

MOBILISING IDENTITIES IN RESPONSE TO ‘ILLIBERAL POPULISM’: EVIDENCE FROM THE HUNGARIAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

by
ZSÓFIA ANNA BORSI

Submitted to
CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor:
PROFESSOR ANDRÁS BOZÓKI

Budapest, Hungary
2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	2
<i>Abstract</i>	3
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	4
<i>Chapter 1: Introduction</i>	5
<i>Chapter 2: Theoretical framework</i>	8
2.1. Populism and Progressivism	8
2.1.1. Illiberal populism and hybridisation	8
2.1.2. Populist identity frames	11
2.1.3. Progressive frames	13
2.2. Strategies and Political Opportunities	16
2.2.1. Political opportunities	16
2.2.2. Oppositional identities and coordination	18
2.3. Overview and Missing Links	22
<i>Chapter 3: Research Methodology</i>	23
3.1. Methodological background	23
3.2. Research questions	23
3.3. Case Selection	25
3.4. Contextual Analysis	27
3.5. Semi-structured interviews	28
3.6. Discourse Analysis	29
3.7. Limitations of the project	30
3.8. Ethical considerations	31
<i>Chapter 4: Contextual analysis</i>	32
4.1. The Hungarian mayoral electoral system and the oppositional primary	32
4.2. Districts' profile	33
4.2.1. The 'Castle District' (I.)	33
4.2.2. 'Josefstadt' (VIII.)	35
4.3. Mayor-candidates' profile	37
4.3.1. Márta V Naszályi	37
4.3.2. András Pikó	39
4.4. Campaigns' profile	41
4.4.1. Organisational structures	41
4.4.2. Brands and Messages	44
4.4.3. Strategies	50
4.5. Municipal elections: a blueprint for 2022?	56
<i>Chapter 5: Conclusion</i>	58
<i>Bibliography</i>	64
<i>Appendix</i>	72

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

<i>1. Figure: Possible within-case mechanisms in relation to RQ2.</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>2. Figure: Cross-case relevance (RQ3).</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>3. Figure: The frequency of 4 types of tags compared, Dovetail (2020).</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>4. Figure: Comparison of Organisational Structures, Várunk vs. C8.</i>	<i>44</i>
<i>5. Figure: Poster of Várunk, Online. (Source: Várunk's Facebook page)</i>	<i>46</i>
<i>6. Figure: Conclusions of cooperation.</i>	<i>56</i>
<i>7. Figure: Summary of Tags Used on Dovetail</i>	<i>73</i>
<i>1. Table: Votes for lord mayor candidates in the I. and VIII. districts, based on data from Választás.hu</i>	<i>37</i>
<i>2. Table: Comparison of the two campaigns' communicative elements.</i>	<i>50</i>
<i>3. Table: Overview of findings.</i>	<i>61</i>

ABSTRACT

Through what kind of identities and strategies can a liberal-democratic opposition respond to the electoral challenges of illiberal populism? Can political opportunities be created from below in a hybrid regime? This thesis investigates these questions by conducting an in-depth exploratory, comparative case study research regarding the Hungarian municipal elections of 2019. Oppositional campaigns of the I. and VIII. districts are explored via semi-structured interviews with campaign members, complemented by the contextual analysis of each district. Campaigns are comparatively analysed regarding their structures, brands, messages and strategies used.

The results suggest that political opportunity creation in an ‘unlevel electoral playing field’ (Levitsky and Way, 2001) is possible, through the use of innovative strategies, such as oppositional coordination and intensive personal campaigning, and through the politicisation of both inward- and outward-looking, affective messages. Moreover, this project asserts that given hybrid regimes’ centralised nature, it is on the municipal level of governance that the development of oppositional identities is the least hindered. Hence this research provides a useful preliminary framework for progressive bottom-up movements in hybrid electoral settings.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing this thesis during the coronavirus pandemic, almost entirely in lockdown, has been challenging, both mentally and circumstantially. First, I would like to thank my supervisor András Bozóki for his kind assistance, recommendations and advice. Secondly, I am grateful for Márta V. Naszályi, Olivér Pilz, Ferenc Gelencsér, Zsófia Nagy and Gábor Erőss for their time and contribution to this project. Finally, I thank my fellow colleague and flatmate Madison Gable for keeping me motivated during these trying times.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since 2010, Fidesz has systematically dismantled Hungary's still-only-sprouting ties to liberal democracy (Kiss, 2018). The party-in-power has adopted an 'illiberal', often conspiratorial rhetoric (Kopper et al., 2017), which claims to represent the People through the emnification of immigrants and the international elite. Fidesz provides a classic example of 'ruling populism' (Kuisz and Wigura, 2020): many have written its 'strongman' (Lendvai, 2019) Viktor Orbán, and the fate of Hungary's 'broken democracy' (Bozóki, 2015).

The municipal elections of 2019 represent a breakthrough for Hungary's fragmented opposition, as they managed to cooperate nationwide and to symbolically 'regain' Budapest. Gergely Karácsony was elected as lord mayor, beating Fidesz-related former lord mayor István Tarlós. 14 districts of Budapest were won by candidates of the opposition (László and Molnár, 2019: 4). The opposition's relative success is puzzling: seemingly, they have 'lifted the veil of Fidesz's invincibility' (Ibid.), raising the question whether the power of Fidesz has really started to weaken, or rather, the opposition has found new ways of mobilising within the mainstream populist hybrid regime.

Motivated by the topic of political opportunity creation, this research explores the extent to which mainstream populist hybridisation impacts oppositional narratives and identities. How does the establishment of an 'unlevel electoral playing field' (Levitsky and Way, 2001: 3) affect oppositional campaign strategies? Are these more likely to be innovative, or adaptive to the structure they operate in? To what extent does the mainstreamisation of populist communication (Laclau, 2005) impact the messages of a progressive opposition? Finally, can successful municipal strategies and identities mobilised provide the basis for long-term, future coalitions

and be implemented on a national level? These are the main questions this thesis seeks to answer.

Looking at these queries in the context of today's Hungary, this project examines two Budapest-based municipal campaigns of the opposition cooperation that resulted in the electoral victory of oppositional mayors. These were the I. district's *Várunk - Opposition Cooperation (I. kerületi ellenzéki együttműködés)* and the VIII. district's *C8 - Civilians for Józsefváros (Civilek Józsefvárosért)* campaigns.

The research builds its hypotheses based on contrasting Tarrow's (1994) and Bunce and Wolchik's (2011) theories of political opportunity structures. In the first case, political opportunities are perceived from a structuralist, top-down perspective and understood as the result of the regime's decline and/or its 'opening up' to new methods. This view suggests that politics is a 'zero-sum game' (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011: 62) where the deterioration of the system induces the growth of the opposition. Based on this logic, successful opposition campaigns should focus on *adaptive* strategies: mobilising against the out-group by politicising the Us-Them conflict and communicating the weaknesses of the regime. In contrast, Bunce and Wolchik (2011) theorise that political opportunities can emerge independent of the regime's state, through effective cooperation from below. From this perspective, electoral success depends on implementing *innovative* elements of campaigning, such as an inclusive identity-building strategy that focuses on the Us, and initiated from bottom-up social mobilisation.

The analysed campaign strategies and outcomes are comprehended in relation to their specific socio-political context (Goodin and Tilly, 2006) and evaluated from a qualitative perspective, primarily building on semi-structured interviews conducted with campaign members. The

transcription of interviews, opinion polls and survey results, sampled visual data and relevant articles were uploaded to and processed with the cloud-based software *Dovetail*, which allows for the efficient tagging and categorisation of qualitative data. Stored evidence were then evaluated by the combined use of contextual analysis, narrative analysis and critical discourse analysis, giving a unique, multidisciplinary design to the project.

The significance of this research lies in the lack of knowledge about the strategies that can democratically challenge the status quo in a hybrid framework. By tracing the successful campaigning methods of the selected movements, the project sheds light on the interlink between campaign context and the kind of oppositional identities that are capable of collective mobilisation, and highlights the need for *relational* research on mainstream populism. Our discussion carries the normative implication that democracy is a desirable ideal and that mainstream populism results in its disfiguration (Urbinati, 2014).

The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 explores the interlink between the concepts of populism, hybrid regimes, and political opportunity structures available to oppositional movements, as well as the gaps within these fields of academic literature. Chapter 3 presents the research questions, methodological foundations, exact methods, ethical considerations and the limitations of the project. Chapter 4 analyses the sampled campaigns based on the politicians' and voters' profile. Chapter 5 examines in detail both campaigns, with regards to messages, strategies and the conclusions of the municipal cooperation. Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the findings and gives recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section sets up the research topic in the framework of existing literature, building mainly on populism studies and social movement theory. First, it defines populism within an illiberal power structure and contrasts the concept of populist identity frames with progressivism. Secondly, political opportunity structures and oppositional identities are evaluated with reference to hybridisation.

2.1. Populism and Progressivism

2.1.1. *Illiberal populism and hybridisation*

As Csizgó and Merkovity (2016: 2) note, ‘in a political environment so polluted by populism, most scholars have refrained from contrasting populism with mainstream normality’. The idea that populism can only exist ‘in opposition’ has been challenged by real-life cases where leaders continue to employ populist framing once in power. If based on denouncing the elites, how do populists in power maintain anti-elite rhetoric? An originally anti-establishment centred identity taken up by the elite itself leads us to the discussion of the phenomenon of ‘mainstream populism’ (Bozóki, 2019: 8).

When populism becomes mainstream ‘it simply does not make much sense to think of populism as something opposed to the political establishment’ (Csizgó and Merkovity, 2016: 8), hence the paradoxical nature of ‘established populism’. However, this thesis argues that anti-establishment rhetoric does not disappear from mainstream populists’ rhetoric, instead, it gets directed towards new actors that represent a different kind of external ‘establishment’: supranational institutions, the international elite, foreign-sponsored NGOs or oppositional parties.

In general, there is a tendency in political research to reduce populism to ‘right-wing populism’ (Wodak, 2015; Müller, 2016). Yet this thesis argues, based on the arguments of Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (2018), that populism can occur on either axis of the political spectrum. As Judis (2016) argues, the difference between the two kinds, however, is that left-wing populism is rather ‘dyadic’, meaning that it focuses on the People versus the Elite. In contrast, right-wing populism is ‘triadic’: it adds a third out-group to the equation, in general immigrants, who are accused of receiving ‘special treatment’ by the Elites (Ibid.). Thus, in mainstream populism, to use Caiani’s term (2017: 8), ‘enemy politics’ becomes the new normal. Through triadic populism, hostility is directed towards the foreign Other, making the national, internal establishment (the party) equal to the national, ‘authentic People’ (Müller, 2016:4).

By directing anti-establishment rhetoric against liberal-democratic entities, mainstream populism calls into question the very notion of liberalism. Hence, if populists are powerful enough, liberal democracy becomes *disfigured* via mainstream populism. Supporting our claim, Urbinati (2014) argues that a populist democracy downplays a liberal conception of power limitation and the divisions of powers, via polarisation and simplification. This results in the kind of ‘illiberal democracy’ that Zakaria (1997) discusses, pointing out the contradictory nature of illiberal democracy: it gains power exactly because it is *democratic enough*, but once in power, it introduces measures that ignore constitutional limits and deprive individuals of their basic liberal freedoms (Ibid. 22). Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2012, in de Vreese et al, 2018: 424) definition of populism as a ‘corrective form and as a threat to democracy’ signal also populist politics’ inherent ties to and simultaneous tension with the democratic regime type. Similarly, the ‘democratic deficit’ (Caiani, 2017: 5) of illiberalism is confirmed by Zakaria (1997: 43) by arguing that democracy cannot exist in the long-run without constitutional liberalism and leads to the ‘erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even

war' (Ibid.). Thus, both populism and illiberalism are inherently connected to, but also in irresolvable conflict with representative, liberal democracy.

Yet it is important to highlight that Urbinati, Mudde and Kaltwasser and Zakaria regard the Western idea of liberal democracy as the *status quo*, something that exists *previous* to disfiguration. Contrary to the mentioned authors, this thesis is more concerned with illiberal, mainstream populism in a political framework where 'full' democracy has never been achieved, where a democratic framework was introduced exogenously on top of a political culture of distrust (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: 107). Post-soviet countries where populists have gained power, such as Hungary provide the perfect 'laboratory for illiberal populism' (Ibid. 42), as they were formally democratic, 'transitional democracies' (Levitsky and Way, 2001: 3), but their political culture and history made them susceptible to hybridisation that thrives on anti-Western rhetoric. And while right-wing populism is associated with de-democratisation in traditional liberal democratic regimes too (Stetter, 2019: 15), the damage of illiberal populism is arguably greater in regimes where the forces of democracy are not going to balance this deficit out.

The double logic of illiberal populism creates a unique framework: illiberalism 'attacks' constitutional freedoms and legal framework, while populism diverts individuals' attention from this power grab to enemy-figures to blame. Thus this thesis argues with Bozóki and Hegedűs's (2018: 1) claim that 'hybrid regimes need to be treated as a separate category to maintain conceptual clarity in the classification of political regimes'.

Within this category, it is argued that Levitsky and Way's (2001) term 'competitive authoritarianism' is accurate for setting up the context in which our analysis takes place. The

characteristics of such competitive authoritarian framework include making ‘competition real but unfair’ (Levitsky and Way, 2001: 3), thus not satisfying the condition of a ‘reasonably level playing field’ between incumbents and opposition (Ibid. 6). Civic liberties are frequently violated (Ibid. 8); legal repression is used to limit media and other independent actors (Ibid. 9). Levitsky and Way’s (2001: 10) definition of such ‘unlevel playing field’ are given by the following conditions:

1. *state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends;*
2. *incumbents are systematically favored at the expense of the opposition;*
3. *the opposition's ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped*
access to resources, media, and the law are handicapped.

Through the obscuration of checks and balances and the boundaries between state and party power, these criteria fundamentally define and limit the campaigning strategies available to an opposition in a hybrid setting. Overall, it can be argued that both populism and illiberalism thrive on the idea of a homogenous majority, the People, and thus are indifferent or hostile towards individual liberties. Oppositional politics is thus made difficult by 1, mainstream populists’ agenda-setting power 2, the lack of a ‘level playing field’ due to illiberal democratisation.

2.1.2. Populist identity frames

As this thesis is interested in the responses given to populism, it is key to define the level on which populism is understood. As Mouffe (2018) put it, we are living in the ‘populist moment’: it has become the buzzword of contemporary politics. Similarly to nationalism (Freedon, 1998), it is a ‘thin ideology’ (Mudde, 2004), easily attachable to either right-wing conservative or socialist ‘host ideologies’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: 98). Coupled with other elements such as nativism or xenophobia, populism can take up many different forms in different local or national contexts (Ibid.). Judis (2016) confirms the thinness of populism by arguing that ‘there is no common ideology that defines populism’. Instead, he understands populism solely as a

style of politics. Yet it is unclear how ‘style’ can be completely separate from the ideas it denotes. Likewise, Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2017: 98) conceptualisation of populism as a *form* of politics leaves aside the question of on what level (stylistic, discursive, policy) should populism be evaluated.

To fill in this often encountered gap, this thesis builds building on the view that ‘the study of populism is, ultimately, the study of social identity’ (Bos et al., 2020: 16). Given that the formation and expression of any identity, underpinned by the dichotomy of domination and resistance, begins on the level of discourse (Foucault, 1969), populism will be hereby treated as a communication phenomenon (Vreese et al., 2018). Kiss (2018: 9) notes that in today’s world, politicians compete on the level of agenda-setting instead of on the level of governance. Thus, today’s populism can be conceptualised as a rhetorical device to provoke a certain feeling of belonging and to conceal the concrete content of policy-making (Bischof and Senninger, 2018: 489).

Bischof and Senninger (2018: 489) also point out that ‘language is arguably the most important transmitter between political elites and the masses’: it is the vehicle through which the elite’s messages reach the wider public, hence Lukes’ (1974) third face of power, agenda-setting, is a crucial factor when it comes to evaluating the circumstances and possibilities of oppositional movements. Language, in return, becomes meaningful for the masses (the reader) through certain frames, or ‘cognitive instruments that allow one to make sense of the external reality’ (Snow and Benford, 1992 in Caiani, 2017: 7). Therefore, the understanding of framing strategies will be crucial to comprehend populists’ messages (Cammaerts, 2012: 119).

Bos et al. (2020) come up with the term ‘populist identity frames’, which are essentially certain typical populist messages (Mols, 2012 in Bos et al., 2020: 8) in which one’s social identity is

emphasised (Bos et al, 2020: 4). The authors have identified two kinds of ‘negative identity-building’ frames of populism: anti-elitist and exclusionist (usually anti-immigrant, at least on the right-end of the spectrum) identity-framing (Ibid. 3). The third element is the construction of a positive in-group image, one that people identify with and want to be part of (Tajfel and Turner, 1986 in Bos et al., 2020: 5). Combining these three components, they define populist identity frames as the ‘combination of in-group favouritism and out-group hostility’ (Bos et al., 2020: 5): this definition will provide the foundation for the identification of populist frames in this project.

It is important to note that both in-group favouritism and out-group hostility build on affective identities rather than on rational ones. The former values particularistic bonds over individual achievement (Etzioni, 2014: 129). While hostility implies enmification of the out-group, which in return, as Gerő et al. (2017: 17) note, ‘always involves strong feelings’ of anger and hatred, ‘pointing towards their dehumanization’. Silverstein (1989 in Ibid: 18) underlines that enemy images distort information processing, backing up the claim that when it comes to populist identity frames, emotions replace the role of rational logic. As these frames evoke reactive ‘paranoid identities’ (Borsi, 2019: 32), often through the episodic framing of issues (Iyengar, 1987) and the use of simplistic language, their messages become easier to process by the average individual (Bischof and Senninger, 2018: 474). It can be therefore argued that it is due to this double effect of *paranoid affect* and the *simplification of language* that populist identity frames are capable of re-politicising people’s identities and make them more likely to engage in collective action (Bos et al., 2020: 7).

2.1.3. *Progressive frames*

As Morin (2009 in Hillje, 2019: 91) points out, ‘in order to mitigate populism, ignoring it isn’t the best option’. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 119) assert that ‘the best way to deal with

populism is to engage (...) in an open dialogue with populist actors and supporters'. Yet it is unclear how this is feasible in a competitive-authoritarian setting where 'open dialogue' does not exist between the governing regime and the opposition per se. Bozóki (2019: 10) acknowledges that progressives must look for other tools to fight populists if this struggle takes place in a semi-authoritarian framework.

However, to evaluate the kind of messages that count as 'progressive' in such a setting, first, the meaning of the elusive term progressivism must be defined. A highly US-centric concept, that is often used with reference to two particular eras of history, the Enlightenment and the late 19th century (Walter, 2010; Rodgers, 1982), one might wonder, to what extent does it make sense to use it in relation to today's Europe? In accordance with Zeitz (2019), this thesis argues that it is possible and needed to talk about a new progressive movement, yet its definition is more complex than a single set of inflexible characteristics: its strength lies in responsiveness to new, context-dependent ideas. Typical liberal-progressive values today are social solidarity or sustainability, underpinned by the belief that progressive objectives shall be achieved through the inclusion of participatory-democratic processes (Offerein, 2018).

Yet in Central-Eastern Europe, due to the previously discussed processes of hybridisation, progressivism has increasingly 'become synonymous with instability, unpredictability, and precarity' (Fécamp, 2020) and with the demonised international, liberal-democratic elite. In order to redeem this perspective, progressive messages must respond to populism with new discursive toolkits.

Focusing on responding to the illiberal populist challenge in Central-Eastern Europe, Kuisz and Wigura (2020: 44) state that liberal progressives must acknowledge the increased role of

emotions in politics, something that they tend to reject having “learned” from the lessons of the 20th century. Thus an ‘alternative approach to emotions’ (Ibid. 46) is needed: an empathy-based narrative that translates society’s emotions of loss and grief into collectively processable feelings (Ibid. 47). Contrary to this approach, Kiss (2018: 7) argues that the way to tackle emotion- and narrative-centric politics is to all-together re-shift attention to ‘trust-based politics’, ignoring the significance of messages and narrative in today’s modern political communication. Without a strong and capturing narrative, there will be no public whose ‘trust’ progressives could build on.

According to Kuisz and Wigura (2020: 46), progressives should re-frame their narrative regarding the post-1989 past and future. In post-socialist countries, left-wing parties often portray the past 30 years as a period of unequivocal growth and prosperity, thereby signalling their connection to the West. In reality, this narrative is very distant from the experience of most individuals: there is a sense of nostalgia towards the predictable, late-socialist period (Ibid.), and this is what right-wing populists exploited and transformed into an ‘anti-liberal West’ message. Thus, the liberal elite must ‘embrace the many dualities and contradictions that mark the legacy of 1989’ and do not treat liberalism as a ‘complete success nor a pure failure’ (Ibid. 48).

Regarding the future, Kiss (2018: 86) criticises the progressive opposition in a Hungarian context for lacking a forward-looking vision. Kuisz and Wigura (2020: 52) reinsert this claim in a broader, Central European context. Their proposition that progressives and liberals should “give in” to methodological nationalism by crafting the vision of a ‘secure and affluent nation’ (Ibid.) means leaving behind internationalist rhetoric and reimagining national belonging (Boros, 2019: 44). Etzioni (2018: 127) also criticises progressives for becoming ‘globalists’ and

ignore inequalities within their local, national contexts. Somewhat compromised, Hillje (2019: 67) proposes that the liberal opposition should advocate an ‘onion identity’, focusing primarily on the local, secondary on a global dimension of social equality. Having a strong, future-oriented, both development and inclusion-friendly ecological agenda could realise this ‘act local, think global’ perspective, Kuisz and Wigura (2020: 52) note. However, the opposition must act fast before illiberal populists ‘pick and mix’ (Smith, 2013: 45) green politics into their agenda.

Overall, the sampled literature suggests that progressive framing in today’s Central Europe must emphasise the role of emotions in political processes, create an alternative, inclusive notion of the nation instead of avoiding the topic of national realignment, and include a strong green agenda.

2.2. Strategies and Political Opportunities

2.2.1. Political opportunities

Beyond messages, new political strategies are also needed to combat competitive authoritarian processes. Or as Kuisz and Wigura (2020: 42) argue, ‘the factors that have enabled triumphs by the political opponents of ruling populists’ are essential to explore in order to battle illiberal populism.

First, the concept of political opportunity structures (POS) should be noted. Meyer and Minkoff (2004: 1458) define POS as ‘exogenous factors (that) enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy’. Their definition highlights that there is often an interaction between social

activism and institutional politics. Tarrow's (1994: 85) conceptualisation of POS as 'consistent - but not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure', bring our attention to how an overall political culture and atmosphere can affect one's perception of opportunities (Caiani, 2017: 9).

Furthermore, Tarrow (1994) notes that in order to act upon a PO, one has to actually *perceive* such an opportunity. However, he claims that actors might also perceive a non-existent PO, leading to the failure of mobilisation (Ibid.). Thus, Tarrow understands the success of a movement narrowly: if protest or mobilisation does not result in immediate success – a success that is perceived from outside the movement – it can be retrospectively blamed for having acted “in the wrong time”. Meyer and Minkoff's (2004: 1462) distinction between ‘opportunities for policy reform’ and ‘opportunities for political mobilization’ favours the view that not all POS serve the goal of directly reforming policy (thus immediate success), thereby offering space for more inclusive understandings of the concept.

Moreover, participants of the movement must perceive collective action as something that has more benefits than costs, in order to overcome Olson's (1965) collective action dilemma. This may be achieved through the effective mobilisation of ‘collective action frames’ (Tarrow, 1994: 24) that help building identity and solidarity within the movement. This is done, according to Tarrow, through the threefold process of giving context about the word, help to make the (artificial) division between Us and Them, and activating powerful emotions. Seemingly, these frames prioritise outward-looking elements of identity, by which they become susceptible to adopting an enemy-based approach to mobilisation.

This thesis complements the discussed approaches by exploring whether more inward-looking, endogenous elements of identity-building are also capable of mobilisation, as well as the role of cognitive frames that can be realised through the *bottom-up* creation of discursive, cultural (Caiani, 2017: 9) or networked POS (Cammaerts, 2012: 119), which are to be discussed in the following subsection.

2.2.2. *Oppositional identities and coordination*

From the opposition's perspective, a hybrid regime makes them face high levels of uncertainty (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011: 74). The power of an enduring competitive authoritarian regime lies in its ability to alter people's view of what the role of the opposition is (Ibid. 61), thus the discussion of their role and opportunities is crucial to subsequent analysis. The question arises, what makes individuals to form a cohesive opposition, even if they are likely to be deemed as 'unworthy of support' (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011: 61) when facing a powerful illiberal authority?

Theories on oppositional objectives and group dynamics suggest that oppositional entities need a strong *esprit de corps*, 'the sense people have of belonging together and of being identified with one another in a common undertaking' (Blumer, 1951: 203 in Edwards, 2004: 27) in order to survive unsuccessful political periods. One could assume that in a context where the chances for success are minimal, *esprit de corps* plays a heightened role – being 'oppositional' becomes a major part of one's identity. Similarly, Tarrow (1994: 210) urges the need for 'interpersonal networks' within organisations, which survive even when the association formally does not. In a political climate where strategic cooperation is frequent yet especially volatile, these 'trust networks' (Tilly, 2005) are essential for the creation of a long-term oppositional strategy. However, based on Tarrow's (1994: 221) claim, one can argue that competitive authoritarianism impacts negatively the formation of 'social bonds' within the opposition, given

the elections' high volatility. Instead, it encourages cooperation based on 'transaction networks': professional, short-term, goal-oriented coalitions that do not survive long periods of disappointment (Ibid.), making the survival of a strong and unified oppositional entity in a hybrid regime unlikely, pointing us in a pessimistic direction regarding the possibility that the municipal cooperation of the Hungarian opposition can be extended to a national level.

Apart from a strong sense of identity, Laclau (2005 in Judis, 2016) claims that what holds together an underdog coalition is 'a set of specific demands that represent a larger end'. It is exactly this absence of clear aims that the (post-socialist) oppositional elite is criticised for; as Bunce and Wolchik argue (2011: 61), they tend to be 'short on policy' and 'self-destructive'. Lacking a democratic past, leaders have little understanding of the public, making the creation of a cohesive political programme or strategy more difficult. But is it a more policy-oriented approach, or a more strategic cooperation strategy – or both – that is needed from the opposition in a framework that is solely based on strategic decisions (Kiss, 2018)? Evaluating this question will be crucial throughout our analysis.

2.2.2.1. Electoral cooperation

Levitsky and Way (2001: 7) argue that while competitive authoritarians seriously limit competition by manipulating state institutions and resources, democratic procedures remain 'sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power'. This statement answers the question of *why* oppositional movements are still formed within this context: 'opposition leaders believe they have at least some chance of victory' (Ibid.12). Thus, there are still some (right or wrongfully) perceived POS in this framework of hybrid competition. But how does this setting alter the logic of political opportunity structures exactly? Literature highlights the increased significance of coalition formation in electoral contexts.

2.2.2.1.1. Cooperation as a top-down strategy

As Tocqueville (1856, in Tarrow, 1994: 157) asserts, ‘the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways’. Based on this view, one would assume that hybrid regimes would be extremely vulnerable to change, given their relative openness. Van de Walle (2006 in Wahman, 2013: 7) note that elections in nondemocratic regimes are like a ‘tipping game’ for the opposition, due to the system’s high unpredictability. Bunce and Wolchik (2011: 50) point out that elections can act as agents of political change; for Schedler, (2002 in Wahman, 2013: 4) they constitute a momentum when existing rules are under particularly high contestation. Having recognised the importance of elections, we may assert that it is in the interest of oppositional parties to form strategic cooperations. Wahman (2013) tests out whether such tactic oppositional coordination can “create” democratisation by elections. He concludes that while coordinated oppositional parties were more likely to win elections, the positive effect of coalitions was short-lived and had a relatively low impact (Ibid. 32).

Wahman (2013) and Van de Walle (2006) are also interested in whether coordinated oppositional success is a result of the weakening of the regime or of a real democratisation process achieved by cooperation strategies. However, his observations point us to a Tarrowian approach of political opportunity, as they find that coordination was likely to be the result of a sign of clear instability within the regime, due to which leading politicians defected and contested the election ‘on an opposition ticket’ (Ibid. 7). Confirming Tarrow’s emphasis on *perception*, their theories hold that regime instability only resulted in democratic change if the opposition recognised the instability and in return, created a credible alternative vision to that of the incumbent (Ibid.).

2.2.2.1.2. Cooperation as a bottom-up strategy

In contrast, Bunce and Wolchik (2011) argue that POS can be created from below; what matters is whether the opposition is ‘ready to defeat’ the regime, through the use of ‘novel and sophisticated strategies’ (Ibid. 47). In the analysed regimes, they find the presence of a certain ‘despotism dilemma’, meaning that increasing centralisation and display of power might actually backfire in a hybrid system; growing repression might be understood as a growing weakness – that they have no tools left – by the public (Ibid. 53). Thus, in this framework, due to the delicate dynamics of constitutional balancing, sometimes ‘weakening’ is not as easy to perceive as Tarrow (1994) suggests. This further supports the suggestion that hybrid mechanisms are uncertain and difficult to interpret. Moreover, their claim that ‘politics isn’t a zero-sum game’ (Ibid. 62) points out a flaw with Tarrow’s argumentation: even if the regime’s popularity decreases, the opposition’s popularity will not just automatically increase.

Therefore, in contrast with the structuralist perspective on POS, Bunce and Wolchik emphasise the role of agency in acting upon opportunities. The opposition has to come up with an effective strategy, often involving the cooperation of oppositional and civil groups, the use of public opinion polls, compromise, and perhaps most importantly, ambitious campaigns (Ibid. 51). Their research finds that optimism is key for success: believing in an unlikely victory can create a general aura of positivity that trickles down to the public and civil society organisations (Ibid. 71), contributing to large-scale electoral mobilisation. The latter approach provides one of the central theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. It shows that the analysis of underdog players of the political arena is *needed* in order to understand political opportunities and the dynamics of electoral success in a hybrid framework; that threats and opportunities are not always external to a movement.

2.3. Overview and Missing Links

Overall, this review set out to interlink the topics of illiberal populism, progressivism and political opportunities and strategies in a hybrid regime. Through relevant literature, it has been argued that populism's mainstream appearance tends to coincide with political illiberalism, resulting in a hybrid regime. Populism has been defined as a primarily discursive identity-based phenomenon and contrasted with progressivism. Finally, key aspects of political opportunity literature was discussed with regards to hybridisation.

Gaps in literature were pointed out throughout the review, summarised as follows:

Western authors tend to evaluate populism from a strictly democratic perspective. Its particular susceptibility to actually influence *regime type* is often under-emphasised. Therefore, this project aims to pay attention to the intersecting outcome of mainstream populism and hybridisation, resulting in *illiberal populism*. Moreover, this thesis proposes the view of populism as a certain *social identity frame*, that is expressed through language.

'Progressive' strategies to battle right-wing populism make little mention of the fact their responses to right-wing mainstream populism are often *adaptive*, meaning that they actually take populist communicative elements (the use of emotions, appeal to the people) and try to present them in a different light. The question, however, remains, to what extent can inward-looking, empathy-based social identity frames be as powerful as mainstream populism's typically enemy-based narratives? Is this context-dependent? In Chapter 4, these theoretical questions will be discussed with reference to the concrete cases.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the project's main research questions, the logic of case selection, its integrated use of critical approaches to social identity mobilisation, the limitations of the research and the researcher's position.

3.1. Methodological background

Throughout the analysis, sampled data and evidence from the semi-structured interviews were evaluated from the perspective of the following explorative research questions and assumptions. On the one hand, these questions can be understood as part of a confirmatory, hypothesis-testing study, as they combine theories from social movement studies and populism studies and test them in an empirical situation (Rohlfing, 2012: 10). On the other hand, this research shall be rather considered as an explorative study, where the researcher 'gives an explanation to explain (...) a segment of reality given her positionality' (Reiter, 2017: 142). This view proposes a 'more modest view of reality' and acknowledges that hypotheses can never be proven "true": instead, it 'asks how much a theory and a hypothesis can explain, how well it can explain it, or how meaningful and fruitful an explanation is' (Ibid. 144). Our research questions thus act as guiding forces that aid in 'assessing the feasibility' (Hallingberg et al., 2018: 4) of underlying theory-based assumptions, with the overall goal to approach the topic of oppositional identities from a new perspective (Swedberg, 2018: 21).

3.2. Research questions

***RQ1:** What kind of social identity frames were mobilised by the selected campaigns of the opposition? Were these more outward- or inward-looking, more 'populist' or 'progressive'?*

Based on the theoretical foundations of the project, 'populist' social identity frames were identified if they met the criteria of Bos et al.'s (2020: 5) conditions of 'in-group favouritism',

and/or ‘out-group hostility’: if there was a strong presence of either anti-elitist, exclusionist elements of discourse, or if the logic of mobilisation was built on the antagonistic conflict between an imaginary Us and Them. In contrast, ‘progressive’ identity frames were identified if the discursive or strategic elements of the campaigns built on issues of social equality, solidarity, ecology; as well as if they have presented in-group identity as an inclusive, location-based collective instead of a selective, value- or ideology-driven entity.

RQ2: *To what extent was bottom-up political opportunity creation achieved by the selected campaigns, through ‘innovative’ strategies? Or have they relied on the exogenous opening of POS, thus on ‘adaptive’ strategies?*

RQ2 is based on the discussed structuralist versus agency-driven approach to POS, based on Bunce and Wolchik’s (2011) and Tarrow’s (1994) research respectively. It must be emphasised that whether certain specific types of campaigning strategies belong to innovative or adaptive cannot be evaluated without understanding the context in which they operate in. For instance, door-to-door campaigning can be seen as innovative if the incumbent had a strong support base, yet rarely visited residents in person and did not even live in the district, like in the case of the VIII. district. In return, an adaptive strategy could be the I. district’s targeted advertising of scandals related to the previous mayor, as it relies on an external condition.

RQ3: *To what extent the identities mobilised within the opposition cooperation can provide the basis for long-term, higher-level coalitions?*


RQ3 is a secondary research question addressed at the end of the analysis. It is based on the assumption that ‘interpersonal trust networks’ (Tilly, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2000) that cut across party fragmentation is needed in order to sustain recurring cooperation. Based on strategic bonds solely, coalition acts as a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, where cooperating is at this point more beneficial than ‘cheating’. Yet, there is no guarantee that in

the next round, parties do not choose to defect (Kuhn, 1997). Pinpointing the aspects of the campaigns that mobilised long-term identities enhances the generalisability of our findings, as the presence of the same elements could be evaluated in consequent electoral contexts.

3.3. Case Selection

The research was carried out by the slight modification of Rohlfsing's (2012) framework for qualitative, small-N case studies: it formulates concepts (Chapter 2), selects cases (Chapter 3), conducts exploratory analysis (Chapter 4 and 6) and re-evaluates the exploratory research questions (Chapter 6) (Reiter, 2017).


The units of analysis are the two campaigns (understood as entities comprising relevant actors, their relations, discursive outputs and actions) of the opposition coordination formed leading up to the municipal elections of Hungary in 2019: *Várunk (I. district)* and *I Love Nyolc (VIII. district)*. Case selection was determined based on Gerring's (2008) 'most similar approach', meaning that *typical* cases were selected that, based on the researcher's assumption, were most likely demonstrate the project's hypothesised x-y relationships. As shown in *Figure 1* below, 'oppositional campaign' represents X and 'victory of oppositional campaign' represents Y. From a confirmatory perspective, we are interested here are the two kinds of Z-s, or within-case mechanisms, that have resulted in the cross-case effect of electoral victory. The two opposing within-case mechanisms (that include multiple strategies respectively) can be understood as political opportunity creation (z1) versus exogenous political opportunity perception and realisation (z2).



1. Figure: Possible within-case mechanisms in relation to RQ2.

Furthermore, tracing the specific strategies of each campaign raises the possibility of pattern matching, “whereby several pieces of information from the same case” were connected to a theoretical proposition (Yin, 2002: 26 in Nagy, 2019: 9) possibly fitting into a broader context of political opportunity creation and perception (Ibid.).

Related to RQ3, Figure 2 conceptualises a cross-case objective in the research as well, where X is the strategy of opposition cooperation and Y in oppositional victory on a municipal level. In this new perspective, the project is interested whether the causal effect would hold true in other, cross-case comparisons.



2. Figure: Cross-case relevance (RQ3).

The temporal scope of the research is approximately six months, preceding the elections. Our spatial dimension is bound to the I. and VIII. districts of Budapest, Hungary. Given the focus on oppositional movements, rather than on pre-institutionalised entities, the analysis is bound by informal procedures instead of formal electoral processes only.

3.4. Contextual Analysis

The circumstances in which language and actions are explored must be taken into account (Gerim, 2020: 7) for sufficient analysis. Or as Goodin and Tilly (2006: 5) assert, ‘context matters’: ‘it gives an aura of understanding’, a meaning to events (Apter, 2006: 780). The contextual analysis thus relies on the assumption that ‘historical, institutional, cultural, demographic, technological, psychological, ideological’ relations of power underpin the answers to our research questions (Goodin and Tilly, 2006: 6). The project does not aim to establish a causal relationship between the ideas preceding an event (context/history) and the analysed actions, however, their evaluation can provide an ‘analytic starting point for understanding the elements of that relationship in any specific case’ (Hochschild, 2006: 293).


Based on McGraw’s (2006: 144) approach, according to which the ‘systematic consideration of the properties of individuals and properties of the situation, separately and in combination, can be a fruitful strategy’ for analysis, this thesis will briefly address the context of leading figures of the two campaigns (profile-analysis), and in more detail the campaigns themselves via campaign materials and interview-based evidence.

The compatibility of a context-analytical approach with this project lies in its assumption that ‘aspects of identity are influenced by situational factors’ (Ibid.): context gives feedback to the individual regarding whether to keep up their respective social identities (Ibid. 142). The more one is committed to a group, the more likely to identify with its identity even when the group is threatened in the short-run (Ibid.). Thus our understanding of populism and progressivism as social identity frames, and of mobilisation strategies as political opportunities that require commitment from the individual to a certain social identity, is highly compatible with this research perspective.

3.5. Semi-structured interviews

To support the context analysis, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted in person with members of the I. and VIII. district campaigns, lasting about 60 minutes each. These were carried out in Hungarian and transcribed manually. A prototype of questions can be found in the *Appendix*. In the I. district, three interviews were conducted, with newly elected mayor Márta V. Naszályi, deputy mayor Ferenc Gelencsér, and former campaign leader Olivér Pilz. In the VIII. district, two interviews were conducted in person, with communications coordinator Dr. Zsófia Nagy and deputy mayor Dr. Gábor Erőss. A short online conversation took place with campaign leader Tessza Udvarhelyi for further background evidence. The interviews were carried out in Hungarian and transcribed manually.

Then, interviews were processed by the cloud-based research tool *Dovetail*, which allows for the systematic storage, categorisation and coding of qualitative evidence. The summary of identified tags can be found in the *Appendix*. Within these tags, emphasis was put on the distribution and comparison of ‘Messages’, ‘Strategies’, ‘Other contributing factors’ and ‘Online media’s role’. The radar chart generated based on the frequency of the researcher’s manual tagging, is displayed below, suggesting that strategies and messages will deserve a more in-detail analysis compared to the other two identified factors. Due to lack of space, the role of online media was omitted from the discussion.



3. Figure: The frequency of 4 types of tags compared, Dovetail (2020).

All steps of the interview process were executed in accordance with CEU's Ethical Research Policy (2010). Consent was obtained from all interviewees prior to the meeting; they were informed of the objective of the interview beforehand and were given the option to stop the voice recording any time. The information said during non-recorded times were not included in the research. The transcription of the interviews are available upon request.

3.6. Discourse Analysis

The approach of contextual analysis carries similar foundational traits to the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis. Both rely on a critical perspective to qualitative evidence, are interested in the *interpretation* of dimensions of power underlying actions and texts and believe in the idea of 'situatedness': that structured knowledge must be analysed with reference to its context (Wodak, 2015: 50). Therefore, this thesis also adopts methods from the discourse-historical approach (DHA). As defined by Wodak (2015: 52), 'it looks at a set of context-dependent semiotic practises' related to a broader, macro-topic. It is specifically used to explore the

semiotic ways in which ‘positive self- and negative other-presentations’ are constructed and made powerful (Ibid.) through language, making the method relevant to answering RQ1.

The multidisciplinary approach taken by this thesis allows us to combine insights from contextual analysis, semi-structured interviews and discourse-historical analysis into sophisticated qualitative research design. Interviews evaluate the relations of power and meanings behind actors and actions. DHA complements the primary findings by textual evidence, through sampled visual material. At the end of each subsection, findings were visualised.

3.7. Limitations of the project

While the integration of different research methods and traditions celebrates the value of multidisciplinary, it must be accounted that this might imply a trade-off in the depth and unity of the research. Secondly, the degree to which evidence from diverging methods can be combined to support a mutual claim is questionable, given their distinctive theoretical underpinnings highlighted in the previous subsection. Thirdly, given their critical and interpretive nature, our methodological foundations raise the issue of subjectivity. However, this objection holds true for all studies with an interpretative element, thus for all exploratory and qualitative traditions (Bryman, 2012: 405 in Gerim, 2020: 57). Nevertheless, the role of transparency in order to battle subjectivity is acknowledged and respected (Gerim, 2020: 57).

A final limitation of this project arises from its small N comparative nature: the necessary tradeoff between the generalisability and validity of findings (Rohlfing, 2012). As the study explores two very specific cases in detail relying on highly context-dependent methods, its findings are bound to score low on generalisability. Furthermore, one might raise the criticism

that the validity of the project's findings can be undermined by source coverage bias (Saez-Trumper et al., 2013), meaning that data was sampled in an arbitrary way to prove our findings. Again, in the case of qualitative research designs, this issue can only be tackled by the transparent tracing of each analytical step.

3.8. Ethical considerations

As Jacobs and Büthe (2019: 22) note, the standard of research transparency, fundamental to political science, is more compatible to some understandings of knowledge-production than with others; it supposes that there is some sort of objective truth that becomes closer to attain if one makes transparent research decisions. Rejecting the notion of transparency, however, would be false, both from an ethical stance and from the point of replicability as well (Ibid.).

With this in mind, it is important to note the researcher's particular relation to the I. district campaign. The researcher worked as a volunteer social media assistant for the last 2 months of the campaigning period, meaning that she had taken part in the online production of discursive material. However, it should be emphasised that the researcher was never in a position to make strategic decisions regarding any of the analysed output. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the writer's pre-existing knowledge of the I. district campaign has contributed to the case selection decision of this thesis.

CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

4.1. The Hungarian mayoral electoral system and the oppositional primary

Before the detailed analysis of the two districts, a few words should be said about the overall electoral framework and outcomes in which the municipal victory of these two oppositional mayors took place. On the one hand, it must be noted that overall, Fidesz's mayoral candidates received more votes than in the previous elections, both in Budapest and in cities with county rights (László and Molnár, 2019: 3). Moreover, it has been shown that the smaller a settlement is in Hungary, the more popular Fidesz gets (Ibid. 2). On the other hand, the increase of Fidesz-related votes did not necessarily result in their winning of a mandate, due to the opposition's effective cooperation, the success of which is also represented by the election of Karácsony as lord mayor. According to László and Molnár (2019: 3), the possibility of an oppositional victory on a capital-level has given a boost to the rest of the coordination's micro-campaigns, mainly in the Budapest districts.

It is worth pointing out that an important change in the way in which members of the Budapest Council are elected came into practice in 2014: the constitutionally debated modification allows for the gaining of absolute majority control even if only having a relative majority in the Council (László and Molnár, 2019: 19). While this law hinders a fragmented opposition's chances at governing on a capital level, a united opposition can clearly profit from it. However, as in 2014, the opposition's cooperation was solely partial (did not include Jobbik or LMP) and only focused on the capital, the desired breakthrough did not take place (Ibid. 20). Yet, the conclusion that next time, an all-encompassing cooperation is needed in order to have a chance of gaining a majority was clear.

Thus, it is within the context of these preceding events that the opposition decided to hold a two-round primary on the level of the capital, in which major oppositional parties (Momentum, Párbeszéd, MSZP, and DK) participated (Mérce.hu, 2019). LMP and Jobbik, who originally supported the independent candidate Róbert Puzsér, withdrew from participating in the second, deciding round of the primary (Gaál, 2019), yet Puzsér has still decided to run for lord mayor, threatening the outcome by a spoiler effect (Ibid.). In the end, Karácsony won and gained a majority in the Budapest Council. Moreover, 14 out of 23 districts were won by oppositional candidates (Mérce.hu, 2019), including the analysed I. and VIII. districts, signalling their strategic cooperation's effectiveness.

4.2. Districts' profile

As the former campaign leader of the VIII. district campaign, Tessza Udvarhelyi notes in the pocket guidebook 'The District is Everyone's' – *A Kerület Mindenkié* (2017: 20), in order to build a successful bottom-up local movement, one has to know 'where they are'. With other words, what counts as an 'effective' campaigning strategy largely depends on circumstantial factors, such as the socio-demographic composition of the analysed territory and local relations of power. Their evaluation contributes to our understanding of *why* certain messages and strategies were preferred to others and bring us a step closer to understanding the strategic disparities between I. and VIII. district campaigns.

4.2.1. The 'Castle District' (I.)

The I. district is a prosperous, 'elite' district, rich in culture and tradition: it incorporates and is known from the Buda Castle, 'surrounded by history' (Naszályi, 2020). It has a population of ca. 25000 people, within which the dominant age group is the elderly (Varga-Kovács, 2015). An integral part of Budapest's centre, the district plays a significant role in international tourism: its architecture attracts visitors to the Castle, and its natural qualities to the areas of

Tabán or Gellért hill (Bezerédy-Herald et al., 2015) and historical heritage of Krisztinaváros and Víziváros (Varga-Kovács, 2015). Most of its educational and cultural institutions perform higher than average by regional standards (Ibid.). As deputy mayor Ferenc Gelencsér describes, it is a ‘more bourgeois place’ than many areas of the more diverse and left-leaning Pest side of the city. Indeed, its average income per capita district exceeds the capital’s average: just as in the surrounding XII. and II. districts, the middle- and upper-middle classes are overrepresented (Újbuda.hu, 2014).

Tradition, safety, order, stability: these are the words that come to people’s mind when talking about the district, former campaign leader Olivér Pilz mentions. Perhaps, it is then not surprising that the district had the same mayor since 1989: Fidesz-member Tamás Gábor Nagy. Pilz refers to a poll carried out by TÁRKI (2019), which showed that most voters in the district saw the former mayor as a competent, but corrupt politician. ‘Corruption has always been in the air’, newly elected mayor Naszályi explains: ‘For the past 20 years, this district has been led by a mafia government, which has trampled many people into the ground’. Indeed, much of the national news concerning the I. district – besides its tourism – has centred around the topics of the corruption scandals around municipally-owned housing expropriated by Fidesz-related oligarchs in the elite Castle area. Pilz underlines that post-1989, people in Hungary could buy their rented flats from the municipality, but not in the Castle, because they count as monuments, thus the system of ‘heritable leasing agreements’ have come into force. This is the system that has given the opportunity for influential individuals to rent for minimal fees, inherit or even swap valuable flats – giving ground for the opaque distribution of flats to friends in high places. Moreover, the district has recently been in the spotlight given the government’s so-called ‘Hausmann-plan’: the regime’s gradual move to the Castle since 2019. The themes of rental corruption and the government’s move to the Castle both imply an ideological dimension.

Given that the ‘there are no largely underdeveloped areas in the district – most things work just fine’ (Pilz, 2020), this value-driven approach to campaigning will be key.

Finally, when it comes to pre-elections electoral dynamics, Pilz and Naszályi share some crucial insights. The whole campaign was built on the antecedent of the 2018 parliamentary elections, they explain: in the district, LMP-member Antal Csárdi won a mandate, beating Fidesz’s candidate. Naszályi, who was also running for the position, resigned from candidacy in order to unite oppositional voters. Thus, even though seen as a ‘Fidesz-loyal district’ (Naszályi, 2020), there have been more opposition-leaning voters than Fidesz voters, even in 2018. ‘We only had to mobilise those who have already voted for us once’, Pilz points out. Yet, the residents’ overall value-orientation is conservative: even though Naszályi and 8 out of 10 candidates of the opposition won in the municipal elections, the district as a whole favoured former Tarlós than the opposition’s candidate for lord mayor (Valasztas.hu, 2019), as shown on *Table 1* on page 37. This was something that the candidates of the opposition have expected (Gelencsér, 2020), thus positioned themselves accordingly.

4.2.2. ‘Josefstadt’ (VIII.)

The VIII. district, or *Józsefváros*, is located on the Pest side and is a heterogeneous area with more than 78000 residents (Horváth, 2019). It is a central, physically often rundown, ethnically and culturally diverse district, whose different parts develop with a different speed (Közélet Iskolája, (2017: 20). Its population comprises the lower middle class scared of slipping a step down on the ladder of social mobility, successful entrepreneurs, and extremely underprivileged, socially vulnerable groups of society (Ibid.). Approximately 40 percent of the district’s population are of Roma origin (Csatlós, 2018). Social segregation is high and present in education: nationally renowned secondary schools and institutions with low attractiveness and ‘bad reputation’ function in parallel, with almost zero interoperability (Baranyai et al., 2018).

The greatest issues in the district are the lack of resources and consequent lack of safe housing (Közélet Iskolája, 2020: 21). Given these qualities, there are many social institutions in the district, primarily homeless shelters and charitable organisations (Ibid. 22.). There are more than 1100 municipally owned flats in the district that are deemed as inhabitable (Pikó in Partizán, 2019). Similarly to the I. district's issue, there has been a lack of transparent application processes for municipally-owned rental flats (Közélet Iskolája, 2017: 22). Moreover, procedures of the district's governance 'often go against the law; the representatives' board meetings often do not allow civil participants to speak and are hostile to oppositional speakers', Közélet Iskolája writes in 2017 (Ibid. 23). Finally, the authors highlight how difficult it is to do organise something bottom-up in a place where the 'appearance of democracy' is kept up through the creation of "fake" civil associations in areas of the district: as these bodies never criticise any of the local policies, they block the grounds for a democratic discussion (Ibid.).

In contrast with the I. district's stable leadership, the VIII. district has faced sudden changes in the distribution of powers, even though these changes rarely resulted in oppositional leaders' victory. In 2017, an interim election took place in the Magdolna-area of the district, won by Fidesz-member Péterné Sántha (Józsefváros.hu, 2017). However, civil candidate Márta Bolba also participated in the elections, whose campaign has given the foundations for András Pikó's 2019 campaign (Udvarhelyi in Partizán, 2019). Moreover, in 2018, former mayor Máté Kocsis has won a seat in parliament under Fidesz's colours, thus an interim election for the mayor's position was announced. Even though won by Sára Botond (Fidesz), the conclusions of this campaign have also shaped the practices of the 2019 elections, Erőss adds, who supported Péter Győri (MSZP) in the former campaign.

In the VIIIth, it is not so much the ideological values that matter, but that people 'deserve leadership that actually lives there and listens to their problems', Dr Zsófia Nagy,

communications coordinator of the campaign asserts. This will be also one of the most important messages of the civil-oppositional team throughout the campaign: we are *One of You*. There was a great synergy with the opposition's Budapest campaign, which is clear from votes for lord mayor Karácsony, who has won 648 more votes than his opponent Tarlós in the district, as *Table 1* displays below.

	SUM of Tarlós	SUM of Karácsony	SUM of Puzsér	SUM of Berki	All votes	Percentage of Tarlós	Percentage of Karácsony
Budapest 01.	6 032	5 917	589	39	12 577	47,96%	47,05%
Budapest 08.	10 321	10 969	1 279	126	22 695	45,48%	48,33%

1. Table: Votes for lord mayor candidates in the I. and VIII. districts, based on data from Választás.hu

4.3. Mayor-candidates' profile

4.3.1. Márta V Naszályi

Originally a landscape architect, mayor Márta V Naszályi started her political career in the green party LMP's (*Lehet Más a Politika*) local unit in 2009. From 2010, she has been a representative of the I. district municipal council, thus her profile in the district was well-known by 2019, Pilz explains. A close colleague of the newly elected lord mayor, both Naszályi and Karácsony are founding members of the new Hungarian progressive party 'Dialogue' (*Párbeszéd*). *Párbeszéd* is supposed to fill in a 'vacuum' on the Hungarian left: as Győri et al. (2020: 28) note, this small party can be considered as the 'biggest winner' of the municipal elections, given the successes of Karácsony and Naszályi.

A mother of 3, Naszályi describes her motives for becoming a local politician as 'wanting to create a "green palace" out of the I. district: 'if I do not do it, no one will', she adds. As a politician of *Párbeszéd*, she can be ideologically located on the progressive left. In the interview, she mentions 'progressivism' multiple times, describing it as 'a forward-looking perspective that is not afraid to experiment with new solutions to issues, that does not accept

the axioms of old habits’. She considers ecology, universal basic income and solidarity as key progressive topics. Even though a primarily local politician, she believes that ‘there are issues where I must express myself beyond my local orientation, as a responsible citizen and as a political figure’.

One might wonder, how can such a strongly left-leaning candidate succeed in such a ‘traditional’ district? According to Naszályi, just because the Castle is built on tradition, it does not mean it rejects innovation: ‘In history, the greatest ideas never came from the periphery. They could be realised where there were power and resources, where the politicians realised the calling of the future’. Yet campaign leader Pilz adds that while Naszályi ‘is progressive, but also a local, Christian, empathetic mother with a large family (*nagycsaládos*)’; values that the more traditional voters of the district could also sympathise with. It is then not surprising, that the survey carried out by TÁRKI (2019, referenced by Pilz, 2020) shows that in August 2019, Naszályi was less known for her past achievements as a local representative and more for her ‘personal’ qualities as a ‘green, humanist, compassionate’ individual, while residents tended to trust the former mayor as a more ‘competent, experienced’ leader. These personal versus public associations can also carry a gendered connotation in which the ‘female’ is often recognised for its ‘domestic’ traits (Armstrong, 1987).

Naszályi’s relationship to party politics is ambiguous: even though her value-system signals a clear party orientation, she thinks of herself as a local figure, whose role as a mayor should not be tainted by party fragmentation. Hence her choice to virtually never mention Fidesz by name in her speeches: ‘When I repeat the names Orbán and Fidesz in the media, I not only contribute to these names being even more memorised by the public but also, I then speak as a party politician. Instead, I want to be seen as a municipal politician’. While she ‘believes in plural

democracy and does not want to alienate or stigmatise Fidesz-voters’, Naszályi (2020) also strongly asserts that ‘this regime must be replaced’.

4.3.2. *András Pikó*

In contrast to Naszályi, András Pikó, former journalist at the independent radio station *Klubrádió*, presents himself as a civil, ‘everyday guy’ (Pikó in Partizán, 2019). Even though he was a member of the former liberal party SZDSZ (Nagy, 2019) and worked as a communication coordinator for the 2018 Győri campaign (Udvarhelyi, 2020), Pikó never held a formal political position and ran as a civil candidate (supported by Momentum). Nevertheless, he has been active in local issues in the past 5 years and was among the founding members of the civil group C8 (*Civilians for Józsefváros*) at the core of the 2019 campaign (Udvarhelyi, 2020). Both his local and his intellectual network played a big role in the putting together of the campaign team, deputy mayor Erőss notes. Pikó put everything up for winning the elections, or as communications coordinator Dr Nagy put it ‘he has burnt his boats, left his entire career behind for this’.

As Pikó himself was not available for an interview, his profile is constructed based on his team members’ accounts. Presented as ‘the cycling mayor’ (*a bicikliző polgármester*), Pikó is perceived as a down-to-earth figure, who ‘wears his heart on his sleeve’ (Nagy, 2020). Both Udvarhelyi (in Partizán, 2019) and Nagy (2020) note that as Pikó had no previous experience in politics, ‘he truly could only say what he really meant’ and ‘he never had to make bad compromises in order to win’. Thereby his representation as an honest, reliable, caring man was central to the campaign. Ideologically left-leaning, As a politician, Pikó is considered as ‘more of a liberal than a progressive personage’ than his I. district counterpart Naszályi (Erőss, 2020). Erőss further stresses the ideological differences between Pikó and his party *Párbeszéd* by

arguing that ‘Pikó represents the continuity of the Hungarian left’ thus does not completely break away with the post-1989 liberal elite.

A key aspect of Pikó’s past is that as a member of *Heti Betevő*, a charity that cooks for those in need, he was helped refugees during the ‘crisis’ of 2015 in Hungary (Bogatin, 2019). In an interview given to Origo.hu (Koncz and Polyák, 2015), he says that ‘refugees count as people in need just as much as the Hungarian underprivileged, we cannot make a difference in their support’. Opinions like this could not be found today without a negative commentary on Origo.hu, which ‘has gradually transformed into a satellite platform of Fidesz’ (Borsi, 2019: 15). During the campaign, Pikó’s posters were damaged and covered by an ‘I Love...Refugees and the Homeless’ sign (Bogatin, 2019). Nagy notes that ‘people told us to be quiet about Pikó’s past, but instead, we chose to be loud and proud of his actions – this was seen as risky, but it worked’, reiterating the honest atmosphere of their campaign.

Pikó’s relationship to party-politics is complex. ‘He is both a civil and a party candidate, he speaks to both groups of society’, Erőss concludes. At the same time, as Nagy highlights, ‘Pikó could be the candidate of the opposition in the district given the (poor) state of the local opposition’. This duality of activists and party members was central to the campaign as a whole, in which ‘civils led, parties assisted’ (Udvarhelyi, in Partizán, 2019). When it comes to Fidesz, Pikó does not follow Naszályi’s logic of ‘don’t think of an elephant’ (Lakoff, 2004). He is quick to establish that unlike former mayor Botond Sára, who ‘works out in elite gyms alone’, his sport is ‘cycling from Vajda Péter street to Blaha Lujza square and greeting people along the way’ (Pikó in Partizán, 2019).

Naszályi and Pikó are thus positioned as caring, approachable, locally embedded figures, they are in stark contrast with the establishment symbolised by the prior mayors. While presenting themselves as one of the local people, they do not claim to know the needs of those who live there. Instead, they both emphasise a strong participatory-element in their campaign, to ‘those open-ended procedures that contribute to not only “consultation”, but also truly shape decision-making’ (Naszályi, 2020). However, the two candidates’ relationship and approach to party politics are firmly different. While both habitual in institutional politics and civil organisations, Naszályi’s strong involvement in formal oppositional party politics in the past 10 years and Pikó’s consistent civil orientation signal a key discrepancy between them.

Overall, both Pikó and Naszályi can be seen as candidates with distinctive traits. On a municipal level, one might conclude that personal qualities of leading figures often do matter more than overall party perception. In return, the opposition’s advantage lies in being able to offer a larger palette of political figures than Fidesz; the modulation in the extent to which successful candidates choose to differ or adopt Fidesz’s narrative of the nation is greater. Next, the exact dynamics of their campaigns will be explored.

4.4. Campaigns’ profile

4.4.1. Organisational structures

4.4.1.1. Várunk - A common list for oppositional parties

The organisation structure of the opposition coordination (*Várunk*) of the I. district can be divided as displayed in *Figure 4*, based on campaign leader Pilz’s account. In the ‘inner circle’ belongs Pilz, Naszályi, and volunteers’ coordinator Enikő Tatár. The second layer encompasses the parties’ municipal candidates, while the third element includes the consistently active

volunteers, altogether approximately 50 people. All major oppositional parties (Momentum, Párbeszéd, DK, Jobbik, MSZP and LMP) took place in the cooperation locally. Most volunteers were mobilised through the parties' local unit, but merged with Várunk's civil volunteers (5-6 people). Finally, the outer circle incorporates those external political strategists and coordinators that belonged to the capital city's central campaign.

Pilz emphasises that *Várunk* was a multi-centric campaign: 'the oppositional campaign of the VIII. district felt more focused on Pikó than our campaign around Naszályi'. Here, individual representative candidates' communication and mobilisation mattered just as much – or based on Momentum's founding member, deputy mayor Ferenc Gelencsér's perspective, in some respects even more than the central campaign's. *Várunk*, the local opposition's nonprofit association, served the function of running oppositional candidates under one common list. This was a "Plan B", Pilz explains, when it became clear that the capital's campaign, *Budapest Mindenkié* ('Budapest belongs to all') will not be able to run candidates under a single list, arguably due to fragmentation and variation regarding views on the inclusion of the formerly far-right Jobbik.

Thus the campaign's permanent team consisted of around 70 members. Local party units played a central role in mobilisation and strategic planning. Momentum, who gave both deputy mayors and three representatives, had its own campaign leader as well: deputy mayor Ferenc Gelencsér (Gelencsér, 2020). Naszályi's party *Párbeszéd* gave its primary funds to the central, *Várunk* campaign, while other parties also contributed to their local candidates' resources (Pilz, 2020).


4.4.1.2. C8 - A civil campaign assisted by parties

The structure of the VIII. district's campaign, led by the civil association C8, was in many respects different to that of the I. district. Firstly, the team was greater in size, which is not

surprising given the district's triple size and heterogeneity. Secondly, the roles of campaign team members were also more specific and demarcated, as *Figure 4* suggests. Communications coordinator Nagy accounts that the 'core team, which met on a weekly basis, consisted of Pikó, of organisational campaign leader Udvarhelyi, and specific coordinators for communication, volunteers' coordination and political relations'. The latter position is somewhat specific to the innovative, bottom-up, civil-led nature of the campaign: they had to assign someone to navigate possible conflicts within and between parties, meanwhile ensuring the external unity of views and messages. As Udvarhelyi explains (2020), C8 made cooperation with Jobbik subject to specific conditions: local Jobbik-members must publicly declare that Roma people are integral and valuable members of Hungarian society and must apologise for Jobbik's previous, controversial statements with regards to the subject. As none of its local members complied with these requirements, Jobbik did not participate in the coordination locally.

The second layer of their organisational structure consists of several 'working groups' of C8, most importantly responsible for the smooth running of the many participatory processes of the campaign, Udvarhelyi (2020) shares. This campaign also includes a layer of external advisors, followed by volunteers and finally, at the outermost stratum of the circle, the parties themselves, who are loosely connected to the inner layers. Parties participated in voters' mobilisation and the building of the *I Love Nyolc* brand almost purely externally – through giving candidates, posters and social media (Udvarhelyi, 2020). However, as both Nagy and Erőss note, not only the core members and the mayor candidate but also almost all volunteers were independent of parties: 'Momentum gave the most (volunteers) among the parties, like 10-15, now compare that to the other independent 200', Nagy recounts. In contrast, in *Figure 3*, it is clear that apart from the campaign leader and volunteers' coordinator, almost everyone has had ties to an institutional entity.

Therefore, the significance of C8's campaign lies in its truly civil nature, led by individuals with extensive experience in bottom-up organisation and past involvement in institutional politics as external actors. While the I. district's *Várunk* was built on the foundation of party cooperation, the *C8* campaign was a result of both party *and* civil partnerships. Coming back to Pilz's comment regarding the 'person-centred atmosphere' of the VIII. district campaign, his observations do not contradict the organisational characteristics discussed. Given that parties were only loosely connected to the campaign, more efforts went into central campaign, to 'Pikó for mayor' (*Pikót polgármesternek!*).



4. Figure: Comparison of Organisational Structures, *Várunk* vs. *C8*.

4.4.2. Brands and Messages

4.4.2.1. The *Várunk* "brand"

The I. district's common brand was *Várunk*, which also stands for the formal cooperation of oppositional parties. A wordplay on 'Castle' (*Vár*) and 'waiting' (*várni*), the name translates to 'We are waiting for you', signalling inclusivity and local belonging. Its logo and colours fit into the design of the broader city-level cooperation: 'walking through the streets of Budapest and

seeing the same colours really gave me a sense of continuity and hope’, campaign leader Pilz shares.

Várunk as a brand identified itself as the cooperation of ‘civilians and parties’ (Pilz, 2020), however, as seen from the organisational structure, this is somewhat misleading, as its main focus was on party cooperation. Most of its messages politicised the topics of anti-corruption and transparency, placing its identity in relation to Fidesz. For example, the slogan ‘There are no oligarchs behind us’ (*Nincsenek oligarchák mögöttünk*) suggests that the team’s strength lies in their *difference*; the negative identity of what We Are Not (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 8). This kind of campaign message is relevant to Tarrow’s (1994) approach to political opportunities, where the politicisation of the flaws of the party-in-power without offering an alternative vision is enough for the mobilisation of an oppositional identity.

Another slogan ‘We take back the Castle from the raiders’ (*Visszavesszük a Várat a fosztogatóktól*) signals the opposition’s commitment to anti-corruption through a communication style that can be categorised as ‘populist’, given its anti-establishment sentiment: the topos of threat (Wodak, 2015: 53) is implied by the idea that there are dangerous figures in the area not respecting local rules. The idea of ‘taking back control’ is equally present, all too familiar from the Brexit’s Leave campaign (Serhan, 2019).



5. Figure: Poster of Várunk, Online. (Source: Várunk's Facebook page)

Figure 5 above displays one of the typical social media posters of Várunk. Such a comparative structure was utilised in the campaign to display various messages, the orange part displaying the Fidesz-governed present and the green-yellow section the Várunk-led future. Again, this contrast, the ‘topos of opposites’ (Wodak, 2015: 52) is present: what belongs to Us is whatever does not to Them (Ibid.). Based on this figure, the qualities associated with the Fidesz leadership are elite-centric, given that they favour ‘the interests of the government’. Conversely, Várunk is suggested to favour the ‘interests of the local community’. Emphasising both anti-establishment and ingroup-related aspects of their identity, Várunk’s communication uses a ‘populist’ strategy of identifying themselves against the ‘corrupt elite’, with the *volonté générale* (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012: 8).

Programme and broader messages

Interview-based evidence also suggests that the most attention-grabbing messages of the campaign were the ones related to Fidesz and its corrupt management of the district. Both Naszályi and Pilz argue that politicising ‘the housing embezzlement’ (*lakásmutyi*) was key, together with the topic of the government’s move to the Castle (Naszályi, 2020). They highlight that the question of municipally-owned flats was largely misinterpreted by the wider public: ‘we never said that our aim was to “throw Fidesz out” from the district, but this is how our

message was interpreted’, notes Naszályi. Regarding the question whether Várunk’s was a negative-identity based campaign, Naszályi partly confirms: ‘I really wanted to push through a third, inward-looking message, related to ecology or transport policy, but these were just not as the other two’.

Várunk’s manifesto (Várunk2019.hu, 2019), while progressive in its objectives, also signals a reactionary element. Although centred around the values of transparency, participatory democracy, ecology, sustainable tourism and social solidarity, the structure of the brochure puts these aims in contrast with Fidesz’s management of the district. Each paragraph begins a detailed description of what Fidesz has *done wrong*, thereby contrasting the “rotten present” with the district’s prosperous future under Várunk’s leadership. This strategy utilises the ‘topos of reality’: ‘because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made’ (Wodak, 2015: 53). In many points, it ‘challenges the legitimate authority of the establishment’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2019: 5), again hinting a ‘populist’ strategy. On the other hand, Naszályi claims that their Fidesz-oriented messages, built on the idea that political opportunity must be realised as the current regime is harmful, can be considered as progressive: ‘We are not just saying what they are doing wrong, but also offering a complex alternative vision with a trustworthy leadership: I believe this counts as a positive message’.

Overall, as *Table 2* on page 50 summarises, it can be argued that Várunk’s most crucial messages centred around Fidesz’s malfunctions, with a secondary focus on local issues. As demonstrated, Várunk used several ‘populist’ communication style to make its progressive objectives visible.

4.4.2.2. The I Love Nyolc brand

At the core of the VIII. district's campaign, the *I Love Nyolc* brand gave locals a sense of belonging (Udvarhelyi, 2020). As Pikó explains (in Partizán, 2019), the idea of *I Love Nyolc* came up mid-campaign: it is a humorous take on the famous 'I Love NY' logo by Glaser (1977), where NY is supplemented to read 'NYolc' (Eight). Based on Pikó's account (in Partizán, 2019), 'it all started as a joke: who would choose Józsefváros instead of the Big Apple?'. Yet it made people believe that 'we have an identity and we have a future', he claims. The brand, while keeping unity with the common design guidelines of the capital's coordination, was perhaps more successful in establishing a strictly district-specific identity on top of the capital's programme. While *Várunk* also attempted to create brand-specific merchandise, these played a marginal role in mobilisation (Pilz, 2020); in contrast, *I Love Nyolc* grabbed people's attention, individuals were inclined to wear T-shirts with this slogan (Pikó in Partizán, 2019).

The *I Love Nyolc* brand does not build on the explicit contrast between *Us* and *Them*. Instead, it focuses on the inward-looking self-definition of the group and on a positive sentiment that can be adopted by anyone regardless of ethnicity or political orientation. 'Loving' the VIIIth implies an 'experiential value' that is based on the 'text producer's experience' of the social context (Fairclough, 1989: 112): given the VIII's pejorative connotation (*nyócker*) in popular Hungarian culture (Nagy, 2019), the brand reclaims and redefines what it means to belong here (Pikó in Partizán, 2019). Moreover, the fact that it is an English-language slogan in a Hungarian framework signals diversity and modernity, and a certain 'trendiness' that is capable of drawing in the younger generation, too.

Programme and broader campaign messages

Based on the interviews, it becomes clear that Pikó's campaign equally relied on the perpetual conflict between Fidesz and the oppositional-civil coordination. Communications coordinator Nagy admits that the campaign 'got extremely emotion-driven' because of Fidesz's systematic attempts 'to take them down'. However, in the face of these attacks, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section, the C8 team signalled that beyond all this 'drama' (Erőss, 2020), what they truly care about is the people of Józsefváros and not Fidesz itself. This was suggested through slogans such as 'if We win, Józsefváros succeeds' (*Ha mi győzünk, Józsefváros nyer*), where We is used in an inclusive sense to indicate sameness (Wodak, 1999: 46).

In a district so socially fragmented, a campaign that introduces further opposites would have been perhaps counterproductive, thus the strategy of inward-looking identity-building was employed instead. The campaign's written programme, which was shaped through the participatory process of an opinion poll conducted by C8, focused on making local housing more affordable, on social solidarity and transparent, participatory municipal processes (Blaskó, 2019). It must be noted that messages around solidarity in the VIIIth imply an ethnic dimension as well: the campaign set out to appeal to both Roma and non-Roma populations, to create at least a symbolic unity amongst often segregated or discriminated groups (Erőss, 2020).

While the I. district's relative homogeneity and harmony meant the conscious mentioning of Fidesz was needed to mobilise latent oppositional identities, arguably, in Józsefváros, there was no need for the explicit mention or visualisation of the 'tangible enemy' (Bauman, 1998: 8). Instead, the enemy 'presented itself' through the real-life events of turning the sounds off at Pikó's campaign event (Pikó, in Partizán, 2019), their destruction of oppositional campaign

posters (Erőss, 2020) and last but not least, through the team's 'police case' (Nagy, 2020). The impact of the latter event will be further explored in the following 'Strategies' section.

To summarise the communicative elements of the VIII. district campaign as displayed in *Table 2*, the strength of the civil-oppositional brand *I Love Nyolc* can be seen as 'strong' as it managed to create a district-specific identity. In contrast, Várunk did not manage to become a stand-alone brand. The most popular messages of the campaign were built on the values of inclusivity and local participation. Value-communication did not explicitly include anti-establishment, or anti-outsider sentiments. Instead, it focused mostly on the future-oriented and inward-looking development of the district, signalling a 'progressive' component. However, the perpetual Us-Them conflict and anti-establishment feeling were underlyingly present throughout the campaign's unsaid atmosphere, making it into an emotive, stirring 'battle' (Nagy, 2020).

	I. district	VIII. district
<i>Brand name:</i>	VÁRUNK	I LOVE NYOLC
<i>Strength of brand identity:</i>	intermediate	strong
<i>Most important campaign messages and external objectives:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • prevent the government's invasion of the Castle; • revise the municipality's residential lease system; • rehabilitate green spaces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • bring innovation and resources to the district; • listen to the people's needs; • make municipal processes transparent/participatory
<i>Values behind the messages:</i>	anti-corruption, local interests, ecology	inclusivity, future-orientedness, local interests
<i>Categorisation of messages:</i>	mostly populist, partly progressive	mostly progressive, partly populist

2. Table: Comparison of the two campaigns' communicative elements.

4.4.3. Strategies

4.4.3.1. Várunk's strategies

Pilz, Naszályi and Gelencsér all emphasise the role of door-to-door campaigning. In contrast with Naszályi and Pilz, Gelencsér argues that 'it is not really the messages that mattered in our

campaign, but that we did not abandon the nitty-gritty work: we personally visited locals and asked them what *they* think of the district'. Given the relatively low number of permanent volunteers, who were prepared for campaigning through workshops, most of the door-to-door work was done by the candidates themselves. Momentum's candidates managed to go back at least twice to each address: 'if you go back to an address 3 times, the chances that they will vote for you increases by 72%' based on the calculations of the liberal ALDE party, shares Gelencsér. All participants agree that the significance of personal presence is relatively higher in a setting where state-owned media crowds out and scapegoats the opposition. 'People must talk to us to realise that oppositional candidates are not the agents of George Soros', underlines the deputy mayor, adding that it was particularly important to engage with those who showed little interest in them. The innovativeness of Várunk's door-to-door strategy, therefore, lies in its emphasis on regularity and persuasion.

Moreover, events such as *'Let's take back the Castle'*, organised by Várunk to commemorate the 333. year of regaining Budavár from the Turks, symbolically displayed the 'populus' (Wodak, 2015: 7). By contributing to the politicisation of participants' identities, such events arguably made individuals more inclined to engage in the action of voting (Bos et al., 2020: 7). Additionally, Várunk co-organised several street campaigning events with the surrounding II. and XII. districts at Széll Kálmán square (II. district), and with the capital's campaign at Batthyány square (I. district). 'The opposition's "theme song" was blasting from the loudspeakers', Pilz recounts, emphasising that these events gave a sense of optimism to the community; something that is, according to Bunce and Wolchik (2011: 71) is essential for opportunity creation from below.

The distribution of leaflets containing the campaign material was also crucial to the success of the *Várunk* campaign, based on participants' accounts: given the district's large elderly base, 'written communication still mattered' (Gelencsér, 2020). Yet one could argue that what made a difference here is that these leaflets were in most cases distributed by the candidates themselves, through real-life contact with voters, further strengthening the personal-aspect of the campaign. What could truly bring attention to written content, according to Pilz, was the publishing of the results of the TÁRKI (2019) opinion poll, showing that the two relevant mayor candidates were 'practically neck to neck'. This strategy publicised what is at stake at the elections, thereby giving emotional meaning to a fact. Instead of utilising the 'affect-as-information approach to political opinion' (Schwarz, 2000 in Gross, 2008: 174), where emotive aspects (such as fear) are presented as facts (as a threat), it turns to an 'information-as-affect' approach, thereby reinstates the role of reason in politics (Sniderman et al., 1991). Such an approach can be seen as an innovative way to combat the pessimism of the electorate arising from the decreased level of electoral competition (Levitsky and Way, 2001) and to nudge potential Naszályi-voters out of their indifference to politics (Pilz, 2020), an attitude that is especially prevalent in paternalistic regimes (Schwartz et al., 2000: 222).

4.4.3.2. C8's Strategies

Working with more than 200 volunteers, C8's tactics of popular engagement had to be well-planned. Their mobilisation strategy can be divided into three stages, based on Nagy's recollection. The first stage focused on popularising Pikó's name, through the distribution of posters and other visual material. As posters arrived later than envisioned, this stage was delayed: when these finally arrived, volunteers 'organised a race within themselves, whether they can find any streets where there were no posters yet' (Nagy, 2020), suggesting participants' dedication from the early stages and the permanent role of agency in the campaign (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011: 77). The goal of the second phase was to persuade indifferent or undecided

residents, while the third stage, mobilisation, focused solely on those who were already in favour of Pikó, but unsure of voting (Nagy, 2020) through the door-to-door campaigning even on election day (Udvarhelyi, 2020). Participants were subject to specific ‘performance-indicators’ at each stage (Ibid).

In addition, towards the end of the process, a special body for ‘electoral fraud watch’ was created in order to passively block the buying of votes, ‘which is an established strategy of Fidesz in the district’ (Udvarhelyi, 2020). Members of the volunteers’ team showed up at suspected locations of electoral fraud, quietly stood and followed suspects around in strictly public areas (Ibid.)

The *Persuasion* phase’s ‘secret weapon’ (Udvarhelyi, 2020) was the organisation of area-specific public walks in the district, together with the opposition’s candidates and local experts. The popularity of these Facebook events gave the campaign virtual visibility (pre-investigation), and gave proximity of the campaign to local attendees (Nagy, 2020). It was ‘in the midst of the persuasion phase that the investigation was brought upon us’, Nagy remembers. As this event has modified and influenced the rest of the envisaged campaign-structure substantially, it is worth discussing it as a separate strategy, extrinsic from the agency-based strategic elements discussed so far.

The police investigation and its representation of ‘conflict’

‘This was no ordinary campaign’, Nagy emphasises throughout the interview. It was a bottom-up *movement* carried out by mainly non-political actors, a process through which collective action dilemmas could be overcome. Part of their success was that they were truly ‘ready to defeat’ the incumbent (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011: 47) through the discussed ‘innovative’

strategies. However, what equally mattered in the campaign is that the underlying, antagonistic conflict between Us (opposition) and Them (Fidesz) was brought to the forefront: the C8 team's and its sympathisers identity was *visibly* threatened (Erőss, 2020).

On 2 September, campaign leader Udvarhelyi posted a picture of collected nomination forms in their private volunteers' Facebook group with the caption 'we are working on them' (Ágoston, 2019). The post was leaked, the Fidesz-related newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* published the screenshot on their page with the accusation that Pikó's team was making a secret database of voters (Ibid.). Based on this article, 'an investigation against an unknown perpetrator was launched on suspicion of misuse' (Baranyai et al., 2019). The police showed up at the team's base, volunteers' coordinator Kató Balázs-Piri's laptop was confiscated, Udvarhelyi was questioned by the police and Erőss was also summoned to give testimony (Ágoston, 2019; Erőss, 2020). The team has denied all accusations regarding the recording of personal data (Hvg.hu, 2019). The case shook members of the campaign to their core, as 'their most fundamental value, transparency was questioned' (Nagy, 2020). Without substantial evidence, the case was dropped on 3 October (Hvg.hu, 2019), apart from one proceeding in relation to an activist writing 'person will not sign the sheet, but will vote for us' next to an address (Erőss, 2020). From Erőss's perspective, this illustrates the moral of the story for future bottom-up, civil campaigns in illiberal structures: 'the weakness of the campaign was its occasional amateurism, present in this instance as well'.

However, all members point out that the police investigation was a strange 'blessing' in the long-run: 'the news of the case reached everyone; the entire district realised what is at stake here on 13 October', Nagy recounts, adding that the event generated substantial attention beyond the district, capable of politicising not only the VIIIth but also the opposition's

campaign as a whole. It has strengthened the community and popularised the ‘folk tale storyline’, that even though they are ‘small’, the regime is afraid of them building a community and sending away the ‘powerful evil’ (Erőss, 20). This kind of narrative, which was initiated externally (from C8’s opponents), resulted in an ‘adaptive’ strategy, where the opposition felt that they had no choice but to defend themselves via the visualisation of this conflict through popular protests.

From the interviewees’ perspective, this case gave an insight into the uncertain challenges, the vulnerability of oppositional movements vis-a-vis the regime, supporting the claim that the durability of these otherwise fragile power-structures lies in their capability to ‘undermine the ability of oppositions to mount effective electoral challenges’ (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011: 60). Nevertheless, the investigation also showed that increased repression might suggest the opposition’s perceived chance of victory and the despair of the incumbent (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011: 51). The regime’s showcasing of unequal power backfired: their method of combating an oppositional victory in the district led to the further strengthening of the in-group identity frame of Good versus Evil, reinforcing the role of cognitive, emotive processes in the campaign (Caiani, 2017: 10).

4.4.3.3. Conclusion of strategies


Throughout the interviews, it has become evident that both campaigns included a strong participatory element, be it through door-to-door campaigning, the distribution of flyers or the organisation of community events. In the case of *Várunk*, mobilisation was carried out by cooperating parties and made successful by their continuous engagement of undecided voters. It included mainly ‘innovative’ strategies, building on a pre-existing set of politicised local issues (Naszályi, 2020). Similarly, C8’s campaign was also built on participatory, innovative elements of campaigning in a hybrid regime. However, the impact of the police investigation

introduced a strong ‘adaptive’ component to their campaign. Their political opportunity was partly created *structurally* from above, through the attack on them, which has paradoxically backfired, signalling the regime’s weakness.

4.5. Municipal elections: a blueprint for 2022?

The analysed cases and the rest of oppositional victories (12 within Budapest and several others in the countryside) ‘constitute a considerable breakthrough, especially compared to very moderate expectations’ (László and Molnár, 2019: 4). The role of effective cooperation in this success is undeniable: the opposition did not win at any of the places where there was no sign of coordination (Ibid, 27). As Udvarhelyi (2020) put it, these campaigns showed that ‘with the right strategies, democracy can still work’ in today’s Hungary.

The question arises, whether the strategies of these campaigns can serve as best practice for political opportunity creation in the 2022 parliamentary elections. The most important conclusions of cooperation and the values they embody, based on the interviews conducted, can be classified into three groups, as visualised in *Figure 6* below.



6. Figure: Conclusions of cooperation.

Firstly, inter-party cooperation is perceived as crucial. Gelencsér notes that negotiations regarding possible coordination for 2022 should begin as soon as possible: ‘deciding the ten

common candidates of *Várunk* took us almost eight months, now imagine how long it would take us to come up with a common list on a national level'. The opposition's heterogeneity was pointed out by all interviewees: 'it is in the interest of Fidesz to obscure the ideological differences between us' (Gelencsér, 2020). Inter-party conflicts and 'bad compromises' (Udvarhelyi in Partizán, 2019) can thus hinder a larger-scale cooperation. Nevertheless, the local elections showed effective ways to overcome persistent conflicts within the opposition, for instance through the official primary for the opposition's mayoral candidate for Budapest. Therefore, *readiness to compromise* has been identified as a crucial experience of the elections.

Secondly, the municipal outcomes stressed the role of civic engagement in political processes. 'We have shown that the community-building aspect of oppositional cooperation is not just some 'civil sweet talk' (Udvarhelyi in Partizán, 2019): in today's Hungary, the opposition needs non-governmental organisations' support and everyday individuals' inclusion into political processes. Although it remains unclear whether these participatory elements of campaigning can be as effective on a national, as on a municipal level (Nagy, 2020), their *inclusion* into oppositional manifestos signals commitment on the level of values, too.

Finally, interviewees drew attention to a third way in which the municipal elections, and within that effective cooperation can contribute to preparation for the 2022 elections: 'the opposition now got a chance to show its capability of governing' (Naszályi, 2020). In agreement with political scientist Ambrus Kiss (2018), Naszályi believes that the myth of Fidesz's invincibility can be broken by pointing out its 'inability to govern': 'while presenting the appearance of good governance through the demonstration of its "hard-handedness", the government categorically ignores the development of healthcare, education and public supply systems. Hard-handedness also serves the prevention of a regime change.' These claims support Kiss's (2018: 88) assertion

that since 2014, Fidesz has over-centralised: ‘faithfulness’ (to the leader) has become the governing principle of politics. Similarly to Naszályi, the author claims that the opposition needs to display a realistic alternative regarding their vision of social issues, thus re-shifting competition from the rhetorical sphere to policy (Ibid. 90). Evidence remains uncertain regarding how populist identity frames, that drive discourse away from policy (Ibid. 88), can be overcome. However, popularising the successes of the new oppositional municipal governments, thereby demonstrating the opposition’s *ability to govern*, can certainly be a good start.

The above-mentioned aspects thus show that the 2019 municipal elections, in various ways, do matter for the future mobilisation of oppositional identities in 2022. The three most important aspects of a future united-oppositional identity to be emphasised are *readiness to compromise*, *the inclusion of participatory processes* and *the ability to govern*. However, one must keep in mind that announcing winners is possible on many levels of public administration: criteria for success is the lowest on the municipal level (László and Molnár, 2019: 17). Even on this level Fidesz’s overall number of seats has increased (Ibid.). Thus, ‘the opposition has a lot more work to do, including collecting more votes, if they want to be real challengers of Fidesz in 2022’ (Ibid. 5).

CONCLUSION

Overall, this thesis argued that the understanding of oppositional identities and narratives are crucial for the evaluation of political opportunity structures in hybrid regimes, building on some of the structuralist, and agency-driven approaches to political opportunity theory. Through the combined use of contextual and discursive approaches to qualitative, primarily interview-based evidence, the questions of through what exact tools oppositional identities can be mobilised in a hybrid regime, and whether these can provide the basis for long-term cooperation were evaluated.

A broader conclusion to be drawn from this research is that while the opposition as a whole is largely limited by the structural circumstances of hybrid populism, many of these hindering factors could be overcome, at least on a municipal level. Or as lord mayor Karácsony put it (in Urfi, 2020), Hungary's political system 'is like a football match: chances are not equal, but you can still score goals'.

More specifically, this project demonstrated the intricate ways in which the context-specific issues and history of the municipalities matter for oppositional mobilisation. With other words, the answer to the question of what kind of oppositional identity-building strategy is going to be successful in a municipal setting is that, *it depends*. Among various factors, it depends on the composition of the district, its existing political power-relations, the traits of prominent local oppositional figures, as well as on the broader national framework the elections take place.

The most significant findings of the analytical process are summarised by *Table 3*. It displays the sociodemographic characteristics of each case, outward- and inward-looking elements of

communication, ‘innovative’ and ‘adaptive’ strategies, other contributing factors to their success, perceived internal weaknesses and the most significant external challenges they faced.

	I. district	VIII. district
<i>Sociodemographic characteristics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Population of ca. 25 000 Middle and upper-middle classes Average years of schooling and income per capita above capital’s average Relatively homogeneous neighbourhoods Ethnically under-diversified Large elderly population base High number of international visitors, booming tourism Culturally vibrant: ‘traditional’ culture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Population of ca. 75 000 Lower-middle, entrepreneurial and underprivileged classes Average years of schooling and income per capita below the capital’s average Relatively heterogeneous neighbourhoods Ethnically diverse: Roma population and internationals Younger visitors, Airbnbs Culturally vibrant: ‘alternative’ culture
<i>Out-group focused messages</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘There are no oligarchs behind us’ ‘We take back the Castle from the raiders’ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spreading the word that members of the former leadership do not live in the district
<i>In-group focused messages</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Make tourism sustainable Reduce air pollution Rehabilitate green spaces Make municipal processes participatory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘if We win, Józsefváros succeeds’ Bring innovation and resources to the district Listen to the people’s needs Reduce social segregation Make municipal processes transparent/participatory
<i>Innovative strategies</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Oppositional cooperation within and beyond the district Inclusive brand-building: <i>Várunk</i> Intense door-to-door campaigning by candidates Proximity of the campaign: continuous personal presence of actors at public spaces Volunteers’ workshops Campaign strategy based on representative survey ‘Information-as-affect’ approach to survey results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Oppositional cooperation within and beyond the district Inclusive brand-building: <i>I Love Nyolc</i> Bottom-up, civil campaigning Intense door-to-door and personal presence of team members Volunteer workshops Mayor’s programme based on participatory survey Thematic events: neighbourhood walks with local experts Internal performance-indicators ‘Electoral fraud watch’
<i>Adaptive strategies</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary focus put into parts of the district where previous electoral results suggested potential oppositional success Give the campaign an ideology-based dimension 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Turn the police investigation to their advantage through the organisation of large-scale protest Give the campaign an ideology-based dimension
<i>Other strengths or factors contributing to success</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mayor candidate Naszályi’s personal attributes Candidates’ profile and local 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mayor candidate Pikó’s personal attributes Campaign leaders’ experience in

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • embeddedness • Wide array of external advisors, advice and assistance from the VIII. district campaign • Coordination encompassed all major oppositional parties, Jobbik included 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • bottom-up campaigning • Well-thought-out organisational structure • Wide array of external advisors and 'intellectual' network beyond the district
<i>Internal weaknesses</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Occasional party fragmentation • Lack of strong ties between civil organisations and representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Occasional amateurism • Lack of strong ties between party representatives and organisers
<i>External challenges</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uncertainty of hybrid competition • Fidesz-related individuals local embeddedness, especially in the Castle district 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uncertainty of hybrid competition • The threat of electoral fraud • Instances of 'antagonistic conflict': investigation, damaging of posters, accusations

3. Table: Overview of findings.

As *Table 3* displays, the independent variable of pre-existing sociodemographic factors was largely dissimilar in the two cases. While the I. district is a homogenous, elite, secluded area of the middle classes, the VIII. is a multi-ethnic, diverse, developing neighbourhood with high levels of social segregation and unemployment. In light of these context cues, the choice of slogans and messages also differed. The Castle district's relative sameness allowed for the identity-building of a unified We against the 'corrupt establishment'. As the group's inner identity was somewhat self-evident, and prominently present classes have had a high social status and thus self-esteem, more emphasis was put into defining the outgroup. In contrast, the diversity and feeling of social inferiority of most residents of the VIII. district necessitated re-shifting the focus on the in-group; the reclaiming of their own sense of self through the influential *I Love Nyolc* brand.

Despite these contrasts, based on *Table 3* it can be concluded that both campaigns gave a strong and conscious ideological dimension to their movement. Strictly local issues were not neglected but instead *politicised* in the wider framework of a mainly value-driven conflict between the former Fidesz-leadership of the districts and the oppositional newcomers. In terms of

campaigning tools, both cases heavily relied on innovative strategies. As previously emphasised, this thesis holds that almost any kind of strategy can be seen as innovative if it builds on a logic that was not part of the previous leadership's strategies – hence this is a highly context-dependent aspect of the analysis.

Both campaigns included a powerful participatory element and were first and foremost built on the real-life engagement of locals. One might argue that this is where their primary strength lies in contrast to Fidesz's: due to the regime's paternalistic, highly centralised nature and leader-centric orientation (Lendvai, 2017), Fidesz's competences tend to be aggregated on a higher level of governance and unproportionately directed to focus on agenda-setting and the maintenance of power for power's sake (Kiss, 2019: 88). In contrast, the oppositional campaigns laid stress on the elements of 'good governance', such as openness, participatory processes, accountability, efficiency and coherence (Livioara, 2009), which are arguably fit to be demonstrated on a decentralised, municipal level (László and Molnár, 2019).

On the flip side, it is exactly due to the municipal, decentralised level of analysis that the positive experiences of these micro-campaigns do not necessarily translate into national-level oppositional strategies. However, it has been argued that their more general conclusions regarding inter-party compromise, the inclusion of participatory processes and the above-emphasised ability to govern can be comprehended in the context of the future 2022 parliamentary elections. The feelings of hope and optimism and a renewed, common, inward-looking identity that the analysed campaigns were capable of promoting must also underpin the identities to be mobilised by the opposition in the near future.

Finally, while duly acknowledging the role of structural factors in political opportunity perception, this thesis demonstrated that agency-centred, bottom-up political opportunity creation is indeed possible through innovative strategies. Related to this subject, potential areas of future research include the investigation of the role of online campaigning, oppositional party composition, or the impact of nationwide Fidesz-related scandals in these successes. Alternatively, the comparative analysis of non-Budapest based oppositional successes along our proposed dimensions could shed light on the generalisability of this project's findings.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Armstrong, N. (1987). *Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Bauman, Z. (1998). *Europe of Strangers*. Oxford: University of Oxford. Transnational Communities Programme.
3. Bozóki, A. (2019). *Gördülő rendszerváltás*. Budapest: L'Harmattan Kiadó
4. Bunce, V. J., Wolchik, S.L. (2011). *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Edwards, G. (2004). *Social Movements and Protest*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and Power*. London: Longman.
7. Foucault, M. (1982). *The Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language*. London: Vintage.
8. Goodin, R., Tilly, C. (2006). *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Jacobs, A. M., Büthe, T. (2019). Transparency in Qualitative Research: An Overview of Key Findings and Recommendations. *QTD Working Group Series*. pp. 1-31.
10. Kiss, A. (2018). *Rossz kormányzás Fidesz-módra*. Budapest: Noran Libro.
11. Laclau, E. (2005). *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
12. Lakoff, G. (2004). *Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate*. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing.
13. Lendvai, P. (2017). *Orban: Europe's New Strongman*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2001). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Lukes, S. [1977] (1974). *Power: A Radical View (Studies in Sociology)*. London: Macmillan.
16. Mouffe, C. (2018). *For a Left Populism*. London: Verso Books.
17. Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39, pp. 541-563.
18. Mudde, C., Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19. Müller, J. W. (2016). *What is Populism?*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
20. Norris, P., Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21. Nugent, W. (2010). *Progressivism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

23. Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24. Tilly, C. (2005). *Trust and Rule*. New York: Columbia University Press.
25. Urbinati, N. (2014). *Democracy Disfigured*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
26. Wodak, R. (1999). *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
27. Wodak, R. (2015). *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*. London: Sage.

Journal articles and dissertations

28. Apter, D. (2006). Duchamp's Urinal: Who Says What's Rational When Things Get Tough?. In: Goodin, R., Tilly, C. (eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford University Press.
29. Bischof, D., Senninger, R. (2018). Simple politics for the people? Complexity in campaign messages and political knowledge. *European Journal of Political Research*, 57, pp. 473-495.
30. Boros, T. (2019). Progresszív válaszok a populizmusra Magyarországon. in: Boros, T. (ed.). *Progresszív válaszok a populizmusra*. Budapest: Policy Solutions. pp. 23-51.
31. Borsi, Z. (2019). How do conspiracy theories related to George Soros help Fidesz to reshape Hungarian national identity?, *Durham: Durham University*.
32. Bos, L., Schemer, C., Corbu, N., Hameleers, M., Andreadis, I., Schulz, A., Schmuck, D., Reinemann, C., Fawzi, N. (2020). The effects of populism as a social identity frame on persuasion and mobilisation: Evidence from a 15-country experiment. *European Journal of Political Research*, 59, pp. 3-24
33. Bozóki, A. (2019). Előszó a magyar kiadáshoz. Demokrácián innen és túl - Populista kihívás. in: Boros, T. (ed.). *Progresszív válaszok a populizmusra*. Budapest: Policy Solutions. pp. 7-15.
34. Bozóki, A., Hegedűs, D. (2018). An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union. *Democratization*, 25(7), pp. 1173-1189.
35. Caiani, M. (2017). Between Contextual Opportunities and Discursive Resources. Understanding the Politics of the Enemy in Central and Eastern Europe. *Intersections. EEJSP* 3(3), pp. 5-13.
36. Cammaerts, B. (2012). Protest logics and the mediation opportunity structure. *European Journal of Communication*, 27(2), pp. 117-134.
37. Csigó, P., Merkovity, N. (2016). Hungary: Home of Empty Populism. In: *Populist Political Communication in Europe*, pp. 299-310.
38. De Vreese, C. H., Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Reinemann, C., Stanyer, J. (2018). Populism as an Expression of Political Communication Content and Style: A New Perspective. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 23(4), pp. 423-438.

39. Etzioni, A. (2018). Happiness is the Wrong Metric. *Library of Public Policy and Public Administration*, 11, pp. 125-148.
40. Freeden, M. (1998). Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?. *Political Studies*. XLVI, pp. 748-765.
41. Gerim, G. (2020). *The Nationalist Discourses in Hungary and Turkey during the Right-Wing Domination: The Cases of Fidesz and Ak Party*. Budapest: ELTE University. [doctoral dissertation]
42. Gerő, M., Płucienniczak, P., Kluknavska, A., Navrátil, J., Kanellopoulos, K. (2017). Understanding Enemy Images in Central and Eastern European Politics. *Intersections. EEJSP*, 3(3), pp. 14-40.
43. Gross, K. (2008). Framing Persuasive Appeals: Episodic and Thematic Framing, Emotional Response, and Policy Opinion. *Political Psychology*, 29(2). pp. 169-192.
44. Hallingberg, B., Turley, R., Segrott, J., Wight, D., Craig, P., Moore, L., Murphy, S., Robling, M., Simpson, S. A., Moore, G. (2018). Exploratory studies to decide whether and how to proceed with full-scale evaluations of public health interventions: a systematic review of guidance. *Pilot and feasibility studies*, 4(104).
45. Hilje, J. (2019). Progresszív válaszok a populizmusra Németországban. in: Boros, T. (ed.). *Progresszív válaszok a populizmusra*. Budapest: Policy Solutions. pp. 51-71.
46. Hochschild, J. (2006). How Ideas Affect Actions. In: Goodin, R., Tilly, C. (eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford University Press.
47. Iyengar, S. (1996). Framing Responsibility for Political Issues. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 546, pp. 59-70.
48. Kopper, Á., Susánszky, P., Tóth, G., Gerő, M. (2017). Creating Suspicion and Vigilance. Using Enemy Images to Hinder Mobilization. *Intersections. EEJSP*, 3(3), pp. 108-125.
49. Kuisz, J., Wigura, K. (2020). The Pushback Against Populism: Reclaiming the Politics of Emotion. *Journal of Democracy*, 31(2), pp. 41-53
50. László, R., Molnár, Cs. (2019). *Lifting the veil of Fidesz's invincibility. A summary of the joint study of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Political Capital on the consequences of the most recent elections in Hungary*. Budapest: Political Capital.
51. Livioara, G. (2009). Good Governance in the EU. *Acta Universitatis Danubius. Juridica*. 5.
52. McGraw, K. (2006). Why and How Psychology Matters. In: Goodin, R., Tilly, C. (eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford University Press.
53. Meyer, D.S., Minkoff, D.C. (2004). Conceptualizing Political Opportunity. *Social Forces*, 82(4), pp. 1457-1492.

54. Nagy, Z. (2019). *Sorry about our Prime Minister: Social Movement Responses to Governmental Anti-Refugee Discourse in Hungary*. Budapest: ELTE University. [doctoral dissertation]
55. Offerein, C. (2018). Basic Values of Progressive Liberalism: A European Perspective. *The European Liberal Forum (ELF)*. pp. 7-26.
56. Reiter, B. (2017). Theory and Methodology of Exploratory Social Science Research. *Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications*, 132. [online] Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gia_facpub/132
57. Reiter, B. (2017). Theory and Methodology of Exploratory Social Science Research. *International Journal of Science and Research Methodology*, 5(4), pp. 129-150.
58. Rodgers, D. T. (1982). The Promise of American History: Progress and Prospects. *Reviews in American History*. 10, (4). pp. 113-132
59. Rohlffing, I. (2012). *Case Studies and Causal Inference: An Integrative Framework*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
60. Saez-Trumper, D., Castillo, C., Lalmas, M. (2013). Social Media News Communities: Gatekeeping, Coverage, and Statement Bias. *CIKM'13: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM international conference on Information & Knowledge Management*. October, pp. 1-9.
61. Schwartz, S.H., Bardi, A., Bianchi, G. (2000). Value Adaptation to the Imposition and Collapse of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe. *Political Psychology*, pp. 217-237.
62. Silverstein, B. (1989). Enemy images: The psychology of U.S. attitudes and cognitions regarding the Soviet Union. *American Psychologist*, 44(6), 903–913.
63. Smith, A. D., & Gellner, E. (1996). The nation, real or imagined? the Warwick debates on nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, 2(3), pp. 357- 370.
64. Sniderman, P., Brody, R., Tetlock, P. (1991). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology. *Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
65. Stetter, E. (2019). Merre tovább, progresszívek? in: Boros, T. (ed.). *Progresszív válaszok a populizmusra*. Budapest: Policy Solutions. pp. 15-19.
66. Swedberg, R. (2018). On the Uses of Exploratory Research and Exploratory Studies in Social Science. *Cornell University Online*. pp. 1-37.
67. Van de Walle, N. (2006). Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Split?. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, pp. 77-92.
68. Wahman, M. (2013). Opposition Coalitions and Democratization. *Government and Opposition*, 48(1), pp. 3-32.
69. Zakaria, F. (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), pp. 22-43.

Online articles and reports

70. CEU. (2010). *Ethical Research Policy*. [online document]. Available at: <https://documents.ceu.edu/documents/p-1012-1v1805>
71. Varga-Kovács, E. (2015). *Helyi Esélyegyenlőségi Program*. [online report]. Budavári Önkormányzat. Available at: http://www.budavar.hu/upload/userfiles/1/pages/201606/eselyegyenlosegi_k_2015_1467031391.pdf [Accessed 20 July 2020].
72. Várunk2019.hu. (2019). Budapest Velünk Kezdődik: Választási Program. [online]. Várunk2019. Available at: https://varunk2019.hu/varunk_program_2019.pdf [Accessed 20 July 2020].
73. Zeitz, J. (2019). Progressives Should Read Progressive History—So They Don't Blow It This Time. *Politico Magazine*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/06/01/progressives-history-227037> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
74. Ágoston, Z. (2019). *Megszüntették a nyomozást Pikó András kampánystábja ellen*. [online]. 168 Óra. Available at: <https://168ora.hu/itthon/piko-andras-nyomozas-kampany-adat-megszuntetes-175106> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
75. Baranyai, G., Kárpáti, A., Tar, H. (2019). *Újabb fotók igazolják a tiltott adatbázis-építést*. [online]. Magyar Nemzet. Available at: <https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/nyomoz-a-rendorseg-pikoek-ugyeben-7290953/> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
76. Baranyai, Zs., Szendrei, Zs., Berényi, M., Vojnits, Cs. (2018). Józsefváros Településfejlesztési Koncepció: Megalapozó Vizsgálat. *Budapest Főváros VIII. kerület Józsefvárosi Önkormányzat*. [online report]. Available at: http://jvo.hu/dokumentumok/719_velemenyezesi_dokumentacio_telepulesfejlesztesi_koncepcio_megalapozo_munkaresz.pdf [Accessed 20 July 2020].
77. Bezerédy-Herald, B., Pásztor, E., Pogány, A., Albrecht, U., András, I., Ökrös, L., Kovács, G., Fonyódi, M., Lelkes, M., Tatai, Zs., Orosz, I., Horváth, A., Jordán, P., Hamar, A., Uzzoli, A. (2015). Településfejlesztési Koncepció és Integrált Településfejlesztési Stratégia. *Budavári Önkormányzat*. [online report]. Available at: http://www.budavar.hu/upload/userfiles/1/pages/201602/megalapozovizsgalat_1456479920.pdf [Accessed 20 July 2020].
78. Blaskó, Zs. (2019). *Köztisztaságot, önkormányzati lakásközvetítőt és propagandamentes kerületi médiát ajánl Pikó András a józsefvárosiaknak*. [online]. Mércé. Available at: <https://merce.hu/2019/08/28/bemutatta-programjat-piko-andras-a-jozsefvarosi-ellenzeki-polgarmesterjelolt/> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
79. Bogatin, B. (2019). *Menekültek és hajléktalan emberek ellen uszító feliratokkal ragasztották át Pikó András plakátjait*. [online]. Mércé. Available at: <https://merce.hu/2019/09/15/menekultek-es-hajlektalan-emberek-ellen-uszito-feliratokkal-ragasztottak-at-piko-andras-plakatjait/> [Accessed 20 July 2020].

80. Csatlós, H. (2018). Legszívesebben elkerüli a Nyolckert? Roma fiatalok megmutatják, miért ne tegye. *HVG*. [online]. Available at: https://hvg.hu/kultura/20181127_nyolcker_roma_setak [Accessed 20 July 2020].
81. Fécamp, H. (2020). Read This Before You Write About Hungarian Democracy. *Medium*. [online]. Available at: <https://medium.com/@henryfecamp/read-this-before-you-write-about-hungarian-democracy-786772949558> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
82. Gaál, B. (2019). Karácsony wins opposition primary for Budapest mayor. *Budapest Business Journal*. [online]. Available at: https://bbj.hu/politics/karacsony-wins-opposition-primary-for-budapest-mayor_167666 [Accessed 20 July 2020].
83. Győri, G., Bíró-Nagy, A., Sebők, M. (2020). *Hungarian Politics in 2019*. [online report]. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Policy Solutions. Available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/15945.pdf> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
84. Horváth, D. (2019). A városrehabilitáció társadalmi sokszínűsége gyakorolt hatásainak térbeli-társadalmi vizsgálata Józsefvárosban. *Területi Statisztika*. [online report]. Available at: <http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/terstat/2019/06/ts590602.pdf> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
85. Hvg.hu. (2019). *Házkutatást tartott a rendőrség Pikó András kampányközpontjában*. [online]. Available at: https://hvg.hu/itthon/20190911_Hazkutatast_tart_a_rendorseg_Piko_Andras_kmapany_kozpontjaban [Accessed 20 July 2020].
86. Hvg.hu. (2019). *Megszüntették a nyomozást Pikó András kampánycsapata ellen*. [online]. Available at: https://hvg.hu/itthon/20191003_piko_andras_jozsefvaros_brfk_nyomozas [Accessed 20 July 2020].
87. Hvg.hu. (2019). Viharos kampány után Pikó András Józsefváros új polgármestere. *HVG*. [online]. Available at: https://hvg.hu/itthon/20191013_Viharos_kampany_utan_Piko_Andras_Jozsefvaros_uj_polgarmestere [Accessed 20 July 2020].
88. Józsefváros.hu. (2020). Készen állnak a közös döntésekre a józsefvárosiak. *Józsefváros*. [online]. Available at: <https://jozsefvaros.hu/hir/74799/keszen-allnak-a-kozos-dontesekre-a-jozsefvarosiak---forras-jozsefvaros-ujzag> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
89. Judis, J. B. (2016). Rethinking Populism. *Dissent*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/rethinking-populism-laclau-mouffe-podemos> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
90. Judis, J. B. (2016). Us V Them: The Birth of Populism. *The Guardian*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/13/birth-of-populism-donald-trump> [Accessed 20 July 2020].

91. Koncz, T., Polyák, A. (2015). *Ők tartják életben a menekülteket*. [online]. Origo. Available at: <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/nagyhasab/20150706-heti-betevo-menekultek-etelo-osztas.html> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
92. Kuhn, S. (2019). Prisoner's Dilemma. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [online]. Available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/prisoner-dilemma/> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
93. Mead, W. R. (2010). Progressivism: A Very Short Introduction, Capsule Review. *Foreign Affairs*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2010-09-01/progressivism-very-short-introduction> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
94. Mércé.hu. (2019). Karácsony Gergely nyerte a budapesti előválasztás első fordulóját – percről percre a Mércén. *Mércé*. [online]. Available at: <https://merce.hu/2019/02/03/karacsony-vagy-horvath-eldol-a-budapesti-elovalasztas-elso-forduloja-percrol-percre-a-mercen/> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
95. Mércé.hu. (2019). Nyert Karácsony, Elsőpró Ellenzéki Győzelem Az Önkormányzati Választásokon – Percről Percre. *Mércé*. [online] Available at: <https://merce.hu/2019/10/13/eljott-a-nap-orszagszerte-megvalasztjak-a-telepulesek-vezetoit/> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
96. Nagy, Zs. (2018). *A szegénylegény három próbája: ellenzéki kihívások és lehetőségek Illiberáliában*. [online]. Mércé. Available at: <https://merce.hu/2018/04/27/a-szegenylegeny-harom-probaja-ellenzeki-kihivasok-es-lehetosegek-illiberaliaban/> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
97. Partizán. (2019). *Beszélgetés Józsefvárosról*. [video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxUL7h9XwyE&feature=emb_title [Accessed 20 July 2020].
98. Partizán. (2019). *Miért nyert az ellenzék Józsefvárosban? interjú Udvarhelyi Tesszával, Pikó András kampányfőnökével*. [video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqA9Gtx5Oh4&list=PLiQ1IThs1NNN1rjqSPyD_2Ek59S5ot0Ys&index=11 [Accessed 20 July 2020].
99. Serhan, Y. (2019). *In a Bid to 'Take Back Control,' Britain Lost It*. [online]. The Atlantic. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/brexit-britain-control-may-eu/585940/> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
100. Udvarhelyi, T. (2017). *A Választás Mindenkié*. [online report] Közélet Iskolája, Közöd Civil Társaság. Available at: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1B8k4m5wb0n4p2vbwtON2cCsbpKO3aKJO/view> [Accessed 20 July 2020].


101. Újbuda.hu. (2019). Újbudán nőtt leginkább az egy főre jutó összevont jövedelem. *Újbuda*. [online]. Available at: <https://ujbuda.hu/ujbuda/ujbudan-nott-leginkabb-az-egy-fore-juto-osszevont-jovedelem> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
102. Urfi, P. (2020). *Karácsony szerint van esély a „demokratikus változásra” 2022-ben, de ő nem lesz miniszterelnök-jelölt*. [online]. 444. Available at: <https://444.hu/2020/07/12/karacsony-szerint-van-esely-a-demokratikus-valtozasra-2022-ben-de-o-nem-lesz-miniszterelnok-jelolt> [Accessed 20 July 2020].
103. Választás.hu. (2019). *Helyi önkormányzati választások 2019*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.valasztas.hu/helyi-onkormanyzati-valasztasok-2019> [Accessed 20 July 2020].

APPENDIX

Interview Questionnaire

- When and why have you decided to become involved in Hungarian politics?
- Have you always considered yourself as a 'local' politician?
- What does 'progressive' mean to you? Are there progressive 'issues' or topics in politics?
- Looking at Hungarian politics, what is the role of the opposition now and in the past years? Do you think that it has a different role locally or not?
- Your values as a politician: do they represent party or municipal interest?
- From your perspective, who were the main actors of the municipal campaign?
- Which were the most important phases of campaigning?
- What were the most important campaign messages, what did people pick up on the most? And what did they pick up on less?
- Did you experience any difficulties regarding cooperating with other oppositional parties?
- To what extent do you feel like the same values can be accomplished than what you stood for in the campaign, now that you work in institutionalised circumstances? What were the values or messages that you could actually achieve so far?
- Can the model of opposition coalition achieved in the municipal elections serve as a model for cooperation for the national elections?

Summary of Tags Used on Dovetail



7. Figure: Summary of Tags Used on Dovetail