are susceptible to using state-sponsored persecution and discrimination as a political strategy hampering minority accommodation prospects.

Throughout the history of Pakistan, both the regime type and its strength played an important role in determining the level of religious instrumentalization in the political market by highlighting the fluid role of religion in society. Observing the changes in the use of religion between each regime shows that religion is an important power centre, however, the absence of protective structures, presence of discriminatory laws, weak institutional structures, and poorly developed accountability apparatuses are likely unable to provide minority protections[240] in weak transitory states.

[240] Ispahani, "Purifying the Land,' 9

Through the lens of the political economy of religion, the interactions between regimes and politicization of religion, indicate that regime strength and type together are able to show 1) the non-static nature of religion that allows for different levels of instrumentalization of religion by political or non-political actors; 2) States are a resource managing entity (economic or ideological), and their involvement in the politicization of religion can adversely affect the political market. State support for one group over another can hamper creating a politically inclusive environment for all groups or sub-groups, particularly by making hostility towards minority groups more likely. 3) Regime type and strength both contribute to the fluctuations between different regimes in their use of religion. This shows that when comparing more authoritarian vs. more civilian regimes, regime strength played a crucial role in determining the level of religious instrumentalization. Thus, the durability or strength of the system in which political operations take place is integral for developing minority accommodation, even more so than the regime type itself. This is even more evident when comparing weak military regimes with high religious instrumentalization and minority marginalization, and military regimes that start out strong and become weak but are still able to curb religion's power within certain limits and increase minority accommodation.

To further strengthen the lessons of this thesis, scholars can expand the research scope to include the majoritarian viewpoint and explore what majorities feel the role of the state has been, why have majoritarian groups clung onto religion, and whether they feel they really are the dominant force in society. Doing so can better explain the actions of the majoritarian clergy, and hopefully uncover why other social divisions such as class or ethnicity have not been able to become a key political influencer. This can be done for countries with one regime type but fluctuating degrees of regime strength, and even between countries with hegemonic religions in

the political fabric of society such as; Israel, Pakistan, El Salvador, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and many others.

Lessons from these findings can be useful to Pakistan and to countries all over the world (religious or not) that experience majority-minority religious conflict, especially under fragile state-conditions. Understanding how state actions alter the political market can be extremely useful for developing strategies for conflict resolution/management, allowing for a way to better adjudicate group conflict that ensures state strength is maintained. These findings underscore why some states remain path-dependent in its actions and fall into a pattern of chronic state-weakness. This draws attention to how states can use opportunities for adjudication to be more inclusive in their political development which in turn, strengthens their own position in society. Moreover, findings signal that countries moving towards a liberal democracy needs to structure its political narrative by enhancing non-majoritarian power centres to balance majoritarian religious or ethnic dominance. This can be done by enhancing educational and independent judicial avenues that generate an environment of greater accountability for the state and its subjects, alleviating minority concerns[241] by contributing to the development of both state and society.

To expand on the findings of the thesis, the political economy of religion model can also be developed and studied under or with the lens of other elements of conflict such as race, ethnicity, and class. Moreover, an additional layer of analysis focusing on external actor and their support can be added to the current framework. Through external interferences, the framework can be more sophisticated to see how the global political market, and/or external support to a domestic regime can impact the evolution of a domestic political economy of

[241] Finke and Martin. "Ensuring Liberties," 699.

religion. As seen in the empirics, electoral processes can reinforce or augment conditions of the political economy of religion. Therefore, it is important to explore, particularly for weak transitory regimes that are opening themselves up to a more people-centric political process like elections, how a monopolized political market can become a hindrance to political development itself.

To see how much regime strength can contribute to minority accommodation efforts, further research can compare stronger liberal democracies that discriminate with weaker transitory democracies that also discriminate their religious minorities. This can display a more targeted understanding of the key institutional mechanisms needed for minority accommodation. By creating stronger and more accountable institutional operations, states can effectively strengthen their ability to effectively manage majority-minority religious conflict This will not only help restrict the business of religion in politics, but it will benefit state capabilities to govern effectively, and most likely alleviate minorities from state-led systemic persecution.

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