

Central European University (CEU)
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)
Erasmus Mundus Master of Arts in Public Policy (Mundus MAPP)
Academic Year 2018-2020



THE WORKING PROCESSES OF BI-REGIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Effectiveness of Soft Laws at the EU-LAC Foundation and the UfM

Dissertation submitted by
MANEEHA BINTE MAHMOOD CHOWDHURY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
ERASMUS MUNDUS MASTER OF ARTS IN PUBLIC POLICY

Supervisors: Charles Roger (IBEI) and Agnes Batory (CEU)

Submitted 31 July 2020

Signed Declaration

I hereby certify that this dissertation contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

I hereby grant to the Central European University (CEU), Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, (IBEI) and the Mundus MAPP Consortium, the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible my dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this dissertation.

Name: Maneeha Binte Mahmood Chowdhury

Signature:



Location and Date: Barcelona, 31 July 2020

Word count: 12,701

Abstract

Founded on the grounds to create deeper cooperation between regions through dialogues, projects, and activities, bi-regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are aimed to create a sustained impact on the citizens and civil societies of their respective Member States. This dissertation argues that the prevalence of soft laws in the institutional design of bi-regional IGOs is a catalyst in the effective achievement of such institutional goals. To verify this, it investigates the working processes of two recently established bi-regional organizations: the European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC Foundation) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Findings unveil that the objectives of the strategic partnerships and summit declarations, albeit non-binding, are translated into concrete actions, through the projects and activities of the bi-regional IGOs. However, it is important to note that the strong political will of the members is a necessity for projects and activities to be implemented in the bi-regional cooperation space.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Table of Contents	ii
1. Introduction	1
2. Background	3
3. Framework for Analysis and Hypotheses	6
3.1 Soft Laws: The Cornerstone of Bi-regional IGOs	6
3.2 Hypotheses	10
4. Research Design	13
4.1 Methodology and Case Selection	13
5. Findings and Analysis	19
5.1 The EU-LAC Foundation	19
5.1.1 Over the Years	19
5.1.2 Structure, Projects and Activities	21
5.2 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)	26
5.2.1 Roadmap and Achievements	26
5.2.2 Structure, Projects and Activities	28
5.3 Potential Pitfalls	33
6. Conclusion	35
7. Bibliography	37
Annex: Thesis Report	47

1. Introduction

The trend of establishing intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has swept the global governance sphere in the past few decades.¹ This is a testament to the growing importance of these organizations, and their goals of fostering deeper cooperation between their Member States on various focus areas, such as peace, security, trade, and development among others.

While the work of IGOs has been at the forefront of scholarly work in the public policy and global governance sphere, it has been mostly focused on either global IGOs or regional IGOs. For example, global IGOs with universal, or “open to all”², membership such as the United Nations (UN)³ and its specialized agencies, as well as, the World Trade Organization (WTO)⁴ have been investigated from many different angles. Well-known regional IGOs have also received ample coverage, such as the European Union (EU)⁵ and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)⁶, among others. There is a vacuum though, in the scholarly literature, on bi-regional IGOs, especially related to evaluating their working processes and effectiveness. This dissertation focuses on two relatively new bi-regional IGO, as case studies, namely, the European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC Foundation) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

¹ The Union of International Associations, “Yearbook of International Organizations (YBIO)” has recorded more than 73,000 international organizations in 2020, including IGOs among other types. Also see Langhorne, *The Essentials of Global Politics*; Erturk, “Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Their Roles and Activities in Security, Economy, Health and Environment.”

² United Nations, “Chapter II | Membership, Charter of the United Nations”; “WTO | Understanding the WTO - Membership, Alliances and Bureaucracy.”

³ Simma et al., “The Charter of the United Nations”; Reisman, “The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations Notes and Comments.”

⁴ Bossche, *The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization*; Matsushita et al., *The World Trade Organization*.

⁵ Wallace, Pollack, and Young, *Policy-Making in the European Union*; Kohler-Koch, Eising, and Kohler-Koch, *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union*.

⁶ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*; Goh, “Non-Intervention and ASEAN’s Role in Conflict Management.”

To examine the effectiveness of the IGOs, the dissertation applies the lens of soft laws in assessing the achievement of the institutional objectives. A structured, focused comparison method is conducted between strategic partnership documents and constitutive agreements, coupled with the institutions' projects and activities, in an attempt to answer the research question: *do soft laws in bi-regional IGOs contribute to the effective translation of political priorities into concrete projects and activities?* The framework of Underdal⁷ is applied to measure the angle of effectiveness in three aspects: output, outcome, and impact. In order to also capture the effect of voluntary funding in the bi-regional IGOs, the element of 'budget' serves as the fourth angle in this dissertation.

Soft laws, in the context of international law, often seem to be considered a rather ineffective⁸, and weak instrument⁹ to achieve the objectives of the organizations that employ the informal, non-binding principles. This dissertation argues that it is, in fact, the opposite. Findings suggest that the projects and activities of IGOs, closely follow that of the political priorities stated in the political partnership principles and statutes of the institutions. These political priorities are of a non-binding nature, which in essence is characterized by soft laws, hence confirming the effectiveness of soft laws captured through the practices of the IGOs.

It should be noted that this dissertation by no means, aims to approach the topic from a purely law-based approach. It plans to examine the instruments found in the dynamics of bi-regional IGOs, such as soft laws, in order to evaluate the institutions' effectiveness in achieving the

⁷ Underdal, "One Question, Two Answers."

⁸ Chinkin, "The Challenge of Soft Law."

⁹ Union for the Mediterranean, "Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean."

political priorities of strategic partnerships between regions. Consequently, the dissertation is foremost aligned with public policy perspectives.

The structure of the dissertation is as follows: chapter 2 provides a brief background of bi-regional IGOs, followed by chapter 3 that discusses the framework of soft laws leading to the proposal of two hypotheses¹⁰. The methodology and case selection in chapter 4 specify the structured, focused comparison method and the usage of secondary resources to test the hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the findings, categorized by the individual analysis of the projects and activities, as well as, the constitutive agreements and strategic partnerships of the EU-LAC Foundation and the UfM. It also explores the possible pitfalls of the analysis. Chapter 6 closes with a conclusion and scope for potential future research.

2. Background

IGOs have been established by sovereign states as a means of addressing global issues, which might otherwise be left unresolved if the states acted individually. Considered as a manifestation of cooperation at a broader scale, one of the most prominent IGOs created at a global level was the League of Nations in 1920, that aimed at attaining world peace in the aftermath of the World War I.¹¹ Nonetheless, World War II ensued in the 1940s which ultimately lead to the creation of the UN in 1945.¹² It continues to be a strong presence in the IGO sphere in ensuring peace and beyond.

¹⁰ (a) soft laws amplify the effectiveness of bi-regional IGOs by enabling flexible institutional designs; (b) the bi-regional IGOs translate the goals of the strategic partnerships into concrete actions through their projects and activities

¹¹ McGlinchey, “E.H Carr and The Failure of the League of Nations.”

¹² United Nations, “History of the UN.”

While the IGOs at the global level began to be perceived as enforcers of international justice, peace, security, and trade, there were growing incentives for regional IGOs to flourish soon after. The 1950s experienced the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and other bodies which eventually lead to the creation of the EU in 1992 through the Maastricht Treaty.¹³ Differing in membership count and the structure of governance, both the UN and the EU have high delegated authorities in terms of the judicial mandate, legislative leverage, and executive powers. With different fundamental bodies responsible for distinct actions within the IGOs at both the global and regional levels, the common decision-making process includes consensus and unanimity as the key factors for many prominent IGOs such as the UN¹⁴ and the EU¹⁵.

Expanding from the trend of regional groupings, bi-regional IGOs, especially established between the EU and other regions, were created through similar mechanisms: by fostering a cooperation mechanism through strategic partnerships¹⁶ between Member States of two (or more) regions often united by their shared interests, culture, history, identities or proximity of location¹⁷. It borrowed similar characteristics of other larger IGOs that pledged equal allocation of power to the Member States, equitable and participatory decision-making, and promotion of greater collaboration.¹⁸

¹³ European Union, “The History of the European Union.”

¹⁴ For example, the General Assembly strives to adopt the rule of consensus for its resolutions and decisions wherever possible as outlined in the United Nations', “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly.” Whereas the UN Security Council resolutions signal unanimity when resolutions are adopted without vote according to the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, Dag Hammarskjöld Library, “What Does It Mean When a Decision Is Taken ‘by Consensus’?”

¹⁵ See The Council of the European Union, “Unanimity” and Novak's article on “Decisions Made by Consensus in the Council of the European Union...”

¹⁶ European Commission, “Strategic Partners.”

¹⁷ As evidenced by the Union for the Mediterranean, “Barcelona Declaration”; “The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership”; “EU-LAC Strategic Partnership | Rio Declaration” and “Asia-Europe Partnership for Greater Growth | 1st ASEM Summit” among others.

¹⁸ Each Member State has one representative in the decision-making body, see for example Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean” and Official Journal of the European Union, “International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation.”

That being said, the strategic partnerships are not formal, legal treaties between the Member States.¹⁹ They are primarily partnerships for effective multilateralism which instrumentalize bilateral relationships for broader ends.²⁰ According to the EU²¹, strategic partnerships can be established between the EU and individual countries, groups of states, and even regions that entail policy dialogues, international agreements, and expert meetings and summits.

However, the cornerstone of IGOs, in general, are treaties or international agreements that are ratified by the Member States under the framework context of international law.²² These treaties have a legal status that serves as the rules and protocols that the Member States consent to conform with, upon signing and ratifying them.²³ The ratified or in other words approved or accepted, agreements or treaties specify the regulations, rules, standards, and frameworks that would govern the organization's aim, structure, membership, decision making, staffing capabilities, activities, funding among others.²⁴ Hence in the context of international law, treaties or international agreements provide the IGOs the necessary legitimacy to carry out their activities. The UN sets the benchmark, with its Charter being accepted, or ratified by 193 countries.²⁵ The content of the Charter spans from maintaining international peace and security to co-operation in addressing social, economic, cultural, and/or human rights-based issues.²⁶

¹⁹ Grevi, "Why EU Strategic Partnerships Matter."

²⁰ Renard, "The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for True EU Strategic Partnerships."

²¹ European Commission, "Strategic Partners."

²² Harvard Law School, "Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)."

²³ Article 5 of the United Nations, "Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties", outlines the treaties applicable to international organizations and mentions the constituent instruments of the international organizations to abide by the rules of international law.

²⁴ See for example the "Charter of the United Nations."

²⁵ United Nations. "United Nations Treaty Collection," Chapter 1.2.

²⁶ "Charter of the United Nations."

Therefore, bi-regional IGOs established in line with the strategic partnerships of two regions essentially fall under “soft laws”, in the context of international law. The non-binding commitments of the political processes, as demonstrated by their political summit declarations²⁷, indicate the workings of such soft laws in the establishment of the institutions, and thereby influence their projects and activities. The following chapter sets up a framework for the analysis of the effectiveness of soft laws and develops two hypotheses to answer the research question of this dissertation.

3. Framework for Analysis and Hypotheses

3.1 Soft Laws: The Cornerstone of Bi-regional IGOs

Soft laws, in the context of international law, is a set of agreements, principles and/or declarations that are not legally binding, to the same extent as hard law²⁸. Although the presence of soft laws, in the form of non-binding commitments, can also be found in the resolutions of the UN General Assembly²⁹, this dissertation will only focus on its effect on bi-regional organizations.

The non-binding commitments set by the strategic priorities of the political meetings serve as a guide for projects, activities, publications, and expert meetings conducted by the bi-regional IGOs. The political declarations only exist to steer the direction of the projects into achieving the broader goals of the organizations. For example, many of the goals include collaboration

²⁷ “EU-LAC Strategic Partnership | Rio Declaration” and “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

²⁸ European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, “Term: Hard Law/Soft Law

²⁹ Boyle, “Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law.”

in economic, political, and social issues³⁰ which are, more often than not, manifested into deeper strategic cooperation between regions or the Member States.

This leaves a lot of room for interpretation in terms of their capacity to implement discussed clauses and agreements. For example, Boyle³¹ explains that the generality of the language used in political declarations “are so cautiously and obscurely worded and so weak that it is uncertain whether any real obligations are created”. This can prove to be a problem of enforcement of the non-binding commitments found in the strategic partnerships, as well as, in the statements or declarations of political dialogues.

Critics of soft laws, such as Woolfson³² and Chinkin³³, argue that soft laws are weak instruments in ensuring compliance of Member States. Besides, they are ineffective since the organizations do not have the necessary means to support the self-regulatory principles that soft laws entail.

Aust³⁴ warns that such claims might be premature. The political declarations of an informal nature do not free the Member states from disregarding the commitments, despite the freedom of having no legal consequences. He argues that doing so would lead to damaging political relations. Subsequently, Shelton³⁵ claims that the guidance provided through soft law documents, such as through political declarations, in fact, gives flexibility to the Member

³⁰ For example, the Barcelona Process highlights the agreement and pledges, made by the two regions to fortify peace, stability, and security of the shared Mediterranean region at all costs. In fact, the declaration clearly states political and security issues as its very first point of cooperation followed by economic and socio-cultural factors. Similarly, a very close pattern can be traced back to the EU-LAC Strategic Partnership that outlines synergies in the political, economic, and cultural fronts which form the basic grounds for EU-LAC Foundation’s mission and activities.

³¹ Boyle, “Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law.”

³² Woolfson, “Working Environment and ‘Soft Law’ in the Post-Communist New Member States.”

³³ Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law.”

³⁴ Aust, *Modern Treaty Law and Practice*.

³⁵ Shelton, *Soft Law*.

States. It provides a path for the adoption of the commitments to be incremental, thus allowing consensus on global issues to be built slowly. This gives enough incentive for the Member States to continue supporting the institutions in carrying out the non-binding political mandates through projects.

Pauwelyn et. al³⁶ also argue that traditional lawmaking with rigid rules and commitments are considered as shackles in the new international sphere. Governments increasingly seek to cooperate in newer, flexible ways that do not “invade” their national legislation with international rules/norms. Hence, soft laws enable bi-regional IGOs to implement tools, policies, and measures in addressing global challenges without the complex legal repercussions.

Another interesting aspect of the soft laws, carried forward from the strategic partnerships between regions into the effective implementation of activities at the bi-regional IGOs, is the nature of financial contributions. Member States can choose to make annual contributions on a voluntary basis³⁷. The action of not contributing does not result in sanctions, penalties, or termination of membership. This very element of flexibility makes it hugely popular for countries to accede into becoming members of informal networks of cooperation through bi-regional IGOs.

³⁶ Pauwelyn, “When Structures Become Shackles.”

³⁷ This is found to be true, specifically for the two cases studies in this dissertation. Article 8.1 of the Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean” mentions that “the running costs of the Secretariat will be funded from grants provided by the participants in the UfM on a voluntary and balanced basis”. In addition, Article 16 of the Official Journal of the European Union, “International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation” states that the “Foundation shall be financed mainly by its Members...contributions are made on a voluntary basis without prejudice to the participation on the Board of Governors.”

So where exactly do the bi-regional IGOs stand in the spectrum of institutional arrangements? Vabulas and Snidal's³⁸ framework can be used to speculate whether the IGOs follow a more formal (hard laws) or informal (soft laws) categorization. The first aspect of an informal IGO (IIGO), "shared expectations, rather than a binding agreement" is fulfilled by the bi-regional IGOs through the shared values, interests and principles³⁹ stated in the various strategic partnerships that do not carry any legal basis. However, it is important to note that the bi-regional organizations themselves are created through ratified agreements. The strategic partnerships result in the organization of regular summits, and meetings among the Heads of States and Governments, as well as high-level government officials, thereby partly fulfilling the second aspect. However, the element of having "no permanent secretariat or other significant institutionalization, such as a headquarters and/or permanent staff" is a fairly tricky one. While some bi-regional strategic partnerships do not currently yet have any formalized secretariats or institutional structures to achieve their political goals⁴⁰, it is rather interesting to assess the bi-regional organizations that were, in fact, successfully created to foster deeper cooperation between the regions. Lastly, the membership of bi-regional IGOs is rooted in a group of Member States, essentially capturing the 'intergovernmental' part of the IGO makeup.

This makes the two chosen bi-regional IGOs, EU-LAC Foundation and UfM, fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of Vabulas and Snidal's⁴¹ 'spectrum of organizational formality'. Spanning from formal (hard laws) to informal (soft laws) at the extreme ends, the two case studies have similar features to an Ad Hoc Formal Agreement⁴², making it a step more formal

³⁸ Vabulas and Snidal, "Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs)."

³⁹ See footnote 29

⁴⁰ Such as the AU-EU Partnership, see "External Partnerships between the AU and Organisations, Regions or Countries | African Union."

⁴¹ Vabulas and Snidal, "Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs)," 21.

⁴² An Ad Hoc Formal Agreement, as explained by Vabulas and Snidal, consists of an international treaty as its organizing principle, states as members, codified rules for the institution, meetings held for a limited duration

than IIGOs, but still possessing the dimensions of soft laws carried forward from their founding political processes.

3.2 Hypotheses

The above sections indicate the prevalence of soft laws in the institutional design of the bi-regional IGOs, and their aim of achieving deeper cooperation between two regions. This leads to the development of two main hypotheses in answering the research question: do soft laws in bi-regional IGOs contribute to the effective translation of political priorities into concrete projects and activities?

Hypothesis 1: Soft laws amplify the effectiveness of bi-regional IGOs by enabling flexible institutional designs

Hypothesis 2: The bi-regional IGOs translate the goals of the strategic partnerships into concrete actions through their projects and activities

The bi-regional IGOs mostly serve as technical tools for carrying out the delegated executive power bestowed upon them by the Member States⁴³. The judicial and legislative authorities are usually absent from such IGOs, with their main focus on carrying out projects, and activities through interdisciplinary partnerships. Therefore, it is likely that the nature of such bi-regional IGOs makes the effectiveness of their activities as a primary goal.

(however, this is not the case for the UfM and the EU-LAC Foundation, which has regularized meetings, similar to that of IIGO) and potentially has a secretariat (true in the case of UfM, but not for the EU-LAC Foundation).

⁴³ Article II of Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

Underdal⁴⁴ asserts effectiveness to be the key factor that leads to desired problem-solving in the sphere of intergovernmental cooperation, and the consequent attainment of organizational goals. Therefore, his framework for effectiveness in assessing organizational performance will be used throughout the next sections to test the two hypotheses. This will be done through the three angles of output, outcome, and impact. An additional lens of ‘budget’ is developed primarily for this dissertation, to display the effect of voluntary funds on the effectiveness of bi-regional IGOs.

To give some context, Tallberg et. al⁴⁵ points out that ‘output’ denotes the agreement standards reflecting the norms, policies, and structures of the institution while ‘outcome’ indicates the implementation of the policies/programs of the organization. Lastly, ‘impact’ refers to the change effected by the implementation process on the underlying issue/problem.

In order to apply the four elements of effectiveness in the hypotheses, ideal scenarios are illustrated below under each factor. This will assist in testing the hypotheses for each bi-regional organization individually in chapter 4.

Output

The institutional design of the IGOs enables less stagnation in the decision-making process. In addition, the approval process of the budget for projects, programs, and activities involves the board of governors and the higher management, but without the bureaucracy of strict government legislations. The informal structure hence provides greater flexibility for the

⁴⁴ Underdal, “One Question, Two Answers.”

⁴⁵ Tallberg et al., “The Performance of International Organizations: An Output-Based Approach.”

projects, programs, and activities of the organizations to be carried out with greater effectiveness.

Outcome

Projects and activities are carried out pertaining to Summit/Meeting Declarations, developed through the consensus of the Heads of States and Governments or senior government officials, at annual or bi-annual forums. Most importantly, the non-binding nature of the Declarations paves the way for broader mandates. Therefore, more areas of activities can be covered due to the non-rigid rules of engagement which are implemented with speed and efficiency.

Impact

The activities, projects, and programs of the bi-regional IGOs create a higher impact on the end participants/users, i.e. on the citizens and society of the Member States. This is due to the diversified partnerships of the organizations with all sectors, including businesses, academia, non-governmental organizations, other international organizations, civil society, and of course the respective governments of the Member States.

Budget

The soft laws operating within a bi-regional IGO also affect the budget usage where public money/state contributions are used effectively and in a timely manner. The IGOs have an inherent incentive to use the money efficiently to maintain the inflow of voluntary funding. Projects and programs are run on deadlines using the annual contributions every year, hence signaling the efficient usage of funds. This draws in more funds, and the cycle goes on. The IGOs are also allowed to possibly seek funds from private corporations and civil society institutions, if needed, based on partnership and implementation of projects and activities.

The next chapter presents the research design of the dissertation by explaining the methodology for testing the hypotheses, and the rationale for case selection along with a brief overview of the cases.

4. Research Design

4.1 Methodology and Case Selection

A structured, focused comparison⁴⁶ method is used to answer the research question and test the two hypotheses that have been outlined in the previous chapter. A comparison of the working processes of the two IGOs is an integral part of the dissertation, and it will do so by first analyzing the protocols and standards on which the organizations are based and then go on to the analysis of the activities that the organizations carry out.

This dissertation is based on secondary⁴⁷ research materials such as the review of the constitutive agreements and strategic partnerships of the two IGOs. The main instruments of assessment for the EU-LAC Foundation are the EU-LAC Strategic Partnership⁴⁸ and the International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation⁴⁹. While the Barcelona Process/Declaration⁵⁰, the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean⁵¹ and

⁴⁶ Kachuyevski, *Structured, Focused Comparison*.

⁴⁷ The original plan of this dissertation was to consult primary resources, and conduct semi-structured interviews of the staff of the two organizations in order to understand how the institutional structure and working processes of the bi-regional IGOs contribute to the effectiveness of the institutions. However, due to the global Covid-19 pandemic status since March 2020 which led to lockdowns and border closures in most countries around the world, the necessary interviews could not be conducted in time.

⁴⁸ "EU-LAC Strategic Partnership | Rio Declaration."

⁴⁹ Official Journal of the European Union, "International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation."

⁵⁰ Union for the Mediterranean, "Barcelona Declaration."

⁵¹ "Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean."

the Statutes of the Secretariat of the UfM⁵² have been used to assess the working processes of the UfM. The examination of documents published by the IGOs and/or the Member States, as well as, existing literature on the organizations will also be utilized to test the hypotheses and analyze the projects and activities of the two IGOs. These documents are reviewed through the information posted on institutional websites, annual reports, activity-specific publications, etc.

While previous literature on the two organizations, including the work of Wessel and Odermatt⁵³, focuses on the relationship of the EU with other international organizations, the lens has been mainly on how the EU participated in these partnerships. Through a structured, focused comparison of the working processes of the UfM and the EU-LAC Foundation, this dissertation is able to expand on that research. Moving away from an EU specific focus, it captures the influence of soft laws in amplifying the effectiveness of the IGOs in the execution of the political priorities into concrete actions.

The rationale behind choosing the EU-LAC Foundation and the UfM is multifold. Firstly, a review of existing bi-regional IGOs was conducted in order to choose the most suitable cases. While many were identified to be very interesting, such as the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations⁵⁴ and the Arctic Council⁵⁵, the membership was too narrow to assess the effectiveness and broader impact of the IGOs. The Organization of the Black Sea Economic

⁵² Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

⁵³ Wessel and Odermatt, *Research Handbook on the European Union and International Organizations*.

⁵⁴ Established in 2001, the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations unites four post-soviet states, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and Artsakh in East Europe and the Caucasus. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Pridnestrovskiaia Moldavskaia Respublika, “Charter of the Community For Democracy and the Rights of Peoples.”

⁵⁵ Since 1996, the Arctic Council brings together eight Arctic States of North America and Europe: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, The Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States. See The Arctic Council, “About | The Arctic Council.”

Cooperation (BSEC)⁵⁶, as well as, the Asian–African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO)⁵⁷ were suitable candidates for assessment but has diverging common goals such as economic integration and international law, respectively. The two major defense and security related IGOs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)⁵⁸ and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)⁵⁹ are great examples of IGOs with a common mission. However, their work has been largely covered in academia and hence does not assist in the purpose of filling the literature gap.⁶⁰

Therefore, the two bi-regional IGOs, EU-LAC Foundation and UfM, are carefully selected based on similar features: both are relatively recent establishments of around 10 years and their official operation of activities coincides in the year 2012; they have singular secretariats i.e. operating from only one office and not stationed across multiple countries; both IGOs are medium-sized and have around 40-60 Member States and 10-60 staff members; the political processes of both the IGOs prioritize the three elements of political, economic and cultural cooperation;⁶¹ and finally, the common denominator for both the IGOs is the EU itself, along with all the EU Member States as their Members as well.

The section below gives a brief overview of the institutional design of the two cases before proceeding into the analysis of the working processes in the subsequent chapter:

⁵⁶ Formed in 1992, The BSEC connects the Balkans and the Caucasus with 12 Member States: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. See “BSEC - Black Sea Economic Cooperation”

⁵⁷ AALCO has forty-eight Member States from Asia and Africa and has been operating since 1956. See full member list at “About AALCO | Asian African Legal Consultative Organization.”

⁵⁸ 1749 marked the establishment of NATO, which caters to 30 Member States from Europe and North America. See “What Is NATO?”

⁵⁹ 57 participating States engage at the OSCE since 1973. See the full list of Members from Europe, Central Asia, and North America at “OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe.”

⁶⁰ Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization?”; Galbreath, *The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)*.

⁶¹ Union for the Mediterranean, “Barcelona Declaration”; “EU-LAC Strategic Partnership | Rio Declaration.”

The EU-LAC Foundation

Established in 2010, and officially operating from 2012, the EU-LAC Foundation has 62⁶² members including the EU, the 28 EU Member States, and the 33 Member States of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)⁶³.

The aim of the EU-LAC Foundation is simple: “to transform the strategic partnership between the European Union, Latin America, and the Caribbean...” into a vibrant reality with “active participation” of all the Member States.⁶⁴ Bi-regional cooperation and partnership are at the forefront of their agenda with the incorporation of academia, civil society, and businesses of both the regions.

The board consists of 62 Governors⁶⁵, 1 from each member and the organization’s top management consists of a President, alternating between a representative from either an EU or CELAC member state, every 4 years.⁶⁶ The Executive Director heads the activities of the IGO, and also alternates in the same rotation as the president but is required to be a national of a region opposite than that of the elected President, in order to maintain a balanced representation

⁶² Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

⁶³ CELAC International, “Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).”

⁶⁴ EU-LAC Foundation, “About Us.”

⁶⁵ “Board of Governors | EU-LAC Foundation.”

⁶⁶ “President | EU-LAC Foundation.”

in the management body of the IGO.⁶⁷ The support team is around 10 people,⁶⁸ consisting of contractual staff to carry out the projects and mandated tasks.

The EU-LAC Foundation mainly partners with other foundations, international organizations, businesses, banks, academic institutions, and NGOs,⁶⁹ to cooperate on projects in six thematic areas (1) Culture (2) Higher Education and Knowledge Generation (2) Science, Technology and Innovation (3) SMEs and Competitiveness (4) Sustainable Development and Climate Change (and (6) Mutual Understanding and Visibility of the Association.⁷⁰

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

28 EU countries and 15 countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean complete the member list of the UfM with a total of 43⁷¹ members. The UfM was launched in 2008 to strengthen bi-regional cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean nations and officially started its operations in 2012.⁷²

The Secretariat of the UfM actualizes the mandate set by the Member States and is headed by a Secretary General and six Deputy Secretary Generals (DSGs) who are all seconded by the Member States. Each of the six priority areas has its own projects lead by a DSG each and their

⁶⁷ Article 15, Official Journal of the European Union, “International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation.”

⁶⁸ “The Team | EU-LAC Foundation.”

⁶⁹ “Partners | EU-LAC Foundation.”

⁷⁰ “Action Lines | EU-LAC Foundation.”

⁷¹ Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, Palestine, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Syria suspended its membership to the UfM on 1 December 2011, and Libya has an observer status at the UfM.

⁷² Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), “History of the Union for the Mediterranean - UfM.”

own team of 3-4 hired staff members along with more staff working at the Legal & Administration Department, Communication & Public Affairs Department, and the Directorate for Operations and Partnerships.⁷³ Moreover, the UfM is governed by a co-presidency system ensuring equal representation of both the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries. The EU serves as the Northern representative and a member country from the League of Arab States represents the South. This co-presidency system applies to all their activities which include “summits, ministerial meetings, and officials’ level meetings”⁷⁴.

The UfM Secretariat’s partnership network ranges from civil society organizations, governments, universities, local authorities, international and regional organizations, foundations, private sector, and financial institutions.⁷⁵ The organization focuses on three key themes of human development, stability, and integration to carry out their projects supporting regional cooperation in all Member States. The priority areas under the three themes include (1) Economic Development & Employment (2) Energy & Climate Action (3) Higher Education & Research (4) Social & Civil Affairs (5) Transport & Urban Development and (6) Water, Environment and Blue Economy.⁷⁶

⁷³ Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), “Structure of the Union for the Mediterranean - UfM.”

⁷⁴ Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

⁷⁵ Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). “Partners | UfM.”

⁷⁶ Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), “What We Do.”

5. Findings and Analysis

5.1 The EU-LAC Foundation

5.1.1 Over the Years

With the vision of increasing mutual understanding and awareness of both regions, as well as, active involvement and participation of civil societies, the EU-LAC Foundation creates policies, agendas, and partnerships, along with developing shared strategies that generate mutual benefits for both regions.⁷⁷

The EU-LAC Foundation is a brainchild of the EU-LAC Strategic Partnership⁷⁸, which manifests as biennial summits of the Heads of States and Governments of the EU and CELAC⁷⁹ Member States. The annual meetings started off as EU-LAC Summits⁸⁰ in 1999 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and reorganized as EU-CELAC Summits⁸¹ from 2013 once CELAC was formed in 2011⁸². The EU-LAC Foundation is bestowed with the responsibility to carry out the mandates of the Declarations and it also feeds into the intergovernmental dialogue between the regions, in line with the bi-regional EU-CELAC Action Plan⁸³.

Receiving its ‘International Organization’ status in May 2019, the International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation⁸⁴ serves as the very first international agreement ratified

⁷⁷ EU-LAC Foundation, “About Us.”

⁷⁸ “EU-LAC Strategic Partnership | EU-LAC Foundation.”

⁷⁹ CELAC International, “Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).”

⁸⁰ Diaz-Rodriguez, “20 Years of Bi-Regional Summits of EU-Latin America: Is It Time for a Turning Point?”

⁸¹ European Parliament, “EU-CELAC Summits of Heads of State and Government.”

⁸² “EU-CELAC Relations.”

⁸³ General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), “EU-CELAC Action Plan.”

⁸⁴ Official Journal of the European Union, “International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation.”

by 35⁸⁵ countries of the two regions. Although this agreement serves as an official instrument to establish the IGO under public international law, the thematic priorities shaping the activities, projects, and programs of the EU-LAC Foundation stem from the non-binding priorities of political summits. Thus, it illustrates the elements of soft laws resulting in amplified effectiveness of the bi-regional IGO.

In its Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council published in April 2019⁸⁶, the EU recognized the value of the EU-LAC Foundation's role in fostering close ties between the people, institutions, civil society, academia, and the private sector of the two regions and transform the mandate of the EU-LAC Partnership into concrete activities.

However, the IGO faced severe constraints in the stagnation of political will from the Member States across both regions. Since the transformation of the EU-LAC relations to EU-CELAC relations in 2011, which fostered the cooperation between one regional institution to another instead of with individual sovereign Member States – there have been challenges looming in the background. The political dialogue between the EU-LAC Partnership states was carried forward through six EU-LAC summits from 1999 to 2010 and two EU-CELAC summits, in 2013 and 2015 respectively. However, the biennial summit plans came to a staggering halt in 2015 due to political tensions on the Latin American side, especially with the instability in Venezuela which lead to the cancelation of the summit in 2017⁸⁷. The lack of political dialogue among the leaders of the states and governments showcases the complex relationship between the two regions. Rodriguez⁸⁸ asserts that perhaps the EU-CELAC setting is not the most ideal

⁸⁵ “Ratifications | EU-LAC Foundation.”

⁸⁶ “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: Joining Forces for a Common Future 2019.”

⁸⁷ Diaz-Rodriguez, “20 Years of Bi-Regional Summits of EU-Latin America: Is It Time for a Turning Point?”

⁸⁸ Diaz-Rodriguez.

platform for multilateral relations due to the wide membership role that it assumes with CELAC still at an infant stage of development. On the bright side, there is still willingness from the EU to resume the EU-CELAC Summits.⁸⁹

Unfortunately, a lack of scholarship and information available on the progress made by the EU-LAC Foundation in terms of total projects conducted, stakeholders impacted, as well as, the number of dialogues held, made it challenging to assess the development of the organization as a whole. Nonetheless, the following section charts out the various projects the Foundation has conducted in its six thematic focus areas, as well as, analyzes the structure of the organization more thoroughly.

5.1.2 Structure, Projects and Activities

The decision-making process, albeit operating at a high-level is fairly straightforward at the EU-LAC Foundation. Article 11⁹⁰ of the International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation outlines that the Board of Governors⁹¹ approve the proposed projects and activities of the EU-LAC Foundation, while Article 15⁹² states the responsibility of the Executive Director of the Foundation in managing the budget and recruiting staff for carrying out the approved activities. This flow of decisions from the Board of Governors to the Executive Director to the staff reduces the red tape present in many rigid structures thereby allowing faster approval of projects and activities.

⁸⁹ “Declaration by the Co-Presidents of the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) | 13 Dec 2019.”

⁹⁰ Official Journal of the European Union, “International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation”, 5.

⁹¹ There are 62 Members at the Board of Governors, 1 representative from each member, as well as, other observers from the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat), and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

⁹² Official Journal of the European Union, 7.

The activities of the organization also have a clear mandate. Clause 1(a) of Article 6⁹³ of the agreement states that the “activities of the EU-LAC Foundation shall...be based on the priorities and themes addressed at the level of Heads of State and Government at the Summits...”. This sets the tone for the non-binding nature of the priorities and themes set by the summits and meetings and creates a mechanism of guidance instead of rigidity. Furthermore, clause 2⁹⁴ of the same article explicitly mentions that the activities of the Foundation must be “action-guided, dynamic and result-oriented”. This is further reflected in clause 1 of article 7,⁹⁵ which encourages a wide range of activities beyond the mandate of the summit declarations. This includes, but not limited to, seminars, workshops, conferences, expert meetings, trainings, publications, exhibitions, initiatives, focus studies, virtual platforms for knowledge sharing, etc.

The EU-CELAC Action Plan of 2015⁹⁶ outlined ten key areas aligned with the EU-LAC Partnership goals of bi-regional integration. Among those ten⁹⁷, all of them coincided with the six thematic priorities and their subcategories of the EU-LAC Foundation. These priorities are made achievable by principles stated in the constitutive agreement, that clearly underlines the Foundation’s capacity to launch “initiatives in association with public and private institutions, the EU institutions, international and regional institutions, Latin American and Caribbean States and the EU Member States” ⁹⁸. Such diversified partnerships of the organizations

⁹³ Official Journal of the European Union, 4.

⁹⁴ Official Journal of the European Union, 4.

⁹⁵ Official Journal of the European Union, 4.

⁹⁶ General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), “EU-CELAC Action Plan.”

⁹⁷ Science, research, innovation and technology; sustainable development; environment; climate change; biodiversity; energy; regional integration and interconnectivity to promote social inclusion and cohesion; migration; education and employment to promote social inclusion and cohesion; the world drug problem; gender; investments and entrepreneurship for sustainable development; higher education; and citizen security.

⁹⁸ Clause 2, Article 7 of the Official Journal of the European Union, “International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation,” 5. Article 19 also mentions the four strategic partners of the Foundation to be: “L’Institut

engaging different sectors and civil society actors enable it to create deep and wide impact, which are analyzed below:

Higher education and knowledge generation⁹⁹ is a priority theme that has been high on the agenda of the EU-LAC Partnership and translated into actionable outcomes through the EU-LAC Foundation. The Foundation contributes to the Common Higher Education Area across the regions through the facilitation of dialogues, events, publications, and projects. It has successfully developed a matrix¹⁰⁰ for academic cooperation which was vetted by various regional and bi-regional networks. It also continuously supports the EU-LAC Bi-regional Academic Fora¹⁰¹ through the organization of knowledge summits with the most recent one in 2017. At the same time, it partners with organizations for knowledge generation through seminars, conferences, expert meetings, etc. to analyze political recommendations, identify key partnership areas for the two regions among others. The topic of gender and youth falls under this theme, which is supported through the EU-LAC Youth Days¹⁰² conferences, along with seminars and commissioned studies on the role of women and inclusive opportunities in the labor market.

The sphere of science, technology, and innovation¹⁰³ is still a work in progress at the Foundation. It seeks to foster the EU-LAC scientific cooperation through increased opportunities for different stakeholders such as governments, NGOs, and academic interest

des Amériques' in France and 'Regione Lombardia' in Italy for the EU side, and Global Foundation for Democracy and Development (FUNGLODE), in the Dominican Republic and United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) for the Latin American and Caribbean side".

⁹⁹ EU-LAC Foundation, "Higher Education and Knowledge Generation."

¹⁰⁰ "Matrix of Objectives and Strategic Lines for the Construction of the Common Area of Higher Education EU-LAC."

¹⁰¹ EU-LAC Foundation, "Academic and Knowledge Summit."

¹⁰² EU-LAC Foundation, "EU-LAC Youth Days."

¹⁰³ EU-LAC Foundation, "Science, Technology and Innovation."

groups in accessing the resources. It does so by organizing seminars and commissioning publications.

One of the EU-LAC Foundation's main areas of focus for bi-regional cooperation in the economic arena has been the advancement of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and competitiveness¹⁰⁴. The internationalization of SMEs, promotion of competition through mapping of industrial hubs, enhancement of corporate social responsibility, and professional training are administered through studies, publications, dialogues, and events.

Sustainable development and climate change¹⁰⁵ is another area of interest with limited progress. The Foundation aspires to offer platforms for dialogues and reflection for diverse stakeholders, to give them a platform to contribute to the intergovernmental process. An ongoing study¹⁰⁶ is conducted on the green bond market which is due to be finished in 2020.

Cultural¹⁰⁷ cooperation between the two regions is captured through reflection forums and publications that promote and contribute to the creation of mutual knowledge and a deeper understanding of the cultural fabric of the two regions. In that spirit, the Foundation aims to use this theme as a tool for social transformation.

Finally, the area of mutual understanding and visibility of the association¹⁰⁸ is one of the most active lines of action at the EU-LAC Foundation. This is a natural trajectory for a young organization like the Foundation to follow in order to gain visibility and grounding for strong

¹⁰⁴ EU-LAC Foundation, "SMEs and Competitiveness."

¹⁰⁵ EU-LAC Foundation, "Sustainable Development and Climate Change."

¹⁰⁶ "Call for Proposals for the Study 'Analysis of the Green Bonds Market in Latin America and the Caribbean and Its Comparison with the European Union Market.'"

¹⁰⁷ EU-LAC Foundation, "Culture."

¹⁰⁸ EU-LAC Foundation, "Mutual Understanding and Visibility of the Association."

partnerships and synergies in the aspect of bi-regional cooperation as well as the active participation of the Member States. Studies, research opportunities, seminars, and exploratory missions have been used as the medium to raise awareness of the EU-LAC Strategic Partnership among civil society members of the states involved. The Foundation also organizes 'Reflection Fora's for the representatives of the members in order to foster bi-regional partnership and explore future possibilities of collaboration with eight editions arranged so far. In addition, it regularly publishes newsletters, updates its database of civil society players in both regions, expands its digital library with archives of relevant official documents and hosts the EU-LAC Awards to honor citizen initiatives in different fields.

The key achievement of the EU-LAC Foundation is in knowledge creation with 188 publications published in 17 areas, including climate change, culture, democracy, gender, innovation, development, economic relations, migration, and youth, among others.

While the projects and activities of the organization are the key drivers of change, one very important element of the soft law is found under Article 16¹⁰⁹ of the constitutive agreement which emphasizes the financial contributions of the Member States to be on a voluntary basis. It further states that the Foundation can also seek funding from external public and private institutions on a request and approval basis for its activities. This makes the usage of public money to be efficiently and responsibly accounted for the purpose of achieving the goals of the Foundation.

¹⁰⁹ Official Journal of the European Union, "International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation," 7.

5.2 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

5.2.1 Roadmap and Achievements

UfM was birthed out of a common ambition of European and Mediterranean countries in the joint promotion of democracy, peace, prosperity, and mutual understanding. While the Barcelona Process celebrated its 25 years of existence in 2020¹¹⁰, it was the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean¹¹¹ in 2008 that the leaders of the Member States saw an opportunity for the introduction of an intergovernmental organization in the form of UfM. It was created to serve as a secretariat and act as a catalyst in deepening the multilateral relations, intensifying co-ownership, and increasing the visibility of the process through concrete projects.

Like its Latin American and Caribbean counterpart, the UfM experienced a similar stagnation of projects from 2008-2011 mainly due to the co-presidency structure. According to Wessel and Odermatt¹¹², the initial co-presidency title held by France on the EU side, required a transfer to the EU after the Lisbon Treaty¹¹³ came into effect in 2009. This transfer finally occurred in 2012, kickstarting the operations of the UfM that year after a few years of paralysis. Wessel and Odermatt¹¹⁴ further explain how the Summit Meetings planned to be attended by the Heads of States and Governments of Member States, never actually took place in the first few years either due to political instabilities on the Southern side, for example, the Arab Spring in many of the Member States in 2010-2012 and the Gaza strip crisis in 2008.

¹¹⁰ “25 Years Barcelona Process.”

¹¹¹ “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

¹¹² Wessel and Odermatt, *Research Handbook on the European Union and International Organizations*.

¹¹³ European Parliament, “The Treaty of Lisbon.”

¹¹⁴ Wessel and Odermatt, *Research Handbook on the European Union and International Organizations*.

Those initial years of preparation propelled the activities of the UfM to a great start in 2012. For the following four years until 2016, the UfM made an extensive impact through its unique model of political forums/framework, regional policy and dialogue platforms, and regional projects and activities. They established 47 regional projects, engaged 10,000 stakeholders including “international organizations, parliamentarians, NGOs and other civil society representatives, international financial institutions, development agencies, industries, and private sector representatives and entities, universities and think-tanks” and held 10 Ministerial conferences along with other high-level meetings according to official records shared at the Foreign Ministers Meeting in January 2017.¹¹⁵

Since then, a renewed and invigorated roadmap in 2017¹¹⁶ paved the way to more partnerships with greater impact. The number of regional cooperation projects rose to 59 in 2019¹¹⁷ with a new aspect of labeling taking into effect in September 2018¹¹⁸ where projects are awarded labels that “contribute to the overall goals of stability, development and regional integration”¹¹⁹. The projects claim to have directly benefited 15 million citizens of the region while having the potential to impact more than 100 million people indirectly according to the website of UfM.¹²⁰ It is important to note the magnitude of such projects, with €5 billion¹²¹ invested with the UfM label.

On top of that, the institutional activities publication of 2019 claims the UfM to have held more than 400 regional dialogues and expert forums on policies, that brought together 30,000

¹¹⁵ “UfM Roadmap for Action.”

¹¹⁶ “UfM Roadmap for Action.”

¹¹⁷ “2019 Follow Up of the Roadmap | UfM.”

¹¹⁸ Mediterranean Blue Economy Stakeholder Platform, “UfM Labelled Projects.”

¹¹⁹ “2019 Follow Up of the Roadmap | UfM.”

¹²⁰ “UfM Institutional Activities at a Glance | 2019.”

¹²¹ Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), “What We Do.”

stakeholders for regional dialogues.¹²² These dialogues engage various stakeholders ranging from government officials, academics, businesspeople to representatives from international organizations, think tanks, and the civil society. This network of stakeholders builds on the mandates of ministerial meetings, exchange best practices, and promote collaborative regional projects.

Lastly, the number of ministerial meetings over the years has been significantly bolstered with the successful organization of more than 25 Ministerial Conferences and 35 plus Senior Officials (SO) Meetings until 2019.¹²³ The political framework of the UfM is key in generating strategic priorities for the region and defining the scope and objectives of a shared Mediterranean agenda.

5.2.2 Structure, Projects and Activities

The aspiration for democracy, peace and regional security builds the foundation of the partnership between the regions and is reflected in the Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.¹²⁴ The Paris Declaration further asserts that the values that the Barcelona Process adheres to, such as co-ownership, multilateral collaboration, equal responsibilities, and decision-making powers, are to be translated into concrete projects through the UfM thereby connecting the people, institutions and the civil societies of the region.¹²⁵

¹²² “UfM Institutional Activities at a Glance | 2019.”

¹²³ Union for the Mediterranean, “Political Framework.”

¹²⁴ Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

¹²⁵ Article 9, “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

The structure of the institution seems optimal to attain maximum effectiveness in project conceptualization, approval, and implementation. All the senior management members, such as the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary Generals, are appointed by Senior Officials of the Barcelona Process through consensus.¹²⁶ As stated under Article VI,¹²⁷ the Senior Officials conduct similar tasks such as the Board of Governors at the EU-LAC Foundation, for example approving of projects, budget, and activities, etc. The staff of the Secretariat is a combination of seconded officials and contracted individuals who carry out the administrative, operational, and project management related tasks.¹²⁸ It is, however, interesting to note that the EU seems to have a slight upper hand at the UfM management body with two positions reserved: one for a seconded staff from European Commission or the European External Action Service as the advisor to the Secretary General¹²⁹ and another Senior Deputy Secretary General¹³⁰ position to be filled by a member state of the EU.

The UfM follows a slightly different principle than the EU-LAC Foundation when it comes to conducting projects and activities. An assessment of the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean indicates that the scope and objectives of the UfM include the implementation of concrete projects in the regional and sub-regional levels that fortify the flow of exchange among the citizens of the regions.¹³¹ Article 24¹³² outlines the line of actions of the IGO to include gathering, examination, and promotion of projects and activities, hence leaving the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation aspects to the suitable partner organizations. This is echoed in the Statutes of the UfM Secretariat under Clause 3 of Article VI¹³³.

¹²⁶ Article VI, Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

¹²⁷ Union for the Mediterranean, 5.

¹²⁸ Article III, clauses 6-9, Union for the Mediterranean.

¹²⁹ Article III, clause 8, Union for the Mediterranean.

¹³⁰ Article V, clause 1, Union for the Mediterranean.

¹³¹ Article 12 and 14, “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

¹³² “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

¹³³ Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

The Joint Declaration further clarifies that the biennial Summits of the Heads of States and Governments should produce a list of project priorities, as well as, the necessary political declaration.¹³⁴ This indicates the importance of the non-binding commitments of the Summits to be translated into projects, which upholds the aspect of soft laws. Moreover, an interesting aspect is the broader mandate of the project initiatives that are not only limited to the summit declarations but expanded to include “...sectoral ministerial meetings, national or regional authorities, regional groupings, private sector, civil society”¹³⁵.

The breadth of impact by the UfM is far-reaching and broader than that of the EU-LAC Foundation. It not only initiates projects, and searches for suitable partners for the funding and implementation of projects, it also works closely with the Senior Officials in the preparation of working documents. For example, it drafts papers for the co-presidency nations in charge, as well as, for “Summits, the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and respective Sectoral Ministerial Meetings of the UfM”.¹³⁶ Thus, it has a very strong presence in the coordination of all ground-level activities under the Barcelona Process.

One of the main criteria of the UfM in its effort to create a positive impact is the principle of sustainable development to be upheld for every project.¹³⁷ It is also mentioned several times throughout the Joint Paris Declaration that the main aim of the UfM is to cater to citizens and civil society of the region,¹³⁸ thereby treating them as the main stakeholders. This reflects the significance of diversified synergies between the UfM and potential partners to implement the

¹³⁴ Article 15, “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

¹³⁵ Article VI, clause 3 (a), Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

¹³⁶ Article II, clause 2 (a), Union for the Mediterranean.

¹³⁷ Article VII, clause 2, Union for the Mediterranean.

¹³⁸ Article 12, 14 and 32, “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

projects on the ground, which is underscored by the encouragement of active participation of the private sector in conducting the projects.¹³⁹

Additionally, a fundamental element of soft law, the principle of variable geometry is stated under Article VII, clause 2(c)¹⁴⁰ of the Statutes of the UfM Secretariat that allows the Member States the flexibility to adapt and implement projects in different locations on their will,¹⁴¹ and free from bounded commitments¹⁴². This paves a path for the UfM to create a deeper and wider impact across the region.

The three original pillars of cooperation of the Barcelona Declaration set the priority areas for the UfM to follow: political dialogue and security partnership, economic and financial cooperation, and lastly and human, social and cultural dialogue. Translating these into key actionable themes, the UfM categorizes them into three broad focus areas of human development, stability, and integration. It then divides them into six sub-categories that are analyzed below:

The thematic area of economic development and employment¹⁴³ includes the topics of job creation; support for SMEs, creative industries and solidarity economy programs; and strategies to enhance private sector development, industrial cooperation, and trade and investments in the region.

¹³⁹ Article 29, “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

¹⁴⁰ Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

¹⁴¹ Tino, “The Variable Geometry in the Experience of Regional Organizations in Developing Countries.”

¹⁴² Lloyd, “The Variable Geometry Approach to International Economic Integration.”

¹⁴³ In 2020, there are 13 ongoing projects, 5 current regional dialogue platforms and 8 Ministerial Meetings held on the topic. Union for the Mediterranean, “Economic Development & Employment.”

Energy and climate action¹⁴⁴ on the other hand, links the regional energy and climate agenda to international priorities and creates dialogues as well as supports projects on the topic across many stakeholders. One of the key achievements of UfM in this regard is earning the observer status at the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 22). Similarly, UfM places solid attention to the theme of water, environment and blue economy,¹⁴⁵ with its observer status at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

Several important issues are being explored in the sphere of higher education and research¹⁴⁶ at the UfM. This includes academic mobility, vocational education, and training, internationalization of higher education, enhancement of learning opportunities in the region, research, and innovation among others. The establishment of the Euromed University of Fes¹⁴⁷ is the most ambitious project of the UfM which is forecasted to be completed in 2021 with a capacity to host 7,000 students from the region.

Two lines of action that need a boost, however, are the transport and urban development¹⁴⁸ that anchors the UfM Urban Agenda for the Mediterranean mandate, and the aspect of the social and civil affairs,¹⁴⁹ which focuses on the areas of youth and women empowerment. The latter is a relatively new issue that the UfM has been developing since 2017.

¹⁴⁴ 4 ongoing projects and 2 regional dialogues in 2020, with 5 Ministerial Meetings held on the theme over the years. Union for the Mediterranean, “Energy and Climate Action.”

¹⁴⁵ 14 ongoing projects plus 3 regional dialogue platforms in 2020, coupled with 4 Ministerial Meetings. Union for the Mediterranean, “Water, Environment and Blue Economy.”

¹⁴⁶ 7 ongoing projects in 2020 with 6 Ministerial Meetings held on the issue. Union for the Mediterranean, “Higher Education & Research.”

¹⁴⁷ Union for the Mediterranean, “Euromed University of Fes.”

¹⁴⁸ 2020 includes 11 ongoing projects and 2 regional dialogue platforms with 3 Ministerial Meetings discussing the subject. Union for the Mediterranean, “Transport & Urban Development.”

¹⁴⁹ 9 ongoing projects and 5 regional dialogue forums in 2020, with 3 Ministerial Meetings highlighting the issue. Union for the Mediterranean, “Social and Civil Affairs.”

Finally, the same element of voluntary financial contributions prevails at the UfM, as its counterpart. The guidelines¹⁵⁰ specify the grants to be provided on a “voluntary and balanced” from the Member States as well from the EU. However, the UfM mainly operates as a donor coordinator, and its emphasis on the maximization of private sector funding collaborations for its projects is what sets it apart from the EU-LAC Foundation.¹⁵¹

The investigation of the projects and activities, along with the political processes of the EU-LAC Foundation and the UfM, confirms the hypotheses. It signals that the prevalence of soft laws can indeed be found in the institutional design of the IGOs, leading to amplified effectiveness organizations. This is captured through the translation of the goals of the intergovernmental processes into concrete actions through activities. The subsequent chapter, conversely, summarizes the possible limitations of the findings and analysis.

5.3 Potential Pitfalls

Further investigation of the IGOs shows grave existing concerns. The trade relations in the Mediterranean are largely strained according to the UfM Secretary General, Nasser Kamel. At the 2019 UfM Business Forum,¹⁵² he stressed that trade narrative depicted in political processes is more drastic in reality. He further expressed that “only 1% of the overall trade flows in the Euro-Mediterranean Region takes place between non-EU Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries” which indicates fragmentation and low economic integration. This concern can derail the efforts of the promotion of peace and stability between the two regions, and lead to further stagnation of cooperation.

¹⁵⁰ Article 8, Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

¹⁵¹ Articles 29 and 31, “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.”

¹⁵² UfM Business Forum, “Opening Speech by the UfM Secretary General, Mr. Nasser Kamel | 2019.”

On the other hand, The 2019 audit report¹⁵³ of the EU-LAC Foundation conducted by Ernst & Young signal significant risks in the continuation of the organization in the face of no financial commitments from the Member States for the fiscal year of 2020. Even though the executive directors of the Foundation showed confidence for the funding to continue from the Members, the insecure liquidity position of the institution casts doubt on the continuation of future activities.

Moreover, the aspect of voluntary contributions also brings its own challenges. Some Member States might ear-mark certain projects for funding which leads to the recycling of funds back to their own countries, thereby diluting the impact of projects intended to generate at least bi-regional, and possibly global change.

It is important to note, that the bureaucratic structures of those the IGOs might be an extension of the governance rubric of the Member States. This might, in fact, make decision-making within the IGOs complex and possibly hinder effective enforcement of multilateral agreements and agendas. This could be due to the issue of the principal-agent problem. In the case of the EU-LAC Foundation, the Executive Director and the President of the organization are elected from a pool of nominated diplomatic officials from the Member States. They might have different priorities than the staff hired for the Foundation, for example, the former might try to push national agendas while the latter will work towards the broader goal of the Foundation. While this is avoided in the UfM¹⁵⁴ through explicit instructions for the staff to not engage in any commands or influence by their affiliated governments or host countries, the EU-LAC

¹⁵³ “Audit Report 2019 | EU LAC Foundation”

¹⁵⁴ Article 3, clause 5, Union for the Mediterranean, “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

Foundation, however, does not cover such grounds and can possibly be a victim of the principal-agent problem.

Lastly, there may be a lack of transparency and accountability due to lower membership evaluation levels. Informal dialogues and non-binding agreements provide a conducive environment for the Member States to collaborate without the legal restrictions of reporting all administrative decisions and activities. Although flexible institutional design enables more effective collaboration, its lack of obligation to maintain transparency and accountability poses a risk to global governance.

However, this is a debated topic among researchers, for example, Slaughter¹⁵⁵ argues that IGOs follow the domestic administration procedures of the Member States thereby automatically holding them accountable to the public and to the respective Member States. Whereas, Hertz and Hoffman¹⁵⁶ refute that the informal structures in IGOs might, in fact, give them a free license to circumvent international transparency laws by allowing secret, closed-door meetings between the Member States.

6. Conclusion

The global governance of bi-regional IGOs offers a dynamic sphere for the investigation of strategic relations and priorities. Shared interests of actors, growing power relations, and a socialized model of norms and identities cater to the popularity of such institutions. Soft laws, in the context of international law, further simplifies the path for conducive institutional

¹⁵⁵ Slaughter, "The Accountability of Government Networks."

¹⁵⁶ Herz and Hoffmann, "Democracy Questions Informal Global Governance."

designs desired by the Member States in terms of greater flexibility, equal ownership of responsibilities, and deeper cooperation through non-binding commitments. These commitments, derived at the summits of the Heads of States and Governments, shape the thematic priorities of the projects and activities conducted by the IGOs.

The investigation of the working processes of the EU-LAC Foundation and the UfM, confirms that the prevalence of soft laws in bi-regional IGOs, catapult them to the star-studded status of ‘effective organizations’ that successfully achieve their goals and missions. This heightened effectiveness of the organizations brings societies and institutions closer together in working towards a common goal of bi-regional collaboration.

This paper argues that shared objectives of strategic partnerships are translated into actionable outcomes, through projects and activities of the IGOs. Acting as the medium to operationalize political mandates into concrete projects, the IGOs identify, process, promote and fund projects in the regional, sub-regional, and transnational levels. However, it is important to note that, new bi-regional organizations, such as the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU-LAC Foundation, require strong support and engagement from the members, especially in the years of establishment. As evidenced through the analysis of the IGOs in this dissertation, both the institutions faced huge stagnation in the initial years. The analysis also signals that ample interest from civil society institutions are needed as their role of partners, for the implementation of the projects and activities at the IGOs. The organizations otherwise face the risk of financial insolvency and paralysis.

This dissertation was limited in its resources, in exploring the bureaucratic shackles of the bi-regional intergovernmental organizations, in the internal approval processes and

implementation of projects. This could not have been researched due to the limited information published by the entities, as well as the lack of previous scholarly literature on the bi-regional IGOs. This can be best examined through in-depth research, engaging the primary stakeholders: the Member States, the respective institutions, partners, and especially staff members, among others. Furthermore, additional research can be conducted on the areas of transparency and accountability of bi-regional IGOs, that are certainly of interest to the citizens of the Member States, whose taxes often fund the activities of such institutions.

7. Bibliography

Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization. “About AALCO.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

<http://www.aalco.int/about>.

Acharya, Amitav. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. Routledge, 2014.

African Union. “External Partnerships between the AU and Organisations, Regions or Countries | African Union.” Accessed July 30, 2020. <https://au.int/en/partnerships>.

Asia-Europe Foundation. “Asia-Europe Partnership for Greater Growth | 1st ASEM Summit.” Accessed July 29, 2020. https://cdn.aseminfoboard.org/documents/1996_-_ASEM1_-_Chair_Statement_Svhj1Gx.pdf.

Aust, Anthony. *Modern Treaty Law and Practice*. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Black Sea Economic Cooperation. “BSEC at a Glance” Accessed July 31, 2020.

<http://www.bsec-organization.org/bsec-at-glance>.

Bossche, Peter Van den. *The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials*. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Boyle, A. E. "Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law." *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 48, no. 4 (October 1999): 901–13.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300063739>.

CELAC International. "Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)."

Accessed July 31, 2020. <http://celacinternational.org/>.

Chinkin, C. M. "The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (1989): 850–66.

Dag Hammarskjöld Library. "What Does It Mean When a Decision Is Taken 'by Consensus'?" Accessed July 28, 2020. <https://ask.un.org/faq/260981>.

Diaz-Rodriguez, Joel. "20 Years of Bi-Regional Summits of EU-Latin America: Is It Time for a Turning Point?," April 29, 2019. <https://www.ceje.ch/fr/actualites/action-exterieure/2019/04/20-years-bi-regional-summits-eu-latin-america-it-time-turning-point/>.

Erturk, Esref. "Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Their Roles and Activities in Security, Economy, Health and Environment." *Journal of International Social Research* 8 (April 20, 2015): 333–333. <https://doi.org/10.17719/jisr.20153710606>.

EU-LAC Foundation. "About Us," 2019. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/about-us>.

EU-LAC Foundation. "Academic and Knowledge Summit," 2017.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/en/calendar/academic-and-knowledge-summit>.

EU-LAC Foundation. "Action Lines" Accessed July 31, 2020.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/en/action-lines>.

EU-LAC Foundation. "Audit Report 2019." Accessed July 24, 2020.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/sites/eulacfoundation.org/files/files/Audit%20Report%202019.pdf>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Board of Governors.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/en/board-governors>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Call for Proposals for the Study ‘Analysis of the Green Bonds Market in Latin America and the Caribbean and Its Comparison with the European Union Market.’” Accessed July 31, 2020.

https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/call_for_proposals_green_bonds_markets_in_lac_eng_final_20.05.pdf.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Culture,” 2020. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/culture>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “EU-LAC Strategic Partnership | Rio Declaration 1999.” Accessed July 21, 2020. <http://alcuenet.eu/assets/01.%20Rio%20Declaration%201999.pdf>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “EU-LAC Youth Days II: Meeting of Organisations That Aim to Promote Youth Volunteering between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean | EU-LAC Foundation,” 2018. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/calendar/ii-eu-lac-youth-days-meeting-organisations-aim-promote-youth-volunteering-between-european>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Higher Education and Knowledge Generation,” 2020.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/en/higher-education-and-knowledge-generation>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Matrix of Objectives and Strategic Lines for the Construction of the Common Area of Higher Education EU-LAC.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

https://eulacfoundation.org/sites/eulacfoundation.org/files/files/Matrix%20Academic%20Cooperation%2002_2020.pdf.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Mutual Understanding and Visibility of the Association,” 2020.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/en/mutual-understanding-and-visibility-association>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Partners | EU-LAC Foundation.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/en/partners>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Political Framework | EU-LAC Strategic Partnership” Accessed July 21, 2020. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/eu-lac-strategic-partnership>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “President | EU-LAC Foundation.” Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/president>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Ratifications | EU-LAC Foundation.” Accessed July 24, 2020. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/news/ratifications>. EU-LAC Foundation. “Science, Technology and Innovation,” 2020. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/science-technology-and-innovation>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “SMEs and Competitiveness,” 2020. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/smes-and-competitiveness>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “Sustainable Development and Climate Change,” 2020. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/sustainable-development-and-climate-change>.

EU-LAC Foundation. “The Team | EU-LAC Foundation.” Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/team>.

European Commission. “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: Joining Forces for a Common Future 2019.” Accessed July 31, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/eu-lac-communication_en.pdf.

European Commission. “Strategic Partners.” Text, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/info/international-justice-cooperation/strategic-partners_en.

European Commission. “The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership.” Accessed July 29, 2020. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf.

European External Action Service. “EU-CELAC Relations.” Text. Accessed June 16, 2020. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/13042/eu-celac-relations_en.

- European Parliament. “Declaration by the Co-Presidents of the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) | 13 Dec 2019.” Accessed July 31, 2020.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/assembly/plenary_sessions/panama_2019/declaration/1195159EN.pdf.
- European Parliament. “EU-CELAC Summits of Heads of State and Government,” March 2, 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-000617_EN.html.
- European Parliament. “The Treaty of Lisbon,” February 2020.
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon>.
- European Union. “The History of the European Union.” Text, June 16, 2016.
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en.
- Galbreath, David J. *The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)*. Routledge, 2007.
- General Secretariat of the Council (GSC). “EU-CELAC Action Plan,” 2015.
- Gheciu, Alexandra. “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe.’” *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (October 2005): 973–1012.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050332>.
- Goh, Gillian. “Non-Intervention and ASEAN’s Role in Conflict Management” 3, no. 1 (2003): 6.
- Grevi, Giovanni. “Why EU Strategic Partnerships Matter,” 2012, 24.
- Harvard Law School. “Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs).” *Harvard Law School* (blog), 2020. <https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/public-service-practice-settings/public-international-law/intergovernmental-organizations-igos/>.
- Kachuyevski, Angela. *Structured, Focused Comparison: An In-Depth Case Study of Ethnic Conflict Prevention*. 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road, London EC1Y 1SP United

Kingdom: SAGE Publications, Ltd., 2014.

<https://doi.org/10.4135/978144627305013517799>.

Kohler-Koch, Beate, Rainer Eising, and Professor of Political Science and International Relations Beate Kohler-Koch. *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union*. Psychology Press, 1999.

Langhorne, Richard. *The Essentials of Global Politics*. Routledge, 2006.

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203774373>.

Lloyd, Peter. “The Variable Geometry Approach to International Economic Integration,” January 1, 2008.

Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Michael Hahn. *The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy*. Oxford University Press, 2015.

McGlinchey, Stephen. “E.H Carr and The Failure of the League of Nations.” *E-International Relations* (blog), September 8, 2010. <https://www.e-ir.info/2010/09/08/e-h-carr-and-the-failure-of-the-league-of-nations-a-historical-overview/>.

Mediterranean Blue Economy Stakeholder Platform. “UfM Labelled Projects.” Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://medblueconomyplatform.org/ufm-labelled-projects/>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Pridnestrovskiaia Moldavskaia Respublika. “Charter of the Community For Democracy and the Rights of Peoples,” November 4, 2007. <http://mfa-pmr.org/ru/gnk>.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “What Is NATO?” Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>.

Novak, Stéphanie. “Decisions Made by Consensus in the Council of the European Union Are Often Far More Contentious than the Voting Record Would Suggest.” *EUROPP, European Politics and Policy* (blog), January 8, 2014.

<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2014/01/08/decisions-made-by-consensus-in-the-council-of-the-european-union-are-often-far-more-contentious-than-the-voting-record-would-suggest/>.

Official Journal of the European Union. “International Constituent Agreement of the EU-LAC Foundation,” October 22, 2016.

<https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/en.pdf>.

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. “What is the OSCE?” Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce>.

Reisman, W. Michael. “The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations Notes and Comments.” *American Journal of International Law* 87, no. 1 (1993): 83–100.

Renard, Thomas. “The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for True EU Strategic Partnerships.”. EgMont Paper 45. Royal Institute for International Relations, April 2011. <http://aei.pitt.edu/32321/1/ep45.pdf>.

Shelton, Dinah. *Soft Law*. Routledge Handbooks Online, 2008. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203884621.ch4>.

Simma, B., H. Mosler, C. Tomuschat, Rüdiger Wolfrum, A. Paulus, and E. Chaitobu. “The Charter of the United Nations : A Commentary,” 2002. https://pure.mpg.de/pubman/faces/ViewItemOverviewPage.jsp?itemId=item_3109113.

The Arctic Council. “About | The Arctic Council.” Arctic Council. Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/>.

The Council of the European Union. “Unanimity,” 2020. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/unanimity/>.

- Tino, Elisa. "The Variable Geometry in the Experience of Regional Organizations in Developing Countries." SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, December 30, 2014. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2576739>.
- UfM Business Forum. "Opening Speech by the UfM Secretary General, Mr. Nasser Kamel | 2019," June 18, 2019, 3.
- Underdal, Arild. "One Question, Two Answers." *Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence*, 2002, 3–45.
- Union for the Mediterranean. "25 Years Barcelona Process." Accessed June 12, 2020. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/25bcnprocess/>.
- Union for the Mediterranean. "Barcelona Declaration," 1995, 14.
- Union for the Mediterranean. "Economic Development & Employment." Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/business-development/>.
- Union for the Mediterranean. "Energy and Climate Action." Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/energy-and-climate-action/>.
- Union for the Mediterranean. "Euromed University of Fes." Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/euromed-university-of-fes/>.
- Union for the Mediterranean. "Follow Up of the Roadmap." Accessed July 24, 2020. https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ENG_Follow-Up-of-the-Roadmap-WEB.pdf.
- Union for the Mediterranean. "Higher Education & Research." Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/higher-education-research/>.
- Union for the Mediterranean. "Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean." Accessed July 29, 2020. https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ufm_paris_declaration1.pdf.

Union for the Mediterranean. “Partners | UfM.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

<https://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/partners/>.

Union for the Mediterranean. “Political Framework.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

<https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/political-framework/>.

Union for the Mediterranean. “Social and Civil Affairs.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

<https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/social-civil-affairs/>.

Union for the Mediterranean. “Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean,” 2008, 8.

Union for the Mediterranean. “Transport & Urban Development.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

<https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/transport-urban-development/>.

Union for the Mediterranean. “UfM Institutional Activities at a Glance | 2019.” Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/UfM-Institutional-Activities-Leaflet-EN.pdf>.

Union for the Mediterranean. “UfM Roadmap for Action,” n.d., 28.

Union for the Mediterranean. “Water, Environment and Blue Economy.” Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/water-environment/>.

Union for the Mediterranean. “Structure of the Union for the Mediterranean - UfM,” 2019. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/structure/>.

Union for the Mediterranean. “What We Do: The Work of the Union for the Mediterranean,” 2019. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/>.

Union of International Associations. “Yearbook of International Organizations (YBIO).” Accessed July 29, 2020. <https://uia.org/ybio/>.

United Nations. “Chapter II: Membership | Charter of the United Nations,” June 17, 2015. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-ii/index.html>.

United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations,” August 10, 2015.

<https://www.un.org/en charter-united-nations/index.html>.

United Nations. “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,” 2020.

<https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>.

United Nations. “History of the UN,” 2020.

<https://www.un.org/un70/en/content/history/index.html>.

United Nations. “Member States | United Nations.” Accessed July 15, 2020.

<https://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html>.

United Nations. “United Nations Treaty Collection | Chapter 1.2.” Accessed July 31, 2020.

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=I-2&chapter=1&lang=en.

United Nations. “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” 1969, 31.

Vabulas, Felicity Anne, and Duncan Snidal. “Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs).” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2011. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1900274>.

Wallace, Helen, Mark A. Pollack, and Alasdair R. Young. *Policy-Making in the European Union*. Oxford University Press, 2015.

Wessel, Ramses A., and Jed Odermatt. *Research Handbook on the European Union and International Organizations*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.

Woolfson, Charles. “Working Environment and ‘Soft Law’ in the Post-Communist New Member States.” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, no. 1 (2006): 195–215. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00619.x>.

World Trade Organization. “WTO | Understanding the WTO - Membership, Alliances and Bureaucracy.” Accessed July 29, 2020.

https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm.

MANEEHA CHOWDHURY

Mundus MAPP 2018-2020

THESIS REPORT

Thesis supervisors:

AGNES BATORY (CEU)

and CHARLES ROGER (IBEI)

Title

Bureaucratic structures of intergovernmental organizations: an enabler or impediment?

Working processes of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the EU-LAC Foundation

Research question

Does the embedded bureaucracy in intergovernmental organizations enable transparency and accountability while simultaneously impeding efficiency and cooperation?

Introduction

The very nature of intergovernmental organizations (IGO) calls for bureaucratic measures to be in place. This can be explained by the IGOs being extensions of nation states in an effort for closer collaboration transgressing borders. While the intensity and breadth of bureaucracy differs from one IGO to another and also in terms of the scale of the IGOs, the final thesis will explore how bureaucratic structures are perceived within the IGOs: is it looked upon as an

administrative hurdle for the staff members and partners, or on the other hand, is it a fair and necessary tool considered by the member governments to give legitimacy to the IGOs and its use of public funds?

An ample amount of research has been conducted in the public policy and/or international relations sphere on global IGOs such as the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies along with the World Trade Organization (WTO), but there is a definite lack of scholarly literature on bi-regional IGOs. Hence, this thesis report will focus on 2 bi-regional IGOs: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC Foundation) to understand how bureaucracy impacts their internal operations and possible external cooperation. The thesis will analyze how the enabling elements of bureaucracy can perhaps be optimized to combat the impeding aspects.

Background

Bureaucratic structures

Most of the literature that covers IGOs focuses on the principal-agent (PA) problem: member states as the 'principal', setting rules and regulations for the IGOs i.e. the 'agent'. But before we deep-dive into dissecting the PA theory, which can be also explained by the realist theory of IGOs as tools of member states (Mearsheimer 1994), let's start with why IGOs are labeled as international bureaucracies in the first place. Bureaucracy in its core is believed to be a necessary function of management: a rational and efficient approach in conducting complex administrative tasks of public administration (Weber 1978). Hence the application of the model is mostly adopted in governments and ultimately also in intergovernmental

organizations, which are essentially, delegated authorities of a set of states that ratify treaties or agreements for cooperation on certain issues.

Other scholars define the constitution of IGOs as “supranational bureaucracies and bureaucratic interpenetration” by the national bureaucracies (Rittberger 2013). An IGO does not automatically suffice the conditions of being a supranational bureaucracy until the decisions taken by the IGO are binding for the member states who vote for it. Another criterion is that national bureaucracies, otherwise known as - member states/nations, has to chart out some regulatory framework for the subscribed IGO hence extending their bureaucratic arm but at the same time giving the IGO staff some autonomy.

For example, the mechanism of secondment of staff is an act of interpenetration of supranational and national bureaucracies where lines are blurred between the priorities of the seconded staff and the epistemic communities in the form of non-government tied subordinates that they hire (Rittberger 2013).

Principal-agent theory and bureaucratic autonomy

The embedded bureaucratic rules and norms in intergovernmental organizations have been investigated throughout the years in relation to the nexus between bureaucracy and authority in IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This research is important for the thesis because it shows how the bureaucratic character of the IOs shapes the way they perform and operate.

The formal rules and procedures customary in a bureaucracy ultimately acts as a catalyst for bureaucratic autonomy (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) due to the biased role perceptions and decision-making behavior by the international bureaucrats/civil servants working at the IGOs.

Having said that, the principal-agent theory is complex when it comes to IGOs. Seconded staff such as high-ranking diplomats or former politicians are usually appointed by the member states to sit at the head of the IGOs (Bauer and Ege 2016), thereby ensuring that the mandate set by the ‘principal’ member states are followed by the international bureaucrats or ‘agents’. However, the agents have fragmented members subscribing to different visions for the IGOs they work for. As mentioned in the section above, the international bureaucrats hired by the seconded staff might actually be “supranational enthusiasts” (Trondal and Veggeland 2014) with diverse priorities who place the collective goal of policy reforms higher than sticking to the national prerogatives of the member states (Johnson 2014).

Organizational design: efficiency and partnerships

Another issue that is persistent in big IGOs with multiple offices spread across many countries, is the fragmentation of collective agents (Graham 2014). Organizational design and leadership are integral factors in shaping IGOs, but for large IGOs with country or regional offices, the same processes and protocols set by the headquarters often do not permeate through as standardized practices. Hence effective control of member states or even the IGO headquarters over quality of information submitted for tasks carried out is not exercised.

While this is true for big organisations, it does not apply to the 2 chosen organisations. However, they might still not be immune from efficiency issues.

Working processes set forth by member states require the IGOs to submit yearly reports on financial contributions, performance, monitoring and evaluation of projects taken up by the IGOs. Hence regardless of the size of an IGO, staff capabilities are extremely important in making sure that the tasks delegated by the member states are carried out (Heldt and Schmidtke 2017). Since the government officials checking these reports rarely interact with the international bureaucrats working at the IGOs (Graham 2014), the fragmentation problem still persists even in smaller IGOs.

In addition, if the hired staff's vision is vastly different than their seconded superiors, it will lead to deep divisions within the organization itself. Although rare, funding cuts can be possible repercussions of removing a seconded staff and in the other scenario, might lead to high turn-over of hired staff leading to loss of institutional knowledge as well as loss of efficiency and possible weakening of external partnerships. Efficiency will be lost in the form of time spent on training and low motivation among staff wherein external partnerships are often maintained through personal connections of staff working on existing or past projects.

Transparency and accountability

While efficiency and cooperation are key elements of the organizational mandate of IGOs, transparency and accountability of the organizations to both the member states and the public are equally important.

Historically, IGOs have been transparent and accountable to their member states, but less so to the public (Heldt and Schmidtke 2017). With multiple governments as member states,

each state adopts their own data privacy laws such as GDPR by EU etc., where practices on how information is stored, used and shared vary vastly between national member state laws. This might be reflected on the level of transparency the government might want the IGO to adopt when it comes to sharing internal information with the public.

However, with the advent of technology and the internet, information available to the public has been on the rise. IGOs are also being held more accountable by the public and civil society, so this is a quick path to increase legitimacy (Grigorescu 2007) as a proof of the way public funds are used.

Methodology

Given the background information provided above, 2 hypotheses will be tested and analysed through qualitative analysis in the form of semi-structured interviews of the staff members

Hypothesis 1: The bureaucratic structures of IGOs enable transparency and accountability to member states and external parties

Hypothesis 2: The internal regulations however, impede efficiency and cooperation within the organization and external parties

of the 2 IGOs as secondary research.

Questions will be asked on the rules, norms and procedures of the bureaucratic structures in place and how it affects the 4 elements mentioned in the hypotheses. Primary research will be conducted through examination of reports and other documents published by the IGOs in

particular as well as cross-examining previous literature on IGOs and administrative styles to validate the findings. The proposed interview questions are outlined in Annex A.

A comparison of the discrepancies in bureaucratic structures present in both IGOs will be an integral part of the final thesis and will further dive into how it impacts the internal and external operations at both the organizations and the perspectives of the staff members in improving the structures, if any. The information shared by the staff members will be treated with full confidentiality as highlighted in Annex B.

Case Selection

The 2 IGOs, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC Foundation) were carefully selected based on similar features: both are relatively recent establishments of around 10 years; they have singular secretariats i.e. operating from only one office and not stationed across multiple countries; both IGOs are medium sized and have around 40-60 member states and 10-60 staff members; and finally the common denominator for both IGOs is the European Union along with all the EU member countries as member states.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

28 European Union countries and 15 countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean complete the member list of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with a total of 43 members. The UfM was launched in 2008 in an effort to strengthen bi-regional cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean nations (Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 2019a).

The organisation focuses on three key themes of human development, stability and integration to carry out their projects supporting regional cooperation in all member countries. The priority areas under the three themes include (1) Business Development & Employment (2) Energy & Climate Action (3) Higher Education & Research (4) Social & Civil Affairs (5) Transport & Urban Development and (6) Water, Environment and Blue Economy (Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 2019b).

The stakeholders of the UfM vary from civil society to governments, universities and think tanks, local authorities, private sector, international financial institutions and donors and international and regional organisations.

The UfM is governed by a co-presidency system ensuring equal representation of both the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries. The European Union serves as the Northern representative and a member country from the League of Arab States represents the South. This co-presidency system applies to all their activities which include “summits, ministerial meetings, and officials’ level meetings” (Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 2019).

The Secretariat of the UfM actualize the mandate set by the member states and is headed by a Secretary General and six Deputy Secretary Generals (DSGs) who are all seconded by the member states. Each of the six priority areas work on their own projects lead by a DSG each and their own team of 3-4 hired staff members along with more staff working at the Legal & Administration Department, Communication & Public Affairs Department and the Directorate for Operations and Partnerships (Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 2019).

Finally, the UfM Secretariat's partnership network ranges from civil society organisations, governments, universities, international organisations, foundations, private sector and financial institutions (Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 2019).

The EU-LAC Foundation

Established in 2010, the European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC Foundation) has 62 members including the European Union, the 28 EU member countries and the 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (EU-LAC Foundation 2019a).

The aim of the EU-LAC Foundation is simple: "to transform the strategic partnership between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean..." (EU-LAC Foundation 2019a) into a vibrant reality with "active participation" of all the member countries.

Bi-regional cooperation and partnership is at the forefront of their agenda with the incorporation of academia, civil society and businesses of both regions.

The board consists of 62 governors, 1 from each member country and the organization's top management consists of a former president of a Caribbean nation followed by a high-ranking EU diplomat to represent both regions. The support team is around 10 people, consisting of hired staff to carry out the projects and mandated tasks.

The EU-LAC Foundation mainly partners with other foundations, businesses, academia and NGOs to cooperate on projects in six thematic areas (1) Culture (2) Higher Education and

Knowledge Generation (2) Science, Technology and Innovation (3) SMEs and Competitiveness (4) Sustainable Development and Climate Change (and (6) Mutual Understanding and Visibility of the Association (EU-LAC Foundation 2019b).

Expected results and limitations

A confirmation of the 2 hypotheses is expected but a systemic analysis of the bureaucratic structures in the 2 IGOs might lead to interesting findings whether all 4 aspects of transparency, accountability, efficiency and cooperation are impacted to the same extent and has a similar trajectory of development. There could be instances where a hypothesis is confirmed by one IGO and not by the other, or perhaps confirmed or negated by both. In doing so, the thesis will contribute to finding more optimized solutions in using the existing structures to its maximum capacity and harnessing the administrative procedures for an enhanced multi-level governance.

Given the difference in the staff size of the two organizations, it might be difficult to make a comprehensive comparison between the organizational design, efficiency and cooperation factors as well as transparency and accountability. One more thing to note that is that the EU-LAC Foundation, though with more members, seems to have much less operational projects than the UfM.

Also, while the interviews for UfM might be slightly easier to coordinate due to the proximity of the headquarters in Barcelona to IBEI campus, the organisation seems to be quite big with

a lot of on-going meetings for the seconded staff. As for the EU-LAC Foundation, at least 70% of staff is aimed to be interviewed due to the small organizational structure.

Conclusion

The bureaucratic structures of IGOs dictate the operations within the organization and also guide their relations to the member states as well as external partners.

By testing the hypotheses, the final thesis will be able to ascertain whether the working processes of two bi-regional IGOs consider the organizational design as an administrative hurdle slowing down efficiency and cooperation or does it in fact facilitate more transparency and accountability?

Further research can be done on the time taken for a new IGO to reach a certain level of autonomy to operate at full capacity with supranational interests. This is because the initial years after the establishment of an IGO are dedicated towards creating the mandate and operationalizing it. Hence the 4 factors of transparency, accountability, efficiency and cooperation might still be at an infant stage for new IGOs such as UfM and EU-LAC Foundation to reach their full potential of impact.

References

- Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Cornell University Press.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7z7mx>.
- Bauer, Michael W., and Jörn Ege. 2016. "Bureaucratic Autonomy of International Organizations' Secretariats." *Journal of European Public Policy* 23 (7): 1019–37.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1162833>.
- EU-LAC Foundation. 2019. "About Us." 2019. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/about-us>.
- EU-LAC Foundation. 2019. "Overview." 2019. <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/overview-0>.
- Graham, Erin R. 2014. "International Organizations as Collective Agents: Fragmentation and the Limits of Principal Control at the World Health Organization." *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (2): 366–90.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113476116>.
- Grigorescu, Alexandru. 2007. "Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (August): 625–48.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00467.x>.
- Heldt, Eugénia, and Henning Schmidtke. 2017. "Measuring the Empowerment of International Organizations: The Evolution of Financial and Staff Capabilities." *Global Policy* 8 (Suppl Suppl 5): 51–61. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12449>.

- Johnson, Tana. 2014. *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments Are Losing Control Over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance*. Oxford University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. 2005. "Abuse of Power: Assessing Accountability in World Politics." *Harvard International Review* 27 (2): 48–53.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19 (3): 5–49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078>.
- Rittberger, Volker. 2013. *Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration*. Springer Science & Business Media.
- Trondal, Jarle, and Frode Veggeland. 2014. "The Autonomy of Bureaucratic Organizations: An Organization Theory Argument." *Journal of International Organization Studies* 5 (2): 15.
- Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 2019. "History of the Union for the Mediterranean - UfM." 2019. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/history/>.
- Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 2019. "Partners - Union for the Mediterranean - UfM." 2019. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/partners/>.
- Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 2019. "Structure of the Union for the Mediterranean - UfM." 2019. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/structure/>.
- Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 2019. "What We Do: The Work of the Union for the Mediterranean." 2019. <https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-we-do/>.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. University of California Press.

Annex A:

Potential questions for interviews (semi-structured)

Institutional questions

Member-states influence & bureaucratic structures (some questions in this section might be skipped if the relevant information is available on their websites)

- Who has the decision making power in your organization?
- Does your board consist of officials of member states/governments?
- Does the board approve the projects you conduct?
- Are certain projects earmarked by some governments/countries? How does this ensure fairness across departments and sectors?
- What is your reporting mechanism to your member countries/states?
- What are the financial guidelines set in place by your members? Does it differ according to funds used e.g. EU DEVCO/others, country specific Trust Fund etc.?

Internal operations

Efficiency

- How are the projects/conferences you conduct funded?
- How long does a procedure take to disperse funding to partners, speakers etc.?
- What is the approval process for projects including speakers, participants, partners

Accountability

- How do you conduct monitoring and evaluation for your projects?

- Are financial expenditure reports standardized and controlled by the highest/strictest measures such as of the EU or each project follows the guidelines of the particular funds used?
- How does the management of the organization ensure more accountability within staff?

External operations

Transparency

- What channels are used to share information with the public?
- Does the public have access to annual reports, budgets and funding?
- Is all funding and contributions transparently displayed on your publications or website?

Cooperation

- Does the approval process for projects affect your cooperation with partners, consultants, experts etc.?
- Is there is a high turnover of staff? If yes, does it affect the institutional knowledge and established partnerships?

Employee specific questions

- Would you identify yourself as an international civil servant or supranational enthusiast?
- The fact that the board is consisted of diplomats and might have more national than supranational stakes, how does it affect your personal attachment to the mission of the organization?
- Is your daily work impacted due to working with such diverse mandates of the national member governments? Does it serve as a catalyst or more of an impediment?

Annex B:

Interview consent form for quantitative research

Research Title: Bureaucratic structures of intergovernmental organizations: an enabler or impediment? *Working processes of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the EU-LAC Foundation*

Name of Researcher: Maneeha Chowdhury

Research carried out by Programme: Erasmus Mundus Masters in Public Policy, Central European University (CEU) and Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)

- I agree to participate in this research study on a voluntary basis.
- The researcher has explained the purpose of the research study to me.
- I am free to withdraw from this research at any point of time before the interview is conducted or while the interview is going on. There will be no consequences for the withdrawal.
- Within one week after the interview has been conducted, I can seek to withdraw the permission to use my answers from the research study. This has to be done in writing or email.
- I have the understanding that all information shared during the interview will be treated in full confidence.
- I have the understanding that my identity will remain anonymous for any data used from my interview. For example, if any quotes are extracted from my interview and used in the final thesis report, my name and function will be not included.

- I give permission to have the interview to be audio-recorded for transcription purposes. The transcription of the interview is confidential and will only be retained in the university records for (tbc).
- According to the GDPR law, I can access any information that I have provided during the time it is stored in university records.
- I can contact the researcher for clarification purposes or any other questions I might have at the details provided below.

Researcher's details:

Name: Maneeha Chowdhury

Address: *To be updated with Spanish address once confirmed*

Email: chowdhury_maneeha@spp.ceu.edu

Research Supervisor's details *(to be confirmed with supervisor for permission on sharing):*

Name: Agnes Batory

Function: Professor of Public Policy and Director of Mundus MAPP, Central European University (CEU)

Email: *tbc*

Name: Charles Roger

Function: Assistant Professor, Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)

Email: *tbc*

Participant's details

Name: *To be typed*

Function: *To be typed*

Organization: *To be typed*

Signatures

Signature of participant

Date

Signature of researcher

Date

Annex C:

Proposed structure of thesis

- Title page
- Abstract/executive summary
- Table of contents
- Main body of the thesis (including introduction, literature review, methodology, hypothesis, results/findings)
- Conclusion
- Bibliography

Work schedule/plan for thesis

August 2019

Submit Thesis Report on 31 August 2019

September - October 2019

Reach out to the 2 organizations: UfM and EU-LAC, and seek consent to interview their staff between October 2019 - February 2020

Fine-tune interview questions

Develop additional hypothesis, if possible

Further clarify the words the 4 elements: transparency, accountability, efficiency and cooperation

October - December 2019

Conduct interviews with UfM staff in Barcelona headquarters

Travel to Hamburg to interview staff of EU-LAC

January - February 2020

Conduct follow-up interviews, if required

Collect all data and start analysis

Further fine-tune methodology section based on actual proceedings

Share preliminary research findings with supervisors

March - April 2020

Formalize results and draft the findings for the hypothesis

Share concrete analysis with supervisors

May - July 2020

Share the final draft of the thesis with supervisor and do the last edits based on consultation

Submit thesis by 8 July 2020

September 2020

Oral defense of master's thesis in September 2020

Annex D:

Author's Declaration Form

I, the undersigned hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis report. To the best of my knowledge this thesis report contains no material previously published by any other person except where proper acknowledgement has been made. This thesis report contains no material, which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

This is a true copy of the thesis report, including final revisions.

Date: 31 August 2019

Name (printed): Maneeha Binte Mahmood Chowdhury



Signature: _____