SCHOOLS FOR THE HOLY CITY: EDUCATION, IMPERIAL LOYALTY AND MISSIONARIES IN LATE OTTOMAN JERUSALEM, 1876-1909

By

R. Merve Demirkan Aydogan

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Supervisor: Associate Professor M. Brett Wilson
Second Reader: Associate Professor Jan Hennings

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Abstract

This thesis provides a detailed investigation of Ottoman educational policies during the Hamidian (1876-1909) period in a nexus of inter-imperial competition with that of the English Church Missionary Society (CMS). Taking Jerusalem as its center of focus, it offers a fresh examination of Hamidian educational policies in a provincial and comparative perspective and, thereby, aims to provide new insight on late Ottoman education as a whole. By tracing the policies of both actors on teacher training and recruitment as well as curriculum design, the thesis shows that the Ottoman Empire’s education policy in Jerusalem was driven by hasty and ad hoc decisions. It suffered from a lack of a long-term strategy, insensitivity to local demands, linguistic imperialism, labor shortage, and the mismanagement of already poor financial resources in the field of education. The CMS, on the other hand, fared better in these categories due to its diligence in far-sighted policymaking rooted in its rich educational experience in different corners of the world, a large pool of volunteering teachers, utmost sensitivity to local demands, fast adaptability in the face of challenges posed by the Ottoman authorities and the generous diplomatic support of Great Britain.
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Introduction

On 19 December 1883, news in the Vakit newspaper based in Istanbul sent the Ottoman government into a panic. According to its author, despite the presence of numerous schools of various kinds opened by the foreigners in Jerusalem and its environs, there was only one elementary government school (mekteb-i rüşdiye). Worse still, the news went on, a new teacher only recently replaced the previous teacher of the said school, who died two years ago. The most striking part of the news, however, was that due to the lack of orderly schools for Muslims, Muslim girls and boys were compelled to attend the Latin and Protestant schools there. On the exact same day, the Imperial Secretariat informed the Grand Vizierate about the issuance of an imperial decree by the Sultan. Most possibly after reading this unsettling news, Sultan Abdülhamid II ordered the Grand Vizierate to take the necessary precautions together with the Ministry of Public Instruction. The reason for this panic was clear: While in all corners of the Ottoman Empire numerous foreign schools and other educational facilities operated, the presence of a small number of Muslim schools, their complete absence in some locations and the attendance of Muslim children to foreign schools would cause “various inconveniences.” In its swift response, the Ministry assured the Grand Vizierate that Jerusalem was not deprived of the widespread educational investments in the whole imperial domains, on the contrary, it had recently opened 52 primary (ibtidâi) government schools, and that new projects were underway to open a number of schools in its environs. Just recently, even a traditional madrasa was turned into two modern schools for boys and girls and began to function with “capable teachers.” By emphasizing the importance of Jerusalem to the

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1 BOA/I-DH/ 904-71845-1, 18 S 1301 [19 December 1883].
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 BOA/I-DH/ 904-71845-2, 18 S 1301 [19 December 1883].
5 Ibid.
6 BOA/Y-A-HUS/176-4-2, 27 S 1301 [28 December 1883].
government, the Ministry stated that officers were sent to inspect the existing schools to improve them and to visit the villages which lacked schools to introduce new ones there expeditiously. The updated numbers of the Ministry were also published in newspapers, most probably in order to repair the damage the government’s image had suffered due to the earlier story.  

The fact that the Sultan issued a special decree following the news on Jerusalem and that the Ministry felt the need to promptly change the conversation on the Ottoman educational investments in the news to present a more favorable picture of the present situation there shows both the significance of Jerusalem for the Ottoman government and the Hamidian administration’s obsession with projecting a favorable image of itself. However, as one could gather from the correspondence summarized above, the Ministry neither rejected nor accepted the allegations; therefore, it is not easy to readily dismiss their inaccuracy. Consequently, a glaring contradiction emerges: On the one hand, the Ottoman government was keen to spread education and concerned to consolidate its educational network throughout the empire under the pressure of the increasing competition from foreign powers. On the other hand, the government learned about the pressing problems that its schools faced in the overall educational landscape of Jerusalem, which was crucial for its public image, through a newspaper article. For this reason, this dispatch presents a convenient point of departure for this thesis.

In the following chapters, I will explore whether this concern to enlarge and improve its educational investments in the face of the intense competition from foreign powers translated into actual and strong Ottoman educational presence in Jerusalem during the

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7 BOA/Y-A-HUS/176-4-1, 2 Ra 1301 [1 January 1884].
Hamidian period (1876-1909). I specifically selected this period to study because it was during the reign of Abdülhamid II that the Ottoman government began to take steps to implement the landmark Maârif-i Umâmiye Nizamnâmesi (Regulation on Public Instruction) (1869) to better supervise the government and foreign schools at the provincial level. Additionally, the Ottoman government expanded the network of the local education councils to systematize its educational investments and provide an institutional basis for the development of provincial education. It was also during the Hamidian period that the number of state schools saw an unprecedented increase in the overall empire. Throughout the Hamidian era, not only did the state schools expand in the provinces and the villages, but also their overall quality improved in terms of teachers, curricula, and educational facilities. When the Hamidian period ended, rüşdiye schools were to be found throughout the empire. As for Jerusalem, it was one of the localities where government primary schools (ibtidâi) enjoyed broad dissemination. For instance, while the imperial average of male and co-educational primary schools for each kaza (county) was 12.47, the figure for Jerusalem was 70 in 1905-1906.

The Hamidian period also coincided with a considerable increase in the foreign influence in the empire. One of the most powerful among them was Great Britain, and just as other great powers, it used missionary organizations as a vehicle to increase its presence. Therefore, to gauge the efficiency of the Ottoman educational policies, I will compare them with those of the most influential and fastest-growing English missionary organization at the time in Jerusalem, the Church Missionary Society (hereafter CMS). I will base my analysis on

10 See, for example, Benjamin C, Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 10; Bayram Kodaman, Abdülhamid Devri Egitim Sistemi, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1980), 8.
the following categories: teacher training and recruitment, and curriculum design together with their career prospects upon graduation by bearing in mind the entanglement that the policies of the Ottoman authorities and the CMS had. I will argue that despite its best intentions, the Ottoman Empire’s education policy in Jerusalem was driven by hasty and ad hoc decisions, and it suffered from a lack of a long-term strategy, insensitivity to local demands, linguistic imperialism, labor shortage, and the mismanagement of already poor financial resources in the field of education. The CMS, on the other hand, fared better in these categories due to its diligence in far-sighted policymaking rooted in its rich educational experience in different corners of the world, a large pool of volunteering teachers, utmost sensitivity to local demands, fast adaptability in the face of challenges posed by the Ottoman authorities and the generous diplomatic support of Great Britain.

In the following sections of this chapter, I will situate my research question in the existing historiography and explain the ways in which exploring this question is relevant. Subsequently, I will provide a brief sketch about the methodological approach I will use for my analysis and the sources I will be consulting. Before proceeding to a detailed examination of the cases in the following chapters, I will provide contextual information about Jerusalem and the CMS at the end of this chapter.

**Historiography on Ottoman Educational Policies during the Hamidian Period**

Existing literature on the Hamidian educational policies can be grouped under several categories. In one group, we find the works that use the Hamidian period to highlight and praise the educational advancement made during the Republican era and deny that a remarkable improvement in the field of education occurred during this period.\(^\text{14}\) This nationalist-republican

approach, as called by Somel, limits the analysis of those scholars to only government schools and results in their overlook of the role played by the foreign schools to stimulate Ottoman educational investments.\footnote{Ibid., 41.} Since these works are also exclusively based on Ottoman archival materials, they reflect the concerns of the Ottoman state \textit{vis-à-vis} the foreign schools and categorically regard them as malevolent entities aiming to disintegrate the empire.\footnote{See, Osman Ergin, \textit{Türkiye Maarif Tarihi} Cilt 3 ve 4. (İstanbul: Eser Matbaası, 1977); İlkınur Polat Haydaroğlu, \textit{Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yabancı Okullar} (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990), Bayram Kodaman, \textit{Abdüllahıdı Devri Eğitim Sistemi}, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1980). For an exception, see Yahya Akyüz, \textit{Türk Eğitim Tarihi (Başlangıçtan 1982’ye)} (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1982).} Additionally, these works generally focus on Istanbul; therefore, their conclusions do not reflect the realities on the provincial level. Even if it is not difficult to come across statements of some missionaries in their own reports disclosing their strong desire for such an outcome, I believe, just like the works of the second group below, that their interaction with the Ottoman authorities and their effects on the broader Ottoman educational reforms are worth exploring further.

Another group of works, whose findings this thesis aims to contribute, acknowledges the importance of both Ottoman agency and foreign schools for informing the Ottoman educational policies.\footnote{See, Büssow, \textit{Hamidian Palestine}; Selim Deringil, \textit{The Well-Protected Domains}; Emine Ö, Everett, \textit{Empire and Education under the Ottomans: Politics, Reform and Resistance from the Tanzimat to the Young Turks} (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012); Benjamin C. Fortna, \textit{Imperial Classroom}; Somel, \textit{The Modernization of Public Education}.} They include in their analysis the challenges faced and the solutions adopted at the provincial level, which is crucial to gauge the effectiveness of the reform plans on paper when translated into reality. One could gather from their accounts that the empire was aware of the importance of education for the future of the empire, the dangers posed by the missionary schools for securing the loyalty of its citizens, and consciously took steps not to lag behind its foreign rivals in this stiff competition. By acknowledging the significance of educational expansion during the Hamidian period against the challenges on many fronts, I aim...
to explore the application of Ottoman education policies in Jerusalem, where foreign competition was at its fiercest. Consequently, scholars might expect to find a systematic and well-planned approach to education on the part of the Ottoman state. In what follows, I will provide a detailed investigation of Ottoman policy in a nexus of inter-imperial competition, and additionally, assess this policy in comparison with that of British missionary networks. My analysis, therefore, offers a fresh examination of Hamidian educational policies in a provincial and comparative perspective and, thereby, aims to provide new insight on late Ottoman education as a whole.

A critical gap in the above-mentioned historiography is the prevalent use of exclusively Ottoman archival sources or viewing the policies as communicated in the official correspondence, state yearbooks, and memoranda of state officials. In recent years, studies focusing on the American missionary encounters in the Ottoman Empire and their effects on the Ottoman educational policies have emerged; however, the same cannot be said about the English missionary organizations and their interactions with the Ottoman state authorities. One important exception is Selim Deringil’s work, where he provides an overview of the relations between the Ottoman authorities and the British missionaries in the Empire during the Hamidian period. Another exception is Ş. Tufan Buzpınar’s work, which consulted British Foreign Office correspondence to explore the activities of the British Missionaries in Syria and Palestine and the reactions of the Ottoman authorities. Studying this interaction is especially

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18 Notable exceptions are Fortna, who consulted maps, architectural plans and disciplinary records of the students and Somel, who used student memoirs in his analysis in addition to the Ottoman archival materials mentioned above. Büssow and Evered also made use of additional archival materials alongside the Ottoman state sources.


20 Deringil also uses Ottoman correspondence in his analysis.

relevant for Jerusalem in these periods in the sense that the Ottomans were concerned about the increasing British influence in Palestine through its missionary schools, and, additionally, Britain was the political successor of the Ottoman Empire in Palestine after its collapse.

One crucial contribution in this regard is the work of Abdul Latif Tibawi. In his accounts of the British missionary and diplomatic presence in Palestine between 1800 and 1914, he bases his analysis largely on the CMS archives and offers significant details that the Ottoman archival sources would not furnish such as the reception of the Ottoman policies by the missionaries, their communication with the British diplomatic representatives, and their strategies to come up with alternative solutions to the restrictions imposed by the authorities. Since one team at the one end of the rope determined the actions of the team at the opposite end in this tug-of-war, incorporating the perspective of the CMS in my analysis will be highly relevant to better frame the Ottoman educational policies. Different from Tibawi, I will not give precedence to CMS sources but also exploit Ottoman sources to an equal degree to present a more extensive account of the interaction between the CMS and the Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem.

**Methodology**

To answer my research questions, I will adopt an entangled-history approach and consider the history of the Ottoman Empire and the CMS as one unit rather than two separate units for comparison. Such a perspective is most suited to present the processes and factors mutually influencing and reinforcing each other, as in the case of the competition between the Ottoman state schools and the CMS schools operating in Jerusalem. I argue that factors such as Ottoman modernization efforts and emulation of Western models in education; the Ottoman

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attempts to assert imperial authority in Jerusalem where foreign powers vied with each other and with the Ottoman Empire through educational institutions for religious presence and political foothold; the objectives of the missionaries and local educational needs were all interrelated. Therefore, to understand the competition between the Ottoman government schools and the CMS for the hearts and minds of the Jerusalemites, one needs to take into consideration numerous other interrelated factors connected with the inter-imperial politics, religious competition, modernization, and legitimation efforts.

I will concretize this entanglement in two categories, as mentioned above, namely, teacher selection and curriculum design. As will be shown in the following chapters, the meticulous policies of the CMS for employing its teachers or offering some courses that were not taught in government schools helped increase the quality of its schools and drew more Muslim students to their schools. This, in turn, led the Ottoman authorities to reconsider its teacher selection process and its curriculum. The converse was also true. However, any lack of planning in these categories would place both sides at a disadvantage against each other.

Sources

To understand this entanglement between the Ottoman government and the CMS schools, I will make use of archival materials in Turkish Presidency Ottoman Archives in Turkey, and the Church Missionary Society Archives and the National Archives in the UK.

The Ottoman archival materials I will be consulting are records from the Office of the Grand Vizier, Ministries of Education, Internal Affairs, and the Mutasarrifate (Provincial Governorate) of Jerusalem. They are related to the Ottoman stance against the missionaries and foreign power activities in Jerusalem, efforts to reform education, appointment of teachers, problems and complaints about the government schools and their teachers, changes to the curricula of government schools, and statistical information about the missionary and government schools. I will also make use of the Salnâme-i Nezâret-i Maârif-i Umûmiye
(Annual Yearbook of the Ministry of Public Instruction) published by the Ministry between the years 1898 and 1904\textsuperscript{24} to trace directives, the educational personnel and the courses taught at government schools. Despite their flaws for not presenting updated statistical information, these yearbooks are valuable for including information about the local educational personnel and their backgrounds. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that since the Ottoman sources are charged with strong skepticism towards not only these missionary schools but also any non-Muslim community school in this period, I will balance my analysis with the non-Ottoman sources and focus more on the interactions rather than confrontations.

To understand the CMS policies on the categories I have selected, I will use personal papers of the missionaries, station reports sent to the CMS headquarters in London, the minutes of the education and finance conferences of the CMS Palestine mission, and the annual reports of the missionaries. It is important to note that these materials also reflected the bias of the missionaries towards the Ottoman authorities and might have exaggerated the facts on the ground to persuade the CMS headquarters to keep the Palestine mission open. Mainly, the annual reports, through which the CMS informed the prospective donors about its activities throughout the globe to ensure the sustainability of its large-scale enterprise, should be read alongside and against other sources. Since these reports served as an effective advertisement for each mission to maintain a constant flow of donations and a clear assurance to the donators that their financial contributions were not futile, reading the private letters of the missionaries and their correspondence with the CMS headquarters is of utmost importance to understand whether the pragmatic or economic gains dictated the content, and whether it completely reflected what the missionaries deemed crucial.

\textsuperscript{24} Despite its initial enthusiasm to publish the \textit{salnâmes} regularly, the Ministry seems to have published only five \textit{salnâmes} in total. Although six \textit{salnâmes} were to be published during the period cited above, the \textit{salnâme} for the year 1902 was not published at all. The practice came to an end with the \textit{salnâme} for the year 1903 for reasons unknown to the present author.
Additionally, though not heavily as the abovementioned sources, I will make use of general correspondence between the British Consuls in Jerusalem and the British Foreign Office or the British Embassy in Istanbul about the CMS and other missionary schools in Jerusalem. Even though the reports of the Consuls were prone to exaggeration and bias to some extent, they are also helpful to analyze the same educational developments in Jerusalem in the years this thesis focuses from different angles. All in all, using these three categories of primary sources will offer a more comprehensive analysis of Ottoman educational policies in Jerusalem. This analysis is all the while important because the actions of the government in the theatre of intense educational competition could give us a clue about its policies on the broader empire. This point will become clearer in the following section centering on Jerusalem.

**Contextual Background**

Jerusalem as the third holiest city in Islam was held in special reverence by the Ottoman sultans. As a sign of this reverence, its residents were exempted from paying certain taxes. Due to its peripheral location, its low demographic weight within the Ottoman Empire, it was of secondary interest for the Ottoman central government during the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, this decline in interest should not be exaggerated. Because of the maintenance of the Islamic holy sites and Jerusalem’s proximity to the pilgrimage route to Mecca and Medina, the protection of Jerusalem was directly related to the legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan as the caliph. Therefore, during the nineteenth century, before the European interest in the region surged, it received special care under Mahmud II (1808-1839). Under his rule, when the power

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26 Büssow, *Hamidian Palestine*, 45. According to the first comprehensive census conducted around 1885, the population of Ottoman subjects in the district of Jerusalem was 234,000. This amounted to 1.5% of the then approximately 17 million subjects of the Empire. (Ibid.); Butrus Abu Manneh, “The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late 19th Century,” in *The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict*, ed. Gabriel Ben-Dor (Tel Aviv: Turtledove, 1979), 21.
27 Büssow, *Hamidian Palestine*, 47.
of the Ottoman caliphate was opened to question due to the military inefficiency shown during the Wahhabi uprising in Hijaz, Jerusalem’s significance for the Ottoman caliphate came to resurface.\textsuperscript{28}

In parallel with the Ottoman interest, during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Jerusalem increasingly gained importance for the European powers as well. The primary factors that ushered in an era during which Jerusalem became a center of increased western attention are growth in the interest in the holy places and their political significance, missionary enthusiasm imbued with eschatological expectations, and colonial ambitions of competing empires.\textsuperscript{29} However, the entry of western powers was facilitated during the Egyptian takeover of Jerusalem (1831-1840). When the Ottoman governor of Egypt Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha tried to secure the support of the European powers for their control of Syria, they opened Jerusalem to European missionary and consular activities. This was a significant encouragement for those wishing to visit and reside in the Holy Land because, under Ottoman rule, the pilgrims and visitors had not been allowed to settle in Jerusalem permanently.\textsuperscript{30} Due to this new open-door policy that continued under the Ottomans after it re-established its control in Palestine and Syria, there was a growing number of Europeans visiting the Holy Places. These visitors opened religious and charitable institutions and gradually established themselves\textsuperscript{31} and received diplomatic protection of the states with which they were affiliated.

\textsuperscript{28} Abu Manneh, \textit{The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem}, 21.
\textsuperscript{31} David Kushner, “The District of Jerusalem in the Eyes of Three Ottoman Governors at the End of the Hamidian Period,” \textit{Middle Eastern Studies} 35:2 (1999): 84. It is important to note that the ease in the establishment of various European religious and charitable institutions stemmed also from the rights that non-Muslim subjects of the Empire began to enjoy under the Tanzimat period. This period was, therefore, conducive to the increase in the proselytization activities across the Empire. See, Eleanor H. Tejirian and Reeva Spector Simon, \textit{Conflict, Conquest, and Conversion: Two Thousand Years of
Since this region also became a sensitive border area with semi-independent Egypt under Muhammad Ali Pasha after 1840 and the fact that the Egyptian rulers did not hide their intention to be recognized as patrons of Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, the Ottoman Empire increasingly felt threatened by the possibility of Egyptian re-takeover of this district with the support of a European power. In order to oversee the activities of its European and Egyptian rivals, the Ottoman Empire changed the administrative status of Jerusalem in 1872. With this change, Jerusalem gained ‘unattached’ or ‘independent’ district status, which meant that it was no longer subordinate to any other provincial capital but would be directly governed by the Ministry of the Interior in Istanbul.

At a time when European powers discussed the future of the Ottoman Empire through the “Eastern Question,” a rivalry for political supremacy and influence in the Ottoman lands emerged among them. Consequently, intensification in the activities of one group connected with any state or religion aroused the ire of another. Intra-religious competition as well played a significant part in this rivalry. For instance, the foundation of an Anglo-Prussian Protestant Bishopric in 1841 preceded the movement of residence of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem from Istanbul to Jerusalem in 1845, the revitalization of Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in 1847, and the appointment of a Russian bishop in 1858.

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32 Kushner, “The District of Jerusalem,” 84; Büssow, Hamidian Palestine, 48.

33 Ibid., 43.

It was not only intra-religious but also intra-denominational rivalries that determined the actions and policies of the actors on the ground. For instance, until the Ottoman state formally stopped executing converts from Islam after 1843, Catholic and Protestant missionaries understandably directed their proselytization efforts to the prevalent Greek Orthodox community to create the human base necessary to advance their political claims in these lands. These efforts, however, could spell disaster for the demographic dominance of the Greek Orthodox community in time. Russia, which considered itself as the “true defender of Orthodoxy” in the Ottoman dominions, realized that it was losing the base it had been very confident about. Therefore, it took steps to reverse this trend and secure its foothold in Palestine. One of these steps was the foundation of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society in 1882. Since one of the imperial strategies for the peaceful penetration in these lands was education, education was also seen as the panacea for resistance to these efforts. Therefore, through this Society and the schools it opened, Russia tried not to lose the Greek Orthodox community to the Catholic and Protestant missionaries.

Britain, as one of the greatest powers of the 19th century, took its place among the competitors for influence and political foothold in Jerusalem. Indeed, the British dominated the Western involvement in Palestine in the 19th century. For instance, it was Britain that opened

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36 Indeed, they did. For instance, while in 1840 nine out of every ten Arab Christians were Greek Orthodox in Palestine, this ratio dropped to seven out of ten in 1880, while the number of Arab Catholics and Protestants increased manifold. According to the census taken during the British Mandate period in 1922 in Palestine, the number of Arab Greek Orthodox comprised only around five out of every ten Arab Christians. See, Alex Carmel, “The Activities of the European Powers in Palestine, 1799-1914,” *Asian and African Studies* 19 (1985): 62; Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843-1914: Church and Politics in the Near East* (London: OUP, 1969), 99-100.
the first consulate in Jerusalem in 1838. After realizing that France and Russia had taken the lead in the competition in Jerusalem through protecting Catholic Christians and Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, Britain directed its efforts to Jews and Protestants to create its own group of protégés. With the installation of the first Anglican Bishop in 1842, the building of the first Protestant church in 1849, and the official recognition of the Protestant millet in 1850, the Protestant efforts gained legitimacy, and Britain began to establish its own base and influence in Jerusalem. The CMS, through its schools, was one of the vehicles to extend British influence in Jerusalem during the Hamidian period.

In the following, I will briefly provide information about the place of the CMS in the educational and imperial rivalry by analyzing the information given in the Palestine Mission section of the Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East (hereafter Section) between the years 1875-1909. This source is important to explore as it gives us valuable clues about the intensity of the educational and religious rivalry, the positioning of various actors in it and the imperial competition from the eyes of one of the contenders in the field of education. To illustrate, we learn from the Section that the CMS regarded itself as an influential actor that shaped the policies of not only the Ottoman Empire but also other denominations in the field of education. Furthermore, the CMS functioned as an apparatus of the British imperial policies in Palestine and considered the Ottoman state as a key actor with an increasing presence in the educational inter-imperial rivalry in Palestine.

39 British consulate was followed by the consulates of Prussia (1842), Sardinia (1843), France (1843), Austria (1847), Spain (1854), America (1856) and Russia (1857). See, also, M. Vereté, “Why Was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem?” The English Historical Review 85:335 (Apr., 1970).
Taking their inspiration from the evangelical revival and the rising popularity of the Evangelical Movement in the late 18th and 19th century England, the English missionary societies extended their work to Palestine during the 19th century. Even though it was laboring in the same land together with other missionary organizations such as the Society for Female Education in the East (FES, 1834) and London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews (1809), the CMS was the largest English missionary society in Palestine. The CMS also distinguished itself from other English missionary societies by clearly establishing its primary objective as the evangelization of the Muslims from the start.

The CMS began its activities in Jerusalem in 1851 upon the invitation of Samuel Gobat, the second Protestant Bishop of Jerusalem, who was a former CMS missionary. Bishop Gobat’s invitation precipitated the opening of mission stations not just in Jerusalem but also in various parts of Palestine, such as Nazareth (1852) and Salt (1873). However, the most remarkable proliferation in the number of CMS mission stations in overall Palestine ensued the decision of the CMS Committee based in London to withdraw from Constantinople and Smyrna to “strengthen [its] force as much as possible” in Palestine in 1875. Thanks to this decision, Palestine, which belonged formerly to the Mediterranean Mission together with Constantinople and Smyrna, was transformed into a separate mission in 1879. It now came to operate through several missions opened in Jaffa (1876), Gaza (1878), Haifa (1884), Acca (1890), Kefr Yasif and Bir Zeit (1892), and Ramleh (1894). Following the closure of the FES in 1899, the CMS took over FES schools and missionaries and further expanded its base in Nazareth, Bethlehem,

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42 Tibawi, “English Education,” 598.
43 While the FES strove for opening interdenominational schools for girls in Palestine, the LJS’s main goal was the conversion of the Jews in Palestine. The CMS throughout the course of its work in Palestine, embraced additional objectives such as enlightening the Eastern Churches and gaining converts among the members of these churches to influence the Muslims through them. However, proselytizing the Muslims had always remained the core mission of the CMS in Palestine. For more information on the subject, see, Tejirian and Spector Simon, Conflict, Conquest, and Conversion.
and Shefa Amar. In these stations scattered across Palestine, the CMS could reach to
Palestinians through its schools, which it regarded as “unquestionably the best basis for
evangelistic effort in Palestine.”

The Section illustrated the ways in which the CMS missionaries viewed the intense
religious rivalry in Palestine and defined their own place in comparison to the Orthodox and
Catholics. For instance, the Section mentioned the constant opposition of Roman Catholics to
the CMS work and their determination to conquer Palestine. The CMS missionaries who
constantly visited many corners of Palestine and reported about the educational activities of
the Latins, therefore, suggested to the Parent Committee in London that if the CMS did not
“enter upon openings whenever they occur,” they will find out later that the way was closed.

The missionaries were careful to watch not only the Latins but also the Greeks and
chose opening schools wherever both denominations neglected to do so. They regarded the
Greeks as more open to their influence unlike the Latins, and the Section is replete with
instances when the efforts of the Greek Patriarch to keep the Greek children from attending the
CMS schools, either by opening schools or by threatening the parents of the children attending
them are mentioned.

The closure of the schools of other denominations represented an opening for the CMS,
which could lead to an increase in the number of its scholars just as it happened when the
Russian schools in Nazareth shut down. For instance, this closure created excellent
opportunities for the CMS to impress the parents of its new students, who could now compare
the education given in the Russian and CMS schools and also to learn what the other schools
taught.

45 CMS, Proceedings..., 1876-77 (London: Church Missionary House, 1877), 53.
48 See, for instance, CMS, Proceedings...,1884-85 (London: Church Missionary House, 1885), 57.
49 CMS, Proceedings..., 1877-78 (London: Church Missionary House, 1878), 63.
The Section also gave significant information about the place of the CMS and its connection to the British Empire. According to the section, the CMS was clearly supported by the British Empire and the royal family. For instance, The British Consul in Jerusalem, Mr. J. Dixon, accepted a seat on the Society’s Finance Committee in Palestine.\(^{50}\) Moreover, when one of Society’s schools in Bethlehem (under the Jerusalem station) could not obtain a permit for three years from the Ottoman authorities, the Duke of Edinburgh who visited Jerusalem intervened to facilitate the obtainment of the said permit. He drew attention to the need for the permit by personally delivering the letter written by the Society to the British Ambassador in Istanbul, and the permit was sent through the British Consulate in Jerusalem to the Society ‘without costing it any penny.’\(^{51}\) Additionally, the British Government intervened in many cases when the Ottoman government introduced new regulations that could curb the aggressive missionary work. After such an intervention in 1892, for instance, the section noted the unprecedented immunity the missionaries enjoyed from Ottoman interference in that year.\(^{52}\)

Another important fact the Section laid out is the identification of the CMS missionaries with Great Britain by the Palestinians and the Ottoman authorities in that political steps of Great Britain affected both parties’ approach towards the CMS missionaries. The Section also promoted the idea that these steps had direct influence over the popularity of the CMS work in Palestine. As a case in point, when Great Britain took the same sides with the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War, the Section reported that the prestige connected with the Englishness facilitated the work of the missionaries and led to the increase in the number of Palestinians attaching themselves to the CMS mission.\(^{53}\)

\(^{50}\) CMS, *Proceedings...*, 1892-93 (London: Church Missionary House, 1893), 65.
\(^{52}\) CMS, *Proceedings...*, 1892-93 (London: Church Missionary House, 1893), 64.
Nevertheless, when Great Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, the CMS missionaries drew attention to the “revival of Mohammedan fanaticism,” which hampered their communication with the Muslims and thereby diminished the influence of the CMS over them.\textsuperscript{54} Concomitant with the Palestinians’ antipathy towards the Englishness and hence the CMS after the said occupation, the missionaries noted the heightened hostility of the Ottoman government against their work. The Secretary of the Mission, Rev. T. F. Wolters wrote in the Section that the CMS schools came to the attention of the Ottoman Government due to the recent events in Egypt and that no new schools could be opened without the government’s permission.\textsuperscript{55} It is also noteworthy that he related the events in Egypt with the Ottoman Government’s ban on Muslim children’s attendance in all Christian schools in Palestine and the fresh efforts of the Ottoman Government to found Muslim schools for girls and boys not only in towns but also in the villages. It might be true that the Ottoman Government began to be stricter about its Muslim community’s attendance to the English schools after what happened in Egypt, however, the fact that the ban included all Christian schools in Palestine shows that there might have been other concerns complementary to it.

Furthermore, the CMS connected the spread of Ottoman state schools directly with the action of the British political actions in the region and presented it as the trigger that drew the Ottomans into an imperial competition in the field of education. Even though the developments in Egypt might have served as a cause for the Ottoman Government’s serious consideration of the dangers of the missionary education, the fact that the Ottoman educational reform plans date back to far earlier,\textsuperscript{56} contradicts the CMS’ perception and reflection of the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{54} CMS, \textit{Proceedings...}, 1883-84 (London: Church Missionary House, 1884), 60-61.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 61. Obtaining a permit became an official prerequisite for opening foreign schools in the Ottoman dominions with the Regulation on Public Instruction (\textit{Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizamnâmesi}) (1869), however, the section presented it as a new policy. This part might give us additional insight as to the level of awareness of the CMS missionaries about the Ottoman regulations on education or the hitherto level of strictness of the Ottoman authorities in the implementation of the said regulations.
\textsuperscript{56} See Evered, \textit{Empire and Education}; Fortna, \textit{Imperial Classroom}; Somel, \textit{The Modernization of Public Education}.  

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Government as inherently passive political entity in need of an external catalyst for self-development.

The political developments, however, were not the only stimuli that gave rise to the Ottoman authorities’ “sudden” alertness in the field of education. The Section is full of references to the cases where the success of the CMS in reaching out to the Muslims of various social backgrounds through its schools was praised. Yet, the CMS did not only target the children of the influential families but spread its reach to the remotest villages in Palestine. As a case in point, Rev. Canon Tristram, who inspected the Palestine mission station in 1880, wrote in the Section that:

“Our work in Palestine is a real and vast one. I have visited thirty-five stations and out-stations, and I say without hesitation that the CMS is saturating the villages with Gospel knowledge. We are reaching the Moslem youth of both sexes, and are doing a mighty work, ‘not by might nor by power;’ and the result, under God’s blessing, must one day be vast.”

The intensity of the educational competition among various actors in Jerusalem, as felt by the CMS missionaries, induced each contender to do its best to stay in the race. But how competitive was the Ottoman state? Let us now turn our attention to the Ottoman central and local administration and the CMS Palestine Mission to investigate their educational policies and assess how they fared in this competition.

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57 CMS, Proceedings..., 1874-75 (London: Church Missionary House, 1875), 44.
Ottoman Policies on Teacher Training and Recruitment in Jerusalem

On 15 April 1902, the Governor of Jerusalem sent a dispatch to Yıldız Palace about conversion among Muslim Jerusalemites and missionary schools, most probably upon the request of the Palace.¹ He wrote that in the past years, there were not any Muslims who converted to Christianity. But there had been a few cases around fifteen years ago when several converted Muslims left Jerusalem ‘stealthily.’ As for the missionary schools, he stated that due to Jerusalem’s particular importance across the whole Christian world, foreigners opened lots of schools and had been secretly encouraging the students to convert.² He noted with regret the abundant tendency and inclination among the Muslim children to attend these schools even though attending them was against the law.³ As a solution, the Governor suggested the opening of alternative institutions for Muslim children to keep these children loyal to the Ottoman state.⁴ But, what about the teachers of these schools? Could they also be alternative to the teachers at missionary schools?

In this chapter, I will explore Ottoman policies on teacher training and recruitment, with a particular focus on the procedures the local educational administration in Jerusalem followed or devised for training and recruiting its teachers. However, since the central administration, namely the Ministry of Public Instruction, also appointed teachers or approved the certificates of the teachers that the provincial administration appointed, they were also involved in this process. The degree of the Ministry’s involvement varied, though. The Ottoman documents reveal that there were many instances where the central administration was not informed about

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¹ BOA/Y-PRK-UM/ 51-2, 4 July 1316 [17 July 1900].
² Ibid.
³ Ibid. Interestingly, the Governor in his dispatch did not make a distinction between Christian schools, missionary schools and foreign schools and he used them interchangeably. Apparently, the distinction was between Muslim and non-Muslim schools and it was of utmost importance that the Muslim children attended only the Muslim schools.
⁴ Ibid.
either the opening of some schools or the appointment of teachers. This attests to the fact that in such cases, the local administration had a certain autonomy for recruiting its teachers. My main focus, therefore, will be on the procedures through which the local authorities trained and appointed these teachers, their educational and professional backgrounds and the challenges for the creation of a system in teacher training and recruitment in Jerusalem.

To understand the importance of these policies, it is important to grasp fully the stiffness of competition between the Ottoman and the missionary schools. As the Governor mentioned, the missionary schools had so strong an appeal for Muslim children in Jerusalem. The previous attendance of the members of a notable family, which descended from Prophet Muhammad, was another indication of this strong tendency.\(^5\) To fight against this tendency, whenever the local administration received the news of Muslim children attending Christian schools, they gave strong warnings (\textit{tenbihat-i şedide}) and inflicted legal punishment (\textit{mürâzat-i kanuniye}) on their parents for their withdrawal.\(^6\) However, since they could give only monetary fines and could not do anything else, these schools would shortly begin to accept Muslim children secretly, and this occurred time and again.\(^7\) The Ottoman local administrators had understood well by resorting to such means they could not achieve results. The Ottoman schools had to be superior to foreign schools to dissuade Muslim children from attending them.\(^8\)

Indeed, the Ottoman schools had to be better in every single aspect of education because of the many other quality schools in Jerusalem. To capture the landscape of the overall educational establishments in Jerusalem better, a table sent by the British Consul, Noel Temple Moore, in 1885 to the British Embassy in Istanbul might be helpful.

\(^5\) BOA/Y-PRK-UM/ 51-2, 4 July 1316 [17 July 1900].
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 621-11-1, 6 M 1320 [15 April 1902].
Table 1. Table of educational statistics for the city and sub-province of Jerusalem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>No. of Schools</th>
<th>No. of Boys</th>
<th>No. of Girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>9465</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>1489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>379</strong></td>
<td><strong>14390</strong></td>
<td><strong>3396</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FO 195/1514, Moore to White, 12 December 1885.9

Despite the apparent numerical superiority of the Ottoman Muslim schools over other religious and ethnic communities, the presence of such diverse schools, was an important pull factor for parents not content with Ottoman education. Teachers whose competence was essential to bring contentment to Muslim parents was, therefore, indispensable to the success of Ottoman schools in this fierce competition. But, how did the Ottoman administrators manage this aspect of competition in Jerusalem?

In pursuing answer to this question, I will be primarily consulting the correspondence between the Ottoman Ministry of Public Instruction, the Jerusalem Provincial Governorship, and the British Embassy in Istanbul.

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9 FO 195/1514, Moore to White, 12 December 1885. It is important to note that Moore does not explicate on the sources on which he relied to deduct the detailed information in his dispatch. Therefore, we should be cautious about the exactitude of these numbers. These numbers are, however, still important mostly because the dispatch that included this table was in response to the circular of the British Embassy in Istanbul asking for a report on the Muslim and non-Muslim educational establishments in the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, the Embassy was not only interested in the schools that enjoyed British protection, but also the activities of all the other actors in this field and Britain’s position among them.
Jerusalem’s Provincial Education Directorate as well as various petitions. Additionally, I will make use of the official regulations on teacher training, and the Annual Yearbook of the Ministry of Public Instruction (Salnâme-i Nezâret-i Maârif-i Umûmiye) published by the Ministry between the years 1898 and 1904 to trace the educational personnel in the local administration. In this way, I will juxtapose both the official scheme and actual practice for teacher training and recruitment on the ground where competition with foreign schools persisted. It is important to note that the dispatches sent by the local administration, though very rich in detail, are, at times, confounding when read alongside the local petitions. While one dispatch presented how widespread Ottoman educational infrastructure even in the smallest villages was, a petition complained about how difficult it was for the residents of some villages to benefit from the blessings of education. Therefore, I will include as many Ottoman archival documents as possible to reach a reliable conclusion in my analysis.

Based on my investigation on these primary sources, I will show that the Ottoman state knew well the importance of teachers in its newly modernized educational infrastructure and issued regulations to ensure that capable teachers served at Ottoman schools. Thanks to the graduates of the schools it opened in Jerusalem, it also created a source to meet the teacher needs of its expanding school network. However, there was a gap between high idealism and rhetoric of Ottoman state and the Ottoman educational policies were beset with deep problems of implementation and management. At the local level, its teacher training and recruitment policies lacked consistency and were crippled by ad hoc decisions, linguistic imperialism, personal interference, financial setbacks, and mismanagement of available financial resources. This inconsistency, nevertheless, was firstly due to the incongruity between the aims of the central administration and the possibilities and needs of the local administration. As a case in

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10 See, for instance, BOA/MF-MKT/ 679-15-1, 16 February 1317 [1 March 1902]; BOA/MF-İBT/19-16, 17 § 1302 [1 June 1885].
point, towards the end of the Hamidian period, the central administration began to promote the instruction of the Turkish language even at the primary schools and increasingly imposed the condition on local teachers to prove their ability to teach in Turkish for attaining their certificates. This insistence on Turkish instruction, in turn, placed a heavy burden on the local administration for finding a sufficient number of teachers meeting this criterion in a place where Turkish was not the majority language. By uncovering the problems that the linguistic imperialism created for succeeding, this chapter provides a new timeline for Turkification policy in late Ottoman history and revises the current understanding that proto-nationalism emerged only after the 1908 revolution. Another reason for this inconsistency was the incongruity between the parents and the state. As we will see, the subjects and students in Jerusalem sought good education regardless of religious/political allegiance and in this, the families and the state were at odds. Based on all these findings, I will argue that despite the increase in the number of Ottoman public Muslim schools in Jerusalem and efforts to improve its educational apparatus, the Ottoman state could not put in place a competitive system for training and recruiting its teachers during the Hamidian period in Jerusalem.

In the following pages, I will first present a brief overview of how the Ottoman state raised its teachers preceding the Hamidian period with references to the regulations the state attempted to enact. Afterward, I will examine the ways in which the Hamidian period differed from the preceding administrations for teacher training and recruitment. I will, subsequently, focus on the teachers in Jerusalem, their appointment process, and the local policies to train them. I will then explore the changing priorities of the Ottoman state, which led to the inauguration of a teacher training school in Jerusalem in 1905. I will finally examine the challenges that lay ahead of the creation of an effective teacher training and recruitment policy.
Ottoman Regulations on Teacher Training and Recruitment

Pre-Hamidian Period

Before the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), the schools that the Ottoman state opened to catch up with its Western rivals were mainly military schools. With the ushering in of the Tanzimat period, however, the Ottoman state began to put more emphasis on opening civilian schools with more practical and modern curricula to equip students with more proper education for the higher schools and to create a workforce to support its burgeoning bureaucracy. At a time when the traditional sıbyan schools, which were centers of basic religious education, formed the backbone of the Ottoman educational apparatus, Ottoman steps to introduce a modernized set of civilian schools, such as rüşdiye (a new type of elementary school to succeed sıbyan schools) were slow and prudent not to draw the scorn of traditionalists. The Dâr-ulmuallimin-i Rüşdiye, the first male teacher training school for rüşdiye schools, was inaugurated in 1848 in Istanbul, almost a decade after the Ottoman state inaugurated the first modern-oriented rüşdiye schools.

11 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Eğitim ve Bilgi Üretim Sisteminin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1999), 63; Somel, The Modernization of Public Education, 3. It is important to note that before the Tanzimat period, madrasas (religious colleges) were also a significant component of Ottoman educational tradition. They provided a deeper learning of religious subjects. During the Hamidian period, they were left out of the modernization efforts. See, Amit Bein, “Politics, Military Conscription, and Religious Education in the Late Ottoman Empire,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 38:2 (May, 2006), 283.

12 Sibyan school was a broad category for primary schools until the 1880s. The term applied even to their modernized version, the ibtidâi schools, that the Ottoman state began to open in 1862. The Ottoman documents reveal, however, that the Ottoman state began to make a more rigid distinction between sıbyan and ibtidâi schools after 1880s. As the Hamidian period neared its end, this time, ibtidâi schools became a broad category for all primary schools including the traditional sıbyan schools. See, Somel, The Modernization of Public Education, 109.

13 Tekeli and İlkin, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Eğitim ve Bilgi, 67.

14 Ibid., 62-66. As we will see, thanks to the modernization of the school system, the Ottoman educational system would come to comprise ibtidâi (primary), rüşdiye (elementary), idâdi (schools preparing students for advanced education), sultâni (high school), and Mekâtib-i Âliye (professional schools and university). For more information on the categorization of the government schools in the Ottoman Empire, see Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnamesi (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire: 1869).
In 1862, another significant development occurred for the modernization of the Ottoman school system, which had a direct influence on the policies of teacher training. The Ottoman state began to introduce a modern form of *sibyan* schools, the *ibtidâis* (primary school), which would teach in the new method (*usul-i cedid*) in 1862.\(^{15}\) To train specifically the teachers of these schools and modernize the Ottoman education system from below, it opened the *Dârülmuallimin-i Sibyan* (Primary School Teacher Training School for Men) in 1868.\(^{16}\) Yet, measures for expense reductions forced this school’s shutdown shortly after its inauguration. The school could reopen in 1872.\(^{17}\) These inconsistent actions, indubitably, produced dissatisfying results for training teachers suitable for the modernized schools. The limited capacity of these teacher training schools further aggravated the deficiencies in teacher training in this period. Just before the beginning of the Hamidian period, in 1875, for instance, only twenty-five students were studying at the *Dârülmuallimin-i Sibyan* (Primary School Teacher Training School for Men).\(^{18}\)

In 1869, a turning point came in the history of modern education in the Ottoman Empire when the *Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizamnâmesi* (Regulation for Public Education came into force. In addition to specifying the structure of the Ottoman educational enterprise in terms of its school types, financing and institutions for central and provincial education structure, and public/private schools, the Regulation also marked a significant milestone for systematizing the process of teacher training and recruitment in alignment with the modern education objectives of the empire. For instance, the regulation stipulated that a *Dârülmuallimin-i Âliye* (Higher Teacher Training School for Men) would be established in Istanbul for training


\(^{16}\) Akyüz, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi*, 122.

\(^{17}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 3-171, 17 C 1289 [23 August 1872]; Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education*, 130.

\(^{18}\) Akyüz, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi*, 125.
teachers to work at various types of public schools.\textsuperscript{19} The school would comprise three branches, namely \textit{rüşdiye}, \textit{idâdi} and \textit{sultâni}, and the courses offered in each branch was divided into two categories: \textit{ulum} (sciences) and \textit{fünun} (humanities).\textsuperscript{20} Candidates after showing their certificates of graduation from \textit{rüşdiye}, \textit{idâdi}, and \textit{sultâni} or madrasas (Islamic colleges) could enter the school. But in case of the absence of these certificates, it was possible to take an examination and enroll in the school afterward.\textsuperscript{21} After three, two, and three years of training respectively in these branches and passing the final exam, its students, whose number was specified as a hundred, would receive their certificate of graduation (\textit{şehirdetnâme}).\textsuperscript{22} The courses they took depended on the grade of the school at which they would be teaching.\textsuperscript{23} Preference would be given to them for appointments in schools across the empire.\textsuperscript{24} But if these teachers did not serve at least five years in their postings, the Ministry would ask for the return of the salaries they received while studying at the teacher training school.\textsuperscript{25} With this stipulation, the Ministry aimed at providing a steady supply of teachers.

The 1869 Regulation also laid out the opening of a Female Teacher Training School (\textit{Dârülmuallimat}) in Istanbul to train teachers for \textit{ibtidâi} and \textit{rüşdiye} schools.\textsuperscript{26} Same as the \textit{Dârülmuallimin} students, after two years of training for \textit{sibyan} schools and three years of training for \textit{rüşdiye} schools, these female students would pass an exam and would have to

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Maârif-i Umümîye Nizamnâmâesi}, 19.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 21-22.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 19-22. But those who could not complete their studies at the \textit{Dârülmuallimin} could take an examination and if they could prove their suitability (\textit{isbat-i iyyakat edenler}), they would also be recognized as teachers. See, ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 19-20.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 22-23.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 23. The fact that the Regulation did not envisage training female teachers for \textit{idâdi} schools might be because the Ottoman state at the time did not plan to provide higher education for female students. However, \textit{idâdi}, \textit{sultâni} and higher-level educational establishments were opened during the Second Constitutional Period. See, Mehmet Ö. Alkan, \textit{Tanzimat tan Cumhuriyet’e Modernleşme Sürecinde Eğitim Istatistikleri 1839-1924}, (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 2000), 3.
accept their postings in the empire.\textsuperscript{27} The female students in the teacher training school, whose number was specified to be as fifty in the Regulation, were also required to serve at least for five years in state schools after graduation; otherwise, they would pay back the salaries they received during their training.\textsuperscript{28}

Another essential stipulation of the Regulation was that teachers to be employed at Ottoman schools would be required to either have a certificate from the teacher training schools or to prove their capabilities before an examination committee.\textsuperscript{29} In this way, the Ottoman state attempted to provide a uniform education in all its schools with the teachers it authorized.

Following the roadmap provided by the Regulation, the \textit{Dârülmuallimat} (Teacher Training School for Women) and the \textit{Dârülmuallimin-i Āliye} (Higher Teacher Training School for Men) with its three branches were opened in 1870 and 1874, respectively.\textsuperscript{30} But since the number of their graduates was limited and could not catch up with the pace of the spread of education in Istanbul, let alone in the provinces, one could argue that their use for meeting the needs of teachers in the overall empire remained negligible. To close this gap, the Ministry of Public Instruction opened some teacher training schools in provinces such as Konya, Bosnia, and Crete in 1875. However, we would not see a remarkable expansion of teacher training schools in the provinces until the Hamidian period. As we will see, one Teacher Training School for Men would also be operational during the Hamidian period in Jerusalem.

\textbf{During the Hamidian Period}

While the \textit{Tanzimat} period might be regarded as the experiential and preparatory phase for the Ottoman state to assume the sole responsibility of education in the empire, the Hamidian period was when the state could build on this groundwork to permeate into the lives of its

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizamnâmesi}, 25.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 26.  
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 53-54.  
\textsuperscript{30} Akyüz, \textit{Türk Eğitim Tarihi}, 124; Kodaman, \textit{Abdülhâmîd Devrî Eğitim Sistemi}, 227.
subjects and put its imprint on their identities. The reason for this is the spike in the number of schools that the state opened in this period and their broad geographic dissemination. While there were 19,205 educational establishments before Abdülhamid II’s enthronement, at the end of the second decade of his rule, the number of schools in the overall empire rose to 34,244.31 But, for the materialization of the educational modernization, quantitative advancement would not suffice; training and recruitment of teachers with modern education were of equal importance. Therefore, the Hamidian administration put the plans of the previous administrations into effect and paid serious attention to establishing provincial educational councils and opening teacher training colleges in provinces under their supervision. Below, I will shortly introduce the general framework on the provincial education councils and then narrow down my focus to the local level by referring to the ways in which the local and the central administration organized teacher training and recruitment in Jerusalem.

One of the novelties that the Regulation brought about was spreading the slowly growing educational network in Istanbul into the provinces. To achieve this, it stipulated that provincial education councils (Vilayet Maârif Meclisleri) would be constituted in the provinces as a branch of the Grand Education Council in Istanbul (Dersaadet Meclisi Kebir-i Maârif).32 A Director of Education (Maârif Müdürü) would be entrusted with presiding over this Council, which would be comprised of two assistant directors, four investigators, one clerk, one accountant, one treasurer, two inspectors, and four to ten members.33 While the Ministry of Public Instruction appointed the Council’s Director, his assistants, inspectors, and auditors, the rest of the council members were members of the local population.34 Among the main tasks of

31 These numbers draw on the table provided in the 1894-1895 academic year statistics. See, Alkan, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Modernleşme, 49. However, the numbers should be taken with a grain of salt. As Alkan also notes, the comparison table, which might have highlighted the achievements of the Hamidian period at the expense of the periods preceding it, might have disregarded some schools in the previous periods.
32 Maârif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi, 41.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
the Provincial Education Councils were to implement the instructions of the Ministry of Public Instruction, to preserve and spend the grants of the imperial treasury and the local tax revenue carefully, to conduct inspections to the schools, to pay attention to their needs of reform, and to send annual reports to the Ministry about the state of education in the province and proposals for its betterment. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the most crucial task of the Council was selecting, changing, rewarding, or taking disciplinary measures against the teachers, organizing their examination, and granting them certificates of competence.\textsuperscript{35}

An additional law, the Directive Regarding the Duties of the Directors of Education in the Ottoman Provinces\textsuperscript{36} was issued in 1896 and further highlighted the centrality of the Director of Education and the local educational Council for teacher selection and recruitment at the local level. The Councils of Education were responsible for the selection and betterment of the teachers and opening new schools in the villages and communes (\textit{kura ve nevahî}).\textsuperscript{37} From then on, the Directors were to act as prime conduits between the teachers and the Ministry of Education as the teachers were not allowed to communicate with the Ministry directly about any kinds of petitions and official requests (\textit{her nevi maruzat ve müsted’ayat-ı resmiyeler}).\textsuperscript{38} With this stipulation, the Ministry might have wished to materialize a centralized localization in educational administration and deal only with the issues that required a central response. Additionally, the Directors of Education could now dismiss the teachers without asking for the approval of any other authority. However, they needed to inform the local Governorship and the Ministry of Public Instruction about the grounds of their dismissal.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, the Directors could assume significant authority over the teachers. We will see, however, that these Instructions would not always be followed in Jerusalem.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{36} Vâlâyat-ı Şahane Maârif Müdürlerinin Vezâifini Mühüyîn Talimat
\textsuperscript{37} Salnâmê-i Nezâret-i Maârif-i Umûmiye, (Istanbul: Matbâa-ı Âmire: 1316), 139.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 137.
After this brief sketch for the general structure of the educational administration in the Ottoman Empire during the Hamidian period, let us now turn our full attention to the educational administration in Jerusalem.

**Becoming a Teacher at an Ottoman Muslim Public School in Jerusalem**

As prescribed in the Regulation, teachers to be employed locally at the Ottoman Muslim public schools in Jerusalem needed to pass an examination to receive a certificate of competence for teaching (*ehliyetnâme*). The examination committee (*heyet-i tâlimiye*) consisted of the Director of the *idâdi* School in Jerusalem and a few other teachers who could evaluate and attest to the capabilities of teacher candidates. The Administrative Council of the Sub-Province (*Meclis-i Îdâre-yi Liva*), the Governor and the Director of Education would then certify the document before sending it to the Ministry of Education for its final approval and registration. The Ministry, in turn, would ask the Director of Education if the teacher was of good character. After the Director gave his assurance about it, the Ministry would certify the document and send it back to the Director.

Not only the candidates but also the teachers already employed at the Ottoman schools or the personnel in the administrative offices who wished to teach at these schools took this examination to receive a certificate. The exam corresponded to the grade of the school and the area of specialization of the teacher. For instance, while a penmanship (*hüsn-i hat*) teacher at the *idâdi* school needed to present a piece of his writing during the examination, the teacher of history at the same school wrote short essays related to his field. While an assistant teacher

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40 See for example, BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33- 1, 3 B 1322 [13 September 1904]; BOA/MF-MKT/ 806-57-1, 21 Ca 1322 [3 August 1904].

41 BOA/MF-MKT/ 245-27-8, 15 Kanun-i Sani 1311 [27 January 1896]; BOA/MF-MKT/ 245-27-6, 17 Teşrin-i Sâni 1308 [29 November 1892]. For instance, the history teacher answered the following three questions: How did the ancient Roman state come into existence and was founded (*Roma hükümet-i kadimesinin sureti-i zuhuru ile tesisî ne vechle vuku bulmuştur*); what were the reasons for the Crusades in the Land of Palestine and [could you give] an account of the First Crusade (*muhacemat-i salibiyenin arz-i Filistin [d]e esbab-i vukuuya ila ilk muhacemenin beyani*); What were the reasons for the fall of the
(muallim-i sani) candidate at a rüşdiye school answered basic questions about Arabic, Persian, Ottoman grammar, geography, arithmetic, and Ottoman history, a village ibtidâi school teacher would take an examination on the Quran, Qur’anic recitation (tecvid), Islamic beliefs (akaid), jurisprudence (fîkh), Arithmetic, and Penmanship.42

Even though the Regulation conditioned the local Councils to employ teachers only after they received their certificates, the documentation shows that it was possible to work for years without a certificate. For instance, Ahmed Efendi, who was a village primary school teacher, had been employed for four years without this certificate.43 For the itinerant primary school teachers, who did not work regularly at least at one school or taught as a side job to help alleviate the teacher shortage, the years of employment without certificate would be much longer. When a teacher named Ali al-Gavri Efendi was dismissed due to the abolition of itinerant teaching, he requested compensation from the Ministry of Education. He had taught for some twenty-two years as a travelling instructor, but the Ministry failed to recognize his service and responded that his name did not appear in any of their records.44 The link between the Ministry and the Local Education Council was so tenuous that let alone the teachers, in many cases, the Ministry did not have any information about the schools operating in Jerusalem. In some cases, it was when a teacher who had already worked at such an

Umayyad State fall and how was the Abbasid State founded (Devlet-i Emeviyenin eslab-i inkırazıyla devlet-i Abbasyenin suret-i tesis ve teşekkürü).

42 BOA/MF-MKT/ 236-35-1, 11 August 1310 [23 August 1894]; BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33-4, 5, 6, 7, 10 July 1320 [23 July 1904]. It is important to note that the ibtidâi examinations mentioned above drew the ire of the Ministry as they did not include subjects such as Geography, Ottoman History and Reading. But the major source of the Ministry’s sensitivity on this issue, which produced a surprising result that I will mention extensively in the following pages, was because the examination was not held in Turkish. See BOA/MF-MKT/812-33-2, 18 B 1322 [28 September 1904].

43 BOA/MF-MKT/806-57-6, 18 Ra 1322 [2 June 1904].

44 BOA/MF-MKT/ 962-22-1, 4 September 1322 [17 September 1906]; BOA/MF-MKT/ 962-22-2, 20 N 1324 [7 November 1906].
“unregistered” school wished to receive a certificate, and the Local Council sent the required documents that the Ministry would be informed about the existence of such a school.\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 805-26-1, 10 C 1322 [22 August 1904]; BOA/MF-MKT/ 806-57-1, 20 B 1322 [30 September 1904].}

During the Hamidian period, the background of the teachers in Ottoman schools in Jerusalem ranged from military personnel, graduates of the Male and Female Teacher training schools (Dârûlmuallimin and Dârûlmuallimat), the Imperial Civil Service School (Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şahane), Imperial High School (Mekteb-i Sultâni), the graduates of the local idâdi and rüşdiye schools, and madrasas depending on the type of the school and the type of availability of this personnel to teach in these schools. The idâdi school, for example, had various military officers working as teachers when it was first opened.\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 154-56-1, 6 S 1310 [30 August 1892]. During the Hamidian period, there was only one idâdi school in Jerusalem which was inaugurated in 1890. See, BOA/MF-MKT/ 120-94-1, 9 M 1308 [25 August 1890].} Even though these officers helped to fill the teaching posts in this newly opened school, they could not regularly teach as their commanders commissioned them for another duty in other places frequently.\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 154-56-1, 6 S 1310 [30 August 1892].}

As could be expected, their irregular attendance negatively affected their students; therefore, the local Education Council, together with the support of the Ministry, took practical steps to remedy this problem. They decided to employ the personnel who could deputize for them in their absence if the Education Council attested their competence.\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 154-56-1, 15 R 1310 [6 November 1892].}

According to the internal communication between the different departments of the Ministry on this issue, the reasons for the ongoing employment of the military personnel were the reluctance of higher school graduates (mekatib-i âliye mezunları) to teach in these schools due to their low pay and the lack of expert knowledge (ihatîsas) of teacher training school graduates to teach some of the courses at these schools.\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 154-56-1, 11 Teşrin-i Evvel 1308 [23 October 1892].}
In a few years, the number of military officers at the idâdi school dropped significantly. A glance at the teacher list of 1895 would reveal that nearly half of the teachers were graduates of the recently formed Imperial Civil Service School and Imperial High School. There was only one graduate of the military school.\(^{50}\) Among the teachers, there were graduates of the Madrasa of Haram al-Sharif, Jerusalem idâdi school, and Jaffa rüşdiye school as well. Those who were working at the local administrative offices, such as Tax Office (Vergi Dairesi), Legal Office (Adliye Kalemi), Correspondence Office (Mektubi Kalemi), and Imperial Estates Office (Arazi-yi Seniye) were the remaining teachers of the school.\(^{51}\) It was evident from this list that the existing teacher training schools did not reach the capacity to meet the empire-wide need for teachers after two decades of Hamidian rule, and the graduates of other high-level schools catered for this demand. This was a conscious policy in that the Ministry was already preparing the new graduates of Imperial Civil Service School and Imperial High School, who were willing to be employed at the service of education, for teaching by sending them to assist the teachers at schools.\(^{52}\) Graduates of these schools, therefore, continued to work at the idâdi school in Jerusalem in the following years.\(^{53}\)

Another group of teachers was the graduates of the local Ottoman schools, as the list I mentioned above shows. Even though we do not have a comprehensive list exhibiting the career paths of the graduates of these schools, Ottoman documents reveal that these schools provided other local schools with teachers. For instance, a graduate of an ibtidâi school in Jerusalem would continue his education at a madrasa in Haram al-Sharif and then begin working at a village school.\(^{54}\) Graduates of Jerusalem idâdi school would sometimes occupy administrative and teaching positions at the same time. Faik Efendi, who was appointed as the

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\(^{50}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 245-27-3, 8 L 1312 [4 April 1895].

\(^{51}\) Ibid.

\(^{52}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 226-36-1, 29 S 1312 [1 September 1894].

\(^{53}\) See for instance, BOA/MF-MKT/ 621-11-1, 21 N 1319 [1 January 1902].

\(^{54}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 806-57-5, 5 May 1321 [18 May 1905].
A teacher of Turkish at the idâdi school in 1905, previously worked at the Directorate of Public Debts (Düyun-ı Umûmiye) office in Hebron and primary schools there at the same time.\(^{55}\) A graduate of a rüşdiye school, on the other hand, would be eligible to teach at a rüşdiye school later.\(^{56}\) From a petition dated 1904, it is possible to discern that there was a further effort to regulate the appointment of teachers to Ottoman schools. When a Jerusalem idâdi graduate asked to be appointed to a rüşdiye school as the first teacher (muallim-i evvel) in Jerusalem, the Ministry replied that only teacher training school graduates could become first teachers at rüşdiye schools and asked the Beirut Education Council to employ this graduate as an assistant teacher to a rüşdiye school in Beirut.\(^{57}\) As in the case of this graduate, graduates of the neighboring provinces also served as teachers at Jerusalem schools.\(^{58}\)

**Madrasas**, that is Islamic religious colleges, while providing space for the new type of schools, were also significant feeders of teachers to Ottoman schools, especially the ibtidâi schools, during the Hamidian period in Jerusalem.\(^{59}\) As the curriculum of the schools included a significant quantity of subjects on Islam, ulamas were indispensable elements of the new schools.\(^{60}\) Some of them also contributed to the expansion of educational institutions by proposing themselves as teachers and hosting the new type of schools. As a case in point, the guardian of Prophet Samuel’s tomb in Jerusalem, who had studied at Haram al-Sharif, sent a petition to the Ministry of Education for permission to teach at the tomb’s madrasa.\(^{61}\) He stated that hundreds of students, who wished to study but did not have the financial means to stay

\(^{55}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 652-19-5, 22 May 1320 [4 June 1904].

\(^{56}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 236-35-2, 22 August 1310 [3 September 1894].

\(^{57}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 801-77-1, 6 C 1322 [18 August 1904]; BOA/MF-MKT/ 801-77-1, 25 C 1322 [6 September 1904].

\(^{58}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 1012-89-1, 23 L 1326 [18 November 1908].

\(^{59}\) Various madrasa buildings were transformed into new type of schools in Jerusalem. See, for instance, BOA/MF-MKT/ 509-34-1, 22 L 1317 [23 February 1900]. The idâdi school was built on the ruins of the Madrasa Ma’muniya. BOA/MF-MKT/ 102-43, 23 M 1306 [29 September 1888]. The Madrasa Rasasiya was another central locality for primary education. See, BOA/MF-MKT/ 941-54-1, 9 Ra 1324 [3 May 1906].

\(^{60}\) Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 137.

\(^{61}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 679-15-1, 16 February 1317 [1 March 1902].
long enough to attend the schools at the center of Jerusalem, were deprived of education. He, therefore, expressed his wish to teach them subjects such as the Holy Quran, Qur’anic recitation, arithmetic, Arabic grammar, Persian, jurisprudence (fīkh), Penmanship with a suitable salary at the tomb, around which situated forty to fifty villages. The Ministry granted the tomb keeper permission and salary to teach these subjects to poor children (fūkara etfale ulum-i diniye ve ibtidâiye tâlimi etmek üzere) after receiving the assent of the Director of Education about the necessity of such a school and his suitability for the job.

**Local Methods for Training Teachers**

Thus far, I have provided a general overview of the backgrounds of Ottoman Muslim schools’ teachers in Jerusalem, most of whom had not received training specifically designed for teaching. However, the Local Education Council expended efforts to train teachers, especially the village school teachers, at a teacher training facility set up by the Local Education Council before they were hired. The training process was as follows: The Council would summon some village imams and those who expressed their desire to become teachers to this facility where they would take courses such as Qur’anic recitation (tecvid), Islamic jurisprudence and theology, arithmetic (fenn-i hesab), and a ‘sufficient amount of reading and writing’ from the teachers of the central rüşdiye and ibtidâi schools and some ulama of the

64 BOA/DH-TMIK-S/ 14-35, 24 R 1315 [22 September 1897]. Another document dated ten years earlier, which was apparently sent to be published in some newspapers to praise the educational investments across the Empire as well as in Jerusalem, also mentions the inauguration of a teacher training school in Jerusalem. See, BOA/MF-İBT/ 19-16, 20 May 1301 [1 June 1885]. Even though the Governor of Jerusalem in this archival document also designated this facility as “Dârülmualmin (Teacher Training School for Men),” I believe that this facility was an informal one and the word was used to refer to its overall objective as the Director of Education blamed the low quality of primary schools on the lack of such a school later. As we will see, the Dârülmualmin-i ibtidâi (Primary School Teacher Training School for Men) in Jerusalem would be established nearly a decade later with a teacher appointed by the Ministry.
city.65 After a period of attending these classes, those who prove their competence would be appointed by the Local Education Council to village schools.66 By operating this facility during the holidays when the schools were closed, the Council could create a steady supply of teachers who had adequate ability for village schools.

Nevertheless, given that the teachers already employed in the village schools needed to attend these classes every year, one could assume that the facility could not furnish them with a decent education.67 Indeed, a few years later, as a response to the imperial decree on increasing the number and quality of primary schools, the Director of Education brought up the limited competence of village teachers trained this way (kuradaki mekatib muallimlerinin iktidarları pek mahdul bulunduğunandan).68 He added that the Council’s past experience with this method of training demonstrated conclusively that it would not produce the intended results (husul-i maksudu temin edemeceği tescir-i adide ile sabit olmuş). Since ‘the general public attached more delicacy and extraordinary importance to Jerusalem than other localities,’ he emphasized that it was an obligation to render the Muslim schools superior in terms of quantity and organization to the non-Muslim and foreign schools.69 Identifying the crux of the problem as the absence of teacher training school graduates in village schools, he urged the Ministry to open such a school in Jerusalem so that the ‘level of progress and orderliness’ at Muslim primary schools could reach at least that of non-Muslim and foreign schools.70 In a couple of years, the Ottoman Ministry sanctioned the inauguration of a school to train teachers for village schools. Unanticipatedly, what triggered this decision was not the persistent reports of the Director of Education for employing better-qualified teachers in village schools. It might

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65 BOA/DH-TMIK-S/ 14-35, 24 R 1315 [22 September 1897].
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 BOA/MF-İBT/ 115-60, 2 Z 1319 [12 March 1902].
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
have played a role, but the main reason was the sudden and strict insistence of the Ministry of Education to teach Turkish language in village primary schools in Jerusalem.

**Spreading the Turkish Language in Jerusalem: Dārülmuallimin-i ibtidâi**

On 13 September 1904, the Director of Education in Jerusalem, Ismail Hakkı Efendi, sent the certificate of competence belonging to Mehmed Halil Efendi, a village primary school teacher, to the Ministry for its approval.\(^{71}\) The Ministry, however, was not pleased with the document that indicated the subjects in which the Local Education Council held the examination of the said teacher. Accordingly, the themes of the examination were the Holy Quran, Qur’anic recitation (*tecvit*), Islamic principles (*akaid*), jurisprudence (*fîkh*), Islam, Arithmetic, and Penmanship.\(^{72}\) The Ministry found the documents deficient and stated that it would not approve certificates without an examination on Geography, Ottoman History, and Reading as well.\(^{73}\) Yet, what struck the Ministry most was that the examination was held in Arabic. Therefore, it sent a dispatch to the Council asking whether the teacher knew Turkish. If not, the dispatch urged the selection of another teacher with Turkish knowledge and the necessary capacity. Because the language of instruction [at government schools] was Turkish and instruction in any other language than the official language at these schools was not permitted.\(^{74}\)

In his response, the Director of Education expressed the impossibility of finding teachers with Turkish skills for village schools.\(^{75}\) As ‘generally the inhabitants were Arab in Jerusalem, those who knew Turkish were a rarity and teachers with Turkish knowledge could only be employed at primary schools in towns.’\(^{76}\) The Director continued that until the

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71 BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33-1, 3 B 1322 [13 September 1904].
72 BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33-4, 5, 6, 7, 10 July 1320 [23 July 1904].
73 BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33-1, 17 B 1322 [27 September 1904].
74 BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33-2, 18 B 1322 [28 September 1904].
75 BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33-9-1, 7 M 1323 [14 March 1905].
76 Ibid. The Director’s dispatch also shows that until then the Ottoman Muslim schools had not equipped their students with enough Turkish skills. If the Ministry had adopted the policy of making Turkish the
inauguration of a teacher training school in Jerusalem which would train teachers in alignment with the Ministry’s demands, it was impossible to employ teachers with Turkish skills at village primary schools. It was for this reason that the Council had been employing teachers without Turkish skills and holding their examinations in Arabic. He urged the Ministry’s permission to continue this practice since teachers whose examinations were held in Arabic previously attained the approval of the Ministry and sent additional certificates for approval.77 This new policy was also fraught with another problem. If the Ministry would not approve the certificates of the teachers, they would be called up to the military service (muallimlerin yedlerinde musaddak ehliyetnâmeler bulunmaması askere alınmalarını müeddî bulunduğun bedi̇ hi idüğünden) and stop teaching.78

In their internal communication upon the Director’s dispatch, the Ministry departments underlined that Jerusalem was one of the localities where the Turkish language needed to spread, therefore, they saw it fit to open a teacher training school there to train teachers for primary schools.79 The Ministry also decided to appoint a teacher for this training school from Istanbul.80 However, it rejected the proposal of the Director to continue to approve the certificates as before and sent them back to Jerusalem. Because it would not be allowed to teach in any other language than Turkish at official schools.81

In the meantime, some teachers wrote petitions to the Ministry for the approval of their certificates, otherwise they would be enlisted and this would inflict injury on them.82 Yet the Ministry continued to reject doing that as employing a teacher, who was not able to pass an examination in Turkish, was against the practice (Türkiye imtihan vermek iktidarmı haiz

language of instruction at village schools previously, knowledge of Turkish would not have been that unusual among teachers, a significant portion of whom had attended village primary schools.

77 BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33-9-1, 7 M 1323 [14 March 1905].
78 Ibid.
79 BOA/MF-MKT/ 812-33-9, 24 March 1321 [6 April 1905].
80 BOA/ MF-MKT/ 812-33-10, 1 Ra 1323 [6 May 1905].
81 Ibid.
82 BOA/ MF-MKT/ 838-5-1, 23 Kanun-i Sâni 1320 [5 February 1905].
Soon, lack of Turkish knowledge became a ground for dismissal for some teachers at primary schools.  

Amid this chaos in teacher recruitment, the Ministry inaugurated the teacher training school at the idâdi building and appointed a graduate of the Dârülmuallimin-i Rüşdiye (Teacher Training School for Rüşdiye Schools) in Istanbul to Jerusalem. The salary of the teacher would be paid by the Local Education Council. But apparently, the Ministry just picked a teacher without considering his suitability for the job. Rüşdi Efendi, the said teacher, did not know any Arabic. Therefore, the Director of Education asked the Ministry to let the Council select a suitable person for the training school as Rüşdi Efendi’s job required knowing the local language and suggested the appointment of Rüşdi Efendi to a rüşdiye in Jerusalem. The Ministry’s response to this reasonable request was hard to fathom. Even though the Ministry also saw it more proper to employ a teacher knowing both the local and Turkish language, because of the salary difference between a Dârülmuallimin (teacher training school) and a rüşdiye and the lack of vacancies in rüşdiyes in the district of Jerusalem at the time, it decided to keep Rüşdi Efendi at the post.

At first glance, the decision to employ a teacher who only spoke Turkish to train Arab teachers might induce one to assume that it might be because of the unavailability of Arabic speaking teachers at the time to send to Jerusalem. But then one is tempted to ask, why the

83 BOA/ MF-MKT/ 838-5-2, 28 February 1320 [13 March 1905].
84 It is important to mention that there was not a wholesale dismissal of teachers for their lack of Turkish skills, but it became very difficult to attain the teaching posts without proving Turkish skills. Apparently, additional criteria were in place to keep the posts, which might have been closely related to a teacher’s relations with the Local Education Council. For instance, in a petition of a teacher who worked for seventeen years at a primary school, the teacher stated that while the visible excuse of his dismissal was his lack of Turkish, the real reason behind his dismissal was his complaint about a corruption case in the Local Council. See, BOA/ MF-MKT/ 784-38-12, 22 April 1321 [5 May 1905].
85 BOA/ MF-MKT/ 812-33-15, 27 § 1323 [27 October 1905].
86 Ibid.
87 BOA/ MF-MKT/ 812-33-16, 24 N 1323 [22 November 1905].
88 Ibid.
89 BOA/ MF-MKT/ 812-33-16, 22 Kanun-i Evvel 1321 [4 January 1906].
Ministry did not let the Local Education Council select another teacher who knew both languages? Why did the Ministry risk wasting more of the Ottoman state’s time, energy, and money for a venture which would not be efficient due to the predictable communication problems? One might conjecture that the appointment was possibly nepotistic. However, in this case it was something different. In his letter to the Ministry, Rüşdi Efendi had requested a post in Bingazi.\(^90\) The documents concerning this appointment did not state any clear reason for this miscalculated decision except that Rüşdi Efendi’s interest for teaching at a teacher training school coincided with the inauguration of such a school. However, the developments which happened elsewhere previously and those happening simultaneously with the training school’s opening make one think that the appointment of Rüşdi Efendi was a conscious decision to force the teachers to learn Turkish in a short time.

**Service to the Spread of Turkish as a Loyalty Benchmark**

According to the *Salnâme* of the Ministry of Public Instruction, Ismail Hakkı Efendi, the Director of Education in Jerusalem, was a Jerusalemite who attended the *ibtidâi* and *rüşdiye* schools in Jerusalem and later the *Mekteb-i Sultâni* in Beirut.\(^91\) He studied Arabic, Turkish, French, and English in Beirut, and upon his return to Jerusalem, he fast climbed the ladders of the local administrative offices. He became the Director of Education on 8 December 1896 at the age of twenty-nine.\(^92\) His origins are important to remember, for it played a role in his dismissal from his office together with his perceived failure to spread Turkish in Jerusalem.

Ismail Hakkı Efendi was a controversial figure according to the Ottoman archival materials. For instance, soon after the Governor of Jerusalem wrote to the Ministry for his rise in rank due to his efforts and perseverance (*mesai ve ikdamına mebni*), letters of complaints

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\(^90\) BOA/ MF-MKT/ 812-33-13, 5 Ş 1323 [5 October 1905].

\(^91\) *Salnâme-i Nezâret-i Maârif-i Umûmiye*, (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire: 1319), 1646.

\(^92\) Ibid.
about his administration began to pour into both the Ministry of Public Instruction and the Ministry of Pious Foundations.\textsuperscript{93} Even though one cannot claim with certainty that all the allegations were true, the Ministry’s and the Provincial Governorship’s responses to them might point out the deficiencies in the inner workings of the Local Education Council and the communication problems between the center and the periphery.

The allegations about Ismail Hakkı Efendi were voiced by the members of the ulama and teachers and concerned a wide variety of issues. Together with his relatives, he was accused of embezzling the revenue of Islamic endowments or waqf, which were significant sources of funding for schools. Another accusation was that he filled the Local Education Council with ignorant people like himself and neglected Muslim education while foreign institutions flourished.\textsuperscript{94} The allegations went on that he employed two American female teachers, by whom he was charmed, at a Muslim girls’ school and exposed ‘the nation’s girls to Christian education.’\textsuperscript{95} This petitioner was furious that while the foreigners were building grand schools and inculcating harmful ideas in Muslim students by drawing them there, the Muslim education was in the hands of a local person, namely Ismail Hakkı Efendi, who did not even finish primary school.\textsuperscript{96}

Receiving continuous letters about Ismail Hakkı Efendi was also curious for the Ministry of Public Instruction.\textsuperscript{97} This time a primary school teacher complained that the Local Education Council was confined for long to the members of a local family and was passed from one brother to the other without any attention for merit and competence.\textsuperscript{98} He claimed that as Ismail Hakkı Efendi was ‘a local with influence, he filled the offices within the Local Council

\textsuperscript{93} BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-14, 20 N 1321 [10 December 1903].
\textsuperscript{94} BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-5, 8 April 1320 [21 April 1904].
\textsuperscript{95} BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-6, 17 S 1322 [3 May 1904].
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-8, 22 Ra 1322 [6 June 1904].
\textsuperscript{98} BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-12, 22 April 1321 [5 May 1905].
and teaching positions entirely with his relatives hence its corruption remained concealed.'

He continued that unless one helped maintain the influence of the Director on the people of the center and the villages, one could not keep their posts as teachers and Council officers.

Upon receiving these letters, the Ministry either made its own investigation or urged the District Governorship to conduct an investigation on these allegations. Its investigations revealed that some of these accusations were unfounded. For instance, the headmaster of the idâdi, Halid Efendi, whose dismissal Ismail Hakkı Efendi requested previously, alleged that he paid more than the legal sum to the teachers who were temporarily employed. Even the Ministry’s departments were aware that such a claim which could be so easily refuted by checking the local salary registers was a consequence of personal grudge and expected new accusations about Ismail Hakkı Efendi. But rather than interfering in this crisis in the local educational administration, the Ministry preferred to sit back and look on such grudges reduce the efficiency of its educational policies in Jerusalem.

Neither these complaints were as effective as the other letter sent by Halid Efendi to the Ministry for bringing the end of Ismail Hakkı Efendi in Jerusalem. Accordingly, ‘the Local Educational administration had long been preventing the spread of Turkish language in Jerusalem.’ As a case in point, the Council recently appointed a teacher, whose lack of Turkish skills was known by all, for teaching the course of Turkish Reading at a primary school in the center of the province ‘on purpose’. But the matter was not just the appointment of an unsuitable teacher, it was appointment of an unsuitable teacher to teach Turkish. Halid Efendi

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99 Ibid.
100 BOA/MF-MKT/784-38-12, 22 April 1321 [5 May 1905].
101 BOA/MF-MKT/784-38-9, 22 Ra 1322 [6 June 1904]; BOA/MF-MKT/784-38-13, 20 Ra 1323 [25 May 1905].
102 BOA/MF-MKT/784-38-16-1, 10 N 132[3] [8 November 1905[5].
103 BOA/MF-MKT 784-38-16-2, 5 Kanun-ı Evvel 1321 [18 December 1905].
104 BOA/MF-MKT/784-38-17, 16 N 1323 [14 November 1905].
105 Ibid.
stated that ‘Jerusalem as a neighbor of Egypt held special importance and it was evident that the spread of Turkish would be a robust means for building loyalty.’

Upon this letter, the Ministry again urged investigation of these complaints and asked the comments of the Jerusalem Governorship. The Governor finally wrote back. He stated that Ismail Hakkı Efendi was ‘a local and did not graduate from any school.’ For him, despite Ismail Hakkı Efendi’s ‘good intentions,’ his lack of serious service in Jerusalem was caused by these two reasons. He therefore suggested that Ismail Hakkı Efendi be sent to another location. In the end, Ismail Hakkı Efendi exchanged offices with the Director of Education in Adana, about whom the Ministry also received several complaints.

The process which lasted for two years and the nature of complaints that finally brought the end of Ismail Hakkı Efendi’s mandate in Jerusalem are helpful to detect the problems of the Ottoman educational administration in general. First of all, there was not effective communication between the Ministry and the local branches of governance, such as the Governorship and the Local Education Council. Despite the persistent requests of the Ministry, somehow, the Governor did not conduct an investigation for two years on these allegations. Therefore, if the allegations were true, the Ministry and the Governor thus condoned the corrupt practices of the Director at a place where rendering Ottoman schools superior to the foreign schools remained a top priority. Additionally, although the Ministry saw that personal problems were reducing the efficiency of their policies in Jerusalem, such as the unfounded claims of the Director of the idâdi about Ismail Hakkı Efendi, it did not take any action and condoned the dominance of such grudges in the implementation of its educational policies.

106 BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-17, 16 N 1323 [14 November 1905].
107 BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-29, 22 Z 1323 [17 February 1906].
108 Ibid.
109 BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-31, 11 April 1322 [24 April 1906].
Secondly, service to spread Turkish language during the final years of the Hamidian period seems to have become a more crucial loyalty benchmark than leading a principled educational administration in Jerusalem. Even though it is hard to claim with certainty by looking at this correspondence that only the Turkish issue triggered the Governor to send his comments to the Ministry on the whole of the complaints, the reasons he suggested for the end of Ismail Hakkı Efendi’s administration lead us to think that the state’s Turkish language policy played a significant role.\(^{110}\) Firstly, the Governor did not say anything about the results of an investigation about the complaints in his dispatch when he suggested that Ismail Hakkı Efendi was not successful in this post. Instead, the reasons for his failure were that he was a local, and he did not finish any school. It is understandable that a Director who did not even go to school was not a proper choice for this significant post.\(^{111}\)

However, it is difficult to follow his reasoning on the other matter: Why was being a local considered as a hindrance to success but not the other complaints of corruption or lack of commitment to Islam? Was Ismail Hakkı Efendi not a local when he was nominated for a rise in rank a few years ago? Was there not another local person in Jerusalem who could replace Ismail Hakkı Efendi instead of Abdulkerim Efendi, whose administration received complaints as well? The Ministry’s following dispatch to the Commission of Civil Service on Ismail Hakkı Efendi might indicate that becoming a local in Jerusalem began to be associated with bad

\(^{110}\) It is important to point out that the recent historiography on Hamidian period increasingly depict is as a complex period when ideologies of pan-Islamism and nationalism were intertwined. This is in contrast to the previous scholarship highlighting only its pronounced emphasis on Islam. As Kamal Soleimani neatly shows in his analysis of the period, Hamidian period coincided with strong Turkification policies of various ethnic groups of the empire. One of the pillars of this policy was the spread of Turkish language across the empire through education. What was happening in Jerusalem at the time was very similar to the other reflections of this policy in the wider non-Turkish speaking provinces of the empire. Yet what is different is that while this policy began from the later 1880s in other locations, it began towards the end of the Hamidian period in Jerusalem. See, Kamal Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 105.

\(^{111}\) This is also complicated in that according to the Ministry registrations, he went to several schools and this was even published in the *Salname* as I cited above. Even if this was the case, then one should ask, why did the Ministry appoint this person to this post in the first place?
management in education. Without even mentioning that he did not go to school, the Ministry only stated that ‘he was a local and was not expected to provide an efficient service.’ Most probably, the Ministry and the Governor thought that a local Director in such a central position would not be able to carry out the “serious job” of spreading Turkish in Jerusalem and decided to replace him with another Director who would not oppose this new policy. Soon, spreading Turkish across Jerusalem became a benchmark of success along with teaching children their religious obligations. Though the ground for this sudden change in Jerusalem is not explicitly stated in the documents, Halid Efendi’s reference to the need for building loyalty among Muslim Jerusalemites against possible threats from Egypt might provide a significant clue. In another document that coincided this change, the Governor of Jerusalem sent a strong warning to the central government about the spread of Egyptian ideas (efkar-ı Mısriye) and the political and religious harm they would espouse. The governor thought that if these false ideas keep arriving to Jerusalem, Jerusalem would be their point of departure to spread to Hejaz, Syria and Iraq due to its geographical location. Therefore, it was of utmost importance to strengthen the bond of Jerusalem and its environs to the Ottoman caliphate.

As for the effects of this policy, the Ottoman documents do not show us how this new policy affected the overall quality of the Ottoman schools and whether it helped keep Muslim students at them. But one thing was obvious. Knowledge of Turkish became indispensable for teachers at an Ottoman school. This change definitely limited employment opportunities for many local teachers at Ottoman schools and resulted in the dismissal of some of them. It was a clear form of linguistic imperialism. While it empowered those who could speak the dominant language, Turkish, it definitely disempowered the locals who could not. This,

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112 BOA/MF-MKT/ 784-38-25, 29 S 1324 [24 April 1906].
113 BOA/MF-MKT/ 941-54-2, 22 Ca 1324 [14 July 1906].
114 BOA/Y-PRK-UM/ 75-155-0, 28 Ra 1323 [2 June 1905].
115 Ibid.
nevertheless, was not the only challenge to the implementation of a systemic policy in teacher training and recruitment; there were various others.

**More Challenges to Tackle**

On 15 June 1904, the Director of Education in Jerusalem, Ismail Hakkı Bey sent a disturbing dispatch to the Ministry of Public Instruction, according to which, he had received letters from the fathers of two students at the idâdi school in Jerusalem, complaining about sexual harassment of the schoolmaster, Halid Efendi, directed toward their sons. Ismail Hakkı Efendi informed the Ministry that due to this incident, the number of students who attended the school dropped from one hundred-twenty-four to sixty. He urged the Ministry to dismiss the schoolmaster immediately and replace him with a “capable one,” or, the school “would be completely abandoned” (bütün bütün muattal hükmünde kalacağı) in the upcoming academic year. More distressing still was the letter of some other fathers whose sons went to the same school. In their letter addressed to the Ministry of Public Instruction, they threatened to withdraw their children from the school and enroll them in foreign schools if the Ministry kept Halid Efendi in his post.

Based on this dispatch, the Ministry requested an urgent investigation into the matter by the Jerusalem’s provincial government. The investigation, however, took two years. The investigation ended with the acquittal of Halid Efendi from these charges. The Jerusalem Governor, nevertheless, requested his transfer to another location as he would not be successful in this post due to the circulation of accusations. Eventually, Halid Efendi was appointed to Manastir as the schoolmaster of the idâdi school there. But for two years, the demands of

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117 BOA/MF-MKT/ 792-33-4, 1 R 1322 [15 June 1904].
118 BOA/MF-MKT/ 898-50-12, 20 B 1322 [30 September 1904].
119 BOA/MF-MKT/ 792-33-5, 10 Ca 1322 [23 July 1904].
120 BOA/MF-MKT/ 898-50-12, 27 Za 1322 [2 February 1905].
121 BOA/MF-MKT/ 929-31, 14 Ra 1324 [8 May 1906].
122 BOA/MF-MKT/ 930-46-1, 1 R 1324 [25 May 1906].
the Director of Education and the parents fell on deaf ears. He, most probably, with the support of the Jerusalem Governor, could keep his post, as alleged by Ismail Hakkı Efendi.\textsuperscript{123}

While Halid Efendi was somehow protected, his successor Halil Efendi would not be that lucky. The Governor of Jerusalem wrote to the Ministry about him complaining that let alone being serious to make the idâdi prosper and to inspect the courses, he had been estranging the people from the school with his ‘strange behavior.’\textsuperscript{124} He was ‘flighty’ (hafif mesrep) and could not accomplish anything remarkable in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{125} The Governor, therefore, requested from the Ministry that he be sent to Anatolia and exchange offices with the schoolmaster of the idâdi of Kirsehir, of whose morals, behavior and competence he was cognizant.\textsuperscript{126} The Ministry acted upon this request immediately, and in six months, Halil Efendi was appointed to Kirsehir.\textsuperscript{127} As was clear from these cases which ensued one another, in the absence of a clear policy for appointments and dismissals, an influential person could wield enormous influence on teacher recruitment and hence the efficiency of Ottoman schools.

One could assume that similar cases occurred at the local level, as the Ottoman archival materials testify to various instances where Jerusalemites complained about the behavior of the teachers at Ottoman schools. Some of them were about teachers who did not regularly attend the courses they were supposed to teach.\textsuperscript{128} Some were about teachers who were beating children or about teachers with other unseemly behavior (sifat-ı memuriyetine yakaşmaz bazı uygunsuzluğundan dolayı).\textsuperscript{129} In such instances, the Ministry asked for their dismissal and replacement with better teachers, but the Local Council was not always quick to act.\textsuperscript{130}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 792-33-4, 1 R 1322 [15 June 1904].}
\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 1013-3-2, 17 Ca 1325 [28 June 1907].}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 1013-3-6, 27 L 1325 [3 December 1907].}
\footnote{BOA/MF-İBT/ 10-37, 23 M 1294 [7 February 1877].}
\footnote{BOA/MF-MKT/ 53-47, 7 S 1295 [10 February 1878]; BOA/MF-MKT/ 58-7-1, 20 N 1295 [17 September 1878].}
\footnote{BOA/MF-İBT/ 10-37, 23 M 1294 [7 February 1877].}
\end{footnotes}
However, it is important to note that complaints about the behavior of teachers appeared less and less in the archival materials over the years. Given that other serious allegations continued to be voiced, one might conclude that they indeed emerged less as the Hamidian period neared its end.

The incompetence of teachers at Ottoman schools and the mismanagement of educational tax collected from the locals were another recurring theme in the documents during the Hamidian period. As a case in point, in a petition sent from Jaffa in 1908, the locals complained that the head of the Jaffa Education Committee, a sub-division of the Local Education Council, appointed incompetent teachers to their schools. The said teachers were not regularly teaching their classes. Since these schools did not operate normally, the majority of the students in Jaffa were attending foreign schools. The locals were also not pleased that the taxes they were paying for education were not spent on education. For this reason, they demanded the opening of new schools with capable teachers who received better salaries. The Ministry asked the Local Education Council to replace the teachers if they were not capable. But the Council replied that all the teachers had their certificates, possessed the necessary qualifications and that there was no need for betterment concerning this issue at schools in Jaffa. About the tax issue, the Council did not even make an explanation. Therefore, one could argue that the problem of communication did not only take place between the Ministry and the Local Education Council, but also between the Local Education Council and the locals.

Local teachers also suffered from this chaos. Their financial contentment was another significant challenge. One major problem was the regular payment of their salaries. It was

131 BOA/MF-MKT/ 1048-30-1, 4 S 1326 [8 March 1908].
132 Ibid.
133 BOA/MF-MKT/ 1048-30-2, 17 Ra 1326 [19 April 1908].
134 BOA/MF-MKT/ 1048-30-3, 10 Ca 1326 [9 June 1908].
especially problematic for the primary school teachers because their salaries were paid by the residents of the locality where the school was built. In some instances, the residents were so poor that they could not pay these salaries.\textsuperscript{135} In others, the reason for not receiving salaries on time was a local officer’s alleged effort to cover his corrupt deeds.\textsuperscript{136} In these cases, the teachers had to receive their salaries in arrears. For instance, the teachers at Hebron once could not receive their salaries for three years.\textsuperscript{137}

Another obstacle to a teacher’s satisfaction was that a teacher’s salary did not always increase with experience. For instance, a teacher at the primary school in Jerusalem began with a salary of 60 \textit{kuruş}.\textsuperscript{138} After receiving this salary for two years, his salary rose to 200 \textit{kuruş} and 225 \textit{kuruş} respectively for the next ten years. But while he was nearing his retirement, his salary dropped to 185 \textit{kuruş} and 175 \textit{kuruş}, respectively.\textsuperscript{139} These changes partly depended on the differences of hours they taught in years. But several teachers resigned due to their low salaries or asked to be sent to another post with a higher salary; therefore, it is not difficult to assume that this issue might have been another factor for their resignations.\textsuperscript{140}

\textit{Concluding Remarks}

This chapter has shown that the educational policies of the Hamidian period built to a large extent on the legacy of the Tanzimat period. The aspects that it differed most from Tanzimat were that it strove to systematize the implementation of the landmark Regulation across the provinces of the empire. To this end, the Hamidian administration introduced a qualitative advancement in Ottoman Muslim schools, spread provincial education councils, and teacher training schools across the empire.

\textsuperscript{135} BOA/MF-MKT/ 110-35, 12 Za 1305 [21 July 1888].
\textsuperscript{136} BOA/MF-MKT/ 94-98, 20 April 1303 [2 May 1887].
\textsuperscript{137} BOA/MF-MKT/ 279-62, 8 Ra 1313 [29 August 1895].
\textsuperscript{138} BOA/ŞD/ 1063-48-1, 22 July 1323 [4 August 1907].
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} BOA/MF-MKT/ 141-13, 27 L 1309 [25 May 1892]; BOA/MF-İBT/ 177-26, 12 Ra 1324 [6 May 1906].
However, while analyzing Ottoman teacher training and recruitment policies in Jerusalem, where the Ottoman state competed against various missionary schools, we have seen that there was a gap between discourse and reality. In the absence of a deep engagement with educational reform on the ground, the policies on teacher training and recruitment were victims of serious implementation and management problems. While the Ottoman central and local educational administrations could somehow fill the schools with teachers among whom the graduates of the local Ottoman Muslim schools also figured, their competence or reputation was not always relevant for the educational administrations. This was also the case for the Directors of Local Education Councils, who were supposed to direct all aspects of the local educational administration.

The state’s language policy, which indicated the emergence of proto-nationalism in the Ottoman state earlier than generally acknowledged, was an additional hurdle for the success of Ottoman teacher training and recruitment policies. Considering Turkish skills as a loyalty benchmark for both the teachers and the Local Education Council, where Turkish was not the majority language was a serious challenge for the implementation of a systemic policy on teacher training and recruitment. Amid this chaotic Ottoman educational administration and various other alternatives, the Muslim parents sought good education from whomever provided it.
Teacher Training and Recruitment Policies of the Church Missionary Society in Jerusalem

In the previous chapter, I have explored Ottoman teacher training and recruitment policies against the backdrop of competition with missionary schools in Hamidian Jerusalem. This chapter focuses on one of the most serious contenders of the Ottoman government schools, CMS, and presents a view from the other end of the competition. We will see that to build a system for teacher training and create a readily available pool of teachers, CMS also had to deal with a range of common and unique challenges and came up with creative and practical solutions.

In this chapter, by focusing on these challenges and responses, I will explore the teacher training and recruitment practices of the CMS in the Jerusalem District during the Hamidian period. For my analysis, I will be consulting primarily the Original Papers – the documents (annual reports, letters, minutes of conferences, etc.) sent by the CMS Palestine Mission’s Secretary and individual missionaries to the Group Committee in England supervising the CMS Palestine Mission; Précis Books - the summaries of the Original Papers, and the Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East (hereafter Proceedings).\(^1\) It is necessary to note that one can discern in these sources a certain measure of aspiration to present the work of the Mission in a positive light to CMS headquarters so that the Mission would stay open. In addition, the missionaries conveyed in their reports the perception that the Ottoman measures against foreign schools targeted mainly the CMS work due to its remarkable success. Nevertheless, missionaries’ frequent self-critical remarks and proposals for improving their work make these sources valuable for historians to catch a glimpse of the challenges the Mission faced. Furthermore, reading CMS sources alongside the Ottoman sources enables us

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\(^1\) Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East was a missionary magazine published annually in London. The Proceedings included a summary report on the work done in the previous year, along with statistical information of all the missions and missionaries of the CMS and financial contributions to the CMS.
to have a balanced view on the local conditions and to compare the priorities of both sides when they dealt with the same issues.

Based on my investigation on these primary sources, I will show that although CMS went through several problems for retaining the teachers it educated, it was - from the very beginning - aware of the centrality of the teachers in its educational apparatus and endeavored to establish a system for training its own teachers through years of planning. Even though the CMS faced serious challenges for recruiting the teachers it trained, based on the figures I collected from the CMS documents, I will argue that the CMS schools continued to hold their appeal despite the apparent loss of its best teachers, which attests to the success of its teacher training policies.

In the first section of this chapter, I will focus on the ways in which CMS staffed its educational apparatus. We will see that during the Hamidian period the discussions to improve its lot of teachers and resolutions to create its own reserve of efficient teachers ready to be deployed in the expanding network of CMS schools throughout Palestine were commonplace in the Palestine Mission. At the end of the Hamidian period, thanks to its many advantages such as the diplomatic support of the Foreign Office, its comparative ascendancy in terms of funds over the other Protestant missions in Palestine, and the participation of voluntary European missionaries in its efforts, CMS Mission in Palestine put in place a system for training its own teachers. However, as we will see in the second section of this chapter, it encountered challenges for retaining the teachers it trained in its schools. Although it worked to resolve these issues, its efforts were hampered by various factors. These included the need to make retrenchments in the Mission due to the occasional financial crises that hit CMS, the competition with the schools of other denominations over the limited supply of newly graduated local teachers, and better work opportunities for teachers trained at CMS schools in
other CMS Missions such as those in Egypt, Cyprus, and Sudan, where British political and economic power was on the rise.

After this brief overview, it will be opportune now to take a closer look at the CMS Palestine Mission’s endeavors to build its own teacher recruitment system, the challenges it faced, and the solutions it found for dealing with them. However, before exploring the local CMS endeavors, I will give a short overview of how CMS trained its European missionaries. This context is critical to mention in that most of the European missionaries in the Mission also worked as teachers and recruited local teachers in the CMS schools. Moreover, they superintended and further trained the local teachers after school hours.²

**Before the Mission: Becoming a CMS Missionary**

In its earlier days, CMS initially experienced difficulty in staffing its missions and was dependent on continental missionaries trained at the Protestant but non-denominational Basel Seminary for a while.³ However, as it was nearing to send its missionaries overseas and become the largest Protestant mission of the 19th century, the need to train a large number of missionaries in line with the CMS objectives became urgent.⁴ In response to CMS appeals for missionaries to work abroad, several men and women offered their services to partake in this growing missionary enterprise. The CMS provided these volunteers, who were mostly hailing from middle-class families, significant opportunities for spreading the message of Gospel,

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² CMS, G3 P/O 1909 #65.
adventure, social advancement by ordination, and a source of steady income. For women, CMS represented an opportunity to overcome the restrictions they faced due to the clearly defined roles for men and women in Victorian society. By leaving their private space marked by domesticity, they could blur the male-female professional lines abroad and assume a role in the administration of their respective mission. They could even exercise professions such as medicine, a field in which they were largely excluded except for becoming nurses.

Consequently, in 1825, the CMS opened a college in Islington (England) to train its own missionaries. The candidates showing missionary zeal, strong commitment, obedience, and orthodoxy were sent to this college. In this college, whose curriculum underwent changes over the years, male missionary candidates took courses such as Latin, Divinity, Logic, Greek, Mathematics and attended examinations in languages such as Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and Bengali. The curriculum of the school equipped missionary candidates with other practical skills, such as gardening, agriculture, elementary medicine, botany, chemistry, carpentry, and printing, to prepare them for the expediencies of their future posts abroad.

In England, there were also evangelical training centers for female candidates who were not university graduates, such as “The Willows,” “the Olives,” and the “Highbury Training

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5 C. P. Williams, “Not Quite Gentlemen: An Examination of 'Middling Class' Protestant Missionaries from Britain, c. 1850-1900,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 31:3 (July 1980). It is important to note that despite the prospect of a steady income, in some expensive places such as Jerusalem, sometimes the salaries paid to the missionaries did not suffice to meet their expenses, especially if they were employed in “local connexion.” In some of these cases, missionaries pleaded for an increase in their salaries, but the headquarters did not grant their wish. See, CMS/ G3 P/P vol.4, 1893 #7.
7 Jeffrey Cox, The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700 (NY, Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 105.
9 Cox, The British Missionary Enterprise, 105.
Home.” These centers enabled them to study the Bible, bookkeeping, cooking, nursing, and other practical subjects to train them as missionaries. Nevertheless, CMS did not rely on these institutions alone, as both male and female missionaries, who held university degrees, also joined the CMS’ missionary ranks.

Starting from 1887, the CMS began to send unmarried women as well to the Palestine Mission on account of their usefulness for interacting with the local women, who were harder to access by the male missionaries. This decision was also taken to support the work of missionary wives who had limited time for evangelization due to their domestic duties. The usefulness of women in Palestine Mission turned into frequent calls for reinforcing the mission with female European missionaries. These calls usually received a prompt response. This voluntary enthusiasm went on, and within years, the number of women missionaries in Palestine Mission soared to twenty-nine in 1899 from one in 1887, reaching forty in 1904. These women played a crucial role in designing the system and regulations for teachers in the Mission, together with their male counterparts.

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14 For instance, when the Palestine mission sent an unofficial appeal for ten women to work as “honorary agents of the CMS” under the superintendence of CMS Missionaries and to pay for their own expenses, to the Keswick Convention – an annual Christian evangelical gathering held since 1875 in England—seventeen women volunteered to work in Palestine and other CMS missions. See, Brian Stanley, “Anglican Missionary Societies and Agencies,” 132. Even without this call, many European women were in contact with the Palestine Mission to serve there without pay. See CMS, G3 P/P vol.2, 1887 #163.
In the Mission: Arabic for Missionaries

After joining the Palestine Mission, the European missionaries had to take Arabic courses to be effective in their evangelistic work and to start teaching at schools. The Mission would cover the cost of these courses if the missionaries were admitted into “full connexion.” Following this course, they would take two examinations in Arabic, which were arduous. According to the regulations, they were expected in these examinations, for instance:

[t]o [demonstrate] a knowledge of the usual grammatical terms in Arabic; to read distinctly and to translate with accuracy a selected passage from the Gospels; to quote from memory a few passages from the Scriptures in Arabic in a religious subject; to carry on with persons unacquainted with the English language an intelligible conversation in the ordinary matters and everyday life and in ordinary religious subjects; to read and translate a plainly written original letter in the Arabic character [...].

As is clear from the content of the examinations, the missionaries were expected to have a good command in both written and colloquial Arabic, a language which they described as “one of the most difficult in the world.” Even though they repeatedly asked for a modification in this examination system, it remained difficult, and the significance of Arabic skills endured. According to the questionnaire which its supervising Parent Committee sent to the Mission for evaluating the missionaries on probation, in addition to “steadfastness in Christian character, teaching in accordance with CMS principles, zeal and earnestness in [their] missionary work, gaining access to and being acceptable with the people to whom [they are] sent,” progress in the language study was also a crucial benchmark for evaluating the missionaries’ efficiency. If a missionary possessed poor Arabic skills and showed no prospect

16 As a case in point, when Mr. Adeney joined the Mission, he was to take Arabic instruction from two teachers for two years before being able to teach in Arabic. CMS, G3 P/P vol.3 1891 #221.
17 The advantages of employment on “full connexion” were a grant for a language teacher, furniture, medical expenses, education of the children of the missionaries, and the permission to take a leave in England. See, CMS/ G3 P/P vol.4, 1896 #167.
18 CMS, G3 P/O 1892 #196, Minutes of the 31st Conference of the CMS Palestine Mission held in Jerusalem.
19 CMS, G3 P/O 1899 #65, Report on the Conditions of Women and CMS Women’s Work within the Area of the Palestine Women’s Subconference.
20 CMS, G3 P/O 1909 #74, Church Missionary Society Missionaries on Probation.
of learning it, they were considered unfit for training students. In such cases, the Mission asked for their withdrawal.\(^{21}\) Therefore, the significance for the CMS missionaries who were training students or teachers to have considerable proficiency in Arabic cannot to be overemphasized. As we have seen in the previous section, this approach stands in stark contrast to that of the Ottoman state when appointing its non-Arab teachers toward the end of the Hamidian period.

Thus far, I have explored the institutions CMS founded or resorted to train and recruit its European missionaries in general. It was essential to begin my analysis by providing this context in that these missionaries were the backbone of the Palestine Mission, and they designed the system for local teacher training and recruitment. The obligation to learn the language well in a short time must have been extremely demanding. Nevertheless, this hardship did not deter them from joining the Mission because they were aware of the importance of acquiring this skill to better convey their principles, train and manage the Mission’s own local teachers.

In the next section, I will introduce the three chief schools that CMS operated to train its own teachers with the help of these missionaries. These were the Preparandi Institution (later the English College) and the Bishop Gobat School for male students, and Jerusalem Girls’ Training Institution (later Bethlehem Girls’ School) for female students.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{21}\) CMS, G3 P/P vol. 1, 1881 #31, Report of Rev. Canon Tristram and Rev. E. H. Bickersteth. In cases where the examiners, who were the senior missionaries of the Mission, believed that the level of language skills a missionary acquired would not hinder their missionary work even if they fail the examinations, the missionaries were excused from taking them further.\(^{21}\) Nevertheless, this was a rare occurrence. See CMS, G3 P/P vol.5, 1905 #99.

\(^{22}\) It is important to note that CMS Palestine Mission also recruited teachers trained by other societies. For instance, most of the female teachers of the “humbler village schools” were recruited from the Nazareth Orphanage, which belonged to the Female Education Society before taken over by CMS in 1899.\(^{22}\) See, CMS, G3 P/O 1906 #67, Report of the Educational Sub-Committee of the Palestine Mission. It also recruited female teachers from American Presbyterians, London Jews’ Society, and German Deaconess School. See CMS, G3 P/O 1899 #65, Report on the Conditions of Women and CMS Women’s Work within the Area of the Palestine Women’s Subconference. However, the CMS correspondence included remarks about the “insufficient results” gained through employing them and the need to train CMS’ own teachers. See CMS, G3 P/P vol.2 1885 #117 (Mott); CMS, G3 P/P vol.3 1892 #105 (Hall).
Three Schools in Pursuit of Efficient Teachers

The Preparandi Institution

The first of these three schools, the Preparandi Institution, was opened in 1869 in Jerusalem with the objective to train teachers, catechists, and evangelists for the CMS.²³ It was the highest institution in the CMS educational organization until 1904, and its graduates could find work quickly in the Mission as teachers and catechists. Imperfect though it was, a system was developed to regulate the disposal and occupation of the Preparandi Class students.²⁴ Accordingly, every missionary would suggest at a minimum one pupil for the Preparandi Class every year and would not appoint a teacher in his district without first contacting the Preparandi Class for an assistant. The Mission would appoint students who finished their courses as assistant teachers under the “immediate superintendence of a missionary or a native pastor” or an experienced teacher.²⁵ Some of the institution’s students could gain teaching experience in other high schools of the Mission, such as the Bishop Gobat School, even while being students at the Preparandi Institution.²⁶ In this way, the Mission would incentivize the entry of more students to the Preparandi Institution and carve out a secure career path for them after graduation. Nevertheless, the institution fell short of providing the required number of teachers alone.²⁷ Based on the Proceedings between the years 1876-1904, seventeen of its students became teachers at CMS schools.²⁸ Unfortunately, we do not know about the fate of the other

²³ CMS, G3 P/O 1909 #142, The English College Robert Bruce Scholarship.
²⁴ CMS, G3 P/O 1887 #136.
²⁵ Ibid.
²⁶ Mr. Ellis of the Bishop Gobat School reports that a Preparandi pupil gave thirteen lessons in a week at the school. See, CMS, G3, P/O 1897 #91, Report of the Preparandi Institution, the Bishop Gobat School and the Printing Press at Jerusalem.
²⁷ CMS, G3 P/O 1893 #229, Reports of the CMS Palestine Mission Conference. This institution was transformed into the English College in 1904. More details on this transformation will be given in the following chapter.
²⁸ I reached this number by counting the numbers of graduates whose profession was explicitly stated as teachers in the Proceedings. See, CMS, Proceedings..., 1888-9 (London: Church Missionary House, 1889), 63 (5); CMS Proceedings..., 1893-94, (London: Church Missionary House, 1894), 68 (4); CMS Proceedings..., 1896-97, (London: Church Missionary House, 1897), 146 (3); CMS Proceedings...
students, except that some of them became catechists, dispensers, or dragomans. However, it would be useful to bear in mind that some of these students were employed by the rival schools. Thus, the Proceedings might have omitted them from the statistics.

Whatever the exact number was, one thing was certain. The institution could not meet the growing demands of the Mission alone because its capacity was small. This was because the institution was gratis, and the CMS could pay for only a certain number of students. Its maximum capacity was twenty in a year. It even presented additional costs to the mission because its pupils were studying gratuitously and would often not continue to work at CMS schools after graduation. Therefore, the Mission had to come up with a solution to this problem. Hence, the institution was transformed into the English College in 1904, with the threelfold objective of abandoning the practice of training its teachers and agents for free, satisfying the demand for higher English education and producing a supply of better class teachers to improve the standards at the CMS days schools. To these ends, the Mission remodeled its curriculum along modern lines and extended its capacity. It also accepted only paying pupils to cover the expenses of the College’s modern facilities and the salaries of its teachers. For the period between 1904 and 1910, out of a total of one hundred-fifty-one newly
admitted students, the College supplied twenty-two students to CMS schools.\textsuperscript{34} We should definitely take into account the likelihood that the statistics omitted the teachers who served in other schools than those of the CMS. Therefore, the picture presented in these statistics is not fully representative of the results the College obtained in teacher training in general. However, it revealed an additional and striking fact: Nineteen of twenty-two teachers served in CMS schools for only two years and then left.\textsuperscript{35} I will expound on the reasons behind their short service for CMS schools later in this chapter.

**The Bishop Gobat School**

The second institution that CMS relied on training its male teachers was the Bishop Gobat School. It was founded as an orphanage by the second Protestant Bishop of Jerusalem, Bishop Samuel Gobat, in 1853. Bishop Gobat, who was a former CMS missionary, bequeathed this orphanage to CMS in 1877.\textsuperscript{36} The education there had been free and grants from England and Germany met the expenses of its students.\textsuperscript{37} However, soon after overtaking it, CMS transformed this school into a boarding school for male students and began to ask its boarders to contribute to their own expenses.\textsuperscript{38} Soon it became one of the most popular CMS schools in Jerusalem, and every year, numerous applications had to be refused due to the lack of accommodation.\textsuperscript{39} The School welcomed boarders from throughout Palestine, Egypt and Abyssinia who were Protestant, Greek, Armenian, Coptic, Roman Catholic, Muslim and

\textsuperscript{34} CMS, G3 P/O 1914 #66, Statistics of English College, Jerusalem. If we take the number of CMS teachers in the Mission in the year 1910, which was 114 in total, the school supplied nearly one-fifth of all the teachers CMS employed in just six years. See, CMS, *Proceedings…, 1910-1911*, (London: Church Missionary House, 1911), 92.

\textsuperscript{35} CMS, G3 P/O 1914 #66, Statistics of English College, Jerusalem.

\textsuperscript{36} CMS, G3 P/O 1906 #58, Report of the Bishop Gobat School on Mount Zion (July 1, 1903 – Dec 31, 1905)

\textsuperscript{37} CMS, G3 P/O 1887 #187, Annual Report of Bishop Gobat’s Memorial School on Mount Zion, Jerusalem for 1886.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.; CMS G3 P/O 1906 #67, Report of the Educational Sub-Committee of the Palestine Mission.
Abyssinian.\textsuperscript{40} It was a springboard for the more intelligent students at CMS day schools to prepare for their entrance to the Preparandi Institution.\textsuperscript{41} As the headmaster of the School wrote in his report for the year 1890 about “the occupations of one hundred-forty-four of the best known” students that attended the School, twenty-nine of them became teachers.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{Jerusalem Girls’ Training Institution (Bethlehem Girls’ School)}

Having dwelt on the principal schools where the CMS trained its male teachers, it is now opportune to explore the main centers where the Mission trained its female teachers. The school I will examine in this regard is the Girls’ Training Institution in Jerusalem. The institution was opened in 1892 as the Girls’ High School with the main objective of training the Society’s female teachers.\textsuperscript{43} The increasing number of Roman Catholic boarding schools in Jerusalem was an ancillary cause for its emergence.\textsuperscript{44} In the beginning, the institution accepted a small number of students, namely up to twelve students, to monitor each student’s personal development and to keep them under close scrutiny.\textsuperscript{45} This limitation was also dictated by the shortage of accommodation at the institution. Despite the small number of students and the special care given to them, this institution had serious difficulties in supplying teachers. According to its principal, Miss Welch, six years after its opening, only three out of fourteen

\textsuperscript{40} CMS, G3 P/O 1880 #121, Report of Bishop Gobat’s Memorial School.
\textsuperscript{41} CMS, G3 P/O 1896 #56, Report of Bishop Gobat’s Memorial School on Mount Zion, Jerusalem.
\textsuperscript{42} CMS, G3 P/O 1892 #104, Report of Bishop Gobat’s Memorial School on Mount Zion, Jerusalem.

Occupations of the rest were as follows: “Clergymen 6, lay missionaries 5, teachers 29, doctors 9, student of medicine 1, students in colleges 3, Preparandi [Institution] 8, merchants 34, officers in the English army 2, officers in the Turkish army 4, printers 2, interpreters 13, craftsmen 18, dispensers 3, agriculturists 5, telegraphists 2.” It is important to note that even though this ratio might seem good at first sight as the school added at least two teachers to CMS teacher reservoir annually, we do not know for sure that these teachers worked at CMS schools afterward, or if they did, how long they worked at them.

\textsuperscript{44} CMS, G3 P/O 1898 #164, 26 Sept 1898 (Welch).
students in total could be any use to the Society. For her, at the root of the institution’s inefficiency in producing a larger number of teachers lay its students’ “failure of health, insufficient brain power, weakness of character, [and] objections of relatives.” Another reason was that the students entered the institution at around the age of ten and that their capabilities for being a teacher were hard to measure when they enrolled in the school. Therefore, Miss Welch constantly asked for grants to move the institution to a larger premise so that she could supply more teachers from among a larger group of students. Her calls went unanswered as it required significant effort to either rent or buy a building in Jerusalem at the time. However, her wishes were finally fulfilled with the abolishment of the Female Education Society in 1899 and the transfer of its Teacher Training School in Bethlehem to CMS. The school had larger premises as well as an official permit, which denoted that its graduates would be recognized by the Ottoman authorities. Therefore, the Boarders’ Class was moved to Bethlehem to take in more students and to supply the Mission with more local teachers.

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46 CMS, G3 P/O 1898 #164, 26 Sept 1898 (Welch). In 1899, the Mission was, to a large extent, dependent on teachers educated by other Societies. Out of twenty female teachers employed by the Society in 1899, only four were trained by CMS. Of the rest, seven were trained by American Presbyterians, four by Female Education Society, one by London Jews’ Society, two by British Syrian Schools, one by Miss Procter’s School in Syria, and one by German Deaconess School. As most of these teachers’ training was given in a “non-Church-of-England” way in these schools, they could not offer much help for CMS to advance the Church of England practice. See CMS, G3 P/O 1899 #65, Report on the Conditions of Women and CMS Women’s Work within the Area of the Palestine Women’s Subconference; CMS, G3 P/O 1906 #194, Review of Palestine Mission.

47 CMS, G3 P/O 1898 #164, 26 Sept 1898 (Welch).

48 CMS, G3 P/O 1899 #62, Palestine Mission Conference.

49 The complicated procedure for obtaining an official permit for erecting a church or a school building in Ottoman lands was a source of considerable dissatisfaction among the missionary societies at that time. See CMS, G3 P/O 1892 #82, Appeal on Behalf of Religious Work in the Turkish Empire from Representatives of Bible & Missionary Societies at Constantinople.

50 The Ottoman authorities had granted a permit for this school with the proviso that FES would not accept any Muslim child, and it did not. However, accepting such a condition in its schools was inconceivable to CMS missionaries because evangelizing Muslims was its principal objective. The Ottoman authorities attempted to exert pressure on the Mission for not receiving Muslim students. British Consul in Jerusalem, however, assured the Mission that “the Porte [would] dare not interfere with the schools, or, if attempted, the Embassy would support CMS.” See CMS, G3 P/P vol.4 1894 #48 (Hall).

51 CMS, G3 P/O 1901 #88, Jerusalem District Report.
Any healthy girl, who was over ten years old, passed the entrance examination and received a positive review from her teachers at CMS day schools could attend it.\(^52\) She would be expected, however, to teach at CMS schools not less than three years after completing her course and receiving her certificate.\(^53\) The girls, nonetheless, were not always willing to serve as teachers after graduation. Although they were paying fees to cover their own expenses, it was still a significant loss to the Society when it could not deploy them as teachers after expending a great deal of effort for training them. In order to overcome this problem, the missionaries contemplated obligating at least the daughters of the Mission’s agents to serve in the mission schools at least two years after graduation.\(^54\) As agents’ daughters attended the CMS schools with a discount, they thought that if their daughters refuse this, they would at least refund the discount from the salaries of their fathers.\(^55\) However, taking a pledge from the fathers of such young girls for the future was not expedient. In the end, the students who expressed their wish to become teachers at CMS schools for at least two years, after studying at the School for three years, could complete their studies with a reduced fee and could receive a bonus payment when they began to work.\(^56\) Until 1910, twenty-six teachers in total graduated from the School and commenced working at CMS Mission schools in Palestine, Egypt and Sudan. Two others took up work as nurses in Mission hospitals.\(^57\)

**A System not without Problems**

As we have seen above, the Mission noticed the importance of training efficient teachers for its schools earlier than the beginning of the Hamidian period, took steps to this end, and did not lose sight of this objective throughout this time. Thanks to these steps in this

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\(^52\) CMS, G3 P/O 1907 #45, Church Missionary Society-The Training School for Girls at Bethlehem.

\(^53\) Ibid.

\(^54\) CMS, G3 P/P vol.5 1905 #104, Minutes of Women’s Conference.

\(^55\) Ibid.

\(^56\) CMS, G3 P/P vol.5 1906 #93, Minutes of Educational Sub-Committee; CMS, G3 P/P vol.5 1906 #89, Minutes of Women’s Conference.

regard, at the end of the Hamidian period, it developed the ability to build its own reservoir of
teachers. We can reach this conclusion simply by looking at the teacher statistics of the
Mission. Let us take the year 1910. Accordingly, in the year 1910, the Mission employed 104
teachers in 48 schools throughout Palestine.\(^5^8\)

Table 2. Overview of the number of CMS schools, students, and teachers in Palestine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Teachers(^5^9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2749</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2506</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3339</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2549</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2671</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us now remember the number of teachers graduated from the schools I mentioned
previously in this chapter.

Table 3. Principal CMS schools for teacher training and their contribution to CMS’ reserve of teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the School</th>
<th>The years the statistics covered</th>
<th>Number of teachers the school graduated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Bishop Gobat School</td>
<td>1877-1898</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparandi Institution</td>
<td>1876-1904</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The English College</td>
<td>1904-1910</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Girls’ Training Institution</td>
<td>1892-1900</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls’ Boarding School in Bethlehem</td>
<td>1900-1910</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>97(^6^0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^5^9\) In the table, teachers segment refers to the number of “native lay teachers” as listed in the CMS
Proceedings and excludes the English missionaries. See CMS, *Proceedings…, 1908-9*, (London:

\(^6^0\) It is important to mention that this estimate is still a conservative one as the number of Bishop Gobat
School graduates who went out as teachers between the years 1898 to 1910 is absent from the statistics.
I also have not included the number of teachers who graduated, for instance, from other schools or
orphanages, as the number of their teacher graduates are marginal compared to these institutions.
As the second table above shows, the number of teachers that the CMS Palestine Mission could supply during the Hamidian period was just a little lower than the total number of teachers it employed in the said period’s aftermath. Even if we consider the fact that some of these teachers might have retired in the meantime, we can still safely argue that the Mission achieved its initial objective of training its own teachers to a remarkable extent. Yet, this interpretation needs a follow-up question: Did all these teachers work at CMS schools? Unfortunately for CMS, they did not. In the following, I will explore the challenges that CMS’ teacher employment system faced and the solutions the Mission found to resolve them.

The most prominent reason behind the trained teachers’ preference to leave the Mission was the huge pay gap between the local and European teachers. This remunerative inequality was such that when the Mission asked for a recent university graduate from England to work as a Science teacher at the English College it offered him a salary of £175 for the first year and £200 for the next two years.\textsuperscript{61} The value of a non-English Syrian Protestant College graduate to be employed at Bishop Gobat School, was on the other hand, £54 per year.\textsuperscript{62} Even if it was understandable for the Mission to pay more to university graduates, the value it set for its own teacher graduates was incomprehensibly low.\textsuperscript{63} For a new graduate of Preparandi Institution, the salary was only 1-2 Napoleon a month in 1901, and in those years one Napoleon equaled 16 shillings.\textsuperscript{64} Given the fact that 20 shillings made £1, local teachers, especially those who knew they could fare better at other rivaling schools than £12-24 a year, quit the Mission and

\textsuperscript{61} CMS, G3 P/O 1907 #53, 25 February 1907 (Sykes).
\textsuperscript{62} CMS, G3 P/P vol.5 1903 #118, Minutes of Missionary Conference.
\textsuperscript{63} The pay gap between male and female teachers was also huge. For instance, while a first-grade female teacher could receive maximum £36, the salary of a first-grade male teacher, who could become headmaster, began at £60 and reached £76 maximum. See, CMS, G3 P/P vol.5 1904 #79/Report of Committee on Education.
\textsuperscript{64} CMS, G3 P/O 1901 #216, Jerusalem District Report (Hall); Francis E. Newton, \textit{Fifty Years in Palestine} (Wrotham: Cold Harbour Press, 1948), 29.
joined these schools. Some of them who had other lucrative options stopped teaching and went into business partnerships.

This glaring inefficiency of the Mission to retain its own teachers then begs the question: Why did the Mission let the human capital it accumulated through years of enormous effort go to waste? A fairer income distribution would have remedied a cause for feeling of injustice by the local teachers and kept them in the Mission. To this end, the Mission drew up several scales of salaries for local teachers according to their age, gender, experience, marital status, and the expensiveness of the locality they were working. These scales were updated from time to time to readjust the salaries of the teachers around their certificates and the value of their qualifications in the highly competitive educational market. Such arrangements, though sometimes applied differently than the original plans, offered temporary relief. Nevertheless, when CMS went through financial crises due to the decrease in donations and the expenses brought by overextension, just as the other Protestant missionary organizations, the grants the Mission received from CMS saw considerable diminution.

This, doubtless, led to undesirable consequences for the teachers. The Mission could not keep its promises to teachers for increasing their salaries, had to close down some smaller schools, and dismiss their teachers. In such crises, as was the case in 1903, some of the Mission’s ablest teachers resigned and accepted teaching positions in rival schools with a salary doubling the amount CMS could offer.

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65 CMS, G3 P/O 1901 #216, Jerusalem District Report (Hall).
66 Ibid.; CMS, G3 P/O 1903 #124, Jerusalem and East Jordan Districts.
67 CMS, G3 P/O 1895 #51, Scale of Salaries for Native Teachers in the CMS Palestine Mission.
68 CMS, G3 P/P vol.5 1904 #79, Report of Committee on Education.
69 CMS, G3 P/O 1903 #124, Jerusalem and East Jordan Districts.
70 Cox, *The British Missionary Enterprise*, 100.
71 CMS, G3 P/O 1903 #156, 1 July 1903 (Hall). While this and most other CMS documents did not specify which school the former CMS teachers chose to teach, in one instance a CMS teacher accepted the offer of the Friends’ School in Ramallah, which was a Quaker institution. See, CMS, G3 P/O 1901 #216, Jerusalem District Report (Hall).
Yet, such actions did not seem to affect much the overall attraction of CMS schools, despite some fluctuations in student numbers. As a case in point, while the number of students at CMS schools was 3339 in 1903, it was 3407 in 1904, 2923 in 1905, and 3155 in 1906. Therefore, in the Mission’s case, even if its best teachers left the Mission for better work opportunities elsewhere, CMS could retain its position in the rivalry with its second-best teachers.

**Concluding Remarks**

We have seen in this chapter that CMS’ efforts to train its own local teachers were an indispensable part of its educational policies. For this specific purpose, the Mission opened various schools and, in the long run, managed to systematize its teacher training policies. Despite the problems on the financial side, constant checks on teachers’ competence and the efforts of voluntary European missionaries to train these teachers after their employment played a role in the continued appeal of CMS schools. The success of these policies also depended on the Mission’s sensitivity to use the most efficient way to reach the locals: their language. Insistence on learning Arabic language well and communicating with the local teacher candidates in Arabic must definitely have increased the efficiency of their policies. This was a key difference from the Ottoman sensitivity on Turkish, which hampered its teacher training and recruitment policies. As we will see in the next chapter, the difference in the sensitivity to local needs and demands continued to affect the success of educational policies of both sides in Jerusalem.

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Curriculum Policy of the Ottoman and CMS Schools in Jerusalem

In 1906, the headmaster of the Bishop Gobat School, Mr. Ellis, sent a confidential letter to CMS headquarters. He specifically stated that its content was not for publication in CMS magazines, which means that he did not wish to infuriate the Ottoman authorities with its content. Accordingly, that year, new Muslim students flocked to the Bishop Gobat School and increased the already remarkable number of Muslim students at that school. After decades of praying, he mentioned, the school had finally reached even the hitherto inaccessible neighborhoods of the “most bigoted” families of Jerusalem. One of the new students came from such a neighborhood, which did not send a single Muslim boy to the CMS school in its fifty years of existence despite its proximity. The boy was the son of the guardian of the Tomb of David. But the Muslim students at the Bishop Gobat School were not confined to this background. Several of them hailed from the elite families of Jerusalem. Even the relatives of the Ottoman Director of Education in Jerusalem attended the school.

In the previous chapters, we have explored the importance of the policies for teacher training and recruitment for the overall attractiveness of Ottoman and CMS schools in Jerusalem. Recruitment of incompetent teachers, as we have seen, could make the schools lag

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1 CMS, G3 P/O 1906 #9 (Ellis).
2 Ibid. It is important to note that an investigative committee sent by the Ottoman Ministry of Interior two years prior to this letter also found out that many Muslim children attended Christian schools in Jerusalem and even the Director of Education, Ismail Hakkı Efendi, sent his children to these schools. As a response to these findings, Ismail Hakkı Efendi wrote that only three Muslim children attended these schools in Jerusalem, and that his child was always enrolled in government schools. See, BOA/MF-MKT/ 785-21-3, 3 Ca 1322 [16 July 1904]. While we cannot be sure that what the letter alluded as the relatives of the Director of Education was Ismail Hakkı Efendi’s own children, we are certain that more than three students attended the Christian schools in Jerusalem, as only the Bishop Gobat School had eight Muslim boys in the same year. See, CMS G3 P/O 1905 #106, Report on the work in the Bishop Gobat School, Jerusalem. This number would increase significantly if the number of Muslim girls at CMS Girls’ School in Jerusalem was considered, which exceeded the number of Christian girls. See, CMS G3 P/O 1905 #107. Nevertheless, it is also difficult to understand why the findings of investigative committee and the Director of Education differed so substantially. Additionally, it is important to bear in mind that the Ministry did not take any action concerning Ismail Hakkı Efendi’s conflicting response on a matter which it claimed to attach high importance.
in their popularity since the parents of the students knew how to tap into various better educational alternatives in Jerusalem regardless of their religious or political affiliation. However, the teachers alone did not account for the attraction of a school. As we will see, the curricula that the schools followed played an equally decisive role in maintaining a competitive position in this race for Muslim students.

This chapter aims to present a comparative analysis of the Ottoman and CMS policies on curriculum design in Jerusalem. To this end, I will use primarily Ottoman memoranda on curriculum changes, and correspondence between the Jerusalem Director of Education and the Ministry of Public Instruction. For the CMS policies in this regard, I will consult the correspondence between the CMS Palestine Mission and the headquarters, namely the original letters and their summaries in the Precis Books. As will be apparent in the following, I will use a larger number of CMS sources to examine this contrast, since the CMS missionaries discussed this issue more frequently and left a lot more sources on these discussions at the local level. As for the Ottoman side, the archival materials reveal that requests for the adjustment of the curriculum to reflect the local needs were not that common, and the Ottoman local administration did its best to carry out the instructions coming from the central administration. This might seem to produce an imbalance at first sight; however, it also indicates an imbalance between both sides about their sensitivity to local needs and demands, which I will explore in the following subsections.

Drawing on these sources, I will show that while the Ottoman state strove to introduce a uniform curriculum across the empire imbued with a firm sense of officially sanctioned religion and morality, it could not fully capture the zeitgeist of the moment in Jerusalem. The Ottoman curriculum policies reflected the defensive stance of the state against the “harmful effects” of the education given in foreign and missionary schools by emphasizing religion and morality rather than offering the courses to increase the attraction of Ottoman schools. This
does not necessarily mean that the Ottoman schools lacked practical or other scientific subjects that its rival schools taught. However, their steadily decreasing weight in the curriculum and the Ottoman schools’ incapability of meeting the demands of its subjects could be a strong motive for the Muslim students’ increasing preference for the CMS schools. For the Muslim girls, the lack of higher-level government schools was an additional factor for this inclination. On the other hand, the CMS was more aware of the stiffness of competition in education and took various actions to compete against not just the Ottoman schools, but also various other schools associated with France, Russia, and Germany. Therefore, it remodeled its educational apparatus and curricula according to the demands of the locals and strove to provide them with the skills that could open doors for them not only in Jerusalem but also in different corners of the world. Based on these findings, I will argue that while the Ottoman and CMS administrations were aware of the importance of curriculum in their schools to achieve their objectives, the difference between their goals, and their differing degrees of sensitivity to local needs and demands resulted in the increasing attendance of Muslim students in CMS schools. Additionally, the gap between the Ottoman rhetoric and actions on the ground found its echo on curriculum policies in Jerusalem and contributed to the loss of inclination among the Muslim students to attend Ottoman schools.

In the following, I will substantiate my argument in concrete cases by analyzing the policies of the Ottoman local and central administration and the CMS Palestine Mission on the school curriculum. For this, I will compare their policies on the following categories: their flexibility to make changes in their curriculum in line with the local demands and their approach to demand for girls’ education by exploring some aspects of their schools’ curricula. However, before delving into these categories, it is essential to give brief information about the objectives of both sides with their educational policies, since their objectives informed how they designed their curriculum to a large extent.
**CMS Objectives and Their Effects on the School Curricula**

A close look at the CMS documents reveals that CMS objectives in Palestine were realigned through the years in accordance with the necessities and possibilities of the times. However, the following objectives remained the same: Imparting Scriptural knowledge to the youth of Palestine, shaping their characters through a moral training so that they acquire “cleanliness, order, truthfulness, honesty and kindness and unselfishness” and eventually gaining converts among them. The conversion of Muslims was so crucial for the CMS that numerous proposals were made by the headquarters to reach more Muslims. When the need to retrench on its educational investments occurred due to the CMS’ financial difficulties, the headquarters asked the Mission to reconsider the educational work that did not “successfully influence” the Muslims. Whereas the number of converted Muslims did not see a remarkable surge over the years, this objective was realigned to the eventual conversion of Muslims through the “conversions” of other non-Muslims of Jerusalem, such as the Greek Orthodox and Catholics. However, to attain this objective, it was paramount first to draw many students and then keep them within the CMS school system to perpetuate the “evangelical influences of the Protestant Church of England” on them.

Around the end of the Hamidian period, we see another significant change in how the CMS defined its objectives:

“(…) to make an indelible impression upon the Arabic speaking races of Palestine and the lands beyond, by the presentation of Evangelical truth and the introduction of all that is good in our western civilizations (…)”.

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3 CMS G3 P/O 1887 #187; CMS G3 P/O 1894 #187, District Reports Presented to the CMS Palestine Mission Conference.
4 CMS G3 P/P vol.4 1901 #224.
5 CMS G3 P/O 1907 #124, Extract from Minutes of General Committee of July 16, 1907.
6 CMS G3 P/O 1902 #63.
This change needs to be further explained because previously, the educational objective of CMS focused more on raising children with a Christian character than loading them with information or “giving them a smattering of English and a European varnish.” The realignment above mirrored itself in the increased emphasis on English language teaching in not only the English College but also in other CMS schools while previously Arabic teaching was a significant asset of the CMS schools. As a case in point, at the CMS School for Girls in Jerusalem, without acquiring “a good knowledge of Arabic and English,” a girl would not be allowed to start learning French or German. Before then, English courses were optional at girls’ day schools and could start in their fourth year. Even at Bishop Gobat’s school, where English was thoroughly taught, the weekly hour of classes in Arabic was 77, and English was 47. Until then, the CMS in the Preparandi school, which trained teachers and agents for the Mission, the language of instruction was ‘almost entirely Arabic.’ Despite the objections within the Mission, the dominant belief that Arabic was essential for missionary work in Jerusalem kept this practice going in that school. Yet this change, as we will see, also hinged on the local demands.

**Ottoman Objectives and Their Effects on the School Curricula**

By expanding the network of schools, the Hamidian administration aimed to make its presence felt in the furthest corners of the empire and thus redefined its relationship with its

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9 CMS G3 P/O 1894 #187, District Reports Presented to the CMS Palestine Mission Conference.
10 The president of the Syrian Protestant College, who witnessed the examinations at the Bishop Gobat School was most impressed by the classes held in Arabic. See, CMS G3 P/O 1887 #187.
11 CMS G3 P/O 1892 #43.
12 CMS G3 P/O 1902 #64.
13 CMS G3 P/O 1897 #91, Report of the Prep Institution, the Bishop Gobat School and the Printing Press at Jerusalem (Spring Conference 1897) by Rev. Zeller.
15 CMS G3 P/O 1900 #93. Minutes of the Proceedings of the Women’s Subconference 1900; CMS G3 P/O 1895 #60 (Zeller).
subjects. Considering foreign schools as the places where “various kinds of sedition” (envalyi fesadat) were stirred up, the Hamidian administration placed great importance in limiting their effects by spreading their version of education. The central objective of the Ottoman educational efforts during the Hamidian period was to secure the Ottoman state’s future by raising loyal, capable, and civilized subjects who would adopt the values of the central administration as their own when the empire’s future was at stake. The principal values that the Ottoman state aimed to inculcate were loyalty to the sultan, the Ottoman state and dynasty, and Islamic morality.

According to the Ottoman state documents, the Ottoman state was aware that streamlining its schools in accordance with the demands of the time and increasing their number vis-à-vis the foreign schools was of utmost importance. Therefore, starting from the mid-1880s, the Ottoman state made various alterations to its schools’ curricula with the help of commissions assigned to correct them. A reason that spurred such an interest in the curriculum reformation, aside from the Hamidian consideration for improving the moral state of its subjects, was the perceived weakness in the Islamic beliefs (akaid) of the government school graduates and the perceived success that the non-Muslim schools attained by emphasizing their own beliefs in their curricula. Consequently, successive commissions emphasized the need to “wholly inculcate and impart Islamic beliefs” as the most significant

17 BOA/Y-PRK-MF/ 3-31, 29 Z 1311 [3 July 1894].
19 Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education*, 167. The morality that the Ottoman state promoted comprised both the civic values that the CMS extended and morals to strengthen the link between the subjects and the Ottoman state. The textbooks used for imparting this morality made frequent reference to Qur’an and hadiths. See, Fortna, “Islamic Morality,” 388.
20 BOA/A}-DVN-MKL/ 42-3-1, 16 Teşrin-i Sani 1317 [29 November 1901].
22 BOA/I-DH/ 1019-80409, 4 Ca 1304 [29 January 1887].
aspect of curriculum revision. For the Ottoman state, raising students in a way which could be beneficial for the state depended on the following qualities: loyalty to the Sultan, devotion to God, and piety.\textsuperscript{24} Despite the increasing emphasis on the teaching of religious principles, the Ottoman state also aimed to endow their subjects with the current scientific and technical knowledge.\textsuperscript{25} Yet, the weight of these courses was surpassed by the courses designed to strengthen the religiosity of the Ottoman subjects.

After presenting the setting in which the Ottoman state and the CMS developed their curriculum policies, let us now compare the policies of both sides on the basis of their flexibility to adapt their curriculum to the changing needs and demands of the time.

**Flexibility on Curricular and Related Matters**

On 13 June 1906, Ismail Hakkı Efendi sent a dispatch to the Ministry of Public Instruction as one of his final deeds in Jerusalem. He asked the Ministry to allow the Council to add English class to the curriculum of the idâdi and budget for a teacher of English there.\textsuperscript{26} He enumerated the reasons for such a request as follows: the English language almost became the universal language of trade in that century, learning it began to enjoy widespread popularity in Jerusalem, and many Muslim parents had been sending their children to the foreign and non-Muslim community schools which taught it.\textsuperscript{27} Therefore, he wrote, if they met this need at an Ottoman school, these parents would have no excuse to send their children to other schools.\textsuperscript{28}

What could be the ideal response to this simple request at a time when the Ottoman state endeavored to keep the Muslim students from attending these schools? Granting this permission instantly would come to mind as the most reasonable way to act. The Ministry’s

\textsuperscript{23} BOA/Y-PRK-MF/ 4-56-2, 22 R 1320 [29 July 1902].
\textsuperscript{24} BOA/Y-PRK-MF/ 4-54-1, 26 S 1320 [4 June 1902].
\textsuperscript{25} BOA/Y-A-RES/ 105-13-3, 13 N 1317 [15 January 1900].
\textsuperscript{26} BOA/MF-MKT/ 942-22-1, 21 R 1324 [13 June 1906].
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
response, however, was just the opposite. It stated that since all the curricula of the idâdi schools were uniform across the Empire, it could not arrange a separate curriculum for the Jerusalem’s idâdi and advised the current one be executed in full.\(^{29}\) It also reminded the Director the limits of its authority and wrote that it was only the Ministry which could decide to make changes in the curricula.\(^{30}\)

Why did the Ministry respond this way? Clearly, the problem was not about the budget as the Ministry did not touch upon it in the dispatch. Was it because of the unpopularity of the English language with the Ministry? Was it because of the need to maintain its authority over Local Councils in curriculum matters? We can only presume at this point. Whatever the real reason was, the Ministry’s inactivity in this example was utterly incongruous with its rhetoric of fighting against the extension of foreign schools’ influence on its lands. The Ottoman state thus could not seize a timely opportunity to decrease the attractiveness of CMS schools when they had just begun to stress English language education more.

The Ottoman indifference to such demands did not only surface in case of the requests for permission to teach a popular language. The Ottoman insistence on uniformity caused other related problems as well. In another instance, the Director of Education asked for a change in the regulations which expelled students who failed in a class for two consecutive years.\(^{31}\) The Director conveyed the complaints of the parents who had no other choice to send their children to foreign and non-Muslim schools since their children had to leave the school “at a young age when they were not capable of engaging in business, crafts or other kinds of work.”\(^{32}\) Yet, because the Ottoman state banned the attendance of Muslim children, these parents thus were the victims of the system.

\(^{29}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 942-22-2, 25 Ca 1324 [17 July 1906].
\(^{30}\) Ibid.
\(^{31}\) BOA/MF-MKT/ 723-20-1, 4 Za 1320 [2 February 1903].
\(^{32}\) Ibid.
The internal correspondence in the Ministry about this request is difficult to associate with the Ottoman concerns about foreign schools. Accordingly, the possibility of Muslim students’ attendance to the foreign schools after their expulsion from the government schools was not only valid for Jerusalem, but other localities as well.\(^ {33} \) Although this explanation itself was enough to necessitate a change in the regulation to correct this empire-wide problem, for the Ministry, this was an excuse not to change the regulation. According to the Ministry, the main responsibility to prevent Muslim students’ attendance to these schools lay on the local administration, not on the regulation.\(^ {34} \) Therefore, there was no need to change it. By overemphasizing the uniform application of the educational policies, the Ottoman central administration disregarded the requests of the Local Council and the parents’ needs.\(^ {35} \)

This approach differed widely from the attitude of CMS missionaries, which had a broader autonomy on such matters. The missionaries on the ground watched the changing circumstances, the efforts of others (namely, “Latin, Greek, Russian, Anglican, German Lutheran or other Protestants as well as Muslim and Jewish”) and their effects on CMS work closely.\(^ {36} \) Their method accommodated the needs and conditions of the places they worked at rather than imposing a uniform practice.\(^ {37} \) They stressed that successful method in another part of the world was not necessarily efficient for Palestine. Even an approach which brought success to the missionary work at one period in Palestine could hamper their future work if it

\(^ {33} \) BOA/MF-MKT/ 723-20-1, 6 February 1318 [19 February 1903].
\(^ {34} \) Ibid.; BOA/MF-MKT/ 723-20-2, 28 June 1319 [11 July 1903].
\(^ {35} \) Though the CMS documents did not make any reference to this problem, the English College, which the CMS opened around the same year with this request, had a different approach. Accordingly, while the duration of study at the College lasted for three years, students could receive a certificate after completing each year, which equipped them with the necessary skills for employment. See, CMS G3 P/O 1904 #115, The English College- Syllabus of the College Course together with the subjects for the admission exam.
\(^ {36} \) CMS G3 P/O 1906 #67, Report of the Educational Sub-Committee of the Palestine Mission.
\(^ {37} \) Ibid. A survey which was distributed to the CMS Palestine missionaries working in the field of education in 1906 to reorganize the Mission is exemplary of the concern for local demands. For instance, the survey asked questions about the locals’ approach to western education, their preference for boarding schools, demands for female education, demand for learning English or other foreign languages, and the locals’ inclination to pay for education. See, ibid.
was not updated to meet the new demands. This flexibility also informed their approach to the curriculum. The telling exchanges that took place during a missionary women conference in 1896 in Jerusalem are representative of such flexibility to respond to the local needs.

During the conference, the missionaries brought up various recommendations about the Mission and its work, and a discussion about teaching the French language at CMS schools took place. Accordingly, one missionary stated that teaching French had the danger of increasing the lure of Roman Catholic schools for CMS students or their “reading of infidel or trashy literature.” Another missionary responded that in the locality where she worked, French was more in demand than English. Therefore, they were “obliged” to teach it not to lose their students to other schools teaching the French language. Another one said that in her district English language education was sought; therefore, it was the English language that was taught at the CMS school.

As for the English language teaching, the missionaries had already reported about the increasing attraction of the English language among the upper-class Muslims and the opening of classes for teaching them English. This interest was also widely shared among the other classes, the CMS Mission sent teachers with English knowledge to such areas. But apparently, the CMS did not force learning of the English language on the locals in all of its schools. For example, Miss Wenham, a women missionary working in Ramallah, reported that 200 students enrolled in CMS day schools in her district, and 30 of them were learning

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38 CMS G3 P/O 1906 #194, Review of Palestine Mission 1906 But it is important not to overemphasize this flexibility as we saw in the chapter on CMS teacher training and recruitment policies, the CMS Palestine mission was not flexible enough to make the changes in the salary system to keep its best teachers in the mission schools.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 CMS G3 P/O 1896 #28.
44 CMS G3 P/O 1889 #290, Report of Jerusalem District.
English. But when English skills gained definite currency in the district and the region, the CMS reorganized its educational apparatus with the transformation of the Preparandi Institution into the English College. This College, where the medium of instruction was English, was also designed as a feeder to the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, whose certificates at the time “were passports to the most lucrative employment.” For the new system to work efficiently with the English College at the top, the CMS Mission promoted English language education more at its larger schools.

In another instance, though not directly associated with the Muslim students, but essential to show the care the CMS mission gave to the local demands, a Greek, most probably a Greek Orthodox, visited the CMS mission to inform that he and people from his congregation would withdraw their sons from the Roman Catholic School for “tampering” their religion. Even though the CMS mission school would do the same to their sons, the fathers apparently wanted to enrich the educational options of their sons. However, they had one condition for enrolling their sons in CMS schools en masse: the CMS was to “improve” its curriculum to add more English as well as French and Turkish courses. If the CMS did not meet their requests, they would enroll their children to the schools opened by the Greek Patriarchate. The missionary who wrote the letter on this meeting was confident, however, that the insistence of Patriarch to make the Greek language prevalent at its schools would deter these Greeks. As these parents wanted their children to learn other languages, the CMS had to take action and fulfill this need.

45 CMS G3 P/O 1899 #64, Minutes of the Palestine Women’s Sub-Conference.
47 Ibid.
48 CMS G3 P/O 1896 #115 (Wolters).
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
After showing the difference between the attentiveness to local demands on both sides to curricular issues, let us now turn our attention to another significant demand, education for girls.

**Education for Girls in Jerusalem**

A crucial feature of the Hamidian period was the importance attached to the education of Muslim girls. Even though the schools for girls operated at the level of *ibtidâi* (primary), *rüşdiye* (elementary) and the *Dârülmuallimat* (teacher training school for women) without the option of secondary and other higher schools, this was still a significant achievement. While Abdülhamid II commissioned various committees to make changes in the curriculum, some suggestions went beyond the curricula of the schools and directed towards the reorganization of the girls’ school. As a case in point, the committee headed by the şeyhülislam, the imperial mufti, advised the closure of *rüşdiye* and the *Dârülmuallimat* and the transfer of the courses taught in these schools to a new kind of girls’ school. The committee justified this proposal by referring to sharia law and stated that the girls’ education beyond the age of nine, when they reached “the limit of puberty,” was not permitted.51 Although other curricular proposals of the committee for increasing the number of classes devoted to religion, morality, and Arabic were largely accepted later, the Ottoman state’s school structure for girls remained untouched by such traditionalist views during the Hamidian period.52 However, the Ottoman state’s negligence in offering the Muslim girls the opportunity to continue their education after *rüşdiye*

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51 BOA/Y-MTV/ 25-52-2, 6 Ca 1304 [31 January 1887].
52 Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education*, 180-185. However, the addition of courses on morality to the curricula of the girls’ schools came at the expense of other important courses. For instance, in the changes to the curriculum of the *Dârülmuallimat* (teacher training school for women), courses in morality and religious principles replaced courses on natural sciences. It was also proposed that the hours devoted to geometry class in the first two years in *Dârülmuallimat* be cancelled as this course “was not necessary for women.” See, BOA/Y-PRK-MF/ 4-54-1, 26 S 1320 [4 June 1902]. However, the yearbook of the Ministry of Education for the year 1903 shows that this proposition was rejected, and the hours of the geometry class remained the same. See, *Salnâme-i Nezâret-i Madârîf-i Umûmiye*, (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire: 1321), 131.
(elementary) in Jerusalem made higher level CMS schools a magnet for Muslim girls who were also attending CMS primary schools in large numbers.\textsuperscript{53}

As for the CMS, we have seen in the preceding chapter that it exerted efforts to raise its own female teachers with the schools it opened for this purpose. For those who were not capable enough to become teachers, some household courses were proposed so that they could be good housewives.\textsuperscript{54} The courses that could attract the Muslim girls were given prominence in the curricula. As a case in point, Miss Welch, a lady missionary, reported that needlework classes attracted the Muslim girls in Jerusalem to CMS schools. If she did not provide these classes, she said that they would leave immediately.\textsuperscript{55} This suggestion was included in the curriculum for day schools shortly after this report, and at each year, sewing classes with an updated content were taught.\textsuperscript{56} The female missionaries also encouraged their students to train as nurses and work at hospitals.\textsuperscript{57}

It is important to note, however, that some female missionaries mentioned the criticism they received about the behavior of girls educated at CMS schools, including the local female teachers at CMS schools. Accordingly, these girls “thought themselves above ordinary household work.”\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, some argued that the girls should be educated in a way that reminded them that they would become wives in the end.\textsuperscript{59} Such criticisms, nevertheless, did not make the courses about domestic training prevail over the curricula of the CMS schools. The curriculum of the CMS Female teacher training school in Bethlehem for the year 1904 is telling in this regard. Apparently, while the girls took classes ranging from scriptures, arithmetic, science, geography, physiology, chemistry and botany to English and Arabic

\textsuperscript{53} See, for instance, CMS G3 P/O 1907 #46, Women’s Standing Committee held in Acca.
\textsuperscript{54} CMS G3 P/P vol.4 1899 #64, Minutes of Women’s Sub-Conference.
\textsuperscript{55} CMS G3 P/O 1902 #63.
\textsuperscript{56} CMS G3 P/O 1902 #64.
\textsuperscript{57} CMS G3 P/P vol.4 1902 #51.
\textsuperscript{58} CMS G3 P/O 1896 #97, Report of Proceedings of the Ladies Conference.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

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grammar, composition, and universal history, the only class that could be considered for domestic training was the highly popular class on needlework.\textsuperscript{60}

It is also interesting that both sides had to deal with the traditionalist oppositions about the limits and content of female education. However, they resisted these attempts to a remarkable extent and continued to provide educational venues for females with the curricula that did not always meet the expectations of the traditionalists.

\textbf{Concluding Remarks}

We have seen in this chapter that the Ottoman state and the CMS both attached importance to the curricula in their schools to shape the Jerusalemite youth in accordance with their objectives. However, the degree of their sensitivity to local demands for curriculum changes and the zeitgeist of the moment contrasted considerably. This difference resulted in varying levels of inclination among parents for their schools.

As for the Ottoman side, the gap between its rhetoric about the need to prevent the Muslim students’ attendance to foreign schools and its actual policies at the local level exemplifies the inconsistency of the Ottoman educational policies in general. The CMS, on the other hand, showed a more consistent approach in being attentive to the parents’ demands and the emerging needs about courses in Jerusalem. Thus, it could maintain the attendance of Muslim students at CMS schools.

The lack of higher-level government schools for Muslim girls in Jerusalem and the courses CMS schools offered for these girls increased the popularity of CMS schools among them. But it is important to note that both sides exerted remarkable effort to educate female Jerusalemites despite the opposition of traditionalists.

\textsuperscript{60} CMS G3 P/O 1904 #150, Curriculum of the CMS Training School, Bethlehem.
Conclusion

In this thesis, I attempted to explore the Ottoman educational policies during the Hamidian period in the context of inter-imperial competition and in comparison with a British missionary network, the Church Missionary Society (CMS). I took Jerusalem as my main focus since it was a theater of intense imperial competition and home to various educational institutions affiliated with this competition’s contenders during this period. I concentrated on the Hamidian period since the Ottoman educational investments and the Ottoman efforts of systematizing education saw an unprecedented surge at this time. Because the presence of rival foreign and non-Muslim schools contributed to Ottoman educational activism in this period, I sought to examine the efficiency of Ottoman policies at a locality with a strong presence of foreign schools and shed fresh light on the late Ottoman educational policies as a whole. To assess these policies, I focused on two essential components of education: teacher training and recruitment, and curriculum design. I explored them by making use of the Ottoman and CMS archival materials to an equal degree as much as the types of the archival materials allowed it.

The first chapter traced Ottoman policies on teacher training and recruitment with a particular emphasis on the procedures the local educational administration in Jerusalem followed or devised for training and recruiting its teachers. It showed that the Ottoman Empire was aware of the importance of the teachers in the efficiency of its educational apparatus and took gradual steps to train them. The schools it opened in Jerusalem also helped fill the vacant teaching posts in its expanding school network. However, a closer look into the implementation of the educational policies at the local level revealed deep management issues and showed the gap between high-idealism and rhetoric of the Ottoman state. At the local level, its teacher training and recruitment policies lacked consistency. They were crippled by ad hoc decisions, linguistic imperialism, personal interference, financial setbacks, and mismanagement of available financial resources. By uncovering the problems that the linguistic imperialism
created for succeeding, this chapter also provided a new timeline for the Turkification policy in late Ottoman history and revised the current understanding that proto-nationalism emerged only after the 1908 revolution. Additionally, it showed that the parents sought a good education without looking for a religious or political affiliation, which placed the parents and the Ottoman state at odds. It concluded that despite the increase in the number of Ottoman public Muslim schools in Jerusalem and efforts to improve its educational apparatus, the Ottoman state could not put in place a competitive system for training and recruiting its teachers during the Hamidian period in Jerusalem.

The second chapter explored the CMS policies on teacher training and recruitment in Jerusalem. It showed that from the very beginning, the CMS Palestine Mission aimed to raise its own teachers among the local population. To this end, it opened or took over various teacher training schools and, in the long run, managed to systematize its teacher training policies. As opposed to the Ottomans, the CMS placed paramount importance that its missionaries learned Arabic and did not impose learning the English language on its teachers to be able to work at CMS schools. While its teacher training system worked well, the CMS Palestine Mission had serious difficulties implementing a teacher recruitment system. As it could not solve this primarily financial problem, it had to lose its best teachers to the rival schools. Surprisingly, however, this did not result in the overall reduction of the attraction of the CMS schools, and the CMS schools could retain their position in the educational competition.

The third chapter presented a comparative analysis of the Ottoman and CMS policies on curriculum design in Jerusalem and how this affected their attraction for the Muslim students. It began by showing the objectives of both sides with education and how these goals shaped the curricula of their schools. Afterward, it explored the flexibility of both parties to include the locally popular courses in their curricula. As a subsection, it dealt with the flexibility of both sides to meet the local demands for female education. Accordingly, while
the Ottoman state emphasized the need to improve the Ottoman schools’ quality to limit the influence of the foreign schools on paper, it is difficult to associate its actual policies in Jerusalem with this goal. While being insistent on a uniform practice on curricular matters in its schools, it could not capture the zeitgeist in Jerusalem for certain courses. The CMS, on the other hand, was more attentive to local needs and demands. It included courses which were on demand to its curriculum to make sure that not only Muslims but also students from other denominations attended its schools. Finally, although both sides spent considerable effort on female education, CMS’ higher-level schools for girls and their tailored curricula accounted for the Muslim girls’ strong preference for the CMS schools.

Overall, these conclusions help us to gauge the efficiency of the Ottoman educational policies thanks to their comparison with those of the fastest-growing British missionary society at the time in Palestine. Accordingly, the Ottoman concerns to enlarge and improve its educational investments in the face of the intense competition from foreign schools did not translate into actual and strong Ottoman educational presence in Jerusalem. In fact, despite the number of schools the Hamidian administration opened in this period, its inflexibility to reorganize its policies based on local demands and persistency of administrative problems diminished the efficiency of these schools, as this thesis proved with numerous examples.

Last but not least, this thesis explored two central pillars of educational policies of both sides, namely teachers and curriculum designs, and attempted to mention another significant component, students, as much as the primary sources allowed. However, combining these findings with further research about the impact of these actors’ educational policies on identity formation and the intellectual profiles of the students might present a more comprehensive picture of these policies. Especially, consulting ego documents left from the students who attended these schools would put the remaining pieces of the puzzle in place.
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