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CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION IN THE PARIS AGREEMENT PROCESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PACIFIC ISLAND STATES

By

Sebene Eshete

Submitted to
Central European University
School of Public Policy

In partial fulfilment for the degree of
Master of Arts in Public Policy

Supervisor: *Diane Lesley Stone*

Budapest, Hungary
2020

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Date: June 12, 2020

Name: Sebene Eshete

Signature: 

Table of Contents

Abstract

Climate-induced migration is one of the emerging policy puzzles for the global community. To this day, a consensus has not been reached on an appropriate policy framework. As the adverse effects of climate change are becoming more and more intense, addressing this policy gap is crucial. This thesis focuses on the case of the Small Island Developing States in the Pacific Ocean. By reviewing their Nationally Determined Contributions in the Paris Agreement process, this thesis explores how these states frame the issue of climate-induced migration. The framings used for this analysis are those of security, human rights, adaptation, and responsibility. The findings show that the framing of the Pacific SIDS is consistent with the approaches of adaptation and responsibility.

Word count: 12,973 (excluding tables and figures)

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the School of Public Policy and the Central European University for the support they showed to the students this year, and for the beautiful learning experience.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Professor Diane Stone, for her constructive feedback and encouragement throughout the writing process of this thesis. I would also like to thank Zsuzsanna Toth, an Academic Writing Instructor, for her insights throughout the academic year. Finally, I want to thank Theresa Weippert for being a great Thesis Buddy.

I am grateful to my friends, Tonia, Maria, and Kostas for their support.

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations

CBDR-RC	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
COP	Conference Of Parties
INDCs	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
PDD	Platform on Disaster Displacement
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations
UNHRC	United Nations
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism
WPR	What's the Problem Represented to be

Introduction

The ruling of the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), issued in January 2020, regarding the asylum application of Ioane Teitiota, generated hope for the future protection of people displaced due to climate change (Amnesty International 2020). Teitiota, a Kiribati national, had applied for refugee status in New Zealand and got rejected in 2013. After exhausting all domestic legal tools, he appealed to the UNHRC. The ruling did not accept his claim. However, the reasoning implied that at some point in the future, climate-displaced people could be eligible for international protection (United Nations Human Rights Committee 2020). Is this hope plausible, and most importantly, would this be a solution?

Despite the importance of climate-induced migration, the international community has not reached a consensus on which migration policy framework is appropriate. The absence of a framework has caused a stalemate in protecting or accommodating people who move because of climate-related reasons. Governments and international organizations are at an impasse which has left people on the move with no safety nets.

This thesis addresses climate-induced migration by focusing on the Pacific region and analyzing how a group of affected states 'frames' this issue. The framing approaches employed are those of security, human rights, responsibility, and adaptation. Specifically, this thesis investigates the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions submitted to the Paris Agreement platform by the signatory states, as a mechanism to find policy solutions to climate-induced migration. This is done through an empirical case study on the approaches of a group of states which is significantly affected by climate change, the Small Island Developing States of the Pacific Ocean.

Background

Climate-induced migration is a complex phenomenon. It can be triggered by various symptoms of climate change that vary from slow-onset degradation to sudden catastrophes. The categorization between slow-onset and sudden events is based on the definition of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2012, para. 25). According to this, slow-onset events are the gradual sea-level rise, increase in temperatures, loss of biodiversity, desertification, salinization, and ocean acidification (UNFCCC 2012). The sudden events are disasters like tornados, floods, and tsunami (UNFCCC 2012). The form of migration also takes multiple shapes as it can be internal or international, circular or permanent, voluntary, or forced (Ionesco et al. 2016; Rigaud et al. 2018; Gemenne and Blocher 2017). This complexity of the phenomenon has prevented it from being defined clearly. As a result, this lack of definition has led to a lack of consensus on how it can be regulated so that the communities affected (communities of origin, migrants themselves, and communities of destination) are protected (Ionesco et al. 2016, 108).

The policy debate has circled around some proposals on regulating the phenomenon and protecting the affected communities. There are three main policy approaches or 'frames'. These are a) the refugee approach b) the humanitarian approach, and c) adaptation (Gonzalez 2018). Each one of these approaches reflects some assumptions about climate-induced migration, which might be oversimplifying the situation. For example, the refugee approach assumes that the people flee forcibly, that they flee internationally and that their country of origin in unwilling or unable to protect them. Empirical research, however, has shown that in a lot of cases migrants usually resettle within the borders of their own country, and if they migrate internationally, they do so strategically and pre-emptively to build resilience in the community of origin through their remittances (Ionesco et al. 2016; Gemenne and Blocher 2017).

Governments around the world are designing and implementing policies to tackle or prevent climate-induced consequences. Most of them do so, based on their international commitments. Today, these commitments derive from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992 and specifically, from the latest Agreement in this framework, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change of 2015. However, the Paris Agreement does not incorporate measures to address the consequences of human mobility due to climate change. Nevertheless, it is the UN legal document that mostly addresses the issue (Chazalnoel and Ionesco 2018). Indicatively, the Agreement foresaw the creation of a Task Force on displacement for the development of relevant recommendations, informing the UNFCCC processes, namely each Conference of the Parties (COP) (United Nations 2015).

During the process that led to the Paris Agreement, the governments needed to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). These INDCs were the communications in which each state stated its mitigation goals as well as its adaptation challenges. Out of the 185 INDCs submitted, the 33 (20%) mention migration in one of its different forms (IOM 2016). These INDCs are from countries located on the African continent, in Asia-Pacific and Oceania and Latin America, continents that are the most affected by climate change, which might explain their interest in linking climate impacts on migration issues (Rigaud et al. 2018).

In migration studies, the countries of origin are usually studied in the context of remittances and political influence over their citizens abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). This thesis serves as an opportunity to study how affected states frame the issue and how policies can be designed based on that framing. Also, this thesis proposes how policies on mobility can be designed not as a result of a crisis such as conflicts, but as a consequence of a well-expected phenomenon for the future– climate change.

One way to do so is to focus on a specific context such as the case of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS). These states already face soil salination and sea level rises as a result of climate change (UNFPA 2014). These phenomena are threatening the very existence of the island state populations (UNFPA 2014). Therefore, their governments are already examining the possibility of mobility.

Research Questions and Structure

To explore how these states frame climate-induced migration, this thesis is going to analyze the NDCs submitted by the Small Island States of the Pacific Ocean to the Paris Agreement and address the following research questions:

- How, and why, do the Pacific Small Island Developing States frame the relationship between climate change and human mobility?
- Have their Nationally Determined Contributions to the Paris Agreement achieved policy impact and influence?

This thesis will take a critical approach to the security/refugee approach and the humanitarian approach as the least relevant to the Pacific Small Island Developing States' framing. Instead, the thesis will illustrate that the most suitable/appropriate approach is an environmental/adaptive one based on the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) principle of the UNFCCC.

The thesis is divided into 3 chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on the issue of climate-induced migration. Chapter 2 gives an outline of how global governance approaches-specifically the security, the humanitarian, the adaptation, and responsibility are operationalized vis-a-vis climate-induced migration. Chapter 3 focuses on the case study of the Pacific SIDS and analyzes

how their governments frame the relationship between climate change and mobility in their NDCs and whether this framing has had policy impact in the UNFCCC. This analysis will be based on the content of the 15 NDCs submitted to the Paris Agreement Platform by the Pacific SIDS.

1. Literature Review

Human migration is an overarching word covering all the cases of people moving places of residence. It can be internal or international (King 2012). It can be voluntary or forced (King 2012). Also, it can be caused by multiple reasons like family reunification, conflict, and wage differentials (Massey et al. 1993). The factors that determine migration decision-making have been classified based on economic theories. A macroeconomic approach is that of wage differentials between countries of origin and destination, whereas a microeconomic approach is that of the individual investment in human capital (Massey et al. 1993). Furthermore, the New Economics of Migration theory suggests that migration is a household decision to minimize risks and diversify resources (Massey et al. 1993).

One of the factors of migration decision-making that emerges as more and more influential on a global scale, now and in the future, is climate change. Specifically, due to sudden-onset events like floods and slow-onset processes like soil salinization or desertification, over 140 million people are estimated to migrate due to climate-related reasons, internally or internationally until 2050 (Rigaud et al. 2018). One major reason behind this mobility is the food and water insecurity created by soil degradation which are affecting the communities' livelihoods. In other cases, those of island states, it is the existential threat caused by sea-level rise.

Since only 2019, approximately 24.9 million people were (internally) displaced due to natural disasters like earthquakes, storms, and hurricanes around the globe (IDMC 2020). The World Bank has conducted Foresight projections, according to which, the scenarios are as follows: Until 2050, as many as 86 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million people in South Asia, 17 million

in Latin America, a total sum of 143 million people will move internally, a number that amounts to 2.8 percent of the population in these areas (Rigaud et al. 2018).

Nevertheless, proving the direct or indirect causality between climate change and migration has been challenging. Some academics have said that direct relationships are almost impossible to be established (Pécoud and Guchteneire 2011). This is due to the complexity and interconnectivity of migration drivers (cumulative causation) and because of the complexity of climate change projections. This has been called the *double uncertainty* (Faist and Schade 2013). Cumulative causation is connected with the inherent complexity of modeling migration and with path dependence, meaning that previous flows can determine future ones so it is difficult to distinguish them (McLeman 2014). Because of this, the conceptualization of climate-induced migration as a distinct type of migration has been contested.

Mayer argues that the literature on climate migration is less reliant on data and more on sensationalism and by that it overlooks the fact that a big number of the persons in question are migrating within the borders of their country (Mayer 2013). This argument refers to the existence of alarmist academics and civil society advocates that have been warning about big numbers of international flows. This, of course, does not mean that climate migration is not an issue we should investigate but more that we should take it into consideration with the right lens. He further argues that we do not just need more research, but we rather need to ask the right questions (Mayer 2013). The right questions are the ones that will allow the relevant actors to understand better how climate change affects migration, to which extent, and along with what other factors. A way to acquire this understanding is to analyze how affected states frame the issue and which attributes they give to the phenomenon. After that, the relevant actors can more design appropriate policies more effectively.

1.1. Definition of climate-induced migration or lack thereof

As Ionesco mentions, the definition of this kind of mobility is a political construct. The goal of such a construct is to not solely define another driver of migration but to shed light on a relatively neglected issue that humanity will face in the future (Ionesco et al. 2016, 6). The idea of climate-induced migration was first mentioned in a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report in 1985 under the title *Environmental Refugees*, written by Essam El-Hinnawi. His definition was:

> Environmental Refugees are those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life. (El-Hinnawi 1985, 4).

This definition does not distinguish between people who flee before or after a significant environmental event, between people fleeing voluntarily or forcibly, and between people that move due to sudden or slow-onset events.

The first part of the term, the word *environmental*, was not connected to climate change per se, but mostly on the development-population nexus and the overuse of an area's carrying capacity (Faist and Schade 2013). In 1988, Jacobson included the people displaced after industrial accidents and development projects like, for example, dams, a situation also known as *land grabbing* (Jacobson 1988). Adding to this, Lonergan, in the decade of 1990, published works in which, he introduced a category of displacement which is caused by conflicts related to environmental degradation, introducing thus, a security dimension (Lonergan and Kavanagh 1992; Lonergan 1998). The direct association with climate change occurred in the first reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) (Faist and Schade 2013) and was continued by Biermann and Boas who, later on, coined the term *climate refugee* (Biermann and Boas 2010).

The second part of the term, the word *refugee*, has also been controversial as it has a very specific meaning under international law and specifically, under the Convention Relating to the status of refugees in 1951. According to Article 1 of this Convention, a refugee is someone who:

> …..owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, article 1).

This definition implies the role of the state (unable or unwilling to protect), the pattern of the movement (international), and the role of the migrants themselves (forced displacement). As the thesis will illustrate, these assumptions do not capture accurately the situation regarding climate-induced migration. For this reason, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is advocating against this word and its replacement with the word migrants (Ionesco 2019).

Since 1985, the issue was gradually getting more attention in policy arenas and academia. In 2002, Diane Bates attempted the first distinction to correct the vagueness of the initial conceptualization of environmental mobility. Bates' classification was based on the characteristics of the drivers of migration; migration due to disasters, migration due to deterioration, and migration due to expropriation (Bates 2002). In this classification, it was admitted that the most difficult to define was the one due to man-made deterioration (Bates 2002). This classification also introduced an

analysis on the basis of agency with a continuum starting from forced migration and ending in voluntary migration (Bates 2002).

The term *climate-induced migration* makes the connection with climate change, implies that the connection might be direct and includes forms of mobility that are not covered by the term *refugee*. The term *climate-induced migration* is preferred in this thesis as it is broad enough to cover mobility that does not necessarily come as a result of solely environmental effects. Also, this term considers the indirect and gradual effect that environmental degradation has on livelihoods and migration decision-making. However, the lack of an internationally agreed term comes as an impediment for the international community to decide upon appropriate policy responses, as will be illustrated below.

1.2. Framing matters for governance

Apart from defining the issue, it is important to understand the multiple forms climate-induced migration can take as a phenomenon. Hugo has said to that matter that as much important as it is to acquire a common understanding of climate-induced migration, it is also important to draw relevant taxonomies (Hugo 2010). Also, McAdam mentioned that one of the drawbacks of the climate-induced migration literature is its understanding as a one, single migration phenomenon (McAdam 2010). Adding to this, Kalin also has supported that looking into the distinctive features of each regional migration scenario is the most appropriate way to designing relevant policies (Kälin 2010).

The first to analyze the different conceptualizations of climate-induced migration in the UN was McNamara in 2007. This analysis was not based on text, but interviews with UN diplomats, and revealed the causal relationship between the disagreement on the definition and the lack of policy

strategy on the issue (Karen Elizabeth McNamara 2007). The fact that climate-induced migration includes so many scenarios means that policymakers cannot conclude to a single, one-size-fits-all response.

In public policy, problem definition and framing predefine how an issue is going to be handled (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Analyzing problem definition is not only important in order to identify the truth about the problem; but also about what this definition produces as a policy effect. Carol Bacchi's *What's the Problem Represented to be* (WPR) approach starts with the point that every policy represents the policy problem that it is designed to solve (Bacchi 2012). This representation carries some assumptions about the problem. The WPR framework does not only examine the problem framing, but also the processes that this framing was formulated and the platforms in which this framing take place (Bacchi 2012). This thesis puts problem framing into scrutiny and analyzes how the issue of climate-induced migration is framed by the Pacific SIDS in their NDCs and seeks the practical effect that this framing has.

1.3. Climate-induced migration in the UN

The Paris Agreement is the agreement that most of all in the UNFCCC system acknowledges the link between mobility and climate change. It foresees the creation of a Task Force on Displacement and acknowledges that the states can include the topic of migration in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (Yamamoto, Serraglio, and Cavedon-Capdeville 2018).

Jernnas and Linner observed the formation of discursive coalitions in the NDCs (Jernnäs and Linnér 2019). This means that there are discursive clusters in the Paris Agreement, based on geopolitical factors, income, and level emissions (Jernnäs and Linnér 2019). Among these clusters, were also the SIDS, the Small Island Developing States (Jernnäs and Linnér 2019). These states

frame the issue of climate-induced migration in a way that does not correspond to the above conceptualization of environmental refugees as this thesis will go on to discuss.

The concept of mobility in the context of NDCs has been examined in the past (Yamamoto, Serraglio, and Cavedon-Capdeville 2018; Thomas and Benjamin 2018). Yet, these studies focus on the existence of policy strategies. This thesis investigates the representation of the climate-induced migration in the Paris Agreement process and the effectiveness of the NDCs as tools for agenda-setting in the UNFCCC context.

2. Global Governance Approaches to Climate-Induced Migration

In the literature review, it was explained that definitions have been an ongoing matter of debate regarding climate-induced migration. In the context of the ongoing debate, this chapter presents the current approaches towards climate-induced migration and their manifestations in international institutions. Choosing a framing approach over others has real-world consequences and carries assumptions about the pattern of mobility and the role of the communities involved. Furthermore, each approach directs to a different instrument of global governance.

The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how different conceptualizations of climate-induced migration have specific governance implications, which in turn, affect the involved stakeholders differently. This analysis will later on, in Chapter 3, be the basis on which the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) contents will be analyzed.

This is based on a joint reading on Vliet's book chapter *A Legal Mapping Exercise* from the book *Climate Refugees: Beyond the Legal Impasse?* (2018) and on Gonzalez's journal article *Climate Justice and Climate Displacement: Evaluating the Emerging Legal and Policy Responses* (2018). There are other significant studies regarding the approaches to climate-induced migration (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015; Karen Elizabeth McNamara 2007). However, the studies of Vliet and Gonzalez, apart from recent, are the more complete, as they employ the concept of responsibility as well.

2.1. Approaches and the relevant global governance implications

The current approaches to climate-induced migration are 4: The first one is the humanitarian, which has been mostly expressed through the Platform for Disaster Displacement (Vliet 2018; Gonzalez 2018). The second is the security approach which corresponds to the idea of the affected communities as refugees (Vliet 2018; Gonzalez 2018). The third one is an adaptation, which is manifested in the inclusion of mobility in the UNFCCC instruments (Gonzalez 2018).[1] The fourth approach is that of responsibility, which is expressed by the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities-Respective Capabilities principle of the UNFCCC (Vliet 2018; Gonzalez 2018). The first two are reflected in the area of global migration governance and the other two in the UN system of global climate governance. The approaches and their policy implications are depicted in Figure 1:



Figure 1. Approaches and respective institutions regarding climate-induced migration (Vliet 2018; Gonzalez 2018)

[1] Gonzalez names adaptation also as *migration management* but the term adaptation is used here to avoid confusion (Gonzalez 2018).

2.2. Migration Governance Approaches: Human rights and Security

2.2.1. Humanitarian

The humanitarian approach is focusing on the people who move and the consequences of climate-induced migration on them (Vliet 2018). This approach implies that the states have a duty to protect the vulnerable populations which are displaced due to environmental disasters. It is connected with the international human rights legal framework, which consists of multiple international instruments (Vliet 2018). Therefore, it could constitute an answer to the current international legal and policy gap.

The policy institution that has embedded this approach is the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), formerly known as the Nansen Initiative (Gonzalez 2018; Oakes, Banerjee, and Warner 2019). This Platform is a state-led, non-binding agreement focusing on the vulnerability and the protection of human rights of people being internationally displaced due to natural disasters (The Nansen Initiative n.d.; McAdam 2016). Members of the Steering Group are Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, European Union, Fiji (Vice-Chair), France (Chair), Germany, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Senegal, Switzerland. IOM and UNHCR are standing invitees (PDD n.d.).

The Nansen Initiative started in 2012 as a follow-up of a call made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the states, regarding the protection gap of disaster displaced persons (McAdam 2016). The Nansen Initiative worked through its consultations, on a global and a regional level. Each of these consultations had conclusions and an outcome report that informed the Protection Agenda in 2015(The Nansen Initiative 2015).

The global consultation led to the creation of the protection agenda, which is a toolbox with good practices and existing legal instruments that can be utilized for these populations. It is a non-binding document and has been endorsed by 109 countries (The Nansen Initiative 2015). The agenda includes practices and legal tools that already exist in the participating countries (The Nansen Initiative 2015). The agenda also acknowledges the lack of an international legal tool. Overall, the agenda focuses on sudden-onset events and measures to protect people after the said events have occurred, be that relocation or other measures (The Nansen Initiative 2015). In 2016, the Platform on Disaster Displacement was created in order to follow-up and implement the agenda (McAdam 2016).

This approach addresses the issue of displacement after the disaster has occurred (Vliet 2018). Furthermore, it has been criticized as paternalistic, not taking into account the local cultural context and not examining the local mitigation and adaptation strategies (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). It has also been criticized for assuming a complete lack of agency for the displaced persons (Gonzalez 2018).

2.2.2. Security

The security approach is focusing on the consequences of climate-induced migration on the state. This means that climate-induced migrants are identified as threat multipliers for the countries of destination (Gonzalez 2018; Vliet 2018; Oakes, Banerjee, and Warner 2019). This threat is understood as an augmented possibility of conflict due to resource competition (UN Secretary-General 2009). Advocates of this approach have been warning about mass numbers of internationally displaced persons (Gonzalez 2018; Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015).

The relevant policy instrument promoted by the advocates of this approach is the expansion of the term *refugee* in a way that includes protection from climate-related dangers (Scott 2020). The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as it was signed in 1951, foresees the provision of international protection to persons who have fled their countries of origin due to persecution (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951). The basic premise of this protection is that the countries of origin are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens.

When a refugee applies for international protection in another country and gets a positive decision, they gain access to a series of social rights like access to education and employment but the most important right is the principle of non-refoulment (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, article 33). According to this principle, a refugee cannot be returned to their country of origin, as it would entail significant risks for them.

The specialized UN agency, UNHCR, has attempted to respond to today's climate realities with no success. In 2011, the agency urged countries to look into a framework addressing the needs of people displaced due to natural disasters (UNHCR 2011). When the agency addressed the issue of broadening the scope of international protection, in the context of climate change, it received resistance from the Global North (Loescher and Milner 2011). The response from these states indicated that they were reluctant to give this mandate to a supranational institution (McAdam 2016). This is the development that led to the Nansen initiative, as a state-led and voluntary agreement, instead of a multilateral binding one (McAdam 2016).

The security approach and the use of refugee governance as an instrument of protection has its merit. Human security is threatened due to climate-related disasters and the need to update the Geneva Convention is evident. As is illustrated above, the need for a more inclusive refugee definition has been put forward on a regional level. However, the attempt to include environmental

issues on an international binding convention has not succeeded. Even if it had succeeded, however, this policy solution would only be applicable for persons that have been forcibly displaced, across borders, after a disaster. Framing climate-induced migration as a security issue implies coerced mobility, an imminent threat to life, and leads to binding protection only when the movement is international. Therefore, it addresses climate-induced migration partially and leaves other cases of mobility unregulated.

2.3. Climate Governance Approaches: Adaptation and Responsibility

2.3.1. Adaptation

Adaptation is one of the core concepts in climate science regarding climate risk management. The term refers to the strategy chosen when mitigation measures do not suffice. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has defined it as "In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, which seeks to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities" (IPCC 2012, 36).

In the context of human mobility, adaptation refers to migration as one of the climate adaptation strategies of households under immediate or future risk (Black et al. 2011). Like in cases of common labor migration, the households decide preemptively and based on income diversification to migrate and support the community of origin with remittances (Vliet 2018).

Inevitably, the policy implication of such an approach would relate to the governance of climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty that entered into force in 1994. Its primary goal is to stabilize the rising greenhouse emissions and prevent their adverse effects on the climate (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992). The main decision body is the Conference of

the Parties (COP)(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992). The COP consists of the signatory parties of the convention which are the states; and overviews the implementation of the Convention (UNFCCC n.d.).

Climate-induced migration was mentioned as an adaptation strategy in the UNFCCC negotiations in COP 13 in 2007 (Warner 2012).[2] What followed was the Cancun Adaptation Framework in 2010. The Framework has an objective to promote action on adaptation, to decrease vulnerability, and build resilience in the global South through technical and financial support (UNFCCC 2011). This text refers to three types of human mobility (displacement, migration, and relocation) and levels of governance (national, regional, and international). Moreover, the mention in this text makes a clear connection of mobility as a means of adaptation. Paragraph 14 reads:

> (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels (UNFCCC 2011, para. 14(f)).

This reference introduced a more inclusive understanding of climate-induced migration. This is because it implied that people might move forcibly (*displacement*), migrate voluntarily (*migration*), or move as part of a national/regional strategy (*planned relocation*). This shift in problem framing assumes a different number of people affected, includes sudden and slow-onset events and does not apply only to people who are forcibly displaced but also to people who move pre-emptively. Also, it does not assume international movement, but leaves this part open including thus, internal mobility as well.

[2] Each COP is numbered based on the order by which it took place. For example, the first session was COP 1 etc.

After that, the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) was created at the COP 19, after the realization that some damage is unavoidable, and signifies the acknowledgment of adaptation's limits. It was created to face the losses and damages created by climate change effects "including **extreme events and slow onset events**, in **developing countries** that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change" (UNFCCC 2014, para. 1, emphasis mine). With regards to migration, the biggest leap forward took place with the COP 21 in 2015, that led to the Paris Agreement. In the decision 1/COP21, it is requested that WIM establishes a Task Force which will build upon the existing framework and, along with expert groups like the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, will create recommendations to " **avert, minimize and address** displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change" (Paris Agreement 2015, para. 49). This means that the Task Force operates under WIM. It consists of experts that come from organizations that had in the past mentioned the need to address human mobility under the UNFCCC.[3]

In the Cancun Adaptation Framework and WIM the type of mobility is not specified and, in this way, includes all kinds, temporary or permanent, internal or international, forced, or voluntary. Moreover, the introduction of the Task Force makes the focus more specific. First, its mandate is, though, to *avert and minimize* displacement. This translates to taking measures to mitigate climate change but also to relocating or migrating preemptively before a disaster has occurred. Secondly, the focus has moved from understanding the phenomenon (Cancun Adaptation Framework) to providing recommendations.

[3] These organizations are: the International Labour Organization, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for Migration, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and others (UNFCCC 2018).

On a policy level, when migration takes place in the context of an adaptation strategy, it can take different shapes and forms according to the needs of the communities affected, the geographic characteristics of the area affected, and the kind of dangers faced. One policy tool is managed migration, where population pressures are lifted from an area, and the migrants support the community of origin through remittances (Gemenne and Blocher 2017). For such a policy to be inclusive and respectful of human rights, it can be coordinated through bilateral agreements. Another policy tool can be that of planned relocation, provided that it is accompanied by social integration measures and comes with the community's consent (Bettini 2017).

The merits of the adaptation approach are that it accepts the agency of the people affected. This approach is also "adaptive", in the sense that it also addresses internal migration and does not address only areas facing sudden events but also slow onset events. However, the regulation of such movements is critical for 2 reasons: First, if the movements are not regulated, households with a will to move, but with lower incomes and not enough sources to do so, will become trapped into a situation of "forced immobility" (Black and Collyer 2014). Secondly, irregular movement can jeopardize the human rights of the people on the move. This can happen either due to the lack of safe international passages or due to conflicts with the community of the receiving area. This regulation presupposes funding and regional or international cooperation. Therefore, it presupposes that the states affected have the resources to organize these movements.

2.3.2. Responsibility

There is also a fourth approach, the one of responsibility (Gonzalez 2018; Vliet 2018). The responsibility approach follows the argument of the environmental principle "the polluter pays" and the precautionary principle. The central premise of this approach is that climate change is a global injustice, as the emissions of industrialized countries have resulted in a situation that mostly

affects less developed countries. This means that the global North and generally, industrialized countries, as large polluters have a responsibility to relieve the countries which are more adversely affected by climate change. The industrialized countries should prevent environmental degradation by mitigating their emissions and if they fail to do so, provide reparations (Vliet 2018). Therefore, this approach develops the debate from a remedial one to a preventive one as well.

This approach seems to also be connected to Environmental Justice. On an international level, Environmental Justice refers to the exposure of native populations and Least Developed States to environmental hazards (Kuehn 2000). Environmental justice literature illustrates four parallel and interconnected dimensions of injustice (Kuehn 2000). These are the distributive, corrective, procedural, and social (Kuehn 2000; Gonzalez 2018). The dimension which is more relevant to the responsibility approach on climate-induced migration is the distributive one, as it stems from the overexposure of low-income populations to environmental degradation.

There are some principles in the context of UNFCCC that express this idea of responsibility and can constitute a basis for policies. The UNFCCC, as is mentioned in Article 3(1) (and as a result, WIM and the Paris agreement) is ran by the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). Based on this principle, the UNFCCC Parties are divided into Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992, article 4 para. 2). The former category refers to the most developed countries who thus ought to play a greater role in mitigation, and the latter category refers to the least developed ones. This means that even though all countries have a responsibility for climate change mitigation, the industrialized countries have a greater one and should offer more funding and technologies for this goal, proportionally to their contribution to environmental degradation. One tool that embodies this approach in the UNFCCC system is the Green Climate

Fund. This Fund was established in 2010 with a goal to support less developed countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts (Green Climate Fund 2020).

More generally, the fundamental difference of the responsibility approach from the three other approaches is that it adds a justice dimension that is missing. With regard to human mobility, this principle could mean obligations for the Annex 1 countries, resulting from their respective ecological footprint. In this sense, its operationalization could be complementary with one of the approaches above. In the migration governance instances, it could mean that the receiving countries have a responsibility to protect and engage in some burden-sharing. In the adaptation case, responsibility could take the form of financing adaptation efforts on the ground so that further dangers are averted in the communities affected (origin and destination).

2.4. Conclusion

Based on the attributes of the governance approaches above, their fundamental differences can be observed. These lay on the patterns of mobility that they include, the assumptions they make about the role of migrants and the type of climate events they refer to. As has been illustrated in the Literature Review, there are multiple patterns in which climate affects mobility and climate-related events can be rapid or slow. The security and the human rights approach and their policy implications, namely the PDD and refugee governance have the following attributes: they address international mobility, promote protection after the disaster, and refer to migrants with little to no control over their movement. The adaptation and responsibility approaches that relate to global climate governance focus on averting and minimizing the dangers of climate change assume a more participatory role of the communities affected, and do not exclude any pattern of mobility. Furthermore, the responsibility approach, without victimizing migrants, places a critical role on the responsibility of the industrialized states in supporting the affected communities. Therefore, in

accordance with the characteristics that climate-induced migration has, it seems that the international community can place its hopes on resolving the socioeconomic adverse effects of climate-induced migration, on policy tools based on adaptation and responsibility.

This analysis is depicted in Figure 2 below, starting from the framing approaches in the core and respective policies and the cases in which they apply:



Figure 2 Framings and respective policies

Problem definitions or framings have real-world consequences with the policies they produce. This chapter illustrated how each different framing has specific assumptions and leads to a specific policy choice that affects and involves communities differently. This illustration is the basis on which the framing of climate-induced migration will be analyzed in the case study of the Pacific SIDS.

3. Case of Pacific Small Island Developing States

This chapter studies the framework of the policy approaches illustrated in Chapter 2 for the case of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the Pacific Ocean. Section 3.1 provides background information about Pacific SIDS. Section 3.2 constitutes the empirical part of the thesis. Finally, Section **Error! Reference source not found.** contextualizes the findings and concludes by arguing that Pacific SIDS frame the issue of climate-induced migration in a way that corresponds to a combined responsibility and adaptation approach rather than the conventional migration approaches as are expressed by the Platform on Disaster Displacement and refugee governance.

3.1. Background

3.1.1. General information

The case studied in this thesis is that of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the Pacific Ocean. The term SIDS acknowledges that they are small islands with a small population that face similar development challenges due to their size, remoteness, vulnerability to shocks (price volatility of petroleum for example) and climate vulnerability (UNFPA 2014). Their distinct identification can be traced back to 1992, in the UN Conference on Environment and Development and continues to be widely acknowledged by international entities (UNFPA 2014). There are SIDS in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean. The thesis focuses on the SIDS in the Pacific Ocean, which are 15. These are the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu,

and Vanuatu. The Pacific SIDS case study is an extreme case, where the populations are facing an existential threat due to climate change.

Five of the above, (Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) also fall under another UN classification, that of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)(UNFPA 2014). This is a classification of countries based on their level of socioeconomic development (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2010). Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu are independent politically (UNFPA 2014). The Cook Islands and Niue are self-governed, but in a free association with New Zealand (UNFPA 2014). This means that New Zealand cannot legislate for them but can represent them on issues of defense and international affairs (UNFPA 2014). Also, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau are in a free association with the United States of America, meaning that their citizens can enter the US without a visa for exchange of access to the islands' land for strategic purposes of the US (USDOI 2015a; 2015b).

Even though these islands share characteristics, they also have significant variations among them regarding income or population size. Gross National Income per capita can range from USD13,330 in Nauru to USD 1,380 in the Solomon Islands (OECD 2018). Population-wise, the largest island is Papua New Guinea with 7.6 million people and the smallest one is Niue with 1,600 people (OECD 2018). Regardless of the small population sizes, population density constitutes a problem for some islands such as Tuvalu, South Tarawa in Kiribati, and Ebeye in the Marshall Islands (UNFPA 2014).

These islands have been disproportionally affected by climate change. Their contribution to global CO_2 emissions has been minimal. That is, all the SIDS in the world have contributed less than 1% of the global CO_2 emissions (UN-OHRLLS 2015, 18). Nevertheless, due to their geographic

characteristics, as they are atoll islands very close to the sea, they face adverse impacts of climate change. Some of them face rapid events such as El Nino, tornados, and floods but most of them mainly face slow-onset events such as soil salination and the slow but constant sea-level rise which has developed to an existential threat for their populations (UNFPA 2014). Health-wise, the changing climate has led to the expansion of waterborne diseases, but also the destruction of agriculture leads to food and water security issues (UNFPA 2014). Their economies are highly dependent on fisheries and agriculture, which means that there are not so many opportunities for income diversification when the crops get destroyed (OECD 2018).

3.1.2. Pacific SIDS and climate-induced migration

Based on the issues described above, and the existential threat that these populations face, the case of the Pacific SIDS is one of the most prominent cases regarding climate-induced migration. During the Nansen Initiative Consultations, a separate Pacific Regional Consultation was devoted to the issues of the region in 2013 (The Nansen Initiative 2013). There, the state and civil society representatives from the Pacific SIDS stressed that cross-border mobility was the least preferred option (The Nansen Initiative 2013). Specifically, the island representatives stated that their priorities lay with the preservation of the islands' cultures and that the communities wanted to remain in their land (The Nansen Initiative 2013). Therefore, for them, the priority of the industrialized countries should be to mitigate their emissions and prevent the disappearance of the islands (The Nansen Initiative 2013).

This stance is consistent with the general strategy that some Pacific SIDS have been promoting; under the title *Migration with Dignity* (Tong 2018). This term had been expressed initially by Kiribati's leadership as the response to the threats that the country is encountering due to climate change (McNamara 2015). It refers to a scenario where migrants have control over their

displacement, how, and where it takes place (McNamara 2015). In the context described in this section, the next section studies how the framing of climate-induced migration is expressed in the Paris Agreement process through the NDCs, to which approach it corresponds and whether the NDCs constitute a platform that makes this framing influential.

3.2. Analysis of the Nationally Determined Contributions

3.2.1. Context

The Paris Agreement has a goal to keep the global temperature rise this century below 2 °C from pre-industrial levels and limit the temperature increase further to 1.5 °C (Paris Agreement 2015). In the Paris Agreement, it is written that each signatory party should prepare and communicate Nationally Determined Contributions towards the achievement of the common goal of reducing the temperature to pre-industrial levels (Paris Agreement 2015, article 4 para. 2). Furthermore, in paragraph 12, there is a specific invitation to the Parties to include adaptation components in these communications. This is a novel element of the Paris Agreement is that it is an international agreement based on contributions and not just obligations, something that gives it a more "bottom-up" approach compared to other international agreements.

The contributions were initially named Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, showing the intended contribution of a state towards the common goal shared by the parties to the Agreement. After the said state ratifies the Paris Agreement, this communication becomes the official contribution pledge and is no longer named "Intended". As the Pacific SIDS are Parties to the Agreement, this thesis uses the term Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs.

Not all the NDCs have a fixed structure, and there was no detailed guidance, on purpose, as different states had different issues that wanted to raise which expanded from the scope of

mitigation (W. Pieter Pauw and Klein 2020). Nevertheless, this means that they are diverse in the sense of structure, timeframes, actions, and themes. Therefore, the comparability and analysis are more complicated.

As of the 27th of May 2020, as many as 186 states have submitted their first NDCs, focusing on the reduction of CO_2 emissions and mitigation targets (UNFCCC n.d.). When read collectively they can showcase if they are ambitious enough to achieve the collective goals of the agreement. The NDCs will be updated every 5 years, and to date, 4 countries have already submitted a second NDC (UNFCCC n.d.). As for the future, the Katowice Climate Package of 2018 includes more guidelines on future NDCs, regarding clarity (UNFCCC 2018). So, the next round of NDCs is expected to be more coherent and comparable.

It has been observed that for states with limited capacity and especially for SIDS, there is an alignment between their NDCs and their national development plans (Atteridge, Verkuijl, and Dzebo 2020). This alignment indicates that the NDCs are for some states a strategic way to advocate for development needs. This advocacy is based on the conditionality of the contributions.

The success of the Paris Agreement depends on the implementation of the intended contributions by the participating parties. However, many LDCs, as well as some Small Island Developing States have made their contributions conditional (Pauw et al. 2020). This means that the implementation of the measures described in them is conditional to the provision of international support. This support can take the shape of climate finance, capacity building, or technology transfer.

The NDCs are studied in this thesis because of the high importance they have under the UNFCCC system, as they are considered to reflect a more bottom-up approach in climate global governance. Also, their role as a tool to promote development agendas by the SIDS has been identified before

(Atteridge, Verkuijl, and Dzebo 2020). However, their evaluation and analysis as such have not taken place to this day.

Table 1. List of the Pacific SIDS' NDCs

Country	***Date of Submission to the UNFCCC***
Cook Islands	01/09/2016
Fiji	22/04/2016
Kiribati	21/09/2016
Marshall Islands	22/04/2016
Micronesia	15/09/2016
Nauru	07/04/2016
Niue	28/10/2016
Palau	22/04/2016
Papua New Guinea	24/03/2016
Samoa	22/04/2016
Solomon Islands	21/09/2016
Timor-Leste	16/08/2017
Tonga	21/09/2016
Tuvalu	22/04/2016
Vanuatu	21/09/2016

The 15 NDCs (**Table 1**) were downloaded from the official website of the UNFCCC on April 28, 2020 (UNFCCC n.d.). Their length varied from 3 pages in the case of Cook Islands, to 32 pages in the case of Timor-Leste. Most of the NDCs have a timeframe until 2025. Their authorship of these communications was assigned to government officials from the respective ministries of environment or development. What posed a methodological challenge was the variation among countries as the structures differed, ranging from general statements to specific work plans on a designated timeline. All of them were originally written in English, so no translation has taken place.

3.2.2. Concepts and measurement

To illustrate the argument of this thesis, what will follow is a qualitative content analysis of the NDCs. The analysis takes place on a latent level, meaning that the analyst does not count the frequency of words used only, but also interprets what the text is talking about (Bengtsson 2016).

The concepts have been operationalized and coded based on the framework provided by Adcock and Collier (2001). According to this framework, the background concepts are connected to policies on a four-level basis, to acquire valid results in the analysis and measurements in policy studies (Adcock and Collier 2001). The first level is that of the more abstract, background concept (for example, security). The second level is the systematized concept, which is essentially the definition used in the context of the research. Based on this, follow the indicators and the policy implication on the third level (Adcock and Collier 2001). Then, the fourth level is the one where the analyst measures the concept based on their classification (Adcock and Collier 2001).



Figure 3 Conceptualization Levels (Adcock and Collier 2001)

By using the four-level basis of Adcock and Collier this thesis will organize the background concepts of security, adaptation, human rights, and responsibility in a way that corresponds to policies and by that will address the questions on problem representation.

Table 2 Concepts

Background concept	*Security*	*Human rights*	*Adaptation*	*Responsibility*
Systematized Concept In the context of climate-induced migration	Climate-induced migrants as a border security issue, as threat multipliers for the countries of destination. An augmented possibility of conflict due to resource competition (UN Secretary-General 2009).	The states have a duty to protect the vulnerable populations that are displaced due to environmental disasters (Vliet 2018).	Mobility as a way to preserve life and support the community behind (Black et al. 2011).	Adverse impacts of climate change as a product of industrialized states who should take the main responsibility for it (Gonzalez 2018).
Indicators	International movement Lack of choice Displacement	International movement Lack of choice Displacement	Internal or international movement Migration Mobility as a pre-thought strategy	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change Mention of the need of industrialized states to support SIDS' adaptation
Policy implication	Refugee protection	Humanitarian protection	Planned Relocation Managed migration	Financial Support Hosting Agreements

Table *2* above, illustrates the coding methodology from the background concept to the policy implication. The line of thought, starting from the background concepts and leading to the policy implications is based on the framework presented in Chapter 2. The analysis schedules and the quotes are included in the appendices A to C for transparency and reliability of the results.

3.2.3. Findings from the NDCs

3.2.3.1. General overview

The NDCs of the Pacific SIDS generally include measures for mitigation of emissions and general strategies to cope with risks and damages. Their structure and length vary as does their content. Most of the countries describe the issues they face in the introduction and/or the adaptation section (when there is one). There is a convergence regarding the practical issues faced due to climate change. These are food security, water security, and the spread of waterborne diseases like malaria. Population growth and remoteness are also common themes touched upon in the NDCs. The majority mentions a dependence on imported fossil fuels and therefore a sensitivity towards volatility of prices. In their mitigation contributions, all of them pledge to cut down their emissions (except for Timor-Leste that engages on other measures) on a level that they deem ambitious.

As far as the processes in which these NDCs were formulated, Palau and Micronesia included the private sector and civil society (Federal States of Micronesia 2016; Republic of Palau 2016). Niue and Tonga only involved government officials (Government of Niue 2016; Kingdom of Tonga 2016) Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Nauru indicated having made 2 national consultations involving all the relevant stakeholders (Government of Tuvalu 2016; Republic of Vanuatu 2016; Republic of Nauru 2016). Therefore, the NDCs of the Pacific SIDS are products coming from inclusive processes. The following sections narrow the focus down on the mentions of mobility, climate threats, and differentiated responsibility in the NDCs.

3.2.3.2. Mobility

Out of the 15 island states, the 8 mention mobility, as can be seen in **Appendix A**. These are Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Tuvalu. The references to migration mostly revolve around it as an adaptation strategy:

> Capacity building provided to communities for which vulnerability assessments have indicated that relocation is the long term adaptation strategy to minimise risks due to anticipated impacts of climate change. (Republic of Fiji 2016, 10);
>
> The plan to relocate the provincial headquarters and town from Taro Island to the mainland area of Choiseul Bay is also a good adaptation strategy (Solomon Islands 2016, 12);

as a scenario to be avoided:

> While longer term impacts such as sea level rise could result in the unavoidable out-migration of some of her people, they have a right to pursue any and all means to ensure their nation survives and the legacy remains, with future generations living productive lives on these islands (Government of Tuvalu 2016, 9);

and in one case, as a product of instability: " Increase in conflict and stress due to loss of property and land, and forced migration."(Republic of Kiribati 2016, 16).

Out of these 8 island states that refer to mobility, the 5 make an explicit mention on internal movement as an adaptation strategy, and only 2, Kiribati and Tonga, mention international movement. The silence regarding mobility in the rest of the Pacific SIDS can be partially attributed to some island states not pursuing to address risks and damages in their contribution report as will be shown in the next section.

3.2.3.3. Slow on-set and sudden events

As many as 10 island states mention slow-onset climate events in their NDCs. For example:

> RMI faces major impacts on its communities' livelihoods and infrastructure from sea-level rise, sea surges, typhoons, and rainfall intensity; water and food security issues from changing rainfall patterns and ocean acidification; health issues from rising temperatures and prolonged drought periods, as well as the potential for increasing peak wind speeds and changes to ocean circulation patterns. (Republic of Marshall Islands 2016, 8).

The exact quotes from each island's NDC can be found in **Appendix B**. As many as 4 island states, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands have mentioned that at the same time they are vulnerable to hazards from both slow events and sudden natural disasters like earthquakes and tsunami.

It should be noted that 3 islands, the Cook Islands, Micronesia, and Tuvalu do not describe any climate threats in their NDCs. They comment that they do not perceive this process as one to express their adaptation needs. They participate in this process only as contributors to mitigation.

3.2.3.4. Responsibility

Except for Nauru and Micronesia, most of the island states mention the disproportionality of their contribution to climate change and the fact that they endure its adverse effects as can be observed in **Appendix C**. For example:

> Globally, the Cook Islands contributes to only 0.00012% of GHG emission, which is an insignificant amount relative to the total global emission of 2004 (IPCC Report, 2007). Yet,

> collectively, the consequences of the global emission via climate change is detrimental to ecosystems, infrastructures, economy, and therefore the livelihood of Cook Islanders. (Republic of Cook Islands 2016, 1).

A number of 8 island states, explicitly connect this proportionality with the need for external funding for their efforts:

> …..a consequence of the emissions of other large countries over many generations as they developed and became wealthy. Achieving the contributions set out in Tonga's INDC will require considerable support for capacity and technology investment. (Kingdom of Tonga 2016, 12)

Nevertheless, there is no explicit or implicit mention of any responsibility of the developed states to support or finance any migration/relocation plans.

3.2.3.5. Discussion of the findings

This section is narrowed down to the 8 island states that included mobility in their NDCs so that the framing of climate-induced migration can be drawn. To this end, below, the contents of the NDCs have been codified based on the indicators shown in **Table 2**. Next to each island state's name, we can see how each country frames the relation between mobility and climate change. We can see whether this mobility is forced or not and whether it is internal or international. The next column indicates the type of climate threats faced by each country, as they are represented in their NDCs, and the third column shows whether the countries refer to the disproportional way they are affected by climate change, compared to their state's contribution to it.

Table 3 Framings of climate-induced migration

Country	*Mobility*	*Sudden or Slow*	*Responsibility*
Fiji	Mobility as a strategy Internal movement	Both	Yes
Kiribati	Mobility as a strategy Internal movement International movement	Slow	Yes
Marshall Islands	Choice Internal movement	Slow	Yes
Papua New Guinea	Migration as a hazard	Both	Yes
Solomon Islands	Internal movement Mobility as a strategy	Both	Yes
Timor-Leste	Internal movement	Slow	Yes
Tonga	Mobility as a strategy International movement	Slow	Yes
Tuvalu	Lack of choice	No information	Yes

The Pacific Small Island Developing States frame climate-induced migration as a result of mainly slow-onset events that are gradually deteriorating their livelihoods and constitute an existential threat for the future of their populations. As the Pacific SIDS are in a position to foresee these hazards, some like Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, and Tonga, explicitly frame migration as a strategy, either in the form of planned relocations or as a source of income through remittances. The pattern of migration is in most cases within the borders of each island state, with two

exceptions that discuss managed international migration (Kiribati) and remittances (Tonga). Finally, Tuvalu frames migration as an unavoidable development, that needs to be delayed. These elements, namely the slow-onset events, the role of migration as a strategy, and the pattern of internal migration, point to the approach of migration as adaptation.

Furthermore, the island states who address the issue of migration, explicitly articulate that their contribution to climate change is minimal compared to industrialized countries, and that they are at the forefront of vulnerability. The conditionality of their planning to funding and technology transfer is also a common theme. Therefore, the relevance of the responsibility approach is established.

As has been stressed earlier in this paper, the approaches related to migration governance, security and humanitarian, correspond to different problem framings where mobility is forced and takes place after or during an event that poses an imminent threat to populations. Contrary to that, the framing of climate-induced migration by the Pacific SIDS points to the approach of migration as adaptation. Migration as adaptation can either be a strategy of relocating communities within the borders of a state, or a strategy of income diversification.

Putting these findings into the wider context of this thesis and, especially in the analytical framework described in Chapter 2, we can draw some conclusions. The chosen representation of the problem proves that a refugee approach towards climate-induced migration is mostly irrelevant for the case of the Pacific SIDS. This does not mean that an update of the Geneva Convention would not be beneficial. It would, as reality has shown that the 1951 term for refugees does not necessarily address the needs of today. However, as the analysis in the thesis has shown, such a solution would not be of use for most of the residents of the Pacific SIDS.

The analysis of the NDCs shows that the Pacific SIDS do not all use these communications as a medium to talk about mobility. Half of the island states chose to include mobility in their NDCs. This indicates that the other half did not deem the issue as relevant to their implementation of the Paris Agreement.

As problem framing takes place within a policy process, having established how, and why the Pacific SIDS frame climate-induced migration in their NDCs, the question that arises is that of impact and influence of this framing. To understand the influence of the NDCs from the Pacific SIDS, it is needed to trace the developments regarding climate-induced migration in the context of the UNFCCC.

In UNFCCC, the issue of migration is getting more space formally, as after the COP24 in Katowice, the mandate of the Task Force on Displacement got extended and guidelines regarding migration were given to the participating Parties, based on the Task Force's recommendations (UNFCCC 2018). Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this has been a result of the NDCs.

On the other hand, the mention of migration in the NDCs, in the context of adaptation has shown the potential to lead to some financial support through the Green Climate Fund. During the proceedings in the update of its strategic plan proceedings in 2016, the Board of the Green Climate Fund stated that the NDCs as a *reference point* for the Fund's planning (Green Climate Fund 2016, 28). Also, the Board expressed the intention to provide financial support, based on the countries' priorities as these have been expressed in their NDCs (Green Climate Fund 2016, 31). However, the Fund needs to make the best allocation choosing among the priorities expressed in other communications as well, such as the National Adaptation Plans and the Low Emission Development Strategies (Green Climate Fund 2016, 31). In this context, there is no mention or evidence of a prioritized focus on the Pacific SIDS, on this issue.

Moreover, migration is mentioned in one of the Green Climate Fund's 8 "Result Areas" (Green Climate Fund 2020). The Green Climate Fund has also funded adaptive policies intending to prevent climate-related migration in El-Salvador (FAO 2018). In the input given by the SIDS regarding the update of the strategic plan of the GCF, there is a general mention that the Fund's planning should take into consideration the NDCs among other communications in the UNFCCC, for its planning (Green Climate Fund 2018). Therefore, it appears that the NDCs are an additional tool that sets the tone regarding adaptation financial needs and can play a strategic role in the acquisition of international funding that can be streamlined in adaptation activities that can prevent or organize migration.

Conclusion

As the thesis argued, for the Small Island Developing States of the Pacific Ocean, the most relevant policy approach for the issue of climate-induced migration is one based on the concept of adaptation and the Common But Differentiated Responsibility principle of the UNFCCC. This argument was supported by the findings of the analysis of the Nationally Determined Contributions submitted by the Pacific Small Island Developing States during the Paris Agreement process.

This thesis contributes to the literature of climate-induced migration, by focusing on how states affected by climate change, frame the relationship of migration and climate change, to conclude to appropriate policies. Also, this thesis proposes how policies on mobility can be designed not as a result of a crisis such as conflicts, but as of a well-expected phenomenon for the future– climate change. Furthermore, this thesis provides insights on the NDCs as a potential medium for agenda-setting in the UNFCCC context. Regarding the effect of these NDCs in the UNFCCC context, it appears that they constitute a tool that can play a supplementary, role in setting the funding agenda for adaptation plans.

The was no fixed structure in the first round of NDCs, and this does not allow for direct comparability, as some countries did not include their adaptation needs. However, this analysis laid the ground for future research on the next round of NDCs, in 2020. The next round of NDCs is going to be more structured, coherent, and carrying the experiences of the first 5 years of the agreement and therefore, of the Task Force on Displacement. Such research can allow for the observation of the potential differences in the framing of climate-induced migration, as well as the observation of the development of NDCs as tools for agenda-setting.

The normative dimension evoked by the analysis of the NDCs is that addressing climate-induced migration needs a hybrid policy approach, that does not rely only on migration governance, but instead, borrows tools from it. Strategies like bilateral labour agreements and planned relocation of populations can be discussed under the UNFCCC, in the context of adaptation and could be funded in the context of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities. Or, as some Pacific SIDS stated, migration can even be delayed by ambitious efforts of industrialized countries, to mitigate their carbon emissions, and therefore, prevent the rise of global temperature that gradually makes their countries inhabitable.

Migration governance has a specific starting point. In the case of the refugee approach, and the Platform of Disaster Displacement, the protection of the displaced populations and the regulation of their status comes after a disaster has occurred. The policy mechanisms refer to people who escape imminent violations of their human rights, and their states of origin are unable or unwilling to protect them.

The element that makes global climate governance, and specifically, the UNFCCC, an appropriate space to address climate-induced migration, is the nature of its mandate. Climate-related events can be foreseen, predicted, mitigated, and even avoided. For this reason, the UNFCCC has developed mechanisms and institutions that act in a proactive manner. Thus, in the context of UNFCCC, all the communities affected, meaning, the communities in the places of origin and the places of destination can prepare and design appropriate managed migration policies, based on a long-term strategy. In this way, the human rights of the affected Pacific SIDS populations can be safeguarded, and they will retain control of how they move or, as the former president of Kiribati, Anote Tong has said, people will be able to migrate with *dignity*.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Mobility in all the NDCs

Country	Meaning unit	Condensed	Indicator
Fiji	"The planting of mangroves, construction of seawalls and the relocation of communities to higher grounds are part of ongoing adaptation initiatives." "Capacity building provided to communities for which vulnerability assessments have indicated that relocation is the long term adaptation strategy to minimise risks due to anticipated impacts of climate change."	relocation of communities to higher grounds relocation is the long term adaptation strategy	Mobility as a pre-thought strategy Internal movement
Kiribati	"Approximately 47% of the population lives in South Tarawa, and this is a magnet for internal migration from the outer islands. disparities between the different islands of Kiribati (resulting in internal migration, displacement, and urbanisation)." "Increase in conflict and stress due to loss of property and land, and forced migration." "Population and resettlement – aim to reduce the vulnerability of Kiribati to increasing physical risks caused by climate change by establishing host country agreements to government-sponsored and self-sponsored emigration to resettle I-Kiribati overseas and assist the inevitable migration of the population, due to climate change as and when this eventually arrives."	internal migration displacement forced migration host country agreements to government-sponsored and self-sponsored emigration to resettle	Internal movement International movement Mobility as a pre-thought strategy
Papua New Guinea	"The government of Papua New Guinea through the Office of Climate Change and Development has put its emphasis on identifying the specific nine (9) hazards prevalent in Papua New Guinea. 1. Coastal Flooding and Sea Level Rise 2. Inland Flooding 3. Food Insecurity caused by crop failures due to droughts and inland frosts 4. Cities and Climate Change 5. Climate Induced Migration 6. Damage to Coral Reefs 9. Landslides."	Climate-induced migration as a hazard	
Solomon Islands	"Urban migration is estimated at 4% and with the current rate of growth the national population is expected to double by 2020." "The plan to relocate the provincial headquarters and town from Taro Island to the mainland area of Choiseul Bay is also a good adaptation strategy that needs to be complemented with an Integrated Water Resource Management strategy and programme."	Urban migration The plan to relocate the provincial headquarters and town from Taro Island to the mainland area of Choiseul Bay	Internal Mobility as a pre-thought strategy
Timor-Leste	"As new country, the main challenges faced by Timor-Leste include low education, rapid population growth, high rates of rural-urban migration, high rates at unemployment especially amongst the youth, depletion of natural resources, food insecurity, poverty, vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change"	rural-urban migration	Internal
Tonga	"Because of Tonga's large receipts of remittances, running at over 20% of GDP, Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (about US$4,500 in 2013) is a better measure of the actual income going to Tongans."	remittances	Mobility as a pre-thought strategy

Country	Meaning unit	Condensed	Indicator
Tuvalu	"While longer term impacts such as sea level rise could result in the unavoidable out-migration of some of her people, they have a right to pursue any and all means to ensure their nation survives and the legacy remains, with future generations living productive lives on these islands."	unavoidable out-migration ensure their nation survives and the legacy remains, with future generations living productive lives on these islands	Lack of choice
Vanuatu	-	-	-

Appendix B

Climate threats in all the INDCs

Country	Meaning unit	Indicator
Cook Islands	"Note that Loss and Damage is not factored into the policy and planning processes outlined above."	-
Fiji	"The country is subject to earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, flooding, and storm surges." "eroding shorelines and riverbanks, shortage of water, depleted fisheries stock, reduced food production, large-scale flooding, increase in outbreaks of vector borne diseases and sea level rise"	Both
Kiribati	"Sea-level rise and exacerbated natural disasters such as drought and weather fluctuations pose significant and direct additional threats to sectors and resources central to human and national development and the provision of basic human needs."	Slow
Marshall Islands	"RMI faces major impacts on its communities' livelihoods and infrastructure from sea-level rise, sea surges, typhoons and rainfall intensity; water and food security issues from changing rainfall patterns and ocean acidification; health issues from rising temperatures and prolonged drought periods, as well as the potential for increasing peak wind speeds and changes to ocean circulation patterns."	Slow
Micronesia	"FSM does not see this NDC as the vehicle to address its adaptation needs in the post 2020 context, even if these need careful consideration and assessment."	-
Nauru	Sea level rise-existential threat	Slow
Niue	"Niue is vulnerable to climate risks such as tropical cyclones (TCs) and droughts; geological risks such as earthquakes and tsunami; and human-caused risks such as disease outbreaks and contamination of its only fresh water supply."	Both
Palau	"Palau is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, principally from sea level rise and the increase in extreme events (drought, flooding, Category 4 and 5 typhoons)."	Both
Papua New Guinea	"The natural environment already poses significant risks to Papua New Guinea today; hazards like coastal flooding, inland flooding and droughts take a severe toll on the people and the economy."	Both
Samoa	"the impacts of climate change on the environment are already quite evident"	N/A
Solomon Islands	"The country is situated within the earthquake belt or "Ring of Fire" which makes it extremely vulnerable to the effects and impacts of earthquakes." Earthquakes have caused tsunamis which in turn have affected the island heights. "Solomon Islands climate is tropical, though temperatures are rarely extreme due to cooling winds blowing off the surrounding seas." "High rainfall intensity events occur during tropical storms and often result in flooding of most river systems." Decline in rainfalls and at the same time 6% yearly increase of population leads to issues of water security. "Tropical cyclones pose a serious threat to the people, economy and environment and result in flooding and wind damage in the Solomon Islands." "by the end of this century projections suggest decreasing numbers of tropical cyclones but a possible shift towards more intense categories" El Nino leads to droughts through a decline in rainfall "Solomon Islands is highly vulnerable to droughts, extreme rainfall, floods, king tides and sea level rise."	Both
Timor-Leste	Timor-Leste's climate is affected by the West Pacific Monsoon, which is driven by large differences in temperature between the land and the ocean,	Slow

Country	Meaning unit	Indicator
	According to projections Timor-Leste's future climate can be summarized as follows: "• Temperatures will increase by 0.4-1 degree Celsius by 2030; Rise in number of hot days and warm nights; Decrease in dry season rainfall and increase in wet season rainfall; Extreme rainfall days likely to occur more often; Decrease in frequency of tropical cyclones, but likely increase in intensity of cyclones; Increase in sea-level rise; and Increase in ocean acidification." "In terms of climate change, warmer temperatures are likely to increase the incidence of vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever, Rainfall is also expected to increase in intensity, which may exacerbate soil erosion, landslides and local flooding. Changes in rainfall patterns may impact agricultural productivity and water availability. Sea-level rise may also Increase coastal erosion and destruction of infrastructure—particularly in Dili; and salinization of water sources for both drinking and agricultural production."	
Tonga	"the following future projections to 2100 for Tonga: 1.El Niño and La Niña events will continue to occur in the future (very high confidence), but there is little consensus on whether these events will change in intensity or frequency; 2. It is not clear whether mean annual rainfall will increase or decrease and the model average indicates little change (low confidence in this model average), with more extreme rain events (high confidence); 3.Drought frequency is projected to decrease slightly (low confidence); 4.Ocean acidification is expected to continue (very high confidence); 5.The risk of coral bleaching will increase in the future (very high confidence); 6.Sea level will continue to rise (very high confidence)."	Slow
Tuvalu	"This ndc focuses on mitigation, so it does not give information on risks"	-
Vanuatu	"Vanuatu is located in a seismically and volcanically active region and has high exposure to geologic hazards, including volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis and landslides."	Sudden

Appendix C

Responsibility in all the NDCs

Country	Meaning Unit	Indicator
Cook Islands	"Globally, the Cook Islands contributes to only 0.00012% of GHG emission, which is an insignificant amount relative to the total global emission of 2004 (IPCC Report, 2007).Yet, collectively, the consequences of the global emission via climate change is detrimental to ecosystems, infrastructures, economy, and therefore the livelihood of Cook Islanders." -	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change
Fiji	"Despite contributing a mere 0.04% of greenhouse gas emission to the atmosphere compared to the global average, Fijian communities are experiencing climate change impacts such as eroding shorelines and riverbanks, shortage of water, depleted fisheries stock, reduced food production, large-scale flooding, increase in outbreaks of vector borne diseases and sea level rise."	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change
Kiribati	"Kiribati is a LDC SIDS that is in no way responsible for the unfolding climate change catastrophe, yet Kiribati is extremely vulnerable to climate change impacts." "Accordingly, ANY contribution from Kiribati is more than fair, and must be considered ambitious, given the extraordinary circumstances of Kiribati."	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change
Marshall Islands	"Though RMI's total greenhouse gas emissions are negligible on a global scale, the country takes its national motto, "Jepilpilin ke ejukaan" ("Accomplishment through joint effort"), very much to heart. RMI recognizes that it has a role to play in the global effort to combat climate change, demonstrating that even with its limited means it will undertake the most ambitious action possible."	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change
Micronesia	-	-
Nauru	-	-
Niue	"Niue has the distinction of being among the world's least populated nation states and with a future that is imperilled by the effects of climate change for which it bears absolutely no responsibility." "The risks climate change poses to Niue are therefore highly significant, and the ability of Niue to effectively respond to minimise or avoid these risks is minimal. Niue therefore must rely on the international community to avoid the dangers of climate change. This requires significant reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions so that climate is stabilised to allow Niue's natural and social systems to adapt, and partnerships are	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change Mention of the need of industrialized states to support SIDS' adaptation

Country	Meaning Unit	Indicator
	developed between Niue and more developed nations to implement effective and efficient adaptation responses."	
Palau	"The Republic of Palau's total emissions are de minimis in the global context. Given Palau's remoteness, the small size of the economy, low GDP per capita, dependence on partnership support and vulnerability to climate change, Palau's proposed targets are ambitious and fair as measured against other nations."	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change Mention of the need of industrialized states to support SIDS' adaptation
Papua New Guinea	"PNG's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been negligible and the state of the economy is such that the main burden for any mitigation undertaken by the country must be the responsibility of the developed countries that have been primarily responsible for the bulk of the world's emissions." "the country's effort will be contingent on external, adequate and predictable funding being made available"	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change Mention of the need of industrialized states to support SIDS' adaptation
Samoa	"Samoa is a small island developing state in the Pacific that is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. However, it is only responsible for an insignificant amount of global greenhouse gas emissions."	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change
Solomon Islands	"All commitments are premised on: (a) A fair and ambitious agreement being reached, reflecting Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities; and (b) Timely access to international climate change financing, capacity building and technology." "Solomon Islands is a LDC SIDS that is in no way responsible for the unfolding climate change catastrophe, yet it is highly vulnerable to adverse impacts of climate change."	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change Mention of the need of industrialized states to support SIDS' adaptation
Timor-Leste	As an LDC, the ability of Timor-Leste to pursue the proposed adaptation and mitigation actions identified in this INDC will be dependent upon the receipt of technology transfer; finance and capacity building support	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change Mention of the need of industrialized states to support SIDS' adaptation
Tonga	"The current need for Tonga to invest large portions of its public service capacity in the ambitious quest to achieve our climate resilience objectives is a consequence of the emissions of other large countries over many generations as they developed and became wealthy. Achieving the contributions set out in Tonga's INDC will require considerable support for capacity and technology investment."	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change Mention of the need of industrialized states to support SIDS' adaptation
Tuvalu	-	-

Country	Meaning Unit	Indicator
Vanuatu	Vanuatu is a small developing nation with absolute levels of CO2 eq emissions very small at under 0.0016% of world emissions. The country is also one of the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and has much to lose should the worst predictions from increased temperature levels eventuate.	Mention of the low contribution of SIDS to climate change