

Politically Ideological Opposition in Hybrid Regimes: To what extent they are treated differently? Case Study of Russian Federation

By

Zhengiskhan Bolatkhanov

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor András Bozóki

Budapest, Hungary

(2020)

Abstract

The following research aims to find and explain the difference in state reactions towards non-ideological and ideological opposition in hybrid regimes. The theoretical background and definition of non-ideological and ideological opposition is presented and formulated based on theoretical background of protest studies and studies of hybrid regimes. Through comparative case study, three pairs of cases (one from non-ideological, other from ideological opposition) are compared. Unlike their non-ideological counterparts, the positive political agenda of ideological opposition makes them an alternative to the existing political regime, which motivates state to utilize more repressive measures when dealing with them. The main finding of research confirms the hypothesis, and significant differences in state reaction are found in two pair of cases (leaders and terrorist groups). The last pair (protesters) only shows minor difference in state reaction towards non-ideological and ideological opposition.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Table of Contents	ii
Introduction	1
Research Limitations	4
Chapter 1. Basis of Ideological and Non-Ideological Opposition	6
1.1 Theoretical Background	6
1.2 State Reaction to Opposition in Hybrid Regimes	9
1.3 Original Contribution of Research	10
1.4 Categorical Divisions of Political Opposition	12
1.4.1 Systemic and Non-Systemic Opposition	12
1.4.2 Economic and Political Opposition	13
1.4.3 Ideological and Non-Ideological Opposition	14
Chapter 2. Leaders, Protesters, and “Terrorists”: cases of ideological and non-ideological opposition	18
2.1 Leaders of opposition movements	18
2.1.1 Vyacheslav Mal’tsev – Failed Revolutionary	20
2.1.2 Alexander Potkin – “Russia for Russians”	22
2.2 Protesters “on the ground”	23
2.2.1 Non-ideological opposition – Businessmen, Pensioners, Students	25
2.2.2 Ideological Opposition – Antifascists, Anarchists, Nationalists	26
2.3 Political Terrorist Organizations	28
2.3.1 New Greatness – Legacy of Artpodgotovka	30
2.3.2 Network – Terrorists without terrorist attacks	31
Chapter 3. Challenging Status-Quo with Positive Political Agenda	34
3.1 Leaders – Arrest Warrant Versus Criminal Sentence	34
3.2 Protesters – Differences in Details	36
3.3 “Terrorists” – Unprecedented level of political repression	38
3.4 Discussion	40
Conclusion	44
Reference List	46

Introduction

Throughout the history of political regimes, there were always those, who has objected the balance of power, the policy that is proposed by a leader, or the core of the regime itself. Few leaderships would be able to tolerate such resistance within their power block. That is why in democracies, the opposition is protected on the level of institution. On the paper, it should be able to express its concerns regarding the path that government took, whether it is positive (which is unlikely) or negative (which is more common). It is printed on the paper, but it surely does not mean that this aspect would be followed in reality. If even the oldest living democracies do not always let opposition politics, or whole political parties to operate without bureaucratic barriers, one cannot really say about tolerance towards opposition in countries that can hardly be called democracies.

Such countries may have a constitution that allows opposition voice to be heard in the parliament, and in the streets. They may even have a parliament, where the laws are being passed and some image of discussion is created. In these parliaments, there might be more than one party, which take only a fracture of the main power block, but officially call themselves an opposition. The problem is that it does not add to the plurality of the voice, or to the legitimacy of the ruler based on fair political competition. One could ask on why would there be façade institutions at the first place, if the rulers never meant to use them properly. And what, if any advantage does those decoys provide to these political regimes.

The regimes with such institutions are categorized as the hybrid regimes in the literature of political science. The term is aimed to portray a specific type of political regime that has features of both democratic and autocratic rule. It can be a transitional period of ones, but it also can be pretty much permanent period for the others. For the latter, maintaining the balance between façade democratic institutions and autocratic rule has been of main priority.

The politics tries to look like a fair game, where the electorate could hold the authorities accountable through the process of election, where they are given choice at least between the incumbent political party, and the alternative that comes from opposition politics. Here where the mentioned parliamentary opposition comes to the scene. Because this institution is probably the second most important after the elections, it also has to be taken into account, if the ruler or ruling group want to mimic working democracy.

And despite what opposition in these states may say, the hybrid regime cannot be absolutely totalitarian. Throughout the study of hybrid regimes, the researchers, specifically Levitsky and Way (2010) has argued that competition can, indeed, take place in such states. The term “competitive authoritarianism” may sound like a paradox but entails a lot of features from more common term “oligarchy”. In their works, Levitsky and Way (2010) have argued that hybrid regimes not only can be competitive, but also preserve authoritarian features at the same time. They state that the assumption that hybrid regimes should be moving towards democracy is not supported with significant evidences, and that competitive authoritarian regimes are not “regimes in process” but established political frameworks (Levitsky and Way 2010). Thus, hybrid regimes cannot preserve unanimous agreement around political status-quo. Would it be the parliament debates, political struggle behind closed doors, or massive demonstrations, the regime has to react accordingly, if it wants to prolong its lifespan.

The following research will study this state reaction on the alternative or opposition voice in hybrid regimes. It will analyze the differences of state reactions on the opposition groups and political protest. Two main categories, reactions on which will be compared, are divided upon the agenda that opposition group or political protest movement has declared and strived for. The research will divide analyzed cases on ideological and non-ideological opposition. And it expects to find that there is a difference in the reaction of state towards them. Study will

particularly analyze the cases of Russian Federation. Russia is an important state in this research, due to the fact that among hybrid regimes, Russian Federation experiences plethora of political protest activities. Within the post-communist area, it is a country that managed to keep balance between authoritarianism and protest activities. The post-communist states west to Russia are more leaning towards democratic form of rule, and their cases cannot be applied when the hybrid regimes are discussed. The post-communist states south to Russia lack the sample of political protest cases needed for the research to be representative of a bigger sample of hybrid regimes. As for the Russian Federation, it has a wide choice of political protest and opposition groups, and state reactions to work with.

Research will comparatively approach the cases of state reactions from both ideological and non-ideological opposition. It is expected to find not only significant difference between state reaction but also establish a pattern which is affected by whether the opposition group has declared any political ideology or not. The hypothesis of research reads as follows: The ideological opposition is more likely to receive a harsher state reaction in face of political, economic, legal, or social oppression rather than non-ideological opposition. The argument behind hypothesis states that ideological opposition presents citizens with a positive alternative that non-ideological opposition lacks. Due to that, hybrid regime views such groups as more dangerous, as their agenda can compete with government's policy, and may even be supported by population. The harsher political, economic, legal, and social repression is enacted to discourage activists from promotion of their political ideologies. In turn, non-ideological opposition is also repressed by the state, but relatively it is not as affected as politically ideological groups.

Chapter I will observe theoretical background of hybrid regimes in general, and state's reaction to the opposition in these countries in particular. It will define the ideological and

non-ideological opposition, and present examples of such groups in Russian Federation. It will frame the research within existing literature and explain the novelty and contribution of the paper. Chapter II will focus on the empirical part of research. Different state reactions to opposition will be compared case by case. The sample will consist of Russian state reactions to the ideological and non-ideological opposition within Russian Federation. Research will speculate only with reactions of Russian Federation in order to minimize the effect of confounding variables, so that the difference in reaction could be explained by the categorical differences between two cases.

Chapter III will be dedicated to the analysis of the results of research and argue in depth about the reasons why state has reacted differently between ideological and non-ideological cases. The research will conclude with affirmative results. In the analysis of protest leaders, and terrorist groups there is evidence of categorical difference between state reactions towards non-ideological and ideological opposition. As for the “protesters on the ground”, there is only minor differences between the repressions enacted towards non-ideological protesters and members of ideological political organizations.

Research Limitations

Before framing the theoretical part, there is an essential need in explaining the limitations of following research. The observed topic presents with a wide field for different methodologies and different samples. Even thoroughly specified conditions of this research (case analysis in only one country, although it is the biggest one in the world) would require a much more substantial and complex approach than it is possible to show within following paper. For this reason, the research should not be seen as ordinary scientific work of testing theories through given methodology. Since the matter that is discussed in the paper have not yet been studied, it is complicated to deliver a full-scale research within the limitation of this paper.

Specifically, the division of opposition groups into ideological and non-ideological is an original division. Even though it draws some of its features from previous categorical frameworks applied to opposition and protest in previous works, in its core, the differentiation between opposition and protest groups is novel to the scientific field. To support theoretical concepts, the definitions that will be delivered in this paper will mention economic-political division of opposition (Ostbo 2017), as well as ideocratic and programmatic division (March 2009).

It would be even better, if existing theoretical divisions of opposition and protest group would become the base of this research, but unfortunately neither of them allows such analysis in the context of following paper. For these reasons, it is important to mention that the major limitation of the research will affect the scope of research. Rather than conducting a full-scale research that would demand more time and resources, the point of this paper is to show the potential that discussed topic bears and formulate novel theoretical basis upon which further researches may take place. Luckily political science already has formalized this kind of approach to the puzzle. It is called plausibility probe. It is “the attempt to establish a theoretical construct that is worth considering at all” (Eckstein 2011). Such approach allows for the modest and diffusely designed comparative study. However, author of the paper will still strive to create a holistic and cohesive argument with needed support in face of the comparative cases. The thing is that the needed amount of work to fully frame the theory behind the research and conduct a large-scale study to test hypothesis based on the constructed theory is too large to fit it within the limitations of following paper.

Chapter 1. Basis of Ideological and Non-Ideological Opposition

1.1 Theoretical Background

The study of hybrid regimes in political science already has a significant amount of theoretical contributions from various authors. From the vague and widespread concepts that were intuitively used without clear definition of what hybrid regime is (for example, see the opposite definition of hybrid regimes in Akyuz and Hess (2018) and Ekman (2009)), researches that tackle hybrid regimes in general, and its specific aspects has made a sensible contribution into our understanding about the topic. As it was mentioned before, one of the most important achievements of the study of hybrid regimes is its conceptual framing as distinctive political regime, which still inherits and systematically uses instruments of both democracy and authoritarianism and cannot be labelled as either of those. The existence of competition and struggle for power may not sound so groundbreaking (after all any kind of politics entail fight for power), but formalization of this fact in the conceptual formation of “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2010) has indeed altered perception about hybrid regimes.

This is the first theoretical basis on which the idea of ideological and non-ideological opposition and their state in hybrid regimes will rely. Apart from the historical past of post-totalitarian spaces, the genuine political competition plays a major role in the policies of these governments. And unlike in totalitarian regimes, the opposition and protest groups in modern hybrid regimes play fundamentally different role within their states than their predecessors. Let us take the Post-Communist space for example, as the studied case is directly related to that historical period. The dissidents, and opposition groups in the totalitarian regimes are outlawed and officially treated as outsiders, which bear direct threat to the state. Their presence was not only unpleasant for the political elites, but they had officially documented

and legitimized tools to criminalize any opposition activity and implied severe sanctions against these individuals or groups of people. On the level of constitution and laws, any alternative political opinions and views were labelled as treachery and excluded from public discourse. State denies the very idea of public discussion of politics outside of governmental facilities.

Although some of these features has migrated to the hybrid regimes, which were formed on the ruins of totalitarian regimes, the place of opposition has dramatically changed in these states. The most important field, where the treatment of opposition was altered is legal field. Since majority, if not most of hybrid regimes has adopted democratic form of rule, they have also accepted the democratic constitutions. The outsiders and enemies of the state has become the part of political system of the state. Democratic system cannot be imagined without this crucial part. And, at least on paper, the opposition groups are no longer criminals. Quite the opposite, it is now encouraged to have opposition within parliament and on elections. Though, it is a separate question on the quality and genuineness of systemic opposition in hybrid regimes, the fact remains: the institution of opposition is utilized and is legitimate in hybrid regimes. There are less and less cases where elections in hybrid regimes present only one candidate, and although state party takes significant portion of legislative branch, opposition is allowed to have a seat in the parliament.

This is what differentiates full scale totalitarian countries from the hybrid regimes: as Levitsky and Way (2010) framed it, there is a genuine competition there, although it is unfair. The hybrid regimes face the need to resolve its internal conflict: although their political elites would prefer passive population that is docile for the policy of government, as it was before, today it is not possible to construct and sustain such political framework. They have to conduct elections, allow the plurality of opinions, and fulfill the capacities of democratic

institutions, as written in constitutions of those states. At least, they should behave so. The combination of democratic and authoritarian institutions helps them in avoiding unwanted democratic practices, but it also forces them to balance between authoritarianism and democratic rule. Even though people may call such actions as construction of façade democracy (to some extent it is true), hybrid regimes still genuinely allow population and interest groups to genuinely utilize democratic institutions, as they were intended. Would it be out of powerlessness (even if state passes censorship laws, it cannot effectively enforce it) or out of unwillingness to repress (the level of repression in hybrid regimes cannot be compared with totalitarian regimes), modern hybrid regimes are forced to interact with opposition actors (Petrov et al 2013).

Based on that premise political scientists have thoroughly studied various aspects of opposition in hybrid regimes. For example, Robertson (2009) tends to agree that success of hybrid regimes does not lie only in the defensive position taken by the leaders, but also requires extensive coordination of different interest groups. In his works, Robertson (2007, 2009) primarily concentrates on the political elites that are using protest groups in their interest. In modern hybrid regimes, the tool of protest is available not only to the non-systemic interest groups that exist outside of official politics, which happens in governmental facilities. These types of protest actions are majority in hybrid regimes, labor strikes take a significant portion in political bargaining. In some cases, poor political relations between regions and center can lead to the protest, mobilized by the official local authorities (Robertson 2007). It is also interesting how these protests are less known than, for instance, non-systemic protest action. Since labor strikes in hybrid regimes are organized as an instrument of bargain (Robertson 2007), the state might make a deal with the organizers or patrons of the protest in order to minimize its consequences. Whereas, non-system protest

actions demand too much, so that repression from the state is more effective measure of dealing with opposition.

1.2 State Reaction to Opposition in Hybrid Regimes

Along with studying hybrid regimes in general, and opposition groups in hybrid regimes in particular, scholars have also discussed and speculated on the topic of state reaction onto opposition and protest groups. There are several theories that are considering state reaction as an independent variable which affect the continuity, size, and intensity of opposition and protest groups. Relative Deprivation Theory (repression radicalize protest), Resource Mobilization Theory (tightening social control barriers social protest), Theory of Collective Action (repression increases cost and creates negative incentive towards joining protest action) are the most popular theories that speculate on the state reaction effect on the opposition and protest groups (Gurr 1970, Obershall 1973, Olson 1965 cited in Opp and Roehl 1990). Indeed, the effect of repression has been studied in political science for quite some time. Throughout numerous studies, scholar not only has developed various theories considering the effect of political repressions, but also have conceptually defined the term repression. It is a state or private actor meant to prevent, control, or constrain non-institutional collective action (protest), including its initiation (Earl 2011). The research will stick to this definition, although for the most time the term “reaction” will be used simultaneously with the term “repression”.

The term repression entails negative connotation and has been primarily used to describe oppression of political opponents in totalitarian regimes. Since the aim of this paper is to measure the difference of state perception between ideological and non-ideological opposition, I believe it is necessary to use a more neutral term “reaction” to better show the difference in the treatment of different opposition groups. After all, the state is not always

harassing the opposition groups, it may ignore it, or even encourage it in case of pocket opposition. The reason why other theories could use the term safely was due to the fact that repressions played role of independent variable, while the main aim of mentioned researches was to study changes in the opposition and protest groups. As for this research, it is the state reaction which will be analyzed and compared, and it is important to cover all state reactions to the opposition and protest groups to see the difference in their treatment more clearly. Since term repression does not cover disregard and endorsement, term “reaction” fits better in context of this research.

Not only state reaction was interesting to the political scientist as an independent variable, but it was also studied in relations to different types of opposition groups. It is not the original argument of the paper that hybrid regimes treat different types of opposition differently. Nor it is the intent to prove so, following study will rely on the works that is already written on this topic. Such result was found in the study of Nam (2009) that was conducting a research on protest-repression dynamics in Republic of Korea during 1990-1991. Apart from main finding of research, Nam (2009) also discovered that government of Republic of Korea has been harsher in mediating student protests. At the same time, more tolerant approach was chosen in order to deal with peasant protest (Nam 2009). Different types of opposition indeed can receive different type of reaction from the state, so what is so novel about this research?

1.3 Original Contribution of Research

Since the ideas of opposition operating within hybrid regimes, and governments that have to react to their actions can hardly be called an original contribution, what is the ultimate point of the research? And why there is a need in designing a plausibility probe, if the main theoretical bases have already been established? The reason lies in the novel division of opposition and protest groups. In the second part of this chapter, some of the divisions and

categories that scientists apply to the opposition and protest groups in hybrid regimes will be discussed. And from their definitions, the original division will be formulated in the end of the chapter. The categorization based on political ideology and different state perceptions of ideological and non-ideological opposition is the exact contribution of the following research.

The reason why modern hybrid regimes were chosen to test hypothesis of the paper is in the unique nature of opposition groups within hybrid regimes. The ideological and non-ideological division is not exclusive to the hybrid regimes, but the differences between these types of opposition and protest groups are the most distinctive in them. They are more widespread due to the imperfections and intentional defects of democratic political system. The formalization and definition of ideological and non-ideological opposition, therefore, is relatively easier on the example of hybrid regime rather than healthy democracy.

Although the definition of ideological and non-ideological opposition takes significant part in theoretical chapter, the main aim of the research is to study the state reaction towards these categories of political opposition. The empirical chapter of the research will uncover and compare the state reactions towards ideological opposition, protest groups or individual with its non-ideological counterpart. As it was mentioned before, there is plethora of theories that speculate on the effect that political repression takes towards the opposition and protest groups. Within this research, the goal is otherwise. The state reaction will be tested on variation based on the object it reacts to. The results of this plausibility probe will show the perspective of potential scientific works that may take place in the future. To sum up, the novel categories that differentiate opposition groups, and the studied object of the research (state reaction) comprise the original contribution to the study of hybrid regimes in general (although the definition of ideological and non-ideological opposition can be applied to other countries), and to the research of political protests specifically.

1.4 Categorical Divisions of Political Opposition

1.4.1 Systemic and Non-Systemic Opposition

Political opposition in hybrid regimes is a topic of great interest within political science. And the existence of various categorical divisions supports that claim. Again, the categorical divisions of opposition are not tied only to hybrid regimes but are also relevant for the study of democracies. And one of the most important categorical division of opposition either for a democracy or a hybrid regime is based on the position of opposition group in official state politics. The systemic-non-systemic division is pretty much self-explanatory. The opposition and protest groups are divided based on the objective fact of their direct relation with state institution. If an opposition group is a part of parliament, or have held a sit in the legislative branch, it can be defined as a systemic opposition (Lavery 2008). Otherwise, if the representatives of opposition or protest groups have not been elected or assigned to governmental positions, they are labelled as non-systemic opposition. Several studies have shown that this division does not exist only on paper, but the representatives of either category tend to behave differently when compared to each other. Especially in hybrid regimes. As was mentioned earlier, the opposition is one of the democratic institutions that is utilized by the government in order to preserve its own power.

Since the systemic opposition can be directly affected by the government and is located in the facilities where state leaders have extensive power, they are likely to be used by the power elite in order to pursue its own interest. This may effectively extend the life of hybrid regime, if the state manages to control and co-opt systemic opposition in behaving like opposition but being loyal to the state officials at the same time (Reuter and Robertson 2015). The analyzed case of Russian Federation also is wealthy on such kind of opposition parties. The Russian Duma has formed a power consensus, where the state party United Russia controls the

absolute majority of the house, while other parties in the parliament can hardly be called a real opposition to the regime. Sometimes, systemic opposition in hybrid regimes can behave like real opposition in a sense that they are allowed to critique the policy of the government to some extent. One of the examples of such party is Just Russia, which was designed to mimic the real socialist party. It was an anti-establishment populist party that engaged into active political criticism of Russian government. They have criticized almost all of the aspects of Russian state policy... except the President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin (March 2009). That is why systemic opposition within Russia is usually remained ignored by the state.

On the other hand, non-systemic opposition has been attracting the attention of Russian officials from different angles. When political scientists tackle the topic of political repression in hybrid regimes, they usually mean non-systemic opposition or protest groups. State employs different tactics of fighting against non-systemic opposition. They can utilize systemic opposition groups in order to affect non-systemic counterparts of political parties. For example, already mentioned Just Russia (March 2009) was designed to attract and appease moderate left voter. They shared this job with their colleagues from Communist Party of Russian Federation, which is also has channeled and de-radicalized protest actions (Ostbo 2017). Another way of dealing with non-systemic opposition is to control it through legislature that is aimed to criminalize their activity. Such recent legislature was related to the field of digital media (Denisova 2016).

1.4.2 Economic and Political Opposition

The second categorical division differentiates opposition groups based on the content of their program. Different scholars may apply different terms in order to illustrate this categorical division, but they, roughly speaking, are describing same phenomena. For example, Henry

Hale argues about the ideocratic-programmatic dichotomy when wants to differentiate single issue protest from the ideological group (March 2009). In the same way, Evans (2018) talks about non-essential (protest about local problems that are not highly politicized) opposition group Blue Bucket Society, while also mentioning essential protest (that demand defense of human rights and democratic institutions) that are more popular in media. In my view, these two antagonistic definitions of opposition and protest groups were summarized by Ostbo (2017), when he defined political and economic protest.

In relation to Russian Federation, Ostbo (2017) defines economic protest as “promotion of specific and often local demands concerning matters such as wages, workplaces, healthcare affecting private economy and welfare”. On the other hand, he defines political protest as, “addressing broader issues, often of a more abstract character, like democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” (Ostbo 2017). Such division of political opposition is the closest to the dichotomy of ideological-non-ideological opposition. And stating differences between these two categorizations will help in underlining the uniqueness of ideological-non-ideological division.

1.4.3 Ideological and Non-Ideological Opposition

This division traces its roots to both systemic-non-systemic and political-economic categorizations. The ideological opposition is a group of individuals that provide political demands to the state based on their political ideology. In other words, it can be seen as a “protest for”. For example, politically socialist opposition group would demand social welfare policies and protest for the increase of minimum wage and enactment of progressive taxation. The nationalist opposition would support anti-immigration policies, and title nation favoritism. The ideological opposition in this sense is tied to the ideology it holds and lacks flexibility when it comes to serious political demands (nationalists cannot simply change their

position, while still remaining as nationalists). From this definition, the systemic opposition is highly unlikely to be ideological opposition, as it can be utilized by the state. For the same reason, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia does not confirm its name, as the actions of the party contradict to liberal ideology. For example, they have extensively supported the “Law of Dima Yakovlev”, which forbids the adoption of Russian children by foreign citizens (RBC 2014).

On the other hand, non-ideological opposition’s demands do not come from particular political ideology, but rather are aimed to criticize existing state institutions. It is the “protest against”. The topics, which is discussed by non-ideological opposition can be shared by the representatives of different political ideologies. The most popular agenda of non-ideological opposition, for instance, is fighting corruption. No matter of one’s ideological stance, nationalist or liberal, socialist or libertarian, they can agree that corruption is a destructive phenomenon, which should be prosecuted and constrained. Similar situations were already mentioned in previous scientific works as “cross-ideological coalitions” (Durac 2015, Kolsto 2016). However, non-ideological protest does not require unity between different politically ideological groups. There are plenty of opposition groups that do not adhere to any ideology, while still demanding for political and economic change. Based on political-economic categorization, the non-ideological opposition tend to be economic, like the Society of Blue Buckets (Evans 2018). This group has protested against privileged drivers that were legally allowed to break traffic laws (Evans 2018). Although it is an opposition group, they had no affiliation towards any political ideology.

If the non-ideological opposition can be described using existing terms, then what is a point in creation of new concept? The reason is that not all non-ideological groups can be described as economic opposition. There are political demands, which cannot be described as economic

demands, but they are shared among majority of protesters, no matter of their ideological preferences. The famous Anti-Corruption Fund is probably the biggest non-ideological opposition group in Russian Federation. Apart from anti-corruption agenda, which is purely economic, they also have developed a set of demands that required free and fair elections, which is a political demand. Yet, this political demand did not cut a portion of protesters because they ideologically disagree with it. On the contrary, political protest actions against election fraud organized by Anti-Corruption fund managed to unite people from different ideological stances (BBC 2019).

In this sense, protest against democratic backsliding, while being a pure political protest by Ostbo definition, is non-ideological in its core. Protest against election fraud is not exclusive to specific political ideology. This protest does not demand a brand new ideologically supported policy, it demands the fulfillment of “rules of the game” that government agreed to, according to state constitution. Only when parties follow rules of the game, they can compete based on their political ideology. But the rules themselves are not ideological, they are ensuring platform, where political ideological parties can exercise politics. This is the unique distinction between ideological-non-ideological and political-economic categorization, and this is why there is a need in a new dichotomy. And although, the ideologies of opposition and protest groups has been discussed before, categorization provided by the paper is original.

Another major reason for such differentiation lies in the use of same concept towards different groups of opposition. The term “liberal” with regards to Russian politics can mean two things: ideological liberalism, which is supported by ideological opposition groups, like *Soyuz Pravykh Sil* (Union of Right Forces) (Lavery 2008). And non-ideological liberalism, which is synonym to terms “western” and “democratic” and defines non-ideological opposition and protest groups, the main goal of which were described above (Volkov 2012). Even though

they are two different groups (not all non-ideological liberals necessarily share the ideas of ideological liberalism), it is impossible to differentiate them by using economic-political dichotomy. That is why ideological-non-ideological categorization is important to the research.

Chapter 2. Leaders, Protesters, and “Terrorists”: cases of ideological and non-ideological opposition

The following chapter will go over the cases which are going to be used in the research. The analysis and results of the paper will be overviewed in third chapter. Here, only empirical data is going to be presented. The research will uncover three pairs of cases of state reactions to opposition action committed by individual or group. These pairs of non-ideological and ideological are divided into three categories: The cases where leaders of movements were prosecuted, the cases where opposition activists “on the ground” were prosecuted, and the prosecution of terrorist opposition groups. Each of the categories entail different action that caught the attention of state, different circumstances, and led to different levels of reactions. Because one cannot compare the prosecution of leader of opposition group and of a person that only took part in protest, these categories will be treated as different aspects, which won’t be compared outside their category.

The most important part of the research lies in the cases within each category. Inside them, there are two cases, which will be analyzed throughout third chapter. Categories will contain state reactions on non-ideological and ideological opposition. The history of their opposition action, their political ideology (where applicable), state reaction, and sentences will be uncovered in detail. The data is taken from various Russian news portals, each of them is a respectable media source. In addition, it is not opinions but facts, court processes and their results that will be analyzed.

2.1 Leaders of opposition movements

When it comes to the state reactions on opposition actions, the most popular cases are more likely to be revolving around the leaders or faces of opposition movement. Would it be the

Leader of Opposition in Parliament, or a speaker in the protest action, their words and their appearance characterize the whole protest or opposition event. In hybrid regimes, such kind of individuals gather the attention from the media and use available resources in order to promote their ideas or to share their dissatisfaction with state policy. Along with that, they also promote themselves and become the symbol of protest. Their names and words are being cited in mass media. People can follow them on social media. And even if a person is distant from politics and does not wish to get involved in such affairs, it is more likely that he or she will hear about popular leader of opposition movement, rather than the organization itself. And a person that want to involve into politics may base their choice not only on the nature of organization, but also on the charisma of its leader.

Since leaders of opposition groups are public figures, not only their actions, but state reactions become a topic for people to discuss and evaluate. Knowing that, the state maybe more careful in their actions and will probably remain within legal borders as much as it is possible. Sometimes, the state can even choose the tactics of complete indifference to the actions of opposition leader. So that their reaction would not provoke a backlash from the society, the opposition leader is left outside of public state discourse. Particularly, state can avoid any mention of this figure on the official media resources. It is already happening, for example, with Alexey Navalny, whose name is hardly ever heard from the official TV channels.

In order to get a reaction from the state, the opposition leader not only has to be popular enough, but he or she also needs to employ rhetoric radical enough, to catch the attention from the state. Because the state reaction can fully express itself when dealing with radical opposition leaders, the following pair of cases present such characters. The cases of Vyacheslav Mal'tsev and Alexander Potkin (goes under alias Belov) and state reaction to them allow to show researched difference. They are both leaders of opposition organization.

Mal'tsev is the leader of Artpodgotovka, and Potkin is ex-leader of Movement Against Illegal Migration or DPNI (*Dvizhenie Protiv Nelegal'noy Migracii*) and leader of "Russians" (*Russkie*). Both of them have radical political position against the policy of state, and both have organized protest actions. The difference between these two cases lie in their politically ideological stances. While Mal'tsev is hopping from one camp to another, and ultimately is certain only about his anti-governmental position, Potkin is convinced Russian Nationalist. His words and actions are ideologically consistent, on the other hand Mal'tsev utilizes any popular radical rhetoric, whether it is left or right.

2.1.1 Vyacheslav Mal'tsev – Failed Revolutionary

Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich Mal'tsev has been working as a policeman before his political career (Mediazona 2017). His first famous political involvement led to creation of "Narodny Front" (People's Front). This campaign was aimed against the governor of Saratov oblast – Dmitry Ayatskov. After that he became a local phenomenon and tried to advance into Russian federal politics. He tried to create an image of a left ideologue and has been using symbols, such as Che Guevara in order to promote himself as follower of left ideas. But along with that, he was also utilized homophobic and xenophobic rhetoric. The result of that behavior was concluded by journalist from Saratov, Sergey Vilkov. He described him as being liked among very different groups of society. From nationalist minority, and other marginal layers of society, to moderate liberals and businessmen. First liked him for Mal'tsev's radical and brutal rhetoric, while others saw him as flexible politician, who also can be trusted (Mediazona 2017).

This ideological inconsistency is what makes Mal'tsev a non-ideological opposition activist. Even though he tried to build an opposite image, his words and deeds contradicted with his supposed beliefs. The only aspect where Mal'tsev did not change sides is the direction of his

political actions. Would it be local banter against the governor of oblast, or the full-scale criticism of federal government and president himself, Vyacheslav Mal'tsev continued his anti-governmental opposition rhetoric. His popularity can also be explained by this – he could address not only to a particular part of society. People from different political backgrounds could find something attractive from his populist messages. Eventually, Mal'tsev gave up on trying to play for particular political ideology.

His political agenda revolved not around the theoretical image of future desired Russia, but around the method, which can eliminate existing Russian state structures. This is clearly seen from Artpodgotovka – a YouTube channel and organization, which Mal'tsev found in 2011 (Mediazona 2017). The main direction of Mal'tsev political activity now was fully concentrated on revolution, which was announced by Mal'tsev. By his beliefs, the revolution that would strike down Russian regime will happen on 5 November 2017. Although, he was not clear about what will happen after revolution and what are the prerequisites of it, his prediction spread throughout conventional media and Internet. In the time period between 2011 and 2017, Mal'tsev has agitated his supporters to take part in various protest movement. He also was participating in them and received 2 administrative sentences for joining non-sanctioned rallies (15 and 10 days of custody) (Gazeta 2017, Lenta 2017).

Until 2017, he was not receiving any harsh reaction from the state, although his action could be classified as a call to extremism – article 280 in Russian Criminal Code. But eventually they did, and Russian security services became actively suppressing the followers of Mal'tsev close to the date of his revolution. Mal'tsev managed to flee Russia and was seeking political asylum in France (Gazeta 2017a). Soon, the Meshyansky court of Moscow have arrested him in absentia, and Mal'stev was put on international wanted list (Mediazona 2017a).

2.1.2 Alexander Potkin – “Russia for Russians”

Alexander Potkin (goes under pseudonym Belov) is a notorious Russian political activist, who has been a leader of two nationalist groups – DPNI (Movement Against Illegal Migration) and “Russians”. The names of these organizations speak for themselves – they are political organizations which has a designated ideology. The media has been consistently labelling Potkin as a Russian nationalist. And Potkin does not seem to avoid such label. In his interview, he openly declared that he is a convinced Russian nationalist (Expert 2008). His political actions included organization of Russian Marches – a nationalist rallies that have been relatively widespread and popular in 2000s. He was one of the first users of infamous nationalist and xenophobic slogans “Russia for Russians”, pointing out that the policy of Russian authorities towards the republics of North Caucasus and their migration policy towards citizens of Central Asian states were wrong.

In addition, Potkin openly showed his antisemitism. For this he was first conditionally sentenced for 1,5 years. In the end of another Russian March in 2007, he was chanting nationalist and racist slogans, such as “Russia will be white”, and the crowd was answering in the same manner. He also compared Russian government with Jews in derogatory way. For that, he was prosecuted under article 282 (hate speech) and was sentenced, but only conditionally (he was not put in custody, but the sentence remained as he was) (Kommersant 2007).

Potkin continued his political activity. Even after banning DPNI, he found another political organization “Russians”, which in turn was also banned and declared extremist in 2015. By the words of another leader of that organization, Dmitry Demushkin “the organization has not organized any events to be called extremist” (Ria 2015). While Potkin already has been sentenced for his political actions, he continued it despite the decision of the court. Then the

court's tactics changed, and they have banned the organizations that was found by Potkin. But soon after the ban of "Russians", Potkin faced charges on economic crimes (robbery) as well as full spectrum of political crimes. In total, Potkin was accused by three political articles of Russian Criminal Code – 282 (hate speech), 280 (call to extremism), 282.1 (creation of extremist organization) (Mediazona 2016). Eventually, court has sentences him for 7,5 years in colony.

Although one may argue that it is hard to tell, how much his economic crime has contributed to the sentence, but soon Potkin has suspended charges on his economic crimes. After that, the court has sentenced him for 3,5 years in colony because he was still guilty of political articles (Ria 2017). To sum up, even though Potkin has been active in Russian political field for a long period of time, found two political organizations that were banned by state, and eventually was seriously sentenced only in 2016. This might show how careful state was in their reaction to Potkin's political career and did not want to make a martyr out of him. In a time, though, he had to serve his term in prison for hate speech and call to extremist action.

2.2 Protesters "on the ground"

As it is clearly seen from the first category of cases, the Russian state is not so eager to prosecute popular opposition leaders that enjoys support from their followers. And even if these leaders call for direct action, it might take a while before state decides to prosecute them (with existing criminal political articles in Russian Criminal Code). On the other hand, Russian authorities are more attentive to people that has listened to mentioned leaders of the movements and took part in their political events. These people are being covered by media when they are reporting the political protest action. They don't have to be politicians, roughly speaking, none of them directly relate their main work with politics. Protester might be bearer

of certain political ideology, and even be a part of political party or opposition group before the event. But he or she also can be as distant from politics as it is possible for the protester.

The following category involves these people. And unlike other categories, this will cover only one political event both for non-ideological and ideological opposition. This done in order to make both cases as similar as possible, so that author could avoid the confounding variables. Studying the cases of people in protest actions has a lot of differing variables that can affect the outcome of comparative analysis – size, aim, success or failure, cause, and even the homelands of police units that were dispatched to suppress the protest. But the protest actions also present a unique advantage to researchers – it does not have to be homogeneous. If the political organization has to have a unifying factor (like Mal'tsev's revolution or Potkin's ideology), the protest event can collect people from completely opposite sides of political spectrum. And non-ideological protesters also take part in such events. That is why choosing one particular event, which involve both non-ideological and ideological protesters to study is the best way to articulate the difference between state treatment of ideological or non-ideological opposition.

For the analysis, research would be comparing the state reaction to non-ideological and ideological opposition that took part in the “March of Million” (*Marsh Milliona*) – the protest rally, which was a part of protest against election falsification (2011 Parliamentary and 2012 Presidential elections) and were even labelled as “snow revolution” by the media (Lenta 2012, Gazeta 2011). The analyzed protest rally included severe suppression of the protest by the police force. The political event was followed by series of criminal charges that were put against participants of the protest. These criminal charges can be divided in two groups: people were either prosecuted for participation in mass riots (article 212.2 of Russian Criminal Code), or in addition to that they were also accused of the use of violence against the

representative of authority (article 318.1 of Russian Criminal Code). In this category, non-ideological opposition representatives were not a part of politically ideological organization, while ideological opposition representative held followed various ideologies – most of them were members of Left Front (*Levy Front*), but antifascists, anarchists, and nationalists were also prosecuted.

The information on prosecuted citizens is taken from Bolotnoye Delo internet portal (Bolotnaya Square Case, English version of portal is available), which has aggregated all cases of criminal prosecution that took place because of political protests of 2011-2013.

2.2.1 Non-ideological opposition – Businessmen, Pensioners, Students

As it was mentioned in first chapter, majority of protesters described themselves as liberals (Volkov 2012), but on the other hand, they went there primarily to protest against election falsification. Around 30 criminal cases were initiated due to protest, and around 60 percent were opened against people that either have not been a part of any political organization, or their political organization did not have clear political ideology. All of the non-ideological protesters were going under article 212,2 – participation in mass riots. Those, who had only been accused of participation in the protest has been amnestied soon after the initiation of the processes. Dmitry Altaychinov, Mariya Baronova, and Anastasiya Rybachenko were among them (Bolotnoye Delo n.d.). They have not been taken into custody and were allowed to wait for the sentence outside of confinement. However, there were also exception to that. Oleg Arkhipenkov spent 60 days in custody before he was amnestied. And Fyodor Bakhov spent 88 days (Bolotnoye Delo n.d.).

The rest of the cases involved not only article 212.2, but people were also accused of use of violence against the representative of authority (article 318.1). People were prosecuted for resisting arrests and throwing things on policemen. The difference between those who were

accused only of participation in the protest and those who were also accused of attacking policemen is pretty distinct – none of the prosecuted that went both under articles 212.2 and 318.1 has been amnestied. Based on the severity of their crimes, protesters were sentenced to various terms in colony – from 2 years and 6 months to 4 years and 6 months. On average, protesters got 3 years and 6 months in colony. Denis Lutskevich, Dmitry Ishevsky, Alexander Margolin, Sergey Krivov were among them. There are two exceptions to this group. First, Ekaterina Kokhtareva, who was only conditionally sentenced for 3 years and 3 months, due to the fact that she admitted committed crimes. And Maxim Luzyanin was sentenced for 4,5 years in colony for physically attacking a policeman, and also had to pay for dentist operation of that policeman (Bolotnoye Delo n.d.).

2.2.2 Ideological Opposition – Antifascists, Anarchists, Nationalists

As for the ideological protesters against whom the Investigative Committee of Russian Federation has initiated criminal cases, there are 11 sentences. Like non-ideological protesters, there were those, who were accused only of participation in March of Million. Only Dmitry Rukavishnikov, who was a member of Left Front (Russian socialist organization), was amnestied without being put into custody. Majority of ideological protesters have spent some time in prison, while they were waiting for the sentence to be announced. In some cases, they spent similar amount of time in custody. Like Alexander Kamensky, member of “Other Russia” (*Drugaya Rossiya*, a Nationalist-Bolshevik organization), who was been held for 10 days. But others have waited considerably longer. Vladimir Akimenkov, another member of Left Front was released and amnestied only after 557 days held captive. Nikolay Kavkazsky, member of Left Socialist Movement has experienced same situation: he was released after 512 days in custody. Even though nobody

was sentenced for term in colony, and were all eventually amnestied, some has spent more time waiting to be released than others.

As for other prosecuted, the situation again resembles cases of non-ideological protester.

Under article 318.1, all of the prosecuted were sentenced for a term in colony. Ilya Gushin, a nationalist-democrat received lesser term than others – 2 years and 6 months. Others has received 3 years and 6 months: Alexey Gaskarov, the antifascist; Stepan Zimin, the anarchist; and Alexey Polikhovich, the anarchist. There were also exceptions. First, the anarchist Dmitry Buchenkov spent 2 years in custody, and then was sentenced for 2,5 years in colony, but he managed to flee to Lithuania (Nastoyashee Vremya 2019). Second, two members of Left Front were accused of organization of preparing to commit crime (article 30.1 of Russian Criminal Code) and organization of mass riots (article 212.1 of Russian Criminal Code). Sergey Udal'tsov and Leonid Razvozzhaev were sentenced to 4.5 years in colony and fine of 150,000 rubles – the most severe punishment of the whole Bolotnaya Square case.

The Russian authorities were more active in prosecuting protesters than their leaders. Many people have faced with criminal charges, and even though all of them were amnestied, they have spent time in court, and often even in custody. Such behavior can be explained by the fact that protesters do not possess the same media resources that the leaders of movements have. Prosecuted protestors are more likely to pass from the attention of media, and that is why their punishment can put fear in future protesters, while not provoking backlash from the society. But the situation turned out to be completely opposite from the desired picture. The prosecution for participating in protests were perceived as severe violation of human rights that are supported by Russian Constitution. The state reaction to that backlash is illustrated in the fact that all of the cases accused under article 212.2 were amnestied.

On the other hand, if the protester was accused of use of violence in addition to participation in mass riots, the state reaction was extremely punishing. The policemen on the protest were not seriously harmed by the action of protesters (except mentioned policeman, who then required an assistance from dentist), yet the courts sentenced protesters to long periods in colonies (in average, 3 years of prison). The detailed comparative analysis of state reaction to non-ideological and ideological opposition will be presented in third chapter. To sum up, the protester on the ground receive categorically different reaction from the state, than the leaders to called protester to action. This may present a state tactic in dealing with popular dissent, by punishing participators, and not propagators.

2.3 Political Terrorist Organizations

The title of this category does not really reflect the content that is going to be covered. Within this research, it is not necessary for some organization to be indeed a terrorist by nature. Since the studied phenomenon here is dynamics in state reaction, it is more important that state perceives particular organization as a terrorist. This disclaimer is needed, since the discussed cases are perceived and labelled as terrorist by the Russian authorities, but this status is a subject of debate among Russian public, human-right advocates, and international non-governmental organizations. And even if the organization is not terrorist, it still can receive the most severe reaction from the state, because authorities have been convinced that it is terrorist group that they are striking down.

Having said that, let us now move to the third category of cases. Even though hybrid regimes are far from being called democratic, it is still complicated for them to suppress political opposition. If hybrid regime will go too far in censorship and suppression of alternative voice, the population or the political elites may take advantage of that situation and show their dissatisfaction with the state's policy. That is why state is being careful when dealing with

popular and charismatic political opposition leaders. It is easier to target individuals that does not enjoy support from media and cannot access it immediately. However, even such kind of criminal prosecutions have a chance of becoming viral among population, and if political opposition is successful, it may begin the new wave of protest. State, in turn, would have to think of a way to appease the dissatisfied public, while thinking about not losing face because of failed attempt to suppress opposition without unwanted noise.

While in both cases state needs to keep in mind the public opinion of their actions, when it comes to terrorist groups, state is almost free to do whatever they might think of. The terrorist groups are not the humble and peaceful protesters that are defending their freedom and rights. When hearing the word terrorist, we tend to imagine a criminal that is utilizing the worst methods in order to achieve even worse goals. If population would find out that peaceful protesters are being criminally prosecuted by the state, they are more likely to feel sympathetic towards them, and show support. But if they would hear that state is striking terrorist, they would rather praise authorities for neutralizing such immoral criminals.

In this context, one cannot really talk about limitation that state faces when dealing with political terrorist groups. And this is where the difference in treatment of non-ideological and ideological opposition is the biggest. Since state is presented with extended choice of repression and punishment, and are granted their use with popular support, they are able to utilize state monopoly on violence to full extent. And that is what happened to studied cases in this category.

Both of the cases are perceived as a terrorist organization, and members of these groups have been criminally prosecuted for organization of terrorist attacks and government overthrow.

But, in turn, human right advocates doubt that both of the cases really intended to do so. Apart from these characteristics, groups differ in the political ideology they are perceived to follow.

The non-ideological political terrorist group is New Greatness (*Novoye Velichie*) – the former member of Mal'tsev's Artpodgotovka. And their ideological counterpart is Network (*Set*) – left anarchist terrorist groups, who were accused of organizations of terrorist attacks and plans to create “anarchist state” (Novaya Gazeta 2018).

2.3.1 New Greatness – Legacy of Artpodgotovka

After the ban of Vyacheslav Mal'tsev's political organization Artpodgotovka (which was preparing for the revolution on 5th November 2017), the ex-members of it has organized into another group, which was also of political nature. On December 17th, 2017 the group was reorganized from social media chat to a proper political organization, with manifest and distribution of roles (Kommersant 2018). The newfound political organization was called New Greatness. They have been participating in anti-governmental protests and has been distributing anti-governmental brochures. Soon, the witness in the court would state that “they have been learning on how to create and throw Molotov cocktails” (Novaya Gazeta 2019). Although the human right advocates have doubted that testimony (implying that witness could not clearly indicate on the aims, place, and duration supposed organization of terrorist attacks), the state prosecutor have included witness testimony in the case of the organization.

With regard to the ideology of the organization, witnesses confirm that the main aim of the organization was the overthrow of government in general, and President Vladimir Putin in particular (Novaya Gazeta 2019). There were call to actions, but without ideological basis. Witnesses testified that the reason behind the overthrow of government is to get rid of Putin and take power after the overthrow. No political party was indicated as benefactor of that course of actions, and from testimonies was not clear what state the New Greatness supposedly wanted to build after successful revolution. The only certain political position of

New Greatness known to state, is their anti-governmental position. Or, non-ideological political goals.

Eventually, New Greatness was arrested and accused of creation of extremist community, and organization of terrorist attacks on the territory of Russian Federation. First, the members of group have been kept in custody, but later some of them has been put under house arrest (Rustam Rustamov, Sergey Gavrillov, Maxim Roshin, Pavel Rebrovsky, Anna Pavlikova, Mariya Dubrovik). Other members (Dmitry Poletaev, Petr Karamzin, Ruslan Kostylenkov, Vyacheslav Kryukov) were released out of confinement (Moskva24 2019). Due to public coverage of the case, the court process has been extended, and the only sentence has been declared to Rustam Rustamov. He was conditionally sentenced for 2,5 years, for admitting committed crimes and making a deal with investigators. However, soon this sentence was suspended, because Rustamov has rejected his guilt (Interfax 2019). The case became controversial due to the fact that the initiator and creator of the group was undercover agent of FSB, and on court said that he was ordered to do so. Human right advocate Alla Frolova believes that investigators were ready to accuse New Greatness based on article 205 (Terrorist attack) (OVD-info 2018). And the general line of prosecution was describing New Greatness as a terrorist group that were organizing attacks. But eventually the list of prosecution only contained two articles – parts 1 (organization of extremist community) and 2 (participation in extremist community) of article 282.1 (OVD-info 2018).

2.3.2 Network – Terrorists without terrorist attacks

When New Greatness criminal case was initiated, around the same time (2017) Investigative Committee of Russian Federation were also observing another supposed political terrorist group. Unlike New Greatness, the Network were initially perceived as left anarchist terrorist group. Some of the members of Network were once part of Artpodgotovka, but the core of the

organization consisted of antifascists and ideologically left leaning protesters (Novaya Gazeta 2018). Investigators suspected Network of organization of terrorist attacks that were supposed to take place during 2018 Football World Cup (Meduza 2018). The criminal case initially went under part 1 of article 205.4 – creation of terrorist group. Out of all criminal articles discussed in the research, this is the hardest and it follows by harsh punishments. The prosecution has asked the court to sentence members of Network from 6 to 18 years in maximum security prison (Mediazona 2019). Soon after the court process has started, Network was declared terrorist organization and was banned on territory of Russian Federation (Novaya Gazeta 2019a).

Defense in the court has argued that testimonies has been taken under torture, but court has not taken this point into consideration (Mediazona 2019). In 2020, court has finished, and declared all of the members of group guilty of creation and participation in terrorist group. They have received unprecedented terms. For creation of terrorist organization, Dmitry Pchelintsev and Ilya Shakursky were sentenced to 18 and 16 years in maximum security prison. Maxim Ivankin was sentenced to 13 years in maximum security prison. Andrey Chernov received 14 years in maximum security prison. Mikhail Kul'kov – 10 years in maximum security prison. Vasily Kuksov and Arman Sagynbayev were sentenced to 9 and 6 years in colony respectively (Novaya Gazeta 2020).

The details of reasons behind such sentence is kept secret. The case was covered by Privolzhsky court – unlike other courts that have analyzed other cases of the research, this is a military court (Novaya Gazeta 2020). Along with sentences, court has confiscated all legal weapons from the accused, and have ordered to destroy the left anarchist literature, which was found in the apartments of Network members. Other materials were not shown to the public.

The Network case received a harsh criticism from civil society groups. Media, human right advocates, and non-governmental organizations has pointed the lack of evidences and their poor quality. It was already mentioned that there are chance that testimonies of accused were taken under torture (which describes the *carte blanche* that state gets when it is dealing with supposed terrorists) (Meduza 2018). But it also shows the difference between state treatment of political terrorist organization and other types of political opposition. Even if politically active part of society protests against such measures, the majority of population seem to be indifferent towards Network case. And when state is fully convinced that they are dealing with terrorists, they may allow condition that they cannot enjoy when dealing with legal political opposition groups. Like delivering the case to military court which can justify keeping details of the case in secret from public eye.

Such state reaction dramatically differs from other categories. The leaders of opposition were allowed to practice politics for continuous periods of time, even if they called for national hatred and violation of existing legislation. People that were following them and has participated in the events organized by them also had small chance of receiving real term. The participation in events would not have been completely ignored, but there is a chance being amnestied for that. Only if the protesters would resist or physically attack the policemen on the event, they would receive a sensible sentence that is already seen by civil society as excessive measures. But when someone is suspected of terrorism, the state repression takes a huge leap forward, and accused are being treated in the harshest way possible. Not mentioning the sentences, which can be justified against real terrorists. But when there are doubts about that, the civil society is shocked by the cruelty of state.

Chapter 3. Challenging Status-Quo with Positive Political Agenda

The following chapter will illustrate the results of research and show comparative differences between observed cases. Three pairs of cases will be compared based on the reaction of the state that may come in different forms: from prolonged investigative process to severe criminal punishments and sentences that reach and exceed 10 years of imprisonment. Further, the discussion part will concentrate on the reasons such differences may have took place. The differences in state reactions will be viewed through the prism of non-ideological and ideological dichotomy. This variable will play crucial part in explaining the differences, because most of the confounding factors match in both cases. The hypothesis of the research will be tested and confirmed. The positive political alternative that particular ideology provide increases perceived threat, and thus, state will attempt more active role in repressing ideological opposition groups. On contrary, non-ideological opposition fails to provide anything but the protest itself, with which state can work in more moderate manner. It can refrain from using extraordinary methods of repression, but rather refer to channeling opposition, minimizing the role of opposition in media, and assigning symbolic sentences to the prosecuted, after which they have a considerable chance of receiving amnesty. In the end, the theses of paper will be summed up in conclusion part.

3.1 Leaders – Arrest Warrant Versus Criminal Sentence

The cases of leaders of opposition movement was interesting, because the reaction of state to them was categorically different from state reaction to protester on the ground, and perceived terrorist. If there are less question about difference in treatment between leaders and terrorists, it was not obvious that protesters would receive a harsher reaction in general than those who mobilize them to protest. Both Mal'tsev and Potkin has received a relatively moderate reaction from the state based on what they were accused of than protester of Bolotnaya Square

Case for lesser crimes (in terms of damage to the integrity of regime). But even though the author anticipated harsher reaction to the leaders of opposition groups, there are those who faced greater repressions than others. Vyacheslav Mal'tsev has gone through 25 days in custody in total for taking part in unsanctioned protest event, although his political activism within Artpodgotovka was known to the state officials long before he was sentenced twice. One may argue that he has not organized any unsanctioned protest events that may have lied under criminal article under which Sergey Udal'tsov (organizer of March of Million) was prosecuted. Indeed, one may legally interpret it that way. But his political statements and demand for change in general, and revolution of 2011 in particular would be enough to prosecute him. As it happened with Potkin – who was also not prosecuted for the organization of political groups (first “Russians”, then DPNI), but nevertheless received 3,5 years of imprisonment for extremism (Article 282).

Instead, as it was mentioned before, Mal'tsev successfully fled Russia and found political refuge. There is an arrest warrant against him to this day, but eventually this sums up all of the state reaction to Vyacheslav Mal'tsev and his political activism. On the other hand, Alexander Potkin, who has been politically active in the field of Russian nationalism, has received different treatment. Both Potkin and Mal'tsev have been in opposition to Russian state, both have founded political organizations, which aimed to combat Russian regime. Both have called their supporter to actions, and in case of Mal'tsev they have been called to revolution. Both are known for their antisemitism and xenophobia towards labor migrants. But in the end of the day, Potkin is the only one that received a serious reaction from the state for his political activity. Even though his economic crimes (money laundering) eventually became the catalyst for his arrest, he was amnestied on that article, while still had to serve 3 years in colony for his political activity. The ideology is what differentiate both leaders. While Potkin has been open about his political beliefs, and due to that managed to gain

popularity among Russian nationalists, Mal'tsev's opportunism and hopping from one political statement to another made him populist and well known among different social circles. When analyzing his statements separately, one may categorize them towards particular political ideology, but in collection, they are not ideologically coherent, and thus are said purely on the basis of their opposition nature.

3.2 Protesters – Differences in Details

As it was mentioned before, unlike leaders, protester in Russian Federation are more likely to receive harsh reaction from the state when it comes to political activism. And the results of research within the Bolotnaya Square case shows that sentences are roughly similar between ideological and non-ideological groups. But this is only in general, and when each case is being examined, appearing anomalies in ideological groups begs for further analysis. Apart from ideological and non-ideological division, the protester also can be divided in additional two groups: those who were prosecuted by article 212 (participating in mass riots), and those who additionally were charged with article 318 (use of violence against representative of authority).

Almost the entirety of the first group has been amnestied. And based on that result, one may argue that there is no significant difference in treatment of protesters, whether they identify themselves with particular political ideology or not. However, there are some exceptional cases that does not allow to conclude that court was unbiased on that matter. Even though most of the prosecuted by article 212 has been amnestied in short period of time, some of them had to spend some time in custody. Some people spent time in custody considerably more than others. And if they are assigned to ideological/non-ideological category, the difference tends to correlate with it. Non-ideological protesters spend less time in custody before they were amnestied than ideological protesters. Oleg Arkhipenkov and Fyodor

Bakhov (60 days and 88 days respectively) were amnestied almost ten times faster than members of Left Front and Left Socialist Movement (*LevSocDvizhenie*) Vladimir Akimenkov and Nikolay Kavkazsky, who has waited amnesty for 557 and 512 days respectively.

Similar situation is observed in the second group. Although the degree of repressions is dramatically different, the ratio and proportions correlate with first groups. Majority of people that has been prosecuted under 2 criminal articles has received sentences to spend in colony. On average, protesters have received 3 years and 6 months. However, we also can point to some exceptional cases or anomalies that fall from the trend. From the group of non-ideological protesters, only one has received 4 years and 6 months in colony – Maxim Luzyanin, for the exceptional use of violence against the representative of authority. In his case, policeman has been sensibly harmed, and this can explain harsher sentence among non-ideological group.

However, there are several exceptions in the ideological group. First, the case of Dmitry Buchenkov, who has never been amnestied, and had to flee Russia after spending 4,5 years in colony. Second, the organizers of protest, who also have received 4,5 years of colony. If in the case of non-ideological Maxim Luzyanin, his increased sentence could be explained by the physical damage to the policeman, the anomalies in ideological groups cannot be explained as easily. In case of organizers, it is remarking that all of the prosecuted has been the part of Left Front, politically ideological organization. It is remarking for the reason that they were not the only organizers of the protest event. Furthermore, not only politically ideological individuals organized the protest, but non-ideological organizers (such as Alexey Navalny) were not prosecuted by the state. The press and media that covered the protest also mentioned the exceptional attention to left organizations from the state (Svoboda 2013).

Unlike the case of leaders, there is no dramatic difference in state reaction towards ideological and non-ideological opposition. Which does not mean the absence of the difference, but rather its smaller scale. Although in general, protester received harsher sentences not for their relation to political ideology but for the actions they have done on the protest, the number of prosecuted ideological protesters exceed non-ideological protesters (Svoboda 2013). To say the least, it shows the increased attention to politically ideological protesters from the state. And in case of March of Million, state had clear bias towards politically left activists.

3.3 “Terrorists” – Unprecedented level of political repression

The cases of New Greatness and Network qualify as one of the most important events for the field of political science. Particularly, they show the difference in treatment of perceived ideological and non-ideological actors. The court processes for both cases are almost parallel to each other in terms of time period. Both cases became exceptionally controversial after media coverage. Public has questioned and denounced methods (stated and described by the press) of the state in dealing with the New Greatness and Network. And eventually, cases that resemble in many aspects, receive two completely different results. New Greatness, at first, was also to be prosecuted for creation of terrorist organization. The material of the court process still keeps the testimonies of the witnesses, who has described the preparation for terrorist attacks in Russian Federation. But after the public upheaval which was concerned about the quality of the evidences from prosecutors, the court has changed criminal article to extremism, while still labelling the New Greatness as a dangerous political group.

On the contrary, the case of Network also has received the attention from the media, and public support for the accused are comparable with the case of New Greatness. The quality of presented evidences is also on the same level as the witness testimonies from the case of New Greatness. Multiple statements about torture that was used during interrogation process does

not add to the credibility of court process. But the difference in result is astonishing: while suffering from the same popularity damage as with case of New Greatness, court sentences the members of Network to the most severe sentences to be served in maximum security prisons. Within the court case, the Network was consistently described as anarchist terrorist organization. And while the alleged crimes of Network are comparable with New Greatness, they are not ideologically identified in the court, reserving to “political extremist organization”.

As evidences of political nature of both groups, the prosecution has used different methods. In the case of Network, the found anarchist books and writings of Karl Marx served as the evidence of the ideology of the group. In case of New Greatness, these accusations were backed up by the witnesses and organizer of the group, who happened to be an undercover agent of FSB. This aspect has influenced the stark differences between the state reactions to either of groups. Found political literature from members of Network has led investigators to the conclusion that Network had a plan of what to do after the alleged political overthrow. They were accused of plans to create an anarchist state (Novaya Gazeta 2018). On the other hand, New Greatness was only accused of preparing the overthrow, and not planning for the aftermath of that overthrow. The perceived political ideology of Network has influenced the conclusions that were made by the investigators and by the court, while non-ideological nature of New Greatness did not allowed prosecutors to assume planning to create new political systems. These differences between the cases is what defines New Greatness and Network as non-ideological and ideological opposition respectively, and these differences has led to the contrasting state reactions.

3.4 Discussion

Throughout the research, there have been several evidences of difference in state reaction towards non-ideological and ideological opposition. But as for the reasons of that difference, the following part will describe them in detail. The hypothesis of the research has been mostly confirmed. The ideological opposition is, indeed, more likely to receive a harsher state reaction in face of political, economic, legal, or social oppression rather than non-ideological opposition. The scale of differences varies across the three categories, but in all of them ideological opposition was treated in more severe manner than their non-ideological counterparts. The only exceptions that was found in case of protesters on the ground can be explained by the reasons why state is more attentive towards ideological opposition than non-ideological.

Opposition exists in all states, despite their political regimes. From totalitarian dictatorships to consolidated democracies, the government is doomed to deal with opposition: either within Parliament, or on the battlefield. And hybrid regimes are not exceptional. Throughout time, they manage to get used to the opposition as an aspect of their rule. And perceive them as necessary part of the political system. Of course, this does not mean that state is willing to leave opposition as is and will try to control and combat it in many different ways. But they also know that even though opposition is active continuously, they fail to achieve their ultimate goal – change of political system. The protest may seem as threatening factor, but eventually any protest action comes to an end and people return to their home, acknowledging the power of state.

The negative agenda (or opposition “against”) may mobilize a considerable amount of people on the streets but is not as effective in keeping them for a long period of time. At first, protester accept the reason of opposition activity which is purely based on antagonism

towards the state. But this motivation would last only for the protest events themselves and will not go beyond them. After asking a question “Why we need to change regime?”, the answer “Because it is incompetent and corrupt” founds itself not convincing enough. Eventually public or state media will point that even if state is incompetent and corrupt, there is no alternative to them. At best, the same incompetent and corrupt government will follow. At worst, they will be much more incompetent and corrupt. Non-ideological opposition in this case cannot argue with that, because all of their activity revolves around criticizing the state. They cannot be characterized otherwise than “a group of people that are against the state”. Therefore, state can be relatively calm about non-ideological opposition as it does not suit for the valid alternative. They only can promise to be a good government, which is not convincing enough.

On the other hand, when opposition groups base their activity not only on the pure criticism of the state, but also present their political program, it changes the state of affairs significantly. The political ideas around which ideological opposition forms has been developing for a long period of time. And in different times in history people have been concerned about the issues brought by political ideologies. The problems of inequality, injustice, and common grief has faced multiple solutions from opposite parts of political spectrum. And when one ideology would fail to solve those issues, an alternative would arise to demand power in order to solve problems through their own way.

Political ideologies can endorse people to support them because of the solutions they promise. Their reasoning and their image of utopia can inspire not only a mere protest movement, but full-scale revolution. States have been built on fundamentals of one political ideology and have fallen under the strike of other political ideologies. The ideological leader can be supported despite his or her personal characteristics or past actions. In turn, even if the alternative to the

state will be as corrupt and as incompetent as themselves, the relation of opposition group to particular political ideology can smooth the edges of group's imperfections.

The same mechanism applies to the ideological opposition of Russian Federation. The representative of Russian nationalists, Russian left, and Russian anarchists do not only criticize the state for their policy but do so in accordance to their political ideologies. Russian nationalists criticize state migration policy. In addition to that, they propose an alternative positive agenda – tightening the migration policy, introducing visa regime with Central Asian states and deporting of illegal migrants. People that can associate with that problem and see an alternative in the Russian nationalists are more likely to support them, and then continue to do so for a longer period of time than they would support populist opposition leader that only criticizes the state without proposing any positive alternative.

Russian left opposition would accuse the Russian Federation from abandoning and betraying the legacy of Soviet Union and point to the enormous income gap and repressed labor unions. Along with that, they would also appeal to the values of equity, justice, and wealth distribution – ideas that are not foreign to Russian citizen. The nostalgia towards Soviet Union would encourage people to support such organizations and be more active in their political life. As for the Russian anarchists, even though their ideas seem too radical for the average Russian, the growing desperation from stagnation and absence of any change whatsoever makes anarchist slogans and ideas more popular and attractive to young political activists.

For these reasons, state needs to suppress any alternative that may arise in public field. If non-ideological opposition is limited by its incoherence and absence of clear plan of action, and thus can be left in political arena, the ideological opposition does not need to come up with any positive agenda – they have it by default. The very fact of their ideological relations

means that they have already chosen their path of action, which already has defined the problem, have chosen appropriate solution, and painted the future national/socialist state or merry absence of state. Due to that, state and state-controlled media can no longer appeal to the absence of alternative and needs to resolve the conflict with ideological opposition. Since letting them in parliament is not an option in hybrid regimes, they are suppressed, and their activity is repressed. This eventually leads to the difference in state reactions between non-ideological and ideological opposition.

Conclusion

Taking all points into consideration, Russian Federation tend to treat ideological opposition in more severe manner than their non-ideological counterparts. The following research has shown the potential of this topic not only within Russian Federation, but also in other hybrid regimes. The literature has shown that state treat different opposition groups differently. But this research has shown in which particular cases this is true. The novelty of ideological/non-ideological categorization of opposition bases itself on the economic/political categorization but broadens and defines it distinctively. This is enough to treat such differentiation as a novel contribution. The comparative case study has shown that there are differences in state treatment within this dichotomy.

The academic literature provided with theoretical basis of relations between opposition and state in hybrid regimes. Along with that, the theoretical divisions of the opposition have also inspired the non-ideological/ideological categorization. Even though this categorization draws some of the aspects from the existing theories, in its core it is original. Along with the existing theories of repression, the research contributes to this field of political science. The research also broadens understanding about the political opposition and its relationship with state in modern Russian Federation. The news report from reliable and credible sources provided with data and facts about the state of different types of political opposition within Russian Federation. Along with Post-Communist literature, research contributes to our understanding of Post-Soviet regimes.

Three pair of cases has observed the state reactions across different types of opposition. The analysis of state reaction to the leaders of opposition groups showed that state would prosecute ideological leader with more enthusiasm than a non-ideological leader. The prosecution of leaders of opposition groups will be inevitably followed by media coverage,

and that may explain the general passivity of state towards leader of any opposition group. As for the protesters, state employ roughly similar tactics to repress protesters on the ground. Partly this happens for the reasons that opposition protest actions in Russia rarely lead to the significant political changes if are not backed up by political ideology. The Bolotnaya Square case confirmed that, as most of the protesters received similar sentences, whether they followed any political ideology or not. However, there is still a minor bias against ideologically left protesters that was shown on the example of Bolotnaya Square case.

The most dramatic difference in state reactions towards opposition groups was illustrated in the cases of perceived terrorist organizations. The non-ideological New Greatness, at first was perceived as terrorist organization, but was treated in relatively less severe manner. Relatively to the anarchist Network, which was accused of creation of terrorist organization and preparation of terrorist attacks. They have received the most ruthless state reaction – from 6 to 18 years of maximum-security prison. The data shows that the perceived ideological part of the group has played a major role in this difference, as the evidences and accusation was similar between New Greatness and Network.

The hypothesis of the research has been tested and confirmed. And as far as being a plausibility probe, research has reached its goal. The probe has shown the potential of this topic within the academic field. The analysis of the literature suggest that this topic can be extrapolated outside of Russian Federation and can be applied to other hybrid regimes. This provides a fundamental basis for future researches.

Reference List

1. Akyuz, Kadir, and Steve Hess. "Turkey Looks East." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (January 2018): 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-6898075>.
2. BBC. "Митинг За Свободные Выборы в Москве Собрал Более 20 Тысяч Человек." *BBC News Русская служба*. BBC, July 20, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-49058803>.
3. Bolotnoye Delo. "Суд Приговорил Удальцова и Развозжаева к 4,5 Годам Колонии." *Болотное дело*, July 24, 2014. <https://bolotnoedelo.info/news/4932/sud-prigovoril-udalcova-i-razvozzhaeva-k-45-godam-kolonii>.
4. Bolotnoye Delo. "О Следствии По 6 Мая 2012 Года." *Болотное дело*. Accessed May 30, 2020. <https://bolotnoedelo.info/>.
5. Denisova, Anastasia. "Democracy, Protest and Public Sphere in Russia after the 2011–2012 Anti-Government Protests: Digital Media at Stake." *Media, Culture & Society* 39, no. 7 (September 2016): 976–94.
6. Durac, Vincent. "Social Movements, Protest Movements and Cross-Ideological Coalitions – the Arab Uprisings Re-Appraised." *Democratization* 22, no. 2 (2015): 239–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010809>.
7. Earl, Jennifer. "Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37, no. 1 (2011): 261–84. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102609>.
8. Eckstein, Harry. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." *Case Study Method*, 2011, 118–64.

9. Evans, Alfred. "Protests in Russia: The Example of the Blue Buckets Society".
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 26: 1 (Winter 2018): 3-24
10. Expert. "Происхождение Националиста." Expert, March 27, 2008.
https://expert.ru/russian_reporter/2008/11/belov_potkin/.
11. Gazeta. "В Саратове Задержан Оппозиционер Вячеслав Мальцев." Gazeta.ru,
April 13, 2017. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2017/04/13/n_9918059.shtml.
12. Gazeta (a) "Прокурор Заявила о Планах Мальцева Получить Политическое
Убежище За Рубежом." Gazeta.ru, October 31, 2017.
https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2017/10/31/n_10760372.shtml.
13. Interfax. "Суд Отменил Приговор Участнику 'Нового Величия' и Отправил Дело
На Пересмотр." Interfax.ru, October 8, 2019. <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/679555>.
14. Kolstø, Pål. "Marriage of Convenience? Collaboration between Nationalists and
Liberals in the Russian Opposition, 2011-12." The Russian Review 75, no. 4 (2016): 645–63.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/russ.12107>.
15. Kommersant. "Александр Белов получил розничный приговор". Kommersant,
May 29, 2009. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1177795>
16. Kommersant. "Что Нужно Знать о Деле 'Нового Величия.'" – Картина дня –
Коммерсантъ. "Коммерсантъ" от 15.08.2018, 16:01, August 15, 2018.
<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3714179>.
17. Laverty, Nicklaus. "Limited Choices: Russian Opposition Parties and the 2007 Duma
Election." Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 16, no. 4 (January
2008): 363–82.

18. Lenta “Они Придут Еще.” Оппозиция проведет марш за день до инаугурации Путина: Россия: Lenta.ru, May 4, 2012. <https://lenta.ru/articles/2012/05/04/march/>.
19. Lenta. “Мальцеву Дали Десять Суток Ареста За Сопротивление Полиции На Акции 12 Июня.” Мальцеву дали десять суток ареста за сопротивление полиции на акции 12 июня: Общество: Россия: Lenta.ru, June 13, 2017. <https://lenta.ru/news/2017/06/13/malzev/>.
20. Lucas, Christopher, Richard A. Nielsen, Margaret E. Roberts, Brandon M. Stewart, Alex Storer, and Dustin Tingley. “Computer-Assisted Text Analysis for Comparative Politics.” *Political Analysis* 23, no. 2 (2015): 254–77
21. March, Luke. “Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition.” *Slavic Review* 68, no. 3 (2009): 504–27.
22. Mediazona. “Националиста Александра Поткина Приговорили к 7,5 Годам Общего Режимы По Делу о Хищении в БТА-Банке.” Медиазона, August 24, 2008. <https://zona.media/news/2016/24/08/belov>.
23. Mediazona “Апокалипсис Мальцева. Как Силовики Не Ждут, а Готовятся к Революции, Предсказанной Саратовским Оппозиционером.” Медиазона. November 11, 2017. Accessed May 30, 2020. <https://zona.media/article/2017/11/03/5-11-2017>.
24. Mediazona (a) “Суд в Москве Заочно Арестовал Уехавшего Из России Вячеслава Мальцева.” Медиазона, October 10, 2017. <https://zona.media/news/2017/10/10/malt>.
25. Mediazona “Обвинение Запросило Фигурантам ‘Пензенского Дела’ Сроки От 6 До 18 Лет Колонии.” Медиазона, December 26, 2019. <https://zona.media/news/2019/12/26/set-prenija>.

26. Meduza “‘Я Сдался Практически Сразу’. Как ФСБ Под Питками Выбивает Признания у Антифашистов ‘Медуза’ Отвечает На Главные Вопросы о ‘Пензенском Деле.’” Meduza, June 14, 2018. <https://meduza.io/feature/2018/06/14/ya-sdalsya-prakticheski-srazu-kak-fsb-pod-pytkami-vybivaet-priznaniya-u-antifashistov>.
27. Moskva24. “Вынесен Первый Приговор По Делу Организации ‘Новое Величие.’” m24.ru. m24.ru, March 6, 2019. <https://www.m24.ru/news/sudy/06032019/68288>.
28. Nam, Taehyun. “The Broken Promises of Democracy: Protest-Repression Dynamics in Korea 1990-1991” *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11, no. 4 (2009): 427-442
29. Nastoyashee Vremya “Суд Дал 2,5 Лет Колонии ‘Болотнику’ Бученкову. Он Бежал Из РФ и Получил Убежище в Литве.” Настоящее Время. Новости, видео и репортажи из России, Украины, стран Азии – Настоящее Время, December 24, 2019. <https://www.currenttime.tv/a/buchenkov-bolotnaya-prigovor/30341850.html>.
30. Novaya Gazeta. “Звенья Одной «Сети».” Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru, February 2, 2018. <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/02/02/75366>.
31. Novaya Gazeta. “«Величие» в Тупике.” Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru, October 9, 2019. <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/10/09/82287-velichie-v-tupike>.
32. Novaya Gazeta (a) “Те Же и Запрещенная в России «Сеть».” Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru, April 10, 2019. <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/04/10/80169-te-zhe-i-zapreshennaya-v-rossii-set>.
33. Novaya Gazeta “23 Минуты и 86 Лет Тюрем На Всех.” Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru, February 10, 2020. <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/02/10/83856-23-minuty-i-86-let-tyurmy-na-vseh>.

34. Opp, Karl-Dieter, and Wolfgang Roehl. "Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest." *Social Forces* 69, no. 2 (1990): 521. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2579672>.
35. Ostbo, Jardar. Between Opportunist Revolutionaries and Mediating Spoilers: Failed Politicization of the Russian Truck Drivers' Protest, 2015–2016. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 25: 3 (Summer 2017): 279-304
36. OVD-Info. "Дело 'Нового Величия' - Кто Эти Люди и За Что Их Судят. Гид ОБД-Инфо." *ОБД-Инфо*, October 27, 2018. <https://ovdinfo.org/articles/2018/10/27/delo-novogo-velichiya-kto-eti-lyudi-i-za-chto-ih-sudyat-gid-ovd-info>.
37. Petrov, Nikolay, Maria Lipman, and Henry E. Hale. "Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 30, no. 1 (2013): 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2013.825140>.
38. RBC. "ЛДПР Предложила Распространить 'Закон Димы Яковлева' На Весь ЕС." *РБК*, August 15, 2014. <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/15/08/2014/570420b29a794760d3d40b75>.
39. RIA "Мосгорсуд Запретил Националистическое Движение 'Русские.'" *РИА Новости*. October 28, 2015. <https://ria.ru/20151028/1309462694.html>.
40. RIA "Осужденный За Экстремизм Националист Поткин Обратился в ЕСПЧ." *РИА Новости*. *РИА Новости*, October 17, 2017. <https://ria.ru/20171017/1506970893.html>.
41. Reuter, Ora John, and Graeme B. Robertson. "Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes." *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 1 (2015): 235–48.
42. Robertson, Graeme B. "Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes." *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4 (2007): 781–98.

43. Robertson, Graeme B. "Managing Society: Protest, Civil Society, and Regime in Putins Russia." *Slavic Review* 68, no. 3 (2009): 528–47.
44. Svoboda. "'Левые' в 'Болотном Деле. '" Радио Свобода. Радио Свобода, August 13, 2013. <https://www.svoboda.org/a/25074494.html>.
45. Volkov, Denis. "The Protesters and The Public." *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 3 (2012): 55–62. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0049>.