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The Dual Process of Identity Formation and Collective Mobilization from Below:
Turkish Diaspora on Kinship Care in Germany

By

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Abstract

In the literature, diasporas have been long considered as "objects" of the kin-states. Accordingly, they are mobilized by the political elites, when there are critical developments in the "homeland." Such communities are viewed as "agents of economic and social development" in the countries of origin. Several scholars thus demonstrate that diasporas are "passive, delineated, and altruistic communities," and their primary role is to support the homeland's interests. On the other hand, diasporas are not pre-existing entities, and they do not always translate their "emotional attachment" to direct actions. Besides, diasporas are not homogeneous ethnic lobbying groups, and they have different agendas with diverse interests. Rather, diasporas are identity- and interest-based communities, whereby they are mobilized in a variety of places and spaces beyond the homeland for various reasons.

In this vein, diaspora mobilization should be considered as a self-organized and grassroots social movement (with or without the active support of the homeland) whereby ordinary transnational migrants take an active part in various socio-political activities for their needs, interests, and identities. Diasporas subsequently act as social and political actors in everyday life, and challenge the state-centric power, and elite-driven top-down approach of mobilization diasporization. Diasporas, furthermore, form biopolitical collectivities on "the correct way of life," and (re-)influence the policies of both the homeland and the hostland.

Under these circumstances, there is a dual process of diasporic identities formation and collective mobilization based on those constructed transnational identities. Diasporic identities are not formed as a "natural and automatic result of migration;" hence, they are socially and politically constructed. Diasporas, "as communities that care," demonstrate their morality, care, and solidarity, particularly when they or their co-ethnics face precarious living conditions in the hostland. Apart from the homeland, the hostland environment also helps or hinders diaspora mobilization.

Consequently, the main aim of this dissertation is to analyze diaspora mobilization from below. Within a theoretically informed analysis diaspora-led mobilization and mixed methodology of the study of Turkish communities in Germany, this research examines an in-depth study of bottom-up diaspora mobilization on the selected issue (kinship foster care). The central research question of the dissertation is, "how does diaspora mobilization occur from below?" The sub-questions are "how do ordinary transnational migrants become diaspora entrepreneurs to construct diasporic identities in everyday life?" and "how do diaspora communities establish networks and relations for diasporic care and solidarity on threshold events?"

Since there is a lack of sensitivity and analytical capacity to examine diasporas as non-state actors in the literature, this dissertation offers a new theoretical and methodological framework in diaspora politics. It also highlights the importance of the hostland factor in diaspora mobilization rather than giving excessive attention to the homeland and kin-states' geopolitical interests. The dissertation, therefore, explores the precarious living conditions of the hostland and biopolitical discourses of diasporas on the correct way of life. The research findings demonstrate that diaspora communities are highly mobilized based on their needs, interests, and identities, whereby they participate in both online and offline socio-political activities. Through collective mobilization, diasporas resonate with their transnational, hybrid identities on and across the various web and social media platforms, and they take part in collective actions in everyday life. Online and offline worlds subsequently interact together in diaspora mobilization. As a result, this dissertation contributes to the literature on identity building of transnational communities such as diasporas, and mobilization of disadvantaged communities in the hostlands. The dissertation, furthermore, gives direct voices to diaspora communities and not talk about them in their absence and the abstract form.

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Empirical Puzzle(s)

In recent years, the number of children in foster care in Germany has been growing. According to 2018 data, 52.590 children were taken away from their families by the German Youth Offices. The number was only 25.664 in 2005 and 36.343 in 2010. The German Youth Welfare Office (Jugendamt) is often accused of separating tens of thousands of children from their families based on "minor" or even "baseless" reasons. Some Turkish diaspora families believe that Turkish origin children make up the vast majority of those foster children, and they occasionally express that "Jugendamt systematically targets non-German migrant families." Although the number of children with foreign origin (i.e., 28.204 in 2018) is available in the Federal Statistics data, the ethnic and religious background of a child is not known.[1]

In this context, the Turkish descent population in Germany often claims, they are systematically discriminated by the German state institutions. According to them, Jugendamt aims to assimilate migrant children and makes them foreign to their own culture under Germanization policies. Migrant families have subsequently called policy-makers to end the practice of taking away migrant children from their natural parents when there is no maltreatment of a child in the household. Besides, they are in favor of kinship care, placing migrant children with their own kin community foster parents instead of German ones. Consequently, Turkish migrant families are highly mobilized on child protection (both online and offline) and take collective actions to bring about the policy change within the German child protection system.

In the literature, Turkish communities in Germany are highly stigmatized by claiming that they are "the least integrated and politically passive immigrant group" (i.e., Koopmans & Statham, 1999; De Wit & Koopmans, 2005). However, they are actively mobilized for their

[1] Since January 2000, children born in Germany, whose parents had resided legally in the country for the past eight years, automatically obtain German citizenship.

needs, interests, and identities (with or without the active support of the homeland). They pay enough attention to the precarization of their livelihoods (insecure, volatile, and vulnerable human conditions, and attempt to establish the transnational social justice in their country of residence. They have approached both the hostland (Germany) and the homeland (Turkey) institutions for many years, and successfully raised the public as well as political awareness to the distress of Turkish origin children in Germany caused by Jugendamt.

The self-organized grassroots diasporic social movement activism and collective mobilization on their own needs, interests, and identities (bottom-up diaspora mobilization or diaspora mobilization from below) on the threshold events (such as kinship care) get significant attention by Turkish co-ethnics as well as the homeland institutions. There is a tremendous discursive politicization effect of bottom-up diaspora mobilization in the homeland. Turkish Media has begun to tell the stories of the Turkish diaspora families on how they have lost their (grand-)children by "illegal actions" of Jugendamt. "Stolen lives" and "Victims of Jugendamt" have become typical news headline to describe how Turkish migrant origin children are being torn illegally from their parents by the Youth Welfare Offices. It is not possible to figure out the number of Turkish origin children who are taken into foster care in Germany.[2] However, Turkish Media portrays that "the rate of seized Turkish immigrant children in the German Youth Offices makes up more than 25 percent of the total number (with approximately four to five thousand children per year), and this number has been significantly increasing in recent years.

In this vein, "*Turkish origin children brutally seized by the German Youth Welfare Office for assimilation*" become typical news that you can often come across in Turkish media, including social media. While news articulates sad and horrifying stories of Turkish diaspora families, Turkish co-ethnics (both in Germany and other countries – including Turkey) share the pain of families. They are collectively organized under the discourses of child abduction and systematic institutional discrimination in the country of residence.

A large number of petitions, street demonstrations, and other types of activities attempt to attest to the "unjust practices" of Jugendamt towards migrant families. The Turkish descent population in Germany furthermore asks Turkish political elites to intervene in the "problem"

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[2] The German state statistics do not indicate the racial, ethnic, and religious origins of children.

and solve it. According to them, every case needs to be examined without any delay and discussed by the Turkish political elites since the issue is not a matter of some isolated cases, but a systematic injustice towards Turkish migrants abroad. In return, Turkish political elites started to accuse German policy-makers of destroying transnational and multicultural families by Islamophobia and Xenophobia motivations but doing nothing to promote migrant families' cohesion and their integration to the host society. They even compare Jugendamt with Nazi Germany's Lebensborn adoption system. Child protection practices of Jugendamt, therefore, have become a hot political debate in Turkey. Turkish politicians often instrumentalize the issue for their internal interests and domestic politics. Diaspora mobilization from below, however, has a more significant effect on Turkey's diaspora engagement/management policies with the institutional innovation (i.e., the Attaché of Social and Family Policy within the Turkish Consulate).

Consequently, the foster care practices of Jugendamt have caused diplomatic and political disputes, even tensions between Germany and Turkey. Protests and social media campaigns with the hashtag "Give us back our children!" paved the way to intense criticism towards Jugendamt in the Turkish political and social life. Edanur Karademir (2006), Muhammed Oral (2014), Esen Brothers (Baran, Atakan, Kaan, 2015), Elif Karakaya (2018), Elçin Bilgiç (2020) became just a few examples of the Turkish immigrant children who were "forcibly" taken away from their parents by Jugendamt in Germany. Although their names are forgotten, they became a symbol of the "silent," "apolitical," Turkish migrants to engage in a dispute over the concept of kinship care both in Germany and Turkey.

Throughout the years, I have witnessed several demonstrations of Turkish diaspora families in Germany against Jugendamt, and occasionally found myself part of these protests. I very often realize the importance as well as the sensitivity of the subject and became interested in the issue not only as a Turkish diaspora in Germany but also as an academic researcher. Besides, I figured out that there are not enough statistics and scientific research on the topic. Migrant families and youth welfare officers, furthermore, have different narratives on the policies and practices of child protection in Germany. German policy-makers claim that they will not allow the maltreatment of any child in the country, regardless of the citizenship and ethnic and cultural background. Germany indeed has one of the most advanced legal frameworks for protecting minors and promoting child welfare in the world. However, sentiment has formed among some Turkish diaspora families, who label Jugendamt as a

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"state-sponsored mafia organization" and accused it of being behind "brutal child kidnappings."[3] This shows that there is an incompatibility between migration governance and child welfare policy in Germany. Although the Turkish descent population in Germany usually claims the child protection is one of their most important everyday problems, there is no systematic study and academic examination on the topic. For this reason, it is needed to examine how the Turkish descent population is mobilized on kinship care and take collective actions both online and offline.

Theoretical Puzzle(s)

In the literature, diaspora is an essentially contested concept. The term has no set clear definition yet, and its meaning has been continually changing. Various definitions of the phenomenon from different perspectives (both theoretically and contextually) have undoubtedly caused some confusion and stimulated academic debates. Under the "primordial and essentialist" approaches, several scholars consider diasporas as "passive, delineated, and altruistic communities." The literature mostly demonstrates that diaspora communities are mobilized by "the homeland" to support the "interests of the kin-state," mainly when there are critical developments in the country of origin. The literature thus focuses on diaspora engagement/management policies of the kin-states and deals with "how to manage remittance and financial flows properly." Most scholars consequently consider diaspora as a "geopolitical object of the kin-states" and explain "why and when diaspora mobilization occurs" from the top-down approach under the extensive attention to the homeland.

Most scholars in diaspora literature analyze the socio-economic situations of "foreign workers" in the hostland and their potential role to reduce poverty in their respective homeland. Such communities should not be seen only as "economic tools" of the homeland. Diasporas re-articulate the critical issues not only in the homeland but also in the hostland. They challenge the state-centric power and elite-driven top-down mobilization; however, there is a lack of sensitivity and analytical capacity to examine the diaspora as a non-state actor.

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[3] Diasporas are not homogeneous communities, and there are various discourses on Jugendamt within the Turkish descent population in Germany.

This study, therefore, aims to make "invisible the visible," and bring the marginalized transnational diaspora families into the center of politics. Diaspora communities are not objects of the kin-states, but they are subjects of policy-making. The homeland factor cannot explain everything. Diaspora mobilization is based on human experiences. Thus, we need to understand the diasporic narratives without judging what is right or wrong. Rather than analyzing top-down elitist diaspora engagement/management policies of the kin-states, we should talk about the needs and self-interests of diaspora communities.

Migration is a dynamic process, and there are no clear-cut differences between the categories of "migrants, transnational communities, and the diaspora." Although all diasporas are transnational migrants, not all migrants are diaspora, and nobody becomes a diaspora overnight. What makes diaspora as diaspora is their "socio-political collectivity" and "ability to collaborate based on their hybrid identities." Diaspora mobilization is a complex phenomenon, and there is a dual process: (1) identity building process, and (2) mobilization based on those constructed identities. The multi-facets processes are linked together, which usually interact with both directions. It may be true that the term diaspora is not a self-identified category. It is not very common to hear from dispersed transnational migrant groups to identify themselves as "diaspora" (only a few diaspora communities such as Jewish and Armenians call themselves as diaspora). The majority of such communities continue to label themselves in terms of their ethnic or cultural identities. Thus, the researchers have the flexibility to interpret the subject of the research. It is more useful to discuss "diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, and practices than a or the diaspora itself" (Brubaker 2005: 13). As Brubaker (2005) argues, diaspora communities "make claims, articulate projects, and mobilize energies." Since collective actions of diaspora communities are mainly based on their identities and interests, any research on diaspora mobilization should focus on two interrelated processes: identity building and mobilization based on those "constructed" identities.

The Research Gap(s) in the Literature

In the literature, several scholars argue that diasporas are mobilized and take collective actions for two reasons: (1) to support the homeland and (2) to promote the well-being of the co-ethnics in the host state (Sheffer, 2003; Quinsaat, 2015). As mentioned, the existing literature predominantly focuses on the first concern – how diaspora communities are

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mobilized to support the homeland. Diasporas are "held together by active solidarity and dense social interactions" (Brubaker, 2005: 6); however, not all diaspora members play an active role in collective actions. Such communities do not always translate their "emotional attachments" into direct actions. Diasporas are heterogeneous communities with diverse interests, and they have different attitudes and actions towards the homeland, the hostland, and their kin community. As a result, how they are mobilized and promote the well-being of their co-ethnics in the hostland is not well explained in the literature. In this dissertation, I thus focus on bottom-up diaspora mobilization and analyze their online and offline activities.

Several scholars have already answered, "who and what produces or disseminates diaspora mobilization" (either the kin-states or political elites). This top-down diaspora mobilization is concentrated on the formal procedures, policies, and institutions of the kin-states. In the top-down approach (homeland-calling literature), diaspora institutions and associations, which are formal institutional arrangements of the kin-states, initiate the diaspora activism. It is more visible in the top-down elitist approach "by whom and which purposes diaspora mobilization occurs" (due to the clear visibility of the kin-states' institutions, policies, and programs for protecting the homeland interests). However, this process is not that evident and systematically explained in the bottom-up diaspora mobilization.

The literature does not illustrate how transnational members of dispersed heterogeneous diaspora communities organize the solidarity-based collective actions, particularly in the hostland, for the promotion of the well-being of the co-ethnics. Apart from analyzing the dual process of identity building and diaspora mobilization, this research also fills in some pieces of information missing in the literature, such as how diaspora communities are mobilized on the well-being of the co-ethnics in the host state and establish their networks and relations for the solidarity-based collective actions online and offline.

Aim and Purpose

Under these circumstances, the primary purpose of this dissertation is to understand the diasporic identity building process through different stages of mobilization as well as diaspora mobilization based on those constructed identities by ordinary transnational migrants. The diaspora mobilization from below (bottom-up diaspora mobilization) is the method adopted by transnational dispersed communities to mobilize other co-ethnics for the

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diasporic care and solidarity (with or without the active support of the homeland). This study consequently analyzes how diaspora communities promote and ensure the well-being of the co-ethnics in the hostland, particularly during the time of precarity, and construct their diasporic identities through mobilization. As a case study, the dissertation examines Turkish diaspora mobilization on kinship foster care in Germany. It analyzes how they utilize the childcare welfare policy of the hostland, and in what ways they organize collective actions online and offline.

Research Questions

The central research question of the dissertation is: "*how does diaspora mobilization occur from below?*" The supplementary questions are (SQ-1), "how do ordinary transnational migrants become diaspora entrepreneurs to construct diasporic identities in everyday life?" and (SQ-2) "how do diaspora communities establish networks and relations for diasporic care and solidarity on threshold events?"

Figure 1 – *The Matrix of Research Questions (in the Literature vs. Dissertation)*

Why, *When*, *By Whom*, and *How* Diaspora Mobilization Occurs?		
	Top-Down Approach (Homeland-Calling) Literature	Bottom-Up Approach (Diaspora-Calling) Dissertation
Why?	To support the homeland To fulfill emotional attachment	To perform diasporic care, morality, and solidarity.
When?	When there are critical developments and changes in the homeland	When there is a precarity in the hostland to promote the well-being of co-ethnics.
By Whom?	By the kin-state and political elites: Diaspora institutions and associations	The literature says by "diaspora entrepreneurs." BUT how do transnational populations become diaspora entrepreneurs? (SQ-1)
How?	Through kin-state's policies, programs, and actions	Through mobilizing structures and collective vehicles: "networks of people:" diasporic associations/ organizations and kinship ties. BUT, how do they establish such networks and relations? (SQ-2)

Hypothesis

- *The hostland factor*: apart from the homeland factor, diaspora mobilization occurs in response to "specific critical events, policies, and issues in the country of residence" (Sökefeld, 2006). Hostland's environment thus helps or hinders diaspora mobilization.

- *The construction of identities*: not all transnational migrants act as diasporic entrepreneurs. Diasporas are moral entities, whereby they share moral values (at least at the minimum level). In everyday life, such communities construct diasporic identities and produce (biopolitical) collectiveness.

- *Mobilization is based on those constructed identities*: Diasporas, furthermore, are social and political entities, and they are mobilized for their needs, interests, and identities (bottom-up diaspora mobilization). They are highly active on selected threshold events, particularly during the time of precarity.

- *Agency of diaspora*: diaspora mobilization is a dynamic socio-political process, whereby several actors, including the diaspora itself, deploy resources, frame issues, and make claims about their needs, interests, and identities. Although there are specific conditions and mobilizing vehicles, diasporas perform care ideals, practices, and responsibilities and act as a socio-political actor.

- *Online Participation and Offline Activities*: diasporas are virtual communities, and they strategically use online platforms to show their diasporic togetherness. They use digital space for diasporic communication, care, and solidarity. Diasporic care and morality are the preconditions of collective solidarity. The need for diasporic solidarity brings collective actions, both online and offline. However, the stages of diaspora mobilization (morality as preconditions, mobilization as a process, and collective actions as outcomes) should not be considered in linear and under the cause-effect relations. There is a correlational effect, and most of the time, they reproduce each other.

Novelty and Contributions

This study contributes to the literature by analyzing diaspora mobilization "from below." It explains "how ordinary migrants become diaspora entrepreneurs and establish their transnational/trans-local networks for collective actions online and offline." The dissertation offers "a new theoretical as well as a methodological" understanding of diaspora mobilization on the promotion of the well-being of co-ethnics in the country of residence. The novelty and contribution of the research can be summarized as follows:

1. Bottom-up Approach of Diaspora Mobilization: Self-Organized Grassroots Movement

As mentioned, the literature predominantly considers diaspora communities as a geopolitical object of the homeland and focuses on "when and why kin-states develop diaspora management/engagement policies." Most scholars, therefore, analyze top-down diaspora mobilization under the primordial and essentialist state-led approaches. Accordingly, diasporas are naturally rooted in distant homelands. Diasporic identities are formed as a natural and automatic result of migration, exile, and dispersion. The literature predominantly focuses on the homeland factor (methodological nationalism) and shows that diaspora communities are mobilized to support the kin-state's political interests. Consequently, the literature underestimates the importance of other factors, such as the hostland environment and the agency role of diasporas.

In this study, I examine diaspora mobilization from below and highlight that Diasporas are active social and political agents to act for their needs, interests, and identities. Such communities are not bounded and pre-political entities. For these reasons, we should not consider them as robust communities under the common ethnic origin, kin, and descent of the homeland. They are politically and socially constructed and involve in several socio-political activities online and offline.

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2. Theoretical Innovation(s): A New Conceptualization of Diaspora Mobilization?

The literature explores the process of diaspora mobilization within the "triadic nexus" (the relations between the homeland, the hostland, and diaspora) and transnational activities of diaspora communities towards their respective homeland. In this dissertation, I combine three theoretical/conceptual layers: "triadic nexus," "transnationalism/trans-localism," and "life as politics" under the single study. It is hard to separate each from others since they are bounced together in everyday life. In the complex and multi processes of diaspora identity construction and collective mobilization, there is still a need to focus on biopolitics. Biopolitics helps us to examine narratives, moral ideals, everyday practices, and outcomes of social relations of "caring about" and "caring for." As Cohen (1997) argues, diaspora communities share a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnics. Rather than the geopolitical interests of the kin-states, biopolitics plays an essential role in collective mobilization. Although biopolitics constructs the identities and it is the channel of communication between the actors in the triadic nexus, it is not commonly used to understand diasporic identity construction and collective mobilization.

None of the works in diaspora literature, as well as in other ones such as welfare policies and multiculturalism, have attempted to conceptualize the diaspora mobilization with its preconditions (diasporic care and morality) and outcomes (collective actions). I propose different variables in the process of identity construction and mobilization (diasporic care, morality, and solidarity) rather than analyzing classical variables of the literature (i.e., citizenship status).

There is still a state-centric approach in International Relations; however, the formation of de-territorialized/multi-territorialized diasporic identities and their mobilization challenge the state-centric power, identity, and territorial borders. In this study, I highlight that diasporas are non-state actors. Diasporas are spatially diffuse communities, and they challenge the state-centrism as well as power. As a result, diasporas are transnational communities and always in-making "here and there" or "the elsewhere" who are active agents of politics in everyday life.

Besides, the literature highlights diaspora mobilization under the "elite-driven processes." Accordingly, nation-state and political elites mobilize kin and related groups abroad for the benefits of the homeland. With the increase of the use of the Internet, ordinary transnational migrants contribute to the construction of diasporic identities and collective actions, and they become diaspora entrepreneurs. This study, therefore, challenges the elite-driven, state-centric, top-down approaches of diaspora mobilization.

Last but not least, there is another theoretical contribution to the literature. Diaspora communities affect the homeland's diaspora management/engagement policies with institutional innovation. I coin this positionality as "boomerang effect of diasporization." In the following chapters of the dissertation, I will further examine these contributions in detail.

3. Methodological Innovation: A Combination of Data Ethnography with Digital Ethnography

In the diaspora literature, there is still a need for more diversified methodological approaches with a combination of various methods ranging from the quantitative and qualitative. Single case qualitative ethnographic methods mostly dominate the literature. This research has a mixed methodology and combines data ethnography with the digital/virtual ethnography. In this dissertation, I also used Netnography to collect much larger and more representative samples. Since digital technologies construct a new distribution of power and identities, scholars need to apply digital methods (Schrooten, 2012). Whereas most of the works in the literature examine only the offline activities of diaspora communities, I highlighted the importance of online activities and analyzed them with offline participation. In the Digital age, it is hard to underestimate the close link between online and offline participation. I thus combined online and offline activities and followed one of the new methodological research paradigms in the literature.

4. Policy Recommendations: Controversial Issue(s) with Possible Solutions

There is a research gap on the well-being of migrant children in the hostlands. The childcare policies and practices in Germany are one of the critical problems of Turkish immigrant families. Kinship foster care has continuously been on the agenda in recent years, yet not been researched holistically so far. This research is solution-oriented and offers policy

recommendations for all parties. It also provides new terminology in the existing literature. The literature predominantly considers informal practices of kinship care among close family members such as grandparents and uncle/aunt. I expanded the informal kinship care of close relatives into formal kinship practices of diaspora communities. I thus developed a new conceptualization of diasporic kinship care rather than informal practices of close family members or friends. Policy recommendations will further be discussed in the following chapters.

Under these circumstances, this study offers both theoretical, methodological, and policy recommendations that researchers might further develop in the future.

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I reviews the theoretical and conceptual framework of the dissertation. First of all, the chapter aims to re-conceptualize the term *diaspora*. The chapter examines the diaspora literature and then develops its own theoretical and conceptual framework. The literature mostly portrays the top-down approach of diaspora mobilization as a kin-state-led project. However, in this chapter, I advocate the necessity of bottom-up, actor-centered diaspora mobilization. I argue that diaspora communities are mobilized for their own needs, interests, and identities (with or without the active involvement of the homelands). This chapter helped me to find the research gaps theoretically in the literature and allowed me to develop a unique theoretical framework on the phenomenon. I also combined three works of literature, (1) triadic nexus, (2) transnationalism/trans-localism, and (3) life as politics, which has never been addressed before.

Chapter II outlines the research design and methodological choices of the dissertation. The literature mostly reflects on diaspora as a single case study with a tiny sample and based on locality under the ethnographic method. In this chapter, I developed a detailed research methodology on how to examine diaspora communities. The multi-sited study of the Turkish diasporas in Germany as a case study describes the research design, data collection method, and data analysis. The overall data includes a mixed-methodology approach, including the ethnographic approach at multi-sited fieldworks, qualitative interviewing, and digital ethnography – Netnography. The data corpus is approached with Content Analysis. The first

part of the chapter presents the research philosophy, approach, and strategy under the multi-level study of design. The second part examines data collection methods and data analysis. The third part finally discusses the main issues and limitations of the research design between ontological, epistemological, and methodological choices. The chapter furthermore legitimizes the case selection: why Germany, why Turkish communities, why in North-Rhine Westphalia, and why the child protection issue.

Chapter III reviews the literature on Turkish communities in Germany and gives a short introduction to Turkish migration to Germany. The chapter firstly examines Germany's Migration policy since 1960, and secondly, Turkey's Diaspora Policy. It is essential to know the brief policies of the hostland and the homeland to understand the construction of diasporic identities and collective mobilization. Although the literature excessively covers Turkish communities in Germany, it mainly focuses on integration and identity problems. Only a few studies focus on the nexus between family and migration, particularly in child protection and kinship care. This part of the dissertation, therefore, figures out the research gaps in the current literature on the Turkish descent population in Germany.

Chapter IV examines the child protection system from the state perspective. The well-being of children has become one of the critical sociopolitical, economic, and cultural issues in late modern societies. In many countries, including Germany, child protection has become the top issue of national public and social policy debates. In this context, this part of the dissertation first reviews the structures and legal foundations of child protection in Germany. It then examines the homeland response to the policies and practices of the hostland – "the boomerang effect of diasporization" (the re-influence of the diasporic identity building and collective mobilization based on those identities on the policies of the homeland and the hostland).

Chapter V firstly reviews the differences in foster and kinship care to give a better picture of the importance of kinship in child protection. It secondly examines the kinship ties, belonging, and cares among diaspora communities. This part of the dissertation highlights the importance of diasporic care and moral responsibilities in establishing kinship networks and relations. The main question of this chapter is "how kinship ties, belonging, and care to create diasporic networks and relations." While the dissertation focuses on cultural, national, and religious clashes between/among Turkish diaspora communities in Germany and the German

child welfare system, the chapter concludes that the nexus between family and kinship ties became one of the leading resources of collective actions.

Chapter VI analyzes the online activities of Turkish diasporas in Germany on kinship care. In this dissertation, I argue that Turkish communities in Germany have a strong interest in the diasporic care ideals, practices, and responsibilities on the selected issues; therefore, there is a high level of political and social mobilization in both the country of residence and the country of origin. Turkish diaspora communities collectively politicize family issues and re-construct the (bio-)political belonging under the shared diasporic identities. The majority of Turkish diasporas in Germany are digitally connected under the theme of kinship care and quickly communicated through web-based connectivity to take action. Under these circumstances, the central question of this chapter is "how Turkish communities in Germany establish their networks and relations at the online platforms."

Chapter VII examines the offline participation of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany in matters of child protection. Online and offline worlds interact together, and they are not independent of each other. I thus applied a relational approach to spatiality in online and offline platforms. I examined the interconnectedness of the relationship between online and offline activities of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany. This chapter also gives further details on the "boomerang effect of diaspora mobilization."

The Conclusion part finally highlights the findings of the dissertation and summarizes the research questions. This part of the dissertation also recaps the policy recommendations for all parties "what to do and how to do" if/when they face such problems in everyday life, the limitations, and further study recommendations.

Chapter I

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework(s): How to Think of Diaspora?

Introduction

This chapter demonstrates the key conceptual frameworks and theoretical challenges in diaspora literature. The main aim of the chapter is to investigate the origins, various definition(s), and several implications of the phenomenon of "diaspora." It first revisits the triadic nexus (the homeland, the hostland, and diaspora), and briefly illustrates the diverse uses of the term in the triadic model (both from the top-down and bottom-up perspectives). The literature predominantly examines the diaspora as a geopolitical object of the homeland; therefore, it focuses on the kin-states' activities and policies (the top-down approach). This chapter, however, highlights diaspora mobilization from below and shows that diaspora communities are active social and political agents to organize themselves in everyday life with or without the active involvement of the homeland. The chapter, furthermore, portrays the diasporic life space within the notions of transnationalism and trans-localism. The last part of the chapter finally examines the precarity and biopolitics and shows how insecure and vulnerable conditions (precarity) of everyday life in the hostland shape diaspora mobilization. Three theoretical layers of the dissertation (triadic nexus, transnationalism/trans-localism, and biopolitics) help to understand the process of diaspora mobilization. Under these circumstances, this study gives direct voice to diasporas and does not talk about such communities in the absence and the abstract form(s).

1.1 How to Think of Diaspora?

The term diaspora originates from the Greek word *speiro* (to sow) and the preposition *dia* (over), which means "*scattering of seeds*" (Anthias, 1998: 560) from one destination to another. Historically, several scholars employed the concept to define classical Jewish, Ancient Greek, and Armenian communities, who were dispersed and exiled from their homelands (e.g., Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997; Reis, 2004). Initially, the diaspora referred to migration and colonization. Later, it became much more inclusive to include any overseas deterritorialized/multi-territorialized populations. Recently, the term has been primarily used

as a political slogan in public, political, and popular lexicons (Bauböck, 2008) for "the self-representations of a wide range of groups and initiatives" (Brubaker, 2005: 4).

Diaspora is a widely contested and debated concept. There are multiple as well as contradictory meanings of the term. The literature fundamentally disagrees whether to define it narrowly for only traumatic exile and forced dispersed communities or more broadly for any overseas populations (Dufoix, 2008). Some scholars insist on keeping the term under the narrow definition and focus on the historical criteria that establish genuine diasporas of William Safran[4] (1991) that portray them as catastrophic (Guo, 2016). On the other hand, some scholars argue the necessity of widening the concept to include new and other types of transnational populations without much focusing on traumatic motivations behind the dispersal (e.g., Armstrong, 1976; Sheffer, 1986).

Robin Cohen[5] (1997), for instance, expanded Safran's definition of victim diasporas and included other cases such as labor diasporas (e.g., the Indian and Turkish diasporas to search of work and economic opportunities abroad), trade diasporas (e.g., the Chinese and Lebanese diasporas to open new trade routes and links), imperial diasporas (e.g., the British and French diasporas to serve and maintain the empires), and cultural diasporas (e.g., the Caribbean diaspora to move through a process of chain migration).[6] Thus, the diaspora has been used for "the dispersal throughout the world of a people with the same origin" (Ben-Rafael, 2013: 1) whether there is a catastrophic reason or not behind the dispersal. Therefore, several scholars have begun to define diaspora communities to include "whole ethnic groups living abroad, who have cross-border migration experiences" (Naerssen et al., 2007).

Under these circumstances, diaspora is defined as a group of "people with a common origin, who reside, more or less permanently, outside of the borders of their ethnoreligious

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[4] Safran (1991: 83) defines diaspora under the conditions of (1) dispersal to more than one destination; (2) a collectively shared memory of the homeland; (3) a feeling of partial alienation in the host countries they live in; (4) a commonly held dream about the eventual return to the homeland; (5) a collective commitment to the maintenance and betterment of that homeland; and (6) continuing links with the homeland which gives them a common sense of belonging and shapes their communal identity.

[5] Cohen (1997: 26) expands the criteria of Safran and adds: (1) the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of a trade or to further colonial ambitions, (2) a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement, and (3) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.

[6] These are not distinct categories, and it is possible to be part of more than one category simultaneously. Diasporas also should not be considered as only ethnic, demographic, or ethno-cultural facts. Non-ethnic diasporas are also been existed (i.e., white, liberal, gay, queer, and digital diasporas).

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homeland, whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control"[7] (Shain & Barth, 2003: 452). This standard definition highlights the homeland,[8] whereby people migrate from the home country to others. Much of the literature subsequently considers diasporas as a natural result of migration from one place to another, either voluntarily or compulsorily. It treats them as "happening naturally following the dispersion that forms the identities" (Brubaker, 2005: 10-12).

There is a disagreement between the primordial and constructivist approaches. Several scholars emphasize the primordial[9] and essentialist state-led approaches, whereby diasporas are naturally rooted in the distant homelands (Connor, 1978). Accordingly, such communities are formed as a natural and an automatic result of migration, exile, and dispersion (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007). Diasporas, therefore, are seen as bounded and pre-political entities, whereby they maintain their collective identity and fundamental unity with the homeland. The primordial and essentialist approaches consider diasporas as robust communities under the common (ethnic) origin, kin, and descent of the homeland.

In contrast, diasporas are politically and socially constructed communities (Koinova, 2009; Adamson, 2012). Unlike the primordial and essentialist approaches, the constructivist approach considers diasporic identity not a product of primordial ties or a set of historical, cultural goods, but somewhat politically and socially constructed. The constructivist approach emphasizes political identities. Accordingly, diaspora communities are active socio-political agents in negotiating their identities, and they pick up some of the elements from the past and present (Isajiw, 1999) or create some new ones. In this process, various actors from the homeland and hostland, including the diaspora, construct the diasporic identities. In this dissertation, the constructivist approach has been seen as more adequate to study diasporas.

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[7] Shain and Barth (2003: 452) categorize diaspora members into three main groups: (1) core members, who are the organizing elites, (2) passive members, who are likely to be available for mobilization, and (3) silent members, who are generally uninvolved in diasporic affairs but may mobilize in times of crises.

[8] The triadic model focuses on diaspora mobilization as taking place in the context of the relationship among a so-called home state, host state, and diaspora. The host state refers to the country of settlement or the migration-receiving state. Home state refers to the perceived state of origin, whether real or imagines, and the diaspora is conceived of as either transnational ethnic group or as a political field of competing identity-based stances that stretch across the home and host states (Sheffer, 1986; Brubaker, 2005; Adamson, 2018). In this dissertation, the triadic nexus is considered as an analytic construct rather than necessarily reflect the self-understanding of transnational migrants, whereby the homeland and hostland are existed in reality.

[9] Primordialist argues that ethnic identity is something given, and it is fundamental, fixed, and unchangeable (Isajiw, 1999).

There is a tension between the "boundary-maintenance" and "boundary erosion" of the diasporic identities. On the one hand, some scholars argue that diasporas keep their ties with the homeland and fundamental unity and preserve their collective identity (the boundary maintenance) (i.e., Safran, 1991; Tölölyan, 1996; Cohen, 1997). Accordingly, diasporic identities, place, and space are considered as stable categories.

On the other hand, others claim that diasporic identities are "always in motion and moving in and between multiple locations" (i.e., Gilroy 1993; Brah, 1996; Clifford, 1997; Rapport & Dawson, 1998). Diasporic identities are multiple, interlinked, fluid, and deterritorialized (Bhabha, 1994). Although the homeland orientation continues to be one of the essential factors for diasporas, the feelings of a home can no longer be simplistically distinguished for the analysis, particularly when they have incomplete, unstable, and fluid nature of transnational identities (Al-Ali & Koser, 2002). Such communities rebuild the homeland identities with the hostland's one or create a new one. As a result, diasporic identities are always "in-the-making" (Hall, 1990; Gilroy, 1993; Appadurai, 1996).

Diasporas are distinctive communities with distinctive features. First of all, diasporas are embedded in the interaction between the "past, present, and future" (Hall, 1990) as well as "here and there" (Morley, 2001) or "the elsewhere" (Appadurai, 1996). Secondly, they are active transnational communities (Tölölyan, 1991; Brubaker, 2005; Bauböck & Faist, 2010), and engage in political projects directed towards the homeland, hostland, or co-ethnics (Butler, 2001; Levitt & Schiller, 2004). The framing process of diasporic identities takes place at multiple levels, such as family, neighborhood, city, nations, and transnational connections. Diasporas maintain and sustain their multi-stranded social-political relations as well as moral values in the societies of origin but also in the country of settlement (Basch et al., 1994). As a result, both the roots (the homeland) and the routes (the hostland) provide a diversity of belongings (Clifford, 1997) and loyalties.

Unlike the primordial and essentialist approaches, diaspora communities should not be considered as a natural and an automatic result of mass migration (Sökefeld, 2006; Koinova, 2008). Diasporas are not only transnational immigrant communities, but also they share common ethnic, cultural, and moral values to be socially and politically active in their transnational/trans-local networks and relations. Whereas they maintain significant allegiances and connections to the homeland, the hostland, and the dispersed community

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located elsewhere (Shuval, 2000: 43), diasporas differ from other types of transnational migrant communities.

Adamson and Demetriou (2007: 497) define diaspora as "a social collectivity that exists across state borders and has succeeded over time: (1) to sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland, and (2) to display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collective through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links."

In this dissertation, by the term of the diaspora, I mean those (1) who were either forced to leave or voluntarily left their homeland; (2) became residents in a country of settlement with the longer stay purpose; (3) a group of transnational people who share an internal cohesion - common morality at the minimum level and collectivity under the hybrid diasporic identities; (4) is descendants of the emigrants who remain interested in their heritage to keep their ties with the real or imagined homeland as well as co-ethnics abroad (despite having hybrid and multiple identities) and (5) actively mobilize co-ethnics for their community' needs and interests, to perform their diasporic care, morality and solidarity.

Figure 2 – *What Makes "Diaspora Diaspora"*

Consequently, diaspora is "an ongoing and contested process of subject formation embedded in a set of cultural and social relations that are sustained simultaneously with the homeland [country of origin], place of residence [the hostland] and compatriots/co-ethnics dispersed elsewhere" (Parreñas & Siu, 2007). As mentioned, the idea of a homeland could be complicated, symbolic, multiple, flexible, and dynamic. However, homeland orientation distinguishes diaspora communities from other kinds of transnational social formations. Besides, such communities share similar feelings and moral values under the internal cohesion, and they perform the de-territorial/multi-territorial forms of essentialized belonging and identities. Diasporas, therefore, are not pre-established communities, but they are socially and politically constructed.

Nevertheless, "no single definition of the diaspora can be useful" (Shuval, 2000: 49). The term is highly dependent on the particular circumstances and contexts. Diaspora, therefore, should not be considered as a bounded entity but rather as a category of practice. As Brubaker (2005; 4) argues in his "Diaspora Diaspora," such communities should be de-substantialized by treating them as a "category of practice, claim, and stance" rather than as a bounded definition who they are. I agree with Brubaker that "it is more useful to discuss diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, and practices than a or the diaspora itself" (Brubaker 2005: 13). Thus, I follow Brubaker's argument and consider diaspora as a category of social practice, whereby they "make claims, articulate projects, and mobilize energies."

Since the diaspora is an essentially contested concept, many scholars choose to employ other terms to define such communities such as "immigrants, emigrants, overseas citizens, or expatriates" (e.g., Heisler, 1985; Brand 2006; FitzGerald, 2006; Eckstein & Najam, 2013; Miller & Ritter, 2014). These terms have been overwhelmingly used interchangeably in the literature as well as in the dissertation. Therefore, the term yields analytical, theoretical, and methodological difficulties due to the complex nature of the terminology (Féron & Lefort, 2018).

Besides, several works in the literature attempt to conceptualize diaspora communities under transnationalism or governmentality. Some scholars use the frames of "transnationalism, transnational communities, or transnational politics" (e.g., Faist, 2000; Portes, 2001; Vertovec, 2001, 2004; Bauböck 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Others apply the governmentality to describe practices of those communities (e.g., Brubaker, 1996, 2005;

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Dufoix, 2008; Ragazzi, 2009). Adamson (2018) successfully portrays the importance of three kinds of literature: (1) triadic nexus: the homeland, the hostland, and the diaspora, (2) transnationalism, and (3) governmentality.

Figure 3 – *Theoretical Layers of the Dissertation*

The Triadic Model Precarity	**Transnationalism Trans-Localism**	**Governmentality Biopolitics**
Preconditions	*Processes*	*Outcomes*
(*Moral* and *Virtual*)	(*Category of Practice*)	(*Non-state Actor*)
Online Activities ----------------- Offline Participation		

In this study, I follow three theoretical layers: (1) the triadic nexus, (2) transnationalism/trans-localism, and (3) life as politics. This theoretical distinction helps me to understand the preconditions, processes, and outcomes of diaspora mobilization. Although the process of diaspora mobilization should not be considered as cause and effect, the preconditions of diaspora mobilization (morality) occur within the triadic nexus; the process (solidarity) itself is transnational/trans-local, and outcomes of diaspora mobilization (collective actions) are (re-)produced biopolitics.

In the following part of the chapter, I first examine diaspora communities within the triadic nexus and then explore diaspora mobilization from below. Second, I analyze the diaspora within transnationalism/trans-localism. Finally, I use the concept of life to explore the practices, claims, and stances of diaspora communities.

1.1.1 Homeland-Calling: Diaspora as the Objects of Geopolitics

States' efforts to create, expand, and mobilize extraterritorial populations of emigrant and kin groups (homeland-calling) have been extensively studied in the diaspora literature (e.g., Brand, 2006; FitzGerald, 2009; Varadarajan, 2010; Naujoks, 2013; Ragazzi, 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2016; Adamson, 2018). For instance, Brand (2006) compares the diaspora policies of Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Jordan. FitzGerald (2009) explores the Mexican state's emigration policies. Varadarajan (2010) and Naujoks (2013) analyze the Indian state's diaspora engagement policies. All these works extensively focus on the top-

down approach (kin-states' policies) and demonstrate that homelands are actively engaged with kin groups; therefore, they increasingly set up policies and institutions to reach out to their co-ethnics abroad for their benefits and interests (Hoehne, 2010).

The homeland-calling literature mainly covers two broad areas: (1) security and (2) the development (of the home country), and attempts to answer two fundamental questions: (1) what does the role of homeland play for its kin and related groups? Moreover, (2) how do the homeland policies influence the hostlands via diaspora communities? (e.g., Sheffer, 1986; King & Melvin, 1999-2000; Sorrentino, 2003; Wayland, 2004). The first concern of the literature is to understand the extension of homeland conflicts into transnational space amongst diaspora groups. The literature primarily analyzes how kin-states mobilize diaspora groups to pursue national and security interests (Levitt & de la Dehesa 2003; Ragazzi, 2009). Accordingly, kin-states mobilize diasporas to get maximum economic and political benefits, particularly during and after the crisis in the homeland (Sheffer, 2003). The literature, thus, focuses on the efforts of kin-states to mobilize diaspora communities for maintaining as well as acquiring power resources for the homeland's interests (Uphoff, 2005).

The second concern of the literature, on the other hand, is to explore the relationship between the homeland's political and socio-economic growth and diaspora groups. Several scholars examine the role of diasporas in the socio-economic development of the homeland (e.g., Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Ragazzi, 2009; Mugge, 2013). Since the early 2000s, many states, such as India, China, and Turkey, have revised the development policies with the inclusion of new development actors, including diasporas. For instance, Israel and Armenia consider their diaspora communities as vital political and economic assets. The Philippines and Somalia have begun to recognize the massive financial contributions of diaspora communities through remittances. Consequently, the homelands attempt to control kin and related groups abroad as a political and economic resource for their socio-economic and political interests.

Kin-states might have various reasons to intervene in diaspora mobilization, such as material-economic benefits, foreign policy objectives, political concerns, and moral responsibility. These interventions can be both structural/rational and normative/moral. However, the literature mostly considers the homeland's political-economic context (e.g., Sherman, 1999; Smith, 2003; FitzGerald, 2006) and elite interests and regime type (e.g., Waterbury, 2010). The literature, furthermore, demonstrates that diaspora mobilization occurs when "ideational

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frames and practices used by diaspora entrepreneurs to make claims in support of homeland political processes" (Koinova, 2017). Several scholars, therefore, pay attention to the connection between diaspora political entrepreneurs and policy disturbances in the homelands (e.g., Ramakrishan & Espenshade, 2001; Aleksynska, 2011). As a result, diaspora mobilization has been seen under the "critical developments and changes in the homeland" (e.g., Newland & Patrick 2004; Gamlen, 2006; Demmers, 2007; Saideman et al., 2011; Hess & Kopf, 2014).

The homeland-calling literature describes diaspora communities as "centrifugal minorities" (Caratini, 1986), whereby the kin-state is the center and diaspora is the periphery. Michael Bruneau (2010) uses the analogy of the solar system to explain the relationship between the homeland and diasporas, where the homeland is the sun and the various diaspora communities are part of the constellation of stars around the sun in this solar system. The literature consequently considers diaspora as a "too restrictive concept with extensive attention to the homeland" (Hall, 1994).

Furthermore, the literature examines the diaspora as an "altruistic entity" (Gillespie et al., 1999). Diasporas are defined as "predetermined, static, and neatly delineated communities" (Okyay, 2015). Accordingly, diasporas have no other independent, collective, or individual needs, interests, and identities. When such communities are portrayed as "passive receivers of kin-state policies" (Kastoryano, 2002; Amelina & Faist, 2008; Yurdakul, 2009), they have been seen as a corporate geopolitical object of the homelands. From this perspective, several scholars explain, "when, why, and how kin-states play a central role in defining and delineating diaspora communities" (Brubaker & Kim, 2011).

Under these circumstances, the process of diasporic identity formation in the literature highly relies on a methodological nationalism,[10] whereby the kin-state is the sole unit of analysis (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002; 2003). Apart from these two significant issues in the literature (considering diasporas as altruistic and passive entities, and the methodological nationalism), I consider three additional problems in the homeland-calling literature: (1) the notion of the

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[10] Methodological nationalism considers the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis or as a container for social processes. It displays that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world. There is unjustified supremacy granted to the nation-state with the state-centrism.

homeland for diasporas, (2) the conflictual and negative relationship between the homeland and diasporas and (3) the hostland factor.

Firstly, as Leroi and Mohan (2003: 611) claim, it is not very clear for diasporas where the homeland and the hostland are in reality.[11] Diasporas live in a complex transnational world, and they keep multiple identities and loyalties. They might quickly expand the meaning(s) of the homeland and develop multiple homes (Schulz & Hammer, 2003). Diaspora communities might also have no real and direct experience with the respective homeland, particularly for second and later generations of diaspora communities. New generations have fewer ties with the homeland; therefore, the homeland could only be symbolic. Thus, diaspora members might have no clear and definitive ancestral homeland. The notion of homeland is highly dependent on individuals' subjective perceptions (Pattie, 1999). As Benedict Anderson (1991) conceptualizes the nations as the imagined communities, diasporas should also be considered as "imagined transnational communities" (Sökefeld, 2006). Similar to the nation-states, diasporas are socially and politically constructed - between the imagined we and the imagined other. Different people within the same diaspora groups can perceive the homeland(s) differently. Consequently, the homeland is not existed in a traditional way for diasporas, particularly when it is imagined, symbolic, and multiple.

Secondly, the literature portrays that diaspora communities are mobilized when the country of origin has experienced political and economic crises. While the literature considers diasporas as passive and altruistic entities, it is expected that such communities are not mobilized by themselves. There is a contradictory logic within the argument. The literature shows that diaspora mobilization occurs when there is an economic and political crisis of the homeland, and the homeland should be powerful enough to shape its kin and relative communities abroad. When the kin-states face economic and political crises, homelands might not have the full capacity as well as the power to activate their co-ethnics abroad. The homeland elites might also prefer solving the problem at home. So, who decides what and when the crisis is if diasporas are passive and altruistic?[12] How does the literature explain diaspora mobilization without giving a political agency to them? Although several

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[11] Several scholars use the concept of sending-state. Sending-states are "original homelands that maintain durable linkages with diasporas abroad and incorporate them into policy areas such as health, labor, economy, culture, education, and foreign policy" (Koinova, 2018; Collyer, 2013; Gamlen, 2014).
[12] They might argue that diaspora entrepreneurs or core members of diasporas initiate the diaspora mobilization. However, who are they, and how do they become core members - diaspora entrepreneurs?

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developing countries in Africa, such as Ghana and Somalia, have successfully developed diaspora policy since the 2000s, why does the literature mostly analyze the relatively powerful states such as India, China, Russia, Turkey, and South Korea? Does it mean that these countries mobilize their co-ethnics because of economic and political crises at home, or are they powerful enough to shape the mobilization or any other reasons? The literature fails to answer these questions above.

The literature also displays diaspora mobilization as one way to support the homeland. When diasporas intervene in homeland politics, local communities might perceive certain activities of the diasporas negatively. However, the literature mostly focuses on diaspora mobilization when diasporas are recognized positively in the homeland. The local community can reject diaspora intervention. Kin-states and diaspora communities do not always support each other (Gilroy, 1997; Werbner, 2008), for instance, in the Chinese and Macedonian diasporas (Sorrentino, 2003). Kin-states can also prefer some ethnics within the diaspora groups. Turkey has successfully developed positive and strong relations with its Sunni and ethnic Turks population abroad; however, Alevites and other ethnicities, such as Kurds, Jews, Armenians, and Greeks from Turkey, had been long ignored by the Turkish elites. As a result, there is not always a positive and one-way relationship between the diaspora communities and the respective homeland.

Prasad and Savatic (2018) claim, "if the country of origin is more democratic, it is more likely for diaspora political entrepreneurs to form the diasporic interest groups." The homeland could be democratic, and even diasporas might have direct experience with the homeland; however, if the hostland is not democratic, diasporas cannot organize collectively to take collective action.[13] Only democratic hostlands allow minorities to share a joint commitment with enhanced socio-economic, cultural, and political rights. Although the homeland-calling literature underestimates the importance of the hostland's context, diaspora communities may influence policy-makers only in democratic systems. Therefore, the hostland environment/regime should not be underestimated in the diaspora mobilization.

In sum, the socio-economic and political contexts of the homeland positively affect diaspora mobilization (Nownes & Neeley, 1996; Nownes, 2013). The homelands seek to encourage

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[13] They can mostly take part in radical/violent political actions in non-democratic settings.

their overseas populations to pursue political and economic interests. Diaspora communities, on the other hand, do not always accept kin-state interventions. Diasporas are affected by both domestic and international structures (Wayland, 2004; Adamson, 2005; Koinova, 2009; Bauböck and Faist, 2010). There are multiple actors within and beyond the kin-state to engage in diaspora mobilization, such as hostland's political parties, international organizations, religious institutions, the media, business, NGOs, as well as diaspora communities (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Gamlen, 2006; Adamson & Demetriou, 2007). The literature, however, fails to take into consideration other factors in diaspora mobilization, particularly the hostland's context and the political agency of diasporas. Under these circumstances, the promotion of the homeland does not solely explain why and how the diasporas are interested in collective actions in the transnational networks (Baser, 2014). The geopolitical and ideological stances of the kin-states are not enough to explain diaspora mobilization. For these reasons, I continue to analyze the hostland's environment and then focus on the agency roles of diasporas.

1.1.2 Hostland-Calling: Political and Social Contexts of the Host-State

Although the homeland factor is vital in diaspora mobilization, it should not always be taken for granted. We cannot understand transnational diaspora networks and relations by only looking at the homeland's interests and activities. Several scholars have thus begun to discuss how the hostland context(s) may facilitate diaspora mobilization (e.g., Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Koinova, 2011; Adamson, 2013; Brkanic, 2016). Recently, there has been a tendency in the diaspora literature to pay more attention to the political and social environments of the hostlands. Several studies have already shown that diaspora communities are mobilized in a variety of place and space beyond the homeland, such as cities, online platforms, and supranational organizations (e.g., Brinkerhoff, 2009; Adamson, 2016; Brkanic, 2016; Gabiam and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016; Kok and Rogers, 2016; Van Hear and Cohen, 2017; Koinova and Karabegovic, 2017; Koinova, 2018). For instance, Adamson and Koinova (2013) illustrate how London, as a global city, provides a specific space for diaspora mobilization. Horst (2018) argues that civic participation of diasporas is increasingly multi-sited and engaged in, between, and across specific transnational locations. Brinkerhoff (2009) claims that diaspora mobilization depends on the interests and obligations rooted not only in the homeland but also in the hostland. All these works successfully demonstrate that diaspora mobilization occurs beyond the homeland.

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While the literature emphasizes the political incorporation and the integration of diaspora communities in the hostlands, several scholars analyze socio-economic and political factors of the diasporas in the hostlands such as the citizenship status (Karpathakis, 1999; Bueker, 2005), electoral participation, and voting (Barreto and Munoz, 2003; Bueker, 2005), community-level activism (Tillie, 2004), and specific political orientations (Garcia, 1987). However, the hostland factor is still poorly understood by/in the literature (Koinova, 2018; Koinova & Karabegovic, 2016).

This dissertation demonstrates how the host country's contexts, including actions and policies, encourage or discourage diaspora mobilization. When the hostlands' policies offer relatively good redistributive public and welfare policies with a high level of political and social participation, diasporas will be less dependent on the homeland's sources. Although Varadarajan (2010) successfully portrays that diasporas are the product of the economic transformation of neoliberal restructuring, she only considers how homeland economics shapes national identity and loyalty. The hostlands, on the other hand, also shape diasporic identity formation and produce both positive and negative loyalties through economic, cultural, and social policies. The hostlands institutionalize their relationship with the populations, including diaspora communities. Consequently, such communities "always experience a process of acculturation and belonging to their host societies" (Parreñas & Siu, 2007: 4).

Some diaspora members more attach "the sense of belonging to their country of settlement by seeing their futures increasingly tied to the host country rather than their country of origin" (Kadhum, 2015). Like the homeland, the hostlands also provide incentives and opportunities as well as obstacles for diaspora communities (Perlmann, 2002). When the hostland governments follow inclusion, diversity, and multiculturalism, they establish the loyalties with their minority communities. When they follow exclusionist and assimilation policies, they produce more negative loyalties. Diasporas, therefore, could have different attitudes and loyalties towards the ancestor's homeland as well as the country of residence. However, the literature fails to "understand and explore diaspora mobilization as a way of asserting belonging to an adopted country" (Kadhum, 2015).

The literature also assumes that host countries do not interfere in kin-state interventions when the homelands undoubtedly attempt to manipulate their diasporas as geopolitical objects. On

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the contrary, I argue that hostlands are not passive actors, and they take all necessities to stop foreign influences in their territories, even if there are some clashes with democracy, tolerance, and openness. Ethnic minorities are seen as a destabilizing factor that could betray the titular majority; this potential disloyalty is known as the "fifth column" in the literature (Brubaker, 1996). Diasporas can be viewed as inspiring dual loyalties (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). For example, Russian compatriots in the former Soviet periphery in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Central Asia have been long considered as potential as well as an actual threat to peaceful relations between the new Russia and its neighbors (Kolstø, 2001). Host states can easily demonize certain diasporic groups in their territories if they see diasporas as potentially harmful to their independence and sovereignty and claim that they are employed by the homelands to promote the political agenda and national interests of the kin-state.

The hostland governments subsequently design several policies to lead to the de-diasporization of transnational communities. For instance, some countries do not allow dual citizenship or at least restrict it under certain conditions to eliminate the political link between migrant groups and the homelands. Some ban bilingual education for minorities and do not support the education in the mother tongue. Some control foreign donations and institutionalize their relations with the minority populations by establishing control mechanisms. The hostlands are not passive observers to watching the diasporization of the kin-states in their territories and sovereignty. Instead, they are active actors with full of power and capacity for the de-diasporization of the transnational communities by producing both positive and negative loyalties.

In sum, as Doreen Massey (2004) demonstrates, the identities of diasporas reflect particular experiences of place and time that influence the narratives of belonging and tendency to engage in collective actions. The literature fails to understand social and political interactions as well as cultural and moral structures of diasporas within the transnational/trans-local contexts. The persistence of diaspora communities depends on the political, economic, and social contexts, policies, and actions of the hostland. Thus, the hostland's environment helps or hinders diaspora mobilization.

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1.1.3 Diaspora-Calling: Diaspora as Actors of Everyday Life Politics

The literature often describes diasporas as passive and altruistic entities, whereby homeland politics generate them. Diasporas, however, are not given and pre-existing social actors. Instead, they are active political and social actors to mobilize for their needs, interests, and identities. Diasporas may act on their own, with or without seeking the active support of the homeland, to protect their needs, interests, and identities. Thus, the homeland should not be considered the only factor, and diaspora politics should go beyond the geopolitical, rational, and ideological narratives of the kin-state.

Diaspora communities demonstrate the transnational agency for their needs, interests, and identities. Unlike the primordial/essentialist approach in the literature, such communities are active participants of identity formation and processes. Diasporas are in more than one place, and locality (Schiller et al., 1995; Castells, 1996), and they have a hybrid, fluid, deterritorialized/multi-territorialized, always in motion, and displaced identities (Gilroy, 1993; Hall, 1994; Appadurai, 1996).

Diasporas participate in various transnational/trans-local activities, such as voting (Tillie, 1998), involvement in civil society organizations (Morales & Pilati, 2011), and other types of collective actions (Koopmans et al., 2005). The political participation[14] of diaspora communities includes a broad range of activities (i.e., voting, demonstrating and protesting, boycotting, signing the petition, attending party rallies, contacting political elites and institutions). Diasporas aim to develop and express their opinions and take part in the process and shape the decisions that affect their day-to-day lives. Such communities have an enormous input on the influence of the political, economic, social, and cultural processes of the homeland and hostland.

First of all, diaspora communities play a significant role in the political, social, and economic sectors of the countries of origin (Van Hear, 1998; Portes, 2001; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002; Wahlbeck, 2002; Sheffer, 2003; Levy and Weingrod, 2005; Braziel, 2008; Dufoix, 2008; Pirkkalainen & Abdile, 2009; Van Naerssen et al., 2011; De Haas, 2012). They are often linked in the democratization (Shain 1999/2000; Koinova 2009), economic growth

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[14] Political participation simply means that individuals are participating in the political process by making their opinions and beliefs know and attempt to influence the outcome of a political issue or issues.

(Smart & Hsu, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2008; Escriba-Folch et al., 2015), capital flows (Leblang, 2017), and foreign policy (Huntington 1997; King & Melvin 1999/2000; Smith 2000; Saidemann 2001; Haegel & Peretz 2005; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007) of the homelands. They are subsequently considered as "development and peace-building actors" (De Haas, 2012), whereby diasporas are actively involved in the socio-economic and political development, peace-building, humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction, and human rights promotion of the homelands.

Diaspora communities could make significant contributions to the development of the homelands through transnational activities such as transferring remittances, return migration, and direct investment. On the one hand, they are peace promoters by feeling a strong sense of attachment to support the homeland (Glick-Schiller, 2004; Cochrane et al., 2009). For instance, Jewish, Armenians, Irish, Chinese diasporas have played active roles in homelands' conflicts. On the other hand, diasporas are peace wreckers by prolonging the conflict in the hostland (Skrbis, 1999; Shain, 2002; Lyons, 2004).[15] Such communities could have both positive conflict-mitigating and negative conflict-escalating roles in the conflict resolution and peace-building of the homeland.

Secondly, diaspora communities have direct impacts and influences in the hostlands. Such communities do not act only transnationally between the home state and host state to increase the bilateral relations and to lobby the host country governments for the homeland's interests (Shain & Barth 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Adamson 2012). They also act trans-locally in the country of residence. Diasporas encourage forming and shaping public opinion, expressing everyday life problems of their co-ethnics, fighting against poverty, racism, and (institutional) discrimination, and demanding social justice in the hostlands. Diaspora communities are mobilized to take collective actions, mainly when there are political, economic, social, and cultural conflicts in the hostlands. Diasporas cannot be neutral, passive, and apolitical when facing political challenges and socio-economic difficulties in the hostlands. Diaspora activism subsequently emerges.[16]

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[15] There is no dichotomy between the conflict-prone agency and conflict-generated role of diasporas (Koinova, 2018). Smith and Stares (2007) brought empirical pieces of evidence that diasporas can be both peace wreckers and peace promoters at the same time.

[16] Activism is an effort to promote, direct, or intervene in the system to make changes in society. It uses active and coercive initiatives to create awareness about issues. Therefore, it is a practice of participation to achieve political and other goals and bring about political and social changes.

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There has been recently an increase in far-right movements, nationalism, and protectionism all around the world. All types of minorities, including diasporas, face nationalist, extremist, and populist challenges. Due to the political and economic atmosphere of the hostland, diasporas (re-) consider their identities and a sense of [political] belonging. As a result, diasporas are mobilized for collective actions not only because of the homeland's interests but also to act/react towards those [negative] developments in the country of residence.

The social movement literature illustrates that low trust among immigrant communities leads to resentment toward the hostland and provokes collective mobilization for the (social) change in the host country (Snow & Oliver 1995; Gecas 2000). Martin Sökefeld (2006) analyzes diaspora mobilization within the social movement paradigm, whereby he draws on the classic typology of comparative perspectives on social movements. Sökefeld firstly focuses on the opportunity structures (consistency), where the political environment of the host society provides incentives for diasporas to engage in collective action. Secondly, he analyzes the mobilizing structures (collective action) and the vehicles of mobilization. The author argues that the formation of diasporic identity develops out of social mobilization in response to specific critical events in the hostland. There are specific political, social, and economic circumstances – especially negative ones, which helps mobilization. I follow Sökefeld's argument of the social mobilization approach and call this process as "diaspora mobilization from below" (bottom-up) in the dissertation. Like Sökefeld, I focus on the shared understanding of a social movement (framing process) by analyzing rendering events, policies, and conditions of diaspora mobilization in the country of residence.

Diasporas are not homogeneous ethnic lobbying groups to protect the kin-states (Bauböck, 2005; Délano, 2014; Koinova, 2017). Such communities are internally heterogeneous, and some members have different interests (Smith & Stares, 2007). There are various individuals within the same diasporic community with different agendas with diverse interests (Kleist 2008: 130). Individuals of the same diasporic community respond to the same issue differently. Diasporas, thus, do not maintain a single position vis-à-vis the homeland (Galipo, 2011). As several scholars claim, diasporas might reflect different visions rather than the homeland (e.g., Zunzer, 2004; Sökefeld, 2006; Horst, 2018). Therefore, diasporas should not be considered as homogeneous communities whereby they always support and protect the homeland's interests.

Furthermore, not all diasporas can easily be motivated in meaningful ways (Koinova, 2018). Diasporas might have socio-cultural and political connections as well as moral and emotional feelings to the homeland and co-ethnics. However, the attachment to the homeland does not mean that they always translate the emotional connections and strong feelings into direct actions (Mavroudi, 2018). Such communities are not mobilized in/through the same way with the same claims (Monforte & Morales, 2018). There are varieties of diaspora mobilization in various countries (Koopmans & Statham, 1999). For these reasons, it is essential to understand "when and under which conditions diaspora mobilization works and leads to collective activism." This will also address one of the main questions in the literature: "why certain diaspora discourses arise among a particular group of people and not all members take on the issue at the same level" (Sökefeld, 2006).

As a result, several scholars attempt to answer the questions above. For instance, Baser (2014: 360) argues that "interest-based politics and rational anticipation could explain why certain groups transform into collectively organized and politically active networks." Wald (2008), on the other hand, claims that diaspora mobilization leads to diaspora activism because diasporas are politicized entities both at the individual and collective levels to take action. I follow both of these authors and consider that diasporas are both interest-based and politicized communities.

Nevertheless, I do not ignore the importance of top-down kin-state activism in diaspora mobilization. The strength of diaspora communities also depends on the power of the homeland. Some homelands could better facilitate and actively support diaspora communities. However, I claim that there are other factors in diaspora mobilization, such as the hostland context and the political agency of diasporas. In sum, diasporas are identity and interest-based politicized entities to act their own, and they protect their needs, interests, and identities both in the country of origin and residence. In the following part of the chapter, I explore diaspora mobilization from below (the actor-centered bottom-up perspective) in detail.

1.1.3.1 Diaspora as Moral Communities: Norms and Values in Public Space

Although diasporas are heterogeneous communities and their identities are fluid, they have internal cohesion and share at the minimum level "common sets of cultural knowledge,

including interpretations of history, concepts of identity, value systems, moral imperatives, or rules for everyday behavior" (Kokot & Giordano, 2013). Therefore, diasporas demonstrate a feeling of moral co-responsibility to be politically and socially active within/among/for their co-ethnics.[17] In this dissertation, I consider diasporas as moral communities, whereby they act for their moral co-responsibility (Malkki, 1992; Werbner, 2002; Kleist, 2008).

When diasporas wish to maintain their unity and ties, they might confront and recreate a sense of self, especially if the homeland identity is of little meaning or less relevant to the host society. Diaspora communities produce as well as reproduce common moral standards, not only for themselves but also for their co-ethnics (Werbner, 2010). These moral values could be along with the homelands' ones, or they can construct the new ones in the country of residence.

Several institutions, such as families, clans, hometown associations, and religious organizations, form a public space to construct diasporic consciousness (Werbner, 2004; Mohan, 2006). The public space[18] creates social ties and interactions, whereby diasporas generate trust, emotions, belonging, and loyalties. Diasporic space creates communal, cultural, ethnic, and socio-political connections as well as emotions, belongings, and loyalties amongst diasporas (Adepoju, 2000). As Brah (1996) argues, diasporic space set the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging and otherness between them and us. The diasporic space creates adjacent areas of shared moral values whereby individuals actively engage with their co-ethnics abroad, who have similar moral norms and values. While several formal and informal associations (media and cultural societies) compose the diasporic civil society (Tölölyan, 2000), diasporas maintain an active interest and linkage within their diasporic spaces.

Diasporic space subsequently helps to integrate transnational migrants (Adepoju, 2000), whereby it forms diasporic communication, consciousness, and identities. Through the diasporic spaces, diaspora communities fulfill the moral obligations that are not legally defined but operate as a part of the moral norms. For this reason, diasporic space is a

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[17] The aim of this dissertation is not to explain what diasporic morality is. However, morality should not be considered as granted; rather, it is socially constructed. The dissertation primarily follows the argument of Werbner (2002) and Kleist (2008) and examines the diaspora as a moral community based on co-responsibility with the essential material, organizational, and institutional aspects.

[18] The public space occurs when "the discussion among people are formed, and issues are made more topical and on shape" (Habermas, 1989: 4).

"dynamic understanding of diaspora members where different power positions, discourses, and actors' dwell on the same ground" (Brah, 1996; Naldemirci, 2013). While diasporic space sets the limits and possibilities of belonging with the evoking of inclusion and exclusion (Naldemirci, 2013), it continually deliberates "different power positions, cultural, emotional, and ethical scripts, norms, values, and practices" (Naldemirci, 2013).

Under these circumstances, I follow Werbner's (2010) argument and refer to the diaspora as a moral community whereby individuals produce and reproduce moral values and norms as well as obligations in their transnational/trans-local diasporic spaces. Thus, the ethical dimension(s) of the diasporas should be examined to understand the political and mobilizing power of such communities.

1.1.3.2 Diaspora as Digital Communities: Online Activities in Virtual Space

When diasporas foster moral values and obligations, online communication becomes an essential tool to maintain contacts and exchange information for/among members (Crush et al., 2013). Although Mohan (2006) does not include digital platforms as a diasporic institution to create a public space, the Internet has recently become a primary space that fulfills the diasporic emotional, social, and political needs and communication. In the age of globalization, digital technology turns into an essential resource for everyday communication, but also an alternative way to traditional social and political participation. Even though diaspora communities may operate on a tactile level on the web and social media platforms (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) to show their feelings, anger, fears, emotions, and personal opinions (Trandafoiu, 2013: 132), they may also (re-)invent the diasporic consciousness at the online platforms by (re-)producing the collective migratory expertise (Laguerre 2006: 114), the memory of the past (the homeland), and everyday life experiences at present and the future.

In the literature, several scholars have already examined the influences and impacts of the Internet in the formation of diasporic identities (e.g., Ackah & Newman, 2003; Parham, 2004; Bernal, 2006; Georgiou, 2006; Kissau & Hunger, 2008; Mano & Willems, 2010; Peel, 2010). The literature shows that the Internet becomes an essential resource for the self-awareness and awareness of others (Nedelcu, 2012). It helps to understand (1) what it means to be a diaspora, and (2) which canons of diasporic identities performance are adequate and

acceptable for co-ethnics (both in the homeland and the hostland). Recently, diaspora social media groups have been rapidly increased in number and size (Crush et al., 2013), whereby they link the homeland, the hostland, and co-ethnics. With the increase in web and social media usage, ordinary diaspora members began to use online platforms to create, expand, and mobilize the diasporic sense of collective morality, solidarity, and identities.

In the 21st century, the spatial determination of identity has been disappearing day by day. As Anderson (1992; 1998) illustrates in his long-distance nationalism, there is a multitude of communication flows between the homelands and transnational communities. Brinkerhoff (2009), furthermore, exposes the impact of digital diasporas in international affairs and analyzes the role of diasporic websites in fostering democracy, security, and conflict resolution of the homeland. Diasporas began to use the Internet to shape homeland politics through long-distance nationalism, emotional reflections, as well as criticism (Bernal, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2009).

While the Internet provides one of the primary sources of information about the homeland (Trandafoiu, 2013: 4), it also describes the everyday life of diaspora communities in the country of residence. Due to technological developments, diasporas can easily be in two or more physical localities, and they reflect the political and social realities of both the homeland and hostland. As Trandafoiu (2013) argues, diasporas continuously reflect on the social and political realities in both home and host countries. For these reasons, it is essential to understand the digital hyperlinks among diasporic websites and their connections on social media platforms and web pages.

The dominant approaches in International Relations (IR) are still state-centric and represent that "territoriality provides the only organizational basis for mobilization and formation of political identities" (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007: 492). In contrast, the formation of deterritorialized/multi-territorialized identities has been mostly under-addressed in the IR literature. Although several IR scholars examine the relationship between the state and non-state actors, norm diffusion, and soft power of transnational networks and actors (e.g., Peterson, 1992; Sikkink, 1993; Wapner, 1995; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Boli & Thomas, 1999; Brysk, 2000; Mendelson & Glenn, 2002), there is still a lack of theorization of transnational deterritorialized/multi-territorialized identities as well as the

networks and relations. Diasporas, as non-state actors, are spatially diffuse communities, and they challenge state centrism.

The existing IR literature extensively evaluates diaspora mobilization under the elite-driven processes of the homelands. IR scholars such as Van Evera (1994) and Snyder (2000) believe that the nation-state and political elites manipulate the diaspora communities. With the increase of the use of the Internet, especially social media, ordinary transnational migrants become active political agents of everyday politics.[19]

In this dissertation, I seek to challenge the state-centric and elite-driven approaches of diaspora mobilization. I consider diasporas as constructed socio-political actors. Diaspora communities resonate with the diasporic consciousness on the Internet through different e-activities such as e-lobbying, online petitioning, demonstrating, and negotiating. They deploy a political and moral language for their needs, interests, and identities. They successfully highlight the problems of social injustice in the hostlands. Diasporas, therefore, constitute as political subjects/actors, not an object of the kin-states. As a result, diaspora mobilization from below challenges the methodological nationalism and the state-centric nature of the IR.

In sum, the Internet is transnational and plays a vital role in facilitating different resources of diaspora mobilization. Diaspora, as a digital community, constructs diasporic consciousness, solidarity, and belonging on/through the digital platforms. Thus, the Internet helps diasporas to maximize the advantages of being a virtual community (Kwok, 1999; Chan, 2005). Through the Internet, diasporas become aware of themselves as well as others (co-ethnics) whereby the digital space is not limited by place and time. I thus consider digital connections as one of the primary platforms for transnational communities to turn their diasporic consciousness into an identity practice, whereby online activities interact with offline participation.

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[19] King (2002) argues, in the absence of clear political aims among diasporic social media users, only standard and banal interests attempt to bind such communities, and those interests will not automatically bring the diaspora mobilization.

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1.1.3.3 Diasporic Solidarity: Offline Participation in Physical Space

Several works in the literature have already begun to identify online activity as central to offline political events[20] (i.e., Kissau, 2012). For instance, Laguerre (2006) describes the relationship among Haitian migrants and their home society, and he claims that the online participation and the offline activities of diaspora groups are mutually enforcing at the global and local levels. Ekwo (2011) also analyzes the relationship between the Internet and democracy. He argues that digital platforms provide a public space for diasporas to criticize the homeland, whereby they generate international supports for a regime change.[21] These works focus on the relationship between the homeland and diaspora communities under the methodological nationalism that continues to give excessive attention to the homeland.

As mentioned, diasporas are also mobilized for their co-ethnics and show diasporic care and solidarity. Solidarity, thus, "remains a central dimension of cultural, institutional, and interactional life of collective actions" (Alexander, 2014: 304). Numerous scholars analyze the concept of solidarity by defining its substantial meaning and practical implementations from a variety of disciplines such as political theory and philosophy (Bayertz, 1998; Scholz, 2008; Sangiovanni, 2013; Wilde, 2013; De Witte, 2015; Grimmel and Mi Giang, 2017), political science (Stjernø, 2004), sociology (Reynolds, 2014; Alexander, 2014), legal studies (Wolfrum & Kojima, 2010; Biondi et al., 2018), science and technology (Liboiron, 2016), and migration studies (Augustin & Jorgensen, 2018; Della Porta, 2018). Although these works have provided many insights on the concept, they left many questions unexamined such as the sources and preconditions (Kymlikca, 2015).

While solidarity is defined as "the ability of actors to recognize others and to be recognized as belonging to the same unit" (Melucci, 1996: 23), it becomes a critical component in the development of collective identities (Fireman & Gamson, 1979; Hunt & Benford, 2004). There is a close linkage between solidarity and belonging. Diaspora communities express their solidarity and support their co-ethnics both in online and offline platforms. Diasporic

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[20] Offline activities can be summarized under the political and civic engagement of diasporas, such as philanthropic activities, gain and spread the information, protest and demonstrate, and lobbying. While some of these activities target the homeland, the others are for the hostland, diasporic communities, or both.

[21] Although little is known about the causality between the cause (mobilization of diaspora groups on the Internet) and the effect (changes of non-democratic governments in the homelands), the author claims, there is a strong interconnectedness between the online participation and offline political activity of diaspora communities.

solidarity, which is mostly based on the shared cultural and moral codes, turns into a significant resource for collective actions. Diaspora communities form networks and relations to serve an alternative assistance system dealing with the most pressing needs and interests. The networking of solidarity, therefore, enables diaspora communities to cope better with their day-to-day problems. However, solidarity does not necessarily exist before the migration act. As a result, the collective experiences of being a diaspora quickly form an identity circle.

Diasporic solidarity operates through nested scales of loyalty to the homeland and kin-community, but also the hostland (Van Hear & Cohen, 2017). As communities that care, diasporas are actively engaged in collective movements to develop solidarity with the homeland and the hostland as well as with their co-ethnics (Flores & Malik, 2015). Diaspora members are concerned about their community needs, especially when their co-ethnics are insecure and vulnerable situations. Diasporas have a sense of moral co-responsibility to mobilize politically, socially, and economically to support their co-ethnics, and they take collective action to establish social justice.

Under the notion of solidarity, diasporic identities turn into a practice of collective togetherness. Diasporas (re-)construct as well as transform online platforms to mobilize their actions, specifically in a situation of precarity, to fulfill the moral responsibility and obligations. As Bonanich (1973) argues, solidarity mostly emerges when there are some threats and insecurity. The collective togetherness of diasporas is strategically forged to act for specific and elusive ideas. For this reason, "diaspora and solidarity movements are interwoven as they interact and influence each other in the course of political contention" (Quinsaat, 2016).

In sum, diasporas are "motivated by solidarity, not merely included by law" (Calhoun, 2002: 153). The primary source behind the solidarity is diasporic care and morality. It is essential to examine the preconditions, sources, and outcomes of diasporic solidarity. Neither the diaspora literature nor other kinds, such as welfare and multiculturalism, have attempted to conceptualize the diasporic solidarity with its preconditions and outcomes. In this dissertation, I aim to show the diaspora mobilization with its preconditions and outcomes. Accordingly, the fundamental precondition of diasporic solidarity is the morality of co-responsibility, and the significant consequence is various types of collective actions.

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1.2 From Identity to Actions: Diaspora Mobilization "from Below"

In the literature, diaspora mobilization is mostly described as "political and economic participation," such as "voting abroad, sending remittances, and promoting homeland politics and interests" (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Nell 2008). Diaspora communities vote in elections − sometimes with extraterritorial voting rights, they make an ethnic lobby in foreign policy, and they act as a development actor through financial flows of remittances, investment, and trade. Several scholars have already focused on conditions, causal mechanisms, and processes of diaspora mobilization (e.g., Mavroudi, 2008; Orjuela, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Koinova, 2009; Lyons and Mandaville, 2010; Carling et al., 2012; Adamson, 2013; Horst, 2013; Karabegovic, 2014; Cochrane, 2015; Abramson, 2017). They highlight that political entrepreneurs[22] initiate the diaspora mobilization (i.e., Olson, 1965; Quinsaat, 2016). Accordingly, diaspora entrepreneurs engage in strategic identity construction, activate and unite disparate transnational networks, and deploy resources to make claims. However, the literature is unable to answer "how transnational members of dispersed migrants become political entrepreneurs to initiate the solidarity-based collective actions." Consequently, there is still a need to understand better "what triggers an interest in diaspora mobilization" (Baser, 2014: 360).

Diaspora communities establish as well as strengthen transnational networks and relations for their own needs and interests. Therefore, they are involved in "other" socio-political activities:

1. to gain and spread information about the homeland, the hostland and kin community;
2. to perform hybrid transnational identities;
3. to show diasporic care and solidarity, mainly when they or their co-ethnics are in-need and face precarious living conditions in the hostland;
4. to involve with philanthropic activities;
5. to establish civil society organizations, and
6. to collaborate (i.e., protesting policies and institutions to bring about socio-political change both in the homeland and the hostland).

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[22] The word entrepreneurs have been applied in its generic sense to define individuals who exhibit qualities of political action orientation and opportunity recognition (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Koinova, 2014; Syrett & Keles, 2019).

The political and civic engagements of other activities are profoundly shaped by the notion of the family or kinship networks. Thus, the nexus between family dynamics and kinship ties becomes one of the primary sources of bottom-up diaspora mobilization. In this context, diasporic care and solidarity sustain and maintain kinship ties among such transnational communities. Diasporas feel the moral responsibility to act together and show their collective unity. At the same time, they attempt to preserve their traditional family values and structure in the country of residence. Subsequently, the notion of the family turns into one of the significant sources of diaspora mobilization from below.

For these reasons, diaspora communities undertake several online and offline activities to mobilize co-ethnics and establish solidarity-based collective actions.[23] Some of these activities include protesting policies and institutions, participating in demonstrations, establishing civil society organizations, forming public opinion, raising awareness through social campaigns, contacting with state authorities (both in the homeland and the hostland), lobbying – particularly pushing the homeland to be part of the issue, signing petitions, and engaging in philanthropic activities. Diasporas thus take a more active role in the socio-political life of their countries of origin as well as the countries of residence, and they participate in both conventional (i.e., voting, being involved in a political party, contacting politicians) and unconventional (i.e., protesting or participating in marches) forms of socio-political participation.

As a result, diaspora activism has emerged as a distinct type of participation.[24] Diaspora communities engage in mobilized activism online and offline for their own needs, interests, and identities. Diaspora mobilization, therefore, designates the pursuit of claims and practices through different online and offline activities and a variety of means, ranging from moderate to more radical politics (Koinova, 2017). There are various components of the diaspora mobilization that includes the features of the homeland (sending state), the hostland (receiving state), and the diaspora itself. It should be noted that diaspora mobilization is a dynamic process whereby several actors, including the diaspora itself, deploy resources, frame issues, and make claims on their needs, interests, and identities.

[23] Shared diasporic morality on the "correct way of life" allows the establishment of diasporic solidarity for collective actions. Diasporic morality and solidarity, therefore, play a crucial role in diaspora mobilization.
[24] Participation refers to all forms of involvement in which individuals express their opinion and convey that opinion to decision-makers (Vissers & Stolle, 2014).

Diaspora communities are non-state actors, and they establish the transnational networks for policy changes both in the homeland and the hostland. They influence both the homeland and the hostland,[25] whereby they connect local issues with transnational ones within the triadic nexus. Diaspora communities actively mobilize on the "threshold events" that negatively affect their day-to-day life. They collectively organize demonstrations for civil resistance (or obedience) when their everyday life becomes precarious and demand for policy changes. Thus, the formation of diasporic identity develops out of social mobilization in response to specific critical events in the hostland.

In this dissertation, I argue that bottom-up diaspora mobilization is a self-organized and grassroots social movement (with or without the active support of the homeland), whereby ordinary transnational migrants have opportunities to form various socio-political activities for their needs, interests, and identities in everyday life. More importantly, such communities become diaspora entrepreneurs, and they perform hybrid-transnational identities and act as a "diaspora."

Diaspora mobilization is a highly political process. Diaspora communities find resources and strategies to participate in transnational/trans-local activities and encourage co-ethnics to be part of the collective actions. Whereas diaspora communities undertake socio-political actions to accomplish their aims, they turn into active participants in public and political life and become political entrepreneurs. Consequently, diaspora mobilization should be considered as a study of "how and to what extend dispersed transnational diaspora members mobilize co-ethnics to take collective actions and influence the political decision-makers both in the homeland and the hostland."

1.3 Transnational and Trans-Local Diasporic Life Space in Triadic Nexus

The transnational and trans-local perspectives[26] of the everyday lives and experiences of migrant communities have been studied by various scholars from a wide range of disciplines.

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[25] In the political activities of migrants, there is an aim to change the policies or actions affecting their lives in the host country (Simon & Ruhs, 2009; Klandermans et al., 2008).

[26] Although there are several studies, which often use transnationalism and trans-locality as synonyms, trans-locality is a more general term to define particularly spatial connectedness (Grillo & Riccio, 2004; Freitag & von Oppen, 2010; Hedberg & Do Carmo, 2012). Several scholars assert the importance of local-local connections during transnational migration (e.g., Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Mandaville, 1999; Smith, 2001; Velayutham and Wise, 2005; Conradson and McKay, 2007), and they use trans-locality as "being identified

Several scholars adopt transnationalism as an analytical framework to better understand the multi-territorial and socio-spatial interconnectedness (e.g., Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Basch et al., 1994; Cohen, 1997; Levitt, 2001). The early works of transnationalism primarily focus on the role of agency and pay attention to the social spaces, networks, and identities of emigrants. Recent studies examine the practices of agents, not states and nations, but individual actors and associations (Portes et al., 1999; Vertovec, 2001; Faist, 2000). The transnational/trans-local ties of migrants establish interconnectedness in multiple places and locations, but also networks and relations. In this context, the literature began to consider diasporas as transnational communities whereby they capture the numerous attachments and cross-border networks and connections between the country of origin and the country of residence or *the elsewhere*.

Diasporas have hybrid and de-territorialized/multi-territorialized identities, and they live in multiple places through transnational practices (Portes et al., 1999). Such communities, therefore, establish and maintain their social, political, economic, and cultural networks and relations across borders between "*here and there*" or "*the elsewhere.*" Since diasporas interact in several places and spaces within the (trans-)local and global networks, they (re-)create, (re-)mobilize, and (re-)shape the everyday practices in the transnational/trans-local spaces, networks, and power. Thus, the following part of the chapter examines the diasporic life space under the concepts of transnationalism and trans-locality.

1.3.1 Transnationalism: The Life Space(s) of Habitus, Field, and Capital

Transnationalism refers to the "connections between two or more specific localities where people create and experience in their everyday life practices" (Hoerder, 2013). During the 1970s, the term was first used to denote the importance of global interactions and international connections (Vertovec, 2009).[27] Recently, transnationalism has been used to describe a social process, which establishes social fields across borders. Transnationalism

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with more than one location" (Oakes & Schein, 2006). Brickell and Datta (2011) also used the trans-locality to develop an agency-oriented approach to localities and mobility. As a result, trans-locality takes an agency-oriented approach to transnational migrant experiences, while transnationalism mostly focuses on social networks and economic exchanges.

[27] Steven Vertovec (2009) distinguished four types of transnationalism: (1) as a social morphology, where transnational families maintain social relationships and networks across borders; (2) as a type of consciousness, where transnational consciousness marked by multiple identifications; (3) as an avenue of capital, where migrant communities involved in social and economic remittances; and (4) as a (re)construction of place or locality, where migrants are in transnational social fields and spaces. Diaspora communities perfectly fit these different angles and layers of transnationalism.

subsequently diminishes the significance of national and territorial boundaries in the "production and distribution of objects, ideas, and people" (Glick Schiller et al., 1995).

Diasporas are transnational communities whose "daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders whereby their identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state" (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Basch et al., 1994). Transnationalism engages with almost all aspects of migrants' lives (Levitt and Waters, 2002); therefore, it seems to be everywhere (Vertovec, 2003). However, not all migrants are spontaneously and inclusively involved in transnational practices (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995; Levitt and Waters, 2002).

The literature attempts to understand migrants' everyday lives and answer "when and under which conditions migrant communities establish transnational networks and relations." Courgeau (1972) defines the concept of "life space" to explore and map the network of relations among individuals within various locations, such as family, leisure, and work. Diasporas, as moral and virtual communities, have a network of relations and perform the transnational identities within the diasporic life space. As a result, such communities engage in networks and connections both at the (trans-)local and global levels.

Bourdieu (1984) introduces the trilogy of "habitus, field, and capital" to understand everyday life practices.[28] First, he defines habitus[29] to underline the structures of practices such as acts, which are underpinned by a generative principle (Grenfell, 2008). The habitus helps us to examine the diasporic social world where it reminds diaspora communities who they are and how they might link their history, culture, and identities. On the other hand, the field provides the setting in which agents and the social positions of diasporas are located (Grenfell, 2008).[30] Between the habitus and field, capital[31] plays an important role. While Bourdieu distinguishes four types of capital (economic, social, cultural, and symbolic), particularly social capital helps us to understand the transnational/trans-local networks and relations.

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[28] As Bourdieu (2005: 148) argues, "to understand interactions between people or to explain an event or social phenomenon, it is insufficient to look at what was said, or what happened." Instead, it is essential to examine the social space (field), interactions, transactions, and events.

[29] The habitus is the property of social agents, which are comprised of a "structured and structuring structure" (Bourdieu, 1994: 170). The habitus establishes "a system of dispositions that generate perceptions, appreciations, and practices" (Bourdieu, 1990: 53).

[30] In the process of networks, agents and social position interact with each other.

[31] Bourdieu (1998: 133) argues, the capital is a "social relation, which only exists and only produces its effect in the field in which it is produced and reproduced."

Bourdieu's capital describes the social products of a field where individuals of diasporas carry out their daily interactions.[32]

Figure 4 - *Bourdieu's Trilogy within Diaspora*

The Habitus	Practices of diasporas
The Field	Interaction between/among diasporas
The Capital	Networks and social relations

When diasporas mobilize co-ethnics for collective actions within their social structures, there are close connections between the habitus and the social world. The habitus shapes the social world of diaspora communities, and the external social structures shape the habitus. However, the habitus does not determine the actions of diasporas; rather, it constrains everyday practices. While the habitus describes the practice, the field examines the interaction, and the capital portrays the networks and relations of diaspora communities. Under these circumstances, Bourdieu's trilogy is a valuable tool for understanding the diasporic life space at multiple and transnational locations, networks, and relations. It addresses individuals' situatedness across different localities and networks, and relations, both online and offline.

The literature emphasizes the critical role of the homeland in the making of diasporic identities (e.g., Safran, 1991; Cohen, 2008); therefore, diasporas are often considered as anti-cosmopolitan. There is a juxtaposed interplay in the literature between diaspora and cosmopolitanism. It is believed that trans-migrants keep their distinctive homeland identity to be called as a diaspora and maintain the boundary and social distance with the host-society. Diasporas, therefore, are considered as intrinsically anti-cosmopolitan.[33] Several transnationalism works, on the other hand, successfully show the limitations of this argument. Diasporas have both local and transnational/trans-local networks and relations beyond the homeland (Tsagarousianou, 2004; Georgiou, 2006; Diminescu, 2008), and they are more likely to go beyond the national boundaries by expanding their hybrid identities and transnational cultural belonging in the global, transnational, and trans-local interconnectedness. Instead, diaspora communities should be considered as inherently

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[32] Everyday practices of diasporas have mainly resulted from the relationship between the habitus (one's disposition) and the capital (one's position in a field) within the field (social arena).

[33] The methodological nationalism is heavily designed in these works (e.g., Appadurai, 1996; Brah, 1996; Vertovec, 2009).

cosmopolitan (Georgiou, 2006) since they are more ready to accept openness and engagement with others in the transnational/trans-local social networks and relations.[34]

The dichotomy between diasporas as intrinsically anti-cosmopolitan and diasporas as inherently cosmopolitan become another paradox in the literature (Dharwadker, 2011). As Georgiou (2006) argues, the binaries between the "homeland-oriented versus hostland-oriented" and "nationalist versus cosmopolitanist" are limiting.[35] Even cosmopolitans are rooted somewhere (Appiah, 1997). Diasporas are hybrid communities, and they have multi-dimensional as well as multi/de-territorialized identities. However, they have roots elsewhere, including territorial ones. For this reason, the global and the local connections of diasporas are not mutually exclusive realities (Smith & Guarnizo, 1998; Delanty, 2000; Molina & Rodriguez-Garcia, 2018).

In this regard, *glocality*[36] becomes a useful concept to apply to the social and cultural practices and identities of diaspora communities (Robertson, 1995). The combination of globalization and localism connects transnational diasporic life space. The diasporic life space becomes a global village (McLuhan, 1994), whereby the importance of the geographical borders has been primarily disappeared, even if there is a continuation of protectionism and the border barriers in the world.[37] However, diaspora communities act both locally and globally between here and there or elsewhere in the past, present, and future. The following part of the chapter further examines the diasporic life space within the notion of trans-locality.

1.3.2 Trans-locality: Diaspora from Geographical to the Analytical Concept

There has been an increase of interconnectedness in/between multiple locations, spaces, people, identities, networks, and relations. In the age of globalization, it is inevitable to consider the locality, particularly for the locality of transnational communities. Trans-

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[34] Glick-Schiller and Irving (2015) introduce the concept of diasporic cosmopolitanism to define "the shared practices, outlooks, aspirations and sensibilities that emerge from and link people simultaneously to those similarly displaced and to locally and transnationally emplaced social relationship."
[35] I follow the three theoretical layers: the triadic model, transnationalism, and governmentality, to challenge some of those binary limitations in the literature.
[36] Glocality refers to the reflections or characterization of both local and global considerations.
[37] The current pandemic Covid-19 brings the importance of the nation-states and the state borders.

locality[38] helps us to understand "the practice of people across places and borders," which is created through everyday life practices (Brickell & Datta, 2011). Thus, trans-localism re-conceptualizes the interconnectedness of diaspora communities at the local, national, and global levels, as well as online and offline platforms. The literature, however, considers trans-locality as a geographical sense within the fixed geographical and physical territorial borders, whereby migrants live in more than one location (Tapp et al., 2006). The term itself is not useful to understand the non-psychical interconnectedness of diasporic networks and relations.

In contrast, trans-localism should be considered as an analytical term.[39] There is an agency role of the trans-locality to examine the interconnectedness mobility of networks and relations (Brickell & Datta, 2011). As Courgeau (1985) claims, trans-locality is a community and network relations, and it connects various social actors in more than one reality and spaces (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Castells, 1996). Diasporas are one of those networks where successfully form the collective togetherness under the shared diasporic identities. Unlike geographical distances and political borders, diasporas connect different networks and relations. Therefore, trans-locality is not only de-territorialization of everyday practices whereby migrants live in multiple places but also how such communities constitute their social units at various networks and relations. As a result, trans-localism should not only refer to a distinct geographical location but express the socio-spatial connections of cultural practices and normative systems (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

"Diasporas exist and express themselves sub-nationally, in addition to making new claims on nation-states" (Al-Rustom, 2013: 480). Such communities establish their diasporic life space by creating de-territorialized/multi-territorialized associations, and they significantly combine both local and global attachments, networks, and relations in day-to-day lives. Diasporas are sub-national and transnational actors but also trans-local communities (Tölölyan, 1996). The dissertation uses the concepts of de-territorialization and multi-territorialization when diaspora communities share resources and bridge the various political localities, spaces,

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[38] Although there is no widely accepted universal definition of trans-locality, the term mostly refers to "local to local connections across national boundaries." Peth (2014) defines trans-locality as a "variety of enduring, open, and non-linear processes that produce close interrelations between different places and people." He argues that trans-local relations "illustrate a new character of relations where it connects and influences different localities and people at the same time."

[39] Trans-locality is "multidirectional and overlapping networks, which facilitate the socio-spatial mobility of people, cultural practices, objects, and ideas (Häkkinen & Tawah, 2016).

identities, and power. For this reason, the diaspora challenges state-centric power, identity, and borders (Tölölyan, 1996).

The degree of trans-locality (community network relations) among diaspora members might be different. There is a crucial and frequent element of the community network relation between diasporas and their respective homelands. For instance, diasporas send remittances to their family members and maintain personal contacts with the homeland (Glick Schiller et al., 1995; Olwig, 2003; Guarnizo, 2003; Orozco, 2005; Valenta and Strabac, 2011; Coughlan, 2011). Furthermore, they accomplish the long-distance social ties of solidarity, reciprocity, and moral obligation by the socio-economic activities (Guarnizo, 2003: 670). They are also involved in transnational political activities and emotional attachments to the homeland when there is a necessity of moral obligations (Valenta & Strabac, 2011). All these activities show the linkages of diasporas whereby they meaningfully perform their transnational duties, morality, and solidarity only in their respective homelands, but not among each other or in the hostland.

In sum, diasporas act trans-locally under different circumstances, particularly when there is a need for diasporic care and solidarity for co-ethnics. Such communities operate not only in their transnational networks for the global interconnectedness but also in (trans-)local interconnectedness in the country of residence. Through various diasporic associations and political and socio-cultural events at the different trans-local points, diasporas maintain their networks and spaces, not only with the country of origin but also with the kin community in the hostland. Although trans-locality intensity varies in various contexts and spaces, trans-local activities of the diasporas should be taken into consideration in diaspora mobilization.

1.4 Politics of Everyday Life: Precarity and Biopolitics

The literature substantially covers the kin-states' efforts to mobilize kin groups and the activities of diaspora communities towards their respective homeland. However, there has been increasing in insecure and vulnerable conditions (precarity) in diasporas' livelihoods, whereby such communities are mobilized for collective actions. The literature largely ignores how precarious living conditions become a core element of diaspora mobilization. This part of the chapter first examines the precarity and then demonstrates how biopolitics could be an

alternative approach to understand diaspora mobilization rather than the geopolitics of the kin-states.

1.4.1 Life as an Object of Politics: Precarity

Several scholars criticize neoliberal governance, institutions, and policies, and they use the term of precarity to describe the unfavorable conditions of insecure work and destabilized economic circumstances of laborers in the capitalist systems.[40] Thus, the concept refers to the economic hardships of working conditions such as underemployment, insecure job, low income, and material instability (Bacci et al., 2017). Precarity is a highly complex term and has recently been used in different national, economic, social, and political contexts. It is connected with insecure, volatile, or vulnerable human situations, not only in the workplace but also within the nature of life (Della Porta et al., 2015). Precarity has become a predominant characteristic of social relations nowadays (Kalleberg, 2009); thus, the term should not refer to only the economic hardships of the neoliberal policies. Different political and economic systems, including social democracy, produce precarious conditions. Although welfare policies of social democracy conclude positively for the majority of society, minorities can stay in disadvantaged positions. Some groups, such as non-citizens and refugees, might not benefit from the welfare state distribution and political participation in the country of residence.

The current understanding of precarity as an economic term is insufficient (Banki, 2014) to describe insecurities, uncertainties, and inequalities, especially for transnational migrant communities. Precarity should be extended to include a more extensive set of specific vulnerabilities of political, social, cultural, and environmental risks (Ettinger, 2007; Paret & Gleeson, 2016).

Diaspora communities also face political, social, and cultural vulnerable and insecure conditions such as poverty, deprivation, social exclusion, unsafe housing, violence, abuse, discrimination, ethnic segregation, and (institutional) racism in day-to-day life. Precarization becomes an important term to understand the primary motives behind diaspora mobilization. Precarious living conditions quickly turn into a political struggle. Diasporas seek to establish

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[40] Maurizio Lazzarato, Klaus Dörre, Isabell Lorey, and Guy Standing critically reflect on the impact of capitalism on everyday life, and use the terms of precarity, precariousness, and precarization.

social justice and ask for political and socio-economic changes. Transnational communities, who have multiple identities, may worry about the cultural hybridity under the political discussions of the integration and assimilation. The hybrid diasporic identities between "the past, present, and the future" as well as "here and there or the elsewhere" might produce precarious living conditions. When diasporas try to adopt the host society norms into their identities, they might feel their inner-roots at the same time and face with double-consciousness.[41] Under the forced choice between integration and assimilation, double consciousness can easily lead to isolation, marginalization, and radicalization of diaspora communities. As a result, diasporas might feel insecure and vulnerable due to their loneliness and isolation in the unknown hostlands, and their feelings can (re-)produce the precarious living conditions.

The precarity of diasporas differs according to the emotional, social, cultural, political, legal, and economic conditions diaspora communities. Such communities may quickly deploy the modern notion of victimization in identity formation. Narratives of victimhood and trauma have been long considered as essential elements for diasporic identity. The establishment of diasporic identities and traumatic dispersal are deeply intertwined in the literature, whereby diasporic consciousness is mainly derived from those catastrophic experiences. Diasporic identity posits from the harsh traumatic circumstances of collective memory and experiences.

However, "older notions of diaspora need to be rethought" (Misrahi-Barak & Raynaud, 2014: 12). The classical victimization of diasporas, such as genocide, may not be so relevant for the current diasporas now. Therefore, they easily create new traumatic unities in modern times under the precarious living conditions. Diasporas might transform precarity into a new type of victimhood and traumatic experiences. Subsequently, the precarization of livelihoods can quickly become the soil for collective actions.

Under precarious living conditions, diasporas establish a form of solidarity, whereby they act as a moral community of co-responsibility.[42] There is sensitivity to the needs of others among diaspora members. Casas-Cortes (2019) examines the rise of precarity activism and introduces a new term "*care-tizenship*" in the literature. According to her, "care-tizenship

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[41] W.E.B. Du Bois (1999) describes this situation as "two souls, two thoughts, and two unreconciled strivings" in one human body.
[42] Care is described to "protect us and others from extra-ordinary incursions of violence or other forms of disruption into our daily lives" (Tronto, 2013: 104).

suggests a community of practice forged by ties of a caring relationship, mutually attending to basic needs in a context of increasing vulnerability among local, migrant, and immigrant populations" (Casas-Cortes, 2019: 19). I argue that the care-tizenship helps diasporas to perform their precarious collectivism. As communities that care, diasporas actively perform the care-tizenship when their co-ethnics are insecure and vulnerable. Precarious living conditions allow diasporas to be socially, politically, economically, and culturally more active between/among the homeland, the hostland, and co-ethnics for the policy changes.

The precarization of livelihoods of migrant communities is one of the essential sources of diaspora mobilization. However, neither diaspora nor welfare works of literature explain the precarious conditions in collective actions. I argue that diasporas politicize the insecurity and vulnerability (precarity) of everyday life under the shared diasporic care, morality, and solidarity. The precarity collectivities effectively transform the political imagination of diasporic identities into the actions within the (insecure) hostland's environments, policies, and activities.

1.4.2 Life as a Subject of Politics: Biopolitics

States exercise power and control over their populations (governmentality) – including their non-citizens' residents. Biopolitics,[43] as a technique of power, is used by the states to regulate and manage human bodies. Several scholars, such as Michael Foucault, Thomas Lemke, Giorgio Agamben, Antonio Negri, and Michael Hardt, attempt to describe how biopolitics should be understood. However, they conceptualize biopolitics very differently. Although there are multiple views on the concept, even sometimes competing and conflicting ones, all these works are against the Aristotelian idea that "life and politics are two separate domains." Almost all politics deal with life and the sphere of life; thus, biopolitics seems to be everywhere in human life, particularly when human bodies are produced and reproduced as well as controlled and managed.

Biopolitics initially referred to the "politics about life" or "the living of biological life." It merely denoted a politics that deals with human life when states regulate and control medicine, demographic policies, abortion, and food security. Biopolitics, however, deals with

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[43] Biopower tends to control, reinforce, and optimize life, whereas biopolitics is a technique for optimizing life (Foucault, 1979).

the population and considers the population as a political problem (Foucault, 1976: 245). In this sense, the term is not a new phenomenon and has been existed at the heart of politics (Thomä, 2002: 102).

Recently, biopolitics has become a much more complex to study political behaviors and policies related to "living things within the sphere of life" (Meyer-Emerick, 2007). Indeed, politics to life and life to politics are both bio-political subjects (such as healthcare, abortion, medical technologies, and immigration). Biopolitics, therefore, creates a life collectivity, which separates individuals from their subjective experience.[44] Human bodies are collectively politicized through biopolitical collectivities, and populations become a subject of politics. Biopolitics, furthermore, articulates the normative and moral core to show as well as perform the correct way of life, from birth to death. Since biopolitics shows how life should be articulated collectively, it reflects on the everyday life of ordinary people. Biopolitics subsequently focuses on people whose lives are directly affected and influenced.[45]

Moreover, biopolitics constructs subject-centered identities and creates an actor's role through a variety of institutions. It radically reformulates political sovereignty. When states attempt to standardize "human lives as a precondition for aggregating a population into a single collective body" (Makarychev & Yatsyk, 2017), biopolitics - the practices of inclusion or exclusion, controls the basic rules of belonging and conditions of abandonment in a society (Oliwniak, 2011). As a result, "bio-policies might easily turn into manipulative tools by the state and produce strong ideological impulses" (Makarychev & Yatsky, 2017).

Non-state actors, including diasporas, also produce biopolitical ideological and normative moral discourses. Diaspora communities adjust moral and social-cultural values to arrange their life and collectivities.[46] Under the biopolitical norms, diaspora communities create as well as perform the collective togetherness, and they standardize human lives as a precondition for the aggregation of a population. As a result, biopolitics "constitutes the aggregation of collectivities as a new political form" (Foucault, 2003: 242-243), and it

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[44] Biopolitics helps people to "represent a collective reality that is not dependent on political intervention but is characterized by its dynamics and modes of self-regulation" (Lemke, 2011: 5).

[45] Although biopolitics is political, "it cannot simply be labeled a specific political activity. Rather, it lies in its ability to make a visible difference between politics and life, as well as culture and nature" (Lemke, 2011).

[46] Similarly, "biosociality" (Rabinow, 1996) and "biosocial citizenship" (Rose & Novas, 2005) define human individuals not only biologically, but also socially.

constructs the political, social, and moral behaviors and tendencies (Somit & Peterson, 1999) amongst diaspora communities.

Biopolitics should not be separated from the precarization of life. Precarious living conditions (unstable, insecure, and unsafe human conditions) prompt individuals to be collectively constitutive political and moral actors in the public and political life. In the 21st century, individuals are not what they used to be. Biopolitical collectivism, which is based on morality, binds diaspora members, particularly when co-ethnics face the precarious living conditions in the hostland. Precarity produces biopolitics and the biopolitics re-produces the precarization. In this regard, biopolitics becomes a powerful technique to form and shape the collective consciousness not only for states but also for non-state actors such as diasporas. "Biopolitics contains strong non-governmental elements" (Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015), and it establishes the circles of inclusion and exclusion and the correct way of life.

The literature examines the notion of power within the state authority and territory, whereas the state is the major actor to denote political and social power. Most of the works follow a one-dimensional, state-centered, spatial, top-down traditional Hobbesian approach of power. However, there are two significant problems with the notion of power in the literature: (1) diffusion and (2) spatiality.

Firstly, non-state actors play a significant role in international politics. Diasporas are "an enhanced presence on the world stage today" (Vertovec, 2006: 3), and they are the active agents of power. The power should not be understood as a traditional Hobbesian view from the top (state) to the bottom (population). Instead, power is a network of relations exercised through net-like organizations (Gordon, 1980: 98). Diasporas, as corporate networks, perform the (bio-)power from below both horizontally (among diaspora members) as well as vertically (to the states). Power is not absolute in the hands of the sovereign state. Power, on the contrary, is a social relation. As Lazzarato (2012: 103) argues, "there is no single source of power, but a multitude of forces that act and react amongst each other." Non-state actors such as diasporas are active sources of power to balance the state, whereby they could act, react, and resist.

Diaspora communities are "stateless power" (Tölölyan, 1991; 2001). In the Foucauldian sense, they have both productive and prohibitive power (Al-Rustom, 2013). They exercise

power by extending social services as well as (re-)producing the meaning of diasporic identities through discursive means (Tölölyan, 2001: 27). Biopolitics helps us recognize diasporas as non-state actors. Diasporas are not passive and powerless (Lemke, 2011). They have the full capacity to form diasporic identities and powerfully act for their needs and interests. The literature "should not neglect the power exercised by diasporas nor their ability to propagate ideological [and moral] stances" (Tölölyan, 2001; Al-Rustom, 2013).

Secondly, biopolitics is also applicable in the extra-territorial spaces of a nation-state. Kelly (2010: 5) argues, "biopolitics, as it has historically existed, has always had its border." In the age of globalization, territorial borders become less important even though there have been increasing in protectionism and nationalism all around the world. Power can be considered as de-territorialized at the international level. As Merlingen (2003) argues, "power operates at an international level, in an international network of power relations." A few studies began to analyze the biopolitical practices of states in foreign and security policy (e.g., Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Guerra-Barón, 2017; Makarychev & Yatsky, 2017). However, they continue to follow the top-down state-centered power. Although Foucault attempts to challenge the dominant state-centered understanding of power, these works continue to consider the power under the domestic applicability (sovereignty) and jurisdiction (territoriality) of a nation-state and follow the methodological nationalism.

Kelly (2014) also pays attention to the continued existence of territorial borders between states, and he follows Walters' (2002) notion of biopolitical borders. They argue, biopolitical border divides not land, but population. When diaspora communities employ biopower techniques, power becomes de-territorialized/multi-territorialized at the international level. Diaspora communities contribute to create, sustain, and maintain the biopolitical collectivities in their network transnational/trans-local interactions. However, biopolitical borders can also unite the people under the shared collective identities. Therefore, biopolitics do not always separate people but also unite them under the moral values and practices on the correct way of life.

Nevertheless, politics should be "people of power," not "people in power." The notion of power is not transcendental (top-down approach from state to the population) but is imminent, rising from diverse actors in all aspects of society. As Meyer-Emerick (2007: 690) argues, "biopolitics provides other [critical] explanations for social and political behavior

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with the potential for engaging citizens in governance," not only at the state level but also among the domestic abroad.[47]   Biopolitics provides certain social, political, and moral behavior tendencies (Somit & Peterson, 1999), and encourages diaspora members to be socially and politically active. Biopolitics thus, "provides a useful indicator of political attitudes and potential behavior" (Somit & Peterson, 1999: 43).

In sum, biopolitics plays an essential role(s) for diaspora communities. Through biopolitical discourses, diasporas construct the collective identities and set the channel of communication between various actors in the triadic nexus. Similar to the nation-states, diasporas deploy bio-power techniques to sustain collective identities and political-moral behaviors. "Diasporas are transnational social formations that can challenge and even subvert the power of nation-states" (Lee, 2007). In this context, as Lemke argues (2011), biopolitics "deconstruct the classical operation of power where it takes the object (population) and gives them a subjective incarnation." As a result, the new ties and commonalities are established by biopolitics, and diasporic collectivities remain incomplete without the biopolitical dimension.

Under these circumstances, I argue that precarious living conditions and biopolitics are alternative approaches to analyze diaspora mobilization. Diaspora communities establish moral values as a precondition of collective solidarity rather than passively accepting the homeland's geopolitical interests. Diasporic identities are the practice of collective biopolitical togetherness. Therefore, I advocate the external, international, and bottom-up dimensions of power. Through biopolitics, we can observe how non-state actors such as diasporas deploy biopolitical techniques in everyday life. "All societies engage in politics even without the presence of a state" (Masters, 1989: 140). "When bodies come together and relate to one another, politics occur" even with or without the states (Puumala, 2013: 952). As a result, "biopolitical governance seeks to govern without government" (Dillion & Reid, 2001). Diaspora communities actively engage in local and global politics, especially by reproducing biopolitical norms and values on the diasporic morality and the correct way of life at multiple levels here and there, or the elsewhere, both online and offline.

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[47] Latha Varadarajan (2010) introduced the concept of domestic abroad. She refers to the overseas diaspora population as domestic abroad and pays attention to the institutionalization of states with their diasporas under two broad factors: the neoliberal restructuring of the homeland and reconstruction of the nation's boundaries.

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Conclusion

In the literature, several scholars follow the primordial and essentialist approaches where diaspora communities are established naturally following the migration act. The homeland factor is seen as the only crucial factor in diaspora mobilization, and diasporas are seen as geopolitical objects of the kin-states to pursue the homeland interests. The literature, therefore, focuses on the activities of the kin-states and analyzes when, why, and how states engage in diaspora policies. As a result, diasporas are considered as passive, altruistic, static, and predetermined entities.

Figure 5 – *When and Why Diaspora Mobilization Occurs* (in the Literature)

However, diasporas are moral, politically active, identity and interest-based, collectively organized, and dynamic communities. They have a hybrid, de-territorialized/multi-territorialized, and multiple interlinked identities. Various actors from the homeland and hostlands, including the diaspora itself, construct the diasporic identities. Diaspora mobilization occurs under different local, national, international, and transnational/trans-local contexts. Since the framing process of diasporic identities takes place at multiple levels, diasporas raise new ideas, voices, demands, and actions rather than following homeland interests. For these reasons, diasporas should not be considered as the objects of the homelands; instead, they are active subjects of everyday life (bio-)politics.

The literature analyzes diaspora communities within the triadic model and fails to understand how diaspora mobilization occurs from below. Diasporas are moral and virtual communities, and they act between/among/within the triadic nexus. The homeland and the hostland are not mutually exclusive realities. There is no binary conceptualization of home and host for diasporas. The triadic model is not enough to understand diaspora mobilization. Besides, the homeland and the hostland should be considered as analytical concepts as "country of origin" and "country of residence" rather than geographical or emotional concepts.

Diasporas, communities that care, demonstrate a feeling of moral co-responsibility to be socially and politically active. When the hostland environment creates insecure, precarious living conditions, diasporas feel the moral co-responsibility to intervene, not only for themselves but also for co-ethnics. Diaspora communities "care about" each other and "care for" establishing social justice. The precarization of livelihoods (insecure, volatile, and vulnerable human situations) in the hostlands quickly turn into the soil to develop collective actions. The hostlands, furthermore, are not passive actors. Unlike most of the works in the literature, hostlands are active actors in diaspora mobilization, and they (re-)act towards the homelands' activities in their territory and sovereignty.

Under the diasporic morality and solidarity, diasporas act together and (re-)produce biopolitical moral discourses on the correct way of life. Such communities set the moral standards through biopolitical discourses and narratives and establish solidarity for collective actions (such as protest, participate in philanthropy activities, lobbying, and many others). Through the diasporic care and morality, diasporic communities perform and act their togetherness and demand for social justice. Besides, de-territorialized/multi-territorialized diasporic life space is established within the transnational/trans-local networks and relations. There are always power networks and connections in diaspora politics, both under the ideas of "diasporas as an object of the kin-state" (in the literature) and "diasporas as a subject of the politics" (in the dissertation).

Figure 6 – *When and Why Diaspora Mobilization Occurs* (in the Dissertation)

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In this dissertation, I applied precarity and biopolitics as an alternative way to understand diaspora mobilization from below. Figure 7 illustrates the process of diaspora mobilization under diasporic morality, solidarity, and collective actions. One of the preconditions for the diaspora mobilization is to share diasporic morality. Heterogeneous diaspora communities have internal cohesion, and they establish diasporic solidarity. The preconditions, processes, and outcomes of diaspora mobilization are explained under the three theoretical layers of the dissertation (triadic nexus, transnationalism, and biopolitics). These stages of diaspora mobilization should not be considered as always in linear relations. Most of the time, outcomes reproduce the preconditions. There is also a boomerang effect in the processes of diaspora mobilization.

Figure 7 – *Three Stages of Diaspora Mobilization*

In this context, online activities become an essential resource to maintain contacts for/among diasporas and establish networks and relations. The Internet is one of the platforms for the self-awareness and awareness of others. Diaspora members use online platforms to create, expand, and mobilize the diasporic sense of collective identities. The Internet, thus, influences as well as (re-)shapes the formation of diaspora identities. While it provides one of the primary sources of information about the homeland, it also portrays the everyday life of co-ethnics in the country of residence. Diasporas maintain an active interest and linkage among each other, and the diasporic public space helps to integrate them. As a result, there is an interconnectedness of online activities and offline participation in diaspora mobilization.

Consequently, diasporas communities construct and transform online platforms to mobilize collective actions, specifically in a situation of uncertainty and vulnerability (precarity). Diasporas (need to) fulfill the moral co-responsibility and care-tizenship obligations. However, online and offline worlds interact and are not independent of one another (Bauböck & Faist, 2010). With the increase of the use of the Internet, especially social media, ordinary members of the diasporas become active political agents in offline participation. Diaspora communities are identity and interest-based politicized entities, whereby they construct

diasporic identities and solidarity on/through the digital platforms, as well as to take part in offline participation.

Figure 8 demonstrates the theoretical arguments on the diaspora among the most dominant works in the literature and the dissertation. This table helps me to compare and contrast how the phenomenon is conceptualized differently.

Figure 8 – *Theorization of Diaspora* in the Literature vs. Dissertation

	Diaspora Literature	Dissertation
1.	Primordial and essentialist approaches of diaspora	The non-essentialist constructivist approach of diaspora
2.	Diaspora as "altruistic entity: Passive, apolitical, static."	Diasporas are "interest and identity-based entities."
	Diasporas are "objects of the homeland."	Diasporas are active political actors.
	Diasporas are "homogenous (ethnic) group/lobby."	Diasporas are "heterogeneous (cultural) groups."
	No independent interest in everyday life	Precarization of livelihoods: protect interests, identities, and needs.
3.	Methodological nationalism: homeland	Methodological cosmopolitanism: diasporas
	Top-Down homeland mobilization	Bottom-Up diaspora-led mobilization
	Homeland identity	Multiple interlinked identities and loyalties
	Homeland interests	New ideas, voices, demands, and actions
	Geopolitics	Biopolitics
	Rational Choice Theory	Social Movement Paradigm
4.	Hostland as a passive actor	Hostland as an active and preemptive actor
5.	Transnationalism as a geographical concept	Trans-Localism as an analytical concept
6.	Macro-level r/s b/w the home state and diaspora	Micro (individual), Meso (local/national), and Macro (transnational/trans-local) levels r/s

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Introduction

This chapter outlines the research design and methodological choices of the dissertation. Chapter II is divided into three parts. The first part presents the research philosophy (interpretivism), approach (both inductive and deductive reasoning), and strategy (multi-sited comparative case study). The second part illustrates data collection methods (mixed methodology: both qualitative and quantitative) and data analysis (content analysis). Finally, the third part demonstrates the methodological issues and (ontological, epistemological, and methodological) limitations.

The multi-sited study of the Turkish diaspora communities in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) in Germany as a case study is the research design and data collection method. The overall data includes a mixed-methodology, including the ethnographic approach at multi-sited fieldworks, qualitative interviewing, and digital ethnography – Netnography. The data corpus is approached with Content Analysis.

Figure 9 – *Research Methods and Methodology of the Dissertation*

2.1 Research Philosophy: Interpretivism

The socio-cultural and political realities such as identity, morality, solidarity, power, and diaspora can be contested concepts. These concepts are never neutral, and they respond to different meanings and purposes (Zapata-Barrero, 2018). There is no single, universal, and neutral definition of these realities. Since there is no direct and unmediated access to them, "the decision to interpret or not to interpret is not an option open to human beings" (Ball, 1995: 7).

In this context, interpretivism helps us to understand the social and political realities through the meanings that people assign to them (Myers, 2008). Interpretivism develops a conceptual framework for examining complex phenomena within its political, social, and cultural settings. The cultural contexts always mediate human interactions with the external worlds (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2009: 34), and interpretivism helps us to understand the construction of social and political realities in their contexts through different interpretations (Sigona, 2014).

The conceptualization always is a matter of interpretation whereby the same concepts, such as the notion of diaspora, can only be meaningful for the audiences within their contexts. "Most of the migration-related concepts [including diasporas] have mixed descriptions with the normative elements, and there are always some principles and values as well as practices, which orient the actions and regulate people's behaviors" (Zapata-Barrero, 2018: 85). As a result, it is not easy to understand any social and political realities (such as diasporas) without taking consideration of conceptualism and contextualism. Only the context could help us to identify the meanings of social and political realities (Gerring, 1999: 366).

Diaspora communities interact with their external worlds at the local, national, and transnational/trans-local levels. Diaspora mobilization could only be meaningful by the understanding of its context. The contextualization spontaneously becomes part of the methodology to examine the construction of realities. For these reasons, in the previous chapter, I started with how to (re-)conceptualize the term diaspora. I interlinked several approaches/concepts in the literature and provided a more comprehensive understanding of the concept. However, I did not collect several contested concepts on the term diaspora but also systematically constructed the theoretical framework whereby each concept, such as

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diasporic morality and solidarity, plays an integral role. The previous chapter consequently lays out the key concepts that construct the relationship between/among different theoretical puzzles and research gaps under the interpretive epistemology. For these reasons, interpretive epistemology became part of the methodology.

2.2 Research Approach: Inductive and Deductive Reasoning

There are both inductive and deductive approaches in this study. The inductive approach starts from the active participant observation, both at the online and offline platforms, to understand the complex interactions of diaspora communities. On the other hand, this research is not entirely inductive, whereby I already have specific ideas and preconceptions on the topic.[48] Even in the data ethnography, as a researcher, I have particular goals, preferred theories to understand the complex realities and personal experience in the field. Although I attempted to minimize these effects with self-reflexivity, I draw the research based on the selected theories and my pre-observation knowledge. Therefore, there is also deductive reasoning.

As a result, I employed both inductive and deductive reasoning as a research approach. When I described diaspora mobilization under the normative and moral dimension of diasporic care, I analyzed collective actions during the precarious times in the country of residence.[49]

2.3 Research Strategy and Design: Multi-Sited Comparative Case Study

The case-oriented approach aims at the detailed description of a few instances of a particular phenomenon to understand at the multiple units; therefore, it helps us to "explore in-depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals" (Creswell et al., 2003: 15). The case-oriented approach also shows how the specific social and political processes develop and combine to produce specific outcomes in particular settings (Della-Porta, 2008). In this dissertation, I followed a case-oriented approach to seek in-depth knowledge of how Turkish communities in Germany mobilize in matters of kinship care.

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[48] Reflexivity becomes an essential factor in any ethnographic qualitative works. The self-reflexivity will be later discussed at the end of this chapter.

[49] However, the stages of diaspora mobilization (pre-condition - morality, process - solidarity, and outcomes - collective actions) should not be considered as cause and effect relations with dependent and independent variables. Instead, there are correlations among the phases of diaspora mobilization.

Besides, I followed intensive research case studies. The intensive case study focuses on particular phenomena (here, diaspora mobilization[50]) in-depth to explore how and why specific processes (diasporic care, morality, and solidarity) generate particular outcomes (collective actions) in some circumstances (under precarity in the country of residence). I applied the intensive research case study to examine the diaspora mobilization from below and analyze how diaspora communities establish their networks and relations for care ideals, practices, and responsibilities. I argue that diaspora communities are non-state actors, and they perform the diasporic morality and solidarity for their co-ethnics. I thus focused on the actor-centered bottom-up diaspora mobilization rather than following the top-down diasporization of the kin-states.

The case study approach also helps me to "investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, particularly when the boundaries between phenomenon (diaspora) and context are not evident" (Yin, 2003: 13). In this dissertation, I examined the everyday life practices, stances, and diaspora claims and focused on how a particular welfare policy of the hostland (child-care policy) helps or hinders diaspora mobilization at the online and offline platforms. Under these circumstances, a within-case analysis (Mahoney, 2000) becomes the central component of the research.

The diaspora literature is mostly dominated by single-case studies (Délano & Gamlen, 2014), and there is a need for theory building[51] with more comparative studies.[52] The existing examples of comparative studies are also state-centric. Most of the comparative works compare the diaspora engagement/management policies of several kin-states; therefore, they follow the methodological nationalism. For these reasons, the literature does not explain how a particular topic, issue, or policy (threshold events) in the hostland helps or hinders diaspora mobilization.

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[50] Diaspora mobilization is a social and political process, and there are pre-conditions and outcomes. Diasporas are moral communities, and they are mobilized in/through diasporic public space. Such communities form the diasporic solidarity under the normative biopolitical core on the correct way of life. The diasporic solidarity later turns into the collective actions such as protesting, lobbying, negotiating, involving in philanthropic activities, and participating in political-civic and social engagements (i.e., voting, involvement in civil society organizations, forming and shaping public opinion). The political and socio-economic environment of the hostland and the precarious living conditions of diasporas spontaneously are one of the core factors of diaspora mobilization from below.

[51] There is a need for theory building in the diaspora literature (Brand 2006; Varadarajan, 2010).

[52] There are several comparative works in the diaspora literature. Smith, 2003; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Lafleur, 2011; Gamlen, 2014; Ragazzi, 2014, and Pedroza et al., 2016.

The case-oriented research approach can be implicitly or explicitly comparative. Although the dissertation explores only one specific diasporic community (Turkish) in one host country (Germany), it has comparative dimensions at different levels. For instance, I compare diaspora mobilization in various settings, both online and offline, to show that there are connections between the web-based activity of Turkish diasporas and their offline actions. I also consider the differences within the Turkish diasporas in Germany. Not all members of the Turkish diasporas to take collective actions at the same level. Some members of the Turkish diasporas support Germany and criticize co-ethnics. When the dissertation demonstrates the differences among the Turkish descent population, it also has comparative elements within the heterogeneous communities.

2.3.1 Case Selection: Why…Germany;…in North-Rhine Westphalia;…by the Turkish Diaspora, and…Kinship Care?

Germany has one of the most significant numbers of immigrants in the world. According to the United Nations Report (2015), Germany has the second-highest number of immigrants after the United States. In 2005, 18% of the population had a migration background; however, this ratio increased to 24% in 2018. There has been a sharp increase in the country's migrant population, and it seems that it will continue to follow the same path in the future. As of 2019, the total population was around 83 million, and the population with migrant background makes up nearly 25% of the population. Thereof, Turkish descent population was close to 2.8 million, which were three to four percent of the population.

Figure 10 - *Population by Migration Status in Germany, 2005 to 2018*

Year	Total Population	%	Population without Migration Background		Population with 'Migration Background'		Turkish Descent Population	
			Number (in 1,000)	%	Number (in 1,000)	%	Number (in 1,000)	%
2005	82.465	100,0	67.165	81,4	15.024	18,2	2.745	3,3
2010	81.715	100,0	65.963	80,7	15.753	19,3	2.485	3,0
2015	81.404	100,0	64.286	79,0	17.118	21,0	2.851	3,5
2018	81.613	100,0	60.814	74,5	19.639	24,1	2.769	3,4

Source: Mikrozensus 2018 - Bevölkerung mit (türkischem) und ohne Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland

Besides, the immigrant groups in Germany have become much more heterogeneous. For instance, 3.4% Turkish, 1.9% Polish, 1.5% Russian, 1% Italian, 0.8% Syrian, 0.5% Sub-Saharan African, and 2.7% East and South/South-East Asians. There has been increasing

diversification of immigrant groups. Although the ethnic composition of the country has been changing, Germany did not define itself officially as an immigrant society in the past (Eckardt, 2007). Being German has been continuously expanding over the past decades; however, citizenship and nationality have not been extended to include all these cultural minorities and immigrants (Von Below & Bös, 2013). Because of these reasons, Germany turns into a significant source as a host country to study ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity as well as diaspora mobilization.

At the same time, social and economic (in-)justice has become a significant issue in the country. After Austria, Germany is the second top country in the Eurozone for the unequal distribution of wealth (The Local, 2016). The literature considers Germany as a movement of society; however, most affected citizens – including migrants, remain inactive in the political and civic participation (Hass et al., 2014), although they have a moral responsibility as well as should have a socio-political right to enter the political arena in the country of residence.

Germany was following ethnic and collectively monist models, unlike most Western European countries (i.e., the Netherlands and Britain) (De Wit & Koopmans, 2005). Migrants, especially non-citizen residents, lack political and legal resources to participate in political life in Germany. Immigrants, who do not hold German citizenship, have no direct access to influence the political system under the German corporatist system. While their political claims have been less publicly visible in the country, migrants have been accused of having little interest in the hostland's politics.

Germany was also accused of having "double standards in the integration and migration policies for decades to various immigrant groups with selective integration measures" (Kaya, 2017: 57). There have been different structures of inclusion and exclusion policies and practices for other immigrant groups (German diasporas and non-ethnic German migrants) (Geddens, 2003; Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009; Kaya, 2017).

With the rise of new social media and digital communication, social and political cleavage structures in Germany have also been changing (Kern et al., 2018). Transgressive (unregulated) social conflicts such as hate speech and the rise of extremism of neo-Nazis begin to bear a risk of escalation. The far-right extremism has been continuing to be a fundamental problem in the country, and there is an urgent need to fight against it. Neo-Nazi

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groups share a hatred for immigrant groups. Due to the far-right terrorist attacks, precarious migrants begin to feel insecure in their day-to-day life.

Furthermore, *Leitkultur* – leading/guiding culture[53] (Tibi, 1998) on how to accommodate immigrant groups between integration and assimilation has been re-emerged in the national political and public discourses. Deployment of the Leitkultur under the cultural relativism becomes a central component of the macro-level issues such as Islamophobia, Xenophobia, discrimination, and institutional racism. For these reasons, Germany is an excellent example as a host-country to examine diaspora activism and understand how the host country environment helps or hinders diaspora mobilization. Figure 11 summarizes why Germany is selected as a host country in the dissertation.

Figure 11 – *Why Germany as a Host Country?*

Overall, Turkish communities in Germany are 3.4 percent of the whole population. They make up 16 percent of the entire immigrant population. Since 1961, Turkish migrants have a long history of migration with different generations (*time*) - the majority of them (52%) born in Germany. Only 48% have their firsthand migration experience. While half (50%) of them hold German citizenship, only 8.7% have dual citizenship.

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[53] Bassam Tibi (1998) defines Leitkultur is based on values such as Human Rights, tolerance, and the separation of church and state in order to integrate migrants successfully. In 2000, Interior Minister Thomas de Maziere called for tighter immigration restrictions under the Leitkultur, and the concept is highly politicized.

Figure 12 - *Population with 'Migration Background' in Germany*

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'	
	Number (in 1.000)	Percent	Number (in 1.000)	Percent
Total	2.769	100	20.799	100
Foreign citizen	1.481	53,5	9.907	47,6
German citizen	1.387	50,1	10.892	52,4
Dual citizenship*	240	8,7	1.747	8,4
Naturalized	606	21,9	2.679	12,9
With own migration experience	1.319	47,6	13.457	64,7
Born in Germany	1.449	52,3	7.342	35,3

*Dual citizens are counted as foreign as well as German citizens
Source: Mikrozensus 2018 by ZfTI

Turkish descent population in some German federal states (i.e., Bremen, Hamburg, North-Rhine Westphalia) makes up more than five percent of the population. The most densely concentrated Turkish descent population in Germany in 2018 was in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) with 942.000. The largest urban settlement of Turkish migrants in Germany is found in cities of Köln, Düsseldorf, Essen, Duisburg, Dortmund, Bochum, and Gelsenkirchen in NRW.

Figure 13 - *Population by the German Federal States in 2018*

	Turkish Descent Population			Total Population		Population with 'Migrant Background'		
	Number (in 1.000)	Percent among TDP	Percent in total	Number (in 1.000)	Percent Total	Number (in 1.000)	Percent among MBP	Percent Total
Baden-Württemberg	493	17,8	4,5	10.897	13,4	3.638	17,5	33,4
Bayern	338	12,2	2,6	12.841	15,7	3.282	15,8	25,6
Berlin	171	6,2	4,8	3.589	4,4	1.135	5,5	31,6
Bremen	43	1,6	6,4	673	0,8	236	1,1	35,1
Hamburg	94	3,4	5,2	1.825	2,2	607	2,9	33,3
Hessen	288	10,4	4,7	6.169	7,6	2.075	10,0	33,6
Niedersachsen	182	6,6	2,3	7.824	9,6	1.726	8,3	22,1
North-Rhine Westphalia	**942**	**34,0**	**5,3**	**17.646**	**21,6**	**5.362**	**25,8**	**30,4**
Rheinland Pfalz	121	4,4	3,0	4.010	4,9	1.045	5,0	26,1
Saarland	18	0,7	1,8	977	1,2	220	1,1	22,5
Schleswig-Holstein	55	2,0	1,9	2.841	3,5	492	2,4	17,3
Others*	23	0,8	0,2	12.320	15,1	982	4,7	8,0
Total	2.769	100,0	3,4	81.613	100,0	20.799	100,0	25,5

*Thüringen, Sachsen, Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Source: Mikrozensus 2018 by ZfTI

Diasporas are de-territorialized/multi-territorialized transnational communities, and they are mobile and quickly are in multiple locations at the same time. Instead of taking the spatial locations between *"here and there,"* socio-political identities of diasporas in *"the elsewhere"* were considered as the oriented point. Although diasporas are not homogeneous entities, Turkish communities show similar characteristics on the topic of kinship care, not only among German *Bundesländer* (federal lands) but also in Western Europe and Turkey. Although the hostland's context is vital to understand diaspora mobilization, and there could be significant differences in the outcomes, the psychical geographical location of Turkish diasporas was not the primary concern in the dissertation. The fieldwork of the dissertation, however, was done in NRW for practical reasons:

1. the highest shares of migrants from Turkey in Germany;
2. the highest rates of Turkish immigrant children who have been taken into care by Jugendamt among German federal states;
3. The Turkish descent population and Turkey's institutions are mostly mobilized in NRW (i.e., the Attaché of Family and Social Policy in Düsseldorf and Umut Yıldızı Derneği in Neuss).

Nevertheless, Turkish immigrants in Germany are selected not because they are the largest immigrant group (*size*) in the country. Instead, they represent one of the most diverse ethnic, cultural, religious, and social groups of immigrants (*heterogeneity*). There is a high level of diversification among Turkish communities and their level of socioeconomic status and political participation (*mobilization*).

Turkish communities in Germany have different political and social characteristics in terms of the level of integration, naturalization practices, and citizenship status (*access*), and political participation. Some of them are more willing to adopt the German way of social interaction and more prone to have a relationship with the so-called "host society." There are differences among the interest in local news, German politics, and the level of political participation. The level of trust in German institutions also differs. As a result, there are various economic, social, cultural, and political differences (*positionality*) among/within the Turkish diasporas.

Furthermore, Turkish communities are more deprived than other immigrant groups in Germany, with 1.242 Euro median monthly household incomes. They have also experienced

ethnic discrimination at a higher level (18%). They have a relatively high level of concern about xenophobia (29%) rather than other immigrant groups.

Figure 14 – *The Precarization of Turkish Migrants in Germany*

Source: Financial Times

The literature often portrays Turkish communities in Germany as "the least integrated and politically passive immigrant group" (*misperception*) (e.g., Koopmans & Statham, 1999; De Wit & Koopmans, 2005). However, they actively engage in politics in the country of residence and are mobilized for collective actions (misconception). There is a high level of contact among family members and kin community (*familial and kin bonds*), whereby they share diasporic morality and dense social interactions in everyday life. When they face social and structural exclusion and institutional discrimination, they possess a natural feeling of insecurity (*precarity*). They attempt to increase feelings of security not only for themselves but also for their co-ethnics. Besides, Turkish communities in Germany are highly active on digital platforms (*virtual community*) to form new connectedness and togetherness. They are actively involved in transnational/trans-local networks and relations, although there are different attitudes towards the homeland, the hostland, and diaspora members.

The distant homeland also becomes increasingly romanticized (*homeland identity*) and remains a large part of the diasporic identities - most of the Turkish descent population identifying themselves with Turkey rather than Germany (Uslucan, 2017). Throughout the years, the attachment to Turkey has grown. For instance, in 1999, the ratio was forty-two

percent, and it increased up to forty-nine percent in 2015. In contrast, the attachment to Germany was decreasing, from twenty-two percent in 1999 to nineteen percent in 2015.

Figure 15 – *Attachment to Turkey and Germany as Home*, *1999-2015*

Attachment to	1999	2001	2005	2010	2015
Turkey	42%	35%	41%	40%	49%
Germany	22%	32%	22%	26%	19%
Both	31%	28%	28%	40%	30%
Neither	5%	7%	7%	5%	5%

Source: Uslucan, 2017

On the one hand, most of the Turkish descent population in Germany claim that the socio-economic and political conditions (such as healthcare and social security systems, democracy and human rights, educational system, judiciary system) are better in Germany (Kaya & Kentel, 2005). There is a low level of return migration from Germany to Turkey. Turkish descent population seeks their future in the country of residence, not in an idealized homeland. On the other hand, mutual tolerance and moral, social values of the homeland still prevails.

Figure 16 – *Which country is better? (2005 vs. 2020)*

	2005		2020	
	Turkey	Germany	Turkey	Germany
Health care and social security systems	1.3	96.0	3.0	95.2
Respecting rules	3.5	88.2	4.0	90.0
Pursuit of rights	1.8	87.1	1.0	90.0
Democracy and human rights	2.6	86.4	1.0	89.0
Job opportunities	3.3	77.4	4.0	82.3
Educational system	7.4	77.3	6.0	82.0
The efficiency of the judiciary system	2.5	77.3	1.0	80.4
Valuing human capital	7.4	74.8	75.0	5.20
Equal treatment for all	3.6	71.8	7.0	70.0
Attitudes of police	6.0	66.3	10.0	35.0
Comfortable and easy life	28.3	51.6	70.0	25.0
Respecting cultures and religions	25.6	48.5	85.0	10.4
Mutual tolerance	42.9	37.2	88.0	11.0
Moral, social values	56.0	19.9	90.0	8.4

Source: Kaya and Kentel in 2005 & author's calculation in 2020

I followed Kaya and Kentel (2005) and conducted the same survey on social media in February 2020. Although there were only 30 respondents, the results were slightly different. Social and welfare systems (such as healthcare, education, social security), as well as political conditions (democracy, human rights) in Germany, continue to be more advanced than Turkey. Mutual tolerance and moral/social values of the homeland are continued to be better in Turkey. Unlike the result of 2005, in the areas of "respecting cultures and religions," "comfortable and easy life," and "valuing human capital," most respondents found that Turkey is now better than Germany. Figure 17 summarizes why the Turkish diasporas are selected in the dissertation.

Figure 17 - Why the Turkish Diaspora in Germany?

In this context, child protection has become one of the core subjects of Leitkultur debates. Turkish diaspora communities in Germany construct the feeling of collective unity and being related (kinship) under the notion of extended family. The family is one of the most critical social institutions and units that offer emotional and mutual support and welfare for compatriots in the country of settlement. The family structure thus turns into a source of identity and collective mobilization.

There are several problems with the child protection system(s) in Germany, particularly for migrant families. In the literature, several works have already demonstrated the systematic issues of the German child welfare system. First of all, there are high numbers of overburdened case works for Youth Welfare officers – Jugendamt (Seckinger et al. 2008).

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Secondly, there is low reliability in caseworker and team decisions regarding maltreatment risk and an intervention strategy (Pothman & Wilk, 2009). Thirdly, there are high numbers of children in out of home placements combined with quick caseworker decisions regarding long-term placement and weak efforts to restore parents parenting capacity (Thoburn 2007; Kindler et al. 2011).

Last but not least, there are high numbers of families with recurrent maltreatment even after a child protection intervention (Kindler et al. 2008). Indeed, the child protection system is one of the most critical issues in Germany, whereby several public policies have recently attempted to solve some of these problems. Because of these reasons, Turkish communities in NRW in Germany, and their collective mobilization on the matters of child protection are selected as a case study in this dissertation.

2.4 Methods of Data Collection On-Site and Online

In the diaspora literature, there is a need for more diversified methodological approaches with the possible combination of various methods ranging from the qualitative and quantitative research designs. Several scholars apply mixed methods as a pre-condition for advancing research in their works (e.g., Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Bryman, 2006; Horvath, 2012; Meeus, 2012). For instance, Kenneth Horwath (2012) combines the qualitative study of multi-sited ethnography with the quantitative research methods when analyzing the informal labor migrants in Central Europe. Bruno Meeus (2012) uses the multi-sited ethnography with a questionnaire-based quantitative survey and focus group method to examine Romanian migrants' activities in Belgium critically. Several scholars use mixed methods of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze different perspectives and paradigms of diaspora communities.

The mixed methodology provides in-depth insights where a single method (either qualitative or quantitative) does not sufficiently explain the complex transnational phenomena such as the diaspora (Bloch, 2007). The mixed methodology is designed for confirmation, complementarity (Small, 2011), and initiation of research (Schensul et al., 2013). Mixed-methods, therefore, increase the interpretability, meaningfulness, and validity of the study, whereby the single method has potential methodological pitfalls (Schensul et al., 2013: 158).

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The combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies is fruitful. I followed the investigation of the mixed methods of the Turkish diaspora communities' care ideals, practices, and responsibilities on child protection in Germany. The qualitative data ethnography was complemented by digital ethnography to "compensate for the weakness of the single method of qualitative ethnographic study" (Small, 2011: 63). The comprehensive data included ethnographic methods at multi-sited fieldworks, qualitative semi-structured interviews with the key experts and interviews with diaspora members, and a virtual ethnography using both Netnography and digital computational approach of online materials. Turkish diaspora mobilization was examined through the qualitative analysis of multi-sited data ethnography and was through mixed methods of digital data by Netnography and computational data approaches. The interviews with vital key diasporic entrepreneurs and regular members supported the data analysis through participant observation in multi-sited fieldwork. The mixed-methods also helped me to examine the interconnectedness of the relationship between online and offline activities of Turkish diasporas in Germany.

2.4.1 From Local Ethnography to the Global Digital Ethnography

Ethnography is a qualitative research design that focuses on studying the culture-sharing group (Harris, 1968). "Any group of people interacting together for a while will evolve a culture" (Patton, 2002: 81), and ethnography examines the culture as well as the everyday lives of people and their interactions (Emerson et al., 1995; Anderson-Levitt, 2006). Ethnography thus observes the shared and learned patterns of values, beliefs, behaviors, and language among group members (Creswell, 2007). It subsequently "reflects upon observation, experiences, and interaction in a confessional way to allow the realization of how things come to be" (Baka, 2012: 84).

Traditional ethnographic works, however, are based on the idea of locality (Wittel, 2000). Many works of diaspora literature follow the classical ethnographic design and examine diaspora communities within the particular cities or regions (e.g., Orozco, 2005; Schmelz, 2007; Schüttler, 2007; Makina, 2010; Warnecke, 2010). There are significant methodological problems within these works. For instance, they have tiny samples, and there are often problems with the representation and the generalization of findings (Arthur, 2000; Ndofor-Tah, 2000; Schlenzka, 2009). These works also underestimate the role of global and transnational forces shaping local contexts (Marcus & Fischer, 1986). Due to the rise of

globalization and communication technologies, traditional ethnographic works have already been challenged in the literature. Many ethnographic works start to follow the multi-sited fieldwork to overcome the locality problem.[54]

The multi-sited fieldwork analyzes "how people, objects, ideas, symbols, and commodities circulate, and later become interconnected in different locations" (Marcus, 1995). As Marcus (1998: 79) suggests, there are "moves out from the single sites and local situations to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space." While the diaspora literature examines transnational communities between "here and there," Appadurai (1991) and Gupta and Ferguson (1997) introduced the third layer, "the elsewhere" in their multi-sited fieldwork. The ethnographic works, therefore, began to examine the political location(s) rather than the simple dialectic of the territorial spatiality (Wittel, 2000). Diaspora literature, however, continues to analyze the kin-states' motives and interests and largely ignores the multiple and political locations of transnational/trans-local connections.

I followed the multi-sited fieldwork to analyze how regulatory regimes of child-care policy influence various practices of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany both at the online and offline platforms. The multi-sited fieldwork does not only mean that I researched the different locations in Germany and Turkey. Instead, I examined the kin networks and relations among Turkish communities and their transnational/trans-local connections and practices – both online and offline in the triadic nexus across space and time (Marcus, 1995; Hannerz, 2003; Falzon, 2009). Thus, I applied a relational approach to spatiality in online and offline platforms. Diasporas are fluid transnational communities, and their online and offline connectivity can only be contextualized within the multi-sited fieldwork and transnational locations.

Furthermore, in the literature, there has been a move away from methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Nation-states are no longer considered "a structuring principle of societal and political action and the orienting reference point" (Beck & Sznaider, 2006: 4). Nation-states are not natural entities (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003). However, "under methodological nationalism, social science researches are unduly circumscribed by the territorial boundaries of nation-states" (Amelina et al., 2012). Similar to the nation-state,

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[54] Several scholars such as David Fitzgerald, Kenneth Horvath, Mieke Schrooten, Besim Zirh, and Bruno Meeus apply multi-sited ethnography in their empirical studies.

power is also conceptualized within the territorial limitation (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003).

The separations of the analytical distinction of territoriality between "global vs. local" and "national vs. international" become another methodological issue in the literature (Amelina et al., 2012). However, several works on globalization and transnationalism continue to follow the differentiated oppositions (Beck & Sznaider, 2006: 18), although the spatial differentiation of the locations is no longer evident, particularly for transnational diaspora communities.

In contrast, methodological cosmopolitanism offers a multi-perspective way to facilitate social and political contexts. When local, national, transnational, and global spatial contexts are relationally defined, methodological cosmopolitanism helps us to analyze the context without falling into binary positions. Fluid diasporic communities mobilize for collective actions at multiple locations. Methodological cosmopolitanism, thus, ignores the essentialist concept of territorial spatiality, identity, and power, whereby it defines spaces under the social and political contexts rather than the territoriality. Under the relational view on spatiality, actors (such as diasporas) form the spatial frameworks and boundaries in their social and political settings rather than the bounded territory of the nation-states.

Methodological cosmopolitanism goes beyond the mere critique of methodological nationalism (Beck & Sznaider, 2006). Instead, it helps us to understand a non-national way of research contextualization (Amelina, 2010) and offers new research strategies to provide insights into the complexity of transnational phenomena such as diasporas (Marcus, 1995). Diasporic identity formation takes place at the roots and routes where diaspora communities come from and where they settle (Gilroy, 1993). Diaspora communities have multiple identities, and the cosmopolitan methodology takes these multiple identities as the starting point (Beck & Sznaider, 2006).

As a result, I followed the multi-sited ethnographic work under the methodological cosmopolitanism, whereby I took a reference of multiple transnational political identities of diasporas as the oriented point rather than the kin-state. I also applied Pries' (2007) heuristic distinction between "units of reference, analysis, and measurement" (Amelina, 2010). The unit of reference in the dissertation is the hostland environment (political and social settings

of diaspora mobilization), the unit of analysis is Turkish diaspora communities, and the unit of measurement is diaspora mobilization of the kinship care practices amongst Turkish diasporas in Germany.

Diasporas are digitally mobile and connected communities (Diminescu et al., 2011; Kissau & Hunger, 2010). They form online and offline connectedness and togetherness across geographical borders. Such communities usually participate in digital and social networks at multiple locations. The digital sphere subsequently becomes a new form of data collection to investigate the units of analysis (Turkish communities in Germany) and the unit of reference (the hostland). The digital public space is instrumental for diaspora communities to create and recreate, as well as enforce and reinforce the diasporic identities. Although the Internet is a useful tool to spread information and build support, it also turns into an emotional, social, and political basis for cultivating diasporic subjectivities for collective actions. Diasporas produce moral and normative discourses of belonging (inclusion and exclusion) across the borders (both online and offline), and the diasporic care and morality bring biopolitical collectivities among diaspora communities.

I collected data from the digital platforms, whereas the Internet becomes a new data collection "about" and "from" diasporas. Several scholars have already applied digital ethnographic methods within the qualitative research epistemologies in the migration and diaspora studies (Alinejad et al., 2019). For example, Komito (2011) examines how social media affects migrants and migration processes. Bernal (2014: 8) analyzes how diaspora members form an online public sphere to protest violence and repression in Eritrea. Mano and Willems (2010) explore how the Zimbabwean diaspora connects with the homeland through the websites, chat rooms, and discussion forums. Other authors also pay attention to online manifestations of diaspora communities under the notions of e-diasporas (Diminescu et al., 2011) and digital diasporas (Brinkerhoff, 2009). These works successfully show that the Internet is highly embedded in the diasporic lifestyle, and digital online platforms have significant influences on people's daily lives.

Several scholars label these digital ethnographic methods differently, such as virtual ethnography (Hine, 2015), online ethnography (Correll, 1995), media ethnography in virtual space (Lindlof & Shatzer, 1998), digital ethnography (Murthy, 2008), Internet ethnography (Buchanan & Sveningsson, 2004), Netnography (Kozinets, 2010), and ethnography across

online and offline spaces (Leander & McKim, 2003). Most of these works support the digital methods with the classical data ethnography collection, whereby they conduct multi-sited fieldwork of the participant observation at different stages of the research. The ethnographic fieldwork supports the digital ethnography and can be done both before and after data collection processes. The majority of scholars apply digital technologies to support the participant observation of online communities (e.g., Lindlof & Shatzer, 1998; Kozinets, 2009; Hine, 2015).

Although the study of digital technologies has been a growing field of research in the social sciences (Lyman & Wakeford, 1999: 359), there is still a lack of academic works which incorporate the different methodological approaches under the mixed methodology, especially digital ethnography methods to studying of diaspora communities (Murthy, 2008; Kozinets, 2010; Oiarzabal & Reips, 2012: 1334; Leurs & Prabhakar, 2018: 249). Offline ethnography still dominates in the literature (Schrooten, 2013: 92). As Smets (2018) argues, "much less literature addresses methodological issues in diaspora research, particularly in media and communication." As a result, there is a lack of digital ethnography methods within diaspora literature. In this dissertation, I applied the digital ethnography in diaspora literature by analyzing online and offline activities of Turkish communities in Germany.

Leurs and Prabhakar (2018: 250) introduced three paradigms of digital migration studies: (1) migrants in cyberspace, (2) everyday digital migrant life, and (3) migrants as data. These paradigms are divided in terms of the primary object of the study under the notion of digital-media-centric-ness (Horst et al., 2016: 9-11). The first paradigm, migrants in cyberspace, is digital-media-centric and illustrates that cyberspace is a unique virtual space (e.g., Markham, 1998; Gajjala, 2004; Everett, 2009; Bernal, 2014; Frouws et al., 2016). The second paradigm, everyday digital migrant life, is non-digital-media-centric and focuses on daily practices and online-offline activities. Miller and Slater (2000), Georgiou (2006), Madinaou and Miller (2012), and Zijlstra and Van Liempt (2017) are some of the scholars who focus on everyday migrant life and apply digital ethnography with participant observation and qualitative interviews. The third paradigm, migrants as data, is predominantly driven by digital methods. Diminescu (2008), Messias et al. (2016), Kok and Rogers (2017), Sharma and Booker (2017) are a few examples of digital-media-centric scholars.

I followed the second paradigm to understand the everyday practices of diasporas. However, as Leurs and Prabhakar (2018) argue, single studies can draw on multiple paradigms of digital strategies that are all currently in use and combined. I also used the third paradigm, a digital-media-centric digital approach, to understand online activities and offline participation of diaspora communities. The usage of digital methods helps me to understand the link between the homeland, the hostland, and diaspora communities in the triadic nexus, diasporic connectedness, and togetherness for the diasporic solidarity and examine how kin-community becomes embedded in the country of residence.

Diasporas mostly use digital platforms to ask information or legal assistance in times of precarity; request for help economically, legally, emotionally, and socially; construct a shared imagination, especially about the homeland and diasporic identities; express of the nostalgia about the past life and the homeland; disseminate and discuss information for collective actions; provide a variety of social networks and relations (capital), and perform as well as the act of being a diaspora. Digital technologies thus construct a new distribution of power (Borkert et al., 2009: 32-33) as well as a new type of hybrid identity. Ordinary diaspora members modify the social and political constructions of diasporic realities, imaginations, identities, as well as power in everyday life (Escobar, 1994).

Diaspora literature needs to apply digital methods to understand how transnational communities enact daily (Schrooten, 2012). As Lewis et al. (2008) and Boyd and Ellison (2007) argue, digital methods offer remarkable new research opportunities. The usage of the Internet for the construction, as well as the performance of diasporic identity, is one of the data collections about and from diasporas. Web platforms and social media networks, such as Google Search, Facebook, and Instagram, are useful in accessing narratives and discourses of the diaspora communities. Digital ethnography becomes an additional method of classical ethnographic works (Brickman-Bhutta, 2009). As Østergaard-Nielson (2002: 200) claims, diaspora politics "must be measured with a more meshed method tool rather than is usually the [single] case in the [classical ethnographic] analysis," and digital ethnography is one of the alternatives to that proclaimed meshed tools.

Diasporas are not only facilitating economic support and financial remittance transfers to the homelands, but they are also digital agents of change (Borkert et al., 2018). Such communities communicate among and between to influence the formation of diasporic

identities (e.g., Ackah & Newman, 2003; Bernal, 2006; Parham, 2004; Georgiou, 2006; Kissau and Hunger, 2008; Mano & Willems, 2010; Peel, 2010). As Georgiou (2006) mentions, the Internet develops "a space of commons, a sense of imagined community across borders, and a meeting place of the private and the public, and the interpersonal and the communal." Diasporas not only forge their identity constructions online but also the digital platforms enable them to perform the diasporic togetherness as physical (offline). There are many similarities, connections, and overlapping between online and offline togetherness (Schrooten, 2012). Digital ethnography thus helps diasporas to transform virtual and imagined communities into more tangible and psychical communities of practice. For these reasons, digital platforms are useful for diasporas in everyday life practices such as communication, emotional and social needs, identity construction, solidarity, philanthropic activities, and political mobilization.

On the other hand, there are several existing methodological problems within the digital ethnography: (1) the validity of data on Internet users (the accuracy of information), (2) absence of the participant observation while the main idea of the ethnography is the ethnographic practice of observation of real people, (3) a full description of digital networks without understanding emotions, and (4) the hard distinction between real and virtual worlds (Wittel, 2000).

The inclusion of data ethnography into the digital ethnography with the interviews and focused group observation solves the problem of participant observation. However, other issues might continue to exist. Several scholars, therefore, chose to combine different research strategies within digital methods. For instance, Doná (2014) uses netnographic e-transnationalism to observe posts and comments on sites. Zijlstra and Van Liempt (2017) combine digital methods with interviews and examine both online and offline dynamics and.

In this dissertation, I also combined different research strategies under data and digital ethnography. "Though online spheres are the extension of offline worlds, they alone do not suffice for a thorough analysis" (Bauböck & Faist, 2010: 248). As Miller and Slatter (2000: 5) claim, "if you want to get to the Internet, do not start from there." Online activities (digital ethnography) can only be complementary to offline data collection (data ethnography). Since "no one lives an entirely digital life" (Miller & Horst, 2012: 16), there is a need for a combination of digital methods with a data ethnography. For these reasons, I supported

digital ethnography by data ethnography. I followed Zijlstra and Van Liempt and combined digital methods with interviews to examine both online and offline dynamics. The data ethnography helped me to observe how digitally mediated practices of diasporas turn into real physical places. Without data ethnography, digital ethnography never becomes successful in understanding why and how a specific social and political phenomenon such as diaspora mobilization occurs.

Under these circumstances, I collected the primary data from the interviews and participant observation within the multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork in Germany. In November-December 2019, I made research visits to North-Rhine Westphalia - Essen, Duisburg, Köln, Düsseldorf, Bonn, Dortmund, and Bochum. I was a visiting researcher at the Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung (ZfTI) - The Center for Turkish Studies and Research on Integration at the University of Duisburg-Essen. At the institute, I mainly worked on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Turkish communities in Germany. I also visited DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs) and the Attaché of Family and Social Policy (AFSP) in Düsseldorf to conduct interviews.

Furthermore, formal interviews with the officials, policy-makers, and scholars in the home country (Turkey), and the host country (Germany) were conducted to understand how the child protection in Germany turns into a problem for Turkish communities. The interviews were the semi-structured format. There were also face-to-face, open-ended interviews with Turkish diaspora members in Germany to understand the problem itself. The interviewees were included from activists, NGO representatives, and associations' members as well as regular members of the Turkish compatriots. I particularly contacted with the Umut Yıldızı Derneği (UYD) to explore the problems of the Turkish descent population in Germany and their activities to solve these problems.

The sample, however, was not representative of the whole Turkish diasporic communities since they are numerically large numbers of people. Interviewees were selected who are active in diasporic care and engage in an activity related to the child-care practices in Germany. With the consideration of heterogeneity among the Turkish communities, the interviews were not involved only with Turks, Muslim, and Sunni members, but also with the "others" such as Kurds, Alevite, and Jews. The diversification helped me to represent different diasporic stances and narratives related to diasporic care within the triadic nexus.

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The heterogeneity subsequently affects the perceptions of the "issue," as well as the homeland and hostland's politics.

In sum, online activities do not exist in isolation from the offline participation, and they should "never considered as inseparable from offline factors" (Leurs and Prabhakar, 2018: 250-251). Diasporas are "situated across online and offline contexts, spanning here, and there [or the elsewhere], across various platforms, and borders" (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2018). Digital technologies thus "shape and be shaped by everyday social life" (Leurs and Prabhakar, 2018: 252). Since online and offline activities interlink diaspora connectivity and togetherness, I combined online (digital ethnography) and offline (data ethnography) observations. I thus followed data ethnography with the digital ethnographic approach as it is considered as the most suitable research strategy to analyze diaspora mobilization from below.

2.4.2 Netnography where the Data Ethnography Meets Digital Ethnography

Netnography is used for the description of the Internet or technologically networked ethnography (Kozinets, 2010). It is the "participant-observational research-based in online fieldwork" (Kozinets, 2010), whereby it collects primary data from the Internet, interviews, and fieldwork. Netnography collects the data not only from the Internet but supplies these preliminary data with the participant observation and interviews. As a result, there is a combination of data ethnography and digital ethnography to solve the deficit and limits of participant observation and fieldwork.

The main contribution of the Netnography is to "adapt the complexities of the modern, globalized, contemporary, technological mediated social world" (Kozinets, 2010). Netnography, therefore, adds "valuable interpretative insight, by building through careful focus and analysis, what is available publicly on the Internet a known and respected body of codified knowledge" (Kozinets, 2010: 113). It also focuses on cultural insights and contexts. Online activities bring social interactions, and later, digital interactions turn into offline participation. Netnography subsequently enables the researcher to recognize a deeper understanding of various dimensions and cultural insights of social and political realities.

There are three main methods for data gathering in Netnography. The first method is to analyze the Internet as the primary data. The second one is to examine everyday life and

cultural practices. The third one is to follow digital media and public blogging about specific events or policies. I followed the second method for data gathering. Netnography helped me to involve direct participation in online forums on the Internet, participant observation of communities, events, and policies, whereby I conducted several interviews with digital members of diaspora communities about their experiences on the care ideals, practices, and responsibilities.

Figure 18 - *Netnographic Inquiry of Turkish Communities in Germany*

Step 1 Definition of research questions and identification of a social site for investigation	RQ: "How does diaspora mobilization occur from below?" SQ1 - "How do ordinary transnational migrants become diaspora entrepreneurs at online and offline platforms?" SQ2 - "How do they establish networks and relations for diasporic care and solidarity?"
Step 2 Online community identification, selection, and entree	Purposive sampling of Turkish diaspora online communities: Facebook groups and pages, Instagram hashtags
Step 3 Participant Observation and data collection (data source: field note, elicited and archival)	Conducting in-depth interviews, research visits at ZfTI, The Attaché, DITIB, UYD
Step 4 Data Analysis and iterative interpretation	Inductive theory development
Step 5 Write, present and report research findings, theoretical and policy implications	Presentation of research findings in Germany

Source: Adapted from Kozinets (2010:61)

Kozinets (2010: 61) identifies the necessary steps in the netnographic inquiry. The first step is to define the research questions and identify digital platforms for investigation. The second step is to identify an online community, select the sites, and be a member of these virtual communities. The third step is the data collection with participant observation. The fourth step is data analysis, and the last step is to write, present, and report the research findings. I also followed each step in this study.

In this regard, the researcher should first be familiar with "everyday experiences and be concerned about social problems and then with technology" before conducting digital research (Gregory et al., 2017). I employed the Netnography to understand everyday life and practices of Turkish diaspora communities in terms of child protection and welfare in Germany. In November 2018, I became a member of the social media groups on Facebook and started to follow their conversation and narratives on the care ideals.

Nonetheless, online activities of diasporas enable to guide the group's behaviors and practices. There are several advantages to apply Netnography in ethnographic works. While the classical ethnographic studies have a sampling problem with a relatively small size of the qualitative cases, the Netnography offers much larger and more representative samples for the investigation. Snowball sampling is not also very successful in the analysis when it limits the selection of the participants in the research design. The researcher accesses the diasporas only through other members; therefore, it might end up in the same circle of the population without diversification. Netnography solves the snowball technique's problem with its big data collection, whereas social media users have a high level of heterogeneity.

Another advantage of the netnographic inquiry is that it develops trust among the researcher and the participants in the study (Atkinson & Flint, 2001; Warnecke, 2010). Netnography offers the participant observation in the data collection with the support of semi-structured interviews, and it collects the visual media materials to determine the role of online activities in offline participation. In this dissertation, I thus followed Netnography to supplement data ethnography. I used both data and digital ethnographies to embrace the online and offline connectivity and togetherness of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany under the care ideals, practices, and responsibilities.

2.4.3 Computational Approach to Study Diaspora Communities

While Netnography offers an alternative way for the data collection, several scholars analyze the everyday life of transnational people through big data analysis and use computational tools for data gathering (e.g., Rogers, 2013; Brooker et al., 2016; Kok & Rogers, 2017). The computational approach could support the netnographic inquiry. Diaspora communities have also been increasingly datafied (Leurs & Shepher, 2017). I followed the issue mapping and tracing crossing of Candidatu et al. (2018) and Leurs and Prabhakar (2018) of the computational approaches to study diaspora communities.

The issue mapping approach helped me to explore "how a particular topic of discussion/issue mobilizes diasporic conversation and contestation through digital technologies" (Rogers et al., 2015). It allowed me to understand how smaller-scale issues or policies (child protection and welfare) emerge and come to matter to diasporic people in intensely for collective

activism (Alinejad et al., 2019). This approach is particularly suitable for investigating diasporic flow and connectivity.

The mattering maps show "how specific issues or policies come to take intensity for a group of people (tracing crossing) and separates relevant and non-relevant issues and conversations among diaspora members." Therefore, the mattering maps identify critical events to shape people's experiences when identity comes to matter through these experiences (Grossberg, 2010). Figuring out the important events for diaspora mobilization is a crucial step in the analysis, whereby the mattering maps demonstrate the significant events and experiences within the construction of diasporic consciousness and identities. I used the mattering maps to illustrate how some members of the Turkish diasporas in Germany have been moved to connect to the diasporic care and solidarity in child protection matters. Diasporas, being moral and virtual communities, mobilize co-ethnics for collective actions, particularly when co-ethnics face the vulnerability and precarious living conditions in the "unknown alienated hostland."

There are three distinct spheres, device-demarcated source sets in the computational analysis (Rogers, 2013). The device-demarcated source sets are composed of (1) an institutional, news-related sphere such as via Google Search, (2) a cause-related sphere such as via Facebook, and (3) an image-sphere such as via Instagram. These spheres helped me to identify empirical traces of care ideals, practices, and responsibilities amongst Turkish diasporas in Germany.

In the first step, I analyzed "Google Search" results across local Google domains (Rogers, 2013) for the literary query of words Turkish kinship/foster parents in Germany (Almanya'da koruyucu Türk aile, Türkische Pflegefamilie in Deutschland) both in Turkish and German languages. There was an inclusion of two local domains – google.de (Germany) and google.com.tr (Turkey) to compare the results of each domain for identifying commonalities and differences. Google search showed the circulation of the kinship care both in the country of residence and the country of origin. It also portrayed how the Turkish communities have engaged in kinship care in different settings (both the homeland and the hostland contexts as well as among) in two languages (Turkish and German).

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The second step of the analysis was based on the cause sphere via Facebook pages and groups. It showed me how social media platforms actively disseminated content related to the Turkish diasporas' kinship foster care practices in Germany.

The third step of the analysis was image-sphere on Instagram with hashtags by using Instagram Insights. Hashtags of the "Turkish foster parents" (Almanya'da koruyucu Türk aile, Türkische Pflegefamilie in Deutschland) in two different languages (Turkish and German) categorize the intensity of the issue in multiple different locations. It was possible to identify which language prevails in the posts among Turkish diasporas, either the language of the hostland (German) or the homeland language (Turkish). The image-sphere helped to understand the most frequently used co-hashtags in the diaspora networks related to kinship care. By analyzing hashtags, it was possible to recognize whether Turkish diasporas reach Turkish diaspora members, the hostland's elites and community, the homeland's one, or both.

In conclusion, the digital ethnography in the data collection, participant observation, and informal conversations was applied to explain how Turkish diaspora communities mobilize for their needs, interests, and identities at the online and offline platforms. Under the issue mapping (how the kinship care practices cross digital platforms among Turkish diaspora members in Germany) and tracing crossing (how the issue of kinship care connects different diaspora members for collective actions), I followed both qualitative and quantitative research techniques and epistemologies.

2.5 Data Analysis: Content Analysis

In this dissertation, I used a multi-method approach to the Content Analysis (CA) to understand diasporic networks, relations, commitments, and practices at various online and offline platforms. I examined Turkish diaspora networks of kinship care practices for Turkish origin children through in-depth interviews, social media, and observatory participation by the CA.

Kozinets (2006) argues, "Netnography should never be tied too closely with any one particular method of data collection and analysis" since it "encompasses multiple methods, approaches, and analytic techniques," Langer and Beckman (2005), however, claim that Content Analysis (CA) is the primary method to be employed in conducting a Netnography.

CA is a systematic approach to analyzing the content, and there are five main steps: (1) identify data sources, (2) develop categories, (3) code data, (4) assess reliability, and (5) analyze results. In CA, three essential criteria should be met: (1) objectivity, (2) systematic, and (3) generality. CA subsequently makes inferences from the text and other types of qualitative information (including postings in social media). Though systematic coding of the data, key trends and themes are identified for the analysis. Since it is a descriptive approach to describe the phenomenon (Maier, 2018), CA becomes a process of data reduction (Schreier, 2012). Under the CA, I used a variety of analytic strategies to categorize, compare, and contrast a corpus of data and characterize communication by making comparisons.

As a result of these, I combined online and offline research techniques and included the CA to investigate how Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are mobilized in matters of child protection. I used CA for both research methods and analytical tools (Bryman, 2006), and I categorized, compared, and contrasted social media posts and interviews. As a supplementary research method, CA was applied to investigate the online activities of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany, whereby I identified relevant pages and groups on Facebook and categorized these postings. As an analytical tool, CA was applied to understand the expression of diasporic identity for the representational function (Parham, 2004).

2.6 Reliability, Validity, and Generalizability of Data

The ethnographic works usually have internal validity, whereby the researcher is familiar with the subject's complexity. For external validity, the researcher might create appropriate data collection that can be applied to other similar situations (by using the same research methods and data collection techniques) (Lecompte & Schensul, 1999: 3). When the ethnographic data is collected subjectively, the research has serious validity and reliability issues. For instance, it is difficult to assess the impact of digital activities in cyberspace on the self (diaspora mobilization). Other factors could also affect offline participation, such as the hostland factor or individual interest.

There is no cause and effect relationship between the online and offline worlds. It is difficult to estimate the real contribution of online togetherness in bringing offline participation.

Online and offline worlds, however, interact together, and they are not independent of each other.

Furthermore, the digital data is too large on the Internet. Hence, the researcher does not necessarily analyze large data sets to conclude the analysis. As Kozinets (2006) argues, it is possible to make a useful analysis in the social aspects even with minimal material. In this respect, Netnography as a supplementary data collection helps me to work with a relatively small data corpus to making a further generalization.

2.7 Setting the Field

From the beginning, I have known that there would be both significant advantages and disadvantages to researching communities from the "same" ethnic and cultural backgrounds. I have been a Turkish migrant for almost 15 years in my life (in Cyprus, Czechia, Kyrgyzstan, and Hungary), and also stayed in Germany for a while. Therefore, I have an insider perspective with the Turkish communities in the country, whereby we collectively share some elements of the Turkish diasporic consciousness. Under the Turkish migrant identity markers, we have been well-connected and shared some of the aspects of the homeland culture, language, religion, ethnicity, but also the romanticized far-away ideal homeland as well as migratory diasporic experiences.

I am aware that diaspora communities are closed entities, and they are not willing to share their experiences with outsiders. Being an insider of the Turkish diaspora save me numerous advantages in this research, notably when I established my networks and relations. I was always welcomed by all Turkish descent scholars, institutions, and organizations in Germany to work closely with them and be invited to be part of their academic and cultural community. In this context, I developed a sophisticated but also a lasting relationship with the "subject" of my research.

On the other hand, I was continued to be an "outsider" since our migratory experiences, including the diaspora consciousness, have been shaped by different local and collective histories in different hostlands. As a middle-aged, single, male, and educated researcher, I do not belong to the community of "victim families" of childcare. However, the disadvantage of being an outsider dramatically turned into a significant advantage in the research, whereby I

could stay more "objective" to the topic and the child protection and welfare policy in Germany.

2.8 Ethical Issues: Self-Reflexivity, Confidentiality, and Anonymity

I know beforehand, any research that targets the human population must have a detailed research design and methodology with ethical considerations and self-reflexivity. In the remainder of these, I attempted to develop the methodological framework(s) to consider particular problems - especially on ethics.

The role of the researcher is significant in both data and digital ethnography works, including Netnography. "The researcher is not simply a person who knows how to run specific software, but a living, breathing individual whose personality will enrich the research" (Kozinets, 2015). The researcher, therefore, has to have a deep understanding of the culture. As a Turkish migrant as well as a researcher, there were some difficulties during the data collection. I was aware that I could easily be fully integrated with a high level of personal sympathizing with the topic (or "the issue"), and I could quickly bring biased interpretations in the analytical framework (Hammersley, 1990; Hine, 2005). The close connectivity between me and the topic itself, as well as I and other Turkish co-ethnics, might quickly bring the biased interpretations. I thus adopted a reflexive engagement in my research.

Self-reflexivity, on the other hand, turned into a significant advantage as I am a part of the Turkish diaspora communities as well as a professional researcher at the same time. The closed members of the Turkish diasporas usually trusted me and my professionalism without serious hesitation. Trust between the researcher and the community is one of the essential factors in examining vulnerable communities. Turkish diasporas in their closed groups feel that they are in a secure environment with me, and they were more quickly and openly share their opinions with real emotions. Diaspora identities are constructed and re-constructed under shared morality; therefore, they felt less concern for the identification and openly expressing their views in the closed diasporic groups. However, I was aware that I must care about the confidentiality of data in my study.

Another ethical issue was raised whether I should inform the users about their participation in the research. Neither Messias et al. (2016) nor Kok and Rogers (2017) reported the users

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when they conducted their investigation. If the users would know that they participate in the research, they could change, alter, and modify their behaviors, which may not fit the everyday causal experiences and daily routines. Initially, I observed the online discussions and everyday conversations in social media. I faced difficulties in separating "what public and private online is" (Mann & Stewart, 2000). Several scholars argue that if the information is published online, it automatically becomes public, even if they were on the private pages and account of individual users in social media (Mann & Stewart, 2000).

In this study, I used these "public" sources on "private pages" for data analysis. After participation observation (online), I informed the admins of the Facebook groups and pages and asked them to pin a post to the top of the page. All the users, both the current and the future ones, in those pages and groups, were informed about the research. I also asked the admins to set up one specific clause related to my research purpose when the new users ask to join these groups/pages. The post included (1) the description of the project, (2) main aim and purposes, (3) my contact addresses (both e-mail and mobile phone), (4) the duration of the research (that is set up for six months), (5) benefits of the research for the Turkish descent population in Germany (i.e., how I will use the findings for their claims and will have policy recommendations to the policy-makers both in Germany and Turkey), and last but not least (6) written electronically inform consent.

In this context, anonymity might easily breach the ethical implications of data gathering procedures, especially in my study. Preservation of anonymity is an essential pitfall (Hamelink, 2006: 120). Kozinets provides a minimum cloak where he hides the users' names as pseudonyms but contains the name of the groups, pages, or online communities with direct quotations. I followed Kozinets and hide the users' names as pseudonyms but gave all the details of the groups, pages, and online communities with direct quotes.

There were some problems during the translation of the conversations. I translated quotations from Turkish to English or from German to English. Without attention, I might alter as well as potentially add my understanding to the diasporic narratives and discourses. Translation of the sentences, however, allowed keeping the users anonymous and making them not easily be identified through a simple internet search.

For these ethical considerations, I chose not to start data collection online directly. Data ethnography, especially fieldwork and participant observation, was conducted before and after the digital data collection. I first chose data ethnography (fieldwork and interviews) and then the Netnography. At the same time, I observed the online platforms to select the relevant data for the identification of the issue, events, and discussions among Turkish diaspora communities in Germany.

Under these circumstances, I paid particular attention to data protection, confidentiality, and anonymity of the users. For the data protection, I decided not to include the transcript of the (both online and offline) interviews, focused group discussions, and social media postings (apart from the translation of some direct quotations). Since I collected extensive data from various sources and with thousands of users, I was not able to collect written informed consent from all participants; however, they were aware of the research "publicly," and I was approachable during the study.

2.9 Methodological Limitations and Other Issues

In the virtual world, it is not easy to identify who the real users are. Digital methods have a high risk of false identification. As Trandafoiu (2013: 15) describes, "virtual communities have virtual boundaries." However, "Netnography focuses on flow and connectivity rather than the location and boundaries of the users" (Hine, 2000: 31). This is why; the Netnographic works mainly discover the connections and interactions among the users in the digital platforms. I believe that any research must be meticulous in designing research strategies and analyzing the potential agency role(s) of diaspora communities. For this reason, I am always careful not to end up where my "subject position" (diasporas) turns into the meaningfulness of an "object" in this research.

I also attempted to estimate the unexpected outcomes and insights of computational data analysis since I was not so familiar with technology and computational tools. For instance, Netvizz is no longer be available to gather vast amounts of Facebook's data. Therefore, I spent considerable time on the data collection on Facebook pages.

I examined Turkish diasporic care and collective actions for Turkish origin children in Germany as a case study. However, I focused on the care, which is "needy" (children who are

taken into care). In contrast, care is a universal right and should not be dependent on the needs of people. In this context, family and kinship ties (both biological and social) become the central analytical position in my dissertation. As Orozco (2006) argues, the needs and desires of the population are the responsibility of society. Hence, I chose the case study for a specific part of the society (children), who is needy because I assume that there is a high level of mobilization among Turkish diaspora communities in child protection and welfare in Germany. The issue (threshold event) still matters for diaspora activism. In matters of other care (for instance, elderly care), it is possible to find different outcomes (such as a low level of mobilization). I am always aware of the diasporic selectivity in morality, solidarity, and collective actions.

Nevertheless, in this dissertation, I chose a topic or even an "issue," which is framed by the diasporic communities themselves. I particularly wanted to raise public awareness on the issue among academic circles. I aim to offer possible solutions with practical policy recommendations in the triadic nexus (for both the hostland, the homeland, and diaspora communities).

Conclusion

There is a need for a methodologically more diversified approach in diaspora literature, and this dissertation offers a combination of a mixed method of investigation. The qualitative data ethnography was complemented by digital ethnography to compensate for the weakness of the traditional ethnographic works. The overall data included ethnographic methods at multi-sited fieldworks, qualitative semi-structured interviews, and virtual ethnography by using both Netnography and digital computational approach. Turkish diaspora mobilization in Germany was examined through the qualitative analysis of multi-sited data ethnography as well as through mixed methods of digital data by Netnography and computational data approaches. The (online and offline) interviews through participant observation in multi-sited fieldwork supported the data analysis.

I thus followed both qualitative and quantitative research techniques and epistemologies and employed both inductive and deductive reasoning approaches. The inductive approach started from the active participant observation, both at the online and offline platforms. However, the research was not entirely inductive since I already have specific ideas and preconceptions on

the subject. I drew the analysis based on the selected theories and pre-observation knowledge and experience in Germany. I also followed Pries' (2007) heuristic distinction between the relevant units of reference, analysis, and measurement. The unit of reference is the hostland environments, the unit of analysis is Turkish diaspora communities in Germany, and the unit of measurement is diaspora mobilization in matters of kinship care. The data corpus was approached with the Content Analysis to examine the processes of diasporic identity and mobilization from below.

Chapter III

Revisiting the Triadic Nexus: Turkish Communities in Germany

Introduction

Turkish immigrants in Germany have always been recognized as a central topic in Turkish political and social discourse. Turkish political elites, as well as media and public, pay particular attention to the Turkish compatriots abroad and consider their problems as part of Turkey's internal issues. Neo-Nazi Döner killings, racist and xenophobic attacks against Turkish immigrants in Germany always get significant attention in the homeland. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan makes several visits to Germany and shows the political and public sensitivity on the Turkish descent population in Germany. President Erdogan controversially advises the Turkish immigrants to integrate into German society; hence, not to be assimilated. He suggests that Turkish parents first to teach their children Turkish culture and norms, and then German. In Germany, about 1.5 million remain Turkish citizens and are eligible to vote in Turkish elections. Turkish politicians, therefore, demand to hold public rallies in various German cities. Germany, on the other hand, banned Turkish politicians' election campaigns in their cities. The AKP government branded Germany's rally refusal as political suicide. As a result, Germany always holds a special place in Turkish domestic and foreign politics, and Turkish compatriots in Germany get significant attention in/by the homeland.

In this context, the aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to review the literature on how scholars examine Turkish[55] communities in Germany and (2) to describe how Turkish migration to Germany has been historically developed over the decades. The second part of the chapter, furthermore, explores how the sending country (Turkey), the receiving country (Germany), and diasporas (Turkish communities in Germany) have responded to this migratory process.

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[55] In this dissertation, Turkish refers to nationality and denotes "those from Turkey," regardless of the ethnic background.

3.1 Literature Review: Turkish Communities in Germany

In the literature, most of the scholars do not refer to Turkish communities in Germany as diaspora groups. Mandel (2008) summarizes the terminology used for Turkish co-ethnics as (1) "Gastarbeiter – guest worker," (2) "Ausländer – foreigner/outlander," (3) "ausländische Mitbürger – foreign fellow citizen," and (4) "Deutsche ausländischer Herkunft – Germans of foreign descent." Recently, the term "Deutsche mit Migrationshintergrund – Germans with a migratory background" has also gained popularity to define Turkish communities in the country (Tschoepe, 2017).

Figure 19 – *Conceptual Framework in the Literature*

Labels	Authors
Guest workers	Abadan-Unat (1976)
(Im-)migrants	Wolbert (1992), Ehrkamp (2005), Şen (2007), Simon & Ruhs (2008), Doormernik (1995), Kaya (2019)
German-Turks	Çağlar (1995), Kaya (2007)
Germany's Turks	Ögelman (2006)
Germany-born Turks	King & Kilinc (2012)
Turks in Germany	Faist (1995), White (1997), Stowasser (2002), Yurdakul (2006), Green (2003), Vermeulen & Berger (2008), Scheffler (2009), Sakman (2015)
Turkish-Germans	Kılınç & King (2017), Vierra (2018)
Turkish Minority	Kürsat-Ahlers (1996), Aktürk (2010)
Turkish Community in Germany	Öner (2014)
Euro-Turks	Østergaard-Nielsen (2003), Kaya & Kentel (2005), Sirkeci et al., (2012), İçduygu (2014)

Some scholars, furthermore, use "Almancı/Alamancı – Germanized" and "Gurbetçi - someone with a Turkish origin who lives and works in another country" (e.g., Yasa, 1979; Demircioglu, 1984; Abadan-Unat, 2006; Gelekci, 2014). These labels, however, often carry negative connotations since it shows that Turkish co-ethnics have a lack of cultural and religious sensitivity and formal language of the homeland.

In a few studies, some scholars have begun to refer those communities as a diaspora (e.g., Chapin, 1996; Aydin, 2014; Öktem, 2014; Yildirim-Tschoepe, 2017; McFadden, 2019). Turkish communities in Germany fit Cohen's typology of diaspora: a type of labor diaspora, but also a victim type of diaspora belonging to the political and ethnic minorities that escaped from the military regime in Turkey at the beginning of the 1980s or nowadays.

Figure 20 – *Analytical Framework in the Literature*

Discussion Areas	Authors
History of Migration	Abadan-Unat (1976), Yurdakul (2006), Şen (2003)
Everyday Life	Soysal (1999), Sirkeci (2002), Çağlar & Soysal (2004), Gülçiçek (2006), Hinze (2013), Yildirim-Tschoepe (2017)
Identity	Mandel (2008), Østergaard-Nielsen (2003), Kaya & Kentel (2005), Kaya, (2007), King & Kilinc (2012)
Racism and Discrimination	Klusmeyer & Papademetriou (2009)
Integration	Müller (2006)
Assimilation	Ehrkamp (2006)
Inclusion and Exclusion	Çağlar (1995), Küçükcan (2002)
Citizenship	Soysal (1994), Faist (1995), Kaya & Kentel (2005), Ehrkamp & Letner (2013)
Political Mobilization	Aktürk (2010)
Social Mobility	Çağlar (1995)
Transnational Activities	Faist (2000), Østergaard-Nielsen (2006)
Culture	Horrocks & Kolinsky (1996), Heckmann (1997, Çağlar (1998), Kaya (2007)
Return Migration	Sayari (1986), Fokkema (2011), Sirkeci et al. (2012), Kılınç & King (2017)
Generational Differences	Hartmann (2016), Barwick (2016)
Socioeconomic Conditions	Language and Education: Faist (1993)
	Status: Kalter (2002), Avci (2006)
Gender	Kadıoğlu (1994), Diehl, Koening & Ruckdeschel (2009)

In the literature, several scholars highlight the importance of religion and culture in everyday ethnicity. Religion is one of the identity descriptors for Turkish (diaspora) communities. As Tietze (2000) argues, Turkish diaspora communities redefined the notion of ethnic Turks in Islamic terms. The Turkish descent population is not a homogeneous ethnic group; therefore, they do not quickly unite under the ethnic-national identity of "Turks." Instead, Islam, being a religious identity, becomes an alternative descriptor to unite most of those communities. Turkish ethnic and religious identities go hand in hand both at home and abroad. As a result, Islam becomes one of the common cultural denominators and has a strong position in the Turkish diasporic institutionalization (Muttalib & Hashmi, 1994; Byrnes & Katzenstein, 2006) - particularly in Germany (Abduallah, 1993; Helicke, 2002; Spuler-Stegeman, 2002).

As mentioned, Turkish migrants in Germany are not a single ethnic community, collectively united under the national/ethnic identity and interests of the homeland. They are somewhat more diversified ethnically under homeland differences (Ögelman, 2006). Although Islam plays a decisive role in uniting Sunni-Muslim communities, including Turkey, under the shared religious values, there is a need to understand to what extent Islam can provide a vehicle of diaspora mobilization for Turkish communities abroad.

The homeland politics - particularly Turkey's diaspora policies and the accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU), continues to be one of the most dominant subjects in the literature (e.g., Kaya & Kentel, 2005; Erzan & Kirişçi, 2006; Behar, 2006). Several scholars argue that the Turkish descent population in Germany shows little political involvement, except for the participation in homeland politics, when it is compared with other migrant groups in the country (e.g., Koopmans & Statham, 1999; De Wit & Koopmans, 2005). The literature demonstrates a low level of political mobilization, or even non-mobilization, among Turkish communities in Germany. Several scholars, therefore, highlight the political loyalties of Turkish immigrants to Turkey and their transnational activities towards the homeland (e.g., Soysal, 1994; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Ögelman, 2006; Kaya, 2007). Söhn and Özcan (2006), for example, demonstrate the level of political attachment of the Turkish communities in Germany to Turkey.

Besides, most of the works in the literature compare Turkish communities in Germany and Turkey. For instance, Pfluger-Schindlbeck (1989) explores Alevi communities in Berlin and Turkey; Mıhçıyazgan (1986) analyzes the gender roles in Turkey and Germany; White (1997) discusses the functioning of reciprocity in identity maintenance in Istanbul and Berlin. All these comparative works focus on the concept of return migration. However, there is still a gap in the literature to understand the political loyalties of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany (both towards Germany and amongst each other).

Under these circumstances, the literature illustrates that Turkish communities in Germany have integration difficulties (e.g., Rex, 2000; Thränhardt, 2000; Avci, 2006; Wets, 2006; Abadan-Unat, 2011; İçduygu, 2011) and they have social distance towards the host society (Thränhardt, 1989; Reif & Melich, 1992; Ögelman, 2000). The Turkish descent population has been accused of building and living in a "*Parallelgesellschaften* - parallel society"[56] (Müller, 2006; Karcher, 2010).

Non-Turkish scholars do not refer to the works of any Turkish scholars. For instance, Hartmann (2014) and Barwick (2016) did not include any Turkish scholars' arguments. These works often lack an understanding of the everyday life of the Turkish descent

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[56] Wilhelm Heitmeyer (1996) describes parallel societies as a form of voluntary cultural segregation from the mainstream society. William Hiscott (2005) similarly defines the term "practice of forming voluntary segregation and unwilling to integrate into the host society."

population when there is no reference to the insider perspective(s). However, several Turkish scholars have significant expertise in Turkish communities in Germany such as Nermin Abadan-Unat, Ayşe Çağlar, Gökçe Yurdakul, Ayhan Kaya, Nedim Ögelman, Asiye Kaya, M. Murat Erdoğan, and many more.

Although much research has been done on Turkish immigrants in Germany - particularly about their integration and identity problems, there is less academic publication in international journals. For example, in "the Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies," only one article is related to the Turkish community in Germany.[57] The semi-annually journal - Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien (ZfTS)[58], which was published between 1988 and 2007, also stopped publication. Besides, only a few universities in Germany have Turkish centers and programs on Turkish Studies.[59]

Immigrant communities have been underrepresented in the family literature (Crosnoe & Cavanagh, 2010; Steinbach, 2013). There are a few studies on the nexus between family and migration among Turkish communities in Germany. Nauck (2002), for instance, examines the filial beliefs of Turkish immigrant adult children toward responsibility for aging parents. Baykara-Krumme (2015) explores intergenerational relationships among Turkish migrants and their emotional closeness among family members. There is a high level of contact among Turkish diasporas family members and the kin community (Olbermann & Dietzel-Papakyriakou, 1995; Baykara-Krumme, 2007), and the literature could pay more attention to the everyday life of the Turkish descent population in Germany.

Similarly, there is no enough academic literature in kinship care among Turkish communities in Germany, neither in Germany nor Turkey. In Turkey, only three scholarly articles have been published. The first one is entitled "German Youth Office (Jugendamt) and Turkish-Origin Children Put under Protection" by Selim Vatandaş in 2014. The second one is "German Youth Office and Criticisms for the Protection of Children" by Mustafa Uyanık in 2018. The last one is "Experiences of Turkish immigrant families whose children have been taken into care in Germany" by Fikret Yaman and Tarik Tuncay in 2018. All these articles

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[57] The article is called: Turkish Diaspora in Germany by Wesley Chapin (1996).

[58] The journal mostly covered religion, migration, and EU politics.

[59] These centers are Free University of Berlin – Institute of Turkic Studies, University of Bamberg – Department of Turkish Studies, Georg-August University – Turkology/Turkish Studies, Hamburg University – Tuerkei Europa Zentrum (TEZ), and the University of Duisburg-Essen – Center for Turkish Studies.

were published in the Turkish language. The first two articles predominantly describe the child protection system in Germany and an overview of Jugendamt practices. Both Vatandaş and Uyanik argue, "the inadequate legal regulations concerning the German Youth Office lead to mistreatment of children of Turkish immigrant families" (Vatandaş, 2014: 137). This study, however, confirms that other factors lead to the mistreatment of immigrant children, such as lack of intercultural competence of youth workers and cultural differences of migrant families in child-rearing.

The first two articles are primary sources to understand the issue; however, there is a lack of analysis. The authors mostly describe the problem without having an in-depth investigation. There is a lack of fieldwork in these works. In contrast, Yaman and Tuncay (2018) did fieldwork in Germany with seventeen families and nine officials. They claim, "the German child protection services towards Turkish immigrant families are one of the problems that have constantly been on the agenda in recent years, yet not research holistically so far." According to the authors, "there is a need for more research to understand better the child protection practices of [Turkish] immigrant families [in Germany]." As the authors argue, "there is a research gap in the experiences of Turkish children who are in foster care (Yaman & Tuncay, 2018).

Further academic research is needed to explore the kinship care ideals, practices, and responsibilities of Turkish communities in Germany. These new works should be based on the primary sources and supported by the fieldwork in Germany. By doing so, it can be figured out the everyday life of Turkish descent population rather than describing only integration problems or how they have been mobilized under the homeland's politics/interests. These works will contribute to diaspora, migration, and family literature. This dissertation attempts to fill this research gap in the literature; however, it is not easy to undertake such research due to the high sensitivity of the topic in both Germany and Turkey.

3.2 Historical Background of Turkish Migration to Germany

After the Second World War, the division of Germany and the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 stopped the flow of workers from Eastern and Central Europe. Under the economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) in the early 1960s, the West German government needed to find alternative labor sources from other parts of the world. Turkish economic migrants, along

with other seven Mediterranean countries: Italy, Spain, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia, offered to solve immediate German labor shortages. In October 1961, West Germany and Turkey bilaterally signed a formal labor recruitment agreement (Anwerbeabkommen) to meet the demand for cheap labor in a booming post-war German economy.[60]

From the early 1960s, Turkish workers started to arrive in Germany. In 1961, a total of 7.116 Turkish citizens migrated to Germany, and the German Central Recruitment Office (Anwerbebüros der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) started to regulate labor migration flows. According to the bilateral agreement, there would be a rotation system, which allowed a work permit of guest workers for only two years. The guest worker system was transformed into a permanent settlement when many Turkish workers never returned to the homeland. Turkish migrants have subsequently become the largest non-ethnic German community.

During the early 1960s, Turkish labor migrants were mostly young aged (20-40) male workers. They were skilled laborers with education from the more economically developed regions and cities of Turkey (Abadan-Unat, 1976). In the initial phase of the migration of the 1960s, the rural migrants were very low[61], and Turkish laborers had formed a more homogenous ethnic and socioeconomic group. The socioeconomic background of Turkish guest workers started to change from the mid-1960s. More people with rural backgrounds became the labor migrant by the mid-60s (Kaya & Kentel, 2005).

The labor migration from Turkey to Germany had crucial importance for Turkey's economic development and modernization. First of all, the migration flow offered a short-term solution to the unemployment problem in Turkey. Secondly, Turkish guest workers started to send remittances to their families and contributed to the Turkish economy directly by consumption and investment. Last but not least, the migration act set off a process of modernization in family roles, gender relations, and lifestyles in the emigrant's home regions (Aydin, 2016: 6) even though it was not successful. Consequently, the recruitment of Turkish laborers into the German industry has been considered as a part of the development aid and modernization of the country in the 1960s (Sayari, 1986).

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[60] The first agreement about receiving the workers from Turkey was made between the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Labor of Schleswig-Hollstein in 1957.
[61] Only 17 % had a rural background in the early 1960s (Abadan-Unat, 2011).

In the early 1970s, Turkish labor migration in Western Europe reached the highest level. More than half of a million Turks had already migrated,[62] and the significant majority of Turkish labor migrants were located in West Germany. Despite the recruitment ban in 1973, 700.000 Turkish citizens had already arrived in Germany, and the Turkish population in Germany increased from 172.439 to 910.525 (Statistisches Bundesamt). Throughout the 1970s, the Turkish population started to increase significantly due to the family reunification (Familiennachzug) and the birth of the second generation. In 1974, almost twenty percent of Turkish immigrants in Germany were non-working spouses, and another twenty percent were children (Martin, 1991). Since the mid-1970s, the composition of Turkish migrants in Germany began to change.

From the beginning of the 1980s, Turkish migrants continued to arrive in Germany. Following the 1980 military coup d'état in Turkey, many regime opponents applied for asylum seekers in Western Europe.[63] From the end of the 1970s, there was an inflow of asylum seekers and clandestine (illegal) migrants from Turkey to Germany (Sirkeci et al., 2012). In 1980, there were 57.913 asylum applications.[64]

Figure 21 – *Asylum Seekers from Turkey in Germany, 1980-2018*

Years	Number of Applicants	Status
1980	57.913	
1990	22.082	(4.8 percent accepted)
1995	25.514	(21.5 percent accepted)
2000	8.968	
2013 - 2015	1.800 per year	
2017	8.483	
2018	10.655	3.666 [accepted as a refugee]

Source: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees - BAMF

Germany became a primary destination for irregular migrants from Turkey, who entered illegally or overstayed with tourist visas (Aydin, 2016: 4). There has been an increase in politically motivated emigration, especially from Kurdish origin. The composition of Turkish migrants in Germany continued to be changed dramatically in the 1980s. As a result, Turkish

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[62] Germany needed unskilled and semi-skilled laborers for jobs; therefore, there were mainly labor migrants with low education levels. Only 73% of first-generation of Turkish guest workers in the 1970s had elementary school degrees (Fassmann & İçduygu, 2013).

[63] Germany has always been the most preferred destination for Turkish asylum seekers.

[64] In 1990, there were 22.082 asylum seekers, with almost 5% of the accepted status. In the mid-2000s, there were approximately 2.000 applicants per year. After 2017, the number of asylum applicants from Turkey has been sharply increased - 8.483 in 2017 and 10.655 in 2018.

immigrant communities in Germany began to refer to many ethnic, political, and religiously diverse groups from the population of Turkey.

At the same time, there was a low level of return migration from Germany to Turkey in the 1980s. Under the law of return incentive in 1983, approximately 250.000 Turkish citizens (only 5.5 percent) returned to Turkey in 1984 (Abadan-Unat, 2011). In the early 1980s, the annual number of returnees was around 100.000 and decreased to 50.000 annually in the 1990s (İçduygu & Kirişçi, 2009).

Figure 22 – *Return Migration from Germany to Turkey*

Periods	Number per year (approximately)
1965 - 1969	50.000
1973	100.000
1975	150.000
1979 - 1983	100.000
1983 - 1985	200.000
1985 - 1998	50.000
2000 - 2010	40.000
Since 2010	30.000
Total:	1.250.000

Source: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees – BAMF

In the 1990s, the migration of ethnic Kurds from Turkey peaked, and they seek refuge and political asylum in Germany. The ethnic fragmentation among Turkish communities became more apparent (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). In the 1990s, there was also an increase in aggressive xenophobia and violence in Germany against immigrants from Turkey.[65] Turkish communities became the primary target for racist attacks under the discourse of "Turken Frei Deutschland - free of Turkish people" (Küçükcan, 2002).

During the 1990s, the naturalized persons from Turkey in Germany rapidly increased. In 1990, 2.034 Turkish nationals acquired German citizenship and continued with 12.915 in 1993, 31.578 in 1995, and 59.664 in 1998. The Nationality Act of 1990 allowed Turkish immigrants to naturalize to obtain German citizenship, although it required Turkish migrants to give up their Turkish citizenship. With the introduction of new citizenship law, the naturalization of Turkish migrants reached 103.900 in 1999 and continued between the ranges of 32.000 to 82.000 per year in the first half of the 2000s.

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[65] There were bloody racist attacks on Turkish houses in Mölln in 1992 and Solingen in 1993.

Figure 23 – *Turkish Citizens Receiving German Citizenship: Naturalized Persons*

Years	Number
1972-79	2.219
1980-89	10.361
1990	2.034
1995	31.578
1996	46.294
1997	42.240
1998	59.664
1999	103.900
2000	82.800
2001	75.600
2002	64.631
2005	32.661
2012	33.246
2015	19.695
2018	16.700

Source: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees - BAMF

In the second half of the 2000s, there was a significant decrease of naturalization among Turkish people (e.g., 32.661 in 2005). Kaya and Kentel (2005) argue that Turkish communities in Germany "did not see any further benefit in acquiring German citizenship; therefore, they preferred to hold Turkish citizenship."[66] In 2018, 16.700 Turkish citizens obtained German citizenship by naturalization. The ratio was approximately 15 percent of the total number of naturalized people (112.340) in Germany.

Due to the demographic changes throughout the years, Turkish immigrant communities became not guest workers anymore, but be part of "new Germans." By 2002, only 30 percent of Turkish immigrants were considered as labor workers (Müller, 2006). The significant majority of the Turkish migrants in Germany do not have a direct economic purpose behind their stay in the country. Instead, a considerable majority moved for family reunification and newborn child as German citizens (Goldberg et al., 2002). Turkish communities subsequently comprise the largest non-national immigration population of Germany, comprising approximately four percent of the population.

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[66] Citizenship is not included only political and civil rights but also is a social practice (Benhabib, 1999); therefore, the acquisition of citizenship is an essential factor in diaspora mobilization.

Figure 24 – *Turkish Citizens Resident in Germany*

Years	Number
1967	172.439
1970	652.812
1980	1.462.422
1991	1.779.586
2001	1.947.938
2005	1.764.041
2010	1.629.480
2015	1.506.113
2018	1.476.410

Source: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees - BAMF

With the acquisition of German citizenship, it has become challenging to estimate an exact number of Turkish migrants in Germany. German census does not allow people to declare their ethnicity. Since 2007, German official statistical data has included "migration background"[67] as the central category. According to Destatis, nearly 3 million people with "Turkish roots" living in the country in 2017 while 1.5 million retaining Turkish citizenship. Under these circumstances, the Turkish communities demographically become the largest immigrant and non-citizen group in Germany. In 2018, Turkish citizens' resident in Germany was 1.476.410 (Destatis), and they were 13.5% of the total foreign population in the country [10.915.455].

Figure 25 – *The Characteristics of Turkish Migration Flow to Germany*

Time	Waves of Migration
1961-1973	Labor recruitment – '**guestworker**' period
1973- the 1980s	**Family reunification** & **Irregular migrations**
The 1980s	**Clandestine migration** (illegal) & **Asylum seekers** and **refugees** '**European Turks**' (Sirkeci, 2002) & 'Euro-Turks' (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Kaya, 2004)
1983-1985	**Return migration** (from Germany to Turkey)
The 1990s	**Second refugee wave**: ethnic Kurds from Turkey to seek refuge and political asylum
The 2000s	**Circular migration**: better qualified and highly skilled migrants - white color migrants 'Alternative Diaspora'
Since 2016	'**Unwanted citizens**:' regime opponents who labeled as "terrorist" by the government Qualified Professional Migrants (academics, doctors, civil servants)

In the following part of the chapter, the socioeconomic status of the Turkish descent population in Germany is explained in more detail. These statistics were provided by the Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung (ZfTI) at the University of Duisburg-Essen during the fieldwork in November-December 2019. According to these

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[67] The category "migration background" refers individuals who are not born in Germany, foreign nations – even if born in the country, or those with at least one parent born outside of Germany.

statistics, Turkish migrants in Germany have the most socioeconomic disadvantaged position in the country, whereby they face severe precarious living conditions in everyday life.

Figure 26 - *Population by Gender and Age Groups in Germany, 2018*

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	Percent	Number (in 1.000)	Percent	Number (in 1.000)	Percent
Total	2.796	100,0	20.799	100,0	60.814	100,0
Gender Female	1.351	48,8	10.124	48,7	31.083	51,1
Male	1.418	51,2	10.675	51,3	29.731	48,9
Age groups						
Under 15	497	17,9	4.297	20,7	6.539	10,8
15 to 24 years	459	16,6	2.784	13,4	5.645	9,3
25 to 34 years	418	15,1	3.439	16,5	6.941	11,4
35 to 44 years	496	17,9	3.427	16,5	6.657	10,9
45 to 54 years	481	17,4	2.791	13,4	9.867	16,2
55 to 64 years	218	7,9	2.070	10,0	9.876	16,2
Above 65	201	7,3	1.990	9,6	15.290	25,1
Average age	35,1		35,5		47,5	
Under 18 years	638	23,0	5.112	24,6	8.079	13,3
Over 18 years	2.130	76,9	15.687	75,4	52.735	86,7
15 to 64	2.071	74,8	14.512	69,8	38.986	64,1
65 years and older	201	7,3	1.990	9,6	15.290	25,1

Source: Mikrozensus 2018 by ZfTI

Turkish descent population in Germany is relatively young compared with other migrant communities: 29% are between 18-25 years old, 27% are between 25-65 years old. Almost 55% of Turkish immigrants are active population and potential candidates of the labor force. There is also a low level of senior Turkish adults. Only 7% are above 65 years old. Besides, Turkish immigrants have been staying in Germany for a more extended period: 45% have been living in Germany for 20-40 years, and 32% for more than 40 years. However, there are only 13% of other migrants who have been staying for more than 40 years.

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Figure 27 - *Population with Migration Background by Age and Length of Stay*

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'	
	Number (in 1.000)	Percent among TDP	Number (in 1.000)	Percent among MBP
Age at entry	134	10,2	1.192	8,9
Under 5 years	127	9,6	1.126	8,4
5 to 10 years	156	11,8	1.042	7,7
10 to 15 years	149	11,3	738	5,5
18 to 25 years	377	28,6	3.097	23,0
25 to 65 years	352	26,7	6.042	44,9
65 years and older	-		79	0,6
The average age at entry	18,8		23,8	
Length of stay				
Under 5 years	63	4,8	3.149	23,4
5 to 10 years	49	3,7	1.456	10,8
10 to 15 years	62	4,7	829	6,2
15 to 20 years	109	8,3	1.305	9,7
20 to 40 years	589	44,7	4.755	35,3
40 years and more	423	32,1	1.823	13,5
The average length of stay	31,4		20,8	
Total	1319	100,0	13457	100,0

Source: Mikrozensus 2018 by ZfTI

The significant majority migrated to Germany because of family reunification (48%), marriage (20%), and working/employment (17%) reasons, while other migrant communities are for a family reunion (37%), working (19%), and asylum (15%). This shows that almost 70% of Turkish migration has occurred under family circumstances.

Figure 28 - *Immigration Motives*

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'	
	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%
Working/Employment	219	16,6	2.580	19,2
Studying/Education	24	1,8	620	4,6
Family Reunion	636	48,2	4.998	37,1
Marriage	262	19,9	1.402	10,4
Asylum	68	5,2	2.028	15,1
EU - Freedom of Movement	7	0,5	406	3,0
Miscellaneous	94	7,1	1.362	10,1
No Answer	9	0,7	61	0,5
Total	1.319	100,0	13.457	100,0

Source: Mikrozensus 2018 by ZfTI

In terms of language, the Turkish descent population in Germany show very similar characteristics to other migrant groups. Almost half of them (50%) speak German in the household. This indicates that the negative stigmatization of Turkish migrants does not reflect the reality of Germany's level of integration. There is no massive difference in the integration levels.

Figure 29 - *Mainly Spoken Language in the Household*

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%
German	565	50,2	3.850	50,4	30.993	99,5
Not German	559	49,6	3.772	49,4	124	0,4
Among them						
Turkish	531	47,2				
Others	9	0,8				
No Information	-	-	18	0,2	31	0,1
Total	1.126	100,0	7.639	100,0	31.147	100,0

Source: Mikrozensus 2018 by ZfTI

The statistics demonstrate that the Turkish descent population in Germany has different demographics and socioeconomic characteristics compared to other migrant communities and the titular society. One of the most significant differences is related to the maternal mortality rate. 57% of Turkish migrants have children, while this ratio is only 36% among the population with migration background and 23% among Germans. Besides, Turkish migrants have the lowest rate of marital status as a single (23%), when it is 46% in other migrant communities.[68] The average number of children among Turkish descent population is 1.92 while it is 1.86 among other migrant communities and 1.56 among Germans. Turkish descent population thus has the highest number of children statistically. There is also a higher level of marriage with co-ethnics among Turkish immigrants (29%), while it is only 19% for other migrant communities. The number of marriages with German is subsequently deficient (3%) among Turkish migrants, while it is 8% for other migrants. Turkish migrants live in the household with three people and more (56%), while the ratio is 34% for other migrants and 20% for Germans.

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[68] In total, the ratio of being single, however, are close to each other since Turkish immigrants have young people.

Figure 30 - *Population by Form of Life*

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%
Life Form						
Total	1.173	100,0	8.008	100,0	31.510	100,0
Couples without children	210	17,9	1.391	17,4	9.478	30,1
Single	293	25,0	3.753	46,9	14.749	46,8
Families with children	670	57,1	2.864	35,8	7.283	23,1
The average number of children in families	1,92		1,86		1,56	
The average number of children under 18 years	1,75		1,79		1,57	

Source: Mikrozensus 2018 by ZfTI

On the one hand, the Turkish descent population's socioeconomic conditions have lower compared to other migrant communities in Germany. There is a lower level of education and a higher unemployment rate among Turkish migrant communities. The poverty risk is also higher (30% among Turkish descent, 27% among other migrant groups, 11% among Germans). On the other hand, Turkish immigrants have a relatively higher income than other migrant communities. Their monthly net income household average is 2.759 €, while it is 2.361 € among other migrants and 2.908 € among Germans. Other notable differences include a relatively young Turkish population with a low percentage of senior adults and staying in the country for a more extended period.[69] These statistics help us to understand the current status of Turkish descent population, their socio-economic conditions, social integration, precarity, and everyday life.

In sum, several works in the literature highlight that Turkish communities have little interest in German politics, whereas they feel belonging to Turkey more despite there is a low level of return migration. Turkish communities in Germany feel somewhat home both in Turkey and Germany. Germany thus needs to continue to support the inclusion of Turkish communities into the German political and legal system. "The negative repercussions on access to rights such as welfare services, political suffrage, and protection from expulsion from the country, including equal access to economic opportunities, marginalize immigrant communities from the fabric of German society" (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 206). As Klusmeyer and Papademetriou (2009: 206) argue, the marginalization, as well as socio-

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[69] All these demographic and socioeconomic characteristics can be further found in the appendix.

cultural and physical segregation, reflects "in patterns of community formation, political mobilization, and transnational political association networks." Rather than accusing Turkish diaspora communities of preferring living in the parallel societies and their inabilities to integrate with the host society, more legal and political policies should be established for the inclusion.

3.3 Migration Policy of Germany from the 1960s to the Present

Since the early 1960s, Germany has experienced labor migration and foreignness. In 1965, the Foreigners Act (Ausländergesetz - AuslG) was introduced by the conservative-led coalition under Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. The act granted only minimal rights to the guest workers, such as staying only two years in the country. The policy, which dealt with migration in the 1960s, was based on labor market conditions and the recruitment of the workers. The cultural and integration needs of labor migrants were largely ignored. The German labor recruitment policy, therefore, focused on short-term and temporary solutions with little political and socioeconomic commitments, and there was no intention of future planning for migration and integration (Kaya, 2017: 61). In this context, the policy of "non-integration" and "return of labor workers" were the dominant approaches to deal with "foreign workers" (Fremdarbeiter) population in the era of guest-worker (1961-1973).

In November 1973, due to the oil crisis and a high level of unemployment, Germany introduced a Recruitment Ban (Anwerbestopp). Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt decided to ban the immigration of non-European Economic Community (EEC) workers. Although the law aimed to reduce the intake of new foreign workers, it dramatically helped the guest workers stay in the country for an extended period. This unintended consequence of the law led to an increase of the Turkish population in Germany.

Between 1975-1980, the German government under Helmut Schmidt continued to the ban of new recruitment of guest workers. Chancellor Schmidt had three concerns: (1) the continuation of the 1973 ban on the recruitment of new workers; (2) new measures to promote the integration of the foreigners who had the right to live in the country; and (3) financial incentives to encourage guest-workers to return their countries of origin (Bade & Münz, 2000).

In the early 1980s, both the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) began to consider "guest workers as a problem" (Ausländerproblem). However, they believed that migration was only a "temporary problem" for Germany. When they paid specific attention to the restriction of the recruitment of the newcomers, they did not develop a well-established migration policy in the 1980s. When Helmut Kohl became the Chancellor in 1982, he introduced an "Aliens Policy" (Ausländerpolitik), which was based on three principles: (1) integration of guest-workers, (2) restriction of newcomers, and (3) the promotion of repatriation of existing migrants.

In 1983, the law of "Foreigners Repatriation Incentives Law" (Gesetz zur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländer) was introduced to encourage and finance existing guest workers for the return migration. Under the economic and social difficulties of the early 1980s, German policymakers believed that they could solve the temporary migration problem with the incentivizing return (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009). However, there was a low level of participation to take this economic "opportunity," especially from the Turkish workers (Faas, 2007: 46). Due to the low interest, the law was abandoned in 1985.

The CDU's migration policies throughout the 1980s under Chancellor Kohl marginalized and excluded immigrant communities, although they gained widespread support among the German public. The CDU government "stigmatized and punished immigrant communities by showing them as a threat to German society and label immigration as a problem" (Kaya, 2017: 63). As a result, "Germany failed to address integration as a political goal and misused political power by introducing a non-integration policy and exclude immigrants structurally from society" (Kaya, 2017).

In the 1990s, there were significant socioeconomic changes and national identity-based discussions on the notion of Germanness. German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said that: "…*solange die Deutschen sich mit ihrer nationalen Identität so schwertun, so lange ist es schwer, anderen zu sagen, sie sollen Deutsche warden*" (as long as Germans struggle with their national identity, it is difficult to tell others they should become German) (Hübschmann, 2015). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Germany's unification in 1990 had huge impacts on the reconstruction of German national identity. These events fundamentally altered the foundation of the country's migration and integration policy (Kolb, 2017: 325). While Germany has "historical obligations towards Germans living in the East, there were

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structural conditions [reasons] of the dual strategy of migration and citizenship policies towards diasporic Germans and non-German migrants" (Joppke, 1997). Several scholars argue that the German migration policy followed "strong ethnocultural roots and legacy of the Second World War" (Hailbronner, 1983; Joppke, 1999). Since the (re-)unification in 1990, Germany has begun to follow the normalization of migration, integration, and citizenship policies.

In July 1990, the Aliens Act of 1965 was revised. The migration policy in Germany became more restrictive. The dual nationality was not allowed. Political activities and civic participation of migrants were remained highly restricted. In contrast, with the Law of Foreigners in 1990, migrants who fulfill certain conditions such as a minimum stay, no criminal record, and a regular income can legally claim to citizenship (Anspruch). Before the Law of 1990, German citizenship had been based on an administrative assessment (Ermessen). The law became the "first very cautious replacement of the principle of citizenship acquisition" (Kolb, 2017) and reviewed the German asylum policy (Article 16 of the Basic Law).

Despite the revision of citizenship, CDU and CSU coalition followed a "high degree of cultural assimilation" throughout the 1990s (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009: 198). They continued to reject that "Germany is an immigrant country" with the official statement "Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungs" (Germany is not a country of immigration) (Avci, 2006: 69). Although Social Democrats and Greens proposed annual quotas for immigrants, the right-wing conservative government preferred not to have an active immigration policy in the 1990s. The conservative government, however, focused on (1) the integration problems for the existing migrants; (2) the high number of foreigners in various categories, especially asylum seekers and family unification, and (3) socioeconomic problems (high level of unemployment and burden of the social-welfare system after the unification).

The coalition government attempted to solve the integration problems of the existing migrants in the 1990s. They spent more than one billion Deutsche Mark for the integration measures each year. When Germany followed a "two-pronged migration and citizenship policy," for ethnic German diasporas and non-ethnics German migrants, she was accused of developing "double standards in the migration and integration policies with more favorable migration policies, and selective integration measures for different immigrant groups" (Kaya,

2017: 57). Under these circumstances, it is believed that some immigrant communities in Germany, such as Turkish, experienced "marginalization, non-recognition, and exclusion" (Geddes, 2003; Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009; Kaya, 2017).

The number of naturalizations among non-ethnic Germans nearly doubled when the German Federal government amended the Aliens Law in 1993. For instance, there were 3.529 Turkish naturalized in 1992, and this ratio increased to 12.915 in 1994. Although there was a little discussion of the immigration policy behind the 1994 local elections (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009), new words such as "inburgering" (adaptation, integration) and newcomers appeared in the German political lexicons. In the 1960s and 1970s, the labor migrants were mostly labeled as guest-worker (Gastarbeiter), foreign workers (Fremdarbeiter), and foreign employees (ausländische Mitarbeiter). Since the 1980s and early 1990s, foreigners (Ausländer) began to denote the alien character of the migrants in Germany.

When the Social Democrats and the Greens formed a coalition in 1998, they aimed to have a political agenda to reform and modernize immigration, integration, and citizenship policies (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009). Due to the demographic decline, labor shortages, and strained pension system, the left-wing government realized that Germany needs a new legal and policy framework for immigration. Leftist progressive politicians, civil society organizations, and liberal media began to demand the changes of citizenship, immigration, and migration policies in the 1990s (Ehrkamp & Leitner, 2003).

In 1999, the German Parliament (Bundestag) under the red-green alliance introduced a new "Nationality Act" (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz - StAG), which came into force in 2000. Accordingly, foreigners, particularly migrant children born in Germany, can acquire German citizenship under the birthright citizenship (jus soli) principle. Before the Nationality Act of 2000, the citizenship was based on the blood kinship (jus sanguinis) principle, which required ethnic nationality under the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) Article 116 and German Citizenship law of 1913. The citizenship law of 1999 formed a new type of citizenship from the descent-based into civic rights-based.[70] Since January 2000, children born in Germany, whose parents

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[70] It has been long believed that "immigrants use their German citizenship to establish political parties that would work to promote the interests of foreign states" [homelands] (Nathans, 2004: 56). The politics of

had resided legally in the country for the past eight years, automatically obtain German citizenship, and they can hold dual citizenship until the age of 23. After the age of 23, they needed to choose between German citizenship and the citizenship of the country of origin.[71] The reformed Nationality Act also reduced the residency requirement from 15 years to 8 years without any restrictions and set forth criteria for the naturalization (Ehrkamp & Leitner, 2003).

In 2005, "German Immigration Law" (Bundesamt für Migration and Flüchtlinge), the first federal immigration and integration law, came into effect. The immigration act (Zuwanderungsgesetz - ZuWG) conceptualized the German migration and integration policy. Although the recruitment bans of 1973 remained in the country, the new immigration law distinguished limited and unlimited residence permits. The bill focuses on the integration of migrant communities. It regulates the newcomers with the latest procedures, such as the integration courses to learn the German language and be familiar with the basic knowledge of German culture, history, politics, and society before the migration.[72] The law of 2005 launched the first official integration programs in the country and accepted that "Germany as a country of immigration" (Zuwanderungsland). The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) was also established in 2005 to regulate migration and integration policies.

In April 2014, the grand coalition of the SDP and CDU removed the restriction on citizenship (Optionspflicht) and granted the right to dual citizenship for second-generation children who had been born in the country. The children of foreign parents have been exempted from the obligation to choose between German citizenship and the citizenship of their parents. As a result, dual citizenship is allowed.[73]

This part of the chapter is crucial for understanding the hostland environment and how Germany has developed its migration policy. Figure 31 summarizes the main characteristic of

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exclusion, therefore, was remained under restrictive citizenship rights. After the Nationality Act of 2005 and the amendment of 2014, there have been following more liberal policies on citizenship status in Germany.

[71] In 2014, the grand coalition of the SPD and CDU removed the restrictions.

[72] The integration courses are part of the formal program and composed of two parts: language and orientation in history, politics, and culture. It is mandatory for non-EU citizens while voluntary for EU citizens. Germany has the most extensive intensive program among EU member states between 430 up to 1260 hours. There are also various courses for women, youth, and parents.

[73] Currently, only 14% of the Turkish communities in Germany have dual citizenship.

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the German Migration Policy since the 1960s. The chapter continues to examine the homeland in triadic nexus and analyze how Turkey has been developed its diaspora policy.

Figure 31 - *German Migration Policy since the 1960s*

Time	Political Spectrum	Main Characteristics		
1961-1973	L. Erhard (1963-1966)	"**Guest-worker era**." Short-term temporarily solutions	"**Fremdarbeiter**" Foreign worker	The policy of non-integration & Return migration: No intention for future
	K. Georg (1966-1969)			
1965	**The Foreigners/Aliens Act - Ausländergesetz** (*AusIG*): - Minimal rights: 2 years of short-term residency and cultural and integration needs were ignored. - Labor market-oriented (the needs of the German economy).			
1973	W. Brandt (SDP) (1969-1974)	**Anwerbestopp** (Recruitment ban)	- Ban the immigrant of non-EEC workers: - Unintended consequences (existing migrants able to stay for a more extended period)	
1974 -1982	H. Schmidt (SDP)		- Continuation of the recruitment ban; - Financial incentives for return migration; - Weak promotion of the 'integration.'	
1982	H. Kohl (CDU) (1982-1998)	"**Ausländerproblem**" *Guestworkers are a 'temporary problem.'*	- Restriction of the recruitment of the newcomers; - Ausländerpolitik (Aliens Policy): Integration, restriction, and Return migration.	
1983	**The Foreigners Repatriation Incentives Law** (abandoned in 1985) - 'return migration.'			
The 1980s	Marginalization and Exclusion of Immigrants; Migrants treated as a 'threat' to German society by the conservative government			
1990	**The Law of Foreigner** (is the revision of the Aliens Act of 1965) - First cautious revision of citizenship and asylum policy: From an 'administrative assessment' (Ermessen) to 'legal claim' to citizenship (Anspruch). - Restrictive migration policy continued (dual nationality was not allowed, and political activities of migrants were limited).			
1993	The *amendment* of the 1990 Law on Foreigner: the number of naturalizations was sharply increased			
The 1990s	"**Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungs**" (Germany is not a country of immigration) - Identity-based discussion on '**Germanness**.' - The dual strategy (for German diaspora and non-ethnic Germans) - Migration, integration, and citizenship policies based on '**ethnocultural roots**' - The high degree of cultural assimilation: marginalization, non-recognition, and exclusion - Not an active immigration policy: focusing integration problems for existing migrants			
	'Inburgering' (adaptation/integration) & 'Nieuwkomers' (newcomers)			
1998	G. Schroder (SDP) (1998-2005)	- Political agenda to reform and modernizes immigration, integration, and citizenship policies (realization of the need for a new legal and policy framework for immigrants)		
1999	**The Nationality Act -** Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (*StAG*) A new type of citizenship from ius sanguinis (descent-based) to ius soli (civic rights-based) Changes of the criteria for the naturalization from 15 years to 8 years			
2005	Merkel (CDU) (2005-)	**German Immigration Law of 2005** (ZuWG) - Separation of 'limited' and 'unlimited' residence permits - Launching first official integration programs		
		Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)		
		"**Zuwanderungsland**" (Germany is a country of migration)		
2014	**Optionspflicht** - removal of the restrictions on (dual) citizenship			

3.4 Diaspora Policy of Turkey

Turkey has been both an immigrant and an emigrant country for more than 50 years. As of December 2018, the current population of Turkey is estimated at 82.41 million, where she ranks 19th in the list of countries by population (Worldometers, Turkey Population, 2018). According to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) of the mid-2017 estimates, Turkey ranks 14th a destination country with almost five million immigrants and 18th a sending country with approximately four million Turkish citizens living abroad. Although Turkey has always been a place for transit and destination country for both legal and irregular migrants, immigration policy has been developed very slowly. Since the Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey has recently been facing severe challenges to immigration and asylum policies. Turkish policymakers have been attempting to enact comprehensive immigration policies and asylum laws to overcome these "new" problems.

The emigration policy of Turkey, on the other hand, has developed from the economic and practical necessities: (1) the control of remittances effectively; (2) the provision of the logistical background for the citizens if the return migration occurs, specifically within the pension and healthcare systems, and (3) the assistance of bureaucratic matters of the rights and obligations of the citizenship, such as military service and funeral arrangements. Although there are no reliable statistics, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website shows that the population of Turkish people living abroad exceeds six million.

In this context, Turkey has remained a major migrant-sending country, and Turkish communities abroad are formed one of the largest immigrant groups in the world, especially in Western Europe. There is a total of about three million of the Turkish descent population in Germany. Despite the significant number of extra-territorial population, Turkey has not prioritized the importance of the kin communities abroad at Turkey's domestic and foreign politics until very recently.

As a result, the notion of the diaspora is a relatively new phenomenon for Turkey and Turkish political elites. When the Justice and Law Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey discovered its' extra-territorial populations. Since then, Turkey has been transforming "its loose emigration" policy into a more "coherent diaspora" policy (Öktem, 2014; Baser, 2014). Turkey's overall diaspora policy has primarily resulted from the

newly emerging self-perception of the country in world politics as a regional and global political-economic power (Mugge, 2011; Kaya, 2011; Aksel, 2014; Aydin, 2014; Öktem, 2014; Mencutek and Baser, 2018).

When AKP political elites attempted to redesign the political regime of Turkey, they began to question who constitutes the Turkish nation. Several political events such as the Gezi Park protests in 2013, the failed coup d'état in 2016, and the Constitutional referendum of 2017 became a center of political values of the "new Turkey." At the same time, AKP elites often declare their vision of a new lifestyle in Turkey. They believe that the modernization process destroyed the religious and cultural values of Turkish society. Both state-building and nation-building processes are intertwined under the AKP regime in Turkey. The construction of a new Turkey with a new society has not targeted only populations in Turkey but also includes extra-territorial populations, "the domestic abroad." Consequently, Turkey's new diaspora policy has been sharply influenced by the elites' ideological and political motives, whereby Turkish communities abroad are primarily seen as the object of the home state's politics for persuading national/state interests in international politics.

Historical Conjuncture(s) and Radical Shift of Turkey's Diaspora Policy

Before 2002, Turkey had shown a limited and selective diaspora policy with its co-ethnics abroad, and Turkish immigrants were never referred to as a diaspora at the state level (Unver, 2013: 183). The kin and relative communities were not prioritized in the national and political agenda. There were relatively few and limited institutional arrangements; therefore, Turkey had selectively intervened in matters related to its dissident abroad (Mugge, 2011: 20). When the AKP came to power in 2002, there have been radical changes in Turkey's policies.

Historically, Turkey's diaspora policy can be examined under four different periods: (1) the 1960s-1970s, (2) 1982-1990s, (3) 2000-2016s, and (4) since the coup d'état attempt in 2016. The first period (the 1960s-1970s) is mainly based on the bilateral labor agreements in the 1960s between Turkey and West European countries. This period is characterized as a guest-worker period where Turkish labor migrants would reside in the host country only for a limited period. In the 1970s, the Turkish state began to recognize that the migration flow would be longer-lasting than planned (Aksel, 2014; Aydin, 2014); therefore, she started

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developing an emigration policy under the concern of social policies, especially for the pension and healthcare policies. At the same time, Turkey attempted to control the remittances effectively. Although the relation between Turkey and its co-ethnics was mainly based on economic motives, Diyanet (The Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey) became the central organization to deal with Turkish emigrants by providing religious education and practices of Imams since the 1970s.

The coup d'état in 1980 brought both political and economic instability, and the military regime changed Turkey's emigration policy. Political, ethnic, and religious minority groups such as Leftists/Communists, Kurds, Assyrians, and other minorities rapidly left the country. The communities of "others" formed new types of diasporas in various countries. Turkey aimed to take control of these so-called "marginal groups" for regime security; thus, she created some diasporic organizations. When the political elites in Turkey realized that the migration situation of Turkish laborers was a permanent phenomenon than expected, they allowed the passing of the dual citizenship law in 1981.

During the 1990s, Turkey started to conceive its co-ethnics as representatives of the country. Turkey attempted to enhance the diaspora policy under public diplomacy (Özdora-Aksak & Molleda, 2014; Aydin, 2014). The primary purpose of Turkey's diaspora policy was to promote a more positive image of Turkey (Mugge, 2013). With the goal of the European Union (EU) membership in the 1990s, Turkish elites began to engage more actively with Turkish immigrants and their problems in the Western European countries. Turkey thus dealt with the integration and discrimination problems of Turkish immigrants in Europe. In 1998, two institutions were established: The Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Dayanışma Kurulu), and the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Üst Kurulu) under the Prime Ministry of Turkey.

Since 2002, three critical historical conjunctures have been shaped to Turkey's diaspora policy: (1) the accession negotiations with the EU in 2005; (2) the coup d'état attempt in 2016, and (3) the Constitutional referendum in 2017.

In this period, there were many institutional efforts to mobilize diaspora communities abroad. The Parliamentary Commission was established in 2003 to deal with the problems of Turks

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living abroad, along with Diyanet. In 2010, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (YTB) was established, and they started to publish a journal called Arti 90. Moreover, Yunus Emre Institutes were established to promote the Turkish language and culture across various countries. Turkish immigrants have been included in the political, economic, and social agendas of the government. Figure 32 illustrates the important actors in the new Turkey's diaspora policy.

Figure 32 - *Main Actors in Turkey's Diaspora Policy*

The failed coup d'état in 2016 is one of the turning points in Modern Turkey's history. President Erdogan declared a state of emergency under Article 120 of Turkey's Constitution, which lasted for two years (until July 19, 2018). President Erdogan claimed Fethullah Gülen, an exiled Cleric, was responsible for masterminding the failed coup attempt. He declared Gülen's movement as a terrorist organization under the name of FETÖ (Fethullah Terrorist Organization). While Gülen Movement supporters have been charged to be responsible for the parallel state structure in Turkey, they have been seeking asylum in various countries,

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especially in Germany. Turkey has been faced with the reality of "unwanted" Turkish citizens.[74]

Another critical development in Turkey's history is the Constitutional referendum on April 16, 2017. The referendum altered the political regime in Turkey from the parliamentary to the presidential system. Although the Fundamental Principles of Elections and Voters Law of Turkey in 1961 granted to Turkish citizens the right to vote at the borders, and the consulates abroad, external-voting rights remained very limited in practice.[75] With the changes in 2008 (No. 5749 Law) and in 2012 (No. 6304 Law), Turkish citizens abroad were able to vote in their countries of residence. Turkish diasporas mostly voted to support for constitutional reform in the country, and they have begun to play a pivotal role in Turkish political life.

Subsequently, the external voting has become a massive issue between Turkey, Turkish citizens abroad, and the host countries. Some of the Turkish communities in Europe, including in Germany, organized massive demonstrations to support Turkey and show their loyalty to President Erdogan. When AKP politicians wanted to have several rallies for the upcoming elections as well as protests against the Gülenist Movement, European authorities banned AKP elites' political activities in their territories. After that, Turkey and the European countries have begun to have tense relations, and they have severely criticized each other.

Under these developments, Turkey's diaspora policy has begun to change. According to Aydin (2014), there are three motivations behind the sudden shift of the diaspora policy in Turkey: (1) the emergence of an established diaspora community abroad with the transnational networks; (2) the establishment of a new state elite and their contemporary discourse stressing Muslim Sunni national identity, and (3) the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy.

Mugge (2011) demonstrates the radical shift of Turkey's diaspora policy under three factors: (1) the move from guest-workers to immigrants with the recognition of permanent stay; (2) the changing political climates in the home and host states, and (3) the political events that trigger ad hoc government actions. While Mugge examines the diaspora policy regarding the

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[74] According to Eurostat, the number of asylum applications from Turkish citizens has tripled over the last two years. Germany is the most preferred destination, with 13.230 requests between 2015 and 2017.
[75] For the first time, Turkish citizens used their votes in the Presidential elections of 2014.

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historical and political lenses, Aydin analyzes within the identity and foreign policy orientations of the AKP government.

Mencutek and Baser (2018) highlights foreign policy objectives and ideological stances of the AKP government in the new diaspora policy. According to these authors, the AKP elites promote Turkey's diaspora policy to enhance the country's image as a regional but also potentially a global power. The AKP government identifies the specific role of Turkish compatriots in lobbying for public diplomacy and Turkey's soft power. Turkish communities abroad enhance Turkey's positive image as a leading country in the region and increase its soft power as a lobbying asset in world politics. Because of these reasons, the AKP government has created diaspora institutions to monitor kin and relative communities abroad and emphasized the cultural heritage, the shared past, and conservative values of the society.

The AKP government's commitment to reviving historical ties with the former Ottoman territories as well as citizens shapes the formation of the new Turkish diaspora policy (Öktem, 2014). Reference to the Ottoman Empire has been very apparent in various political, economic, and cultural activities and policies. There are many references to the Ottoman Empire rather than the Modern Republic era of Turkey in the diaspora policy, which is highly reflected in the AKP's policies and elite discourses.

The new diaspora policy of Turkey overlapped with AKP's foreign policy objectives and Turkey's role in the international system. Several scholars perceive the AKP's foreign policies as neo-Ottomans as well as (post-)imperialist. Western European governments, including Germany, are negatively perceived Turkey's active involvement with its co-ethnics in their territories. Turkish diaspora communities are labeled as being "long-arm of Ankara" or even "Erdoğan." Under the close homeland and diaspora relations, Turkey is stigmatized by other states when she attempts to play a more normative and moral role over its kin communities abroad.

Heiko Mass and Sigmar Gabriel wrote an article in Der Spiegel in Jan 2017 and accused Turkey of starting *Kulturkampf*.[76] Turkish political elites argued that "Germany does not trust

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[76] Kulturkampf is a term that described cultural conflicts.

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her Muslim communities and considers them as a Fifth Column. The discourse of "*Penner*"[77] started to be dominant among Turkish political and intellectual elites against the German opposition. There is an argument in Turkey: "even Penners in Germany have said many things and pontificate President Erdogan and the (domestic) politics of Turkey" (Fikriyat, 2017). AKP elites label the domestic opposition as "*Çapulcu*" (roughly translated to marauders) in the Gezi Park protest and now consider the regime oppositions as "terrorist." When regime critics are coming abroad, they are called "penner," such as Germany.

The new diaspora policy of Turkey considers Turkish co-ethnics are not passive actors but as catalysts of state strategies and policies (Mencutek and Baser, 2018). Since 2002, the political expectations (the potential pool of votes for the regime legitimization, the lobbying asset, public diplomacy, and the representative of a positive image of the country), as well as the economic potentials (the remittances, investment, development, and return migration) have been prioritized under Turkey's diaspora policy.

Nevertheless, Turkey's diaspora policy has always been a mirror of the country's fragmented political and social culture. Domestic politics has continuously played a significant role in how Turkey formulates its diaspora policy. There has been an explicit reference to the Muslim Sunni identity. AKP political elites echo the Sunni Islamic lifestyle under the biopolitical and moral discourses on the correct way of life. Although Turkey is a secular country, fundamental and ethical values are primarily shaped by the Sunni Muslim culture and neo-conservative policies. The AKP government attempts to exercise and control over its population, including the domestic abroad, and regulates people's lives by producing biopolitical collectivities.

Although there has been a radical shift in the diaspora policy of Turkey, several scholars began to question the efficiency and limit of the policy (e.g., Kaya, 2011; Aydin, 2014; Baser, 2015). Some criticize the position of exclusivity and favoring of some group(s) over the others. The AKP elites, however, claim that they are trying to reach the others, including Kurds, Alevite, Jews, in Turkey's diaspora policy. The AKP government, furthermore, broadened the definition of the diaspora by including Azerbaijani, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Uzbek,

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[77] Penner in German is accepted as a way to insult being dirty, homeless, and alcoholic and drug user, beggar, and having nothing to do in life, even though he cannot think.

and Turkmen groups as external members. The new diaspora policy pays particular attention to Muslim and Turkic communities abroad, whereas Turkey wishes to play the big brother role of the Muslim and Turkic world. Unlike many countries, Turkey did not choose to develop a diaspora policy based on national and ethnic identity. The AKP elites deploy the historical responsibility narrative to formulate policy and articulate biopolitical techniques to show the correct way of life, from birth to death, that would address all of the Turkic-speaking and Muslim communities.

Apart from the exclusivity of the new Turkish diaspora policy, Kaya (2011) argues that even favorite groups (ethnic Turks and Sunni Muslims) complain about the paternalistic approach of the Turkish state and its diaspora policy. He claims that Turkish communities in Europe no longer want to be perceived as passive and obedient. Baser (2017) believes that the AKP's diaspora policy creates more tension among the Turkish communities when it is strengthening some over others with the resentment of the host country.

Under these conditions, Turkey's new diaspora policy is resulted under (1) the geopolitical and economic interests; (2) the foreign policy objective: lobbying asset and public diplomacy/soft power tool, and (3) the ideological stance of the government and source of external regime legitimation.

These factors are the primary concerns of AKP's diaspora policy that attempts to mobilize Turkish communities abroad for Turkey's national interests. While the domestic and foreign policy objectives are closely intertwined under the diaspora policy of AKP, diaspora politics became a tool of public diplomacy and soft power of Turkey. They reflected the government's perceptions of a new Turkey and society, not only within the territory of the country but also within the domestic abroad.

When the AKP government started to develop diaspora policy by emphasizing the geopolitical and economic interests, Turkish political elites and institutions begin to react towards the Turkish diaspora community's needs, problems, and interests. In this process, Turkey has become vocal about religious and ethnic discrimination of Turkish communities and anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe. Bekir Bozdağ, who was the Minister of Justice between 2015-2017, and the Deputy of Prime Minister between 2017-2018, criticized Germany several times. He activated the Committee on Human Rights Inquiry under the

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Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) to deal with the everyday problems of the Turkish diaspora. The sub-committee dealt with Islamophobia in Western countries. The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Türk-Islam Birliği - DITIB) consequently rose as the chief actor in Turkey's diaspora engagement/management policy.

Nevertheless, Turkey's diaspora policy cannot fully capture the Turkish diaspora communities' needs, interests, and everyday life problems. Turkish migrants have been facing many political, social, religious, and cultural challenges. When Turkey's diaspora policy aims to promote national interests and state identity abroad, Turkish diaspora groups have other agendas in the country of residence. Therefore, the primary motivations behind collective mobilization cannot solely be explained by the emotional fulfillment of diaspora communities towards the home state (Sheffer 2003).

In contrast, the moral responsibilities of care ideals turn into one of the primary sources of bottom-up diaspora activism. The mobilization source should come from the Turkish diasporas rather than Turkey. Turkey itself could play only a complementary role in diaspora mobilization. There is a problem with the legitimacy of Turkish state organizations,[78] which operate in Germany. Turkish Community Organizations are considered as long-arms of Ankara since Turkey drives them for the national interests. These organizations pay specific attention to the integration and discrimination problems of Turkish communities abroad. Although the integration and discrimination problems are crucial for understanding collective mobilization, they are limited to explaining diaspora activism. There are other concerns and issues of diaspora communities in everyday lives.

The diaspora communities care about their needs and interests, not only for themselves but also for their co-ethnics in the country of residence. Almost half of the Turkish communities in Germany have German citizenship; thus, they could not be very active in German political life. Instead, they seek alternative ways of political and civic participation in the hostland, such as developing more civil society-orientated participation (Odmalm, 2009: 154). When Turkish expatriates have become German citizens, the level of political participation has also

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[78] Such as the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate for Religious Affairs (DITIB), Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG), and Association of Turkish Entrepreneurs.

been increasing. The establishment of the Turkish political parties in Germany is one of the results of the policy change on citizenship.

Kaya and Kentel (2005) argue that Turkish communities in Germany involve in political activities towards Turkey, not Germany, and there is a lack of political participation and low level of representation under the exclusionary German citizenship policy. Østergaard-Nielsen (2000: 23-38) claims that Turkish diaspora activities are based on (1) the socioeconomic position of the Turkish communities; (2) political developments in the home state, and (3) the relationship between Turkey and the EU. These arguments in the literature, however, do not show the reality of Turkish diaspora activism. The literature fails to understand the bottom-up diaspora-led mobilization of the Turkish communities in Germany.

When the literature primarily demonstrates the role of homeland in diaspora mobilization, it underestimates the role of collective social movements of diaspora groups in the hostlands. Diaspora communities are also mobilized for their needs, interests, and identities in the country of residence. The political, economic, and social environments of the hostland are crucial in diaspora mobilization. More research is thus needed to focus on the (trans-) local conditions, which allow for more inclusive participation of diaspora communities. Turkish diaspora communities have established several local associations and organizations to address their political, social, cultural, and economic needs and interests. These organizations become active makers of the German domestic and foreign policy, whereby they attempt to establish social, economic, and political justice. This part of the chapter is crucial to understand the homeland factor and the relationship between the kin-state and Turkish diaspora communities. The following part of the chapter further examines how Turkish migrants have formed numerous civic organizations of diverse types in Germany.

3.5 Turkish Community Organizations (TCOs) in Germany

Turkish Community Organizations (TCOs) in Germany are highly diverse and fragmented from religious to secular oriented as well as from radical left to right-wing nationalist ones. TCOs in Germany are categorized under five broad types: (1) religious organizations, (2) political associations, (3) fellow citizens associations and professional associations, (4) sports clubs, and (5) business associations; however, they mostly take an active part in:

1. Religious domain (i.e., Turkish Islamic Union of the Directorate for Religious Affairs – DITIB, Islamic Community Milli Görüş – IGMG, Alevitic Community Germany – AABF) or;
2. Business domain (i.e., Association of Turkish Entrepreneurs and Industrialists in Europe – ATIAD, German-Turkish Chamber of Industry and Commerce – TDIHK).

TCOs in Germany are characterized as "not monolithic, but highly fragmented as well as ideological polarized, large in terms of number but limited influential, and with diverse preferences and interests" (Öner, 2014). Even the most influential TCOs in Germany, such as Milli Görüş – National Thought, Alevi Community, and business organizations are rarely able to act together when there are issues that affect the whole Turkish community in the country (Öner, 2014). Consequently, they are unable to work together to reach common goals (Ögelman et al., 2002).

TCOs in Germany are (1) usually mobilize around homeland political agendas to express their thoughts about Turkish Foreign Policy, and (2) keep direct or indirect ties with the counterparts or certain political parties in Turkey (Öner, 2014). In the literature, the homeland is the most important factor in diaspora mobilization. Initially, the TCOs were polarized along political lines (especially during the 1980s) than ethnic lines (Schoeneberg, 1985: 242). Later, they started to develop more ethnic structures (Kaya & Kentel, 2005: 10). Turkishness and Sunni Islam are the most dominant unifying factors to keep these various organizations together (Öner, 2014). Østergaard-Nielsen (2000) argues that the organizational structure of the TCOs depends heavily on the socioeconomic position of Turkish diaspora communities, developments in Turkey, and developments in Turkey-EU relations. TCOs in Germany acts as a bridge between/among the Turkish diasporas, Turkey, and Germany. They have transnational/trans-local characteristics, particularly when they rely on financial support from the homeland rather than the hostland.

TCOs in Germany attempt to preserve Turkish culture, traditions, and identity (Sezgin, 2011). They primarily deal with the integration and discrimination – including racism, Islamophobia, Turkophobia, and problems of the Turkish diaspora communities. Besides, they contribute to solving the socio-cultural, political, and economic problems. The TCOs aims to establish social justice not only for Turkish immigrants but also for the whole society. However, they need to be more professionalized and cooperate with the local, national, and

international organizations to be a powerful actor (Öner, 2014). German political elites could realize the power of TCOs if they become large enough, have access to political power, and speak with a single voice (Ögelman et al., 2002: 162).

TCOs in Germany do not have full bargaining power vis-à-vis the German state authorities and institutions. Most of them have been long considered as social service providers than political interest groups (Yurdakul, 2006). There is a lack of formal opportunities for immigrant communities to participate and influence the political system under the German corporatist system (Öner, 2014).[79] Since the 2000s, TCOs have begun to encourage Turkish co-ethnics to receive German citizenship. By the naturalization process, German political parties start to consider them as potential voters. Turkish communities in Germany might have more ability to influence the political system and make their claims as politically salient when they become German citizens. However, participation in German elections is still low among the Turkish community. TCOs have often encouraged Turkish co-ethnics to participate in the elections.

In contrast, Turkish diaspora communities chose to develop alternative ways, such as civic society-oriented participation, to be part of the political system (Odmalm, 2009: 154). As Ögelman (2006) argues, Turkish communities in Germany have developed a more civil society-oriented participation. Apart from the classical top-down TCOs, Turkish compatriots organize several CSOs from below to provide alternative platforms to facilitate the resources for their cultural, religious, and socio-political needs, interests, and identities. Recently, there has been a move from the top-down interest organizations of the homeland to more civil society-oriented bottom-up associations. The top-down diaspora associations did not entirely fit the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The TCOs attempt to be independent of the Turkish government and its related organs, business, and formal religious institutions. The Turkish diaspora organizations try to work outside of the kin-state influence.

Under these circumstances, TCOs are not always passive recipients of the decisions. They are also active political agents to develop their positions (Yurdakul, 2009). Germany, therefore, begins to consider them as a representative and consultative body, particularly in integration

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[79] Other migrant communities (such as Greek, Italian, and Spanish) also have difficulties in incorporating themselves into the German polity. Thus, this does not make peculiar for only Turkish communities (Ögelman et al., 2002: 156).

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and immigration fields (Yurdakul, 2006). Turkish diaspora communities in Germany act as civil society actors to solve everyday life issues. In this context, the policies and campaigns of Turkish CSOs began to be directed towards the Turkish diaspora community and Germany. However, they continue to maintain strong ties with the homeland. There have been significant changes in the organizational and sociographical structures of Turkish organizations in Germany, from top-down interest-based associations to the bottom-up diasporic initiatives to deal with everyday life. Turkish CSOs in Germany challenge the hegemony and boundedness of the nation-state (Werbner, 2002). Such transnational social and political formations confront the state-centrism as well as power in an interconnected, globalized world. Bottom-up diaspora mobilization subsequently proves that "civil society is no longer confined to the territorial nation-state" anymore (Ishkanian, 2005).

Conclusion

Turkish communities in Germany have been long stigmatized to be the least integrated and politically passive immigrant group. The negative stigmatizations, however, do not reflect the political and socio-economic realities. Although the Turkish descent population in Germany has a relatively lower socioeconomic position than other migrant groups as well as the titular majority, they mobilize in everyday life and contribute to the construction of diasporic consciousness without the need for the active involvement of the homeland. Turkish communities in Germany could remain politically ineffective, not because of their unwillingness to integrate and adopt the host country's norms. The main reasons for the ineffectiveness of Turkish diasporas are the consequence of the corporatist system in Germany and their citizenship status. The immigrant groups have no direct access to influence the political system; therefore, they become naturally ineffective even though they are large in number, well organized, and cohesive in their political and social demands. Although socio-spatial positions of diaspora groups are essential, the hostland environment continues to shape the socio-spatial positions of such communities. Turkish diasporas, therefore, began to choose different strategies, such as to form civic participation, to influence the host society and its political system. The literature thus needs to consider bottom-up diaspora activism and understand how the hostland context could help or hinder diaspora mobilization.

This dissertation demonstrates that kinship care ideals, practices, and responsibilities among Turkish communities in Germany frame the diasporic subjectivity, leading to collective actions. As Nauck (2002) claims, the integration of Turkish families in Germany does not develop along the ethnic line but preferably along the family lines. It is also possible to extend the family lines into kinship diasporic ties. Everyday experiences of Turkish families, whose lives are shaped at the nexus of kinship networks and welfare policy, become the foundation of the collective mobilization. While German authorities insist that they are acting in the best interest of immigrant families and their welfare, Turkish diaspora communities have begun to mobilize for the policy changes and attempted to establish social justice for their needs and interests.

Policies of Child Protection: The Hostland Environment and the Homeland Response

Introduction

There has been an increase of poor, deprived, marginalized, and excluded people in the world. Migrant children are exceptionally one of those vulnerable groups who need special care and protection from the state as well as society. The well-being and safeguarding of children become one of the most critical problems in late modern societies. While child protection becomes one of the top issues of the national public and social policy debates in Germany, the German child welfare system has faced several challenges. In 2018, almost two and a half million children were at the risk of poverty and social exclusion in the country. Germany subsequently starts to focus on how the welfare system can be responsibly managed as well as reformed for the well-being of children, including migrant children.

There is a high proportion of immigrant children in the country. According to the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), as of 2019, 42% of children in Germany have a migrant background. Migrant families often have problems with the German child protection system. In this context, families with immigrant backgrounds and their interactions with the German child welfare system warrant further consideration and research, and these studies need to address the cultural clashes between migrant families from other cultures and the German child welfare system itself (Wolff et al., 2011: 196).

Under these circumstances, this study addresses cultural, national, and religious clashes between Turkish diaspora communities and the German child protection system. As a case study, it explores the everyday life practices of the Turkish descent population in matters of child protection. It thus attempts to understand how Turkish co-ethnics in Germany mobilize to take collective action for the well-being of their kin community children. Turkish diaspora communities need to pay more attention to establishing a preventive mechanism for child maltreatment risk and protective factors rather than dealing with only the crisis management when Turkish origin children are taken away by the Youth Offices. This chapter,

furthermore, illustrates the hostland environment as well as the homeland response. However, there is a need to examine the notions of foster and kinship care. While the chapter is dedicated to the top-down approach of child protection and state policies, it concerns not only hostland policies but also the homeland's policy response.

4.1 The Notions of Foster Care and Kinship Care

Childcare services consist of community-based services, day treatment, and out of home care services. Out of home care services include both residential and non-residential care. Residential (i.e., children's homes) and non-residential (i.e., family foster care) are the most common forms of substitute care. Residential care is referred to "as a group home, institutional care, or an orphanage in which professional caregivers are entrusted to look after the daily care and welfare of the children" (Li Chng & Chu, 2017). On the other hand, family foster care encompasses parent figures in private families entrusted with the care of the children (Li, Chng & Chu, 2017). This study only focuses on the family type of foster care to understand how Turkish diaspora communities in Germany mobilize for the protection of the kin community children. The residential care of childcare services is spontaneously excluded. Furthermore, this research does not include Turkish children who are unable to live with their biological families for various reasons, such as when they are abused, neglected, abandoned, or orphaned. As a result, the dissertation includes only the cases where Turkish children are taken away by the German Youth Office (Jugendamt) without the consent of the biological families.

First of all, there is a need to distinguish foster and kinship care. Foster care is the formal placement of a child with unrelated or previously unknown sociological foster parents. In contrast, kinship care is "the full-time nurturing and protection of children who must be separated from their parents by relatives, members of their tribes or clans, godparents, stepparents or other adults who have a kinship bond with a child" (The Child Welfare League of America - CWLA, 1994 in Craig & Herbert, 1999). Kinship care, therefore, is the formal placement of a child within the family or social network of the parents or the child (Farmer, 2009; Strijker, Zandberg, & Van der Meulen, 2003). As a result, kinship care is the "upbringing of a child by kith and kin, non-blood and blood-related relatives, tribes, and friends" (Broad, 2001).

Besides, kinship care should be separated from a kinship caregiver who informally takes care of the children by close relatives (i.e., grandparents) or friends.[80] Kinship care is formally recognized as foster parents by the state and the child welfare system. The state remains as the main responsible actor for the legal approving and monitoring of replacement care; thus, it provides all professional and financial supports "before, during, and after" the placement of a child into a foster family.

In the literature, several scholars examine the notion of kinship care (i.e., Goody, 1978; Young, 1980; Korbin, 1991) and analyze the common practice of parenting by the kin groups within the African-American communities (e.g., Carson, 1981; Hall & King, 1982; Hill, 1977; Martin & Martin, 1978) and Hispanic communities (e.g., Delgado & Humm-Delgado, 1982). There are many supporters as well as opposes of kinship care. The notion of kinship care, therefore, remains a very controversial topic. Proponents of kinship care argue that there are several advantages such as:

1. Kinship care allows children to remain with people who know their family background, religion, culture, and traditions. It establishes an extended kin/family relation and preserves the original ties to the family members under the continuity of family, culture, and community (Goertzen et al., 2007);

2. It is expected that children in kinship care will experience less trauma than placing with strangers (Chipungu & Everett, 1998; Dubowitz, Feigelman, & Zuravin, 1993);

3. Kinship care respects the diversity of the religious, cultural, and moral values and the social norms of a child; therefore, it establishes different forms of the family-based household;

4. Kinship ties could maintain more frequent and close ties with birth parents (LeProhn, 1994). It thus facilitates ongoing contact with parents more frequently (Berrick et al., 1994; Dubowitz et al., 1993);[81]

5. Kinship care could ensure foster parents to be more committed (Strijker et al., 2003);

6. Kinship care could be a more stable placement for children. There is less likely to experience any other placements for children during foster care (Barth et al., 1994). It

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[80] This dissertation focuses only on kinship care that is part of the formal and legal system of child protection. Thus, it does not take into consideration the practices of informal kinship caregivers.
[81] Several studies demonstrate that there is no difference between kinship and non-kinship foster placements in the proportion of regular contact with biological parents (i.e., Berrick, 1997; Strijker et al., 2003).

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subsequently tends to last longer (Berrick et al., 1994; Dubowitz et al., 1993; Thornton, 1991);

7. Kinship care could be more acceptable for biological parents (Keller et al., 2001). The literature portrays that parents are less appealed to the placement decision of kinship care as long as kin community foster parents share common morality, values, and norms as well as religion and language with the biological families (Holtan et al. 2005).

As a result, several scholars advocate that foster children in kinship care have slightly fewer behavioral and educational problems (i.e., Benedict, Zurawin, & Stallings, 1996; Berrick et al., 1994; Cochrane-Winokur, 2014; Wu et al., 2015), somewhat better mental health outcomes (i.e., Benedict et al., 1996; Cochrane-Winokur, 2014; Iglehart, 1994; Stein et al., 2014), and fewer developmental issues (i.e., Benedict et al., 1996) when it is compared with children in non-kinship foster care.

On the other hand, several scholars argue the negative aspects of kinship care, such as:

1. Kin parents may view children's behavior more positively and be more inclined to deny or turn a blind eye to behavior problems in the children they serve (Chipman et al., 2002);

2. Kinship foster parents may consistently receive fewer services from the local child welfare agency. The low level of agency monitoring in kinship cases may have implications for child safety (Chipman et al., 2002). The state is responsible for ensuring child safety and care, and state officials (such as pedagogues) can question the ability of kin parents to protect children adequately. There are some doubts by the state about the quality of care (Chipman et al., 2002);

3. Children in kinship care can be more frequently exposed to violence in their neighborhoods than children in non-kinship care (Fox et al., 2000);

4. Kin caregivers are more likely to hold favorable views of physical punishment (Gebel, 1996; Chipman et al., 2002).

Dubowitz (1990) claims that children in kinship care have a much "higher rate of health problems such as asthma, anemia, and dental problems than American children in general." The author, however, does not pay attention that children in replacement care - whether

kinship or foster, might have slightly more problems than children in the general population (Berrick et al., 1994). Several scholars argue that children in kinship care have similar problems to those found in foster children (i.e., Fanshel & Shinn, 1978; Fox & Acuri, 1980; Gruber, 1978; Hoffman-Plotkin & Twentyman, 1984; McIntyre & Keesler, 1986; Schor, 1982; Simms, 1989). The problems in kinship care can also be seen in residential care or even children in the general population.

Nevertheless, kinship care as a legal concept is a relatively new phenomenon in the literature. A few studies attempt to test the quality of kinship care, and it is very challenging to assess the quality of care. The literature, however, portrays the kinship parents as more vulnerable population members than the other foster parents, and it describes kinship care under the foster parenthood of close relatives such as grandparents or aunt/uncle. They are often described as "older with more health problems, poorer and less well off financially, less educated and sometimes single-parent families, particularly women" (Ehrle & Geen, 2002). Hence, there is also another type of kinship parenthood that is composed of diaspora communities. Kinship care among diaspora communities is not recognized in/by the literature. This study, therefore, offers a new conceptualization of kinship care among diaspora communities. Diaspora members, who become kinship foster parents, are not necessarily part of those "vulnerable or disadvantaged" groups, although they could have lower socioeconomic status than the general population.

Consequently, it is not always necessary to argue that kinship parents are the close relatives of a child or are part of vulnerable groups of the society. The dissertation, however, does not attempt to discuss if kinship care has more advantages than foster care. Instead, it shows how diaspora communities are mobilized for collective actions in child protection. The following part of the dissertation explores the state policies on child protection.

4.2 The Hostland Environment: Mapping Child Protection System(s) in Germany

There is both a narrow and broad definition of child protection. In a narrow sense, child protection is considered as (1) to protect the children from rehabilitating parent's parenting capacity if possible, (2) to help the children to stabilize or regain a positive development path, and (3) to protect the rights of parents and children during any child protection procedure. In

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a broad sense, the term includes "all forms of psychological support for families with parenting difficulties or at risk for parenting difficulties" (Kindler, 2012).[82] As a result, child protection is defined as a legal term for organized activities to detect and handle cases of endangerment where maltreatment has already happened, or there is a risk of recurrence as well as urgent cases that maltreatment could occur (Kindler, 2012).

4.2.1 Historical Development of Child Protection Policies in Germany

Since the end of the 19th century, local government services and non-governmental charitable agencies in Germany have been involved in child protection. The bipartite[83] the design has been structured under the state-funded service of voluntary and public agencies, and it has been continued to play a significant role in the child and youth welfare system (Kinder – und Jugendhilfe) in the country (Wolff et al., 2011).

During the 1960s and 1970s, a new child protection system was developed in Germany. This approach attempted to combine both family-based and out-of-home services with more preventive and crisis intervention programs. The new process brought significant changes to the policies of the German child protection. For example, non-governmental child protection centers[84] were established in major cities.

In 1990/1991, a new federal "Child and Youth Welfare Act" (Kinder – und Jugendhilfegesetz) entered into force. As a democratic and social welfare state, Germany was obliged to provide more comprehensive services for children's well-being, especially when families and children are in need or danger. By this federal act, children and parents have been received a wide range of services, and they began to participate fully in the planning and monitoring of the child protection system (Wolff et al., 2011).

With the unification of Germany in 1990, socio-economic problems were sharply increased. The federal government needed to invest more money to reconstruct the infrastructure and public administration systems, particularly in the East German cities. Due to high economic

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[82] Kindler (2012) argues the importance of the balance between the narrow and broad senses of child protection.
[83] There are about 600 Youth Offices and 80.000 non-governmental social work agencies in Germany. 67% of the residential child welfare institutions are run by non-governmental agencies, employing 61% of the workforce. The overall number of about 618.500 employed professionals (Wolff et al., 2011: 196).
[84] These centers provide comprehensive nonpunitive services and steer children and adolescents away from police investigations and criminal court procedures (Wolff et al., 2011).

burdens, the federal government was not able to pay enough attention to other welfare policies – including child welfare in the mid-1990s. The German media extensively started to cover child abuse cases and presented the child protection as a risky system.[85] When the German and public media began to rebuke social workers and blamed them for the harm and the death of children, child protection workers started to follow early risk assessment, crisis intervention, and quick out-of-home placements. "These events caused a massive child protection panic in the public sector, political arena, and also in the professional field" (Wolff et al., 2011, 184).[86]

The child-welfare system in Germany is family-service oriented. Families in need and danger are entitled to request family support services from the state in terms of child daycare, pre-school activities, youth work, and recreational activities (Kindler, 2008: 319). Youth Offices offer forms of voluntary support for parents or legal guardians (i.e., how to raise the children). Forms of service delivery include social pedagogical family help, support for children and juveniles, specialist daycare for children, residential care, and foster care. As a result, there is a holistic child welfare service in Germany, where the state provides child daycare, pre-school activities, youth work, and recreational activities and protection of children and adolescents (Berg & Vink, 2009: 23).

In this brief historical background, the state policies of child protection have recently arrived at a crossroads. There has been increasingly severe criticism towards the German child protection policies, particularly from migrant families. Most families demand to make essential changes to the benefits of the children. The following part of the chapter explores the primary laws, institutions, and policies in child protection.

4.2.2 Institutional and Legal Mechanisms of Child Protection in Germany

In Germany, marriage and family are considered under the constitutional protection of the state. The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [hereinafter GG]) Article 6 [Marriage – Family - Children] regulates state protection on families and children. The article also covers "the rights and

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[85] Lydia in Osnabruck, 'Jessica in Hamburg, Kevin in Bremen, and Lea-Sophie in Schwerin.
[86] In 2005, the Child and Youth Welfare Act was amended with a new paragraph (§ 8a Social Code VIII). The social workers are reformulated as guardians and guarantors of the well-being of children (Wolff et al., 2011).

responsibilities of the parental guardians over a child." Article 6 (2) of GG stipulates that the children are the primary responsibility (duty) of parents:

> "*The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in the performance of this duty.*"

Accordingly, parents must safeguard their children's livelihoods: they need to provide supervision and protect them. Although families have both the responsibilities and rights over the children, the state is responsible for watching and control of those parental guardians. As a result, there is a triangular relation between family, children, and the state. If families fail the duties of the parental guardians towards their children, the state intervenes and protects them. Article 6 (3) of GG states:

> "*Children may be separated from their families against the will of their parents or guardians only under the law and only if the parents or guardians fail in their duties or the children are otherwise in danger of severe neglect.*"

The constitutional rights of parents as guardians of their children[87] are restricted by the family court when/if a parent (or legal guardian) is not competent, willing, and fit to care for a child adequately.[88]

The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [hereinafter BGB]), furthermore, defines the details of facilitating child custody at the Sections 1626 to 1698.[89] The parental right and responsibilities are regulated under four main titles:

1. the right to determine the child's place of residence;
2. the right and responsibility of determining the child (i.e., the allowance of the child, and childcare money);
3. the right and responsibility of making a health-related decision for the child;
4. the right and responsibility for representing the child in administrative procedures.

Other parental rights are also included:

1. the right and responsibility of caring, raising, and monitoring the child;
2. the authority to monitor and determine over the selection of school of vocation;
3. the authority to monitor and determine meeting other people, and

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[87] Article 6 of the Basic Law, the German Constitution.
[88] Under the concept of endangerment of the well-being of a child (Kindeswohlgefährdung).
[89] In child custody, the courts' judicial opinion of the German Court of Appeal (Bundesgerichtshof) can be considered.

4. the right to monitor and determine the choice of religion and practicing the necessities of this religion (TBMM, 2013).

The parental guardians shall carry out these rights and responsibilities over the children. When parents could not exercise the rights and responsibilities, "the child's sake" (Kindeswohl) shall be pursued under Section 1627 of the BGB.[90] As mentioned, the state has an audit mandate over the responsibilities and rights of parents regarding the raising and caring for children. The need for the German state intervention for the child's protection is recognized in 1900 by the legal definition of "endangerment of the child's well-being" (Kindeswohlgefährdung).[91] The term was incorporated into under Section 1666 (1) BGB for the endangerment of the "physical, mental, or psychological best interests of the child or his/her property."[92] However, there is an ongoing problem with the definition and its limits. The term is an open-ended concept, and it depends on the characteristics of each case. The Family Court thus needs to determine the child's sake in each case. Section 1631 (2) BGB, however, regulates the content and limits of care and guarantees the non-violent upbringing. Physical punishment, psychological injuries, and other degrading measures are considered inadmissible.[93] The German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch [hereinafter StGB]) also finds child sexual abuse, neglect, and physical maltreatment as criminal offenses.[94]

In this context, the Federal Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof - [hereinafter BGH]) has the power to examine situations if a child's best interest is in danger with a high degree of certainty and considerable harm to the child's well-being (Schmid & Meysen, 2006). Custody lawsuits are filled in the family courts (Familiengericht) of the region where the child is

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[90] Under Clause No. 1628 of BGB, the full or partial custody could be singly given to the mother or the father by the court decision if the parental guardians could not jointly exercise their rights and responsibilities. If the mother or the father could not or did not execute the rights and responsibilities, the custody will be transferred to the Youth Office by the court's decision (Clause No. 1666).

[91] Kindeswohlgefährung is a concept to define "a harming behavior or action or an omission of adequate care that infringe upon the well-being and the rights of a child, committed by parents or other persons in families and institutions that result in non-accidental injuries and impairments in the development of a child."

[92] Endangerment is described for the relationship between parents/guardians and children. "The family court uses the concept to assess and judge whether a parent or guardian is competent, willing, and fir to adequately care for a child, and if not, to intervene in or restrict the constitutional rights of parents as guardians of their children" (Wolff et al., 2011).

[93] The concept of maltreatment is considered as a harmful social practice and interaction process under societal and systematic violence.

[94] The Sections 171 and 221 of the StGB deal with child neglect and Sections 174; 176; 180; 182; 184; and 225 copes with the child abuse.

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living in.[95] There has been an increase in the early interventions of the family court in child maltreatment with the risk assessment (Gefährdungsmitteilung). The family court judges became much more active in child protection (Wolff et al., 2011) under the "Act to facilitate family court measures of children facing the risk of the well-being" (Gesetz zur Erleichterung familiengerechtlicher Massnahmen bei Gefährdung des Kindeswohls).[96]

Germany has not developed a comprehensive national policy on child rights.[97] Child protection (Kinderschutz) has not been explicitly defined and seldom organized within a centralized unit (Witte et al., 2016). There is still a lack of national strategy and policy[98] on child rights and protection at the federal level. The Federal Government has recently intended to recognize children's rights in German Basic Law explicitly. For this reason, a joint working group comprising representatives of the federal government and the Länder governments was established to work out a proposal for an amendment of the constitution until the end of 2019.

However, Germany has attempted to develop a consolidated federal act devoted to child protection. Federal Child Protection Act (Bundeskinderschutzgesetz [hereinafter BKiSchG]) and German Social Code (Sozialgeseztbuch - [hereinafter SGB]) Book VIII (Das Achtes Buch: Kinder und Jugendhilfe - Children and Youth) are the national legislative and policy frameworks for the child protection system in the country.

Figure 33 - *National Legislative Frameworks in Germany*

What are the national legal instruments on child protection in Germany?	
1.	Federal Child Protection Act (Bundeskinderschutzgesetz - BKiSchG)
2.	German Social Code (Sozialgeseztbuch – SGB) Book VIII on Children and Youth (Das Achtes Buch)

The BKiSchG was passed in 2011 by the Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen, und Jugend - [hereinafter BMFSFJ]). The BKiSchG addresses child protection responsibilities by setting

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[95] The court process can be initiated by one of the parents or the Youth Welfare Office. The court primarily gets written statements from the parties (mother, father, and the youth care agency). The child by themselves can also be appealed to for a testimony, depending on the age and cognitive skills.

[96] The parties have the right to appeal to a custody decision within a month following the issuing of the decision. The Appeal Courts are the State Supreme Courts (Oberlandesgericht).

[97] Unlike Germany, Austria, as a federal state, established a national policy targeting children's rights.

[98] A comprehensive national policy for children covers sector-specific national actions plan and policies such as setting out specific goals, targeted implementation measures, and allocation of financial and human resources.

forth the general frameworks and fundamental principles for drafting both state and regional laws. The main aim of the act is to strengthen preventing child abuse and neglect, but also to improve the cooperation of child protection systems between federal states (Bundesländer).

Local policies at the municipal level have been developed under the decentralized child protection systems in Germany. Each federal state regulates child protection through the Child Protection Acts at the Länder level (Landeskinderschutzgesetze), and there is no centralized government agency on child protection practices among federal states. As a result, it is challenging to implement unifying standards for the well-being of children throughout the country (O'Halloran, 2006; Wolf, 2012).

There are different regulations between the federal government and the state government with a legal obligation to protect children. The federal law sets the general framework for the legal concerns in child protection, such as data protection and parental rights. On the other hand, the local governments have rights and obligations to decide on the organizational structures and procedures at the municipal level. Each municipality thus decides on the structure of the child protection agencies. Spontaneously, there are disparities in the child protection systems (with-)in the country since regional laws among federal states are not centralized or harmonized. The harmonization of policies and national coordination[99] remains one of the significant problems of the German child protection system(s). The fragmentation and limitations of the national legal frameworks might keep certain groups of children, including migrant children, in disadvantaged positions. Similar to other disadvantaged groups of children (i.e., children with disabilities, unaccompanied minors, and children in juvenile), children of migrant families could face challenges from accessing some rights and receive inadequate services in different Länder.[100]

As a result, there is no single authority with overall child protection responsibility in Germany. Instead, child protection policies and practices are shared between national and

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[99] For instance, among the EU member states, only 13 have specific national policies or strategy on child protection: Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Croatia, France, Italy, and Romania have a draft national policy in the adoption process (Source: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014).

[100] The network Youth Migration Services (Jugendmigrationsdienste - JMD) operates as part of the youth promotion initiative 'Jugend Stärken' for young people from disadvantaged families and young adults with migrant backgrounds (aged 12 to 16). The network consists of 465 services across the country and offers professional support and advice for young people with migration backgrounds and their families.

local authorities. Although municipal authorities bear primary responsibility for child protection, several authorities coordinate and monitor the implementation of national policy and legislation. These authorities are:

1. Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen, und Jugend);

2. Federal Panel of Experts (Bundesjugendkuratorium);

3. Federal Working Group of the State Child and Youth Office (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Landesjugendämter), and

4. Working Group of the Highest State Authorities on Youth and Family (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Obersten Landesjugend - und Familienbehörden [hereinafter AGJF]).

The Federal Parliament's Children Commission (Kinderkomission) is responsible for monitoring the child protection system's performance at the national level. Kinderkomission is an institutional working group in the BMFSFJ and focuses on advocacy for children and adolescents. The commission represents the interests of children and sets up policies on child protection and welfare at the national level.

The role of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and ombudsperson also become vital in monitoring the state's compliance with the implementation of child protection laws, policies, and practices. The NHRI, the German Institute for Human Rights (Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte), was established in 2001 to help Germany comply with the obligations arising from international human rights law. As an academic institution, the Institute becomes a bridge between the government and civil society, and it provides policy advice for the full implementation of Germany's human rights obligations. The Institute also promotes awareness of children's rights. However, it does not systematically monitor the child protection system(s) and state institutions. Instead, it reacts to filed monitors and individual complaints. It is often claimed that there is a need to establish an external and independent monitoring mechanism on child protection, whereby it regularly checks the state institutions' policies and practices. The protection of children is part of the human rights and social impact assessment. Thus, state policies and procedures of child protection should be monitored independently.

There are several social projects on the child protection both on a national (i.e., 'Nummer Gegen Kümmer,'[101] 'Kinderschutzzentrum[102] - Child Protection Center, 'Kein Raum für Missbrauch[103] - No Room for Abuse' and 'Trau dich![104] - Just dare!) and Länder level (in North-Rhine Westphalia, 'Echt Schätze![105] - Real Treasure, 'Echt Klasse!'[106] and Notinsel[107]). Migrant communities need to develop similar social projects that are based on their children's needs and interests. However, they are often too late to intervene in their children's needs. They need to focus on the prevention of child abuse, neglect, and violence rather than only protesting German state authorities after their children are taken away. Non-governmental organizations in Germany (i.e., Geolino, and the World Vision Study) have sampled the opinions of both children and their parents. Migrant civil society organizations in Germany might conduct similar research and figure out the current problems of their community children. Destatis releases yearly statistical reports on the number of children involved in the child and youth welfare system (adoption, educational assistance, provisional protective measures, amongst others). These statistics could be used for the policy recommendations by academic centers.

Germany is also part of several global, international, and EU legal frameworks for child protection. The United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) [1990][108] is a critical component of the child protection system, although the Convention is not domestically directly applicable.[109] Germany is part of the European Convention on Human

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[101] It is an umbrella organization for the free telephone counseling service for children and parents throughout Germany. The call is free and anonymous.

[102] There are 28 Child Protection Centers. They provide counseling services for families affected by violence. The center aims to reduce and prevent violence against children, child maltreatment, child neglect, and sexual abuse.

[103] It is an initiative of the Independent Commissioner of the Federal Government on issues of child sexual abuse (Unabhängigen Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Fragen des sexuellen Kindesmissbrauchs).

[104] It was established based on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and on a comprehensive concept of sex education. The main aim is to empower and promote children in a positive overall education concept. It emphasizes the rights of children to protection against violence, abuse and exploitation, physical integrity and dignity, and their right to security, support, and help.

[105] It is a project targeted at daycare centers and gives tools for educators and parents to empower children. It provides them with prevention tools to suppress violence.

[106] This is a primary school exhibition targeting primary school children from the fifth and sixth grades to give tools to children on how to recognize and protect themselves from abuse.

[107] It is a child protection project for public spaces and created a sign for emergencies. Throughout Germany, several shops carrying the Notinsel symbol on the door, which symbolizes that when children get to these spaces, "Where you are here, you are safe."

[108] Germany ratified the Convention on February 17, 1992, and it became effective on April 5, 1992.

[109] Germany made specific reservations to several articles of the Convention, such as Article 18, which deals with the parents' shared responsibility to raise the child. In the decision of Verwaltungsgericht Berlin (December 11, 1996), the German courts have upheld the German government's intent to deny any domestic effects to the Convention.

Rights (EHRC) (1950), The Convention on the Protection of Minors (1961), the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (HCCH) (1993), the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement, and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (Hague Convention 1996), the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights (1996), and the European Convention on the Adoption of Children (2008). Although there is no supranational policy at the union level, the EU attempts to develop guidance on integrated child protection systems among member states.[110] These global, international, and EU mechanisms proposed multidisciplinary and systematic frameworks to prevent and respond to all aspects of violence against children in Germany.

The core of the child protection system in Germany, however, remains in the power of the family courts and the youth welfare agencies.[111] The Youth Welfare Office in Germany (hereinafter Jugendamt) is a local agency to promote children's welfare, and they fight against violence and abuse of the children.

Under the Law on Helping Children and Youth (Kinder und Jugendhilfegesetz), Jugendamt maintains its operations.[112] The First and Eight Sections of the 8th Book of Social law describe the principal duties of Jugendamt. Accordingly, Jugendamt has duties of:

1. bringing the behaviors of parents over the children under state control;
2. protecting children and youth from all kinds of danger (even from their mothers and fathers if necessary);
3. assisting parents in the child's education, provide counseling to them in adoption, and custody and visiting rights cases, and
4. attending court hearing regarding children and assist family courts in the decision-making process (TBMM, 2013).

Jugendamt has obligations to provide services for children and families. These are the support of youth work (§§ 11, 12 SGB VIII), youth social work (§ 13 SGB VIII), educational child and youth protection (§ 14 SGB VIII), general childrearing in families (§ 16 SGB VIII),

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[110] For instance, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 24 (the Rights of the Child) (2009), The European Commission an EU agenda for the rights of the child (2011), and the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings (2012-2016).
[111] Municipalities are obliged to establish youth care agencies in all cities and districts.
[112] It is a self-contained law which consists of 24 sections.

counseling and support services for parents in certain situations such as during divorce, single parenthood (§§ 17, 18 SGB VIII), support of the development of children in daycare (§§ 22-25 SGB VIII) and support for childrearing (§ 27-35 SGB VIII) including family support, foster care and residential care (Witte et al., 2016).

As mentioned, there are several actors involved in the child protection system in Germany, even within the Jugendamt. Apart from Jugendamt, charities and agencies (Wächteramt) take part in the child protection system.[113] There is no single institution or a specialized centralized system in child protection. This leads to the practical responsibilities of Jugendamt often keep minimal. Freier Träger,[114] charities, and private agencies provide help for the child and the family. Section 75 SGB VIII regulates the legal entities and associations of persons. As a result, Freier Träger is included both at the risk assessment and in the protective mandate in cases of child endangerment.[115]

Jugendamt is also created as a bipartite authority under Section 70 of the SGB VIII. The activities are carried out both by the youth welfare committee (Jugendhilfeausshuss) and by the administration (Verwaltung). Although it is not very easy to identify the organizational structure of child protection, the multiplicity of different actors at the local, regional, and national/federal levels on child protection can quickly turn into an advantage for the check and balance system. The multiply of actors is a tremendous advantage if/when the Jugendamt, as well as other state authorities and institutions, fails to implement its duties and responsibilities.

Under these circumstances, Jugendamt stays at the foremost responsible authority for child protection in Germany under § 8a SGB VIII[116] (to investigate whether a child is endangered) and § 42 SGB VIII (for the emergency placement of children and adolescents – Inobhutnahme ION). The Jugendämter should act: (1) if the child requests to[117]; (2) if there is an imminent danger to the well-being of the child,[118] and (3) if a foreign minor enters

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[113] Charities and organizations (Freie Träger der Kinder - und Jugendhilfe) are accepted as service providers.
[114] Freier Träger are licensed or contracted by Jugendamt to carry out services for the well-being of a child.
[115] While each federal state decides which institutions can be recognized as Freier Träger, there are different assistance programs for parents and children to promote the well-being of the children.
[116] The Clause No 8a was added to the 8th Book of Social Law in 2005.
[117] Under Section 42 (1) Sentence 1 SGB VIII
[118] Section 42 (1) Sentence 2 SGB VIII

Germany unaccompanied.[119] Jugendämter has to take action and obliged to conduct a situation and risk assessment when there is the endangerment of a child. Jugendämter thus becomes the guarantor of the well-being of children, whereby it follows "more control-oriented and tends to intervene earlier" (Wolff et al., 2011).

Although Jugendamt has the legal duties and obligations to plan, organize, and monitor the services provided by themselves or contract charities (Freier Träger) to fulfill the needs of families and children, the central role of the primary caregiver still belongs to families. Parents have a natural right and a primary duty to provide education and take care of the children. In the assessment of the risk of child well-being, Jugendämter needs to consult with the families (or legal guardians) to estimate the risk of danger [Section 42 (3) SGB VIII].

Thus, Jugendamt does not have any right to remove the child from the families unless there is immediate intervention required.[120] For any intervention, certain situations and circumstances should be met (i.e., children need to be in danger within the family). The specific conditions should be met under § 8a 1 SGB VIII. These conditions are:

1. parents have to be included in the process unless their participation might put the child's well-being at risk (e.g., if they are perpetrators in cases of child sexual abuse);
2. the investigation has to be carried out by more than one professional;
3. If necessary, the child has to be seen during a home visit, and
4. If the Jugendamt offers support services for the family (Witte et al., 2016).

Any actors (i.e., relatives, neighbors, teachers, and doctors, as well as anonymously) can report situations of child endangerment to Jugendamt. Some families, however, find the complaints and denouncements of third parties as unsubstantial, whereby they try to pervert the facts. There is an obligation for institutions (i.e., schools and hospitals) to report child endangerment. Jugendamt can also contact the institutions to determine if there is a need for immediate removal of a child from the family. Under § 8a 2 SGB VIII, Jugendamt can call upon the family court to intervene in parental rights when families are unwilling or unable to cooperate[121] (Wittel et al., 2016). According to families, Jugendamt does not fully understand

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[119] Section 42 (1) Sentence 1 SGB VIII

[120] Jugendamt can take a child or all children of the family away by using the police force when necessary, despite the parents' objections, and give them to a foster family or children's home.

[121] Many families believe that the judges in the family courts pay only attention to Jugendamt reports and they do not take parents' statements seriously enough. They think that the court will take away the parents' right to

the cultural, religious, and familial values. They believe that the state authorities mistreat the complaints, which results in the loss of their children.[122]

The Jugendamt does not need to require a court decision to exercise its right to seize the child when there is the maltreatment of a child.[123] There are three different types of interventions in case of child endangerment: (*1*) counseling for parents or children; (*2*) social pedagogical family assistance; and (*3*) foster care settings.[124] Jugendamt could follow early warning systems (*Frühwarnsystem*). The early warning system consists of visits to the family house, necessary check-ups, midwife visits up to one year after birth in place to monitor the situation, and context of the life of families (Dahme & Wohlfahrt, 2018: 232). When there is no need for the removal of a child from the family, the families get support from the Educational and Family Services Offices (Erziehungs-und Familienberatungsstellen) (i.e., partial inpatient support measures in the daycare centers or psychotherapeutic field in the healthcare). When children need to remove, there are various possibilities for the replacement (i.e., adoption, full-time foster care, and residential group homes and communities) (Galm & Derr, 2011: 30).

There is a very complex and multiple (holistic) child protection system in Germany. Although there are several actors to deal with the child protection, the central organization remains the power of Jugendamt, whereby they carry out investigations to determine if a child is endangered under § 8a SGB VIII and arrange for the emergency placement of children for short-term custody (Inobhutnahme[125]) under § 42 SGB VIII. Parents' constitutional rights to raise and educate children can be restricted when there is the endangerment of the child's well-being. Jugendämter thus has the right to take children into care when there is violence, neglect, and sexual abuse.

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custody and give their children to Jugendamt; therefore, the court decisions seem to be always against families. There is a low level of trust in the state authorities, particularly to Jugendamt and family courts among migrant families.

[122] Migrant families (i.e., Turkish and Polish) claim that the host society does not know anything about the structure of their society and traditions, including cultural and religious norms and values on how to raise a child. Therefore, they argue that Jugendamt gives notifications which are proven to be groundless.

[123] The families have the parental right to request their child to take back from Jugendamt. However, Jugendamt can prevent the child's return by applying to the authorized family court within 24 hours. If the court finds the child's endangerment, and mother and father are insufficient in guaranteeing the child's future, the court can take away the right of custody from the parents and give it to Jugendamt.

[124] The dissertation examines only kinship care settings.

[125] Inobhutnahme (ION) is a provisional admission and placement of a child or adolescent in an emergency by the youth office. In Germany, ION is regulated by Section 42 SGB VIII and represents the so-called other tasks of youth welfare within the meaning of Section 2 (3) No.1 SGB VIII.

Figure 34 - *Chain of Child Protection in Germany*

Figure 34 - *Chain of Child Protection in Germany*

Source: Witte et al., 2016

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4.2.3 Current Trends in the German Child Protection System

The child protection system in Germany is considered a child rights-based model, which requires the child's involvement and participation in certain circumstances (i.e., Inobhutnahme - § 42 SGB VIII, and risk assessment -§ 8a (1) SGB VIII]. Under Section 8a (1) SGB VIII, Jugendamt must include the child in the risk assessment. Children can themselves request to be taken into care (Inobhutnahme). As a result, they are enabled to participate in the child protection system wherein Jugendämter (as well as other state authorities) need to take their complaints seriously.[126]

The child protection model in Germany attempts to promote children's individual and social development while avoiding (or at least reducing) discrimination (§ 1 SGB VIII). The system is mostly based on preventive (Frühwarnsystem) mechanisms and attempts to protect children from any abuse, neglect, and violence (§ 8b SGB VIII). It subsequently includes early prevention measures, whereas most migrants' families are not familiar with the state intervention in matters of child protection and welfare in advance.

Furthermore, the child protection system in Germany does not differentiate between German nationals from foreign persons [§ 42 SGB VIII] in terms of the application of the emergency placement (Inobhutnahme). Every child in the country is recognized, respected, and protected as a rights holder, with non-negotiable rights to protection. No child in the country shall be discriminated against (although there are some discriminatory practices against migrant children).[127]

In 2018, Jugendamt examined 157.271 cases for the risk assessment of the child's well-being.[128] There were ten percent or about 13.996 instances more than in the previous year. This ratio was not only the highest increase but also the highest level since the introduction of statistics in 2012. However, the increase in child welfare risks cannot be explained purely demographically since the number of children also increased from 2017 to 2018.

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[126] Jugendamt is obliged to act under Sections 8a and 42 SGB VIII. Children and adolescents have support and protection by the state authorities.

[127] World Vision Study (2013) confirms that children in Germany have limited opportunities for participation.

[128] Jugendamt was obliged to determine the risk and the need for help in the context of a risk assessment under Section 8a SGB VIII and to counteract the threat. This usually includes a home visit and discussion of the problem situation with the child and the custody, unless this contradicts child protection. If the parents are not willing or able to do this, child protection can also be enforced against their will by a family court.

Figure 35 - *Procedures for Assessment of Child Endangerment under Section 8a SGB VIII*[129]

Years:	Total Investigations	Suspected Child Endangerment[130]			No Child Endangerment but the need for help	Neither Child Endangerment nor need (further) help
		Acute	Latent	Total		
2018	**157.271**	24.939	25.473	**50.412**	52.995	53.864
2017	**143.275**	21.694	24.054	**45.748**	48.949	48.578
2016	**136.925**	21.571	24.206	**45.777**	46.623	44.525
2015	**129.485**	20.806	24.188	**44.994**	43.185	41.306
2014	**124.213**	18.630	22.419	**41.049**	41.543	41.621
2013	**115.687**	17.211	21.411	**38.622**	37.848	39.217
2012[131]	**106.623**	16.875	21.408	**38.283**	33.884	34.456

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

In 2018, there were 24.939 cases as severe (acute) endangerments to the child's well-being. This ratio was fifteen percent more than in 2017. Around 15 percent of all cases of those affected (7.800) were temporarily taken into care by Jugendamt for protection. The Family Court was involved in 20% and 10.100 of all 50.412 acute and latent cases. In 52.995 cases, the examination by Jugendamt did not show any endangerment to the well-being of the child but advised further needs for help and support (such as educational counseling or social-pedagogical family help). Around 53.900 cases, the original suspicion was not confirmed by Jugendamt, so neither a risk to the well-being of the child nor any further need for support or help was identified. Most children with acute and latent cases showed signs of neglect. Almost 60 % of the cases showed signs of neglect. Signs of psychological abuse (i.e., humiliation, intimidation, isolation, and emotional cold) were found in 31 % of the cases. There were also signs of physical abuse somewhat less frequently (23,1 %). Signs of sexual violence were found in 5 % of cases.[132]

While Jugendamt carries out a risk assessment, information came from the police, court, prosecutor office, schools/kindergartens, neighbors, and friends/relatives, among others, or was received anonymously. The police, court, or prosecutor office frequently alerted the youth welfare office to investigate a possible risk of the child's well-being. The number of children living in dangerous circumstances in Germany has been growing. Young children

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[129] Gefährdungseinschätzungen nach §8a Absatz 1 SGB VIII
[130] A child is at risk of imminent or immediate damage to a child's physical, mental, or emotional well-being.
[131] In 2012, the Federal Statistical Office published a balanced sheet on the risk assessment of child well-being for the first time. Hamburg did not participate in the survey and not provide any information this year.
[132] Multiple answers were possible.

were particularly affected by the procedures for assessing the risk to children's well-being. The details can be found in the Appendix.

4.2.4 Foster Care Models in Germany

Although there is no standard practice of foster care in Germany, there are certain conditions for a foster parent. Provisions regarding foster care are established by law. Accordingly, there is no need to be a German citizen to become a foster parent. The foster family, on the other hand, should have long-term permission to stay in the country. Foster parents should be able to provide a secure and stable home environment to promote healthy child development. Foster parents are no need to be married; single people, as well as same-sex couples, can be allowed to foster. Foster parents should have German language skills, and it would be very beneficial if they can speak the native language of the children. Besides, they should attend the fostering school and receive professional support from the local state agencies. Foster parents, thus, must undergo training provided by the responsible authority. Any individual, including non-Germans, can be a foster family when they submit the necessary documents. The assessment process and subsequent placement of a child into a foster family can take up to nine months (Pflegekinder-Berlin.de).

Figure 36 – *How to be a foster family?*

To have enough and regular income of the person or family;
To accept the continuation of the relationship between the children and their families;
To know the German language;
There are different policies on the necessity of house conditions (in terms of child age);
It is not necessary to be a German citizen;
It is not required to be married. Single can also be a foster parent.

Figure 37 – *Which documents are needed?*

Application form (Antragsformular)
The CV (Lebenslauf)
Birth registration certificate (Geburtsurkunde)
Marriage certificate for the married (Familienbuch)
Residency certificate (Meldebescheinigung)
Income status and job certification (Gehaltsnachweise)
Criminal record (Polizeiliches Führungszeugnis)
Health report (Gesundheitszeugnis)

Germany provides all opportunities for individuals to be a foster family. Foster parents, who are the legal guardians of a child, have a right to the child benefit (*Kindergeldanspruch*), a standardized monthly payment for children under the age of 18.[133] Regardless of the income status, foster parents receive a payment from the municipality to cover some of the costs of children that they care about in their house. The financial subsidy allowance reaches 1.000 €

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[133] As of 2019, the payment is calculated as follows: for each of the first two children it is 204 €, for the third child is 210 €, and for every further child it is 235 €.

per month.[134] Although financial contributions attract many families to be foster families, Turkish families continue to have reservations, particularly religious ones, to be a foster parent.

Figure 38 – *Financial Support for a Foster Family in NRW, 2019*

North Rhine-Westphalia	Care Allowance	For Education	*Total*
0-7 years	531 €	252 €	783 €
8-14 years	606 €	252 €	858 €
14-18 years	738 €	252 €	990 €

In this context, there are different models in foster care in Germany:

1) Only protective family (Bereitschaftspflege): in case of emergency, children are placed to this type of foster families until the decision of child custody is taken whether they will return to their biological families. The protective fostering is a temporary situation, and a child remains in foster parent until their condition becomes definite.

2) Short-term protective family (Kurzzeitpflege): in this type of fostering, the maintenance usually lasts between three and six months. There is no emergency or risk for the children's well-being; however, biological families do not have an opportunity to take care of their children (such as being in the hospital for a long time). Short-term foster parents are responsible for the well-being of children until the biological parents start providing the necessary conditions for the children.

3) Long-term protective family (Dauerpflege): when there is not any possibility for children to return to their biological families (in a short time or permanently), the long-term protective family becomes responsible for the well-being of the child. Children mostly stay in this type of foster until they reach the age of 18. This is a long-term protective model and is not designed to overcome the short-term crisis.

4) Relatives' protective family (Verwandtenpflege): in all types of foster family models above, children who are taken into care can be given to any relatives such as an uncle, aunt.

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[134] The amount of financial support varies across Germany.

5) Expertized protective family (Sonderpflege): children with special needs (such as disabled) are given into the specialized foster families, who have been long years trained in pedagogical and educational training.

In sum, Germany has one of the most advanced legal frameworks for protecting minors and promoting child welfare in the world. Although foster care is terminated when the youth turns 18, German political elites have recently been in favor of the extension of the term of care to the age of 23. The child protection system is relatively costly for the local governments, whereby foster families receive a monthly subsidy of 745 to 913 Euros per child. German authorities, however, determinedly continue the comprehensive policy of child protection for the benefits of the children and the future of the society as well as the country.

4.3 The Homeland Response: The Boomerang Effect of Diasporization (BED)

The bottom-up diaspora mobilization in the country of residence re-influence (positively and negatively) the kin-state's diaspora engagement/management policy and, in return, political elites of the kin feel a moral and political responsibility to intervene in the domestic policy of the host state. The homeland elites, however, intervene in other state's policies mostly for domestic interests rather than international and foreign policy purposes. In this dissertation, the (re-) influence of diaspora mobilization over the policies of the home-state is called as a "Boomerang Effect of Diasporization" (BED).

Figure 39 – *Boomerang Effect of Diasporization (BED)*

Phase I: Triadic Nexus (Home-state, Host-State, and Diaspora)
Red: Home-state – Diaspora relations: based on interests and identities
Black: Host-state – Diaspora relations: Integration-Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and Leitkultur.
Yellow: Home-state and Host-state relations: bi-lateral relations
Phase II: Diaspora Mobilization and Activism
Brown: Diaspora mobilization from the below in the hostland towards home-state and host-state policies (precarity of diaspora communities in everyday life politics)
Phase III: Boomerang Effect – Biopolitical Diasporism
Green: Reactions of the home state towards diaspora mobilization and host-society politics (Boomerang Effect).
Dark Blue: Biopolitical Diasporism by the home state (Biopolitical Diasporism)
Light Blue: Biopolitics over diaspora communities
Purple: Biopolitical Collectivities of Diaspora communities

The Boomerang Effect of Diasporization (BED) occurs when diaspora communities mobilize for collective solidarity and actions in the country of residence for their identities, interests, and needs, particularly during the time of precarity. Diaspora policies of the homelands can be successful only if the policymakers and political elites of the kin state recognize this boomerang link. Otherwise, the needs, interests, and identities of the diaspora communities and the homeland's interests will not be in line and match together. Diaspora activism and bottom-up mobilization further change and modify the diaspora policies of the homeland. The BED in the triadic nexus has never been addressed in the diaspora literature. In this context, this study offers a new theoretical conceptualization of the diaspora policy of the homeland. The following part of the chapter further analyzes the homeland response.

4.3.1 Institutional Innovation: The Attaché of Family and Social Policy (AFSP)

The Attaché of Family and Social Policies (hereinafter AFSP) within the Consulate General of Turkey in Düsseldorf was established in May 2015 to suffice the needs of Turkish diaspora communities.[135] The AFSP mostly figures out the problems of Turkish descent population in Germany related to the field of family and social policies. The primary focus of the Attaché's activities is to protect the rights and interests of Turkish origin in Germany. The AFSP meets with Turkish compatriots to examine their cases and establish communication with the German state institutions to solve the problems.

The AFSP arbitrates between people and institutions and acts as a guidance institution. The Attaché does not directly provide social services such as children's homes or women's shelters. After the experts evaluate the problems or needs of the Turkish descent population, the AFSP guides the individuals to the relevant institutions and becomes part of the solution process. The Attaché is also a medium mediator body for sharing information when any institutions in Turkey or Germany make a request. Besides, the experts of the AFSP attend to the scientific and academic conferences to establish networks and increase cooperation.

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[135] Currently, there are one Attaché, four social pedagogues, and one office manager at the AFSP. All of them speak both German and Turkish. Attaché, A. Raci Mazi, completed his master's degree in social policy in Germany, and other personal completed their education in Germany.

Figure 40 - *The Operation Mode of the Attaché*

The AFSP consequently becomes a central institution for the coordination with the German state institutions, whereby the Attaché helps to solve the problems of the Turkish descent population.[136] However, the AFSP is not a primary institution to provide social and family policies. Instead, it operates as a coordination, solidarity, and counseling center between the social service organizations and the Turkish-origin people. The initiation of consultancy should come from individuals. Besides, the AFSP informs Turkish co-ethnics about the current regulations and legislation in Germany, particularly in family and social policies.

The AFSP's activities are broadly categorized as (1) children and adolescents; (2) senior citizens, disabled, and persons in need of nursing; (3) family and women, and (4) social assistance/help. These activities include:

1. to deliver counseling in the fields of family and social policies;

2. to inform the social rights of the family, child, teenager, women, disabled, elderly, and other disadvantaged groups;

3. give consultations and to be a mediator in the process, if necessary, and to contribute to the solution on problems with Jugendamt;

4. to provide guidance and counseling services on disability and elderly rights and care services (nursing homes, rehabilitation, home care nursing);

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[136] During this research, I advised so many Turkish families to communicate with the AFSP for the consultation when their children were taken away from Jugendamt. Most of the time, Turkish families did not know the institution.

5. to encourage and promote how to be a foster family (Pflegefamilie) and provide counseling to the candidate of foster families;

6. to offer guidance and counseling in matters of violence against women and the other problems faced by women;

7. to support consulting services on drugs, alcohols, gambling, and other addictions;

8. to help guidance and counseling services on social assistance in connection with German government agencies; and

9. to give information on the birth benefit help of Turkey.

The AFSP, therefore, provides guidance and consultancy and makes all necessary coordination for the solutions to the problems of the Turkish origin population in Germany in matters of family and social policies. Under these circumstances, the primary responsibilities of the Attaché are categorized as:

1. to examine individual cases when the Turkish descent population ask for a consultation and help;

2. to meet and coordinate with the official institutions and NGOs;

3. to attend academic conferences and workshops;

4. to prepare events for public information;

5. to improve Research and Development (R&D) studies.

Between 2015-2019, a total of 1.673 meetings were held in the Attaché, and most of them were with individuals (1.389). The figure shows that the AFSP becomes a vital institution for Turkish compatriots to solve their problems in matters of family and social policies.

Figure 41 – *Examination of Cases, May 2015- June 2019*

Number of meetings with individuals	1389
Number of meetings with NGOs, and volunteers	284
Total	1673

In 2018, the AFSP dealt with 543 cases.[137] The most significant number of these meetings was held with individuals (390). One hundred fifty-three meetings occurred with the NGOs.

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[137] In total, 1.147 meetings were held at the end of 2018.

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Figure 42 – *Examination of Cases, 2018*

Number of meetings with individuals	390
Number of meetings with NGOs, and volunteers	153
Total	543

The central topic of these meetings in 2018 was related to "children and adolescents" (%69), "social help and assistance" (%12), "seniors, disabled, people in need of nursing" (%10), and "family and women" (%9). Children and adolescent, therefore, is the most important topic/area in the activities of the Attaché.

Figure 43 – *Main Topics of the Cases, 2018*

In 2018, 284 cases out of 390 were related to child protection and welfare, 174 were the candidate of foster parents, 41 were about children who were taken into care by Jugendamt, ten were about adoption, and four were on child custody.

Figure 44 – *Main Subjects of the Individual Cases, 2018*

Candidate of Foster Parents	174	45%
Taken into care	41	11%
Social Consulting	38	10%
Children and Adolescents	36	9%
Disabled Persons	27	7%
Women	20	5%
Family	16	4%
Adoption	10	3%
Senior Citizens	8	2%
Social Help/Assistance	8	2%
Questions with Custody	4	1%
Student	4	1%
Child Kidnapping	3	1%
Martyr and Veteran Soldiers	1	0%
Total	*390*	*100%*

Figure 45 – *Distribution of Total Cases, 2018*

The Meetings with Official Institutions and NGOs

The AFSP has a constructive relationship with the state institutions in Germany. The Attaché expresses the problems of the Turkish descent population in matters of family and social policies and searches for possible solutions. The AFSP actively participates in the solution of the social problems of Turkish migrants and creates awareness of the problems (such as kinship care). The Attaché also encourages NGOs to work in the area of child protection and welfare. For instance, the AFSP provides consultancy services to the Turkish NGOs in Germany, which could open children's homes for children of Turkish origin. Turkish NGOs are encouraged to become an accredited agency for providing foster family training. Social services in Germany are mostly offered by free contracting institutions (Freie Träger). Turkish NGOs, however, are not very active in kinship care. The AFSP thus attempts to motivate Turkish origin NGOs in Germany to provide such kind of social services.

The Consulates of Turkey also discuss the problems of the migrant children and the German child protection system with other consulates (such as the Consulate of Italy in Köln and the Consulate of Poland in Köln). In 2018, the Ambassador of Italy in Köln visited the Attaché to highlight the everyday problems of diaspora children, particularly with Jugendamt. The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, as well as the President of Turkey, gives crucial importance to the necessity of kinship care in Germany. Subsequently, child protection and

welfare of diaspora children turn into a transnational and international issue between the host state and the home state, and several kin states.

Participation in Academic Meetings and Workshops

The Attaché mostly focused on organizing meetings with individuals to solve their problems; therefore, they could not attend many conferences. Between 2016-2018, the Attaché participated in a total of 26 academic meetings. In 2018, the AFSP participated only five academic congresses.

Figure 46 – *The Attaché in Academic Workshops, 2018*

#	Date	Academic Workshops
1.	12.03.2018	Participation in the 'Migration and Health' workshop was organized under the NRW Secretary for Children, Family, Refugees, and Integration of North-Rhine Westphalia, Serap Güler.
2.	12.04.2018	Attendance of 'Living Together is the Muslim Women Organization in Köln organized future' project.
3.	13.04.2018	Participation in the panel titled 'Successfully Establishment of Intercultural Communication and Interaction.'
4.	08.05.2018	Participation in the Congress titled 'Where do you live now?' was organized by the Jugendamt in Köln.
5.	03.12.2018	Essen based 'Mitempathie' NGO organized an informative meeting related to healthcare services that considered cultural elements.

Research and Development (R&D)

Several research and development studies have been carried out to improve the quality of activities of the AFSP. Destatis publishes official statistics on child protection every year. The Attaché analyzes these statistics and examines whether Turkish immigrant children's interventions are high, as it is often claimed in the Turkish media and among the public. The AFSP attempts to monitor the rate of Turkish migrant children if there is an excessive intervention to the Turkish origin children in the country.[138]

The R&D activities of the Attaché are:
1. preparing information brochures to reach a wider community for raising the kinship care;
2. analyzing the statistics on children and adolescents;

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[138] For instance, in 2018, a total of 52.590 were taken into care. Among them, 24.386 were German children (46%), 12.211 were unaccompanied minors (23%), and only 15.993 (30%) were migrant background children. However, it is not possible to know the exact number of Turkish origin children since Jugendamt does not indicate their ethnic origin.

3. examining the legal rights and conditions of Turkish compatriots in Germany;

4. finding the strategies to solve the problems of the families, and

5. Writing information notes and shares them with the public and political institutions.

Figure 47 – *R&D Activities of the Attaché, 2018*

#	Topic
1.	The function of the State Family Ministries Conference was investigated within the scope of WÜK. The content of the letter was prepared.
2.	The federal statistics on child custody of 2017 were examined.
3.	The statistics of NRW were examined.
4.	The statistics of Länder, where Turkish migrants live intensely in Germany, were examined.
5.	The statistics of Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Bremen were examined.
6.	The statistics of children in foster families were examined.
7.	As of 2017, the statistics of children in residential care were examined.
8.	A statement of opinion was prepared for kinship foster care.
9.	The letters that would send to the Family Courts were prepared.
10.	The news on the media (related to child custody) was investigated. The essential information notes were written and sent.

In 2018, apart from examining the statistics of 2017 on children and youth welfare, the Attaché mainly worked on the issue of notification of the Turkish children, who are taken into care by Jugendamt, to the consulates under the Vienna Convention of Consular (*Wiener Übereinkommen über konsularische Beziehungen*, WÜK).[139]

Public Information Activities

In 2018, the AFSP carried out four major public information activities to introduce the services and activities of the Attaché. They explained under which conditions Turkish families can ask for a consultation and what they can offer to solve the problem. In these events, the AFSP also tried to find new Turkish foster families. On the day of the election in 2018, the Consulate of Turkey in Düsseldorf found 72 new Turkish foster family candidates. The national holidays and special events (such as election) become crucial moments in the recruitment of foster parents.

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[139] Chapter V will further examine the problem of WÜK.

Figure 48 – *Public Information Activities of the Attaché, 2018*

#	Date	Place	Activities
1.	25.02.2018	Oberhausen	Attended to the Quran Feast organized by DITIB and introduced the services of the Attaché.
2.	22.04.2018	Düsseldorf	Participated in the April 23 Children's Day and provided information on foster family and gathering new foster families.
3.	07.06.2018 19.06.2018	Düsseldorf	Turkish citizens who voted for Presidential and Deputy election were informed about the AFSP's activities after leaving the voting processes. Fifteen thousand brochures were distributed, 72 foster families were found, 33 cases were interviewed.
4.	15.07.2018	Düsseldorf	Information provided on the activities of the AFSP.

Conclusion

Germany undertakes all appropriate legislative, administrative, and financial measures to protect minors. There are adequate protection and promotion of a child's rights, ensuring that they are implemented regardless of a child's citizenship status. When there is no central institution providing training related to the identification of risks in the framework of child protection,[140] it is difficult to ensure that measures are maintained and implemented across the various Länder.

The German child protection system is multiple and differentiated amongst the sixteen Länder; several actors are involved in the child protection system in the country. In this context, there are miscommunication and misunderstanding - even crisis - among the German state authorities and families, mainly migrant families, on the practices of child protection. Migrant families often claim that they follow different paths on how to raise children according to their cultural, national, and religious values rather than the German ones. Every member of the society, however, is aware and supportive of the well-being of children and the right to freedom from all forms of abuse, neglect, and violence.

Nevertheless, the intense criticism of the German child protection system(s) creates social and political tensions, especially between the state authorities and migrant families. Migrant families often complain about the inadequate of the German child protection system. They even created a popular nickname for Jugendamt: "Kinderklaubehörde" (authority that kidnaps the children). Besides, the child protection policies and practices create political

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[140] The Child Protection Centers (Kinderschutz zentren) offer different training possibilities for professionals.

conflicts between Germany and the kin states (such as Turkey, Poland, and Italy) as well as Germany and the International Organizations (i.e., the UN and the EU).

Under these circumstances, this chapter examines the policies of child protection in triadic nexus and analyzes the hostland environment as well as the homeland reactions. The following chapter will explore the practices of kinship care among diaspora communities. It will further highlight what needs to be done for migrant families to avoid human rights violations in child protection. From the beginning of my research, I always have an aim to increase awareness as well as explain the sensitivity of the topic. Before and during the study, I realized that migrant families have a disadvantaged position to express their needs freely and publicly. This dissertation, on the other hand, could be the voice of others. It is hoped that the German authorities take all necessary steps to avoid incidents of child protection and find possible solutions for the miscommunication between migrant families and the state authorities.

Chapter V

Practices of Child Protection: Kinship Care among Diaspora Communities

Introduction

This chapter examines the notions of kinship, belonging, and cares among diaspora communities. The main aim of the chapter is to explore the practices of child protection by diaspora communities. As a case study, it analyzes the diasporic care ideals, practices, and responsibilities of Turkish communities in Germany in matters of child protection, and it reviews how care-tizenship among Turkish diasporas constructs the implications of the (un-)making of moral and socio-political belonging, particularly in times of vulnerability, insecurity, and in-need (precarity) in the country of residence. The chapter subsequently shows the importance of diasporic care in/for understanding how diaspora members establish transnational/trans-local networks and relations and mobilize collectively for the needs of kin-community.

5.1 Kinship Ties, Belonging, and Care

Kinship[141] is a system of social ties and networks that connect individuals. Although the term is mostly considered as "a system of social ties based on the acknowledgment of genealogical relations" (Keesing, 1975; Holy, 1996), not only biogenetic and agnatic relations of blood and marriage establish kinship ties. The feelings of the cultural and socio-political belonging to the same community also construct such networks. Kinship, therefore, should be considered as "metaphorically conferred on those individuals who do what kin do every day: that is, participate in relations of collective reciprocal assistance with no calculation of return" (White, 2000: 124).

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[141] Kinship is described as a social network of people based on common ancestry, marriage, or adoption. However, it is a culturally defined relationship between individuals who are commonly thought of as having family or extended social ties.

Kinship is a culturally specific notion of relatedness and social category (Mitchell, 1969; Barnes, 1972; Whitten and Whitten, 1972; Bott, 1971), whereby individuals establish their emotional, moral, political, socio-cultural, and economic belongings on various levels. Kinship ties develop the core foundations of social relatedness as well as social organization (Nuttall, 2000). Within the kin networks, individuals do not share only blood and marriage relations, but also moral ideals and social practices.

In this context, kinship ties entail mutual moral obligations (Nuttall, 2000). Each moral obligation acts as a cultural map to enable individuals to find a path in their own culture (White, 2000: 130). These obligations turn into the roof paradigms of the cultural groups (Turner, 1974: 67), and affect the social interactions of individuals in the daily connections. Individuals negotiate their social relations under these moral guidelines, and they act as moral agents to negotiate the proper thing to do, like other members of the kin community (Williams, 2004). Therefore, kinship ties are witnessed in daily lived practice (Carsten, 2004; Schnegg et al., 2010).

The kinship ties, particularly fictive kinship, which is based on neither consanguineal (blood ties) nor affinal (by marriage), construct the (un-)making of social and political relatedness of the individuals (Andrikopoulos, 2018). Diaspora communities establish their networks and relations whereby each member contributes to the kin community. Diasporic networks and connections are modified as well as re-modified under the strong kinship ties.

Within the social category of relatedness, belonging has been widely used to denote diverse forms of membership among kin and ethnic groups such as the nation-state, categories of race, and even humanity (Thelen & Coe, 2017). In any social system - including the diaspora, political and cultural belonging is a vital element of collective unity. Diasporas are not internally homogeneous and externally bounded communities; however, there is somewhat a cultural and moral belonging among those "imagined" communities. Diasporas, as moral and socio-political groups,[142] interact in an interconnected set of moral, socio-cultural, and political belonging, rules, and norms.

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[142] There is a need for a distinction between cultural categories and social groups. While cultural categories are a set of entities in the world that are classed as similar for some purposes, social groups interact in an interconnected set of roles.

In contemporary societies, citizenship has been considered as the most effective form of (political) belonging. Social citizenship, which is the moral and performative dimensions of membership, forms the meanings and practices of belonging (Holston & Appadurai, 1999: 14). The belonging encompasses legal rights, and it helps individuals "how to identify with and negotiate forms of political membership in everyday practices in multiple domains" (Crowley, 1999; Thelen & Coe, 2017). Everyday kin interactions among diaspora communities at the online and offline platforms sharpen the political boundaries and diasporic identities.

The precarious diasporas might use the ideal of equality to demand rights for/of the inclusion, not only for themselves but also for their (kin) communities (Holston & Appadurai, 1999; Keating, 2009; Thelen & Coe, 2017). The shared experiences of civic inequality and exclusion in the titular society could promote diasporic care and solidarity. In/during a time of precarity, diaspora communities seek to establish kinship care networks and relations to mobilize other co-ethnics for the collective actions. Diaspora communities "create opportunities with the widening of inclusion as well as the new constructions of commonality" (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2011: 203). Diasporic care ideals and moral responsibilities produce a new type of (bio-)political belonging. Care practices construct a representation of traditional and modern transnational family ties, not only among biological relatives but also social/cultural groups, including the diaspora.

Diasporic care is established through the feelings of moral and political belonging to the same (ethnic, cultural, or social) community by fictive kinship ties. Diaspora members share collective reciprocal obligations. They are vibrant examples of the kinship networks in which individuals share collective moral obligations (at the minimum level). Diasporic morality, for instance, acknowledges and determines how to raise children in the country of residence. The everyday kin practices help them to construct the diasporic consciousness. The notion of care thus connects heterogeneous transnational migrants on various levels. As mentioned in Chapter II, I follow Casas-Cortes's concept of the "care-tizenhip" for delineating diaspora communities, whereby individuals establish their networks and relations, particularly for/under the care ideals, practices, and responsibilities. When the care relations forge everyday life interactions, it becomes a vital identity marker to perform the cultural, moral, and political (un-)belonging(s).

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In the literature, several works portray the notion of care through the lens of neoliberal policies. On the other hand, care should be considered under the universal responsibilities and obligations of social citizens (Han, 2012; Muehlebach, 2012; Stevenson, 2014). Therefore, I follow the processual understanding of care (Thelen, 2015; Aulino, 2016), whereby it becomes one of the core foundations for the satisfying moral and political ideals, practices, and responsibilities of diaspora communities.

Kinship interactions (re-)formulate (un-)belonging among individuals. Kinship ties and networks demonstrate the significance of care in the making, breaking, and negotiating of social and political relations (Weismantel, 1995; Carsten, 1997; Marshall, 1997; Aulino, 2016). However, "people cannot expect the same help and support from all those to whom they can trace a genealogical [or kin] connection" (Holy, 1996: 40). Individuals [need to] "choose and wish to sustain kinship relations" (Nuttall, 2000: 57) and establish care relations. For this reason, it is essential to analyze how ordinary transnational migrants become diaspora entrepreneurs and show diasporic care. Kinship ties and care have to be actively chosen, made, or maintained.

All in all, [diasporic] "care practices contribute to the making and maintaining of the networks" (Alber & Drotbohm, 2015). Care generates membership in numerous social and political formations, including the diaspora. Therefore, care establishes a "mode of social belonging" (Alber & Drotbohm, 2015), and "creates as well as destroys belonging in political collectivities" (Thelen & Coe, 2017). The care, however, does not only connect "kinsmen, friends, neighbors, but also other socio-political collectivities such as states and nations" (Alber & Drotbohm, 2015) and diaspora communities.

Nevertheless, diasporic care should not be understood as only "a duty or a burden" or "a pleasure or as a matter of course" (Alber & Drotbohm, 2015). Instead, care is an "emotional, social, and [political] practice" (Alber & Drotbohm, 2015). As mentioned, there is a moral responsibility behind care practices (Livingston, 2005; Stevenson, 2014). In this dissertation, I tackle the notion of diasporic care as a moral and political transnational imagination. In its broader sense, I attempt to capture the duality of diasporic care as "emotions and practices" as well as "ideals as relations." The literature shows this duality under the dialectic of "caring for" and "caring about." Diasporic care crosses the boundaries of kin community and culture. Diaspora communities sustain and maintain their moral and socio-political commitments of

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"caring for" and "caring about" within the triadic nexus. "Caring for" refers to the caregiving relations among diaspora members, whereas "caring about" is based on the diaspora contact as well as emotional and moral support. Therefore, the moral dimension of the care is crucial to understanding the everyday practices of diaspora communities.

Furthermore, diasporic care is an interactive process in which different actors (i.e., individuals, home state, host state, as well as other actors and institutions) negotiate modes of political and social transnational belongings (Thelen & Coe, 2017). Therefore, care is a long-term reciprocal relation among diaspora communities, which entails "mutuality and reciprocity over a long time" (Thelen & Coe, 2017). The notion of diasporic care subsequently mobilizes political, social, material, and labor resources (Buch, 2015) and belonging.

In sum, diasporic care ideas, practices, and responsibilities produce as well as re-produce the political and moral belonging(s) among transnational imagined communities and create kinship (particularly fictive kinship) ties and networks. Diasporic care is the product of moral imagination; therefore, it establishes the cultural roof of moral responsibilities among co-ethnics. Diasporic care, however, should not be considered as "a service or commoditized activity, but a social and emotional practice connected with cultural expectations and moral norms" (Alber & Drotbohm, 2015). Under these circumstances, diasporic care helps us to examine how socio-political and moral belonging is established with the representations of reciprocity and mutuality (Thelen & Coe, 2017).

5.2 Kinship Care among the Turkish Descent Population in Germany

Recently, there has been a significant increase in the number of immigrant-origin children who are in foster care without the consent of the biological families in Western European countries, including Germany. When the numbers of Turkish immigrant children who are taken into the Youth Offices rise every year, child protection and welfare become one of the most important everyday life problems of Turkish diaspora communities. According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, Destatis), the number of children in foster care amounted to 52.900 in 2018 as more than twice in 2006. Turkish media often claims that Jugendamt "forcibly" took Turkish children away from their biological families, and the number has been sharply increased to several thousand

throughout the years. The Turkish Media often portrays that the rate of seized Turkish origin children in Jugendamt makes up more than 25% of the total number, and over 22 years, almost 600.000 Turkish immigrant children have been taken for foster care in Germany.

Among Turkish public and political discourses, Jugendamt is often described as a "state-sponsored mafia organization" for "brutal immigrant children kidnappings." There are multiple explanations behind these accusations. Firstly, some of the Turkish diasporas argue that the Jugendämter are too quick to separate immigrant children from their parents with too little justification or only political and ideological reasons that are motivated by institutional racism, discrimination, and Xenophobia. According to them, the Jugendämter systematically take away Turkish origin children with made-up excuses to destroy traditional Turkish families and forcibly assimilate them. They claim social workers forcibly take children away from the families under the guise of child protection, and later, they give these migrant children to German Christian families. With Christian foster families, they say, Turkish immigrant children, forget their mother tongue as well as traditions and lose their national, cultural, and religious identities. They suspect that German foster families raise those children with a strong anti-Turkish sentiment (Turkophobia) under European and Christian values. Some believe that German society considers those assimilated migrant children as no longer posing a threat to German society and its leading culture (Leitkultur), whereby they could make a significant contribution to the demographic problem of the country.

With the changes in the German Citizenship Law in 2000, every newborn child has been registered as German. Jugendämter does not collect the ethnic or religious background data or at least share them with the public. Although it is possible to figure out the total number of migrant children as well as unaccompanied minors under state protection, it is very challenging to estimate the ethnic origin and religious background of children. There is no detailed official data of the children's backgrounds in the Youth Offices, and migrant children's religious, ethnic, and cultural identities can easily be ignored during the replacement care. Jugendämter sometimes does not take into consideration the cultural and religious background of the immigrant-origin children when they place them into foster families. Thus, the religious and cultural sensitivity of immigrant children is not always considered during foster care.

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This situation is a contrast to the Turkish diaspora claims on/about child protection. The Turkish descent population demands a clear indication of the ethnic and religious background of children during the replacement care, whereby Jugendämter should consider the religious and cultural sensitivity of migrant children. Turkish descent communities request from German state institutions and authorities to respect the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and follow the rule that children shall not be separated from their religion and culture.

Some of the Turkish diaspora communities also claim that siblings are separated during foster care, and they are given to different foster families. They believe Jugendämter does not follow the unity of siblings; therefore, brothers and sisters are separated from each other in replacement care. According to families, siblings could have a higher risk of facing experience trauma, anger, and an extreme sense of loss when they are separated from each other upon entry into the foster care system. Besides, the impact of placing siblings in different (ethnic and religious) foster families may be ended with severe consequences in the long run. Turkish families in Germany demand from Jugendämter to consider the unity of siblings as well as respect the cultural and religious background of children in foster care.

According to some families, there is a substantial economic profit behind the child protection system in Germany. The Youth Offices are paid according to the number of children whom they take care of. There is no centralized countrywide coordinating office of Jugendamt, and thousands of personnel, teachers, lawyers, doctors, dormitory officials, and social workers earn their salary from the local Jugendamt budget. There are about 580 Jugendamt in Germany to work and support families on a local level (Witte et al., 2016). The overall number of employees was predicted to be around 550.000 in 2011. In 2012, the German government allocated a budget of 32.2 billion euros to Jugendamt. Some also argue that foster families manipulate the child protection system for their economic interests rather than children's well-being. It is often claimed that there is a significant economic interest behind the policies of child protection, whereby Jugendämter, as well as foster parents, mostly consider their financial gains rather than the well-being of the foster children.

Under these circumstances, most (migrant) families find foster care practices in Germany as "unsatisfactory" (Wolf, 2012; Ferrara et al., 2016), and they complain about the absence of kinship care. Turkish diaspora communities are collectively involved in several online and

offline activities and encourage co-ethnics to be a foster family. They aim to give Turkish origin children "stability" and "the future" according to their cultural and religious needs. Taking the Turkish immigrant children into foster care by the local and national authorities in Germany without the willingness and permission of the biological parents has become one of the primary sources for Turkish diaspora mobilization.

Furthermore, Turkish immigrant children's replacement care has caused diplomatic and political disputes between Turkey and Germany. President Erdogan often compares the Jugendamt foster care system to Nazi Germany's Lebensborn adoption system. Being a kin-state of Turkish communities abroad, Turkey severely criticizes Western European countries, especially Germany, for placing Turkish-Muslim children into the care of European Catholic families. Turkey, therefore, launches several socio-political campaigns to retrieve Turkish origin children with the motto of "Give us back our children." Turkish diaspora communities in Germany attempted to establish a culturally sensitive approach to childcare with the active support of Turkey. They promote the Turkish foster parenthood for the kin community children and bring them up into the homeland culture, language, identity, and religion. However, there is still a looming shortage of kin foster families among Turkish diaspora communities in Germany, as well as in Western Europe.

5.3 The Construction of Child Care as an Issue: What and How It Matters?

Turkish diaspora communities in Germany aim to protect and promote the rights and freedoms of the Turkish descent population. According to them, Turkish origin children should not be separated from their biological families unless there is child maltreatment at home. The linguistic and religious needs of children should be provided if the child needs to be taken into care. Foster parents should not detach Turkish origin children from their parent's culture, language, and religion. Turkish families thus demand that their children not be culturally assimilated during the replacement care from the German state authorities.

Some Turkish families believe that Jugendämter systematically takes Turkish origin children into care without "any reason" or just for "political reason" such as Xenophobia and Islamophobia. In their opinion, Jugendämter does not pay particular attention to preserving the cultural and religious identity of migrant children. For these reasons, they would like to bring about policy changes in the German child protection system by requesting the revision

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of Jugendamt. Firstly, families would like to have more opportunities to visit their children during replacement care. For instance, in the first three months, children do not see their biological families. After that period, the families can see their children once in a month for one hour. Many children subsequently face a trauma that is a natural result of the separation. Secondly, Jugendämter should be subjected to the investigation and controlled by an independent ombudsman or institution. However, there is no such independent inspection. When/if the Jugendämter are engaged in misconduct, there is a need for fair and quick law enforcement. Thirdly, the decision-making process in family courts should be shortened. The judicial proceedings could take several months or even years. There are overburdened of Jugendamt cases in courts; therefore, the bureaucracy works very slowly for families.

5.3.1 Everyday Life: Issue(s) at the Micro-Level

The protection of a migrant child is indeed related to two broad issues at the micro-level: (1) changes in family patterns and parenthood and (2) precarization of everyday life.

1) Changes in Family Structure and Parenting

Recently, the notion of the family has been radically changed worldwide, including Germany. Most Turkish migrants try to keep their "traditional" family values and norms, and they often claim that family dynamics in Germany are very different from theirs. Besides, some do get used to "non-traditional" types of families such as same-sex parenting or partnership, without marriage. In their view, Germans have "severe family problems," including "childlessness, unmarried and same-sex partnership, and single-parent households." In this context, there is a strong bias among Turkish diaspora communities that German parents do not pay enough attention to their children and provide a "proper family discipline and education" at home. They sometimes refer to the numbers on child protection and claim that "the young population in Germany is almost half of Turkey; however, the number of foster care statistics is more than double time.[143] They argue that childlessness poses socio-economic and cultural problems, especially when the population of senior citizens, who need nursing, has been increasing in the country.

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[143] The German figure, however, includes approximately 100.000 refugee children. Besides, informal kinship care among close relatives is relatively higher than in Germany.

Turkish descent population in Germany has strong family ties under "traditional" Turkish and "conservative" Muslim values. Similarly, they have faced with hazardous socioeconomic and cultural problems in modern life. New generations have more hybrid identities, which are composed of both home and host country cultures. They subsequently lose their traditional homeland's values. For these reasons, Turkish diaspora communities often argue that there is an urgent need to have guidance and consultancy on the area of family matters to protect the traditional Turkish family ties and Islamic values in the country of residence.

According to most Turkish co-ethnics, the family is the most important social institution, and there is no place for a state of being inside the house since family is the private life of individuals, but not the business of the state. Some argue that the state (neither Turkey nor Germany) should not "dictate" parents on how to raise the children. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Germany highly intervenes in these "private areas" of families and controls families' parental rights and responsibilities. The child protection system consequently turns into a bigger problem between the state and individuals in a broader context than specific individual cases at the micro-level. They argue that child protection is a problem of modernity and between the state and individuals.

2) The Precariousness of Everyday Life

As Chapter III demonstrates, the Turkish descent population in Germany is one of the most disadvantaged socioeconomic migrant groups. They are far beyond the rest of society. However, the low socioeconomic status does not mean that they are not mobilized for collective actions and stay as apolitical in the country of residence. Most of them feel insecure - particularly after the neo-Nazi attacks, and they fraught with insecurities and vulnerabilities in everyday life. For instance, there has been increasing in shisha lounge shootings (i.e., the last one in February 2020 in Hanau in Hesse). Mosques frequently receive bomb threats. In 2018, more than one hundred and religious institutions were attacked in the country. Turkish diaspora communities often claim that they do not trust German institutions, including police and mass media. Under these circumstances, the child protection issue has mainly resulted from the precariousness of everyday life conditions.

5.3.2 Seeing the Bigger Picture: Understanding Child Care at the Macro-Level

Child protection issues are related to (1) migration and (2) gender at the macro-level. There is a misperception of the host society among Turkish families, and some believe that Germans consider migrants as a "threat" to the titular society. Under the strong bias, Turkish diaspora communities argue that Jugendamt is too quick to separate migrant children from their parents because of Xenophobia and Islamophobia. According to them, Jugendämter does not consider the well-being of immigrant children; instead, they attempt to assimilate those children. Turkish diasporas frequently claim that "there is too much prejudice in Germany against foreign-born parents when they speak the native language with their children." In their opinion, "there is a fear that migrant children are not able to learn and speak the German language properly, and it will cause serious problems in schools as well as everyday life." "There are cases where migrant children are taken away from their parents because they are deemed not to speak sufficient German."

There are also several differences between/among Turkish and German families in family dynamics and child-rearing. Migrant families often raise the issue of a Leitkultur and refer to the child protection issue at the macro-level. They think that migrants are forced to be assimilated under the set of shared cultural values of Leitkultur. For instance, German authorities deny visitation rights if they observe the child speaking a foreign language with the parent. Bilingualism continues to be a political problem in Germany. However, some migrant families do not speak German fluently, and the native language is the only way of communication between families and children. Turkish diaspora communities request from Jugendämter to allow migrant families to speak their mother tongue during the visits. As a result, language becomes an essential component of child protection issues, creating a severe barrier to migration governance.

Besides, there is a gender aspect of the issue. Migrant families often claim that children of single mothers are systematically taken into care by Jugendamt, and they believe "there is social pressure on mothers, particularly single migrant mothers." According to them, the majority of society considers the role of mothers within the houses as bread-maker and birth-giver." Thus, they mention, "the host society considers non-working migrant mothers as a problem."

5.3.3 Child Care as an International and Transnational Issue

The child protection is not a problem only for Turkish communities in Germany. Other immigrant communities, such as Polish, Italian, and Russian, also have similar problems with Jugendamt. Child protection decisions create political tensions between Germany and the kin-states of migrant communities. The EU attempts to bring child protection issues in Germany as an international and transnational issue. For instance, on May 05, 2015, there was an online petition in the European Parliament (EP). Polish representative of the MEPs has been forced to the EP to adopt resolutions on the role of the Jugendamt, particularly in cross-border family disputes and rights of children of bilingual couples (the petition in December 2008 and the resolution on November 29, 2018). The EP has called Germany to revise the child protection law and subordinate Jugendamt; however, it was refused. At the same time, Polish and other EU families (i.e., Italian and Bulgarian) lobby in the EU institutions, Turkish communities in Germany lack the EU power. Therefore, they try to form public opinion in Turkey and ask Turkish political elites to intervene. Subsequently, there is a supra-national aspect of the child protection issue, especially at the EU level.

Turkish diaspora families attempt to bring legal and political mechanisms to launch and support their claims against Germany.[144] The European Court on Human Rights (ECHR) becomes a natural place to complain since it has jurisdiction on child protection matters. The ECHR president, Luzius Wildhaber, admonished Germany and asked for the implementation of the human rights convention system, specifically article 46 of the convention.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the notification of the children to the Consulates is a critical issue between Turkey and Germany. According to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) (*Wiener überinkommen über konsularische Bezeiehungen – WÜK*), children who are taken into care should be reported to the Consulates. Article 37 (Information in cases of deaths, guardianship or trusteeship, wrecks, and air accidents) paragraph b states:

> "…to inform the competent consular post without delay of any case where the appointment of a guardian or trustee appears to be in the interests of a minor or other person lacking full capacity who is a national of the sending State. The giving of this information shall, however,

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[144] Chapter VII will further examine the cases in the ECHR against Germany, pages 250-251.

> be without prejudice to the operation of the laws and regulations of the receiving State concerning such appointments."

The German authorities, however, do not fulfill the notifications. Family Courts do not report the migrant origin children to the Consulates since the newborn children are registered as German. When Turkish Consulates do not receive any notifications, they could not help the Turkish families on time. Therefore, Turkey has attempted several initiatives to solve the problem.[145] For instance, she delivered a warning to the Federal Government of Germany for the implementation of the Vienna Convention and the necessity of the notification of Turkish migrant children who are taken into care by the German Jugendamt.

Furthermore, there are additional problems that make child protection as an international and transnational issue. There are some legal issues in matters of child custody in Turkey. After the divorce abroad, child custody orders by the foreign courts are not automatically recognized and enforced in Turkey. The decision of international courts on child custody is not automatically valid in the Turkish legal system, and this creates another issue for Turkish citizens living abroad. Child custody (vormundschaft) in Germany is belonging to both the family and the state. When Turkish communities in Germany have problems with their parental responsibility, they do not understand the different applications of the rule that the German state acts and differently intervenes in the private life of families. There is a de-facto discriminatory practice of child custody in Germany, which is based on nationality and citizenship. In practice, child custody is usually granted to a German national. However, migrant families – particularly families from the EU, claim that Article 21 (Non-discrimination) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should be applied. The notion of European Citizenship has to be more inclusive and includes child custody matters. The EU thus needs to develop more supranational policies in matters of child protection.

German domestic courts have made it clear that no matter what an international treaty says, the well-being of any child in the country is the priority of the German state. International law and organizations cannot interfere in German courts' independence, and there is no consequence for not complying with international treaties. However, there is a need to establish international mechanisms to monitor states if states fail the responsibilities of migrant children's well-being in their territories.

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[145] The necessity of notification was reminded in the meetings of Attaché with municipalities and state administrations of Jugendamt.

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These lingering suspicions indicate a lack of communication between migration management and child protection. Migrant children's rights need to be included in international/global mechanisms to monitor state policies. In 2015, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) developed a Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) to define what a well-managed migration policy might look like for international standards. According to the Migration Governance Indicators (MGI),[146] there are six dimensions of good migration governance.[147] The dimension of the well-being of migrants primarily focuses on the educational and professional aspects of migrants. Child protection of migrant children also needs to be included in the migration governance.

5.3.4 Day-to-Day Communication between Turkish Diaspora Families and Jugendämter

According to the Turkish descent population in Germany, there are some reasons for misunderstanding between them and Jugendämter: (1) lack of cultural understanding of social workers and (2) overload jobs for Jugendämter.

Firstly, Turkish diaspora communities claim that Jugendämter is not aware of the cross-cultural differences in child-rearing. While one thing is acceptable in one culture, the same habit may be perceived as neglect in another culture. In their opinion, Jugendämter has a lack of intercultural competences; therefore, they cannot assess the fairness of the cases if there is maltreatment at home. There are some cases where Jugendämter make mistakes when there is a lack of cultural awareness and intercultural competence.

Secondly, they claim that Jugendamt is often understaffed. According to them, Jugendämter is frequently either overzealous in taking children into care that are not at risk or careless in leaving children in endangered with abusive or incompetent parents. As a result, Jugendämter does not make decisions accurately and take every child as much as possible, not to be responsible in the future if something happens to a child.

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[146] The MGI is a tool based on policy inputs to advance the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society.
[147] Six dimensions are (1) migrant's rights, (2) institutional capacity, (3) regional and international cooperation, (4) socioeconomic well-being of migrants, (5) mobility dimensions of crises, and (6) safe and orderly migration.

5.4 Possible Solutions for Turkish Diaspora Communities: What Should Be Done?

During the interviews, Turkish diaspora families shared their views on child protection and offered possible solutions. Although there are different views on the German child protection system, most families express that they have been subject to racism and (institutional) discrimination in the country, and Turkish origin children are systematically "seized" by Jugendämter for the sake of assimilation. This part of the dissertation conveys their "solutions."

From their perspective, child protection has been taken place under different practices across Germany. For instance, they claim that Jugendämter in Hessen does not follow discriminatory practices towards migrant children and considers the cultural and religious sensitivity of migrants during replacement care. They do not have any empirical evidence for this claim. However, it is more based on the diasporic narratives that they have heard from other co-ethnics. For this reason, they often draw attention to the differences in child protection practices among federal states within Germany. Turkey is a unilateral state; therefore, most Turkish migrants are not familiar with the federal state structure. They continue to evaluate the hostland environment under the political characteristics of the homeland as well as their own cultural and religious values. Besides, they always compare their situation with a relatively better example in another German federal state (such as the comparison of NRW and Hessen), but not with a relatively worse example, such as in the new states[148] which were belonging to former East Germany.

According to them, there are several systematic problems of the German child protection system(s). For instance, Jugendamt exercises control over the families but also provides support for them at the same time. It is difficult for families to collaborate during replacement care when there is a lack of communication between families and Jugendämter. Most of the Turkish diaspora families also have negative opinions of Jugendamt. They express that they are insecure and fear of Jugendämter. This aroused a need to find new forms/ways of support for families, particularly when children are "forcibly" taken into care by Jugendamt.

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[148] Saxony, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia.

Since the child protection in Germany is mainly based on prevention and early intervention strategies, decisions by Jugendämter are sometimes too quick not to be a responsible party for child endangerment. Jugendämter is a guarantor of every child's safety in the country. Jugendämter thus prefers the earlier intervention to prevent possible risks in the future. As a result, there are sometimes cases without having an in-depth risk assessment of maltreatment.

Turkish families request from Germany to institutionalize culturally sensitive care for migrant children. There is no enough Jugendamt employees with a migrant background or have intercultural competences. Jugendämter does not always understand the cultural differences since they are not exceptionally trained for the intercultural competences. Germany may wish to consider encouraging social workers to have intercultural competence as well as communication skills by providing them extra opportunities such as time, money, certificate programs. Besides, there should have been more Jugendämter with migrant origin who share the cultural and religious values of the families. During my fieldwork, I have been told that there were only three staff in Jugendamt with Turkish origin in the whole federal state of NRW. Students with a migrant background should be encouraged to continue their education in social work. Jugendamt also should provide better opportunities for migrants to work in such a profession.

Another way to solve the problem is that Germany needs to accept Muslim organizations as an independent welfare organization (Freie Träger). The religious organizations (the Catholic organization Caritas, the Protestant Diakonie, and the Jewish Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland) provide institutional services such as kindergartens, retirement homes, schools, and local services for youths, parents, seniors, disabled people, homeless, migrants, and other social groups. Their activities are supported by public funding. However, no Islamic organization in Germany is registered as an independent welfare institution. Therefore, they could not receive public funding as a social partner from Germany. Like other religious communities, Muslim organizations should provide institutional services, including child protection. Recently, several Muslim communities in Germany (including Turkish, Bosnian, and Albanian) have attempted to be registered as an independent welfare organization. German politicians such as Horst Seehofer continue to express that "Islam does not belong to Germany." Germany needs to support the integration of Muslim communities into Germany not only at the society level but also at the state level by accepting that Islam

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belongs to Germany since almost six percent of the population (close to five million) is Muslim.

In child protection, parents should be more actively involved in collaboration and coordination with Jugendamt, including in the risk assessments if they are not offenders of violence and abuse. Currently, the families feel that they are excluded in the process. Most families are not immediately informed when their children are taken into care. There is a big fear as well as miscommunication between families and Jugendämter. It is not very easy for families to "cooperate" with Jugendämter, whereby they "fight" against. The German state authorities need to support families and enhanced families' capacities to provide for the well-being and safety of children. Therefore, the problem should be first solved at home – if there are no severe signs of neglect, rather than taking children into care and excluding families in the process. There is also a need to have preemptive strategies for the best interests of a child.

Furthermore, the possibility of reunification between biological families and foster children is extremely low in Germany. Indeed, the ratio of reunification is one of the lowest in Europe. There are severe deficiencies in bringing children home from foster care. Germany needs to improve policies for the reunification rather than long years of care replacement and separation. Some families propose that there should be cut off expenses that it will make easier for children to come back to their biological families. As long as the German government pays the Jugendämter for the number of children, economic gains continue to be a financial interest behind replacement care decisions.

Nonetheless, there is a shortage of foster families with a migrant background, especially among Turkish communities. Jugendämter spontaneously place migrant children into care without much focusing on their cultural and religious needs. In the current protection model, the most significant and probably the only concern - is the "endangerment of a child." Jugendämter urgently attempts to find a safe place for children to grow up. Jugendämter might spontaneously ignore the cultural and religious sensitivities of children in replacement care when the cultural and spiritual needs are not the priorities of the foster care decision. Therefore, families propose increasing the number of foster families among Turkish diaspora communities, as well as the necessity of kinship care.

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In Germany, there are not enough children's homes designed explicitly for migrant community children and protect their cultural and religious needs. In Paderborn, there is only one small private institution that provides residential care for Turkish migrant children. Foster care in family settings could be better than residential care of children's homes. Therefore, it is more efficient if the Turkish descent population is encouraged to be a foster family rather than establishing particular children's homes for Turkish migrant children. Migrant children in that type of residential care could be isolated. They could have integration problems and keep social distance towards the host-society. However, some Turkish families often argue the necessity of such residential care alternatives for migrant children. From their standpoint, even if Germany does not establish migrant children's homes, Turkey should do it in Germany.

Some families demand from Germany to send Turkish origin children back to Turkey when there is a shortage of Turkish foster parents. They think that their children will be able to grow up safely with their relatives or kin community in the "homeland," whereby their cultural and religious needs, as well as identities, are preserved and maintained. This claim, however, is not realistic at all, neither for Germany nor Turkey. Besides, as German citizens, Turkish origin children would like to grow up in Germany, not in Turkey.

Although most Turkish families express that they are unjustly deprived of their children under the bureaucratic arbitrariness of Jugendamt, it is challenging to say that there is a systematic policy in Germany to take Turkish immigrant children into care for the sake of assimilation. Nonetheless, there is a lack of culturally sensitive practice in foster care replacements for migrant children in the country. The cultural and religious sensitivity of migrant families is often ignored by hostland's institutions (Thouburn, 2007; Laird, 2008). The local institutions do not pay enough attention to the cultural and religious sensitivity of other ethnic and religious groups. There could be some mistakes in every institution, including Jugendamt. There are cases where Jugendämter is not able to understand and consider the cultural sensitivity of migrant children. However, it becomes hazardous to generalize every case. There are also several positive examples that Jugendämter helps migrant families and protect the best interests of children, including migrant and refugee children in the country.

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The real reasons for the replacement care are indeed dependent on the differences in the cultural and religious values, norms and traditions, family structures and dynamics, the notion of child-rearing, (domestic) violence, socioeconomic conditions (poverty), and educational status of Turkish diaspora families in Germany. There is a need to understand both the roots and routes of the conflict from two sides (migrant families vs. Jugendamt). There is a high level of fear and distrust against the Jugendämter; therefore, Germany needs to overcome this. It should also be noted that child protection is one of the significant problems of the modern state, particularly in the multi-ethnic and multicultural states. When most Turkish diaspora communities believe that there is no place for the state of being inside of their home as well as private life, Germany needs to explain the necessity of the state intervention in some cases, even in the personal life of individuals.

Many Turkish diaspora families do not know their rights and "what to do" when their children are taken into care by Jugendamt. They first try to solve the problem in their inner cities and neighboring areas, including among diaspora communities, rather than applying any German state institutions. Apart from having social pedagogues with migrant background in Jugendamt, there is also a need to have migrant origin lawyers specialized in child protection matters. There are significant problems of not having enough Turkish descent lawyers in the child law. Some Turkish families often claim that they do not trust any German lawyers because they think that German lawyers will never come up against the German state and its institutions. For this reason, they firstly look for Turkish descent lawyers on the Internet. Some Turkish families also begin to claim that they do not trust Turkish lawyers as well and even accuse them of caring only money interests but no benefits of families.

As a result, the Turkish descent population in Germany needs to know their rights better, whereby they can ask from German state authorities to follow the legal procedures. As long as they do not know and request, Germany does not automatically provide these rights. It should be noted that any help can be supplied if a person asks. Turkish CSOs, therefore, need to work more on the issue of child protection among Turkish diaspora communities. Turkish academic centers should also conduct detailed research on child protection and welfare issues.

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During the fieldwork, I often noticed that Turkish civil society organizations in Germany attempt to promote the higher political participation of Turkish descent population in the elections, and they encourage co-ethnics for the dual nationality to be part of the political system. Turkish communities in Germany will have the power to bring about policy changes only if they are politically active. They could achieve the claims by having a high level of political participation in the German political system.

5.5 Biopolitical-Diasporic Collectivities under the Shadow of Child Care

Turkish diaspora communities produce biopolitical collectivities in their day-to-day life. They argue that Jugendamt is a part of birth control and population policy. According to them, Germany has been deeply concerned about its rapid dwindling population; therefore, Jugendämter systematically takes migrant children into care to assimilate and fill the urgent need of the young population. They draw attention to why Jugendämter take one child from families while letting others stay in the same family despite the high risk of maltreatment by parents.

In their view, there is systematic discrimination towards migrant parents' lifestyles, including their mother tongue, clothing, and cultural and religious symbols. Migrant families are often accused of not being "modern" when they do not follow the European way of the Western lifestyle. Turkish families declare that they firmly attach to the notions of honor and virtue. They believe titular society considers them as "conservative" who stay behind modern times. For example, if mothers wear a veil, they are accused of being primitive who cannot provide proper education to their children; therefore, there is an urgent need for child protection. They believe that German society considers them "third-world citizens" and "uncivilized people" and that discrimination is also at the state level.

Nonetheless, there is high pressure on daughters from some migrant families as well as from their co-ethnics. Turkish girls are mostly expected to dress modestly according to the Muslim tradition, do not have a boyfriend, do not go out at night, and do not drink alcohol. Women thus face high pressure to conform to traditional Turkish - indeed Muslim - norms and behaviors from their families and their compatriots. Although there are statistics on the gender composition in replacement care, it is not possible to know the exact number of sexes among one ethnic group since there is no indication for the ethnic and religious background.

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However, most of the interviews that I conducted declared that their daughters had been taken into care. As it is mentioned earlier, there is a gender aspect of the child protection issue.

Families, on the other hand, believe that not only Turkish women are discriminated against. Migrant men also face several biases: they are mostly labeled "aggressive" and "macho," and they do not play an active role in child-rearing. It is somehow true that some Turkish men consider childcare as the responsibility of mothers. Some have difficulties in showing their feelings, emotions, and love. Although some Turkish fathers cannot show their feelings directly to their children, it does not mean that they do not care about their children.

There are also differences in terms of understanding violence. From their point of view, parents have the right corporal punishment. Even if they do not use physical punishment, children face psychological punishment. There is a high level of domestic violence in a home, which severely affects children. Indeed, one of the biggest reasons Turkish origin children are taking into care by Jugendämter is domestic violence at home between the husband and wife. Pringle (2010) argues that there is no relationship between parental corporal and ethnic background of the family. Violence is more dependent on the socio-economic conditions and educational level of the families.

In this context, there is a high level of precarization among Turkish diaspora families in Germany. The debates on child protection highly contribute to the insecurities and vulnerabilities of the Turkish descent population in day-to-day life. Through biopolitical collectivities on the correct way of life, the inclusion and exclusion of membership among domestic abroad as well as with the titular majority are established. Turkish diaspora communities in Germany subsequently (re-)construct their hybrid, transnational, and diasporic identities behind the child protection issues. Most of them believe that there is institutional racism towards their kin-community in Germany, and they claim that German society considers their children a threat. As a result, they (re-)produce biopolitical collectivities and act together for the diasporic morality, care, and solidarity.

Biopolitical narratives and discourses set the conditions of how Turkish-Muslim identities are established in the hostland. Turkish diaspora members idealize the homeland through traditional norms and values under the Islamic way of life. They perceive the hostland with

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strong ethnocentric interpretations. Turkish diasporas frequently claim, they cannot accept that their children are given to same-sex couples (since they consider "*homosexuality as a sin for Muslims*"). There is a hostility of many Muslims towards LGBT people and their lifestyles. For them, this is highly unacceptable.

Consequently, Turkish diaspora communities produce as well as re-produce biopolitical discourses on the limits of inclusion and exclusion. When some co-ethnics criticize and blame families for child maltreatment, families emotionally overact and get tense. Compatriots criticize families because of using physical force in child discipline, domestic violence, and miscommunication between families and the German state authorities. In return, those families claim that their co-ethnics do not have any idea, and they just betray their own culture, religion, and nation. The inclusion and exclusion of biopolitical collectivities set the diasporic identities, "either you belong to us" or "to them - those infidel Germans." Therefore, biopolitical collectivities do not only establish the links between the Turkish communities and the host society but also within diaspora communities – 'domestic abroad.'

5.6 Negotiating in Times of Conflict(s)

There are several ways that Turkish families can appeal to the Jugendamt decision. First, they can write an objection to the decision (Widerspruchsrecht). In this process, they should not sign any document without consulting an expert lawyer. They need to consult a lawyer who specializes in family law. If their German level is not enough, they can request a Turkish-speaking pedagogue and social worker. This is important for them to explain the situation and not lead to misunderstandings between the family and Jugendämter. Besides, they can get an assistant/supporter (Beistand). Every person has the right to have a personal assistant to protect their interests (persönlicher Beistand) to appoint and give them a power of attorney (Vollmacht). The assistant/supporter can be any person, such as a neighbor, friend, and officials of associations.

Moreover, families can request the right to a legal meeting with the child (Umgangsrecht). They should attend all the meetings and stay in contact with the children. Families should not lose contact with a child. They need to identify the demands of the Jugendamt and learn the conditions for reunification. Families need to improve themselves to take the education

competence document (Erziehungsfähigkeitsbescheinigung). This is a necessary condition for the reunification with a child. If families have problems, they need to solve them. In terms of a lack of financial abilities, families can apply to the court for financial support (Prozesskostenhilfe). If the child is taken into care because of the parents' application, the protection situation can be withdrawn with the family court decision. Ex-spouses should bilaterally negotiate with the former wives/husbands. Families should not endanger the future of the children because of their incoherence and arguments. As a result, families need to focus on how to improve their financial as well as emotional/psychological conditions. It should be noted that families have the right to petition each year (Antragsrecht) until their child is returned.

If families want to pay attention to the protection of a child's cultural and religious background, they can bring up the rights of accommodation in close relatives such as grandparents and uncle-aunt. The families can insist on the necessity of the protection of the child's cultural and religious values when a child is given to foster families who have different religious and cultural values. Families can also use the right to choose between organizations in the services to be provided (Wunsch- und Wahlrecht). Therefore, they can demand to give their children into a foster family who shares the same religious and cultural values. It should not be forgotten that according to laws, the cultural and religious background of a child should be taken into consideration during foster care.

Turkish families also need to stay in positive and constructive communication with Jugendämter. It should not be forgotten that Jugendämter prepares a report and deliver it to the family court. Most of the time, the courts decide on the child's custody, which is highly dependent on the Jugendamt reports. Thus, families should continue to keep in contact with Jugendämter and do not close their communication. Constructive collaboration is always needed.

During my fieldwork and interviews, I realized that one of the main reasons behind the miscommunication is that Turkish communities in Germany do not know "what to do" and "how to do." With the increasing fear towards Jugendamt, most families do not want to cooperate with Jugendämter, or they are afraid of contacting them. The negative image of Jugendämter among the Turkish diaspora in Germany increases the tension without any reason. It makes both parties are unable to work together for the well-being of the children.

For these reasons, this part of the dissertation is vital for Turkish families to solve the problem. The real problem, indeed, happens because of misunderstanding and miscommunication rather than child maltreatment itself. Minor issues on child protection often turn into a "war" between migrant families and the German state authorities.

Turkish Civil Society Organizations, academic centers, political parties, and media (both in Germany and Turkey) need to touch upon the real problem(s) and explain both the roots and route of the conflict rather than building another brick on the wall. It should not be forgotten that families have the right to appeal to the decision of Jugendamt. In case of the unlawful and unfair decision of protection by Jugendamt, there are following possibilities that families can apply to:

1. Family Court (Familiengreicht): the family court does not decide if the decision is lawful or the duration of care. However, it arranges for custody rights. This means that whether the child will be returned to the family or placed elsewhere under protection.
2. Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht): it is the duty of the administrative court whether child protection takes place under the law. Before the decision, Jugendamt needs to provide necessary services for families. If Jugendämter does not follow the procedures, the Administrative court could determine the decision as unlawful.
3. Ombudsman Youth Welfare (Ombudschaft Jugendhilfe): Ombudsman is an independent institution, and in case of problems with Jugendämter, they can negotiate with the officials to find a solution.
4. Administrative Appeal (Dienstaufsichtbeschwerde): when families believe that the officials maltreat them, they can report a complaint to the Mayor of the municipality or Jugendamt.

Consequently, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany have several ways to contest the decision of Jugendamt. The lack of lawyers, mainly Turkish origin, in child protection makes it difficult to have legal actions towards Jugendamt. At the same time, the issue is highly politicized by Turkish media and co-ethnics. Several actors become part of the problem, and they feel moral and political responsibility to intervene in each case. Turkish diaspora communities in Germany need to be aware of the conflict's real causes and find possible mechanisms to solve the issue – misunderstandings.

Conclusion

In the literature, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are often portrayed as having "a low interest as well as participation in the hostland's politics" (e.g., Koopmans & Statham, 1999; De Wit & Koopmans et al., 2005), whereas they have "high interest in the homeland's politics, but with low participation" (Turkan-Ipek, 2019). The Turkish descent population in Germany, therefore, is rendered as politically passive communities. In contrast, in this dissertation, I argue that the Turkish descent population sets and prioritizes the "threshold events" to take part in socio-political activities. There is a high level of mobilization on the "selected issues" such as family and child matters, even though they are not socio-politically active on every topic. However, they politicize[149] family matters and organize collective actions. Biopolitical discourses and practices on the ideal Turkish family are one of the threshold events, whereby they share collective morality on "the correct way of life" and "normative ideals of the traditional Turkish-Muslim family." As a result, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are socio-political actors in day to day livelihoods, and they construct diasporic belonging and unity. They subsequently perform "what to be a diaspora" as well as "act as a diaspora."

In matters of child protection and welfare, Turkish diasporas in Germany are far from being passive, altruistic, and delineated communities.[150] They act and engage in struggles for the policy changes in the country of residence and participate in several socio-political activities such as protesting and demonstrating against the German youth welfare office, establishing Turkish civil society organizations in Germany, launching social campaigns, increasing public awareness, organizing academic workshops and conferences, and involving in philanthropic activities. They also re-influence Turkey's diaspora policy (boomerang effect of diasporization). Although they may not be very successful in bringing radical policy

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[149] The word of politics is not always included to define such activities. When politics is considered the realm of public life, everything can quickly turn into politics, where individuals cooperate and compete for resources, rights, and responsibilities. As Thomas Mann claims, "everything is politics," and all individuals participate in politics every day. Besides, diaspora communities are social and political collectivities and non-state actors to make "claims, articulate projects, and mobilize energies" (Brubaker, 2005).

[150] Not in all subjects, Diasporas are actively mobilized for collective actions. The issue selection still matters in the mobilization. There is a high selectivity of the diasporic morality that "which topic matters" and "for whom with what purposes." This selectivity is called "threshold events" in the dissertation. For these reasons, it is essential to understand how diaspora communities identify, interpret, and problematize the everyday life (thematic process) and how they understand the situations and activities on the issue (framing process) for collective solidarity.

changes in the hostland, they draw socio-cultural as well as political attention to their needs, interests, and identities.

Most of the Turkish diaspora families in Germany "perceive Jugendamt as negative, useless, and detrimental to their family unity and integrity" (TBMM, 2013). Jugendamt is predominantly seen as "a negative organization that is ready to seize kids at any moment and is not helpful to families to facilitate in finding solutions for certain problems" (TBMM, 2013).

Turkish communities expect German childcare services to provide a secure environment for their children's cultural and social needs, including religion. It is anticipated that Jugendämter should provide all the important values to migrant children and their families (TBMM, 2013). The ad-hoc committee on the Human Rights Inquiry Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey found out the Jugendamt, as well as German foster parents, does not provide these necessary opportunities and facilitation. It is highly believed among Turkish diasporas as well as homeland's public and political elites, cultural and religious sensitivity of the Turkish origin children in Germany have been neglecting "knowingly and willingly" (TBMM, 2013). Besides, most of the Turkish families believe that Jugendamt is not monitored adequately; therefore, they request the establishment of an independent control mechanism against Jugendämter.

As a result, most of the Turkish families demand the application of Section 37 SGB VIII and solve the problems between the child and the parents, rather than taking the child away from the biological families. If the children are taken away and need to be given to the foster family, biological families want to involve in joint actions for the sake of their child's interest.

Nevertheless, there is no one type of Turkish migrant children in Germany. Their social status, education levels, as well as financial status, is different. In some cases (even most of the cases), Jugendämter takes children into care for just reasons. There is also a need to differentiate between forced and voluntary taking the children. Children can leave their homes by themselves and ask for protection. In this dissertation, only children, who are taken into care without the consent of the biological families, are considered. There is a difference between cases of willfully overlooking evidence of abuse and deliberately separating parent

and child based on nationality or any other reasons such (institutional) racism and Xenophobia.

Although most of the children in Jugendamt are taken into care due to maltreatment and endangerment, the cultural and religious sensibility of children should be maintained. There are no enough Turkish origin foster families in Germany; however, Turkish families demand the increase of kinship care, whereby co-ethnics can ensure that Turkish origin children in Germany will grow up according to their culture and values. Turkish diaspora families in Germany are not against the child protection system. However, they demand several changes in the practices of Jugendamt. Jugendämter needs to cooperate with families. Families should be aware of the situation. And then, they can jointly investigate the case if there is maltreatment. If Jugendämter finds any maltreatment, they need to discuss the findings with the parents. Many families believe that there is a need to establish a check and balance system in child protection. The Jugendämter needs to be more accountable for its actions. Family courts are involved in the process to cease and desist orders to Jugendamt. The courts can hold Jugendamt responsible in a way that individuals or the media cannot, although there is a low level of trust towards family courts among Turkish communities in Germany. If Germany violates the international/global conventions on child protection, the international courts need to intervene and recommend for policy changes and ensure that there is compliance between domestic law and international law in migration governance in matters of child protection and welfare.

(Non-)Practicing of Diasporic Care and Solidarity among Turkish Communities in Germany: Online Participation

Introduction

This chapter examines how Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are digitally mobilized on the Internet for the necessity of kinship care,[151] and contributes to the literature by analyzing "what and how online modes of participation could offer in diaspora mobilization." The Turkish descent population in Germany mostly takes part in online activities:

1. to create social interactions in everyday diasporic life and exchange information among co-ethnics in the hostland;
2. to construct diasporic identities from below;
3. to express emotions, feelings, and thoughts, and share pains, hopes, and happiness;
4. to show diasporic care, empathy, and collective solidarity;
5. to raise awareness and public opinion;
6. to lobby to bring about socio-political changes.

Furthermore, in this chapter, I examine the spillover effects of online activities to offline participation, including further mobilization offline. I also explore whether online participation is something "new as well as a different type of participation." Finally, I conclude the chapter with the main issues of digital connectedness and togetherness.

In matters of kinship care, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are involved in online activities for various reasons. For instance, the usage of the Internet helps Turkish co-ethnics to organize offline activities and strengthen their voices in the German public. On the Internet, they attempt to influence public opinion and raise awareness. For this reason, in 2016, the website of foster-parents (www.koruyucuaile.de) was created. The site provides all the necessary information on the notion of kinship care, including the contact address of the

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[151] Culturally-sensitive care is "the ability to be appropriately responsive to the attitudes, feelings, or circumstances of groups of people that share a common and distinctive racial, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural heritage" (Tucker et al., 2001: 131). Kinship care is one of the examples of culturally-sensitive foster care.

Attaché of Family and Social Policy (AFSP) at the Consulate of Turkey in Düsseldorf. The information contains the activities of Attaché, as well as the kinship care (i.e., what it is and why Turkish families should become a foster family; conditions of being a foster family; foster family care models; the process of being a foster family; the cooperation with the Jugendämter; custody rights; and financial supports and insurance) with the possible frequently asked questions. The website is simple and has a user-friendly design. However, it is only in the Turkish language. Therefore, it is constrained to reach more people or at least restricted only Turkish speakers. By December 31, 2018, the website was reached 56.800 visitors, and later most of the information on the website turns into a flyer to distribute in offline activities.

Turkish families, whose children are taken into care, as well as Turkish Civil Society Organizations, are very active on the Internet. Online platforms are usually the first place where families begin to ask for help and legal consultation. Thus, the Internet has profoundly changed the Turkish diasporas' lives and how they interact with each other. Subsequently, social media becomes the central facilitator for daily communication and set up diasporic identities.

Online Activities
• *Aims & Purpose*:   "…we open this page [#Muhammedi geri istiyoruz] as his family to get some support…"   "…the best help to us is to share our voice. Please, share our page on Facebook [Umut Yildizi Derneği]."   ---   • *Comments*:   "…we are friends of the family, and we do not answer all the questions not to say something wrong…"   ---   • *Reactions*:   "…Online platforms, i.e., FB can only be moral support, nothing else. If you want assistance, specify it…"   "…I think it is not good to publish all these on FB. Can you not find other places? Facebook will not bring your children back…"

On the other hand, there are several problems with the digital connectedness. For instance, non-professional individuals designed the social media pages of Turkish diaspora groups. The moderators often provided information one-way, and the followers of the pages were passive and did not react to the posts. Followers often did not post, or they did not comment on the existing posts. The same posts were repeated several times in different groups. Most probably, the same person shared the same news on other social media groups and pages. Thus, the pages needed a more professional way to raise public awareness. For instance, they

could share the success stories of Turkish foster parents and make the pages more interactive. Otherwise, they would have minimal effects in bringing about policy changes. Online campaigns have indeed reached more people through offline activities such as the public events of the Attaché. It shows that online participation itself is not enough to be effective on policy changes. Instead, they are used as a tool for offline mobilization and turn into the extension of offline activities.

6.1 Daily Communication and Information Exchange

The Internet makes dispersed transnational migrant communities stay connected. It helps to create everyday communication and reconnect diaspora members with the homeland as well as other co-ethnics in the country of residence despite their physical absence (Fong et al., 2010). In the age of the Internet, the notions of place, time, and space are highly reshaped by web technologies. The Internet, therefore, reduces the distance and maintains social interactions. Diaspora communities have faster as well as cheaper access to information and communication online. The Internet consequently becomes a vital source for facilitating everyday conversations (Valenzuela, 2013) and information exchange.

Why do they take part in online activities?
• *Exchange of Information*: "…what is the last situation?" "…when/how did it happen?" "…which city in Germany do you live in?" "…how come does this happen? I cannot even believe it…" "…Jugendämter does not take children into care without any reason; what is the real story here?" "…what does the Family Court decide?" "…who reunites with their children?" "How did you achieve it?" "Please share your experiences." --- • *Asking for Consultation and Help*: "…There should be some strategies before the Jugendämter takes the child into care. Lawyers are so expensive. What would you recommend me in a similar situation? Please share your strategies." --- • *Looking for Recommendations*: "…Is there any Turkish Civil Society Organization in France similar to Umut Yildizi Derneği? "…I also need help with my child. I would like to consult with Turkish NGOs…" --- • *Everyday Diasporic Experiences and Narratives*: "…the difficulties of living in Germany as a foreigner, especially as a Turkish…" "…It is tough to live in another country under some pressure…"

Turkish diaspora communities are mostly engaged in online activities for information exchange in day-to-day life. They widely use social media for everyday communication and

get information about offline events. Most of them follow only social media for taking information about public events and offline activities. When there is no information on social media, they claim that they did not know the event; therefore, they were not able to attend offline activities. As a result, the Internet strengthens communication strategies and information dissemination among diaspora members. Some use the Internet to ask for advice on what they should do if there are any similar cases in the future. Therefore, they use social media extensively by asking for advice and getting support from co-ethnic for collective actions.

Turkish diaspora communities in the neighboring countries (such as the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden) have similar problems with the Youth Welfare Offices. They believe that Turkish origin children are systematically and forcibly taken away by the Youth Offices. In 2013, Turkish communities in the Netherlands organized a protest with the motto of "give our children back, the Netherlands." They first contacted co-ethnics in Germany through social media and asked for practical strategies on how to raise public awareness and organize collective actions. After the online information exchange, they decided to protest offline. Unlike Germany and the Netherlands, there is no Turkish civil society organization in other countries (i.e., France), which works on the childcare for the benefits of Turkish origin children. When Turkish families in neighboring countries have similar problems with Youth Offices and need for the consultancy, they ask personal and legal advice/help in the Turkish-German social networks. Several compatriots in the neighboring states, therefore, follow the German websites for daily communication and information exchange on kinship care.

Since Turkish diaspora communities are very active on the Internet, they often attempt to raise awareness and get support from co-ethnics on the Internet. Their posts also include expressing personal experiences and emotions. Besides, they try to find the best strategies for their actions. Consequently, social media is used to express emotions and migratory experiences. Turkish diaspora communities describe the difficulties of being a foreigner, migrant, and Turkish origin in Germany. On the Internet, they portray their loneliness and their unfortunate situation, which they live in another country under political and societal pressure, whereby they cannot do anything to change it. In daily online communication, Turkish diaspora communities express "what it means to be a part of the Turkish diaspora."

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Some Turkish co-ethnics claim that social media will not bring the children back; therefore, they do not understand what families (can) do at online platforms. Instead, they advise to families for offline actions and "do something real" in physical platforms (i.e., consulting the lawyers or calling the Attaché). There is occasionally miscommunication on the purpose of the e-activities of families and co-ethnics. Some compatriots also complain that they do not get any answers to their questions. Families whose children are taken into care by Jugendamt do not want to reply to the questions during the replacement care. The families are worried about saying something negative or seem offensive against Germany. They often prefer not to be so vocal and criticize Jugendamt. Thus, they do not post or answer the questions of co-ethnics.

Dialogue: Critiques and Responses
• *Critiques from Co-ethnics*:   "…The German government does not take any child without reason. My comments were deleted…"   "…why do not you explain the real reason for the decision of replacement care?"   "…I do not want to make a bad comment, but the state [Germany] will not take children without any reason. So, there should be something (maltreatment of child) for the decision…"   "…you have to prove the real arguments…"   "…Jugendamt is there to protect children…"   "…this is also our fault. They take into consideration all the small details. So, we need to be more careful…"   --   • *Reactions of Families*:   "…some immediately criticize, look for mistakes, and talk without any sense. It is easier to comment from your side…"   "…hear what you say! Families are suffering. Do not make stupid comments…"   "…do not make fun with someone else's pain…"   "…do not you have any conscience?"   "…can you say the same if Jugendämter takes your children into foster care…"   "…do not you know what it means to be a mother. Please be conscious…"   "…your unnecessary comments should stay with you…"   "…If you do not believe what is written here, do not follow this page…"   "…you judge families without understanding; however, you need to support them…"   "…whoever criticizes and judges us, they cannot be with us…"

Daily communication among Turkish diaspora communities shows that there are various opinions on the d protection issues. The significant majority of Turkish co-ethnics support the families. However, some criticize them and argue, "Jugendamt is the guarantor of child safety and welfare; this is why Jugendämter does not take any children, including Turkish migrant children, without any abuse." They are suspicious that families hide some truths on child abuse. In contrast, families claim co-ethnics who criticize them, betray their kin community, and even they are spies who work for the "enemy." The families get annoyed and reply to the comments that some co-ethnics do not understand the reality of "why and

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how it happens." Families claim that everyone might have similar experiences with Jugendamt.

Whereas Turkish communities are well connected digitally all around the world, many compatriots ask if they can be a foster family even though they live in other countries such as Switzerland and Turkey. Child protection is a transnational as well as borderless problem. Daily communication and information exchange on the Internet, therefore, is vital to understanding the formation of diasporic identities and the mobilization processes. Several scholars, thus, attempt to understand how identities are constructed in the social interactions of everyday life and communication practices on the Internet (Bozdağ, 2014; Karakusheva, 2016). Consequently, the Internet becomes a source of diasporic identity and constitutes a socio-political representation of threshold events. The following part of the chapter examines the construction of diasporic identities in everyday life and then analyzes how the Turkish descent population in Germany produces diasporic narratives and discourses on kinship care.

6.2 Identity Construction in Everyday Life: Diasporic Narratives and Discourses

The Internet brings different patterns of participation, and it enlarges the complex and multi-layered process of identity construction. The literature mostly focuses on the traditional top-down processes of constructing identities, whereby political elites have the power to shape common beliefs (Van Dijk et al., 2008). In contrast, ordinary transnational migrants become an actor in identity construction through the Internet. Diasporic identities are constituted by the content that individuals produce, represent, and consume on the Web. Transnational imagined communities set the limits of inclusion and exclusion among co-ethnics, producing narratives and discourses on the collectivity.

Earl and Kimport (2011: 75) claim that collective identities are not so important (minimal or perhaps not necessary) in an online environment. However, social media turns into a distinctive type of socio-political participation, whereby diaspora members learn about collective actions through diasporic networks and relations. This study confirms Tufekci and Wilson's (2012) argument that interpersonal connections are the most popular ways to learn about offline activities. Social media, therefore, is a distinctive way of participation when the recruitment attempt arrives through trusted friends (Lee et al., 2017) within the diasporic

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networks. Social movement participants are most likely to be recruited through acquaintances, rather than by people outside the networks (Snow et al., 1980). On the Internet, there is a high level of communication among Turkish diaspora communities, whereby they feel being part of a larger entity of "imagined transnational communities."

Herzfeld (1997:3) defines "cultural intimacy" as a collective understanding of self-recognition but also a source of solidarity among a cultural group that is not be shared with others. Boym (2001: 251) further develops the notion of "diasporic intimacy," which is constituted by the collective experience among transnational communities. In this study, I also demonstrate that Turkish diaspora communities are identified through a shared "diasporic cultural intimacy," whereby their collective experiences and hybrid identities play an essential role in diaspora activism and mobilization.

Under these circumstances, the Internet has a socializing as well as a politicizing effect on the creation of a sense of cultural coherence and diasporic identities. It creates new spaces and forms of collective expression, identification, and belonging among diaspora communities, and it changes and transforms social and political organizations' forms. The Internet consequently becomes a diasporic space for community formation and identity building.

Online Discourses
• *Discourse on Assimilation*
"…Turks are not assimilated in Germany. They do not allow their children to forget their language as well as a cultural and religious identity. Unlike other migrants, we are always proud of being who we are…"
• *Discourse on Ethnicity*
"…Turks complain other Turks while Arabs keep their collective unity and solidarity…"
• *Discourse on State*
"…the state does not ask me under which conditions I take care of my child, what types of difficulties I have, and how I had a bad marriage; however, it takes my child just because it wants without any real reason…"

On social media, Turkish communities often compare and contrast their co-ethnics with other ethnicities. They produce the nationalist-populist discourses. According to them, "*Jugendämter needs to consider the risks of Bulgarian, Romanian, Russian, and Polish origin children in Germany. These ethnicities do not care about the well-being of their children; therefore, their community children have been suffering in front of the train-stations (Hauptbahnhof). Jugendämter, however, forcibly seize Turkish children into care*"

because "*it is not easy to assimilate Turks, unlike other ethnicities. Jugendämter thus systematically pick up Turkish children to assimilate while not interested in others.*"

There are some positive stereotypes about other ethnicities, such as the "*Japanese way of disciplining children*" and "*togetherness of Hebrew and Arabic communities in times of precarity.*" In social media, some co-ethnics criticize the lack of solidarity among Turkish communities and ask, "*Have you ever seen that Jugendamt takes Japanese children?*" Subsequently, most of the posts include vital ethnocentric perspectives.

Besides, the language of these posts is highly gendered. It is often believed that "*Jugendämter target divorced, single, and migrant mothers, who are lack of German language proficiency.*" Some also argue that "*separated spouses commit perjury and complain the former wives to the Jugendamt.*" According to them, "*after the divorce, former husbands use Jugendamt as a gun to take revenge from their ex-wives.*" As a result, several postings are centered on family dynamics of marriage, gender roles, divorce, and the possibility of returning to the father's house.

6.2.1 Narratives on ''Us'' (Turkish Diasporas) vs. ''Them'' (Jugendämter)

There is a strong bias for Jugendamt amongst the Turkish diaspora communities. Most of them describe Jugendamt as a "*cruel institution whereby the workers are contemptible in their jobs, infidel, unscrupulous, and brutal.*" They often express that Jugendamt is a "*family destruction machine,*" which is the "*state-sponsored terrorist organization to make psychological torture for migrant families.*" Families describe themselves are "*hopeless and powerless against the Jugendamt terror, and whatever they do, they cannot take their children back if the Jugendamt decides.*" Many users advise others not to consult with Jugendamt, even for small help.

'Us vs. Them' - The main words to describe themselves and Jugendamt	
'Us' - Turkish Families (Positive)	'Them' – Jugendämter (Negative)
Fighter, Honest, Stubborn, Desperate, Aggrieved person, Patient *To be tested by God* *Examination*	*Cruel, Contemptible people, Infidel & Non-Muslim, German scum, Unscrupulous – heartless, Mason, Brutal, Vulture, Psycho, Dishonest, Enemy, with ulterior motives, Terror organization to make psychological torture, Family destruction machine I hate Germans - They do the crime of humanity.*

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6.2.2 Discourses on the (Mis-)Perceptions of the Homeland

In matters of child protection and welfare, there are mostly "negative" comments about Turkey. Turkish diaspora communities often argue that "*Turkey does not support them.*" They blame the homeland for being very passive and remaining silent on the issue. They claim that they are the citizens of a "*vacant state, whereas Turkey has no power.*" According to them, they are alone without the active support of the homeland.

For this reason, they need to be mobilized by themselves for collective actions. They highly criticize the Turkish state institutions, including civil society organizations. They claim that "*The Turkish Consulates in Germany do nothing rather than the paperwork and collecting money.*" On social media, they share their personal experiences with homeland institutions very negatively. Even some accuse Turkey of "*making a secret agreement for economic gains from the Jugendamt budget.*"

(Mis-)Perceptions of the Homeland
• *Negative*: "…we do not see so much support from the Turkish authorities. Only our sensitive citizens show their care and solidarity…" "…Turkey does not react to the situation and remains silent. They [Turkey] will not help us. Turkish NGOs are so passive. Victims must raise their voices by themselves…" "…I expect that Turkish political elites pay attention to the issue; however, they are very passive…" "…Turkish Consulates, including the Office of Relatives Abroad – whatever it is, Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Committee, did not help…" "…I went to the Consulate of Turkey in Frankfurt (am Main) and asked for help. Hence, nobody did anything for me…" "…It is even too late to establish Family and Social Policy Attaché…" "…staffs in the Consulates continue to sit and do nothing; they should do something real for people…" "…they [Consulates] have been following the cases for years. Nothing else they can offer more for families…" "…the victimization of the families by the Jugendamt will never be stopped. The state, and its institutions – consulate, exist only whenever they want money…" "…If the Consulates find free time rather than collecting the money, they will follow the issue…" "…Consular officers themselves do not know the laws…" "…the Consulates do not protect their citizens…" "…Jugendamt also pays money to the Turkish authorities that they grasp from the state budget …" "…Tell Turkish NGOs that you will give money to them. Then, you will see how they arrange a huge line…" "…there is no [Turkish] statesman who attempts to solve the problem…" "…Turkey does not have any power to make sanctions…" "…the Turkish government is not interested in the issue…" "…It is time for the Turkish government to do something on the issue. Consulates should focus on searching the solutions rather than the paperwork responsibility…" "…I do not have much trust in Erdogan…" --- • *Positive/Neutral*: "…Recep Tayyip Erdogan could help and solve your problem…" "…The Turkish state cannot come and interfere with the domestic policies of Germany. Rather, we should be collectively gathering and looking for other solutions…"

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In this context, several uses refer to President Erdogan. Although there are mostly positive comments about the President, some criticize him not to do anything on this particular issue. Nonetheless, most users mention that it is not easy for Turkey to intervene in German domestic politics and force German policy-makers to make policy changes. Therefore, they believe that Turkish diaspora communities need to come together for the policy changes on child protection without asking too much active intervention of Turkey.

6.2.3 Discourses on the (Mis-)Perceptions of the Hostland

The perceptions of the hostland are also negative. Most users claim that "*the population of Germany has been sharply decreasing; therefore, the Jugendamt systematically picks the immigrant children to solve the country's population deficit*." They express, "*Germans have anxiety and fear about the population decline. Thus, they target the migrant population*."

Some commenters have negative feelings towards Germans and their child-rearing practices. "*Alcoholic, drug addicts Germans do not care about the children, but Jugendämter do not pick up their children.*" Germany is often portrayed as an "*anti-child and anti-migrant society, whereby Germans are not married; stay as single; frequently change the partners and even homosexual.*" Non-traditional family types are considered as "*abnormal and perverted,*" whereby some diasporic families aim to keep their traditional Turkish family values.

When children are taken into care by Jugendamt, biological families think that they are not allowed to see their children again in their lives. Families argue that children are forcibly taken away by Jugendamt due to the "*false denunciation by a third party such as neighbors or former spouses.*" They find the forced separation is very "*drastic,*" "*when the only evidence is based on the accusation of a third party but not maltreatment itself.*" As a result, for families, "*Jugendamt kidnaps children from the parents.*"

Some think that their children will be in horrible conditions during the replacement care (either in children's homes or foster homes). They believe their children will leave as "*criminals*" or "*drug/alcoholic addicts.*" According to them, the situation of replacement care is not suitable for their children. They argue, "*there are so many children in children's homes, and the staff is not able to control them. Therefore, there is a high possibility for*

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physical as well as sexual abuse from older children over the younger ones and males to females."

The users usually refer to Xenophobia and institutional racism as the main reason for foster care. As mentioned earlier, they often compare Turkish children with other ethnicities by saying that "*Jugendämter take Turkish children for the sake of assimilation.*" According to them, "*Turkish origin children are systematically assimilated by the Christian-German foster parents.*" Most users believe that there is a "systematic policy" in Germany to "*assimilate Turkish children, whereby xenophobic rhetoric dominates the German society and politics.*" They argue, "*Germany fails to implement the obligations in child protection.*" They refer to the court trials against Germany in the European Court of Human Rights. Some add that "*German families are also suffered from Jugendamt.*" In these circumstances, most Turkish diaspora members describe Germany as "*although located in the heart of Europe with democratic institutions, there are lots of migrant family drams.*"

Besides, they argue that "*Germany systematically victimizes Turkish-Muslim children when there are political problems with Turkey.*" They believe, "*Germany could do everything to kidnap Turkish origin children*" and "*the protection is mostly taken under the political tensions between Germany and Turkey.*" In their diasporic (mis-)perception, there is a "*political ideology behind the German child protection system to assimilate Turkish children.*" They also set forth an argument that "*there is a vast economic benefit behind the child protection system, whereas staff earns income through the Jugendamt budget by kidnapping their children.*"

Some migrant families express that they do not trust to German state institutions. They argue, "*The German Media does not vocally criticize when Jugendämter makes a mistake.*" In their opinion, "*…media in Germany has not been allowed to report Jugendamt as a problem in the country. However, a few political magazines such as Frontal 21, Report, Monitor, Akte, and Spiegel have begun to no longer respect the state censorship.*" They claim, there is a limit on freedom of speech and expression in Germany if they criticize Jugendamt. In this context, Jugendamt is described as a "*Nazi terror organization*" and a very "*powerful lobby*" that "*cannot be controlled by the government or any other state authorities.*" "*…Hitler Germany has survived in the German Jugendamt…*" Accordingly, "*there is no higher organization to control Jugendamt and its activities.*" For this reason, they often compare Jugendamt with

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Nazi's Lebensborn. The comparison, however, is not welcomed by most Turkish diasporic users.

Return Migration
"…take your child and come to Turkey as I did…" "…when you take your child back, leave Germany. It becomes tough to live here…" "…bring your child to Turkey as fast as possible…"

On the one hand, some co-ethnics strongly advise for the return migration from Germany to Turkey after the reunification with the child. They give an example of their personal stories of how they are happy in Turkey after taking their child back from Jugendamt. On the other hand, the biological families, whoever "fights against" Jugendamt, are against returning migration. They claim, "*They need to think the future of their children.*" According to them, the best future for their children is in Germany, not in Turkey.

(Mis-)Perceptions of the Hostland
• *Population Decline*: "…The German population has decreased; therefore, they (Jugendämter) prefer Muslim families…" "…Since the German population has been decreasing, they (Jugendämter) target the foreigners…" "…They (Germans) are in fear because their nation is about to die out…" --- • *Xenophobia*: "…they [Jugendämter] want to take our Muslim children…" "…they [Jugendämter] are only against foreigners…" "…children are taught how to lie, or at least highly manipulated to tell lies by the German institutions. While there is Xenophobia, whatever children say, they (Jugendamt) take as a real…" "…There is nothing happen to the children of drug addicts and alcoholics German parents. The Jugendamt does not protect their children, whereas it does not give ours back to us…" --- • *Institutional Racism*: "…I think this [Jugendamt takes Turkish immigrant children into care] is a political ideology…" "…I think this is purely a state policy. This state [Germany] does everything to kidnap our children…" "…this is a political issue between two countries [Germany and Turkey] …" "…[Germany] do not stick your problems with Turkey over Turkish communities in your country…" "…Jugendamt can take our children without any court order on the groundless slander…" "…Family courts are also the backyard of Jugendamt…" "…If the Youth Office wants to take children, they will take it, and you can do nothing…" "…this is a deep bureaucracy circle that you can break…" "…they [Jugendämter] sell children like selling cars in the bazaar…" "…they [Jugendämter] do not help families; rather, they victimize them. They are becoming destructive…" "…even for a small help, you should not knock the door of Jugendamt…" "…If the Jugendamt poured jewelry into my paths, I swear that I would not go and ask for help…" "…Jugendamt is no longer a humanitarian institution…" "…save your child from the Jugendamt terror…" "…these are the Nazi methods…" --- • *Economic Gains*: "…the system [Jugendamt] is based on economic gains…" "…the staff of Jugendamt is just there to take income from the state. Jugendämter has just finished a university degree but nothing to do without a real job. They are just a few people with university degrees…"

- *Stereotypes*:

"…Germans themselves, of course, do not like children at all…"

- *Sexual Orientation*:

"…Our children are given to homosexual couples…"

"…how gay and lesbian Germans protect our children?"

"…If my children are given to other families, this should be a Turkish family. They are always better than homosexuals…"

"…Germans should give their lives to Turkish-Muslim families. Shall we become perverted ['homosexual'] as themselves?"

- *Trust*:

"…German media does not tell anything about Jugendamt…"

"…German state authorities are not interested in the issue…"

"…I do not trust the German state and its workers…"

In sum, some Turkish co-ethnics argue that "*Jugendämter forcibly took their children away for no good reason or sometimes for political reason, and the decision is not an isolated incident or a mistake. Rather, it is a deliberate, institutionalized practice of assimilation policy of Germany.*" They add, "*Jugendämter can take every migrant child away from the biological families. They even do not need a reason for replacement care.*" For these reasons, Jugendamt is considered as "*a racist state organization to Germanify immigrant children on German soil.*" They often claim that "*Germany violates the human rights under the echo of child-protection.*" It is believed that Germany considers immigrant communities as risky groups; therefore, Jugendamt "*targets migrant children for assimilation.*" In their opinion, "*Jugendamt cultivates that being a non-German is a potential threat to children* because Germans think *migrant parents have a lack of knowledge on how to provide education for children.*" As a result, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany often spread the message that "*Jugendamt decisions on child protection are horrifying and need to be stopped immediately.*"

6.2.4 Discourses on the (Mis-)Perceptions of Turkish Co-ethnics

Similar to the homeland and the hostland, most comments about Turkish co-ethnics are also unfavorable such as "co-ethnics do not support each other; criticize families without understanding what it happens, and they are very passive as well as insensitive on the issue." However, there are some positive comments by saying that "they are united; they can win all fights as long as they are together and need to show to Germany that they have the power to bring about socio-political changes." Several posts claim that they are a Muslim community; therefore, they need to act together. According to them, collective actions are the only

"solution to stop activities of Jugendamt, and they could bring about policy changes in Germany if they act together."

(Mis-)Perceptions of the Kin Community
• *Negative*: "…Turks do not support Turks…." "…The saddest thing is to hear from co-ethnics that if we did not do anything wrong, they would not take our children…" "…our society does not find time for solidarity, but they search only for the mistakes…" "…other ethnicities are interested in kinship care. Why do we not show similar interests? Why do not we give our hands to our children…?" "…our nation, unfortunately, is insensitive about the kinship care…" "…It is understood once more that we are an insensitive society…" "…Turks are so passive in kinship care. Why? They are afraid that they will lose their [German] passport. It is more important to live in Germany than their children…" "…Nobody is interested in the issue. Everything seems all right. There is no need to go for it…" "…Nobody talks on the issue, so we opened this page for nothing. Nobody answers my posts…" "…In any case, Turks do not know how to fight for their rights…" "…powerful Turkey, powerless Turks…" "…they [some co-ethics] claim that we [families] exploit their emotions. Indeed, their cold and insensitive behaviors exploit our souls…." --- • *Positive*: "…here we go, this is our nation…" "…the power of the Turkish nation…" "…as long as Turks are together, nobody can challenge us…" "…It is good to see that Turks are united in special times. God bless us…" --- • *Identity Lenses*: "…there is nothing about Turkish, please use Turks…" "…we are a Muslim unity…" --- • *Collectivity*: "…I, you, we must do something. If there is no state, we exist. If 50 people come together in several cities for a couple of weeks, we do not need anybody and anything else. Everything can be solved by itself…" "…as long as we do not act and react collectively, Jugendamt will continue to take our children…"

6.3 (Self-)Expression of Emotions, Feelings, and Thoughts on the Internet

This dissertation confirms the literature that emotions are essential in social movements (i.e., van Stekelenburg & Klanderman, 2007; Van Zoemeren et al., 2009; Leach et al., 2006; Jasper, 2011). "Anger," for instance, becomes one of the primary motivators of protest movements worldwide. The online activities of Turkish diaspora communities are both emotionally and morally charged. Families whose children are taken away from Jugendamt use online platforms to express their emotions and personal experiences. They have feelings of relief, anxiety, stress, anger, but also hope. Several co-ethnics also share their sadness and the yearning to express their sorrow on the separation. They share hopes for the reunification and sympathize with families who are in a hopeless situation. Friends of families often create

Facebook pages to post about families' sadness and ask for diasporic solidarity and collective actions. Thus, online participation is usually performed through emotions and personal experiences.

(Self-)Expression: Share Emotions and Experiences
• *Emotions of Families*: "…my angel, where are you now?" "…This is the 4th day that we have been separated from our baby…" "…I did whatever they (Jugendämter) said, now I want my child back…" "…I never want to have appeared in the media, but I had to…I did not have any other option…" -- • *Emotions of Co-ethnics*: "…May Allah give the same joy to other families, who have been waiting for the reunification…" "…my God, please never give this pain to any Muslim families…" "…I am very sorry…" "…I am very sorry that I cannot help…" -- • *Experiences*: "…we struggle for nothing, once these infidel Germans take our children, they will never give back. I know it because they also took children from my friends…" "…We do not know what to do, how to do (fight against Jugendamt). Whenever there is no other solution for us, we try to act immediately. We should not be afraid of their (Jugendämter) blackmails…"

As a result, Turkish diaspora communities use the Internet as a public space for diasporic communication, whereby co-ethnics quickly turn into emotional and be ready for taking part in collective actions. Daily online communication helps compatriots to be "angry" about the issue and immediately act offline. On the Internet, families often express that they "*are not protected against the arbitrariness of Jugendamt*;" therefore, they need to act offline collectively.

6.4 Diasporic Solidarity, Empathy, and Sympathy

When Turkish diaspora families become desperate, they attempt to create collective actions such as protest, march, and petition. However, they first try to get some online support from co-ethnics. The Internet thus becomes a crucial platform to spread the issue among co-ethnics. Diaspora families reach more people on social media for offline activities. The significant part of Turkish co-ethnics has built empathy and sympathy with families. Although there is some criticism from compatriots, most people claim that they are ready to act together and show their diasporic solidarity.

Some co-ethnics also wish for themselves to reunite with their children when co-ethnics share their pain. Compatriots pray for each other that are in similar situations. Most users are indeed united together because they have or had similar problems. Even here was a post in Turkish-German social media from Malta, whereby the Youth Office took Maltese children without the consent of the biological family. In this post, the Maltese family asked for solidarity against the Youth Office in Malta. Turkish diasporas supported the online petition. Transnational diasporic solidarity turns into international solidarity, although it was not that strong and organized. The Turkish users mostly shared empathy and sympathy as well as universal morality with the Maltese family that "*every child belongs to the families, and the state should not intervene in family matters and privacy of individuals.*"

Empathy & Sympathy: What would happen if you were?
"…how do you know that this will not happen to you?"   "…I also have a 2-month son; I feel your pains…"   "…as a mother, I share…"   "…we cry for you; we pray for you…"   "…our prayers with you…"   "…Glad to hear that you reunified with your child. I feel the same happiness that I reunited with my own…"   "…I saw my pains in your story…"   "…I hope I will also reunify with my child soon…"

As mentioned, not all the time, co-ethnics support each other. Some compatriots claim that "*Germany will never take any children without any reason, and there should be maltreatment of a child in the house.*" Families believe, Jugendämter can take away children from anybody. They advise compatriots not to decry their kin community. When some co-ethnics criticize the families, they ask others what they would feel if Jugendamt "*kidnaps*" their children.

"…Can you imagine what you would do if the kidnapped child is yours?..."
• *Answers:*   "…I would go ballistic…"   "…I would not sit on my hands and wonder whether I was fair by calling them Nazis or racist…"   "…I would not give a flying crap about being neutral…"   "…I would attack the Jugendamt with every fiber of my being…"   "…Being neutral is the judge's job. It is not the job of the parent…"

On social media, there are many references to religious idioms, particularly God. Most Turkish diaspora users ask God's help and wish that nobody has similar experiences, and God should not test them with their child. Several posts, therefore, include Muslim's daily religious expressions such as If Allah wills (Inshallah) and God speed you (Allah yardımcınız olsun).

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Religious Idioms
"…May Allah help you…" "…May Allah not separate you again…" "…May Allah never let to happen of Jugendamt terror…" "…May Allah not test anyone with/through the child…"

In this vein, online activities of Turkish communities in Germany have primarily focused on diasporic solidarity (how to help each other and demand social justice) and empathy and sympathy. On the Internet, Turkish communities are band together. In social media, most users agree that they should not stay silent and do something offline. They take moral responsibility to act together and address everyday life issues. Because of these reasons, the strongest motivation for bottom-up Turkish diaspora activism in Germany has resulted from the shared feelings of diasporic solidarity, whereby they have morality to act together.

In matters of child protection and welfare, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are united to fight against Jugendamt. On the Internet, they claim that they will do their best to support each other offline, and until they get the child back, they will be together. Not only Turkish descent population in Germany supports the families, but compatriots from other countries and Turkey also show their diasporic care and solidarity. Diasporic solidarity is constructed under the Turkish ethnic and Muslim religious values on the family dynamics.

Solidarity: Helping each other, demanding social justice, and fighting together…
"…we are together until we get our child back. We will take the child back…" "…Inshallah, we will do our best…" "…Inshallah, we will win this fight…" "…l let us save our children…" "…do not worry. See how many mothers, fathers, siblings you have now. There is a big family behind you…" "…we support from Berlin…" "…from Turkey, we can only support through liking and sharing the post…" "…they should not see us as a foreigner in this country. We have united hearts in this country…" "…as long as we are united like a single heart, Germans cannot manage to take our children from us…" "…we should always act as a single heart…" "…we will take our children back as long as we are united and together…" "…If we are united, we can solve all problems…" "…first of all, it is needed to be united…" "…it is time to show our power against the system, which tries to assimilate us…" "…it is time to show that we are not stigmatized as passive communities against the unjust policies. Instead, we need to show our strong solidarity and ability to act collectively and actively…" "…this solidarity should be an example for all of us that we can always unite…" "…Muslims should not leave each other…" "…we are ready to support - Felicity Party Düsseldorf representation…" "…power means people, how many people support mean how much power we have…" "…I am trying to reach the mother of the child and would like to help. I work in this area…" "…What can we do? Let us not remain silent!"

6.5   Raising Awareness and Public Opinion

Since the Turkish descent population in Germany use online platforms for raising awareness and forming a public opinion for their needs, interests, and identities, I followed Grossberg's notion of "mattering maps" (2010) to identify how they have been moved to connect to kinship care. As Grossberg (2010) argues, "the image of mattering maps points to the constant attempt, whether or not it is successful, to organize moments of stable identity, sites at which we can, at least temporarily, find ourselves at home with what we care about." In this dissertation, the mattering maps help me to understand "the affective dimension of how certain issues come to take on intensity for people and moving them to action" (Alinejad et al., 2019, 24).

The mattering maps are also crucial to analyze the "prepolitics," which is the initial phase of social movements that are built and institutionalized (Mandaville, 2001; 50). Online participation makes the prepolitics of diaspora mobilization and shows how collective actions are institutionalized. I further combined the findings of the mattering maps with the data ethnography approach (Dourish, 2014) since I attempted to develop analytical ways to identify empirical traces of the diaspora mobilization on kinship care amongst the Turkish descent population in Germany.

I continued the digital investigation to observe the "tracing process" of the issue's formation at online platforms and explore how Turkish diasporas in Germany establish networks and relations for the diasporic care ideals, practices, and responsibilities. In the following part of the chapter, I follow Roger's (2013) "device-demarcated source sets" (distinct spheres): (1) an institutional, news-related sphere via Google search, (2) a cause-related sphere via Facebook pages, and (3) an image-sphere via Instagram.

6.5.1 The Institutional News-related Sphere: Google Search

In the first step of the digital investigation, I analyzed *Google Search* results across the local Google domains (Rogers, 2013) for the literal query [kinship foster care among Turkish communities in Germany] in both Turkish and German languages. I explored two local domains - *google.com.tr* (Turkey) and *google.de* (Germany) on October 18, 2019, and compared the top-ranking web results for each domain. I selected the top 25 URLs to

determine how kinship care has been framed in Turkey and Germany. By doing so, I attempted to identify the main similarities and differences in kinship care in Turkish and German domains.

I collected publication dates for each URL to identify how kinship care has been developed as a topic or even an issue for Turkish communities both at home and the domestic abroad throughout the years. *Google.com.tr* shows that the case continues to be current and still hot debate among the Turkish public, particularly in the Turkish media, from 2012 until now. In contrast, *google.de* indicates, there is relatively no concern about the topic in Germany. Most of the links in *google.de* search is belonging to the period of 2013-2015, and they are already outdated information as of today.

In the *Google.de*, out of the top twenty-five URL links, seven of them (9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, and 25) are spams, and they are not relevant to the kinship care. Most of the links are the repetition of the same news. For instance, three links (3, 14, and 15) are the same story of the Turkish origin foster family in Berlin in 2015. Nesrin and Cenk couples were the foster parents of three German children. However, there was no mention of kinship care. Although the Gök family has two children, their stories mostly describe how well they were ready to take care of three German foster children.

Only two links (2 and 5) deal with kinship care. Link 2 expresses that there is little experience of foster care parents with a migration background, and it describes how Hamm and Möchengladbach municipalities try to increase foster parents with migrant backgrounds. Link 2 also shows how Turkish families become foster parents for German children. Link 5 highlights that there is a short supply of kinship care in Germany. The source indicates that there only 10% of foster parents have a migrant background in the country. The same link describes how Duisburg municipality attempts to increase Turkish and Russian foster parents.

Several links (1, 8, 19, 6, and 23) have a criticism of Turkey's diplomatic and political pressure. Link 6, which belongs to the youth organization DIDF-Jugend, was critical of Turkey's involvement in the issue. According to this source, Turkey promotes the further isolation of the Turkish descent population in Germany.

Figure 49 - *Google.de Search*

Rank	URL	Date	Type	Title	Main Message
1.	pflegeelternnetz.de	2014	Portal	Türkische pflegefamilie in DE	Turkish associations take the initiative, forced Germanization of Polish children, Erdogan make diplomatic pressure
2.	moses-online.de	2009	Portal	Türkische Pflegeeltern für Deutsche Kinder	Turkish foster parents for German children, little experience of foster care parent with a migration background; Hamm & Möchengladbach
3.	spiegel.tv	n. d	News	Pflegefamilien (Gök)	Nesrin and Cenk Gök in Berlin (2+3)
4.	t-online.de	2013	News	Türkische Pflegekinder: "Assimiliert und entfremdet."	Turkish foster children assimilated and alienated: 19-years-old Elif in Melle
5.	wp.de	2014	News	Duisburg benötigt türkische und russische Pflegefamilien	Short supply of kinship foster care: only 10% of foster parents have a migrant background.
6.	didf-jugend.de	2013	Youth Organization	Türkische Pflegefamilien!?!?	Turkey promotes further isolation Kurdish and Armenian assimilation in TR
7.	zeit.de	1986	News	Kampf un ein Kind: Nicht Nuri und Nicht Florian	Nuri's story on (not) being Florian
8.	volksstimme.de	2013	News	Ankara empört über Türkische Pflegekinder in EU	Elif's story
9.	moses-online.de	n. d	Portal	Wir suchen Pflegeeltern	Not relevant to the topic
10.	suche.web.de	n. d	Web	Pflegefamilien in Deutschland	Not relevant to the topic
11.	de.jooble.org	n. d	Web	Türkei Deutschland	Not relevant to the topic
12.	moses-online.de	n. d	Portal	Pflegeeltern gesucht	Not relevant to the topic
13.	erziehungsstellen-beratung.de	n. d	Web	Familie als Beruf	Not relevant to the topic
14.	youtube.com	2015	Video-sharing website	Beruf Mutter: Alltag in einer türkisch-deustch Pflegefamilien	The story of the Gök family in Berlin
15.	spiegel.tv	2015	News	Alltag in einer türkisch-deustch.	The story of the Gök family in Berlin
16.	pfad.wordpress.com	n.d	Blog	Türkei: Aktuelles rund um PFlege	DITIB reduces the fear and prejudices among Turkish communities towards Jugendamt
17.	pflegefamilie-werden.info	n. d	PFDA association	Pflege und Adoptivkinder	Not relevant to the topic
18.	tagesschau.de	2019	News	Zahlen und Ihre Interpretation	Numbers and their interpretations: politically-oriented issue
19.	derwesten.de	2013	News	Türkei erzürnt über Türkisches Kind bei Lesben-PFlege	The involvement of Turkey Turkey's criticism of lesbian parents
20.	islamiq.de	2014	Online Journal	Jugendämter und Muslimische Pflegekinder	Interview with Meryem Özmen Mosques and CSOs
21.	islamiq.de	2013	Online Journal	Muslimiche Pflegeeltern warden gebraucht	Muslim foster parents are needed
22.	hayat-deutschland.de	2012	Article	Jugendamt, Stadtteilmutter und Familien	Ideas for better cooperation between the Youth Welfare Office and Immigrant Families.
23.	noz.de	2013	News	Wiedersehen mit leiblicher Mutter	19-years-old Elif from Melle (Ankara accuses the EU countries of alienation of Turkish migrants)
24.	dialogforum-pflegekinderhilfe.org	2018	Article	Migration in der Pflegekinderhilfe	Selected aspects of the state of research and development tasks
25.	wellenbrecher.de	n. d	Web	Pflegefamilien	Not relevant to the topic

The link 7 indicates the double consciousness of the migrant children and describes the story of a foster child Nuri, who is originally a Turkish migrant child but grow up with the German foster family. Nuri is not anymore Turkish, but he cannot be German Florian as well. The link 7 portrays the foster experiences and identity problems of Nuri, which are very similar to Elif.

The link 18 (in 2019) describes the number of children in foster care in Germany and how different politicians interpret and frame the numbers very differently. These links (24 and 18) show that foster care is an issue in the country; therefore, there is a need to pay attention to child protection among the German public and political elites.

In contrast, there are three links (16, 20, and 21) directly focused on the culturally-sensitive approach to kinship care. For instance, link 16 describes how DITIB reduces the fear and prejudices among Turkish communities towards Jugendamt. Links 20 and 21 illustrate the need of Muslim foster parents for Muslim children in Germany. The links 22 (in 2012) and 24 (in 2018) are the only articles on child protection. *Google.de Search* shows that there are no scholarly works in Germany to deal with kinship care for immigrant communities.

Under these circumstances, the hyperlinks in the *Google.de Search* are mostly part of news (*9*), the portal (*4*), web advertisement (*4*), association (*2*), online journal (*2*), article (*2*), video-sharing website (*1*), and blog (*1*). There is no negative news on the child protection system in Germany, as well as no criticism towards Jugendamt. The voice of migrant families is not often included, and their personal stories are missing.

On the other hand, there is a different story of kinship care in the *Google.com.tr search*. First of all, there are many negative criticisms towards Germany and strongly advocating for the urgent need of Turkish foster parenthoods for Turkish origin children in the country. Out of twenty-five hyperlinks, only one link (22) is not related to the German child protection system, whereas this academic article compares social policy and fosters family model in Turkey, not in Germany.

Figure 50 - *Google.com.tr* Search

Rank	URL	Date	Type	Title	Main Message
1.	dw.com	2013	News	Türk çocuklari için Türk aile	To describe the situation from both sides Campaign for Turkish foster parents
2.	haberler.com	2012	News	Almanya'da Türk koruyucu aile yok denilecek kadar az	To increase of Turkish foster parents
3.	dergipark.org.tr	2018	Article	Almanya'da cocuklarin koruma altina alinan	Jugendamt experiences of Turkish families in Germany
4.	postaktuel.com	2018	News	Türk çocuklarina Almanlar bakiyor	To increase of Turkish foster parents
5.	cnnturk.com	2018	News	Almanya'da Skandal	1.5 years old Savas Taskin died
6.	dusseldorf.ailevecalisma.gov.tr	2019	Official	25. Koruyucu Aile toplantisi	Experiences of Turkish foster parents in Essen
7.	hurriyet.com.tr	2012	News	Almanya'da koruyucu aile skandali	Grandparents kidnapped Jeremie
8.	yenihayat.de	2013	News	Jugendamt gerçegi	AKP's propaganda
9.	evrensel.net	2013	News	Koruyucu aile tartismasiyla korunan ne?	AKP's propaganda
10.	dailymotion.com	2018	Video	Koruyucu Aile Konferansi	Umut Yildizi Dernegi
11.	bilgesam.org	2013	Article	Almanya'da Koruma Altina Alinan Cocuklar	Academic Article on Jugendamt
12.	pflegekinder-berlin.de	n. d	Official	Das Informationsportal für Pflegefamilien	Information about Foster Care
13.	atlasjournal.net	2018	Article	Turkiye ve Almanya'nin Sosyal Hizmet Politikalarinin Karsilastirilmasi	Social Welfare policy of Turkey and Germany: An investigation on children in need of protection
14.	sabah.com.tr	2019	News	Koruyucu aile koruyamadi	A 1-year-old boy died in Plettenberg
15.	hbrma.com	2019	News	Almanya'da koruyucu aile bilgilendirme	Information about the Turkish foster family and activities of Turkish Consular in Köln
16.	facebook.com	2019	Post	Koruyucu aile ile ilgili bilgilendirme	Information about the meeting: 403 Turkish foster family
17.	koruyucuaile.de	2019	Official	Koruyucu aile olmanin sartlari	Information about Turkish foster family
18.	sabah.de	2016	News	Almanya'da cocuk drami yasaniyor	Number of children in foster care and their bad situations in Jugendamt
19.	sivilsayfalar.org	2019	Portal	Her cocugun aile sicakliginda buyumeye hakki var	The story of Pelin Caliskanoglu Eksi (Kalben Dernegi)
20.	aa.com.tr	2015	News	Yurtdisindaki Türkler koruyucu ailelige özendirilecek	Gönül Elçileri Projesi - increase the number of Turkish foster parents
21.	tbmm.gov.tr	2013	Official	Almanya, Hollanda, ve Belcika Genclik dairelerinin	Commission Report about Youth Offices in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
22.	researchgate.net	2015	Article	Türkiye'de Sosyal Politika ve Koruyucu Aile Hizmet Modeli	Social Policy and the Foster Family Model in Turkey
23.	koln.bk.mfa.gov.tr	2016	Official	T.C Düsseldorf Baskonsoloslugu	Information about consular
24.	arti33.com	2018	News	Ailesinden alinip koruyucu aileye verilen Turk cocugu hayatini	1.5 years old Savas died in Kassel
25.	blog.umut.org.tr	2016	Blog Foundation	Almanya'da cocuk cinayetleri artti	Number of death children in Germany

Unlike *Google.de* Search, there are varieties of sources among Turkish sources, from academic articles to social networking posting and state organizations' campaigns to the civil society organizations' activities. The highest number of hyperlinks in the Turkish domain list belongs to the Turkish mainstream media and news agency (Sabah, Hürriyet, and Anadolu Ajans), news site (Haberler.com, Hbrma.com, Evrensel.net), Turkish (online) media in Europe (Post Aktüel, Arti33, Yeni Hayat), German media (Deutsche Welle), portal (Sivil Sayfalar - Civil Pages), Turkish state organization (Turkish Grand National Assembly, and Consulate General of Turkey in Cologne, Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Policy in Düsseldorf), German state organization (Pflegekinder Berlin), Blog of Foundation (Umut.org.tr), Social Networking Sites for researchers (ResearchGate) and individuals (Facebook), Academic Journal (Dergi Park and Atlas Journal), Research Center (Bilgesam) and Video-sharing website (Dailymotion). The links in the *Google.com.tr* are relatively new; six of them are belonging to 2019, and six of them are belonging to 2018. There are also links from 2012 (1) and 2013 (5).

Although most of the links in the *Google.com.tr* have a relatively neutral tone and prefer describing the situation of foster care in Germany for Turkish children (e.g., hyperlinks 1, 15, 16, and 17), the links have a negative language towards German child protection system (5, 7, 11, 13, 15, 18, 24, and 25). Most of the titles of the links include "scandal" (5 and 7), "inability to protect" (14), "truth" (8), "deaths" (24 and 25), and "drama" (18). Most of the links in *Google.com.tr* also include the social campaign for the notion of "Turkish kinship parents for Turkish immigrant children" (1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 23).

Under these circumstances, there is no recurrence of hyperlinks from the *google.de* domain in the Turkish results. There is no substantial overlap between the Turkish and German domains on kinship care. The hyperlinks in the *Google.de* and *Google.com.tr* show that the results were mainly news items, and there is rarely academic publication on the topic (only two in Turkey but none in Germany). The majority of the hyperlinks that appear in the Turkish domain are *com.* and *com.tr.* hyperlinks, and in the German domains, are *de.* domain. It indicates that the kinship care ended up among the Turkish diasporas and the homeland in the Turkish-language web. The findings show that the issue's circulation and mattering maps are primarily contained within Turkish domains among Turkish communities - including Turkish diasporas in Europe and are mostly concerned for the Turkish-German community rather than the German society.

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6.5.2 The Cause-related Sphere: Facebook

In the second stage of the device-demarcated source set, I extracted data from Facebook to explore Turkish communities' online participation in Germany. While *google.com.tr* search describes the kinship care as a "problem," Facebook becomes a significant platform to understand how the topic has been spread among Turkish communities to mobilize for collective actions. Other social media platforms (Twitter and Instagram) are not widely used for online activities,[152] and there are a relatively smaller number of twits and hashtags on the topic. Facebook continues to be the most important social network for the Turkish diasporas. Through Facebook conversations, Turkish communities resonate diasporic communication, whereby they perform hybrid identities and act as a diaspora.

In the *google.com.tr search*, I came across with the "Umut Yıldızı Derneği" – UYD (Hoffnungsstern e. V), which is a non-governmental Turkish civil society organization in Germany. I decided to follow its Facebook page. As of October 26, 2019, the page has 3.555 likes. During the analysis of that page, I also came across with the Facebook group, "Almanya-Jugendamt Mağdurları" (Germany-Victims of Jugendamt). I decided to follow this group to explore how Turkish diaspora communities establish networks and relations. I became a member of the group in November 2018 and be a follower of the group posts for more than a year. I noticed that this FB group has a relatively high number of members. As of October 26, 2019, there were 1.119 members. I compared the group with other Jugendamt related-groups on Facebook.[153] Although there are few groups with a higher number of members (such as "Jugendamt - Erfahrungen & Erlebnisse" with 18.000 followers), Almanya-Jugendamt Mağdurları is the biggest as well as the most active Turkish FB group on the subject. Jugendamt related FB groups have mostly around 250-500 members though there are varieties of the numbers. There is also one more group among Turkish diasporas (Almanya-Jugendamt Mağdurları NRW Bölgesi); however, it is inactive with fewer members (447) and did not approve my membership for almost two years. In this context, the Almanya-Jugendamt Mağdurları Facebook group, with 1.119 members, is big enough for data collection.

CEU eTD Collection

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[152] Since Facebook is mostly composed of ties to family and friends (Koc-Michalska et al., 2019), there are relatively strong ties among users.

[153] "Kinder, Familie, Jugendamt" has 219 members, "Jugendamt: Die Last Der Doppelten Vergangenheit" has 386 members, and "Jugendamt: Familienstasi" has 568 members.

During the data collection among the Facebook page of Umut Yıldızı Derneği and a group of Almanya-Jugendamt Mağdurları, I often came across with the social project "Ailenizde bana da yer var *mı?"* (Is there a place for me in your family?) Moreover, the campaign "Muhammed'i geri istiyoruz" (We want Muhammed back). I thus decided to follow these pages as well to examine the diasporic communication on kinship care.

Figure 51 - *The Cause-related Sphere: Facebook Pages/Group (As by November 2, 2019)*

Facebook Pages/Group*	Number of Likes/Members	Number of Posts	Page Created	Date of Last Post
Hoffnungsstern e. V	3,553 likes	359 post, 731 comments	23.06.2011	24.07.2019
Ailenizde bana da yer var mi?	592 likes	185 post, 33 comments	19.11.2011	30.01.2019
Almanya-Jugendamt Mağdurları	1,118 members	584 post	26.05.2013	29.10.2019 (30.04.2019)
Muhammed'i geri istiyoruz	5,678 likes	25 post, 1091 comments	23.05.2014	22.10.2014

For the cause-related sphere, I thus followed three Facebook pages (UYD - Hoffnungsstern e. V, Ailenizde bana da yer var *mı?* and Muhammed'i geri istiyoruz) and one Facebook group (Almanya-Jugendamt Mağdurları).

Main Categories of the Facebook Postings

There are five main categories of postings on Facebook: (1) institutional news, (2) public information events, (3) official visits, (4) mass media news, and (5) everyday life experiences.

In terms of institutional news, many posts include necessary information on how to be a foster family. Turkish communities publish events to raise public awareness of kinship care. Institutional news mostly informs the followers about the need for volunteering and membership. There is also some administration news (such as the resignation of Kamil Altay). Some posts include information days in different German cities (i.e., Monheim and Bremen) or other meetings (i.e., protection of religion). Official visits (from the Turkish Consulates in Germany and the state authorities in Turkey) are included in these posts. Most posts, however, share Turkish mass media news, and others are related to the everyday life experiences of the Turkish diasporas in Germany. Turkish media predominantly criticizes Jugendamt and the German child protection system. They often use words of violence and scandals.

Figure 52 – *Main Categories of the Facebook Postings*

1.   Institutional News
- Administration news: Resignation of Kamil Altay (01.11.2018) - Website of the Turkish lawyers - The UYD participation of the Astec Book Fair (2015): Altay published a book - *Muhammed nasıl Markus oldu*? (How did Muhammed become Markus?) - The financial difficulties of the UYD - Membership and Funding: affiliated with the UYD and (financial) support through membership - Volunteering (especially for translation - the need for the German language)

2.   Public Events / Information Sessions
- Information days (Monheim & Bremen in 2015) - Info session: 'Why is a foster family?'

3.   Official Visits
- Embassy of Turkey in Berlin (2017)

4.   Mass Media News
- Violence, Scandals of Jugendamt, and German child protection system. - It is not allowed for Muslim children to be circumcised in Jugendamt. - Children who are taken into care by Jugendamt are registered as German. - Agenda in Europe (Avrupa'da Gündem), Fuat Ugur, Sabah Deutsch, Haber.com, TRT Türk, Show TV: Eylem Aksin (2015), ATV Avrupa - News on the reunification of biological families and their children

5.   Everyday Life: On & About Diaspora
- Gizem Korkmaz was lost – Gizem was found. - The everyday life of Muhammed bebek, who was taken away from Jugendamt without the consent of his family.

The language in these posts is predominantly Turkish despite there are a few in the German language. Several users asked to hold the conversation in the Turkish language if the posts are in German. The posts in the Turkish language also get more comments from the users. There are also non-Turkish members/followers, and they demand the translation of some posts. Turkish diaspora members realize that they need to take support from the German public as well as German media. Thus, the latest posts are bi-lingual (both Turkish and German). Umut Yıldızı Derneği has several posts in the German language; hence, there is almost no comment and feedback to these posts, which are only in German. It is a wrong strategy for any Turkish communities not to include the Turkish version or at least translation in the posts.

Figure 53 summarizes the postings on social media. It shows the development of kinship care from an introductory news article to a more institutionalized and organized issue. Initially, the posts were repeated and gave the necessary information and events. However, the latest posts are more related to "how and why to be a foster parent" and collective actions offline.

Figure 53 –*Facebook Postings Throughout the Years*

Years	Main Categories of the Postings
2010	News about the Turkish diaspora activism on kinship care
2011	Trips to Ankara, Visits of Turkish Consular in Germany, Events (against domestic violence), News, Circumcision ceremony for the children in Jugendamt, Activities
2012	News, Institutionalism: New logo and Twitter address.
2013	Information (communication address), Institutional (volunteers), Sharing the old post to introduce themselves, Events with pictures (FFM, Munich), News, Website (koruyucu-aile), Academic meeting Dein Köln & NiTAB, New website, Visits (YTB), Breakfast, Intercultural Spring Festival in Neuss. TGNA deals with the situation. Donation (Bayram celebration) - Non-related post (On Diaspora - Child Problems).
2014	Information, Events (Dortmund, Bielefeld, Kiel, Köln, Mülheim, Menden, Rosenheim, Dortmund, Münster), News, Protest: Marching, YouTube, Flyer.
2015	Events (Lübeck), Update of the website, Visits, News (same), Membership (financial), Looking for volunteers, Dinner.
2019	Membership, Support, Charity, Institutional updates, resignation, lawyers' website, Events, Information.

The network relations among/between the Turkish diaspora users show that there is no localization of the topic. Turkish communities from the neighboring countries, as well as from the homeland, get involved with the conversation and offer for help. Turkish diaspora communities in Western Europe have faced similar problems in matters of child protection. Therefore, child protection is not only a particular issue for those who live in Germany. Umut Yıldızı Derneği also established one branch in the Netherlands. Thus, kinship care gets significant attention not only in Germany but also in Western Europe as well as in Turkey.

The Facebook analysis shows that Turkish organizations and associations, particularly the Consulate General of Turkey in Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Berlin, pay special attention to the issue and organize several activities to deal with the situation. However, Turkish media is the most dominant actor and actively circulates news on the topic very frequently in the homeland.

6.5.3 The Image-Sphere: Instagram

In the third stage of the device-demarcated source set, I conducted a hashtag analysis on Instagram. I searched #genclikdairesi (German Youth Office - Jugendamt) in the Turkish and German languages; however, there was less post than 100 in Turkish. Turkish diaspora communities do not use Instagram as well as Twitter for diasporic communication (unlike Facebook). The hashtags were mainly in the personal account of some people (#Kamilaltay, #Fuatugur, #Eylemaksin_karaahmetoglu, #Pedagogpinar). The Instagram account of UYD is also passive. There were two posts from 2014, and one of them is about the book of "how Muhammed become Markus." In the Turkish posts, the main co-hashtag was #Gurbet to explain being homesick in foreign lands. Although there were a few posts on Instagram among Turkish users, they criticize Jugendamt for the assimilation of the Turkish children in Germany and ask whether Jugendamt protects or seizes the Turkish-Muslim children in the country.

In contrast, in the German-language hashtags, apart from #Jugendamt itself, the most frequently used hashtag is #kinderhandel, which is translated into child trafficking in English. In these hashtags, some argue that Jugendamt echoes Nazi Germany. "*Nazi tradition is vivid in Jugendamt*" and "*Germans receive migrant children for 6.000 euro per month on Nazi rules.*"

The Polish-speaking community addresses most posts related to Jugendamt on Instagram. Hashtags on Jugendamt are often circulated among Polish users. Many Poles use the #Jugendamt hashtag to tell "*how Germany is legally abducting children.*" They tag European Institutions, particularly the European Parliament (#Europarl_en). Several hashtags refer to the EP petitions resolution in November 2018 on the role of Jugendamt (with 307 votes against 211 with 112 abstentions). These hashtags highlight, "*…problems concerning the German family law system, including the controversial role of the #Jugendamt, denounced through petitions by non-German parents remains unsolved.*" Although "*MEPs sound the alarm over the controversial role of the Jugendamt, the EU is ineffective in solving the issue, and it took 12 years for the EU to issue a non-binding resolution.*" According to them, "*the EU does not care for highly controversial dealing of Jugendamt in Germany because the EU is Germany.*" Jugendamt is a highly used hashtag among Polish users, whereby they claim,

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"Polish children are forbidden to speak the Polish language with Polish parents, and this is called as forced Germanization."

Under these circumstances, most hashtags on Instagram are connected to discrimination, racism, and corruption. Several users assert a claim that *"Jugendamt starts where the corruption begins"* and *"Germany steals children from the parents."* According to these posts, *"Jugendamt staff receives a bonus if they snatch children out of their families (2.500 euro per child)."* These comments are very similar to Turkish discourses on Facebook, whereby several users describe Jugendamt as a *"government-sponsored child trafficking network."*

6.6 Towards a New Mode of Participation?

There are different motivations for Turkish co-ethnics to join collective actions. For instance, they involve diaspora activism to show diaspora care and solidarity. They also attempt to bring about the socio-political changes on threshold events through democratic ways of participation, such as protesting, voting, and establishing civil society organizations. Although diaspora communities are not homogenous ethnic and cultural groups, they often feel a shared sense of moral co-responsibility to (re-)act together, especially when they or their compatriots are at risk and face precarious living conditions. Diaspora communities, therefore, are involved in online and offline activities to establish social justice and bring about the socio-political changes in the hostland.

In this vein, online participation includes several types of e-activities. For example, Turkish diaspora users "like and follow" social network pages and groups; they promote electronic materials related to political and social issues that other co-ethnics have posted; they digitally encourage compatriots to take action together offline – including to vote and join the protest; they post their thoughts and comments on political and social issues, and they follow political and public figures on the web and contact with them digitally. Turkish diaspora communities subsequently take part in the e-activities on the Internet, and they protest online, make e-donations, and contacting public officials digitally.

Indeed, these e-activities on the Internet are very similar to offline ones. Diasporas sign the petition offline, protest and participate in marches physically, and contact government

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officials in person. This study confirms that online activities open a different way of participation (Bimber, 2003; Chadwick, 2006). The Internet generates a sense of virtual community among Turkish diaspora users and facilitates civic and political engagement (Ellison et al., 2007; Gil de Zuniga et al., 2009). Thus, it has mobilization effects and a catalyst role for offline participation. Besides, the Internet becomes a primary method for hearing about the offline events (Anduiza et al., 2014; Fisher & Boekkooi, 2010; Fisher et al., 2005; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010). The Internet consequently brings socio-political change offline (Howard, 2011).

This study approves Valenzuela's (2013) findings. Accordingly, Turkish diaspora communities use social media for (1) information exchange, (2) network building, and (3) political expression. Online activities are significant predictors of offline participation, and there is more visible support for organizations, politicians, and specific socio-political policies on the Internet. For instance, diaspora users change their profile pictures to express support, diasporic care, and solidarity. Besides, co-ethnics establish several pages and groups on social media for their needs and interests. Turkish diaspora communities in Germany also use the Internet to ask personal and legal advice and mobilize others for offline participation. In the literature, several scholars attempt to understand the determinants of online participation. They examine how "people get into contact with others they would otherwise not meet." However, the literature displays, "social networks increase and maintain weak ties rather than to increase strong ones" (Ellison et al., 2007). This study highlights the opposite way whereby the Internet also has wide-reaching mobilization effects among strong networks, including diasporas. Diaspora communities do not always translate their care ideals to direct actions. The Internet helps diaspora members to establish their ties and networks to take part in collective actions. As a result, the Internet also strengthens network-based participatory politics (Baringhorst, 2009).

This research confirms the literature that the Internet mobilizes broader social networks (Chadwick, 2006, 2013; Haynes & Pitts, 2009; Ward & Vedel, 2006). Turkish diaspora communities in Germany mostly receive news and information about offline activities through social media. Most of them follow the news and diasporic life from social media. The Internet thus creates enormous recruitment opportunities for offline actions. Several individuals join offline activities because they feel diasporic solidarity and moral responsibility to support their co-ethnics. Diasporic solidarity and moral responsibility are

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usually initiated in/by digital platforms. Not all diaspora members are further drawn into politics and play a more active political role; however, the Internet has enormous mobilizing power when diaspora members begin to use social media to encourage co-ethnics to join offline activities.

All in all, online participation brings immediate social interaction and exchange. The speed of information and organize collective actions is super-fast when it is compared to its counterpart offline. The Internet is also less bureaucratic to start collective activities. At the same time, the Internet enables diaspora members to keep current with the events (or issues) and stay in constant touch with co-ethnics and the homeland. It decreases costs to share information and raises public awareness at a lower cost, faster and broader networks. As a result, the Internet helps individuals to connect with their dispersed transnational co-ethnics as well as the homeland in everyday life.

Furthermore, online participation has the ability of content creation, whereby individuals create as well as shape news in everyday life (Chadwick, 2006; Haynes & Pitss, 2009; Ward & Vedel, 2006). On the Internet, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany customize the content of issues and activities according to their needs, interests, and identities. Most Turkish diaspora users are engaged in online platforms at least a few times a week. Facebook activities such as friending, liking a politician, political party, or joining a diasporic group are highly popular among Turkish diaspora communities.

Online news and information are also more credible for Turkish diaspora communities. They often claim that the German media does not cover the "issue" of Jugendamt; therefore, many people are not aware of the "real situation." Although there is a large and diversified amount of information available on the Internet, information becomes more accessible for diaspora communities at any moment. There is also less censorship and state control over information on social media. Information flow in social media occurs rapidly before the offline event occurs without external gatekeepers (Boulianne et al., 2020). The Internet thus provides an alternative to the control of centralized state media apparatuses (Georgiou, 2012). Turkish communities often argue that there are better opportunities for them to freely express their thoughts on social media, particularly in diasporic networks, rather than the traditional German media. The Internet consequently becomes one of the leading platforms for acquiring

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information about (diaspora) politics (Xenos & Moy, 2007) as well as their everyday life in the hostland.

Since the Internet has no border with fewer limits, it is purely transnational. When the German media does not pay enough attention to the problems of Turkish diaspora communities, they seek alternative ways of (diasporic) communication and raising public awareness. Several compatriots – from neighboring countries and Turkey- support offline activities virtually from the long distance. Subsequently, Turkish co-ethnics are mobilized distantly as well as virtually, and they lobby for political pressure wherever they live. For these reasons, the Internet constitutes an intermediary transnational social space in the triadic nexus.

The Internet creates an environment of distrust in political institutions (Carlin, 2011). There is a low level of trust among Turkish diaspora communities in Germany towards German state institutions (i.e., police, family courts, Jugendamt, mass media). Turkish diasporas, who are more critical of the German political system and state institutions, are more likely to attend offline participation. Turkish migrants – similar to other migrant communities, are often worried about participating in activities offline against Germany since they do not want to be identified and become a target of the hostland. Internet users could remain more anonymous, and there is a relatively low level of risk to be identified on the Internet. Turkish diaspora members criticize state institutions and public authorities more openly and freely on the Internet than offline. However, anonymity might cause individuals to be unaccountable in their words as well as actions.

Nevertheless, the Internet turns into a "liminal site" (Nedelcu, 2012), diasporic "contact zones" (Gillespie et al., 2010), and "diasporic resources," to establish "diasporic spaces" (Mainsah, 2014). It enables Turkish diaspora communities to create generative spaces to share personal and collective dispositions. As virtual communities, diasporas invent different forms of practices and socio-political participation on the Internet (Bernal, 2006).

Online participation stipulates new opportunities for disadvantaged groups. The dissertation confirms that the Internet provides equal opportunities in socio-political participation (Best & Krueger, 2005; Bimber, 2001). "Traditional offline participation has long been the domain of specific groups: in particular, those with high levels of income and education" (Smith et al.,

2009). Several scholars (i.e., Borkert et al., 2009) attempt to challenge the literature that focuses on elite groups and leaves out others – including the migrant and diaspora population. Online participation includes the voices of those who are excluded or feel politically powerless; therefore, it gives voices to the underprivileged others (Nessi & Bailey, 2014).

The literature illustrates that political participation is highly influenced by socioeconomic status and education (Almond & Verba, 1963; Verba et al., 1995). Education is closely linked to participation (Converse, 1972; Putnam, 2000). Recently, the relationship between education and political participation has become negative or inexistent (Campbell, 2006). The Internet shows that there is no correlation in the determinants of online participation. This dissertation indicates that Turkish diaspora members who participate in online activities have a relatively lower level of education and socioeconomic status in child protection and welfare.

The literature also suggests that men are more likely to engage in offline participation (i.e., Gurr, 1970; Hustinx, 2012). However, there is no significant difference between males and female participants in collective actions (Teocharis, 2011). Women have recently taken up activist roles (both offline and online) (Matzal, 2013). In matters of child protection and welfare, Turkish female diaspora members highly take part in online activities. Similarly, several scholars link participation with age (i.e., Beck & Jennings, 1979; Melo & Stockemer, 2012; Nie et al., 1974). Older generations are more likely to engage in political activities than youth (Almond et al., 2008).[154] Most Turkish diaspora participants, who are involved in online activities in matters of child protection, are middle-aged (36 to 55 years). In matters of child protection, Turkish diasporic youth are not very active. Most probably, they do not have such problems in their everyday life or even they do not have any children.

As a result, the online activism of Turkish communities in Germany does not correlate with socio-demographic variables of education, income, age, and gender. The literature demonstrates that the demographic variables of gender, age, income, education as significant predictors of online participation, whereas they are unrelated patterns of offline participation

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[154] Hooghe (2004) claims that youth is not involved in politics because they do not perceive that they have a stake in politics. Youth participation has focused on alternative means, such as informal activities or club partying (Riley et al., 2010). Thus, they prefer participation in loose and less hierarchical networks (Vissers & Stolle, 2013), which are often situated in the sphere of informal or sub-politics (Beck, 1992; Stolle & Hooghe, 2005).

(Ogan et al., 2008: 175). Accordingly, there are different socio-demographic and attitudinal predictors for online and offline activities. The literature often portrays that younger male and with higher education would make greater use of social media and illustrates that civic and socio-political activities are stratified by socioeconomic status. In contrast, income and education levels increase political activism and civic engagement increases. Unlike the literature, this study displays that the demographic variables negatively correlate with online participation. Turkish diaspora members, who participate online on child protection issues, are predominantly middle-aged women over the 40s, with a low level of education as well as socioeconomic status. The dissertation, therefore, came to a different conclusion, and the findings are contradictory to the literature.

When the Internet makes socio-political participation easier, it brings out new kinds of diaspora activists (women, middle-aged, low levels of educated, and from various socioeconomic status). The findings also confirm that online participation is "not demanding civic competences and requires much less time than offline participation" (Best & Krueger, 2005). It is easily accessed, low-cost, and less hierarchical. It also increases information dissemination and networking (Machackova & Šerek, 2017). The Internet thus helps to organize actions offline (Postmes & Brunsting, 2002) and enhances diaspora members to take an active part in politics. As a result, the Internet turns into an essential tool for the collective mobilization of individuals to participate in offline activities (Biddix & Park, 2008). For these reasons, online participation offers a new and different type of socio-political engagement (Chadwick, 2006; Raine & Smith, 2008; Schlozman et al., 2010; Vitak et al., 2011).

On the other hand, some works in the literature demonstrate that online participation has a lack of efficiency and effectiveness. Several scholars argue that online participation is "too simple" and has "no real effect" (i.e., Barney, 2010; Gladwell, 2010). For instance, Margolis (2007: 780) claims, "the Internet changes nothing." Online participation could be insufficient for making diaspora members pay more attention to politics, and it may not bring radical changes in political behaviors. However, as this dissertation demonstrates, it is not easy to claim that there is no effect on online participation in the political behaviors of individuals.

Several scholars also argue that online participation is "not always political" and does "not target politicians and political institutions" (Schlozman et al., 2010). Turkish diaspora members often claim that they do not have any political goals in their activities. However,

there is a political purpose of bringing policy changes in the child protection system in Germany. Several homelands' actors, including Turkish media, politicize the child protection cases as an international/transnational issue, whereby they intervene in such conflicts. As a result, it is complicated not to talk about the politicization effect of online activism and mobilization.

Online activities could be a "kitchen sink" (Teocharis et al., 2010) that includes everything; however, there is a "diasporic selectivity" in threshold events. It might be true that online participation itself could be less satisfying or efficient to bring about policy changes compared to its counterpart offline. Online activities, therefore, are needed to be supplemented by offline.

There could also be a "slacktivism"[155] (Morozov, 2009) in online activities. There are some actions performed via the Internet in support of a political or social cause; hence, they could not require more time or active offline involvement. However, it is difficult to say that there is a lack of desire among individuals to get more actively involved in offline activities. Online activities have significant effects on collective mobilization. Since the high level of online activities might reduce the time spent on engaging in offline activities, further research should investigate the correlation between online activities' quantity and the quality of offline activities.

Nonetheless, it is very ambitious to expect from online participation itself to bring about radical socio-political changes and offers something "totally new" from its counterpart. Online participation is indeed a different expression of the same phenomenon – political participation with some new contributions. Diaspora communities use the Internet as a medium of communication in everyday life, and online activities become a tool to strengthen offline participation. However, online participation should not only be an extension of offline activities. Diaspora communities use online activities for network building and political expression rather than only information exchange. For instance, Turkish diaspora communities could use the Internet to create a virtual map to report the cases when Turkish origin children are taken into care without the consent of the families. By doing so, they could solve some of the problems.

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[155] In slacktivism, people post; however, they do not convert the online posts into offline activities.

6.7 From Online Modes of Participation to Offline: Spillover Effects

In the literature, there is no consensus on the correlation between online activities and offline participation.[156] On the one hand, several scholars claim that online activities promote increased offline participation (i.e., Towner, 2013; Towner & Duio, 2011; Vitak et al., 2011). Accordingly, the Internet has revolutionized political participation and communication worldwide (i.e., Bentivegna, 2006; Bimber, 1998; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 2011; Norris, 2001; Polat, 2005). On the other hand, others believe that there is no direct link between online and offline participation (i.e., Baumgartner & Morris, 2010; Zhang et al., 2010). They argue that the Internet's role is "exaggerated, superficial, and unimportant" (Gladwell, 2010; Papacharissi, 2002; Tyler, 2002).

In this dissertation, I argue that online and offline participation is not mutually exclusive realities. Online platforms might quickly turn into the extension of offline worlds but also vice versa. One mode of participation is not enough for analysis in collective actions (Bauböck & Faist, 2010). There has been a decline in traditional forms of offline political participation, such as voting in elections (Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Gidengil et al., 2003; Phelps, 2006; Putnam, 2000; Zukkin et al., 2006). Online participation could compensate for the lack of traditional politics (Dalton, 2007; Norris, 2002; Stolle et al., 2005). As Vissers and Stolle (2013) discuss, traditional political participation repertoires are replaced by new forms of participation in lifestyle politics[157] (Dalton, 2006; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Schlozman et al., 2010; Stolle & Micheletti, 2013). Subsequently, online participation has an excellent potential for offline activities, whereby it helps to put in practice of involvement differently. Since no one lives in an entirely digital world (Miller & Horst, 2012: 16), individuals also participate in offline actions.

In this dissertation, the mode of participation is examined in both directional ways (from online to offline as well as from offline to online). Turkish diaspora communities are mobilized in online platforms to take collective offline actions, but also offline activities bring further online activities on the advocacy of political and social claims. The Turkish descent population in Germany organizes activities online and offline to ally with co-ethnics

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[157] Lifestyle politics refers to the politicization of everyday life choices, including ethically, morally, or politically inspired decisions about modes of living (Moor, 2017).

for collective actions and show their diasporic care and solidarity. Turkish diaspora communities are heavy users of the Internet, and they use digital platforms for several reasons. As a result, online and offline participation is complemented by each other. However, the separation of the modes of participation has mostly resulted from the analytical distinction in data collection rather than an examination of the causality between online and offline activities.

I followed several scholars in the literature and examined the role of online activities in the organization of social movement. Similar to Mercea (2012), I explored: (1) whether online activities increased the number of people mobilized to participate in offline protests, (2) whether the online environment allowed for an increase in the participants' identity with the protest organizations and (3) whether those who joined the movement online affected changes in how the movements were organized. Mercea calls the process of online participation that leads to offline activity as "digital prefigurative participation."

Among Turkish diaspora communities in Germany, online activities increased the number of people mobilized to participate offline. Online activities become mobilizing power in collective actions of Turkish diaspora communities. However, it does not bring significant changes in the nature of offline movements. Turkish diasporas mostly use the Internet to get support from Turkey, Turkish media, Turkish civil society organizations, compatriots, and others who share empathy and sympathy. They use online platforms to sustain offline support and spread their issue. Most co-ethnics also learn about offline actions (such as the protests) through online platforms – particularly Facebook. Online participation, furthermore, provides sources for the construction of Turkish diasporic identities.

On the other hand, online activities do not always bring offline participation. Individuals can be actively involved in online activities when they do not attend to offline activities. The diasporic selectivity is determined by the threshold/trigger events as well as the diasporic "positionality" (the relativity, power, fluidity, and perception). For this reason, there is an open question of how diasporic sociality is maintained and expanded through digital prefigurative participation (Ogan et al., 2016). While diaspora communities are involved in several activities both online and offline in a variety of platforms, there is a "more and more tendency" approach (Ogan, Ozakca, and Groshek, 2008: 175). Most engaged co-ethnics become active both online and offline. Therefore, it is tough to make a clear distinction

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between online and offline activities. As it is mentioned earlier, most activities such as protesting and contacting public officials are practiced both online and offline, or at least they have spill-over effects on each other.

Some compatriots – especially disadvantage groups of lower education and socioeconomic statutes, as well as women, become more active in general socio-political life after they have involved in online activities. Online diaspora activism thus leads to new types of political action offline. Diaspora mobilization is a gradual process, and nobody acts as a diaspora over one night. Several factors affect the mobilization process. As a result, there is a need to study the correlation between online and offline participation in detail in a more extended period to figure out how these modes of participation influence each other.

6.8 Further Mobilization on Collective Actions

In online platforms, several Turkish co-ethnics express the necessity of collective actions offline. Turkish diaspora communities claim that Jugendamt is not only an issue for the family but also a matter of pride for all Turkish compatriots. According to them, they need to act together and show their collective unity and solidarity. They express that Turkish compatriots are not alone in Germany, and they can protect and promote their needs and interests. On the Internet, they often discuss the main strategies of collective actions. Although traditional Turkish mass media is seen as the most powerful actor to raise awareness, Turkish communities use social media to lobby and get support from the homeland and co-ethnics.

Mobility: Protests, Public Opinion, Participation, and Legal Assistance
• *Pride:*   "…this is a matter for all of us. It is necessary to reach more people and inform them as well as mobilize them…"   --   • *Collective Actions*:   "…lets us know about the march. We will protest together…"   "…marching itself is not enough…"   "…instead of marching, we need to prove how they (Jugendämter) act unlawfully…"   "…We must protest against the unfair treatments towards the Turkish descent population in Germany. We should not allow them to behave like this. We exist in Germany, and if necessary, we can fight together. Now it is time to show our collectivity and power to Germans…"   --   • *Media*:   "…As soon as you have appeared in the media, start the legal proceedings…"   "…Have you ever tried to be on the TV?"

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> "…As soon as possible, you should contact the media…"
> "…You also should be in the German media. Turkish media is not enough…"
> "…The news should be in English as well. Let to know your voice to the whole world..."
> --
> - *Further Actions*:
> "…we want our state (Turkey) to help us…"
> "…contact the Turkish Consulate…"
> "…inform the march to the Turkish consulate, all newspapers, and TV channels…"
> "…let's call Recep Tayyip Erdogan…."
> "…When President Erdogan was here, you should contact him. He would find a solution…"
> "…Did you consult a lawyer?"
> "…you should contact Umut Yildizi Dernegi…"
> "...when I go to our mosque, I will request our Imam to organize a march…"
> "…when there is a trial in the family court, let us join all together…"
> "… let us send the signature to the municipal authorities as well as YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities).

Several users frequently tag co-ethnics to help the families or tag others who have similar problems with Jugendamt. Therefore, online platforms turn into a vital source to expand the diasporic solidarity networks among co-ethnics.

Networking: @Tagging people
"…Are not there any MPs in the Greens to help us?" @tag names who can offer help and also @tag names who have similar problems with Jugendamt.

Almost all families whose children are taken into care by Jugendamt organize the offline protest. However, they first ask co-ethnics to support the protest on social media. They attempt to gather many people as much as they can. They mostly reach people through social media, and Facebook becomes an essential source of diaspora mobilization. Besides, families have online consultations with Turkish origin lawyers in social networks and ask e-help for the offline legal procedure. With the support of media, including social media, families increase public awareness and organize collective actions. According to families, Turkish civil society organizations are not very active in supporting them. Turkish academic centers in Germany also do not conduct such research to address the needs of Turkish diaspora communities. They argue the importance of kinship care, whereby Jugendämter is aware of other cultures. As a result, Turkish diaspora communities initially establish strategies on the Internet, which are followed by offline activities.

Strategies
"…The reason for the opening this page is to announce the march and to gather people for mutual support…"   "…Jugendämter were following the page; therefore, we closed the page temporarily…"   "…the march has a huge impact on the Court decision…"   "…today there was a trial, so the protests were very effective…"   "…we want Jugendamt stop unjustly victimizes migrant families, so let us fight together…"   "…it would be better if this page is in German."   "…before the family court, you should take some help from the NGOs and associations…"   "…you need a good lawyer in the trial…"   "…we are few people, and we live in different places. This is the problem…"   "…do not act individually. You need some witnesses…"   "…There should be Muslim pedagogues in the Jugendamt…"   "…we need march in front of the state council or ministry of Justice or Integration with the MPs…"   "…media should be included in the process, whereby the case needs to become a precedent for others…"   "…the Judges should know that the media is part of the game. It will affect the behaviors of the judges…"   "…there are many functions of the media, but it depends on the power of the journalist. We need support from the German media…"

Many co-ethnics express those families should continue to take all necessary steps offline and do not allow Jugendämter to "seize" other Turkish children without reason or with political reason. Compatriots highlight the necessity of further investigation, even after the reunification. It is advised that families should go to the court and sue Jugendämter for the "unlawful act." For instance, Muhammed's family posted on Facebook that their struggle has just finished; however, they continue to be active both online and offline for other children since there will be a new beginning for other families. Turkish communities attempt to increase kinship fosterage among the Turkish descent population to solve the issue. They claim it is not enough to have only online participation without further offline actions. As a result, the Turkish descent population digitally attempt to mobilize co-ethnics for further offline activities.

Further Steps: Do's and Don'ts
"…when the child is taken back, the families should not stop the fight…"   "…do not stop your activities when you take your children back. You should ask for compensation. There is an unfair act of Jugendämter. Do not stop your fight, and let us continue…"   "…you should have a court trial against Jugendamt. Do not let them do the same for other families…"   "…go to the court against Jugendamt. They must understand that they should not take away any children without reason…"   "…please continue to this page, do not stop it now because you have already taken your children back. This page should be an example for other families. We also want to continue our support for other children…"   "…perhaps, our struggle has just finished here. However, for others, it has just beginning…"   "…we are all part of this pain…"   "…be a foster family. We cannot find a solution to the issue by talking here for nothing and just praying. It is time for us to act and do whatever it is needed…"

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Under these circumstances, the Turkish descent population in Germany is highly mobilized in child protection and welfare, not only for their children but also for their kin community. Most compatriots have empathy and sympathy to support co-ethnics in collective actions.

6.9 Problematizing of the Digital Connectedness and Togetherness

This research reaffirms the findings of Kozinets. Accordingly, "…online social spaces have become increasingly recognized as important fields for qualitative social scientific investigation because of the richness and openness of its multifarious cultural sites" (Kozinets, 2015). However, "online data presents unique challenges for researchers, as it is voluminous, optionally anonymous, and often difficult to categorize" (Kozinets, 2015). In this study, I identified several problems: (1) location identification of the users, (2) doubts among diaspora users when they share information and express feelings, (3) high level of irrelevant posts, and (4) too much focus on other issues in daily life rather than the topic/issue itself.

Firstly, location identification seems one of the biggest problems of online connectedness and togetherness. There is always a question on how many users of the Facebook groups are belonging to the Turkish diaspora communities and portray diasporic cultural intimacy. Several posts are possibly not initiated by the diasporic communities themselves. I contacted several members on social media, and they provided all the information. I later learned that they live in Turkey, not in Germany. Some of them did return migration; some of them have the only sympathy and want to help other co-ethnics abroad.

Nonetheless, I did not take the physical location of Turkish communities as the oriented point in this dissertation (as I explained in Chapter II). Instead of taking the spatial locations between "*here and there*," socio-political identities of diasporas - *the elsewhere* were considered as the oriented point for the analysis. Therefore, the psychical identification of the users did not turn into a significant problem.

Secondly, some group members have doubted about other members; therefore, they ask the moderator to be more careful when they add new members or post important messages. There is a concern that there are some members who could work for Jugendamt and betray them. Once, when I asked group members to share their experiences with me, somebody accused

me of being a spy of Germany and working for Jugendamt. Somebody also claimed that I am a self-interest person just to write a book, and not there to share their pains and sadness. I mostly contacted users after the completion of online data collection; therefore, the false accusations did not affect the research outcomes, and trust is continued between me as a researcher and co-ethnics as a subject of this dissertation.

Last but not least, there were so many irrelevant and indirect posts on social media (i.e., the problems of raising children: jealousy of siblings as well as kin-community: blood search, a missing person, and financial help). These posts, however, help me to understand the diasporic communication and other problems in day-to-day life (such as National Socialist Underground – NSU murders and a series of xenophobic attacks by the German Neo-Nazi groups). With Content Analysis, I also overcome this problem.

Other problems can be added to the list. I believe that offline participation could solve some of these problems. For this reason, in the next chapter, I will examine how offline activities might offer different types of involvement than their counterpart online.

Conclusion

Although the Internet becomes one of the virtual platforms in the construction of diasporic identities and mobilization, the content and effects of online activities remain mostly unknown in the literature. Using the content analysis of online activities, I investigated the relationship between everyday life and online participation of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany. The findings show that the Internet provides crucial sources in understanding different phases of diaspora mobilization. Diasporic networks play essential roles in collective actions, particularly in supporting co-ethnics in times of precarity. On the Internet, Turkish diaspora communities set up threshold events and show their emotional and socio-political support.

In this context, Turkish diaspora communities mostly use the Internet for daily communication and establish transnational/trans-local networks and relations to take collective actions. On the Internet, they are liking, sharing, and posting. They also ask and find co-ethnics who could support their claims and actions. They share information about

when and where offline events will take place. While the coverage of social media is mostly contained "before the event," it helps to raise public awareness among compatriots.

Under these circumstances, online participation has a sizable impact on collective actions offline. In matters of child protection, most of the Turkish families first ask help on the digital platforms. The Internet subsequently becomes a diasporic public space to establish collective actions and maintain kinship networks and relations. Thus, the effects of online participation are substantive and significant. Turkish compatriots attempt to establish social justice not only for themselves but for a whole Turkish descent population in the country.

This study confirms that the Internet plays a vital role in empowering immigrant communities (Elias & Lemish, 2008; Hugger, 2009; Kissau, 2012). Similar to Kissau and Hunger (2010), I argue that the Internet contributes to the pluralization of public debates. Most of the Turkish diasporas complain about the German mass media. They claim that there is state censorship on Jugendamt, whereby they do not show the "scandals of Jugendamt." On the other hand, social media provides more opportunity for Turkish diaspora communities to criticize Jugendamt and the German child protection system since there are less control and censorship. The German mass media is engaged with the mainstream agenda; therefore, they can easily ignore the Turkish diasporas' needs and problems. When the mass media consider mainstream agendas of the titular nation, it is difficult for diaspora communities to form and shape the public opinion without the support of digital media. The Internet consequently enables Turkish diaspora communities to draw public attention to their own needs and political agendas, whereby they could successfully mobilize other co-ethnics as well as the homeland institutions.

In sum, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are digitally connected to the issue of child protection and quickly communicated through web-based connectivity to act offline. Similar to Kissau and Hunger (2010), I argue that Turkish immigrants are more politically active when they involve in Internet information exchange. Through digital technologies, they resonate diasporic identities on and across the various web and social media platforms. The findings of this chapter affirm the arguments of Kissau and Hunger (2008): (1) Turkish immigrants have built public political spheres on the Internet and seize the opportunity to get involved in debates and (2) they challenge the mainstream images of immigrants and struggle to be accepted citizens with a political voice. For these reasons, the Internet has been used for

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political purposes among Turkish diaspora communities in Germany, and online activities help them to (re-)build as well as sustain diasporic identities and social ties (Gonzales & Castro, 2007; Navarrete & Huerta, 2006). While this chapter builds upon the online participation of Turkish diaspora communities in child protection in Germany, it demonstrates how Turkish co-ethnics digitally mobilize and encourage others to participate in socio-political activities in the country of residence. The next chapter will further examine the offline participation of the Turkish diaspora communities in Germany.

(Non-)Practicing of Diasporic Care and Solidarity among Turkish Communities in Germany: Offline Participation

Introduction

Chapter VI demonstrates that Turkish communities in Germany mostly use online platforms for everyday communication and information exchange, engaging in identity construction, showing emotions and empathic solidarity with co-ethnics, forming public opinion and raising awareness, making propaganda, and influencing the decision-makers to bring socio-political changes. The Internet, therefore, turns into a diasporic public space for the co-ethnics abroad and provides daily communication as well as networking. While the Internet has mobilization sources with informative means, it becomes a useful tool for aggregate data for researchers.[158] Since diaspora communities use online platforms to sustain support and spread their activities offline, online activities spontaneously affect and make change the nature of collective actions. However, no social movement, including diaspora mobilization, can exist exclusively online to bring about the socio-political policy changes. Online participation thus requires people to appear in the streets and engage in activities offline. Although "virtual participation" is an essential component of diaspora mobilization, there is still a need for "actual" participation. Offline participation consequently helps virtual solidarity turn into physical practices.

In this context, this chapter aims to examine the offline participation of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany in matters of kinship care. Chapter VII, furthermore, explores "what offline modes of participation could offer in diaspora mobilization that its counterpart (online participation) does not or at least remains restricted." It should be noted that there is no one dimension of participation (online vs. offline). There are multiple dimensions as well as the duality[159] of participation, since mobilized people could be active both online and offline. This chapter, however, attempts to differentiate offline involvement of its online counterpart and explains what makes it meaningful for understanding the diaspora

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[158] In this dissertation, online platforms are considered as primary sources for collecting data on the offline activities.

[159] It becomes challenging to make a clear distinction between online and offline activities. Some activities are practiced both online and offline.

mobilization process. The first part of the chapter explores the main offline activities: (1) protests, (2) civil society organizations, (3) political parties, (4) social clubs, (5) public campaigns.[160] The second part of the chapter describes the (non-)effects of Turkish diaspora mobilization on the policy changes in matters of child protection both in the hostland and the homeland.

7.1 Protest Politics of Civil Resistance

One of the most frequent types of offline participation is protesting and demonstrating against a topic, issue, policy, practice, institution, or event in the homeland or the hostland. The Turkish descent population has opposed the German child protection system, particularly Jugendamt, since 2011. Most of the demonstrations are self-organized by families whose children are taken into care by Jugendamt. The protests are supported by the Turkish Civil Society Organizations (such as *Umut Yıldızı Derneği* - UYD) as well as compatriots and other ethnicities. Although most participants in these demonstrations have Turkish descent origin, other ethnic groups (such as Germans, Greeks, and Italians) also attend the protests. The protests have the character of collective action, whereby families advocate for policy change. The protests also have social and political demands with the explicit purpose of critiquing the German child protection system in general, and Jugendamt in particular. The protests subsequently have occurred in a negative way that families express dissatisfaction with the "unjust decision" of Jugendamt. For this reason, the protests have a public character whereby they are directed towards the changes of Jugendamt practices.

Figure 54 – *Turkish Organized Protests against Jugendamt in Germany*[161]

Date	Name/Location
26.01.2020	'Elçin bebek' in Heilbronn II
28.12.2019	'Elçin bebek' in Heilbronn I
27.10.2018	UYD protest in Düsseldorf
15.07.2018	UYD protest in Neuss
10.04.2017	UYD protest, European Parliament in Brussel & Ayse Dahlhoff
10.01.2017	UYD, in Düsseldorf
July 2015	In Stuttgart (2,400 people)
September-October 2014	UYD 'Tent of Hope' - 35 days activism in Düsseldorf (Landtag, NRW)
31.05.2014	'Muhammed bebek' in Velbert, North Rhine-Westphalia (1,500 people)
07.03.2014	'Devran and Büşra siblings' in Bornheim
04.03.2013	'Ecem bebek' in Amstgericht, Gelsenkirchen (300 people)
24.12.2011	'Vahdettin Çicek' in Düren

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[160] The list might be extended further. These activities can also be practiced online.

[161] There is no source to record such kind of protests against Jugendamt. I mostly identified protests on social media. Therefore, it is more likely to have other protests.

In these protests, people gather, march, and leave black wreathes to the building of the municipality as well as Jugendamt. They are rallied to express their "anger" towards Jugendamt and show collective diasporic solidarity. The protestors do not block highways, storm the governmental buildings or clash with police forces. Thus, the protests are always taken place in a non-violent peaceful environment in public places that are legal and protected.

There has been recently a move from "self-organized protest" to more "collective solidarity diasporic protests." Throughout the years, the number of people who attend the protests has been significantly increasing. For instance, Vahdettin Çicek protested Jugendamt alone in 2011. In 2014, for Ecem bebek, there were approximately 300 people, and for Muhammed bebek, around 1.500 people gathered. Although the duration of the protests is variable, they mostly take a few hours. Some demonstrations, which are formed by the Turkish civil society organizations, could last several weeks.

There are mostly three main slogans in these protests: (1) *Jugendamt, Enough!* (2) *We are on the streets for our children*, (3) *we want our children back*. Turkish families very often portray their "loneliness and desperate" with the slogan of "*a lonely Turkish child in an unknown foreign land*." The language of the protests is (very) negative against Jugendamt.

Turkish families claim that they do not have any "political goals" in these protests. They are cautious not to "destroy" the bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey. They mostly demand reunification with a child and request some changes in German child protection policies. On the other hand, even being apolitical is political, or at least, it turns into a political by public and political elites as well as the media. There is a high level of politicizing effect of the protests, and some actors highly politicize the subject as an "issue." Turkish political associations in Germany, such as the Union of European Turkish Democrats - UETD, support the protests. Apart from the humane motifs among diaspora communities, political motivations also drive these protests. The individuals who attend the protests hold a broad spectrum of political views and religious and ethnic backgrounds. The protesters tend to take a more general direction on social injustice and criticize the macro policies of immigration, Leitkultur, and multiculturalism in Germany. The protests are explicitly against the "unjust decisions" of Jugendämter when they take migrant children without the consent of

the biological families for "no reason or with political reasons such as Xenophobia and Islamophobia."

During the marches, Turkish communities in Germany claim that they are not against Jugendamt; however, a few practices should be changed. They request that (1) Jugendämter should be more accountable, (2) the staff needs to be monitored, questioned, and controlled, (3) standard practices should be established, (4) Jugendämter should consider the children's cultural and religious values, (5) siblings should not be separated from each other during the care placement, (6) children should be able to speak on their native language during the family visits, (7) instead of registering all children as German, the authorities should indicate the ethnic origins of the migrant children, (8) Jugendamt needs to inform the Turkish Consulates when the Turkish origin children are taken into care, (9) kinship care should be increased, and Turkish migrant children will be given first to the relatives or kin-community, and (10) statistics on immigrant children should be more in detail and share it with the public.

Nevertheless, these protests do not turn to any type of social movement. Turkish diaspora communities often are not involved in other human rights activities or are part of social movements (such as women's rights, black rights, or LGBT movements). There is no clear political strategies and goals in the protests; therefore, it is challenging to sustain further actions as well as success. The protests usually stay as "ad-hoc demonstrations" for a short period for a specific purpose – reunion with a child. When Turkish families get their children back from Jugendamt, they do not continue their actions. Since the protests mostly focus on the case itself (such as for Muhammed bebek or Elçin bebek), they are not persistent and well-disciplined action-oriented.

Under these circumstances, the protests do not make (and also bring out) significant changes to the German child protection system. It is hard to estimate the effectiveness of the protests and establish a direct link between the collective actions of the Turkish diasporas and the German child protection system's policy changes. There are other factors at the macro and international levels to affect the German child protection system. However, it seems that the protests do not make genuinely lasting changes in Jugendamt practices, and the same "problems" have been continuing since the early 2010s. Protest movements usually attempt to bring about social and political changes. Individuals in the protests are channeled into successful tactics where the protests (actions) become a useful tool for the policy changes.

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Turkish diasporas can make a real change; hence, it is not that easy. For this purpose, they need to consider several factors if they would like to bring the protests up to salience and achieve the (socio-political) demands.

First of all, the protests should not be a concern of only Turkish communities in the country. Other ethnicities, such as Polish, Russian, Italian – including German, also criticize the child protection system. Child welfare is a common concern for most of the society in the nation-wide; thus, all parties need to act together. The protests should be more inclusive that German political elites feel obliged to consider the complaints. While Turkish diaspora communities frequently express that they do not have any political aim in their actions, they could not generate political pressure. As Gillion (2013) argues, it is more likely that the government acts if the protest persists louder and longer. When the protests take place longer than a day, they could have more chances to make the message as politically salient. Consequently, the protests should target the direct (political) messages and actions towards the German policy-makers, whereby they could act consistently and collaboratively.

As a result of these, one of the biggest reasons for the ineffectiveness of the protest is: Turkish diaspora communities do not have any specific political plan or strategy in their protests. The protests need to create a political moment (or moments) that decision-makers will be no longer ignore the requests. The pivot of the protests should not "just talk or shout" in the demonstrations; instead, it should set up the strategies on how to act collectively and politically. Therefore, other types of political activities (i.e., boycotts) can be formed to support the protests. Otherwise, the protests will not put political pressure on politicians at the local and national level.

The Turkish descent population in Germany has all the capacity and opportunity to mobilize and organize collective actions. They successfully mobilize co-ethnics to be part of the protests. Within a couple of days – even hours, several hundred people are found to participate in the protests. Turkish diaspora communities share diasporic care and morality and show their solidarity. They are large in numbers and occupy different socio-political positions as well as the hostland environment is very democratic to organize such kind of civil resistance.

In contrast, as mentioned earlier, there is no sustainability of the protests. Families whose children are taken into care initiate the immediate ad-hoc protests for a specific individual purpose in a relatively short period. The protests are occurred more "spontaneously" rather than institutionally organized. Therefore, the protests are more case-related without further political aims. The protests, however, are needed to be extended beyond individual specific cases if the Turkish descent population would like to influence the decision-makers at the local, federal, and national levels for policy changes.

This dissertation demonstrates that kinship could play an essential role in diaspora mobilization. Kinship care is subsequently one of the "threshold events" that mobilizes diasporic communities for collective actions. The social ties among the participants are strong in these protests. Knowing the families in real life, sympathizing with them and their situation, and collective diasporic unity are essential elements of these protests. Therefore, the protests are driven by personal empathy and diasporic sympathy, whereby most co-ethnics share diasporic morality (that is, children belong to families, and the state should not intervene in private family matters). Besides, the protests are driven by more general claims (i.e., the failures of immigration policy and multiculturalism as well as the domination of Leitkultur). For these reasons, emotions, sympathy, and empathy, diasporic morality, collective solidarity, as well as kinship ties, turn into the mobilizing power to build up the transnational/trans-local diasporic networks and relations.

Furthermore, these protests have no leaders. There is no always a need for a leader in the protests; however, there should be political direction(s). The protests can be put out even without a leader as long as there are grievances and directions. Otherwise, it will be hard for such kind of leaderless protests to be persistent and salient for an extended period to achieve the claims. Leaderless protests might quickly turn into chaotic and rudderless if there is no political direction. Decision-makers may also find it challenging to discuss the problem since they do not know whom they should negotiate. Turkish diaspora communities attempt to remain apolitical in the protests; therefore, they do not develop political directions. As a result, they could not advocate well how to channel their collective actions into meaningful socio-political changes. German political elites spontaneously are not attached to these ad-hoc protests.

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On the other hand, these protests are crucial for the articulation of collective unity and identity among Turkish diasporas whereby they (re-)construct the diasporic stance on "the correct way of life," including "how to raise children according to their (Turkish and Muslim) norms." Turkish diaspora communities (re-)produce biopolitical discourses and practices. Through the biopolitical unity among diasporas, the protests create as well as re-create an opportunity for the establishment of hybrid identities with the limits of inclusion and exclusion.

Another significant ineffectiveness of the protests is that they are just "reactive." Turkish diasporas are mobilized in response to the "unfair" decisions of Jugendämter. The literature demonstrates that proactive protests tend to be more effective than reactive protests (Oliver & Maney, 2000). The protests, therefore, need to be proactive with a larger size of participation for a more extended period. As mentioned, these protests need to include other ethnicities to turn into a social movement with clear (political) aims and strategy in the countrywide.

In the Social Movement literature, the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) helps to examine the dynamics and outcomes of the protests. The POS thus explores the national and local institutional contexts rather than the homeland's environment or interest. The strategies and organizational structures of the diaspora protests can be understood by the political, socio-economic, and cultural environment of the hostland. This research confirms that the hostland environment helps or hinders the diaspora mobilization, and the protests may vary according to the national and local conditions of the hostland. In this dissertation, I argue that the diaspora literature takes the homeland as a core reference, and it fails to understand the mobilization process from below in the hostland. For instance, as a "movement society" (Roth and Rucht, 2008), Germany has a higher level of demonstrative protests and does not suppress the civic activity of residents in her territory. When a backlash of precarious living conditions drives the Turkish descent population in Germany, co-ethnics feel a moral responsibility to be part of the protests and joint collective diasporic actions.

In this context, I used Protest Event Analysis[162] (PEA) to answer the following questions: (1) why does the Turkish descent population participate in these protests? (2) Why do they choose specific tactics (such as being apolitical, non-violent, leaderless, and ad-hoc) as a

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[162] Protest Event Analysis (PEA) is a form of Content Analysis (CA) to analyze protest movements.

useful means to attain the policy demands? And (3) what do policy consequences emerge from these protests? Accordingly, Turkish communities participate in the protests to show their diasporic morality and solidarity and attempt to make several policy changes in the German child protection system. They chose to stay apolitical because they do not want to destroy the bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey, or at least they are afraid of being victimized by the host country. The goal is to reunify a child with the biological family – most probably the only one. Although the protests do have some impacts, particularly in the homeland, such as bringing the institutional innovation (the creation of the Attaché), there is a low-level of influence on German decision-makers for policy changes on foster care policy and practices.

As a result, the Turkish descent population in Germany needs to invest (more) time and (better) resources with a clear political strategy to make their protests as politically salient, whereby they could influence the decision-makers. Besides, there is a need to understand post-protest processes. It is vital to examine "what happens in the aftermath of the protests" and see the lasting effects of the protests, if there are any, or at least recognize the reasons for the failures.

In the homeland, these protests get considerable attention from the Turkish political elites as well as the public. Turkish media extensively cover news on "Jugendamt victims." For this reason, I introduce the concept of the boomerang effect of diasporization to explain how diaspora mobilization from below re-effects the homeland's diaspora engagement/management policies. These protests are usually facilitated through the diasporic networks with the support of homeland's institutions, including Turkish media and civil society organizations. Consequently, there is a discursive impact of the protests, which increases the visibility of the issue, at least in Turkey, as well as among co-ethnics abroad. Media coverage of the protests thereof brings the topic to the attention of the Turkish public and political elites both in the homeland and "the domestic abroad." In the previous chapter, I mentioned that the German media does not pay enough attention to the subject – kinship care. Subsequently, the protests are not taken on a high degree of salience by media and the decision-makers in Germany.

After the protests, Turkish diaspora communities face severe tackles on what they should do next for their claims/demands. I argue that diaspora communities are transnational social and

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political collectivities, and they have collectively organized identity and interest-based actors. It is hard to "fight against a political issue" and remain "apolitical" at the same time. When the protests abate, Turkish diasporas simply disengage themselves with the issue, and they do not continue their activities for further organizational and institutional efforts. While the Turkish descent population quickly steps back from any further political activity, the political struggle is carried on by the homeland's institutions. Subsequently, the issue itself becomes "political" as long as the traditional organizations of the homeland (i.e., the Consulates) are directly involved with the "problem." The everyday life of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany, therefore, becomes a transnational political and diplomatic issue between Turkey and Germany. Almost half of the Turkish descent population in Germany has only Turkish citizenship; thus, it becomes necessary for the kin-state to intervene in the problem.

It should be noted that under the corporatist system of Germany, non-citizens have a lack of political opportunity to influence the political system directly. Apart from the homeland institutions, Turkish diaspora communities also resist by adopting civil society organizations in Germany. Most of the Turkish co-ethnics claim that child protection is one of the significant problems of their day-to-day life; however, there are not well organized Turkish civil society organizations to deal with the kinship foster care.

Figure 55 – *Main Characteristics of Protests*

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
In sum, the protests on kinship care last for a certain amount of time (relatively for a short time) on individual cases (for Muhammed bebek, Ecem bebek, and Elçin bebek) and then disperse again before achieving varying degrees of political impacts in Germany. Turkish diaspora communities react over emotionally based on their nationalist and religious sensitivities, particularly in times of precarity, and later no further political actions are taken to sustain the claims. The protests are highly individualist, even somehow populist and nationalist. For these reasons, the protests are not able to influence the German decision-makers. Under these circumstances, they do not make additional efforts to maintain social capital, which could easily be activated in times of precarity. As a result, the protests fail to move Turkish co-ethnics "from protest actions to diaspora politics." Maintaining the post-protest activism can be far more challenging than organizing the actual protest, especially when there is no other political strategy and aims. Turkish diaspora communities in Germany, therefore, encounter several obstacles in achieving their claims when there is no clear political agenda and institutionalism.

7.2 From Community Organizations to the Civil Society in Making

The Turkish descent population in Germany demonstrates a feeling of moral co-responsibility, whereby co-ethnics become more active and engaged in collective actions. Although they have become much more "activists" and "campaigners" to show their diasporic morality and solidarity, their collective actions are still under-institutionalized. The following part of the chapter examines how the structures of Turkish Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Germany have been changing since 2010.

7.2.1 Umut Yıldızı Derneği (UYD): "The Voice of Jugendamt Victims"

Umut Yıldızı Derneği (Hoffnungsstern e.V. in German, and The Hope Star Association in English) – UYD is the first Turkish CSO in Germany, which works for the benefit of Turkish migrant children. The association was founded in 2008 in Neuss in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) to help families, particularly Turkish migrant families. The UYD provides pedagogical and legal advice to solve conflicts on child protection and welfare between the families and German state institutions.

The association's primary goal is to establish a healthy future for children, whereby every child can avoid possible discrimination and racism. On the website of the association, it is claimed that the association is "apolitical" and does not serve any political ideology or groups. The UYD remains a politically and religiously neutral association and opens its doors to everyone, regardless of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or political background of the families. They are also cautious not to destroy bilateral ties between Turkey and Germany. Therefore, the association does not attempt to create social fear; instead, it aims to draw attention to the problems of the Turkish descent population in the country and accelerates possible solutions.

There is a lack of information and miscommunication between some migrant families and Jugendämter, particularly during the risk assessment and child's replacement. Several families ask for a consultation when their children are taken into care by Jugendamt. The UYD spontaneously turns into a more "crisis management association" rather than for early risk aversion. Families mostly want to learn the process of child protection and future steps that they need to follow. Families often ask the following questions: (1) my child has been taken into care, what happens now? (2) When I get my child back? (3) When and how often can I see my child? Who decides it? (4) We are supposed to sign something, but we do not know what they mean (5) we do not speak German fluently. Can we talk with our children in our native language? (6) Why are we not allowed speaking to our child in our mother tongue? (7) Where is my child? (8) Who is the foster parent of my child? (9) What is the ethnic and religious background of the foster parent? And (10) does the foster family provide the linguistic, religious, and cultural needs of my child? – (i.e., can my son be circumcised in his foster home?). As a result, the UYD mainly focuses on the questions above and provides necessary information for the families. The association subsequently supports families as a "moderator" between the families and the state authorities.

Throughout the years, the UYD has followed several steps for institutionalization to act as a Turkish CSO in Germany. For instance, in June 2012, a new logo was created, and a Twitter account was taken. However, the association has faced several obstacles (especially financial difficulties) to continue its activities. There is no enough financial support both from the hostland and the homeland. In 2013, the former president of the association, Kamil Altay, claimed that "Turkey also does not support the UYD's activities." He argued that 550.000 euros were needed to establish a professional team to work consistently. Turks Abroad and

Related Communities Presidency (YTB) agreed to give 83.000 euros; hence, they only paid the half. Apart from financial difficulties, the association has faced political obstacles. In 2018, Altay was resigned from his position. He claimed that they did not have a problem with Turkey but the bureaucratic obstacles of YTB to irk the activities of the UYD. As a result, the staff of the association often expresses their "loneliness" and difficulties. For these reasons, they often claim that "the victims of Jugendamt would be abandoned in their fight."

The association has been contributed to the problems of the Turkish descent population, not only in Germany but also in Western Europe. First of all, it becomes a "role model" for Turkish CSOs in neighboring countries. In 2013, the UYD Netherlands was established to help families and provide consultations. In their activities, they fought against racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious discrimination. Secondly, other Turkish CSOs in Germany include kinship care in their agenda and activities.

The UYD shows that there is a "new type of Turkish CSOs" (from below), rather than the classical type of top-down interested-based homeland institutions (religious and business-oriented). Thus, the UYD turns into a model of Turkish CSOs, which works for the needs and interests of the diaspora communities in the country of residence rather than serves for the economic and political interests of the homeland. Turkish co-ethnics mobilize each other for their needs, interests, and identities rather than the homeland's political agenda. Whereas the literature demonstrates that Turkish CSOs in Germany are not highly dependent on hostland institutions (i.e., Østergaard, 2000), this type of Turkish CSOs shows the opposite way: they are highly dependent on the host country, both financially and politically.

Furthermore, the UYD has offered a unique way of activities to promote kinship care and raise awareness. It became the first and only organization in the world, which celebrates the "Day of Fosterage Family" every February 9 (since 2011). Besides, they choose the "Foster Family of the Year" to encourage other families to be foster parents.

In contrast, there are several things that the UYD may wish to consider to be a more effective organization. Firstly, the UYD needs to influence the policy-making and German political system. Currently, the political influence of the association is insufficient. The UYD is more active at the local level in the municipalities rather than the national level. The UYD needs to establish close and positive relations with the German institutions as well as German political

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elites. The association, therefore, needs to find mechanisms to make political pressure on German state authorities, whereby both the German public and political elites could no longer ignore the "problem."

Secondly, the UYD needs to cooperate with other CSOs both in Germany and Turkey as well as in the world. They should act together and organize more massive demonstrations, not only for individual cases but also for more general-purpose with policy change demand. The UYD might continue to maintain its strong cultural ties with Turkey; however, it needs to establish new ones in Germany as well as in the world. Although the UYD mostly defends the rights and interests of Turkish origin children, the association may wish to consider being a more human rights-oriented organization and include other ethnicities. The association, therefore, needs to adopt international human rights discourses as the basis of its activities and be a more inclusive human-rights organization.

The level of cooperation of UYD with other German CSOs is shallow. The UYD needs to prepare English language information booklets to engage more effectively in the world and act together with similar CSOs abroad. Cooperation with international organizations could increase funding opportunities. There is a growing need for external support both financially and politically for the association. As mentioned, the UYD has difficulties receiving financial support from both the homeland and the hostland. The establishment of financial independence should be one of the top priorities. The UYD urgently needs to find alternative financial sources. For instance, it can get funds from the EU (particularly EU Social Funds) or other international projects. Subsequently, the association may wish to consider being part of international projects and cooperates with other human rights organizations.

Thirdly, there is an urgent need to have a high level of professionalization. If the UYD wants to be more influential in German politics or the world as a human-rights organization, the staff needs to be more professionalized. The association currently does not have enough experience in professionalization. Since most people work voluntarily, there are some deficiencies in terms of personal and advisory staff. The low level of professionalization has a spontaneous limit to bring about the policy changes. Although there are few professionals in the associations, the number is not enough. More Turkish origin advocates, who are specialized in matters of child protection, need to work in the association. When there are no enough professional experts, it becomes challenging for the UYD to compete for funds and

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establish its financial independence. The organizational structure of the UYD, thus, should be strengthened with more professionalized staff. Economic independence can only be succeeded through professionalization and institutionalization.

Moreover, the UYD needs to be part of immigrant advisory councils to have access to political power. The association needs to take assistance and help from German institutions. Germany also needs to encourage the association for better cooperation with other CSOs and provides funding opportunities. Some believe that if Germany does not support the UYD for professionalization and institutionalization, Turkey should allocate funds. Therefore, the YTB and the Attaché could play a more supportive role and actively cooperate with the UYD under the joint projects.

Nevertheless, the UYD has the potential to provide new platforms for cooperation and communication among domestic and international actors. The UYD mobilizes social capital and networks among Turkish diaspora communities, which links trans-local and transnational politics. The association represents the Turkish diasporas' needs and interests, and it brings capable instruments, particularly within the boomerang effect of diasporization.

As a civil society actor, the UYD has several functions. Firstly, it creates an alternative way of (direct) civic participation rather than political participation. It promotes socio-political accountability through information dissemination, public interest litigation, lobbying, and media campaigns. The UYD also helps generate social capital (Bourdieu, 1990), which consists of trust, reciprocity, and networks. The association constitutes the diasporic public space in which democratic alternatives of participation are promoted. The UYD creates a space that Turkish communities show their dissatisfaction (or anger) with the German child protection system. The UYD thus brings a unique contribution by generating a social basis in Germany. Civil society actors have many functions that cannot be ascribed to every association, including the UYD; however, Turkish CSOs form a "civic community" (Putnam, 1993) and mobilize co-ethnics for collective actions.

7.2.2 A New Type of Turkish Community Organizations in Germany?

Kinship care is an example where most of the Turkish diasporas in Germany are quickly mobilized under the shared diasporic morality and solidarity. Turkish communities echo the

diasporic consciousness as well as morality in the country of residence. Turkish Community Organizations (TCOs) also provide the necessary social help and legal assistance to co-ethnics whose children are taken away by Jugendamt.

The TCOs promote "civil initiative" to encourage Turkish families in Germany to be a foster parent and take all responsibility, including providing cultural and religious needs, for the protection of their kin-community children in the hostland. As mentioned earlier, the UYD impacts other Turkish CSOs in Germany. The Forum Internationaler Frauen (International Women Forum - FIF) has been organized by Turkish diaspora women to support women's position and their roles in society. The FIF provides several types of childcare services from a short period to a more extended, temporary, and permanent level foster care. However, the FIF has adopted different strategies and tactics when they communicate with the German decision-makers. The name of the association is only in German, and they closely cooperate with Jugendamt and support German institutions, including German political parties, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Integration, and Equality. At the same time, they collaborate with the homeland's institutions. Unlike the UYD, they do not frame the cultural and religious vulnerability discourse to organize their actions. When they provide foster care, they do not emphasize the cultural and religious differences between Turkish-Muslim families and German-Christian families. In contrast, they aim to show Turkish hospitality to German families and reduce social distance. The UYD and the FIF examples show that there are different strategies and tactics among Turkish CSOs in Germany.

The Committee of the New Turks in Germany (AYTK) was also established in 2016. The AYTK is an independent so-called "social movement," where they have no organic link with other institutions, political parties, as well as NGOs neither in Turkey nor Germany. The members of AYTK declare their loyalty to Germany by claiming that they have no intention to betray the country. The AYTK organizes meetings and demonstrations to be vocal of the Turkish descent population in Germany. They describe themselves as a civil initiative with the motto of "2C" (from Civilians to Civilians) for social engineering. They provide social help and legal assistance to "victims of Jugendamt" along with jobs opportunities to unemployed youths, scholarship for talented migrant children, safe places for homeless mothers, opportunities for a businessman to invest in Turkey, legal services to Turkish prisoners, and procedures of Islamic burials and transfer of dead bodies to Turkey. Besides, they actively participate in child protection demonstrations that are organized by co-ethnics.

The AYTK shows that Turkish communities in Germany can be mobilized under the semi-formal organizational structure to deal with everyday life problems without the active involvement of the homeland.

7.3 From Socialization to Radicalization?

German political elites have exceedingly discussed the "unwillingness" of Turkish communities to integrate into German society, even sixty years later of the migration. When diaspora communities begin to live in a segregated parallel society (Parallelgesellschaften), they remain socially and culturally disconnected from the host society. It is more likely to see the radicalization of "others" when there is a social distance. When the social distance between two cultures (the homeland and the hostland) increases, diaspora communities prefer to organize and create a safe social zone for their daily life.

Turkish communities in Germany established a macho boxing and biker club called "Osmanen Germania Boxclub" (OGBC). The club was established in 2014 by Mehmet Bağcı. In one year, more than 1.500 people joined. It established thirty-one sub-branches throughout Germany, including NRW. The OGBC is closely identified with Turkish nationalism and AKP political elites. German media (i.e., Frontal 21 program in ZDF channel and Stuttgarter Nachrichten newspaper) associated group members with "murders, blackmail, drug trafficking, and sex slavery." In 2018, Germany banned the ethnic Turkish boxer club by claiming that they are committed to criminal acts.

Nevertheless, the club attracted a lot of young Turkish immigrants in Germany. The groups use several tactics to expand their networks, including the rock-music. Through diasporic art and popular culture, group members express their conservative and nationalist ideas and opinions regarding the variety of socio-political topics – including kinship care. Subsequently, the club formed a distinct type of diaspora protest, and it had a high level of potential for resource mobilization. It thus mobilized people and material resources to protect ethnic Turkish and Sunni Muslim identities among Turkish descent population in Germany.

Furthermore, the OGBC had a high level of political and economic influence to help Turkish families in need. The political connections, as well as close ties with business and financial circles, provide a significant source for co-ethnics. The group's members protect the

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traditional ethnic values of Turkish and Islamic moral and cultural norms in matters of family life. As a result, the non-traditional, informal, gangster, hipster, popular, social club types of diasporic networks and relations have also been established among the Turkish descent population in Germany.

7.4 Moving toward an Active Political Participation?

German political life has been familiar with Turkish descent politicians (i.e., Cem Özdemir, Vural Öger, Aydan Özoguz). However, there had not been a Turkish migrant type of political party for a long time. With the introduction of the new citizenship law in 2000 in Germany, migrant communities start to have more accessible citizenship rights, and more Turkish co-ethnics have become German citizens. It affects the level of political participation among Turkish descent population in the country. When the political participation of Turkish communities was increased in the German elections, Turkish immigrant parties were established. There are currently three political parties in Germany which are founded by Turkish descents politicians: (1) "Alliance for Innovation and Justice" (Bündnis für Innovation und Gerechtigkeit – BIG Partei) (2010), (2) "Alliance of German Democrats" (AD-D) (2016), and (3) "Alternative for Migrants" (Alternative für Migranten) (2019). Consequently, the Turkish immigrant parties with new political elites (i.e., Haluk Yıldız, Remzi Aru, Fatih Zingal) have emerged in German politics.

Nonetheless, all these parties have very similar political identities (ethnic Turks and Sunni Muslims) as well as political agendas. They are all against Xenophobia, Islamophobia, and Turkophobia. They claim that they are the "voice of marginalized immigrant groups." They support the ethnic and cultural diversity in the country, and they fight against (institutional) discrimination, racism, and poverty. Although they have an opportunity to occupy an important role in German political life, they have received low-level electoral support (around 1% of votes) from Turkish co-ethnics. Thus, the idea of the establishment of the political party with Turkish roots has not fully supported by most Turkish diasporas.

Turkish political parties in Germany could play an essential role in linking the Turkish descent population to active political participation. Haluk Yıldız, who is the leader of BIG Partei, often mentions the necessity of the kinship care and preservation of the homeland culture (including language, religion, and historical values) in his speeches. He advises to

Turkish-Muslim youths not to forget their native culture, language, and identity. For this reason, in 2016, JUBIG (Junges Bündnis für Innovation und Gerechtigkeit/the Youth Alliance for Innovation and Justice) was founded to provide a space for Turkish migrants to participate and develop their skills meaningfully. It also makes diasporic youth aware of their rights and responsibilities.

In matters of child protection, Yıldız claims that the BIG Partei actively works against child adoption by same-sex couples in several German federal states. He often declares that res family issues are one of their political objectives that are included in their political manifesto. These parties extensively focus on the protection and promotion of cultural, national, and religious norms and values and support kinship care.

It is often argued that there is no need to have different Turkish political parties in Germany since most of the Turkish descent voters do not vote for Turkish immigrant parties. While the Turkish immigrant political parties are segmented and diversified with similar political agenda but without political achievement, it seems that Turkish origin voters continue to vote for mainstream parties (mostly for the Social Democrats) rather than Turkish immigrant parties. The political influence of these newly established parties, thus, remains minimal in German politics. Turkish civil society organizations still occupy the most important mobilization resources and provide necessary platforms for Turkish compatriots to articulate their demands and voice that concern everyday life needs and interests in the hostland.

7.5 Hearing the Diaspora Voices: Social Campaigns

The Turkish descent population in Germany has organized several social campaigns to raise awareness of kinship care. There are four main slogans in the campaigns: "*Protect your orphan and be a foster family*," "*Turkish foster parents for Turkish children*," "*Do you want to be a foster family?*" and "*Is there a place for me in your family*." Recently, the tone of these campaigns has changed from the ethnic oriented to the child-sensitivity of foster care.

In 2011, "Ailenizde bana da yer var mı?" (*Is there a place for me in your family*?) - ABYV was introduced. The campaign was initially started as a diasporic social project. It later became a national-wide social campaign in Germany. The project has attempted to increase the number of Turkish foster families and provide conditions for Turkish origin children to

grow up according to their native cultural and religious needs. Until the end of 2014, the campaign reached approximately 650 Turkish foster families.

In 2016, the ABYV was launched in neighboring countries. For instance, in Belgium, the F-Amis project was introduced (Family Counseling Center/Centre de Conseil Familial de Bruxelles).[163] As mentioned, child protection is a transnational issue between several states as well as communities. Turkish diasporas have problems not only in Germany but also in other countries such as the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Belgium, and France.

Although different online platforms have crossed social campaigns, they become more efficient through offline activities. Flyers support social campaigns and help to raise public awareness on the necessity of kinship care. These flyers include the necessary information when the children are taken into care by Jugendamt as well as how to be a foster family. Although they are relatively low-costed and straightforward, they are informative and beneficial materials for the promotion of kinship care among domestic abroad.

Furthermore, these social campaigns have been supported by other offline activities (such as in academic workshops and conferences). For instance, the NGO "Dein Köln" and "NiTAB" (Turkish Academic Union from Germany) brought the issue of kinship care to the Municipality of Köln. With the motto of "*our children – our future*," they aimed to expand the academic activities in other municipalities in the NRW. However, the academic meetings were not so successful since there are no detailed academic publications on the topic. It seems that Turkish origin academics in Germany do not pay enough attention to kinship care, or at least they do not want to involve such a highly political and sensitive topic for the sake of their career.

7.6 International Law: Cases in the European Court of Human Rights

On the one hand, several Turkish migrants in Germany complain about the practices of Jugendamt. They often claim that "Turkish immigrant children have been placed in families of drug addicts and same-sex couples; therefore, children have faced severe physical and

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[163] The F-Amis provided familial, psychological, pedagogical, and social professional support to Turkish citizens living in Belgium. The center was established in 2014 and closed in 2017 under the unexpected reasons. It is vital to figure out why such a demanding center was unable to continue its works and support Turkish co-ethnics in Belgium.

psychological traumas in everyday life." On the other hand, German state authorities argue that all children have the right to grow in health and safety in the country, and they take care of all children, regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, religion, or citizenship status. Jugendamt often declares that the priority of its activities is to solve the issue within the family; rather than taking children into care.

Nevertheless, Germany has been accused of violations against children's rights and the abduction of children of migrant families. Complaints regarding the implementations of Jugendamt and German childcare policies are taken to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). There are around twenty applications against Germany in matters of family justice in the ECHR under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Individual applications), and Article 8 of the Convention (Right to respect for private and family life). Several jurisdiction cases such as "Görgülü v. Germany" (74969/01 in 2004), and "B.B and F.B v. Germany (18734/09 and 9424/11 in 2013)" accused Germany of violating the rights of children and families.

Kazim Görgülü, a Turkish citizen, applied to the ECHR in 2004, and the ECHR built its verdict against Germany. In Strasburg, Mr. Görgülü complained against Germany when the family court refused him custody of his son. In February 2004, the ECHR condemned Germany based on offenses against the fundamental rights of protection of family life. His son, however, continued to live with a foster family. The decision was shifted again by the responsible higher regional Court (OLG) in Naumburg, in the state of Saxony-Anhalt. The Court stated that it is a violation of human rights to separate a child from his/her roots under the German family adoption. The decision highlights that children should be separated only under extraordinary situations such as endangerment of the child's well-being.

In the case of B.B and F.B v. Germany (18734/09 and 9424/11), B.B and F.B, Turkish origin Austrian citizens, applied to the ECHR regarding the taking away of the right of custody from them. The applicants complained about the decision of the Family Court in removing the custody due to the children's abstract statements without supported by any real facts. The Clause No.8 of the European Convention on Human Rights was violated due to the insufficiency of the examination and inquiry. The Court concluded that the German authorities had failed to give sufficient reasons to withdraw parental authority from the applicants. The decision holds that Germany violated Article 8 of the Convention.

In the Sahin v. Germany case (30943/96 in 2003), the applicant was denied access to his daughter because the family court concluded that their contact would be harmful to the child due to the severe tensions between the parents. The Court recalled that it was for the national courts to assess the evidence before them, including the means used to ascertain the relevant facts.

As a result, there are several applications to ECHR and sue to Germany for the violation of human rights under the child protection policies and practices. According to some families, taking a child into replacement care constitutes an interference with the right to respect for family life. When there is no fair balance between parents' rights and the child's best interests, there is a violation of ECHR. In all these three cases above, the ECHR concluded that Germany violated the best interests of the child.

7.7 From Offline Modes of Participation to Online: *Spillover Effects*

The previous chapter demonstrates the online mode of participation and its spillover effects. In this part of the chapter, the spillover effects of offline to online participation will be further examined. There is a holistic way of networks and relations among diaspora communities to sustain and maintain their collective togetherness. Similar to its counterpart; offline participation also brings online activities. After the demonstrations, many people occasionally post on social media by saying that "we were there, too" "there were more people than we had expected," "there was unbelievably huge support from people," and "I was there, too." These posts show that diasporic solidarity is continued even after the offline protests. Diaspora mobilization is a continuous process, and it does not start and stop immediately. Several co-ethnics thus continue to use the Internet as a diasporic public space to expand communication in everyday life and reflect their personal experiences on the selected issues. More importantly, compatriots could advise what was wrong and missing in the offline activities and what should be done next.

Several individuals also begin to ask for advice from those who organized or attended offline activities. As mentioned, Turkish diaspora communities mostly receive information on the Internet. Through social media, they want to know the most "efficient" and "successful" ways of (collective) actions. For this reason, they successfully pass helpful information and contacts to help each other as well as strategies for further actions.

The post-protest trends show that offline participation alone is not enough for bringing about policy changes (similar to online participation). Diaspora communities, therefore, combine both online and offline strategies to support their demands and actions. After offline participation, some re-launch various online activities such as e-social campaigns, online petitions, and digital protests.

Since offline participation requires more motivation and effort than online participation, it is more likely to be "more efficient" with "direct socio-political consequences" than its counterpart online. In the previous chapter, the modes of participation were mainly discussed to understand how online participation compensate and supplement to offline participation. Online platforms are essential communication tools to mobilize sources, including people. Since most Turkish diasporas get news on social media and keep frequent contact with each other, online platforms become an ultimate source of information on "when, where, with whom, and how to act offline." Whoever participates offline is most likely to participate online. Several studies, therefore, demonstrate that politically active people are also active internet users (Conroy et al., 2012; Pasek et al., 2009; Valenzuela et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2010).

7.8 The (Non-)Effects of Turkish Diaspora Mobilization on the Policy Changes in Turkey

This part of the chapter further analyzes the "Boomerang Effect of Diasporization" (BED) under the homeland's institutions of (1) the Attaché of Family and Social Policy, and (2) the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB).

7.8.1 The Attaché on Family and Social Policy (AFSP)

Chapter IV briefly introduces the Attaché on Family and Social Policy (AFSP). In this part of the chapter, I further examine the activities of the Attaché on kinship care. Before the AFSP was established in 2015, there had already been 46 Turkish foster families in Germany. The AFSP keeps contact with the existing Turkish foster families and helps them when they have problems. Besides, the Attaché invites them to share their experiences with other co-ethnics in public meetings.

Figure 56– *Public Events for Kinship Care, 2016 - 2019*

Activities/Events for Foster Care, 2016-2019	
The number of meetings: 26	
The number of people who attended: 1425	
Candidate of Foster Family	484
Not in Formal Process	21
In the Formal Process	168
No reply	81
Disclaimant	95
Postponed	112
Existed Foster Parents	56

The Attaché closely works with other Turkish Community Organizations and state institutions (such as the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs - DITIB) and organize public information events to raise awareness on kinship care among the Turkish descent population. In 2018, the Attaché organized 11 events to promote kinship care among Turkish families in Germany.

Figure 57 – *The Meetings on Kinship Care, 2018*

#	Date	Place	Institution	# Participants	# Candidate for Foster Family	Volunteers
1.	23.02.2018	Neukirchen	DITIB Hamidi Veli M.	65	11	-
2.	18.03.2018	Duisburg	DITIB Merkez M.	63	15	3
3.	15.04.2018	Bünde	DITIB Yeni Cami M.	50	12	2
4.	04.05.2018	Solingen	Bildungs – Familienzentrum e. V.	35	10	1
5.	29.06.2018	Düsseldorf	The AFSP	6	3	-
6.	06.07.2018	Düsseldorf	The AFSP	12	9	-
7.	31.08.2018	Düsseldorf	The AFSP	7	4	-
8.	14.09.2018	Düsseldorf	The AFSP	6	3	-
9.	16.11.2018	Mülheim	Union of European Turkish Democrats	25	4	3
10.	25.11.2018	Löhne	DITIB Haci Bayram M.	58	3	1
11.	02.12.2018	Oberhausen	FÖDEN	44	9	2
			Total	*371*	*83*	*12*

In 2018, three hundred seventy-one families were attended public meetings. Overall, one hundred seventy-three families were identified as candidate foster parents. In 2019, the Attaché continued to organize public events to increase the number of Turkish foster parents.

Figure 58 - *Kinship Care with Numbers, 2018 and 2019*

2018	
The number of meetings: 11	
The number of people who attended: 371	
Candidate of Foster Family	173
Not in the Formal process	131
In the Formal Process	19
Waiting/Taking of child	6
Disclaiming	4
Postponed	16

2019*	
The number of meetings: 6	
The number of people who attended: 345	
Candidate of Foster Family	78
Total Foster Family	2

*As by 01.10.2019 – author's calculation

In 2016, there was 110 candidate of Turkish foster family, and it was increased to 173 in 2018. Although the number of candidates of Turkish foster parents in Germany has been increased, there are several problems in practice. There is a high level of participants in public meetings; however, most of the Turkish families do not take further action to be a foster parent. Most families often claim that: "their house is too small," "their children do not want any foster child," "they are old enough to have a foster child," "they have health problems," "they will have newborn children," and "they cannot persuade the spouse yet." These became the most common "excuses" when Turkish descent population in Germany decides not to be a foster family. Besides, some face institutional obstacles. For instance, some families are not called back from the Jugendamt that they applied. Even though becoming a foster parent is not very difficult in Germany, Turkish families do not always translate their diasporic morality into direct actions. Most families subsequently do not start the official procedure.

Figure 59 – *The Number of Cases and Turkish Foster Families, 2016-2018*

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
When Jugendamt takes the Turkish origin children into care (due to "just or unjust reasons"), the AFSP helps the families reunify children with biological families. Together with the General Consulate of Turkey in Düsseldorf, the AFPS takes immediate action and gives an appointment to help the families. The Attaché thus provides the necessary information to the families on the rights and draws an essential roadmap. It helps Turkish families in choosing a lawyer and keeps contact with Jugendamt to solve misunderstandings if there are any. The AFSP also provides services for consultancy on the phone.

Figure 60 – *The Attaché with Numbers, 2015-2018*

Total Number of Foster Parent Candidate	406
Dealt with the cases of children under protection or endangerment	226
The number of children who helped bring to the family back	70
Dealt with children who are at risk of being removed from their family	74

In 2018, a total of 52.590 children were taken into care. Out of these numbers, 12.211 was asylum seekers, 24.386 was German, and 15.993 was the migrant origin. At least half of the migrant children were reunited with their biological families - most migrant children who were taken into care requested by them for the care placement.

Figure 61 – *Number of Children who were Taken into Care in Germany, 2018*

Since 2000, every newborn child is registered as German; thus, children's ethnic and religious background is not included in the statistics. For this reason, there is no exact number of Turkish immigrant children in replacement care. According to Attaché's statistics, a total of two hundred-eight Turkish origin children were taken into care between 2015-2019.

Seventy-four of them requested by themselves to be removed from their biological families. Seventy children were brought back to their families with the help of the Attaché. Ninety-four of them reunified with their families, and the decision of reunification was taken for thirty-one children.

Figure 62 – *The Attaché's Statistics, 2015-2019*

In this vein, it is hard to talk about the systematic assimilationist policy and practice of the Jugendamt towards migrant origin children. The statistics of the Attaché should be shared with the Turkish public to show that child protection is excessively exaggerated as well as politicized by some families and Turkish media.

The AFSP is an intermediate body to mediate the conflicts between Turkish families and German state institutions. However, mediators should be independent and neutral without having a political agenda and interests to influence the negotiation. The Attaché has both political personality and legal identity. It is a homeland state institution. Therefore, its mediator status to facilitate communications between Turkish descent population and German state authorities face obstacles. The German state authorities question the role of the AFSP. Between 2015 and 2018, the AFSP could make a total of 21 meetings with Jugendamt. The Attaché attends the working groups of Jugendamt and raises awareness on the issue. The AFSP is a more influential actor at the local level (municipal level) rather than at the federal or national level. However, the activities of the Attaché have remained limited in Germany.

Figure 63 – *Total Number of Meetings with Jugendamt, 2015-2018*

Meetings at the Länder level	2
Meetings at the Municipal level	13
Participation of the Working groups	6
Total	21

In 2017, the Attaché requested meetings with the Jugendamt in twenty municipalities in NRW, where Turkish migrants in Germany predominantly live. Almost all the requests were unanswered in 2018. In 2018, the Attaché met with official institutions and NGOs for 41 times. The AFSP staff attended five academic workshops. Total 22 notes prepared, and 45 news published on the website. The Attaché also coordinated with the local media, and 30 news was published about the AFSP. However,

Figure 64 – *Official Visits of the Attaché to Jugendamt in 2018*

Date	Meeting
21.02.2018	Köln Jugendamt prepared brochures on how to be a foster family in Turkish
09.03.2018	Ertunç Deniz, who is a Turkish origin, became a new head of the Jugendamt in Oberhausen.

Since the German child welfare system has been characterized by a high proportion of placements in residential care (Schrödter, 2014), some Turkish diasporas have a high level of demand from the Attaché to establish a Turkish children's homes in Germany. In Germany, in NRW, there is only one residential care of children's homes for Turkish origin children. In 2014, "Evim" residential home was established in Rüthen-Oestereiden, a small town close to Paderborn, by Dr. Turan Devrim.[164] In 2019, eleven Turkish origin children stayed in this residential home, and eight Turkish adolescents left the shelter to establish their own independent life when they became over 18 years old. While the Attaché continues to improve the culturally sensitive approach of childcare in Germany, it also encourages Turkish philanthropists and businesspeople to open children's homes for Turkish migrant children.

During my fieldwork in November 2019, the staff of the Attaché told me that "there are excellent relations with the local municipalities of Jugendamt with a high level of cooperation." However, the low level of cooperation shows the efficiency of the Attaché's

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[164] This project is an example of diaspora philanthropy. However, in terms of child protection, philanthropy activities among Turkish diaspora communities in Germany have not been significantly developed yet.

mediator role. While social pedagogues in the Attaché provide counseling services, there is also an urgent need to establish a legal unit within the Attaché to offer better legal advice to families. I also met several Turkish families who do not know the activities of the Attaché. Among Turkish diasporas, there is a high level of skepticism towards the AFSP and bias that the Attaché does not help the families. Under these circumstances, the Attaché may wish to consider making changes in its trans-local mediator role and be a more "transnational legal advocacy" actor.

7.8.2 Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB)

One of the main reasons that Turkish families not to take further action to be a foster parent is because of their strong religious reservation on the foster parenthood. Most families are concerned about the place of a foster parent in Islam. In this context, the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) becomes an important institution. DITIB was founded in 1984 under the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in Turkey. Currently, DITIB is the largest Islamic organization in Germany. As of 2016, it funds 900 mosques in Germany and has about 800.000 members throughout the country. DITIB initially received state aid from the Federal Ministry of the Interior in Germany. Between 2012-2018, it received nearly 6 million euros. In 2018, the Federal Ministry of the Interior cut all funds. Thus, the primary financial source of DITIB is now the donations from its members and supporters.

DITIB is mainly a service provider for its community organizations and members. The narrow focus of DITIB, which was offering religious services to ethnic Turks and helped them not to not to be assimilated in Germany, has been recently changed. DITIB has included other Muslim and migrant communities in Germany. There has also been a diversification of services under the new type of organizational structure. For instance, social welfare and family services were included in the activities. The directorate of family and social services was established with two offices: (1) social service bureau and (2) spiritual guidance bureau. The bureau of women and youth was established as a separate office. The DITIB has started to provide a telephone hotline for family and social counseling for ethnic Turks and other communities in Germany. The broadening of the activities of DITIB has been a direct result of demands raised by its members but also the hostland environment.

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Furthermore, DITIB's services and activities underwent radical changes by the establishment of professionalization. DITIB became a less protest-oriented institution. At the same time, there have been some attempts to keep its political neutrality and not to be considered as a long-arm of Ankara. Cooperation with others (both religious and non-religious) organizations in Germany has been sharply increased. More importantly, the high level of collaboration became an organic part of the organizational identity of DITIB.

In matters of kinship care, DITIB also plays a crucial role. For example, it prepares some information documents on foster care and issues fatwa for the Friday prayer about the rules of fostering in Islam. DITIB expresses the importance of the protection of vulnerable children and the fact that foster care is allowed in Islam. Besides, it cooperates with other Turkish CSOs in Germany, including the UYD, to raise public awareness not only among Turkish communities but also among Muslim communities.

When DITIB focuses on the precarization of Muslim migrant communities in Germany, it promotes "how Islam within daily life" should be practiced. DITIB, therefore, plays a vital role in the creation of biopolitical collectivities of Turkish as well as Muslim diaspora communities. Although it is difficult to say that the inclusion of family matters in DITIB's activities is the direct consequence of Turkish diaspora mobilization, the organization began to provide counseling services for families' needs day-to-day life. Unlike most of the Turkish community organizations, DITIB has been developed its institutional autonomy in the hostland to be an independent organization from the homeland.

7.9 The (Non-)Effects of Turkish Diaspora Mobilization on the Policy Changes in Germany

There are two main factors of the limited effectiveness of the Turkish diaspora mobilization in Germany: (1) "cohesion" - the organizational and material capabilities of collective actions, and (2) "access" to political power in the hostland institutions (Ögelman et al., 2002: 162). In matters of kinship care, Turkish diaspora mobilization raises awareness on the issue and forms public opinion, particularly among co-ethnics (both in Turkey and abroad). However, it does not bring significant policy changes in Germany. There are three main reasons for lack of cohesion: (1) lack of professionalization and institutional autonomy, (2) lack of independent financial sources, and (3) lack of clear political strategies and further

political aims. When immigrant groups do not have citizenship, they have restricted access to political influence the system, even if they are large in number, well organized, and cohesive in their political and social demands (Öner, 2014: 85). For these reasons, Turkish diaspora communities mostly chose to influence the German decision-makers through CSOs even though their political influence to bring about socio-political changes remains very limited.

On the one hand, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are easily and quickly mobilized for collective actions in matters of child protection and demand for the policy changes. On the other hand, German authorities continue to ignore their claims. As mentioned, the hostland context is an essential factor in diaspora mobilization since the framing process mostly occurs in the country of residence. Diaspora communities continue to select threshold events - transformative and triggering issues in everyday life. These events motivate them to participate actively in efforts to affect policy-makers and bring about the socio-political changes. Although the hostland environment helps or hinders diaspora mobilization, there is a low-level of the political re-influence of Turkish diaspora mobilization for the policy changes in matters of kinship care due to the lack of positionality. The following part of the chapter will examine the hostland context from a macro-level perspective and how Turkish diaspora communities react to these policy changes.

German "Response" and the Reactions of Turkish Diaspora Mobilization

Although there is a relatively less impact of Turkish diaspora mobilization on the policy changes of foster care, it adds the current discussions of migration governance and multiculturalism at the macro-level. The hostland is not a passive actor to watch diaspora mobilization in its territory. German policy-makers might continue to ignore the demands of the Turkish diaspora communities in kinship care; however, they design several broader policies to arrange the everyday lives of Muslim migrant communities. Consequently, Germany also produces de-diasporization policies in a broader macro perspective to re-establish the links between the state and its migrant communities.

The hostland's organizations (i.e., Auslanderbeirate: Foreigner's Councils and Wohlfahrtsverbande: Welfare Federations) protect immigrant interests, including Turkish and Muslims. In matters of family services and child welfare, several institutions such as "Die Arbeitwohlfarht" AWO (1919), "German Caritas Association" (1897), and "Solibund e.V"

(1993) provide help for families both at the federal and national level. However, most of the Turkish diasporas perceive these organizations as a "long arm of Berlin." While they advise policy-makers at the communal and state levels, some consider them as "ineffective" and "distrustful" due to the "assimilationist" goals. Most Turkish diasporas, therefore, chose to mobilize at the local self-help and advocacy organizations of TCOs, rather than the hostland's organizations.

The reactions of German state authorities towards Turkish diaspora mobilization in kinship care vary at the local and federal levels. While there is close cooperation between the migrant association and local municipalities in some federal states (such as in Hesse), others might not establish such kind of collaboration and mutual trust (such as in the cases of NRW and Berlin). While German political elites design macro-level policies to establish a link between state authorities and Muslim communities, most Turkish diasporas see these macro-level developments negatively.

For instance, Germany has recently launched several policies and institutions on Islam. The most significant development of the de-diasporization policies is the establishment of the "German Islam Conference" (DIK) by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building, and Community in 2016. For the first time, Germany created an institutional forum for dialogue between federal, state, and local authorities and Muslims. The primary purpose of this "political project" is to redesign Islam in Germany and its relations with the Muslim communities. German political elites such as Wulff, Gauck, Steinmeier, and Merkel have been moving from the discourse of "Islam does not belong to Germany" to the narratives of "German Islam" and "Muslims, which belong to Germany."

Most of the Turkish diasporas are very skeptical about the new macro policies of Germany. In the everyday life of diasporic communication, Turkish communities in Germany have "symbolic and interactionist" perspectives of Islam. For example, some criticized the Turkish-Muslim participants (such as Serap Gürel), and they claim that these participants do not represent their voices and raise community problems. In the DIK meeting in November 2018, there was a hot and continuous debate about what Gürel wore (she wore mini-skirt and cowboy boots) rather than what she said at the conference. Almost everybody paid attention to how she dressed without knowing who she is and what she said. At the same time, "others of others" – diasporas of diasporas were marginalized in a second by supporting the idea that

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she should represent LGBT+ communities rather than Islam. These discussions show that symbolism prevails over the ideas, and there are high-level biopolitical collectivities of the inclusion and exclusion (us vs. them) even among Turkish diaspora communities within Germany.

Another big discussion about the DIK among Turkish diaspora communities was about food. During the conference, the German government served pork blood sausage (Blutwurst); therefore, some Turkish communities were mobilized to discuss and protest why German authorities had a little respect for the Muslim values, even at the Islam Conference. After significant attention and criticism of the Turkish diaspora communities and other Muslim diasporas, German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer apologized. These examples illustrate that there is an apparent lack of understanding as well as miscommunication between Germany and its migrant communities, including in matters of child protection and welfare.

Durmuş Yıldırım, who is the leader of the Union of Turkish Islamic Cultural Associations in Europe (ATIB), declared that they are not in favor of accepting the concept of German-Islam. He claims that secular and liberal Muslims-Turkish, who is invited to the DIK, tries to make political pressure over the mosques in Germany. According to him, there were several attempts to create Euro-Islam in the past. Since the idea was failed, German political elites now try to build the German-Islam. Most of the Turkish association, including the ATIB, do not accept the idea of German-Islam and are anxious to watch this development. They mostly perceive the hostland's reactions as "global cultural assimilation." Yildirim also mentioned that they are not against the idea that Imams will be educated by and in Germany; however, they do not want to imagine any religious leaders for their community who cannot speak Turkish properly. They believe that there should not be any external pressure (such as Turkey) on their mosques in Germany. However, they demand from German policy-makers not to force the Turkish-Muslim communities in Germany.

Turkish political elites, such as Devlet Bahçeli, who is the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), criticize the de-diasporization policies of Germany. Bahçeli, during his party's parliamentary group meeting in December 2018, said, "the conference (DIK) which convened with the slogan of Islam in Germany and for Germany is a scandal, it is carelessness and an insult on our belief" ("MHP Chair Slams," 2018). Under these circumstances, the everyday life of Turkish-Muslim communities in Germany creates a

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transnational diplomatic and political crisis. Nonetheless, Turkey sees the moral responsibility to intervene in Germany's domestic politics to "protect" its compatriots and "provide" their extra-territorial needs.

The examples of bottom-up Turkish diaspora-led mobilization in Germany are highly based on adverse events. In the bottom-up diaspora mobilization, there is always a conflictual socio-political environment of the hostland and precarious living conditions. Turkish diaspora communities profoundly feel insecure and vulnerable in the country of residence. Under these circumstances, kinship care becomes only a particular issue that is part of broader macro-level immigration policies, multiculturalism, and Leitkultur.

Conclusion

The Turkish descent population in Germany is organized around issues that concern everyday life, such as kinship care. Throughout the years, the civic capacity of Turkish communities has been considerably improved, and there has been expansion and diversification of TCOs in Germany since the late 1970s. Family and social welfare became one of the focal points for diaspora mobilization, and TCOs have been effective in mobilizing co-ethnics for collective actions on selected issues. Although their influence remains limited in policy-making changes in the hostland, they successfully form and influence public opinion about the importance of kinship care and the necessity of Turkish origin foster parents.

The demands of the Turkish diaspora communities have brought significant changes in Turkey's diaspora policy. Turkey's relationship with its diaspora communities has been altered along with the changes in the associational realm of TCOs in Germany. However, it is difficult to say that bottom-up diaspora mobilization is the only and the most important reason in the changes of the homeland's diaspora engagement/management policy. It should be noted that the demands of Turkish immigrants and Turkey's diaspora policy have better aligned under the new systematization and institutionalization of the AKP's diaspora policy.

In the new phase of Turkey's diaspora policy, there is overt interest in mobilization, with the launching of new state agencies (i.e., the YTB in 2010 and the AFSP in 2015). There has been the establishment of more cooperation between Turkey and TCOs in the realms of education, culture, and religion as well as family and social services. Since the 1980s, there

has been a strong focus on the preservation of Turkish cultural heritage abroad among Turkish state institutions. The AKP government, furthermore, began to emphasize the importance of religion and started to combat Islamophobia abroad. In this context, the AKP elites relate the child protection with Islamophobia in a broader context. For instance, in 2013, for the first time, the kinship care appeared as an "issue" in the Turkish Parliament's Human Rights Sub-Commission Report. This shows that, like Germany, Turkey considers dealing with the child protection issue at the macro-level; hence, the only difference is that there is trans-local support in the homeland through institutional innovation - the AFSP. While Turkey began to underline an attempt to remake the national community within as well as outside of Turkey's borders, Turkish state institutions such as the DITIB and the AFSP swiftly developed a thematic focus on family and social welfare issues.

Nonetheless, the TCOs in Germany are needed to be encouraged for institutional autonomy and financial interdependence. It should not be forgotten that Turkish diaspora communities began to raise an issue of "too much interference" from the Turkish state in their day-to-day life. The findings of the chapter illustrate that Turkish diaspora mobilization from below does not turn into an influential factor in the hostland's policy since Turkish diaspora communities have limited economic, political, and social opportunities. Thus, the Turkish descent population in Germany is needed to participate in the political decision-making system, and they should be encouraged to acquire German citizenship to be a more influential political actor. Only active and meaningful socio-political participation could foster the influences, whereby diaspora communities could bring about the socio-political changes in the country of residence.

Children are often at the crossroads of conflicts, and they are standing at the center of local, national, and global issues such as poverty, war, forced displacement, underdevelopment, and human trafficking. Nowadays, they have become one of the precarious groups who need superior protection from the state as well as society. Although the state's efforts on the management and control of transnational communities have been extensively studied in the literature, there is still a gap in the research of the well-being of migrant children. Within a theoretically informed analysis of diaspora-led mobilization and ethnographic study of Turkish communities in Germany, this research examined in-depth research of diaspora mobilization on child protection. It analyzed how Turkish diaspora communities establish transnational/trans-local networks and relations to show their diasporic care and solidarity as well as perform and act as a diaspora.

Main Findings of the Dissertation

Turkish diaspora communities are mobilized, both online and offline, on kinship care. Unlike the literature, this study demonstrated that they are active socio-political actors and ready to help co-ethnics, mainly when there are insecure and vulnerable living conditions (precarization) in the country of residence. Thus, Turkish diasporas in Germany are far from being passive, altruistic, and delineated communities. They act as moral and virtual communities on selected threshold events (such as kinship care).

As the dissertation highlights, diaspora communities demonstrate the political agency, and they are actively mobilized for their own needs, interests, and identities in the hostlands. The high level of mobilization based on collective unity and their shared morality makes them different from other transnational communities (i.e., migrants). The Turkish descent population in Germany is digitally connected to kinship care and quickly communicated through web-based activity to take collective action. They also take part in several offline activities to show their collective unity, diasporic care, and solidarity with co-ethnics in the country of residence. Negative stigmatizations in the literature, therefore, do not reflect the current socio-political realities of Turkish diaspora communities in Germany.

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In this dissertation, I focused on the political agency of diasporas and perceived them as socially and politically constructed. Diasporas are not given and pre-existing actors. Instead, they are politically active, identity, and interest-based, collectively organized, heterogeneous, and dynamics groups. The quest for a definition of diaspora seems not an easy task for scholars. I thus followed Brubaker's argument and considered them as the "category of practice," whereby such communities "make claims, articulate projects, and mobilize energies" (Brubaker, 2005). Rather than a bounded description of which diasporas are, I focused on the processes of diasporic identity formation and mobilization and examined how transnational migrant communities become diaspora entrepreneurs in everyday life.

Although I separately analyzed online and offline activities, they are closely interlinked, and they usually (re-)influence each other. This separation mainly resulted from the data collection methods. Accordingly, Turkish diaspora communities in Germany are involved in online activities for the following purposes: (1) everyday diasporic communication and information exchange, (2) engaging in diasporic identity construction, (3) showing emotions and empathic solidarity, (4) forming public opinion and raising awareness, (5) making propaganda and influencing the decision-makers to bring socio-political changes, and (6) involving in socio-political participation and collective mobilization. Besides, they act and engage in struggles for the policy changes in the country of residence and participate in several offline activities such as (1) protesting and demonstrating against the hostland policies and practices, (2) establishing Turkish civil society organizations, (3) forming political parties, (4) launching social and media campaigns, (5) increasing public awareness, and (6) organizing academic workshops and conferences on their needs and interests. Consequently, they are well connected to the threshold events such as kinship care, both online and offline, and act as a socio-political actor in diaspora politics.

Under these circumstances, the research questions of the dissertation can be summarized as follows:

- *How does diaspora mobilization occur from below?* (Central Research Question)

Diaspora mobilization takes place both online and offline. Bottom-up diaspora mobilization is based on the formation of diasporic identities by ordinary transnational migrants in everyday life. Co-ethnics start to communicate with others through social media and get

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support for their offline activities. They ask for help, particularly for free legal consultations from their co-ethnic lawyers about their specific cases or at least ask others' personal experiences. They contact the homeland institutions and report their situations for further legal and political help. Apart from the homeland institutions and co-ethnics, they also contact with the local authorities and administrations in their country of residence. Media, including social media, takes on an essential role in the sphere of identity construction and civic action. They know that homeland institutions and co-ethnics are not enough to solve their problems - the hostland institutions, as well as the host-society, play a significant role in diaspora mobilization.

- *How do ordinary transnational migrants become diaspora entrepreneurs to construct diasporic identities in everyday life?* (Sub-Question 1)

In everyday life, transnational migrants take part in several online and offline activities, and they contribute (un/intentionally) to construct the hybrid, transnational, multiple, and dynamic diasporic identities. Diasporic identities are formed based on their collective actions and mobilization. Therefore, such communities are closely connected and act together, even though they have never met in real life. Diasporas are identity- and interest-based communities that express their care, morality, and solidarity. For instance, co-ethnics provide free legal assistance and let others know who has similar problems. Diasporic identities are often formed situationally (i.e., pride to the country of origin, precarious living conditions in the hostland, sharing common threats such as racism and discrimination, and many more). To further explore the formation of diasporic identities, we also need to understand their activities (Sub-Question 2).

- *How do diaspora communities establish networks and relations for diasporic care and solidarity on threshold events?* (Sub-Question 2)

Diaspora communities form and shape public opinion, and they take an active role in both social and mass media, particularly the ones in the homeland. They exchange information and connect members of the kin-community. The Internet often becomes a platform for the extension of mobilizing resources of offline activities. Through digital platforms, diasporas easily reach more people for offline collective actions. Social media thus provides a

discussion platform and forms a diasporic public space. Diaspora communities attend demonstrations against the hostland institutions (protest is the most used and common way of participation both online and offline). They also initiate and participate in petitions. They often go into courthouses collectively and watch trials altogether to show their support. They involve in lobby activities and create networks with several institutions, including the homelands' ones (boomerang effect of diasporization). They negotiate with actors and political elites both in the hostland and the homeland. They promote active civil society organizations and support NGOs. They furthermore demand civil society organizations to conduct detailed academic research on their everyday life problems and to reach broader co-ethnics as much as possible. They act in philanthropic activities and organizing charity events. They participate in political and social engagements within the triadic nexus as well as serve as a model of diaspora mobilization in the neighboring countries. Therefore, they raise awareness of their needs and interests.

Figure 65 – Main Findings

In this context, this dissertation demonstrates that diaspora communities challenge the state-centric power. Diasporas are the key civil society actors in transnational/trans-local politics. The literature portrays them as "the development agents, transnational investors, promoters of trade and tourism, political activists, conflict instigators or peace brokers" (Kunz, 2012). In contrast, I demonstrated that they are collectively organized for their needs, interests, and identities rather than the interests of the homeland. The dual process of identity formation and

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collective mobilization cannot be explained only by the homeland factor. There are also other factors (such as the hostland factor and diaspora agency), which help or hinder diaspora participation in everyday politics.

In the literature, there is a problem of legitimacy question whether diaspora community organizations in the hostland represent the real problems of such communities, or they are just "long-arm of the homeland." This dissertation shows that not all diaspora organizations are automatically extension of the homelands' interests. Instead, some diaspora organizations (i.e., Umut Yıldızı Derneği, in this case) represent the real problems, needs, and interests of diaspora communities.

The official-state discourses around the diaspora politics of the homelands often lay down the triangle of discrimination, (institutional) racism, and Xenophobia. Nowadays, we have been witnessed the "*Black Lives Matter*" movement all around the world and realize the power of collective actions to fight against (state) racism and (institutional) discrimination. Recently, there are also anti-fascist demonstrations against neo-Nazi violence in Germany ("*Es Reicht!*"[165]Although these problems are crucial and witnessed in everyday life, this dissertation also highlights "other issues" of diaspora communities (such as child welfare and kinship foster care) in the country of residence.

Through collective unity and shared morality, diaspora communities produce biopolitical discourses on "exclusion and inclusion" and "the correct way of life," particularly when they or their co-ethnics face precarious living conditions in the country of residence. Turkish migrant families often claim that "German child protection policy and practices force them to change their lifestyles." For example, some Turkish Muslim mothers argued that they begin not to wear a headscarf when Jugendamt takes their children into care because they want to be perceived as "modern citizens" by the titular German society. Another example is the school meetings of parents. These meetings are usually organized in a place where migrant families do not want to attend (such places belonging to Christian foundations - Church or pubs after 19:00). Some families find these locations are uncomfortable; therefore, they do not attend the school meetings. While they are mostly perceived as "careless" of their children, the titular majority does not know the real reason for the absence. Migrant families

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[165] "Es Reicht" can be translated as "It's enough!"

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occasionally mention that their lifestyles have dramatically changed because of the hostland's child protection system.

Migrant families whose children are taken into care claim that they are accused of maltreatment of their children, even if there is no real "just" reason. Their co-ethnics even sharply criticize them. Thus, they feel that they are excluded from the social life by both titular society and the kin-community. Child protection itself constitutes an essential element of biopolitics (both from top-down and bottom-up perspectives). In contrast, individual freedoms of families are restricted by the hostland as well as their compatriots.

Nevertheless, it is tough to claim that there is systematic discrimination and assimilationist policies are at work under the practices of Jugendamt in Germany. The Jugendämter might not pay enough attention to children's religious and cultural backgrounds (since there is no culturally sensitive kinship care). German state authorities often claim that they would like to take into consideration of cultural and religious sensitivity of children; however, they cannot find foster families with migration backgrounds. Being a migrant is not the main factor in the decision to care for replacement. Jugendämter applies to the same rule to every child and does not differentiate them. Indeed, the socio-economic conditions are the most dominant factor in the decision for child protection. Diaspora communities have lower educational and socio-economic positions, and they might not be able to take care of children "enough" socio-economically or have "different" norms on the child-rearing.

Significance of the Findings

The literature portrays four distinct features of diaspora communities: (1) dispersion (spread beyond the territory of origin), (2) retrospection (ties to the country of origin and identification with it), (3) community spirit (the collective experience of migratory process, including exclusion and discrimination in the host country), and (4) extraterritoriality (a collective identity that is no longer necessarily tied to belonging to a specific territorial area) (Berking, 2000; Aydin, 2014). The literature, however, predominantly focuses on the first two features (dispersion and retrospection), and it ignores the last two (community spirit and extraterritoriality). This dissertation mainly focuses on the last two elements and highlights the importance of the community spirit and extraterritoriality in the formation of diasporic identity and collective mobilization.

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In this study, I argued that the bottom-up diaspora mobilization is a "self-organized and grassroots social movement" whereby ordinary transnational migrants have opportunities to form various social-political activities (both online and offline) in everyday life, and more importantly, they act and perform as a "diaspora." In the literature, several scholars consider diaspora mobilization as "voting abroad, sending remittances, and promoting homeland politics and interests." I expanded these transnational/trans-local practices of diaspora communities and offered a new theoretical framework on diaspora mobilization (from below). The dual process of identity building and mobilization is a political process, whereby such communities undertake socio-political actions for their own needs, interests, and identities. Transnational migrants thus turn into active participants in public and political life. Diaspora politics, therefore, should be considered as "a study of how and to what extend diaspora communities mobilizes co-ethnics to take collective actions to influence the political decision-makers (both in the homeland and the hostland)." I consequently gave direct voices to diasporas and did not talk about them in the absence and the abstract forms as a geopolitical object of the kin-states.

Besides, I demonstrated that diaspora communities mobilize compatriots to take collective actions, particularly when they or their co-ethnics face precarious living conditions in the hostlands. Diasporas are moral communities (Malkki, 1994; Werbner, 2002; Kleist, 2008), and they produce biopolitical collectivities (such as the correct way of life). This dissertation, therefore, offers a new understanding of diaspora mobilization under the biopolitics of everyday life rather than geopolitics of the kin-states. In the literature, the main factor of diaspora mobilization is the emotional attachment to the respective homeland(s). However, I illustrated that diasporic care and morality are the main factors. The diasporic morality, care, and solidarity among co-ethnics have a primary mobilization resource. Although precarious living conditions in the hostlands turn into one of the essential sources of diaspora mobilization, neither diaspora literature nor welfare works of literature explain how precarious living conditions of diaspora communities in the country of residence shape the identity building and collective mobilization.

Diaspora communities have a high interest in care ideals, practices, and responsibilities on "threshold events." They have a high level of political and social mobilization in both the country of residence and the country of origin on selected issues. These events are indeed produced and reproduced by the biopolitical discourses. Diaspora communities often

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politicize the family matters, including child protection, and (re-)construct the (bio-)political belonging under the shared collective identities. Thus, the biopolitical discourses on the (ideal) family and how to raise children in the hostland are the core elements of diaspora activism. Diaspora communities share collective morality on "the correct way of life" and "ideal family," whereby they perform what to be a diaspora, and more importantly, how to act being a diaspora. Under these circumstances, diaspora communities turn into a central player of (bio-)politics in day-to-day livelihoods.

It should not be forgotten that hostlands are not passive actors to observe diasporization policies of kin-states in their territories within their sovereignty. The hostlands produce de-diasporization policies and attempt to diminish the close link between the migrant communities and their respective kin-states. I thus confirmed that the hostland's environment helps or hinders diaspora mobilization, and it should take into account in diaspora politics.

Policy Recommendations

There is little information on the Turkish origin children who are taken into care by Jugendamt. German state authorities do not notify Turkish authorities even though Turkish state authorities request from Germany to inform the decision of replacement care for Turkish origin children. However, German institutions do not cooperate with the Turkish Consulates and register newborn children as Germans. There is a citizenship aspect on the issue but from different angles. There should be more cooperation between German and Turkish state authorities on replacement care decisions.

On the one hand, the current child protection systems in the world may not protect children all the time, and even some of them could create various problems. On the other hand, it will be hazardous to claim that there are assimilationist policies towards migrant (origin) children. There are multiple factors in each case, and each has different reasons. There is a high level of the politicization of foster care decisions by all parties. For instance, there is a significant (negative) role of Turkish media in the construction of public fear towards Jugendämter.

Besides, the Turkish descent population is not aware of the importance of (kinship) foster care. They have a high level of religious reservation on what Islam says about it. Spontaneously, there are not many Turkish origin families who become foster families in

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Germany. There is still a need to raise awareness on foster care among the Turkish descent population in Germany, and they should be encouraged to become foster families (not only for Turkish origin children but also for all, without much considering the ethnicity). Only just a couple of years ago, Turkish co-ethnics began to mobilize on the kinship care and collaborate for the policy changes. The Turkish Community Organizations need to negotiate with German policy-makers and explain the needs and demands of the Turkish descent population on kinship care. In return, Germany needs to recognize Islam officially and accept the reality of "Islam belongs to Germany." Therefore, German policy-makers may wish to consider Muslim organizations as an independent welfare organization (Freie Träger), whereby they could provide institutional services, including child-care services, to their religious communities.

The Youth Offices should not be late to intervene when there is the maltreatment of a child. Jugendamt takes every possible risk very seriously and follows early preventive strategies. Although early intervention seems very beneficial for a child, families may sometimes suffer. When Jugendämter considers the best interest of a child, families are often excluded from the risk assessment process. More preemptive strategies are needed for families, especially to migrant families. By doing so, the hostland government could reduce to cost 50 Euro per week (for social pedagogues). Since there is a substantial financial obligation for the state for child protection, more families should be encouraged to be foster parents.

Furthermore, the concept of family has been changing in modern societies. Many children become victims of abuse by the members of their families and societies. The endangerment of the child is a significant problem in Germany, like in many parts of the world. Pedophile and child pornography attract more people. In this dissertation, I highlight that child protection is one of the systematic socio-economic issues of migrant communities, whereby the hostland governments may wish to consider paying more attention. It might be true that Germany does everything to protect children's rights – including migrant and asylum seeker children. Child protection is a very costly social-welfare policy. For instance, Germany spends between 4.500 to 8.000 Euros per child per month in residential care, and the cost is reduced to 1.000 Euro in foster care. Germany also attempted to establish children's shelters in Hungary and Brazil to reduce the cost; however, it became a major political scandal that the German child protection system turned into "international trade" in a "cheaper environment."

Some migrant families in the hostlands often claim that they are bounded by a social contract of the dominant culture (*Leitkultur* in German case). The micro-level issues of child protection indeed turn into macro-level problems of Multiculturalism, whereas the leading culture applies social norms and values to everyone regardless of the ethnic and religious backgrounds. When the state authorities interpret the social and cultural dynamics of immigrants in terms of the titular values and norms under the dominant culture, such problems spontaneously arise. Over the past decades, Germany has become much more multicultural and multi-ethnic. Immigrant communities include a wide range of ethnic and religious diversities (such as from Turkey, Russia, Poland, Italy, South-East Asia, and the Middle East). Thus, it is very challenging to show the cultural competence and sensitivity of each culture in the country. It also becomes less evident, which counts as being a German native or having a migrant background. Although multicultural policies are applied at the institutional level in Germany, there is still a lack of cultural and political sensitivity and openness among German political and public life. As a result, the ideas about the legal and political accommodation of Multiculturalism has become crucial in new debates on inclusion and exclusion in diverse, pluralistic societies, such as in Germany.

Some migrant families also argue that there are cultural differences in child-rearing. They claim, there are different limits on "neglect, abuse, and violence." The assessment of child maltreatment in a multicultural setting is much tricky for youth work officers. In Germany, there is a shortage of personnel in Jugendamt. Jugendämter deals with approximately 50 children. Besides, Jugendämter might have a lack of intercultural competence as well as intercultural communication skills. When social workers, including Jugendämter, do not speak foreign languages, particularly the most common minority languages: Turkish, Polish, Russian, Italian, and Arabic, there will always be misunderstanding and miscommunication. Migrant families thus demand to have special training of intercultural awareness and competence for youth workers. Otherwise, they believe that Jugendämter cannot make a proper and detailed risk assessment in each case.

As the dissertation shows, there is a high level of fear and distrust against Youth Welfare Offices among migrant families. Besides, most migrants are struggling with self-confidence problems. When their children are taken into care, most families panic and even sometimes become aggressive. Some societies are still patriarchal, where men have a dominant position.

They are always assigned roles to "protect" families and to be "powerful" not to show their feelings and emotions openly.

In this vein, the absence of culturally sensitive care and lack of institutional mechanisms increased the possibility of miscommunication and misunderstandings between migrant families and state authorities. For instance, only large German cities have focused on culturally sensitive kinship care. Jugendamt may wish to consider the establishment of country-wide quality standards in child protection, whereby migrant families can take a more active role in the risk assessment. Jugendämter and migrant families should work with trans-local NGOs and municipalities. By doing so migrant families will be more responsible for developing kinship foster care systems in the hostlands.

As I illustrated in this dissertation, most diaspora families want to raise children regarding their cultural and religious needs. When they have conflicts with the state authorities or institutions in the country of residence, they do not know their rights and do not take enough professional and legal help. This dissertation, therefore, aims to increase the awareness of kinship care and give necessary directions to the respective actors. I thus offered policy recommendations for all parties.

Limitations: The Question of Internal and External Validity of the Research

In this dissertation, I considered only migrant children who are taken into care without their will. There has been an increasing number of children who are taken into care by their request. There are generational differences between parents and children, and it is spontaneous to have parent-child conflict in some families. Young generations might have different cultural and religious norms, values, beliefs, and lifestyles than their parents. The generation gap may sometimes lead to familial conflicts. However, this study has limitations and narrows down the research agenda.

Diasporas are not homogeneous communities, and there are differences even within the same group. It is hard to generalize and claim the findings for the whole Turkish descent population in Germany. The reader should take into consideration that there are internal differences with the Turkish diasporas; therefore, I intentionally did not use the word "some" in every case.

Not only Turkish diaspora communities in Germany have problems with Jugendamt. Other migrant communities also have issues with the German child protection system. Italian, Poles, and Russian migrant families complain about Jugendamt too. Besides, the child protection policy and practices might affect the same diaspora groups in other hostlands since there are cultural differences in child-rearing and the hostland systems.

As a Turkish diaspora, there have been so many advantages and disadvantages of researching my community. I furthermore acknowledged the concept of self-reflexivity not to have bias interpretation in my analysis. Self-reflexivity indeed allowed me to be more critical of my co-ethnics. I practiced self-reflexivity during my research in several ways (i.e., collecting data from both sides, applying relational ethics, and being a responsible researcher). I also demonstrated the significant elements of the research space so that readers can understand socio-political realities such as diasporas. Although I followed the interpretive epistemology, I aimed to not to make any alterations, intentionally or unintentionally, in the research findings.

Setting Agenda for Future Research

Diasporas are located at the intersection of the domestic and foreign policy of not only the homeland but also the hostland. This study shows how the domestic welfare policy (child protection) of the hostland (the country of residence: Germany) affects the domestic and foreign policy of the homeland (the country of origin: Turkey). The domestic welfare social policy of child protection quickly turns into an international, transnational, and diplomatic problem (i.e., WÜK). This dissertation is the first in-depth and systematic study of bottom-up diaspora mobilization and identity formation on kinship foster care. To better understand how (different) diaspora communities (in the same hostland) or how (different) hostlands (of the same diaspora groups) are affected by welfare policy (child protection), future studies should focus on other diaspora communities in different hostlands by applying the theoretical framework that I suggested in this study.

During the fieldwork, the families that I made interviews claim that child protection is related to the role of the state in family life. They argue modern politics is delving too deeply into an individual life, whereas there should not be such a position of the state (neither Turkey nor Germany) to get involved in their private lives. Thus, they often questioned the limits of state

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intervention in family life and raised the following crucial questions: (1) what is the role of the state in the lifestyles of (migrant) families? (2) When should the state intervene in family life? And, (3) to what extent families should give the right to the state to intervene in their family life? Although I demonstrated that child protection is one of the major problems between individuals and the state in modern societies, future research might answer some of these questions and focus on the role of the state in family matters.

Apart from the homeland, diaspora communities also ask for help from international organizations. The EU, the EP, the ECHR are some examples that they become parts of the issue. The EU has a limited role in transnational family law matters. Each member state has its own rules about divorce, separation, maintenance of spouses, and children. There is still a lack of supranational policy on child custody in the EU.

On the one hand, European citizenship needs to include more extended rights for the child and transnational families. On the other hand, the majority of EU member states support the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in family matters. Child protection of migrant families is a transnational issue between/among several states and communities, particularly when most transnational families expect from their respective homeland to intervene and protect their rights. By focusing on the well-being of migrant children, this study brought into a better understanding of how the hostland's political and legal environment shape and impact on diaspora mobilization (from below). Future research also might consider the role of supranational/international organizations, such as the EU, in kinship foster care.

Last but not least, kinship foster care is one of the 'threshold events' that diaspora communities are quickly mobilized and collaborate. Other social welfare policies (i.e., elderly care) should also be considered in future research and possibly compare the positive (foster care) and negative (elderly care) cases of diaspora mobilization.

Concluding Remarks

In sum, I demonstrated the importance of the hostland factor and the role of digital technologies in identity building and collective mobilization. Diaspora communities are more politically active when they involve in Internet information exchange. Through digital technologies and social media, they potentially resonate diasporic identity on and across various web and social media platforms. Everyday experiences of migrant families, whose lives are shaped at the nexus of family networks and welfare policies, have become the foundation of diaspora politics. In this context, the most significant contribution of the dissertation is to give direct voices to diasporas and not to talk about diasporas in their absence and the abstract form.

The Turkish descent population constantly argues that "parents are always role models for their children, and every child would like to look so much like their parents. It should never be forgotten that every child deserves to grow up in family settings with lots of parents' love and care with particular respect for their cultural and religious needs. Nobody can replace the importance of parent figures in the child's entire life."

I argued that there might be no inadequate legal regulations concerning the child protection system in the hostlands, but there could be some ineffective practices (intentionally or unintentionally). Rather than systematic assimilation policies of the hostlands, other factors might lead to the mistreatment of immigrant children, such as lack of intercultural competence of youth workers or cultural differences of migrant families in child-rearing. For this reason, the hostlands may wish to consider paying more attention to culturally sensitive kinship care, whereby migrant civil society organizations play a more active role and are collectively organized.

While concluding these sentences, only as of today (June 17, 2020), two news took place in the media on the foster care replacement for Turkish descent children in Germany - "Altınkaya Brothers: Yakup and Kuzey" (in Dormagen) and "Yağmur Çelik" (in Bochum). The Turkish descent population in Germany has quickly mobilized online and started to discuss how they can act together offline towards the "injustice" decisions of Jugendamt. It seems that kinship foster care will continue to be in the headlines and keep its vital importance for diaspora communities.

Appendix

The Conceptualization of Diaspora

'Diaspora Diaspora'

1.	Social and political collectivity;
2.	Internal cohesion and sustained ties with the homeland, the hostland, and co-ethnics under the shared diasporic morality, loyalty, and identities (although diasporas are heterogeneous);
3.	Identity and interest-based entities: diasporas are active socio-political and moral communities to perform their transnational belongings;
4.	Act for their needs, interests, and identities (with) in the transnational/trans-local networks and relations.

Research Design and Methodology

Mapping Diaspora

Research Philosophy	Interpretivism
Research Approach	Inductive and Deductive Reasoning
Research Strategy and Design	Multi-Sited Comparative Case Study
Data Collection	Qualitative: Data Ethnography Digital Ethnography Participant Observation + Fieldwork + Interviews = *Netnography*
	Quantitative: Computational Approach
Data Analysis	Qualitative and Quantitative research methodologies = *Mixed Methodology*
	Content Analysis

The Case Selection

Why in Germany as a host country?

1.	The second highest population of immigrants in the world (UN Report, 2015): approximately 20 million - 25% of the whole population.
2.	Social justice has recently become a significant issue, especially for migrant communities: the second top country in the Eurozone for the unequal distribution of wealth.
3.	While the literature considers Germany as a 'movement of society,' most affected population remain politically inactive (Hass et al., 2014) – [although they have a moral responsibility to enter the political arena, they have a lack of resources].
4.	Due to the corporatist and welfare system, non-citizens immigrants have no direct access to influence the political system.
5.	Unlike most of the Western European countries, Germany had a long ethnic and collectively monist model. Therefore, ethnic minorities' political claims have been less publicly visible in the country. Migrants subsequently have a relatively lower interest as well as participation in domestic politics.
6.	Germany is also accused of having double standards in the integration and migration policies: selective measures for different immigrant groups and exclusion policies for non-ethnic Germans.
7.	Due to the rise of new social media and digital communication, social cleavage structures have been changing.

Why Turkish Diasporas in Germany?

1.	The largest immigrant group: 16% of the entire immigrant population (*size*)
2.	A long history of migration - since 1961 (59 years) and different generations (*time*)
3.	Diverse ethnic, cultural, religious, and social groups within Turkish diasporas (*heterogeneity*)
4.	Different political and social characteristics: various levels of integration, political participation, trust, and et alia (*positionality*)
5.	The naturalization practices and citizenship status (*access*)
6.	Stigmatized for being 'the least integrated and political passive immigrant group' and struggling with identity (*misperception*)
7.	Prevailing the homeland issues and politics among diaspora members (*misconception*)
8.	Increasing of attachment to Turkey as home (*homeland*)
9.	High level of contacts among family and co-ethnics: shared morality and solidarity (*familial* and *kin bond*)
10.	Social and structural exclusion and institutionalized discrimination (*hostland*)
11.	Modern victimization: 'feelings of insecurity' and precarity (*diaspora*)
12.	Cultural and political mobilization to help to increase feelings of security (mobilization)
13.	Established transnational and trans-local networks and relations (*category of practice*)
14.	Digitally mobilized to form new online and offline connectedness and togetherness (*virtual community*)

The Turkish Descent Population in Germany

Population by Migration Status in Germany in 2018

	Number (in 1.000)	Percent
Total Population	81,613	100
Population without Migration Background	60,814	74.5
Immigrant Population	20,799	25.5
Turkish Descent Population	2,769	3.4

Population by Marital Status

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%
Marital Status:						
Single	1.209	43,7	9.990	48,0	23.670	38,9
Married	1.332	48,1	8.934	43,0	27.958	46,0
Among them:						
With German with a migration background	367	13,3	2.791	13,4	1.018	1,7
With German without migration background	95	3,4	1.729	8,3	25.228	41,5
With Foreigner	811	29,3	3.861	18,6	710	1,2
Widowed	72	2,6	682	3,3	4.659	7,7
Divorced	155	5,6	1.193	5,7	4.527	7,4
Total	2.769	100,0	20.799	100,0	60.814	100,0

Population after School Education

	Turkish Descent Population			Population with 'Migration Background'			Population without Migration Background		
	Number (in 1.000)	%	% at those with passed education	Number (in 1.000)	%	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	%
Not compulsory / Still students	652	23,5		5.209	25,0		8.162	13,4	
With continuous school career	2.117	76,5	100,0	15.590	75,0	100,0	52.652	86,6	100,0
Without graduation	542	19,6	25,6	2.003	9,6	12,8	834	1,4	1,6
Hauptschulabsschluss	700	25,3	33,1	4.185	20,1	26,8	16.766	27,6	31,8
Polytechnic	-	-	-	95	0,5	0,6	4.568	7,5	8,7
Realschulabschluss	422	15,2	19,9	3.439	16,5	22,1	13.035	21,4	24,8
Fachhochschulreife	134	4,8	6,3	1.137	5,5	7,3	4.422	7,3	8,4
Abitur	300	10,8	14,2	4.594	22,1	29,5	12.870	21,2	24,4
Others	7	0,3	0,3	48	0,2	0,3	72	0,1	0,1
Total	2.769	100,0		20.799	100,0		60.814	100.0	

Population after Vocational Training

	Turkish Descent Population			Population with 'Migration Background'			Population without Migration Background		
	Number (in 1.000)	%	% at those with passed education	Number (in 1.000)	%	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	%
In training / not yet compulsory for school	849	30,7		6.413	30,8		10.712	17,6	
With a continuous training career	1.920	69,3	100,0	14.386	69,2	100,0	50.102	82,4	100,0
Among them:									
No schooling	1,109	40,1	57,8	5.305	25,5	36,9	6.382	10,5	12,7
With education	797	28,8	41,5	8.985	43,2	62,5	43.607	71,7	87,0
Education:									
Teaching/Professional qualification	587	21,2	30,6	5.261	25,3	36,6	28.339	46,6	56,6
Master Technician / Vocational School	64	2,3	3,3	826	4,0	5,7	4.800	7,9	9,6
Fachschule of East Germany	-	-	-	11	0,1	0,1	634	1,0	1,3
Academic degree (Vocational Academy, University of Applied Sciences, University)	145	5,2	7,6	2.864	13,8	19,9	9.789	16,1	19,5
Total	2.769	100,0		20.799	100,0		60.814	100,0	121,4

Population by Households

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%
Households						
Total	1.126	100,0	7.639	100,0	31.147	100,0
1 - Person household	236	21,0	3.923	51,4	14.040	45,1
2 - Person household	263	23,4	1.783	23,3	10.868	34,9
3 people and more	627	55,7	2.562	33,5	6.239	20,0
Children under 18 years old on average	0,77		0,51		0,24	
Average on people in the household	2,9		2,21		1,87	

Population by Predominant Livelihood

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%
Predominant Livelihood						
Occupation	1.120	40,4	8.991	43,2	28.973	47,6
Unemployment Benefit I	33	1,2	209	1,0	393	0,6
Unemployment Benefit II	210	7,6	1.430	6,9	1.225	2,0
Pension	244	8,8	1.997	9,6	15.951	26,2
Assets	9	0,3	91	0,4	536	0,9
Support by relatives	1.054	38,1	7.076	34,0	12.614	20,7
Welfare/Basic Security	45	1,6	456	2,2	296	0,5
Parental Benefit	11	0,4	87	0,4	250	0,4
Total	2.769	100,0	20.799	100,0	60.814	100,0

Private Households according to Household Income

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%
Household Income						
Under 900 €	89	7,9	992	13,0	2.315	7,4
900 to 1.300 €	112	9,9	1.069	14,0	3.398	10,9
1.300 to 1.500 €	60	5,3	539	7,1	1.952	6,3
1.500 to 2.000 €	155	13,8	1.225	16,0	4.790	15,4
2.000 to 2.600 €	188	16,7	1.211	15,9	4.783	15,4
2.600 to 3.200 €	159	14,1	861	11,3	3.484	11,2
3.200 to 4.500 €	210	18,7	1003	13,1	5.007	16,1
4.500 € and above	128	11,4	601	7,9	4.647	14,9
Monthly Net Income Household (average)	2.759 €		2.361 €		2.908 €	
Monthly Net Income per capita (average)	1.075 €		1.257 €		1.653 €	
Household size (average/persons)	2,9		2,21		1,87	
Number of persons in employment (average/persons)	1,28		1,06		0,97	
Poverty Risk	30,1		27,2		11,1	
Total	1.126	100				

Population by Employment Status

	Turkish Descent Population			Population with 'Migration Background'			Population without Migration Background		
	Number (in 1.000)	%	N= 1.352	Number (in 1.000)	%	N= 10.605	Number (in 1.000)	%	N= 32.755
Total	2.769	100		20.799	100		60.814	100	
Employment Status									
Inactive	1.417	51,2		10.193	49,00		28.059	46,1	
Labor Force	1.352	48,8		10.605	51,0		32.755	53,9	
Labor Force									
Unemployed	95	3,4	7,0	614	3,0	5,8	852	1,4	2,6
Employed	1.257	45,4	93,0	9.992	48,0	94,2	31.903	52,5	97,4

Employed Persons by Occupational Status and Economic Sectors

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	% N=1.257	Number (in 1.000)	% N= 9.992	Number (in 1.000)	% N=31.903
Professional Position						
Self-employed	98	7,8	843	8,4	3166	9,9
Helping family members	-	-	23	0,2	115	0,4
Officer	12	1,0	145	1,5	1862	5,8
Employee	676	53,8	5.988	59,9	21.302	66,8
Worker	389	30,9	2.540	25,4	4411	13,8
Trainee	78	6,2	453	4,5	1047	3,3
Total	1.257	100,0	9.992	100,0	31.903	100,0
Economic Sectors						
Agriculture	-	-	50	0,5	474	1,5
Manufacturing business	415	33,0	3.002	30,0	8452	26,5
Commerce, Hospitality, Transport	433	34,4	3.167	31,7	7682	24,1
Public Administration	32	2,5	281	2,8	2602	8,2
Other Services	375	29,8	3.492	34,9	12692	39,8
Total	1.257	100,0	9.992	100,0	31.903	100,0
Personal Net Income of the employed	1.752 €		1.813 €		1.813 €	

Employees by Working Hours and Employment Status

	Turkish Descent Population		Population with 'Migration Background'		Population without Migration Background	
	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%	Number (in 1.000)	%
Weekly Working Hours						
Up to 9 hours	63	5,0	482	4,8	1.333	4,2
10 to 20 hours	179	14,2	1.432	14,3	3.823	12,0
21 to 31 hours	108	8,6	969	9,7	3.517	11,0
32 to 35 hours	98	7,8	648	6,5	2.143	6,7
36 to 39 hours	208	16,5	1.370	13,7	5.107	16,0
40 to 44 hours	495	39,3	4.137	41,4	12.269	38,5
45 hours and above	105	8,3	954	9,5	3.711	11,6
Special Employment						
Minority Employed	148	11,8	1.076	10,8	2.483	7,8
Shift Work	283	22,5	1.815	18,2	4.008	12,6
Saturday Work	527	41,9	3.958	39,6	10.775	33,8
Sunday/ Holiday work	274	21,8	2.282	22,8	6.303	19,8
Further Gainful Employment	47	3,7	409	4,1	1.199	3,8
Total Employment	1.258	100,0	9.992	100,0	31.903	100,0

The Statistical Data on Child Protection in Germany

Risk Assessment, by age group and sex, 2012-2018,

Age:	Years:						
	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012
Under 1	13,095	12,430	12,105	11,605	11,336	10,724	10,130
1-3	23,373	20,798	19,719	18,658	18,734	17,775	16,270
3-6	30,066	27,485	26,506	25,171	24,885	23,430	21,778
6-10	35,214	32,397	31,041	28,617	27,538	25,369	23,327
10-14	30,701	27,694	25,600	23,657	22,680	21,017	19,631
14-18	24,822	22,471	21,954	21,777	19,040	17,372	15,487
Total:	**157,201**	**143,275**	**136,925**	**129,485**	**124,213**	**115,687**	**106,623**
Male:	81,033	74,162	70,263	67,174	63,648	58,997	54,001
Female:	76,238	69,113	66,662	62,311	60,565	56,690	52,622

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

Unaccompanied Minors, who were taken into care (ION) in Germany, 2013-2018

Year	Total minors are taken into care	Unaccompanied entry from abroad					
		Total	%	Male	%	Female	%
2013	42,123	6,584	15,63	5,858	88,97	726	11,02
2014	48,059	11,642	24,22	10,511	90,28	1,131	9,71
2015	77,645	42,309	54,49	38,690	91,44	3,619	8,55
2016	84,230	44,935	53,35	41,217	91,72	3,718	8,27
2017	61,383	22,492	36,64	19,797	88,01	2,695	11,98
2018	52,590	12,211	23,21	10,098	82,69	2,113	17,30

Source: Federal Statistical Office, author's calculation

The Signs of Neglect(s) in Acute Cases:[166]

Year	Neglect		Physical ill-treatment	Psychological/Mental[167] ill-treatment	Sexual Violence	Total Acute Cases
2018	**14,906**		**7,764**	**8,014**	**1,478**	**24,939**
	M	7,668	3,878	3,869	436	
	F	7,238	3,886	4,145	1,042	
2017	**12,938**		**6,748**	**6,541**	**1,218**	**21,694**
	M	6,751	3,378	3,226	371	
	F	6,187	3,370	3,315	847	
2016	**13,138**		**6,470**	**6,210**	**1,137**	**21,571**
	M	6,811	3,164	2,964	343	
	F	6,327	3,306	3,246	794	
2015	**13,357**		**5,632**	**5,513**	**1,078**	**20,806**
	M	7,652	2,767	2,625	330	
	F	5,705	2,865	2,888	748	
2014	**11,475**		**5,284**	**5,141**	**1,072**	**18,630**
	M	6,259	2,574	2,497	338	
	F	5,486	2,710	2,644	734	
2013	**10,889**		**4,929**	**4,573**	**1,049**	**17,211**
	M	5,744	2,392	2,145	303	
	F	5,145	2,537	2,428	746	
2012	**10,721**		**4,990**	**4,689**	**1,118**	**16,875**
	M	5,560	2,401	2,246	327	
	F	5,161	2,589	2,443	791	

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

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[166] Several types of child endangerment may be present at the same time.
[167] Mental-ill treatments include humiliation, intimidation, isolation, and emotional coldness.

The Signs of Neglect(s) in Latent Cases:

Year	Neglect		Physical ill-treatment	Psychological/Mental ill-treatment	Sexual Violence	Total Latent Cases
2018	**15,562**		**5,315**	**7,549**	**976**	**25,473**
	M	8,298	2,864	3,779	362	
	F	7,264	2,451	3,770	614	
2017	**14,856**		**5,137**	**7,018**	**827**	**24,054**
	M	7,850	2,679	3,467	276	
	F	7,006	2,458	3,551	551	
2016	**14,814**		**5,307**	**6,810**	**884**	**24,206**
	M	7,811	2,791	3,458	318	
	F	7,003	2,516	3,352	566	
2015	**15,291**		**4,765**	**6,641**	**910**	**24,188**
	M	8,040	2,561	3,244	323	
	F	7,251	2,204	3,397	587	
2014	**14,360**		**4,396**	**6,027**	**832**	**22,419**
	M	7,584	2,304	3,012	292	
	F	6,776	2,092	3,015	540	
2013	**14,165**		**4,020**	**5,391**	**817**	**21,411**
	M	7,443	2,140	2,717	279	
	F	6,722	1,880	2,674	538	
2012	**14,614**		**4,044**	**5,137**	**821**	**21,408**
	M	7,699	2,097	2,562	291	
	F	6,915	1,947	2,575	530	

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

The Percentage of Neglect(s) in both Acute and Latent Cases:

	Signs of Neglect	Psychological ill-treatment	Physical ill-treatment	Sexual Abuse
2018	60 %	31%	26 %	5 %
2017	60,8 %	29,6 %	26 %	4,5 %
2016	61,1 %	28,4 %	25,7 %	4,4 %
2015	63,7 %	27 %	23,1 %	4,4 %
2014	63,6 %	27,2 %	23,6 %	4,6 %

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

Who Alerts the Risk Assessment in the Child Endangerment?

	Health Services	Police, Court, or Prosecutor Office	Parents	Child	Relative	Neighbors/Friends	Anonymous	Others
2018	9,580	38,627	10,673	3,326	7,595	17,118	16,738	9,519
2017	8,947	33,542	9,789	3,080	7,582	16,030	15,133	9,478
2016	9,066	30,234	9,558	3,034	7,128	15,850	14,289	10.036
2015	8,325	28,071	9,380	3,094	7,403	15,760	14,147	8,478
2014	8,726	25,298	9,061	2,663	7,645	16,256	14,251	7,670
2013	8,616	22,530	8,404	2,461	7,075	16,224	13,045	7,405
2012	7,976	18,360	7,905	2,432	6,707	15,120	11,806	7,332

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

Percentage of Alerts in the Risk Assessment:

	Police, Court, or Prosecutor Office	Schools/Kindergarten	Neighbors/Friends	Anonymous
2017	23,4 %	13,5 %	11,2 %	10 %
2016	22,1 %	12,9 %	11,6 %	10,4 %
2015	21,7 %	12,4 %	12,2 %	10,9 %
2012	17 %	13 %	14 %	10 %

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

The Publicizing Institution/Person[168]:

		Social Service/Jugendamt	Advice Center	Other Educational Institutions	Youth Work and Help	Children's Day Facility	Schools
2018	Total: 157,271	9,295	1,776	6,258	5,000	5,084	16,682
	Male: 81,033	4,734	898	3,233	2,532	2,532	8,962
	Female: 76,238	4,561	878	3,025	2,468	2,468	7,720
2017	Total: 143,275	8,533	1,546	5,882	4,341	4,850	14,542
	Male: 74,162	4,495	765	3,124	2,256	2,752	7,828
	Female: 69,113	4,038	781	2,758	2,085	2,098	6,714
2016	Total: 136,925	8,607	1,652	6,175	3,678	4,358	13,260
	Male: 70,263	4,523	797	3,235	1,959	2,398	7,050
	Female: 66,662	4,084	855	2,940	1,719	1,960	6,210
2015	Total: 129,485	7,875	1,487	5,602	3,746	4,426	11,691
	Male: 67,174	4,219	763	2,897	1,922	2,482	6,217
	Female: 62,311	3,656	724	2,705	1,824	1,944	5,474
2014	Total: 124,213	7,072	1,385	5,202	3,453	4,496	11,035
	Male: 63,648	3,500	704	2,663	1,769	2,470	5,863
	Female: 60,565	3,572	681	2,539	1,684	2,026	5,172
2013	Total: 115,687	6,556	1,314	4,840	3,291	4,016	9,910
	Male: 58,997	3,364	642	2,440	1,631	2,205	5,179
	Female: 56,690	3,192	672	2,400	1,660	1,811	4,731
2012	Total: 106,623	6,085	1,212	4,723	3,159	4,079	9,727
	Male: 54,001	3,128	574	2,418	1,534	2,221	5,005
	Female: 52,622	2,957	638	2,305	1,625	1,858	4,722

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

Details of Child Endangerment Investigations in 2018 under 8a SGB VIII:

Age/Sex	Number:	Acute Risk:	Latent Risk:	No-Risk but Further Support	No-Risk and No Further Support
Under 1	13,095	2,565	1,864	4,342	4,324
1-3	23,373	3,150	3,427	7,714	9,082
3-6	30,066	4,045	4,708	9,968	11,345
6-10	35,214	4,966	6,071	12,420	11,757
10-14	30,701	5,076	5,318	10,411	9,896
14-18	24,822	5,137	4,085	8,140	7,460
Total:	**157,271**	**24,939**	**25,473**	**52,295**	**53,864**
Male	81,033	12,403	13,302	27,733	27,595
Female	76,238	12,536	12,171	25,262	26,269

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services.

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[168] Including procedures in which there is no risk to the child's well-being.

The Short-Term Placements of Children and Adolescents (Inobhutnahme - ION)[169] under Section 42 SGB VIII in Germany, 1995-2018

1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
23,432	28,052	31,807	31,415	31,645	**31,124**	31,438	28,887	27,378	25,916	**25,664**	25,998

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
28,192	32,253	33,710	**36,343**	38,481	40,227	42,123	48,059	**77,645**	84,230	61,383	**52,590**

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

Short-Term Placements with Parental Consent in Germany, 1995-2018

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
At one's own desire	7,882	9,630	11,448	11,029	10,843	10,565	10,504	9,250	8,701
Because of endangerment	15,389	18,192	20,116	20,248	20,588	20,449	20,830	19,477	18,508
Total	23,271	27,822	31,564	31,277	31,431	31,014	31,334	28,727	27,209

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
At one's own desire	8,056	7,684	7,119	7,028	7,790	8,212	9,298	10,033	9,170	9,922
Because of endangerment	17,674	17,758	18,728	20,729	24,100	25,188	26,120	27,642	30,195	31,300
Total	25,442	27,757	25,847	27,757	31,890	33,400	35,418	37,675	39,354	41,222

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
A child's request	11,447	15,101	16,004	10,404	9,606
Other bodies/people	36,612	62,544	68,226	50,979	42,984

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues

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[169] The numbers of children who were taken into 'Herausnahme' were also included in the total number. *Herausnahme* (H) can be defined for "short-term placements of children without parental consent." Thus, it is a short-term emergency replacement and exclusion of contact of a child from the family.

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Details of Short-Term Placements, by Migrant background and Sex, 1995-2018

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total:	**23,432**	**28,052**	**31,807**	**31,415**	**31,645**	**31,124**	**31,438**	**28,887**	**27,378**
German:	18,531	21,105	24,367	24,689	24,765	24,694	24,615	23,272	22,031
Not German:	4,901	6,947	7,440	6,726	6,880	6,430	6,823	5,615	5,347
ION.	23,271	27,822	31,564	31,277	31,431	31,014	31,334	28,727	27,209
H.	161	230	243	138	214	110	104	160	169
Male:	**10,909**	**13,567**	**14,702**	**14,832**	**14,953**	**14,416**	**14,515**	**12,862**	**12,228**
German:	8,408	9,793	10,577	11,083	11,260	11,041	10,964	10,055	9,558
Not German:	2,501	3,774	4,125	3,749	3,693	3,375	3,551	2,807	2,670
Female:	**12,523**	**14,485**	**17,105**	**16,583**	**16,692**	**16,708**	**16,923**	**16,025**	**15,150**
German:	10,123	11,312	13,790	13,606	13,505	13,653	13,651	13,217	12,473
Not German:	2,400	3,173	3,315	2,977	3,187	3,055	3,272	2,808	2,677

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total:	**25,916**	**25,664**	**25,998**	**28,192**	**32,253**	**33,710**	**36,343**	**38,481**	**40,227**	**42,123**
German:	20,819	20,729	21,437	23,095	26,424	26,745	28,271	29,265	29,470	28,883
Not German:	5,097	4,935	4,561	5,097	5,829	6,965	8,072	9,216	9,216	13,240
ION	25,730	25,442	25,847	27,757	31,890	33,400	35,418	37,675	39,365	41,222
H.	186	222	151	435	363	310	925	806	862	901
Male:	**11,524**	**11,339**	**11,640**	**12,750**	**14,972**	**16,100**	**17,380**	**18,589**	**20,165**	**22,188**
German:	9,210	9,105	9,575	10,366	12,124	12,326	12,830	13,298	13,355	13,257
Not German:	2,314	2,234	2,065	2,384	2,848	3,774	4,550	5,291	6,810	8,931
Female:	**14,392**	**14,325**	**14,358**	**15,442**	**17,281**	**17,610**	**18,963**	**19,892**	**20,062**	**19,935**
German:	11,609	11,624	11,862	12,729	14,300	14,419	15,441	15,967	16,115	15,626
Not German:	2,783	2,701	2,496	2,713	2,981	3,191	3,522	3,925	3,947	4,309

	2014	2015	2016	2017[170]	2018
Total:	48,059	77,645	84,230	61,383	52,590
Non-Foreign Origin	x	x	23,361	23,582	24,386
With Foreign Origin	x	x	60,869	37,801	28,204
Provisional taking into care	x	x	x	11,101	6,385
Regular taking into care	x	x	x	50,282	46,205
Male:	27,375	55,114	60,359	38,680	29,479
With Foreign Origin:	x	x	49,616	27,272	17,759
Female:	20,684	22,531	23,871	22,703	23,111
With Foreign Origin:	x	x	11,253	10,529	10,445

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

Details of ION by Age, 1995-2018

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
0-3	1,280	1,396	1,514	1,689	1,747	1,686	1,781	1,761	1,852	1,751	1,811	2,187
3-6	1,380	1,402	1,434	1,414	1,425	1,423	1,347	1,337	1,329	1,293	1,343	1,543
6-9	1,298	1,402	1,506	1,549	1,469	1,379	1,399	1,271	1,259	1,249	1,277	1,459
9-12	1,817	2,240	2,419	2,317	2,416	2,415	2,309	2,135	1,964	1,822	1,831	1,862
12-14	4,129	4,885	5,110	5,152	5,147	4,786	4,901	4,531	4,378	3,964	3,665	3,527
14-16	8,082	10,239	11,451	10,884	10,956	10,871	11,381	10,371	9,230	8,827	8,694	8,225
16-18	5,446	6,488	8,373	8,410	8,485	8,564	8,320	7,481	7,366	7,010	7,043	7,195

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
0- 3	2,630	3,233	3,334	3,438	3,716	4,030	4,132	4,257	4,471	4,817	4,927	5,380
3-6	1,813	2,310	2,241	2,331	2,467	2,553	2,380	2,513	2,722	2,972	2,906	3,086
6-9	1,667	2,152	1,883	2,085	2,377	2,476	2,272	2,322	2,729	2,943	2,944	3,013
9-12	2,113	2,346	2,414	2,752	3,088	3,004	3.017	3,070	3,579	4,052	3,847	3,964
12-14	3,500	3,950	4,031	4,556	4,771	5,164	5,257	5,394	6,444	6,938	5,714	5,930
14-16	8,326	9,351	9,824	10,530	11,162	10,789	11,371	12,432	19,673	19,488	14,127	12,525
16-18	8,143	8,911	9,983	10,651	10,900	12,211	13,694	18,071	38,027	43,020	26,918	18,692

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

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[170] Differentiated data on provisional and regular taking into care have been available since 2017.

Details of ION by Migration Background, 2016-2018

		2016	2017	2018
With Foreign Origin (mit ausländischer Herkunft) *	Male:	49,616	27,272	17,759
*At least one foreigner parent (mindestens eines Elternteils)[171]	Female:	11,253	10,529	10,445
	Total:	**60,869**	**37,801**	**28,204**
A total number of children who are taken into custody:		**84,230**	**61,383**	**52,590**

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services

The Reason(s) for Short-Term Placements (ION), 1995-2018

Reason(s):	2018	2017	2016	2015	2010	2005	2000	1995
Integration Problems at home	2,907	3,270	3,525	2,915	2,076	1,730	2,650	2,054
Excessive Strains on Parents	17,743	17,291	17,462	16,400	15,433	10,366	10,307	6,944
School/Educational Problems	1,780	1,607	1,589	1,597	1,682	1,439	1,870	1,316
Signs of Neglect	5,991	5,439	5,454	4,846	4,037	2,812	2,790	2,358
Child's Delinquency/Juvenile Offense	3,087	3,043	2,992	2,502	2,029	1,856	2,419	2,201
Child/Adolescent Addiction Problems	2,010	1,626	1,498	1,289	896	975	1,223	431
Physical/Mental Abuse	6,157	4,918	4,619	4,023	3,344	2,359	2,233	891
Sexual Violence	840	693	607	611	677	655	836	1,098
Separation/Divorce of the Parents	715	684	685	683	786	461	663	715
Housing Problems	1,902	1,665	2,054	1,538	1,029	617	831	653
Unaccompanied Entry from Abroad	12,211	22,492	44,935	42,309	2,822	602	1,453	996
Relationship Problems	5,442	5,183	5,592	6,222	7,014	6,581	9,178	6,530
Other Problems	13,555	14,677	15,752	14,512	9,374	7,294	8,987	6,628

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

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[171] Data are available from 2016

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Most Frequent Reasons for Temporary Protective Measures, 2018[172]

	Total	%	With Foreign Origin	Male	Foreign Male	Female	Foreign Female
Integration Problems at Home	**2,907**	5,5	1,906	1,856	808	1,051	288
Overburdened Parents	**17,732**	33,7	5,981	8,615	2,799	9,117	3,182
School/ Educational Problems	**1,779**	3,4	594	899	286	880	308
Signs of Neglect	**5,987**	11,4	2,063	2,852	1,029	3,135	1,034
Child's Delinquency Juvenile Offense	**3,083**	5,9	1,317	2,143	944	940	373
Child/ Adolescent Addiction Problems	**2,010**	3,8	621	1,269	412	741	209
Physical/ Mental Abuse	**6,154**	11,7	3,430	2,431	1,253	3,723	2,177
Sexual Violence	**840**	1,6	317	216	72	624	245
Separation/ Divorce of the Parents	**715**	1,4	276	305	125	410	151
Housing Problems	**1,902**	3,6	660	1,037	378	865	282
The entry of Unaccompanied minor from Abroad	**12,211**	23,2	12,211	10,098	10,098	2,113	2,113
Relationship Problems	**5,442**	10,3	2,026	2,041	720	3,401	1,306
Other Reasons	**13,541**	25,8	6,315	6,502	3,274	7,039	3,041

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services.

Children and Adolescent under Custody and Guardianship, 1995-2018

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2018
Legal Guardianship (*Gesetzliche Amtsvormundschaft*)	12,278	10,075	9,311	6,478	5,502	4,492
Appointed Official Guardian (*Bestellte Amtspflegschaft*)	31,130	24,607	26,957	32,556	33,883	31,551
Maintenance Care (*Bestellte Amtsvormundschaft*)	35,414	33,056	30,447	31,377	59,501	44,944

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services, various yearly issues.

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[172] Up to two occasions for the measure could be specified for each child or adolescent (Total: 74,303).

Children and Adolescent under Custody and Guardianship in 2018

	Legal Guardianship (*Gesetzliche Amtsvormundschaft*)		Appointed Official Guardian (*Bestellte Amtspflegschaft*)		Maintenance Care (*Bestellte Amtsvormundschaft*)		With Assistance (*Mit Beistandschaften*)	
Total	**4,492**	100 %	**31,551**	100 %	**44,944**	100 %	**505,809**	100 %
Male	2,330	51,9 %	16,393	52 %	28,395	63,2 %	257,833	51 %
Female	2,162	48,1 %	15,158	48 %	16,549	36,8 %	247,976	49 %
German	3,458	77 %	28,243	89,5 %	28,189	62,7 %	486,708	96,2 %
Male	1,755	39,1 %	14,577	46,2 %	14,718	32,7 %	248,137	49,1 %
Female	1,703	37,9 %	13,666	43,3 %	13,471	30 %	238,571	47,2 %
Non-German	1,034	23 %	3,308	10,5 %	16,755	37,3 %	19,101	3,8 %
Male	575	12,8 %	1,816	5,8 %	13,677	30,4 %	9,696	1,9 %
Female	459	10,2 %	1,492	4,7 %	3,078	6,8 %	9,405	1,9 %

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare Services

Public Expenses (+Revenues) for Child and Youth Welfare Services in Selected Service-Fields – Social Law VIII in Germany, 1992-2017

Year	Total Expenditure €	Child daycare centers	Educational assistance for young adults and taking into care
1992	14,284,341	8,490,895	2,968,614
1995	17,020,311	9,796,698	3,811,116
2000	18,464,958	10,035,690	4,857,443
2005	20,865,232	11,542,452	5,668,067
2010	28,893,054	17,384,754	7,512,224
2014	37,790,413	23,741,065	9,293,822
2015	40,717,755	25,389,906	10,260,262
2016	45,121,434	27,370,036	12,207,589
2017	48,500,936	30,138,898	12,533,317

Source: Federal Statistical Office: Statistics of the Child and Youth Welfare – Expenses and Revenues

Foster Care in Germany

The Stages of Becoming a Foster Family

Phase I: *Information*
Phase II: *Application* and *Approval Process* – to Jugendamt or Freie Träger, and preparation the application documents, and attending foster training school.
Phase III: *Introduction* – Finding suitable children for the family's conditions and taking mutual approval of all parties.
Phase IV: *Placemen*t – Making foster agreements with Jugendamt and arranging financial support for the needs of the child.

The Attaché of Family and Social Policy in Düsseldorf:

- What do the Turkish Embassy and Consulates in Germany do for the situations of the Turkish origin children who have been taken under custody?

- Are there any statistics in the Turkish Embassy related to the number of Turkish families who have asked for help on the matter of child protection?

- Are there any bilateral mechanisms (or frameworks) to make German authorities notify you about Turkish origin children as per the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consulate Relations?

- Is there any project to establish "Turkish children's shelter" in Germany? What are the activities of Turkey to promote a culturally sensitive approach to child-care?

Experts, Elites, CSOs:

- What is your opinion on the child protection system in Germany?

- What are the main problems with the child protection system in Germany between state authorities and Turkish migrant families?

- Do you think that there are different discourses on the Jugendamt among state authorities and migrant families? If yes, why?

- What is the position of Turkish origin politicians and political parties in Germany on the child-care protection system?

- Are there any academic works on NiTAB (Turkish Academic Union from Germany)? What are your activities to promote child protection?

- What is the role of the Turkish CSOs in matters of child protection issues?

Diaspora Families:

- How was your experience with the Jugendamt? What is your opinion about Jugendamt?

- What is the main reason that Jugendamt took away your children?

- Do you think that other Turkish migrant families in Germany face similar problems on child protection? Why (not)?

If yes, what is the main reason for this?

- To what extent do 'cultural misunderstandings' and 'language' become an issue during child protection?

- When your child was taken away by the Jugendamt, which procedures did you follow?

- Do you think that there are different discourses on the Jugendamt among state authorities and migrant families? If yes, why?

- According to you, is there institutional racism in Germany?

- Do you think Turkish co-ethnics support you? What do they do?

Visual Appendix

I – Protests

Düsseldorf – 2014 – Source: Google Photos

Elçin Bebek – 28 December 2019 Source: Google Photos

Muhammed Bebek – 31 May 2014 Source: Google Photos

Devran & Büşra – 07 March 2014 Source: Google Photos

26 October 2014 Source: Google Photos

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Vahdettin Çicek – 24 December 2011 Source: Google Photos

Ayse Becker – October 2014 Source: Google Photos

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Ailenizde bana da yer var mı?" (*Is there a place for me in your family*?) – ABYV

"Do you want to be a foster family?"

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Public Events on Kinship Care

III – Popular Culture

By İlhan Değirmenci

My child is taken into care – What should I do? – The AFSP Brochure

Koruyucu Ailelere maddi destek

Almanya'da Koruyucu Aile olmanın önemi

KORUYUCU AİLE OLMAK İSTİYORUM!
Ne yapmalıyım?

Kuzey Ren-Vestfalya	Bakım ücreti	Eğitim ücreti	Aylık toplam
7 yaşını doldurana kadar çocuk başına	507 €	241 €	748 €
8-14 yaşları arası çocuk için	579 €	241 €	820 €
14-18 yaşları arası çocuk için	705 €	241 €	946 €

Adres: Willdittanstraße 9 | 40549 Düsseldorf
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Faks: +49 (0) 211 53 818 854 | İnternet: www.dusseldorf.aile.gov.tr

KORUYUCU AİLE NEDİR?

KORUYUCU AİLE BAKIM MODELLERİ

1. NÖBETÇİ KORUYUCU AİLE (Bereitschaftspflege)

2. KISA SÜRELİ KORUYUCU AİLE (Kurzzeitpflege)

3. UZUN SÜRELİ KORUYUCU AİLE (Dauerpflege)

4. AKRABA KORUYUCU AİLE (Verwandtenpflege)

5. UZMANLAŞMIŞ KORUYUCU AİLE (Sonderpflege)

SAHİP OLMANIZ GEREKEN KOŞULLAR

BAŞVURU İÇİN GEREKLİ BELGELER

- Başvuru formu (Antragsformular)
- Özgeçmiş (Lebenslauf)
- Doğum kayıt örneği (Geburtsurkunde)
- Evliler için evlilik cüzdanı örneği (Familienbuch)
- İkamet belgesi (Meldebescheinigung)
- İş ve gelir durumunu gösteren belgeler (Gehaltsnachweise)
- Adli sicil kaydı (Polizeiliches Führungszeugnis)
- Sağlık raporu (Gesundheitszeugnis)

BİLGİLENME AŞAMASI	
BAŞVURU VE ONAY SÜRECİ	
ÇOCUK İLE TANIŞTIRILMA	
YERLEŞTİRME AŞAMASI	

ATAŞELİĞİMİZİN DESTEĞİ

How can be a foster family – The AFSP BROCHURE

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